provided by the internet archive how we robbed mexico in 1848 by robert h. howe 1916 [illustration: 001] |there is one page of our own history that our historians pass over lightly and to which america cannot point with any feeling of pride, but only with shame and disgrace. i refer to the mexican war. when the causes and results of that war are studied it can be readily understood why the mexicans hate us and why the rest of the south american republics view us with suspicion. prior to the mexican war the nation was divided over the question of chattel slavery. that form of property had been abolished north of the ohio river and mason and dixon line, but altho the south was still in the saddle, it felt that its seat was by no means secure. at that time the nation consisted of 28 states, 14 of them free and 14 slave. states were admitted to the union practically in pairs--one free and one slave state being admitted at the same time. this kept the united states senate equally divided. but the more rapid growth of the population in the free states of the north threatened the political supremacy of the slave holding power. wisconsin was applying for admission, and further west minnesota, dakota, kansas and nebraska loomed up as future free states. louisiana, admitted in 1812, was the western limit of slave territory. beyond louisiana lay mexico. adventurers not only permitted, but encouraged by the slave power, entered mexico and joined in a revolt against mexico, and texas was declared an independent state. negotiations were immediately begun, looking to the annexation of texas with the intention of dividing it into four states, and thus securing the south with a new lease of power. upon its admission a conflict with mexico arose over its western boundary--mexico claimed that the nueces river was the dividing line, while the united states claimed the territory to the rio grande. this left a strip about 150 miles wide as debatable ground. here was a question that could easily have been settled by diplomacy and a treaty drawn up and the war of 1848 prevented. but the american army invaded the disputed territory and was met by resistance by the mexicans-a number were killed and wounded and the rest compelled to surrender. the war spirit always lying dormant in some people was lashed into a frenzy by such public declarations as "our country has been invaded," "american blood has been spilled on american soil," all of which sounds strangely familiar to us today. |general u. s. grant was a soldier in the army at this time and it is pertinent at this point to quote the following extracts from his personal memoirs: "there was no intimation that the removal of the troops to the border of louisiana was occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of texas, but it was generally understood that such was the case. _ostensibly_ we were intended to prevent filibustering into texas, but really as a menace to mexico.... and to this day i regard the war which resulted as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies." (vol. 1, chapter iii, page 53.) "the same people who, with permission of mexico, had colonized texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so, offered themselves and the state to the united states, and in 1845 the offer was accepted. _the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states may be formed for the american union_. even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war _was forced upon mexico cannot_." "the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war. _nations_, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times." (vol. 1, chapter iii, pages 54-56.) "the presence of united states troops on the edge of the disputed territory furthest from the mexican settlements was not sufficient to provoke hostilities. _we were sent to provoke a fight_, but it was essential that mexico should commence it. it was very doubtful whether congress would declare war, but if mexico should attack our troops, the executive could announce: 'whereas war exists, by the acts, etc.' and prosecute the contest with vigor." (vol. 1, chapter iv., page 68.) war was declared and it ended in the complete defeat of mexico. and then the greed that incited the war gained full sway. the 150 miles of debatable ground, the dispute over which brought on the war, was lost sight of. mexico, defeated and helpless, was forced to sign a treaty giving to the united states not only all of texas, which in itself is as large as the whole german empire and new england together, but in addition, colorado, utah, nevada, new mexico, arizona and california. is it any wonder that the mexicans hate us and call us "pigs?" in the present agitation in america for the invasion of mexico, ostensibly for the purpose of establishing order or punishing a bandit for an invasion which it has been declared on the floor of the united states senate was organized and financed by americans, they see a cleverly planned scheme of financiers to force intervention and they know that once the army and the flag were in mexico they would remain permanently. they see that unless this is resisted to the death, the ultimate fate of mexico is to be absorbed by the colossus of the north and her independence as a nation destroyed. there is abundant proof that their fears are well grounded by the record of events that have recently occurred in central america and the west indies. some years ago nicaragua borrowed $3,000,000 from j. p. morgan & co. of new york. a revolution broke out and this was urged as an excuse to land the marines from american warships to protect american interests. they are still there. america has established a protectorate over that country and the present congress has ratified a treaty and appropriated $3,000,000 for the exclusive right to the nicaraguan canal route from the atlantic to the pacific, and it further stipulates that the money shall be used to pay its foreign debt under the advice and supervision of the secretary of treasury of the united states. this is an example of what is known as "dollar diplomacy." first get a nation into debt and the rest is easy. united states troops are also in possession of the republics of hayti and also of santo domingo under precisely similar conditions. the troops were landed and took possession of the custom houses; in other words, of the nation's finances. representatives of the united states are at the elbow of the native officials, dictating the expenditures and in general telling what may and may not be done. porto rico is the absolute property of the united states. cuba is dominated by the american tobacco and sugar trusts and cannot make any treaty without the consent of the united states government. the panama canal strip was seized as the result of a plot formulated in washington and of which president roosevelt was fully advised--american warships were in the harbor when the so-called revolution was sprung. a provisional government was organized and immediately recognized by the powers at washington; a treaty already drawn up was hastily adopted and accepted by washington; the troops were landed and took possession of the ten-mile canal strip, and when the navy of columbia, which consisted of one small gunboat, arrived, it was confronted with the american fleet and was helpless. all this was done within the space of forty-eight hours. and this dastardly piece of land piracy was endorsed by all the governments of europe--kaiser wilhelm personally congratulated president roosevelt. ten million dollars was loaned by j. p. morgan & co. to the republic of panama and the bonds are guaranteed by the united states. in 1848 the dominant economic class was represented by the slave-owning, cotton-growing element in the south. they sent troops to the border of mexico with the sole purpose of fomenting trouble so as to have some valid excuse for the invasion of mexico. they succeeded and took from mexico one-half of her territory. the dominant economic class today is represented by banking, railroad, oil, mining and other interests and they are playing the same game that the exploiters of chattel slaves played in 1848. to prove this is an easy matter, all one has to do is to read a few extracts from the current press. |from the chicago _tribune_, june 24, 1916: intervention grows in favor. members of congress fear it is inevitable--favor annexing a part. * * * it also transpires that many senators and representatives who advocate immediate intervention also favor annexing the northern portion of the republic as compensation for the cost of the undertaking. . . . typical expressions of opinion follow: representative rainey--events of the week seem to make it clear that there is no way of escaping intervention in mexico. we have striven and striven to get along with our neighbor, but it seems impossible. we have on our southern border the longest boundary in existence between a civilized and a semi-civilized nation. to police it properly would require over 2,000,000 men. i favor taking over the northern tier of mexican states. representative sabath--i hope it will not be necessary to intervene, but if we do and are forced to lose the lives of a number of men, we should annex the country either wholly or in part. _should do a good job._ representative britten--if it becomes necessary to go into mexico, we should make a complete job of it by annexing the northern tier of mexican states. representative denison--if it turns out that our troops were treated treacherously we should not hesitate to intervene. we should go southward, taking the border with us. we should either do this or receive a large indemnity. on june 24, 1916, the chicago _american_ printed a cartoon that pictured in the most brazen way what the capitalists intended to do, and followed it later with an editorial from which the following extracts are taken: "nothing worth while will be accomplished by occasional 'punitive expeditions.'"... "the way to impress the mexicans is to repress the mexicans. the way to begin is to say to them: . . . "we are no longer planning to catch this bandit or that. we are going into mexico. and as far as we go, _we'll stay_." . . . "when you see an american soldier one hundred feet inside of mexico, you may take it to mean that one hundred feet are no longer mexican, but united states. "if you make it necessary for our soldiers to go in two hundred miles, you can change your geographies and add two hundred miles to the united states. "in this way we hope to make you realize that it is not wise to make us go in too far."... "the united states ought to make one single bite of the cherry, go down all the way, and civilize everything between the rio grande and the panama canal. "the right kind of american enthusiasm will eventually do that." march 24, 1916, senator james hamilton lewis introduced the following resolution in the senate, recounting the fact that villa, the "bandit," was notoriously receiving support of both munitions and money from americans. "the text of the lewis "treason" resolution follows: _whereas_, it is known to the authorities of the united states that funds and supplies are being furnished to the force and following of villa in mexico from foreign countries, and from sources in the united states of america, and _whereas_, such supplies and sustenance are being delivered for the purpose of being used against the soldiers of the united states and to oppose the authority of the united states; therefore, be it _resolved_, that those who are furnishing supplies and sustenance to the force of villa for the purpose of opposing the united states are the enemies of the united states, and those in the united states who are furnishing supplies and sustenance to the said villa forces, either of money or provisions, arms and ammunition, are within the provision of the laws of the united states defining treason as giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the united states."... "i shall push my resolution vigorously," said mr. lewis, after the splutter of mexican debate it had caused, died away. "i may call it up saturday. the administration is in possession of means of information as to the identity of the persons or corporations who have been assisting this murderous mexican bandit for the sake of filthy money or dirtier politics." "the nation would be amazed to learn the names of some of the men of national repute who are mixed up in the intrigue against national peace. many of them are noisy champions of the campaign for preparedness." company "a," corps of engineers, u. s. a., 1846-'48, in the mexican war. by gustavus w. smith, formerly lieutenant of engineers, and bvt. captain, u. s. army. the battalion press, 1896. preface. executive document, no. 1, united states senate, december 7, 1847, contains a communication from the secretary of war, transmitting to congress the official reports of commanding generals and their subordinates in the mexican war. the secretary says: "the company of engineer soldiers, authorized by the act of may 15, 1846, has been more than a year on active duty in mexico, and has rendered efficient service. i again submit, with approval, the proposition of the chief engineer for an increase of this description of force." (senate-ex. doc. no. 1, 1847, p. 67.) table of contents. page preface. 3 chap. i.--enlistment--instruction--detention on the rio grande--march to victoria and tampico--landing at vera cruz--death of captain swift. 7 chap. ii.--engaged in operations against vera cruz. 21 chap. iii.--after the surrender of vera cruz to the occupation of puebla. 28 chap. iv.--from puebla to churubusco. 34 chap. v.--capture of the city of mexico. 48 chap. vi.--in the city of mexico; return to west point. 57 appendix a.--brief extracts, from wilcox's history of the mexican war, 1892. 66 appendix b.--promotions of enlisted men of the company. 69 chapter i. enlistment--instruction--detention on the rio grande--march to victoria and tampico--landing at vera cruz--death of captain swift. previous to the war with mexico there existed among the people of the united states a strong prejudice against maintaining even a small regular army in time of peace. active opposition to a permanent, regular military establishment extended to the west point academy, in which cadets were trained and qualified to become commissioned officers of the army. that academy was then a component part of the military engineer corps. for years the chief of the corps had, in vain, urged upon congress, the necessity for having, at least one company of enlisted engineer soldiers as a part of the regular army. in the meantime he had, however, succeeded in persuading the government at washington to send--by permission of the government of france--a selected captain of the u. s. engineer corps to the french school of engineer officers at metz; for the purpose of having in the u. s. army, an officer qualified to instruct and command a company of engineer soldiers in case congress could be induced to authorize the enlistment of such a company. captain alexander j. swift was the officer selected to be sent to metz. on his return to the united states, he was assigned to temporary duty at west point awaiting the long delayed passage of an act authorizing the enlistment of a company of u. s. engineer soldiers. that act was passed soon after the commencement of hostilities with mexico. it provided for the enlistment of an engineer company of 100 men, in the regular army. the company to be composed of 10 sergeants, 10 corporals, 39 artificers, 39 second class privates, and 2 musicians; all with higher pay than that of enlisted men in the line of the army. captain swift was assigned to the command; and, at his request, i was ordered to report to him as next officer in rank to himself. at my suggestion, brevet second lieutenant george b. mcclellan, who had just been graduated from the military academy, was assigned as junior officer of the company. at that time i had been an officer of engineers for four years; my rank was that of second lieutenant. all the first lieutenants, and some of the second lieutenants, of that corps, were then in sole charge of the construction of separate fortifications, or were engaged in other important duties. captain swift was not disposed to apply for the assignment of any of those officers to be subalterns under him in a company of soldiers. i had taught mcclellan during his last year in the academy, and felt assured that he would be in full harmony with me in the duties we would be called upon to perform under captain swift. it is safe to say that no three officers of a company of soldiers ever worked together with less friction. the understanding between them was complete. there were no jars--no doubts or cross purposes--and no conflict of opinion or of action. in the beginning i was charged with the instruction of the company as an infantry command, whilst the captain took control of the recruiting, the collection of engineer implements--including an india rubber ponton bridge--and he privately instructed mcclellan and myself, at his own house, in the rudiments of practical military engineering which he had acquired at metz. in the meantime we taught him, at the same place, the manual of arms and infantry tactics which had been introduced into the army after he was graduated at the military academy. in practical engineer drills the captain was always in control. after the men were passably well drilled in the "infantry school of the company"; the time had come for him to take executive command on the infantry drill ground. he did this on the first occasion, like a veteran captain of infantry until "at rest" was ordered. whilst the men were "at rest", mcclellan and myself quietly, but earnestly, congratulated him upon his successful _début_ as drill officer of an infantry company. he kindly attributed to our instruction in his house, whatever proficiency he had acquired in the new tactics which had then been recently introduced. but, after the company was again called to "attention" and the drill was progressing, whilst marching with full company front across the plain, the men all well in line, to my surprise the captain ordered "faster", and added "the step is much too slow". of course we went "faster". in a short time the captain ordered "faster still, the step is very much too slow". this order was several times repeated, and before the drill ended we were virtually "at a run". after the drill was over and the company dismissed from the parade ground, i asked the captain why he had not given the commands "quick time" and "double quick", instead of saying "faster" and "still faster". he said he did not intend the step should be "quick time"--much less "double quick". he only wanted the rate to be in "common time--90 steps a minute"; and added: "you had not reached that rate when the drill ended". i insisted that he must be mistaken, and told him we were marching in "common time" or very near it, when he first gave the order, "faster". he persisted that he was right in regard to the rate of the step--said "that he had carefully counted it, watch in hand"; and added: "you were, at the last, not making more than 85 steps to the minute". i was satisfied that he was mistaken; but he relied implicitly upon the correctness of his count and the accuracy of his watch. mcclellan and i proceeded to the company quarters, of which i still had charge. on the way we referred to the matter of the step, and both of us were at a loss to account for the misapprehension we were sure the captain labored under in regard to it. i asked mcclellan to take out his watch and count whilst i marched in "common time". i made 90 steps per minute--and repeated it more than once. it presently dawned upon us that our captain, whilst consulting his watch, had counted only one foot in getting at the number of steps: and that we were really making 170 steps to the minute when he counted 85. the mystery was solved, the captain had counted "the left foot" only. when we next went to his house for instruction in details of the school of the engineer soldier, i asked him how many steps we were making a minute when he first ordered "faster". he said "about 45". i replied: "that's it. we have found out what was the matter. you counted only the left foot. we were marching in 'common time' when you ordered us to move 'faster'; and you pushed us to nearly twice that rate". "the cat was out of the bag." the captain saw it at once and laughed heartily over the error he had fallen into in the latter part of his "first appearance" as captain, in drilling the company as infantry. he made no such mistake thereafter; and the men never knew of his "count", watch in hand. on the 26th of september, 1846, we sailed from new york, 71 rank and file, for brazos santiago, under orders to report to general taylor, commanding the u. s. army in mexico. we landed at brazos on the 12th of october, remained at that point for several days, proceeded thence to the mouth of the rio grande and arrived at carmargo on the 2nd of november. there the company was delayed for several weeks because transportation for the engineer train to the headquarters of the army at monterey, was not then available. the company left carmargo for brazos, on the 29th of november, under orders to proceed to tampico by sea, but was ordered to return to matamoros with a portion of its tools, and march, via victoria, to tampico--the bulk of its train to be transported to the latter place by water. whilst detained at carmargo instruction in the school of the engineer soldier was kept up, and infantry drills were constantly practiced. during that time several thousand troops were in camp near carmargo, and the men of the engineer company learned that they were, by the line of the army, styled: "the pick and shovel brigade". their officers advised them not to care for this epithet but, "take it easy, continue to endeavor to become _model_ infantry, and engraft on that a fair knowledge of the duties of the engineer soldier". they were assured that "for heavy work", details would have to be made from the line of the army; and these details would, for the time, constitute the real "pick and shovel brigade" under the control of engineer officers, assisted by trained engineer soldiers. when the time came for close fighting the engineer company would be at the front. the troops stationed on the rio grande during the fall of 1846, suffered greatly from mexican diarrhoea, fevers and other diseases. several men of the engineer company died, and captain swift and twenty of the men were left in hospital at matamoros, when the company finally left the latter place. before giving an account of our first march in the enemy's country, it may be well to state here, that with two exceptions, the enlisted men of the engineer company were native born, and all but four of them were raw recruits. each of those four had served, with credit, during one or more terms of enlistment in the regular army. three of them were promptly made sergeants, and the fourth was a musician (bugler). all of the recruits but one, were very carefully selected material, out of which to form, as soon as practicable, skilled engineer soldiers. the one exception was a short, fat, dumpy, long island dutchman--a good cook, specially enlisted by captain swift to cook for the men. he was given the pay and rank of artificer of engineers. the men looked upon him more as a servant of theirs than as a fellow soldier. he was well satisfied with his position, prided himself on his special duties, rather looked down upon "soldiers"--and was impudent by nature. all went well enough with the "cook" until he was required to take his place in the ranks, at regular bi-monthly "muster, and inspection" for pay. his performance on that occasion was so grotesquely awkward that i directed he should be put through the "squad-drill" by one of the sergeants, who was a thoroughly competent, but rather severe, drill-master. the "cook" felt that his rights were invaded, in requiring him to submit to be drilled. the sergeant made no progress in teaching him. after three days' trial, he reported to me that he was mortified, and ashamed, to have to admit he could do nothing with "that cook"; and he asked to be relieved from the duty of drilling him. in reply to my question: "can't you make him obey you?" he replied: "no--the only thing i can do is to kill him"; and added: "when that kind of thing has to be done, in this company, my understanding is, the lieutenant in command is the only one who has the right to kill". i relieved the sergeant, and told him i would take the "cook" in hand at the next drill. on the following day, i marched him off into the dense chaparral, on the bottom lands near matamoros. after following obscure paths, about three miles in their windings through the jungle, i halted him in a small open space a few hundred yards from the company camp. he thought no doubt, we were five miles from camp--in a boundless wilderness--whilst, in fact, we were at no time five hundred yards away. i told him of the report that had been made to me of his disobedience, informed him that i had brought him into the chaparral for the purpose of compelling him to obey me; called his attention to the fact that we were in the enemy's country in time of war; all of our lives were in peril, and that persistent disobedience on the part of any officer or soldier to the legal authority of those over him, was punishable with death; that i did not propose to place him before a court martial; but, would kill him, if he did not implicitly obey an order i proposed then and there to give him. i measured 15 paces in front of him and placed a small white chip on the ground, called him to "attention", ordered him to place his eyes on that chip, and told him if he removed them from it before i gave the command "rest", i would run him through with my rapier. i then drilled him at the manual of arms for about 20 minutes. large beads of perspiration rolled down his face--he began to totter on his feet--and i gave the command "rest". he had not taken his eyes from the chip. at the command "rest", he drew a long sigh of relief and uttered a subdued but prolonged "o-h". i asked him if he now thought he could obey the sergeant. he replied: "yes, i will obey anybody". i told him i would temporarily withdraw what i had said about killing him, and would put him on his good behavior. i drilled him about two hours longer; and then took him, by a circuitous route, through the jungle, back to camp. he was obedient enough thereafter. when the war had ended and i was relieved from duty with the company, one of the men told me that "the cook", on his return from the drill i had given him said: "the lieutenant took me way off, ever so far, in the chaparral, and told me he took me there to kill me if i didn't mind him. the little devil meant it, and would have done it too, if i had fooled with him like i had done with the sergeant." except this _case_, of "the cook", there had been no difficulty in bringing the men of the company to a high standard of drill and discipline as an infantry company, and a reasonable degree of proficiency in the school of the engineer soldier. but, on their first march into the enemy's country, they were called upon to do an immense amount of hard work not specially referred to in their preliminary instruction. the march from matamoros to victoria and tampico. by special orders from general taylor, brought by major george a. mccall to captain swift, the latter was charged with the duty of repairing the road from matamoros to victoria, and making it practicable for artillery and the baggage train; and to do this, if possible, so that the whole command might make its prescribed daily marches and arrive at victoria on a named day. captain swift was authorized to call upon the commander of the forces, on this march, for such assistance as might be needed to perform the work; and was directed to do no more to the road than was barely sufficient to enable the trains to pass over it. it was not expected that we would ever have occasion to pass through that region again; and it was not proposed to make a permanent road for the benefit of mexicans. captain swift being sick in hospital, the foregoing instructions were given to me, as commander of the company, by major mccall, who, in the capacity of adjutant-general of the forces under general patterson, accompanied him on this march. under orders from general taylor, the company of engineers, reduced to two officers and forty-five enlisted men for service, marched from matamoros on the 21st of december, 1846, with a column of volunteers under general patterson, to join general taylor's army at victoria. we arrived at the latter place on the 4th of january, 1847. a great deal of work had been done by details of volunteers and the engineer company in making the road practicable for artillery and baggage wagons. without dwelling upon daily operations, the following statement of the manner in which we made our way across a difficult stream may be of interest. about noon one day i was informed by major mccall, who had ridden ahead of the working party, that there was an exceedingly difficult "river-crossing" about one mile in front, and that he feared we would be detained there for, perhaps, two days. i galloped forward to the place designated. it looked ugly. the banks of the stream were something more than 100 feet high and quite steep. guiding my horse down to the water's edge, i crossed the river which was from two to three feet deep, and about one hundred yards wide. the bottom was fair enough, until within a few yards of the opposite shore, where it was soft mud. getting through this with some difficulty i rode to the top of the bank on the far side. to make an ordinary practicable road across that stream would require two or three day's work of several hundred men. it seemed a clear case for the free use of drag-ropes to let the wagons down into the stream on the near side, and haul them up the opposite bank. it was plain to me that with a working party of two hundred men--which was the greatest number we could supply with tools--a straight steep ramp could be cut on both banks in six or eight hours hard work. the greatest difficulty would be encountered in getting out of the stream on the far side. returning quickly to where i had left major mccall, i asked him to give me a working party of about 800 men, told him i would find use for that number and that in my opinion, with that force, the wagon train could be put across the stream before dark. the commanding general thought my requisition for the working detail was extravagant, as we scarcely had tools enough for a quarter of that number of men. but the detail was ordered, as called for, to report to me. in the meantime the engineer company and its train was taken to the crossing, and the character of the work to be done there was explained to the men. leaving lieutenant mcclellan with a portion of the company to take charge of the near bank, directing him to halt there about 300 of the working party and send about 500 to me on the opposite bank, i crossed the stream with the rest of the company and explained to them the work to be done on that side, particularly the means to be used in getting out of the river. on each side of the stream the working party was divided into three "reliefs", or relays--with one hundred men or more held in reserve, to meet contingencies. the working party arrived in good season, tools were promptly distributed to the first "relief" on each side of the river, and the men were told that, if they would work as at a "corn-shucking-match", or as if the "house was on fire", they would be let off in an hour, or less, depending on the rapidity and effectiveness of their work. it was to be a race against time. i wanted all the work there was in them, and wanted it inside of an hour. before the hour was up the "first relief" on each side of the river, was ordered to stop work, drop their tools, get out of the road and take to the bushes. the "second relief" was immediately marched into the vacated places, seized the tools, and worked like the first--and on the same conditions. so with the "third relief"; and, inside of three hours from the time the work began, the engineer wagons were crossing the river. they soon moved on, leaving the rest of the forces to follow at their leisure. the volunteer officers afterwards complained to me that the "wild work" on the banks of that river, had "scattered" their men so badly, it was several days before they could be again got into their proper places. this case was an exception--a frolic. the usual daily work on the road was more regular and continuous, without disorder. it may perhaps not be out of place here to mention, that about the time i sent the "first relief" into the bushes, and set the "second relief" to work under the directions of men of the engineer company, the commander of the forces, with his staff, arrived on the bank where mcclellan was in charge, and asked for me. he was told that i was on the opposite bank. just at that time the confusion and wild yells of the "first relief" and the loud cheers of the "second relief" when told that they, too, would be let off inside of an hour, provided they would work as if engaged in a "corn-shucking-match", astounded the general, and had to him the appearance of disorder, perhaps mutiny. on asking lieutenant mcclellan what it meant, the latter replied: "it is all right; lieutenant smith has the larger portion of the engineer company with him on that bank; and i can see him, and men of the company near him in the road, all of whom seem to be quietly giving instructions to the new working party". after starting the "second relief" to digging in the road, i had gone to the brow of the bank overlooking the work which was being done, mostly by my own men in the river, where the road was to leave it. the engineer sergeant in charge of that work informed me that he was then in immediate need of about twenty additional men. the reserve working force was not far from me. i called out for a sergeant and twenty men, without arms or accoutrements, to come to me. pointing to the river, just under the place at which i was standing, i directed the sergeant of this reserve party to take his men down at once and report to the engineer sergeant in charge there. the bank was precipitous. the sergeant of the reserve working party said that he would take his men back about one hundred yards, and go down by the road on which the "second relief" was working. i demurred, and told him again, to take his men straight to where they were needed. he still hesitated. i pushed him over the brow of the bank, and he went headlong into the river. i then ordered his men to follow him. they did it with a cheer and regular "comanche-whoop"--sliding down the slope, which was too steep to stand on. this scene, too, was witnessed from across the river by the general of the forces and his staff. i did not know they were there; but if i had, it would have made no difference; i was in charge of the working party, and in haste to finish that _special job_. on our arrival at victoria, the company was relieved from duty under general patterson, and i was directed to report to the headquarters of general taylor. on the 12th of january the company was ordered to report to general twiggs. with two companies of the line to furnish additional details for labor when required i was charged with the duty of making the road between victoria and tampico practicable for wagons. these three companies left victoria on the 13th. the following extracts from my official report of the operations of the engineer company for the month of january, 1847, illustrate, in part, the difficulties met with. "the first day, (out from victoria,) we had three bad boggy brooks to cross; besides a great deal of cutting to do with axes in order to open the road; and many bad ravines and gullies to render passable. to make a bridge, across a boggy stream, with no other material than the short, knotty, hard and crooked chaparral bush, was no easy matter. the first day's march was about ten miles--we encamped about sunset after a very hard day's work." in order to shorten the route and save the forces one day's march, we were, for several days, working on a mule path "cut-off" from the main road. "january 14th. the mule path was infamous. no wagon had ever traveled that road--the rancheros have a tradition of a bull cart that, it is said, once passed that way. i believe, however, that the story is not credited. we worked from dawn of day until dark and encamped about six miles from where we started in the morning and about the same distance from the camp we wished to reach that day." "january 15th. another day's tremendous hard work." "january 16th. we had again a very severe day's work." "january 17th. road improved very decidedly, but still a good deal to do. we managed, by getting a little ahead with our repairs after the army encamped for the night, to get along without seriously delaying the column." we arrived at tampico on the 23rd. the distance from victoria to tampico is 120 miles; whole distance from matamoros to tampico, by way of victoria, is 354 miles. although the service was arduous, the men came through it in good health, and were all the better soldiers for the practical schooling acquired in that 350 miles of road making. after this experience, ordinary marches and drills were to them, very light matters. tampico to vera cruz. from tampico we sailed for lobos island and vera cruz, on a small schooner, the captain of which was a brave little frenchman, who was not acquainted with the mexican gulf coast, and was not provided with accurate instruments for taking observations. late one afternoon the clouds rolled away, and we distinctly saw the snow-clad peak of orizaba. this was the first intimation to us that we were "somewhere", near vera cruz. in a very short time we saw opposite to us a large fleet of vessels at anchor. we were south of vera cruz and were passing anton lizardo, the place to which we were bound. but a reef was between us and the anchorage where the fleet was quietly lying. the captain of the schooner said he could cross the reef. taking his place in the rigging from where he could better observe the breakers and the currents, the schooner tacked here and there, rapidly and repeatedly, under the orders of the little frenchman; and we were soon clear of the reef and breakers. it was now nearly dark. in a few moments after reaching the anchorage ground, we glided up a gentle slope, without perceptible shock; and the bow of the vessel was almost entirely out of water. in less than twenty minutes thereafter a boat from one of our men-of-war pulled alongside; and when the officer in charge learned who we were, he said he would report at once to the naval commander; and had no doubt that the company with its effects would have to be landed on an adjacent island, while the schooner was being lightened and hauled off into deep water. he said the movements of the little schooner, through the heavy surf, across the dangerous reef, had been watched from the naval vessels with intense anxiety, and expectation that we would be wrecked and all hands lost. this feeling was changed to admiration when it was seen that the schooner was being very skillfully handled in the difficult channel; and all rejoiced when they saw the unknown little craft safely in smooth water; but were surprised, immediately after, to see her put on a course that would inevitably run her aground. we found that captain swift with the convalescents from matamoros on another vessel, had arrived before us. in the meantime lieutenant j. g. foster, of the engineer corps, had been assigned to duty with the company. he was with captain swift. i at once reported to the latter, and he resumed command of the company; but the men remained on separate vessels. captain swift was still very sick; to all appearance more feeble than when we left him at matamoros. all the men he brought with him were convalescent. in a few days after our arrival at anton lizardo, an order was issued by general scott for the transports to move up next morning, towards vera cruz, with a view to landing the army on the main shore, opposite the island of sacrificios, two or three miles south of the city. on the morning of the day we were to make the landing the whole company was transferred to another vessel; and all were again together. early in the previous night, mcclellan, who had just been aboard the vessel on which captain swift arrived, informed me that the latter proposed to lead the company ashore. worth's division was to land first, and the engineer company was temporarily assigned to that division. mcclellan added: "the captain is now too feeble to walk across the cabin of his vessel without assistance--the effort to lead the company in this landing will be fatal to him, and i told him i thought he ought not to attempt it. but, he looks upon me as a boy,[1] and i have no influence with him in this matter. you ought to advise him against this thing. if he attempts it, it will certainly kill him." i fully agreed with mcclellan in reference to the physical condition of the captain; and the probable, if not certain, result of an attempt on his part to lead the company in the landing. but for me to advise him not to go ashore with us, was to request him to give me the command of his company in this important enterprise. i told mcclellan that i felt a delicacy about the matter which made me hesitate to advise the captain to give me the command of the company. he replied: "yes, but this case is beyond mere delicacy. the act of leading the company ashore will kill him; and i think you can persuade him not to undertake it. you ought to try. i am sure he will not misconstrue your motive." urged thus, i pulled over to the captain's vessel, after dark found him alone in the cabin, and quickly told him why i came. he listened patiently to all i had to say; thanked me cordially for the interest i took in his physical welfare; said he fully appreciated the kindness shown; understood the motive which actuated the advice given; and added: "my mind is made up; i will lead the company in this landing; and would do so even if i knew that the bare attempt would certainly cost me my life." the next afternoon, the captain, standing by the gangway, directed the embarkation of about 20 men in the smaller of the two surf boats in which the company was to land. just as that boat was ready to pull away to make room for the larger boat, i said to him: "i suppose i am to go with this detachment of the company; and if so i must get aboard now". he replied "no. i wish you to go in the larger boat with me". to which i said: "all right", and added: "mcclellan goes with the detachment?" the captain said, "yes." when the larger boat for the rest of the company came along side i relieved the captain at the gangway and superintended the embarkation of the men in that boat. the captain was lowered over the side of the vessel in a chair; and i, when all else was ready to pull off, scrambled down into the closely packed boat, and took my place in the bow. each boat was rowed by sailors from the fleet under the direction of a naval officer. we had reason for anxiety in regard to the resistance we might meet with from mexican batteries that could easily have been sheltered behind the sand hills immediately overlooking the open beach on which the landing was to be made. a single cannon-shot striking one of the closely packed surf-boats would probably have sent it, and all on board, to the bottom. the anxiety of the soldiers was to get ashore before such a fate should befall them. they cared very little for anything that might happen after they were on land; but wished to escape the danger of having the boats sunk under them by mexican batteries. when we were within five or six hundred yards of the beach all were startled by the whistling of shells and cannon balls close about our heads. this fire was soon understood to come from our naval gunboats, and aimed at small parties of mexican lookouts on shore. no resistance was made to the landing of worth's division. when we were within two or three hundred yards of the beach, i made my way, over the heads of the men to the stern of the boat where the captain was seated; and said to him i thought the time had come for him to get to the bow, if he still intended to lead the company in going ashore. for a moment the most painful expression i ever saw depicted on a human countenance marked his face. he rallied, however, almost immediately, and said: "i must, at the last moment, relinquish my command"; and added "i turn the command over to you until the company is formed in line on the beach". i made my way quickly back to the bow; ordered the right file of the company, two stalwart corporals--thorough soldiers, to go to the stern of the boat, take their places near the captain, keep their eyes on me after they reached him, spring into the water when they saw me jump from the bow, seize the captain, place him on their shoulders or heads, and bring him to me in the line on shore without a wet thread on him. i informed the corporals that i had been placed in full command by captain swift; warned them he would probably resist their bringing him ashore; but no matter what he said or did, they must obey my orders. they did it. the corporals were athletes--over six feet in height, young and active. in the captain's then physical condition he was as helpless as an infant in their hands. the water where they went overboard was nearly up to their necks; but when they brought the captain to me he was as dry as whilst sitting in the boat. he had resisted them more violently than i anticipated. in vain they explained to him that they were instructed by me to take him ashore without his touching the water. he ordered them to put him down, used all his force to compel them to do so, repeated his orders in no measured terms, and continued to denounce the corporals after they had placed him on his feet by my side. he was wild with rage. i at once relinquished to him the command of the company, and said: "captain, the corporals are not in fault. they simply obeyed my order whilst i was, by your authority, in command of the company. blame me, if you will, but exonerate them." he apologised to the corporals for kicking, striking, and otherwise abusing them, and thanked them for the service they had rendered him. the termination of this incident made an indelible impression on the men in favor of their captain. that night the company slept among the sand hills a few hundred yards from the shore, undisturbed, except by a flurry of firing which occurred about 10 p. m., between a mexican detachment and the light battalion of worth's division. this firing continued for a few minutes, and then all was quiet for the rest of the night. about sunrise next morning, the company moved several hundred yards, into its position on the sand hills, on the right of worth's division in the line of investment, facing vera cruz which was about two miles distant. the captain showed wonderful increase of vitality after he reached the shore. he conducted the company to its assigned place in the line of investment without much apparent difficulty in walking through the sand. but three hours exposure to the hot sun was more than he could bear; his strength was gone. he lost consciousness and was, by my order, carried to the beach on an improvised litter. the sergeant of the party was instructed to report to the naval officer in charge of the surf boats, and in my name, request that captain swift be taken as soon as practicable, to the steamer which was the headquarters of general scott. that request was promptly complied with; but the captain's vitality was exhausted. he was sent to the united states on the first steamer that left vera cruz after the landing was effected, and died in new orleans within twenty-four hours after his arrival at that place. thus, the army and the country lost the services of one of the best officers of the u. s. corps of military engineers; and the engineer company lost their trained captain. footnote: [1] at that time, mcclellan was about 20 years of age. chapter ii. engaged in operations against vera cruz. within a short time after captain swift was taken to the beach, i received an order, from general worth, directing me to withdraw the engineer company from the line of investment and report to general patterson. the latter instructed me to locate and open a road through the chaparral to the old malibran ruins. this was accomplished by the middle of the afternoon. general pillow who was to occupy a position beyond malibran, requested me to take charge of a working party of his troops and, with the engineer company, locate and open a road along his line to the bare sand hills on his left. in this work we were somewhat disturbed by the fire of mexican detachments. on the 11th, the work of locating and opening the road along the line of investment was continued, the working party being still a good deal annoyed by both infantry and artillery fire. at 1 p. m., i reported to general patterson that the road was opened, through the chaparral, to the bare sand hills. he ordered me to report, with the engineer company, to general worth; and the latter directed me to report to the general headquarters. on the same day i was ordered by colonel totten, chief engineer, to find and cut off the underground-aqueduct which conveyed water into vera cruz. that business was effectually accomplished by the engineer company on the 13th.[2] from that time, until the commencement of work upon the batteries and trenches, the engineer company and its officers were engaged in reconnoitring the ground between the picket line of our army and the fortifications of the city. my reports were made each night to the chief engineer. the night of the 15th, he pointed out to me, on a map of the city and its fortifications, the general location in which it was desired to place the army gun battery, on the southern prolongation of the principal street of the city, and within about six hundred yards of its fortifications. he directed me, with the engineer company, to closely examine that ground. i was informed by him, at the same time, that captain r. e. lee, of the engineer corps, had discovered a favorable position for a battery, of six heavy naval guns, on the point of a commanding sand ridge, about nine hundred yards from the western front of the city; but no final decision would be made in regard to the naval battery until the army battery could be definitely located. he said general scott was getting impatient at the delay; and i was directed to find, as soon as possible, a position that would satisfy the conditions prescribed, by the chief engineer, for an army battery. i explained those conditions to mcclellan and to foster; and informed them that i would assign one-third of the company to each of them as an escort--take one-third myself--and we would all three start, at daylight next morning, in search of a location for the required battery. it was necessary that we should be extremely careful not to get to fighting each other in the dense chaparral. we found a location that complied with the conditions. in reporting this fact to the chief engineer, i added: "the communication with the battery will be very difficult--will require a great deal of work--and will be dangerous". he ordered me to take the engineer company to the selected ground, next morning, and lay out the battery; and said he would direct lieutenant g. t. beauregard, who had supervised the construction of the field fortifications at tampico, to assist in the work. at 2 p. m. that day the battery and magazine had been traced out, all necessary profiles carefully adjusted; and, the whole completed, ready to commence throwing up the works. we had not been discovered by the mexicans--though we could plainly see their sentinels on the walls; and occasionally hear words of command. after allowing the company to rest for a couple of hours we started to return to camp. in going forward we had the mexicans before us; and by exercising great care, at certain places, could avoid being seen. when our backs were turned to vera cruz i felt confident that we would soon be discovered and fired upon. i had cautioned the men to be as careful as possible; but, in spite of their best efforts, we were seen, and a heavy fire of artillery was opened upon us. the order to move at double-quick was immediately given. the company was conducted about three hundred yards, to a cut in a low sand ridge, that had been formed by a road crossing that ridge. all got safely into the cut. the mexican artillery fire, aimed at us, was continued for about twenty minutes. we had then before us an open level plain for five hundred yards. soon after the fire upon us had ceased, i ordered the men to scatter and run rapidly across the plain until they reached a designated place of shelter behind high sand hills. beauregard and i brought up the rear in this movement. the mexicans re-opened their guns upon us whilst we were crossing the plain and continued to fire for some time after we reached the shelter above referred to. when i reported the result of that day's work to the chief engineer, i urged him to permit a further examination to be made, for a location of the army gun battery, before attempting to construct the one we had just laid out. he consented, and we made further reconnaissance the next day. in the meantime the pickets of worth's division had been considerably advanced. on returning from an examination at the extreme front that day i came across a detachment of the fifth infantry not far from the cemetery. whilst explaining the object of my search to a group of four or five young officers, a person whom i took to be a veteran sergeant, said to me that he knew a good position for a battery, only a few hundred yards from where we then were. i asked him to describe it to me. from the description he gave i thought the ground referred to would be a favourable site; and asked him to tell me definitely how to reach it. he offered to guide me to the place. on getting to the position i found that the conformation of the ground constituted almost a natural parapet for a six gun battery--requiring but little work to complete it for use. it afforded immediate shelter for men and guns. it was not on the prolongation of the main street of the city, and it was farther from the enemy's works than the site where a battery had already been laid out. but the communications with the proposed new location were shorter, and could easily be made much safer--in every way better than was possible in the former case. i thanked my guide for pointing out the position; and told him i thought it would be adopted by the chief engineer. after our return to the group of young officers, my "guide" was soon called away; and, i then asked one of them the name of that "fine old sergeant" who had pointed out such a good location for the battery. to my amazement he replied: "that was major scott, the commander of our regiment". the major was enveloped in an ordinary soldier's overcoat and wore an old, common slouched hat. i had mistaken the "famous martin scott" for a "fine old sergeant" of the line. on my return to camp i reported all the facts to the chief engineer. the position first selected and laid out, for the army gun battery, was abandoned; and the location pointed out by major martin scott was adopted. the work of throwing up batteries, digging trenches, and making covered communications with them, was commenced on the night of the 18th by large working parties detailed from the line. after that time, the officers of the engineer company, including myself, were placed on general engineer service--supervising the construction of the siege works. all the engineer officers then with the army, except the chief, were in regular turn detailed for that duty; each having some of the men of the engineer company to assist him. after the work upon the army gun battery, the mortar batteries and the trenches had been fairly commenced, i was transferred to the naval battery and took my regular turn, with captain r. e. lee, and lieutenant z. b. tower, in superintending its construction. i was in charge of that work the day it opened its guns upon the fortifications of the city, having relieved captain lee that morning. seeing him still in the battery, about the time the firing commenced, i asked him if he intended to continue in control; adding, "if so, i report to you for instructions and orders". he replied: "no. i am not in charge. i have remained only to see my brother, lieutenant sydney smith lee of the navy, who is with one of the heavy guns. my tour of service is over. you are in control; and, if i can be of any service to you whilst i remain here, please let me know". there had previously been a difference of opinion between captain lee and myself in regard to the dimensions that should be given to the embrasures. the chief engineer decided in favor of captain lee, and the embrasures were changed and made to conform to his views. in a very short time after the firing began one of the embrasures became so badly choked that it could not be used until the _debris_ could be removed. hastily renewing the blindage of brush-wood that had been used to conceal the work from view of the enemy during the construction, the detail of engineer soldiers then on duty, in the battery, cleared the embrasure of the obstructions, removed the blindage, and the gun resumed its fire. just after that incident, i asked captain lee what he now thought in regard to the proper dimensions for the embrasures. he replied: "they must be made greater when the battery is repaired to-night." the naval detachment had only forty rounds of ammunition; which was expended in about three hours, and the firing had to cease until the arrival of the next naval detachment. the latter when it came into the battery, had only forty rounds of ammunition and was to serve until relieved, the next afternoon by a third naval detachment. before the ammunition of the first detachment was expended the embrasures were all in a very bad condition--the battery was almost entirely unserviceable; and before the second detachment arrived i caused the embrasures to be filled up, until the battery could be repaired that night and put in good condition for re-opening the next day. the second naval detachment came into the battery about the middle of the afternoon. the naval captain in command, without consulting me, ordered the embrasures to be cleared at once, with the intention of immediately opening fire. perceiving what was being done by the sailors in re-opening the embrasures, i ordered them to stop; and asked by whose authority they were acting. on being informed that their orders came from the commander of the detachment, i asked them to point him out to me. i immediately introduced myself to him, as the engineer officer in full charge of the construction of the battery, and told him if the embrasures were cleared the battery would still be unfit for service--that it could not be repaired until that night, and would then be put in better condition than it was when it first opened. the army gun battery would be ready next morning; and its fire, combined with that of the naval battery, after the latter was put in good condition, would be very effective. but, if the naval detachment opened fire that afternoon, the battery being unfit for service, its ammunition would be exhausted before night without hurting the enemy; and the battery would necessarily be silent the next day, when the army battery would open its fire. the naval captain insisted that the embrasures should be cleared at once, and the firing resumed. i protested against his clearing the embrasures and told him that, but for the appearance of the thing, i would leave the battery and take my men with me if he persisted in carrying out his intentions. i added: "i will remain here until regularly relieved, but will continue to _protest_ against the course you propose to pursue". he then told me that it was "the general's" order that he should open fire that afternoon as promptly as possible. i asked him why he had not told me of that order in the first place; and added: "it is not customary for general scott to give orders to engineer officers through officers of the navy. but, if you had told me in the beginning that he had ordered the battery to commence firing as soon as possible after you reached it, i would have accepted his order--coming to me through you." to this he replied; "i did not say the order came from general scott." i asked: "whom did you mean when you said 'the general.'" he told me that he meant "general patterson." to which i replied: "i receive no orders in reference to this battery except from general scott or the chief engineer of the army." the naval captain finally said he would not open fire until next morning; provided i would report the circumstances to general scott. i told him it was not usual for me to report my action direct to the general-in-chief: but, i would report all the facts to the chief engineer as soon as i was relieved and had returned to camp, and he would report them to general scott. when i commenced to make my report to the chief engineer he stopped me; and said he was instructed to order me to report in person, to general scott as soon as i reached camp. i obeyed the order; and was very coldly and formally told by "the general": he had been informed it was my fault that the naval battery had not opened fire against vera cruz that afternoon. i answered: "i did prevent the fire being opened; but, that act was not a fault on my part; and i can convince you of the latter fact if you will give me a hearing". he replied--still very coldly--"i hope you can do so". i then related to him, in full, all that had occurred--as briefly stated above--between the commander of the naval detachment and myself. my reasons for opposing the opening of the fire of the battery seemed to produce little or no favorable impression on general scott until i reached that part of the narrative in which i replied to the naval captain's statement that he meant general patterson when he said "_the general_". i gave general scott the exact words i had used in replying to the naval commander. at this he rose from his seat--came to where i was standing, and clasping one of my hands in both of his; said: "thank god i have young officers with heads on their shoulders and who know how to use them". he added: "your opinion, and your action, in this matter, would do credit to a field marshal of france"! to which i made no reply, but thought to myself: "if there was a sergeant in the engineer company who, in view of the plain facts of this case, would not have known that the naval battery ought not to open fire that afternoon, i would reduce him to the ranks before night." the following extracts from my official report of these operations may not be amiss in this connection: "whenever we have acted as a company i have been most ably and efficiently supported by lieutenants mcclellan and foster; and i am proud to say that the non-commissioned officers and men of the company have shown great willingness and skill in the discharge of the important duties assigned them. great part of our labors have been performed under fire. on such occasions i have had every reason to be satisfied with the cool deportment and conduct of the company. "in conclusion i regret that i have to state, a serious blow was inflicted on the military pride of the engineer company in _not_ allowing them to participate in the ceremonies of the surrender, when it was well understood that the troops having had most to do in the attack were selected to take a prominent part in the proceedings." we all felt that, if our distinguished captain had been with us, we would have been called on to take part in those ceremonies. the chief engineer, colonel joseph g. totten, in his report of operations against vera cruz, says: "the obligation lies upon me also to speak of the highly meritorious deportment and valuable services of the sappers and miners, [engineer company] attached to the expedition. strenuous as were their exertions, their number proved to be too few, in comparison with our need of such aid. had their number been four-fold greater, there is no doubt the labors of the army would have been materially lessened and the result expedited." (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 245). footnote: [2] in illustration of the character of the work done during the first two or three days after the landing, the following quotations from general scott's official report are not irrelevant. he says: "the environs of the city outside the fire of its guns, and those of the castle, are broken into innumerable hills of loose sand, from twenty to two hundred and fifty feet in height, with almost impassable forests of chaparral between." "in extending the line of investment around the city the troops, for three days have performed the heaviest labors in getting over the hills and cutting through the intervening forests." ("ex. doc. no. 1" p. 216.) chapter iii. after the surrender of vera cruz; to the occupation of puebla. from the capitulation of vera cruz, on the 29th of march, until we left that place on the 13th of april, the engineer company was principally engaged in assisting engineer officers in making surveys of the fortifications and surrounding ground, in dismantling our own batteries, magazines, &c.; and aiding the quartermaster's department in landing and placing in depot the general engineer train of the army. in the meantime, on the 7th of april, i reported, through the senior engineer, to the adjutant-general of the forces, that the engineer company would be ready to move with the advance division of the army on the 8th, if transportation for its train could be furnished. transportation, together with orders to move with the advance division, were applied for. "the reply was that general scott would, at the proper time, order such transportation for the engineer company as he deemed sufficient--and would, when it was his pleasure, order the company forward."[3] twiggs's division left on the 8th; patterson's on the 9th; on the 11th worth's division was ordered to move on the 13th; quitman's brigade had been previously sent on an expedition to alvarado; the garrison of vera cruz was designated. thus, every soldier in the army, except the engineer company, had received instructions either to go forward or to remain. on the night of the 11th, in my evening report to the adjutant of engineers, i asked the senior engineer[4] then serving with the army; when and where the engineer company was ordered; what i was ordered to do; and what transportation, if any, i was to have. on these subjects not one word had been stated, in either written or printed orders, that had come to my knowledge. on the morning of the 12th, general scott consented that the engineer company should, if possible, move with the general headquarters, which left at 4 p. m. that day. i then applied direct to the chief quartermaster for transportation. he told me that it was impossible to let me have any teams at that time--all the good teams had been taken by the army, general worth was getting the last. a positive order from headquarters, was then procured by the adjutant of engineers, requiring the quartermaster's department to furnish transportation for the engineer train, etc. the teams, such as they were, came into our camp about dark on the 12th. that night the wagons were loaded; and we started half an hour before daylight on the 13th. the mules were wild, the teamsters could not speak english, some of them had never harnessed an animal; and it was soon apparent that the men of the company would have to put their muskets in the wagons and give their undivided attention to the mules. at 2 p. m., after struggling through the deep sand, west of the city, we struck the firm beach, and could make better progress, for about three miles, to vergara, where the road leaves the coast, and again passes through deep sand. in the meantime one team had become broken down and useless before we got beyond the city. in order to procure another i had to take some of my own men into the mule pen. three mexicans were given me to lasso the mules, and five men were required to put them in harness--seasick, wild, little animals. one teamster deserted; one had his hand, and another had his leg broken; and a number of mules in different teams, were crippled. at vergara, half the load of each wagon was thrown out, before we entered upon steep ridges and deep sand immediately after leaving the beach. all the men were engaged in helping along the half loaded wagons. that night we slept in the sand ridges. on the 14th, we reached santa fé, eight miles from vera cruz, threw out the half loads, and returned to vergara. before we again reached the beach, the men had actually to roll the empty wagons up every hill, the mules not being able to drag them. by 10 p. m., we were again at santa fé, having killed three mules, and the men being worked nearly to death. fortunately for us, several good mules that had escaped from preceding army trains, came out of the chaparral to our feed troughs, were caught, and "pressed" into engineer service. from santa fé the road was much better, but at every hill the men had to take to the wheels and help the mules--this too, after throwing out half the load at the foot of some of the steeper hills. in this way, we reached the national bridge, at 3 p. m. on the 16th. general worth's division was about starting from that place to make a night march to plan del rio. he informed me that our army would attack the enemy, at the cerro gordo pass, on the afternoon of the 17th; and said he desired that the engineer company should accompany his division. i informed him that my men and animals were utterly exhausted and could not go any further without several hours rest. but i assured him that we would be in plan del rio by noon of the next day. we rested at the national bridge until 11.30 p. m., on the 16th and reached plan del rio, about 11 a. m., on the 17th. at cerro gordo. soon after our arrival at plan del rio, i was ordered to detail an officer and ten men of the engineer company to report to general pillow for temporary service with his division. lieutenant mcclellan was placed in charge of that detail. with the remainder of the company, i was directed to report to captain r. e. lee, then acting as chief engineer of twiggs's division; who instructed me to allow the men to rest, whilst i accompanied him to the front, where twiggs's division was about going into action. captain lee informed general twiggs that the engineer company was at plan del rio, and had been ordered to serve with his division. i was directed by general twiggs to return at once, and bring the company to the front as soon as possible. the action of the 17th was over before the engineer company arrived. captain lee directed me, with a portion of my men and a large detailed working party, to construct a battery that night, in a position he had selected on the heights we had gained that afternoon. this was a work of some difficulty, owing to the rocky nature of the ground and the small depth of earth--in some places none, and nowhere more than a few inches. about 3 a. m. on the 18th i sent one of my men to the foot of the hill to awaken lieutenant foster, who was sleeping there with the company, and tell him he must relieve me for the rest of the night. after putting foster in charge i started to join the company--and became sound asleep whilst walking down the hill. stumbling into a quarry hole, i found myself sprawling on a dead mexican soldier--his glazed eyes wide open, within a few inches of mine. for a moment i felt that horror of a corpse which many persons have, at times, experienced. the probability that, in a short time after daylight--in storming the strong position of the enemy--i might be as dead as the man upon whom i was lying, forced itself upon me. before i could regain my feet streams of men were rushing past me in the darkness; and i heard and recognised, the voice of lieutenant peter v. hagner, of the ordnance, calling in no measured tone or language, upon these stampeded men to stop. whilst promptly aiding hagner to bring the fugitives to a halt, i forgot the dead mexican, and the whole train of thought connected with the corpse. when something like order was restored on the hillside i learned from lieutenant hagner that he had been detailed to take one of our heavy guns up the hill to the battery. a regiment of volunteers had been placed at his disposal to man the drag-ropes. their arms had been left at the foot of the hill. on finding his way blocked by trees, hagner had sent to procure axes from the engineer train; and in the meantime the regiment at the drag-ropes had been permitted to lie down. of course they went to sleep. suddenly awakened by a false alarm that the mexicans were upon them, they rushed down the hill to get their arms. hagner soon procured the required axes and the gun was delivered at the battery in good time. at daylight i was again at the battery. a slight epaulment had been finished for three pieces of artillery, the platforms were laid, and the guns in position. i was then instructed by captain lee, to send ten men to report to him for special service; to order lieutenant foster with eight additional men, to report to him (lee) for the purpose of opening a road for the light artillery around the foot of the heights; and i was ordered, with the rest of the company, to report to colonel harney, who was then in command of persifor smith's brigade, of twiggs' division. i was instructed to accompany that brigade when it moved forward to attack the enemy in position on a hill immediately in front of, and higher than that on which our battery had been constructed. the mexicans were in strong force on the higher hill. from our lower position we could not clearly see their lines nor determine how they were fortified. the hill they occupied was flat on top and their lines were set back from the crest of the precipitous slope which faced us. the storming brigade was ordered to halt and reform just before reaching the top of the higher hill. at this point they were below the plane of the enemy's fire, and were when lying down, perfectly protected. in this position they were ordered to rest, until the order should be given to rise, charge and carry the enemy's works by open assault. when the line was thus formed, i requested colonel harney not to give the order to charge until i could go on the plateau, get a clear view of the enemy's works, and report their character. i soon informed him that their main line was not more than forty or fifty yards from where our men were then lying, that the fortifications were very incomplete, offered no effective obstacle, and we could dash over the works without a halt. i then ordered my men to drop their tools and use their muskets. whilst i was making this report to colonel harney, our attention was drawn to quite a sharp fire that the mexicans had suddenly opened from a point close to the left flank and in the prolongation of our line. i told him i was certain there were no fortifications in that position; and i had seen no troops there. the fire increased from that direction, and colonel harney ordered me to proceed rapidly with my men to the left of our line, direct two companies on that flank to wheel at once, to the left; and when he gave the order to charge, these two companies and the engineers would move to the left against the force that was firing upon us from that side. these dispositions on our left were made in a very few moments, and the order to charge was given immediately thereafter. the brigade sprang up, dashed over the short intervening space, and were almost instantly inside of the mexican incomplete works. after a short, but bloody, hand to hand struggle, in which bayonets, swords, pistols, and butts of muskets were freely used, the mexicans retreated in great disorder. the troops that had been faced to the left just before the order to charge was given, immediately found themselves in the midst of a detachment of mexicans, in a nest of surface quarry holes which gave them protection from distant fire and effectually concealed them from view until we were among them. the struggle here was hand to hand, and sharp for a short time. but they were driven from their quarry holes, back on their main line which gave way, and their own guns were turned upon them before they could get off the field. thus, persifor smith's brigade, under colonel harney, carried, and held possession of, the key-point of the battlefield of cerro gordo. after the battle the various details of engineer soldiers joined in the pursuit of the enemy, were collected together at encerro, and the company remained with twiggs division until it reached jalapa. at this place it was furnished by the chief quartermaster with the finest mule teams in the army. this gave great satisfaction to the men who had struggled so hard to get the engineer train forward, through deep sand, from vera cruz. to add to their elation, they had now left the "hot lands" of the coast behind them, had reached a temperate climate, 4,000 feet above the level of the sea, had escaped the dread _vomito_ of vera cruz, and had participated closely in the great victory gained by scott's army at cerro gordo. from jalapa, worth's division led the way, the engineer company at its head. during the halt of a few days, at perote, i procured the transfer of first sergeant david h. hastings, from the third artillery to the engineer company. he was considered one of the best sergeants in the army, and was at once, made first sergeant of the engineer company. previous to that time we had only an acting first sergeant. the company entered puebla with worth's division, and on the arrival of general scott at that place we were again ordered to report to general headquarters. during the three months delay of the army, at puebla, awaiting reinforcements before moving into the valley of mexico, the regular instruction of the company--both as infantry and as engineer soldiers--was resumed. besides the "school of the sapper" as taught them before they left the united states, the men were now instructed, theoretically and practically, in the "school of the miner". they were engaged too in work upon the fortifications of puebla; and had practice in loop-holing walls, and received instruction for placing towns, villages, etc. in a state of defense. whilst at puebla the company received the sad news of the death of their captain. general scott, in his official report of the battle of cerro gordo, says; "lieutenant g. w. smith led the engineer company as part of the storming force [under colonel harney], and is noticed with distinction". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 263). general twiggs, in his official report of the same battle, states: "lieutenant g. w. smith, of the engineers, with his company of sappers and miners, joined colonel harney's command in the assault on the enemy's main work, and killed two men with his own hand". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 278). in colonel harney's official report of this battle it is stated: "lieutenant g. w. smith, of the engineers, with his company, rendered very efficient service in his own department, as well as in the storming of the fort". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 281). footnotes: [3] taken from my official report for the month of april, 1847. g. w. s. [4] colonel joseph g. totten. chief engineer, had left vera cruz and returned to his duties in washington city. major john l. smith then became senior engineer with general scott's forces. chapter iv. from puebla to churubusco. on the 7th of august, 1847, the advance of general scott's army, twiggs' division, the engineer company leading, left puebla and commenced the forward movement into the valley of mexico. the company served with that division, until worth's division was placed in the lead during the turning movement made by the army around lake chalco. in that movement the engineer company was at the head of worth's division. the road ran between the western border of the lake and a high range of hills which, in some places, rose from the water's edge. the road was narrow and rough; and had been obstructed by rolling immense masses of stone upon it from the almost overhanging cliffs. these obstructions were of considerable height; they completely blocked our way; and at several points ditches had been cut across the road. general worth directed the light battalion, under colonel c. f. smith, to advance and drive off the mexicans who were firing upon us--ordered me to make the road passable for artillery and wagons as soon as possible--and notified me that the leading brigade would assist in that work when called upon. i immediately asked for a detail of 500 men; put them to work, at once, under the direction of the officers and men of the engineer company, and everything was progressing rapidly, when, to my surprise, lieutenant j. c. pemberton, aide to general worth, came up to me and insisted that the whole character of the operations should be changed. whilst he was elaborating his views i cut him short by asking if he had any orders for me from general worth. in the meanwhile the latter had reached the front, without either pemberton or i being aware of his presence. before the aide had time to reply to my question, general worth, in a very peremptory tone called out "come away from there mr. pemberton, and let mr. smith alone. this is his business--not yours". in a few hours, the road was put in such condition that, by the use of drag-ropes and men at the wheels, we were enabled to pass artillery and wagons over the obstructions; and the column moved on without further material delay. after reaching san augustine, and passing beyond, the forward movement, now on the main road, or causeway, leading from acapulco to the city of mexico, was checked by fortifications about six hundred yards in our front. these fortifications crossed the road at san antonio, and were occupied by the enemy in large force. the afternoon of the 18th of august, was spent in reconnoitring that position. about 3 a. m., on the 19th, i received an order to return to san augustine with the engineer company and its train. in making our way from the head of worth's division, along the main road, towards the rear, it was somewhat difficult to arouse the men of that division, who were sleeping on the road, and get them to clear the way for the passage of our wagons. no explanation of the order for our return had been given. just after the dawn of day, and before we were clear of the division, two soldiers on the side of the road, were lighting a fire for the purpose of preparing coffee. as we passed them, one said to the other: "we are not going to fight to-day: twiggs's division is going to fight". the other of the two replied, sneeringly: "what do you know about it?" to which the first answered: "don't you see those young engineer officers, with the engineer company and their wagons? they are going back, to be sent on another road with twiggs's division, we are not going to fight to-day". as we passed out of hearing of the two soldiers i said to mcclellan, who was riding by my side: "did you hear that?" he answered "yes and i consider it the handsomest compliment that could be paid to the engineer company. the private soldiers of this army understand that we are sent where the hardest work and hardest fighting are to be done--and always at the head of the leading division". we reached san augustine a little after sunrise, august 19. i will now quote direct from my official report of these operations. "orders were [at once] received, from the headquarters of the army, directing me to report to captain r. e. lee, of the corps of engineers, with the company under my command, and [i] was ordered by captain lee to take ten of my men, and select certain tools from the general engineer train, in addition to those carried along with the company. i turned over the command of the engineer company to lieutenant mcclellan, who, under the direction of captain lee, proceeded at once to commence the work on the road from san augustine to contreras." "in about one hour and a half, i rejoined the command with the necessary implements for [a large working force in] opening the road. captain lee directed me to retain the men i then had with me, and to take charge of a certain section of the road, to bring forward my wagons as rapidly as possible, and to see that the road was practicable before i passed any portion of it. at this time my company was divided into five sections, each under an engineer officer directing operations on [different portions of] the road". at contreras. general scott, in his official report, says, "by three o'clock, this afternoon, [august 19th.] the advanced divisions came to a point where the new road could only be continued under the direct fire of 22 pieces of the enemy's artillery [most of them of large calibre] placed in a strong entrenched camp to oppose our operations, and surrounded by every advantage of ground, besides immense bodies of cavalry and infantry". in my official report it is stated that; "the head of the column having halted, i reached the front in time to receive instructions from captain lee to halt the company, collect the scattered parties, and to examine the road inclining to the left, while he went to the right. lieutenants mcclellan and foster had been for some hours detached. having gone about four hundred yards, i heard just ahead sharp firing of musketry; and immediately after met captain mcclellan, of the topographical engineers, and lieutenant mcclellan, of the engineer company, returning on horseback--they had come suddenly on a strong picket, and were fired upon. lieutenant mcclellan had his horse shot under him. information of the enemy's picket being in our vicinity was reported to general twiggs, who ordered a regiment of rifles forward. there being several engineer officers present when the rifles came to the front, i returned to my company, which had been for a short time left without an officer. captain lee about this time, sent back for captain magruder's battery, which was conducted by lieutenant foster, and placed in position by lieutenant mcclellan". "the third infantry was ordered to support the battery. i moved forward with this regiment, taking my company and pack mules, loaded with tools, and placed my command under such shelter as could be found on the left, near the position occupied by the third infantry, and in rear of the battery. meeting with lieutenant mcclellan, i directed him still to remain with the battery, but to order lieutenant foster to rejoin the company. in a few moments this officer reported to me, and brought information that the troops were preparing to storm the enemy's position." "riley's brigade had moved in advance by our right. leaving the mules and tools, i moved the company forward, falling in with the brigade of general [persifor] smith. captain lee being present, with his consent, i requested the general to allow the engineer company to fight in his brigade. he told me to take the head of the column, and to direct myself towards a church in a village, on the left of the enemy's battery--between it and the city. whilst passing down the hill and crossing the ravine, the enemy were rapidly appearing [reinforcements from the direction of the city] on an eminence beyond the church. general smith directed me to take my company as an escort, reconnoitre the village, and find out whether colonel riley's brigade was in the vicinity. i continued some distance beyond the church; and returned without seeing the brigade under colonel riley, which had, as i understood afterwards, advanced very near [the rear of] the enemy's battery. the reinforcements of the enemy upon the hill in our front were rapidly increasing. they had at this time probably ten thousand men, on the height, formed in line of battle. towards dark colonel riley's brigade returned and joined the troops under the command of general smith: too late, however, to allow time for forming the troops to attack the enemy [on the hill] in our front. lieutenant mcclellan joined me about this time in our movement on the village. lieutenant foster, who was on horseback, became detached with a few of the men, and did not rejoin me until after the action on the morning of the 20th." "general smith, very soon after dark, informed me that the enemy's main battery would be stormed, [in rear], at daylight on the morning of the 20th. this would open the road for artillery, and our communications with [the main army under] general scott would be re-established. i received orders to hold the engineer company ready to move at 3 a. m. and to take my place on the right of the rifles. on the morning of the 20th there was considerable delay in the movement of the brigade [raw troops] under general cadwallader, by which general smith's brigade, now under the command of major dimmick, first artillery, was detained very nearly an hour. part of the eleventh regiment [cadwallader's brigade] lost its way, caused the voltigeurs to halt, thus throwing the brigade under major dimmick still further from riley's, which had moved very soon after 3 o'clock. at the request of general cadwallader, major dimmick ordered me to turn over the command of my company to the officer next in rank, and to move forward and conduct the troops that had lost their way. the whole force was by sunrise, or little after, halted in a sheltered position in rear of the enemy's battery". (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix p. 67). i reported the cause of the delay to general smith and requested instructions to rejoin my company; but he said he desired that i should remain with him for a while. by his order, the three brigades were soon put in motion. i again asked him to permit me to rejoin my proper command. he replied "not yet" and added: "i will soon give you instructions". because of a dense fog the delay in reaching the position in rear of the mexican works was no material disadvantage. the fog began to disappear about the time i reported to general smith. he was then on a ridge at a point, about 600 yards in rear of the mexican works. the three brigades were passing around the extremity of that ridge, several hundred yards in rear of the general. all was quiet in the lines of the enemy. there was another ridge south of the one on which general smith was standing, and separated from it by a deep and very narrow valley. the sides of both ridges were precipitous; their tops sloped gently to the enemy's line. general smith informed me that riley's brigade would pass partly beyond the extremity of the second ridge; then face to the left, and attack a strong mexican detachment which was in position on that ridge, several hundred yards in rear of their works. riley was ordered to drive that detachment and pursue it closely into the mexican main lines. cadwallader's brigade would go on when riley faced to the left; and, as soon as he passed riley, cadwallader would also face to the left and come into action on riley's right. smith's own brigade would turn to the left before reaching the extremity of the second ridge. the third infantry and first artillery would advance in the deep valley between the two ridges; whilst the rifle regiment, with the engineer company leading, would ascend the steep slope of the second ridge, and get into position on the flank, or rear, of the mexican detachment which riley was to attack in front. in the meantime the head of smith's brigade had come within view, near the foot of the steep slope of the second ridge, and was moving towards the mexican main line. general smith pointed out to me the route to be taken to reach the top of the second ridge; and ordered that the engineer company and rifles should bear to the right, and on getting near the mexican detachment, remain concealed, and quiet, until riley's brigade became well engaged; then join in the attack and pursuit of that detachment. with these specific instructions, i was ordered to rejoin my company; and lieutenant beauregard was directed to take general charge of the movements of smith's brigade. when beauregard and i reached the top of the second ridge we found we were 50 yards, or less, in rear of the mexican detachment, which was facing riley. all was quiet. in a very few moments riley's fire commenced. the engineer company, followed by the rifle regiment was then forming in line, under cover, in rear of the mexican detachment, whose attention was concentrated on riley, in their front. we were between that detachment and the mexican works. a small portion only of the rifle regiment was in line, when the firing with riley became very severe, and the order was given for the engineer company and rifles to rise and fire into the backs of the enemy. that fire was very destructive. the mexicans were astounded; faced squarely about, and in a moment precipitately retreated. in my official report it is stated that: "colonel riley's advance became engaged with a very strong picket, some 300 yards or more from the rear of the [enemy's] battery, near the crest of the ridge; the engineers and rifles came up at once in position to take the picket in rear, delivered a deadly volley within 50 yards, cheered and rushed on. the enemy's force fled; the head of our column crossed the line of their retreat, which brought the right of the column [engineer company and rifles] conducted by lieutenant beauregard, in contact with the seventh infantry, which formed the left of colonel riley's brigade. i went into the enemy's battery with the colors of the seventh infantry, my company immediately behind me. the enemy, or at least a portion of them, stood to their guns well, and delivered a fire of grape into our troops when the head of the column was within 25 yards of their pieces. our troops followed the retreating enemy without halting until they were beyond the reach of our musketry. lieutenant beauregard then strongly advised that the troops be halted and formed. a short time afterwards general twiggs, came up. the pursuit was resumed. at san angel we had an unimportant skirmish". (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix, p. 68). the following additional quotations from my official report are not deemed irrelevant: "in the action of the morning of the 20th--the battle of contreras--my men acted with great gallantry; their promptness in obeying every order, and the effect with which they used their muskets, entitle them all to the highest praise. in my report to the chief engineer in the field, i shall make special mention of all who, to my knowledge, particularly distinguished themselves. i will mention here, first sergeant d. h. hastings, of the engineer company, who, by his gallant conduct and soldiery bearing, in this action, richly deserves promotion to the rank of commissioned officer in the army. sergeant hastings was slightly wounded by my side in the battery. sergeant [s. h.] starr attracted my particular attention by his gallant and efficient conduct. sergeant starr was the ranking non-commissioned officer with the detachment of the engineer company which accompanied colonel harney's command at the battle of cerro gordo. i would recommend him for promotion [to the grade of commissioned officer in the army]." "artificer w. h. bartlett attracted my particular attention by [his] cool and steady gallantry, artificer a. s. read shot the color bearer of the twelfth regiment of artillery, and secured the color." "lieutenant foster was at this time, as i have before remarked, detached with a portion of the company; and, at the head of his men, led the ninth and twelfth regiments of infantry in their attack on the flank of the retreating column at contreras." "lieutenant mcclellan, frequently detached, and several times in command of the engineer company, is entitled to the highest praise for his cool and daring gallantry, on all occasions, in the actions of both the 19th and 20th." (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix, p. 69.) in the pursuit, we passed through the village of san angel; and near that place, were again halted. during that halt, i noticed a large, high building, in an extensive open field, five or six hundred yards to the north. i was satisfied that from the top of that building, with a powerful field glass, which was a portion of the engineer company equipment, i would be able to get a good view of the level country for miles around, and obtain quite definite knowledge of the positions and movements of the main mexican forces. i communicated my wishes to major loring; and asked him if he felt authorized to support the engineer company, with the rifle regiment, in a close reconnaissance of the building i pointed out. he laughingly replied: "i have been directed by general smith to follow you and your company--of course i will go with you". we had not proceeded more than two hundred yards towards the building when we were overtaken by lieutenant van dorn, aide to general smith, who brought an order requiring the rifle regiment and the engineer company to return to the head of the column on the road. i told van dorn the purpose i had in view, asked him to explain the matter to general smith, and expressed my conviction that he would approve the movement, when he knew its object. van dorn replied: "general smith was very peremptory. i am directed to see that you and major loring, with your respective commands, return at once". on our way back, van dorn said that general pillow had reached the front and taken control; and his belief was that general pillow had ordered general smith to recall the engineer company and the rifle regiment. a short time thereafter we moved from san angel to coyoacan, where the head of the column again halted; and was soon joined by general scott. there is good reason to believe that observations, which could easily have been made from the roof of the high building above referred to, would have resulted in obtaining such information in regard to the mexican position at the convent of churubusco and at the _tête-de-pont_, as would have enabled general scott to complete the rout of the mexican army without incurring the additional loss of nearly one thousand men in killed and wounded. at churubusco. the following quotations are taken from my official report: "between 12 and 1 o'clock, p. m., [august 20, 1847] i received orders to move, from the village of [coyoacan] immediately after the rifle regiment, on a road intersecting the road from san antonio to mexico, in order to cut off the enemy already retreating from san antonio. "i had not gone two hundred yards when i received orders to countermarch and move on another route intersecting the road from san antonio to the city nearer to mexico. [the latter road led nearly due east, parallel to the front of the earthworks at the convent, distant from those works about 250 yards]. the regiment of riflemen continued on the road on which i first started. [this road led south-east from coyoacan]. the company took its place [again] at the head of the column [twiggs's division]. the column was halted by general twiggs, and i was directed by him to send an officer in advance to see the position of a battery reported to be not far in front. lieutenant mcclellan was sent on one road; and lieutenant stevens of the engineers, was directed by general twiggs, to take another. both officers soon returned and reported a battery in front of a convent, the roof and steeples of which were in plain view of the head of the column and within 700 yards. the roof was crowded with troops; the battery was masked by intervening trees and corn-fields. general twiggs then directed these officers to make a closer reconnaissance and ordered my company as an escort. having proceeded 500 yards, we saw [mexican] troops on our right, left, and in front. a lancer was taken prisoner. lieutenant stevens directed me to take the prisoner to the general and request an additional escort of two companies. we were at this time about 300 yards from the battery, but it was still almost masked from view. i delivered the prisoner and the message to general twiggs, and returned at once to my company which i had left in charge of lieutenant foster. lieutenant stevens joined general twiggs whilst i was with him. when i resumed command of the company, lieutenant mcclellan reported to me that _our troops were already engaged in our front_; having, apparently, turned the battery and convent by our right. one of general twiggs's staff, [lieutenant w. t. h. brooks, a. a. adjutant general, twiggs's division,] was present and informed us that the rifles with captain lee of the engineers, were reconnoitring the same works, and had gone to our right considerably farther from the battery than we then were. we all concurred in opinion that the rifles were engaged with a vastly superior force. there was at this time no firing of artillery. i ordered lieutenant mcclellan to report the result of his observations to general twiggs. he did so, and on the recommendation of lieutenants stevens and mcclellan, in which i concurred, the first regiment of artillery was ordered to support the rifles. the firing on the right increased; it was evident that several thousands of the enemy were pouring a heavy musketry fire into our troops on the right. the tops of the convent and the surrounding walls were lined with troops; the roof was literally covered. lieutenant stevens was of opinion that a few rounds of grape would disperse these masses and relieve our troops already engaged [on the right] from a destructive plunging fire. he went back to the general, leaving myself the senior engineer then in front of the [convent] battery. the fire had now become very brisk upon my [reconnoitring] party; having placed the company under the best shelter at hand, with lieutenant foster i proceeded to examine the works to determine the number, character and position of the pieces of artillery. nothing heavier than a 4 or 6-pounder had yet been fired." (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix, p. 69.) in my official report it is further stated that: "the troops had become engaged in our front within ten minutes after a reconnaissance had been ordered by general twiggs, and before the officer whom i was escorting had been able to make a single observation". in my official copy of that report, i find the following sentence, which is not in the printed report: "deeply do i regret that the attack, in advance of the reconnoitring party, precipitated the attack on our side, and involved us in action against we knew not what". the force which became engaged, far to our right--before the reconnaissance, supported by the engineer company, fairly commenced, was the advance of worth's division pursuing the mexicans who had abandoned their strong works at san antonio. captain james l. mason, engineer of worth's division, says, in his official report, that the works attacked by that division, and "so gallantly stormed, had not been reconnoitred". the engineers in front of the convent, being informed that the rifles with captain lee had gone to our right considerably farther from the battery, advised that the rifles be supported by an additional regiment. the same engineers advised that one gun be sent to the front to drive the mexicans from the roof of the convent, and thus relieve our troops on the right from a destructive plunging fire. the additional escort of two companies, asked for by the reconnoitring engineers, had not come to the front. after lieutenant stevens had gone back to general twiggs, to have one gun with a few rounds of proper ammunition sent forward for the purpose of clearing the roof of the convent, the firing in our front, on the san antonio road, had materially increased; and the fire from the convent, upon the engineer company, was becoming troublesome. there had been, to me, unexpected delay in bringing the one gun forward; and i determined, as already stated, to place the men under the best shelter at hand, and endeavor to make, in person, a closer examination of the works. resuming quotations from my official report--it is therein stated: "at this time the first artillery came up to where i was. the lamented and gallant burke, at the head of the leading company, asked which direction they were to take. i inquired what were his orders. he said that the regiment was ordered to support the rifles. i pointed to the smoke, which was all we could see by which to determine the position of our troops engaged in a corn-field on our right; told him that they reached their present place by moving farther to the rear, out of range of the works; and remarked to him that the fire through which he would have to pass in the direction he was going was very severe. he replied that they were ordered to move by that road to support the rifles. the first artillery filed by and soon encountered, at a distance of 150 yards from the enemy, the heaviest fire of artillery and musketry, followed almost immediately after [by that] brought to bear upon taylor's battery, which had been ordered to fire upon the convent; and, in selecting a place suitable for managing the guns, had most unfortunately been placed, entirely exposed, directly in front of a well constructed battery with heavy pieces firing in embrasure." "as the first artillery filed by me, i ordered my company to be formed, determined to go on with the reconnaissance; and if possible, send back to the general, [twiggs,] accurate information in reference to the works of the enemy and the position of our own troops, which at that time i could not understand. in moving forward, i was opposite the centre of the [first] artillery which inclined more to the left, toward the battery, whilst i kept nearer the [principal road leading almost due east from coyoacan]. the ground was level, but some shelter was afforded to small bodies of men, by the ditches, maguey plant, etc. i ordered my men to separate, to shelter themselves as much as possible, [and] to keep within supporting distance of me. i proceeded about two hundred yards. i ordered every man to shelter himself in a small ditch which was fortunately near us; immediately after i heard the fire of taylor's battery passing directly over my head. [when that fire commenced we were] in the corn-field, about half-way between taylor's battery and the enemy. requiring my command to lie close, with lieutenant foster, i made my way to an old ruined wall in the open space east of the corn-field, and from that position sent lieutenant foster to general twiggs to report the extent of the line engaged on the right, that we were directly in front of the works [which were now in plain view], and that, in my opinion, the whole force under general twiggs's command should turn the enemy's position by our left. another battery [of the enemy] was seen distinctly to our right and far in rear of the churubusco battery, apparently enfilading our line engaged on the right. general twiggs had already sent colonel riley's brigade to turn the position by our left, and take the battery by the gorge. when lieutenant foster returned, i withdrew the company to a position of more safety, and joined general smith and lieutenant stevens, who were near the place from which i started with the first artillery. i remained there [under general smith's order] until after the action." (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix, pp. 70-71.) that point was about 300 yards south-west of the convent. there were several adobe houses near, and from it a road along which there were some huts, led to the convent, and another road, almost due east, passed in front of the convent. in moving forward i had kept nearer the latter road, the first artillery nearer the former. the point i reached in the open, east of the corn-field, was within less than 100 yards of the works at the convent, and there was every indication that these works did not extend along the western side of that building. the place at which i joined general smith and lieutenant stevens, after i returned from beyond the corn-field, was that at which it had been proposed to place one gun, under cover of the adobe hut; run it out by hand; fire, and run it under shelter again to reload. by this means, a few rounds of grape, canister, and shrapnel, could have cleared the roof of the convent. in more senses than one, the firing of taylor's battery through the ranks of the engineer company, in the corn-field, was a surprise to me. i learned from lieutenant stevens that, when he applied for one gun to be sent to the front, those in authority had deemed it best to send forward a whole battery, and place it in an open field, square in front of the fortifications. the battle of churubusco was commenced, and mostly fought, haphazard, against the front of the mexican fortified lines, without giving time for proper reconnaissance. general scott, in his official report of the battle, says: "lieutenant stevens of the engineers, supported by lieutenant g. w. smith's company of sappers and miners, of the same corps, was sent to reconnoitre the strongly fortified church or convent of san pablo in the hamlet of churubusco--one mile off [from coyoacan]. twiggs with one of his brigades [smith's, less the rifles] and captain taylor's field battery, were ordered to follow and to attack the convent. major smith, senior engineer, was despatched to concert with twiggs the mode of attack, and twiggs's other brigade [riley's] i soon ordered to support him." (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 309.) major john l. smith, senior engineer, says: "lieutenant stevens in the reconnaissance of the position of churubusco, was assisted by lieutenant mcclellan and escorted by the company of sappers and miners. this company also participated in the operations of the right [of twiggs's division]". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 353.) major dimmick, commanding the first regiment of artillery, says: "about 12 o'clock, m., the battalion was ordered to attack the position of the enemy at the church, reported by the engineers at the time to have but one piece of artillery. the point of attack selected by the senior engineer officer was masked by a corn-field, in front of which i deployed the battalion and ordered it to advance, when almost instantly a shower of musketry, grape and round shot poured upon us, under which the battalion advanced". "the right had advanced to within one hundred yards of a regular bastion front, the curtain of which had four pieces in embrasure, besides nearly a thousand infantry, both of which kept up such a constant stream of fire that i could not advance further in line; i therefore ordered the men to cover themselves as well as possible. the left of the battalion advanced to within seventy yards of the work, being exposed to the fire of two pieces of artillery, _en barbette_, in addition to the fire of a considerable force of infantry and some of them still nearer, so that they had a destructive fire on the cannoniers and infantry; which position the battalion maintained until the enemy were driven from their guns and bastion, when they were followed into their work and surrendered." (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix, p. 78.) captain francis taylor, commanding light battery, says: "on reaching churubusco, we came in sight of a church, where the enemy was posted, having, as was supposed, an entrenched battery thrown across the road. troops were soon thrown forward to attack this place; and, after a short time, i was ordered to place the battery in a position where it was thought i could drive the enemy from the roof and walls of the church, and sustain the other troops in their efforts to carry this place by storm. on taking the position assigned me, i found we were exposed to a most terrible fire of artillery and musketry, of a regular entrenchment, covering the front of the church to which we were opposite, and which the intervening indian corn hid from our sight at the time. here i opened my battery, and it was served with great precision for about an hour and a half, notwithstanding it was exposed, during that time, to a constant shower of grape, round shot, shell and musketry. at last, finding my loss was becoming very great, and having succeeded in driving the enemy from the roof and walls of the church, and given to our troops such support as was in my power, i determined to withdraw the pieces". (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix, p. 73). the connection between the reconnaissance of the engineers, and the operations of the first artillery and taylor's battery at churubusco, has already been described in extracts taken from my official report. in his official report, general persifor f. smith says: "lieutenant g. w. smith, in command of the engineer company, and lieutenant mcclellan, his subaltern, distinguished themselves throughout the whole of the three actions [19th and 20th at contreras; and at churubusco]. nothing seemed to them too bold to be undertaken, or too difficult to be executed; and their services as engineers were as valuable as those they rendered in battle at the head of their gallant men. lieutenant foster, being detached from his company during the action at contreras, did not fall under my notice; but in the action on the 19th and at churubusco, he was equally conspicuous for his gallantry". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 332). general twiggs, in his official report, says: "to lieutenant g. w. smith, of the engineers, who commanded the company of sappers and miners, i am under obligations for his services on this and on other occasions. whenever his legitimate duties with the pick and spade were performed, he always solicited permission to join in the advance of the storming party with his muskets, in which position his gallantry, and that of his officers and men, was conspicuously displayed at contreras as well as cerro gordo." (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 325.) chapter v. capture of the city of mexico. during the armistice, which was entered into just after the battle of churubusco, and terminated on the 6th of september, the engineer company was quartered in the village of san angel. on the 7th of september i received orders to move the company, its train, and the general engineer train of the army to tacubaya. molino del rey. that night i was ordered to detail an officer and ten men of the engineer company to report to general worth. lieutenant foster was placed in charge of this detail. he and his men were on the right of the storming party of five hundred picked men, of worth's division, which led the attack against molino del rey on the morning of the 8th. in that attack lieutenant foster was very severely wounded and disabled. chapultepec. on the 11th of september, i received orders to furnish details of men from the company to assist engineer officers in supervising the construction of batteries against chapultepec. i was placed in charge of battery no. 1, on the tacubaya road, against the southern face of the castle; and lieutenant mcclellan in charge of battery no. 2, against the southwestern angle. on the night of the 12th, the details were all called in, and i was directed to furnish implements to the different storming parties which were to assault the castle of chapultepec on the morning of the 13th. san cosme garita. at 3 p. m., that day, i received orders to join the siege train, and report to general worth whose column was to attack the city by the san cosme route. at 4 p. m., i reported to general worth, who was then with his forces, in the suburbs of the city, on the san cosme causeway, at the point where it changes direction, at an angle of nearly ninety degrees, and is then nearly straight for about six hundred yards to the fortified garita in our front. he informed me that lieutenant stevens had just been severely wounded and this made me the senior engineer with worth's division. he directed me to go forward in person, closely examine the condition of affairs at the front, endeavor to determine the best method of operating against the fortified garita, and report to him the result of my observations as soon as possible. he directed me, particularly, to have in view the question whether it would be advisable to bring the siege guns forward against the embrasured battery at the garita. just as i was leaving him, he said: "if you find there are two different methods by which the garita can be carried, one in a shorter time at a sacrifice of men, the other in longer time, but a saving of men, choose the latter". and he added: "there have been too many valuable lives, of officers and men, lost recently in my division, for nothing". though he did not specify the action referred to, he meant the battle of molino del rey. under these instructions, i proceeded to the extreme front, made the requisite examination of our position and that of the enemy, and soon came back. i reported that the houses on the left of the causeway were built up continuously to the battery at the garita, we could easily break through the walls from house to house; and, under perfect cover, reach the top of a three-story building, with flat roof and stone parapet, within 40 yards of the battery. a fire of musketry from that roof would make the works untenable; and we could thus in a short time drive the enemy from the fortified garita, and secure a good lodgement within the city, without material loss and without using the siege guns. general worth directed me to bring forward the engineer company, which was with the siege train a short distance to the rear, and commence operations on the proposed plan; and at the same time ordered that clarke's brigade should render any assistance i might call for. an hour or more before sunset we reached the top of the house above referred to. from that position the inside of the enemy's works could be plainly seen almost to the foot of the interior slope of the parapet. our first fire upon the mexicans, who were unconscious of the impending peril, was very deadly. those who were not killed or disabled by that fire seemed dazed for an instant; but in a few moments, they precipitately retreated, leaving the san cosme garita without a single defender in the works. one of their pieces of artillery was withdrawn a few hundred yards, but was then abandoned. immediately after that first fire, a portion of the force with me on the roof became engaged with the enemy who appeared on house tops in rear of their battery. we soon drove them from their position. the other portion of our men fell back to the stairs, made their way to the lower story, broke open the thick, heavily barred, strong door, passed into the street, entered the abandoned works, and pursued the enemy. in the meantime, some of our troops from the right of the causeway had come forward and, a very small number of them, were slightly in advance of us in reaching the abandoned battery. colonel garland, commander of the first brigade of worth's division, on the right of the causeway, says, in his official report: "the enemy then took position at the garita san cosme, where they were supported by two pieces of artillery which raked the streets with grape and canister. finding a secure position to the right of the second defence, [about 350 yards in front of the garita], i reorganized the command as it came up; mounted a howitzer on the top of a convent, which, under the direction of lieutenant [u. s.] grant, quartermaster, 4th infantry, and lieutenant lendrum, 3rd artillery, annoyed the enemy considerably. about this time, report was made to me that considerable progress had been made by the troops on the other side of the street by means of crowbars and pickaxes, working through houses and yards. this caused me to watch closely for the first movement of the enemy indicative of retreat. the moment this was discovered, the 4th infantry, followed by detachments of the 2nd and 3rd artillery, under colonel belton, rushed up the road, when they entered the work simultaneously with the forces operating to the right and left, captain mckenzie's storming party slightly in advance". (ex. doc. no. 1, appendix, p. 170.) referring to this operation, general worth, in his official report, says; "the moment had now arrived for the final and combined attack upon the last stronghold of the enemy in my quarter; it was made, by our men springing, as if by magic, to the tops of the houses into which they had patiently and quietly made their way with the bar and pick, and to the utter surprise and consternation of the enemy, opening upon him, within easy range, a destructive fire of musketry. a single discharge, in which many of his gunners were killed at their pieces, was sufficient to drive him in confusion from the breastworks; when a prolonged shout from our brave fellows announced that we were in possession of the garita of san cosme and already in the city of mexico". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 392.) the american army having thus captured the fortifications of the capital of the enemy's country, a magnificent city of nearly 200,000 inhabitants, a secure lodgement was immediately effected in large houses, on the left of the street, a few hundred yards from the garita. i then proceeded, with the engineer company and an infantry detachment, several hundred yards farther; and found a strong position, on the right of the street where the troops could rest protected from fire. going farther to the front, i discovered that, 150 yards in advance there was a large convent, on the left of the street, occupied by a strong force. the next cross street, the paseo, had batteries upon it. these facts were reported to general worth, who ordered forward two brigades--one to occupy each of the positions selected--and, directed me to place those troops, station the picket-guards, and then, with lieutenant mcclellan, report at his headquarters which was several hundred yards within the garita. the aqueduct, in the middle of the street along which we advanced, was an open stone trough, supported at a height of ten feet, or more, by pillars and arches. there was a good deal of firing down the street from mexican detachments; but, by taking shelter under the arches, between the pillars, our men, in small groups, were quite well protected. a little before dark, whilst i was under one of the arches at the extreme front, endeavoring to get a closer view of the enemy at the convent and on the paseo, i was joined by lieutenant sydney smith, of the fourth infantry, who had borne several messages from me to general worth during the afternoon. in a few moments after he joined me we heard horses feet rapidly approaching us from the direction of the citadel. these horsemen were captured, and proved to be three mexican officers, one of whom was adjutant-general on the staff of santa anna. accompanied by lieutenant mcclellan, i reported to general worth at 10 p. m., and was ordered by him to suspend operations for the night and resume them at daylight. he received us both very kindly, expressed satisfaction with the manner in which the works at the garita had been carried, and approved of all the dispositions that had been subsequently made of the troops at the front. i called his attention again to the convent, told him that the large mexican force in that position might give us a great deal of trouble next morning, and asked him to permit me, with the engineer company supported by a detachment of about five hundred men, to pass the convent that night, get into a strong position beyond it, and thus induce the enemy to abandon that position before morning; and said i thought it probable a detachment of five hundred men could reach the main plaza of the city, that night, without material difficulty; and that, in case this force encountered serious opposition, they could take possession of some one of the many large, strong buildings on the way, and hold their own against the whole mexican army until relief could reach them. general worth not only refused to comply with my request; but, ordered both myself and lieutenant mcclellan to remain at his headquarters until 3 a. m., at which hour he said he would have us called, and we could then go to the front and resume our duties. that arrangement left the engineer company, for the night, at the extreme front, without an officer. in spite of my earnest remonstrances general worth insisted that we should remain. on the latter point he was inexorable. i finally asked him if i was under arrest. he said "no" and added: "you soon will be if you show further hesitation in obeying my order for you to remain here". being awakened by one of general worth's aides, i asked if it was already 3 o'clock. it seemed to me that i had not been asleep five minutes. the aide said: "it is about 1 o'clock. a deputation from the civil authorities has just informed general worth that santa anna's army evacuated the city before midnight, and they offered to surrender the city. they have been passed on to general scott, at tacubaya; and general worth wishes to see you at once". the latter told me more fully about the deputation and their proposal to surrender; expressed some doubt in reference to the evacuation of the city by the mexican army; directed me to return to the front; take the engineer company and a detachment of infantry; proceed carefully forward, using every precaution; and report to him the slightest indication that the city had not been evacuated. i was directed to examine closely every large building and strong position along our route; and not pass them until thoroughly satisfied that they were not occupied by mexican soldiers. this forward movement commenced about 2 a. m. there was some delay in determining whether the strong convent, mentioned above, had been evacuated. accounts on that subject were conflicting; but a thorough examination of the whole position showed that it was abandoned. i reported that fact to general worth, and informed him that we would move on with great care, in strict compliance with his instructions. all buildings of importance were broken open. none of them were occupied by the enemy. from time to time, i reported these facts to general worth; and, at daylight, i informed him that, from a church steeple near the alameda, i could see that the citadel, which had stopped the advance of general quitman's troops early in the afternoon of the 13th, was deserted. at that time, lieutenant mcclellan reported to me there were no signs of the enemy in any portion of the alameda; and i suggested to general worth that his whole division be moved forward. in the meantime, with the engineer company and the infantry detachment, i passed beyond the alameda, breaking open, as before, and examining all strong buildings on our route. we had gone more than two blocks in advance of the alameda, and were closely approaching the main plaza and the national palace, when i received a positive order to countermarch my command, and report to general worth at the alameda. i demurred, and told the aide, who bore the order, that i had obeyed all of general worth's cautionary instructions; that there was no enemy in our front, and no reason for calling us back. the aide replied: "the order is positive. you must go back." i then gave the order to countermarch. on our way, the aide, who was a classmate and intimate friend of mine, said to me; "general worth is very cross, he is angry. my opinion is that he has received orders from the headquarters of the army which have riled him up badly". a few days later i learned from general worth that he received a peremptory order from general scott not to permit any one under his command to pass beyond the alameda, until further instructions were received from the general-in-chief. for several hours after the engineer company took its place on the right of worth's division, at the alameda, all seemed to be quiet in the city. general quitman's troops, from the belen gate, had passed the abandoned citadel, reached the main plaza, and took possession of the national palace. later, general scott, with his staff officers and mounted escort, entered the city. about that time a shot was fired, evidently aimed at general worth, from a narrow street or lane, opposite the head of the division. the shot missed worth, but very severely wounded colonel garland. general worth, immediately ordered me to take the engineer company, go into the lane, find the man who fired the shot, and hang him. within fifty yards we found the man who i believed fired the shot, a rope was placed around his neck, but i did not order my men to hang him. i had no _positive_ proof against him. i took the man to general worth, reported the circumstances of the case, in full; stated the reasons for my belief that the prisoner fired the shot which severely wounded colonel garland; and added: "in the absence of specific proof against this man i have brought him to you, and await your further instructions". to which general worth replied, in a cold and haughty manner: "this is not the way in which my orders are obeyed by officers of _my division_". colonel duncan, who was close beside general worth, both mounted, whilst i was on foot, said, at once, before i could make any reply to the foregoing censure: "general worth, you are wrong; lieutenant smith is right. under the circumstances he ought not to have hanged this man. it is for you, the major-general commanding these forces, to decide that matter. give the order. you see he and his men are ready to obey you. give the order". in the meantime, the men of the engineer company, without instructions from me, had passed the rope over an adjacent large lantern iron; and stood ready to string the man up. general worth did not give the order. the man was not hanged. in less than an hour after colonel garland was wounded, lawless bands of armed mexicans commenced firing from the parapet roofs of houses, from church steeples and windows, in various parts of the city, upon our troops in the open streets. an order was then given, by general scott, for worth's forces to move beyond the alameda and join with the rest of the army, in putting down the rising of armed outlaws who made this murderous attack upon us eight or ten hours after the city surrendered. in these operations the engineer company was with worth's division until the recall was sounded late that afternoon. general scott, in his official report, says: "i communicated, about daylight [on the 14th], orders to worth and quitman to advance slowly and cautiously [to guard against treachery] towards the heart of the city, and to occupy its stronger and more commanding points. quitman proceeded to the great plaza or square, planted guards and hoisted the colors of the united states on the national palace, containing the halls of congress and executive apartments of federal mexico. in this grateful service, quitman might have been anticipated by worth, but for my express orders halting the latter at the head of the _alameda_, [a green park] within three squares of that goal of general ambition". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 383.) general worth, in his official report, says: "at 5 a. m., on the 14th, my troops and heavy guns advanced into the city, and occupied the alameda to the point where it fronts the palace, and there halted at 6 o'clock, the general-in-chief having instructed me to take a position and await his further orders. shortly afterwards a straggling assassin-like fire commenced from the house-tops, which continued, in various parts of the city through the day, causing us some loss. the first shot, fired at a group of officers at the head of my column, struck down colonel garland, badly wounded. about the time of our entrance into the city, the convicts in the different prisons, to the number of some thirty thousand men, were liberated by order of the flying government, armed and distributed in the most advantageous houses, including the churches, convents, and even the hospitals, for the purpose of exciting, if possible, the city to revolt". in speaking of the general operations of his forces in the capture of the city, general worth adds: "officers and men of every corps carried themselves with wonted gallantry and conduct. of the staff; lieutenants stevens, smith, and mcclellan, engineers, displayed the gallantry, skill and conduct, which so eminently distinguished their corps". (ex. doc. no. 1, pp. 393-4.) general scott adds: "captain lee, engineer, so constantly distinguished, also bore important orders from me [september 13] until he fainted from a wound and the loss of two nights' sleep at the batteries. lieutenants beauregard, stevens, and tower, all wounded, were employed with the divisions, and lieutenants g. w. smith and g. b. mcclellan with the company of sappers and miners. those five lieutenants of engineers, like their captain, won the admiration of all about them". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 385.) major john l. smith, senior engineer, says: "lieutenant smith reports all the sappers who were engaged on the 13th and 14th, to have conducted themselves with intelligence and intrepidity altogether satisfactory; but, he mentions the orderly sergeant, hastings, who was wounded, as being eminently distinguished, and he mentions also artificer gerber, as having been particularly distinguished". (ex. doc. no. 1, p. 430.) without dwelling upon details of the fighting in the streets and houses on the 14th, it may be stated that, a short time before the recall was sounded, when orderly sergeant hastings fell, lieutenant mcclellan seized the sergeant's musket, fired at, and killed the man who shot hastings. in a few moments thereafter the company passed the dead body of that "liberated", _convict_ mexican. the unoccupied private house in which we were quartered that night was near the place at which the man, who shot colonel garland, had been left tied to a lantern iron with a rope around his neck. when we returned the man was gone. nothing further was said or done upon our side, in his _case_. an hour or more after we were comfortably "settled in our new home", i noticed that mcclellan was very quiet for a considerable time, evidently thinking of matters which deeply interested him. an occasional marked change seemed to come over the spirit of his dream. finally i awakened him from his reverie, saying: "a penny for your thoughts. i have been watching you for half an hour or more, and would like much to know, honor bright, what you have been thinking about". to which he replied: "i have been making a 'general review' of what we have gone through since we left west point, one year ago this month, bound for the 'halls of the montezumas'; have been again on the rio grande, that grave-yard of our forces; have gone over the road from matamoros to victoria and tampico, where we had so much hard work; went through the siege of vera cruz, where we were left out in the cold during the ceremonies of surrender, and later, had to make our way as best we could, with the engineer train through the horrid sand; glanced at cerro gordo, where it was my misfortune to be with general pillow's 'whipped community'; stopped again with our friends, the monks, in the convent at puebla; crossed over the mountains; came by way of san antonio, contreras, churubusco, chapultepec and the san cosme garita, into this city. here we are--the deed is done--i am glad no one can say 'poor mac' over me". the capture of the city, and its occupation by general scott's army, virtually ended the war made by the united states against mexico. chapter vi. in the city of mexico--return to west point. after the street fighting on the 14th, the city was quiet and remained so. the men of the company were fairly entitled to a good rest and a new outfit of clothing; but the quartermaster could not then furnish the latter. at their request, i authorized them to purchase a better quality of cloth than that furnished by the government, and to have finer material for trimmings than the coarse cotton braid allowed by the regulations. the clothing was made by good tailors and paid for by the men. in the course of a month or six weeks, the company was provided with handsome, well-fitting uniforms. in the meantime, drills were suspended for about a month. during that period the only duty required of the men, other than that of ordinary guard over their quarters and the engineer train of the army, was that of details to assist engineer officers in making surveys of the recent battlefields. in the latter part of october, the surveys of the battlefields being completed, and the men provided with new and well-fitting uniforms, infantry drills were resumed. an order was issued requiring the company to be formed without arms, the next day, in the alameda, for squad drill. immediately thereafter, one of my most trusted sergeants informed me that this order caused great dissatisfaction in the company. he said the men felt they would be degraded if now turned back to the beginning--at squad drill without arms--thus placing them in the position of raw recruits, whilst the rest of the army were being exercised at brigade and division drill, "evolutions of the line," with all attendant "pomp and circumstance". the sergeant warned me that the state of feeling in the company would, in his opinion, lead to serious trouble if the order was carried into effect. i thanked him for the information. when the men were formed on the drill ground next day, i told them i was aware of their opposition to the order; but, that i was under the impression i commanded that company, and if there was a man amongst them who felt disposed to dispute my legal authority he was requested to step to the front. no one moved. i then directed the artificers and privates to go to their quarters, and inform the sergeant of the guard they had my permission to be absent until evening parade. turning to the non-commissioned officers, i stated that, in my judgment, there was no occasion for them to feel degraded if drilled by their own officers at squad drill without arms. i drilled the sergeants, mcclellan the corporals. whilst the non-commissioned officers were being thus drilled, the men were allowed daily liberty from quarters. later, the non-commissioned officers drilled the men in squads under the supervision of the officers. instruction and practice in the infantry "school of the company" was then resumed; and, after a time, each non-commissioned officer was required, in turn, to take his place by my side and drill the company. on those occasions, the men were warned that no inattention or remissness on their part would be tolerated; no matter how lenient with them i might choose to be when commanding in person. it is safe to say that within six weeks from the time squad drills without arms were commenced in the engineer company, in the city of mexico, that company as infantry, was better drilled than any other in the army. in that respect, and in discipline, they were pattern soldiers. regular instruction in the "school of the engineer soldier" was then resumed. from raw recruits, on the rio grande, disturbed by the epithet, "pick and shovel brigade" applied to them, at that time, by the soldiers of the line, the engineer company had become veterans of more than half a dozen important battles; had always been in the front of the fighting; and had often been called upon to direct large working parties of soldiers, detailed to use the "pick and shovel". about two months after we entered the city of mexico, it was reported to me, by the sergeant of the guard, that artificer gerber was then absent, two hours beyond the time limit of his pass. i directed the sergeant to send gerber to me, in my quarters, as soon as he returned. frederick w. gerber was one of the four men, enlisted by captain swift, who had served in the old regular army. he was enlisted as musician, and was the finest bugler in the service. he was soon made company clerk, and had thorough knowledge of routine "company papers". he was german by birth. as company clerk his duties brought him in close relations with the commander of the company; and i soon formed a very high estimate of his qualities as a soldier--and as a man in every respect; except that he would, on occasion, at intervals, when off duty, indulge too freely in strong drink. i had repeatedly threatened to deprive him of his warrant as artificer, if he did not quit drinking to excess; but i was reluctant to do so, especially because his promotion to that grade was in reward for distinguished gallantry in the attack on the "key-point" of the mexican position at the battle of cerro gordo. when it was reported to me that he had not returned within the time of his "pass", i was quite sure he was again "on a spree". it was several hours later when he reported to me as ordered by the sergeant of the guard. i was alone when he entered my room. he had evidently been drinking to excess; but was to some extent recovering. i charged him with being drunk; told him he had behaved so well in that respect lately that i had made up my mind to recommend his being promoted to the grade of corporal; and even to that of sergeant, when opportunity was afforded me, and added: "you know i cannot make such recommendation whilst you continue this habit of getting drunk". he replied: "the lieutenant is mistaken; i am not drunk, and, if he will allow me, i will satisfy him on that point; and explain to him how i happened to overstay my pass". i told him to go on with his explanation. he said that soon after he left the company quarters, early that morning, with permission to be absent for four hours, he met with a sergeant he had known as a private in the old regular service long before the war. they were glad to see each other, took a few drinks, and then hired a carriage for a drive of several hours in the great city they had helped to capture. he added: "during the drive the sergeant got mad and threatened to have me arrested. i told him that 'no d----d infantry sergeant had rank enough to arrest an artificer of engineers'. he then offered to fight me. we stopped the carriage, got out, drew our swords, and i told him to come on, and we would soon settle the matter. he attacked me, and i disarmed him, kept his sword, made him get into the carriage, drove to general twiggs's headquarters, reported to the sergeant of his guard, told him what had occurred; and asked him to hold, as a prisoner, the sergeant that had attacked me". "but he, being also an infantry sergeant, released the sergeant i had brought there, made me a prisoner, and demanded my sword. i gave it to him; but, when he ordered me to give up the sword i had captured, i told him i would see him d----d first; and i kept it. i then asked to be taken before general twiggs. they told me he was out". "in three or four hours general twiggs returned, and when he was passing through the sally-port, the guard all in line, at present-arms, saluting him, i rushed in front of his horse, and calling him by name, told him his guard had made me a prisoner, and i asked for justice at his hands. he ordered me to get out of his way. still standing in front of his horse, i again asked for justice. to which he replied: 'who in the h--ll are you?' when i told him who i was, he said: 'how is it that you are a prisoner in my guard-house?' i told general twiggs the whole story: and showed him the infantry sergeant's sword i had captured; and which his guard tried to make me give up. general twiggs then asked me if i was willing to hand that sword to him. i gave it to him at once; and he ordered the sergeant of the guard to release me and give me back my own sword. i then came straight home." after hearing gerber's story, on which i placed implicit reliance, i strongly advised him to let liquor alone in future: and, again told him i would gladly have him promoted, if he would quit drinking. some time after we returned to the united states, and i had left the company, i learned that, during the time gerber was closeted with me, opinion in the company was divided, and ran high in regard to the course i would take in his case. all the men knew that he was deservedly a great favorite of mine. some of them said i would let him off; others that i would deprive him of his warrant as artificer, and otherwise punish him. these conflicting opinions as to what i would do in gerber's case, were freely backed by heavy bets among the men. when he joined them, all were anxious to know what "the lieutenant" was going to do--"what did he say?" to which he replied: "it is none of your business". for some time they could get nothing more from him. but he finally said: "d----n it, if you must know; the lieutenant told me he would make me a corporal". the sergeant who gave me the facts just related, added: "previous to that time, gerber was believed, by the whole company, to be a perfectly truthful man. but many of the men thought he lied on that occasion. although he has been truthful ever since, there is still, amongst us, very grave suspicion in regard to the correctness of his assertion that you then told him you would make him a corporal. i would like very much to know the truth in regard to that matter". i replied: "gerber told the truth". it will be shown later, by extracts from official correspondence, that i was not permitted to recommend for promotion, in the company, any of the gallant men under my command who were so highly distinguished in the various battles that occurred in the valley of mexico. so i had no opportunity to have gerber made a corporal--much less a sergeant.[5] the following extracts from correspondence, and from my monthly reports, give a brief official account of the affairs of the company after the capture of the city of mexico. on the 4th of october, 1847, i addressed to lieutenant i. i. stevens, adjutant of engineers, for the information of the senior engineer in the field, and the general in chief, a letter from which the following quotations are taken: "by the last advices that i have received i learn that only six engineer recruits have been made in the united states since september, 1846. during that time the effective strength of the company in the field has been reduced from seventy-one to thirty-six. something must be done. i have endeavored to reenlist good men whose terms of enlistment in other corps had expired; i have tried to get transfers of good men, and succeeded in obtaining but one. the senior engineer, believing that more could be done, attempted it himself--he procured none". "at vera cruz my men were worked too hard; many of them are suffering yet from disease contracted there. time, labor and life would have been saved if we had had the proportion of engineer soldiers usual in the armies of civilized nations. at cerro gordo, when i could furnish ten men [for details], fifty, at least, were necessary. in the operations in this valley, the same necessity has been felt for a larger number of soldiers of this character. there ought to be more companies of engineer soldiers in this army. certainly, measures should be taken to complete the number of men allowed in the only company now authorized. i know of none so likely to succeed as sending an officer and non-commissioned officers [to the united states] on this duty". in my official report for the month of november, 1847, it is stated: "the system of instruction now being pursued is the following: from 9 a. m. until 10:45 a. m., recitations and instruction of the whole company, under direction of both officers, in _manuel du sapeur_, together with lectures and recitations on field fortifications. from 11 a. m. until 12:30 p. m., [infantry drill]. from 2 p. m. until 4 p. m., recitations in arithmetic and practice in writing. each officer has a section in arithmetic, and gives a general superintendence to a section in writing. instruction in writing is given by sergeants". "i have nothing new to offer either in reference to the property, the enlistment of men, or the settlement of the accounts of the late captain swift. all, in my opinion, matters of importance; but already referred to, [in previous reports and correspondence], perhaps, too often". "it is just one year since, by the casualties of service, the command of this company devolved upon myself as the senior officer for duty with the engineer troops. during this time the interests of the general engineer service, particularly of the non-commissioned officers and men, have materially suffered for want of an officer of rank at the head of the company. in the french service _two_ captains are assigned to every company of this character, and the companies are all [well] instructed before they take the field. i earnestly recommend that four officers of engineers be assigned to duty with this company. the commander should be an officer of rank; his position permanent. in case the chief engineer should order an officer into the field to take command of company a, engineers, i respectfully request that i may be ordered to the united states as soon as relieved from this duty". on the 1st of february, 1848, i reported that the course of instruction, adopted for the company, "had been continued, with satisfactory progress on the part of non-commissioned officers and men". on the 27th of february, 1848, in a letter to colonel totten, chief engineer, washington, d. c., transmitting copies of certain papers, i stated: "i would respectfully refer you to my communication of october 4th, 1847, addressed to the then adjutant of engineers, in which i strongly urged that the interest of the engineer service required that an officer and non-commissioned officers should be ordered to the united states for the purpose of obtaining recruits for this company. such is the course pursued in every other arm of service: and i hesitate not to say that, had my recommendation, as commander of the engineer company, been acted upon favorably, at that time, we would now have in this city, a full company. i have referred often to the wants of the company, without favorable action having been had on my recommendations. we are not furnished with men, not allowed to take the usual and, in my opinion, necessary means of procuring recruits. i respectfully request to be relieved from the command of the engineer company without further delay than is necessary for the arrival of the captain commander in this city". owing to casualties of service, i had almost continually commanded the company, its train, and the general engineer train of the army for more than a year. my rank was that of second lieutenant--low on that list. i was conscious that my rank or _lack_ of rank, rather, was, in some essential respects, a detriment to the company. it was believed that the war was over; but, in freely expressing willingness to give up the command i had long exercised, to which i had no claim based upon rank, i did not hesitate to say that: "if the war should be continued, and an additional company of engineer soldiers was authorized to be raised, thus creating an engineer battalion, i would be more than willing to command it in the field: _provided_, i was made major, by brevet, and assigned to duty with that rank". in my official report for the month of march, 1848, it is stated: "during the month, daily instruction [of the company] in branches pertaining to engineering has been omitted, i have thought it best to pay more attention to their improvement in writing and arithmetic. the infantry exercises are continued". on the 1st of may, i reported: "during the month of april the course of instruction and drill pursued in march has been continued, with satisfactory results". "three _privates_ of this company have been appointed [by the government at washington] commissioned officers. three _sergeants_, all men of intelligence, education and character, have been recommended [by me], in compliance with law, for commissions; they having all been repeatedly distinguished for gallant and high soldierly conduct in battle. [as yet] none of these sergeants have received [appointments]". when it became generally known in the army that the mexican government had agreed to the proposed treaty of peace, and that the formal ratification would soon be consummated, i requested the senior engineer, captain r. e. lee, to direct me to sell the tools, etc., of the engineer train, in the city of mexico: order me to proceed to the coast by the first opportunity, for the purpose of looking up, and accounting for, a large amount of engineer property for which the estate of the late captain a. j. swift was responsible; and authorize me to turn over the command of the engineer company to lieutenant mcclellan, when i started for the coast. in compliance with captain lee's instructions, the tools were sold. they brought more than they had originally cost in the united states. i left the city of mexico the day the treaty of peace was signed on the part of the mexicans; and accompanied general persifor f. smith to vera cruz, at which place he was charged with making all preparations for the transportation of the army to the united states. before leaving the city of mexico i turned over the command of the engineer company to lieutenant mcclellan. i was detained in vera cruz about two weeks, obtaining information in regard to, and making disposition of, the public property in that vicinity, for which captain swift's estate was then held responsible. the accounting officers of the government in washington, had charged against him, on their books, the value of large amounts of property which had been shipped to, but never received by him. several vessels, partly loaded with portions of that property, were shipwrecked by northers during the siege of vera cruz. in the time i spent at that place after the war ended, i obtained knowledge which enabled me to clear up all accounts against the estate of captain swift. the amount of that nominal indebtedness far exceeded the value of his property; which would have been unfairly sacrificed to the government, and have left his name unjustly tarnished as that of a defaulter, if conclusive evidence of the facts in the case had not been furnished to the accounting officers. the engineer company, under lieutenant mcclellan, accompanied by all the engineer officers from the city of mexico, left that city on the 28th of may, 1848, and marched to vera cruz. from the latter place the company was transported by steamer to new york city; arrived at west point, n. y., on the 22nd of june; reported to the superintendent of the military academy, and was immediately ordered to report to captain george w. cullum, of the engineer corps, as its new commander. i remained about a week in vera cruz after the company sailed; arrived at west point in july; and was ordered to report to captain cullum. a short time thereafter, i asked to be relieved from duty with the company; and applied for six months leave of absence. the leave was granted, and it was understood that, on its expiration, i would be ordered to other engineer service. before the expiration of my leave, the war men of the company procured the passage of an act by congress, authorizing their discharge from the service. under that act nearly all the men of the company, who had served in mexico, immediately obtained their discharge from the army. this virtually reduced the company to the detachment of recruits which had been collected and retained at west point. at the expiration of my leave of absence i was formally relieved from further direct service with the engineer company; and at the request of the chief engineer, consented to undertake the enlistment of new recruits to fill the places in the company vacated by the war men, who had been discharged. that business was finished within a few months. i was then ordered on other engineer duty and, thus, my connection with the engineer company ended. footnote: [5] frederick w. gerber, was enlisted in co. "a." june 29, 1846, after previous service in the 4th infantry, which he joined in 1839, and under the act of march 3, 1849, was discharged april 6, 1849. he was reenlisted the same day and continued in the service until his death at the post of willets point, n. y., november 10, 1875. he was appointed artificer, april 18, 1847, corporal, august 1, 1848, sergeant, february 1, 1849, and was sergeant major of the battalion of engineers from february 21, 1867, to the date of his death. appendix a. brief extracts, from wilcox's history of the mexican war, 1892. "general patterson was ordered to march [december, 1846,] from matamoros to victoria with three regiments of volunteers, two pieces of artillery, and the engineer company under lieut. g. w. smith". (p. 187.) vera cruz. "this line of investment, through the chaparral and over the sand hills, was located by lieut. g. w. smith, of the engineers, assisted by lieut. g. b. mcclellan, and a roadway along the line was made under the supervision of these two lieutenants with the engineer company and a party of several hundred soldiers". (p. 246.) cerro gordo. "on the arrival of the engineer company and train at plan del rio [april 17th, 1847], lieut. g. b. mcclellan with a party of ten men reported to general pillow, and lieut. g. w. smith with [the rest of] his men and a portion of the train to general twiggs". "that night [17th] one 24-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers were placed in position on the atalaya, the battery being constructed under the supervision of lieut. g. w. smith, assisted by lieut. john g. foster of the engineers, the location of the battery having been determined by capt. r. e. lee". (p. 286.) from puebla to the valley of mexico. "riley's brigade was guided by capt. lee, assisted by lieut. john g. foster with ten men of the engineer company". (p. 287-8.) "it was the rule with general scott that one of the only two regular divisions should always be in front. the engineer company headed the column. there was but one company of engineer soldiers in the united states army". (p. 339.) in the valley of mexico. "beyond san gregorio, the border of xochimilco was skirted, and here obstructions in the road were first encountered, a ditch having been dug across it, and large stones rolled down from the hillside; but these obstacles were soon overcome by the engineer company with a detail from the leading brigade, while the mexicans, who were firing from the heights above, were driven off by colonel c. f. smith's light battalion". (p. 355.) contreras. "the engineer company was recalled from worth, and with a working party of 500 men, was ordered to make the road to padierna practicable for artillery". (p. 362.) "when smith's brigade advanced as described, the engineer company, under lieut. g. w. smith, went into action with the third infantry of that brigade". (p. 363.) "general smith moved to his right and front across the _pedrigal_, the rifles, with the engineer company at their head, leading". "at 2:30 a. m. of the 20th [august, 1847], the troops under general smith began to form and take their places preparatory to the march which would bring them on valencia's rear. leading the rifles in front of the brigade was the engineer company". (p. 369.) "the engineer company and the rifles, being already in position in rear of the mexican detachment, then rose and firing a volley upon it, and riley continuing on upon them, they faced about, broke, and fled in the utmost precipitation to the main line in rear, pursued by riley, the rifles and engineer company". (p. 70.) churubusco. "at coyoacan general scott joined, having previously ordered his columns to halt there. lieut. i. i. stevens, ordered about the same time to advance on the direct road and reconnoitre, was supported by the engineer company under lieut. g. w. smith. this reconnaissance covered the convent of san pablo in the village of churubusco". (p. 378-9.) chapultepec. "battery no. 1 was constructed under lieut. g. w. smith's supervision, and battery no. 2 under lieut. g. b. mcclellan's. details were made from quitman's division to assist the engineer company in the construction of these works, but although directed to report immediately after dark they did not arrive until near 4 a. m., of the 12th; hence these works, which were to have been finished before daylight, were hardly commenced by that time. the engineers were however, indefatigable, and the batteries were completed rapidly". (p. 452.) city of mexico. "lieut. g. w. smith, with the company and train under his command, reported to general worth on the [san cosme] causeway, [in the afternoon, september 13th], was informed that the wounding of lieut. stevens made him [smith] the senior engineer of the attack then going on, and was instructed to go to the front, closely and carefully examine the state of affairs, return as soon as practicable, and report the best method of conducting the attack". he reported "that infantry alone on the left of the road could capture the gate, without artillery and with little loss, by making its way through the houses. he was ordered to take the engineer company and tools, return to the front, and carry out the plan proposed". (p. 476.) "the mexicans did not remain long in front of worth; after dark the signal for retreat of one command was given, and being heard by all, they left the buildings and scattered in all directions, their officers being unable to restrain them. in a little while, however, they repaired to the citadel. in one of the pavilions a council was held. santa anna presided, explained the untoward incidents of the day, and asked the opinions of those present as to whether or not the defence of the capital should be prolonged. there was discussion and opposition, but, santa anna announced his decision in these emphatic words: 'i resolve that this night this city must be evacuated'". (p. 480-1.) "at 1 o'clock a. m. of the 14th commissioners from the municipal government of the city approached the advanced post of worth's command, were passed to his headquarters, and by him sent to general scott's headquarters in tacubaya". (p. 481.) "general worth then directed the two engineer officers, serving with his command, to proceed to the front and with a detachment of infantry and the engineer company, closely examine all strong buildings, and direct operations toward the main plaza and national palace. the senior engineer being directed to make known promptly any indication that the rumored evacuation was incorrect, reported that everything indicated that the mexican army had abandoned the city". (p. 481.) appendix b. promotions of enlisted men of the company. tepe agualco, mexico, _may 4, 1847_. _colonel joseph g. totten_, _chief engineer_, _washington city_. sir: "i have the honor to inform you that, on the 25th of april, first sergeant hastings of 'k' company, third artillery, was, by order of general worth, transferred to the engineer corps, subject to the approval of the commander-in-chief. "sergeant hastings has the reputation of being one of the best first sergeants in the army. he was for 7 or 8 years orderly sergeant in the second infantry. he is an intimate friend of sergeant everett;[6] is a well educated man, very intelligent; a remarkably fine looking soldier, a good drill sergeant. "by birth he is an irishman--he came to this country quite young, and was brought up in po'keepsie, n. y. "we were very much in want of an orderly sergeant. i think there can be no doubt but we have secured a prize. "i would be glad if you would send a sergeant's warrant for david h. hastings. i respectfully recommend the following promotions and appointments in the engineer company: corporal benjamin w. coit, acting lance sergeant since 1st of february, to be sergeant from february 1st, 1847: artificer charles a. viregg, lance corporal since 1st of february, to be corporal from february 1st, 1847: artificer ethan t. sheldon, lance corporal since 1st of february, to be corporal from february 1st, 1847: artificer william a. noyes, to be corporal from the 18th of april, 1847: "privates charles a. pierce, jacob t. smith, benjamin l. boomer, edwin m. holloway, james brannan, joseph a. mower, david p. weaver, thomas bigley, seth h. taylor, and charles a. porter, to be artificers from the 29th of march, 1847: "musician frederick w. gerber to be artificer from the 18th of april, 1847: "privates augustus b. hussey, james b. vansant, and william s. bliss, to be artificers from the 29th of march, 1847: "corporal william bartlett, reduced to the grade of artificer, may 1st, 1847: "artificer hiram b. yeager to be corporal from may 1st, 1847: "artificer charles w. bont reduced to the grade of second class private from may 1st, 1847: "i respectfully call to the attention of the chief engineer the fact that, in accordance with his suggestion, i have delayed making the above recommendations, and now urge them as my deliberate opinion. i hope they will be favorably acted upon. "my monthly return for april shows a total of sixty-two. my recommendations make, in the company, six sergeants, six corporals, one musician, twenty-three artificers and twenty-six second class privates". very respectfully, your obdt. servt., gus. w. smith, _lieut., comdg. engr. co._ the foregoing recommendations were approved and the appointments were received whilst the company was in the city of puebla. soon after the war ended, sergeants hastings, starr and everett were promoted to be commissioned officers in the "old regular army" of the united states. later, sergeant warren l. lothrop was given a commission in that army. footnote: [6] thornton s. everett was property sergeant of the engineer company; had charge of its train from the time of his enlistment in the company until its return to west point; and, in addition, had charge, in mexico, of the general engineer train of the army. +------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | typographical errors corrected in the text: | | | | page 8 a changed to at | | page 9 camargo changed to carmargo | | page 10 camargo changed to carmargo | | page 11 montly changed to monthly | | page 11 chapparel changed to chaparral | | page 12 chapparal changed to chaparral | | page 12 referrred changed to referred | | page 13 extravagent changed to extravagant | | page 15 chapparal changed to chaparral | | page 20 relinguished changed to relinquished | | page 21 chapparal changed to chaparral | | page 22 chapparal changed to chaparral | | page 27 chapparal changed to chaparral | | page 28 twigg's changed to twiggs's | | page 29 chapparal changed to chaparral | | page 30 twigg's changed to twiggs's | | page 31 hights changed to heights | | page 38 quite changed to quiet | | page 41 coyocan changed to coyoacan | | page 44 coyocan changed to coyoacan | | page 45 coyocan changed to coyoacan | | page 49 come changed to came | | page 52 posession changed to possession | | page 64 amonnts changed to amounts | | page 64 seige changed to siege | | page 64 indebtness changed to indebtedness | | page 66 chapparal changed to chaparral | +------------------------------------------------+ transcriber's note: text enclosed by equal signs is in bold face (=bold=). a group of asterisks represents an ellipsis. a complete list of typographical corrections follows the text. the mormon battalion its history and achievements by b. h. roberts the deseret news salt lake city, utah 1919 copyright, 1919. by b. h. roberts. table of contents i. the march of the battalion compared with other historical marches. retreat of the ten thousand 1 doniphan's expedition into mexico 3 the world's record for a march of infantry 4 ii. the call of the battalion. the mormon appeal to the united states government for help 5 little's consultations with the president 7 the order to enlist mormon volunteers 11 terms of enlistment 12 captain allen in the mormon camps 13 brigham young's activities in raising the battalion 16 muster of the battalion 18 farewell scenes 19 iii. advantages and disadvantages in the call of the battalion. a sacrifice nevertheless 21 advantages of the enlistment 22 money value of the enlistment 24 the equipment of the battalion to be retained 25 appreciation of the mormon leaders 26 iv. the march of the battalion from fort leavenworth to santa fe. death of colonel allen. question of a successor 27 complaints of the volunteers 28 the line of march 29 arrival at santa fe. condition of the command 30 invalided detachment sent to pueblo 32 v. the march of the battalion from santa fe to the mouth of the gila. more invaliding 34 hardship of excessive toil 35 irrigation in new mexico 36 march down the rio grande 36 "blow the right." the westward turn 37 the fight with wild bulls 38 mexican opposition at tucson 39 junction with kearny's trail 42 march down the gila 42 at the mouth of the gila 43 vi. the march of the battalion from the colorado to the pacific ocean. destitution and suffering of the men en march 45 from carriso creek to san phillipe 47 at warner's rancho 49 the march directed to san diego 49 in sight of the pacific 50 san diego mission 51 col. cooke's bulletin on the battalion's march 51 vii. the battalion in california. at san luis rey mission 54 clean up and drill 54 company b at san diego 55 the conquest of california 56 the kearny-fremont controversy 56 viii. record of the battalion in california. efforts to re-enlist the battalion 58 homeward bound 60 the discharge and payment of the pueblo detachments 61 the purchase of ogden site with battalion money 61 the battalion's contribution of seeds to utah colonies 63 the battalion's part in the discovery of gold 63 the date of the discovery of gold 65 the tide of western civilization started 67 the mormon battalion's "diggings" on the american river 68 the call of duty 69 ascent of the sierras from the western side 72 wagon trail from los angeles to salt lake 72 evidence of appreciation of the battalion's services 73 efforts to raise a second mormon battalion 74 ix. the battalion in the perspective of seventy-three years. the battalion as utah pioneers 76 achievements of the battalion 77 territory added to the united states 77 the gadsden purchase and the battalion route 78 connection with irrigation 80 x. the subsequent distinction achieved by the battalion's commanding officers. colonel cooke 83 lieut. a. j. smith 84 lieut. george stoneman 84 xi. anecdotes. character of col. cooke 85 col. cooke and christoper layton 85 col. cooke and lot smith 86 the colonel, the mule, and bigler 87 "wire, wire, wire d----n you sir!" 88 col. cooke's respect for the battalion 88 addenda. the battalion's monument. the state of utah's mormon battalion monument commission 89 description of the monument 91 the duty of the people of utah 95 the mormon battalion i. the march of the battalion compared with other historical marches. "the lieutenant-colonel commanding congratulates the battalion on their safe arrival on the shores of the pacific ocean, and the conclusion of their march of over two thousand miles. history will be searched in vain for an equal march of infantry." so wrote lieutenant-colonel p. st. george cooke in "order no. i," from "head quarters mormon battalion, mission of san diego", under date of january 30th, 1847. if col. cooke is accurate in his statement--and one has a right to assume that he is, since he was a graduate of the united states military academy of west point, and hence versed in the history of such military incidents--then the march of this battalion is a very wonderful performance. for if history might be searched in vain for an equal march of infantry when col. cooke wrote his "order no. i," then certainly no march of infantry since that time has equaled it. the only other historical marches that are comparable with the mormon battalions' march are xenophon's and doniphan's, the former in ancient, the latter in modern times. "=retreat of the ten thousand.="--xenophon's march is commonly known as the "retreat of the ten thousand," 401 b. c. the account of the "retreat" is given in xenophon's anabasis. about fourteen thousand greek soldiers under a spartan leader named clearchus entered the service of a persian prince, cyrus, surnamed the younger, brother of the then reigning king of persia, artaxerxes ii. the purpose of cyrus was to deprive his brother of the throne of persia, and reign in his stead. the expedition marched through asia minor to cunaxa, near old babylon, where an army of 900,000 persians engaged the army of cyrus, which, with his greek auxiliaries number but 300,000. the smaller army was really successful in the battle, but a rash attempt on the part of cyrus to slay his brother during the engagement--in which he himself was killed--changed the fortunes of the day, the expedition ended in failure and hence the retreat of the greek ten thousand up the valley of the tigris, through armenia to trebizond, a greek city on the euxine--our modern black sea. this march of greek infantry though attended with almost incredible hardships from cold, hunger, and the assaults of enemies, was not equal to the march of the mormon battalion for the reason that it covered but fifteen hundred miles, as against the two thousand miles covered by the battalion. while the greek infantry in their retreat numbered more men than the battalion, and fought many battles, their march was, for the most part, through settled lands and along well defined roads, while the greater part of the battalion's march was through desert lands; and four hundred and seventy-four miles of it through trackless deserts where nothing but savages and wild beasts were found, "or deserts where, for want of water, there was no living creature."[2:a] =doniphan's expedition into mexico.=--doniphan's march occurred in the same year, and in the same war in which the battalion served--the war with mexico, 1846. the march is known as doniphan's expedition into mexico. the expedition started from santa fe and marched to matamoras, near where the rio grande empties into the gulf of mexico--a distance of about thirteen or fourteen hundred miles.[3:b] the march was via el paso, chihuahua, parras, saltillo and monterey, thence to matamoras. here the expedition embarked for new orleans, where the men were mustered out of service. the important battles of brazito and sacramento were fought enroute, the former placing el paso, and the latter the city of chihuahua--capital of the state of the same name--in the hands of the americans. the expedition numbered about nine hundred men, mostly from missouri, and under the command of col. alexander w. doniphan of that state, and returned to missouri via the gulf of mexico and the mississippi. the march overland it will be observed was less than that of the battalion's. for the most part, moreover, doniphan's march was through a settled country, and over roads long used between santa fe and points in northern and central mexico. besides, the expedition was not exclusively made up of infantry, being mixed cavalry and infantry, and therefore would not strictly come in competition with the battalion which was entirely of infantry, with accompanying baggage wagons. doniphan's expedition is so wonderful a performance, however, and has been so generously acclaimed, that if unmentioned in connection with the performance of the battalion, and the contrast made as above, it might be thought by some to rival the march of the latter. this, however, is not the case. =the world's record for a march of infantry.=--not even in the world's great war, now happily ended, has the mormon battalion's march been equaled, though in all other things that war has surpassed the previous war experiences of mankind. and since the battalion's march has not been equaled by any march of infantry in the world's great war, nor in ancient times, it is not likely now, owing to the new methods for the transportation of troops that have been developed, that the mormon battalion's march across more than half of the north american continent will ever be equaled. it will stand as the world's record for a march of infantry. footnotes: [2:a] see cooke's wagon road map for this part of the route. [3:b] i am aware that the historian of "doniphan's expedition"--william e. connelley, credits the expedition with a grand circuit of 5,500 miles, 2,500 miles of which he states was by water, leaving a distance of 3,500 miles by land; but he accounts the expedition as starting from independence, mo., and returning to it. whereas the expedition was organized and began its great march at santa fe, and ended at matamoras, where it embarked for home. ii. the call of the battalion. the mormon battalion owes its existence to the exodus of the mormon people from the state of illinois to the then (1846) little known region of the rocky mountain west. the leaders of that people had decided that there was little prospect of their being able to live in peace with their neighbors in illinois, or in any of the surrounding states, owing to the existence of strong prejudices against their religion, and therefore they resolved upon seeking a new home in the west--"within the basin of the great salt lake, or bear river valley * * * believing that to be a point where a good living will require hard labor, and consequently will be coveted by no other people, while it is surrounded by so unpopulous but fertile a country."[5:a] =the mormon appeal to the united states government for help.=--before the exodus from illinois began, as early as the 20th of january (1846), the high council at nauvoo made public announcement of the intention of the mormon people to move to "some good valley of the rocky mountains;" and in the event of president polk's "recommendation to build block houses and stockade forts on the route to oregon, becoming a law, we have encouragement," they said "of having that work to do, and under our peculiar circumstances, we can do it with less expense to the government than any other people."[5:b] six days later jesse c. little was appointed by the mormon church authorities president of the eastern states mission, and in his letter of appointment was instructed as follows: "if our government shall offer any facilities for emigrating to the western coast, embrace those facilities, if possible. as a wise and faithful man, take every honorable advantage of the times you can."[6:c] "in consonance with my instructions," says mr. little, in his report to brigham young, which is recorded in the latter's manuscript history, "i * * * resolved upon visiting james k. polk, president of the united states, to lay the situation of my brethren before him, and ask him, as the representative of our country, to stretch forth the federal arm in their behalf." in pursuance of this design mr. little obtained a letter of introduction from john h. steel, governor of new hampshire, in which state mr. little had been reared. the governor in his letter declared that he had known mr. little from childhood, and believed him honest in his views and intentions, and added: "mr. little visits washington, if i understand him correctly, for the purpose of procuring, or endeavoring to procure, the freight of any provisions or naval stores which the government may be desirous of sending to oregon, or to any portion of the pacific. he is thus desirous of obtaining freight for the purpose of lessening the expense of chartering vessels to convey him and his followers to california, where they intend going and making a permanent settlement the present summer."[6:d] from luke milber, also of petersboro, n. h., mr. little secured a letter to hon. mace moulton in washington, which in addition to vouching for the high character of mr. little, based upon personal knowledge of him for twelve years, announced that he was "soliciting some aid from the general government, to assist himself and brethren throughout the united states in emigrating to california." in may of the same year, at a church conference held in philadelphia, mr. little made the acquaintance of the kanes. they were an old and honorable pennsylvania family. the father, judge john k. kane, had been attorney general of the state of pennsylvania; and at the time of mr. little's visit at his home he was united states judge for the district of pennsylvania, also president of the american philosophical society. dr. elisha kent kane, the famous arctic explorer and scientist, was his son; as was also thomas l. kane, who afterward served with distinction as colonel and brigadier general in the union army in the war between the states. from the latter mr. little received a letter of introduction to hon. geo. m. dallas, vice-president of the united states. "he visits washington," said kane's letter to mr. dallas, "with no other object than the laudable one of desiring aid of the government for his people." =little's consultation with the president.=--the arrival of mr. little at washington on the 21st of may was most opportune for the business he had in hand. he called upon president polk that same evening in company with a mr. dame of massachusetts, and mr. king, a representative of the same state. sam houston of texas and other distinguished gentlemen were present. news of the capture of an american reconnoitering troop of dragoons under command of captain thornton, on the east side of the rio grande, sixteen of whom were killed, had reached washington early in may, and enabled the president in his message to congress, on the 11th of that month, to say that "mexico had invaded our territory, and shed the blood of our citizens on our own soil;" which led congress two days later to declare war and vote the funds necessary to its vigorous prosecution. by the time mr. little called upon the president the news had reached washington of the victory of the american forces under general taylor at the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma, fought on the 8th and 9th of may respectively. news of these victories aroused the war spirit throughout the land,[8:e] and hastened all the government schemes for prosecuting the war, including the plan of gathering the "army of the west" at fort leavenworth, under col. stephen w. kearny, to invade new mexico, and ultimately co-operate with the pacific fleet which it was designed should sweep round cape horn and attack on the pacific coast of mexico.[8:f] it was with this "army of the west" that the mormon battalion was destined to be connected. mr. little a few days later was informed by his friends in washington that the plan for the mormon participation in this movement to the west, discussed by the president and his cabinet, was for mr. little to go directly to the camps of the mormon people in the west and have one thousand men fitted out and plunge into california, officered by their own men, the commanding officer to be appointed by president polk; and to send one thousand more by way of cape horn, who will take cannon and everything needed in preparing defense; those by land to receive pay from the time little should see them, and those going by water, from september first.[9:g] at this point mr. little seems to have taken up the matter personally and directly with the president, and under date of june 1st addressed an "appeal" to him. in it mr. little expresses confidence in the president, else he would not have left his home "to ask favors" of him for his people (i. e., the mormons). he gave an account of himself and his forefathers, who fought "in the battles of the revolution;" of his own character, vouched for by his letters of introduction from men of high standing; and then avers that the people he represents are of as high character as himself. "i come to you," he said, "fully believing that you will not suffer me to depart without rendering me some pecuniary assistance. * * * our brethren in the west are compelled to go [west]; and we in the eastern country are determined to go and live, and, if necessary, to suffer and die with them. our determinations are fixed and cannot be changed. from twelve to fifteen thousand have already left nauvoo for california, and many others are making ready to go. some have gone around cape horn, and i trust before this time have landed at the bay of san francisco. "we have about forty thousand (members) in the british isles, and hundreds upon the sandwich islands, all determined to gather to this place, and thousands will sail this fall. there are yet many thousands scattered through the states, besides the great number in and around nauvoo, who are determined to go as soon as possible, but many of them are poor (but noble men and women), and are destitute of means to pay their passage either by sea or land. "if you assist us at this crisis," said the "appeal," "i hereby pledge my honor, my life, my property and all i possess as the representative of this (the mormon) people to stand ready at your call, and that the whole body of the people will act as one man in the land to which we are going, and should our territory be invaded we hold ourselves ready to enter the field of battle, and then like our patriot fathers * * * make the battlefield our grave or gain our liberty." mr. little signs himself "agent of the church of jesus christ of latter-day saints in the eastern states."[10:h] interviews followed with president polk on the 3rd, 4th, and 5th of june. of the visit to the president on the 5th mr. little writes in his report: "i visited president polk; he informed me that we should be protected in california, and that five hundred or one thousand of our people should be taken into the service, officered by our own men; said that i should have letters from him, and from the secretary of the navy to the squadron. i waived the president's proposal until evening, when i wrote a letter of acceptance."[10:i] there followed another and final interview with president polk on the 8th of june: "i called on the president, he was busy but sent me word to call on the secretary of war. i went to the war department, but as the secretary was busy, i did not see him; the president wished me to call at two p. m., which i did, and had an interview with him; he expressed his good feelings to our people--regarded us as good citizens, said he had received our suffrages, and we should be remembered; he had instructed the secretary of war to make out our papers, and that i could get away tomorrow."[11:j] =the orders to enlist mormon volunteers.=--colonel thomas l. kane was entrusted with the orders to colonel, afterwards general, stephen w. kearny, and accompanied mr. little as far as st. louis. here they separated, kane to go with his orders to kearny, then at fort leavenworth, and little to the camps of his people; then moving through southern iowa. it is not known just what considerations led president polk to cut down the number of mormons to be sent to occupy california from two thousand to five hundred. but in the orders sent to col. kearny, that officer was directed not to take into the service a greater number of mormons than one-third of his command, which was limited to about fifteen hundred men. "it is known," said kearny's order, to enlist mormon volunteers, "that a large body of mormon emigrants are en route to california, for the purpose of settling in that country. you are desired to use all proper means to have a good understanding with them, to the end that the united states may have their co-operation in taking possession of, and holding, that country. it has been suggested here that many of these mormons would willingly enter into the service of the united states, and aid us in our expedition against california. you are hereby authorized to muster into service such as can be induced to volunteer; not, however, to a number exceeding one-third of your entire force. should they enter the service they will be paid as other volunteers, and you can allow them to designate, so far as it can be properly done, the persons to act as officers."[12:k] =terms of enlistment.=--under this order kearny issued instructions to captain james allen, of the first regular dragoons, to proceed to the camps of the mormons and endeavor to raise from among them four or five companies of volunteers to join him in his expedition to california. the character of the battalion, terms of enlistment, pledges of the government are clearly set forth in allen's instructions: "each company to consist of any number between 73 and 109; the officers of each company will be a captain, first lieutenant and second lieutenant, who will be elected by the privates, and subject to your approval; and the captains then to appoint the non-commissioned officers, also subject to your approval. the companies, upon being thus organized, will be mustered by you into the service of the united states, and from that day will commence to receive the pay, rations and other allowances given to the other infantry volunteers, each according to his rank. you will, upon mustering into service the fourth company, be considered as having the rank, pay and emoluments of a lieutenant-colonel of infantry, and are authorized to appoint an adjutant, sergeant-major, and quartermaster-sergeant for the battalion. "the companies, after being organized, will be marched to this post [i. e., fort leavenworth, whence the order was issued] where they will be armed and prepared for the field, after which they will, under your command, follow on my trail in the direction of santa fe, and where you will receive further orders from me. "you will, upon organizing the companies, require provisions, wagons, horses, mules, etc. you must purchase everything that is necessary and give the necessary drafts upon the quartermaster and commissary departments at this post, which drafts will be paid upon presentation. "you will have the mormons distinctly to understand that i wish to have them as volunteers for twelve months; that they will be marched to california, receiving pay and allowances during the above time, and at its expiration they will be discharged, and allowed to retain, as their private property, the guns and accoutrements furnished to them at this post. "each company will be allowed four women as laundresses, who will travel with the company, receiving rations and other allowances given to the laundresses of our army. "with the foregoing conditions, which are hereby pledged to the mormons, and which will be faithfully kept by me and other officers in behalf of the government of the united states, i cannot doubt but that you will in a few days be able to raise five hundred young and efficient men for this expedition." =captain allen in the mormon camps.=--captain allen arrived at mount pisgah on the 26th of june, accompanied by three dragoons and presented to the leading men of that place "a circular to the mormons" in harmony with his instructions. the presiding brethren at mount pisgah did not feel authorized to take any steps in the matter of captain allen's communication on the enlistment of a battalion, but gave him a letter of introduction to president young at council bluffs, for which place the captain started immediately and arrived on the 30th of june. the following day he met with president young and others in council and presented the whole question of raising a battalion from the mormon camps. the question arose in the minds of the mormon leaders as to the disposition of the camps which would be materially crippled by the withdrawal of so many young, strong, and able-bodied men. already the question of wintering the camps and caring for so large an amount of stock possessed by them, loomed large among their difficulties. about one hundred and fifty miles to the west, in la platte river, was "grand island," fifty-two miles long, with an average width of a mile and three-quarters, and well timbered; in the neighborhood of which also were immense areas of grass that might be cut for hay, and the rank growth of rushes here and there along the extensive river bottoms would enable much of the stock to winter on this range, could government permission be obtained for a large contingent of the camp to be stationed there. this country, as well as the one the camps were then occupying, was within the louisiana purchase, and largely divided into indian reservations, hence could only be occupied by the whites by permission of the government. the question of government permission therefore, in the event of the battalion being raised, was submitted to captain allen, and he assumed the responsibility of saying that the camps might locate on grand island until they could prosecute their journey. in his speech made to the camp the same day, the captain promised to write president polk to give leave to the mormon camps to stay on their route wherever it was necessary. at a council meeting held later in the day, on brigham young asking captain allen "if an officer enlisting men in an 'indian country' had not a right to say to their families, you can stay till your husbands return," the captain replied "that he was the representative of president polk and could act till he notified the president, who might ratify his engagements, or indemnify for damages. the president might give permission to travel through the indian country and stop whenever and wherever circumstances required."[15:l] after the first council meeting between captain allen and the mormon leaders a public meeting was held at noon on the same day. brigham young introduced captain allen who addressed the people: "he said he was sent by col. stephen w. kearny through the benevolence of jas. k. polk, president of the united states, to enlist five hundred of our men; that there were hundreds of thousands of volunteers ready [to enlist] in the states. he read his order from col. kearny and the circular which he himself had issued from mount pisgah and explained."[15:m] the statement of captain allen that there were hundreds of thousands of volunteers ready to enlist in the states was quite true. the declaration of war upon mexico by the congress "authorized the president to accept the service of fifty thousand volunteers, and placed ten millions of dollars at his disposal. * * * the call for volunteers was answered by the prompt tender of the service of more than 300,000 men."[16:n] "four regiments were called for from illinois, nine answered the call, numbering 8,370; only four of them, numbering 3,720 men, could be taken."[16:o] =brigham young's activities in raising the battalion.= brigham young followed captain allen in an address, at the aforesaid meeting. his own account of his remarks stand in his ms. history as follows: "i addressed the assembly; wished them to make a distinction between this action of the general government and our former oppressions in missouri and illinois. i said, the question might be asked, is it prudent for us to enlist to defend our country? if we answer in the affirmative, all are ready to go. "suppose we were admitted into the union as a state, and the government did not call on us, we would feel ourselves neglected. let the mormons be the first to set their feet on the soil of california. captain allen has assumed the responsibility of saying that we may locate on grand island, until we can prosecute our journey. this is the first offer we have ever had from the government to benefit us. "i proposed that the five hundred volunteers be mustered and i would do my best to see all their families brought forward, as far as my influence extended, and feed them when i had anything to eat myself."[16:p] at the close of the public meeting another council meeting was held, with captain allen present, when the question of the people having a right to remain on indian lands during the absence of the soldiers, and indeed along their whole route of travel, was further considered. captain allen withdrew from the council "and the twelve," says brigham young, "continued to converse on the favorable prospect before us."[17:q] it was arranged that brigham young should go to mount pisgah to raise volunteers for the battalion; and that other leaders should prosecute the work of raising volunteers in the camps about council bluffs. there was apparently some reluctance among the people to respond to this unexpected call, and it required some considerable persuasion to dispel it. on the 11th of july, col. thomas l. kane reached the mormon camps at council bluffs, and gave assurance that the general government had taken the mormon case into consideration, inferentially with benevolent intentions.[17:r] when within eleven miles of mount pisgah, brigham young and heber c. kimball met jesse c. little, president of the eastern states mission, who reported his labors at washington. his written report was incorporated in brigham young's ms. history for that year. while at pisgah brigham young wrote the camp at garden grove, and sent his letter by special messenger. after describing the terms of enlistment and the conditions under which the volunteers would be mustered out of service in california, etc., he said: "they may stay (i. e. in california), look out the best locations for themselves and their friends, and defend the country. this is no hoax. mr. little, president of the new england churches, is here direct from washington, who has been to see the president on the subject of emigrating the saints to the western coast, and confirms all that captain allen has stated to us. the united states want our friendship, the president wants to do us good and secure our confidence. the outfit of this five hundred men costs us nothing, and their pay will be sufficient to take their families over the mountains. there is war between mexico and the united states, to whom california must fall a prey, and if we are the first settlers, the old citizens cannot have a hancock [county] or missouri pretext to mob the saints. the thing is from above, for our good." a letter of like spirit was sent by brigham young to the trustees at nauvoo. in that letter the following passage occurs: "this is the first time the government has stretched forth its arm to our assistance, and we receive their proffers with joy and thankfulness. we feel confident they [the battalion] will have little or no fighting. the pay of the five hundred men will take their families to them. the mormons will then be the old settlers and have a chance to choose the best locations."[18:s] =muster of the battalion.=--when brigham young returned from mount pisgah, a public meeting was held on the 13th of july, and the final work of enrollment of the battalion began. at the opening meeting brigham young said: "if we want the privilege of going where we can worship god according to the dictates of our conscience, we must raise the battalion. i say it is right, and who cares for sacrificing our comfort for a few years. i would rather have undertaken to raise 2,000 a year ago in 24 hours, than 100 in one week now."[19:t] later he said to the mustering companies, "you could not ask for anything more acceptable than this mission."[19:u] an american flag--flag of the united states--"brought out from the store-house of things rescued"--in the mormon exodus from illinois--"was hoisted to a tree mast, and under it the enrollment took place."[19:v] the enrollment of the battalion was completed on the 16th of july, and that day captain allen took the organization under his command. =farewell scenes.=--"there was no sentimental affectation at their leave-taking," remarks col. kane in his account of the departure of the battalion from the camps. the afternoon before their departure a "ball" was given in their honor. of this "ball," col. kane says: "a more merry dancing rout i have never seen, though the company went without refreshments and their ball room was of the most primitive kind. [under a bowery where the ground had been trodden firm and hard by frequent use.] to the canto of debonair violins, the cheer of horns, the jingle of sleigh bells, and the jovial snoring of the tambourine, they did dance! none of your minuets or other mortuary processions of gentles in etiquette, tight shoes, and pinching gloves, but the spirited and scientific displays of our venerated and merry grandparents, who were not above following the fiddle to the foxchase inn, or gardens of gray's ferry. french fours, copenhagen jigs, virginia reels, and the like forgotten figures executed with the spirit of people too happy to be slow, or bashful, or constrained. light hearts, lithe figures, and light feet, had it their own way from an early hour till after the sun had dipped behind the sharp sky line of the omaha hills."[20:w] on the 20th of july the battalion took up its march for fort leavenworth, where it arrived on the 1st of august, and began preparations for the great western march. footnotes: [5:a] from a letter of brigham young to president james k. polk, date of august 9, 1846. history of brigham young, ms. bk. 2 p. 137. [5:b] times and seasons, vol. v, p. 1096. [6:c] little's report, hist. of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, pp. 11-12. [6:d] little's report to brigham young. [8:e] mr. little notes this excitement in his report, to brigham young, by saying in recording his movements of the 23rd of may: "there was considerable excitement in consequence of the news that gen. taylor had fought two battles with the mexicans" (little's report, hist. of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, p. 16). and lossing says that when "news of the two brilliant victories reached the states a thrill of joy went throughout the land, and bonfires, illuminations, orations, the thunder of cannons, were seen and heard in all the great cities". (hist. u. s., p. 483). [8:f] lossing's history u. s., 1872 edition, p. 483. [9:g] little's report, p. 16. [10:h] little's report, p. 20-22. [10:i] ibid, p. 23. [11:j] little's report, p. 23. [12:k] executive document no. 60, letter of secretary of war to gen. kearny, marked "confidential", 1846. [15:l] history of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, pp. 4, 5. [15:m] ibid, pp. 3, 4. [16:n] history of the united states, marcus wilson, appendix p. 682; same lossing, p. 482; stephens, p. 488. [16:o] gregg's history of hancock co. ill., p. 118. [16:p] history of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, pp. 4, 5. [17:q] history of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, pp. 4, 5. [17:r] taylor's journal, entry of july 11th, 1846. [18:s] history of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, pp. 30-34. [19:t] history of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, p. 44. [19:u] history of brigham young, ms. bk. 2, p. 48. [19:v] kane's lecture "the mormons", p. 80. [20:w] kane's lecture "the mormons", pp. 80, 81. iii. advantages and disadvantages to the mormons arising from the enlistment of the battalion. the "call" for the mormon battalion was not an unfriendly act on the part of the united states' government towards the mormon people. a representative of the church, as we have seen, had appealed most earnestly to the executive of the nation for aid in the western emigrations of that people; and when it was decided by the administration to "accept" the services of such a force of volunteers, the mormon leaders received the decision as an answer to their appeal for aid. =a sacrifice nevertheless.=--but notwithstanding the government service was asked for by the representative of the mormon people, and the granting of it was regarded by the mormon leaders at the time as a great advantage to their people, it brought to the volunteers and to the people generally much of sacrifice. for one thing the opportunity to avail themselves of their tendered service to the government came at an unexpected and a most inconvenient time. as explained afterwards by col. kane, "the young and those who could best have been spared, were then away from the main body, either with pioneer companies in the van, or, their faith unannounced, seeking work and food about the northwest settlements, to support them till the return of the season for commencing emigration. the force was therefore to be recruited from among the fathers of families, and others whose presence it was most desirable to retain."[21:a] practically five hundred wagons were left without teamsters, and as many families were left without their natural protectors and providers. the families of the battalion, with the families of their friends, in whose care they must leave their loved ones, and upon whom they must depend for succor, were then scattered in a string of camps for some hundreds of miles between nauvoo and council bluffs, with no certain abiding place designated, and no immediate prospect of being permanently settled. to volunteer for a "war-march" of two thousand miles, much of which was desert, under such circumstances, was doubly hard. moreover the mormon people, from their then point of view, had little to be grateful for to the government of the united states. their appeals from what to them was the injustice of missouri and illinois had met with but cold reception at washington. they did not and could not be expected to understand, much less sympathize with, the refinements employed by the national legislators in drawing nice distinctions about the division of sovereignty between the states and the general government. they were self-conscious of wrongs inflicted upon their community in the two states in which they had settled--missouri and illinois. they had appealed to the general government for a redress of those grievances without avail; and now they were asked by their leaders to go into the service of that government which might mean the sacrifice of life, and surely meant the abandonment of their families to the care of others under circumstances the most trying. to respond to the call made upon them--both as to the volunteers and the camped community whence they were mustered--was a manifestation of unselfishness not often paralleled in history. =advantages of the enlistment.=--notwithstanding all the sacrifices involved, brigham young and those associated with him were too astute as leaders not to appreciate the advantages of having a considerable number of their people to enter the service of the united states. the charge of disloyalty to the american government had often been made against the mormons, which not all their protests and denials could overcome. but to enter the service of the government in a time of war, involving such inconveniences as must be theirs, would be an evidence of loyalty that would stand forever, both unimpeached and unimpeachable. that such was the understanding of brigham young is specifically expressed by him about a month after the departure of the battalion. "let every one distinctly understand," said he, "that the mormon battalion was organized from our camp to allay the prejudices of the people, prove our loyalty to the government of the united states, and for the present and temporal salvation of israel; that this act left near five hundred teams destitute of drivers and provisions for the winter, and nearly as many families without protection and help."[23:b] =the right to settle on indian lands secured.=--another advantage appealed to the leaders: it had become evident before the call was made for the battalion, that while it might be possible for a specially organized pioneer company to go over the mountains that season--preparations for which were being rapidly made--the very great majority of the camps would be under the necessity of spending a year or more in southern iowa, principally on indian lands. the prospects of remaining upon such lands in peace would be much enhanced if it could be pleaded that five hundred of their men were in the service of the government of the united states; and subsequent events demonstrated the validity of such a plea; also it was the advantage sought to be secured by brigham young in his first conference with captain allen on the subject of the enlistment of the battalion. under these arrangements of occupancy, as the indian titles in lands in iowa expired, the mormon occupants acquired valuable pre-emption rights up and down the missouri river from council bluffs for a distance of between fifty and sixty miles, stretching back on the east side of said river some thirty or forty miles.[24:c] =money value of the enlistment.=--another consideration of importance was the remuneration of these soldiers. a year's pay for their clothing in advance at the rate of $3.50 per man per month, would amount to $42.00 each; and to $21,000 for the battalion. deciding to make their march in the clothing they had when enlisting, part of their money for clothing was sent back from fort leavenworth to be used for the benefit of the families of the battalion, and part of it to assist the mormon leaders. subsequently agents were secretly sent to santa fe to bring back to the camps the pay of the soldiers that had accrued by the time they had arrived there. this amounted to three months' pay at the following rates: captain, $50.00 per month--rations 20 cents per day; first lieutenant, $30.00 per month--rations 20 cents per day; second lieutenant, $25.00 per month--rations 20 cents per day; first sergeant, $16.00 per month; sergeants, $13.00 per month; corporals, $9.00 per month; musicians, $8.00 per month; and privates, $7.00 per month. the payment at santa fe was made in government checks--"not very available at santa fe"--i. e. not easily negotiable--writes col. cooke.[25:d] it has often been claimed that the battalion was paid a bounty--$42.00 per man--on entering the service. this was not the case. the payment for clothing, one year in advance, at the rate of $3.50 per month has been mistaken for bounty.[25:e] it was only by foregoing the purchase of clothing that the battalion could send the payment for it to their families and to the mormon leaders. this source of revenue to the camps was accounted a very great blessing at the time. in official letters to the battalion from the mormon leaders, under date of august 16th and 21st, respectively, it was said, in the first, that the battalion had been placed in circumstances which enabled them to control more means than all the rest of the mormon people in the wilderness; in the second brigham young said: "we consider the money you have received, as compensation for your clothing, a peculiar manifestation of the kind providence of our heavenly father at this particular time, which is just the time for the purchasing of provisions and goods for the winter supply of the camp."[25:f] =the equipment of the battalion to be retained.=--in addition to this payment for clothing, and the monthly pay, there was the five hundred stand of arms and camp equipment which were to become the personal property of the men when discharged in california. these several considerations led john taylor--who became the successor to brigham young in mormon leadership--in an address to the mormons in england--to say: "the president of the united states is favorably disposed to us. he has sent out orders to have five hundred of our brethren employed for one year in an expedition that was fitting out against california, with orders for them to be employed for one year, and when to be discharged in california, and to have their arms and implements of war given to them at the expiration of the term, and as there is no prospect of any opposition, it amounts to the same as paying them for going to the place where they were destined to go without."[26:g] =appreciation of mormon leaders.=--in a letter to president polk, under date of august 9th, 1846, after reminding the president of the disadvantages the mormon camps experienced in raising the battalion, brigham young said: "but in the midst of this we were cheered with the presence of our friend, mr. little, of new hampshire, who assures us of the personal friendship of the president in the act before us; and this assurance, though not doubted by us in the least, was soon made doubly sure by the testimony of col. kane, of philadelphia." footnotes: [21:a] transcriber's note: footnote missing in original. [23:b] history of brigham young, august 14, 1846, ms., bk. 2, pp. 151-2. [24:c] see orson pratt in millennial star, vol. x, pp. 241-7. [25:d] conquest of new mexico, p. 92. [25:e] see history of the mormon church (roberts), americana, march, 1912, p. 308, for a letter from the united states war department on this subject. [25:f] history mormon church, americana, march, 1912, p. 310. [26:g] mill. star, vol. viii, p. 117. iv. the march of the battalion from fort leavenworth. at fort leavenworth the battalion received its equipment of 100 tents, one for every 6 privates; also their arms and camp accoutrements. when drawing the checks for clothing, the paymaster expressed great surprise to find that every man was able to sign his own name to the pay roll. =death of col. allen. question of a successor.=--at fort leavenworth col. allen was taken ill; but on the 12th of august he ordered the battalion to start on its western march, while he would remain a few days, recuperate and overtake them. he died on the 23rd, much lamented by the battalion, which had become warmly attached to him. commenting upon his demise the author of the "doniphan expedition," william e. connelly, says: "thus died lieutenant-colonel allen, of the first u. s. dragoons, in the midst of a career of usefulness under the favoring smiles of fortune, beloved while living, regretted after death by all who knew him, both among the volunteers and the troops." on the death of col. allen the question of succession in command was considered. it appears that this subject was mooted at the time the companies of the battalion were enlisted; and "col. allen repeatedly stated to us," says brigham young, "that there would be no officer in the battalion, except himself, only from among our people; that if he fell in battle, or was sick, or disabled by any means, the command would devolve on the ranking officer, which would be the captain of company 'a' and 'b', and so on according to letter." the battalion appears to have had the same understanding, for at a council meeting of the officers it was agreed by them that captain jefferson hunt, of company "a", should assume command, which decision was afterwards sustained by the unanimous vote of the men. meantime, however, major horton, in command at fort leavenworth, sent lieutenant a. j. smith, of the regular army, to take command of the battalion. this led to a threatened complication; for an appeal to such written military authorities as were available to the officers of the battalion, left them hopelessly divided in their conclusions. on the arrival of lieutenant smith a council of officers was held in which the battalion officers demanded to know what reasons existed for their acceptance of him as commander rather than captain hunt. to which it was answered that the government property in possession of the battalion was not yet receipted for, but that lieutenant smith could receipt for it, and being a commissioned officer of the regular army, he would be known at washington, and his actions and orders recognized; whereas the officers of the battalion had not yet received their commissions, and it would be doubtful if their selection of a commander would be approved. after this discussion captain hunt submitted the matter to the officers, and all but three voted in favor of accepting lieutenant smith as the commander of the battalion. =complaints of the volunteers.=--with lieutenant smith had come dr. george b. sanderson, whom col. allen, at leavenworth, had appointed a surgeon in the u. s. army, to serve with the mormon battalion. according to the historian of the battalion,[29:a] the volunteers suffered much because of the "arrogance, inefficiency and petty oppressions" of these two officers. this view of these officers, however, is to be accounted for by the volunteers being suddenly brought under the enforced discipline of the u. s. army regulations. the heat of the season was excessive, the men had been already much exhausted by the strenuous labor and exposure during the journey through iowa with their people earlier in the season, and as a result many of them fell a prey to the malaria prevalent in the country and at this season of the year. for this dr. sanderson prescribed calomel and arsenic, and as the men were averse to taking medicine, pleading even religious scruples against the drugs, the matter gave rise to much unpleasantness between the battalion physician and the command, involving therein lieutenant smith, who, in the interest of what he no doubt regarded as discipline, sided with the physician. =the line of march.=--the battalion's line of march, from fort leavenworth, after crossing the kaw or kansas river, followed that of the first missouri dragoons, led over the route that same year by col. doniphan, via council grove, thence some distance up the arkansas river to a little beyond fort mann, where they crossed that river in order to take what was known as the "cimmeron route"--because it crossed cimmeron river and followed some distance up the south branch of the stream, called cimmeron creek. the last crossing of the arkansas they reached on the 16th of september, and here the commanding officer insisted that most of the families--about twelve or fifteen in number, which had so far accompanied the battalion--should be detached and sent under a guard of ten men up the arkansas to pueblo, which nestles at the east base of the rocky mountain range. there were stout protests against this "division of the battalion;" as it was held to be a violation of the promise that the battalion would not be divided, also that these families should be permitted to travel with the battalion to california. unquestionably, however, the arrangement was in the best interests both of the families and of the battalion, and accordingly the detachment was made up as proposed, and marched to pueblo under command of captain nelson higgins. =arrival at santa fe; condition of the command.=--the main body of the command continued its march south-westward to san miguel, thence turning the point of a mountain range marched north westward to santa fe, where they arrived in two detachments on the 9th and 12th of october, respectively. upon the arrival of the first detachment the battalion was received by a salute of one hundred guns by order of col. doniphan,[30:b] then in command both as civil and military head of the department of new mexico; but making ready for what was to be his great and historic march upon chihuahua. on the arrival of the battalion at santa fe it was learned that general kearny, previous to his departure for the west, had designated col. p. st. george cooke[31:c] to take command of the battalion and to follow on his trail with wagons to california. speaking of the condition of the battalion, on its arrival in santa fe, and remarking on its physical unfitness to undertake the march to california, col. cooke, in his "conquest of new mexico," says: "everything conspired to discourage the extraordinary undertaking of marching this battalion eleven hundred miles, for the much greater part through an unknown wilderness, without road or trail, and with a wagon train. "it was enlisted too much by families; some were too old and feeble, and some too young; it was embarrassed by many women; it was undisciplined; it was much worn by traveling on foot, and marching from nauvoo, illinois; their clothing was very scant; there was no money to pay them, or clothing to issue; their mules were utterly broken down; the quartermaster department was without funds, and its credit bad; and animals were scarce. those procured were very inferior, and were deteriorating every hour for lack of forage or grazing."[31:d] "so every preparation must be pushed--hurried. a small party with families had been sent from arkansas crossing up the river, to winter at a small settlement close to the mountains, called pueblo. the battalion was now inspected, and eighty-six men found inefficient were ordered, under two officers, with nearly all the women, to go to the same point; five wives of officers were reluctantly allowed to accompany the march, but furnished their own transportation. by special arrangement and consent, the battalion was paid in checks--not very available at santa fe (i. e. negotiable). "with every effort, the quartermaster could only undertake to furnish rations for sixty days; and, in fact, full rations, of only flour, sugar, coffee and salt; salt pork only for thirty days, and soap for twenty. to venture without pack-saddles would be grossly imprudent, and so that burden was added."[32:e] =invalided detachment sent to pueblo.=--it was understood that the men invalided and their escort, together with the women and children belonging to the battalion, would have the privilege in the spring of intercepting the main body of their people moving to the west, and going with them "at government expense."[32:f] the above arrangement was the result of a council of the officers of the battalion with colonel doniphan of missouri, then in charge of military and civil affairs at santa fe, and with col. cooke who had been designated by gen. kearny to take command of the battalion in its march to the pacific, on his own departure from santa fe to california. captain james brown, of company c., and st. elam luddington, of company b, were the two officers above referred to as being placed in charge of the detachment. this company arrived at pueblo on the 17th of november, and went into winter quarters near the encampment of captain higgins, who had preceded them to that point; and the next spring, according to the above arrangement, joined in the westward movement of their people, following so closely the pioneer company led by brigham young, that they entered salt lake valley on the 29th of july, five days after the arrival of the first pioneer company. to the wife of one of the members of the battalion, mrs. catherine campbell steele, wife of john steele, company d, was born the first white child in "utah," august 9th, 1847. footnotes: [29:a] this is sergeant daniel tyler, author of "a concise history of the mormon battalion in the mexican war." the work was published in 1881. h. h. bancroft speaks very highly of this work in his history of california, vol. v, p. 477, note. [30:b] col. doniphan had come to santa fe with kearny, commanding the first missouri regiment; and after the departure of the general for california, he was left in command at santa fe until the arrival of col. sterling price, who when he arrived, was to take command at santa fe (doniphan's expedition, connelley, 1907, pp. 250-1-3). the historian of the mormon battalion notes that the command of col. price, numbering about 1,200 men, received no such marked honor on their arrival in santa fe as was accorded to the battalion. (tyler's battalion, p. 164.) [31:c] the colonel was born in virginia in 1809. graduated from west point in 1827; was in the black hawk war in illinois--1832, and at the battle of bad ax, fought in july of that year. in 1833 he was made a lieutenant; saw service on the plains, principally in what is now kansas, before the mexican war; in this war he took a prominent part in the affairs at santa fe and marched the mormon battalion to california. "during the fifties, in the border troubles in kansas he saw much service; in the civil war he was for the union. he was retired in 1873, having served in the army continuously for forty-six years. he died march 20, 1895." "doniphan's expedition," p. 264. [31:d] later, col. cooke again complains of his teams, in the following passage: "i have brought road tools and have determined to take through my wagons; but the experiment is not a fair one, as the mules are broken down at the outset. the only good ones, about twenty, which i bought near albuquerque, were taken for the express for fremont's mail--the general's order requiring the twenty-one best in santa fe." (cooke's conquest, p. 93). to this sergeant tyler adds: "it is but justice to the colonel to state here that with few exceptions, the mule and ox teams used from santa fe to california were the same worn out and broken down animals that we had driven all the way from council bluffs and fort leavenworth; indeed, some of them had been driven all the way from nauvoo, the same season." (tyler's battalion, p. 175). [32:e] conquest of new mexico and california. an historical and personal narrative by p. st. george cooke, g. p. putnam and sons, n. y. 1878: pp. 91-2. [32:f] see history of the mormon church, americana, (roberts), april no. p. 3776--note. v. the march of the battalion from santa fe to the mouth of the gila. the battalion began its march from santa fe on the 19th of october, colonel cooke in command, lieutenant a. j. smith, who had led the battalion to santa fe, became the acting commissary of subsistence; and lieutenant george stoneman, acting quartermaster, instead of lieutenant samuel e. gully, who had resigned. both smith and stoneman were of the regular army. dr. sanderson was continued as physician-surgeon to the command. the guides to the expedition--appointed by gen. kearny--were weaver, charbonneau, and leroux; and stephen c. foster, called "doctor," in all the narratives, was employed as interpreter. =more invaliding.=--the course of the march for some time was southward down the valley of the rio grande. on the 10th of november, fifty-five more men were declared physically unable through sickness to continue the march, and accordingly were detached, and under lieutenant w. w. willis were ordered back to pueblo to join the other detachments that had been sent there. after much suffering from the hardships of the journey--weak teams, scant supplies of food, illy clad, general sickness among the men, the fall of december snows in the mountain ranges north of santa fe, excessive cold, and several deaths occurring, this detachment finally arrived at pueblo between the 20th and 24th of december, in a most pitiable condition; but they were warmly received by members of the battalion already quartered there,[35:a] numbering, now, all told, about one hundred and fifty. =hardship of excessive toil.=--one cause of so many men breaking down in health was the excessive toil at the wagons through the sand stretches of the road, began early in the march from santa fe--while yet in the valley of the rio del norte, in fact, and continuing along the whole route to and through the california desert lying between the colorado and the coast range of mountains. "our course now lay down the rio del norte [the rio grande]," says sergeant tyler. "we found the roads extremely sandy in many places, and the men while carrying blankets, knapsacks, cartridge boxes (each containing thirty-six rounds of ammunition), and muskets on their backs, and living on short rations, had to pull at long ropes to aid the teams. the deep sand alone, without any load was enough to wear out both man and beast." later he remarks: "we had to leave the river for a time, and have twenty men to each wagon with long ropes to help the teams pull the wagons over the sand hills. the commander perched himself on one of the hills, like a hawk on a fence post, sending down his orders with the sharpness of--well, to the battalion, it is enough to say--colonel cooke." one of the battalion celebrates this incident of the march in doggerel verse of which two stanzas follow: "our hardships reach their rough extremes, when valiant men are roped with teams, hour after hour, and day by day, to wear our strength and lives away. * * * * * "we see some twenty men or more with empty stomachs and foot sore, bound to one wagon plodding on through sand, beneath a burning sun."[36:b] in the trackless part of the battalion's march through the sand stretches, in addition to pulling at the wagons, companies marched in double-single file, in each other's footsteps, to make tracks for the wagon wheels. =irrigation in new mexico.=--it was while at santa fe, and while passing down the rio del norte, that the battalion saw, for the first time, irrigation in operation. tyler thus describes it: "canals for irrigation purposes were found all along the banks of the river. some of them several miles in length. they conveyed water to the farms, or as they were called in that country, ranchos. there being little or no rain during the growing season, the water was made to flow over the ground until it was sufficiently saturated, and then shut off until needed again for the same purpose." =march down the rio grande.=--as the command in its southward movement down the rio grande reached the point where general kearny left the valley for a direct march westward--228 miles south of santa fe--and where, too, kearny had abandoned his wagons; the guides declared it impossible to follow the gila route proper with the wagons; and hence a circuit to the south through sonora via janos and fronteras was proposed and determined upon at a council of officers. in the first stages of this changed course, however, the road bore to the southeast, and this was not to the liking of col. cooke, because it would carry his command within hailing distance of general wool, who might incorporate it in the "army of the centre,"--as the general's division of the invading forces against mexico was called--to operate against chihuahua. in that event, as the colonel himself expressed it, he would lose his trip to california. to bear to the southeast was not to the liking of the battalion, as that was not in the direction of california, but one which might lead them within the sphere of the "army of the centre," and they would find themselves discharged in old mexico instead of california, at the end of their term of enlistment. the entire command was thrown into gloom by this change in the line of march: "all of our hopes, conversations and songs," says the historian of the battalion--tyler--"were centered on california. somewhere on that broad domain we expected to join our families and friends." ="blow the right!" the westward turn.=--"on the morning of the 21st," says tyler, "the command resumed its journey, marching in a southern direction for about two miles, when it was found that the road began to bear southeast instead of southwest, as stated by the guides. the colonel looked in the direction of the road, then to the southwest, then to the west, saying, 'i don't want to get under general wool, and lose my trip to california.' he arose in his saddle and ordered a halt. he then said with firmness: 'this is not my course. i was ordered to california,' 'and,' he added with an oath, 'i will go there or die in the attempt.' then turning to the bugler, he said, 'blow the right!' "turning westward at this point, 32â° 41â´ north latitude, and but a short distance--some thirty miles--north of the present city of el paso--the course of march was westward to san bernardino rancho, thence to yanos and so to the san pedro river where the command arrived on the 9th of december. "=the fight with wild bulls.=--here occurred the only fighting the battalion engaged in on its expedition, a battle with wild bulls. this section of the country seemed to abound with herds of wild cattle, and the males among them were much more bold and ferocious than among the buffalos. attracted by curiosity these herds gathered along the line of march, alternately scampering away and approaching; and some of the bolder ones, as if in resentment of the battalion's invasion, attacked the column. several mules were gored to death by them, both in the teams and among the pack animals; and colonel cooke records how some of the wagons were thrown about by the mad charge of these furious beasts. the troops had been ordered to march with guns unloaded, but in the presence of such a danger the men loaded their muskets without waiting for an order to that effect, and when attacked would fire upon the charging beasts, so that the rattle of musketry was for once heard all along the line. the bulls were very tenacious of life, however, and more desperate and dangerous when wounded than before." tyler speaks of one fight between dr. william spencer and a bull which was shot five times, twice through the lungs, twice through the heart, and once through the head, and yet would alternately rise and fall and rush upon the doctor until a sixth ball between the eyes, and near the curl of the pate, proved fatal.[38:c] colonel cooke confirms tyler's narrative about the bull continuing to rush on after being twice shot through the heart, and adds: "i have seen the heart." cooke also relates the feat of corporal frost in bringing down one of these ferocious animals: "i was very near corporal frost, when an immense coal-black bull came charging upon us, a hundred yards distant. frost aimed his musket, a flintlock, very deliberately and only fired when the beast was within six paces; it fell headlong, almost at our feet."[39:d] tyler adds: "the corporal was on foot while, of course, the colonel and staff were mounted. on the first appearance of the bull, the colonel, with his usual firm manner of speech, ordered the corporal to load his gun, supposing, of course, that he had observed the previous order of prohibition. to this command he (the corporal) paid no attention. thinking him either stupified or, dumbfounded, with much warmth and a foul epithet he next ordered him to run, but this mandate was as little heeded as the other. doubtless cooke thought one man's 'ignorance with some stubborness' was about to receive a terrible retribution, but when he saw the monster lifeless at his feet, through the well-directed aim of the brave and fearless corporal, how changed must have been his feelings!"[39:e] the number of the wild bovine enemy killed in the engagement is variously reported as from twenty to sixty, and by one writer as high as eighty-one. =mexican opposition at tucson.=--leaving the san pedro the command marched northeasterly to tucson, a mexican town of between four and five hundred inhabitants. it was garrisoned at the time by a mexican force two hundred strong, according to cooke, commanded by captain comaduran, who was under order from the governor of sonora, don manuel gandara, not to allow an armed force to pass through the town without resistance. the guides furnished the battalion by general kearny, however, declared it was for the command either to march through tucson, or make a detour which would mean a hundred miles out of the way over a trackless wilderness and mountains. cooke determined to march through tucson. foster, the interpreter, went into the town in advance and was put under guard; a corporal, son of the mexican commander, with three mexican soldiers was met by the command and questioned about foster, and on admitting that he was under guard, the corporal and his escort were immediately placed under arrest by cooke, to be held as hostages for the safety of the interpreter. one mexican, however, was released, who, with two of the battalion guides, carried a note demanding foster's release. this was complied with, and about midnight foster was brought to camp, attended by two officers authorized "to make a special armistice." cooke proposed that the mexican command deliver up a few arms as a guarantee of surrender, and a token that the inhabitants of tucson would not fight against the united states unless they were exchanged as prisoners of war; the mexican prisoners were also released.[40:f] these events occurred while the battalion was about sixteen miles from tucson. the next day, when on the march, cooke received a message from captain comaduran declining the proposition to surrender. the battalion were ordered to load their guns with ball. before reaching the town, however, another message was received saying that the garrison had retreated taking two brass cannons and forcing most of the inhabitants to accompany them. about a dozen armed mexicans met the american force to escort them into the town. before passing through the gates, the commander of the battalion addressed the soldiers saying, in effect, that the garrison and citizens had fled leaving their property behind; but they had not come to make war upon sonora, and there must be no interference with the private property of the citizens.[41:g] the battalion marched through tucson and went into camp about half a mile beyond on a small stream. before leaving the vicinity cooke with a party of fifty reconnoitered the country above the town towards a village and church, where, it was supposed, the garrison and main body of the people had taken refuge. as the nature of the country, however, afforded excellent opportunities for ambush, if the mexicans should choose to make resistance, the company of fifty returned. however the movement was not without its value since, according to col. cooke, and as was afterwards ascertained, it caused the mexicans who had fled to the aforesaid village to still further retreat, and the reinforcements which had come from the presidios of fronteras, santa cruz and tubac, to return to their posts.[42:h] =junction with kearny's trail.=--renewing its journey the command in the course of three days, by hard marching, reached the gila river and intersected the route followed by general kearny, four hundred and seventy-four miles from the point at which they left it in the valley of the rio grande. the southern pacific railroad traverses practically the route of the battalion between these two points. colonel cooke made a map of this part of the battalion's journey--published in his book, (see map fold) and referring to it, in connection with the southern pacific railroad, he says: "a new administration, in which southern interests prevailed, with the great problem of the practicability and best location of a pacific railroad under investigation, had the map of this wagon route before them with its continuance to the west, and perceived that it gave exactly the solution of its unknown element, that a southern route would avoid both the rocky mountains and sierra nevada, with their snows, and would meet no obstacle in this great interval. the new 'gadsden treaty' was the result; it was signed, december 30, 1853."[42:i] =the march down the gila.=--following more or less the windings of the gila, the way made difficult from alternating stretches of deep sand and miry clay, the command arrived at the junction of the gila with the colorado on the 8th of january. an attempt at the shipment of part of the command's provisions down the river on a flat boat proved a sad failure, and ended in considerable loss. the scheme was col. cooke's. the "boat" was constructed by placing two wagon beds end to end and lashing them to two dry cottonwood logs. on this improvised boat two thousand five hundred pounds of provision and corn were placed. at places the river spread out over sand bars with but three or four inches of water covering them; the boat was repeatedly lodged on these, and the precious stores of food had to be landed in several places. the most of it was never recovered, though repeated efforts were made to regain it. =at the mouth of the gila.=--speaking of the gila at its junction with the colorado, and of the conditions obtaining in the command at that stage of the march, col. cooke writes: "a vast bottom; the country about the two rivers is a picture of desolation; nothing like vegetation beyond the alluvium of the two rivers; bleak mountains, wild looking peaks, stony hills and plains, fill the view. we are encamped in the midst of wild hemp. the mules are in mezquit thickets, with a little bunch grass, a half a mile off. the mules are weak, and their failing, or flagging to-day in ten miles, is very unpromising for the hundred mile stretch, dry and barren, before them. there is no grass, and only scanty cottonwood boughs for them to-night, but i sent out forty men to gather the fruit, called tornia, a variety of the mezquit. they have gathered twelve or fifteen bushels, which has been spread out to be eaten on a hard part of the sand-bar. "francisco was sent across the river to fire the thickets beyond--this to clear the way for the pioneer party in the morning. he says the river is deeper than usual; it is wider than the missouri, and of the same muddy color. * * * it is said to be sixty miles to the mouth of the river."--the colorado.[44:j] footnotes: [35:a] see tyler's battalion ch. xx. lieutenant willis gives the date of arrival 24th of december. captains brown and higgins, stationed at pueblo, give the 20th. the latter kept a daily journal. [36:b] tyler's history of the mormon battalion, pp. 180-183. [38:c] tyler's battalion, pp. 219, 220. [39:d] cooke's conquest, pp. 145, 6. [39:e] tyler's battalion, p. 219. [40:f] cooke's conquest, p. 149. [41:g] previous to this the colonel had issued the following order: "head quarters mormon battalion, "camp on the san pedro, "december 13th, 1846. "thus far on our course we have followed the guides furnished us by the general [kearny]. these guides now point to tucson, a garrison town, as our road, and assert that any other course is a hundred miles out of the way and over a trackless wilderness of mountains, rivers and hills. we will march, then, to tucson. we came not to make war on sonora, and less still to destroy an important outpost of defense against indians: but we will take the straight road before us, and overcome all resistance. but shall i remind you that the american soldier ever shows justice and kindness to the unarmed and unresisting? the property of individuals you will hold sacred. the people of sonora are not our enemies. "by order of "lieut.-col. cooke, "(signed) p. c. merrill, "adjutant." [42:h] see cooke's conquest, p. 151; also tyler's battalion, pp. 228-230. [42:i] cooke's conquest, p. 159. [44:j] conquest, pp. 170-1. vi. the march of the battalion from the colorado to the pacific ocean. this part of the march led through what is now marked on the maps of southern california as the "colorado desert," "nature's exhausted region lying between the colorado river and the eastern base of the coast range"--some of it being below the sea level. much of the dreary way lay through stretches of sand, and the men were compelled to aid the teams by pulling on ropes, fifteen to twenty men to a wagon. no water was to be had but by the digging of deep wells in the desert sands. these often yielded but little, and at that a poor quality, of water. the suffering of both men and beasts was terrible. "the march of the last five days"--the time it took to cross the desert to the little running stream called "carriso creek,"--was "the most trying of any we had made on both men and animals," writes col. cooke. =destitution and suffering of the men en march.=--"we here found the heaviest sand, hottest days, and coldest nights," says tyler, "with no water and but little food." "at this time," he continues, "the men were nearly bare-footed; some used, instead of shoes, rawhide wrapped around their feet, while others improvised a novel style of boots by stripping the skin from the leg of an ox. to do this, a ring was cut around the hide above and below the gambrel joint, and then the skin taken off without cutting it lengthwise. after this, the lower end was sewed up with sinews, when it was ready for the wearer, the natural crook of the hide adapting it somewhat to the shape of the foot. others wrapped cast-off clothing around their feet, to shield them from the burning sand during the day and the cold at night. "before we arrived at the carriso many of the men were so nearly used up from thirst, hunger and fatigue, that they were unable to speak until they reached the water or had it brought to them. those who were strongest reported, when they arrived, that they had passed many lying exhausted by the way-side."[46:a] col. cooke refers to these conditions in his "conquest of new mexico:"[46:b] "a great many of my men are wholly without shoes, and used every expedient, such as rawhide moccasins and sandals, and even wrapping their feet in pieces of woolen and cotton cloth." of the march on the 16th of january the colonel remarks: "near eleven, [a. m.] i reached, with the foremost wagon, the first water of the carriso [cooke's spelling is 'cariza']; a clear running stream gladdened the eyes, after the anxious dependence on muddy wells for five or six days. i found the march [i. e. of the day] to be nineteen miles; thus without water for near three days, (for the working animals) and camping two nights in succession, without water, the battalion made in forty-eight hours, four marches, of eighteen, eight, eleven and nineteen miles, suffering from frost, and from summer heat."[46:c] of the march of the 17th, he said: "the men arrived here, [carriso creek camp] completely worn down; they staggered as they marched, as they did yesterday, [the 18th:] some of the men did not find strength to reach the camp before daylight this morning. * * * i went through the companies this morning; they were eating their last four ounces of flour; of sugar and coffee there has been none for weeks. i have remaining only five public wagons, there are three private property." yet, as showing the spirit of these battalion men in such plight he writes of the evening in camp of that same day--"the men, who this morning were prostrate, worn out, hungry, heartless, have recovered their spirits to-night, and are singing and playing the fiddle."[47:d] =from carriso creek to san phillips.=--the march from carriso creek was to san phillips, an indian village on a small stream of the same name. it was on approaching san phillips that the rugged heart of the coast mountains was encountered, "which seemed to defy aught save the wild goat," according to col. cooke's description; over which "with crow bar and pick and axe in hand," he continues, "the battalion worked its way." here also the "chasm of living rock, more narrow than their wagons," was encountered, through which they hewed a passage for the wagons, the colonel himself taking a hand in the hewing. "i came to the canyon," says the colonel, "and found it much worse than i had been led to expect [i. e. by the report of the guides]; there were many rocks to surmount, but the worst was the narrow pass. setting the example myself, there was much work done on it before the wagons came; the rock was hewn with axes to increase the opening. i thought it wide enough, and going on, found a hill to be ascended, to avoid a still narrower pass, a great rock had to be broken, before it could be crossed. but when a trial was made, at the first pass, it was found too narrow by a foot of solid rock. more work was done, and several trials made. the sun was now only an hour high, and it was about seven miles to the first water. i had a wagon taken to pieces, and carried through. meanwhile, we still hewed and hammered at the mountain side; but the best road tools had been lost. * * * the next wagon body was lifted through, and then the running gear, by lifting one side; then i rode on again, and saw a wagon up the very steep hill, and down again to the canyon. the work on the pass was perseveringly continued, and the last two wagons were pulled through by the mules, with loads undisturbed." the confused information respecting the state of hostilities, the likelihood of meeting retreating bands of californians, en route for the mexican state of sonora, led the colonel to renew his march on the 19th in a more strictly military order than he had hitherto followed, and the battalion, while waiting for the wagons to come up, was exercised on a prairie in military tactics. the battalion was under orders to march to san diego and there join gen. kearny. "but communication with that officer was now cut off," writes colonel cooke. "by the best information the enemy were concentrated at los angeles. the general was marching on it from the south, and lieutenant-colonel fremont approaching from the north; so that a direct march on los angeles from the east was evidently the proper course; and especially so, as captain montgomery, [from san diego] had written, january 15th, that it was generally believed that parties of californians, headed by leaders who had broken their paroles, would endeavor to effect a retreat to sonora, rather than submit to our arms. * * * it was determined to take the direct road to los angeles; and the guides were sent to warner's, to collect mules, etc." =at warner's rancho.=--warner's ranch was reached on the 21st, the battalion being again drilled enroute. it was found necessary to rest at warner's on the 22nd. "this is a beautiful valley, shut in by mountains or high hills on every side," writes col. cooke, "the name, agua caliente, comes from a bold stream, issuing from rock fissures at the temperature of 170â°; it now sends up little clouds of steam for half a mile below. the valley, a mile long, is elliptical, and its green smooth surface really oval; at its centre stands a wonderful evergreen oak, its boughs reaching a circle, five feet above the ground, and ninety feet in diameter; the hot stream runs round one side, a cold one around the other. the indians, of cold nights, select spots below the spring, of agreeable temperature to sleep, lying in the stream, with sod bank for a pillow."[49:e] =the march directed to san diego.=--on the 23rd of january a march of eighteen miles was made over the hills from warner's rancho. it rained several hours in the afternoon, and again at night, then continued for twenty-four hours. "the battalion had fallen upon the rainy season. all tents were blown down in the night," writes col. cooke, speaking of the night of the 23rd. "the ill-clad battalion," he continues, "were drenched and suffered much." a twelve mile march over the hills from warner's, on the 25th of january, brought the battalion into the temecala valley. there an official dispatch brought to col. cooke the announcement that gen. kearny had returned to san diego, and that the battalion was expected there as originally ordered. accordingly the next morning the march was directed southward, toward the san diego mission. the san luis valley and river was crossed on the 26th, and encampment made near a rancho. =in sight of the pacific.=--about noon the next day the deserted catholic mission of san luis rey was passed. "one mile below the mission," writes tyler, "we ascended a bluff, when the long-long-looked-for great pacific ocean appeared plain to our view, only about three miles distant. the joy, the cheer that filled our souls, none but worn-out pilgrims nearing a haven of rest can imagine. prior to leaving nauvoo, we had talked about and sung of 'the great pacific sea,' and we were now upon its very borders, and its beauty far exceeded our most sanguine expectations." of this event col. cooke says: "the road wound through smooth green valleys, and over very lofty hills, equally smooth and green. from the top of one of these hills, was caught the first and a magnificent view of the great ocean; and by rare chance, perhaps, it was so calm that it shone as a mirror." further describing what must have been to the desert and mountain-worn battalion a wonderful scene, the colonel adds: "the charming and startling effect, under our circumstances, of this first view of the ocean could not be expressed; but in an old diary--once sunk and lost in a river--i find what follows: "i caught my first sight of the ocean, as smooth as a mirror, and reflecting the full blaze of the declining sun; from these sparkling green hill-tops it seemed that the lower world had turned to impalpable dazzling light, while by contrast, the clear sky looked dim. "we rode on into a valley which was near, but out of view of the sea; its smooth sod was in sunlight and shade; a gentle brook wound through it; the joyous lark, the gay blackbird, the musical bluebird even the household wren, warbled together the evening song; it seemed a sweet domestic scene which must have touched the hearts of my rude, far wanderers. but coming to us so suddenly, there was a marvelous accompaniment;--the fitful roar of tide and surf upon a rock-bound shore; while now and then some great troller burst upon the rocks with a booming thunder. it was not a discord."[51:f] from this point the march was down the coast, for the most part in sight of the ocean, in "clear bright sunlight." the battalion no longer suffered from "the monotonous hardships of the deserts and cold atmosphere of the snow-capped mountains." january there, seemed as pleasant as may in the northern states. =san diego mission.=--on the 29th of january the battalion passed into the solidad valley, thence by cross roads over high hills, miry from recent rains, "into a firm, regular road" to the mission of san diego, encampment being made on the flat about a mile below the old mission buildings, and about four or five miles from the seaport of san diego. in the evening col. cooke rode down to san diego and reported the arrival of his command on the pacific. the march of the mormon battalion was completed. =col. cooke's bulletin on the battalion's march.=--on the 30th of january the following bulletin was written by the lieutenant-colonel commanding, though not read to the battalion until the 4th of february. it tells in studied military brevity the achievements and faithfulness of the battalion, its service to the country, and is an imperishable monument in the literature of the nation. bulletin. "headquarters mormon battalion, "mission of san diego, "january 30, 1847. "(orders no. 1) "the lieutenant-colonel commanding, congratulates the battalion on their safe arrival on the shore of the pacific ocean, and the conclusion of their march of over two thousand miles. "history may be searched in vain for an equal march of infantry. half of it has been through a wilderness, where nothing but savages and wild beasts are found, or deserts where, for want of water, there is no living creature. there, with almost hopeless labor, we have dug deep wells, which the future traveler will enjoy. without a guide who had traversed them we have ventured into trackless tablelands where water was not found for several marches. with crowbar and pick, and axe in hand, we worked our way over mountains, which seemed to defy aught save the wild goat, and hewed a pass through a chasm of living rock more narrow than our wagons. to bring these first wagons to the pacific, we have preserved the strength of our mules by herding them over large tracts, which you have laboriously guarded without loss. the garrison of four presidios of sonora concentrated within the walls of tucson, gave us no pause. we drove them out, with their artillery, but our intercourse with the citizens was unmarked by a single act of injustice. thus, marching half naked and half fed, and living upon wild animals, we have discovered and made a road of great value to our country. "arrived at the first settlements of california, after a single day's rest, you cheerfully turned off from the route to this point of promised repose, to enter upon a campaign, and meet, as we supposed, the approach of an enemy; and this, too, without even salt to season your sole subsistence of fresh meat. "lieutenants a. j. smith and george stoneman, of the first dragoons, have shared and given invaluable aid in all these labors. "thus volunteers, you have exhibited some high and essential qualities of veterans. but much remains undone. soon, you will turn your attention to the drill, to system and order, to forms also, which are all necessary to the soldier. "by order [signed] "lieut.-colonel p. st. george cooke, [signed] "p. c. merrill, adjutant."[53:g] small wonder, though the reading of this bulletin to the battalion was unaccountably delayed for four days, that the mormon volunteers received this official announcement of their achievements with hearty cheers. footnotes: [46:a] tyler, pp. 244-5. [46:b] cooke's conquest, p. 185. [46:c] ibid, p. 184. [47:d] "conquest," p. 187. [49:e] conquest, p. 193. [51:f] conquest, p. 195--note. [53:g] cooke's conquest, p. 197. subsequently, viz., on the 9th of may, on the occasion of general kearny visiting the battalion at los angeles, he is reported to have said that history would be searched in vain for an infantry march equal to the battalion's, and added: "bonaparte crossed the alps, but these men have crossed a continent." tyler's battalion, p. 282. vii. the battalion in california. subsequent movements of the battalion were as follows: =at san luis rey mission.=--on the evening of their second day at san diego mission, an order was issued for the battalion to return to san luis rey mission, to garrison that station. this mission was somewhat midway between los angeles and san diego, and it was doubtless thought that the battalion by being stationed there could keep that important position out of the enemies' hands, should mexican hostilities again be resumed, as at the time seemed probable; and they would also be available there for quicker movement either to los angeles or to san diego should danger threaten at either point. accordingly on february 1st, the return march was begun and ended about noon of the 3rd. =clean up and drill.=--here orders were given for a general clean up of arms and clothes--such as they had--shaving, cutting hair, and the like. "some had not shaved since the march began, and would have preferred not to do so until they returned to their people," says the battalion's historian. but the order was imperative. "it prescribed that no beard be allowed to grow below the tip of the ear, hence the mustache only could be saved. the hair also must be clipped even with the tip of the ear," hence the long and tangled locks and shocks of hair of a year's growth had to be sacrificed. by the 6th of february the men had finished cleaning up and repairing their quarters, which in some respects even then "were not the most pleasant," writes tyler, "as we were over-run with fleas, as well as the more filthy vermin, and no person, however cleanly he aimed to be, could escape from them." on the 8th of february, according to tyler, "colonel cooke and lieutenant stoneman commenced the squad drill with officers which, continued and extended to companies and thence to the battalion, and lasted altogether for twenty days, when the battalion was supposed to have learned the drill, and all the officers were considered capable of teaching it." =company b at san diego.=--on the 15th of february company b was ordered to be detached from the battalion and directed to march to the port of san diego to perform garrison duty at that place, though the order, apparently, for the removal of the company was not given until the 15th of march. =los angeles garrisoned by companies a. c. d. e.=--on the 18th of the same month nine privates of company a., eight from c., five from d., and eight from e., were designated as a detachment, under command of lieutenant oman and sergeant brown, to garrison the mission of san luis rey, while the remainder of companies a. c. d. and e. were designated to go to los angeles for garrison duty. these companies began their march on the 19th, and arrived at los angeles on the 23rd. the chief activities here were maintaining by successive details from the command an out-post at cajon pass,--fifty miles north east of los angeles--as a protection against hostile bands of indians; and the erection of a fort on an eminence commanding the city of los angeles. the san luis rey detachment remained at that post until the 6th of april, when under orders the station was abandoned and the detachment marched to los angeles. the companies thus grouped so remained until near the expiration of the term of their enlistment. =the conquest of california.=--the conquest of california was easily achieved. fremont in the north with a company of but sixty americans, with whom he had been sent to explore portions of new mexico and california, was opposed in the vicinity of monterey by a force under general castro, in june, 1846. with the aid of american settlers in the vicinity of san francisco, fremont defeated the mexicans in two engagements and on the 5th of july, the american californians declared themselves independent, and placed fremont at the head of their affairs. on the 7th of the same month commodore sloat, then in the command of the u. s. squadron in the pacific, bombarded and captured monterey. on the 9th commodore montgomery took possession of san francisco. commodore stockton arrived on the 15th of july and in co-operation with colonel fremont took possession of the city of los angeles, on the 17th of august. there was, however, a subsequent uprising in the south, an attempt of the mexicans to regain possession of the country. the attempt, however, proved abortive, and was chiefly noteworthy as occurring at such a time as to allow general kearny's troop of one hundred soldiers, who had marched from santa fe, to participate in some of the last engagements--december 16th, 1846, and jan. 8th, 1847--these ended in the conquest, and brought to pass the pacification of california. =the kearny-fremont controversy.=--a question of authority arose between col. fremont and general kearny. the former had acted in the self appointed capacity of "military commandant of california." general kearny refused to recognize him in that capacity, since in addition to being fremont's superior military officer, kearny also had been instructed himself to establish civil government in california.[57:a] fremont refused to obey the orders of his superior, and was ordered home to be tried for his disobedience. he was deprived of his commission; but in consideration of previous service, it was offered to him again, but refused; and fremont "went again to the wilderness and engaged in exploration."[57:b] footnotes: [57:a] see letter of secretary of war to kearny, executive document no. 60, of june 3rd, 1846, delivered to kearny by col. kane. [57:b] lossing's hist. u. s. p. 487. bancroft's hist. of cal., vol. v., passim, but especially pp. 411-468. viii. record of the battalion in california. the battalion had opened a wagon road to the pacific, but had arrived too late to participate actively in the conquest of california. it was useful, however, in the performance of garrison duty at san diego, san luis rey, and los angeles; and, in connection with the new york volunteers, recently arrived under command of col. jonathan d. stevenson, via cape horn to san francisco bay, also in connection with the constantly increasing naval forces along the coast, they assisted in making secure the conquest achieved. while performing garrison duty many members of the battalion at san diego obtained permission to accept employment of the inhabitants of the town, such as making adobes, digging wells, building houses, and making bricks. the first bricks in san diego, and for matter of that in california, were made and burned by members of the mormon battalion.[58:a] they made an enviable reputation for industry and frugality. =efforts to re-enlist the battalion.=--as the expiration of the term of the battalion's enlistment drew near, strong efforts were made for their re-enlistment by general kearny, before departing for the east in may. "on the 4th of may," writes tyler, "an order was read from col. cooke, giving the battalion the privilege of being discharged on condition of being re-enlisted for three years as u. s. dragoons; but under the circumstances the generous proposition could not consistently be accepted." general kearny addressed the battalion on the 10th of may: "he sympathized with us in the unsettled condition of our people," says tyler, "but thought, as their final destination was not definitely settled, [in this of course the general's information was defective] we had better re-enlist for another year, by which time the war would doubtless be ended, and our families settled in some permanent location. in conclusion he said he would take pleasure in representing our patriotism to the president, and in the halls of congress, and give us the justice our praiseworthy conduct had merited." it was on this occasion, according to tyler, that gen. kearny in praising the battalion said: "bonaparte crossed the alps, but these men have crossed a continent."[59:b] col. jonathan d. stevenson of the new york volunteers, who succeeded col. cooke in command of the battalion by being given command of the southern district of california--col. cooke having been detailed to accompany kearny on his return to the east--made an effort to induce the battalion to re-enlist. stevenson's effort was prompted by governor richard b. mason's instructions. stevenson represented among the advantages of the battalion's re-enlistment, the privilege of choosing their own officers, "and the fact that the mormon commander would be the third in rank among the officers of california, and might become first." the battalion's officers quite generally favored re-enlistment, but not so the men, who, under the leadership of "father" pettegrew, william hyde, and sergeant tyler, were in favor of returning to their families and the body of their people. the result of the effort at re-enlistment was, that a company of eighty-one, officers and men, re-enlisted for six months, and performed garrison service at san diego. =homeward bound.=--the rest of the battalion, on being mustered out of service, in july, began their march for the great basin of the rocky mountains, going via sutter's fort, at the juncture of the american and sacramento rivers, north-eastward from san francisco about seventy-five miles, and now the site of sacramento, capital of the state. about one-half of these returning volunteers arrived in salt lake valley on the first of october. the reason for not more than one-half of this number reaching salt lake valley that fall--they numbered about 240 when leaving los angeles--arose from the following circumstances: arriving at sutter's fort, and finding opportunity for employment at good wages, a number desired to take advantage of that opportunity, and accordingly, with the consent and approval of their associates, "a few" remained. on the sixth of september, when the returning volunteers were leaving the basin of lake tahoe, they met samuel brannan,--leader of the "brooklyn colony" of mormons to san francisco bay via cape horn, in 1846. brannan was returning to california from his visit to brigham young, whom he had met at the green river crossing, and accompanied to salt lake valley. he gave the battalion members a doleful account of the semi-desert region where the mormon people were settling, and predicted their final removal to california. he urged all, except those known to have families in salt lake valley, to return to california and work until spring. this without avail. the next day, however, the volunteers met captain james brown, ranking officer of the pueblo detachment of the battalion, and a small party enroute for california. he brought with him letters from many of the families of the battalion; also an epistle from the mormon leaders advising those who had no means of subsistence to remain in california and labor during the winter, and make their way to salt lake valley in the spring, bringing their earnings with them. about one-half of the volunteers accepted this suggestion and returned to sutter's fort where they found employment. the rest of the company continued their journey to salt lake valley where they arrived at the time already stated. =the discharge and payment of the pueblo detachment.=--captain brown took with him to california the muster rolls of the pueblo detachment of the battalion, and also had a power of attorney from all its members to draw their pay. the pueblo detachment had drawn its pay per captain brown up to may at santa fe, at which time he received orders to resume the march to california, via fort laramie. the detachment arrived in salt lake valley on the 29th of july, where they were disbanded, since the term of their enlistment had expired on the 16th of that month. on the presentation of the claims for the three months' pay still due to this detachment to governor mason of california, they were allowed. "paymaster rich," says the governor, "paid to captain brown the money due to the (pueblo) detachment up to that date, according to the rank they bore upon the muster rolls, upon which the battalion had been mustered out of the service." =the purchase of ogden site with battalion money.=--sometime early in 1848 the goodyear claim to a tract of land at the mouth of weber canyon, said to be twenty miles square, was purchased by captain james brown out of the battalion money collected by him, and "by the advice of the council," meaning the high council at salt lake city. the sum paid was $1,950.00, cash down. in this statement i follow the journal history of brigham young, which under date of march 6th, 1848, contains a letter from "father" john smith, president of the salt lake high council, giving to the mormon leader,--absent at the time in winter quarters--the above information.[62:c] the goodyear tract is specifically described as commencing at the mouth of weber canyon, thence following the wasatch mountains north to the hot springs; thence westward to the shores of the salt lake; along the shores southward to a point opposite weber canyon; thence eastward to the point of beginning.[62:d] goodyear was supposed to have held this tract of land on which ogden city now stands by virtue of a mexican grant. this, however, it was subsequently discovered, was not the case. goodyear's title amounted to no more than a squatter's claim, as there were evidently no mexican grants of land in the eastern and northern parts of the territory ceded to the united states by mexico that rested upon any clearly valid evidence of title from mexico; and the government of the united states, in subsequent years, refused to recognize the so-called mexican grant of goodyear's, and held that title inhered in the government of the united states alone, and that by virtue of the cession of the territory to the united states. such title, however, as goodyear claimed, was purchased, as above related, and by battalion money. and while the title of goodyear was not valid, the purchase quit-claimed his title, such as it was, and gave a sense of security to the colonists who first settled upon one of the most desirable tracts of land in the salt lake valley. =the battalion's contribution of seeds to utah colonies.=--these returning members of the battalion brought to utah various kinds of garden and fruit seeds, as well as grain from california, all which were found to be very useful in the new colonies where both variety and quantity of seeds were limited. lieutenant james pace introduced the club-head wheat, which proved to be hardy and of thrifty growth in utah soil. daniel tyler brought the california pea which in the early years grew so prolific as the field pea of utah. the detached members of the battalion who wintered at pueblo brought with them to salt lake valley the variety of wheat known as "taos," which, mixed with the club-head, became for many years the staple seed wheat sown in utah fields. =the battalion's part in the discovery of gold in california.=--as already stated a number of the mormon battalion members found employment at sutter's fort, with mr. john sutter himself, in fact, who was a rather enterprising swiss; one "who had houses and land, flocks and herds, mills and machinery. he counted his skilled artisans by the score," says the account i am following, "and his savage retainers by the hundred. he was, moreover, a man of progress." among his pressing needs and the needs of the country at large, was a saw mill. the flour mills he then had in course of construction needed timbers, and there would be large profit in shipping lumber to san francisco. accordingly his foreman, a mr. james w. marshall, a native of new jersey, and then about thirty-three years of age, and a carpenter, took in hand the task of building a saw mill. after considerable exploration the requisite combination of water power, timber, and the possibility of easy access to the fort, was found in the coloma valley, on the south fork of the american river, and about forty-five miles due east of the fort. in the latter part of august, or the first of september, mr. marshall with a party of about a dozen white men, nine of whom were discharged members of the mormon battalion,[64:e] and about as many indians, went to coloma valley and began the construction of the proposed mill. a brush dam was built in the river and a mill race constructed along a dry channel, to economize labor. the largest stones were thrown out of this and during the night the water would be turned in to carry off the dirt and sand. on the 24th of january while sauntering along the tail race inspecting the work, mr. marshall noticed yellow particles mingled with the excavated earth, which had been washed by late rains. sending an indian to his cabin for a tin plate marshall washed out some of the soil and obtained a small quantity of yellow metal. during the evening he remarked to his associates of the camp that he believed he had found gold, which was received with some doubts, the expressions being "i reckon not;" and, "no such luck." but henry w. bigler, one of the battalion members, made the following entry in his journal that day: "monday 24 (january): this day some kind of metal was found in the tail race that looks like gold." "jan. 30th: clear, and has been all the last week. our metal has been tried and proves to be gold. it is thought to be rich. we have picked up more than a hundred dollars' worth this week." =the date of the discovery of gold.=--thus it is the journal of a member of the mormon battalion which determines the date of the event which startled the world. usually the 19th of january is given as the date, but in his history of california, bancroft discusses the subject as follows: "the 19th of january is the date usually given; but i am satisfied it is incorrect. there are but two authorities to choose between, marshall, the discoverer, and one henry w. bigler, a mormon engaged upon the work at the time. besides confusion of mind in other respects, marshall admits that he does not know the date. on or about the 19th of january," he says (hutchings' magazine, ii, 200); "i am not quite certain to a day, but it was between the 18th and 20th." whereupon the 19th has been generally accepted. bigler, on the other hand, was a cool, clear-headed, methodical man; moreover he kept a journal, in which he entered occurrences on the spot, and it is from this journal i get my date. if further evidence be wanting, we have it. marshall states that four days after the discovery he proceeded to new helvetta [identical as to the location with sutter's fort] with specimens. now, by reference to another journal, new helvetta diary, we find that marshall arrived at the fort on the evening of the 28th. if we reckon the day of discovery as one of the four days, allow marshall one night on the way, which parsons gives him, and count the 28th one day, we have the 24th as the date of discovery trebly proved. [illustration: facsimile of henry w. bigler's journal, from a photograph] =the tide of western civilization started.=--the discovery of gold is the historical event that turned the eyes of the civilized world to california. within a year it started that mighty wave of western emigration from all parts of the united states, many parts of europe, and even from asia. it was to be a subject of the president's message to congress before the close of the year; within two years it would make california one of the sovereign states of the american union, with a population of nearly one hundred thousand; in seven years it would result in adding nearly five hundred million dollars to the world's store of gold; and then as the gold from soil and sand was exhausted, and costly operations upon gold-bearing quartz ledges, and delving into the earth were required to secure the precious metal, many men who had come to the mines turned their attention to agriculture and to horticulture and found in the grain fields, vineyards and orchards of the pacific slope, even a greater source of wealth than in the gold mines. for a time an effort was made to keep the discovery of gold quiet, but gradually it became known, and the secret of the sierras was revealed to the world, with the result already noted. san francisco, however, was indifferent for some time, the final conversion of that town to the discovery of gold did not take place until samuel brannan, the leader of the brooklyn colony of mormons to california, came down from sutter's fort--where he had a store--to san francisco, in company with a number of others who had with them specimens of collected gold in both dust and nuggets. brannan, holding in one hand a bottle of yellow dust, and with the other swinging his hat, rushed down the street shouting, "gold! gold! gold! from the american river." this in may; and soon afterwards san francisco was deserted for the gold-fields. =the mormon battalion "diggings" on the american river.=--the spare time of the mormons at sutter's saw-mill was devoted to washing out gold in the millrace and from the deposits of the sand bars along the river. henry bigler on the 21st of february wrote to members of the battalion at sutter's fort, telling them of the discovery of gold, but cautioned them to impart the information only to those who could be relied upon to keep the secret. they entrusted it to three other members of the battalion. six days later three of the number, sidney willis, levi fifield, and wilford hudson, came up to the saw-mill, and frankly told mr. sutter they had come to search for gold, and he gave them permission to mine in the tail of the millrace. the next day they began work and were fairly successful. hudson picked out one piece of gold worth six dollars. after a few days, however, these men felt under obligations to return to the fort as they had given it out that they were merely going to the saw-mill on a visit and a few days' shooting. returning, willis and hudson followed down the stream for the purpose of prospecting. fifield, accompanied by bigler, followed the wagon road. about half way between the saw-mill and the fort, hudson and willis, on a bar opposite a little island in the river, found a small quantity of gold, not more than half a dollar in value; and while the smallness of the find filled the two prospectors with disgust, the other battalion members at the fort insisted upon being taken to the point where the gold had been found, that "together they might examine the place." "it was with difficulty that they prevailed upon them to do so," remarks bancroft; but finally willis and hudson consented, "and the so lately slighted spot," continues the historian of california, "presently became famous as the rich 'mormon diggins:' the island, 'mormon island,' taking its name from these battalion boys who had first found gold there." but notwithstanding this new discovery by these members of the battalion, and notwithstanding their development of the discovery of mr. marshall, and the huge excitement which followed, and the fact that whenever they could get released a day from their duty to their employer they could usually obtain in gold several times over their day's wages, history has to record that they were true to their engagement to mr. sutter. "they had promised sutter," says bancroft, "to stand by him and finish the saw mill, this they did, starting it running on the 11th of march. henry bigler was still there. on the 7th of april bigler, stephens and brown presented themselves at the fort to settle accounts with sutter." =the call of duty.=--the call of duty was also pressing upon these battalion men from another direction. the instructions from the mormon leaders, to the members of the battalion, as we have seen, was that they should remain in california during the winter, but make their way to the salt lake valley in the spring, bringing their earnings with them. hence when settling with sutter on the 7th of april, the preliminaries were arranged for this prospective journey to the great basin of the rocky mountains. the first of june was fixed upon as the time of their departure. notice was given to sutter accordingly, so that by that time he could replace the mormon workmen in his employ by others. horses, cattle and the seeds they intended taking with them were to be bought of him; also two brass cannons to be a defense against possible indian attacks enroute, and for defensive use against a like foe in salt lake valley. at first a company of eight went into the mountains to explore a route, but found the snow too deep for passage at that time. the constantly growing gold excitement, also, in consequence of its general unsettling of things, delayed their departure a month beyond the time fixed upon for starting. meantime many of the battalion members availed themselves of the opportunity to search for gold. bigler and two others of the battalion followed up the american river from the fort about fifteen miles, finding gold as they went. arriving at mormon island they came upon the seven members of the battalion mining there who that day had taken out two hundred and fifty dollars. bigler and his associates mined for two months about one mile below the saw-mill, dividing with sutter and marshall, who furnished tools and provisions. the land owners demanded one-half the product for a time; this was finally reduced to one-third. in the midst of this prosperous mining activity, and the daily growing gold fever, the mad rush from san francisco and other parts of california, the members of the battalion sought out a rendezvous for their gathering preparatory to the journey across the mountains. the place of rendezvous was called by them "pleasant valley," near the present site of placerville, a short distance up the south fork of the american river, and not far from the place where gold was first discovered on that stream. parties came in one after another until the 3rd of july, when about forty-five men and one woman, the wife of one of the party, had assembled, bringing with them wagons, horses, cattle, and other effects. on the 3rd a start was made. "as the wagons rolled up along the divide between the american river and the cosumnes, on the national 4th," writes h. h. bancroft, "their cannon thundered independence before the high sierras." "thus," as further remarked by the author here followed, "amidst the scenes now every day becoming more and more absorbing, bringing to the front the strongest passions in man's nature, * * * at the call of what they deemed duty, these devotees of their religion unhesitatingly laid down their wealth-winning implements, turned their back on what all the world was just then making ready with hot haste and mustered strength to grasp at, and struggle for, and marched through new toils and dangers to meet their exiled brethren in the desert." the fame of having discovered gold may not be claimed for members of the mormon battalion, that belongs to mr. marshall, unquestionably, though the mormons in camp when it was found, of white men, were in the majority; and the shovels in their industrious hands it was which threw up the gold-laden soil; and they were the first to extend the discovery; and theirs the honors to first chronicle the date and fact of the event that was to mean so much to the pacific coast of america, and to the world. but while the honor of making the mere discovery of gold may not be claimed for them, that which is infinitely better may be claimed for them, the honor of writing into the annals of california and of the world's history this fine example of fidelity to duty, detailed above; and which is not over-matched in any of the records written by men. =ascent of the sierras from the western side.=--it was a difficult task to cut a wagon road from the west side through the lofty sierras that faced them. a task of infinite toil and in the presence of great danger from the lurking savages. three pioneers who had insisted upon going in advance to blaze the route for the main company had been murdered by the indians. these pioneers were named daniel browett, ezra h. allen, and henderson cox. the main camp came upon their mutilated bodies at a spring which, because of this event, still bears the name "tragedy spring." what numbers of these savages the main company would encounter, what their mood would be--murderous or friendly--of course could not be conjectured, it was of the dangers they must risk. by almost incredible toil and patience, however, this company of mormon battalion men conquered the ascent of the sierras from the western side, hewing a roadway for their seventeen wagons through stony heights, and in like manner down steep declivities and narrow gorges, until the eastern sloping deserts beyond were reached, and finally the valley of the great salt lake,--about the first of october, 1848,--to them, for the time, the place to which duty had called them. =wagon trail from los angeles to salt lake.=--the company that re-enlisted at los angeles for six months beyond the battalion's original term of enlistment, served eight months and then were mustered out of the service. some of these on being disbanded went by way of the coast to the mines or engaged in other industries in california for a time, but most of them finally made their way to salt lake valley in the course of one or two years, though a few remained permanently in california. a squad of twenty-five from this company, however, on being mustered out of the service, organized at once for the journey to salt lake valley, taking with them one wagon and a band of one hundred and thirty-five mules. they went by way of what was called the "southern route;" hitherto, however, traveled only by packers, and the wagon of this battalion company was the first to make the journey over the pack trail. this company reached salt lake valley on the 5th of june, 1848. =evidence of appreciation of the battalion's services.=--the best evidence that the service of the mormon battalion was honorable and appreciated by both the people of california and the u. s. government, exists in the fact of the efforts that were made on the part of both the people and the government to prolong their service, some of which efforts have already been noted in these pages. as the time approached for the company that had re-enlisted to be mustered out of service--known as the "company of mormon volunteers,"--the people of san diego drafted a petition, begging the governor to use his influence to keep the company in the service. the petition was signed by every citizen in the town, and governor mason tried hard to induce the company to remain in the service another year; failing in that, then to stay six months longer; all to no purpose, however; the "volunteers" were determined to join their friends and families in salt lake valley, and made the journey as stated above. =efforts to raise a second mormon battalion.=--when the battalion proper was mustered out of service in july, 1847, efforts were set on foot at that time to raise a second "mormon battalion," of which captain jefferson hunt was to be given the command, with the office of lieutenant-colonel, the office held by its first commander allen, and later by col. cooke. it is learned from a report made by governor mason that the war department, and hence the national administration, also sought the enlistment of this second battalion. in his report to the adjutant general of september 18th, 1847, governor mason says: "of the service of this battalion, of their patience, subordination, and general good conduct, you have already heard; and i take great pleasure in adding that as a body of men they have religiously respected the rights and feelings of these conquered people, and not a syllable of complaint has reached my ears of a single insult offered or outrage done by a mormon volunteer. so high an opinion did i entertain of the battalion and of their special fitness for the duties now performed by the garrisons in this country, that i made strenuous efforts to engage their service for another year."[74:f] the month following, after governor mason had met captain brown of the pueblo detachment, and received his report, and paid off that division of the command; also after captain hunt, who had been for some time acting as indian agent at luis del rey, was well on his way to salt lake valley to raise the proposed 2nd battalion of mormon volunteers, governor mason wrote to washington: "captain brown (after making his report and receiving the pay of the pueblo detachment) started immediately for fort hall. * * * he reported that he had met captain hunt, late of the mormon battalion, who was on his way to meet the emigrants and bring into the country this winter, if possible, a battalion, according to the terms offered in my letter to him of the 16th of august, a copy of which you will find among the military correspondence of the department. in my letter i offered captain hunt, the command of the battalion, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, with an adjutant; but i find, by the orders lately received, that a battalion of four companies is only entitled to a major and acting adjutant. i will notify captain hunt of this change at as early a moment as i can communicate with him. i am pleased to find by the despatches that in this matter i have anticipated the wish of the department."[75:g] when, however, the subject of raising a second battalion was presented to brigham young, both through col. jonathan d. stevenson, of the new york regiment of volunteers, prompted by governor mason, also through captain hunt in person, the proposition was declined. regarding the first enlistment from the standpoint alone of the sacrifices it involved, president young saw no occasion to make like sacrifices a second time, and no effort was made in utah to raise a second mormon battalion. footnotes: [58:a] tyler's battalion, pp. 286-7. [59:b] tyler's battalion, pp. 281-2. [62:c] others place the price paid for this tract of land at $3,000.00 (whitney's history of utah, vol. i, p. 375; bancroft's utah, p. 307, note 4). i think the statement in john smith's letter to brigham young the more reliable, since the high council over which he presided advised the purchase to be made, and would most likely know the price paid. there is also some confusion as to the time of the purchase. june 6th, 1848, is the time fixed upon by jenson's chronology, 1899 edition, p. 35. whitney following the brown family tradition places the time of the purchase late in december, 1847, or early in january, 1848; and the return of captain brown from california in december, 1847. whereas brigham young's journal history--quoting john smith's letter--referred to above--places the date of the captain's return "about the middle of november, 1847"; and that he brought with him "about $5,000.00, mostly in gold." others say $10,000.00 in mexican doubloons. brown was gone (i. e. from salt lake valley) three months and seven days, history of brigham young, ms. march 6th, 1848, p. 16. [62:d] bancroft's history of utah, p. 307, note 3; he cites stanford's "ogden city," ms. p. 1, and f. d. richards' narrative, ms. both are reliable sources of information. [64:e] their names given by bancroft are as follows--i add the given names: henry w. bigler, alexander stephens, james s. brown, james barger, william johnson, azariah smith, william ira willis, sidney willis, (brothers) william koutze (history of california, vol. vi., p. 31, note). the brothers willis and koutze returned in september to work on sutter's flour mill, so they were not in the coloma valley at the time of the gold discovery. israel evans is given in addition to the above by james s. brown in his "california gold, an authentic history," p. 6. (hist. cal., vol. v., p. 31, note.) [74:f] cal. and new mexico mess. and doc. 1850; also quoted by bancroft hist. cal. vol. v., p. 492. [75:g] cal. and new mex. mess. and doc. 1850, p. 355. also quoted by bancroft, hist. cal., vol. v., p. 494, note. ix. the battalion in the perspective of seventy-three years. the story of the mormon battalion is now before the reader. the perspective of seventy-three years corrects many of the misapprehensions that once obtained respecting the purpose of its being called, and its mission. and as this perspective corrects the misconceptions of the past, so also does it enable us to recognize the real importance and value of the incident and the greatness of the achievements of this battalion of the united states' troops, for such they were, and the matter of their coming from the westward migrating camps of the mormon people should not be allowed to obscure that fact. =the battalion as utah pioneers.=--also it should be always held in mind that the members of the battalion were among the pioneers and founders of the state of utah. for though the main body of the battalion went to california its members were never for a day separated in thought or purpose from the main body of their people, whom they had assisted in their westward-moving pilgrimage by the means sent to them from their pay; both from fort leavenworth and from santa fe; the seeds and the tents and arms equipment they brought with them when returning from their historic march; and the newly mined gold for currency. all of which was so helpful in founding the commonwealth to be, to say nothing of the advantage their service in the army of the west had been to their people in securing the effective element in the plea for their right to occupy indian lands along the missouri river in iowa and nebraska. besides one hundred and fifty of their number with their tents, arms, teams, wagons and other equipment, quartered at pueblo during the winter of 1846-7, followed so closely upon the heels of the first company of pioneers led by brigham young, that they arrived in the salt lake valley only five days after the advent of the first pioneer company. =achievements of the battalion.=--four great movements made possible the development of the west--the great intermountain region and the pacific slope. these were: 1. the opening of the highways; 2. the conquest of northern mexico; 3. the discovery of gold in california; 4. the adoption of irrigation farming by an anglo-saxon people. in all of these movements the battalion was an important factor. the part the battalion took in opening the highways to the pacific has already been detailed in the story of their march, and fully recognized in the military order already quoted in these pages, and which is now on file as a government document in washington. =territory added to the united states by the conquest of mexico.=--"in all," says a reliable authority, "more than five hundred and ninety thousand square miles were added to the territory of the united states as a result of the [mexican] war." this included the west half of what is now the state of new mexico, the west half of colorado, all of utah, nevada, arizona and california. for this territory, which equaled in extent two-thirds of the territory of the thirteen original states of the union, the government paid mexico $15,000,000. "including texas," says the authority here followed, "the additions of territory were more than nine hundred and sixty-five thousand square miles."[78:a] or, as another historian states it, "territory equal in area to germany, france and spain added together."[78:b] =the gadsden purchase and the battalion route.=--commenting on the battalion's march and the map he made of it, colonel cooke says: "a new administration, (this was the pierce administration, 1853-1857) in which southern interests prevailed, with the great problem of the practicability and best location of a pacific railroad under investigation, had the map of this wagon route before them with its continuance to the west, and perceived that it gave exactly the solution of its unknown element, that a southern route would avoid both the rocky mountains and sierra nevadas, with their snows, and would meet no obstacle in this great interval. the new 'gadsden treaty' was the result: it was signed december 30, 1853." this purchase added to the territory of the united states forty-five thousand five hundred and thirty-five square miles; for which was paid $10,000,000. the purchase was made by james gadsden of south carolina, minister to mexico, hence the name gadsden purchase.[78:c] in addition to the wagon road opened westward through southern new mexico, arizona, and california, we have seen that it was a detachment of twenty-five discharged members of the battalion which brought the first wagon through from the coast via cajon pass to salt lake valley, following what is now the general course of the san pedro, los angeles and salt lake railroad, and which became known in the early utah california times as the southern california route to the coast. also, as we have seen, the battalion members returning from the gold fields of the american river region cut a new wagon road, much of the way, for their seventeen wagons and two cannons from the western side of the sierra, across the summit of that lofty range, thence down to the eastern sloping deserts of nevada, and so to salt lake valley. the conquest of northern mexico, including, of course, california and utah, as well as new mexico and [transcriber's note: text is missing in the original] lence of their conduct, not only on the march to the pacific fleet of the american navy, and the "army of the west," the main division of which was under the command of general stephen w. kearny. the battalion's part in the conquest is detailed in the foregoing narrative, and also is acknowledged in the military order by col. cooke, referred to several times and given in full in a preceding page of this book. in addition to all this, the battalion reflected great credit upon the community of utah pioneers--of whom it never ceased to be a part--by reason of the excellence of their conduct not only on the march to the pacific coast, but also when doing garrison duty in southern california. the efforts to secure the re-enlistment of the battalion, and, failing that, the effort to secure the enlistment of a second mormon battalion, were the conscious confessions of both california and federal officials--since both participated in such efforts--to the worth of these united states soldiers. "they religiously respected their rights and feelings of the conquered people of california; not a syllable of complaint of a single insult offered, or any outrage done by a mormon volunteer," is the record of the battalion, and the re-enlisted volunteers, according to the report of them by governor mason. such is the reputation of the battalion; of its officers, chosen from its ranks; and of its men, the rank and file. the part the battalion played in the discovery of gold has already been detailed. =connection with irrigation.=--the connection of members of the battalion with the introduction of irrigation among an anglo-saxon people, and most likely coming from their suggestion, is a deduction from circumstances rather than a fact sustained by direct and positive proof. when brigham young's company of pioneers were about to leave green river on july 4, 1847, they were overtaken by a detachment of thirteen men from the battalion, who were in pursuit of men who had stolen horses from their camps some seven days' travel eastward. these men had been with the several invalided detachments from the battalion--about 150 in all--that had wintered at pueblo, in what is now the state of colorado. they were incorporated into the pioneer company and came on with it to salt lake valley, and undoubtedly members of this group would be upon the ground that 23rd day of july, when ploughing was first attempted on the south fork of city creek, on the present site of great salt lake city. the annals of that day say that the ground was so dry and hard that in the attempt to plow it several plows were broken. whereupon, at someone's suggestion--who it was that made it the annals do not disclose, and it is not known--a company was set at work to put in a dam in the creek and flood the land in order to plow it. this was the beginning of anglo-saxon irrigation. as already stated, who it was that made the fortunate suggestion that the water be turned out upon the land in order to make it possible to plow it, is not known, but we have seen that thirteen members of the battalion were among the pioneers, and some of them had seen irrigation in operation among the mexicans at santa fe and further south in the valley of the rio grande. what more likely than that some of those men who had seen irrigation in progress should suggest the flooding of the land to prepare it for plowing, as they had seen it conducted over the land to convey moisture to the growing vegetation? the probability of it has moral certainty. footnotes: [78:a] history u. s. (morris), 1877 ed., p. 326. [78:b] history of the u. s. (fiske), 1877 ed., p. 336. [78:c] conquest of mexico and california--cooke, p. 159. also history of the united states--morris, p. 326. x. the subsequent distinction achieved by the battalion's commanding officers. [illustration: philip st. george cooke] it may be of interest, and certainly it belongs to the history of the battalion, to say that its commanding officer and the two lieutenants of the regular army, his staff officers, rose later to honorable distinction during the war between the states. =colonel cooke.=--col. cooke, after returning to the east with stephen w. kearny, continued in the military service of the united states and was active in the kansas-nebraska troubles of the early fifties. in 1857-8 he commanded the cavalry in the johnston expedition to utah; and it is of record that when that command passed through the streets of salt lake city, en route from the mouth of emigration canyon to the place of its encampment west of the jordan, the colonel rode with uncovered head, through the city; "out of respect to the brave men of the mormon battalion he had commanded in their march to the pacific." for a time after the departure of albert sidney johnston for the east, or rather to the south,--for that officer espoused the cause of the southern confederacy, against the union, col. cooke for a time was in command of "johnston army" at camp floyd, in cedar valley, west of utah lake. during the civil war col. cooke though a virginian served on the side of the union army, and rose through the grade of brigadier general (1861), to the rank of brevet major general (1865). =lieut. a. j. smith.=--lieutenant a. j. smith in the same war rose from the grade of commander of california volunteers to that of brigadier general of volunteers (1862); and to major general of volunteers (1864). in the battle of nashville he commanded the sixteenth corps of general thomas' right, and received the brevet of major general in the regular army for his services in that battle. =lieut. george stoneman.=--lieutenant george stoneman in 1861 was in command at fort brown, texas, with the rank of captain. later he was in command of the union cavalry in the peninsula campaign. after the death of general philip kearny, at chantilly, stoneman took the command of the fallen general's division, and commanded the third corps at fredericksburg. at chancellorsville he commanded the federal cavalry. in a raid upon andersonville, the object of which was to liberate the federal soldiers imprisoned there, he was captured by the confederates. after the war he was in command of one of the many military departments created by the government; and from 1883 to 1887 was governor of california. xi. anecdotes. col. cooke in addition to natural austerity of temperament was a strict disciplinarian, and generally held himself aloof from the men. a few anecdotes that fortunately survived the march, and which were related by wilford woodruff at the celebration of pioneer's day, in 1880, show the colonel in some of his better moods, and witness the fact that he could be somewhat broadly tolerant of the independent attitude of some members of his mormon command. the woodruff narratives follow: =character of col. cooke.=--"those who marched with him (colonel cooke) can understand him much better than i can describe him. i think he possessed a better heart than his language would sometimes indicate. he was a strict disciplinarian, and, like lord nelson, expected every man to do his duty. but he had a peculiar streak in his composition at times that induced him to see how far the mormon battalion would go in obeying his commands and that were inconsistent with reason and good judgment. as an illustration of this, for the edification or amusement of the remnant of the battalion who are present, i will refer to a few incidents, and if i do not get everything as it transpired, i will get it as nearly as i can, from the report of those who were present." =col. cooke and christopher layton.=--"on one occasion, while the battalion was crossing a river with a ferry-boat, col. cooke was sitting on his mule on the bank looking at them. the boat went down into such deep water that the setting poles did not touch bottom. 'try the upper side,' said he. they did so, but could not touch bottom. the colonel then took off his hat and said: 'good bye, gentlemen. when you get down to the gulf of california, give my respects to the folks.' he then rode off and left them, not waiting to see whether they would reach shore or go down the river. he soon returned and found that they had got ashore. while sitting there, christopher layton rode up to the river on a mule to let it drink. col. cooke said to him, 'young man, i want you to ride across the river and carry a message for me to capt. hunt.' it being natural for the men to obey the colonel's order, he [layton] tried to ride into the river, but he had gone but a few steps before his mule was going in all over. so brother layton stopped. the colonel halloed out, 'go on, young man; go on, young man.' but brother layton, on a moment's reflection, was satisfied that if he attempted it both he and his mule would stand a good chance to be drowned. the colonel himself was satisfied of the same. so brother layton turned his mule and rode off, saying, as he came out, 'colonel, i'll see you in hell before i will drown myself and mule in that river.' the colonel looked at him a moment, and said to the by-standers, 'what is that man's name?' 'christopher layton, sir.' 'well, he is a saucy fellow.'" =col. cooke and lot smith.=--on another occasion, (while the battalion was at santa fe) col. cooke ordered lot smith to guard a mexican corral, and having a company of united states cavalry camped by, he told lot if the men came to steal the poles to bayonet them. the men came and surrounded the corral, and while lot was guarding one side, they would hitch to a pole on the other, and ride off with it. when the colonel saw the poles were gone, he asked lot why he did not obey orders and bayonet the thieves? lot replied, "if you expect me to bayonet united states troops for taking a pole on the enemy's ground to make a fire of, you mistake your man." lot expected to be punished, and he was placed under guard, but nothing further was done about it. =the colonel, the mule and bigler.=--"col. cooke called upon w. h. bigler as a provost guard one day to guard his tent. the colonel had a favorite mule, which was fed some grain on a blanket. one of the freight mules came up and helped to eat the grain. the colonel drove him off several times, but he would follow him again, until the colonel got vexed, and said to bigler, 'is your musket loaded?' 'no sir.' 'then load it and give it to me.' brother bigler is the last man on earth that any one acquainted with him would have supposed would have played any tricks on the colonel. but he took out a cartridge and bit off the ball end, which he dropped on the ground. he then rammed the powder and paper down the gun, capped it and handed it to the colonel. several of the officers of the battalion stood looking on. as the mule came back to get the grain and had arrived within a rod of him, the colonel fired the charge into its face; but the only effect that it had upon the mule was to cause it to give a snort, wheel around and kick at him, and then run off a few rods, after which it turned to come back again. this created a good deal of amusement with the lookers on. the only remark the colonel made, as he handed back the musket to brother bigler, was, 'young man, that gun was not properly loaded.'" =wire, wire, damn you sir.=--"col. cooke had rather more sternness than familiarity in him. when he gave an order, if he was not fully understood by the soldiers, they did not like to question him. on one occasion he wanted some wire to fix up his tent. he ordered one of the soldiers to go to a certain man and get some wire, but he did not speak plainly and the soldier did not understand what he said. nevertheless the soldier started to go on the errand, but began to think that he could not tell what to ask for. so he went back to the colonel and asked him what he had told him to get. the colonel said, 'wire, wire, wire, damn you sir.' the soldier went to the man and asked for some wire for col. cooke. but the man had not got any wire. 'what did you ask for?' inquired the colonel, when the man returned. 'i asked for wire, wire, wire, damn you sir.' 'that will do, that will do, young man. you may go to your tent.'" =col. cooke's respect for the battalion.=--"these instances show a little of the kind of temperament col. cooke possessed, but he had a good, generous heart. he entertained great respect for the mormon battalion and he always spoke kindly of them before the government and all men. when he went through salt lake city with col. a. s. johnston, in 1858, he uncovered his head in honor of the mormon battalion, that five hundred brave men that he had led two thousand miles over sandy deserts and through rocky canyons, in the midst of thirst, hunger, and fatigue, in the service of their country. may god bless col. cooke; and may he bless the battalion and their posterity after them."[88:a] footnotes: [88:a] wilford woodruff in "utah pioneers"--1880--pp. 20-22. addenda. the battalion's monument. the march and achievements of the mormon battalion are worthy of celebration in an enduring form that shall perpetuate the memory of them to future generations. this has been recognized for many years and the idea of such a memorial has been kept alive in the community by a women's organization known as the daughters of the mormon battalion, composed of direct female descendants of the men of that organization. of late years the interest has taken on a wider scope, until now the whole state of utah and the surrounding intermountain states have become awakened to the duty of properly commemorating by a monument, this unique event in the history of our country and of the utah pioneers. =the state of utah mormon battalion monument commission.=--this awakened sense of duty led to the creation of the state of utah mormon battalion monument commission, by the twelfth legislature of the state of utah. it is instructed to proceed with the erection of a monument upon the capitol grounds to commemorate the important contribution made to the early settlement of the state of utah and the western portion of the united states by the mormon battalion. the appointment of this commission and the mandate given to it were the sequence of an act of the previous legislature (the eleventh), which had appointed a former commission of seven citizens to investigate the subject of such a monument, choose a site for it upon the capitol grounds, select a design and report to the legislature next succeeding. accordingly a site was selected, a competition held in which the architects and the sculptors of utah and also of the united states were invited to participate, and in which prominent sculptors and architects from the whole country did participate, submitting plans and models of their designs, from which a committee composed of utah's prominent artists and architects selected three as winning first, second and third places, respectively, and to which were awarded cash prizes as per terms of the competition. acting upon the judgment of this committee the design accorded first place was recommended by the monument committee to the twelfth legislature and an appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars asked for, not to be available, however, before 1920, and only when a like amount of money should be raised from other sources. the report of the first committee resulted, as before stated, in the appointment of the present commission, the making of the aforesaid appropriation of two thousand dollars additional for contingent expenses, and authorizing procedure with the work. mr. g. p. riswold, the successful sculptor in the competition, associated with messrs. james r. m. morrison and mr. walker, architects, chicago, illinois, were notified of the action of the legislature. the following spring mr. morrison of the firm of the sculptor and associated architects, being in salt lake city, and meeting with some members of the commission volunteered the making of a larger model of the design submitted by mr. riswold. this model has been inspected by a special committee appointed by the utah state commission and finally adopted by the full commission as the accepted design and model of the monument to be erected on the capitol grounds. =description of the monument.=--the written report of mr. samuel c. park, formerly mayor of salt lake city, made on behalf of the committee that went to chicago to inspect the model, to the utah state mormon battalion commission--may well be taken for a description of the mormon battalion monument that it is proposed to erect on the capitol grounds: "to the chairman of members of the mormon battalion monument commission: "as a member of your subcommittee delegated to go to chicago to inspect the model of the proposed mormon battalion monument, i have the honor to report: "* * * the base is in triangular form with concave sides and rounded corners. "a bronze figure of a battalion man is mounted upon the front corner. flanking him on two sides of the triangle are cut in high relief, on the left, the scene of the enlistment of the battalion under the flag of the united states of america; on the right a scene of the march where the men are assisting in pulling the wagons of their train up and over a precipitous ascent while still others are ahead widening a cut to permit the passage of the wagons between the out-jutting rocks. "the background is a representation of mountains of the character through which the battalion and its train passed on the journey to the pacific. "just below the peak in the center and in front of it is chiseled a beautiful head and upper part of a woman, symbolizing the 'spirit of the west.' she personifies the impulsive power and motive force that sustained these battalion men and led them, as a vanguard of civilization, across the trackless plains and through the difficult defiles and passes of the mountains. "the idea of the sculptor in the 'spirit of the west' is a magnificent conception and should dominate the whole monument. "the bronze figure of the battalion man is dignified, strong and reverential. he excellently typifies that band of pioneer soldiers which broke away through the rugged mountains and over trackless wastes. "hovering over and above him the beautiful female figure, with an air of solicitous care, guards him in his reverie. her face stands out in full relief: the hair and diaphanous drapery waft back mingling with the clouds while the figure fades into dim outline in the massive peaks and mountains, seeming to pervade the air and the soil with her very soul. "'the spirit of the west' is but one of the many attributes of deity symbolizing that infinite love and care which the deity has for all his children and it represents the hope, courage, and determination which moved and impelled the battalion man, his comrades and all the others who have followed in their footsteps in the settlement and development of the great west. "it is the spirit back of the breaking of the soil by the farmer, back of the institution of our schools, back of our mines, back of our government and of our very hearthsides. it permeates the air, the soil and the hearts of men. it tempers the character of all who come within the influence of the boundless plains and majestic peaks. it has led men to make a garden of a desert and a treasure house of the mountain. it has justified and approved every sacrifice to make this part of the world a better place in which to live. it is constant, never ending--infinite. "it is pleasant to contemplate these thoughts as expressed in the model, at this time when the world is all but overcome with the idea of individualism, and while new governments, shifting as the sands, conceived in greed, envy and malice daily are born, struggle and die. "our proposed monument represents and commemorates such ideal in co-operation, steadfastness and progress as should be a lesson and an inspiration to this and to succeeding generations. "the back of the monument has been most happily designed. "it is the third side of the triangle and remains to be described. "the central idea is the dimly suggested figure of an indian woman, of the southwestern type, whose head shows in relief against the background peaks and whose body and outstretched arms draped in the customary blanket are faintly suggested in the crags and rocks. in fact the head is the only part of the figure that is chiseled clear in outline, the balance of the figure being only dimly suggested." =evanishment of race.=--"just as the 'spirit of the west' in the front dominates and pervades so this figure has the air of receding and disappearance. the evanishment of a former race. the figure is heroic in size and beautifully conceived. on either side, really on the lower folds of the blanket or on the rocks whereon the blanket is suggested, are two more scenes incidental to the journey and labors of the battalion. on the right half is a scene at sutter's mill where some of the battalion members in digging the tailrace for the mill turned up the first gold bearing gravel that led to the great gold rush to california in ''49,' and contributed so many millions to the wealth of the country. "on the left half is shown a battalion man digging a ditch and leading the water from a creek to overflow the land so that the pioneers could break the ground that had shattered their plow points and broken their plows. "this was the introduction of irrigation into utah. "the back of the monument in its conception and treatment, by its stateliness and suggested grandeur and what the artists call 'atmosphere' made a distinct impression upon the committee and no changes or modifications were thought of nor suggested. it seemed a very happy solution of a difficult problem. "from the irrigating stream and the tail-race of the mill it is designed to have small streams of flowing water forming a pool in the shape of a half moon at the rear and so arranged as to pass this water through to the other side to form two pools or lagoons on the front side of the monument. "immediately surrounding the monument the architects have laid out a pavement in red brick tile with a border of an indian design. this dark tile will save the glare and dazzling reflection of the bright sun of our clear atmosphere upon a white granite monument. "there are also graceful and symmetrical walks, a granite coping and seats suitably located and arranged to give everyone ample opportunity for a casual or studied view of the monument and its parts. "beyond these walks and seats immediately around the monument, the pools, lagoon and walks are designed to join in and harmonize with the rest of the capitol grounds. "nothing like this monument has ever been designed or built before. it is original and unique. few states can boast the achievements such as are commemorated in this design. more than 72 years have elapsed since the battalion made its memorable march, and the most of its members have passed to the great beyond. so this monument should be built at once if we are to proceed according to first hand evidence and information and not according to more or less fanciful and legendary tales concerning them and their difficult journey. "it is sufficiently creditable and glorifying to tell their history as it was and without adornment. the most important events are to be shown in bronze and stone upon this monument. "its execution will certainly tax the sculptor to his utmost, but i believe it is in thoroughly capable hands and when built will be one of the really great monuments of the united states. * * * "therefore, let us adhere to the proposed model with steadfast purpose to build it not only as an added attraction to the many we have for the tourist and visitor, but more especially as an object of great interest for study and inspiration for our children and our children's children." =the duty of the people of utah.=--such is the monument to be erected in commemoration of this great march of infantry whose achievements are so closely and inseparably connected with winning for the united states her present inheritance in the intermountain west and on the shores of the pacific. also whose achievements and glory are so inseparably connected with the founding of the state of utah, as the work of part of her pioneer-state builders. it is the duty of the people of utah, to whom appeal is now made, to raise the $100,000 necessary to make the state's appropriation of a like amount available to build the monument. to fail in such a duty would be to disgrace the state. no other state in the union has such a unique incident to celebrate as this battalion incident in our utah pioneer history. it is both heroic and dramatic; and in the results achieved is one of the largest events contributed by any state to the history of our country. utah owes it to the state and to the nation to build this monument, that memory of this greatest march of infantry in the world, and the heroism of those who made it, shall not perish from among men. it is the purpose of the utah state mormon battalion monument commission to raise this fund by the 30th day of january, 1920,--battalion day--being the seventy-third anniversary of the official ending of their march, and arrival upon the shores of the pacific. the respective counties have been organized for the campaign for the funds, subscription lists have been opened. it is proposed to conduct a campaign of public meetings in the interest of the monument throughout utah and the surrounding states, and give the people of the inter-mountain west every opportunity to honor themselves and their posterity and their state by fittingly memorializing the march and achievements of the mormon battalion. * * * * * transcriber's note: variations in spelling and hyphenation have been left as in the original. the following corrections have been made to the text: page iii: the call of the battalion. [period missing in original] page iii: from fort leavenworth to santa fe. [period missing in original] page iv: from santa fe to the mouth of the gila. [period missing in original] page iv: record of the battalion in california. [period missing in original] page v: the tide of western civilization started 67 [original has 66] page v: the mormon battalion's "diggings" on the american river 68 [original has 67] page v: ascent of the sierras from the western side 72 [original has 71] page v: evidence of appreciation of the battalion's services 73 [original has 72] page v: efforts to raise a second mormon battalion 74 [original has 73] page v: lieut. george stoneman [original has stonemen] page 9: in it mr. [period missing in original] little expresses page 14: in the event of [original has or] the battalion being raised page 15: locate on grand island until [original has untill] they could page 15: [original has extraneous quotation mark] you can stay till your husbands page 16: "four regiments were called [quotation mark missing in original] page 17: 11th of july, col. [period missing in original] thomas l. kane page 17: with benevolent [original has benevolant] intentions page 17: his [original has hisc] written report page 18: the united [original has unied] states want our friendship page 18: "this is the first time [original has single quote] page 18: choose the best locations." [quotation mark missing in original] page 19: affectation at their leave-taking," [original has ','] page 19: firm and hard by frequent use. [period missing in original] page 19: the canto of debonair [original has debonnair] violins page 22: to volunteer [original has volunter] for a "war-march" page 24: said river some thirty or forty miles. [period missing in original] page 24: would amount [original has amout] to $42.00 each page 24: pay of the soldiers that had accrued [original has accured] page 24: first [original has fiirst] sergeant, $16.00 per month page 25: winter supply of the camp." [quotation mark missing in original] page 26: where they were destined to go without." [quotation mark missing in original] page 26: experienced in raising [original has rasing] the battalion page 28: commissioned officer of the regular army [original has mary] page 32: [original has extraneous quotation mark] by special arrangement page 32: not very available at santa fe [original has extraneous comma] page 36: through sand, beneath a burning sun." [quotation mark missing in original] page 36: through sonora via [original has of] janos and fronteras page 37: 'i will go there or die in the attempt. [period missing in original]' page 40: message from captain comaduran [original has comandurau] page 41: "adjutant." [quotation mark missing in original] page 42: it was signed, december 30, 1853. [period missing in original] page 43: called tornia, a variety of the mezquit. [period missing in original] page 45: was [original has kas] "the most trying of any page 45: the skin from the leg of an ox. [period missing in original] page 46: near eleven, [a. m. [period missing in original]] i reached page 46: dependence on muddy wells for five or six days. [period missing in original] page 48: too narrow by a foot of solid rock. [period missing in original] page 49: round one side, a cold one around the other. [period missing in original] page 49: fallen upon the rainy season. [original has extraneous quotation mark] page 49: "the ill-clad [original has ill-crad] battalion," he continues page 49: the announcement that gen. [period missing in original] kearny page 51: of the snow-capped mountains." [quotation mark missing in original] page 51: military brevity the achievements [original has achievemets] page 52: these first wagons to the pacific [original has pacifice] page 53: lieutenants a. [period missing in original] j. smith and george stoneman page 54: "some had not shaved [quotation mark missing in original] page 54: a year's growth had to be sacrificed [original has sacrified] page 55: vermin, and no person, however [original has howevevr] cleanly page 55: "colonel cooke and lieutenant stoneman commenced [quotation mark missing in original] page 55: nine privates of company a. [period missing in original] page 59: be accepted. [period missing in original] page 59: induce the battalion to re-enlist. [period missing in original] page 60: and work until spring. [period missing in original] page 61: mustered out of the service. [period missing in original] page 62: $1,950.00, cash down. [original has extraneous quotation mark] page 63: goodyear's title amounted to no more [original has momre] page 65: 24th of january [original has extraneous quotation mark] while page 65: jan. [period missing in original] 30th: clear, and page 65: he does not know the date. [period missing in original] page 67: date of discovery trebly proved. [original has extraneous quotation mark] page 67: civilized world to california. [period missing in original] page 68: bigler, followed the wagon road. [period missing in original] page 69: might examine the place." [original has single quote] page 71: parties [original has patrties] came in one after another page 71: national 4th," writes h. [period missing in original] h. bancroft page 72: been murdered by the indians. [period missing in original] page 73: california and the u. [period missing in original] s. government page 75: he had met captain hunt [original has hrnt] page 75: rank of lieutenant-colonel, with an adjutant [original has adjustant] page 75: the wish of the department. [period missing in original] page 76: and that he [original has be] brought with him page 77: 4. [original has comma] the adoption of irrigation farming page 77: the part [original has extraneous of] the battalion took page 78: government paid mexico $15,000,000. [period missing in original] page 78: rocky mountains and sierra nevadas [original has nevavda] page 78: for which was paid $10,000,000. [period missing in original] page 80: such is [word is missing in original] the reputation of the battalion page 80: the part the battalion played [word missing in original] in the discovery of gold page 80: with the several invalided [original has invallided] detachments page 83: the streets [original has tsreets] of salt lake city page 84: grade of brigadier general (1861) [opening parenthesis missing in original] page 85: natural austerity of temperament [original has temperment] page 85: from the report of those who were present." [quotation mark missing in original] page 86: col. [period missing in original] cooke said to him page 87: load it and give it to me. [period missing in original] page 87: was not properly loaded.'" [double quote missing in original] page 88: you may go to your tent.'" [double quote missing in original] page 88: col. [period missing in original] a. s. johnston, in 1858 page 89: the erection of a monument [original has monumen] page 90: a site was selected, [comma missing in original] a competition page 90: mr. g. p. [period missing in original] riswold page 90: mr. [period missing in original] morrison of the firm page 93: world is all but overcome [original has ovrcome] page 93: being only dimly suggested." [quotation mark missing in original] page 93: the front dominates and pervades [original has prevades] page 93: whereon the blanket is suggested [original has suggsted] page 94: the wealth of the country. [original has comma] page 94: shattered their plow points [original has poitns] page 94: also graceful and symmetrical [original has symetrical] page 95: with steadfast purpose to build [original has built] it page 96: with the founding of the [original has te] state page 96: duty would be to disgrace [original has disgrance] page 96: not perish from among men. [period missing in original] page 96: their state by fittingly memorializing [original has memoralizing] [8:e] hist. of brigham young, [comma missing in original] ms. bk. 2 [8:e] (hist. u. s., [comma missing in original] p. 483) [17:q] history of brigham young, [comma missing in original] ms. bk. 2 [18:s] history of [of missing in original] brigham young [comma missing in original] ms. bk. 2, pp. 30-34. [19:v] kane's lecture [original has licture] "the mormons" [19:t] history of brigham young, [comma missing in original] ms. bk. 2 [19:u] history of brigham young, [comma missing in original] ms. bk. 2 [21:a] [transcriber's note: footnote missing in original.] [25:e] history of the mormon church (roberts), [comma missing in original] americana, march, 1912 [30:b] their arrival in santa [original has sant] fe [31:d] driven all the [original has he] way from nauvoo [32:e] personal narrative by p. st. george cooke, g. p. putnam [original has putman] and sons [62:g] middle of november, 1847" [quotation mark missing in original] [64:e] time of the gold discovery [original has discvery] [75:g] quoted by bancroft, [comma missing in original] hist. cal. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 5. by u. s. grant chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. the mattapony river is formed by the junction of the mat, the ta, the po and the ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. it takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the wilderness tavern. the po rises south-west of the place, but farther away. spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. the brock road reaches spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. lee's army coming up by the catharpin road, had to cross the po at wooden bridge. warren and hancock came by the brock road. sedgwick crossed the ny at catharpin furnace. burnside coming by aldrich's to gates's house, had to cross the ny near the enemy. he found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. this brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. about the time i received the news of this attack, word came from hancock that early had left his front. he had been forced over to the catharpin road, crossing the po at corbin's and again at wooden bridge. these are the bridges sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy spottsylvania. these movements of the enemy gave me the idea that lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. i made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and richmond if he should try to execute this design. if he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as burnside was established south of the ny. the po and the ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. the country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. it was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. by noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town. anderson was on his left extending to the po, ewell came next, then early. warren occupied our right, covering the brock and other roads converging at spottsylvania; sedgwick was to his left and burnside on our extreme left. hancock was yet back at todd's tavern, but as soon as it was known that early had left hancock's front the latter was ordered up to warren's right. he formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the po and get on the enemy's flank. the fourth division of hancock's corps, mott commanding, was left at todd's when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of sedgwick's--now wright's--6th corps. in the morning general sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. his loss was a severe one to the army of the potomac and to the nation. general h. g. wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of may, across the left flank of lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of meade's army, by the po river. but for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at wooden bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. the po at the points where hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it turns due south, and after passing under wooden bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. during the night this corps built three bridges over the po; but these were in rear. the position assumed by hancock's corps forced lee to reinforce his left during the night. accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when hancock renewed his effort to get over the po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of early's command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. he succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. the enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the wooden bridge with artillery. anderson's left rested on the po, where it turns south; therefore, for hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him from it. the stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. the idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of hancock's, and i determined to take advantage of it. accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by warren's and wright's corps, hancock to command all the attacking force. two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the po. gibbon was placed to the right of warren, and birney in his rear as a reserve. barlow's division was left south of the stream, and mott of the same corps was still to the left of wright's corps. burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. the enemy seeing barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to himself. but the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. the second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. general t. g. stevenson was killed in this move. between the lines, where warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. the slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. he was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. he then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned colonel emory upton, of the 121st new york volunteers, to the command of it. about four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, warren's and wright's corps, with mott's division of hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. the movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. the battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. meade and i occupied the best position we could get, in rear of warren. warren was repulsed with heavy loss, general j. c. rice being among the killed. he was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. to the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of mott. upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. so much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that i ordered upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that i withdrew the order. to relieve them, i ordered a renewal of the assault. by this time hancock, who had gone with birney's division to relieve barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. his corps was now joined with warren's and wright's in this last assault. it was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. at night they were withdrawn. upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. before leaving washington i had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. by this authority i conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the president. upton had been badly wounded in this fight. burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of spottsylvania court house, completely turning lee's right. he was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and i, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. he had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. burnside's position now separated him widely from wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. at night he was ordered to join on to this. this brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. i attach no blame to burnside for this, but i do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position. the enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on barlow. then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. on the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. i wrote the following letter to general halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 11, 1864--8.30 a.m. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. we have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. the result up to this time is much in our favor. but our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. we have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. i think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. i am now sending back to belle plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. the arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and i hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. my object in having them sent to belle plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. if it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to belle plain or fredericksburg, send them so. i am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. up to this time there is no indication of any portion of lee's army being detached for the defence of richmond. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. and also, i received information, through the war department, from general butler that his cavalry under kautz had cut the railroad south of petersburg, separating beauregard from richmond, and had whipped hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself. on this same day came news from sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between lee and richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. on the 8th i had directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac and pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the manner i have already described. chapter liii. hancock's assault-losses of the confederates--promotions recommended --discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack-reducing the artillery. in the reconnoissance made by mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered at the right centre. i determined that an assault should be made at that point. (*28) accordingly in the afternoon hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of warren and wright, under cover of night, to wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. the night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. it took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. the men got but little rest. burnside was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour. i sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. hancock was notified of this. warren and wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. i occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. hancock put barlow on his left, in double column, and birney to his right. mott followed birney, and gibbon was held in reserve. the morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. the ground over which hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. in front of birney there was also a marsh to cross. but, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. barlow and birney entered almost simultaneously. here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. the men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. the hand conflict was soon over. hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. about six o'clock i ordered warren's corps to the support of hancock's. burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. however, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss in return. this victory was important, and one that lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. he made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. troops were brought up from his left and attacked hancock furiously. hancock was forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. these he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. wright was ordered up to reinforce hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. he was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. at eight o'clock warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. at eleven o'clock i gave meade written orders to relieve warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. he kept lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. if the 5th corps, or rather if warren, had been as prompt as wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained. lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. his losses must have been fearful. sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. in one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. all the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. it was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. in this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. the enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere.(*30) our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. at night lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, cutler's division sent to wright, and griffin's to hancock. meade ordered his chief of staff, general humphreys, to remain with warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name. during the day i was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. about the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. she showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly union that i stopped. she said she had not seen a union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. she said her husband and son, being, union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the union army, if alive. she was without food or nearly so, so i ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if i could where the husband and son were. there was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between mott's division and the enemy. i was afraid that lee might be moving out, and i did not want him to go without my knowing it. the indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. our dead were buried this day. mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and assigned to birney's division. during this day i wrote to washington recommending sherman and meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; hancock for brigadier-general; wright, gibbon and humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers; and upton and carroll to be brigadiers. upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the senate on the nomination of the president. the night of the 13th warren and wright were moved by the rear to the left of burnside. the night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. it was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. they gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in wright's front. here upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of griffin's division, warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. there was no more battle during the 14th. this brought our line east of the court house and running north and south and facing west. during the night of the 14th-15th lee moved to cover this new front. this left hancock without an enemy confronting him. he was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. on the 15th news came from butler and averill. the former reported the capture of the outer works at drury's bluff, on the james river, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of richmond on the danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at dublin, west virginia, and the breaking of new river bridge on the virginia and tennessee railroad. the next day news came from sherman and sheridan. sherman had forced johnston out of dalton, georgia, and was following him south. the report from sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defences of richmond. the prospect must now have been dismal in richmond. the road and telegraph were cut between the capital and lee. the roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. this condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. i wrote halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 16, 1864, 8 a.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c.: we have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. the roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and fredericksburg. all offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. the army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * * * * you can assure the president and secretary of war that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. the condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. but that night hancock and wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. on this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. as stated above, hancock's and wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. news came that sigel had been defeated at new market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. not two hours before, i had sent the inquiry to halleck whether sigel could not get to staunton to stop supplies coming from there to lee. i asked at once that sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. hunter's name was suggested, and i heartily approved. further news from butler reported him driven from drury's bluff, but still in possession of the petersburg road. banks had been defeated in louisiana, relieved, and canby put in his place. this change of commander was not on my suggestion. all this news was very discouraging. all of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. in fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment i thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, but this was no time for repining. i immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. i also asked halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from fredericksburg to port royal, on the rappahannock. up to this time i had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under brigadier general robert o. tyler, just arrived. they had not yet joined their command, hancock's corps, but were on our right. this corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. tyler had come up from fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near kitching's brigade of warren's corps. tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. birney was thrown to tyler's right and crawford to his left, with gibbon as a reserve; and ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. warren had been ordered to get on ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrenchments. but his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. the army being engaged until after dark, i rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. as soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, i naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. the withdrawal of hancock from the right uncovered one road from spottsylvania to fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. this was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by general ferrero, belonging to burnside's corps. ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards fredericksburg. the enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. in consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, lee could be reinforced largely, and i had no doubt he would be. beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the confederate capital when it was in danger. butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to lee. hoke was no longer needed in north carolina; and sigel's troops having gone back to cedar creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. the wilderness and spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. it occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. before leaving spottsylvania, therefore, i sent back to the defences of washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. this relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. in fact, before reaching the james river i again reduced the artillery with the army largely. i believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to richmond, and at a distance from the main army, lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. so i issued the following orders: near spottsylvania c. h., va., may 18, 1864. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. before daylight to-morrow morning i propose to draw hancock and burnside from the position they now hold, and put burnside to the left of wright. wright and burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. to-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards richmond on the line of the fredericksburg railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. if the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. u. s. grant. on the 20th, lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey--position of the national army. we were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in virginia. the roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. no men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. the country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. by reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to guiney's station, on the fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to bowling green and milford. he was at milford by the night of the 21st. here he met a detachment of pickett's division coming from richmond to reinforce lee. they were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached guiney's station that night without molestation. burnside and wright were retained at spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold lee, if possible, while hancock and warren should get start enough to interpose between him and richmond. lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking wright and burnside alone, or by following by the telegraph road and striking hancock's and warren's corps, or even hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. but he did not avail himself of either opportunity. he seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line--the telegraph road--to make sure of keeping between his capital and the army of the potomac. he never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. the evening of the 21st burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by wright, 6th corps. burnside was to take the telegraph road; but finding stanard's ford, over the po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by hancock and warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. the night of the 21st i had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at guiney's station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and hancock. there was a slight attack on burnside's and wright's corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. the object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the confederates. by the morning of the 22d burnside and wright were at guiney's station. hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. they were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. but warren was pushed to harris's store, directly west of milford, and connected with it by a good road, and burnside was sent to new bethel church. wright's corps was still back at guiney's station. i issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day: new bethel, va., may 22, 1864 major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. to-morrow. at that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. if beyond the south anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to beaver dam station, the other to jericho bridge, then south by roads reaching the anna, as near to and east of hawkins creek as they can be found. the 2d corps will move to chesterfield ford. the 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to jericho bridge. the map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. the troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. the trains will be moved at the same time to milford station. headquarters will follow the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. warren's corps was moved from harris's store to jericho ford, wright's following. warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. the men had to wade in water up to their waists. as soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. the line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river--crawford on the left, next to the river, griffin in the centre, and cutler on the right. lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. the whole of hill's corps was sent against warren's right before it had got in position. a brigade of cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. by night wright's corps was up ready to reinforce warren. on the 23d hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the north anna river just west of where the fredericksburg railroad crosses. it was near night when the troops arrived. they found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. hancock sent two brigades, egan's and pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. the bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. several hundred prisoners were captured. the hour was so late that hancock did not cross until next morning. burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the north anna at ox ford, midway between telegraph road and jericho ford. the hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. on the 24th hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. the railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. wright's corps crossed at jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of warren's corps, extending south of the virginia central railroad. this road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. it was found, however, that burnside's corps could not cross at ox ford. lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. before the exact position of the whole of lee's line was accurately known, i directed hancock and warren each to send a brigade to ox ford by the south side of the river. they found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. a third ford was found between ox ford and jericho. burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to hancock. crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with crawford's left. potter joined hancock by way of the wooden bridge. crittenden had a severe engagement with some of hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. when joined to warren's corps he was no further molested. burnside still guarded ox ford from the north side. lee now had his entire army south of the north anna. our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. to get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. we were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. about this time the very troops whose coming i had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. pickett with a full division from richmond was up; hoke from north carolina had come with a brigade; and breckinridge was there: in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. but he did not attempt to drive us from the field. on the 22d or 23d i received dispatches from washington saying that sherman had taken kingston, crossed the etowah river and was advancing into georgia. i was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for burnside's corps to pass. meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. the lady of the house, a mrs. tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. he touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live yankees" before in their lives. the elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, "oh yes, i have; many more." "where?" said burnside. "in richmond." prisoners, of course, was understood. i read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. this threw the younger lady into tears. i found the information she had received (and i suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the south) was that lee was driving us from the state in the most demoralized condition and that in the south-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from sherman was true. i assured her that there was no doubt about it. i left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. but i presume he was in the confederate army. on the 25th i gave orders, through halleck, to hunter, who had relieved sigel, to move up the valley of virginia, cross over the blue ridge to charlottesville and go as far as lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. after doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. on the same day news was received that lee was falling back on richmond. this proved not to be true. but we could do nothing where we were unless lee would assume the offensive. i determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and richmond. i had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but i did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the james river high up. sheridan was now again with the army of the potomac. on the 26th i informed the government at washington of the position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the move i proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to white house, on the pamunkey. the wagon train and guards moved directly from port royal to white house. supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. orders had previously been sent, through halleck, for butler to send smith's corps to white house. this order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the pamunkey, and marched until they joined the army of the potomac. it was a delicate move to get the right wing of the army of the potomac from its position south of the north anna in the presence of the enemy. to accomplish it, i issued the following order: quarles' mills, va., may 25, 1864. major general meade, commanding a. p. direct generals warren and wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. send that belonging to general wright's corps as far on the road to hanover town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. send with it wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, littlepage's bridge and taylor's ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. as soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from wright's corps to make a forced march to hanover town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. at the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. the two divisions of the 9th corps not now with hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. to-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. as soon as the troops reach hanover town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. i think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to little river. here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of lee's army. under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, lee being completely deceived by wilson's feint. on the afternoon of the 26th sheridan moved, sending gregg's and torbert's cavalry to taylor's and littlepage's fords towards hanover. as soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under general russell. on the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. thus a position was secured south of the pamunkey. russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to hanover town. here barringer's, formerly gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away. warren's and wright's corps were moved by the rear of burnside's and hancock's corps. when out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. the one nearest to and north of the north anna and pamunkey was taken by wright, followed by hancock. warren, followed by burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. the trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. all the troops that had crossed the pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from north anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to richmond: "enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at hanover town." the troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. the country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. the streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. the banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. hanover town is about twenty miles from richmond. there are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the chickahominy at meadow bridge, near the virginia central railroad, the second going by new and old cold harbor. a few miles out from hanover town there is a third road by way of mechanicsville to richmond. new cold harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to white house (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the james river below the richmond defences. on the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except burnside's corps. this was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. a line was at once formed extending south from the river, wright's corps on the right, hancock's in the centre, and warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. at the same time sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards mechanicsville to find lee's position. at hawes' shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to richmond, he encountered the confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. in the evening custer came up with a brigade. the attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. this time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. but our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more confederate than union soldiers had been killed. the position was easily held, because our infantry was near. on the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of lee. wright's corps pushed to hanover court house. hancock's corps pushed toward totopotomoy creek; warren's corps to the left on the shady grove church road, while burnside was held in reserve. our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. there was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and sheridan was sent to meet it. on the 30th hancock moved to the totopotomoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. wright was moved to the right of hancock's corps, and burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of hancock. warren moved up near huntley corners on the shady grove church road. there was some skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening early attacked warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and threatening to turn our left flank. as the best means of reinforcing the left, hancock was ordered to attack in his front. he carried and held the rifle-pits. while this was going on warren got his men up, repulsed early, and drove him more than a mile. on this day i wrote to halleck ordering all the pontoons in washington to be sent to city point. in the evening news was received of the arrival of smith with his corps at white house. i notified meade, in writing, as follows: near hawes' shop, va., 6.40 p.m., may 30, 1864. major-general meade, commanding a. p. general smith will debark his force at the white house tonight and start up the south bank of the pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. it is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards cold harbor, and also on the mechanicsville road. wright should be got well massed on hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the totopotomoy if necessary. i want sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communicate with smith and to return with him. i will send orders for smith by the messenger you send to sheridan with his orders. u. s. grant. i also notified smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. the night of the 30th lee's position was substantially from atlee's station on the virginia central railroad south and east to the vicinity of cold harbor. ours was: the left of warren's corps was on the shady grove road, extending to the mechanicsville road and about three miles south of the totopotomoy. burnside to his right, then hancock, and wright on the extreme right, extending towards hanover court house, six miles south-east of it. sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards cold harbor. wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the virginia central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. he got possession of hanover court house the next day after a skirmish with young's cavalry brigade. the enemy attacked sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards cold harbor. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor --correspondence with lee--retrospective. on the 31st sheridan advanced to near old cold harbor. he found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. a hard fight ensued but the place was carried. the enemy well knew the importance of cold harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. he returned with such a large force that sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. he speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defence. night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to cold harbor passing by the rear of the army. it was expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of june before it reached its destination. before the arrival of wright the enemy had made two assaults on sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on cold harbor. smith, who was coming up from white house, was also directed to march directly to cold harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of june; but by some blunder the order which reached smith directed him to newcastle instead of cold harbor. through this blunder smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. he landed twelve thousand five hundred men from butler's command, but a division was left at white house temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. before the removal of wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, federal and confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. finding at daylight that wright had left his front, lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. at all events, soon after light on the 1st of june anderson, who commanded the corps on lee's left, was seen moving along warren's front. warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while wright was directed to move out and get on his front. warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. he seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. wright reconnoitred some distance to his front: but the enemy finding old cold harbor already taken had halted and fortified some distance west. by six o'clock in the afternoon wright and smith were ready to make an assault. in front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards and then became wooded. both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. while this was going on, the enemy charged warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. there was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than warren when the enemy forced him to it. there was also an attack upon hancock's and burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve anderson who was being pressed by wright and smith. during the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting their object. hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of wright. i expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only reached old cold harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 a.m. preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with smith: hancock's corps was got into position to the left of wright's, and burnside was moved to bethesda church in reserve. while warren and burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. the attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. i was so annoyed at this that i directed meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. on this day wilson returned from his raid upon the virginia central railroad, having damaged it considerably. but, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to atlanta that well illustrates this point. the rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. one of them said, "no use, boys, old sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder." sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. he reported favorably. during the night lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. his lines extended now from the totopotomoy to new cold harbor. mine from bethesda church by old cold harbor to the chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. an assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of hancock, wright and smith; but warren and burnside were to support it by threatening lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. the corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. the move was to commence at half-past four in the morning. hancock sent barlow and gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with birney as a reserve. barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. the guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. no (*33) assistance coming to him, he (barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. he found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. but his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. the ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. an open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put martindale's division in it, and with brooks supporting him on the left and devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably picket--rifle-pits. warren and burnside also advanced and gained ground--which brought the whole army on one line. this assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate: but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. in fact, nowhere after the battle of the wilderness did lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind him. fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. at eleven o'clock i started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of hancock's and smith's corps. smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: burnside thought something could be done in his front, but warren differed. i concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. cold harbor, june 3, 1864.-12.30 p.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. to aid the expedition under general hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with lee until the former gets well on his way to lynchburg. to do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of richmond than to have them go back there. wright and hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through general smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now held. by night we were as strong against lee as he was against us. during the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. these we were able to care for. but there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. so i wrote the following: cold harbor, va., june 5, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding confederate army. it is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. i would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. i answered this immediately by saying: cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. your communication of yesterday's date is received. i will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. i propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. i will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way i proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties i may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. i answered: cold harbor, va, june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee. commanding army, n. va. the knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of june--forty-eight hours after it commenced --before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. in the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. and i wrote to lee: cold harbor, va., june 7, 1864. 10.30 a.m. gen. r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. i regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 p.m. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. as a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th north carolina regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. i regret this, but will state that as soon as i learned the fact, i directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. these officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, i remain, &c., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i have always regretted that the last assault at cold harbor was ever made. i might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of may, 1863, at vicksburg. at cold harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the confederate side. before that, the army of northern virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the army of the potomac. they no longer wanted to fight them "one confederate to five yanks." indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. they had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the army of the potomac. this charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. the effect upon the army of the potomac was the reverse. when we reached the james river, however, all effects of the battle of cold harbor seemed to have disappeared. there was more justification for the assault at vicksburg. we were in a southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. the army of the tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. they had driven a portion of that army from port gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at grand gulf. they had attacked another portion of the same army at raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the state, and driven them back into jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms: they had captured the capital of the state of mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at champion's hill, next at big black river bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. the army of the tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. there was no telling how long a regular siege might last. as i have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a southern climate. there was no telling what the casualties might be among northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. if vicksburg could have been carried in may, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. these are reasons justifying the assault. the only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. had the assault not been made, i have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james--general lee --visit to butler--the movement on petersburg--the investment of petersburg. lee's position was now so near richmond, and the intervening swamps of the chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that i determined to make my next left flank move carry the army of the potomac south of the james river. (*34) preparations for this were promptly commenced. the move was a hazardous one to make: the chickahominy river, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and butler, by the roads i should have to travel, with both the james and the chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the army of the potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the chickahominy and the james, move rapidly on butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. then too he might spare troops enough to send against hunter who was approaching lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. but the move had to be made, and i relied upon lee's not seeing my danger as i saw it. besides we had armies on both sides of the james river and not far from the confederate capital. i knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. but i took all the precaution i knew of to guard against all dangers. sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with hunter and to break up the virginia central railroad and the james river canal, on the 7th of june, taking instructions to hunter to come back with him (*35). hunter was also informed by way of washington and the valley that sheridan was on the way to meet him. the canal and central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the army of northern virginia and the people of richmond. before sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from hunter reporting his advance to staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the confederate commander, w. s. jones, was killed. on the 4th of june the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, burnside on our right was moved up between warren and smith. on the 5th birney returned to hancock, which extended his left now to the chickahominy, and warren was withdrawn to cold harbor. wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to bottom's bridge. the cavalry extended still farther east to jones's bridge. on the 7th abercrombie--who was in command at white house, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start--was ordered to take up the iron from the york river railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to city point. on the 8th meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. on the 9th abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at white house, without debarking from their transports, to report to butler. halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to city point. on the 11th i wrote: cold harbor, va., june 11, 1864. major-gen. b. f. butler, commanding department of va. and n. c. the movement to transfer this army to the south side of the james river will commence after dark to-morrow night. col. comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at bermuda hundred. colonel comstock has not yet returned, so that i cannot make instructions as definite as i would wish, but the time between this and sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, i must do the best i can. colonel dent goes to the chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. the corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a forced march to cole's landing or ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning. this corps numbers now 15,300 men. they take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these latter marching with the balance of the army to the james river. the remainder of the army will cross the chickahominy at long bridge and at jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below city point. i directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. i am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. general smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of richmond. the balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. i wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. if there is a point below city point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. i do not want petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. if you should go there, i think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. if colonel dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--on reflection i will send the 18th corps by way of white house. the distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the chickahominy will be avoided. u. s. grant. cold harbor, va., june 11,1864. major-general g. g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. colonel comstock, who visited the james river for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below bermuda hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. it is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. the movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to cole's landing or ferry, and there embark for city point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. the 5th corps will seize long bridge and move out on the long bridge road to its junction with quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy. the other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at long bridge, and two at jones's bridge. after the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about fort powhattan. of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. the 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. the wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than jones's they should take it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--in view of the long march to reach cole's landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to white house. they should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. u. s. grant. about this time word was received (through the richmond papers of the 11th) that crook and averell had united and were moving east. this, with the news of hunter's successful engagement near staunton, was no doubt known to lee before it was to me. then sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to lee's communications and supplies. much of his cavalry was sent after sheridan, and early with ewell's entire corps was sent to the valley. supplies were growing scarce in richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. people from outside began to pour into richmond to help eat up the little on hand. consternation reigned there. on the 12th smith was ordered to move at night to white house, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for city point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. soon after dark some of the cavalry at long bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. a pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. hancock followed warren. burnside took the road to jones's bridge, followed by wright. ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by window shades and cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. it was known that the enemy had some gunboats at richmond. these might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. general butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. on the 13th i sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the enemy. as soon as warren's corps was over the chickahominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from richmond while the army passed. no attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but warren and wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. by the evening of the 13th hancock's corps was at charles city court house on the james river. burnside's and wright's corps were on the chickahominy, and crossed during the night, warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. the material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of brigadier-general benham, commanding the engineer brigade. on the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. when the wilderness campaign commenced the army of the potomac, including burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of may when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men. during the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. at the crossing of the james river june 14th-15th the army numbered about 115,000. besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one-half of the artillery was sent back to washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* in estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. we were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. the manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. in the confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, i believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field. officers and details of enlisted men are not included. in the northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. estimated in the same manner as ours, lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start. his reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. he was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his army. the citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. all circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. general lee, who had led the army of northern virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the confederate army and states, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the northern states. his praise was sounded throughout the entire north after every action he was engaged in: the number of his forces was always lowered and that of the national forces exaggerated. he was a large, austere man, and i judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. to be extolled by the entire press of the south after every engagement, and by a portion of the press north with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. it was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from eastern officers, "well, grant has never met bobby lee yet." there were good and true officers who believe now that the army of northern virginia was superior to the army of the potomac man to man. i do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. before the end i believe the difference was the other way. the army of northern virginia became despondent and saw the end. it did not please them. the national army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. the advance of the army of the potomac reached the james on the 14th of june. preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. as already stated, i had previously ordered general butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent confederate gunboats from coming down the river. butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. i ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. i then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to bermuda hundred to see general butler for the purpose of directing a movement against petersburg, while our troops of the army of the potomac were crossing. i had sent general w. f. smith back from cold harbor by the way of white house, thence on steamers to city point for the purpose of giving general butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. general butler was ordered to send smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the army of the james. he gave smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under hinks. the distance which smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the confederate advance line of works was but two miles outside of petersburg. smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. i believed then, and still believe, that petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. it only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between city point and their lines outside of petersburg. this position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. while there i informed general butler that hancock's corps would cross the river and move to petersburg to support smith in case the latter was successful, and that i could reinforce there more rapidly than lee could reinforce from his position. i returned down the river to where the troops of the army of the potomac now were, communicated to general meade, in writing, the directions i had given to general butler and directed him (meade) to cross hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from smith. i also informed general meade that i had ordered rations from bermuda hundred for hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. the rations did not reach him, however, and hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. he then moved without them, and on the road received a note from general w. f. smith, asking him to come on. this seems to be the first information that general hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. the enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. to the east side of petersburg, from the appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles, probably three. if they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of richmond. smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. by nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. all of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him; and smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. next morning, the 16th, hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at gettysburg. during the day meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. in all this we lost very heavily. the works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. up to this time beauregard, who had commanded south of richmond, had received no reinforcements, except hoke's division from drury's bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. during the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by potter during the day. during the night, however, beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. colonel j. l. chamberlain, of the 20th maine, was wounded on the 18th. he was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. he had several times been recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. on this occasion, however, i promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the war department, asking that my act might be confirmed and chamberlain's name sent to the senate for confirmation without any delay. this was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well. if general hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. the days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. i do not think there is any doubt that petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. this would have given us control of both the weldon and south side railroads. this would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. i now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. they remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when general meade ordered an advance towards the weldon railroad. we were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the south side railroad if possible. meade moved hancock's corps, now commanded by birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. general wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the weldon road. the enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the national troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. the army of the potomac was given the investment of petersburg, while the army of the james held bermuda hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the james river. the 9th corps, burnside's, was placed upon the right at petersburg; the 5th, warren's, next; the 2d, birney's, next; then the 6th, wright's, broken off to the left and south. thus began the siege of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad --early 's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg --explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. on the 7th of june, while at cold harbor, i had as already indicated sent sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the virginia central railroad. general hunter had been operating up the shenandoah valley with some success, having fought a battle near staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. after the battle he formed a junction at staunton with averell and crook, who had come up from the kanawha, or gauley river. it was supposed, therefore, that general hunter would be about charlottesville, virginia, by the time sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. i gave sheridan instructions to have hunter, in case he should meet him about charlottesville, join and return with him to the army of the potomac. lee, hearing of hunter's success in the valley, started breckinridge out for its defence at once. learning later of sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and fitz-hugh lee's. sheridan moved to the north side of the north anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. he pushed on to get to trevilian station to commence his destruction at that point. on the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of trevilian, while fitz-hugh lee was the same night at trevilian station and hampton but a few miles away. during the night hampton ordered an advance on sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. sheridan, however, by a counter move sent custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. this he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. the losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to city point. during that day, the 11th, sheridan moved into trevilian station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. there was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. in the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he left trevilian. sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that general hunter was about lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to charlottesville with a view to meet him. sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of white house, and arriving there on the 21st. here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. he had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy. white house up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops were all on the james river, it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies. sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he did on the 22d of june, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train with him. all these were over the james river by the 26th of the month, and sheridan ready to follow. in the meantime meade had sent wilson's division on a raid to destroy the weldon and south side roads. now that sheridan was safe and hampton free to return to richmond with his cavalry, wilson's position became precarious. meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of wilson. wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon repaired. after these events comparative quiet reigned about petersburg until late in july. the time, however, was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. in the meantime i had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as i could have wished. general hunter who had been appointed to succeed sigel in the shenandoah valley immediately took up the offensive. he met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and defeated him. on the 8th he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured lynchburg. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent early with his corps, a part of which reached lynchburg before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by the way of the gauley and kanawha rivers, thence up the ohio river, returning to harper's ferry by way of the baltimore and ohio railroad. a long time was consumed in making this movement. meantime the valley was left open to early's troops, and others in that quarter; and washington also was uncovered. early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on washington. in the absence of hunter, general lew wallace, with headquarters at baltimore, commanded the department in which the shenandoah lay. his surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which early had with him; but the situation of washington was precarious, and wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the monocacy. he could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until washington could be put into a state of preparation for his reception. i had previously ordered general meade to send a division to baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of washington, and he had sent ricketts's division of the 6th corps (wright's), which arrived in baltimore on the 8th of july. finding that wallace had gone to the front with his command, ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the monocacy with his entire division. they met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. the next morning early started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. learning of the gravity of the situation i had directed general meade to also order wright with the rest of his corps directly to washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that early arrived before it. the 19th corps, which had been stationed in louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about richmond, had about this time arrived at fortress monroe, on their way to join us. i diverted them from that point to washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with wright, on the 11th. the 19th corps was commanded by major-general emory. early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. he at once commenced to retreat, wright following. there is no telling how much this result was contributed to by general lew wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. if early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. farther west also the troubles were threatening. some time before, forrest had met sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. this left forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of sherman who was then advancing. sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. two divisions under a. j. smith had been sent to banks in louisiana some months before. sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack forrest. smith met and defeated him very badly. i then directed that smith should hang to forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his getting upon the memphis and nashville railroad. sherman had anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions for this order to smith, he repeated it. on the 25th of june general burnside had commenced running a mine from about the centre of his front under the confederate works confronting him. he was induced to do this by colonel pleasants, of the pennsylvania volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. burnside had submitted the scheme to meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. his position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. the position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. in the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. the position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. the work progressed, and on the 23d of july the mine was finished ready for charging; but i had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. on the 17th of july several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in richmond, and that lee was coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to georgia where the army sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. i put the army commanders, meade and butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not made. i concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that lee had had. wright's and emory's corps were in washington, and with this reduction of my force lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send west. i had other objects in view, however, besides keeping lee where he was. the mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and i wanted to take that occasion to carry petersburg if i could. it was the object, therefore, to get as many of lee's troops away from the south side of the james river as possible. accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with hancock's corps and sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of deep bottom, where butler had a pontoon bridge laid. the plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with kautz's cavalry of the army of the james, get by lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the virginia central railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. we were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the james as i expected. the mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of july was the time fixed for its explosion. i gave meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th directing how i wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged. meade's instructions, which i, of course, approved most heartily, were all that i can see now was necessary. the only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them. the gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. all was ready by the time i had prescribed; and on the 29th hancock and sheridan were brought back near the james river with their troops. under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at deep bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to burnside's corps, while ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under meade, was to form in the rear of burnside to support him when he went in. all were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and burnside had taken possession. burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by ord's and warren's corps. warren and ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. the four divisions of his corps were commanded by generals potter, willcox, ledlie and ferrero. the last was a colored division; and burnside selected it to make the assault. meade interfered with this. burnside then took ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. in fact, potter and willcox were the only division commanders burnside had who were equal to the occasion. ledlie besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among soldiers. there was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. when it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. there was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as i expected they would do. there had been great consternation in petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. they knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. we had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. they said that we had undermined the whole of petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. i somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. it was just as i expected it would be. we could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. it was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. the effort was a stupendous failure. it cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault. after being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of lee's army which had been drawn north of the james river were still there, i gave meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the weldon railroad. but misfortunes never come singly. i learned during that same afternoon that wright's pursuit of early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from washington, while i was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across chesapeake bay being broken. early, however, was not aware of the fact that wright was not pursuing until he had reached strasburg. finding that he was not pursued he turned back to winchester, where crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out. he then pushed north until he had reached the potomac, then he sent mccausland across to chambersburg, pa., to destroy that town. chambersburg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet mccausland, under early's orders, burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless. this occurred on the 30th of july. i rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the weldon railroad, and directed them to embark for washington city. after burning chambersburg mccausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley and driven into virginia. the shenandoah valley was very important to the confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about richmond. it was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. it had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from washington. it seemed to be the policy of general halleck and secretary stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. they were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western maryland and pennsylvania. i determined to put a stop to this. i started sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry. i had previously asked to have sheridan assigned to that command, but mr. stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. on the 1st of august when i sent reinforcements for the protection of washington, i sent the following orders: city point, va., august 1, 1864, 11.30 a.m. major-general halleck, washington d. c. i am sending general sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. unless general hunter is in the field in person, i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the virginia central railroad. if general hunter is in the field, give sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. all the cavalry, i presume, will reach washington in the course of to-morrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the president in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field, operating against early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch: office u. s. military telegraph, war department, washington, d. c., august 3, 1864. cypher. 6 p.m., lt. general grant, city point, va. i have seen your despatch in which you say, "i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." this, i think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. but please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. i repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. a. lincoln. i replied to this that "i would start in two hours for washington," and soon got off, going directly to the monocacy without stopping at washington on my way. i found general hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the baltimore and ohio railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. i asked the general where the enemy was. he replied that he did not know. he said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with orders from washington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. i then told the general that i would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for halltown, some four miles above harper's ferry, in the shenandoah valley. the cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. i knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south. i then wrote out general hunter's instructions. (*39) i told him that sheridan was in washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, cumberland, baltimore, or elsewhere, and give sheridan command of the troops in the field. the general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. he said that general halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. he did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. there were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. i told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for sheridan to come to the monocacy, and suggested that i would wait and meet him there. sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. i went to the station and remained there until he arrived. myself and one or two of my staff were about all the union people, except general hunter and his staff, who were left at the monocacy when sheridan arrived. i hastily told sheridan what had been done and what i wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for general hunter and directed to that officer. sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry. early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the national commander over the confederate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. as i had predicted, early was soon found in front of sheridan in the valley, and pennsylvania and maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. the importance of the valley was so great to the confederates that lee reinforced early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. to prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from richmond, i had to do something to compel lee to retain his forces about his capital. i therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the james river, to threaten richmond. hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps under birney, and gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the james during the night of the 13th-14th of august. a threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success. general meade was left in command of the few troops around petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. there was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley. i informed sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures. i also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that i should be able to prevent the going of any more. to add to my embarrassment at this time sherman, who was now near atlanta, wanted reinforcements. he was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the north-west, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. i therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the north-west be sent to him. sherman also wanted to be assured that no eastern troops were moving out against him. i informed him of what i had done and assured him that i would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. i also informed him that his real danger was from kirby smith, who commanded the trans-mississippi department. if smith should escape steele, and get across the mississippi river, he might move against him. i had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready to move from new orleans against mobile in case kirby smith should get across. this would have a tendency to draw him to the defence of that place, instead of going against sherman. right in the midst of all these embarrassments halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the north to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. he also advised taking in sail, and not going too fast. the troops were withdrawn from the north side of the james river on the night of the 20th. before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of lee's force was on that side of the river, warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the weldon railroad. he took up his line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. from our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the weldon railroad. a division was ordered from the right of the petersburg line to reinforce warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the james river to take its place. this road was very important to the enemy. the limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and i knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. he fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. lee made repeated attempts to dislodge warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. as soon as warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that source. it was on the 21st that lee seemed to have given up the weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. on the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg were sent south to destroy the weldon railroad. they were attacked on the 25th at reams's station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. but the weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of august to the close of the war. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. we had our troops on the weldon railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; sherman just getting through to atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; washington threatened but a short time before, and now early being strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. it kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. on the 10th of august sheridan had advanced on early up the shenandoah valley, early falling back to strasburg. on the 12th i learned that lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen early. it was important that sheridan should be informed of this, so i sent the information to washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. the messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached sheridan just in time. the officer went through by way of snicker's gap, escorted by some cavalry. he found sheridan just making his preparations to attack early in his chosen position. now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. on the 15th of september i started to visit general sheridan in the shenandoah valley. my purpose was to have him attack early, or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for lee's army. i knew it was impossible for me to get orders through washington to sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such orders as halleck's caution (and that of the secretary of war) would suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. i therefore, without stopping at washington, went directly through to charlestown, some ten miles above harper's ferry, and waited there to see general sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. when sheridan arrived i asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. he at once drew one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. he said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the confederates, and that he could "whip them." before starting i had drawn up a plan of campaign for sheridan, which i had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his views and so confident of success, i said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket. sheridan's wagon trains were kept at harper's ferry, where all of his stores were. by keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. as supplies of ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at winchester. knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagons trains from harper's ferry, i asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following tuesday. this was on friday. "o yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on monday." i told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and i immediately started to return to the army about richmond. after visiting baltimore and burlington, new jersey, i arrived at city point on the 19th. on the way out to harper's ferry i had met mr. robert garrett, president of the baltimore and ohio railroad. he seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. it was a large piece of property to have standing idle. i told him i could not answer then positively but would try and inform him before a great while. on my return mr. garrett met me again with the same and i told him i thought that by the wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. i gave him no further information however, and he had no suspicion of how i expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. he met early at the crossing of opequon creek, a most decisive victory--one which the country. early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy. he had sent g. t. anderson's division east of the blue ridge before i went to harper's ferry; and about the time i arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to martinsburg for the purpose destroying the baltimore and ohio railroad at that point. early here learned that i had been with sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. but his forces were separated and, as i have said, he was very badly defeated. he fell back to fisher's hill, sheridan following. the valley is narrow at that point, and early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. but sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. the pursuit was continued up the valley to mount jackson and new market. sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. the houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. finally, on the 25th, early turned from the valley eastward, leaving sheridan at harrisonburg in undisputed possession. now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished. sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. what he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. i congratulated sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around petersburg. i also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. i had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the november elections. the convention which had met and made its nomination of the democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a failure. treason was talked as boldly in chicago at that convention as ever been in charleston. it was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who talked treason. but this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in washington, and the president became very much frightened about him. he was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of general cass was said to have been, in one of our indian wars, when he was an officer of army. cass was pursuing the indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the indians pursuing him. the president was afraid that sheridan had got on the other side of early and that early was in behind him. he was afraid that sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from richmond to enable early to beat him. i replied to the president that i had taken steps to prevent lee from sending reinforcements to early, by attacking the former where he was. on the 28th of september, to retain lee in his position, i sent ord with the 18th corps and birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on richmond, to threaten it. ord moved with the left wing up to chaffin's bluff; birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while kautz with the cavalry took the darby road, still farther to the north. they got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. in that, however, they were unsuccessful. the enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. stannard's division of the 18th corps with general burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against fort harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. burnham was killed in the assault. colonel stevens who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. our troops fortified their new position, bringing fort harrison into the new line and extending it to the river. this brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the james, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. in the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon general heckman, and later general weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th corps. during the night lee reinforced his troops about fort gilmer, which was at the right of fort harrison, by eight additional brigades from petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. all their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. in one of these assaults upon us general stannard, a gallant officer who was defending fort harrison, lost an arm. our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, i,554 wounded and 324 missing. whilst this was going on general meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. parke and warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. the object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. on the 30th these troops moved out, under warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main line. our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. the number of killed and wounded was not large. the next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. this advanced warren's position on the weldon railroad very considerably. sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. i approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send wright's corps back to the james river. i further directed him to repair the railroad up the shenandoah valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force. the troops were to be sent to washington by the way of culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the blue ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. the valley was so very important, however, to the confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed. reinforcements were sent therefore to early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. early prepared to strike sheridan at harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. on the 6th of october sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle before him, early following. at fisher's hill sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of early, which, under the lead of rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. sheridan lost only about sixty men. his cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. on the 10th of october the march down the valley was again resumed, early again following. i now ordered sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the james river canal and virginia central railroad. but this order had to go through washington where it was intercepted; and when sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what i wanted him to do it was something entirely different. halleck informed sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against charlottesville and gordonsville; that he should fortify this position and provision it. sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and i was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows: city point, va., october 14, 1864.--12.30 p.m. major-general sheridan, cedar creek, va. what i want is for you to threaten the virginia central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. if you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. if you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. i deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. you need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sheridan having been summoned to washington city, started on the 15th leaving wright in command. his army was then at cedar creek, some twenty miles south of winchester. the next morning while at front royal, sheridan received a dispatch from wright, saying that a dispatch from longstreet to early had been intercepted. it directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush sheridan as soon as he, longstreet, arrived. on the receipt of this news sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley to join wright. on the 18th of october early was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. the right under general getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to middletown where it took a position and made a stand. the cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to winchester and held them for the use of our troops in falling back, general wright having ordered a retreat back to that place. sheridan having left washington on the 18th, reached winchester that night. the following morning he started to join his command. he had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. he immediately ordered the cavalry at winchester to be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. leaving members of his staff to take care of winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. as he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. his presence soon restored confidence. finding themselves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. when sheridan got to the front he found getty and custer still holding their ground firmly between the confederates and our retreating troops. everything in the rear was now ordered up. sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. this was made with vigor, and was directed principally against emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. by one o'clock the attack was repulsed. early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. he thought, no doubt, that sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was mistaken. about the middle of the afternoon sheridan advanced. he sent his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. the contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. this victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the valley of virginia. all the confederate troops were sent back to richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. wright's corps was ordered back to the army of the potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than sheridan had commanded from first to last. on more than one occasion in these engagements general r. b. hayes, who succeeded me as president of the united states, bore a very honorable part. his conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. this might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so: "any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in congress, ought to be scalped." having entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, general hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general before its close. on the north side of the james river the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry on the 7th of october, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. this was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. on the 24th i ordered general meade to attempt to get possession of the south side railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. the attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment i ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the james river in order to support this move, by detaining there the confederate troops who were on that side. he succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before turning in on the darby road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. this closed active operations around richmond for the winter. of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either petersburg or richmond. it would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not interest the general reader if given. all these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the scribners, badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the war department, including both the national and confederate reports. in the latter part of november general hancock was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by the secretary of war and ordered to washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the 1st corps. it was expected that this would give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring. it was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the blue ridge to lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. i expected, with sherman coming up from the south, meade south of petersburg and around richmond, and thomas's command in tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that state, to move from the direction of washington or the valley towards lynchburg. we would then have lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. general humphreys, chief-of-staff of the army of the potomac, was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed hancock. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. let us now return to the operations in the military division of the mississippi, and accompany sherman in his march to the sea. the possession of atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. a short time after the fall of atlanta mr. davis visited palmetto and macon and made speeches at each place. he spoke at palmetto on the 20th of september, and at macon on the 22d. inasmuch as he had relieved johnston and appointed hood, and hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to suppose that mr. davis was disappointed with general johnston's policy. my own judgment is that johnston acted very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. as sherman advanced, as i have show, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in detail. i know that both sherman and i were rejoiced when we heard of the change. hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. in his speeches mr. davis denounced governor brown, of georgia, and general johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty to the southern cause was doubtful. so far as general johnston is concerned, i think davis did him a great injustice in this particular. i had know the general before the war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. there, as i have said, i think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole south--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. the north was already growing weary, as the south evidently was also, but with this difference. in the north the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. the south was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. mr. davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of georgia and that portion of the south to come to their relief. he tried to assure his frightened hearers that the yankees were rapidly digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut them off from supplies from the north; and that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the northern states, and they were republished. of course, that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with sherman. when hood was forced to retreat from atlanta he moved to the south-west and was followed by a portion of sherman's army. he soon appeared upon the railroad in sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. at the same time also the work was begun in tennessee and kentucky which mr. davis had assured his hearers at palmetto and macon would take place. he ordered forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the south) north for this purpose; and forrest and wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. hood's army had been weakened by governor brown's withdrawing the georgia state troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. this not only depleted hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and mr. davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which mr. davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than napoleon's retreat from moscow. these speeches of mr. davis were not long in reaching sherman. he took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to break his communications. something else had to be done: and to sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. on september 10th i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., sept. 10, 1864. major-general sherman, atlanta, georgia. so soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. we want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. if we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. now that we have all of mobile bay that is valuable, i do not know but it will be the best move to transfer canby's troops to act upon savannah, whilst you move on augusta. i should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sherman replied promptly: "if i could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at augusta, or columbus, georgia, i can march to milledgeville, and compel hood to give up augusta or macon, and then turn on the other. * * * if you can manage to take the savannah river as high up as augusta, or the chattahoochee as far up as columbus, i can sweep the whole state of georgia." on the 12th i sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting sherman's views about the next campaign. city point, va., sept. 12, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill division of the mississippi. i send lieutenant-colonel porter, of my staff, with this. colonel porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than i can do in the limits of a letter. although i feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, i am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. my lines are necessarily very long, extending from deep bottom north of the james across the peninsula formed by the appomattox and the james, and south of the appomattox to the weldon road. this line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. i propose, when i do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the south side, or lynchburg and petersburg road, then if possible to keep the danville road cut. at the same time this move is made, i want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against wilmington. the way i propose to do this is to land the men north of fort fisher, and hold that point. at the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at mobile. this will give us the same control of the harbor of wilmington that we now have of the harbor of mobile. what you are to do with the forces at your command, i do not see. the difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, i plainly see. if it had not been for price's movements canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to mobile. from your command on the mississippi an equal number could have been taken. with these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to mobile and the other half to savannah. you could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten macon and augusta equally. whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. my object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. it will probably be the 5th of october before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed. if you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and i will approve them. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. this reached sherman on september 20th. on the 25th of september sherman reported to washington that hood's troops were in his rear. he had provided against this by sending a division to chattanooga and a division to rome, georgia, which was in the rear of hood, supposing that hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. at the same time sherman and hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. on the 27th of september i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., september 27, 1864--10.30 a.m. major-general sherman: i have directed all recruits and new troops from the western states to be sent to nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. on the 29th sherman sent thomas back to chattanooga, and afterwards to nashville, with another division (morgan's) of the advanced army. sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should take place against milledgeville and then to savannah. his expectation at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could make two miles to sherman's one. he depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. as i have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of sherman's army. it had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when i first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-mississippi, should move against mobile. i recommended this from time to time until i came into command of the army, the last of march 1864. having the power in my own hands, i now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the gulf about new orleans, with a view to a move against mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. before i came into command, these troops had been scattered over the trans-mississippi department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused mobile to be selected as the objective point for sherman's army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from atlanta, no longer existed. general g. m. dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of october. he was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one. sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right commanded by general o. o. howard and the left by general slocum. general dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and slocum's the 14th and 20th corps, commanded by generals jeff. c. davis and a. s. williams. generals logan and blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. about this time they left to take part in the presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to osterhaus and ransom. i have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the war department. general blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at washington. general logan did not return to his command until after it reached savannah. logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of general howard from that portion of the army of the potomac which was then with the western army, to the command of the army of the tennessee, with which army general logan had served from the battle of belmont to the fall of atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the death of mcpherson the command of the entire army of the tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. he conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement; and i can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. i will not pretend to question the motive which actuated sherman in taking an officer from another army to supersede general logan. i have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; though i doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as logan would have done. differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. the officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand effective men. all weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any european soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the machine thought. european armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. included in these sixty thousand troops, there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand men. hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of forrest, whose forces were operating in tennessee and kentucky, as mr. davis had promised they should. this part of mr. davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. i say this because i have criticised his military judgment in the removal of johnston, and also in the appointment of hood. i am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between davis and his subordinate, whom i regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants. on the 5th of october the railroad back from atlanta was again very badly broken, hood having got on the track with his army. sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. the defence of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched positions against hood's whole army; in fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at them. allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of general corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. he, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the national army and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the confederate troops between him and his subordinate. he sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching corse, would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. corse was a man who would never surrender. from a high position some of sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block house at allatoona. it was from corse. he had been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. it was at this point probably, that sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the north would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond atlanta. he proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. sherman thought hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making thomas strong enough to hold tennessee and kentucky. i, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that hood would go north, as he did. on the 2d of november i telegraphed sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up atlanta and the railroad back to chattanooga. to strengthen thomas he sent stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered schofield, commanding the army of the ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. in addition to this, a. j. smith, who, with two divisions of sherman's army, was in missouri aiding rosecrans in driving the enemy from that state, was under orders to return to thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before hood could reach nashville. in addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the north-west went to thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at bridgeport, stevenson, decatur, murfreesboro, and florence. there were already with him in nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of nashville, for its defence. also, wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. these reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. about this time beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which hood and sherman were, or might be, operating. he made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. but it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. hood soon started north, and went into camp near decatur, alabama, where he remained until the 29th of october, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. the tennessee river was patrolled by gunboats, from muscle shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the ohio river. these, with the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross the tennessee at any place where it was navigable. but muscle shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal which also obstructs navigation. hood therefore moved down to a point nearly opposite florence, alabama, crossed over and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and ammunition. all of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. on the 1st of november i suggested to sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying hood before he started on his campaign. on the 2d of november, as stated, i approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through georgia, leaving hood behind to the tender mercy of thomas and the troops in his command. sherman fixed the 10th of november as the day of starting. sherman started on that day to get back to atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. the right wing, under howard, and the cavalry went to jonesboro, milledgeville, then the capital of georgia, being sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to savannah. the left wing moved to stone mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. slocum was in command, and threatened augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the right wing at milledgeville. atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well done. sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. his artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. the ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. small rations were taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. the army was expected to live on the country, and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days. the troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. the method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. the ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. when a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on fire. this would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of georgia. all this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. some piled the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. the organization for supplying the army was very complete. each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. strict injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. the supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. the captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations. the skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous. when they started out in the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. these would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted. many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance; indeed, i am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. i suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. in one instance it was reported that a few men of sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. they immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. the lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. the soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied: "the rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one. another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. the south, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. on one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. the soldier replied, "madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound." "but this is not a bloodhound," said the lady. "well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it. notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, i do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded. on the 23d sherman, with the left wing, reached milledgeville. the right wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards savannah destroying the road as it went. the troops at milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its march. the governor, who had been almost defying mr. davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the state and all the state officers. the governor, sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the state to fall into our hands. the only military force that was opposed to sherman's forward march was the georgia militia, a division under the command of general g. w. smith, and a battalion under harry wayne. neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of sherman's army. the people at the south became so frantic at this time at the successful invasion of georgia that they took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. they even liberated the state convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army. i have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as could be found in every community, north and south--who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. they were in but little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected. the southern papers in commenting upon sherman's movements pictured him as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection of our navy. these papers got to the north and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with sherman. mr. lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if i could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. i told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as sherman had with him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. he might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could return north. i heard afterwards of mr. lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of sherman's army, that sherman was all right: "grant says they are safe with such a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at." while at milledgeville the soldiers met at the state house, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the state of georgia. the debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the south was in at that time, particularly the state of georgia. they went so far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession. the next day (24th) sherman continued his march, going by the way of waynesboro and louisville, millen being the next objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. the left wing moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as though augusta was the point they were aiming for. they moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. the cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising millen before the union prisoners could be carried away; but they failed in this. the distance from milledgeville to millen was about one hundred miles. at this point wheeler, who had been ordered from tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting sherman. hardee, a native of georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. it was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept sherman's march. he did succeed in raising some troops, and with these and those under the command of wheeler and wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention. our cavalry and wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which wheeler was driven towards augusta, thus giving the idea that sherman was probably making for that point. millen was reached on the 3d of december, and the march was resumed the following day for savannah, the final objective. bragg had now been sent to augusta with some troops. wade hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy sherman's army. if he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. hardee's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men. from millen to savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. this answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations. no further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a few miles of savannah. this place was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. one of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. no further explosion took place. on the 10th of december the siege of savannah commenced. sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would permit. in marching to the coast he encountered fort mcallister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. fort mcallister was soon captured by an assault made by general hazen's division. communication was then established with the fleet. the capture of savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of life. the garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward. when sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which i had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which i supposed he would be in need of. general j. g. foster, who commanded all the troops south of north carolina on the atlantic sea-board, visited general sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at hilton head, for the purpose of sending sherman siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be found outside. the mail on the steamer which i sent down, had been collected by colonel a. h. markland of the post office department, who went in charge of it. on this same vessel i sent an officer of my staff (lieutenant dunn) with the following letter to general sherman: city point, va., dec. 3, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding armies near savannah, ga. the little information gleaned from the southern press, indicating no great obstacle to your progress, i have directed your mails (which had been previously collected at baltimore by colonel markland, special agent of the post office department) to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, i abstain from congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been struck. i have never had a fear, however, for the result. since you left atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. the enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching against you. i think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. bragg has gone from wilmington. i am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. owing to some preparations admiral porter and general butler are making to blow up fort fisher (which, while hoping for the best, i do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. i hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that bragg will not have started back by that time. in this letter i do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea i have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. with your veteran army i hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of atlanta. the condition will be filled by holding savannah and augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of savannah and branchville. if wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you. thomas has got back into the defences of nashville, with hood close upon him. decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to chattanooga. part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. it did not look so, however, to me. in my opinion, thomas far outnumbers hood in infantry. in cavalry, hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. i hope yet that hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. the general news you will learn from the papers better than i could give it. after all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, i will run down the coast to see you. if you desire it, i will ask mrs. sherman to go with me. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general i quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period. sherman now (the 15th) returned to savannah to complete its investment and insure the surrender of the garrison. the country about savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway. for this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to the union troops, with the chance of failing altogether. sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. when he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. general hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as sherman had described. he said he was in full communication with his department and was receiving supplies constantly. hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. on the south carolina side the country was all rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that hardee had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank of the river. sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where general foster had troops stationed under general hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of south carolina, to the plank road which general hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication. while arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, sherman received information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had evacuated savannah the night before. this was the night of the 21st of december. before evacuating the place hardee had blown up the navy yard. some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms. a little incident occurred, soon after the fall of savannah, which sherman relates in his memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition. savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. shortly after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the confederates were still in possession. it was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the custom house, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected. as there was some discussion as to the authorship of sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, i want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between general sherman and myself. circumstances made the plan on which sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from atlanta forward. his suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in washington. even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the president, induced no doubt by his advisers. this went so far as to move the president to ask me to suspend sherman's march for a day or two until i could think the matter over. my recollection is, though i find no record to show it, that out of deference to the president's wish i did send a dispatch to sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that i could not do so. however this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from atlanta to savannah is easily answered: it was clearly sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. it was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (*40) i was in favor of sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. my chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as i learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at washington to stop it. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville. as we have seen, hood succeeded in crossing the tennessee river between muscle shoals and the lower shoals at the end of october, 1864. thomas sent schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades of wilson's cavalry to pulaski to watch him. on the 17th of november hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid schofield, thereby turning his position. hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by stephen d. lee, stewart and cheatham. these, with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. thomas's orders were, therefore, for schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by thomas himself. as soon as schofield saw this movement of hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to columbia. at columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. from this place schofield then retreated to franklin. he had sent his wagons in advance, and stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. cheatham's corps of hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp at spring hill, for the night of the 29th. schofield retreating from columbia on the 29th, passed spring hill, where cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the confederates were encamped. on the morning of the 30th he had arrived at franklin. hood followed closely and reached franklin in time to make an attack the same day. the fight was very desperate and sanguinary. the confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. this fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in, when the confederates drew off. general stanley, who commanded two divisions of the union troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position. the enemy's loss at franklin, according to thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing. thomas made no effort to reinforce schofield at franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. he simply ordered schofield to continue his retreat to nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day. thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive hood. the road to chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at murfreesboro, stevenson, bridgeport and chattanooga. thomas had previously given up decatur and had been reinforced by a. j. smith's two divisions just returned from missouri. he also had steedman's division and r. s. granger's, which he had drawn from the front. his quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, general j. l. donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of general z. b. tower, of the united states engineers. hood was allowed to move upon nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of hood. he had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. to me his delay was unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. it is true the weather was very bad. the rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. but i was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude thomas and manage to get north of the cumberland river. if he did this, i apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the north, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the east to head him off if he got there, general thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence. i consequently urged thomas in frequent dispatches sent from city point(*41) to make the attack at once. the country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and i was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which i have just described that is, hood would get north. it was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc. at last i had to say to general thomas that i should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. he replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. general logan happening to visit city point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, i gave him an order to proceed to nashville to relieve thomas. i directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. after logan started, in thinking over the situation, i became restless, and concluded to go myself. i went as far as washington city, when a dispatch was received from general thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement. i concluded to wait until that time. he did move, and was successful from the start. this was on the 15th of december. general logan was at louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to washington, and proceeded no farther himself. the battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. the next day the battle was renewed. after a successful assault upon hood's men in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy retreated. they sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to franklin ahead of hood's broken army by the granny white road, but too much time was consumed in getting started. they had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing. here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which the confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. they were too late. the enemy already had possession of franklin, and was beyond them. it now became a chase in which the confederates had the lead. our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other bridges over duck river. the heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward chattanooga. there was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. of course hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. up to january, 1865, the enemy occupied fort fisher, at the mouth of cape fear river and below the city of wilmington. this port was of immense importance to the confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. it was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the british government, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to recognize any blockade. for these reasons i determined, with the concurrence of the navy department, in december, to send an expedition against fort fisher for the purpose of capturing it. to show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, i will mention a circumstance that took place at fort fisher after its fall. two english blockade runners came in at night. their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. they then signalled the fort, announcing their arrival. there was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. he informed general terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and terry did as he advised. the vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the union forces. even after they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the union troops were occupying the fort. they were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. i selected general weitzel, of the army of the james, to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through general butler. he commanded the department within whose geographical limits fort fisher was situated, as well as beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against fort fisher. general butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. admiral porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in washington; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. i had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at washington seemed desirous to have it tried, i permitted it. the steamer was sent to beaufort, north carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of fort fisher. general butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of december (1864). very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. his advance arrived off fort fisher on the 15th. the naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into beaufort for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. the fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into beaufort to replenish. another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate. on the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. she was then propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. there the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. at two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the atlantic ocean would have done. indeed when the troops in fort fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the yankee gunboats. fort fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of cape fear river. the soil is sandy. back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. the fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen hundred yards. the fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. at that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. general whiting of the confederate army was in command, and general bragg was in command of the force at wilmington. both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. the governor of north carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun, to join them. in this way they got two or three hundred additional men into fort fisher; and hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from richmond. a few of these troops arrived the very day that butler was ready to advance. on the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. the damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. but the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. on the next day part of butler's troops under general adelbert ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. this was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. they formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. curtis pushed forward and came near to fort fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called the flag pond battery. weitzel accompanied him to within a half a mile of the works. here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to butler, advising against an assault. ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. these prisoners reported to butler that sixteen hundred of hoke's division of six thousand from richmond had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear. upon these reports butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. at that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. curtis had got within a few yards of the works. some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. at night butler informed porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for hampton roads. porter represented to him that he had sent to beaufort for more ammunition. he could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. butler was unchangeable. he got all his troops aboard, except curtis's brigade, and started back. in doing this, butler made a fearful mistake. my instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. but general butler seems to have lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at fort monroe on the 28th. i telegraphed to the president as follows: city point, va., dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 p.m. the wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. many of the troops are back here. delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to wilmington to defeat it. after the expedition sailed from fort monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. who is to blame will, i hope, be known. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. porter sent dispatches to the navy department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a different commander. as soon as i heard this i sent a messenger to porter with a letter asking him to hold on. i assured him that i fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that i would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. i told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. i selected a. h. terry to command. it was the 6th of january before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. they sailed from fortress monroe on that day. the object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the navy department and in the army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. general terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. he simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him, which were to be opened when out at sea. he was instructed to communicate freely with porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of service. they arrived off beaufort on the 8th. a heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at forth fisher until the 13th. the navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. this object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. his artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. again curtis's brigade of ame's division had the lead. by noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way. terry now saw porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. the two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. at day light the fleet commenced its firing. the time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and ames who commanded the assaulting column moved at 3.30. porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with ames's assault. they were under commander breese of the navy. these sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. the signal was given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. these they cut away, and pushed on through. the other troops then came up, pennypacker's following curtis, and bell, who commanded the 3d brigade of ames's division, following pennypacker. but the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained. the works were very extensive. the large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. traverses had, therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. the rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from these traverses one by one. the fight continued till long after night. our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10 o'clock at night the place was carried. during this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by reinforcing terry's northern line--thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of ames. the fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. by means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. during the succeeding nights the enemy blew up fort caswell on the opposite side of cape fear river, and abandoned two extensive works on smith's island in the river. our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. in addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. we had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. in this assault on fort fisher, bell, one of the brigade commanders, was killed, and two, curtis and pennypacker, were badly wounded. secretary stanton, who was on his way back from savannah, arrived off fort fisher soon after it fell. when he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. this confirmed him; and soon after i recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 1. by u. s. grant preface. "man proposes and god disposes." there are but few important events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice. although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs i had determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. at the age of nearly sixty-two i received an injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my general health. this made study a pleasant pastime. shortly after, the rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. this was followed soon after by universal depression of all securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of the income still retained, and for which i am indebted to the kindly act of friends. at this juncture the editor of the century magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. i consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment i was living upon borrowed money. the work i found congenial, and i determined to continue it. the event is an important one for me, for good or evil; i hope for the former. in preparing these volumes for the public, i have entered upon the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the national or confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special mention is due. there must be many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men engaged. there were thousands of instances, during the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. the troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. the first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before i had reason to suppose i was in a critical condition of health. later i was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for weeks. i have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should devote to such work. i would have more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public if i could have allowed myself more time. i have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, f. d. grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of fact given. the comments are my own, and show how i saw the matters treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. with these remarks i present these volumes to the public, asking no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, july 1, 1885. contents volume i. chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. chapter ii. west point--graduation. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico --supplying transportation. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second-lieutenant--army of occupation. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz --siege and capture of vera cruz. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey --storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army--mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast --crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast--promoted captain--flush times in california. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting --mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment--general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo. --jefferson city--cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah --headquarters at cairo. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont--a narrow escape--after the battle. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy--assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight--retreat and defeat of the confederates. chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates--intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston --remarks on shiloh. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth--occupation of corinth--the army separated. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis --escaping jackson--complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen --occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs --collecting forage and food. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general mcclernand in command--assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence--operations at yazoo pass. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press--running the batteries--loss of the indianola --disposition of the troops. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf--movement up the big black--battle of raymond. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy--battle of champion's hill. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black --investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. chapter xxxvii. siege of vicksburg. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines's bluff --explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. volume one begins: chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. my family is american, and has been for generations, in all its branches, direct and collateral. mathew grant, the founder of the branch in america, of which i am a descendant, reached dorchester, massachusetts, in may, 1630. in 1635 he moved to what is now windsor, connecticut, and was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty years. he was also, for many years of the time, town clerk. he was a married man when he arrived at dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. his eldest son, samuel, took lands on the east side of the connecticut river, opposite windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. i am of the eighth generation from mathew grant, and seventh from samuel. mathew grant's first wife died a few years after their settlement in windsor, and he soon after married the widow rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his first wife, on the ship mary and john, from dorchester, england, in 1630. mrs. rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and others by her second. by intermarriage, two or three generations later, i am descended from both the wives of mathew grant. in the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, noah grant, and his younger brother, solomon, held commissions in the english army, in 1756, in the war against the french and indians. both were killed that year. my grandfather, also named noah, was then but nine years old. at the breaking out of the war of the revolution, after the battles of concord and lexington, he went with a connecticut company to join the continental army, and was present at the battle of bunker hill. he served until the fall of yorktown, or through the entire revolutionary war. he must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as i believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the close. soon after this he emigrated to westmoreland county, pennsylvania, and settled near the town of greensburg in that county. he took with him the younger of his two children, peter grant. the elder, solomon, remained with his relatives in connecticut until old enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the british west indies. not long after his settlement in pennsylvania, my grandfather, captain noah grant, married a miss kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this time to ohio, and settled where the town of deerfield now stands. he had now five children, including peter, a son by his first marriage. my father, jesse r. grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second marriage. peter grant went early to maysville, kentucky, where he was very prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at the mouth of the kanawha river, virginia, in 1825, being at the time one of the wealthy men of the west. my grandmother grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. this broke up the family. captain noah grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son peter, in maysville. the rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of deerfield, my father in the family of judge tod, the father of the late governor tod, of ohio. his industry and independence of character were such, that i imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his maintenance. there must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge tod and his wife, with all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of benefactors. i have often heard him speak of mrs. tod as the most admirable woman he had ever known. he remained with the tod family only a few years, until old enough to learn a trade. he went first, i believe, with his half-brother, peter grant, who, though not a tanner himself, owned a tannery in maysville, kentucky. here he learned his trade, and in a few years returned to deerfield and worked for, and lived in the family of a mr. brown, the father of john brown--"whose body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on." i have often heard my father speak of john brown, particularly since the events at harper's ferry. brown was a boy when they lived in the same house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic and extremist in whatever he advocated. it was certainly the act of an insane man to attempt the invasion of the south, and the overthrow of slavery, with less than twenty men. my father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at ravenna, the county seat of portage county. in a few years he removed from ravenna, and set up the same business at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. during the minority of my father, the west afforded but poor facilities for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions for whatever learning they obtained. i have often heard him say that his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while living with judge tod. but his thirst for education was intense. he learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in his eightieth year. books were scarce in the western reserve during his youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where he lived. this scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in it. the habit continued through life. even after reading the daily papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important information they contained. he made himself an excellent english scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant contributor to western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the west at that time. he always took an active part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, i believe, that he was the first mayor of georgetown. he supported jackson for the presidency; but he was a whig, a great admirer of henry clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after jackson. my mother's family lived in montgomery county, pennsylvania, for several generations. i have little information about her ancestors. her family took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when i was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. on the other side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in windsor, connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, lawson grant --still living--was the heir. he was so much interested in the subject that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when i was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners for a consideration--three thousand dollars, i think. i remember the circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing beyond their homes. from these he refused to receive any recompense. my mother's father, john simpson, moved from montgomery county, pennsylvania, to clermont county, ohio, about the year 1819, taking with him his four children, three daughters and one son. my mother, hannah simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years of age. her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several children. she still lives in clermont county at this writing, october 5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the democratic party lost control in 1860. her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in kentucky before the war. he was the only one of the children who entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living in clermont county, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as active in mind as ever. he was a supporter of the government during the war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the democratic party means irretrievable ruin. in june, 1821, my father, jesse r. grant, married hannah simpson. i was born on the 27th of april, 1822, at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. in the fall of 1823 we moved to georgetown, the county seat of brown, the adjoining county east. this place remained my home, until at the age of seventeen, in 1839, i went to west point. the schools, at the time of which i write, were very indifferent. there were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. they were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the a b c's up to the young lady of eighteen and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three r's, "reading, 'riting, 'rithmetic." i never saw an algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in georgetown, until after i was appointed to west point. i then bought a work on algebra in cincinnati; but having no teacher it was greek to me. my life in georgetown was uneventful. from the age of five or six until seventeen, i attended the subscription schools of the village, except during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. the former period was spent in maysville, kentucky, attending the school of richardson and rand; the latter in ripley, ohio, at a private school. i was not studious in habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the outlay for board and tuition. at all events both winters were spent in going over the same old arithmetic which i knew every word of before, and repeating: "a noun is the name of a thing," which i had also heard my georgetown teachers repeat, until i had come to believe it--but i cast no reflections upon my old teacher, richardson. he turned out bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous places in the service of their states. two of my contemporaries there --who, i believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have held seats in congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these are wadsworth and brewster. my father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the community in which he lived. mindful of his own lack of facilities for acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the education of his children. consequently, as stated before, i never missed a quarter from school from the time i was old enough to attend till the time of leaving home. this did not exempt me from labor. in my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. it was only the very poor who were exempt. while my father carried on the manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and tilled considerable land. i detested the trade, preferring almost any other labor; but i was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which horses were used. we had, among other lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the village. in the fall of the year choppers were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. when i was seven or eight years of age, i began hauling all the wood used in the house and shops. i could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that time, but i could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at the house unload. when about eleven years old, i was strong enough to hold a plough. from that age until seventeen i did all the work done with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still attending school. for this i was compensated by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the ground. while still quite young i had visited cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also maysville, kentucky, often, and once louisville. the journey to louisville was a big one for a boy of that day. i had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to toledo, ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to flat rock, kentucky, about seventy miles away. on this latter occasion i was fifteen years of age. while at flat rock, at the house of a mr. payne, whom i was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in georgetown, i saw a very fine saddle horse, which i rather coveted, and proposed to mr. payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two i was driving. payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that i was allowed to do as i pleased with the horses. i was seventy miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and mr. payne said he did not know that his horse had ever had a collar on. i asked to have him hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. it was soon evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no viciousness, and i expressed a confidence that i could manage him. a trade was at once struck, i receiving ten dollars difference. the next day mr. payne, of georgetown, and i started on our return. we got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog that frightened the horses and made them run. the new animal kicked at every jump he made. i got the horses stopped, however, before any damage was done, and without running into anything. after giving them a little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. that instant the new horse kicked, and started to run once more. the road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet deep on the opposite side of the pike. i got the horses stopped on the very brink of the precipice. my new horse was terribly frightened and trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my companion, mr. payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and took passage on a freight wagon for maysville. every time i attempted to start, my new horse would commence to kick. i was in quite a dilemma for a time. once in maysville i could borrow a horse from an uncle who lived there; but i was more than a day's travel from that point. finally i took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal use then--and with this blindfolded my horse. in this way i reached maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my friend. here i borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we proceeded on our journey. about half my school-days in georgetown were spent at the school of john d. white, a north carolinian, and the father of chilton white who represented the district in congress for one term during the rebellion. mr. white was always a democrat in politics, and chilton followed his father. he had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine at their father's school--who did not go the same way. the second brother died before the rebellion began; he was a whig, and afterwards a republican. his oldest brother was a republican and brave soldier during the rebellion. chilton is reported as having told of an earlier horse-trade of mine. as he told the story, there was a mr. ralston living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which i very much wanted. my father had offered twenty dollars for it, but ralston wanted twenty-five. i was so anxious to have the colt, that after the owner left, i begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. my father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted i was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the twenty-five. i at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. when i got to mr. ralston's house, i said to him: "papa says i may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, i am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you twenty-five." it would not require a connecticut man to guess the price finally agreed upon. this story is nearly true. i certainly showed very plainly that i had come for the colt and meant to have him. i could not have been over eight years old at the time. this transaction caused me great heart-burning. the story got out among the boys of the village, and it was a long time before i heard the last of it. boys enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day did, and in later life i have found that all adults are not free from the peculiarity. i kept the horse until he was four years old, when he went blind, and i sold him for twenty dollars. when i went to maysville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, i recognized my colt as one of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. i have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the whole. i did not like to work; but i did as much of it, while young, as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time. i had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and probably more than most of them. i have no recollection of ever having been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. but at school the case was different. the rod was freely used there, and i was not exempt from its influence. i can see john d. white--the school teacher --now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. it was not always the same one, either. switches were brought in bundles, from a beech wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were intended. often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. i never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. mr. white was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in which he lived. he only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. chapter ii. west point--graduation. in the winter of 1838-9 i was attending school at ripley, only ten miles distant from georgetown, but spent the christmas holidays at home. during this vacation my father received a letter from the honorable thomas morris, then united states senator from ohio. when he read it he said to me, "ulysses, i believe you are going to receive the appointment." "what appointment?" i inquired. "to west point; i have applied for it." "but i won't go," i said. he said he thought i would, and i thought so too, if he did. i really had no objection to going to west point, except that i had a very exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get through. i did not believe i possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing. there had been four boys from our village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from west point, and never a failure of any one appointed from georgetown, except in the case of the one whose place i was to take. he was the son of dr. bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. young bailey had been appointed in 1837. finding before the january examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. before the next examination he was dismissed. dr. bailey was a proud and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he forbade his return home. there were no telegraphs in those days to disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the alleghanies, and but few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other people's private affairs. consequently it did not become generally known that there was a vacancy at west point from our district until i was appointed. i presume mrs. bailey confided to my mother the fact that bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his son's return home. the honorable thomas l. hamer, one of the ablest men ohio ever produced, was our member of congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. he and my father had been members of the same debating society (where they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal friends from their early manhood up to a few years before. in politics they differed. hamer was a life-long democrat, while my father was a whig. they had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some act of president jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, i think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. i know both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the advance. under these circumstances my father would not write to hamer for the appointment, but he wrote to thomas morris, united states senator from ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at west point from our district, and that he would be glad if i could be appointed to fill it. this letter, i presume, was turned over to mr. hamer, and, as there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. this healed the breach between the two, never after reopened. besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to west point--that "he thought i would go"--there was another very strong inducement. i had always a great desire to travel. i was already the best travelled boy in georgetown, except the sons of one man, john walker, who had emigrated to texas with his family, and immigrated back as soon as he could get the means to do so. in his short stay in texas he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would form going there now. i had been east to wheeling, virginia, and north to the western reserve, in ohio, west to louisville, and south to bourbon county, kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country within fifty miles of home. going to west point would give me the opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, philadelphia and new york. this was enough. when these places were visited i would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any other accident happen, by which i might have received a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to enter the academy. nothing of the kind occurred, and i had to face the music. georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. it is, and has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. there was probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could have been afforded, it would not have voted for jefferson davis for president of the united states, over mr. lincoln, or any other representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of john morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through ohio, spent a few hours in the village. the rebels helped themselves to whatever they could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered meals to be prepared for them by the families. this was no doubt a far pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a like service for union soldiers. the line between the rebel and union element in georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the churches. there were churches in that part of ohio where treason was preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the bible. there were men in georgetown who filled all the requirements for membership in these churches. yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing arms--furnished the union army four general officers and one colonel, west point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of volunteers, that i can think of. of the graduates from west point, all had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except possibly general a. v. kautz, who had remained in the army from his graduation. two of the colonels also entered the service from other localities. the other seven, general mcgroierty, colonels white, fyffe, loudon and marshall, majors king and bailey, were all residents of georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at the close, returned there. major bailey was the cadet who had preceded me at west point. he was killed in west virginia, in his first engagement. as far as i know, every boy who has entered west point from that village since my time has been graduated. i took passage on a steamer at ripley, ohio, for pittsburg, about the middle of may, 1839. western boats at that day did not make regular trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of time, for passengers or freight. i have myself been detained two or three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. on this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days pittsburg was reached. from pittsburg i chose passage by the canal to harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. this gave a better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of western pennsylvania, and i had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. at that time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more pleasant, when time was not an object. from harrisburg to philadelphia there was a railroad, the first i had ever seen, except the one on which i had just crossed the summit of the alleghany mountains, and over which canal boats were transported. in travelling by the road from harrisburg, i thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. we travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an hour. this seemed like annihilating space. i stopped five days in philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited girard college (which was then in course of construction), and got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. my sojourn in new york was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see the city very well. i reported at west point on the 30th or 31st of may, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. a military life had no charms for me, and i had not the faintest idea of staying in the army even if i should be graduated, which i did not expect. the encampment which preceded the commencement of academic studies was very wearisome and uninteresting. when the 28th of august came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--i felt as though i had been at west point always, and that if i staid to graduation, i would have to remain always. i did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in fact i rarely ever read over a lesson the second time during my entire cadetship. i could not sit in my room doing nothing. there is a fine library connected with the academy from which cadets can get books to read in their quarters. i devoted more time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. much of the time, i am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy sort. i read all of bulwer's then published, cooper's, marryat's, scott's, washington irving's works, lever's, and many others that i do not now remember. mathematics was very easy to me, so that when january came, i passed the examination, taking a good standing in that branch. in french, the only other study at that time in the first year's course, my standing was very low. in fact, if the class had been turned the other end foremost i should have been near head. i never succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one study, during the four years. i came near it in french, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. early in the session of the congress which met in december, 1839, a bill was discussed abolishing the military academy. i saw in this an honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for i was selfish enough to favor the bill. it never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, i would have been sorry to have seen it succeed. my idea then was to get through the course, secure a detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course different from my plans. at the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending from the close of the june examination to the 28th of august. this i enjoyed beyond any other period of my life. my father had sold out his business in georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if i should ever be able to retire on a competency. he had moved to bethel, only twelve miles away, in the adjoining county of clermont, and had bought a young horse that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle during my furlough. most of my time was spent among my old school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at west point. persons acquainted with the academy know that the corps of cadets is divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. these companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and qualifications. the adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieutenants are taken from the first, or senior class; the sergeants from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or sophomore class. i had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when i returned from furlough i found myself the last but one--about my standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. the promotion was too much for me. that year my standing in the class--as shown by the number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the sergeants, and i was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. during my first year's encampment general scott visited west point, and reviewed the cadets. with his commanding figure, his quite colossal size and showy uniform, i thought him the finest specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. i could never resemble him in appearance, but i believe i did have a presentiment for a moment that some day i should occupy his place on review--although i had no intention then of remaining in the army. my experience in a horse-trade ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate chum. the next summer martin van buren, then president of the united states, visited west point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress me with the awe which scott had inspired. in fact i regarded general scott and captain c. f. smith, the commandant of cadets, as the two men most to be envied in the nation. i retained a high regard for both up to the day of their death. the last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they still seemed about five times as long as ohio years, to me. at last all the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. i was anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but there was only one regiment of dragoons in the army at that time, and attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at least four brevet second lieutenants. i recorded therefore my first choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. again there was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of september. again i went to ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and again i found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides a horse and buggy that i could drive--but i was not in a physical condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. for six months before graduation i had had a desperate cough ("tyler's grip" it was called), and i was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though i had grown six inches in stature in the mean time. there was consumption in my father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which made my symptoms more alarming. the brother and sister next younger than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and i seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with different uniforms, i could not get a uniform suit until notified of my assignment. i left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to make the uniform until i notified him whether it was to be for infantry or dragoons. notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. this was a time of great suspense. i was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. the conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste for military uniform that i never recovered from. soon after the arrival of the suit i donned it, and put off for cincinnati on horseback. while i was riding along a street of that city, imagining that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when i first saw general scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for weeks, turned to me and cried: "soldier! will you work? no, sir--ee; i'll sell my shirt first!!" the horse trade and its dire consequences were recalled to mind. the other circumstance occurred at home. opposite our house in bethel stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, the stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. on my return i found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down the outside seams in imitation of mine. the joke was a huge one in the mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but i did not appreciate it so highly. during the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in visiting friends in georgetown and cincinnati, and occasionally other towns in that part of the state. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. on the 30th of september i reported for duty at jefferson barracks, st. louis, with the 4th united states infantry. it was the largest military post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. colonel steven kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but without vexatious rules or regulations. every drill and roll-call had to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without making written application to state where they were going for how long, etc., so that they were back for their next duty. it did seem to me, in my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. i noticed, however, a few years later, when the mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. they had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. they were right; but they did not always give their disease the right name. at west point i had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was room-mate also--f. t. dent, whose family resided some five miles west of jefferson barracks. two of his unmarried brothers were living at home at that time, and as i had taken with me from ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, i soon found my way out to white haven, the name of the dent estate. as i found the family congenial my visits became frequent. there were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. there was still an older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at boarding-school in st. louis, but who, though through school, had not yet returned home. she was spending the winter in the city with connections, the family of colonel john o'fallon, well known in st. louis. in february she returned to her country home. after that i do not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become more enjoyable. we would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit the neighbors, until i became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the younger sisters. if the 4th infantry had remained at jefferson barracks it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the matter with me; but in the following may a circumstance occurred which developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. the annexation of texas was at this time the subject of violent discussion in congress, in the press, and by individuals. the administration of president tyler, then in power, was making the most strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day. during these discussions the greater part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "dismounted rifles"--was stationed at fort jessup, louisiana, some twenty-five miles east of the texas line, to observe the frontier. about the 1st of may the 3d infantry was ordered from jefferson barracks to louisiana, to go into camp in the neighborhood of fort jessup, and there await further orders. the troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down the mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. about the time they started i obtained a leave of absence for twenty days to go to ohio to visit my parents. i was obliged to go to st. louis to take a steamer for louisville or cincinnati, or the first steamer going up the ohio river to any point. before i left st. louis orders were received at jefferson barracks for the 4th infantry to follow the 3d. a messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but before he could reach me i was off, totally ignorant of these events. a day or two after my arrival at bethel i received a letter from a classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post marked st. louis or jefferson barracks, until the expiration of my leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along for me. his advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to me. i now discovered that i was exceedingly anxious to get back to jefferson barracks, and i understood the reason without explanation from any one. my leave of absence required me to report for duty, at jefferson barracks, at the end of twenty days. i knew my regiment had gone up the red river, but i was not disposed to break the letter of my leave; besides, if i had proceeded to louisiana direct, i could not have reached there until after the expiration of my leave. accordingly, at the end of the twenty days, i reported for duty to lieutenant ewell, commanding at jefferson barracks, handing him at the same time my leave of absence. after noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to join my regiment in louisiana. i then asked for a few days' leave before starting, which he readily granted. this was the same ewell who acquired considerable reputation as a confederate general during the rebellion. he was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars --both in my estimation unholy. i immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no baggage with me, of course. there is an insignificant creek--the gravois--between jefferson barracks and the place to which i was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its mouth. there is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. on this occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, i found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. i looked at it a moment to consider what to do. one of my superstitions had always been when i started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. i have frequently started to go to places where i had never been and to which i did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and if i got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, i would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and come in by the other side. so i struck into the stream, and in an instant the horse was swimming and i being carried down by the current. i headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. i went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my --future--brother-in-law. we were not of the same size, but the clothes answered every purpose until i got more of my own. before i returned i mustered up courage to make known, in the most awkward manner imaginable, the discovery i had made on learning that the 4th infantry had been ordered away from jefferson barracks. the young lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for when the regiment left. before separating it was definitely understood that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the removal of a regiment trouble us. this was in may, 1844. it was the 22d of august, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. my duties kept me on the frontier of louisiana with the army of observation during the pendency of annexation; and afterwards i was absent through the war with mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the annexation itself. during that time there was a constant correspondence between miss dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four years and three months. in may, 1845, i procured a leave for twenty days, visited st. louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the union, which had not been asked for before. as already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. accordingly, soon after i was settled at jefferson barracks, i wrote a letter to professor church--professor of mathematics at west point--requesting him to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be made. assistant professors at west point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular branch of study they are assigned to teach. the answer from professor church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt i should have been detailed a year or two later but for the mexican war coming on. accordingly i laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in garrison, with regularity, if not persistency. i reviewed my west point course of mathematics during the seven months at jefferson barracks, and read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. to help my memory i kept a book in which i would write up, from time to time, my recollections of all i had read since last posting it. when the regiment was ordered away, i being absent at the time, my effects were packed up by lieutenant haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken along. i never saw my journal after, nor did i ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. often since a fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands of some malicious person who would publish it. i know its appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. the 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at fort jessup, about midway between the red river and the sabine. our orders required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further instructions. those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine woods, between the old town of natchitoches and grand ecore, about three miles from each, and on high ground back from the river. the place was given the name of camp salubrity, and proved entitled to it. the camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in front and rear. the springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that region in great multitudes and of great voracity. in the valley they swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. the regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. there was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry to the western border of louisiana was occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of texas, but it was generally understood that such was the case. ostensibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into texas, but really as a menace to mexico in case she appeared to contemplate war. generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but not so all of them. for myself, i was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of mexico. it extended from the sabine river on the east to the rio grande on the west, and from the gulf of mexico on the south and east to the territory of the united states and new mexico--another mexican state at that time--on the north and west. an empire in territory, it had but a very sparse population, until settled by americans who had received authority from mexico to colonize. these colonists paid very little attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the state almost from the start, though the constitution of mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. soon they set up an independent government of their own, and war existed, between texas and mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very nearly ceased upon the capture of santa anna, the mexican president. before long, however, the same people--who with permission of mexico had colonized texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the state to the united states, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the american union. even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon mexico cannot. the fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any claim to, as part of the new acquisition. texas, as an independent state, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the nueces river and the rio grande. mexico had never recognized the independence of texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the state had no claim south of the nueces. i am aware that a treaty, made by the texans with santa anna while he was under duress, ceded all the territory between the nueces and the rio grande--, but he was a prisoner of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. he knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the texans, if they should ever capture him. the texans, if they had taken his life, would have only followed the example set by santa anna himself a few years before, when he executed the entire garrison of the alamo and the villagers of goliad. in taking military possession of texas after annexation, the army of occupation, under general taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed territory. the army did not stop at the nueces and offer to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently in order to force mexico to initiate war. it is to the credit of the american nation, however, that after conquering mexico, and while practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was likely to be, to mexico. to us it was an empire and of incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other means. the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war. nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. the 4th infantry went into camp at salubrity in the month of may, 1844, with instructions, as i have said, to await further orders. at first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. as the summer heat increased these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. the summer was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting those stationed at, and near, fort jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the red river, and the citizens of natchitoches and grand ecore. there was much pleasant intercourse between the inhabitants and the officers of the army. i retain very agreeable recollections of my stay at camp salubrity, and of the acquaintances made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living who were there at the time. i can call to mind only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself, who were at camp salubrity with the regiment, who are now alive. with a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my hopes of being ordered to west point as instructor vanished. at the time of which i now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. generally lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff corps. if they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would retain. in the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the regiment. under these circumstances i gave up everything like a special course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and not very much for that, until the war was over. i kept a horse and rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely recovered from the cough which i had carried from west point, and from all indications of consumption. i have often thought that my life was saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an administrative act, and a war, both of which i disapproved. as summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the tents we were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and "further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the hardship. men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as officers. the outlay by the government in accomplishing this was nothing, or nearly nothing. the winter was spent more agreeably than the summer had been. there were occasional parties given by the planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the red river were called. the climate was delightful. near the close of the short session of congress of 1844-5, the bill for the annexation of texas to the united states was passed. it reached president tyler on the 1st of march, 1845, and promptly received his approval. when the news reached us we began to look again for "further orders." they did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of may following i asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose of visiting--st. louis. the object of this visit has been before stated. early in july the long expected orders were received, but they only took the regiment to new orleans barracks. we reached there before the middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. the yellow fever was raging in new orleans during the time we remained there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous well-observed sunday. i recollect but one occasion when this observance seemed to be broken by the inhabitants. one morning about daylight i happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, i looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. i observed a couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces." i do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties engaged. i do not believe i ever would have the courage to fight a duel. if any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill him, i would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating us, when i executed him. if i should do another such a wrong as to justify him in killing me, i would make any reasonable atonement within my power, if convinced of the wrong done. i place my opposition to duelling on higher grounds than here stated. no doubt a majority of the duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those engaged to decline. at camp salubrity, and when we went to new orleans barracks, the 4th infantry was commanded by colonel vose, then an old gentleman who had not commanded on drill for a number of years. he was not a man to discover infirmity in the presence of danger. it now appeared that war was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command of the regiment at a battalion drill. only two or three evolutions had been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to his own quarters, dropped dead. he had not been complaining of ill health, but no doubt died of heart disease. he was a most estimable man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico--supplying transportation. early in september the regiment left new orleans for corpus christi, now in texas. ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made in sailing vessels. at that time there was not more than three feet of water in the channel at the outlet of corpus christi bay; the debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an island in the channel called shell island, the ships anchoring some miles out from shore. this made the work slow, and as the army was only supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison equipage, etc. there happened to be pleasant weather while this was going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable distance apart. the men and baggage were let down to a point higher than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. after i had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at shell island, quite six miles from the ship, i had occasion for some reason or other to return on board. while on the suviah--i think that was the name of our vessel--i heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes," etc. in a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he was, and crying, that his men had mutinied. it was necessary to sustain the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors charged with mutiny were in irons. i rather felt for a time a wish that i had not gone aboard just then. as the men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, i always doubted if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. by the time i was ready to leave the ship again i thought i had learned enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer below, and determined to let myself down without assistance. without saying anything of my intentions to any one, i mounted the railing, and taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, i put one foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as i did so some one called out "hold on." it was too late. i tried to "hold on" with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so rapidly that my hold broke, and i plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me i never would stop. when i came to the surface again, being a fair swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, i swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and i was drawn up without a scratch or injury. i do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with me in the least when they found me uninjured. i rather enjoyed the joke myself. the captain of the suviah died of his disease a few months later, and i believe before the mutineers were tried. i hope they got clear, because, as before stated, i always thought the mutiny was all in the brain of a very weak and sick man. after reaching shore, or shell island, the labor of getting to corpus christi was slow and tedious. there was, if my memory serves me, but one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry arrived. others were procured later. the distance from shell island to corpus christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. the channel to the bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged over the bottom when loaded. not more than one trip a day could be effected. later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. corpus christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by the entrance of the nueces river into tide-water, and is on the west bank of that bay. at the time of its first occupancy by united states troops there was a small mexican hamlet there, containing probably less than one hundred souls. there was, in addition, a small american trading post, at which goods were sold to mexican smugglers. all goods were put up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for loading on pack mules. two of these packages made a load for an ordinary mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. the bulk of the trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. the mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in exchange except silver. the trade in tobacco was enormous, considering the population to be supplied. almost every mexican above the age of ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. nearly every mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. the cigarettes were made by the smokers as they used them. up to the time of which i write, and for years afterwards--i think until the administration of president juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of the revenue collected from internal sources. the price was enormously high, and made successful smuggling very profitable. the difficulty of obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. i know from my own experience that when i was at west point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. i failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. under spanish rule mexico was prohibited from producing anything that the mother-country could supply. this rule excluded the cultivation of the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate were well adapted. the country was governed for "revenue only;" and tobacco, which cannot be raised in spain, but is indigenous to mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of government. the native population had been in the habit of using "the weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more rapidly and universally than good ones, and the spanish colonists adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these places farmed out the privilege at a very high price. the tobacco when raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the capacity of the people to pay. all laws for the government of the country were enacted in spain, and the officers for their execution were appointed by the crown, and sent out to the new el dorado. the mexicans had been brought up ignorant of how to legislate or how to rule. when they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. the only change was, that mexico became her own executor of the laws and the recipient of the revenues. the tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of the obnoxious imposts to be repealed. now, the citizens are allowed to cultivate any crops the soil will yield. tobacco is cheap, and every quality can be produced. its use is by no means so general as when i first visited the country. gradually the "army of occupation" assembled at corpus christi. when it was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry --the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as infantry--not more than three thousand men in all. general zachary taylor commanded the whole. there were troops enough in one body to establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for all they were capable of in case of battle. the rank and file were composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the union. the men engaged in the mexican war were brave, and the officers of the regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. a more efficient army for its number and armament, i do not believe ever fought a battle than the one commanded by general taylor in his first two engagements on mexican--or texan soil. the presence of united states troops on the edge of the disputed territory furthest from the mexican settlements, was not sufficient to provoke hostilities. we were sent to provoke a fight, but it was essential that mexico should commence it. it was very doubtful whether congress would declare war; but if mexico should attack our troops, the executive could announce, "whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.," and prosecute the contest with vigor. once initiated there were but few public men who would have the courage to oppose it. experience proves that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. the history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with that of the northern man who aided him by conspiring against his government while protected by it. the most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. mexico showing no willingness to come to the nueces to drive the invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the rio grande, to a point near matamoras. it was desirable to occupy a position near the largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. the distance from corpus christi to matamoras is about one hundred and fifty miles. the country does not abound in fresh water, and the length of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water supplies. besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who travelled constantly between corpus christi and the rio grande, and some by the buffalo. there was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between corpus christi and matamoras. it was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. the army was but indifferently supplied with transportation. wagons and harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses could not so readily be brought. the american traders and mexican smugglers came to the relief. contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven dollars each. the smugglers furnished the animals, and took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. i doubt whether the mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring them. such is trade; such is war. the government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated price. between the rio grande and the nueces there was at that time a large band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination commenced. the mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and bring them into the american settlements and sell them. a picked animal could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. some of these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. the horses were generally very strong, formed much like the norman horse, and with very heavy manes and tails. a number of officers supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when grazing was the only means of supplying forage. there was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the necessary preparations for a move. in the meantime the army was engaged in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. twice, that i remember, small trains were sent from corpus christi, with cavalry escorts, to san antonio and austin, with paymasters and funds to pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. general taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. i accompanied one of them in december, 1845. the distance from corpus christi to san antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. now that roads exist it is probably less. from san antonio to austin we computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter place back to corpus christi at over two hundred miles. i know the distance now from san antonio to austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. there was not at the time an individual living between corpus christi and san antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering mexican settlements along the san antonio river. the people in at least one of these hamlets lived underground for protection against the indians. the country abounded in game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. on the nueces, about twenty-five miles up from corpus christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called san patricio, but the inhabitants had all been massacred by the indians, or driven away. san antonio was about equally divided in population between americans and mexicans. from there to austin there was not a single residence except at new braunfels, on the guadalupe river. at that point was a settlement of germans who had only that year come into the state. at all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would hastily construct for temporary occupation. from austin to corpus christi there was only a small settlement at bastrop, with a few farms along the colorado river; but after leaving that, there were no settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the old town of goliad. some of the houses were still standing. goliad had been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before there had been a mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been killed or driven away. this, with the massacre of the prisoners in the alamo, san antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in all, furnished the strongest justification the texans had for carrying on the war with so much cruelty. in fact, from that time until the mexican war, the hostilities between texans and mexicans was so great that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in superior numbers or possessed of superior arms. the man we found living there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near fort jessup, louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had known him and his family. he had emigrated in advance of his family to build up a home for them. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second lieutenant--army of occupation. when our party left corpus christi it was quite large, including the cavalry escort, paymaster, major dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except lieutenant benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of mexico --lieutenant, now general, augur, and myself, concluded to spend their allotted time at san antonio and return from there. we were all to be back at corpus christi by the end of the month. the paymaster was detained in austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our leave. we concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their food, it was a good six days' journey. we had to sleep on the prairie every night, except at goliad, and possibly one night on the colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and prepared ourselves. the journey was hazardous on account of indians, and there were white men in texas whom i would not have cared to meet in a secluded place. lieutenant augur was taken seriously sick before we reached goliad and at a distance from any habitation. to add to the complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at his capture--gave out. it was absolutely necessary to get for ward to goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. by dint of patience and exceedingly slow movements, goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our patient. we remained over a day, hoping that augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. he did not, however, and knowing that major dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on. i had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. on this trip there was no minute of time while travelling between san patricio and the settlements on the san antonio river, from san antonio to austin, and again from the colorado river back to san patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great numbers. each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. i, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun; except, being detained over a day at goliad, benjamin and i concluded to go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the pecan--and bring back a few turkeys. we had scarcely reached the edge of the timber when i heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant i saw two or three turkeys flying away. these were soon followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from just over my head. all this time i stood watching the turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never once thought of levelling it at the birds. when i had time to reflect upon the matter, i came to the conclusion that as a sportsman i was a failure, and went back to the house. benjamin remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back. after the second night at goliad, benjamin and i started to make the remainder of the journey alone. we reached corpus christi just in time to avoid "absence without leave." we met no one not even an indian --during the remainder of our journey, except at san patricio. a new settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave protection against the indians. on the evening of the first day out from goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves, directly in our front. the prairie grass was tall and we could not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. to my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. the part of ohio that i hailed from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before i left. benjamin was from indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. he understood the nature of the animal and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number of them. he kept on towards the noise, unmoved. i followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. i have no doubt that if benjamin had proposed returning to goliad, i would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave augur sick there in the first place; but benjamin did not propose turning back. when he did speak it was to ask: "grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack?" knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought i would over-estimate the number, i determined to show my acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and answered: "oh, about twenty," very indifferently. he smiled and rode on. in a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. there were just two of them. seated upon their haunches, with their mouths close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. i have often thought of this incident since when i have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted their associates. there are always more of them before they are counted. a week or two before leaving corpus christi on this trip, i had been promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full second-lieutenant, 7th infantry. frank gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was promoted to the 4th in the same orders. we immediately made application to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. on my return, i found that our application had been approved at washington. while in the 7th infantry i was in the company of captain holmes, afterwards a lieutenant-general in the confederate army. i never came in contact with him in the war of the rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous service in his high rank. my transfer carried me to the company of captain mccall, who resigned from the army after the mexican war and settled in philadelphia. he was prompt, however, to volunteer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general in the union army. i was not fortunate enough to meet him after he resigned. in the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. our relations were always most pleasant. the preparations at corpus christi for an advance progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been there. the principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting them broken to harness. the process was slow but amusing. the animals sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. usually a number would be brought in by a company of mexicans, partners in the delivery. the mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. the mexicans,--who were all experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. a lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. while he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by another mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. this would bring the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "u. s." ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten around the throat if pulled. with a man on each side holding these ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to rise. with more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and fastened there. the delivery of that mule was then complete. this process was gone through with every mule and wild horse with the army of occupation. the method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. it is a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same uses. at that time in northern mexico the mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except for the saddle or pack. at all events the corpus christi mule resisted the new use to which he was being put. the treatment he was subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. the soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to harness. numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not perform. five mules were allotted to each wagon. a teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same color and general appearance for his team. with a full corps of assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules together. in two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. two ropes would be put about the neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if too unruly. they were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. two men remained on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. all being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. the first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. after repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to run. this would bring the breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. in time all were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a mexican mule get entirely loose. their drivers were all teamsters by the time they got through. i recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the saddle, not only for some time at corpus christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite matamoras, then to camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during the night. he did not run away at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster he always got out of the way. at last, growing tired of the constant effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. nothing short of a mexican with his lasso could have caught him. regulations would not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of another to take his place. i am a competent witness, for i was regimental quartermaster at the time. while at corpus christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept horses. the animals cost but little in the first instance, and when picketed they would get their living without any cost. i had three not long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at one time. a colored boy who gave them all the attention they got --besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to water and leading the other two. the led horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. they never were heard of afterwards. shortly after that some one told captain bliss, general taylor's adjutant-general, of my misfortune. "yes; i heard grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he replied. that was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when i got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. i never suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. at last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the advance to begin on the 8th of march. general taylor had an army of not more than three thousand men. one battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by water to brazos santiago, at the mouth of the rio grande. a guard was left back at corpus christi to look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick to be removed. the remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry independent. colonel twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. he was followed by the three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. thus the rear brigade did not move from corpus christi until the 11th of march. in view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's march. general taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, i doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his instructions from washington demanded. his orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of the army. all officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. as already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of horses" but a short time before i determined not to get another, but to make the journey on foot. my company commander, captain mccall, had two good american horses, of considerably more value in that country, where native horses were cheap, than they were in the states. he used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. he was quite anxious to know whether i did not intend to get me another horse before the march began. i told him no; i belonged to a foot regiment. i did not understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to start, he said: "there, grant, is a horse for you." i found that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant went a-foot. he had found a mustang, a three-year old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the colored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. it was probably the only horse at corpus christi that could have been purchased just then for any reasonable price. five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the mustang. i was sorry to take him, because i really felt that, belonging to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. but i saw the captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the trip. the day we started was the first time the horse had ever been under saddle. i had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. at no time during the day could i choose exactly the part of the column i would march with; but after that, i had as tractable a horse as any with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. he never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick within the length of his picket rope. a few days out from corpus christi, the immense herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between the nueces and the rio grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. it was the very band from which the horse i was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. the column was halted for a rest, and a number of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd. the country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's curvature. as far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd extended. to the left, it extended equally. there was no estimating the number of animals in it; i have no idea that they could all have been corralled in the state of rhode island, or delaware, at one time. if they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would have given out the first day. people who saw the southern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of the texas band of wild horses in 1846. at the point where the army struck the little colorado river, the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. the water was brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. here the whole army concentrated before attempting to cross. the army was not accompanied by a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge building. to add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the "assembly," and other military calls. like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour general taylor and his army. there were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the "invader." a few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. i do not remember that a single shot was fired. the troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest part. teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. the bank down to the water was steep on both sides. a rope long enough to cross the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules into the water. this latter rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of the forward one back, to be used over again. the water was deep enough for a short distance to swim the little mexican mules which the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left them to show their obstinacy. in this manner the artillery and transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the colorado river. about the middle of the month of march the advance of the army reached the rio grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite the city of matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the lower end of the town. there was not at that time a single habitation from corpus christi until the rio grande was reached. the work of fortifying was commenced at once. the fort was laid out by the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general directions. the mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. they captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by captains thornton and hardee. the latter figured as a general in the late war, on the confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both armies. lieutenant theodric porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with a small detachment; and major cross, the assistant quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. there was no base of supplies nearer than point isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the rio grande and twenty-five miles away. the enemy, if the mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. i have already said that general taylor's whole command on the rio grande numbered less than three thousand men. he had, however, a few more troops at point isabel or brazos santiago. the supplies brought from corpus christi in wagons were running short. work was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. all the men who could be employed, were kept at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. with all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. by the latter part of april the work was in a partially defensible condition, and the 7th infantry, major jacob brown commanding, was marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. all the supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the army to point isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken with the army. early on the second day after starting the force reached its destination, without opposition from the mexicans. there was some delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. while general taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little garrison up the river was besieged. as we lay in our tents upon the sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the rio grande could be distinctly heard. the war had begun. there were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. what general taylor's feelings were during this suspense i do not know; but for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, i felt sorry that i had enlisted. a great many men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. when they say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach danger they become more subdued. this rule is not universal, for i have known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. but the number of such men is small. on the 7th of may the wagons were all loaded and general taylor started on his return, with his army reinforced at point isabel, but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the rio grande. the road from point isabel to matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the rio grande is reached. this river, like the mississippi, flows through a rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the compass at times within a few miles. formerly the river ran by resaca de la palma, some four or five miles east of the present channel. the old bed of the river at resaca had become filled at places, leaving a succession of little lakes. the timber that had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was still standing. this timber was struck six or eight miles out from the besieged garrison, at a point known as palo alto--"tall trees" or "woods." early in the forenoon of the 8th of may as palo alto was approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in line of battle just in front of the timber. their bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. the force was composed largely of cavalry armed with lances. where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-needle. general taylor halted his army before the head of column came in range of the artillery of the mexicans. he then formed a line of battle, facing the enemy. his artillery, two batteries and two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at intervals along the line. a battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by lieutenant-colonel childs, of the artillery, as reserves. these preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective companies. when the men were all back in their places in line, the command to advance was given. as i looked down that long line of about three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, i thought what a fearful responsibility general taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. the mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry. at first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was continued. as we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through the ranks. they hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them and open ranks and let them pass. when we got to a point where the artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle opened on both sides. the infantry under general taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. at the distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without your finding it out. the artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot; but general taylor had with him three or four twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders before spoken of, that had a long range. this made a powerful armament. the mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. we had greatly the advantage in this arm. the artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened fire. the infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step out of their way. it could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers did a great deal of execution. on our side there was little or no loss while we occupied this position. during the battle major ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally wounded, and lieutenant luther, also of the artillery, was struck. during the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became evident that the mexicans were falling back. we again advanced, and occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. in this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops, and some execution was done. one cannon-ball passed through our ranks, not far from me. it took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of captain page of my regiment, while the splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one officer, lieutenant wallen, --hurting them more or less. our casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded. at the break of day on the 9th, the army under taylor was ready to renew the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our front during the night. the chaparral before us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. a body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. it was better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be relieved. to get to them the chaparral had to be passed. thus i assume general taylor reasoned. he halted the army not far in advance of the ground occupied by the mexicans the day before, and selected captain c. f. smith, of the artillery, and captain mccall, of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where the enemy had gone. this left me in command of the company, an honor and responsibility i thought very great. smith and mccall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until they came up to the succession of ponds, before describes, at resaca. the mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite bank. this position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches and open places. smith and mccall deployed on each side of the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once commenced. as we came up we were deployed in like manner. i was with the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the enemy. at last i got pretty close up without knowing it. the balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting the limbs of the chaparral right and left. we could not see the enemy, so i ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be enforced. we kept our position until it became evident that the enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to advance upon. by this time some progress had been made on our left. a section of artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been taken. the mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of them had, no doubt, left early. i at last found a clear space separating two ponds. there seemed to be a few men in front and i charged upon them with my company. there was no resistance, and we captured a mexican colonel, who had been wounded, and a few men. just as i was sending them to the rear with a guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where i was. the ground had been charged over before. my exploit was equal to that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. when asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied: "some one had done that before." this left no doubt in my mind but that the battle of resaca de la palma would have been won, just as it was, if i had not been there. there was no further resistance. the evening of the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the fort, and the garrison was relieved. the siege had lasted a number of days, but the casualties were few in number. major jacob brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was named. since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the north by the press and the reports came back to us. at the same time, or about the same time, we learned that war existed between the united states and mexico, by the acts of the latter country. on learning this fact general taylor transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and matamoras was occupied. we then became the "army of invasion." up to this time taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year commenced arriving. the army remained at matamoras until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. general taylor was not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. he felt his responsibility as going no further. if he had thought that he was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to determine what should be done. if the judgment was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the public. no soldier could face either danger or responsibility more calmly than he. these are qualities more rarely found than genius or physical courage. general taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or retinue. in dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. i can call to mind only one instance when i saw him in uniform, and one other when i heard of his wearing it, on both occasions he was unfortunate. the first was at corpus christi. he had concluded to review his army before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. colonel twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the command of the review. colonel and brevet brigadier-general worth, a far different soldier from taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to command. worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to twiggs until the question was settled by the highest authority. this broke up the review, and the question was referred to washington for final decision. general taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. he was assigned to duty, however, by the president, with the rank which his brevet gave him. worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. the question was submitted to washington, and no response was received until after the army had reached the rio grande. it was decided against general worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. this kept him out of the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma. either the resignation was not accepted, or general worth withdrew it before action had been taken. at all events he returned to the army in time to command his division in the battle of monterey, and served with it to the end of the war. the second occasion on which general taylor was said to have donned his uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the flag officer of the naval squadron off the mouth of the rio grande. while the army was on that river the flag officer sent word that he would call on the general to pay his respects on a certain day. general taylor, knowing that naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his guest in the same style. his uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. the flag officer, knowing general taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's dress, left off his uniform for this occasion. the meeting was said to have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally apologetic. the time was whiled away pleasantly enough at matamoras, while we were waiting for volunteers. it is probable that all the most important people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently existed. it was the policy of the commanding general to allow no pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded than the people had ever known before. among the troops that joined us at matamoras was an ohio regiment, of which thomas l. hamer, the member of congress who had given me my appointment to west point, was major. he told me then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. i have said before that hamer was one of the ablest men ohio ever produced. at that time he was in the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. but he was taken sick before monterey, and died within a few days. i have always believed that had his life been spared, he would have been president of the united states during the term filled by president pierce. had hamer filled that office his partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt i should have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the army--the pay department probably--and would therefore now be preparing to retire. neither of these speculations is unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny. reinforcements having arrived, in the month of august the movement commenced from matamoras to camargo, the head of navigation on the rio grande. the line of the rio grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade mexico from the north. in that case the most natural route to take was the one which general taylor selected. it entered a pass in the sierra madre mountains, at monterey, through which the main road runs to the city of mexico. monterey itself was a good point to hold, even if the line of the rio grande covered all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. it is built on a plain two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the situation healthy. on the 19th of august the army started for monterey, leaving a small garrison at matamoras. the troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which i belonged, were moved up the river to camargo on steamers. as there were but two or three of these, the boats had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were up. those who marched did so by the south side of the river. lieutenant-colonel garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. one day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the month of august, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for northern men. the order of marching was changed and night marches were substituted with the best results. when camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the mexican hamlet. i was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the regiment. the teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from corpus christi to the rio grande over the level prairies of texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a mountainous country. to obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with mexicans to pack and drive them. i had charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack train to supplement them. there were not men enough in the army to manage that train without the help of mexicans who had learned how. as it was the difficulty was great enough. the troops would take up their march at an early hour each day. after they had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be lashed to the backs of the mules. sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. it took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing so long with their loads on their backs. sometimes one would start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they would take the other. i am not aware of ever having used a profane expletive in my life; but i would have the charity to excuse those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of mexican pack mules at the time. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. the advance from camargo was commenced on the 5th of september. the army was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's march. the advance reached cerralvo in four days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. by the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as before, a day separating the divisions. the forward division halted again at marin, twenty-four miles from monterey. both this place and cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of los grengos--"the yankees." from marin the movement was in mass. on the 19th general taylor, with is army, was encamped at walnut springs, within three miles of monterey. the town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. to the north, between the city and walnut springs, stretches an extensive plain. on this plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of "black fort." its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of their range. there were two detached spurs of hills or mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also fortified. on one of these stood the bishop's palace. the road to saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of the guns from these heights. the lower or eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. to the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of foot-hills. the plaza in the centre of the city was the citadel, properly speaking. all the streets leading from it were swept by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. the house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for parapets. such were the defences of monterey in september, 1847. general ampudia, with a force of certainly ten thousand men, was in command. general taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in three divisions, under generals butler, twiggs and worth. the troops went into camp at walnut springs, while the engineer officers, under major mansfield--a general in the late war--commenced their reconnoissance. major mansfield found that it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the black fort and the works on the detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the saltillo road. with this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the interior. general worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given the task of gaining possession of the saltillo road, and of carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. he started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. the divisions under generals butler and twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the movement under general worth. worth's was regarded as the main attack on monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. his march this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about the bishop's palace and the other outside fortifications on their left. general worth reached a defensible position just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked for the night. the engineer officers with him--captain sanders and lieutenant george g. meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious national army at the battle of gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the saltillo road under cover of night. during the night of the 20th general taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon black fort. a natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest the enemy. the 4th infantry, then consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while they were intrenching themselves and their guns. i was regimental quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp and the public property at walnut springs. it was supposed that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning. the point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. at daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. my curiosity got the better of my judgment, and i mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. i had been there but a short time when an order to charge was given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where i had been ordered to stay--i charged with the regiment as soon as the troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of black fort. as they advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. about one-third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. we retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from walnut springs. i was, i believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the charge who was on horseback. when we got to a lace of safety the regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. the adjutant of the regiment, lieutenant hoskins, who was not in robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. i offered him my horse and he accepted the offer. a few minutes later i saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. i ran to him, took his horse and was back with the regiment in a few minutes. in a short time we were off again; and the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that i recollect of being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower batteries. the adjutant to whom i had loaned my horse was killed, and i was designated to act in his place. this charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. we belonged to the brigade commanded by lieutenant-colonel garland, and he had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended should be decisive. by a movement by the left flank garland could have led his men beyond the range of the fire from black fort and advanced towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as could be expected. there was no undue loss of life in reaching the lower end of monterey, except that sustained by garland's command. meanwhile quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the houses without much loss. colonel garland's brigade also arrived at the suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. an entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses protected our troops so long as they were inactive. on the west general worth had reached the saltillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss. he turned from his new position and captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. this gave him possession of the upper or west end of monterey. troops from both twiggs's and butler's divisions were in possession of the east end of the town, but the black fort to the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the possession of the enemy. our camps at walnut springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. a regiment of kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against black fort. practically monterey was invested. there was nothing done on the 22d by the united states troops; but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from black fort and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of the city. during the night they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held undisputed possession of the east end of monterey. twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered from the fire of the enemy. but the streets leading to the plaza--all spanish or spanish-american towns have near their centres a square called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. the houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. all advances into the city were thus attended with much danger. while moving along streets which did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably encountered. the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. the loss of the 3d infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. there were only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers present, and five of these officers were killed. when within a square of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a halt. placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring houses. the exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our soldiers. we had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our ammunition was growing low. i volunteered to go back (*2) to the point we had started from, report our position to general twiggs, and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. we were at this time occupying ground off from the street, in rear of the houses. my ride back was an exposed one. before starting i adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, i started at full run. it was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but these i crossed at such a flying rate that generally i was past and under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. i got out safely without a scratch. at one place on my ride, i saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. finding that the house was full of wounded american officers and soldiers, i dismounted and went in. i found there captain williams, of the engineer corps, wounded in the head, probably fatally, and lieutenant territt, also badly wounded his bowels protruding from his wound. there were quite a number of soldiers also. promising them to report their situation, i left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with the troops at the east end. before ammunition could be collected, the two regiments i had been with were seen returning, running the same gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with comparatively little loss. the movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. the poor wounded officers and men i had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. while this was going on at the east, general worth, with a small division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the city. he resorted to a better expedient for getting to the plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. instead of moving by the open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from one to another. without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza during the night that before morning, ampudia, the mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. this stopped all further hostilities. the terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. the prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and personal property with them. my pity was aroused by the sight of the mexican garrison of monterey marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. many of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their riders out of town. the men looked in but little better condition. i thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about." after the surrender of the garrison of monterey a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. as had been the case on the rio grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with the "yankees" in the pleasantest manner. in fact, under the humane policy of our commander, i question whether the great majority of the mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. property and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. the educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small percentage of the whole population. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz--siege and capture of vera cruz. the mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. general scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by president polk, or marcy, his secretary of war. scott was a whig and the administration was democratic. general scott was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. it would not do therefore to give him command of the "army of conquest." the plans submitted by scott for a campaign in mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. this was on the 27th of may, 1846. four days later general scott was notified that he need not go to mexico. general gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field. colonel zachary taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was therefore left in command. he, too, was a whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the whig papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the presidency. something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. he could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent. it was finally decided to send general scott to mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture vera cruz and march upon the capital of the country. it was no doubt supposed that scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter taylor or destroy his chances for the presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize. the administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. it was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the presidency. it was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. the problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. the fact is, the administration of mr. polk made every preparation to disgrace scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself. general scott had opposed conquest by the way of the rio grande, matamoras and saltillo from the first. now that he was in command of all the forces in mexico, he withdrew from taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. indeed scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the rio grande, and authorized taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. general taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon buena vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the rio grande. scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture vera cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. he was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the president, but his sincere good wishes. the promises were all broken. only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and scott had scarcely started for mexico before the president undertook to supersede him by the appointment of senator thomas h. benton as lieutenant-general. this being refused by congress, the president asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing benton to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and scott remained in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. general scott reached brazos santiago or point isabel, at the mouth of the rio grande, late in december, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to camargo, where he had written general taylor to meet him. taylor, however, had gone to, or towards tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. he had started on this march before he was aware of general scott being in the country. under these circumstances scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate. general taylor's victory at buena vista, february 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the presidency by the whigs a foregone conclusion. he was nominated and elected in 1848. i believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the presidency of the united states. when general scott assumed command of the army of invasion, i was in the division of general david twiggs, in taylor's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of general william worth, in which i served to the close of the war. the troops withdrawn from taylor to form part of the forces to operate against vera cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the rio grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. i found general worth a different man from any i had before served directly under. he was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. there was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but general worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. the length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. general worth on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much. general worth belonged to this latter class. he enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him. the army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the rio grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. the transports were all sailing vessels. the passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the rio grande to the time of debarkation south of vera cruz. the trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. the transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. the transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of anton lizardo, some sixteen miles south of vera cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from the north. with the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind i had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. at that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were sidewheelers. this little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. i recollect that lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom i happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances." finally on the 7th of march, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given scott to invade a country with a population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. the debarkation took place inside of the little island of sacrificios, some three miles south of vera cruz. the vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; general scott had provided these before leaving the north. the breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. the men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. the mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. during the debarkation one shot took off the head of major albertis. no other, i believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. on the 9th of march the troops were landed and the investment of vera cruz, from the gulf of mexico south of the city to the gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. the landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. vera cruz, at the time of which i write and up to 1880, was a walled city. the wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. there were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. in front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the gulf, stands san juan de ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. after the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. these batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. if a sortie had been made at any time by the mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. no serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away. the siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of march, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. upon this general morales, who was governor of both the city and of san juan de ulloa, commenced a correspondence with general scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. on the 29th vera cruz and san juan de ulloa were occupied by scott's army. about five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. the casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. general scott had less than twelve thousand men at vera cruz. he had been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity. twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. in fact, there were at that time but two roads from vera cruz to the city of mexico that could be taken by an army; one by jalapa and perote, the other by cordova and orizaba, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the city of mexico after the range of mountains is passed. it was very important to get the army away from vera cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the north, was arriving very slowly. it was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. at that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of general scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period. not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong. this force was composed of three divisions, under generals twiggs, patterson, and worth. the importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. on the 8th of april, twiggs's division started for jalapa. he was followed very soon by patterson, with his division. general worth was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. it was the 13th of april before this division left vera cruz. the leading division ran against the enemy at cerro gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to jalapa, and went into camp at plan del rio, about three miles from the fortifications. general patterson reached plan del rio with his division soon after twiggs arrived. the two were then secure against an attack from santa anna, who commanded the mexican forces. at all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of april. general scott had remained at vera cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. he at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by santa anna and of the troops holding it. cerro gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of jalapa, and santa anna had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army. the road, said to have been built by cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended at every turn by artillery. on either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. a direct attack along the road was an impossibility. a flank movement seemed equally impossible. after the arrival of the commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack. these reconnoissances were made under the supervision of captain robert e. lee, assisted by lieutenants p. g. t. beauregard, isaac i. stevens, z. b. tower, g. w. smith, george b. mcclellan, and j. g. foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. the reconnoissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. this was accomplished without the knowledge of santa anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible. on the same day general scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th. the attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. animals could not. these had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. the engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed. artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece. in like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes. in this way scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. the attack was made, the mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. on the left general pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. i am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that i saw. there were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated. the surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores. the prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. the battle of buena vista was probably very important to the success of general scott at cerro gordo and in his entire campaign from vera cruz to the great plains reaching to the city of mexico. the only army santa anna had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of vera cruz, was the one he had with him confronting general taylor. it is not likely that he would have gone as far north as monterey to attack the united states troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south. when taylor moved to saltillo and then advanced on to buena vista, santa anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet general scott in the mountain passes west of vera cruz. his attack on taylor was disastrous to the mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to cerro gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before scott got there. if he had been successful at buena vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at cerro gordo. had the battle of buena vista not been fought santa anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat. after the battle the victorious army moved on to jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast. jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. it was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify in our front. worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this result. the division marched to perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains. there is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the castle of perote. this, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament. general scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of vera cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. the troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to vera cruz should be cut off. it being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the city of mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the american army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through vera cruz during the season of the vomito. this reduced scott's force in the field to about five thousand men. early in may, worth, with his division, left perote and marched on to puebla. the roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs. notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart. nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of amozoque--an easy day's march east of puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. a battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared. on the 15th of may we entered the city of puebla. general worth was in command at puebla until the latter end of may, when general scott arrived. here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. during his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. the brigade to which i was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. on one occasion general worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. he galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of santa anna with an army vastly superior to his own. general scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of santa anna and his myriads. there were, of course, bodies of mounted mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too far out. these always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. after the arrival of general scott i was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. we had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. we procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more. there had been great delay in obtaining the authority of congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. a bill was before the national legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of february before it became a law. appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to mexico. it was august before general scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. his moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by generals twiggs, worth, pillow and quitman. there was also a cavalry corps under general harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons. the advance commenced on the 7th of august with twiggs's division in front. the remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between. the marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack. i had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land. the contrast between the two was very marked. general taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. he moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation. often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. he was very much given to sit his horse side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. general scott was the reverse in all these particulars. he always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be expected. this was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed. on these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. his staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order. orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. in their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. general scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment. taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. he knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. but with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. both were pleasant to serve under--taylor was pleasant to serve with. scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. his plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. taylor saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey--storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. the route followed by the army from puebla to the city of mexico was over rio frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. the pass through this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving puebla. the city of mexico lies west of rio frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and south. between the western base of rio frio and the city of mexico there are three lakes, chalco and xochimilco on the left and texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the city of mexico. chalco and texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the city runs. xochimilco is also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with lake chalco by a narrow channel. there is a high rocky mound, called el penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground dividing the lakes. this mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. scott's army was rapidly concentrated about ayotla and other points near the eastern end of lake chalco. reconnoissances were made up to within gun-shot of el penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south side of lake chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. a way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of august troops were in st. augustin tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south from the plaza of the capital. between st. augustin tlalpam and the city lie the hacienda of san antonio and the village of churubusco, and south-west of them is contreras. all these points, except st. augustin tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to san antonio. this made the approach to the city from the south very difficult. the brigade to which i was attached--garland's, of worth's division--was sent to confront san antonio, two or three miles from st. augustin tlalpam, on the road to churubusco and the city of mexico. the ground on which san antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. to the south-west is the pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. from the position occupied by garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the defences of san antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry. if contreras, some three miles west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the city. under these circumstances general scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. on the 18th of august, the day of reaching san augustin tlalpam, garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced intrenchments of san antonio, but where his troops were protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose than defense. general scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that place. the pedregal on the north and north-east, and the mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. this affair, like that of cerro gordo, was an engagement in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. in fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary field. the very strength of each of these positions was, by the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting parties while securing their positions for final attack. all the troops with general scott in the valley of mexico, except a part of the division of general quitman at san augustin tlalpam and the brigade of garland (worth's division) at san antonio, were engaged at the battle of contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. the assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. the brigade commanded by general riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. from the point occupied by garland's brigade we could see the progress made at contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. the mexicans all the way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. we moved out at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. clarke's brigade of worth's division now moved west over the point of the pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to clear san antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading to churubusco and the city of mexico. when he approached churubusco his left, under colonel hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. about an hour after, garland was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. san antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes waving over contreras. the troops that had been engaged at contreras, and even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way of san antonio and churubusco. it was expected by the commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of his position at churubusco, before turning east to reach the san antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the valley of mexico. general scott coming upon the battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. this shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. the enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners, artillery and small arms. the balance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. i recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their ground, were deserters from general taylor's army on the rio grande. both the strategy and tactics displayed by general scott in these various engagements of the 20th of august, 1847, were faultless as i look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. as before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he could use on an ordinary march. i mean, up to the points from which the attack was to commence. after that point is reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before contemplated. the enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of defeats this day, that the city of mexico could have been entered without much further bloodshed. in fact, captain philip kearney --afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. he had not heard the call for a halt. general franklin pierce had joined the army in mexico, at puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. he had consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the battle of contreras. by an unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. the next day, when his brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the road from san augustin tlalpam to the city, general pierce attempted to accompany them. he was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and fainted. this circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the presidency. whatever general pierce's qualifications may have been for the presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. i was not a supporter of him politically, but i knew him more intimately than i did any other of the volunteer generals. general scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because mr. nicholas p. trist, the commissioner on the part of the united states to negotiate a treaty of peace with mexico, was with the army, and either he or general scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would be more possible while the mexican government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader. be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. the army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as tacubaya. negotiations were at once entered into with santa anna, who was then practically the government and the immediate commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. a truce was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the armistices, but authorized general scott to draw supplies for his army from the city in the meantime. negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between mr. trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of mexico, until the 2d of september. at that time mr. trist handed in his ultimatum. texas was to be given up absolutely by mexico, and new mexico and california ceded to the united states for a stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. i do not suppose mr. trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries. the war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new states might be carved. at all events the mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. the terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. the first train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob. this, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the citizens in bed. the circumstance was overlooked and negotiations continued. as soon as the news reached general scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of september, he wrote a vigorous note to president santa anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. general scott, with worth's division, was now occupying tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the city of mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. more than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands molino del rey. the mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in length. at the period of which i speak general scott supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of guns. this, however, proved to be a mistake. it was valuable to the mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. the building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for infantry. chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line between molino del rey and the western part of the city. it was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous sides. the city of mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on strong stone arches. one of these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or near molino del rey, and runs north close to the west base of chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the city by the garita san cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to the city. the second aqueduct starts from the east base of chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to the city. this aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. the arches supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those engaged defensively. at points on the san cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in each. at the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the san cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of sandbags. the roads leading to garitas (the gates) san cosme and belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. such were the defences of the city of mexico in september, 1847, on the routes over which general scott entered. prior to the mexican war general scott had been very partial to general worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for some reason, worth had become estranged from his chief. scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart. he did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. it was understood at the time that he gave worth authority to plan and execute the battle of molino del rey without dictation or interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. the effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. the battle of molino del rey was fought on the 8th of september. the night of the 7th, worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for the morrow. these orders contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the mills before daylight. the engineers had reconnoitred the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. by daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at molino were all at the places designated. the ground in front of the mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was over. worth's troops entered the mills by every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to chapultepec. had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt americans and mexicans would have gone over the defences of chapultepec so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. the defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering their own men. this was not done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the 8th. i do not criticise the failure to capture chapultepec at this time. the result that followed the first assault could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept on without orders. it is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. the loss on our side at molino del rey was severe for the numbers engaged. it was especially so among commissioned officers. i was with the earliest of the troops to enter the mills. in passing through to the north side, looking towards chapultepec, i happened to notice that there were armed mexicans still on top of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. not seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the building, i took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet of the top. by this i climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by some other way. there were still quite a number of mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the building. they still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had surrounded, all by himself. i halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. molino del rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and property, were marched back to their quarters in tacubaya. the engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged. during the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play upon the fortifications of chapultepec. the bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during this day than that of the artillery. general scott assigned the capture of chapultepec to general pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment. two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. they were commanded by captains mckinzie and casey respectively. the assault was successful, but bloody. in later years, if not at the time, the battles of molino del rey and chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. when the assaults upon the garitas of san cosme and belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the mills until west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from chapultepec. in like manner, the troops designated to act against belen could have kept east of chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of chapultepec. molino del rey and chapultepec would both have been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have been turned. general quitman, a volunteer from the state of mississippi, who stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting against belen. general worth commanded the column against san cosme. when chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. i was on the road to san cosme, and witnessed most that took place on that route. when opposition was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. we encountered no serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. i have described the defences of this position before. there were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that i can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached. one of these officers was a lieutenant semmes, of the marine corps. i think captain gore, and lieutenant judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. our progress was stopped for the time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it. west of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the south-west angle made by the san cosme road and the road we were moving upon. a stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. i watched my opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south wall. proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, i peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. i then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. all that were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, i watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. our men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would fire at it. our crossing was thus made practicable without loss. when we reached a safe position i instructed my little command again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the san cosme road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. when we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, i saw some united states troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. this was the company of captain horace brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. i explained to brooks briefly what i had discovered and what i was about to do. he said, as i knew the ground and he did not, i might go on and he would follow. as soon as we got on the road leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. no reinforcements had yet come up except brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a force. it was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. later in the day in reconnoitring i found a church off to the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back of the garita san cosme. i got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. the road being in possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the church. this took us over several ditches breast deep in water and grown up with water plants. these ditches, however, were not over eight or ten feet in width. the howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by the men to its destination. when i knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. with the little spanish then at my command, i explained to him that he might save property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, i intended to go in whether he consented or not. he began to see his duty in the same light that i did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so. the gun was carried to the belfry and put together. we were not more than two or three hundred yards from san cosme. the shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created great confusion. why they did not send out a small party and capture us, i do not know. we had no infantry or other defences besides our one gun. the effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so marked that general worth saw it from his position. (*3) he was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, lieutenant pemberton--later lieutenant-general commanding the defences of vicksburg--to bring me to him. he expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. i could not tell the general that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. i took the captain with me, but did not use his gun. the night of the 13th of september was spent by the troops under general worth in the houses near san cosme, and in line confronting the general line of the enemy across to belen. the troops that i was with were in the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the town. during the night santa anna, with his army--except the deserters--left the city. he liberated all the convicts confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after santa anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to general scott to ask--if not demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal affairs. general scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved themselves properly. general quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at belen that worth's troops did about san cosme. after the interview above related between general scott and the city council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. the troops under worth were to stop at the alameda, a park near the west end of the city. quitman was to go directly to the plaza, and take possession of the palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which congress has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all located, the president resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. this is the building generally designated as the "halls of the montezumas." chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army --mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. on entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. the streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. in this firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, garland, was badly wounded, lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. he died a few days after, and by his death i was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) i had gone into the battle of palo alto in may, 1846, a second lieutenant, and i entered the city of mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present at any one engagement. my regiment lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the mexican war. the mexicans were not so discriminating. they sometimes picked off my juniors. general scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. i wonder that he was not fired upon, but i believe he was not; at all events he was not hurt. he took quarters at first in the "halls of the montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect of all who study them. lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the city of mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. the people began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south and south-west. whether general scott approved of the mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, i have no means of knowing. his orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. on the other hand, general taylor's, i think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties. both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation. earlier in this narrative i have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of perote, extends to the cities of puebla and mexico. the route travelled by the army before reaching puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. this pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. again, the highest point of the road-bed between vera cruz and the city of mexico is over rio frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. but by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. the road from perote to the city of mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our west. arriving due north from puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the city of mexico. it is true this road would have brought troops in by guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name --and at this point lake texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. it has always seemed to me that this northern route to the city of mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. but my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. i know just enough about the mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. it is natural that an important city like puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. in this same way the city of mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field. but general scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. he invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the government. credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. i had now made marches and been in battle under both general scott and general taylor. the former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming. the road was broad and the country open except in crossing the rio frio mountain. general taylor pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. he moved even in smaller bodies. i never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. i supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains. later i found the fallacy of this belief. the rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under scott and taylor. the victories in mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers. there were two reasons for this. both general scott and general taylor had such armies as are not often got together. at the battles of palo alto and resaca-de-la-palma, general taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at west point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in indian wars. the rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. a better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by general taylor in the earliest two engagements of the mexican war. the volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. they were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. they became soldiers themselves almost at once. all these conditions we would enjoy again in case of war. the mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. the private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. he was turned adrift when no longer wanted. the officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. with all this i have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as i have ever seen made by soldiers. now mexico has a standing army larger than that of the united states. they have a military school modelled after west point. their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. the mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. the mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. they celebrate the anniversaries of chapultepec and molino del rey as of very great victories. the anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. at these two battles, while the united states troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the mexicans suffered. the mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. the trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. with us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers --who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from donelson to vicksburg and to chattanooga; and in the east from gettysburg to appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. there is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories. i would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but i would like to see truthful history written. such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the american citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. the justice of the cause which in the end prevailed, will, i doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time. for the present, and so long as there are living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. as time passes, people, even of the south, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. after the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary. general scott at once began the preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. he contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the people. his plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. from the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. this policy was to be pursued. there were not troops enough in the valley of mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the rio grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of vera cruz. military possession was taken of cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the city of mexico; of toluca, nearly as far west, and of pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. vera cruz, jalapa, orizaba, and puebla were already in our possession. meanwhile the mexican government had departed in the person of santa anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the united states commissioner, mr. trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. a temporary government, however, was soon established at queretaro, and trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back to washington, but general scott prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. the treaty was finally signed the 2d of february, 1848, and accepted by the government at washington. it is that known as the "treaty of guadalupe hidalgo," and secured to the united states the rio grande as the boundary of texas, and the whole territory then included in new mexico and upper california, for the sum of $15,000,000. soon after entering the city of mexico, the opposition of generals pillow, worth and colonel duncan to general scott became very marked. scott claimed that they had demanded of the president his removal. i do not know whether this is so or not, but i do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. at last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. this act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. he had asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the president himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to procure the appointment of benton: and the administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. about the middle of february orders came convening a court of inquiry, composed of brevet brigadier-general towson, the paymaster-general of the army, brigadier-general cushing and colonel belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from washington, relieving scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning major-general william o. butler of kentucky to the place. this order also released pillow, worth and duncan from arrest. if a change was to be made the selection of general butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so far as i remember to have heard expressions on the subject. there were many who regarded the treatment of general scott as harsh and unjust. it is quite possible that the vanity of the general had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the start. the court tried the accuser quite as much as the accused. it was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet in frederick, maryland. general scott left the country, and never after had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. he certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in high places. the efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made them both candidates for the presidency. general taylor was nominated in 1848, and was elected. four years later general scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with his defeat.(*5) chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. the treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the commissioners of each side early in february, 1848. it took a considerable time for it to reach washington, receive the approval of the administration, and be finally ratified by the senate. it was naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there must be delay they contented themselves as best they could. every sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay their fifty cents. i attended one of them--just one--not wishing to leave the country without having witnessed the national sport. the sight to me was sickening. i could not see how human beings could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on these occasions. at these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. the audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. when all is ready a bull is turned into the ring. three or four men come in, mounted on the merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling down. the men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a needle. other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and explosives about the size of a musket cartridge. to each of these explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. before the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to him. the pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the animal becomes frantic. as he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. he turns towards his last tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is allowed to take it on his horns. the flag drops and covers the eyes of the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and the torment is renewed. when the animal is worked into an uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores --literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or eighteen inches long, and sharp. the trick is to dodge an attack from the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. if these efforts fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife blade into the spinal column just back of the horns. he is then dragged out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same performance is renewed. on the occasion when i was present one of the bulls was not turned aside by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc., etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. the horse was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. the bull was then lassoed and killed in the manner above described. men came in and carried the dead man off in a litter. when the slaughtered bull and horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on a litter but a few minutes before. he was only dead so far as that performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who might not be so fortunate. there was a feeling of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he had come to life again. i confess that i felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. i did not stay for the conclusion of the performance; but while i did stay, there was not a bull killed in the prescribed way. bull fights are now prohibited in the federal district--embracing a territory around the city of mexico, somewhat larger than the district of columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. during one of my recent visits to mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at puebla and at pachuca. i was not notified in advance so as to be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases i civilly declined to attend. another amusement of the people of mexico of that day, and one which nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and layman, was monte playing. regular feast weeks were held every year at what was then known as st. augustin tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. there were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. in many of the booths clackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not bet more than a few pennies at a time. in other booths silver formed the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed if there should be a run of luck against the bank. in some there was no coin except gold. here the rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a single day. all this is stopped now. for myself, i was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. my regiment was stationed in tacubaya. i was regimental quartermaster and commissary. general scott had been unable to get clothing for the troops from the north. the men were becoming--well, they needed clothing. material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and people employed to make it up into "yankee uniforms." a quartermaster in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. a regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. i had to look after this matter for the 4th infantry. then our regimental fund had run down and some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a number of months. the regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. there was authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. so many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various grades, and the remainder the pay of privates. this would not secure a band leader, nor good players on certain instruments. in garrison there are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. the best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers instead of flour. the ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one hundred and forty pounds of bread. this saving was purchased by the commissary for the benefit of the fund. in the emergency the 4th infantry was laboring under, i rented a bakery in the city, hired bakers--mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and i also got a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large amount of hard bread. in two months i made more money for the fund than my pay amounted to during the entire war. while stationed at monterey i had relieved the post fund in the same way. there, however, was no profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. in the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit popocatapetl, the highest volcano in america, and to take an escort. i went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous positions before the country. of those who "went south," and attained high rank, there was lieutenant richard anderson, who commanded a corps at spottsylvania; captain sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the khedive of egypt; captain george crittenden, a rebel general; s. b. buckner, who surrendered fort donelson; and mansfield lovell, who commanded at new orleans before that city fell into the hands of the national troops. of those who remained on our side there were captain andrew porter, lieutenant c. p. stone and lieutenant z. b. tower. there were quite a number of other officers, whose names i cannot recollect. at a little village (ozumba) near the base of popocatapetl, where we purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules with forage for our horses. high up on the mountain there was a deserted house of one room, called the vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. the pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now become wild. it was possible to go on horseback as far as the vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. sometimes it was very narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the other side. at one of these places one of our mules loaded with two sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the bottom. the descent was steep but not perpendicular. the mule rolled over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course the poor animal was dashed to pieces. what was our surprise, not long after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent. the load had protected the animal from serious injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the path leading up to the hut where we were to stay. the night at the vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant i ever knew. it was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. a little higher up the rain ceased and snow began. the wind blew with great velocity. the log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly better then a sieve. there was little or no sleep that night. as soon as it was light the next morning, we started to make the ascent to the summit. the wind continued to blow with violence and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. the clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space between them. the wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. we labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to return. the descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got below the snow line. at the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night were at ozumba. the fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us to bed early. our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a blanket under us. soon all were asleep; but long before morning first one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating pain in the eyes. not one escaped it. by morning the eyes of half the party were so swollen that they were entirely closed. the others suffered pain equally. the feeling was about what might be expected from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. we remained in quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. this relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. the swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. we moved back to the village of ameca ameca, some six miles, and stopped again for the night. the next morning all were entirely well and free from pain. the weather was clear and popocatapetl stood out in all its beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to return. about half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and concluded to do so. the remainder--i was with the remainder--concluded that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of mexico, some ninety miles from where we then were, on the road to acapulco. the party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they encountered in their first attempt. three of them--anderson, stone and buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the time. i made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but it seems to me that i can see the whole of it as vividly as if it were but yesterday. i have been back at ameca ameca, and the village beyond, twice in the last five years. the scene had not changed materially from my recollection of it. the party which i was with moved south down the valley to the town of cuantla, some forty miles from ameca ameca. the latter stands on the plain at the foot of popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight thousand feet above tide water. the slope down is gradual as the traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. in the morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are those common to the united states, we halted in the evening in a tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were flourishing. we had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. soon after the capture of the city of mexico an armistice had been agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective armies were not to go during its continuance. our party knew nothing about these limits. as we approached cuantla bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the town towards us. our party halted, and i tied a white pocket handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on to the town. captains sibley and porter followed a few hundred yards behind. i was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized that i should be conducted to him. i had been with the general but a few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. the mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us to be there. however, as we had no special authority from our own commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to cuernavaca the next morning. cuernavaca is a town west of guantla. the country through which we passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions and rich in scenery. at one point, about half-way between the two places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly all full-blooded indians. very few of them even spoke spanish. the houses were built of stone and generally only one story high. the streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before cortez visited the country. they had not been graded, but the paving had been done on the natural surface. we had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that town. on a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. we ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced civilization. the next day we went into cuernavaca. after a day's rest at cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey to the great caves of mexico. we had proceeded but a few miles when we were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. the guard promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. at night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. again in the morning there was no reply. the second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger to the department commander. we determined therefore to go on unless stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. after a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the one at cuantia occurred. the commanding officer sent a guide to conduct our party around the village and to put us upon our road again. this was the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. it must have been a saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. their coin was principally copper, and i do not believe there was a man among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. they were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. i recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a card. monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the window of the room occupied by the officers of our party. the next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. we explored to a distance of about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. some of the former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor; some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. the stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with water. the water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral matter. evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. this in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. i recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side of it. some of our party became satisfied with their explorations before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to take explorers, and started back without guides. coming to the large column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of the fact. when the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the torches of an approaching party. we could not conceive who these could be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but ourselves at the entrance when we started in. very soon we found it was our friends. it took them some time to conceive how they had got where they were. they were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. personal memoirs of u. s. grant (part 4) volume ii. contents. chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans --commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address --arrival at chattanooga. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position--sherman's movements. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy--sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy--pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville --visiting knoxville--cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee --commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position--sheridan's first raid. chapter xlix. sherman s campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan--entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. chapter liii. hancock's assault--losses of the confederates--promotions recommended--discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack--reducing the artillery. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey --position of the national army. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor--correspondence with lee retrospective. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james --general lee--visit to butler--the movement on petersburg --the investment of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad--early's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg--explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg --canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas --capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners--an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg --sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line--the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac--sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville --correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south--president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman --capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis --general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes--grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton--estimate of the different corps commanders. conclusion appendix chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans--commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address--arrival at chattanooga. the reply (to my telegram of october 16, 1863, from cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the galt house, louisville, where i would meet an officer of the war department with my instructions. i left cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via indianapolis. just as the train i was on was starting out of the depot at indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the secretary of war was coming into the station and wanted to see me. i had never met mr. stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when i was in tennessee. occasionally at night he would order the wires between the war department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. on this occasion the secretary was accompanied by governor brough of ohio, whom i had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. mr. stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to indianapolis, and accompanied me to louisville. up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after i left vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of halleck's dispatches that i had better go to nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve rosecrans. soon after we started the secretary handed me two orders, saying that i might take my choice of them. the two were identical in all but one particular. both created the "military division of mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the departments of the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee, and all the territory from the alleghanies to the mississippi river north of banks's command in the south-west. one order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved rosecrans and assigned thomas to his place. i accepted the latter. we reached louisville after night and, if i remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. the secretary of war told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover. he never did. a day was spent in louisville, the secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. by the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and i left the hotel to spend the evening away, both mrs. grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in louisville. in the course of the evening mr. stanton received a dispatch from mr. c. a. dana, then in chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. as stated before, after the fall of vicksburg i urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against mobile. general rosecrans had been at murfreesboro', tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive. but after the investment of vicksburg bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen johnston, in mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. i frequently wrote general halleck suggesting that rosecrans should move against bragg. by so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay chattanooga open to capture. general halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." if true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. it would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. i, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of vicksburg had drawn from rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. finally he did move, on the 24th of june, but ten days afterwards vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from bragg were free to return. it was at this time that i recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against mobile. i knew the peril the army of the cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. if threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. those troops would necessarily come from bragg. my judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. soon it was discovered in washington that rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. the emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of bragg upon mobile. it was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred bragg south of the tennessee river, and through and beyond chattanooga. if he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. but he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until bragg's troops from mississippi began to join him. then bragg took the initiative. rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at chickamauga, some miles south-east of chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. the battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of september, and rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. the corps under major-general george h. thomas stood its ground, while rosecrans, with crittenden and mccook, returned to chattanooga. thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. bragg followed and took possession of missionary ridge, overlooking chattanooga. he also occupied lookout mountain, west of the town, which rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as bridgeport. the national troops were now strongly intrenched in chattanooga valley, with the tennessee river behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with chattanooga creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line. on the 29th halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to rosecrans. long before this dispatch was received sherman was on his way, and mcpherson was moving east with most of the garrison of vicksburg. a retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. it would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization. all supplies for rosecrans had to be brought from nashville. the railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the tennessee river; but bragg, holding lookout and raccoon mountains west of chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the tennessee, between chattanooga and bridgeport. the distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of bragg, all supplies for rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. this country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. the men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from nashville across the country. the region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof." nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. what they had was well worn. the fuel within the federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. there were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. the only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. it would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. if a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy. on the receipt of mr. dana's dispatch mr. stanton sent for me. finding that i was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where i was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. about eleven o'clock i returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. i hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. i immediately wrote an order assuming command of the military division of the mississippi, and telegraphed it to general rosecrans. i then telegraphed to him the order from washington assigning thomas to the command of the army of the cumberland; and to thomas that he must hold chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that i would be at the front as soon as possible. a prompt reply was received from thomas, saying, "we will hold the town till we starve." i appreciated the force of this dispatch later when i witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. it looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. on the morning of the 20th of october i started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as nashville. at that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so i remained in nashville until the next morning. here i met for the first time andrew johnson, military governor of tennessee. he delivered a speech of welcome. his composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. it was long, and i was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. i was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. at all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. from nashville i telegraphed to burnside, who was then at knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men; to admiral porter at cairo, that sherman's advance had passed eastport, mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from st. louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to bridgeport. on the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching stevenson alabama, after dark. rosecrans was there on his way north. he came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. my only wonder was that he had not carried them out. we then proceeded to bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. from here we took horses and made our way by jasper and over waldron's ridge to chattanooga. there had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. i had been on crutches since the time of my fall in new orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. the roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses. at jasper, some ten or twelve miles from bridgeport, there was a halt. general o. o. howard had his headquarters there. from this point i telegraphed burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. we stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. the next day we reached chattanooga a little before dark. i went directly to general thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until i could establish my own. during the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. they pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. if any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. i found general w. f. smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the army of the cumberland. i had known smith as a cadet at west point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. he explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that i could see it without an inspection. i found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. he was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. in addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between chattanooga and bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. this boat consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. i telegraphed to washington this night, notifying general halleck of my arrival, and asking to have general sherman assigned to the command of the army of the tennessee, headquarters in the field. the request was at once complied with. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. the next day, the 24th, i started out to make a personal inspection, taking thomas and smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. we crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the tennessee at brown's ferry, some three miles below lookout mountain, unobserved by the enemy. here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. there was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. they did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. they must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. but, i suppose, they looked upon the garrison of chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence. that night i issued orders for opening the route to bridgeport--a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. they had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. chattanooga is on the south bank of the tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. it is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which chattanooga creek runs. to the east of the valley is missionary ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the tennessee. on the west of the valley is lookout mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. just below the town the tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of lookout mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. the memphis and charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. east of missionary ridge flows the south chickamauga river; west of lookout mountain is lookout creek; and west of that, raccoon mountains. lookout mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. on the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. the intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of missionary ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across chattanooga valley to lookout mountain. lookout mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in lookout valley west, and on raccoon mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. in addition to this there was an intrenched line in chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to lookout mountain, to make the investment complete. besides the fortifications on mission ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. the enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. at one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. the union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. practically, the army of the cumberland was besieged. the enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. the union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. general halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by generals howard and slocum, hooker in command of the whole, from the army of the potomac to reinforce rosecrans. it would have been folly to send them to chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. they were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. before my arrival, thomas ordered their concentration at bridgeport. general w. f. smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which i was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that i deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. on the 24th of october, after my return to chattanooga, the following details were made: general hooker, who was now at bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the tennessee and march up by whitesides and wauhatchie to brown's ferry. general palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, army of the cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite whitesides, then cross and hold the road in hooker's rear after he had passed. four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under general smith directly from chattanooga. eighteen hundred of them, under general hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of lookout, down to brown's ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to brown's ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. on the 26th, hooker crossed the river at bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. smith started enough in advance to be near the river when hazen should arrive. there are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of lookout. it was over this road smith marched. at five o'clock hazen landed at brown's ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. by seven o'clock the whole of smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. this was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. by ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. the two bridges over the tennessee river--a flying one at chattanooga and the new one at brown's ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into lookout valley at wauhatchie. howard marched on to brown's ferry, while geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. the pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered. the river was now opened to us from lookout valley to bridgeport. between brown's ferry and kelly's ferry the tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. to get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. but there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from bridgeport to kelly's ferry. the latter point is only eight miles from chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the raccoon mountains on the south side of the river to brown's ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite chattanooga. there were several steamers at bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions. on the way to chattanooga i had telegraphed back to nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. his animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. in five days from my arrival in chattanooga the way was open to bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. it is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. the men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. the weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. i do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. mr. davis had visited bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as bragg described it in his subsequent report. "these dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of chattanooga for want of food and forage. possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." but the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and i doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. there was no time during the rebellion when i did not think, and often say, that the south was more to be benefited by its defeat than the north. the latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. the former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. with the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. the labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. the whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." the system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. the non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. the war was expensive to the south as well as to the north, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. the enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. he appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. his strength on lookout mountain was not equal to hooker's command in the valley below. from missionary ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from chattanooga, in order to reach lookout valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on geary at wauhatchie by longstreet's corps. when the battle commenced, hooker ordered howard up from brown's ferry. he had three miles to march to reach geary. on his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners. leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce geary. before he got up, geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. the night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. in the darkness and uproar hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. the mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. the latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. by four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed. in securing possession of lookout valley, smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. the enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. in the night engagement of the 28th-9th hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. i never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. after we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, i made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. as i have stated, chattanooga creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the tennessee river at the foot of lookout mountain. this creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. as i would be under short-range fire and in an open country, i took nobody with me, except, i believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. i rode from our right around to our left. when i came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, i heard the call, "turn out the guard for the commanding general." i replied, "never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the confederate pickets. the sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, i believe, added, "general grant." their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which i returned. the most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. at one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. general longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. seeing a soldier in blue on this log, i rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. he was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to general longstreet's corps. i asked him a few questions--but not with a view of gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and i rode off. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position --sherman's movements. having got the army of the cumberland in a comfortable position, i now began to look after the remainder of my new command. burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the army of the cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. he was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, big south fork of the cumberland river, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. the roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. his animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from cumberland gap, and far back towards lexington, ky. east tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. sherman had started from memphis for corinth on the 11th of october. his instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. the distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. his entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. the bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. a hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. often sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee river at eastport, mississippi. knowing the difficulty sherman would have to supply himself from memphis, i had previously ordered supplies sent from st. louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at eastport. these he got. i now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to stevenson, alabama, without delay. this order was borne to sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the tennessee in a canoe and floated over muscle shoals; it was delivered at iuka on the 27th. in this sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards cleveland, east tennessee, and might be going to nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. on the 1st of november he crossed the tennessee at eastport, and that day was in florence, alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at eastport, with blair bringing up the rear. sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from nashville. all indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying burnside's command in east tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. a single track could not do this. i gave, therefore, an order to sherman to halt general g. m. dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from decatur north towards nashville, and to rebuild that road. the road from nashville to decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. all the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. all the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. all bridges and culverts had been destroyed between nashville and decatur, and thence to stevenson, where the memphis and charleston and the nashville and chattanooga roads unite. the rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as stevenson over which to supply the army. from bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. general dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. he had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. with these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. he had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. when these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. but rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. there were no rails except those in use. to supply these deficiencies i ordered eight of the ten engines general mcpherson had at vicksburg to be sent to nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. i also ordered the troops in west tennessee to points on the river and on the memphis and charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the memphis and charleston to nashville. the military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. general dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. the number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles. the enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against burnside or were going to nashville, went no farther than cleveland. their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of holding east tennessee; saying the president was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. we had not at chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. reinforcements could not help burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. there was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from missionary ridge and about chattanooga. on the 4th of november longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against burnside. the situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until sherman should get up. the authorities at washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. on the 7th, before longstreet could possibly have reached knoxville, i ordered thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. i directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery. but he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. nothing was left to be done but to answer washington dispatches as best i could; urge sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. all of burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. he even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to chattanooga when the battle should begin. longstreet had a railroad as far as loudon; but from there to knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. on the 14th i telegraphed him: "sherman's advance has reached bridgeport. his whole force will be ready to move from there by tuesday at farthest. if you can hold longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, i will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between longstreet and bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. sherman would have been here before this but for high water in elk river driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross." and again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: "your dispatch and dana's just received. being there, you can tell better how to resist longstreet's attack than i can direct. with your showing you had better give up kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. every arrangement is now made to throw sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry missionary ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between cleveland and dalton. hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry lookout mountain. the enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. this favors us. to further confirm this, sherman's advance division will march direct from whiteside to trenton. the remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from whiteside to kelly's ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up lookout valley. sherman's advance has only just reached bridgeport. the rear will only reach there on the 16th. this will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. i can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at kingston and pushing for kentucky. if they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of sparta. i will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. it will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?" longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at loudon until the 13th. that being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. he was in a position threatening knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to chattanooga. the day after longstreet left loudon, sherman reached bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached chattanooga the next day. my orders for battle were all prepared in advance of sherman's arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. the possession of lookout mountain was of no special advantage to us now. hooker was instructed to send howard's corps to the north side of the tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into chattanooga valley. the plan of battle was for sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over south chickamauga river so as to threaten or hold the railroad in bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at chickamauga station. hooker was to perform like service on our right. his problem was to get from lookout valley to chattanooga valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to rossville, south of bragg's line on missionary ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to chickamauga valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. thomas, with the army of the cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. to carry out this plan, sherman was to cross the tennessee at brown's ferry and move east of chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of mission ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. there are two streams called chickamauga emptying into the tennessee river east of chattanooga--north chickamauga, taking its rise in tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the south chickamauga, which takes its rise in georgia, flows northward, and empties into the tennessee some three or four miles above the town. there were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the north chickamauga river, their presence there being unknown to the enemy. at night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. a few were to land east of the mouth of the south chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. the rest were to land on the south side of the tennessee, where missionary ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. lookout valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure missionary ridge, hooker's orders were changed. his revised orders brought him to chattanooga by the established route north of the tennessee. he was then to move out to the right to rossville. hooker's position in lookout valley was absolutely essential to us so long as chattanooga was besieged. it was the key to our line for supplying the army. but it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past lookout mountain and chattanooga valley, and up to missionary ridge. by crossing the north face of lookout the troops would come into chattanooga valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. orders were accordingly given to march by this route. but days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. the passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. it might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. after reaching chattanooga valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. i was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep lookout mountain until we got through with the troops on missionary ridge. by marching hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position, he would have chattanooga creek behind him, and the attack on missionary ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on lookout mountain. hooker's order was changed accordingly. as explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at brown's ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against missionary ridge. the next day after sherman's arrival i took him, with generals thomas and smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. i, as well as the authorities in washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for burnside's safety. burnside himself, i believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. nothing could be done for him, however, until sherman's troops were up. as soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, sherman started for bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, i believe, from kelly's ferry. sherman had left bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time. his march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. by the 20th he was himself at brown's ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (ewing's) was at trenton, sent that way to create the impression that lookout was to be taken from the south. sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. news had been received that the battle had been commenced at knoxville. burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. the president, the secretary of war, and general halleck, were in an agony of suspense. my suspense was also great, but more endurable, because i was where i could soon do something to relieve the situation. it was impossible to get sherman's troops up for the next day. i then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered thomas to move on that date. but the elements were against us. it rained all the 20th and 21st. the river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. general orlando b. willcox, a division commander under burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than knoxville --about maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the north. a dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east. the following was sent in reply: "if you can communicate with general burnside, say to him that our attack on bragg will commence in the morning. if successful, such a move will be made as i think will relieve east tennessee, if he can hold out. longstreet passing through our lines to kentucky need not cause alarm. he would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return." meantime, sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. the crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of lookout mountain. once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on lookout mountain or missionary ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. but when sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of chattanooga, howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. his crossing was in full view both from missionary ridge and the top of lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be sherman's. this enabled sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy --sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. on the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at brown's ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at knoxville; of willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was received from bragg which contained these words: "as there may still be some non-combatants in chattanooga, i deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." of course, i understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but i did not know what the intended deception was. on the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that bragg was leaving our front, and on that day buckner's division was sent to reinforce longstreet at knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. the object of bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to chattanooga. during the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in north chickamauga. the material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. hearing nothing from burnside, and hearing much of the distress in washington on his account, i could no longer defer operations for his relief. i determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the army of the cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. the position occupied by the army of the cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. the line was about a mile from the town, and extended from citico creek, a small stream running near the base of missionary ridge and emptying into the tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the south chickamauga, on the left, to chattanooga creek on the right. all commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. the important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named fort wood. it owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and missionary ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. fort wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. on the morning of the 23d thomas, according to instructions, moved granger's corps of two divisions, sheridan and t. j. wood commanding, to the foot of fort wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, sheridan on the right, wood to the left, extending to or near citico creek. palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. he supported sheridan with one division (baird's), while his other division under johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. the picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. at two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. by this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. the signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from fort wood and other points on the line. the rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. these too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. but it was not without loss on both sides. this movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. the fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. during the following night they were made strong. we lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. with the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from missionary ridge and fort wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. the advantage was greatly on our side now, and if i could only have been assured that burnside could hold out ten days longer i should have rested more easily. but we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. by the night of the 23d sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at brown's ferry. the continuous rise in the tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but i was determined to move that night even without this division. orders were sent to osterhaus accordingly to report to hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. because of the break in the bridge, hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. general w. f. smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. to him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from north chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. during the night general morgan l. smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of giles a. smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. during this night also general j. m. brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the army of the cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. he had to use sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, thomas having none. at two o'clock in the morning, november 24th, giles a. smith pushed out from the north chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. the boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of south chickamauga. here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. the guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. the remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. the work of ferrying over sherman's command from the north side of the tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. a steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. the rest of m. l. smith's division came first, then the division of john e. smith. the troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. by daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built. the work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. the ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. by a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the south chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the tennessee. sherman at once formed his troops for assault on missionary ridge. by one o'clock he started with m. l. smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of chickamauga river; j. e. smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of j. e. smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. a good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. by half-past three sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. a brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. the enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. there had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that lookout mountain and the top of missionary ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. but now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at chickamauga station. all of sherman's command was now south of the tennessee. during the afternoon general giles a. smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. howard, however, effected a crossing of citico creek and a junction with sherman, and was directed to report to him. with two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. he went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. while these operations were going on to the east of chattanooga, hooker was engaged on the west. he had three divisions: osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; geary's, 12th corps, army of the potomac; and cruft's, 14th corps, army of the cumberland. geary was on the right at wauhatchie, cruft at the centre, and osterhaus near brown's ferry. these troops were all west of lookout creek. the enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. these brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. general carter l. stevenson was in command of the whole. why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, i do not see. a hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men from the position hooker occupied. the side of lookout mountain confronting hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. on the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of chattanooga with the summit. early on the morning of the 24th hooker moved geary's division, supported by a brigade of cruft's, up lookout creek, to effect a crossing. the remainder of cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. the bridge was seized by gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. this attracted the enemy so that geary's movement farther up was not observed. a heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. he crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. he then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. by this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. by eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. while the operations at the bridge were progressing, geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. the enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by cruft and osterhaus. soon these were up abreast of geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. by noon geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. the rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of chattanooga creek. thomas and i were on the top of orchard knob. hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. it was in full view, extending from the tennessee river, where sherman had crossed, up chickamauga river to the base of mission ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to chattanooga valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of chattanooga creek, thence up the slope of lookout mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. the day was hazy, so that hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. but the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. the enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. during the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where hooker was as to stop operations for the time. at four o'clock hooker reported his position as impregnable. by a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from chattanooga to reinforce him. these troops had to cross chattanooga creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, general carlin, reported to hooker and was assigned to his left. i now telegraphed to washington: "the fight to-day progressed favorably. sherman carried the end of missionary ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at chickamauga creek. troops from lookout valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from missionary ridge." the next day the president replied: "your dispatches as to fighting on monday and tuesday are here. well done. many thanks to all. remember burnside." and halleck also telegraphed: "i congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. i fear that burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. i know you will do all in your power to relieve him." the division of jefferson c. davis, army of the cumberland, had been sent to the north chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. on the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of missionary ridge. firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy --pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. at twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, i began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to willcox to encourage burnside. sherman was directed to attack at daylight. hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on missionary ridge. thomas was not to move until hooker had reached missionary ridge. as i was with him on orchard knob, he would not move without further orders from me. the morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of orchard knob. it remained so all day. bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff officers--could be seen coming and going constantly. the point of ground which sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. a low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. the problem now was to get to the main ridge. the enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. three brigades held the hill already gained. morgan l. smith moved along the east base of missionary ridge; loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of john e. smith's division; and corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. the ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where m. l. smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. the troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. morgan l. smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. the enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. the contest lasted for two hours. corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. sherman now threatened both bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. from the position i occupied i could see column after column of bragg's forces moving against sherman. every confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the union forces was concentrated upon him. j. e. smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of corse's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. he lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. a few hundred yards brought smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of j. e. smith from the position i occupied, i directed thomas to send a division to reinforce him. baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of orchard knob. it had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position. bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. this was what i wanted. but it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and i had expected before this to see hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of rossville and compelling bragg to mass in that direction also. the enemy had evacuated lookout mountain during the night, as i expected he would. in crossing the valley he burned the bridge over chattanooga creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. he was detained four hours crossing chattanooga creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage i expected from his forces. his reaching bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for thomas's assault of the ridge. but sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. sheridan's and wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. i now directed thomas to order the charge at once (*16). i watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. the centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where thomas and i stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. turning to thomas to inquire what caused the delay, i was surprised to see thomas j. wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. i spoke to general wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. he replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. i told him to make the charge at once. he was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards missionary ridge. the confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. the retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. in fact, on that occasion the union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this charge. i watched their progress with intense interest. the fire along the rebel line was terrific. cannon and musket balls filled the air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. the pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the confederate barriers at different points in front of both sheridan's and wood's divisions. the retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. sheridan pushed forward until he reached the chickamauga river at a point above where the enemy crossed. he met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of missionary ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. it was now getting dark, but sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. the enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. to sheridan's prompt movement the army of the cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. while the advance up mission ridge was going forward, general thomas with staff, general gordon granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied orchard knob, from which the entire field could be observed. the moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, i ordered granger to join his command, and mounting my horse i rode to the front. general thomas left about the same time. sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. wood, who commanded the division to the left of sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join sheridan in the pursuit. to the left, in baird's front where bragg's troops had massed against sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. i ordered granger to follow the enemy with wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time i could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. the enemy confronting sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. as soon as sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, davis's division of the army of the cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the chickamauga, and to move forward to chickamauga station. he ordered howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow davis at four o'clock in the morning. morgan l. smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. the rest of sherman's command was directed to follow howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards graysville. hooker, as stated, was detained at chattanooga creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. he got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. at rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. this threw them on palmer. they could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. many, however, were captured. hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near rossville, extending east of the ridge. palmer was on his left, on the road to graysville. during the night i telegraphed to willcox that bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to burnside if he could hold out; to halleck i sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve burnside. before the battle of chattanooga opened i had taken measures for the relief of burnside the moment the way should be clear. thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, and up that to knoxville accompanied by the boat. in addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks. in the battle of chattanooga, troops from the army of the potomac, from the army of the tennessee, and from the army of the cumberland participated. in fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the tennessee river so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. hooker, on the right, had geary's division of the 12th corps, army of the potomac; osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; and cruft's division of the army of the cumberland. sherman had three divisions of his own army, howard's corps from the army of the potomac, and jefferson c. davis's division of the army of the cumberland. there was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. indeed, i doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. all saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. the victory at chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of bragg's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. it was known that mr. jefferson davis had visited bragg on missionary ridge a short time before my reaching chattanooga. it was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between bragg and longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. i had known both bragg and longstreet before the war, the latter very well. we had been three years at west point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. then we served together in the mexican war. i had known bragg in mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. i could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. he was also thoroughly upright. but he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. a man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. as a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. i have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of bragg. on one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. he was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. as commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. as quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. as company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. as quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. in this condition of affairs bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. the latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "my god, mr. bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!" longstreet was an entirely different man. he was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. he was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. it may be that longstreet was not sent to knoxville for the reason stated, but because mr. davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone." on several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the union army by means of his superior military genius. i speak advisedly when i saw mr. davis prided himself on his military capacity. he says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the confederate presidency. some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the confederacy. my recollection is that my first orders for the battle of chattanooga were as fought. sherman was to get on missionary ridge, as he did; hooker to cross the north end of lookout mountain, as he did, sweep across chattanooga valley and get across the south end of the ridge near rossville. when hooker had secured that position the army of the cumberland was to assault in the centre. before sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that hooker was directed to come to chattanooga by the north bank of the tennessee river. the waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. for this reason hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.-----note.--from this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the wilderness, which had been previously written) by general grant, after his great illness in april, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of july, 1885. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville--visiting knoxville-cipher cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chattanooga now being secure to the national troops beyond any doubt, i immediately turned my attention to relieving knoxville, about the situation of which the president, in particular, was very anxious. prior to the battles, i had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of burnside at the very earliest moment after securing chattanooga. we had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. general thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. general granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment missionary ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. with the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until longstreet was driven away, after which event east tennessee would furnish abundance of food for burnside's army and his own also. while following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to ringgold, i directed thomas, verbally, not to start granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that i was going to the front to more fully see the situation. i was not right sure but that bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached dalton. in that case bragg might think it well to take the road back to cleveland, move thence towards knoxville, and, uniting with longstreet, make a sudden dash upon burnside. when i arrived at ringgold, however, on the 27th, i saw that the retreat was most earnest. the enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat. when hooker moved from rossville toward ringgold palmer's division took the road to graysville, and sherman moved by the way of chickamauga station toward the same point. as soon as i saw the situation at ringgold i sent a staff officer back to chattanooga to advise thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start granger at once. feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of burnside i was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between east chickamauga creek and taylor's ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from chattanooga. i arrived just as the artillery that hooker had left behind at chattanooga creek got up. his men were attacking cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. this attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. i directed general hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. at this point sherman came up, having reached graysville with his troops, where he found palmer had preceded him. palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. i went back in the evening to graysville with sherman, remained there over night and did not return to chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. i then found that thomas had not yet started granger, thus having lost a full day which i deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of knoxville. thomas and granger were aware that on the 23d of the month burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. to effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. he was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. finding that granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, i sent word to general sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of knoxville. i also gave him the problem that we had to solve--that burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from dalton to cleveland and knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. i was very loath to send sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from memphis and hard fighting at chattanooga. but i had become satisfied that burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon general granger's movements. sherman had left his camp on the north side of the tennessee river, near chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. the weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. the two days' rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. they did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. they also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach knoxville. i was so very anxious that burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that i determined to send a message to him. i therefore sent a member of my staff, colonel j. h. wilson, to get into knoxville if he could report to burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. mr. charles a. dana was at chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before i assumed command. mr. dana volunteered to accompany colonel wilson, and did accompany him. i put the information of what was being done for the relief of knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of general longstreet. they made the trip safely; general longstreet did learn of sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. burnside had stretched a boom across the holston river to catch scows and flats as they floated down. on these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of east tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the union troops. they also drove cattle into knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. our total loss (not including burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. we captured 6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. the enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. i had at chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. it was his own fault that he did not have more men present. he had sent longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. he did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of brown's and kelly's ferries with bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. knoxville was of no earthly use to him while chattanooga was in our hands. if he should capture chattanooga, knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. i have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. then, too, after sherman had arrived, and when bragg knew that he was on the north side of the tennessee river, he sent buckner's division to reinforce longstreet. he also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached knoxville bragg ordered it back. it had got so far, however, that it could not return to chattanooga in time to be of service there. it is possible this latter blunder may have been made by bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the tennessee river at brown's ferry, in full view of bragg's troops from lookout mountain, a few days before the attack. they then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on missionary ridge until they met their assault. bragg knew it was sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the tennessee river to the relief of knoxville and that longstreet was therefore in danger. but the first great blunder, detaching longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way i know of. if he had captured chattanooga, east tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. it would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from chattanooga safely. it was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. the probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. the enemy reported his loss in killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. there was certainly great dissatisfaction with bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. then, too, chattanooga, following in the same half year with gettysburg in the east and vicksburg in the west, there was much the same feeling in the south at this time that there had been in the north the fall and winter before. if the same license had been allowed the people and press in the south that was allowed in the north, chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the union. general william f. smith's services in these battles had been such that i thought him eminently entitled to promotion. i was aware that he had previously been named by the president for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the senate had rejected the nomination. i was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. my recommendation was heeded and the appointment made. upon the raising of the siege of knoxville i, of course, informed the authorities at washington--the president and secretary of war--of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. the president especially was rejoiced that knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed. the safety of burnside's army and the loyal people of east tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the president for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops by the way of cumberland gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember burnside," "do something for burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. he saw no escape for east tennessee until after our victory at chattanooga. even then he was afraid that burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that longstreet had been driven from the field. burnside followed longstreet only to strawberry plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that longstreet would leave the state. the latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off east tennessee. foster now relieved burnside. sherman made disposition of his troops along the tennessee river in accordance with instructions. i left thomas in command at chattanooga, and, about the 20th of december, moved my headquarters to nashville, tennessee. nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at washington. while remaining at chattanooga i was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and washington. nothing occurred at nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20) so i set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. i expected to retain the command i then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against atlanta. i also had great hopes of having a campaign made against mobile from the gulf. i expected after atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off lee's army from the west by way of the road running through augusta to atlanta and thence south-west. i was preparing to hold atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to mobile if that city was in our possession: if not, to savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. but the spring campaign against mobile was not made. the army of the ohio had been getting supplies over cumberland gap until their animals had nearly all starved. i now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. accordingly i left nashville in the latter part of december by rail for chattanooga. from chattanooga i took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the clinch with the tennessee. from that point the railroad had been repaired up to knoxville and out east to strawberry plains. i went by rail therefore to knoxville, where i remained for several days. general john g. foster was then commanding the department of the ohio. it was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while i was at knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to lexington, kentucky, the first point where i could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at nashville. the road over cumberland gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as i had found it on my first trip to chattanooga over waldron's ridge. the road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from strawberry plains to lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable. i found a great many people at home along that route, both in tennessee and kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. they would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. the people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. i was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. the crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. it also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. i was back in nashville by the 13th of january, 1864. when i started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which i was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. under the rules of the war department at that time, mr. stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. the operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the war department through general stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. i was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there. as i have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the war department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. accordingly i ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to captain cyrus b. comstock, of the corps of engineers, whom i had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. the operator refused point blank to turn over the key to captain comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the war department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any one else. i told him i would see whether he would or not. he said that if he did he would be punished. i told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the war department, he yielded. when i returned from knoxville i found quite a commotion. the operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. i informed the secretary of war, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. it was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. this was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the secretary of war and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. this was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. he never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which i had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. i remonstrated against this in writing, and the secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the army. but he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. after the relief of knoxville sherman had proposed to burnside that he should go with him to drive longstreet out of tennessee; but burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of longstreet without availing himself of this offer. as before stated sherman's command had left their camps north of the tennessee, near chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. the weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the tennessee river. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee--commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. soon after his return from knoxville i ordered sherman to distribute his forces from stevenson to decatur and thence north to nashville; sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what confederates might still be left on the east bank of the mississippi river to impede its navigation by our boats. he expected also to have the co-operation of banks to do the same thing on the west shore. of course i approved heartily. about the 10th of january sherman was back in memphis, where hurlbut commanded, and got together his memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to vicksburg. he then went to vicksburg and out to where mcpherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. sherman knew that general (bishop) polk was occupying meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. he determined, therefore, to move directly upon meridian. i had sent some 2,500 cavalry under general sooy smith to sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before sherman got to memphis. hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and sherman ordered him to reinforce smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against forrest, who was then known to be south-east from memphis. smith was ordered to move about the 1st of february. while sherman was waiting at vicksburg for the arrival of hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. when these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of general polk's being at meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. smith's command was nearly double that of forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as forrest's men had had. the fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. the difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. this same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. sherman got off on the 3d of february and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the big black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached jackson, mississippi. this latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, brandon on the 8th, and morton on the 9th. up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. here, however, there were indications of the concentration of confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. he had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about decatur, mississippi, where, by the way, sherman himself came near being picked up. he entered meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward demopolis, alabama. he spent several days in meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from sooy smith, who he supposed had met forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to vicksburg. there he learned that smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the ohio river, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th. smith did meet forrest, but the result was decidedly in forrest's favor. sherman had written a letter to banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against shreveport, subject to my approval. i disapproved of sherman's going himself, because i had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. we must have them for the spring campaign. the trans-mississippi movement proved abortive. my eldest son, who had accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of january i obtained permission to go to st. louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. while i was permitted to go, i was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with washington, just as though i had remained at nashville. when i obtained this leave i was at chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of thomas in the southern part of tennessee co-operate with sherman's movement in mississippi. i directed thomas, and logan who was at scottsboro, alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against j. e. johnston, who had again relieved bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. i learned through confederate sources that johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of mobile, presumably to operate against sherman, and two more divisions to longstreet in east tennessee. seeing that johnston had depleted in this way, i directed thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides stanley's division which was already to the east, into east tennessee, and notified schofield, who was now in command in east tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements longstreet had received. my object was to drive longstreet out of east tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. about this time general foster, who had been in command of the department of the ohio after burnside until schofield relieved him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in east tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. i thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of longstreet. on the 12th of february i ordered thomas to take dalton and hold it, if possible; and i directed him to move without delay. finding that he had not moved, on the 17th i urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, i asked him if he could not start the next day. he finally got off on the 22d or 23d. the enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. he soon fell back. schofield also had to return for the same reason. he could not carry supplies with him, and longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country. longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. on the 2d of march, however, i learned of sherman's success, which eased my mind very much. the next day, the 3d, i was ordered to washington. the bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through congress and became a law on the 26th of february. my nomination had been sent to the senate on the 1st of march and confirmed the next day (the 2d). i was ordered to washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. the commission was handed to me on the 9th. it was delivered to me at the executive mansion by president lincoln in the presence of his cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors. the president in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that i might prepare a few lines of reply. the president said: "general grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the united states. with this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that, with what i here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." to this i replied: "mr. president, i accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men." on the 10th i visited the headquarters of the army of the potomac at brandy station; then returned to washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. it had been my intention before this to remain in the west, even if i was made lieutenant-general; but when i got to washington and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. no one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. i determined, therefore, before i started back to have sherman advanced to my late position, mcpherson to sherman's in command of the department, and logan to the command of mcpherson's corps. these changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. my commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of march, 1864. on the following day, as already stated, i visited general meade, commanding the army of the potomac, at his headquarters at brandy station, north of the rapidan. i had known general meade slightly in the mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. i was a stranger to most of the army of the potomac, i might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the mexican war. there had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. one was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. meade evidently thought that i might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. he said to me that i might want an officer who had served with me in the west, mentioning sherman specially, to take his place. if so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. he urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. for himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. i assured him that i had no thought of substituting any one for him. as to sherman, he could not be spared from the west. this incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of meade than did his great victory at gettysburg the july before. it is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. he was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the army of the potomac--except from the authorities at washington. all other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. i tried to make general meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if i had been in washington or any other place away from his command. i therefore gave all orders for the movements of the army of the potomac to meade to have them executed. to avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, i established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. this sometimes happened, and i had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. on the 11th i returned to washington and, on the day after, orders were published by the war department placing me in command of all the armies. i had left washington the night before to return to my old command in the west and to meet sherman whom i had telegraphed to join me in nashville. sherman assumed command of the military division of the mississippi on the 18th of march, and we left nashville together for cincinnati. i had sherman accompany me that far on my way back to washington so that we could talk over the matters about which i wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. the first point which i wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. there were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely mcclellan, burnside and fremont in the east, and buell, mccook, negley and crittenden in the west. some time in the winter of 1863-64 i had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign i thought advisable for the command under me--now sherman's. general j. e. johnston was defending atlanta and the interior of georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at dalton, about 38 miles south of chattanooga. dalton is at the junction of the railroad from cleveland with the one from chattanooga to atlanta. there could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the mississippi. johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, atlanta, the second. at the time i wrote general halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time i met general sherman, it was expected that general banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. (*22) the plan therefore was for sherman to attack johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of banks to hold a line through to mobile, or at least to hold atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. this would cut the confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the mississippi river had done before. banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. in regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, i left sherman to look after those who had been removed in the west while i looked out for the rest. i directed, however, that he should make no assignment until i could speak to the secretary of war about the matter. i shortly after recommended to the secretary the assignment of general buell to duty. i received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the secretary told me that he had offered buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. i understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either sherman or canby because he had ranked them both. both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. all of them ranked me in the old army, and sherman and buell did as brigadiers. the worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. on the 23d of march i was back in washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at culpeper court-house, a few miles south of the headquarters of the army of the potomac. although hailing from illinois myself, the state of the president, i never met mr. lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. i knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the west who had known him all their lives. i had also read the remarkable series of debates between lincoln and douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the united states senate. i was then a resident of missouri, and by no means a "lincoln man" in that contest; but i recognized then his great ability. in my first interview with mr. lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the north and congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of "military orders"--one, two, three, etc. he did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. all he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. assuring him that i would do the best i could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the war department, our first interview ended. the secretary of war i had met once before only, but felt that i knew him better. while commanding in west tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. he and general halleck both cautioned me against giving the president my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. i should have said that in our interview the president told me he did not want to know what i proposed to do. but he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as i pleased about. he brought out a map of virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the federal and confederate armies up to that time. he pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. we would then have the potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. i listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. i did not communicate my plans to the president, nor did i to the secretary of war or to general halleck. march the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. when i assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: the mississippi river was guarded from st. louis to its mouth; the line of the arkansas was held, thus giving us all the north-west north of that river. a few points in louisiana not remote from the river were held by the federal troops, as was also the mouth of the rio grande. east of the mississippi we held substantially all north of the memphis and charleston railroad as far east as chattanooga, thence along the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the state of tennessee. west virginia was in our hands; and that part of old virginia north of the rapidan and east of the blue ridge we also held. on the sea-coast we had fortress monroe and norfolk in virginia; plymouth, washington and new berne in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, port royal and fort pulaski in south carolina and georgia; fernandina, st. augustine, key west and pensacola in florida. the balance of the southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the alleghanies and north of natchez, with a large movable force about chattanooga. his command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported to sherman and were subject to his orders. this arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. in the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the federal and confederate capitals. it is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in virginia and north carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the james river and chickahominy, near richmond, to gettysburg and chambersburg, in pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the national army, sometimes to the confederate army; but in every instance, i believe, claimed as victories for the south by the southern press if not by the southern generals. the northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the union and the overwhelming success of the federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. that portion of the army of the potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the rapidan. the army of northern virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the confederate army. the country back to the james river is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. the region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain. such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. to provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. system and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. the union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the west had been concentrated into a single military division. the army of the potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. there were thus seventeen distinct commanders. before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. i determined to stop this. to this end i regarded the army of the potomac as the centre, and all west to memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the army of the james, under general butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. all such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. in this way ten thousand men were added to the army of the james from south carolina alone, with general gillmore in command. it was not contemplated that general gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under general burnside, had been rendezvoused at annapolis, maryland. this was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. the corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of norfolk, in virginia or north carolina, to operate against richmond from that direction. in fact burnside and the war department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. my general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the confederate armies in the field. there were but two such, as we have seen, east of the mississippi river and facing north. the army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee commanding, was on the south bank of the rapidan, confronting the army of the potomac; the second, under general joseph e. johnston, was at dalton, georgia, opposed to sherman who was still at chattanooga. beside these main armies the confederates had to guard the shenandoah valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from richmond to tennessee. forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the west with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west tennessee. we could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the northern states open to invasion. but as the army of the potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of washington even while it was moving on lee, so all the forces to the west, and the army of the james, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. accordingly i arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. sherman was to move from chattanooga, johnston's army and atlanta being his objective points. (*23) crook, commanding in west virginia, was to move from the mouth of the gauley river with a cavalry force and some artillery, the virginia and tennessee railroad to be his objective. either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. sigel was in command in the valley of virginia. he was to advance up the valley, covering the north from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near harper's ferry. every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which lee relied. butler was to advance by the james river, having richmond and petersburg as his objective. before the advance commenced i visited butler at fort monroe. this was the first time i had ever met him. before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign i invited his views. they were very much such as i intended to direct, and as i did direct (*24), in writing, before leaving. general w. f. smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. i found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the senate, but i insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. my wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and i assigned him to the command of one of the corps under general butler. i was not long in finding out that the objections to smith's promotion were well founded. in one of my early interviews with the president i expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. i said i wanted the very best man in the army for that command. halleck was present and spoke up, saying: "how would sheridan do?" i replied: "the very man i want." the president said i could have anybody i wanted. sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the army of the potomac. this relieved general alfred pleasonton. it was not a reflection on that officer, however, for i did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. banks in the department of the gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at new orleans in time to join in the general move, mobile to be his objective. at this time i was not entirely decided as to whether i should move the army of the potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. each plan presented advantages. (*25) if by his right--my left--the potomac, chesapeake bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of tennessee cavalry. these troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. i will leave forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. "the river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. the approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. my loss was about twenty killed. it is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with southerners." subsequently forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. at the east, also, the rebels were busy. i had said to halleck that plymouth and washington, north carolina, were unnecessary to hold. it would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to butler's command. if success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. these places had been occupied by federal troops before i took command of the armies, and i knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at plymouth. i then ordered the abandonment of washington, but directed the holding of new berne at all hazards. this was essential because new berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. general banks had gone on an expedition up the red river long before my promotion to general command. i had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. by direction of halleck i had reinforced banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from sherman's command. this reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. but banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take shreveport on the red river, and turn over the line of that river to steele, who commanded in arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the arkansas. orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for banks to return a. j. smith's command to where it belonged and get back to new orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. but the expedition was a failure. banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. nor was smith returned until long after the movements of may, 1864, had been begun. the services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the department of the gulf, were thus paralyzed. it is but just to banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. i make no criticism on this point. he opposed the expedition. by the 27th of april spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. on that day burnside left annapolis to occupy meade's position between bull run and the rappahannock. meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. on the following day butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of may, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the james river as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. he was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in washington city, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at richmond. the same day sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. sigel was in winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others. the criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the rapidan to the james river that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports. richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. to get possession of lee's army was the first great object. with the capture of his army richmond would necessarily follow. it was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. if the army of the potomac had been moved bodily to the james river by water lee could have moved a part of his forces back to richmond, called beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to washington. then, too, i ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the army of the potomac, up the james river by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. while my headquarters were at culpeper, from the 26th of march to the 4th of may, i generally visited washington once a week to confer with the secretary of war and president. on the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. colonel john s. mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the army of the potomac. on my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached warrenton junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. there was but one man at the station, and he informed us that mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of federal cavalry. had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. i was on a special train, if i remember correctly, without any guard. since the close of the war i have come to know colonel mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. he is a different man entirely from what i had supposed. he is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. he is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. there were probably but few men in the south who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command. on this same visit to washington i had my last interview with the president before reaching the james river. he had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. i explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the northern states. these troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. his answer was: "oh, yes! i see that. as we say out west, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." there was a certain incident connected with the wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression further on i will mention it here. a few days before my departure from culpeper the honorable e. b. washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some distance south, through the battle in the wilderness and, i think, to spottsylvania. he was accompanied by a mr. swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. he assured me--and i have no doubt swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. i expressed an entire willingness to have him (swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. we received richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the confederates. it was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. probably mr. swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. at all events he was not invited, and soon i found that he was corresponding with some paper (i have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. he knew of the assurance washburne had given as to the character of his mission. i never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that i recollect. he accompanied us, however, for a time at least. the second night after crossing the rapidan (the night of the 5th of may) colonel w. r. rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquarters. a short time before midnight i gave him verbal instructions for the night. three days later i read in a richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. a few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the wilderness) general meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private. there was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. one of my staff, colonel t. s. bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation between meade and myself. he called the attention of colonel rowley to it. the latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. the man proved to be swinton, the "historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping. the next i heard of mr. swinton was at cold harbor. general meade came to my headquarters saying that general burnside had arrested swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. i promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position --sheridan's first raid. the armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. they were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. lee, with the capital of the confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. johnston, with atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. it was of less importance only because the capture of johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of richmond, lee and his army. all other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. this was the plan; and i will now endeavor to give, as concisely as i can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns. as stated before, banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the red river, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand with sherman and thirty thousand against mobile. sigel's record is almost equally brief. he moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when i was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley i received instead the following announcement from halleck: "sigel is in full retreat on strasburg. he will do nothing but run; never did anything else." the enemy had intercepted him about new market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. the plan had been for an advance of sigel's forces in two columns. though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. under crook and averell his western column advanced from the gauley in west virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. they reached the virginia and tennessee railroad at dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over new river. having accomplished this they recrossed the alleghanies to meadow bluffs and there awaited further orders. butler embarked at fort monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the james river. his steamers moved first up chesapeake bay and york river as if threatening the rear of lee's army. at midnight they turned back, and butler by daylight was far up the james river. he seized city point and bermuda hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy. this was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to butler. he was to act from here, looking to richmond as his objective point. i had given him to understand that i should aim to fight lee between the rapidan and richmond if he would stand; but should lee fall back into richmond i would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the potomac and the james on the james river. he was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. butler was in position by the 6th of may and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from suffolk to cut the weldon railroad. he also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between petersburg and richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. he made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack petersburg, which was almost defenceless. about the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at drury's bluff, about half way between bermuda hundred and richmond. in the mean time beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. on the 16th he attacked butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the army of the james as a distinct factor in the campaign. i afterward ordered a portion of it to join the army of the potomac, leaving a sufficient force with butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the confederate capital. the position which general butler had chosen between the two rivers, the james and appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. his right was protected by the james river, his left by the appomattox, and his rear by their junction--the two streams uniting near by. the bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed. previous to ordering any troops from butler i sent my chief engineer, general barnard, from the army of the potomac to that of the james to inspect butler's position and ascertain whether i could again safely make an order for general butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that i was getting so near richmond; or, if i could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to white house to join me and reinforce the army of the potomac. general barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that i could do the latter with great security; but that general butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. he said that the general occupied a place between the james and appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. i then asked him why butler could not move out from his lines and push across the richmond and petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of richmond. he replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that general butler had. he then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if butler was in a bottle. he was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. this struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when i saw the hasty sketch which general barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report i used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of general butler and, i know, very much to my own. i found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of general badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, i asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. i make this statement here because, although i have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and i desire to rectify all injustice that i may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the union. general butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. the further operations of the army of the james can best be treated of in connection with those of the army of the potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. before giving the reader a summary of sherman's great atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, i will briefly mention sheridan's first raid upon lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. by thus anticipating, in point of time, i will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when i shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the rapidan. on the 8th of may, just after the battle of the wilderness and when we were moving on spottsylvania i directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac, pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through gordonsville, charlottesville and lynchburg, the other to richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the james river and draw these from butler's supplies. this move took him past the entire rear of lee's army. these orders were also given in writing through meade. the object of this move was three-fold. first, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from fredericksburg, which had now become our base. he started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. it was sixteen days before he got back to the army of the potomac. the course sheridan took was directly to richmond. before night stuart, commanding the confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. but the advance kept on, crossed the north anna, and at beaver dam, a station on the virginia central railroad, recaptured four hundred union prisoners on their way to richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between sheridan and richmond at yellow tavern, only about six miles north of the city. sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at ashland, and on the 11th arrived in stuart's front. a severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. sheridan passed through the outer defences of richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. but having no supports near he could not have remained. after caring for his wounded he struck for the james river below the city, to communicate with butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. he moved first between the chickahominy and the james, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at mechanicsville. he then turned to cross to the north side of the chickahominy by meadow bridge. he found this barred, and the defeated confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. the panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear. he was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. the defences of richmond, manned, were to the right, the chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from richmond. this force was attacked and beaten by wilson's and gregg's divisions, while sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the confederates he found there. the enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building. on the 13th sheridan was at bottom's bridge, over the chickahominy. on the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the james river at haxall's landing. he at once put himself into communication with general butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. sheridan had left the army of the potomac at spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or lee's army was now. great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. on the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. he moved by the way of white house. the bridge over the pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. on the 22d he was at aylett's on the matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. on the 24th he joined us on the march from north anna to cold harbor, in the vicinity of chesterfield. sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around lee's army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. chapter xlix. sherman's campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. after separating from sherman in cincinnati i went on to washington, as already stated, while he returned to nashville to assume the duties of his new command. his military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the alleghany mountains and east of the mississippi river, together with the state of arkansas in the trans-mississippi. the most easterly of these was the department of the ohio, general schofield commanding; the next was the department of the cumberland, general thomas commanding; the third the department of the tennessee, general mcpherson commanding; and general steele still commanded the trans-mississippi, or department of arkansas. the last-named department was so far away that sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the gulf, where general canby, who had relieved general banks, was in command. the movements of the armies, as i have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, i fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. general sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. mcpherson lay at huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the army of the cumberland, was at chattanooga; and schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at knoxville. with these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying johnston's army and capturing atlanta. he visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. one of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. he found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. he found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. he at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. in this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of may. as i have said already, johnston was at dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between chattanooga and atlanta. the country is mountainous all the way to atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. dalton is on ground where water drains towards atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. the best positions for defence had been selected all the way from dalton back to atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. his position at dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. with a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, i have no doubt that he would have succeeded. sherman's plan was to start schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from knoxville, having him move on the direct road to dalton. thomas was to move out to ringgold. it had been sherman's intention to cross mcpherson over the tennessee river at huntsville or decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from chattanooga to atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that mcpherson alone would have troops enough to cope with johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. in this he was disappointed. two of mcpherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. this furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. then, again, sherman had lent banks two divisions under a. j. smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. it is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. that department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. this left mcpherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. he was therefore brought up to chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of thomas--the two coming together about dalton. the three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. sherman soon found that dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. there was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the national and confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. through this gorge the troops would have to pass. mcpherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of snake creek gap into the rear of the enemy. this was a surprise to johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at dalton. on the 15th there was very hard fighting about resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear. again johnston fell back, our army pursuing. the pursuit was continued to kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that newton's division overtook the rear of johnston's army and engaged it. sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. he was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. this work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. the campaign to atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. it is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting --some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. on the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about atlanta more than a month was consumed. it was the 23d of may before the road was finished up to the rear of sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. this pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of allatoona. this place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. an assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. this was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called new hope church. on the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. they kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. this was the case more particularly with the cavalry. by the 4th of june johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and allatoona was left in our possession. allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary base of supplies. the railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. the rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn johnston out of his new position. while sherman's army lay here, general f. p. blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. johnston had fallen back to marietta and kenesaw mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him. at this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. but during the progress of the battle schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. these operations were completed by the 3d of july, when it was found that johnston had evacuated the place. he was pursued at once. sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. he had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the chattahoochee river. johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. this time he fell back to the chattahoochee. about the 5th of july he was besieged again, sherman getting easy possession of the chattahoochee river both above and below him. the enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. here johnston made a stand until the 17th, when sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward atlanta began. johnston was now relieved of the command, and hood superseded him. johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at richmond, or of the people of that section of the south in which he was commanding. the very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted. for my own part, i think that johnston's tactics were right. anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the north to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. in addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was about to assume the offensive. on the 20th he came out and attacked the army of the cumberland most furiously. hooker's corps, and newton's and johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. the losses were quite heavy on both sides. on this day general gresham, since our postmaster-general, was very badly wounded. during the night hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. the investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. during the night of the 21st hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d. at first the battle went very much in favor of the confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. while our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. but they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. the field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26). it was during this battle that mcpherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. in his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals. garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of atlanta and to cut it in the direction of augusta. he was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. rousseau had also come up from tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the tennessee river about decatur and made a raid into alabama. finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of sherman, and reported to him about this time. the battle of the 22d is usually known as the battle of atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of september. preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. the work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between decatur and atlanta. these lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of atlanta. on the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. on the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, general logan commanding, with great vigor. logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. these assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. the enemy's losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful. during that evening the enemy in logan's front withdrew into the town. this now left sherman's army close up to the confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. in the latter part of july sherman sent stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about macon. he was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about andersonville. there were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. but the attempt proved a failure. mccook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. he had also taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. he had lost several hundred men out of his small command. on the 4th of august colonel adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting stoneman and all but himself as lost. i myself had heard around richmond of the capture of stoneman, and had sent sherman word, which he received. the rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. a few days after colonel adams's return colonel capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of stoneman with something less than a thousand men. it seems that stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. he covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding confederate. in this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. on the 4th and 5th sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. general palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both general sherman and general schofield; but i am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with palmer as to whether schofield had any right to command him. if he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. about the same time wheeler got upon our railroad north of resaca and destroyed it nearly up to dalton. this cut sherman off from communication with the north for several days. sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of august to reach the macon road about jonesboro. he succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the confederate lines of atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. these little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. they annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of august, and on the 1st of september was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of atlanta. here he found hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. a battle ensued, but he was unable to drive hardee away before night set in. under cover of the night, however, hardee left of his own accord. that night hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped. the next morning at daylight general h. w. slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of atlanta, and notified sherman. sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from decatur on the left to atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. the campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. there was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely. it was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. the troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. the city of atlanta was turned into a military base. the citizens were all compelled to leave. sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. he limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. the news of sherman's success reached the north instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. this was the first great political campaign for the republicans in their canvass of 1864. it was followed later by sheridan's campaign in the shenandoah valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following november than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the north. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan --entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. soon after midnight, may 3d-4th, the army of the potomac moved out from its position north rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the confederate capital and the army defending it. this was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. the losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. it is true the confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. but previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture philadelphia, new york, and the national capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal north. they had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. so here was a stand-off. the campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. we had to have hard fighting to achieve this. the two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. the country over which the army had to operate, from the rapidan to the crossing of the james river, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the chesapeake bay. the crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. the country roads were narrow and poor. most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the wilderness and along the chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. all bridges were naturally destroyed before the national troops came to them. the army of the potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by generals w. s. hancock, g. k. warren, (*27) john sedgwick and p. h. sheridan. the artillery was commanded by general henry j. hunt. this arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. the surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for germania ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under general j. h. wilson. general sedgwick followed warren with the 6th corps. germania ford was nine or ten miles below the right of lee's line. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon ely's ford, six miles below germania, preceded by gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. the cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. this was undoubtedly a surprise to lee. the fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at warrenton, guarding the railroad from bull run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the rapidan should be long delayed. he was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m. giving the information that our crossing had been successful. the country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. the battle-field from the crossing of the rapidan until the final movement from the wilderness toward spottsylvania was of the same character. there were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. the roads were narrow and bad. all the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. there are two roads, good for that part of virginia, running from orange court house to the battle-field. the most southerly of these roads is known as the orange court house plank road, the northern one as the orange turnpike. there are also roads from east of the battle-field running to spottsylvania court house, one from chancellorsville, branching at aldrich's; the western branch going by piney branch church, alsop's, thence by the brock road to spottsylvania; the east branch goes by gates's, thence to spottsylvania. the brock road runs from germania ford through the battle-field and on to the court house. as spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. lee's headquarters were at orange court house. from there to fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the wilderness. this gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. these roads strike the road from germania ford in the wilderness. as soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, wilson's division by wilderness tavern to parker's store, on the orange plank road; gregg to the left towards chancellorsville. warren followed wilson and reached the wilderness tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. sedgwick followed warren. he was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of warren, by sundown. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with warren and camped about six miles east of him. before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. there never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's corps with the army of the potomac in 1864. with a wagon-train that would have extended from the rapidan to richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. to overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, general rufus ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. at a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. the wagons were also marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. as soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. by this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. they consumed theirs at the depots. i left culpeper court house after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the rapidan in advance of sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river. orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. notwithstanding this i saw scattered along the road from culpeper to germania ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence i had never witnessed before. lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of may, that the army of the potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. this i judge from the fact that at 1.15 p.m., an hour and a quarter after warren had reached old wilderness tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at mine run. here at night dispatches were received announcing that sherman, butler and crook had moved according to programme. on discovering the advance of the army of the potomac, lee ordered hill, ewell and longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, hill on the orange plank road, longstreet to follow on the same road. longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. ewell was ordered by the orange pike. he was near by and arrived some four miles east of mine run before bivouacking for the night. my orders were given through general meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. warren was to move to parker's store, and wilson's cavalry--then at parker's store--to move on to craig's meeting-house. sedgwick followed warren, closing in on his right. the army of the potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of warren, his left to reach to shady grove church. at six o'clock, before reaching parker's store, warren discovered the enemy. he sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. wright, with his division of sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to warren's right, and getty with his division, also of sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by warren's rear and get on his left. this was the speediest way to reinforce warren who was confronting the enemy on both the orange plank and turnpike roads. burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the army of the potomac had safely crossed the rapidan. by making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. meade moved his headquarters on to old wilderness tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. i remained to hasten burnside's crossing and to put him in position. burnside at this time was not under meade's command, and was his senior in rank. getting information of the proximity of the enemy, i informed meade, and without waiting to see burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where meade was. it was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. neither party had any advantage of position. warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. at nine o'clock hancock was ordered to come up to the support of getty. he himself arrived at getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. about this hour warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. getty was somewhat isolated from warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. at two o'clock hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join getty and attack the enemy. but the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. at four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and general getty received orders from meade a few minutes later to attack whether hancock was ready or not. he met the enemy under heth within a few hundred yards. hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by birney and mott, and later two brigades, carroll's and owen's, to the support of getty. this was timely and saved getty. during the battle getty and carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. one of birney's most gallant brigade commanders--alexander hays--was killed. i had been at west point with hays for three years, and had served with him through the mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. he was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. with him it was "come, boys," not "go." wadsworth's division and baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce hancock and getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position. during the afternoon sheridan sent gregg's division of cavalry to todd's tavern in search of wilson. this was fortunate. he found wilson engaged with a superior force under general rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. they soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond corbin's bridge. fighting between hancock and hill continued until night put a close to it. neither side made any special progress. after the close of the battle of the 5th of may my orders were given for the following morning. we knew longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join hill's right, near the brock road, and might arrive during the night. i was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. meade asked to have the hour changed to six. deferring to his wishes as far as i was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. hancock had now fully one-half of the army of the potomac. wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by hill, and to the right of hancock. he was directed to move at the same time, and to attack hill's left. burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between warren and wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. sedgwick and warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce hill from that quarter. burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of lee's army. hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until july. lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until longstreet got up. this is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which i had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before longstreet got up, lee was ahead in his assault on our right. his purpose was evident, but he failed. hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by general barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which longstreet was expected. this disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. hancock moved by the left of the orange plank road, and wadsworth by the right of it. the fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. i believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that lee would not have made another stand outside of his richmond defences. gibbon commanded hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. on the morning of the 6th sheridan was sent to connect with hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. he met them at the intersection of the furnace and brock roads and at todd's tavern, and defeated them at both places. later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. hancock heard the firing between sheridan and stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the brock road. another incident happened during the day to further induce hancock to weaken his attacking column. word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of todd's tavern, and brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from chancellorsville, by the road hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. at 6.50 o'clock a.m., burnside, who had passed wilderness tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. the difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. hancock followed hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. he maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, longstreet came upon him. the retreating column of hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. they were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. falling upon a brigade of hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. the enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. in this engagement the intrepid wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. the enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. the confederate general jenkins was killed and longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. his loss was a severe one to lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. after longstreet's removal from the field lee took command of his right in person. he was not able, however, to rally his men to attack hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of longstreet's or hill's commands. this brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. a brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. firing was continued after this, but with less fury. burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on hancock's right. at 4.15 in the afternoon lee attacked our left. his line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. this status was maintained for about half an hour. then a part of mott's division and ward's brigade of birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. the enemy under r. h. anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. but owing to the efforts of hancock, their success was but temporary. carroll, of gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. the ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. the killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. the woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. the wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. but the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. lee was now in distress. his men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. these facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. his troops were withdrawn now, but i revoked the order, which i had given previously to this assault, for hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. burnside, sedgwick, and warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. i had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the rapidan to be taken up except one at germania ford. the troops on sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. this left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack. but late in the afternoon of the 6th early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion. early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. the defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. early says in his memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. many officers, who had not been attacked by early, continued coming to my headquarters even after sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. during the night all of lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. on the morning of the 7th general custer drove the enemy's cavalry from catharpin furnace to todd's tavern. pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. but lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. there was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in warren's front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. this drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of lee to drive him back. this ended the battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. more desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of may. our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. we gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. in the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily repulsed. as we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. but the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. our losses in the wilderness were very severe. those of the confederates must have been even more so; but i have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. the germania ford bridge was transferred to ely's ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to washington. it may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the army of the potomac: first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. for this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. it was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength. when a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. the second was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. insulated wires--insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. the pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. there was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. there were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. the mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to. the operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. the moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. a mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. when he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. this would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. the ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. the men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles. this was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. at intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. in the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. while this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. no orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. the signal service was used on the march. the men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. when movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. they would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. it would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them. but sometimes they gave useful information. on the afternoon of the 7th i received news from washington announcing that sherman had probably attacked johnston that day, and that butler had reached city point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. i had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that lee might move rapidly to richmond to crush butler before i could get there. my order for this movement was as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., may 7, 1864, 6.30 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at spottsylvania c. h. with one army corps, at todd's tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the piney branch and spottsylvania road with the road from alsop's to old court house. if this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the ny river. i think it would be advisable in making the change to leave hancock where he is until warren passes him. he could then follow and become the right of the new line. burnside will move to piney branch church. sedgwick can move along the pike to chancellorsville and on to his destination. burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the orange and fredericksburg plank road, then follow sedgwick to his place of destination. all vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. it is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on hancock this afternoon. in case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. all the hospitals should be moved to-day to chancellorsville. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. during the 7th sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at todd's tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. soon after dark warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by sedgwick. warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where hancock's command lay on the brock road. with my staff and a small escort of cavalry i preceded the troops. meade with his staff accompanied me. the greatest enthusiasm was manifested by hancock's men as we passed by. no doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. it indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. the cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. at all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. meade and i rode in advance. we had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. we looked to see, if we could, which road sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. it seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. we had not gone far, however, when colonel c. b. comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. in a few minutes he returned and reported that lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. we returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to todd's tavern, where we arrived after midnight. my object in moving to spottsylvania was two-fold: first, i did not want lee to get back to richmond in time to attempt to crush butler before i could get there; second, i wanted to get between his army and richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. but lee, by accident, beat us to spottsylvania. our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the army of the potomac to fredericksburg, and so informed his government. accordingly he ordered longstreet's corps--now commanded by anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to spottsylvania. but the woods being still on fire, anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. by this accident lee got possession of spottsylvania. it is impossible to say now what would have been the result if lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. my belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach richmond first, and the army of the potomac would have had the shorter line. thus, twice since crossing the rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the rapidan to the james river or richmond. the first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. but accident often decides the fate of battle. sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at todd's tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. he issued the necessary orders for seizing spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the po river, which lee's troops would have to cross to get to spottsylvania. but meade changed sheridan's orders to merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at todd's tavern, and thereby left the road free for anderson when he came up. wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in merritt's orders. had he been permitted to execute the orders sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the po river which anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable warren to reinforce wilson and hold the town. anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not already made--immediately across warren's front. warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which merritt had engaged earlier in the day. he assaulted at once, but was repulsed. he soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. this time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he intrenched. his right and left divisions--the former crawford's, the latter wadsworth's, now commanded by cutler--drove the enemy back some distance. at this time my headquarters had been advanced to piney branch church. i was anxious to crush anderson before lee could get a force to his support. to this end sedgwick who was at piney branch church, was ordered to warren's support. hancock, who was at todd's tavern, was notified of warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. burnside, who was with the wagon trains at aldrich's on our extreme left, received the same instructions. sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. even then all of sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. his ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. in like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. his difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. he was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. lee had ordered hill's corps--now commanded by early--to move by the very road we had marched upon. this shows that even early in the morning of the 8th lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the army of the potomac had gone to fredericksburg. indeed, he informed the authorities at richmond he had possession of spottsylvania and was on my flank. anderson was in possession of spottsylvania, through no foresight of lee, however. early only found that he had been following us when he ran against hancock at todd's tavern. his coming detained hancock from the battle-field of spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept early back and forced him to move by another route. had i ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put hancock in the lead. it would also have given us an hour or earlier start. it took all that time for warren to get the head of his column to the left of hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. this hour, and hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush anderson before he could be reinforced. but the movement made was tactical. it kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. if an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. by a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. then, too, i had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. at that time my judgment was that warren was the man i would suggest to succeed meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. as i have before said, warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 2. by u. s. grant chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast--crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. my experience in the mexican war was of great advantage to me afterwards. besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to make them personally acquainted. it also brought them in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. then, in my particular case, i had been at west point at about the right time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. graduating in 1843, i was at the military academy from one to four years with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. these classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding high commands. all the older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion, i had also served with and known in mexico: lee, j. e. johnston, a. s. johnston, holmes, hebert and a number of others on the confederate side; mccall, mansfield, phil. kearney and others on the national side. the acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion--i mean what i learned of the characters of those to whom i was afterwards opposed. i do not pretend to say that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. but my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge. the natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. a large part of the national army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed general lee with just such qualities, but i had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that i felt this. the treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of mexico by united states troops was ordered. early in june the troops in the city of mexico began to move out. many of them, including the brigade to which i belonged, were assembled at jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival of transports at vera cruz: but with all this precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a july sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with great virulence in vera cruz, not two miles away. i can call to mind only one person, an officer, who died of the disease. my regiment was sent to pascagoula, mississippi, to spend the summer. as soon as it was settled in camp i obtained a leave of absence for four months and proceeded to st. louis. on the 22d of august, 1848, i was married to miss julia dent, the lady of whom i have before spoken. we visited my parents and relations in ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to my post at sackett's harbor, new york. in april following i was ordered to detroit, michigan, where two years were spent with but few important incidents. the present constitution of the state of michigan was ratified during this time. by the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the united states residing within the state at the time of the ratification became citizens of michigan also. during my stay in detroit there was an election for city officers. mr. zachariah chandler was the candidate of the whigs for the office of mayor, and was elected, although the city was then reckoned democratic. all the officers stationed there at the time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. i did not offer mine, however, as i did not wish to consider myself a citizen of michigan. this was mr. chandler's first entry into politics, a career he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. in the spring of 1851 the garrison at detroit was transferred to sackett's harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry was ordered to the pacific coast. it was decided that mrs. grant should visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own family at their st. louis home until an opportunity offered of sending for her. in the month of april the regiment was assembled at governor's island, new york harbor, and on the 5th of july eight companies sailed for aspinwall. we numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. passage was secured for us on the old steamer ohio, commanded at the time by captain schenck, of the navy. it had not been determined, until a day or two before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the ohio; consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. the addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in july. in eight days aspinwall was reached. at that time the streets of the town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed from place to place on raised foot-walks. july is at the height of the wet season, on the isthmus. at intervals the rain would pour down in streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's sun. these alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in the afternoons. i wondered how any person could live many months in aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. in the summer of 1852 the panama railroad was completed only to the point where it now crosses the chagres river. from there passengers were carried by boats to gorgona, at which place they took mules for panama, some twenty-five miles further. those who travelled over the isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the chagres river were propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. these boats carried thirty to forty passengers each. the crews consisted of six men to a boat, armed with long poles. there were planks wide enough for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat from end to end. the men would start from the bow, place one end of their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. in this way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the current of the river. i, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and had also to look after the transportation. a contract had been entered into with the steamship company in new york for the transportation of the regiment to california, including the isthmus transit. a certain amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. the regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as above described, for gorgona. from this place they marched to panama, and were soon comfortably on the steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. i, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to cruces, a town a few miles higher up the chagres river than gorgona. there i found an impecunious american who had taken the contract to furnish transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds for the freight and so much for each saddle animal. but when we reached cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. the contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the morning. in the morning he said that they were on the way from some imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. this went on until i saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price he had promised to furnish them for. the unusual number of passengers that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. some of the passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in that market at other times. meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and men were dying every hour. to diminish the food for the disease, i permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to panama. the captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and i was left alone with the sick and the soldiers who had families. the regiment at panama was also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. there were also hospital tents on shore on the island of flamingo, which stands in the bay. i was about a week at cruces before transportation began to come in. about one-third of the people with me died, either at cruces or on the way to panama. there was no agent of the transportation company at cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring transportation at a price which would secure it. i therefore myself dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more than double the original price. thus we finally reached panama. the steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the regiment was detained still longer. altogether, on the isthmus and on the pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. about one-seventh of those who left new york harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of july, now lie buried on the isthmus of panama or on flamingo island in panama bay. one amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in panama bay. in the regiment there was a lieutenant slaughter who was very liable to sea-sickness. it almost made him sick to see the wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. soon after his graduation, slaughter was ordered to california and took passage by a sailing vessel going around cape horn. the vessel was seven months making the voyage, and slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of destination. on landing in california he found orders which had come by the isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should have been ordered to the northern lakes. he started back by the isthmus route and was sick all the way. but when he arrived at the east he was again ordered to california, this time definitely, and at this date was making his third trip. he was as sick as ever, and had been so for more than a month while lying at anchor in the bay. i remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between his hands, and looking the picture of despair. at last he broke out, "i wish i had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy; if i had done so, i should not have had to go to sea so much." poor slaughter! it was his last sea voyage. he was killed by indians in oregon. by the last of august the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe to start. the disease did not break out again on the way to california, and we reached san francisco early in september. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast --promoted captain--flush times in california. san francisco at that day was a lively place. gold, or placer digging as it was called, was at its height. steamers plied daily between san francisco and both stockton and sacramento. passengers and gold from the southern mines came by the stockton boat; from the northern mines by sacramento. in the evening when these boats arrived, long wharf--there was but one wharf in san francisco in 1852--was alive with people crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and to "have a time." of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. many were young men of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. their parents had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. from 1849 to 1853 there was a rush of people to the pacific coast, of the class described. all thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the gold fields on the pacific. some realized more than their most sanguine expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. many of the real scenes in early california life exceed in strangeness and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. those early days in california brought out character. it was a long way off then, and the journey was expensive. the fortunate could go by cape horn or by the isthmus of panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. this took an entire summer. they were very lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. all other means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the missouri river. the immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far from friends. time pressed, for the little means that could be realized from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man long at california prices. many became discouraged. others would take off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. these succeeded as a rule. there were many young men who had studied professions before they went to california, and who had never done a day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. some supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage wagons, until they could do better. more became discouraged early and spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. they were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners who proved good customers. my regiment spent a few weeks at benicia barracks, and then was ordered to fort vancouver, on the columbia river, then in oregon territory. during the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the columbia river being taken from oregon to make washington territory. prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the pacific coast from 1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies as he kept, at new orleans wholesale prices. a cook could not be hired for the pay of a captain. the cook could do better. at benicia, in 1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other articles in proportion. in 1853 at vancouver vegetables were a little lower. i with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. i bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were very poor. they recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to break up the ground with. i performed all the labor of breaking up the ground while the other officers planted the potatoes. our crop was enormous. luckily for us the columbia river rose to a great height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in june, and overflowed and killed most of our crop. this saved digging it up, for everybody on the pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be profitable. in 1853 more than three-quarters of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown away. the only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. while i was stationed on the pacific coast we were free from indian wars. there were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity of portland in oregon, and of fort vancouver in washington territory. they had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except in individual cases. the hudson's bay company had held the north-west with their trading posts for many years before the united states was represented on the pacific coast. they still retained posts along the columbia river and one at fort vancouver, when i was there. their treatment of the indians had brought out the better qualities of the savages. farming had been undertaken by the company to supply the indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle and horses; and they had now taught the indians to do the labor of the farm and herd. they always compensated them for their labor, and always gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. before the advent of the american, the medium of exchange between the indian and the white man was pelts. afterward it was silver coin. if an indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for american half dollars. these he could count. he would then commence his purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. he would not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. at that day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were common on the pacific coast. they were called slugs. the indians, along the lower columbia as far as the cascades and on the lower willamette, died off very fast during the year i spent in that section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had acquired also their diseases. the measles and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. in their wild state, before the appearance of the white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of game, and over-eating. instinct more than reason had taught them a remedy for these ills. it was the steam bath. something like a bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. the tops of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every opening was filled. just inside the open end of the oven the floor was scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of water. these ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big spring, or pool of water. when a patient required a bath, a fire was built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. the cavity at the front was then filled with water. when the stones were sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the patient could stand it no longer. he was then withdrawn from his steam bath and doused into the cold stream near by. this treatment may have answered with the early ailments of the indians. with the measles or small-pox it would kill every time. during my year on the columbia river, the small-pox exterminated one small remnant of a band of indians entirely, and reduced others materially. i do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the hudson bay company took the matter in hand and established a hospital. nearly every case he treated recovered. i never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. the decimation among the indians i knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a hudson's bay building not a stone's throw from my own quarters. the death of colonel bliss, of the adjutant general's department, which occurred july 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then stationed at humboldt bay, california. the notice reached me in september of the same year, and i very soon started to join my new command. there was no way of reaching humboldt at that time except to take passage on a san francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. red wood, a species of cedar, which on the pacific coast takes the place filled by white pine in the east, then abounded on the banks of humboldt bay. there were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber for the san francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to market, furnished the only means of communication between humboldt and the balance of the world. i was obliged to remain in san francisco for several days before i found a vessel. this gave me a good opportunity of comparing the san francisco of 1852 with that of 1853. as before stated, there had been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--long wharf. in 1853 the town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf when i first saw it. streets and houses had been built out on piles where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the wharf. there was no filling under the streets or houses. san francisco presented the same general appearance as the year before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous for their number and publicity. they were on the first floor, with doors wide open. at all hours of the day and night in walking the streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by the sight of players at faro. often broken places were found in the street, large enough to let a man down into the water below. i have but little doubt that many of the people who went to the pacific coast in the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over san francisco bay. besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in city lots. these were sold "on change," much as stocks are now sold on wall street. cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker; but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. he was charged at the rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides commissions. the sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a vara being a spanish yard. these were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many thousands of dollars. the brokers did a fine business, and so did many such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final crash came. as the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still further out. the temporary houses, first built over the water in the harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. the main business part of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest class lay at anchor in the early days. i was in san francisco again in 1854. gambling houses had disappeared from public view. the city had become staid and orderly. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. my family, all this while, was at the east. it consisted now of a wife and two children. i saw no chance of supporting them on the pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. i concluded, therefore, to resign, and in march applied for a leave of absence until the end of the july following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of that time. i left the pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my future home. that expectation and that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the lieutenant-generalcy bill was introduced into congress in the winter of 1863-4. the passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further west. in the late summer of 1854 i rejoined my family, to find in it a son whom i had never seen, born while i was on the isthmus of panama. i was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our support. my wife had a farm near st. louis, to which we went, but i had no means to stock it. a house had to be built also. i worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. if nothing else could be done i would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. i managed to keep along very well until 1858, when i was attacked by fever and ague. i had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in ohio. it lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work i was able to perform. in the fall of 1858 i sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. in the winter i established a partnership with harry boggs, a cousin of mrs. grant, in the real estate agency business. i spent that winter at st. louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. our business might have become prosperous if i had been able to wait for it to grow. as it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families. while a citizen of st. louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, i was a candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. the incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members. my opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. i now withdrew from the co-partnership with boggs, and, in may, 1860, removed to galena, illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. while a citizen of missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at a presidential election occurred. i had been in the army from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although i was a whig by education and a great admirer of mr. clay. but the whig party had ceased to exist before i had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the know-nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and the republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name. it had no existence in the slave states except at points on the borders next to free states. in st. louis city and county, what afterwards became the republican party was known as the free-soil democracy, led by the honorable frank p. blair. most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with whig proclivities. they had been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many had become know-nothings, or members of the american party. there was a lodge near my new home, and i was invited to join it. i accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another afterwards. i have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the american party; for i still think native-born citizens of the united states should have as much protection, as many privileges in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. but all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first bring them together. no political party can or ought to exist when one of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship god "according to the dictate of one's own conscience," or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the state laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever cost. up to the mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the presidency of the united states. they were noisy but not numerous. but the great majority of people at the north, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. they did not hold the states where slavery existed responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the institution. opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political party. in some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the democratic party, and in others to the whigs. but with the inauguration of the mexican war, in fact with the annexation of texas, "the inevitable conflict" commenced. as the time for the presidential election of 1856--the first at which i had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run high. the republican party was regarded in the south and the border states not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the owners. the most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that emancipation meant social equality. treason to the government was openly advocated and was not rebuked. it was evident to my mind that the election of a republican president in 1856 meant the secession of all the slave states, and rebellion. under these circumstances i preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell. with a democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the slave states, there could be no pretext for secession for four years. i very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, i believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. i therefore voted for james buchanan for president. four years later the republican party was successful in electing its candidate to the presidency. the civilized world has learned the consequence. four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country have been opened to their children. the nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. while living in galena i was nominally only a clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated salary. in reality my position was different. my father had never lived in galena himself, but had established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest. when i went there it was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. he lived until september, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the close of life. a more honorable man never transacted business. in september, 1861, i was engaged in an employment which required all my attention elsewhere. during the eleven months that i lived in galena prior to the first call for volunteers, i had been strictly attentive to my business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in the same line with myself. when the election took place in november, 1860, i had not been a resident of illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote. i was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for stephen a. douglas, who had no possible chance of election. the contest was really between mr. breckinridge and mr. lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority. i wanted, as between these candidates, to see mr. lincoln elected. excitement ran high during the canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of galena many nights during the campaign. i did not parade with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes" --republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. it was evident, from the time of the chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that the election of the republican candidate would be the signal for some of the southern states to secede. i still had hopes that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool down; for the southerners to think well before they took the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. but i was mistaken. the republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of the north-west, and i presume the same order of people throughout the entire north, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. it was very much discussed whether the south would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the "divine" institution of slavery. for there were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there are now people who believe mormonism and polygamy to be ordained by the most high. we forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid their practice. it was generally believed that there would be a flurry; that some of the extreme southern states would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession. but the common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for the south, that the movement would not spread over much of the territory and would not last long. doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. each colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves. if there had been a desire on the part of any single state to withdraw from the compact at any time while the number of states was limited to the original thirteen, i do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination might have been regretted. the problem changed on the ratification of the constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one state to withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new states, at least so far as the new states themselves were concerned. it was never possessed at all by florida or the states west of the mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. texas and the territory brought into the union in consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and texas, with a domain greater than that of any european state except russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the public lands within its borders. it would have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this state to withdraw from the union after all that had been spent and done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, texas must necessarily have gone with the south, both on account of her institutions and her geographical position. secession was illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution. now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. when people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable. but any people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. in the case of the war between the states it would have been the exact truth if the south had said,--"we do not want to live with you northern people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered. so long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the north to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing to live with you. you have been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the union no longer." instead of this the seceding states cried lustily,--"let us alone; you have no constitutional power to interfere with us." newspapers and people at the north reiterated the cry. individuals might ignore the constitution; but the nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction put upon it by the southerners themselves. the fact is the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to 1865. its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. if they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a state or states to withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers. the framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of their descendants to the latest days. it is preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. at the time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. rude machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. the instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with the devil. immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones. we could not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly unanticipated. the fathers themselves would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable. they would surely have resisted secession could they have lived to see the shape it assumed. i travelled through the northwest considerably during the winter of 1860-1. we had customers in all the little towns in south-west wisconsin, south-east minnesota and north-east iowa. these generally knew i had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the mexican war. consequently wherever i stopped at night, some of the people would come to the public-house where i was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the future. my own views at that time were like those officially expressed by mr. seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days." i continued to entertain these views until after the battle of shiloh. i believe now that there would have been no more battles at the west after the capture of fort donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory. there is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of the south would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as that of any other. but there was no calm discussion of the question. demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the north; against its aggressions upon the south; its interference with southern rights, etc., etc. they denounced the northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one southern man was equal to five northern men in battle; that if the south would stand up for its rights the north would back down. mr. jefferson davis said in a speech, delivered at la grange, mississippi, before the secession of that state, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of mason and dixon's line if there should be a war. the young men who would have the fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the aggressiveness of the north and its cowardice. they, too, cried out for a separation from such people. the great bulk of the legal voters of the south were men who owned no slaves; their homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the north; they too needed emancipation. under the old regime they were looked down upon by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according to direction. i am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction i reassert the statement. the shot-gun was not resorted to. masked men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every state with a sort of divine right to control public affairs. if they could not get this control by one means they must by another. the end justified the means. the coercion, if mild, was complete. there were two political parties, it is true, in all the states, both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the institution which stood paramount in southern eyes to all other institutions in state or nation. the slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. had politics ever divided the slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. i do not know that the southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs. there was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed. the states of virginia and kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one state defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. but when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. the cotton-gin probably had much to do with the justification of slavery. the winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excitement. south carolina promptly seceded after the result of the presidential election was known. other southern states proposed to follow. in some of them the union sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force. maryland, delaware, kentucky and missouri, all slave states, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called confederate states. the governor and lieutenant-governor of missouri, in 1861, jackson and reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. the governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the state; was recognized as such by the confederate government, and continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. the south claimed the sovereignty of states, but claimed the right to coerce into their confederation such states as they wanted, that is, all the states where slavery existed. they did not seem to think this course inconsistent. the fact is, the southern slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property. they convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves. meanwhile the administration of president buchanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere; that the nation had no power to save its own life. mr. buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild term--in the cause of secession as mr. davis or any southern statesman. one of them, floyd, the secretary of war, scattered the army so that much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the cannon and small arms from northern arsenals throughout the south so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. the navy was scattered in like manner. the president did not prevent his cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its resources or storing them in the south until a de facto government was established with jefferson davis as its president, and montgomery, alabama, as the capital. the secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. in their own estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them birth. loyal men were put into their places. treason in the executive branch of the government was estopped. but the harm had already been done. the stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen. during all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the southerners were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the union. on the other hand men at the north--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the south into submission to the laws of the land; that if the north undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers. a portion of the press of the north was constantly proclaiming similar views. when the time arrived for the president-elect to go to the capital of the nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a president-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled into the capital. he disappeared from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced at the capital. there is little doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his journey. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting--mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. the 4th of march, 1861, came, and abraham lincoln was sworn to maintain the union against all its enemies. the secession of one state after another followed, until eleven had gone out. on the 11th of april fort sumter, a national fort in the harbor of charleston, south carolina, was fired upon by the southerners and a few days after was captured. the confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred themselves of all right to claim protection under the constitution of the united states. we did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an independent nation. upon the firing on sumter president lincoln issued his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening congress in extra session. the call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days' service. if the shot fired at fort sumter "was heard around the world," the call of the president for 75,000 men was heard throughout the northern states. there was not a state in the north of a million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been necessary. as soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached galena, posters were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house in the evening. business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a time there were no party distinctions; all were union men, determined to avenge the insult to the national flag. in the evening the court-house was packed. although a comparative stranger i was called upon to preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that i had been in the army and had seen service. with much embarrassment and some prompting i made out to announce the object of the meeting. speeches were in order, but it is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than patriotic ones. there was probably no one in the house, however, who felt like making any other. the two principal speeches were by b. b. howard, the post-master and a breckinridge democrat at the november election the fall before, and john a. rawlins, an elector on the douglas ticket. e. b. washburne, with whom i was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, i understood afterwards, a little surprise that galena could not furnish a presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. he came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the patriotism of the meeting. after the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a company. the quota of illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from galena. the company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned officers elected before the meeting adjourned. i declined the captaincy before the balloting, but announced that i would aid the company in every way i could and would be found in the service in some position if there should be a war. i never went into our leather store after that meeting, to put up a package or do other business. the ladies of galena were quite as patriotic as the men. they could not enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to the field uniformed. they came to me to get a description of the united states uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material; procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. in a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the state capital for assignment. the men all turned out the morning after their enlistment, and i took charge, divided them into squads and superintended their drill. when they were ready to go to springfield i went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a regiment. there were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, richard yates. the legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to his relief. a law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional district, for one month, to be paid by the state, but pledged to go into the service of the united states if there should be a further call during their term. even with this relief the governor was still very much embarrassed. before the war was over he was like the president when he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something he could give to all who wanted it." in time the galena company was mustered into the united states service, forming a part of the 11th illinois volunteer infantry. my duties, i thought, had ended at springfield, and i was prepared to start home by the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. up to that time i do not think i had been introduced to governor yates, or had ever spoken to him. i knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same hotel and i often saw him at table. the evening i was to quit the capital i left the supper room before the governor and was standing at the front door when he came out. he spoke to me, calling me by my old army title "captain," and said he understood that i was about leaving the city. i answered that i was. he said he would be glad if i would remain over-night and call at the executive office the next morning. i complied with his request, and was asked to go into the adjutant-general's office and render such assistance as i could, the governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. i accepted the proposition. my old army experience i found indeed of very great service. i was no clerk, nor had i any capacity to become one. the only place i ever found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than myself. but i had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the field. the army forms were familiar to me and i could direct how they should be made out. there was a clerk in the office of the adjutant-general who supplied my deficiencies. the ease with which the state of illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close of the war is evidence of the efficiency of mr. loomis as an accountant on a large scale. he remained in the office until that time. as i have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments. i had charge of mustering these regiments into the state service. they were assembled at the most convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. i detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three in the southern part of the state myself. one of these was to assemble at belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of st. louis. when i got there i found that only one or two companies had arrived. there was no probability of the regiment coming together under five days. this gave me a few idle days which i concluded to spend in st. louis. there was a considerable force of state militia at camp jackson, on the outskirts of st. louis, at the time. there is but little doubt that it was the design of governor claiborn jackson to have these troops ready to seize the united states arsenal and the city of st. louis. why they did not do so i do not know. there was but a small garrison, two companies i think, under captain n. lyon at the arsenal, and but for the timely services of the hon. f. p. blair, i have little doubt that st. louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all its arms and ammunition. blair was a leader among the union men of st. louis in 1861. there was no state government in missouri at the time that would sanction the raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect united states property, but blair had probably procured some form of authority from the president to raise troops in missouri and to muster them into the service of the united states. at all events, he did raise a regiment and took command himself as colonel. with this force he reported to captain lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. it was whispered that lyon thus reinforced intended to break up camp jackson and capture the militia. i went down to the arsenal in the morning to see the troops start out. i had known lyon for two years at west point and in the old army afterwards. blair i knew very well by sight. i had heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but i had never spoken to him. as the troops marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal, blair was on his horse outside forming them into line preparatory to their march. i introduced myself to him and had a few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. this was my first personal acquaintance with the honorable--afterwards major-general f. p. blair. camp jackson surrendered without a fight and the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. up to this time the enemies of the government in st. louis had been bold and defiant, while union men were quiet but determined. the enemies had their head-quarters in a central and public position on pine street, near fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. the union men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, i did not know where, and i doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. as soon as the news of the capture of camp jackson reached the city the condition of affairs was changed. union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if you will, intolerant. they proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect for the union. the secessionists became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. they had been playing the bully. the union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from the building on pine street. the command was given in tones of authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in st. louis. i witnessed the scene. i had heard of the surrender of the camp and that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. i had seen the troops start out in the morning and had wished them success. i now determined to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. i stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and pine streets, and saw a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. there were squads of other people at intervals down the street. they too were quiet but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult to, what they called, "their" flag. before the car i was in had started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day --stepped in. he was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt for the union and for those who had just perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. there was only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man entered. he evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull down a flag they adored. he turned to me saying: "things have come to a ---pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. where i came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the union we hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to." i replied that "after all we were not so intolerant in st. louis as we might be; i had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of them who ought to be, however." the young man subsided. he was so crestfallen that i believe if i had ordered him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "more yankee oppression." by nightfall the late defenders of camp jackson were all within the walls of the st. louis arsenal, prisoners of war. the next day i left st. louis for mattoon, illinois, where i was to muster in the regiment from that congressional district. this was the 21st illinois infantry, the regiment of which i subsequently became colonel. i mustered one regiment afterwards, when my services for the state were about closed. brigadier-general john pope was stationed at springfield, as united states mustering officer, all the time i was in the state service. he was a native of illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent men in the state. i was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. while i was on duty at springfield the senators, representatives in congress, ax-governors and the state legislators were nearly all at the state capital. the only acquaintance i made among them was with the governor, whom i was serving, and, by chance, with senator s. a. douglas. the only members of congress i knew were washburne and philip foulk. with the former, though he represented my district and we were citizens of the same town, i only became acquainted at the meeting when the first company of galena volunteers was raised. foulk i had known in st. louis when i was a citizen of that city. i had been three years at west point with pope and had served with him a short time during the mexican war, under general taylor. i saw a good deal of him during my service with the state. on one occasion he said to me that i ought to go into the united states service. i told him i intended to do so if there was a war. he spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of the state, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and that he would do all he could for me. i declined to receive endorsement for permission to fight for my country. going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with general pope, i wrote from galena the following letter to the adjutant-general of the army. galena, illinois, may 24, 1861. col. l. thomas adjt. gen. u. s. a., washington, d. c. sir:--having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at west point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has been educated at the government expense to offer their services for the support of that government, i have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. i would say, in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. since the first call of the president i have been serving on the staff of the governor of this state, rendering such aid as i could in the organization of our state militia, and am still engaged in that capacity. a letter addressed to me at springfield, illinois, will reach me. i am very respectfully, your obt. svt., u. s. grant. this letter failed to elicit an answer from the adjutant-general of the army. i presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not have been submitted to higher authority. subsequent to the war general badeau having heard of this letter applied to the war department for a copy of it. the letter could not be found and no one recollected ever having seen it. i took no copy when it was written. long after the application of general badeau, general townsend, who had become adjutant-general of the army, while packing up papers preparatory to the removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. it had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. i felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether i would be equal to the position. but i had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in from the state of illinois, and some from indiana, and felt that if they could command a regiment properly, and with credit, i could also. having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments authorized by the state legislature, i asked and obtained of the governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in covington, kentucky, immediately opposite cincinnati. general mcclellan had been made a major-general and had his headquarters at cincinnati. in reality i wanted to see him. i had known him slightly at west point, where we served one year together, and in the mexican war. i was in hopes that when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. i called on two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either occasion, and returned to springfield. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment --general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. while i was absent from the state capital on this occasion the president's second call for troops was issued. this time it was for 300,000 men, for three years or the war. this brought into the united states service all the regiments then in the state service. these had elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with their organizations as they were, except in two instances. a chicago regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the colonelcy. when it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made lieutenant-colonel. the 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their selection in any position. while i was still absent governor yates appointed me colonel of this latter regiment. a few days after i was in charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near springfield. my regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social position as any in their section of the state. it embraced the sons of farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions themselves. there were also men in it who could be led astray; and the colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. it was said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. when there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some one else to lead them. i found it very hard work for a few days to bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. the ten regiments which had volunteered in the state service for thirty days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the national service if called upon within that time. when they volunteered the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. men were called now for three years or the war. they felt that this change of period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. when i was appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the state service. about the time they were to be mustered into the united states service, such of them as would go, two members of congress from the state, mcclernand and logan, appeared at the capital and i was introduced to them. i had never seen either of them before, but i had read a great deal about them, and particularly about logan, in the newspapers. both were democratic members of congress, and logan had been elected from the southern district of the state, where he had a majority of eighteen thousand over his republican competitor. his district had been settled originally by people from the southern states, and at the breaking out of secession they sympathized with the south. at the first outbreak of war some of them joined the southern army; many others were preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which national troops had to pass in southern illinois, as it was in kentucky or any of the border slave states. logan's popularity in this district was unbounded. he knew almost enough of the people in it by their christian names, to form an ordinary congressional district. as he went in politics, so his district was sure to go. the republican papers had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. some were very bitter in their denunciations of his silence. logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by threats. he did, however, come out in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of congress which was convened by the president soon after his inauguration, and announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the union. but i had not happened to see that speech, so that when i first met logan my impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. mcclernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the maintenance of the union and had been praised accordingly by the republican papers. the gentlemen who presented these two members of congress asked me if i would have any objections to their addressing my regiment. i hesitated a little before answering. it was but a few days before the time set for mustering into the united states service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. i had some doubt as to the effect a speech from logan might have; but as he was with mcclernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were well known, i gave my consent. mcclernand spoke first; and logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force and eloquence. it breathed a loyalty and devotion to the union which inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear arms against it. they entered the united states service almost to a man. general logan went to his part of the state and gave his attention to raising troops. the very men who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in southern illinois became the defenders of the union. logan entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of major-general. his district, which had promised at first to give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for troops, without resorting to the draft. there was no call made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for. that congressional district stands credited at the war department to-day with furnishing more men for the army than it was called on to supply. i remained in springfield with my regiment until the 3d of july, when i was ordered to quincy, illinois. by that time the regiment was in a good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the company drill. there was direct railroad communication between springfield and quincy, but i thought it would be good preparation for the troops to march there. we had no transportation for our camp and garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d of july we started. there was no hurry, but fair marches were made every day until the illinois river was crossed. there i was overtaken by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been changed to ironton, missouri, and ordering me to halt where i was and await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the illinois river to take the regiment to st. louis. the boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. we remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an illinois regiment was surrounded by rebels at a point on the hannibal and st. joe railroad some miles west of palmyra, in missouri, and i was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to their relief. we took the cars and reached quincy in a few hours. when i left galena for the last time to take command of the 21st regiment i took with me my oldest son, frederick d. grant, then a lad of eleven years of age. on receiving the order to take rail for quincy i wrote to mrs. grant, to relieve what i supposed would be her great anxiety for one so young going into danger, that i would send fred home from quincy by river. i received a prompt letter in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany me. it came too late. fred was already on his way up the mississippi bound for dubuque, iowa, from which place there was a railroad to galena. my sensations as we approached what i supposed might be "a field of battle" were anything but agreeable. i had been in all the engagements in mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in command. if some one else had been colonel and i had been lieutenant-colonel i do not think i would have felt any trepidation. before we were prepared to cross the mississippi river at quincy my anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came straggling into town. i am inclined to think both sides got frightened and ran away. i took my regiment to palmyra and remained there for a few days, until relieved by the 19th illinois infantry. from palmyra i proceeded to salt river, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the enemy. colonel john m. palmer at that time commanded the 13th illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding this bridge. palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as long as we remained together. the bridge was finished in about two weeks, and i received orders to move against colonel thomas harris, who was said to be encamped at the little town of florida, some twenty-five miles south of where we then were. at the time of which i now write we had no transportation and the country about salt river was sparsely settled, so that it took some days to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's supply of provision and some ammunition. while preparations for the move were going on i felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road and found every house deserted i was anything but easy. in the twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed ours. as soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses could carry them. i kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. we halted at night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. the hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. as we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. i would have given anything then to have been back in illinois, but i had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; i kept right on. when we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view i halted. the place where harris had been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. my heart resumed its place. it occurred to me at once that harris had been as much afraid of me as i had been of him. this was a view of the question i had never taken before; but it was one i never forgot afterwards. from that event to the close of the war, i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though i always felt more or less anxiety. i never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as i had his. the lesson was valuable. inquiries at the village of florida divulged the fact that colonel harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was being collected took time by the forelock and left florida before i had started from salt river. he had increased the distance between us by forty miles. the next day i started back to my old camp at salt river bridge. the citizens living on the line of our march had returned to their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us now. they had evidently been led to believe that the national troops carried death and devastation with them wherever they went. in a short time after our return to salt river bridge i was ordered with my regiment to the town of mexico. general pope was then commanding the district embracing all of the state of missouri between the mississippi and missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of mexico. i was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery. there was one regiment encamped by the side of mine. i assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for his regiment for the night. when he was informed that the countersign sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted interference of one colonel over another. no doubt he attributed it for the time to the presumption of a graduate of west point over a volunteer pure and simple. but the question was soon settled and we had no further trouble. my arrival in mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. they carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they found take the oath of allegiance to the government. i at once published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private property to their own or to government uses. the people were no longer molested or made afraid. i received the most marked courtesy from the citizens of mexico as long as i remained there. up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some training on the march from springfield to the illinois river. there was now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. while i was at west point the tactics used in the army had been scott's and the musket the flint lock. i had never looked at a copy of tactics from the time of my graduation. my standing in that branch of studies had been near the foot of the class. in the mexican war in the summer of 1846, i had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since. the arms had been changed since then and hardee's tactics had been adopted. i got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day to the commands i had thus learned. by pursuing this course from day to day i thought i would soon get through the volume. we were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when i got my regiment in line and rode to the front i soon saw that if i attempted to follow the lesson i had studied i would have to clear away some of the houses and garden fences to make room. i perceived at once, however, that hardee's tactics--a mere translation from the french with hardee's name attached --was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied to scott's system. the commands were abbreviated and the movement expedited. under the old tactics almost every change in the order of march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the "forward march." with the new tactics all these changes could be made while in motion. i found no trouble in giving commands that would take my regiment where i wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. i do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that i had never studied the tactics that i used. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo.--jefferson city --cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah--headquarters at cairo. i had not been in mexico many weeks when, reading a st. louis paper, i found the president had asked the illinois delegation in congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first on a list of seven. i was very much surprised because, as i have said, my acquaintance with the congressmen was very limited and i did not know of anything i had done to inspire such confidence. the papers of the next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. when appointed brigadier-general i at once thought it proper that one of my aides should come from the regiment i had been commanding, and so selected lieutenant c. b. lagow. while living in st. louis, i had had a desk in the law office of mcclellan, moody and hillyer. difference in views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. i asked him to accept a place on my staff. i also wanted to take one man from my new home, galena. the canvass in the presidential campaign the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of john a. rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the state. he was also a candidate for elector on the douglas ticket. when sumter was fired upon and the integrity of the union threatened, there was no man more ready to serve his country than he. i wrote at once asking him to accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of captain, on my staff. he was about entering the service as major of a new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the state; but he threw this up and accepted my offer. neither hillyer nor lagow proved to have any particular taste or special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned during the vicksburg campaign; the latter i relieved after the battle of chattanooga. rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the general of the army--an office created for him--before the war closed. he was an able man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing the matter. general rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways than this. i became very much attached to him. shortly after my promotion i was ordered to ironton, missouri, to command a district in that part of the state, and took the 21st illinois, my old regiment, with me. several other regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same time. ironton is on the iron mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of st. louis, and situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. when i reached there, about the 8th of august, colonel b. gratz brown --afterwards governor of missouri and in 1872 vice-presidential candidate --was in command. some of his troops were ninety days' men and their time had expired some time before. the men had no clothing but what they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay on. general hardee--the author of the tactics i did not study--was at greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was said, with five thousand confederate troops. under these circumstances colonel brown's command was very much demoralized. a squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been since. i relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or two, to be mustered out of service. within ten days after reading ironton i was prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at greenville. i sent a column east out of the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west and come into the greenville road ten miles south of ironton. another column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. i was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the movement. my experience against harris, in northern missouri, had inspired me with confidence. but when the evening train came in, it brought general b. m. prentiss with orders to take command of the district. his orders did not relieve me, but i knew that by law i was senior, and at that time even the president did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. i therefore gave general prentiss the situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and started for st. louis the same day. the movement against the rebels at greenville went no further. from st. louis i was ordered to jefferson city, the capital of the state, to take command. general sterling price, of the confederate army, was thought to be threatening the capital, lexington, chillicothe and other comparatively large towns in the central part of missouri. i found a good many troops in jefferson city, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person knew where they all were. colonel mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. i found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to the number of men they brought into the service. there were recruiting stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that station would be received. the law required all volunteers to serve for three years or the war. but in jefferson city in august, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others were not to be sent out of the state. the recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for three years if the war lasted that long. the city was filled with union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with the national troops. they were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the government gave them. they had generally made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. a little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into the wagon. all else of their worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former neighbors; for the union man in missouri who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under the protection of the national troops, was at perpetual war with his neighbors. i stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. order was soon restored. i had been at jefferson city but a few days when i was directed from department headquarters to fit out an expedition to lexington, booneville and chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to st. louis. the western army had not yet been supplied with transportation. it became necessary therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those of union men. this afforded an opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. they accepted the service with alacrity. as fast as troops could be got off they were moved west some twenty miles or more. in seven or eight days from my assuming command at jefferson city, i had all the troops, except a small garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the next day. but my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, i saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be colonel jefferson c. davis. i had never met him before, but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him to proceed to jefferson city and relieve me of the command. the orders directed that i should report at department headquarters at st. louis without delay, to receive important special instructions. it was about an hour before the only regular train of the day would start. i therefore turned over to colonel davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out the department instructions already described. i had at that time but one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by an adjutant-general. in an hour after being relieved from the command i was on my way to st. louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to follow the next day with our horses and baggage. the "important special instructions" which i received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east missouri, embracing all the territory south of st. louis, in missouri, as well as all southern illinois. at first i was to take personal command of a combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of colonel jeff. thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the possession of south-east missouri. troops had been ordered to move from ironton to cape girardeau, sixty or seventy miles to the south-east, on the mississippi river; while the forces at cape girardeau had been ordered to move to jacksonville, ten miles out towards ironton; and troops at cairo and bird's point, at the junction of the ohio and mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness to go down the mississippi to belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved west from there when an officer should come to command them. i was the officer who had been selected for this purpose. cairo was to become my headquarters when the expedition terminated. in pursuance of my orders i established my temporary headquarters at cape girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at jackson, to inform me of the approach of general prentiss from ironton. hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations to jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. neither general prentiss nor colonel marsh, who commanded at jackson, knew their destination. i drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until i should hear of the junction of our troops at jackson. two or three days after my arrival at cape girardeau, word came that general prentiss was approaching that place (jackson). i started at once to meet him there and to give him his orders. as i turned the first corner of a street after starting, i saw a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. i turned and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the column. i found there general prentiss himself, with a large escort. he had halted his troops at jackson for the night, and had come on himself to cape girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him in the morning. i gave the general his orders--which stopped him at jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. he had been a brigadier, in command at cairo, while i was mustering officer at springfield without any rank. but we were nominated at the same time for the united states service, and both our commissions bore date may 17th, 1861. by virtue of my former army rank i was, by law, the senior. general prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to remain at jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as approaching cape girardeau. i then ordered the general very peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to jackson. he obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to jackson, and went to st. louis and reported himself. this broke up the expedition. but little harm was done, as jeff. thompson moved light and had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. he was as much at home in arkansas as he was in missouri and would keep out of the way of a superior force. prentiss was sent to another part of the state. general prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he would not have committed later in the war. when i came to know him better, i regretted it much. in consequence of this occurrence he was off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the west was going on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be obtained. he would have been next to myself in rank in the district of south-east missouri, by virtue of his services in the mexican war. he was a brave and very earnest soldier. no man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. on the 4th of september i removed my headquarters to cairo and found colonel richard oglesby in command of the post. we had never met, at least not to my knowledge. after my promotion i had ordered my brigadier-general's uniform from new york, but it had not yet arrived, so that i was in citizen's dress. the colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the neighboring states of missouri and kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. he evidently did not catch my name when i was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the district of south-east missouri, colonel richard j. oglesby to command the post at bird's point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one identify me. but he surrendered the office without question. the day after i assumed command at cairo a man came to me who said he was a scout of general fremont. he reported that he had just come from columbus, a point on the mississippi twenty miles below on the kentucky side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to seize paducah, at the mouth of the tennessee. there was no time for delay; i reported by telegraph to the department commander the information i had received, and added that i was taking steps to get off that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important point. there was a large number of steamers lying at cairo and a good many boatmen were staying in the town. it was the work of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. troops were also designated to go aboard. the distance from cairo to paducah is about forty-five miles. i did not wish to get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in the stream until the time to start. not having received an answer to my first dispatch, i again telegraphed to department headquarters that i should start for paducah that night unless i received further orders. hearing nothing, we started before midnight and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours. it proved very fortunate that the expedition against jeff. thompson had been broken up. had it not been, the enemy would have seized paducah and fortified it, to our very great annoyance. when the national troops entered the town the citizens were taken by surprise. i never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of the people. men, women and children came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invader. they were expecting rebel troops that day. in fact, nearly four thousand men from columbus were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of paducah on their way to occupy the place. i had but two regiments and one battery with me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to columbus. i stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my return to cairo. before leaving, however, i addressed a short printed proclamation to the citizens of paducah assuring them of our peaceful intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. this was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much preferred the presence of the other army. i reinforced paducah rapidly from the troops at cape girardeau; and a day or two later general c. f. smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at cairo and was assigned to the command of the post at the mouth of the tennessee. in a short time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland. the state government of kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the north and the south, and the governor really seemed to think the state had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. the rebels already occupied two towns in the state, columbus and hickman, on the mississippi; and at the very moment the national troops were entering paducah from the ohio front, general lloyd tilghman--a confederate--with his staff and a small detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as i have already said, nearly four thousand confederate troops were on kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. but, in the estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did not justify the national authorities in invading the soil of kentucky. i informed the legislature of the state of what i was doing, and my action was approved by the majority of that body. on my return to cairo i found authority from department headquarters for me to take paducah "if i felt strong enough," but very soon after i was reprimanded from the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offence. soon after i took command at cairo, general fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at camp jackson in the month of may. i received orders to pass them through my lines to columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. quite a number of these prisoners i had been personally acquainted with before the war. such of them as i had so known were received at my headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed by their presence. on one occasion when several were present in my office my intention to visit cape girardeau the next day, to inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. something transpired which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles above cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. a major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. it was hard to persuade him that i was not there. this officer was major barrett, of st. louis. i had been acquainted with his family before the war. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont --a narrow escape--after the battle. from the occupation of paducah up to the early part of november nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. i was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. by the 1st of november i had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. they were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. i asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against columbus. it could have been taken soon after the occupation of paducah; but before november it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. in the latter part of october general fremont took the field in person and moved from jefferson city against general sterling price, who was then in the state of missouri with a considerable command. about the first of november i was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the mississippi river with the view of detaining the rebels at columbus within their lines. before my troops could be got off, i was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the st. francis river about fifty miles west, or south-west, from cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. i dispatched colonel oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. on the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from columbus to be moved by boats down the mississippi and up the white river, in arkansas, in order to reinforce price, and i was directed to prevent this movement if possible. i accordingly sent a regiment from bird's point under colonel w. h. l. wallace to overtake and reinforce oglesby, with orders to march to new madrid, a point some distance below columbus, on the missouri side. at the same time i directed general c. f. smith to move all the troops he could spare from paducah directly against columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to await further orders from me. then i gathered up all the troops at cairo and fort holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. my force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. we dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of columbus, debarked a few men on the kentucky side and established pickets to connect with the troops from paducah. i had no orders which contemplated an attack by the national troops, nor did i intend anything of the kind when i started out from cairo; but after we started i saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. i did not see how i could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to cairo without an effort to do something. columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force i had with me. it would not do, therefore, to attack that point. about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, i learned that the enemy was crossing troops from columbus to the west bank to be dispatched, presumably, after oglesby. i knew there was a small camp of confederates at belmont, immediately opposite columbus, and i speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the missouri side, capture belmont, break up the camp and return. accordingly, the pickets above columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the boats moved out from shore. in an hour we were debarking on the west bank of the mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at columbus. the ground on the west shore of the river, opposite columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. the soil is rich and the timber large and heavy. there were some small clearings between belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with the native forests. we landed in front of a cornfield. when the debarkation commenced, i took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against surprise. at that time i had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. in the woods, at a short distance below the clearing, i found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water became a slough or bayou. i placed the men in the hollow, gave them their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were properly relieved. these troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our transports. up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. from columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports loaded with troops. but the force from paducah was threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if columbus was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. they doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on columbus before their divided command could be united. about eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching by the flank. after moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, i halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as skirmishers. by this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon belmont and sent out troops to meet us. soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. this continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. early in this engagement my horse was shot under me, but i got another from one of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was reached. the officers and men engaged at belmont were then under fire for the first time. veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. at this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. the enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected him from our shots and from view. this precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the national forces to pick their way without hinderance through the abatis--the only artificial defence the enemy had. the moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. they galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the union cause and the achievements of the command. all this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our transports. i saw at the same time two steamers coming from the columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. i tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. my efforts were in vain. at last i directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. this drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of columbus. they had abstained from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. about this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. the alarm "surrounded" was given. the guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. at first some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. but when i announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. they formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. the enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. again the confederates sought shelter under the river banks. we could not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our transports than we were. it would be prudent to get them behind us; but we were not again molested on our way to the boats. from the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. i now set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. after this had gone on for some little time i rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit the guard i had stationed over the approach to our transports. i knew the enemy had crossed over from columbus in considerable numbers and might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. this guard would be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. my surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the trench. riding back to the boat i found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. at first i ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men together and march them back to their position, i countermanded the order. then fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, i rode out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the enemy was passing. the field was grown up with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly along the rows. even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. i had not gone more than a few hundred yards when i saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty yards away. i looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when i thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me. when at the river bank i still had to ride a few hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay. the cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a dense forest. before i got back the enemy had entered this forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. our men, with the exception of details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them. those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed off. i was the only man of the national army between the rebels and our transports. the captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. my horse seemed to take in the situation. there was no path down the bank and every one acquainted with the mississippi river knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular. my horse put his fore feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single gang plank. i dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. the mississippi river was low on the 7th of november, 1861, so that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the steamers. the rebels were some distance back from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but little harm. our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. when i first went on deck i entered the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. i did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what was going on. i had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it and lodged in the foot. when the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it with vigor. they were well out in the stream and some distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. their position very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. the execution was very great, as we could see at the time and as i afterwards learned more positively. we were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to cairo, every man feeling that belmont was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it. our loss at belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. about 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. we returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. the loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. we had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. the enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of belmont. the two objects for which the battle of belmont was fought were fully accomplished. the enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from columbus. his losses were very heavy for that period of the war. columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical treatment or burial. i learned later, when i had moved further south, that belmont had caused more mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. the national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at belmont that did not desert them through the war. the day after the battle i met some officers from general polk's command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at belmont and also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. when our men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. some of the officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was refused with the statement that we had no dead there. while on the truce-boat i mentioned to an officer, whom i had known both at west point and in the mexican war, that i was in the cornfield near their troops when they passed; that i had been on horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. this officer was on general polk's staff. he said both he and the general had seen me and that polk had said to his men, "there is a yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but nobody fired at me. belmont was severely criticised in the north as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the beginning. if it had not been fought, colonel oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. then i should have been culpable indeed. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. while at cairo i had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the columbus garrison. they seemed to be very fond of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. on two or three occasions i went down in like manner. when one of their boats was seen coming up carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at fort holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no farther. i would then take a steamer and, with my staff and occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. there were several officers among them whom i had known before, both at west point and in mexico. seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the south possessed over the north at the beginning of the rebellion. they had from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the nation. they had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own states. in this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. the whole loaf was leavened. the north had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. in the army of the potomac there was what was known as the "regular brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. so, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number to each, were men educated for their profession. some of these went into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely without military training. this state of affairs gave me an idea which i expressed while at cairo; that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers. the register should be kept up, but the names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close, should be stricken from it. on the 9th of november, two days after the battle of belmont, major-general h. w. halleck superseded general fremont in command of the department of the missouri. the limits of his command took in arkansas and west kentucky east to the cumberland river. from the battle of belmont until early in february, 1862, the troops under my command did little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them. the enemy at this time occupied a line running from the mississippi river at columbus to bowling green and mill springs, kentucky. each of these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the tennessee and cumberland rivers near the tennessee state line. the works on the tennessee were called fort heiman and fort henry, and that on the cumberland was fort donelson. at these points the two rivers approached within eleven miles of each other. the lines of rifle pits at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. these positions were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. with fort henry in our hands we had a navigable stream open to us up to muscle shoals, in alabama. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee at eastport, mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. this road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be of use to them for through traffic the moment fort henry became ours. fort donelson was the gate to nashville--a place of great military and political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in kentucky. these two points in our possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the memphis and charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication. the designation of my command had been changed after halleck's arrival, from the district of south-east missouri to the district of cairo, and the small district commanded by general c. f. smith, embracing the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. early in january, 1862, i was directed by general mcclellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of brigadier-general don carlos buell, who commanded the department of the ohio, with headquarters at louisville, and who was confronting general s. b. buckner with a larger confederate force at bowling green. it was supposed that buell was about to make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from columbus, fort henry or donelson to buckner. i at once ordered general smith to send a force up the west bank of the tennessee to threaten forts heiman and henry; mcclernand at the same time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west kentucky, threatening columbus with one column and the tennessee river with another. i went with mcclernand's command. the weather was very bad; snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were intolerable. we were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. the object of the expedition was accomplished. the enemy did not send reinforcements to bowling green, and general george h. thomas fought and won the battle of mill springs before we returned. as a result of this expedition general smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture fort heiman. this fort stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry on the opposite side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of fort henry. this report of smith's confirmed views i had previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the tennessee and cumberland rivers. with us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the state of kentucky. on the 6th of january, before receiving orders for this expedition, i had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at st. louis. my object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. now that my views had been confirmed by so able a general as smith, i renewed my request to go to st. louis on what i deemed important military business. the leave was granted, but not graciously. i had known general halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at west point or during the mexican war. i was received with so little cordiality that i perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than i might have done, and i had not uttered many sentences before i was cut short as if my plan was preposterous. i returned to cairo very much crestfallen. flag-officer foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the neighborhood of cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was subject to the command of general halleck. he and i consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up the tennessee. notwithstanding the rebuff i had received from my immediate chief, i therefore, on the 28th of january, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, i could take and hold fort henry on the tennessee." this time i was backed by flag-officer foote, who sent a similar dispatch. on the 29th i wrote fully in support of the proposition. on the 1st of february i received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon fort henry. on the 2d the expedition started. in february, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at cairo for want of employment, the mississippi river being closed against navigation below that point. there were also many men in the town whose occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from captain down to deck hand but there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time the 17,000 men i proposed to take with me up the tennessee. i loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent general mcclernand in command. i followed with one of the later boats and found mcclernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles below fort henry. seven gunboats under flag-officer foote had accompanied the advance. the transports we had with us had to return to paducah to bring up a division from there, with general c. f. smith in command. before sending the boats back i wanted to get the troops as near to the enemy as i could without coming within range of their guns. there was a stream emptying into the tennessee on the east side, apparently at about long range distance below the fort. on account of the narrow water-shed separating the tennessee and cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in february, it was a torrent. it would facilitate the investment of fort henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. to test whether this could be done i boarded the gunboat essex and requested captain wm. porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw its fire. after we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. in consequence i had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. one shot passed very near where captain porter and i were standing, struck the deck near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the river. we immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek. when the landing was completed i returned with the transports to paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops. i got back on the 5th with the advance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them. at ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up. being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, i issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the 6th. i felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time. fort henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. the camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to donelson and dover. the garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements from donelson halted some miles out. there were seventeen heavy guns in the fort. the river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. a portion of the ground on which fort henry stood was two feet deep in water. below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. on the west bank fort heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry. the distance from fort henry to donelson is but eleven miles. the two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. prompt action on our part was imperative. the plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. the troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters. general smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear of heiman. at the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. general smith found fort heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. the gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest fort henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. this delay made no difference in the result. on our first appearance tilghman had sent his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to dover and donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on donelson. he stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape. tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. all the gunboats engaged were hit many times. the damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was slight, except to the essex. a shell penetrated the boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. on several occasions during the war such details were made when the complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before them. after the fall of fort henry captain phelps, commanding the iron-clad carondelet, at my request ascended the tennessee river and thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the memphis and ohio railroad. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy --assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. i informed the department commander of our success at fort henry and that on the 8th i would take fort donelson. but the rain continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon trains. then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. at least it would have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force. on the 7th, the day after the fall of fort henry, i took my staff and the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works at donelson. i had known general pillow in mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how small, i could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. i said this to the officers of my staff at the time. i knew that floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and i judged that he would yield to pillow's pretensions. i met, as i expected, no opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the topography of the country on the way and around fort donelson, found that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the village of dover, the other to donelson. fort donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from dover. the fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. on the east it fronted the cumberland; to the north it faced hickman's creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the cumberland. this also was filled with back-water from the river. the fort stood on high ground, some of it as much as a hundred feet above the cumberland. strong protection to the heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. to the west there was a line of rifle pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. this line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the fort. the ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very broken and generally wooded. the trees outside of the rifle-pits had been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. the limbs had been trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greater part of the line. outside of this intrenched line, and extending about half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and opening into hickman creek at a point north of the fort. the entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis. general halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from cairo. general hunter sent men freely from kansas, and a large division under general nelson, from buell's army, was also dispatched. orders went out from the war department to consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in the western states so as to make full companies, and to consolidate companies into regiments. general halleck did not approve or disapprove of my going to fort donelson. he said nothing whatever to me on the subject. he informed buell on the 7th that i would march against fort donelson the next day; but on the 10th he directed me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. i received this dispatch in front of fort donelson. i was very impatient to get to fort donelson because i knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly. i felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than 50,000 a month later. i asked flag-officer foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about cairo to proceed up the cumberland river and not to wait for those gone to eastport and florence; but the others got back in time and we started on the 12th. i had moved mcclernand out a few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on transports. it was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded by colonel thayer, of nebraska. as the gunboats were going around to donelson by the tennessee, ohio and cumberland rivers, i directed thayer to turn about and go under their convoy. i started from fort henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. that afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible. general smith had been directed to leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts henry and heiman. he left general lew. wallace with 2,500 men. with the remainder of his division he occupied our left, extending to hickman creek. mcclernand was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from dover. his right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into the cumberland south of the village. the troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. our line was generally along the crest of ridges. the artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. the men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. the greatest suffering was from want of shelter. it was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. it would not do to allow camp-fires except far down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. in the march over from fort henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. there was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. during the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of wallace and thayer on the 14th, the national forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict further than what was brought on by ourselves. only one gunboat had arrived. there was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front of mcclernand's command. that general had undertaken to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. without orders or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. the battery was in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army present. of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men engaged. in this assault colonel william morrison fell badly wounded. up to this time the surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were overcrowded. owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering was not so great as it might have been. the hospital arrangements at fort donelson were as complete as it was possible to make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of but one or two rooms. on the return of captain walke to fort henry on the 10th, i had requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his expedition up the tennessee, and get possession of the cumberland as far up towards donelson as possible. he started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the carondelet, towed by the steamer alps. captain walke arrived a few miles below donelson on the 12th, a little after noon. about the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at long range. on the 13th i informed him of my arrival the day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that i might take advantage of any diversion. the attack was made and many shots fell within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. the investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of. during the night of the 13th flag-officer foote arrived with the iron-clads st. louis, louisville and pittsburg and the wooden gunboats tyler and conestoga, convoying thayer's brigade. on the morning of the 14th thayer was landed. wallace, whom i had ordered over from fort henry, also arrived about the same time. up to this time he had been commanding a brigade belonging to the division of general c. f. smith. these troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and general lew. wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed of the brigade of colonel thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the same day. this new division was assigned to the centre, giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger line. the plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and silence his guns if possible. some of the gunboats were to run the batteries, get above the fort and above the village of dover. i had ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the river above dover in case they should be needed there. that position attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. by three in the afternoon of the 14th flag-officer foote was ready, and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. after coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. i occupied a position on shore from which i could see the advancing navy. the leading boat got within a very short distance of the water battery, not further off i think than two hundred yards, and i soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly disabled. then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for the day. the gunboat which flag-officer foote was on, besides having been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. the tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped helplessly back. two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. the enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men on board. of course i only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse. subsequent reports, now published, show that the enemy telegraphed a great victory to richmond. the sun went down on the night of the 14th of february, 1862, leaving the army confronting fort donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. the weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. two of the strongest of our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of rendering any present assistance. i retired this night not knowing but that i would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills. on the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger from flag-officer foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to me. i at once made my preparations for starting. i directed my adjutant-general to notify each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. from the heavy rains that had fallen for days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. the intense cold of the night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. this made travel on horseback even slower than through the mud; but i went as fast as the roads would allow. when i reached the fleet i found the flag-ship was anchored out in the stream. a small boat, however, awaited my arrival and i was soon on board with the flag-officer. he explained to me in short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and suggested that i should intrench while he returned to mound city with his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. i saw the absolute necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but i should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. but the enemy relieved me from this necessity. when i left the national line to visit flag-officer foote i had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless i brought it on myself. the conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. from the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under general l. wallace and 2,500 men brought over from fort henry belonging to the division of c. f. smith. the enemy, however, had taken the initiative. just as i landed i met captain hillyer of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of the national troops. he said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered mcclernand's division, which was in full retreat. the roads, as i have said, were unfit for making fast time, but i got to my command as soon as possible. the attack had been made on the national right. i was some four or five miles north of our left. the line was about three miles long. in reaching the point where the disaster had occurred i had to pass the divisions of smith and wallace. i saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by smith; wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. he had, at an opportune time, sent thayer's brigade to the support of mcclernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines. i saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. when i came to the right appearances were different. the enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. mcclernand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. his men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. there was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. when the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. the division broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. it must have been about this time that thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. at all events the enemy fell back within his intrenchments and was there when i got on the field. i saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. no officer seemed to be giving any directions. the soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. i heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. they seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. i turned to colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." i determined to make the assault at once on our left. it was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis. i directed colonel webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." this acted like a charm. the men only wanted some one to give them a command. we rode rapidly to smith's quarters, when i explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. the general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy. the outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th general smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. there was now no doubt but that the confederates must surrender or be captured the next day. there seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in dover during the night of the 15th. general floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one. he was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. as secretary of war he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution of the united states and to uphold the same against all its enemies. he had betrayed that trust. as secretary of war he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred. about a year before leaving the cabinet he had removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. he continued in the cabinet of president buchanan until about the 1st of january, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of united states territory. well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of national troops. he would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he been captured. general pillow, next in command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services in the mexican war. he telegraphed to general johnston, at nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the southern troops had had great success all day. johnston forwarded the dispatch to richmond. while the authorities at the capital were reading it floyd and pillow were fugitives. a council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. general buckner, who was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, a. s. johnston, should get back to his headquarters at nashville. buckner's report shows, however, that he considered donelson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. being assured that johnston was already in nashville, buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. floyd turned over the command to pillow, who declined it. it then devolved upon buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. floyd and pillow took possession of all the river transports at dover and before morning both were on their way to nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000. some marched up the east bank of the cumberland; others went on the steamers. during the night forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. they had to ford or swim over the back-water in the little creek just south of dover. before daylight general smith brought to me the following letter from general buckner: headquarters, fort donelson, february 16, 1862. sir:--in consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, i propose to the commanding officer of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. to brigadier-general u. s. grant, com'ding u. s. forces, near fort donelson. to this i responded as follows: headquarters army in the field, camp near donelson, february 16, 1862. general s. b. buckner, confederate army. sir:--yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, u. s. grant, brig. gen. to this i received the following reply: headquarters, dover, tennessee, february 16, 1862. to brig. gen'l u. s. grant, u. s. army. sir:--the distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. i am, sir, your very ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. general buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify national troops in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. white flags were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the fort. as soon as the last letter from buckner was received i mounted my horse and rode to dover. general wallace, i found, had preceded me an hour or more. i presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of general buckner. i had been at west point three years with buckner and afterwards served with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. in the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command i would not have got up to donelson as easily as i did. i told him that if he had been in command i should not have tried in the way i did: i had invested their lines with a smaller force than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full 5,000 strong, around by water; i had relied very much upon their commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. i asked general buckner about what force he had to surrender. he replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to nashville while we were about fort henry; that floyd and pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them; and that forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said i would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000. he asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. i gave directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. i have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with the sight of confederates passing to and fro that i have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. the most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of the army. some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and i bade them go. the actual number of confederates at fort donelson can never be given with entire accuracy. the largest number admitted by any writer on the southern side, is by colonel preston johnston. he gives the number at 17,000. but this must be an underestimate. the commissary general of prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 fort donelson prisoners at cairo, as they passed that point. general pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual numbers than the officers of mcclernand's division, for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that division, and were buried or cared for by buckner after the surrender and when pillow was a fugitive. it is known that floyd and pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than 3,000 men. forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all night. it is probable that the confederate force at donelson, on the 15th of february, 1862, was 21,000 in round numbers. on the day fort donelson fell i had 27,000 men to confront the confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. during the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. during the siege general sherman had been sent to smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland river, to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. at that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. but every boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at the front i might send for him and he would waive rank. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. the news of the fall of fort donelson caused great delight all over the north. at the south, particularly in richmond, the effect was correspondingly depressing. i was promptly promoted to the grade of major-general of volunteers, and confirmed by the senate. all three of my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer service. my chief, who was in st. louis, telegraphed his congratulations to general hunter in kansas for the services he had rendered in securing the fall of fort donelson by sending reinforcements so rapidly. to washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to general c. f. smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will applaud." on the 19th there was published at st. louis a formal order thanking flag-officer foote and myself, and the forces under our command, for the victories on the tennessee and the cumberland. i received no other recognition whatever from general halleck. but general cullum, his chief of staff, who was at cairo, wrote me a warm congratulatory letter on his own behalf. i approved of general smith's promotion highly, as i did all the promotions that were made. my opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of fort donelson the way was opened to the national forces all over the south-west without much resistance. if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the alleghanies, he could have marched to chattanooga, corinth, memphis and vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the north there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them. rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. on the other hand there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the south-western states, who had not gone into the confederate army in february, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. if our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. providence ruled differently. time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the ohio river. i promptly informed the department commander of our success at fort donelson and that the way was open now to clarksville and nashville; and that unless i received orders to the contrary i should take clarksville on the 21st and nashville about the 1st of march. both these places are on the cumberland river above fort donelson. as i heard nothing from headquarters on the subject, general c. f. smith was sent to clarksville at the time designated and found the place evacuated. the capture of forts henry and donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from columbus to bowling green, and it was known that he was falling back from the eastern point of this line and that buell was following, or at least advancing. i should have sent troops to nashville at the time i sent to clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were many prisoners to be forwarded north. none of the reinforcements from buell's army arrived until the 24th of february. then general nelson came up, with orders to report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to cairo. i knew general buell was advancing on nashville from the north, and i was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the south. i had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking buell would like to have his troops again, i ordered nelson to proceed to nashville without debarking at fort donelson. i sent a gunboat also as a convoy. the cumberland river was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. nashville is on the west bank of the cumberland, and buell was approaching from the east. i thought the steamers carrying nelson's division would be useful in ferrying the balance of buell's forces across. i ordered nelson to put himself in communication with buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from nashville to return below the city and await orders. buell, however, had already arrived in person at edgefield, opposite nashville, and mitchell's division of his command reached there the same day. nelson immediately took possession of the city. after nelson had gone and before i had learned of buell's arrival, i sent word to department headquarters that i should go to nashville myself on the 28th if i received no orders to the contrary. hearing nothing, i went as i had informed my superior officer i would do. on arriving at clarksville i saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same that had taken nelson's division--and troops going aboard. i landed and called on the commanding officer, general c. f. smith. as soon as he saw me he showed an order he had just received from buell in these words: nashville, february 25, 1862. general c. f. smith, commanding u. s. forces, clarksville. general:--the landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this side at every hazard. if the enemy should assume the offensive, and i am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. i have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your command. so important do i consider the occasion that i think it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and i send four boats, the diana, woodford, john rain, and autocrat, to bring you up. in five or six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you. very respectfully, your ob't srv't, d. c. buell, brigadier-general comd'g. p. s.--the steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. general smith said this order was nonsense. but i told him it was better to obey it. the general replied, "of course i must obey," and said his men were embarking as fast as they could. i went on up to nashville and inspected the position taken by nelson's troops. i did not see buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that i had been in nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. on my return to the boat we met. his troops were still east of the river, and the steamers that had carried nelson's division up were mostly at clarksville to bring smith's division. i said to general buell my information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. general buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve miles away. i said: "quite probably; nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all he can. the fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away with." buell spoke very positively of the danger nashville was in of an attack from the enemy. i said, in the absence of positive information, i believed my information was correct. he responded that he "knew." "well," i said, "i do not know; but as i came by clarksville general smith's troops were embarking to join you." smith's troops were returned the same day. the enemy were trying to get away from nashville and not to return to it. at this time general albert sidney johnston commanded all the confederate troops west of the alleghany mountains, with the exception of those in the extreme south. on the national side the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate departments. johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the national side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from washington. at the beginning of 1862 johnston's troops east of the mississippi occupied a line extending from columbus, on his left, to mill springs, on his right. as we have seen, columbus, both banks of the tennessee river, the west bank of the cumberland and bowling green, all were strongly fortified. mill springs was intrenched. the national troops occupied no territory south of the ohio, except three small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown out from louisville to confront that at bowling green. johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior to that of the national troops; but this was compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all the confederate forces at the west, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of his rear without any detail of soldiers. but when general george h. thomas moved upon the enemy at mill springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts henry and heiman fell into the hands of the national forces, with their armaments and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat from bowling green on nashville. he reached this latter place on the 14th of february, while donelson was still besieged. buell followed with a portion of the army of the ohio, but he had to march and did not reach the east bank of the cumberland opposite nashville until the 24th of the month, and then with only one division of his army. the bridge at nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any national troops that could have been brought against it within ten days after the arrival of the force from bowling green. johnston seemed to lie quietly at nashville to await the result at fort donelson, on which he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the states of kentucky and tennessee. it is true, the two generals senior in rank at fort donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even claiming great confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when they must have been preparing for their individual escape. johnston made a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to floyd, who he must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. if these officers had been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he should have left nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to donelson himself. if he had been captured the result could not have been worse than it was. johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of national troops. he wrote to richmond on the 8th of february, "i think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take fort donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in cooperation." after the fall of that place he abandoned nashville and chattanooga without an effort to save either, and fell back into northern mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. from the time of leaving cairo i was singularly unfortunate in not receiving dispatches from general halleck. the order of the 10th of february directing me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that purpose, reached me after donelson was invested. i received nothing direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in possession of donelson. i was reporting regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent to cairo, soon after the troops left there, to receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the st. louis headquarters. cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph wire. another line was started at once from cairo to paducah and smithland, at the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland respectively. my dispatches were all sent to cairo by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to forward them. this operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his dispatches with him. a telegram from general mcclellan to me of february 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of march. on the 2d of march i received orders dated march 1st to move my command back to fort henry, leaving only a small garrison at donelson. from fort henry expeditions were to be sent against eastport, mississippi, and paris, tennessee. we started from donelson on the 4th, and the same day i was back on the tennessee river. on march 4th i also received the following dispatch from general halleck: maj.-gen. u. s. grant, fort henry: you will place maj.-gen. c. f. smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at fort henry. why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command? h. w. halleck, major-general. i was surprised. this was the first intimation i had received that general halleck had called for information as to the strength of my command. on the 6th he wrote to me again. "your going to nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at washington, so much so that i was advised to arrest you on your return." this was the first i knew of his objecting to my going to nashville. that place was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared in orders, were "not defined." nashville is west of the cumberland river, and i had sent troops that had reported to me for duty to occupy the place. i turned over the command as directed and then replied to general halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from further duty under him. later i learned that general halleck had been calling lustily for more troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only be sufficiently reinforced. mcclellan asked him what force he then had. halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command was concerned, but i received none of his dispatches. at last halleck reported to washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that i had gone to nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at bull run had been by defeat. general mcclellan, on this information, ordered that i should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be made into any charges against me. he even authorized my arrest. thus in less than two weeks after the victory at donelson, the two leading generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition should be made of me, and in less than three weeks i was virtually in arrest and without a command. on the 13th of march i was restored to command, and on the 17th halleck sent me a copy of an order from the war department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. he forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. on the contrary, he wrote to me, "instead of relieving you, i wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories." in consequence i felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. i never knew the truth until general badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns. general halleck unquestionably deemed general c. f. smith a much fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than i was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. it is probable that the general opinion was that smith's long services in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such command. indeed i was rather inclined to this opinion myself at that time, and would have served as faithfully under smith as he had done under me. but this did not justify the dispatches which general halleck sent to washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. on receipt of the order restoring me to command i proceeded to savannah on the tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. general smith was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the treatment i had received. he was on a sick bed at the time, from which he never came away alive. his death was a severe loss to our western army. his personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence of those he commanded as well as of those over him. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight --retreat and defeat of the confederates. when i reassumed command on the 17th of march i found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the tennessee at savannah, while one division was at crump's landing on the west bank about four miles higher up, and the remainder at pittsburg landing, five miles above crump's. the enemy was in force at corinth, the junction of the two most important railroads in the mississippi valley--one connecting memphis and the mississippi river with the east, and the other leading south to all the cotton states. still another railroad connects corinth with jackson, in west tennessee. if we obtained possession of corinth the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or supplies until that running east from vicksburg was reached. it was the great strategic position at the west between the tennessee and the mississippi rivers and between nashville and vicksburg. i at once put all the troops at savannah in motion for pittsburg landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at corinth and collecting an army there under johnston. it was my expectation to march against that army as soon as buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with the army of the ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was the place to start from. pittsburg is only about twenty miles from corinth, and hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile or two nearer. i had not been in command long before i selected hamburg as the place to put the army of the ohio when it arrived. the roads from pittsburg and hamburg to corinth converge some eight miles out. this disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of each other. before i arrived at savannah, sherman, who had joined the army of the tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad east of corinth. the rains had been so heavy for some time before that the low-lands had become impassable swamps. sherman debarked his troops and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. the guns had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. on the 17th of march the army on the tennessee river consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by generals c. f. smith, mcclernand, l. wallace, hurlbut and sherman. general w. h. l. wallace was temporarily in command of smith's division, general smith, as i have said, being confined to his bed. reinforcements were arriving daily and as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a division, and the command given to general prentiss, who had been ordered to report to me. general buell was on his way from nashville with 40,000 veterans. on the 19th of march he was at columbia, tennessee, eighty-five miles from pittsburg. when all reinforcements should have arrived i expected to take the initiative by marching on corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration. mcpherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. he did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran. the new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. the fact is, i regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained. this view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy. johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. on the 1st of april this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated. on the 2d johnston left corinth in force to attack my army. on the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from pittsburg on the corinth road. colonel buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and general sherman followed buckland taking the remainder of a brigade. the pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had occurred. at this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad. my apprehension was much greater for the safety of crump's landing than it was for pittsburg. i had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place. but i feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before wallace could be reinforced. lew. wallace's position i regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed. at this time i generally spent the day at pittsburg and returned to savannah in the evening. i was intending to remove my headquarters to pittsburg, but buell was expected daily and would come in at savannah. i remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than i otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. the skirmishing in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of april that i did not leave pittsburg each night until an hour when i felt there would be no further danger before the morning. on friday the 4th, the day of buckland's advance, i was very much injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while i was trying to get to the front where firing had been heard. the night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. under these circumstances i had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. i had not gone far, however, when i met general w. h. l. wallace and colonel (afterwards general) mcpherson coming from the direction of the front. they said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. on the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. the extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. as it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my boot had to be cut off. for two or three days after i was unable to walk except with crutches. on the 5th general nelson, with a division of buell's army, arrived at savannah and i ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over to crump's landing or pittsburg as occasion required. i had learned that general buell himself would be at savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. affairs at pittsburg landing had been such for several days that i did not want to be away during the day. i determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet buell, and thus save time. he had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact and i was not aware of it until some time after. while i was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of pittsburg landing, and i hastened there, sending a hurried note to buell informing him of the reason why i could not meet him at savannah. on the way up the river i directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to crump's landing, so that i could communicate with general lew. wallace. i found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and i directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he might receive. he replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move. up to that time i had felt by no means certain that crump's landing might not be the point of attack. on reaching the front, however, about eight a.m., i found that the attack on pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at crump's. captain baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order general wallace to march immediately to pittsburg by the road nearest the river. captain baxter made a memorandum of this order. about one p.m., not hearing from wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, i sent two more of my staff, colonel mcpherson and captain rowley, to bring him up with his division. they reported finding him marching towards purdy, bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from pittsburg by several miles than when he started. the road from his first position to pittsburg landing was direct and near the river. between the two points a bridge had been built across snake creek by our troops, at which wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. wallace did not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. general wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by captain baxter was simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from pittsburg to purdy where it crosses owl creek on the right of sherman; but this is not where i had ordered him nor where i wanted him to go. i never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to pittsburg landing, without specifying by what route. his was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt. later in the war general wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of april, 1862. i presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country. some two or three miles from pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house called shiloh. it stood on the ridge which divides the waters of snake and lick creeks, the former emptying into the tennessee just north of pittsburg landing, and the latter south. this point was the key to our position and was held by sherman. his division was at that time wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but i thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. mcclernand was on sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at forts henry and donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western troops had become such at that stage of the war. next to mcclernand came prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, stuart with one brigade of sherman's division. hurlbut was in rear of prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. the division of general c. f. smith was on the right, also in reserve. general smith was still sick in bed at savannah, but within hearing of our guns. his services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. the command of his division devolved upon brigadier-general w. h. l. wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a veteran too, for he had served a year in the mexican war and had been with his command at henry and donelson. wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his division was much weakened. the position of our troops made a continuous line from lick creek on the left to owl creek, a branch of snake creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west. the water in all these streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. the enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. this he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the national side, but suffering much heavier on his own. the confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. the ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. there was also considerable underbrush. a number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where sherman was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. but the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks, the national troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer pittsburg landing. when the firing ceased at night the national line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning. in one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by general prentiss did not fall back with the others. this left his flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of his officers and men. general badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. he may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. general prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past five. i was with him, as i was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the last time i was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly and the general was as cool as if expecting victory. but no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. if it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the confederate side. with the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from snake creek or its tributaries on the right to lick creek or the tennessee on the left above pittsburg. there was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. it was a case of southern dash against northern pluck and endurance. three of the five divisions engaged on sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their states to the field. many of them had arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. their officers were equally ignorant of their duties. under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. in two cases, as i now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. in these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by them. better troops never went upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at shiloh. during the whole of sunday i was continuously engaged in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. in thus moving along the line, however, i never deemed it important to stay long with sherman. although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. mcclernand was next to sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. mcclernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. a casualty to sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at shiloh. and how near we came to this! on the 6th sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. in addition to this he had several horses shot during the day. the nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; i therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of whom there were many. when there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments or brigades. on one occasion during the day i rode back as far as the river and met general buell, who had just arrived; i do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. this meeting between general buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and savannah. it was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. as we left the boat together, buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. i saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. he even threatened them with shells from the gunboats near by. but it was all to no effect. most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. i have no doubt that this sight impressed general buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. if he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. could he have come through the confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. the distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. later in the war, while occupying the country between the tennessee and the mississippi, i learned that the panic in the confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. some of the country people estimated the stragglers from johnston's army as high as 20,000. of course this was an exaggeration. the situation at the close of sunday was as follows: along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at pittsburg landing, colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up the river. this line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the tennessee. hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this artillery, extending west and possibly a little north. mcclernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. his division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty. sherman came next, his right extending to snake creek. his command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. all three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day. the division of w. h. l. wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of shiloh. the right of my line rested near the bank of snake creek, a short distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the purpose of connecting crump's landing and pittsburg landing. sherman had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge over which wallace was expected and the creek above that point. in this last position sherman was frequently attacked before night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance in order to make room for lew. wallace, who came up after dark. there was, as i have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. the tennessee river was very high and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. the gunboats tyler and lexington, gwin and shirk commanding, with the artillery under webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. before any of buell's troops had reached the west bank of the tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. there was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but i do not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. as his troops arrived in the dusk general buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly for some minutes, but i do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury. the attack had spent its force. general lew. wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. thus night came, wallace came, and the advance of nelson's division came; but none --unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved shiloh on that first day against large odds. buell's loss on the 6th of april was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th indiana infantry. the army of the tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men. the presence of two or three regiments of buell's army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of pittsburg landing. so confident was i before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that i visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field. i directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. to sherman i told the story of the assault at fort donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at shiloh. victory was assured when wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. i was glad, however, to see the reinforcements of buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. during the night of the 6th the remainder of nelson's division, buell's army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. two other divisions, crittenden's and mccook's, came up the river from savannah in the transports and were on the west bank early on the 7th. buell commanded them in person. my command was thus nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. during the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. i made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. my ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that i could get no rest. the drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without this additional cause. some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, i moved back to the log-house under the bank. this had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. the sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and i returned to my tree in the rain. the advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the confederates on the day before. it is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of buell's command. possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. the position of the union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows: general lew. wallace on the right; sherman on his left; then mcclernand and then hurlbut. nelson, of buell's army, was on our extreme left, next to the river. crittenden was next in line after nelson and on his right, mccook followed and formed the extreme right of buell's command. my old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under buell constituted the left wing of the army. these relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from the field. in a very short time the battle became general all along the line. this day everything was favorable to the union side. we had now become the attacking party. the enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. the last point held by him was near the road leading from the landing to corinth, on the left of sherman and right of mcclernand. about three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, i gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. at this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. i knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier. after marching to within musket-range i stopped and let the troops pass. the command, charge, was given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy broke. (*7) chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates --intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston--remarks on shiloh. during this second day of the battle i had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. in the early part of the afternoon, while riding with colonel mcpherson and major hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. we were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. there did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. the shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. i do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. in the sudden start we made, major hawkins lost his hat. he did not stop to pick it up. when we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. mcpherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. on examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through. in a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. a ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. there were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard. all were thankful that it was no worse. after the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. the enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following. i wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and i did (*8) not feel disposed to positively order buell, or any part of his command, to pursue. although the senior in rank at the time i had been so only a few weeks. buell was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while i commanded only a district. i did not meet buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but had i seen him at the moment of the last charge i should have at least requested him to follow. i rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns. about five miles out we found their field hospital abandoned. an immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns. shiloh was the severest battle fought at the west during the war, and but few in the east equalled it for hard, determined fighting. i saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. on our side national and confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were confederates. on one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. there was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. the smaller ones were all cut down. contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the army i was then commanding, we were on the defensive. we were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. the officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. the result was a union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. the enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. they failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. after the battle i gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried. the latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by mcclernand. the heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions. the criticism has often been made that the union troops should have been intrenched at shiloh. up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the west. i had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. under all these circumstances i concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications. general buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as i ever knew. i had been two years at west point with him, and had served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the mexican war, several years more. he was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. he was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. he was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. one system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. the other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation. general buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. no one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. when i came into command of the army in 1864, i requested the secretary of war to restore general buell to duty. after the war, during the summer of 1865, i travelled considerably through the north, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. the opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend general buell against what i believed to be most unjust charges. on one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge i had so often refuted--of disloyalty. this brought from general buell a very severe retort, which i saw in the new york world some time before i received the letter itself. i could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. i replied to him, but not through the press. i kept no copy of my letter, nor did i ever see it in print; neither did i receive an answer. general albert sidney johnston, who commanded the confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the first day. this wound, as i understood afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. but he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. the news was not long in reaching our side and i suppose was quite an encouragement to the national soldiers. i had known johnston slightly in the mexican war and later as an officer in the regular army. he was a man of high character and ability. his contemporaries at west point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the confederacy would produce. i once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of johnston i am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier. my judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions. all the disasters in kentucky and tennessee were so discouraging to the authorities in richmond that jefferson davis wrote an unofficial letter to johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. the letter was not a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had been one. general johnston raised another army as rapidly as he could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at corinth. he knew the national troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. but he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still more. we have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the forces at shiloh and crush them; then to cross the tennessee and destroy the army of buell, and push the war across the ohio river. the design was a bold one; but we have the same authority for saying that in the execution johnston showed vacillation and indecision. he left corinth on the 2d of april and was not ready to attack until the 6th. the distance his army had to march was less than twenty miles. beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the national troops would attack the confederates in their intrenchments; second, we were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. johnston not only listened to the objection of beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. on the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. during this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the national troops opening fire on the enemy. this seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle of shiloh. it also seems to me to settle the question as to whether there was a surprise. i do not question the personal courage of general johnston, or his ability. but he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. he did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. general beauregard was next in rank to johnston and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. his tactics have been severely criticised by confederate writers, but i do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. some of these critics claim that shiloh was won when johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. ifs defeated the confederates at shiloh. there is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and if all of theirs had taken effect. commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. there was, in fact, no hour during the day when i doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although i was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour. the description of the battle of shiloh given by colonel wm. preston johnston is very graphic and well told. the reader will imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards the tennessee river, which was a little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset. if the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the national troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. but i witnessed the fight from the national side from eight o'clock in the morning until night closed the contest. i see but little in the description that i can recognize. the confederate troops fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of april, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues. the reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the national side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands for many days. on the union side but few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second day. the admissions of the highest confederate officers engaged at shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. the victory was not to either party until the battle was over. it was then a union victory, in which the armies of the tennessee and the ohio both participated. but the army of the tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of nelson's division. the confederates fought with courage at shiloh, but the particular skill claimed i could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since. but the confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the union troops engaged at shiloh as are many northern writers. the troops on both sides were american, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. it is possible that the southern man started in with a little more dash than his northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring. the endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. this they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. the object of the confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. we were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. as it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of prentiss, we took more prisoners on monday than the enemy gained from us on sunday. on the 6th sherman lost seven pieces of artillery, mcclernand six, prentiss eight, and hurlbut two batteries. on the 7th sherman captured seven guns, mcclernand three and the army of the ohio twenty. at shiloh the effective strength of the union forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. lew. wallace brought 5,000 more after nightfall. beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. according to the custom of enumeration in the south, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. with us everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is counted. excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. on the 7th buell brought 20,000 more. of his remaining two divisions, thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service. our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing. of these, 2,103 were in the army of the ohio. beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. this estimate must be incorrect. we buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of mcclernand and sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. beauregard reports the confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. the navy gave a hearty support to the army at shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently when i was in command. the nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. the country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the foe. but about sundown, when the national troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. after nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. this was done with effect, as is proved by the confederate reports. up to the battle of shiloh i, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. donelson and henry were such victories. an army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. bowling green, columbus and hickman, kentucky, fell in consequence, and clarksville and nashville, tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. the tennessee and cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured. but when confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from memphis to chattanooga, knoxville and on to the atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, i gave up all idea of saving the union except by complete conquest. up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether union or secession. after this, however, i regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of confederate armies i regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. i continued this policy to the close of the war. promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our northern depots. but much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. this policy i believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end. the battle of shiloh, or pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between national and confederate troops during the entire rebellion. correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by sherman, badeau and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by general prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed. i myself made no report to general halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing the result. a few days afterwards general halleck moved his headquarters to pittsburg landing and assumed command of the troops in the field. although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, i was ignored as much as if i had been at the most distant point of territory within my jurisdiction; and although i was in command of all the troops engaged at shiloh i was not permitted to see one of the reports of general buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the war department long after the event. for this reason i never made a full official report of this engagement. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth --occupation of corinth--the army separated. general halleck arrived at pittsburg landing on the 11th of april and immediately assumed command in the field. on the 21st general pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of island number ten in the mississippi river. he went into camp at hamburg landing five miles above pittsburg. halleck had now three armies: the army of the ohio, buell commanding; the army of the mississippi, pope commanding; and the army of the tennessee. his orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. major-general george h. thomas, who had been in buell's army, was transferred with his division to the army of the tennessee and given command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except mcclernand's and lew. wallace's divisions. mcclernand was assigned to the command of the reserve, composed of his own and lew. wallace's divisions. buell commanded the centre, the army of the ohio; and pope the left wing, the army of the mississippi. i was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. orders were given to all the commanders engaged at shiloh to send in their reports without delay to department headquarters. those from officers of the army of the tennessee were sent through me; but from the army of the ohio they were sent by general buell without passing through my hands. general halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but i positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports of a part of the army engaged at shiloh without their coming through me. he admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to washington. preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on corinth. owl creek, on our right, was bridged, and expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different routes could reinforce each other. all commanders were cautioned against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it would be better to retreat than to fight. by the 30th of april all preparations were complete; the country west to the mobile and ohio railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to corinth as far as monterey twelve miles from pittsburg. everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to fight battles. corinth, mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. it is about four miles south of the line dividing the states of tennessee and mississippi, and at the junction of the mississippi and chattanooga railroad with the mobile and ohio road which runs from columbus to mobile. from pittsburg to corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that makes high hills to pass over. in 1862 the greater part of the country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with ease. there are two small creeks running from north of the town and connecting some four miles south, where they form bridge creek which empties into the tuscumbia river. corinth is on the ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. the creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy. on the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched. corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. we ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of donelson and nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at pittsburg landing after the battle of shiloh. in fact the arrival of pope should not have been awaited. there was no time from the battle of shiloh up to the evacuation of corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. the demoralization among the confederates from their defeats at henry and donelson; their long marches from bowling green, columbus, and nashville, and their failure at shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of kentucky and tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible. beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. he appealed to the people of the south-west for new regiments, and received a few. a. s. johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of shiloh, but in a different way. he had negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks. the people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes. it is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home. beauregard, however, was reinforced by van dorn immediately after shiloh with 17,000 men. interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to the strength at corinth. with these reinforcements and the new regiments, beauregard had, during the month of may, 1862, a large force on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. we estimated his strength at 70,000. our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. the defensible nature of the ground at corinth, and the fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. on the 30th of april the grand army commenced its advance from shiloh upon corinth. the movement was a siege from the start to the close. the national troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not to bring on an engagement." "it is better to retreat than to fight." the enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become battles. all the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage the enemy. roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case of attack. the national armies were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the tennessee river to corinth. for myself i was little more than an observer. orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. my position was so embarrassing in fact that i made several applications during the siege to be relieved. general halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. on the 3d of may he was at seven mile creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to farmington, within four miles of corinth. his troops had quite a little engagement at farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. there would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. on the 8th of may he moved again, taking his whole force to farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. again he was ordered back. by the 4th of may the centre and right wing reached monterey, twelve miles out. their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. the left wing moved up again on the 25th of may and intrenched itself close to the enemy. the creek with the marsh before described, separated the two lines. skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either line at this point. our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of the right wing was probably five miles from corinth and four from the works in their front. the creek, which was a formidable obstacle for either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our right. here the enemy occupied two positions. one of them, as much as two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. a heavy wood intervened between this work and the national forces. in rear to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by infantry. sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of may, and on that day the investment of corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made. thomas' right now rested west of the mobile and ohio railroad. pope's left commanded the memphis and charleston railroad east of corinth. some days before i had suggested to the commanding general that i thought if he would move the army of the mississippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, i believed, no serious artificial one. the ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. to the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. i was silenced so quickly that i felt that possibly i had suggested an unmilitary movement. later, probably on the 28th of may, general logan, whose command was then on the mobile and ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into corinth with his brigade. trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of corinth constantly. some of the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. they said loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming in. subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of corinth on the 26th of may and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of may general halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. corinth had already been evacuated and the national troops marched on and took possession without opposition. everything had been destroyed or carried away. the confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train to create the impression among the yankees that reinforcements were arriving. there was not a sick or wounded man left by the confederates, nor stores of any kind. some ammunition had been blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. the possession of corinth by the national troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. it was nearly bloodless. it is a question whether the morale of the confederate troops engaged at corinth was not improved by the immunity with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then withdraw themselves. on our side i know officers and men of the army of the tennessee--and i presume the same is true of those of the other commands--were disappointed at the result. they could not see how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed. they believed that a well-directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army defending corinth. for myself i am satisfied that corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of shiloh. general halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the whole national army to do it. all commanding points two or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. it was expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. they were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man them. it was probably thought that a final battle of the war would be fought at that point. these fortifications were never used. immediately after the occupation of corinth by the national troops, general pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and general buell soon followed. buell was the senior of the two generals and commanded the entire column. the pursuit was kept up for some thirty miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were willing captives. on the 10th of june the pursuing column was all back at corinth. the army of the tennessee was not engaged in any of these movements. the confederates were now driven out of west tennessee, and on the 6th of june, after a well-contested naval battle, the national forces took possession of memphis and held the mississippi river from its source to that point. the railroad from columbus to corinth was at once put in good condition and held by us. we had garrisons at donelson, clarksville and nashville, on the cumberland river, and held the tennessee river from its mouth to eastport. new orleans and baton rouge had fallen into the possession of the national forces, so that now the confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with richmond to the single line of road running east from vicksburg. to dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first importance. the possession of the mississippi by us from memphis to baton rouge was also a most important object. it would be equal to the amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. after the capture of corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. in addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. but the work of depletion commenced. buell with the army of the ohio was sent east, following the line of the memphis and charleston railroad. this he was ordered to repair as he advanced --only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way. if he had been sent directly to chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining chattanooga. bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east tennessee and kentucky; the battles of stone river and chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; burnside would not have been besieged in knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of chattanooga would not have been fought. these are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after corinth fell into the possession of the national forces. the positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to atlanta, to vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of corinth in the interior of mississippi. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 3. by u. s. grant chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis--escaping jackson --complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. my position at corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that i asked permission of halleck to remove my headquarters to memphis. i had repeatedly asked, between the fall of donelson and the evacuation of corinth, to be relieved from duty under halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town. i then obtained permission to leave the department, but general sherman happened to call on me as i was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that i concluded to remain. my application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of june i started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. there was a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to the railroad. i went under cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to la grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men i had with me. from la grange to memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. there were no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. not knowing where this party would be found i halted at la grange. general hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country house. the proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he invited general hurlbut and me to dine with him. i accepted the invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a thorough southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. after dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a recital of the services he was rendering the cause. he was too old to be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his means enabled him to be useful in other ways. in ordinary times the homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of mississippi. now he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the "patriotism" of those better off. the crops around me looked fine, and i had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be gathered the "yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the rebellion instead of its support. i felt, however, the greatest respect for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive. the 23d of june, 1862, on the road from la grange to memphis was very warm, even for that latitude and season. with my staff and small escort i started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty miles of memphis. at this point i saw a very comfortable-looking white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little distance from the road. i let my staff and escort ride ahead while i halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. i was invited at once to dismount and come in. i found my host very genial and communicative, and staid longer than i had intended, until the lady of the house announced dinner and asked me to join them. the host, however, was not pressing, so that i declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. about a mile west from where i had been stopping a road comes up from the southeast, joining that from la grange to memphis. a mile west of this junction i found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the road. i, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the afternoon, and then rode into memphis. the gentleman with whom i had stopped twenty miles from memphis was a mr. de loche, a man loyal to the union. he had not pressed me to tarry longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a dr. smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as if something had hit him. mr. de loche knew that the rebel general jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. his neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was mr. de loche in that of the union. the exact location of jackson was entirely unknown to mr. de loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant to him after the call of dr. smith. i have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding workmen who were repairing the railroad east of memphis. on the day i entered memphis, jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had been sent east for the troops so engaged. the drovers were not enlisted men and he released them. a day or two after one of these drovers came to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he was six or seven miles south of the memphis and charleston railroad when he learned that i was stopping at the house of mr. de loche, and had ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that from la grange and memphis, where he learned that i had passed three-quarters of an hour before. he thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms in our hands with which to defend ourselves. general jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the soldiers the facts related were learned. a day or two later mr. de loche called on me in memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility in not insisting on my staying for dinner. he said that his wife accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his neighbor, he had felt restless until i got away. i never met general jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his very comfortable summer home at manitou springs, colorado. i reminded him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he was thankful now he had not captured me. i certainly was very thankful too. my occupation of memphis as district headquarters did not last long. the period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to me. up to that time i had not occupied any place in the south where the citizens were at home in any great numbers. dover was within the fortifications at fort donelson, and, as far as i remember, every citizen was gone. there were no people living at pittsburg landing, and but very few at corinth. memphis, however, was a populous city, and there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought that even the "yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they could only be induced to make an honest confession. it took hours of my time every day to listen to complaints and requests. the latter were generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints were not always, or even often, well founded. two instances will mark the general character. first: the officer who commanded at memphis immediately after the city fell into the hands of the national troops had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the soldiers. army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. second: at the beginning of the war the confederate congress had passed a law confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the south, including the debts of southerners to northern men. in consequence of this law, when memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the evidences he could obtain of such debts. almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. the gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a christian. he was a deacon in the church which had been defiled by the occupation of union troops, and by a union chaplain filling the pulpit. he did not use the word "defile," but he expressed the idea very clearly. he asked that the church be restored to the former congregation. i told him that no order had been issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. he said of course the congregation could not hear a northern clergyman who differed so radically with them on questions of government. i told him the troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed from the pulpit. this closed the argument on the first point. then came the second. the complainant said that he wanted the papers restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the "confederate states government" had been the attorney for a number of large business houses at the north; that "his government" had confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the "government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar received. he said that his "government," when it came in possession of all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims he had surrendered to the provost-marshal. his impudence was so sublime that i was rather amused than indignant. i told him, however, that if he would remain in memphis i did not believe the confederate government would ever molest him. he left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance as i was at the brazenness of his request. on the 11th of july general halleck received telegraphic orders appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in washington. his instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and interests of his previous command. i was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at corinth. i was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my headquarters or not. i telegraphed asking if i was to take my staff with me, and received word in reply: "this place will be your headquarters. you can judge for yourself." i left memphis for my new field without delay, and reached corinth on the 15th of the month. general halleck remained until the 17th of july; but he was very uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what i had been called to corinth for. when general halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief i remained in command of the district of west tennessee. practically i became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that position over me and i made my reports direct to the general-in-chief; but i was not assigned to the position of department commander until the 25th of october. general halleck while commanding the department of the mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from chattanooga north. my district only embraced west tennessee and kentucky west of the cumberland river. buell, with the army of the ohio, had, as previously stated, been ordered east towards chattanooga, with instructions to repair the memphis and charleston railroad as he advanced. troops had been sent north by halleck along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as columbus. other troops were stationed on the railroad from jackson, tennessee, to grand junction, and still others on the road west to memphis. the remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered corinth on the 30th of may had now become so scattered that i was put entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to the union. one of the first things i had to do was to construct fortifications at corinth better suited to the garrison that could be spared to man them. the structures that had been built during the months of may and june were left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design but suited to the command available to defend them. i disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the situation as rapidly as possible. the forces at donelson, clarksville and nashville, with those at corinth and along the railroad eastward, i regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. the mobile and ohio railroad was guarded from rienzi, south of corinth, to columbus; and the mississippi central railroad from jackson, tennessee, to bolivar. grand junction and la grange on the memphis railroad were abandoned. south of the army of the tennessee, and confronting it, was van dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to forty thousand men, after being reinforced by price from missouri. this movable force could be thrown against either corinth, bolivar or memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. nothing could be gained on the national side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present could guard. the most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the time the army of the tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall of corinth and memphis and before i was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. the enemy also had cavalry operating in our rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our supplies. headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of the command except memphis and the mississippi below columbus. with these points communication was had by the railroad to columbus, then down the river by boat. to reinforce memphis would take three or four days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have taken at least two days. memphis therefore was practically isolated from the balance of the command. but it was in sherman's hands. then too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary. during the two months after the departure of general halleck there was much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the mexican war which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they occurred. about the 23d of july colonel ross, commanding at bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be reinforced from jackson and corinth. on the 27th there was skirmishing on the hatchie river, eight miles from bolivar. on the 30th i learned from colonel p. h. sheridan, who had been far to the south, that bragg in person was at rome, georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way of mobile) to chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join him at rome. price was at this time at holly springs, mississippi, with a large force, and occupied grand junction as an outpost. i proposed to the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed that, while i had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops was not to scatter them, but hold them ready to reinforce buell. the movement of bragg himself with his wagon trains to chattanooga across country, while his troops were transported over a long round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. buell was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. more men were required the farther the national troops penetrated into the enemy's country. i, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed bragg, was purely on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far inferior to my own. on the 2d of august i was ordered from washington to live upon the country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far as practicable. i was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and from our lines. i do not recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. i am aware that a great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to joliet, illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my order. i had all such released the moment i learned of their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order. there were many citizens at home who deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was afforded to inflict an injury to the national cause. this class was not of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and i deemed it better that a few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should suffer. on the 14th of august i was ordered to send two more divisions to buell. they were sent the same day by way of decatur. on the 22d colonel rodney mason surrendered clarksville with six companies of his regiment. colonel mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at shiloh. he was by nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his action when the battle was over. he came to me with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to have another trial. i felt great sympathy for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison clarksville and donelson. he selected clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. but when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his constitutional weakness overcame him. he inquired the number of men the enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered and informed his subordinate at donelson of the fact, advising him to do the same. the guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet them and drove them away. among other embarrassments, at the time of which i now write, was the fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the south and directed me to give every facility toward that end. pay in gold was authorized, and stations on the mississippi river and on the railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be received. this opened to the enemy not only the means of converting cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and intelligent information in regard to our position and strength. it was also demoralizing to the troops. citizens obtaining permits from the treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared none of their dangers. on the 30th of august colonel m. d. leggett, near bolivar, with the 20th and 29th ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be about 4,000 strong. the enemy was driven away with a loss of more than one hundred men. on the 1st of september the bridge guard at medon was attacked by guerillas. the guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen wounded. on the same day colonel dennis, with a force of less than 500 infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in strong force, a few miles west of medon, and drove them away with great loss. our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. on the 2d of september i was ordered to send more reinforcements to buell. jackson and bolivar were yet threatened, but i sent the reinforcements. on the 4th i received direct orders to send granger's division also to louisville, kentucky. general buell had left corinth about the 10th of june to march upon chattanooga; bragg, who had superseded beauregard in command, sent one division from tupelo on the 27th of june for the same place. this gave buell about seventeen days' start. if he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside, and chattanooga must have been reached by the national forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. the road between nashville and chattanooga could easily have been put in repair by other troops, so that communication with the north would have been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the national troops. if buell had been permitted to move in the first instance, with the whole of the army of the ohio and that portion of the army of the mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and guard it. granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of september. i was at the station at corinth when the troops reached that point, and found general p. h. sheridan with them. i expressed surprise at seeing him and said that i had not expected him to go. he showed decided disappointment at the prospect of being detained. i felt a little nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which i had served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the pacific coast when the war broke out. he was promoted to a captaincy in may, 1861, and before the close of the year managed in some way, i do not know how, to get east. he went to missouri. halleck had known him as a very successful young officer in managing campaigns against the indians on the pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west missouri. there was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the use of public transportation for private purposes. he asked to be relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and his request was granted. when general halleck took the field in april, 1862, sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. during the advance on corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d michigan cavalry. governor blair, of michigan, telegraphed general halleck asking him to suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he would appoint a good man without reference to his state. sheridan was named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when corinth was reached he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the army of the mississippi. he was in command at booneville on the 1st of july with two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times as numerous as his own. by very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of attack he completely routed the enemy. for this he was made a brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about corinth. on this account i was sorry to see him leaving me. his departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services in his new field. granger and sheridan reached louisville before buell got there, and on the night of their arrival sheridan with his command threw up works around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from the front. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. at this time, september 4th, i had two divisions of the army of the mississippi stationed at corinth, rienzi, jacinto and danville. there were at corinth also davies' division and two brigades of mcarthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. this force constituted my left wing, of which rosecrans was in command. general ord commanded the centre, from bethel to humboldt on the mobile and ohio railroad and from jackson to bolivar where the mississippi central is crossed by the hatchie river. general sherman commanded on the right at memphis with two of his brigades back at brownsville, at the crossing of the hatchie river by the memphis and ohio railroad. this made the most convenient arrangement i could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon any threatened point. all the troops of the command were within telegraphic communication of each other, except those under sherman. by bringing a portion of his command to brownsville, from which point there was a railroad and telegraph back to memphis, communication could be had with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. in case it became necessary to reinforce corinth, by this arrangement all the troops at bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail by the way of jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops from brownsville could march up to bolivar to take their place. on the 7th of september i learned of the advance of van dorn and price, apparently upon corinth. one division was brought from memphis to bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the enemy. i was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing of bragg in middle tennessee. already the army of northern virginia had defeated the army under general pope and was invading maryland. in the centre general buell was on his way to louisville and bragg marching parallel to him with a large confederate force for the ohio river. i had been constantly called upon to reinforce buell until at this time my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms. this included everything from cairo south within my jurisdiction. if i too should be driven back, the ohio river would become the line dividing the belligerents west of the alleghanies, while at the east the line was already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the war. it is true nashville was never given up after its first capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in west tennessee had been compelled to fall back. to say at the end of the second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the east was pushed north of maryland, a state that had not seceded, and at the west beyond kentucky, another state which had been always loyal, would have been discouraging indeed. as it was, many loyal people despaired in the fall of 1862 of ever saving the union. the administration at washington was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. but i believe there was never a day when the president did not think that, in some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. up to the 11th of september rosecrans still had troops on the railroad east of corinth, but they had all been ordered in. by the 12th all were in except a small force under colonel murphy of the 8th wisconsin. he had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet been brought in to corinth. on the 13th of september general sterling price entered iuka, a town about twenty miles east of corinth on the memphis and charleston railroad. colonel murphy with a few men was guarding the place. he made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. i was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops into tennessee to reinforce bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to be. the authorities at washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were very anxious, as i have said, about affairs both in east and middle tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as for any danger threatening my command. i had not force enough at corinth to attack price even by stripping everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far on his way across the tennessee. to prevent this all spare forces at bolivar and jackson were ordered to corinth, and cars were concentrated at jackson for their transportation. within twenty-four hours from the transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train getting off the track and stopping all the others. this gave a reinforcement of near 8,000 men, general ord in command. general rosecrans commanded the district of corinth with a movable force of about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left behind. it was known that general van dorn was about a four days' march south of us, with a large force. it might have been part of his plan to attack at corinth, price coming from the east while he came up from the south. my desire was to attack price before van dorn could reach corinth or go to his relief. general rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at iuka, where his command was spread out along the memphis and charleston railroad eastward. while there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the surrounding country. he was also personally familiar with the ground, so that i deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach. we had cars enough to transport all of general ord's command, which was to go by rail to burnsville, a point on the road about seven miles west of iuka. from there his troops were to march by the north side of the railroad and attack price from the north-west, while rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south of corinth by way of the jacinto road. a small force was to hold the jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force moved on the fulton road which comes into iuka further east. this plan was suggested by rosecrans. bear creek, a few miles to the east of the fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in september, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. the tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried price's army to the rear of the national forces and isolated it from all support. it looked to me that, if price would remain in iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. on the morning of the 18th of september general ord moved by rail to burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of the programme. he was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously. troops enough were left at jacinto and rienzi to detain any cavalry that van dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into corinth until i could be notified. there was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. i detained cars and locomotives enough at burnsville to transport the whole of ord's command at once, and if van dorn had moved against corinth instead of iuka i could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived. i remained at burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from ord's command and communicated with my two wings by courier. ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving burnsville. quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed. he maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning. i was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch from rosecrans after midnight from jacinto, twenty-two miles from iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as jacinto. he said, however, that he would still be at iuka by two o'clock the next day. i did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. it might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault. i immediately sent ord a copy of rosecrans' dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or south-east. he was instructed to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. during the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either towards the point where ord was, or to burnsville where i had remained. a couple of hours before dark on the 19th rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at garnets, the point where the jacinto road to iuka leaves the road going east. he here turned north without sending any troops to the fulton road. while still moving in column up the jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. in this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. the wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either ord or me. neither he nor i nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. after the engagement rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. this was brought by a courier. there was no road between burnsville and the position then occupied by rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback. the courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to jacinto before he found a road leading to burnsville. this made it a late hour of the night before i learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon. i at once notified ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. the next morning rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into iuka with but little resistance. ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time. rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. word was soon brought to me that our troops were in iuka. i immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. i ordered pursuit by the whole of rosecrans' command and went on with him a few miles in person. he followed only a few miles after i left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. i was disappointed at the result of the battle of iuka--but i had so high an opinion of general rosecrans that i found no fault at the time. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. on the 19th of september general geo. h. thomas was ordered east to reinforce buell. this threw the army at my command still more on the defensive. the memphis and charleston railroad was abandoned, except at corinth, and small forces were left at chewalla and grand junction. soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and bolivar became our most advanced position on the mississippi central railroad. our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. we were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. it was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. we, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it. on the 22d bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of grand junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. i reinforced bolivar, and went to jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be made upon. the troops from corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. our cavalry followed the enemy south of davis' mills in mississippi. on the 30th i found that van dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike the mississippi river above memphis. at the same time other points within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. there was at this juncture a large union force at helena, arkansas, which, had it been within my command, i could have ordered across the river to attack and break up the mississippi central railroad far to the south. this would not only have called van dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies. geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to. van dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above memphis, as had apparently been his intention. he was simply covering a deeper design; one much more important to his cause. by the 1st of october it was fully apparent that corinth was to be attacked with great force and determination, and that van dorn, lovell, price, villepigue and rust had joined their strength for this purpose. there was some skirmishing outside of corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. the rebels massed in the north-west angle of the memphis and charleston and the mobile and ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at corinth and all possible reinforcements. any fresh troops for us must come by a circuitous route. on the night of the 3d, accordingly, i ordered general mcpherson, who was at jackson, to join rosecrans at corinth with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. hurlbut had been ordered from bolivar to march for the same destination; and as van dorn was coming upon corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. on the 4th van dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. in that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of corinth and held at bay all the union troops that arrived. in fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about corinth to hold them. he came near success, some of his troops penetrating the national lines at least once, but the works that were built after halleck's departure enabled rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both mcpherson and hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear. the enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. the loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with van dorn's. mcpherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of rosecrans just after the repulse. his approach, as well as that of hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. general rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although i had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. he did not do so, and i repeated the order after the battle. in the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. general ord had joined hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command of his troops. this force encountered the head of van dorn's retreating column just as it was crossing the hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from corinth. the bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat. ord followed and met the main force. he was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on hurlbut. rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road. moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. his march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies. two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. even when he did start, if rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon van dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as van dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril. i now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after rosecrans reached jonesboro, i ordered him to return. he kept on to ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. i thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" upon this i ordered rosecrans back. had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than van dorn had at corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army. the battle of corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. the enemy lost many more. rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. we fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity. among the killed on our side was general hackelman. general oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally, wounded. i received a congratulatory letter from the president, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. this battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as i had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as i now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at corinth. since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the north. the battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements i suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against vicksburg. on the 23d of october i learned of pemberton's being in command at holly springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from alabama and texas. the same day general rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded buell in the command of the army in middle tennessee. i was delighted at the promotion of general rosecrans to a separate command, because i still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which i, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. as a subordinate i found that i could not make him do as i wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day. at the close of the operations just described my force, in round numbers, was 48,500. of these 4,800 were in kentucky and illinois, 7,000 in memphis, 19,200 from mound city south, and 17,500 at corinth. general mcclernand had been authorized from washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening the mississippi. these new levies with other reinforcements now began to come in. on the 25th of october i was placed in command of the department of the tennessee. reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the 2d of november i was prepared to take the initiative. this was a great relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready to give information of our every move. i have described very imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during this time. to describe all would take more space than i can allot to the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9) chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen--occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs--collecting forage and food. vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below memphis. from there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the southern states. a railroad also starts from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as shreveport, louisiana. vicksburg was the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the parts of the confederacy divided by the mississippi. so long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. hence its importance. points on the river between vicksburg and port hudson were held as dependencies; but their fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. the campaign against vicksburg commenced on the 2d of november as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words: "i have commenced a movement on grand junction, with three divisions from corinth and two from bolivar. will leave here [jackson, tennessee] to-morrow, and take command in person. if found practicable, i will go to holly springs, and, may be, grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as i go." at this time my command was holding the mobile and ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles south of corinth, north to columbus, kentucky; the mississippi central from bolivar north to its junction with the mobile and ohio; the memphis and charleston from corinth east to bear creek, and the mississippi river from cairo to memphis. my entire command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the defensive. by moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force for field operations. my moving force at that time was about 30,000 men, and i estimated the enemy confronting me, under pemberton, at about the same number. general mcpherson commanded my left wing and general c. s. hamilton the centre, while sherman was at memphis with the right wing. pemberton was fortified at the tallahatchie, but occupied holly springs and grand junction on the mississippi central railroad. on the 8th we occupied grand junction and la grange, throwing a considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. the road from bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the troops advanced. up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always covered and guarded in all forward movements. there was delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front. by my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government stores. the stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the country itself. it was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "freedman's bureau" took its origin. orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily. humanity forbade allowing them to starve. with such an army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about grand junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. there was no special authority for feeding them unless they were employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. this labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. the plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. to do this work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a competent chief was necessary. on inquiring for such a man chaplain eaton, now and for many years the very able united states commissioner of education, was suggested. he proved as efficient in that field as he has since done in his present one. i gave him all the assistants and guards he called for. we together fixed the prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. the cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. at once the freedmen became self-sustaining. the money was not paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. they gave me no trouble afterwards. later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the mississippi river to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. a good price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with fuel). those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. in this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never known before. at this stage of the campaign against vicksburg i was very much disturbed by newspaper rumors that general mcclernand was to have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate against vicksburg by way of the mississippi river. two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case i did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. i feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. but on the 12th i received a dispatch from general halleck saying that i had command of all the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where i pleased. the next day my cavalry was in holly springs, and the enemy fell back south of the tallahatchie. holly springs i selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from columbus, kentucky, except the few stores collected about la grange and grand junction. this was a long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's country. on the 15th of november, while i was still at holly springs, i sent word to sherman to meet me at columbus. we were but forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to take the rail to columbus and sherman a steamer for the same place. at that meeting, besides talking over my general plans i gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the mississippi central railroad if he could. sherman, who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to cottage hill, ten miles north of oxford. he brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry. further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north to memphis. about this time general halleck ordered troops from helena, arkansas (territory west of the mississippi was not under my command then) to cut the road in pemberton's rear. the expedition was under generals hovey and c. c. washburn and was successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired. the tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad bridge destroyed and pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. a crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. i sent the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. this caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition of hovey and washburn. the enemy was followed as far south as oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles farther by mcpherson's command. here the pursuit was halted to repair the railroad from the tallahatchie northward, in order to bring up supplies. the piles on which the railroad bridge rested had been left standing. the work of constructing a roadway for the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. during the delay at oxford in repairing railroads i learned that an expedition down the mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, i ordered sherman on the 8th of december back to memphis to take charge. the following were his orders: headquarters 13th army corps, department of the tennessee. oxford, mississippi, december 8,1862. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding right wing: you will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to memphis, tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. on your arrival at memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of general curtis's forces at present east of the mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. as soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of flag-officer porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may dictate. the amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. the quartermaster at st. louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of memphis. on arriving in memphis, put yourself in communication with admiral porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. i will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary. leave the district of memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there. u. s. grant, major-general. this idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of december i asked halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south of the yallabusha and move a force from helena and memphis on vicksburg. on the 5th again i suggested, from oxford, to halleck that if the helena troops were at my command i though it would be possible to take them and the memphis forces south of the mouth of the yazoo river, and thus secure vicksburg and the state of mississippi. halleck on the same day, the 5th of december, directed me not to attempt to hold the country south of the tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at memphis by the 20th for the vicksburg expedition. i sent sherman with two divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether i should command the expedition down the river myself or send sherman. i was authorized to do as i though best for the accomplishment of the great object in view. i sent sherman and so informed general halleck. as stated, my action in sending sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. i feared that delay might bring mcclernand, who was his senior and who had authority from the president and secretary of war to exercise that particular command,--and independently. i doubted mcclernand's fitness; and i had good reason to believe that in forestalling him i was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me. neither my orders to general sherman, nor the correspondence between us or between general halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going further south than the yallabusha. pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the territory held by us in west tennessee and kentucky. i hoped to hold pemberton in my front while sherman should get in his rear and into vicksburg. the further north the enemy could be held the better. it was understood, however, between general sherman and myself that our movements were to be co-operative; if pemberton could not be held away from vicksburg i was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the yallabusha. with that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the yazoo until communications could be opened with the mississippi was contemplated. it was my intention, and so understood by sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back i would follow him even to the gates of vicksburg. i intended in such an event to hold the road to grenada on the yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the yazoo, or at vicksburg itself, with grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. it should be remembered that at the time i speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. a halt was called at oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. on the 18th of december i received orders from washington to divide my command into four army corps, with general mcclernand to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the mississippi. this interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. mcclernand was at that time in springfield, illinois. the order was obeyed without any delay. dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. on the 20th general van dorn appeared at holly springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by colonel murphy, of the 8th wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. the capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not to the troops under him. at the same time forrest got on our line of railroad between jackson, tennessee, and columbus, kentucky, doing much damage to it. this cut me off from all communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained in the regular way. this demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. i determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with columbus as a base, and returned to la grange and grand junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to memphis, making the mississippi river the line over which to draw supplies. pemberton was falling back at the same time. the moment i received the news of van dorn's success i sent the cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. he had start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. all these he found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. van dorn did not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at holly springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put together. murphy was also warned of van dorn's approach, but made no preparations to meet him. he did not even notify his command. colonel murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated iuka on the approach of the enemy. general rosecrans denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and punished. i sustained the colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and i thought he had done well to get away without falling into their hands. his leaving large stores to fall into price's possession i looked upon as an oversight and excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. he should, however, have destroyed them. this last surrender demonstrated to my mind that rosecrans' judgment of murphy's conduct at iuka was correct. the surrender of holly springs was most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of colonel murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross cowardice. after the war was over i read from the diary of a lady who accompanied general pemberton in his retreat from the tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. the roads were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and trains. why there should have been a panic i do not see. no expedition had yet started down the mississippi river. had i known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, i would have been in pursuit of pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear. after sending cavalry to drive van dorn away, my next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front back to grand junction, leaving two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. i was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. it showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. this taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days' rations by the commissary. our loss of supplies was great at holly springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught. the news of the capture of holly springs and the destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in oxford. they came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to ask what i was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. i told them that i was not disturbed; that i had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side of the road. countenances soon changed, and so did the inquiry. the next was, "what are we to do?" my response was that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. i advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general m'clernand in command --assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence --operations at yazoo pass. this interruption in my communications north--i was really cut off from communication with a great part of my own command during this time --resulted in sherman's moving from memphis before mcclernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach mcclernand. pemberton got back to vicksburg before sherman got there. the rebel positions were on a bluff on the yazoo river, some miles above its mouth. the waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the high bluffs. these were fortified and defended at all points. the rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought against its front. sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. his efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing. sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but i had no opportunity of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on the 20th. he did not know but what i was in the rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the troops with me. i had, before he started from memphis, directed him to take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the yazoo, not knowing but that i might want them to supply me after cutting loose from my base at grenada. on the 23d i removed my headquarters back to holly springs. the troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. the road was not damaged south of holly springs by van dorn, at least not to an extent to cause any delay. as i had resolved to move headquarters to memphis, and to repair the road to that point, i remained at holly springs until this work was completed. on the 10th of january, the work on the road from holly springs to grand junction and thence to memphis being completed, i moved my headquarters to the latter place. during the campaign here described, the losses (mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their holly springs capture, which they could not hold. when sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men, taken from memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at helena, arkansas. the troops on the west bank of the river had previously been assigned to my command. mcclernand having received the orders for his assignment reached the mouth of the yazoo on the 2d of january, and immediately assumed command of all the troops with sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th, and all of sherman's, the 15th. sherman, and admiral porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the yazoo. after consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render service to the cause where they were, and learning that i had withdrawn from the interior of mississippi, they determined to return to the arkansas river and to attack arkansas post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. sherman had learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other supplies intended for his command. the man had made his escape. mcclernand approved this move reluctantly, as sherman says. no obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of the fort. after three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. i was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was understood i regarded it as very important. five thousand confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the mississippi. immediately after the reduction of arkansas post and the capture of the garrison, mcclernand returned with his entire force to napoleon, at the mouth of the arkansas river. from here i received messages from both sherman and admiral porter, urging me to come and take command in person, and expressing their distrust of mcclernand's ability and fitness for so important and intricate an expedition. on the 17th i visited mcclernand and his command at napoleon. it was here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful of mcclernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. it would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into such danger. by this time i had received authority to relieve mcclernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river expedition, or to assume command in person. i felt great embarrassment about mcclernand. he was the senior major-general after myself within the department. it would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign a junior over him. nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the command myself. i would have been glad to put sherman in command, to give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the december before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was junior to mcclernand. sherman's failure needs no apology. on the 20th i ordered general mcclernand with the entire command, to young's point and milliken's bend, while i returned to memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me secure. general hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. the memphis and charleston railroad was held, while the mississippi central was given up. columbus was the only point between cairo and memphis, on the river, left with a garrison. all the troops and guns from the posts on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. on the 29th of january i arrived at young's point and assumed command the following day. general mcclernand took exception in a most characteristic way--for him. his correspondence with me on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. it was highly insubordinate, but i overlooked it, as i believed, for the good of the service. general mcclernand was a politician of very considerable prominence in his state; he was a member of congress when the secession war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the union at all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of where he stood in the contest before the country. he also gave up his seat in congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had proclaimed. the real work of the campaign and siege of vicksburg now began. the problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which the troops could operate against vicksburg. the mississippi river, from cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up to two or more hundred feet above the river. on the west side the highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest water. through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. at places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. after leaving memphis, there are no such highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until vicksburg is reached. the intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water--many of them navigable for steamers. all of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally impracticable. the strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the yallabusha, or to jackson, mississippi. at this time the north had become very much discouraged. many strong union men believed that the war must prove a failure. the elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the union if it took the last man and the last dollar. voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the north, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. it was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from vicksburg to memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. there was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. this was in my mind from the moment i took command in person at young's point. the winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. to get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many miles of river front. we had to occupy the levees and the ground immediately behind. this was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under general mcpherson, was at lake providence, seventy miles above vicksburg. it was in january the troops took their position opposite vicksburg. the water was very high and the rains were incessant. there seemed no possibility of a land movement before the end of march or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time. the effect would be demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. friends in the north would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it. i always admired the south, as bad as i thought their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by press or by individuals, within their control. war at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. but, once entered into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation. vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the river's edge, below that on which memphis stands. the bluff, or high land, follows the left bank of the yazoo for some distance and continues in a southerly direction to the mississippi river, thence it runs along the mississippi to warrenton, six miles below. the yazoo river leaves the high land a short distance below haines' bluff and empties into the mississippi nine miles above vicksburg. vicksburg is built on this high land where the mississippi washes the base of the hill. haines' bluff, eleven miles from vicksburg, on the yazoo river, was strongly fortified. the whole distance from there to vicksburg and thence to warrenton was also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them. from young's point the mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they were in range of the upper batteries. since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. north of the yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with bayous, and much overflowed. a front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. the problem then became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the mississippi without an apparent retreat. then commenced a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public generally. i, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. nevertheless i was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. in 1862 general thomas williams had come up from new orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from young's point to the river below. the distance across was a little over a mile. it was williams' expectation that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without doing any execution in the way of cutting. mr. lincoln had navigated the mississippi in his younger days and understood well its tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. he set much store accordingly by this canal. general mcclernand had been, therefore, directed before i went to young's point to push the work of widening and deepening this canal. after my arrival the work was diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out until the excavation was completed. this was on the 8th of march. even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. it runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite side, or east bank, of the river. as soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout its length. this battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. had the canal been completed it might have proven of some use in running transports through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. while this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the batteries. on the 30th of january, the day after my arrival at the front, i ordered general mcpherson, stationed with his corps at lake providence, to cut the levee at that point. if successful in opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry us to the mississippi river through the mouth of the red river, just above port hudson and four hundred miles below vicksburg by the river. lake providence is a part of the old bed of the mississippi, about a mile from the present channel. it is six miles long and has its outlet through bayou baxter, bayou macon, and the tensas, washita and red rivers. the last three are navigable streams at all seasons. bayous baxter and macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with dense forests overhanging the channel. they were also filled with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. the land along the mississippi river, from memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the boundary of the valley through which it winds. bayou baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the macon. there was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time. to get through it, even with vessels of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to make a passage way. as the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great magnitude. on the 4th of february i visited general mcpherson, and remained with him several days. the work had not progressed so far as to admit the water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. with this we were able to explore the lake and bayou as far as cleared. i saw then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country. the distance from lake providence to the point where vessels going by that route would enter the mississippi again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. the distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which this new route would carry us. the enemy held port hudson, below where the red river debouches, and all the mississippi above to vicksburg. the red river, washita and tensas were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. i let the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. this work was abandoned after the canal proved a failure. lieutenant-colonel wilson of my staff was sent to helena, arkansas, to examine and open a way through moon lake and the yazoo pass if possible. formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the mississippi river into moon lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through yazoo pass to coldwater, along the latter to the tallahatchie, which joins the yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below moon lake and forms the yazoo river. these were formerly navigated by steamers trading with the rich plantations along their banks; but the state of mississippi had built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the mouth of the yazoo several hundreds of miles below. on the 2d of february this dam, or levee, was cut. the river being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. the bayous were soon filled and much of the country was overflowed. this pass leaves the mississippi river but a few miles below helena. on the 24th general ross, with his brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. the rebels had obstructed the navigation of yazoo pass and the coldwater by felling trees into them. much of the timber in this region being of greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of march ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under the command of lieutenant-commander watson smith, confronting a fortification at greenwood, where the tallahatchie and yallabusha unite and the yazoo begins. the bends of the rivers are such at this point as to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the river. this island was fortified and manned. it was named fort pemberton after the commander at vicksburg. no land approach was accessible. the troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of ground which was discovered above water. the gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of march. both efforts were failures and were not renewed. one gunboat was disabled and we lost six men killed and twenty-five wounded. the loss of the enemy was less. fort pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. in hope of enlisting the elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the mississippi levee, this time directly opposite helena, or six miles above the former cut. it did not accomplish the desired result, and ross, with his fleet, started back. on the 22d he met quinby with a brigade at yazoo pass. quinby was the senior of ross, and assumed command. he was not satisfied with returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether anything could be accomplished. accordingly fort pemberton was revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time without an attack. quinby, with his command, returned with but little delay. in the meantime i was much exercised for the safety of ross, not knowing that quinby had been able to join him. reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on board of their transports. relief had to come from another quarter. so i determined to get into the yazoo below fort pemberton. steel's bayou empties into the yazoo river between haines' bluff and its mouth. it is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. it approaches to within one mile of the mississippi at eagle bend, thirty miles above young's point. steel's bayou connects with black bayou, black bayou with deer creek, deer creek with rolling fork, rolling fork with the big sunflower river, and the big sunflower with the yazoo river about ten miles above haines' bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the winding of the river. all these waterways are of about the same nature so far as navigation is concerned, until the sunflower is reached; this affords free navigation. admiral porter explored this waterway as far as deer creek on the 14th of march, and reported it navigable. on the next day he started with five gunboats and four mortar-boats. i went with him for some distance. the heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also the short turns in so narrow a stream. the gunboats, however, ploughed their way through without other damage than to their appearance. the transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. the road was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. in the evening i returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. sherman went in person on the 16th, taking with him stuart's division of the 15th corps. they took large river transports to eagle bend on the mississippi, where they debarked and marched across to steel's bayou, where they re-embarked on the transports. the river steamers, with their tall smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that the gunboats got far ahead. porter, with his fleet, got within a few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. he could do nothing with gunboats against sharpshooters. the rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000 men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out black bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. on the night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. sherman at once returned through black bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. they tried to force their way through black bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. it was night when they landed, and intensely dark. there was but a narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush or cane. the troops lighted their way through this with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open plantation. here the troops rested until morning. they made twenty-one miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to rescue the fleet. porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. more welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this occasion. the vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous on the mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of vicksburg. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press --running the batteries--loss of the indianola--disposition of the troops. the original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of march. the effort to make a waterway through lake providence and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. at milliken's bend, and also at young's point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing richmond, louisiana, enter the mississippi at carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above grand gulf. the mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these points, is carried through these same channels to the river below. in case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. the dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, i determined to open these other channels, if possible. if successful the effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our transports. there was a good road back of the levees, along these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. as early as the 4th of february i had written to halleck about this route, stating that i thought it much more practicable than the other undertaking (the lake providence route), and that it would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country. the upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for a distance of several miles from their source. it was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. this work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to richmond, louisiana, emerged from the water. one small steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. beyond this it was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter was whiled away. all these failures would have been very discouraging if i had expected much from the efforts; but i had not. from the first the most i hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used below vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that city. this long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about vicksburg. the river was higher than its natural banks from december, 1862, to the following april. the war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the south, further than the production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. malarial fevers broke out among the men. measles and small-pox also attacked them. the hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. because i would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. they were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. mcclernand, fremont, hunter and mcclellan were all mentioned in this connection. i took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as i understood it, to the best of my ability. every one has his superstitions. one of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position. while at cairo i had watched with very great interest the operations of the army of the potomac, looking upon that as the main field of the war. i had no idea, myself, of ever having any large command, nor did i suppose that i was equal to one; but i had the vanity to think that as a cavalry officer i might succeed very well in the command of a brigade. on one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, i said that i would give anything if i were commanding a brigade of cavalry in the army of the potomac and i believed i could do some good. captain hillyer spoke up and suggested that i make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. i then told him that i would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned this superstition. in time of war the president, being by the constitution commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the selection of commanders. he should not be embarrassed in making his selections. i having been selected, my responsibility ended with my doing the best i knew how. if i had sought the place, or obtained it through personal or political influence, my belief is that i would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown in case of disaster. somebody must be responsible for their failures. with all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both president lincoln and general halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. i had never met mr. lincoln, but his support was constant. at last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points at milliken's bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success. i had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. this could not be undertaken until the waters receded. i did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. my recollection is that admiral porter was the first one to whom i mentioned it. the co-operation of the navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise. i had no more authority to command porter than he had to command me. it was necessary to have part of his fleet below vicksburg if the troops went there. steamers to use as ferries were also essential. the navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries. porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. i was glad to accept his proposition, not only because i admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs. porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth of the yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense forests that intervened. even spies could not get near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. our river guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the river near the east shore, from the direction of vicksburg, towards the fleet. on overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of discovery. the boat, crew and passengers were brought ashore to me. the chief personage aboard proved to be jacob thompson, secretary of the interior under the administration of president buchanan. after a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more i allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of mr. thompson and his flag. admiral porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. the great essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. this he accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. the hay and grain would be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy roads over which we expected to march. before this i had been collecting, from st. louis and chicago, yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. by the 16th of april porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. the advance, flagship benton, porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes by the lafayette with a captured steamer, the price, lashed to her side, the louisville, mound city, pittsburgh and carondelet--all of these being naval vessels. next came the transports --forest queen, silver wave and henry clay, each towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when below the batteries. the gunboat tuscumbia brought up the rear. soon after the start a battery between vicksburg and warrenton opened fire across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then by batteries all along the line. the gunboats ran up close under the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably without much effect. they were under fire for more than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the gunboats. the transports did not fare so well. the henry clay was disabled and deserted by her crew. soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's edge. the burning mass, however, floated down to carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. the enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the louisiana side. the sight was magnificent, but terrible. i witnessed it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go. my mind was much relieved when i learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. during the running of the batteries men were stationed in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. all damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direction of admiral porter. the experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. admiral farragut had run the batteries at port hudson with the flagship hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below vicksburg. the 13th of february admiral porter had sent the gunboat indianola, lieutenant-commander george brown commanding, below. she met colonel ellet of the marine brigade below natchez on a captured steamer. two of the colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the greatest consternation among the people along the mississippi from vicksburg (*10) to the red river. the indianola remained about the mouth of the red river some days, and then started up the mississippi. the confederates soon raised the queen of the west, (*11) and repaired her. with this vessel and the ram webb, which they had had for some time in the red river, and two other steamers, they followed the indianola. the latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid current of the mississippi. the confederate fleet overtook her just above grand gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th of february. the indianola was superior to all the others in armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. as it was she fought them for an hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition. the armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. officers and crew then surrendered. i had started mcclernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of march, by way of richmond, louisiana, to new carthage, hoping that he might capture grand gulf before the balance of the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. some miles from new carthage the levee to bayou vidal was broken in several places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. boats were collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across the overflowed interval. by the 6th of april mcclernand had reached new carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these boats. on the 17th i visited new carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. the water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. mcclernand had already found a new route from smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred, to perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below new carthage. this increased the march from milliken's bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet of bridging in all. the river falling made the current in these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "yankee soldier" was equal to any emergency. the bridges were soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). this, if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. these bridges were all built by mcclernand's command, under the supervision of lieutenant hains of the engineer corps. i returned to milliken's bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops: headquarters department of the tennessee, milliken's bend, louisiana, april 20, 1863. special orders, no. 110. * * * * * * * viii. the following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "army in the field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the mississippi river, from which vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads. first.--the thirteenth army corps, major-general john a. mcclernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. second.--the fifteenth army corps, major-general w. t. sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing. third.--the seventeenth army corps, major-general james b. mcpherson commanding, will constitute the centre. fourth.--the order of march to new carthage will be from right to left. fifth.--reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. when the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. sixth.--troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. seventh.--in the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by general orders no. 160, a. g. o., series of 1862. eighth.--all the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army. ninth.--as fast as the thirteenth army corps advances, the seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the fifteenth army corps. tenth.--two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from richmond to new carthage. eleventh.--general hospitals will be established by the medical director between duckport and milliken's bend. all sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. the force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from duckport to milliken's bend. they will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. twelfth.--the movement of troops from milliken's bend to new carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous orders. thirteenth.--commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. all such irregularities must be summarily punished. fourteenth.--brigadier-general j. c. sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to new carthage. his particular attention is called to general orders, no. 69, from adjutant-general's office, washington, of date march 20, 1863. by order of major-general u. s. grant. mcclernand was already below on the mississippi. two of mcpherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately. the third had not yet arrived from lake providence; it was on its way to milliken's bend and was to follow on arrival. sherman was to follow mcpherson. two of his divisions were at duckport and young's point, and the third under steele was under orders to return from greenville, mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our transports. it had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between milliken's bend and perkins' plantation. accordingly six more steamers were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with supplies. they took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. on the night of the 22d of april they ran the batteries, five getting through more or less disabled while one was sunk. about half the barges got through with their needed freight. when it was first proposed to run the blockade at vicksburg with river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. volunteers were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating the western rivers. captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we were moving through this dangerous ordeal. most of them were from logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of illinois and from missouri. all but two of the steamers were commanded by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. in this instance, as in all others during the war, i found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether mechanical or professional. colonel w. s. oliver was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. on the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at perkins' plantation. reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land above grand gulf. there was none practicable. accordingly the troops were set in motion for hard times, twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite grand gulf. the loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water. some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured. all the troops, therefore, except what could be transported in one trip, had to march. the road lay west of lake st. joseph. three large bayous had to be crossed. they were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12) on the 27th mcclernand's corps was all at hard times, and mcpherson's was following closely. i had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, mcclernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. about 10,000 men were so embarked. the plan was to have the navy silence the guns at grand gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. the following order was issued: perkins plantation, la., april 27,1863. major-general j. a. mcclernand, commanding 13th a. c. commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. all the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite grand gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, general mcpherson is ordered to send one division. the plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. the first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement. admiral porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. it may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past grand gulf and land at rodney. in case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. in this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below grand gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. there will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at grand gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board. should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade. if not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. u. s. grant, major-general. at 8 o'clock a.m., 29th, porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. for nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. all this time mcclernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. i occupied a tug from which i could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves. about half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. the enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. i immediately signalled the admiral and went aboard his ship. the navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. a large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. the sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as i boarded the ship was sickening. grand gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it. it is as defensible upon its front as vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. i therefore requested porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be wanted below. there is a long tongue of land from the louisiana side extending towards grand gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the same distance below. the land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. i had had this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of rodney. it was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. i had intended to make this request, but he anticipated me. at dusk, when concealed from the view of the enemy at grand gulf, mcclernand landed his command on the west bank. the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully. the troops marched across the point of land under cover of night, unobserved. by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with national troops. when the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that we would have to go to rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a good landing would be found at bruinsburg, a few miles above rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to port gibson some twelve miles in the interior. the information was found correct, and our landing was effected without opposition. sherman had not left his position above vicksburg yet. on the morning of the 27th i ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the yazoo and threatening an attack on haines' bluff. my object was to compel pemberton to keep as much force about vicksburg as i could, until i could secure a good footing on high land east of the river. the move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about vicksburg and doubts about our real design. sherman moved the day of our attack on grand gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which porter had left above vicksburg. he debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at haines' bluff. this move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service. on the first of may sherman received orders from me (sent from hard times the evening of the 29th of april) to withdraw from the front of haines' bluff and follow mcpherson with two divisions as fast as he could. i had established a depot of supplies at perkins' plantation. now that all our gunboats were below grand gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the big black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies. mcpherson was at hard times with a portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his command. the night of the 29th i directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position. the embarkation below grand gulf took place at de shroon's, louisiana, six miles above bruinsburg, mississippi. early on the morning of 30th of april mcclernand's corps and one division of mcpherson's corps were speedily landed. when this was effected i felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. i was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. but i was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. all the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of december previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. i had with me the 13th corps, general mcclernand commanding, and two brigades of logan's division of the 17th corps, general mcpherson commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. these were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of logan's division and crocker's division of the 17th corps. on the 7th of may i was further reinforced by sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. my total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. the enemy occupied grand gulf, haines' bluff and jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. jackson is fifty miles east of vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. my first problem was to capture grand gulf to use as a base. bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. the bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. it was natural to expect the garrison from grand gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. bayou pierre enters the mississippi just above bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by port gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. this more than doubled the distance from grand gulf to the high land back of bruinsburg. no time was to be lost in securing this foothold. our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during the day, april 30th, and early evening. mcclernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. the bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and mcclernand was pushed on, hoping to reach port gibson and save the bridge spanning the bayou pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. port gibson, too, is the starting point of roads to grand gulf, vicksburg and jackson. mcclernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of port gibson at thompson's plantation. there was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. the enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the grand gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under general bowen. his hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under loring could reach him from vicksburg; but loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of port gibson. two brigades of mcpherson's corps followed mcclernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way. the country in this part of mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. this makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. near the point selected by bowen to defend, the road to port gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. these roads unite just outside the town. this made it necessary for mcclernand to divide his force. it was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. one flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. mcclernand put the divisions of hovey, carr and a. j. smith upon the right-hand branch and osterhaus on the left. i was on the field by ten a.m., and inspected both flanks in person. on the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. on the left, however, osterhaus was not faring so well. he had been repulsed with some loss. as soon as the road could be cleared of mcclernand's troops i ordered up mcpherson, who was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of logan's division. this was about noon. i ordered him to send one brigade (general john e. smith's was selected) to support osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. this movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. it was successful and unattended by heavy loss. the enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset. while the movement to our left was going on, mcclernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. i had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. we followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from port gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf --movement up the big black--battle of raymond. we started next morning for port gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. we were soon in the town, and i was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. the troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the south fork of the bayou pierre. at this time the water was high and the current rapid. what might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. colonel j. h. wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. officers and men generally joined in this work. when it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the north fork that day. one brigade of logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the north fork to repair the bridge there. the enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. before leaving port gibson we were reinforced by crocker's division, mcpherson's corps, which had crossed the mississippi at bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days' rations. mcpherson still had one division west of the mississippi river, guarding the road from milliken's bend to the river below until sherman's command should relieve it. on leaving bruinsburg for the front i left my son frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after grand gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that i had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at thompson's hill--called the battle of port gibson--found his way to where i was. he had no horse to ride at the time, and i had no facilities for even preparing a meal. he, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached grand gulf. mr. c. a. dana, then an officer of the war department, accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. he was in the same situation as fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. the first time i call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. my son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. he looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. his age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. when the movement from bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train. the train still west of the mississippi was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from milliken's bend to hard times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of port gibson. my own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what i had on, was with this train. general a. j. smith happened to have an extra horse at bruinsburg which i borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. i had no other for nearly a week. it was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. i directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. in it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. the making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. no formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them. it was at port gibson i first heard through a southern paper of the complete success of colonel grierson, who was making a raid through central mississippi. he had started from la grange april 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. on the 21st he had detached colonel hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between columbus and macon and then return to la grange. hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at okalona and tupelo, and arriving in la grange april 26. grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the vicksburg and meridian railroad and the new orleans and jackson railroad, arriving at baton rouge may 2d. this raid was of great importance, for grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against vicksburg. during the night of the 2d of may the bridge over the north fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. it was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from grand gulf to vicksburg. every commanding position from this (grindstone) crossing to hankinson's ferry over the big black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress. mcpherson, however, reached hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to vicksburg. when the junction of the road going to vicksburg with the road from grand gulf to raymond and jackson was reached, logan with his division was turned to the left towards grand gulf. i went with him a short distance from this junction. mcpherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of port gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. mcpherson was ordered to hold hankinson's ferry and the road back to willow springs with one division; mcclernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. i did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear. on the way from the junction to grand gulf, where the road comes into the one from vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, i learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to vicksburg. i left logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while i rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. admiral porter had already arrived with his fleet. the enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. when i reached grand gulf may 3d i had not been with my baggage since the 27th of april and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as i could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. the first thing i did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship. then i wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from cairo, orders to general sullivan commanding above vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. about twelve o'clock at night i was through my work and started for hankinson's ferry, arriving there before daylight. while at grand gulf i heard from banks, who was on the red river, and who said that he could not be at port hudson before the 10th of may and then with only 15,000 men. up to this time my intention had been to secure grand gulf, as a base of supplies, detach mcclernand's corps to banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of port hudson. the news from banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. to wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month. the reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. the enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than banks could have brought. i therefore determined to move independently of banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of vicksburg and invest or capture the city. grand gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at washington were notified. i knew well that halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. the time it would take to communicate with washington and get a reply would be so great that i could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. even sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four states of the confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. he urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life." to this i replied: "i do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from grand gulf. i know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. what i do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." we started from bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. a delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. mcclernand's and mcpherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days' rations in haversacks. beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance. quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. all these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. but the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the yazoo above vicksburg. while the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations i ordered reconnoissances made by mcclernand and mcpherson, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the big black and attack the city at once. on the 6th sherman arrived at grand gulf and crossed his command that night and the next day. three days' rations had been brought up from grand gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. orders were given for a forward movement the next day. sherman was directed to order up blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from milliken's bend to hard times with two brigades. the quartermaster at young's point was ordered to send two hundred wagons with blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. on the 3d hurlbut, who had been left at memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to milliken's bend to relieve blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. the four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay. during the night of the 6th mcpherson drew in his troops north of the big black and was off at an early hour on the road to jackson, via rocky springs, utica and raymond. that night he and mcclernand were both at rocky springs ten miles from hankinson's ferry. mcpherson remained there during the 8th, while mcclernand moved to big sandy and sherman marched from grand gulf to hankinson's ferry. the 9th, mcpherson moved to a point within a few miles west of utica; mcclernand and sherman remained where they were. on the 10th mcpherson moved to utica, sherman to big sandy; mcclernand was still at big sandy. the 11th, mcclernand was at five mile creek; sherman at auburn; mcpherson five miles advanced from utica. may 12th, mcclernand was at fourteen mile creek; sherman at fourteen mile creek; mcpherson at raymond after a battle. after mcpherson crossed the big black at hankinson's ferry vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. it is not probable, however, that pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement. the broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the big black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. it was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of vicksburg, and approach from that direction. accordingly, mcpherson's troops that had crossed the big black were withdrawn and the movement east to jackson commenced. as has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. the troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. mcclernand's corps was kept with its left flank on the big black guarding all the crossings. fourteen mile creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by mcclernand and sherman with slight loss. mcpherson was to the right of sherman, extending to raymond. the cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack. in making this move i estimated pemberton's movable force at vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at haines' bluff and jackson. it would not be possible for pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and i determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. this was done with success, but i found afterwards that i had entirely under-estimated pemberton's strength. up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. my line was now nearly parallel with the jackson and vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. the right was at raymond eighteen miles from jackson, mcpherson commanding; sherman in the centre on fourteen mile creek, his advance thrown across; mcclernand to the left, also on fourteen mile creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. mcclernand's left was on the big black. in all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the big black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. mcpherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under general gregg, about two miles out of raymond. this was about two p.m. logan was in advance with one of his brigades. he deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. mcpherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of logan's division, and crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. the order was obeyed with alacrity. logan got his division in position for assault before crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at jackson. in this battle mcpherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing --nearly or quite all from logan's division. the enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. i regarded logan and crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command. crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered. his weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. he died not long after the close of the rebellion. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy --battle of champion's hill. when the news reached me of mcpherson's victory at raymond about sundown my position was with sherman. i decided at once to turn the whole column towards jackson and capture that place without delay. pemberton was now on my left, with, as i supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as i learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. a force was also collecting on my right, at jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with vicksburg connect. all the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. as i hoped in the end to besiege vicksburg i must first destroy all possibility of aid. i therefore determined to move swiftly towards jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon pemberton. but by moving against jackson, i uncovered my own communication. so i finally decided to have none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. i then had no fears for my communications, and if i moved quickly enough could turn upon pemberton before he could attack me in the rear. accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. mcpherson was ordered at daylight to move on clinton, ten miles from jackson; sherman was notified of my determination to capture jackson and work from there westward. he was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to raymond. mcclernand was ordered to march with three divisions by dillon's to raymond. one was left to guard the crossing of the big black. on the 10th i had received a letter from banks, on the red river, asking reinforcements. porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and i now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. i looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held port hudson and vicksburg as a waste of time and material. general joseph e. johnston arrived at jackson in the night of the 13th from tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the confederate troops in mississippi. i knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. on the 6th i had written to general halleck: "information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from tullahoma." up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary. mcpherson reached clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. sherman's advance reached raymond before the last of mcpherson's command had got out of the town. mcclernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at edward's station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. on the night of the 13th, mcpherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon jackson, only fifteen miles away. sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from raymond to jackson, which is south of the road mcpherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. mcclernand was ordered to move one division of his command to clinton, one division a few miles beyond mississippi springs following sherman's line, and a third to raymond. he was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by mississippi springs. mcclernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. with one division at clinton he was in position to reinforce mcpherson, at jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond mississippi springs was equally available to reinforce sherman; the one at raymond could take either road. he still had two other divisions farther back now that blair had come up, available within a day at jackson. if this last command should not be wanted at jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city. but the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. this i expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by johnston to make this very move. i notified general halleck that i should attack the state capital on the 14th. a courier carried the dispatch to grand gulf through an unprotected country. sherman and mcpherson communicated with each other during the night and arranged to reach jackson at about the same hour. it rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. the roads were intolerable, and in some places on sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. but the troops never murmured. by nine o'clock crocker, of mcpherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. they were outside of the intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of raymond. johnston had been reinforced; during the night by georgia and south carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. he was now on the south and south-west of jackson confronting the confederates behind their breastworks, while mcpherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the vicksburg railroad. artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. mcpherson brought up logan's division while he deployed crocker's for the assault. sherman made similar dispositions on the right. by eleven a.m. both were ready to attack. crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. these troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. this stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. mcpherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the next move. it was now about noon. while this was going on sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the mississippi springs road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to pass. by detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. this brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the north, west and south sides from the pearl river north of the city to the same river south. i was with sherman. he was confronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. appearances did not justify an assault where we were. i had directed sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the pearl river. this force, tuttle's division, not returning i rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. tuttle's movement or mcpherson's pressure had no doubt led johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. i rode immediately to the state house, where i was soon followed by sherman. about the same time mcpherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. he captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the national flag over the rebel capital of mississippi. stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. our loss in this engagement was: mcpherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded; sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured. seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. on this day blair reached new auburn and joined mcclernand's 4th division. he had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. i slept that night in the room that johnston was said to have occupied the night before. about four in the afternoon i sent for the corps commanders and directed the dispositions to be made of their troops. sherman was to remain in jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and manufacturing city of military supplies. he did the work most effectually. sherman and i went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of yankee troops. our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. we looked on for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "c. s. a." woven in each bolt. there was an immense amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. finally i told sherman i thought they had done work enough. the operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. in a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. the proprietor visited washington while i was president to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. he asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by national troops, so that he might use it with congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. i declined. on the night of the 13th johnston sent the following dispatch to pemberton at edward's station: "i have lately arrived, and learn that major-general sherman is between us with four divisions at clinton. it is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. if practicable, come up in his rear at once. to beat such a detachment would be of immense value. all the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. time is all-important." this dispatch was sent in triplicate, by different messengers. one of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from memphis some months before by hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. there was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. he delivered his copy of johnston's dispatch to mcpherson who forwarded it to me. receiving this dispatch on the 14th i ordered mcpherson to move promptly in the morning back to bolton, the nearest point where johnston could reach the road. bolton is about twenty miles west of jackson. i also informed mcclernand of the capture of jackson and sent him the following order: "it is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the big black, and beat us into vicksburg. we must not allow them to do this. turn all your forces towards bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there. move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." and to blair i wrote: "their design is evidently to cross the big black and pass down the peninsula between the big black and yazoo rivers. we must beat them. turn your troops immediately to bolton; take all the trains with you. smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. if practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train." johnston stopped on the canton road only six miles north of jackson, the night of the 14th. he sent from there to pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of jackson, and the following order: "as soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. i am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. can grant supply himself from the mississippi? can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him." the concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. mcpherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. mcclernand's command was, one division (hovey's) on the road mcpherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. one (osterhaus) was at raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near champion's hill; one (carr's) had to pass over the same road with osterhaus, but being back at mississippi springs, would not be detained by it; the fourth (smith's) with blair's division, was near auburn with a different road to pass over. mcclernand faced about and moved promptly. his cavalry from raymond seized bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. the night of the 15th hovey was at bolton; carr and osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; smith was north of raymond with blair in his rear. mcpherson's command, with logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached hovey and went into camp; crocker bivouacked just in hovey's rear on the clinton road. sherman with two divisions, was in jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military factories. i rode in person out to clinton. on my arrival i ordered mcclernand to move early in the morning on edward's station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success. i naturally expected that pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which i have shown were to attack us at clinton. this, indeed, i knew he could not do; but i felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. it turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from edward's station and get between me and my base. i, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. on the 15th pemberton had actually marched south from edward's station, but the rains had swollen baker's creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. this brought him back to the jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over baker's creek. some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join johnston at clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected. about five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed on the jackson and vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. they reported that they had passed through pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. they reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five thousand men. i had expected to leave sherman at jackson another day in order to complete his work; but getting the above information i sent him orders to move with all dispatch to bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. within an hour after receiving this order steele's division was on the road. at the same time i dispatched to blair, who was near auburn, to move with all speed to edward's station. mcclernand was directed to embrace blair in his command for the present. blair's division was a part of the 15th army corps (sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. the 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. mcpherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow hovey's division as closely as possible. mcclernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at edward's station, over which to march his troops. hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the clinton) still farther north. mcclernand was directed to move blair's and a. j. smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and osterhaus and carr by the middle road. orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy. smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. about the same time hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from jackson to vicksburg. mcpherson was hastening up to join hovey, but was embarrassed by hovey's trains occupying the roads. i was still back at clinton. mcpherson sent me word of the situation, and expressed the wish that i was up. by half-past seven i was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. when i arrived hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle. mcclernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than mcpherson. i sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. these orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting mcclernand's advance. champion's hill, where pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. it is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. on the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at baker's creek. it was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. the ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. the left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. the bolton and edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to baker's creek, nearly a mile away. on the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. there was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. from raymond there is a direct road to edward's station, some three miles west of champion's hill. there is one also to bolton. from this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching bolton and leads direct to the same station. it was along these two roads that three divisions of mcclernand's corps, and blair of sherman's, temporarily under mcclernand, were moving. hovey of mcclernand's command was with mcpherson, farther north on the road from bolton direct to edward's station. the middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to baker's creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches edward's station. pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. but he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. mcpherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, logan in front, and posted them on the right of hovey and across the flank of the enemy. logan reinforced hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. i ordered crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. mcpherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution. from logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. he did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. up to this time i had kept my position near hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon i moved with a part of my staff by our right around, until i came up with logan himself. i found him near the road leading down to baker's creek. he was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; hovey, reinforced by two brigades from mcpherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; mcclernand two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions, blair's and a. j. smith's, were confronting the rebel right; ransom, with a brigade of mcarthur's division of the 17th corps (mcpherson's), had crossed the river at grand gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. neither logan nor i knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. just at this juncture a messenger came from hovey, asking for more reinforcements. there were none to spare. i then gave an order to move mcpherson's command by the left flank around to hovey. this uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. during all this time, hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from logan and another from crocker, and by crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. the enemy fled precipitately. this was between three and four o'clock. i rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of carr's division just coming in. osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. hovey's division, and mcpherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. i sent orders to osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to carr, whom i saw personally, i explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the big black, and to cross it if he could; osterhaus to follow him. the pursuit was continued until after dark. the battle of champion's hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. every man of hovey's division and of mcpherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. no other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. osterhaus's and a. j. smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. mcclernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing. i sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. these traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come. it is true, in front of mcclernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. instead of this he sent orders to hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. to obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as mcclernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. of course i did not permit hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior. we had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. this excludes those that did not get up, all of mcclernand's command except hovey. our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his division. had mcclernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had i known the ground as i did afterwards, i cannot see how pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. as it was he lost over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in pursuit. loring's division, which was the right of pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into vicksburg. pemberton himself fell back that night to the big black river. his troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200. mcpherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. the pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. the night of the 16th of may found mcpherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to vicksburg. carr and osterhaus were at edward's station, and blair was about three miles south-east; hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. i pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept in advance until after night. finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. as no troops came up we moved back a mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. we had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. while a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black--investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. we were now assured of our position between johnston and pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. pemberton might have made a night march to the big black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to johnston. but this would have given us vicksburg. it would have been his proper move, however, and the one johnston would have made had he been in pemberton's place. in fact it would have been in conformity with johnston's orders to pemberton. sherman left jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. his rear guard did not get in until two a.m. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. he paroled his prisoners at jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. at bolton he was informed of our victory. he was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to bridgeport on the big black river, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy. blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible. this movement brought sherman's corps together, and at a point where i hoped a crossing of the big black might be effected and sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army. i informed him that i would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. the advance division, carr's (mcclernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at half-past three a.m. on the 17th, followed closely by osterhaus, mcpherson bringing up the rear with his corps. as i expected, the enemy was found in position on the big black. the point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. a bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the big black at ordinary stages. when the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. the bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. at this time there was a foot or two of water in it. the rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. the whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. at the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. carr's division was deployed on our right, lawler's brigade forming his extreme right and reaching through these woods to the river above. osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of carr and covered the enemy's entire front. mcpherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance. while the troops were standing as here described an officer from banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from general halleck, dated the 11th of may. it had been sent by the way of new orleans to banks to be forwarded to me. it ordered me to return to grand gulf and to co-operate from there with banks against port hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege vicksburg. i told the officer that the order came too late, and that halleck would not give it now if he knew our position. the bearer of the dispatch insisted that i ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when i heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. i immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; i think not even to this day. the assault was successful. but little resistance was made. the enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. many tried to escape by swimming the river. some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. the enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. but for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, i have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around vicksburg. as the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. it was but little after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place. as soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. one was taken charge of by lieutenant hains, of the engineer corps, one by general mcpherson himself and one by general ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. my recollection is that hains built a raft bridge; mcpherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. a bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose. by eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. sherman reached bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found blair with the pontoon train already there. a few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning. on the 18th i moved along the vicksburg road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined sherman. my first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the yazoo river above vicksburg. sherman's line of march led him to the very point on walnut hills occupied by the enemy the december before when he was repulsed. sherman was equally anxious with myself. our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers. there were some detached works along the crest of the hill. these were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from haines' bluff had not all got past on their way to vicksburg. at all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. in a few minutes sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the december before on the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. he turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. this, however, he said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and i ought to make a report of it at once. vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. i do not claim to quote sherman's language; but the substance only. my reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on. mcpherson, after crossing the big black, came into the jackson and vicksburg road which sherman was on, but to his rear. he arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. mcclernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to mount albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from baldwin's ferry to vicksburg. this brought him south of mcpherson. i now had my three corps up the works built for the defence of vicksburg, on three roads --one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. by the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. mcpherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the jackson road. mcclernand took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line. on the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. the enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at champion's hill and the big black, and i believed he would not make much effort to hold vicksburg. accordingly, at two o'clock i ordered an assault. it resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy. the 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from yazoo river or chickasaw bayou. most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. they had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. i remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that i heard him, "hard tack." in a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "hard tack! hard tack!" i told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. the cry was instantly changed to cheers. by the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. the bread and coffee were highly appreciated. i now determined on a second assault. johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one i had with me, and i knew he was being reinforced. there was danger of his coming to the assistance of pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. the immediate capture of vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive johnston from the state. but the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try. the attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. all the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. the attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. general mcclernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements. i occupied a position from which i believed i could see as well as he what took place in his front, and i did not see the success he reported. but his request for reinforcements being repeated i could not ignore it, and sent him quinby's division of the 17th corps. sherman and mcpherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of mcclernand. this last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. as soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon vicksburg. chapter xxxvii siege of vicksburg. i now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. the experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. with the navy holding the river, the investment of vicksburg was complete. as long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. these could not last always. the crossing of troops at bruinsburg commenced april 30th. on the 18th of may the army was in rear of vicksburg. on the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won by the union forces; the capital of the state had fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from vicksburg to port hudson, had become ours. the union force that had crossed the mississippi river up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men. one division of these, blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the battle of champion's hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade, ransom's of mcpherson's corps, reached the field after the battle. the enemy had at vicksburg, grand gulf, jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. they were in their own country, where no rear guards were necessary. the country is admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. all their troops had to be met. we were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at port gibson seven or eight thousand; at raymond, five thousand; at jackson, from eight to eleven thousand; at champion's hill, twenty-five thousand; at the big black, four thousand. a part of those met at jackson were all that was left of those encountered at raymond. they were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. our loss up to this time was: killed wounded missing port gibson..... 131 719 25 south fork bayou pierre..... .. 1 .. skirmishes, may 3 ..... 1 9 .. fourteen mile creek..... 6 24 .. raymond............... 66 339 39 jackson..... 42 251 7 champion's hill..... 410 1,844 187 big black..... 39 237 3 bridgeport..... .. 1 .. total..... 695 3,425 259 of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. not half of them were disabled for any length of time. after the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege began. sherman occupied the right starting from the river above vicksburg, mcpherson the centre (mcarthur's division now with him) and mcclernand the left, holding the road south to warrenton. lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line. in the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the yazoo river and chickasaw bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. the troops had been without these from the time of crossing the mississippi up to this time. all was now ready for the pick and spade. prentiss and hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the big black, and to observe johnston. i knew that johnston was receiving reinforcements from bragg, who was confronting rosecrans in tennessee. vicksburg was so important to the enemy that i believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere. my line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from haines' bluff to vicksburg, thence to warrenton. the line of the enemy was about seven. in addition to this, having an enemy at canton and jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defence facing the other way. i had not troops enough under my command to man these. general halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch. the ground about vicksburg is admirable for defence. on the north it is about two hundred feet above the mississippi river at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. but here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small streams. the enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a southwesterly direction to the river. deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defences. as there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. to follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. the work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. the problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. we had but four engineer officers with us. captain prime, of the engineer corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. his health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by captain comstock, also of the engineer corps. to provide assistants on such a long line i directed that all officers who had graduated at west point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to their other duties assist in the work. the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. the chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a sap-roller. as soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, i let him off. the general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall. we had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the west to draw from. admiral porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. the first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. the enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. in no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. it was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. to give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. on top of these, logs were put. by these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. the enemy used in their defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but i do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. when they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. in these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. the enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it freely. splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind. there were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. these answered as cochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy. the labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. the work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were advanced. by the 30th of june there were two hundred and twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. we were now as strong for defence against the garrison of vicksburg as they were against us; but i knew that johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east. he had at this time a larger force than i had had at any time prior to the battle of champion's hill. as soon as the news of the arrival of the union army behind vicksburg reached the north, floods of visitors began to pour in. some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the christian and sanitary associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. they did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. but the intention was good. among the earliest arrivals was the governor of illinois, with most of the state officers. i naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. in sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. i therefore took them to sherman's headquarters and presented them. before starting out to look at the lines--possibly while sherman's horse was being saddled --there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the north had been so imperfectly informed. there was a little knot around sherman and another around me, and i heard sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from walnut hills upon the land below on the 18th of may, adding: "grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; i opposed it. i wrote him a letter about it." but for this speech it is not likely that sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. his untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. he could not have done more if the plan had been his own. (*13) on the 26th of may i sent blair's division up the yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the big black and the yazoo. the country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. blair was instructed to take all of it. the cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. blair went forty-five miles and was gone almost a week. his work was effectually done. i requested porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful, up to haines' bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent. on the 26th i also received a letter from banks, asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at port hudson. of course i could not comply with his request, nor did i think he needed them. he was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. on the 3d of june a brigade from hurlbut's command arrived, general kimball commanding. it was sent to mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of haines' bluff and about midway between the big black and the yazoo. a brigade of blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on blair's return from the yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the big black river, to destroy the roads in his (blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. on the 7th of june our little force of colored and white troops across the mississippi, at milliken's bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men from richard taylor's trans-mississippi command. with the aid of the gunboats they were speedily repelled. i sent mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the tensas bayou; and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. this was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. these men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well. on the 8th of june a full division arrived from hurlbut's command, under general sooy smith. it was sent immediately to haines' bluff, and general c. c. washburn was assigned to the general command at that point. on the 11th a strong division arrived from the department of the missouri under general herron, which was placed on our left. this cut off the last possible chance of communication between pemberton and johnston, as it enabled lauman to close up on mcclernand's left while herron intrenched from lauman to the water's edge. at this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. through this opening no doubt the confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night. on the 14th general parke arrived with two divisions of burnside's corps, and was immediately dispatched to haines' bluff. these latter troops--herron's and parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of sent by halleck in anticipation of their being needed. they arrived none too soon. i now had about seventy-one thousand men. more than half were disposed across the peninsula, between the yazoo at haines' bluff and the big black, with the division of osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the jackson road to baldwin's ferry and below. there were eight roads leading into vicksburg, along which and their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. on the 17th i received a letter from general sherman and one on the 18th from general mcpherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by general mcclernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. this order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. the order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of mcclernand's command until brought in this way. i at once wrote to mcclernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. he did so, and i at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and ordered him back to springfield, illinois. the publication of his order in the press was in violation of war department orders and also of mine. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines' bluff--explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. on the 22d of june positive information was received that johnston had crossed the big black river for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release pemberton. the correspondence between johnston and pemberton shows that all expectation of holding vicksburg had by this time passed from johnston's mind. i immediately ordered sherman to the command of all the forces from haines' bluff to the big black river. this amounted now to quite half the troops about vicksburg. besides these, herron and a. j. smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce sherman. haines' bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the big black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. the work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. we were now looking west, besieging pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by johnston. but as against the garrison of vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, i think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. we were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but i did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon pemberton's army, while i would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by johnston. from the 23d of may the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. at three points on the jackson road, in front of leggett's brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of june we had it undermined and the mine charged. the enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. at this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. in fact this parapet was also our protection. the soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the union soldiers for the tobacco of the confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them. our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. this caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. on the 25th of june at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. a heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. the effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. the breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. in fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. there were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. all that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. i remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. he was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. some one asked him how high he had gone up. "dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply. general logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. as soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. the enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. from here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. the compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. the enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. during the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. we found it impossible to continue this work. another mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of july, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. no attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. the enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. we lost none in the second. from this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and i determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. we were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us. at this time an intercepted dispatch from johnston to pemberton informed me that johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at vicksburg. i knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. the picket lines were so close to each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets--that the men could converse. on the 21st of june i was informed, through this means, that pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. the rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. afterwards this story was verified: on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. all necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. our pickets were doubled; admiral porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the louisiana side. had the attempt been made the garrison of vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the louisiana side. general richard taylor was expected on the west bank to co-operate in this movement, i believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. the mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of vicksburg and of port hudson. we had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from lake providence to opposite bruinsburg. the roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force. by the 1st of july our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. at ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of july. the debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches. on the night of the 1st of july johnston was between brownsville and the big black, and wrote pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him. on july 1st pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders: "unless the siege of vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. i see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. you are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation." two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. pemberton had previously got a message to johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement. on the 3d about ten o'clock a.m. white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. they proved to be general bowen, a division commander, and colonel montgomery, aide-de-camp to pemberton, bearing the following letter to me: "i have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of vicksburg. to this end, if agreeable to you, i will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. i make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. this communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by major-general john s. bowen." it was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. the troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the union sure to be saved. bowen was received by general a. j. smith, and asked to see me. i had been a neighbor of bowen's in missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. he then suggested that i should meet pemberton. to this i sent a verbal message saying that, if pemberton desired it, i would meet him in front of mcpherson's corps at three o'clock that afternoon. i also sent the following written reply to pemberton's letter: "your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. the useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and i can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. i do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because i have no terms other than those indicated above." at three o'clock pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. generals ord, mcpherson, logan and a. j. smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. it was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "the true cross." pemberton and i had served in the same division during part of the mexican war. i knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. he soon asked what terms i proposed to give his army if it surrendered. my answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "the conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. i said, "very well." general bowen, i saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. his manner and remarks while pemberton and i were talking, showed this. he now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. i had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. smith and bowen accordingly had a conference, during which pemberton and i, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines were in conversation. after a while bowen suggested that the confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. this was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. the interview here ended, i agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night. word was sent to admiral porter soon after the correspondence with pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. it was agreed on my paging with pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. when i returned to my headquarters i sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting vicksburg. half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for johnston. i informed them of the contents of pemberton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that i was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. this was the nearest approach to a "council of war" i ever held. against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council i sent the following letter: "in conformity with agreement of this afternoon, i will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of vicksburg, public stores, etc. on your accepting the terms proposed, i will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight a.m. to-morrow. as soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. the rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. if these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. the same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. the paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." by the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either aiken's landing below dutch gap on the james river, or to vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. there was a confederate commissioner at vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. i did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. had i insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the mississippi. thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to washington or baltimore; thence again by steamer to aiken's--all at very great expense. at aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the confederates did not have union prisoners to give in exchange. then again pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; i knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. a large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes. late at night i received the following reply to my last letter: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. in the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of vicksburg, i have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. at ten o'clock a.m. to-morrow, i propose to evacuate the works in and around vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. after which you will take possession. officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." this was received after midnight. my reply was as follows: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d july. the amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. it will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. again, i can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. while i do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, i cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. the property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. if you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, i will make no objection to it. should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock a.m. i shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men." pemberton promptly accepted these terms. during the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. all rebels were known as "johnnies," all union troops as "yanks." often "johnny" would call: "well, yank, when are you coming into town?" the reply was sometimes: "we propose to celebrate the 4th of july there." sometimes it would be: "we always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "we are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." the garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. they knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. the vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "yankee" boast that they would take dinner in vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was "first ketch your rabbit." the paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper. the last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had "caught our rabbit." i have no doubt that pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday, the anniversary of the declaration of american independence. holding out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter particular. at the appointed hour the garrison of vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good order. our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. the enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. i myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. it was accepted with avidity and with thanks. pemberton says in his report: "if it should be asked why the 4th of july was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. i believed that upon that day i should obtain better terms. well aware of the vanity of our foe, i knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of july into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." this does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. but it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock a.m., july 3d. it then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. he knew that johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. he knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth. in our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. it was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. on the 4th of july general holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the trans-mississippi department, made an attack upon helena, arkansas. he was totally defeated by general prentiss, who was holding helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers. holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed; but as prentiss buried 400, holmes evidently understated his losses. the union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing. this was the last effort on the part of the confederacy to raise the siege of vicksburg. on the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, i notified sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against johnston, drive him out of the state and destroy his army if he could. steele and ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join sherman as soon as the surrender took place. of this sherman was notified. i rode into vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. at that time i found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. the ridges upon which vicksburg is built, and those back to the big black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone. the magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. a door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. in some instances i saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. in these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and dav without intermission. i returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move into the town until the sixth. on the afternoon of the fourth i sent captain wm. m. dunn of my staff to cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. it was as follows: "the enemy surrendered this morning. the only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. this i regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. it saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on johnston, to drive him from the state. i will send troops to the relief of banks, and return the 9th army corps to burnside." this news, with the victory at gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the president, his cabinet and the loyal people all over the north. the fate of the confederacy was sealed when vicksburg fell. much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the morale was with the supporters of the union ever after. i at the same time wrote to general banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying i would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the mississippi river. general banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of general gardner, who was then in command of port hudson. gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the national forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. he added that if this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. general banks gave him assurances that vicksburg had been surrendered, and general gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of july. port hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell into the hands of the union forces: from that day to the close of the rebellion the mississippi river, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the national troops. pemberton and his army were kept in vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. the paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, federals and confederates), and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us. several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but i declined. it also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. he wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. this request was also declined. it was precisely what i expected and hoped that they would do. i told him, however, that i would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. by the eleventh, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the confederate garrison marched out. many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the james river to be paroled. as soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. the prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. no restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. they were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. the men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. when they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. really, i believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists. the day before the departure the following order was issued: "paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. they will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to edward's ferry, (*14) and on by way of raymond. instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed." chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. the capture of vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the north. new hopes for the final success of the cause of the union were inspired. the victory gained at gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. now the mississippi river was entirely in the possession of the national troops; for the fall of vicksburg gave us port hudson at once. the army of northern virginia was driven out of pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861. the army of the tennessee united with the army of the gulf, dividing the confederate states completely. the first dispatch i received from the government after the fall of vicksburg was in these words: "i fear your paroling the prisoners at vicksburg, without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. such has been the case elsewhere. if these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders." halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of major watts, confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. at vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. the small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old united states flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the belgian musket imported early in the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at--and a few new and improved arms. these were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. the enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. after the surrender i authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter. a large number of arms turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the union army in the capture of vicksburg. in this narrative i have not made the mention i should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. neither have i made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. suffice it to say, the close of the siege of vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. a military education was acquired which no other school could have given. men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. logan and crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies. general f. p. blair joined me at milliken's bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. he commanded a division in the campaign. i had known blair in missouri, where i had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for congress. i knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. i dreaded his coming; i knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination. it affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. there was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. he was one man as a soldier, another as a politician. the navy under porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. it could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. the most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. there never was a request made, that i am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with. the campaign of vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. the elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. a forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. accordingly i resolved to get below vicksburg, unite with banks against port hudson, make new orleans a base and, with that base and grand gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against vicksburg. upon reaching grand gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, i received a letter from banks informing me that he could not be at port hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. the time was worth more than the reinforcements; i therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. with a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. a rapid movement west was made; the garrison of vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. it looks now as though providence had directed the course of the campaign while the army of the tennessee executed the decree. upon the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg there were three things that required immediate attention. the first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the state. the second was to send reinforcements to banks near port hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the stars and stripes. the third was to inform the authorities at washington and the north of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. soon after negotiations were opened with general pemberton for the surrender of the city, i notified sherman, whose troops extended from haines' bluff on the left to the crossing of the vicksburg and jackson road over the big black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the state as soon as vicksburg surrendered. steele and ord were directed to be in readiness to join sherman in his move against general johnston, and sherman was advised of this also. sherman moved promptly, crossing the big black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at bolton, twenty miles west of jackson. johnston heard of the surrender of vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on jackson. on the 8th of july sherman was within ten miles of jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town. the siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. the weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but sherman sent one division, steele's, to brandon, fourteen miles east of jackson. the national loss in the second capture of jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. the confederate loss was probably less, except in captured. more than this number fell into our hands as prisoners. medicines and food were left for the confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind. a large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in jackson. medicine and food were also sent to raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as i thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. i wrote to sherman: "impress upon the men the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. they should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people." provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from bruinsburg to jackson and back to vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. sherman was ordered back to vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before--from the big black to haines' bluff. having cleaned up about vicksburg and captured or routed all regular confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, i felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed. i suggested to the general-in-chief the idea of a campaign against mobile, starting from lake pontchartrain. halleck preferred another course. the possession of the trans-mississippi by the union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the mississippi. i am well aware that the president was very anxious to have a foothold in texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the confederate states. this, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western louisiana and eastern texas, by sending a garrison at once to brownsville on the rio grande. halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against mobile, so that i was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as i had been a year before in west tennessee. it would have been an easy thing to capture mobile at the time i proposed to go there. having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against general bragg's army. this would necessarily have compelled bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. if he had not done this the troops from mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and lee's were yet receiving their supplies. i was so much impressed with this idea that i renewed my request later in july and again about the 1st of august, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near mobile. i also asked for a leave of absence to visit new orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against mobile should be approved. both requests were refused. so far as my experience with general halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one. but i did not regard this as a favor. it was simply in line of duty, though out of my department. the general-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least good. by orders, i sent to banks a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to kentucky and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to schofield in missouri where price was raiding the state. i also detached a brigade under ransom to natchez, to garrison that place permanently. this latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when ransom arrived there. the enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from texas to feed the eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through texas from the rio grande and which were on the way to lee's and other armies in the east. the troops that were left with me around vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. the guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. the country back of vicksburg was filled with deserters from pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from johnston's also. the men determined not to fight again while the war lasted. those who lived beyond the reach of the confederate army wanted to get to their homes. those who did not, wanted to get north where they could work for their support till the war was over. besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. it is not probable that pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. on the 7th of august i further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps, general ord commanding, to banks. besides this i received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the mississippi. having received this order i went to new orleans to confer with banks about the proposed movement. all these movements came to naught. during this visit i reviewed banks' army a short distance above carrollton. the horse i rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to new orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. i was rendered insensible, and when i regained consciousness i found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. my leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit. the pain was almost beyond endurance. i lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. i had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was carried to it on a litter. i was then taken to vicksburg, where i remained unable to move for some time afterwards. while i was absent general sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. no orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of sherman. on the 13th of september, while i was still in new orleans, halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to memphis and thence to tuscumbia, to co-operate with rosecrans for the relief of chattanooga. on the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to rosecrans. this was received on the 27th. i was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but i at once ordered sherman to send one division to memphis as fast as transports could be provided. the division of mcpherson's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join steele in arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to hurlbut at memphis. hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there. halleck suggested that some good man, like sherman or mcpherson, should be sent to memphis to take charge of the troops going east. on this i sent sherman, as being, i thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. he was directed to take with him another division of his corps. this left one back, but having one of mcpherson's divisions he had still the equivalent. before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of chickamauga had been fought and rosecrans forced back into chattanooga. the administration as well as the general-in-chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. mr. charles a. dana, an officer of the war department, was sent to rosecrans' headquarters. i do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in chattanooga when i arrived there at a later period. it seems that halleck suggested that i should go to nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west. i received the following dispatch dated october 3d: "it is the wish of the secretary of war that as soon as general grant is able he will come to cairo and report by telegraph." i was still very lame, but started without delay. arriving at columbus on the 16th i reported by telegraph: "your dispatch from cairo of the 3d directing me to report from cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th. left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for cairo." end of volume i. [illustration: the gunboat series. books for boys, by a gunboat boy. frank in the woods. porter & coates, philadelphia, pa.] frank and archie series. frank in the woods. by harry castlemon, author of "the rocky mountain series," "the go-ahead series," etc. philadelphia: porter & coates. cincinnati, o.: r. w. carroll & co. contents. chapter i. the encampment 7 chapter ii. an unpleasant companion 15 chapter iii. an indian hunt 27 chapter iv. the "ole settler" 47 chapter v. the fight in the woods 52 chapter vi. the white buck 76 chapter vii. a midnight attack 90 chapter viii. a couple of new pets 101 chapter ix. close quarters with a grizzly 116 chapter x. a beaver hunt 132 chapter xi. breaking up a moose-pen 143 chapter xii. the moose shows his qualities 152 chapter xiii. the black mustang 169 chapter xiv. a brush with the greasers 180 chapter xv. caught at last 194 chapter xvi. the lost wagon-train 204 chapter xvii. the struggle in the cave 216 chapter xviii. end of the trapper and black mustang 227 chapter xix. the indians again 236 chapter xx. the journey homeward 251 frank in the woods. chapter i. the encampment. our scene opens in the swamp that stretches away for miles north of lawrence. it was a cold, dreary night. the wind moaned and whistled through the leafless branches of the trees, sending the snow in fitful gusts through every nook and corner of the forest. on the banks of a small lake, that lay hemmed in on all sides by tall trees, which bowed to every gust of the winter's storm, was an encampment. a rude hut--built, however, after the most approved hunter fashion, with its back to the wind, and its front open to a cheerful fire--stood in a little grove of evergreens, ready to receive beneath its friendly shelter four boys, whom you could easily recognize as our old friends of the sailing and fishing frolics described in "the young naturalist." we left them, after a hard day's work at fox-hunting--archie asleep on the bed, and frank seated in his easy chair, reading one of his favorite authors; while george and harry, who had a quarter of a mile to go before they reached home, were walking slowly along the road, so weary that they could scarcely drag one foot after the other. to enable the reader to understand how we come to find them here in the woods, twenty miles from any human habitation, we must conduct him back to lawrence, and relate a few incidents with which he is not acquainted. on the day following the one on which the foxhunt took place, the boys were too lame to tramp about, and they passed most of their time in the shop. frank commenced to prepare the fox-skin for mounting in the museum, and archie busied himself in putting his traps in working order. while thus engaged, frank exclaimed: "archie, let's go and make uncle joe a visit. what do you say?" "i should like to go very much," said archie; "but you know it's a mean journey to make in winter. i don't like the idea of carrying my baggage on"---"we need not carry any thing," interrupted frank. "i have been thinking it all over, and i don't see why we can't do as the canadian trappers do--drag our baggage after us on sleds." the village boys had always been in the habit of visiting uncle joe in the summer; the journey could then be made with scarcely any inconvenience, for glen's creek ran within a few feet of the old hunter's cabin; but in winter the traveling was much more difficult, for the boys were obliged to carry their provisions, blankets, and other needful articles, on their backs. but frank's plan obviated this difficulty. the creek was frozen over, and using it as a highway, they could accomplish the journey to uncle joe's almost as easily as with a boat. "that's a first-rate idea," said archie. "i wonder why we did not think of it before! let us go right to work and make the sled." "we had better wait until we find out whether mother will let us go or not," said frank; "besides, we want harry and george to go with us." "i think aunt mary will give her consent," said archie, laying aside his traps. "let's go in and ask her." the boys readily answered all mrs. nelson's objections--such as being lost in the woods and eaten up by bears--by assuring her that they were well acquainted with the road to uncle joe's, for they had traveled it several times before; besides, they had a compass, and it was impossible to get lost; and, as to the bears, there were very few of them in the woods, and no bear that ever lived was a match for four boys, all good marksmen, armed with double-barrel shot-guns, and assisted by three good dogs. so mrs. nelson was obliged to consent, and the boys started off to see george and harry. the latter easily obtained their parents' permission, and the boys adjourned to the kitchen to talk over their plans. it was decided that two sleds would carry all their baggage, and that every thing should be ready for the start early on monday morning; it was then friday. after making all their arrangements, frank and his cousin returned home, and immediately commenced working on their sled. a stout hickory sapling, which they had used in stretching and curing the skin of the deer they killed in the lake, was sawed in twain for the runners, and bent into shape by steaming. the braces were then put in, and before dark the body of the sled was completed. it was light and very strong, and archie dragged it about the shop in high glee. "it's all done but the box," said he. "we don't want any box," said his cousin. "it would only make the sled heavy, without doing any good. we will get an old quilt or blanket from mother, and that will do better than a box." this article was soon obtained, and fastened to the sled in such a manner that it could be strapped around the baggage; and just as hannah called them to supper, the sled was pronounced ready for the journey. the next day hannah was kept busy baking biscuit and other provisions sufficient to last until they reached uncle joe's; while the boys busied themselves in cleaning their guns, sharpening their knives and axes, and getting every thing ready for the start. time seemed to move on laggard wings, so impatient were they to be off; but monday morning came at length, and the boys were stirring long before daylight. as soon as they had eaten breakfast, the sled was brought out of the shop, and their baggage--which consisted of a change of clothes, blankets, ammunition, axes, and provisions--was strapped on securely. just as they completed their preparations, george and harry came along. bidding mrs. nelson and julia good-by, they all started off; and, after a hard day's tramp, encamped at the place where we now find them. after they had finished carrying their baggage into the hut, a lively scene was presented. harry sat before the fire, cutting a pair of leggins out of a finely-dressed deer-skin, which he had spread on the floor of the hut; george was engaged in arranging their beds; archie was in front of the hut, chopping the evening's supply of fire-wood; and frank was superintending the cooking of their supper. the dogs lay stretched out on a blanket, enjoying a quiet nap. "there," said archie, at length, leaning on his ax, and surveying the pile of wood he had cut; "i guess that will last us through the night." "yes, that's a plenty," said frank. "come, boys, supper is ready!" archie accordingly entered the hut, and, after depositing his ax in a corner, picked out a warm place by the fire, and commenced helping himself to the eatables. the meal consisted of squirrels, which had been roasted on spits before the fire, coffee, and bread and butter. their long tramp--they had made about twenty miles since morning--had sharpened their appetites, and the supper rapidly disappeared. but there was enough left for the dogs, and after they had been bountifully fed, and the supper dishes washed, the boys stretched themselves out on their blankets before the fire. each seemed to be occupied with his own thoughts. the sifting of the snow over the roof of the hut, the crackling of the fire, and an occasional howl of a wolf, were the only sounds that broke the stillness. at length, harry said: "now, boys, this is the kind of a life i enjoy. doesn't it make a fellow feel comfortable, to lie here and listen to the storm, and know that he is securely sheltered? for my part, i don't see how a person can live cooped up in a city all his life." "it is a difficult matter," answered archie; "for i have tried it, and profess to know something about it. how many times i have sat in school, when i had a hard lesson to get, and looked out of the window, and wished that i was off in the woods somewhere!" "well, you're here at last," said george; "but the only way to pass a long winter evening is in listening to a good story. come, frank, give us one." "yes," chimed in harry, "give us something exciting." "a hunting adventure," said archie, "or a fight with the indians." "o, you will hear plenty of such stories when we get to uncle joe's," said frank. "but i will tell you of an adventure which happened to my uncle, who was a young lawyer at the time, settled in st. louis;" and frank, after rearranging his blanket commenced as follows: chapter ii. an unpleasant companion. "it was one bright evening, in the fall of 18--," said my uncle, "while i was traveling on horseback through the northern part of missouri, that i reined up before a pleasant little tavern, where i purposed to stop for the night. the landlord, a bustling little englishman, soon had supper ready for me, and as i had not eaten a mouthful since morning, i sat down to it with a most ravenous appetite, and ate until i began to feel ashamed of myself, and finally stopped, not because i was satisfied, but because i had eaten every thing on the table, and did not wish to call for more. as i was rising from the table, the hostler entered the room, and said: "'what be the matter with your 'orse, sir? he be so lame he can 'ardly walk?' "'the matter with my horse!' i repeated; 'there was nothing the matter with him when i gave him into your charge;' and, in no amiable mood, i started for the stable. "my horse, which was the gift of a deceased friend, was one of the finest animals i ever saw. i had owned him for more than six years, during which he had been my almost constant companion; and as i had neither wife nor child to love, it is no wonder that my affections clustered around him. i found that he was indeed lame; one of his legs was swollen to twice its usual size, and it was with great difficulty that he could move. i was for some time entirely at a loss how to account for it, and felt very much like giving the hostler, who stood at a little distance, eyeing me as though he expected a kicking, a piece of my mind, when i happened to remember that, as i was that afternoon descending a steep hill, my horse had stepped upon a rolling stone, and almost thrown me from the saddle; and i noticed that he limped a little afterward; but i thought it was nothing serious, and had almost forgotten the circumstance. this i explained, in a few words, to the hostler, who drew a long breath, as if a mighty load had been removed from his breast. after rubbing the animal's leg with some liniment, which i had brought with me, i saw him plentifully fed and bedded down, and returned to the tavern. after spending an hour listening to the 'yarns' of the occupants of the bar-room, i went up to bed, and was soon fast asleep. near the middle of the night, i was aroused by loud voices under my window; and, as soon as i was fairly awake, i found that something unusual was going on. the shrill, frightened voices of the females mingled with the hoarse ejaculations of the men, and every thing appeared to be in the greatest confusion. i sprang out of bed, and after hastily drawing on my clothes, ran down into the bar-room. "'what's the matter, landlord?' i inquired of my host, as he hurried by me, pale and almost breathless with excitement. "'matter!' he repeated. 'come and see. giles barlow has been around again, and there is one poor fellow less in the world, i'm afraid.' "he led the way to a small bed-room, which opened off the bar-room, where i found several persons crowded around a bed, on which lay the form of a man, and a surgeon was engaged in bandaging an ugly-looking wound, which he had received in his breast. as soon as the operation was completed, he informed us, in reply to an inquiry of one of the bystanders, that the wound was dangerous, but that by careful nursing the man might recover; and ended by requesting us to leave the room, as much depended on his being kept quiet. we moved back into the bar-room, and i inquired of one of the men who giles barlow was. "'why, don't you know?' he asked, in surprise. 'i thought everybody had heard of him! i guess you are a stranger in these parts, ain't you?' "i replied in the affirmative. "'you must live a good piece from here,' said the man, 'or you would certainly have heard of giles barlow. he is a highwayman, that has been about here for almost ten years, murdering folks and stealing their money. he goes on the principle that "dead men tell no tales."' "'why haven't you arrested him before this time?' i inquired. "'o, yes,' answered the man, 'that's all easy enough to talk about. haven't we tried that game? we've hunted him with rifles, and tracked him with blood-hounds, but you might as well try to catch a will-o'-the-wisp.' "'what sort of a looking man is he?' i asked. "'he's a small man,' answered my informant, 'and looks like a dried-up mullen-stalk. but, the lord love you, he's quick as lightning, and he's got an eye that can look right through a common man. and such hair! it is long and curly, and looks like snakes stuck on his head. i've seen him once, and i never want to meet him alone in the woods, now, i tell you.' "i felt some curiosity to know something more of this noted robber, but before i could ask another question the man had walked away, shrugging his shoulders, and joined a group of his companions, who stood in one corner of the room, talking over the matter. "after the exciting scenes through which i had just passed, sleep was of course out of the question; and i stretched myself out on a bench by the fireplace, and waited impatiently for the morning. it came at length, and, as was my usual custom, i hurried out to the stable to look after my horse. i found him much better, but his leg was still swollen, and i knew that he would not be in good traveling condition for at least a week. "'landlord,' i exclaimed, as i entered the bar-room, 'where can i hire a horse for two or three days? i must be in bennington by day after to-morrow, and my horse is too lame to travel.' "'well,' said the landlord, 'you are in a nice fix. i don't believe there is a horse about here you can get.' "'i must have one,' i answered, 'for i must be in bennington as soon as possible.' "'well, i'll see what i can do for you,' said the landlord, and, going to the door, he shouted to the hostler, who stood in the stable, rubbing down my horse, 'tom, go over to bill parker's and see if you can get his mare. tell him there's a gentleman here who wants to hire her for two or three days.' "tom started off immediately, but soon returned with the information that mr. parker had gone off into the country to buy cattle, and would not return in less than a week. "what should i do? i had an important case to attend to in bennington, and must be there in time. i was about making up my mind that i would start off on foot, when the landlord suddenly exclaimed: "'i'll tell you what you can do. this creek' (pointing to a wide, deep stream which flowed by a little distance from the tavern) 'runs within half a mile of where you want to go; and i guess you might hire jim hilton's boat.' "mr. hilton's dwelling was pointed out to me, and, in a few moments, i found my man chopping wood in the yard. i made known my wants. after rolling his quid about in his mouth, he concluded to let me have the boat, or rather dugout, provided i would 'do the fair thing' by him. to this i readily agreed. after giving emphatic directions as to the treatment of my horse, i stepped into the canoe, and was soon out of sight of the tavern. i used my paddle with a will, and made good headway. when i became weary, i would cease paddling, and allow the canoe to glide along with the current, giving only an occasional stroke to direct its course. "about noon, i began to grow hungry, and turned the canoe's head toward the shore, to eat my dinner and rest myself, for i had become very tired from the cramped position in which i was obliged to sit. in about an hour i made preparations to continue my journey, and was about pushing the canoe from the shore, when a strong, cheery voice called out: "'hallo, friend! whither bound?' "i looked up, and saw a man, dressed in the garb of a hunter, standing on the bank above me, leaning on his rifle. "'i am going to bennington,' i replied. "'are you? that's lucky. i am traveling in the same direction. would you have any objections to good company?' "'no sir,' i replied. 'come on.' "the hunter came down the bank; depositing his rifle and knapsack carefully in the bow of the canoe, he took up one of the paddles, and we pulled from the shore. as soon as we got out into the current, i turned, with some casual remark, to take a nearer look at my passenger. merciful heaven! how i started! he was a small man, considerably below the medium hight, very slim, but well formed, and wiry as an eel, and the enormous muscles on his limbs showed plainly with every motion he made. but his eye! how it flashed! and when he turned it on me i felt as though he were reading my very thoughts. and then there were the long 'snaky' ringlets, which the man at the tavern had described to me. my companion was none other than giles barlow, the highwayman and murderer. "you may be sure i was not very well pleased with this discovery, and the cold sweat started out from every pore of my body; still i did not feel afraid, for i was accustomed to scenes of danger, was well armed, and had the reputation of being a tough customer to handle. but the situation in which i was placed would have tried stronger nerves than mine. i thrust my hand into my pocket, and felt that my revolvers were safe. i concluded that, if the worst came to the worst, i could at least have two pulls at him before he could reach me; and, as i was a good shot, i had little fear of missing my mark. "my companion was a very jolly fellow, and joked and laughed as though he felt extremely happy, and i, of course, joined with him, keeping a close watch on all his movements. "the afternoon wore slowly away, and as it began to grow dark, i became doubly watchful, for i knew that if he intended to make an attempt upon my life, the time was approaching. about nine o'clock my companion suddenly said, as he wound up one of his stories: "'there's no need of both of us sitting up. it's a good forty miles to bennington, and we shan't reach it before morning.' "'very well,' said i, 'you may go to sleep first, and i will call you at midnight.' "'o, no,' said he, 'i'm not in the least sleepy; i will steer the canoe, and you can lie down here in the bow, and sleep as long as you like.' "of course it would not answer for me to raise any objections to this, for i knew it would arouse his suspicions; so we changed places, and the highwayman took his seat in the stern of the canoe. after wrapping my cloak around me, and placing myself so that i could see every motion he made, i drew one of my revolvers, and waited impatiently to see what course things would take. "for almost an hour my companion steered the boat very well, and i began to think that perhaps i had been mistaken in my man, when i saw him carefully draw in his paddle, muttering, as he did so: "'ah, my chicken, you little thought that you had giles barlow for a passenger. i'll just quietly douse your glim, and take what money and other little valuables you may have, to pay your traveling expenses to the other world.' "as he spoke, he bent over and drew out of his knapsack a long, shining bowie-knife, and, after trying its edge with his thumb, rose slowly to his feet. in an instant, i threw aside my cloak, and, supporting myself on my elbow, i raised my revolver, and took a quick, steady aim at his breast. he uttered a cry of surprise, but without hesitating a moment, threw himself forward. but the sharp report of the revolver echoed through the woods, and the robber sank back into the canoe, dead. "i arrived at bennington the next morning about ten o'clock, and delivered the body to the authorities. the news spread like wildfire, for the name of giles barlow was as familiar as a household word. "i prosecuted my case with success, and, in a week, returned to the place where i had left my horse. he had received excellent care, and was entirely cured of his lameness; but the landlord stubbornly refused any remuneration. he had heard of my exploit, and that was his way of showing his gratitude." chapter iii. an indian hunt. the next morning, a little after daylight, frank awoke, and, raising himself on his elbow, he gazed about him. the storm had ceased, and the morning was clear and intensely cold. the fire, however, still burned brightly, for the boys had replenished it several times during the night. his companions, comfortably wrapped up in their thick blankets, were sleeping soundly; but frank thought it was high time they were stirring, for they had a good twenty miles to travel that day; so, reaching over, he seized archie by the shoulder and shook him. the long tramp of the previous day had wearied the boys considerably; but with several hearty shakes, frank succeeded in getting them all on their feet; then, after washing his hands and face in the snow, he commenced to prepare their breakfast. after a good deal of yawning and stretching, the others began to bestir themselves; and while archie cut a supply of wood, with which to cook their breakfast, george and harry busied themselves in packing their baggage on the sleds. as soon as they had eaten breakfast, they put out the fire, and renewed their journey. the traveling was much more difficult than it had been the day before, for the snow was piled on the ice in deep drifts, and it was dark before they reached uncle joe's cabin. as they approached, they were welcomed by the old trapper's dogs, and uncle joe finally appeared at the door. "get out, you whelps!" he exclaimed. "who's that a comin' there?" he continued, trying to peer through the darkness. "friends," answered frank. "jeroomagoot!" ejaculated the old man, who recognized frank's voice. "what are you boys doin' out in these woods this time o' night? come in--glad to see you any how," and uncle joe seized their hands as they came up, and shook them heartily. "what have you got on them sleds--your plunder?" "yes," answered archie. "that's a new way we have got of carrying our baggage." "fetch it right into the house then, boys;" and, suiting the action to the word, uncle joe seized the sleds and pulled them into the cabin. "bars and buffalers!" exclaimed a voice, as the boys entered. "how de do youngsters?" and a tall, powerfully built man arose from his chair, and, striding across the floor, approached the boys. it was dick lewis--uncle joe's brother. he was a fine specimen of a north american trapper; fully six feet in hight, with a frame that seemed capable of enduring any amount of fatigue. thirty years among savage beasts, and still more savage men, had brought him in contact with almost every variety of danger. he had hunted and trapped on every little stream between the rio grande and the great bear lake; had taken more than one rough-and-tumble fight with rocky mountain grizzlies; was very expert with the rifle; could throw the tomahawk with all the skill of an indian; and could lasso and ride the wildest horse that ever roamed the prairie. he was a good-natured, jovial fellow, and when stretched out on his blanket before the cheerful camp-fire, no one delighted more to tell stories and crack jokes than he. he used to say that there was but one thing in the world he hated, and that was an indian. and good cause had he for enmity; for, if the prairie and the deep, dark woods could speak, they could tell of many a deed of cruelty which he had seen practiced upon the unoffending trappers. dick had three times been bound to the stake, once when a mere boy, and had escaped by making use of his prodigious strength, and almost incredible swiftness of foot, which had won for him, from the indians, the appellation of big thunder. of all the trappers, none was more active in punishing the indians, or more hated and feared than he. one night, mounted on a powerful, well-trained mustang, he would appear, in spite of their vigilance, in their very midst, picking off their favorite chiefs, or "stampeding" their swiftest horses; and the next morning a warrior, seated at his solitary camp-fire, fifty miles away, would be startled by the crack of the rifle that was to start his spirit on its way to the happy hunting-grounds. he seemed to delight in danger, and being perfectly acquainted with the indian mode of warfare, he eluded all the plans to capture him, with the same skill and cunning he would exhibit in laying his own. but he did not always escape unhurt, for many an ugly scar on his body bore evidence to the valor of his enemies, and the severity of the struggles in which he had engaged. he did not call uncle joe's his home. he had lived on the prairie, and among the mountains, from boyhood, and despising the ordinary modes of conveyance used by more enlightened men, he had traveled the entire distance, from the head-waters of the missouri to his brother's cabin, on foot. "how are you, youngsters? i say," he exclaimed, continuing his greeting, which we have so unceremoniously interrupted; and he seized frank's hand, and gave it a gripe and a shake, which he felt for a quarter of an hour afterward. "draw a cheer up to the fire, young'uns," said uncle joe, "an' set down." the boys were well acquainted with the trappers, and always made themselves quite at home with them; so, after brushing the snow from their feet, they pulled off their overcoats and seated themselves before the huge fireplace. the cabin--or, as uncle joe called it, "shantee"--was built in the most primitive style, having but one room and a "loft," to which access was obtained by a ladder. there were four beds in the room--rude-looking, indeed, but very clean, and abundantly supplied with quilts and blankets; while around on the walls hung the trappers' rifles, hunting-knives, and powder-horns. three large dogs lay stretched out before the fireplace, and one of them, a huge, powerful animal, was the only companion dick had had for three years. he was an ungainly looking animal, but his strength and courage had been severely tested in many a desperate encounter, and twice he had saved his master's life. no wonder, then, that he held a prominent place in the trapper's affections. the only other inmates of the cabin were the four hired men--tall, brawny fellows, who despised the city, with its "eternal jostlings and monotonous noises," but delighted in the freedom and solitude of the forest. "had any supper, youngsters?" inquired uncle joe, as the boys drew their chairs up to the fire. "no, i reckon not," he continued, without giving them time to reply. "bob, just fetch out some grub. i'll bet the boys are as hungry as wolves, after their long tramp." the boys did not raise any objections, for they _were_ hungry, and they knew that the supper they would get would be worth having. bob, who was one of the hired men, began to bustle about, and, after hanging the tea-kettle over the fire, he drew out a pine table, and covered it with a snow-white cloth, and dishes which shone in the fire-light in a manner that would have delighted a new england housewife. then came ham and eggs, which, with the coffee, were cooked in the fireplace, wheat-bread, honey, and fresh butter and milk. although they were forty miles from any settlement or neighbor, in the midst of an almost unbroken forest, there was no danger but what they would fare well, for uncle joe was famous for good living. the boys ate very heartily, and uncle joe sat by, smoking his pipe, and watching them with evident satisfaction. after supper, while they were engaged in unpacking their sleds, dick's dog, which answered to the name of useless, arose suddenly to his feet, looked toward the door for a moment, and uttered a dismal howl. "injuns ag'in, by all that's miserable," ejaculated dick, removing his pipe from his mouth, and instinctively reaching toward his rifle, which hung on the wall above his head; but instantly recollecting himself, he resumed his former position, while a dark scowl settled on his face. in a few moments, light steps sounded in the snow outside the cabin, and useless bounded toward the door barking, and showing his teeth, with every demonstration of rage. "come back here, dog," said dick; "i don't blame you, 'cause they are a mean, thievin' race. the animal understands their natur' as well as i do," he continued, as the dog reluctantly returned to his place. "me an' him war brought up to hate injuns, an' we believe in makin' war on 'em wherever we find 'em. it's a mighty wonder that they don't steal joe out o' house an' home." the country around moosehead lake was inhabited by the remnant of a once-powerful tribe, and the indians, in going to and from the settlements to dispose of their furs, frequently made uncle joe's cabin a stopping-place. dick was not at all pleased with this state of affairs; but, as he often remarked, he was not "boss of the shantee, and couldn't help himself." the footsteps drew nearer, and finally the door opened softly, and two indians entered. "how are you, jim," exclaimed uncle joe, shaking the outstretched hand of the foremost. "how de do, brother," replied the indian, in imperfect english; and this was all the greeting that passed between them. they deposited their rifles and packs carefully in one corner of the cabin, and then advanced to the fire, and seated themselves on the floor without saying a word. they were dressed in the regular indian costume, with leggins, moccasins, and hunting-shirts of the finest deer-skin, gaudily ornamented, and wore knives in their belts. such sights were not new to the boys, for lawrence was a regular indian trading-post. frank thought that he had never seen such fine specimens of savages before. but different thoughts seemed to be passing through dick's mind, for he twisted uneasily in his chair, and smoked and scowled more vigorously than ever. useless seated himself by his master's side, and watched them as closely as a cat ever watched a mouse, now and then uttering a low, angry growl. neither of the indians took part in the conversation that followed, but, after emptying their pipes, they spread their blankets out on the floor, and were fast asleep in a few moments. "i don't see what in tarnation you let them ar painted heathen camp in your shantee in this way for," said dick, at length, addressing himself to his brother. "the woods are open, an' they won't ketch cold by sleepin' out-doors." "o, i don't mind it," answered uncle joe. "me an' the injuns allers have been on good terms together." "wal, you'll wake up some mornin' an' find your shantee gone," said dick, "unless it is fastened down tarnation tight. i hate the rascals wusser nor pisen, an' i allers ache to begin a knock-down-an'-drag-out fight with 'em whenever i see 'em. now, useless," he continued, turning to his dog, and speaking as though the animal could understand every word he said, "i'm goin' to bed, an' i want you to keep an eye on them fellers;" and dick stretched his heavy frame out on one of the beds, while useless crawled under the blankets, and lay down beside him. the others soon followed his example, and, in a few moments, nothing was heard in the cabin but the regular breathing of the sleepers. the next morning the boys slept later than usual. when they awoke, they found bob engaged in getting breakfast. the indians had gone. according to their usual custom, they had resumed their journey at the first peep of day. dick sat by the fire, engaged in looking over his "plunder," as he called it, to see if any thing had been stolen. "wal," said uncle joe, as they arose from the breakfast-table, "what do you youngsters kalkerlate to do first?" "let's go and set our traps for foxes," said archie, who was particularly fond of hunting that kind of game, and had become quite proficient in the art. "wal," said dick, "i'll go with you. i have some traps that need 'tendin' to;" and the trapper took down his long rifle and thrust his never-failing pipe into his pocket, and was ready for the start. archie began to overhaul his traps, which had been piled in one corner of the cabin. he looked them over and over several times, and finally inquired: "frank, do you know what has become of all my fox traps? three of them are missing." "they ought to be in that pile with the others," answered frank. "there are only two of them here," said archie. "my best ones are gone; i'm afraid we have lost them. they must have got loose, and tumbled off the sled." "no, i guess not," said his cousin; "they were all there last night, for i counted them." "that ar is what comes of allowin' them injuns to camp here," said dick. "jeroomagoot!" ejaculated uncle joe. "you don't s'pose them injuns stole the traps, do you?" "sartin, i do," answered dick, dropping the butt of his rifle heavily to the floor. "i don't s'pose nothin' else." "wal, it's the first thing i ever had stole," said uncle joe. "thar's whar the traps have gone to, any how," said dick. "useless," he continued, turning to his dog, "you aint worth a pinch o' gunpowder. i told you to watch them fellers. i don't see how the rascals could do it, for if useless had seed one of 'em prowlin' around, he would have muzzled him quicker nor lightnin'. if you want your traps, youngsters, you'll have to foller them injuns. i'll go with you." "will you," exclaimed archie. "then, let's start right off." "wal, then," said the trapper, "pull off them overcoats, 'cause it 'ill be the hardest job you ever done to ketch them injuns." there was something novel and exciting in the idea of a chase after indians. the boys had often read of such things, and now there was an opportunity for them to take part in one. they were soon ready for the chase. shouldering their guns, they followed dick from the cabin, and immediately set out on the trail of the indians, which could be easily followed by the prints of their moccasins in the snow. all the dogs were left at home, except useless; for he was the only one that understood "injun hunting," and the others would only be in the way. the trail ran directly down to the creek, and as soon as they were fairly on the ice, the trapper broke into a "dog trot," and the boys followed close behind him, in indian file. after going a little way, frank said: "dick, i don't believe that both of those indians went this way." "why not?" inquired the trapper. "because there is only a single track, such as one person would make." "i guess you haven't hunted injuns much," said dick, with a laugh. "don't you know that when they are travelin', the hindermost ones step exactly in the leader's tracks? if fifty injuns had been along here, they would not have left a bigger trail nor those two have. but arter you have hunted and fit 'em as much as i have, you could tell by lookin' at a trail how many there was in the party. i hope you youngsters are good at runnin'." "we should not care about running a race with you," answered george; "but if you will hold this gait, we will agree to keep up with you." "o, you'll have to go faster nor this, if you want to ketch them injuns," said dick. "see here--here's where the rascals began to run." "how can you tell?" inquired archie. "why, easy enough. you see the tracks are further apart nor they wur a little piece back. come, youngsters! let out a little." the boys thought that dick "let out" a good deal, for he almost redoubled his pace, and they concluded it was best to discontinue their talking; for they soon found that they had no breath to waste. after they had gone about two miles, the trail led them from the creek off into the woods; and, in a few moments, the trapper came to a stand-still on the bank of a small stream, where the trail abruptly ended. "where did they go to?" inquired frank, after he had looked in vain for the trail. "they couldn't have jumped across the creek." "no;" answered the trapper, "that would be a better jump nor i ever saw made. we must go back." "what for?" asked george. "why, the thieves knowed that we would foller 'em, an' they have doubled on their trail, just like a fox." "the tracks all point the same way," said frank, stooping down and examining the trail. "in course they do," said dick. "you don't s'pose you can tell by the looks of a red-skin's track which way he is goin', do you? i have knowed 'em to travel backward for more 'n a mile, to throw their enemies off the scent. but we hain't got no time to waste. come on." the boys followed the trapper back to the creek, and he immediately started off again at a rapid pace. there was not the least sign of a trail, and they were at a loss how to account for the trapper's reasons for following the creek, when he knew that the trail ran back into the woods. at length he said, by way of explanation: "this is takin' a short cut on the injuns. you see, they went back into the woods, an' doubled an' twisted about on their trail, an' when they think they have fooled us nicely, they will come back to the creek again." the next two miles were passed over in silence. the boys could not have talked if they had wished to, for the rapid pace was telling on them severely, and they began to think that they had never known what running was. but the trapper did not seem to mind it in the least. his motions were easy and graceful, and he appeared to move along without making any exertion whatever. they ran until almost noon, without seeing any signs of the indians, and the boys began to think that the trapper had been mistaken in his calculations. but their doubts were soon removed by the finding of the trail. "hurry on now, youngsters," exclaimed dick; "but don't make too much noise, for the redskins aint far off." and so it proved; for the next bend in the creek brought them in sight of the indians, who were walking leisurely along, with their packs on their backs, thinking, no doubt, that they had effectually eluded pursuit. but they soon became aware of the approach of the hunters, and, without stopping to look back, they commenced running at the top of their speed. "bars an' buffalers!" exclaimed the trapper. "this is somethin' like ole times. now, youngsters, i'll show you some runnin' as is runnin'. come, useless, show us what you're made of." the dog seemed to understand him perfectly, and was off on the instant, and the trapper followed after him at a rate of speed which the boys had never expected to see accomplished by a human being. the creek, for almost a mile, was perfectly straight, and afforded them a fine view of the race, which was worth going miles to see. the indians were no inferior runners; and, as they had nearly three hundred yards the start of dick, the boys were doubtful as to the manner in which the chase would end. but the trapper had lost none of that lightness of foot which had rendered him so famous, both among friends and foes, and before they had gone half a mile, he was near enough to seize one of the indians, while useless pulled down the other as though he had been a deer. the boys had been doing their best; but, of course, were left far behind; and when they came up they found the indians standing as motionless as statues, apparently perfectly unconcerned, and the trapper and his dog were keeping guard over them. "now, little 'un," said dick, addressing himself to archie, and pointing to the packs which the indians had thrown down, "look in them ar bundles an' see if you can find your traps." archie accordingly handed his gun to his cousin, and, kneeling down in the snow, opened one of the packs, when the first thing he discovered was his missing property. he arose slowly to his feet, and surveying the indian to whom the pack belonged, with a comical expression on his face, said: "you're a grand rascal. i've a good notion to take the ramrod out of my gun and give you a good trouncing." the indian was a man fully as large as dick, very powerfully built, and muscular; while archie was a little, "spindle-shanked" fellow, very small for his age, and looked as though he were in danger of being carried away by the first gust of wind that passed. the former, after regarding the diminutive hunter for a moment, with an expression of contempt, drew himself up to his full hight, and ejaculated: "ugh! me big injun." he, no doubt, considered it a gross insult that a person of archie's proportions should talk of "trouncing" him. "wal," said the trapper, "we're done with you, you painted niggers; travel on about your business; but i wouldn't advise you to cross my trail, in these woods, this winter;" and dick tapped his rifle in a very significant manner. the savages raised their packs to their shoulders without making any reply, and walked off as though nothing had happened. as soon as they were out of sight, archie packed up his traps, and the hunters turned their faces homeward. chapter iv. the "ole settler". it was dark before they reached the cabin, but they found a good supper waiting for them. after they had eaten heartily, they drew their chairs up around the fireplace, and uncle joe inquired: "wal, youngsters, how do you like injun-huntin'?" "i don't believe we like it well enough to try it again," said harry. "i never was so completely tired out in my life." "o, that wasn't nothin' at all," said dick. "such injun-huntin' as that we had to-day is fun. what would you have thought if we had follered them thieves for a week afore we found 'em? but, i must say, that you youngsters done very well. i'll own up, that when we started, i thought i would see what sort o' stuff you wur made of; an' i thought i'd stretch your legs for you in a way that would make you give in. but you fellers are purty good shakes at runnin', for boys of your age. but this reminds me o' a scrape i onct had near the colorado river. do yer see this? if you can ketch as many grizzly bars in your lifetime as this trap has, you are smarter nor i think you are. this is what i call the 'ole settler!'" and, as the trapper spoke, he raised from the floor the object of his admiration, and held it up to the view of the boys. it was an ordinary bear-trap, with double springs, and huge jaws, which were armed with long, sharp teeth. it had received a thorough rubbing and greasing, and shone in the fire-light like silver; but, after all, there was nothing uncommon in its appearance. there were plenty of traps in the cabin that were quite as well made, and could, probably, do quite as much execution. in the trapper's mind, however, the "ole settler" was evidently associated with some exciting event. "the reason why i call this trap the 'ole settler'" continued dick, "is, 'cause it has been in the service so long. my gran'father bought it, when he war only a boy, of a mexikin trader, an' he give two ten-dollar bar-skins for it. when he got too ole to trap, he give it to my father, an' he give it to me. it has been stole from me a good many times; but i allers made out to get it back agin. onct a yaller-hided mexikin greaser bagged it, an' i didn't set eyes on it for more 'n a year; but i knowed it in a minit when i did see it; an', arter a little brush with the greaser, i made him give it up. the last time i lost it war while i war trappin' in utah. it war stole from me by a blackfoot injun; and the way it happened war this: "i allers had the name of bein' able to bring into market jest as many an' jest as fine furs as any trapper in the mountains. but i had a good many good trappers to go agin, and arter awhile my huntin'-grounds begun to give out; so, one summer, i packed my plunder, an' moved to the west side of the mountains. i war right in the heart of the pawnee region, the wust injun country in the world; but i kalkerlated to get all my trappin' done arly in the spring, an' move out; 'cause as soon as the ice breaks up in the spring, the red-skins allers come round on a grand hunt, an' i didn't care to have the rascals near me. i never yet see the injun that i war afeared of, but it's mighty onpleasant to have them around; they go screechin' through the woods, shootin' at a feller, when he can't see 'em, an' steal his traps an' other plunder in a mighty onfriendly way. "wal, in less than a week arter i got to my new quarters, i war settled. i had all my traps sot in the best places, an' had mighty good luck. the streams war full of beaver, otter, an' mink, an' i used to have a fight with the grizzlies in the mountains every day. in this way the winter passed; an' about the time that spring come, i had well-nigh trapped every thing in the valley. it war gettin' about time for the injuns to come round on their reg'lar hunts; so one mornin,' arter a good breakfast on buffaler hump, i started out an' begun to gather up my traps. a'most every one had some kind o' game in it, an' i soon got as big a load as i could wag under. so i started back for camp. i war goin' along mighty keerless like, an' wasn't thinkin' o' nothin', when all to onct i seed something that made me prick up my ears, an' step a little lighter. i see that something had been passin' through the bushes. you, in course, wouldn't have noticed it, but i knowed in a minit that an injun had been along; an', arter lookin' around a little, i found his track. it wasn't a pawnee; but, arter examinin' the trail, i found that it war a blackfoot. what one of them should be doin' so far from home i didn't know, but most likely he war layin' around for scalps. "'wal,' thinks i, 'dick lewis, you had better be lookin' out for them traps o' yourn;' so i hid my spelter in the bushes, an' started up toward the mountains. i had sot the ole settler the day before, to ketch a grizzly that had been botherin' me a good deal, an' i war afeared the injun would come acrost it an' bag it. i saw plenty of injun signs all the way, but the tracks had all been made by the same feller. i could see, by the way the rascal had moved, that he knowed i war in the valley; for he took mighty good care to cover up his trail as much as possible. arter a few minits' walk, i come to the place where i had set the ole settler; but, just as i had expected, the trap war gone. the blackfoot had been there afore me, an' i knowed that if i wanted my trap, i must look for it; an' i made up my mind that i did want it, an' that i would have it, if i had to foller the injun clar to his home. so i started arter him, an', for a mile or so, the trail was toler'ble plain, an' i got along first-rate. i made up my mind that if the thief got away from me he would have to be smarter nor i thought he war. but, at last, i come to where he had tuk to a swamp, an' two or three times i come mighty nigh losin' the trail. the swamp war full o' logs, an' the injun had walked on them, an', in course, he didn't leave no trail. i follered him more 'n a mile by the marks on the bushes, an' finally i couldn't see a single sign. there war the print of one of his moccasins in the mud as plain as daylight; an' there the trail ended. i couldn't tell which way the rascal had gone. i looked around, examinin' every bush an' twig, but it war no use. now, i s'pose you think i war beat at the injun's own game, don't you? wal, i wasn't. in course, i couldn't find the trail in the swamp; but i knowed which way the blackfoot war goin', an' if i crossed the swamp, i knowed that i would find it on the other side. so i started out, an' as it war gettin' late, i wanted to find the trail agin afore dark. i guess i made purty good time. i done my best, an' the way i got through that swamp war a thing to look at. the runnin' you see to-day wasn't a patchin' to the runnin' i done that night. but i tuk mighty good care to keep my ears open, an' to make no more noise than i could help; for, just as like as not, there war injuns in the swamp, an' one of 'em might take it into his head to send a chunk of lead into me when i couldn't see him. "about an hour afore dark, i reached the other side of the swamp; an' in less nor ten minits more i had found the trail, and wur follerin' it up as fast as my legs could carry me. but afore i had gone a mile it begun to grow dark. in course, i couldn't foller the trail no further; an' the only thing i could do, war to camp down where i war, an' wait for daylight. so, arter makin' my supper out o' parched corn, i picked out a nice place by the side of a log, and settled myself down to sleep. "the next mornin', bright and arly, i war up, an' on the trail agin. i follered it all day, without onct stoppin' or losin' sight of it, an' about night it begun to grow fresher; but it came on dark agin, and i had to camp. long about midnight i heerd a sort of rustlin' like in the bushes. i war wide awake in a minit; for a feller that lives in the woods larns to keep his ears about him. i lifted my head an' listened. yes, thar war no mistake--i could hear something steppin' keerfully over the leaves, an' i thought it war comin' right toward me. at first i thought it war some wild varmint; but, as it come nigher, i found that it war a two-legged critter; so i cocked my rifle an' waited for the injun--for i knowed by the step that it war a red-skin--to come in sight. the steps sounded nigher an' nigher, an' all to onct the bushes parted without any noise, an' out come the biggest blackfoot that it ever war my luck to set eyes on. he didn't seem to know that me an' my rifle war around; if he had, i reckon it wouldn't have made him feel very pleasant; but he walked past, within ten foot of me, an' disappeared in the darkness. "now, perhaps you would like to know why i didn't up and shoot him. wal, i'll tell you. that would have jest knocked the hul thing in the head, an' i should have had all my trouble for nothin'. i knowed that the injun that stole my trap wasn't a great way off, and i knowed, too, that the feller that jest passed war a sort of friend of his'n, an' that they war goin' to meet somewhere in the woods close by. so i thought that perhaps, if i took matters easy, i could rub out both of the rascals. "as soon as the injun wur out o' hearin', i picked myself up, an' started along arter him, purty certain that before long i would come in sight of their camp-fire; an' i wasn't mistaken i hadn't gone half a mile afore i see a light shinin' through the trees; an' droppin' on all-fours, i begun to crawl along through the bushes, until i come to a place where i had a full view of the fire. as i had expected, there war two injuns settin' by it. one of them--the one that had just passed me--war eaten' his supper, an' the other lay stretched out on his blanket, and war showin' his friend the trap he had stole from me; an' they war both laughin' over it, as though they thought it war a mighty good joke. this kinder riled me, an' i knowed that i could soon put an end to their skylarkin'. i might have shot one of them where he sot easy enough, but that wouldn't do, for the other would have escaped, an' i wanted to make sure of both of 'em. i wasn't fool enough to think of walkin' into their camp an' tacklin' both of 'em to onct; they would have made an end of me in the shake of a buck's tail. the only way i could work it war to get 'em apart, an' take 'em one at a time. so i dropped my rifle an' drawed my knife, an' gave two loud yells, which war a signal to let the injuns know that one of 'em war wanted. they both sprang to their feet an' listened for a moment, an' one of 'em--the one that had stole my trap--picked up his rifle and come toward me; an' the other went on eatin' his supper. "i waited until the injun had come within ten foot of me, then all to onct i stepped out from behind my tree an' stood before him. bar an' buffaler! how the rascal started! he looked at me for a minit, as if to make sure that i war a human critter, an' then, givin' an unarthly yell, he dropped his rifle, an' made at me with his tomahawk. but i met him half way, an' ketchin' hold of the hand that held the tomahawk, i give him a stab with my knife that settled his business for him. he fell to the ground like a log, an' i had hardly time to grab my rifle afore i seed the big injun comin' toward me. but he hadn't made more'n two steps, afore a chunk of lead brought him to the ground. "i then walked up to the camp, and stretched myself out on one of the injuns' blankets; and arter makin' a good supper on a piece of venison i found hung up on a tree close by, i covered myself up, an' in a few minits war fast asleep. "the next mornin' i war up bright an' arly, an' pickin' up my trap, an' all the injuns' plunder i wanted, i drew a bee-line for camp. in another day i had gathered up all the rest of my traps, without seein' any more injun signs; but i knowed they would soon be around. as i didn't care about bein' in their company, an' as game war gettin' scarce, i tumbled all my spelter into my canoe, an' started down the river." chapter v. the fight in the woods. the next morning, after breakfast, the trapper took down his long rifle, saying, as he did so: "now, youngsters, i'm goin' off into the woods, about twenty mile or so, to camp out for a week, an' see if i can't find some otter. if you want good sport, you had better go, too. the game is gettin' too scarce around here to suit me." the boys readily agreed to this proposal, and began to talk of packing their sleds; but the trapper scouted the idea. "you'll never larn to be what i call woodsmen," said he, "until you get rid of some of your city notions. you must larn to tote all your plunder on your backs. just fill your possible-sacks[1] with coffee and bread; take plenty of powder an' shot, a change of clothes, an ax or two, an' some blankets, and that's all you need." [footnote 1: haversack.] these simple preparations were soon completed, and, after bidding uncle joe good-by, they set out, accompanied by their dogs. dick carried the "old settler," and had his blanket strapped fast to his belt. frank and george each carried an ax. archie had several of his fox-traps, which he could not think of leaving behind; and harry brought up the rear, carrying a large bundle of blankets. besides these necessary articles, the boys carried their shot-guns, and the trapper his long rifle. dick led the way directly up the creek, following the same course they had taken the day before in pursuit of the indians, for about ten miles, and then struck off into the woods. about noon they halted in a little grove of evergreens, and the trapper said: "we'll camp here for awhile, youngsters, an' eat our dinner." the boys were very glad to hear this; for, strong and active as they were, they found that they were no match for dick in traveling. archie and george leaned their guns up against a tree, took the axes, and commenced to clear away a place where they could build a fire. "now," said the trapper, turning to the others, "we'll leave them here to 'tend to the camp, an' make a good cup of coffee for us agin we come back, an' the rest of us will take a tramp through the woods, an' see what we can get for dinner. take different directions now, so as to scare up more game." the boys immediately set out as directed, each accompanied by his dog. brave ran on ahead of his master, beating about through the bushes, but not a rabbit or squirrel showed himself. but frank kept on, taking good care to remember the points of the compass, determined that he would not go back to the camp empty-handed. at length brave's well-known bark caused him to start forward at a more rapid pace, and the next moment he heard some heavy animal crashing through the underbrush, just in advance of him, at a tremendous rate. the woods were so thick that frank could not see the game, but the angry yelping of the dog told him that it was being closely pursued. guided by the noise they made, he followed after them as fast as his legs could carry him, keeping a sharp look-out on all sides, for he did not know but that it might be a bear which the dog had started. he remembered his meeting with the wild-cat, but felt no fear now, for he had his trusty gun in his hand, heavily loaded with buck-shot, and knew, from experience, that, at short range, it was a very efficient weapon. his first care was to find the trail which the game had made, and, upon examination, he found that brave had started, not a bear, but several moose. he knew their tracks in a moment, for he had often seen them in the woods; but he could not tell how many of them there were, for their trails crossed each other in every direction. he had never had the fortune to meet one of these animals, and his feelings were worked up to the highest pitch of excitement by the discovery. he started forward again at the top of his speed. the rapid pace of the game soon carried all sounds of the chase out of hearing; but frank had no difficulty in following the trail. he had run nearly a mile, when the angry yelps of the dog sounded through the woods in fiercer and more abrupt echoes. frank hurried forward, and soon came in sight of the game. the moose--a huge bull, with wide-spreading antlers--was standing at bay, and the dog was bounding around him, watching an opportunity to seize him, but was met at every point. now and then the moose would lower his head, and rush upon his enemy, but the latter nimbly kept out of his way. frank did not pause long to witness the battle, but immediately ran forward, holding his gun in readiness for a shot. the moose, upon discovering him, suddenly wheeled, and started off at a rapid trot. the snow in that part of the woods was nearly three feet deep, and was covered with a crust strong enough to sustain the hunter and his dog, but the moose sank into it at every step, and his trail could be easily traced by the blood which was running from numerous wounds on his legs, made by the sharp crust. he ran heavily, and frank, who was exerting himself to his utmost, had the satisfaction of finding that he was gaining on him. brave easily kept pace with him and finally succeeded in bringing the moose at bay again. this was what frank wanted. just as the deer was about to make a charge upon the dog, he fired, and the huge animal tumbled to the ground. the young hunter ran forward, intending to give him the contents of the other barrel, but, before he could fire, the moose staggered to his feet, and disregarding the attacks of the dog, which were renewed with redoubled fierceness and vigor, rushed straight upon the hunter, and bore him to the ground. in falling, frank lost his gun. the enraged animal pressed upon the young hunter, burying his antlers in the snow on each side of him, holding him fast to the ground. frank gave himself up for lost; but he determined that he would not yield his life without a struggle. he was unarmed, and the contest must be one of strength and endurance. before the moose could draw back to make another charge upon him, frank seized him by the antlers, and clung to them with all his strength. brave seemed to understand the perilous situation in which his master was placed, and fought more furiously than ever. but the moose, although severely wounded by the teeth of the dog, did not appear to notice him in the least, but struggled desperately to free himself from the young hunter's grasp. frank was dragged about through the snow, and pressed down into it, until his clothing was almost reduced to tatters; and he was severely wounded by the sharp crust and the hoofs of the enraged deer, which cut through his garments like a knife. it required all his strength to retain his hold. he did not seem to be in the least frightened; but the manner in which he clung to the moose, and cheered on the dog, showed that he well knew the danger of his situation. but he was growing weaker every moment, while the moose appeared to be growing proportionately stronger, and his struggles became more furious and determined. frank knew that the animal would soon succeed in freeing himself, and then----. it was a horrible thought! at this moment he heard the noise of approaching feet on the crust, and a voice exclaimed, "bars and buffaler! hang on to the creetur jest a minute longer, youngster! take 'em, dog! take 'em!" and the next instant a dark object bounded lightly over him, and commenced a furious battle with the moose. benumbed and exhausted, frank could hold out no longer. as the moose tore himself from his grasp, the young hunter saw him pulled to the ground by the trapper's dog, and then a mist gathered before his eyes, and he sank back on the snow insensible. when his consciousness returned, he found himself in a rudely-constructed hut, lying in front of a blazing fire, and so tightly wrapped up in blankets that he could scarcely breathe. dick sat in one corner of the hut, smoking his pipe, and gazing vacantly into the fire. brave lay stretched out by his master's side, with his head resting on his shoulder, gazing into his face with every expression of concern. as soon as frank opened his eyes, the faithful animal announced the fact by a joyful bark, which brought all the boys into the hut. "how do you feel, frank?" inquired archie, whose pale face showed that he had more than a common interest in his cousin's well-being. "o! i'm all right," answered frank, in a weak voice. "but you've got me bundled up so tight i can hardly breathe. i wish you would take a dozen or two of these blankets off." "no, you don't," said dick, as the boys crowded up around frank. "i believe i've got the bossin' of this yere job. here," he continued, as he arose from his seat and approached his patient, "drink this;" and he raised frank from his blankets with one hand, and, with the other, held to his lips a cup containing some of the most bitter stuff he had ever drank. the young hunter made wry faces over it, but succeeded in draining the cup. "now," resumed dick, "lay down agin an' go to sleep. shut up! no back talk!" he continued, as frank essayed to speak. "you musn't talk till i say you may;" and the rough but kind-hearted trapper laid him back on his bed, and, drawing the blankets more closely about him, left him to his meditations. he soon fell off into a refreshing slumber; and when he awoke it was dark, and his companions were seated around the fire, eating their supper. "wal, youngster," said dick, "how do you feel now?" "o! i'm much better," answered frank; "and hungry as blazes. won't you give a fellow some thing to eat?" "in course," said dick; and he brought frank some pieces of toast and a cup of coffee. "i don't like your style of doctoring a bit," said frank, as the trapper carefully removed the blankets with which his patient was enveloped. "the remedies you use are worse than the disease. you've kept me wrapped up so tight that i am sore all over." "i shouldn't wonder," said the trapper, laughing heartily; "but that doesn't come of bein' wrapped up in the blankets. you war purty well chawed up when me an' useless diskivered you." dick raised frank to a sitting posture, and, in spite of his objections, once more drew the blankets about him, allowing him, however, the free use of his arms; and the young hunter soon discovered that he was not quite so well as he had imagined, for sharp pains shot through his body, and he was so weak he could scarcely sit up. "i believe i had something of a fight with that moose, didn't i?" he inquired, as he broke off a piece of the toast. "i believe you did, judging from the looks of your clothes," answered harry, as he laid down his plate, and took from a peg in one corner of the hut all that remained of frank's garments. the coat and pants were torn almost into shreds, and covered with blood, and the sole of one of his boots had been pulled off by the sharp hoofs of the deer. brave had also suffered severely, judging from the bloody bandages that he wore. "it was a narrow escape, wasn't it?" said frank, as he gazed in astonishment at his tattered garments. "yes, indeed," said archie; "i shouldn't have cared about being in your boots just then. how you ever made out to get out of those clothes alive, is more than i can tell." "it war a careless trick," said dick, "tacklin' that animal in that ar way. you ought to knowed better." "well, we got the moose, didn't we?" inquired frank. "yes," answered george, chewing away at a large piece of meat; "and we are eating him up as fast as we can." as soon as frank had finished his toast and coffee, he was glad to lie down again, for he was still very weak from the loss of blood. the others, after putting away the supper-dishes, replenished the fire, and stretched themselves out on their blankets. "how do you feel now, youngster?" asked the trapper, as he drew a brand from the fire and lit his pipe. "o! i guess i shall get along." "it's a'most time for you to take some more of your medicine." "i don't care about taking any more of it," answered frank. "it's the meanest stuff i ever tasted." "it's injun medicine," answered the trapper, as he sank back on his blanket, and puffed away vigorously at his pipe. "i remember," he continued, after a few moments' pause, "of doctorin' up my chum, bill lawson, an' that war the way me an' him come to get acquainted. but he war used to injun doctorin', and didn't growl as much as you do. i've heered him tell of that scrape a hundred times; an' he used to tell it in this way: "'the way me an' dick lewis come to get together,' he used to say, 'war this. i war onct trappin' among the mountains on a little stream called muddy creek. it war about the wust bit of injun country in the world; but they didn't bother me, an' i tuk mighty good care not to meddle with their corn an' beans, an' for a long time i had jest the best kind of luck in trappin'. beaver were plenty as black flies in summer, an' the woods war chuck full o' otter, an' the mountains of grizzly bars an' black-tails, so i had plenty to do. "'i had made my camp in the woods, about a mile back from the creek where i war trappin', so as not to skeer away the game. beaver is mighty skeery animals, an' don't like to have a feller trampin' around them all the while; and when a man sets a trap, he musn't go to it agin afore arly the next mornin', for if he does, the game soon gets mighty shy, an' the first thing the trapper knows, he'll have to hunt somewhere else for beaver. you see i knowed all this, an' so kept out of their way. i got along first-rate, until arly in the spring, jest as the ice begun to break up, an' hadn't seed nothin' of the injuns. but one mornin', while i war on my way to 'tend to my traps, i seed the prints of some moccasins, where three or four fellers had crossed the creek. i knowed in a minit, from the looks of them, that they wasn't white fellers' tracks; so i begun to prick up my ears an' look around me a little. i examined the trail agin, an' i knowed there could be no mistake. the comanches had been along there, sure. i begun beatin' keerfully around through the bushes, for i didn't know but that the tarnal red-skins war watchin' me all the time; when all to onct i come acrost another trail, which war as different from the first as a muskrat is different from a grizzly. it war a white feller's track. the tracks looked as though he had been crawlin' along on his hands an' knees, an' onct in awhile i could see the place where the butt of his rifle had trailed on the ground. i knowed in a minit that the white hunter, whoever he war, had been follerin' up the injuns. "'"wal," thinks i, "bill lawson, you had better keep an eye out for them traps o' yourn." so i begun to draw a bee-line through the woods toward the place where i had sot one o' my traps, keepin' my gun ready to put a chunk of lead into the first thing in the shape of an injun that i should see. but instead o' goin' up to my trap in the way i generally did, i went round so as to come up on the other side. purty soon i begun to come near the place where the trap was sot; so i dropped down on all-fours, an' commenced to crawl through the thick brush. i knowed i should have to be mighty keerful, for an injun has got ears like a painter, an' he allers keeps 'em open, too. wal, purty soon i poked my head over a log, an' peeked through the bushes; an' what do you think i seed? there war my trap, with a big beaver in it, ketched fast by the hind leg; an' right behind some big trees that stood near the trap war three injuns, listenin', an' watchin', an' waitin' for me to come an' get my game. "'"that's the way you painted heathen watch for a white gentleman, is it," thinks i; "i'll fix some o' you." so i drawed my knife an' tomahawk, an' laid them on the ground beside me, an' then, arter examinin' my rifle to see that it war all right, i drawed a bead on the biggest injun, an' fired. he rolled over, dead as a door nail, an' the others jumped up an' yelled like two screech owls. i didn't stop to ax no questions; but, throwin' away my rifle, i grabbed up my knife an' tomahawk, an' walked into 'em. "'they both fired as i came up--one missed, an' the other tuk me in the leg, an' kerflumux i come to the ground. the injuns thought they had me now, sure, an' they came toward me, drawin' their knives an' yellin' like mad. but i war on my pins agin in less than no time; an', standin' as well as i could on my broken leg, i swung my tomahawk around my head, an' let fly at the nighest injun. it tuk him plumb atween the eyes, an' i knowed that the work war done for him. but the next minit the other heathen clinched me, an', liftin' me off my legs, throwed me to the ground like a log. he had two legs to use, an' i had only one; there war where he had the advantage of me. but i had the use of my hands; an' i jest made up my mind that if he wanted my scalp he would have to work for it; so, quick as lightnin', i grabbed the hand that held the knife, an' give it a squeeze that actooally made the bones crack, an' the rascal give one yell, an' let go the weapon. then, with the other hand, i ketched him by the scalp-lock, an' done my best to turn him, knowin' that if i could onct get on top of him, i would be all right; but i couldn't use my leg; so, thinks i, i'll hold him here awhile, an' i pulled his head down close to me. but i had bled so much that i begun to give out; an' the injun, who hadn't made a move arter i got hold of his har, knowed that i war growin' weak, an' the first thing i knowed, he broke away from me, an' sprung to his feet. i tried to get up too, but the injun grabbed up his knife, an' pinned me agin. i fit as well as i could, but the rascal knowed i couldn't do nothin'; and, placing one knee on my breast to hold me down, he put one hand to his mouth, an' give a loud yell. "'it war answered close by, an' somebody come out o' the bushes. at first i thought it war another injun comin' up to help rub me out; but another look showed me that it war a white feller. he didn't stop to ax no questions, but made a dash at the comanche, who got off me in a tarnal hurry, an' callin' out some name that showed that he knowed who the white feller war, he begun to make tracks; but he hadn't gone ten foot afore the trapper had him by the neck. the fight war mighty short, for the comanche wasn't nowhere--the trapper handled him as though he had been a baby, an' in less than two minits he war a dead injun.' "that's the way ole bill used to tell his story," continued dick; "an' he allers used to pint me out as the man that saved him. the white feller's trail that he seed by the creek war my own, an' i war follerin' up the comanches. wal, i tuk the old man back to his camp, an', arter two months' doctorin', i got him all right agin. when he got well, he wouldn't let me leave him, nor i didn't want to, for he war jest the kind of a man i wanted for a chum. he hated an injun as bad as i did, an' i used to like to listen to the stories he told of his fights with them. how do you come on now, youngster?" "o! i feel pretty well," answered frank, "only i'm a little weak." "you can thank your lucky stars that you wasn't rubbed out altogether," said the trapper, as he approached the young hunter. "me an' useless got there jest in time. but you won't allers be so lucky." after wrapping frank up carefully in the blankets again, he knocked the ashes from his pipe, and sought his own couch. chapter vi. the white buck. it was a week before frank was able to travel, during which time george and archie had been sent back to uncle joe's after supplies of bread, coffee, and salt. early one morning they again set out, the trapper leading the way more slowly than at the former part of the journey, so as not to weary his young companion. they halted at noon for dinner, and about four o'clock in the afternoon they reached a dilapidated cabin. "this yere is to be our camp for awhile," said dick, throwing his rifle into the hollow of his arm. "i camped here last winter; but i see the shantee is well-nigh broke down. but we can soon set it to rights agin." they leaned their guns against the logs of the cabin, and archie and george cut down some saplings with which to repair the roof; while the others cleared out the old pine boughs that covered the floor, and erected a new crane over the fireplace, which was a hole about four feet in diameter and a foot and a half deep, that had been dug in the middle of the floor. an opening in the roof directly over this did duty both as chimney and window. before dark the cabin was put in order again, and the hunters began to prepare their supper. the next morning the trapper, after giving frank emphatic directions to remain quiet during the day, set out, with useless at his heels, to look for "otter signs." george and archie followed him with their fox-traps; and frank and harry, being left to themselves, shouldered their guns, and strolled slowly through the woods, and amused themselves in shooting rabbits, which were very abundant. in a short time they had secured game enough for dinner, and were about to retrace their steps toward the cabin, when the dog, which was some distance in advance of them, suddenly stopped, and, after listening a moment, uttered a low whine, ran back to his master, and took refuge behind him. "what's the matter with the dog, i wonder?" said frank, patting the animal's head, and endeavoring to encourage him. "i don't know," answered harry, clutching his gun more firmly; "he must have seen or scented some wild animal. perhaps it would be safer to go back a little way. i shouldn't like the idea of meeting a bear or panther;" and harry began to retreat. "hold on," said frank; "don't be in a hurry. if it is a panther, we are certainly a match for him. our guns are loaded with buck-shot." "i know it; but if i should see one of the 'varmints,' as dick calls them, i should be so excited that i couldn't shoot at all. i think we had better"-"hush!" interrupted frank. "don't you hear something?" the boys listened, and a faint cry, like the yelping of a pack of hounds, was borne to their ears. "it can't be dogs," said frank, "for if it was, brave would not have been so frightened; besides, it does not sound exactly like them, and i know of no hunter in this part of the country that keeps hounds." "i wonder if that is what brave heard?" said harry. "it must be," replied frank, watching the motions of his dog, which appeared to grow more excited as the sound came nearer. "i would like to know what it is." "we shall soon find out, for it seems to be coming this way. let's hide behind some of these trees." the boys, accordingly, concealed themselves, and waited impatiently, with a great deal of anxiety, for the animals to come in sight. louder and louder grew the noise, and harry, turning to his companion, with blanched cheeks, exclaimed: "it's the cry of a pack of wolves. let's get away from here." "o, no," said frank. "they must be in pursuit of something. let us wait and see what it is." there was something appalling in the sound, which now began to echo loudly through the woods, and it was no wonder that harry wished to retreat. even brave, although he was a very courageous dog, seemed struck with terror, and crept up behind his master, as if endeavoring to get out of sight. but frank, with his usual recklessness, determined to stand his ground as long as possible. the wolves seemed to be running directly toward them, and the boys held their guns to their shoulders, ready to shoot the first one that appeared. in a few moments there was a crashing in the bushes, and a white object was seen gliding among the trees, while behind him followed a pack of a dozen wolves. they ran with their ears laid close back to their heads, and their mouths open, displaying frightful rows of teeth. frank gazed at them a moment, and then turned his attention to the game. could he believe his eyes! it was a _white buck_. he was running at the top of his speed; but his tongue was hanging out of his mouth, and his legs were horribly lacerated by the sharp crust, into which he sank at every step. he was evidently almost tired out, and the wolves were gaining on him rapidly. frank had often heard of white deer, but had never seen one before, and he determined to take a hand in the affair, and, if possible, rescue the buck from his pursuers. "shoot the wolves, harry," he exclaimed, "and save the deer. we want him ourselves." "don't shoot--don't," urged harry. "the wolves will turn on us." but it was too late. frank's gun was at his shoulder in an instant, and the foremost of the pack leaped high in the air, and fell to the ground, dead. the others stopped and ravenously attacked their fallen comrade, and in a moment every vestige of him had disappeared. the white buck kept on his way, and soon disappeared from their sight. "shoot 'em, harry," exclaimed frank, excitedly, turning to his companion, who stood holding his gun in his hand, and gazing at the wolves as though he had suddenly been deprived of all action; "shoot 'em, and don't be standing there like a bump on a log. they'll pitch into us, sure, and the more we kill now, the less we shall have to deal with by-and-by." this seemed to bring harry back to his senses, and he hurriedly raised his gun to his shoulder and endeavored to cover one of the wolves with the sight. but he was trembling violently, and his gun swayed about like a leaf in a storm. "why don't you shoot?" exclaimed frank. harry pressed the trigger, and the loud yell that followed showed that the shot had not been thrown away. one of the wolves was severely wounded. maddened by the pain, he dashed toward the place where the boys were standing, followed by the whole pack. "take to a tree, quick!" exclaimed frank, who began to be surprised at his own coolness; "it's our only chance. be sure and keep a good hold of your gun." suiting the action to the word, he swung himself into the lowest branches of a small pine that stood near, and, reaching down, seized brave by his long hair and pulled him up after him. it was slow climbing among the thick branches, with a gun in one hand and a dog nearly as heavy as himself in the other; and he had scarcely ascended out of reach before the wolves were around the tree. several of the pack leaped among the branches, and made desperate efforts to reach him, while their dismal howls made his blood run cold. "hold on, down there," muttered frank. "wait until i get brave fixed, and then i'll soon be even with you." after feeling in all his pockets, he found a stout strap, with which he tied his dog fast to the branches, so that he would not fall down among the wolves. "i say, frank, where are you?" shouted harry, from his tree. "here i am," answered frank. "are you all right?" "yes; but i had a narrow escape, i tell you. the wolves pulled off one of my boots as i was climbing up this tree. you're always getting a fellow into some scrape or other, ain't you?" "i don't call this much of a scrape," answered frank. "we're safe, at any rate." "i know it," replied harry, who seemed to be regaining his courage. "but we may have to stay up here a week." "no we won't--not if our ammunition holds out," answered frank, pushing his gun through the branches of the tree. "i'm going to commence shooting them." "that's a good plan; i did not think of that." the report of harry's gun followed his words, and feeling safe in his tree, he made a good shot, the largest of the wolves receiving the entire charge in his head. the boys continued to load and fire until the last wolf was killed, when they dropped down from the trees, and took a survey of their work. nine wolves were lying dead on the snow, which was saturated with blood, and a tenth was endeavoring to crawl away on two legs. brave immediately commenced a battle with him, but the wolf had plenty of fight left in him, and was killed only after a hard struggle. "now," said frank, "let's follow up that white buck. i would give almost any thing to catch him alive. he is pretty well tired out, and can't run far." "lead on, then," said harry; "but, if dick was here, he would say it was no use. you know hunters are inclined to be superstitious about such things." the boys had often heard extravagant stories told about the incredible speed and tenacity of life possessed by white deer, and had heard old hunters say that it was impossible to kill or capture them. but frank was not superstitious. he could not see why a white deer should be so widely different from one of the ordinary color. at all events, he determined to make an attempt to capture the white buck--which would make a valuable addition to his museum. so, leaving the wolves where they had fallen, he led the way along the trail, which could be easily followed by the blood on the snow. they had run nearly a mile, when they discovered the white buck a short distance ahead of them, making his way slowly through the snow, and staggering as though he were scarcely able to keep his feet. "there he is," exclaimed frank, joyfully. "catch him, brave." the dog was off in an instant, and although the buck made an effort to run, he was speedily overtaken, and pulled down without a show of resistance. the boys hurried forward to secure their captive, which struggled desperately as they approached. but at length frank succeeded in fastening his belt around his neck. the buck staggered to his feet, and, after a few ineffectual attempts to escape, seemed to submit to his fate, and suffered himself to be led toward the cabin. he was one of the most noble specimens of the common deer that the boys had ever seen. he stood nearly five feet high at the shoulders, and his head was crowned with antlers, which frank had learned, from experience, would prove no mean weapons in a fight. he was evidently an "old settler," and had seen some stirring times during his life, for his body was almost covered with scars. they reached the camp without any mishap, and harry brought from the cabin a long rope with which the captive was fastened to a tree. after a short struggle, during which the boys received some pretty severe scratches from the buck's sharp hoofs, his legs were rudely bandaged, and he was left to himself. after a hastily-eaten dinner, the boys returned to the scene of their late fight with the wolves, to procure some of the skins, which frank wished to mount in his museum. they got back to the cabin just before dark, and found dick leaning on his long rifle, and closely examining the buck. useless was seated at his side, and near him lay three otter-skins, which they had captured during the day. "see here, youngsters," exclaimed the trapper, as the boys came up, "what's all this yere?" "o, that's our day's work," replied frank. "give us your hands, youngsters," continued dick. "shoot me if you hain't done somethin' that i tried all last winter to do an' couldn't. if i shot at that buck onct, i shot at him twenty times. do you see that scar on his flank? i made that. an' there's another on his neck. when i hit him there i thought i had him sure; for he war throwed in his tracks, an' when useless come up to grab him, he war up an' off like a shot. if you war with some trappers i know, they would tell you to cut that rope an' let him get away from here as fast as he could travel. some fellers think these yere white deer have got the evil one in 'em." "o, that's all nonsense," said frank; "a white deer isn't a bit different from any other, only in the color." "that's what i used to tell 'em," said dick. "but this yere is my day's work," he added, lifting the otter-skins from the ground; "and a good one it is, too. but five mile back the woods are full of otter, an' a little further on is a beaver-dam--eight houses in it--forty beaver at the least kalkerlation." as the trapper finished speaking, he shouldered his rifle and led the way into the cabin, where a fire was soon started, and some choice pieces of venison, which had been brought in by him were laid on the coals to broil. in a few moments, george and archie entered, and the latter inquired: "who caught that white buck?" frank gave him the desired information, and also related their adventure with the wolves; when archie continued: "i'm glad you caught him, for you always wanted one for your museum. we came near catching a black fox for you." "a black fox!" repeated the trapper. "yes; the largest one i ever saw," said george. "he's black as a coal--hasn't got a white hair on him, except the very tip of his tail." "i know him," answered the trapper. "him an' useless had more'n one race last winter. you found his trail down by that little creek that runs through that deep hollow." "yes," answered archie. "an' lost it up here in the woods but two mile back." "yes," said archie again. "an' that's the way you'll keep doin' as often as you chase him. you can't ketch him. he's an ole one in these parts, an' i guess he'll stay here till he dies a nat'ral death." "no, i'll be shot if he does," said archie, decidedly, as he deposited his gun on a couple of pegs in one corner of the cabin, and began to divest himself of his overcoat. "i've got a dog that was never fooled yet. there was a fox that used to live on reynard's island, a short distance from lawrence, and he had been chased by all the best dogs in the country; but the first time he got sport on his trail, he was a gone sucker. i'm going to start out early to-morrow and try that black fox again, and if i don't catch him the first day, i'll try him the next, and keep it up till i do succeed. i don't mean to leave these woods without him." "then you'd better send home for plenty of grub," said the trapper, "for you'll have to stay here all winter." "supper's ready," said frank; and this announcement cut short the conversation. chapter vii. a midnight attack. after supper, the hunters stretched themselves out on their blankets around the fire; but the usual evening conversation was omitted. their day's work had fatigued them all, and soon their regular breathing told that sleep had overpowered them. about midnight frank, who slept away from the fire, and almost against the door, was aroused by a slight noise outside the cabin, like the stealthy tread of some animal in the snow. he had begun to acquire something of a hunter's habits, and the noise, slight as it was, aroused him in an instant. the dogs had also heard it, for they stood looking at the door, with every hair sticking toward their heads, but without uttering a sound. frank reached for his gun, which hung on some pegs just above his head, and at that moment he heard a sound resembling the "wheeze" of a glandered horse. "bars and buffaler!" exclaimed dick, suddenly arousing from a sound sleep, and drawing his long hunting-knife, which he always carried in his belt; "there's a painter around here somewhere--i'm sartin i heered the sniff of one." "i heard something," replied frank, "but i didn't know what it was." by this time all the inmates of the cabin were aroused, and there was a hurried reaching for guns, and a putting on of fresh caps. "lend me your rifle, dick," said frank, "and i'll shoot him. i have never killed a panther." "wal, don't be keerless, like you generally are," said the trapper, handing him the weapon. "be keerful to shoot right between his eyes. hist--i'll be shot if the varmint ain't a pitchin' into the white buck--he are, that's sartin!" as dick spoke there was a violent rustling in the bushes, and a sound as of a heavy body falling on the snow. then there was a slight struggle, and all was still again. frank quickly threw open the door, and hunters and dogs all rushed out together. it was very dark; but frank, who was in advance of his companions, could just distinguish a black object crouching in the snow near the tree where the white buck had been fastened. in an instant his rifle was at his shoulder, and as the whip-like report resounded through the woods, the panther uttered a howl that sounded very much like the voice of a human being in distress, and, with one bound, disappeared in the bushes. the quick-scented dogs found his trail in a twinkling. guided by their barking, the hunters followed after them as rapidly as possible, in hopes that the dogs would soon overtake the panther and compel him to take to a tree. running through a thick woods in a dark night is not a pleasant task; and the hunters made headway very slowly. but at length they came up with three of the dogs, which were standing at the foot of a large tree, barking furiously. brave was nowhere to be seen. "i shouldn't wonder if the varmint war up here," said the trapper, walking around the tree and peering upward into the darkness. "no he ain't, neither," he continued. "useless, ye're fooled for onct in your life. you see, youngsters, where that big limb stretches out? wal, the painter ran out on that, an' has got out of our way." "i wonder where brave is?" said frank, anxiously. "that ar is a hard thing to tell," answered the trapper. "the varmint may have chawed him up too, as well as the white buck." "if he has," said frank, bitterly, "i won't do any thing all the rest of my life but shoot panthers. hold on! what's that?" he added, pointing through the trees. "it looks mighty like somethin' comin' this way," said dick. "turn me into a mullen-stalk if i don't believe it's the painter! he's creepin' along a'most on his belly." in an instant four guns were leveled at the approaching object, and the boys were about to fire, when the trapper, who had thrown himself almost flat on the snow, to obtain a better view of the animal, heard a suppressed whine. springing to his feet, he knocked up the weapons, and quietly said, "i guess i wouldn't shoot, boys. that's the dog comin back. i shouldn't wonder if he had been follerin' the painter all alone by himself." the boys lowered their guns, and, in a few moments, to the infinite joy of frank, brave came up. he crawled slowly and with difficulty toward his master, and the hunters could see that he had been severely handled. he had several long, ugly wounds on his body, which were bleeding profusely. "wal, i'll be shot!" exclaimed the trapper, "if that ar fool of a dog didn't tackle the painter! he ought to knowed better. the varmint could chaw him up in two minits. useless here wouldn't have thought o' doin' sich a thing. but it'll do no good for us to stay here, so we might as well travel back to the shantee. ye're minus a white buck, frank," he continued, as he led the way through the woods. the young naturalist made no reply, for it was a severe blow to him. he had anticipated a great deal of pleasure in taming the white buck, and in showing him to his friends, and relating the circumstances of his capture. but the panther had put an end to these anticipations; and frank determined, as long as he remained in the woods, to wage a merciless war against all his tribe. a few moments' walk brought the hunters to the cabin, and they went at once to the place where they had left the white buck. the panther had torn an ugly-looking hole in his throat, and he was stone dead. it was evident, from the position in which he lay, that the panther had endeavored to drag him away, but was prevented by the rope and the timely interference of the hunters. as regrets were useless, frank and his cousin carried the remains of the buck into the cabin. after fastening the door and replenishing the fire, the hunters again sought their blankets. the next morning they were stirring long before daybreak, and archie busied himself in removing the skin of the white buck, while his cousin, who was impatient to commence his war upon the panthers, was employed in cleaning his gun and sharpening his hunting-knife. brave seemed to understand that something unusual was on hand. in spite of the rough treatment he had received the night before, he appeared to have plenty of spirit left in him still, and acted as though he were impatient to be off. "dick, will you lend me your trap?" inquired frank, after he had finished his breakfast, and was preparing to set out. "the 'ole settler' do you mean?" asked the trapper. "sartin i will. goin' to ketch the painter, ain't you?" "yes; i'm going to try. i must have at least three panther-skins to make up for the killing of the white buck. he was worth more to me than my entire museum." "wal," said dick, as he handed frank the trap, "if you can get him to stick his foot in the 'ole settler,' he's yourn, an' no mistake. that ar trap sticks tighter nor a brother when it gets a hold o' any thing. now, be mighty keerful o' yourself." "all right," answered frank. "i'll have something to show you when i come back." he set out, with brave as his only companion. the trapper did not accompany him, for the reason that he had work of his own to attend to; and besides, although he was constantly scolding and finding fault with frank for his "carelessness," he was proud of his courage, and admired the spirit that prompted this somewhat hazardous undertaking, and wished to allow him to reap all the honors himself. archie and george did not go, for they were very anxious to visit their traps, and see whether there were any foxes in them. they did not like the idea of panther-hunting, and had tried every means in their power to induce frank to abandon his project. harry thought at first that he would be delighted to go, but, on reflection, he remembered his adventure with the wolves, and was fearful of another similar "scrape." so, as we have said, frank started out alone, with nothing on which to depend except the faithful brave, and his own courage and skill as a marksman. he was well enough acquainted with the woods, and the animals that inhabited them, to know that there was danger in the undertaking; but he thought only of the disappointment he had suffered in the death of the white buck, and the pleasure there would be in seeing the panther that had killed him stuffed and mounted in his museum. he followed the same course the panther had taken the night before, until he reached the place where the animal had taken to the tree and escaped, here the trail, of course, ended; but brave had no difficulty in finding it again, and from this frank concluded that he must have seen the panther jumping from tree to tree, and had followed him, until the latter, seeing that he was pursued by only one of his enemies, had descended to the ground and given battle, which had, of course, ended in brave's defeat. after a careful examination, frank could discover but three foot-prints in the trail, which looked as though some one had endeavored to obliterate it, by drawing a heavy stick over it. he could not account for this, but he knew, by the blood on the snow, that the panther had been severely wounded by the shot he had fired at him; so, without stopping to make any more observations, he ordered brave to "hunt 'em up." the dog immediately set off on the trail, and frank kept as close to him as possible. the panther had made good use of his time, for they followed the trail until almost four o'clock in the afternoon, without coming up with him. in the excitement of the chase, frank had not thought of stopping to eat his dinner, and he was both tired and hungry. a few moments' rest, and a piece of the cold venison and bread, with which his haversack was well stored, he thought would enable him to follow the trail until dark. he began to look around to find a good place to build a fire, when a loud bark from brave drove all such thoughts out of his mind, and he ran forward to the place where the dog was standing, and suddenly came in sight of the panther, which had killed a wild turkey, and was crouching at the foot of a tree, just ready to begin his meal. one of his hind-legs was entirely useless, having been broken by the shot from the rifle; and that it was which had given that peculiar look to his trail. how he had managed to climb so many trees, and travel such a distance, with his leg in that condition, frank could not imagine. but he was not allowed much time to make observations, for the panther crouched lower over his prey, and lashed his sides with his tail, as if about to spring toward him. he was within easy range, and frank cocked both barrels of his gun, and slowly raised the weapon to his shoulder. his hand could not have been more steady if he had been aiming at a squirrel. he glanced along the clean, brown tubes for a moment, and fired both barrels in quick succession. the gun had been heavily loaded, in order to "make sure work" of the panther, and the immense recoil threw frank flat on his back. when he recovered his feet, he saw the panther stretched out motionless on the ground. the buck-shot had done its work. chapter viii. a couple of new pets. frank was a big-feeling boy just then. he knew that he had done something that many an older person than himself would hesitate to undertake. he was fast becoming accustomed to scenes of excitement and danger, and he thought only of the feat he had accomplished, and not of the perilous position in which he had placed himself but a few moments before. what if his gun had missed fire, or he had only wounded the panther? how long could he and brave have withstood his attacks? the panther would certainly have conquered them. and what could he have done if he had been disabled in the depths of those woods, so far from any human being? such questions as these passed through the reckless young hunter's mind, but he dismissed them with the thought that the panther was dead, and that he had nothing to fear. the animal was one of the largest of his kind, measuring, as near as frank could judge, fully seven feet in length, including the tail. the rifleshot which had broken his leg had made an ugly-looking wound, and he had received both charges of buck-shot in his head; but the skin was not spoiled, and frank's first thought was to take it off and cure it for stuffing. around the tree was a little space, which was clear of bushes, and was probably as good a camping-ground as he could find. so he placed his gun where he could put his hand upon it at a moment's warning, and removed his haversack, hanging it up on a small tree that stood near. he then unfastened his belt, and took from it his blanket and a small tin pail, which was to do duty as a coffee-pot. with the aid of his heavy hunting-knife, he soon erected a hut--rude-looking, indeed, but sufficiently strong and tight to protect him from the wind. over the floor he spread hemlock branches to the depth of four or five inches, and the camp was finished. he then kindled a fire in front of the hut, and filled his pail with snow, and hung it on a crane to boil. in a little while the turkey, which the panther had killed, was dressed, and cooking as fast as a hot fire could make it. before his supper was cooked, the panther was hauled into the cabin, and his skin taken off, and hung upon a frame to dry. the turkey was equally divided between master and dog; and as neither had eaten any dinner, not a vestige of the fowl was left. while frank was building his camp, he had heard a faint ripple, like the noise of a small water-fall; and he was somewhat surprised thereat, for the intensely cold weather had formed ice, even in the swiftest water, almost two feet in thickness. as soon as he had finished his supper, he started out to see what had occasioned the noise, taking the trap with him, intending to find a good place to set it. when he arrived at the stream, he found it had its source in a salt spring, or, as the hunters would call it, a "deer-lick." the snow on the banks was trodden as hard as a floor, and the paths that the animals had made, in going to and from the stream, ran up into the woods in all directions. these springs are favorite resorts of deer and other wild animals, which delight to taste their brackish waters; and it is a common way of killing deer, in places where they are scarce, to watch one of these "licks" during the night, and shoot the animals as they approach. frank walked up one of the paths that led to the spring, and began to make preparations to set his trap. it was just the place for it, as he would be certain to catch something before morning. he first dug a hole with his hunting-knife, directly in the middle of the path, and the next job was to set the trap. he knew how it ought to be done. but the powerful jaws of the "ole settler" had often resisted the efforts of a stronger person than himself. after half an hour's work, during which time the skirts of his coat had been cut almost entirely off by the long, sharp teeth, he succeeded in getting it set, and placed safely in the hole which he had dug for its reception. then, with his hunting-knife, he cut down a good-sized sapling that stood near, and to this he fastened one end of a short, heavy chain; the other end of the chain he fastened to the trap. after he had placed every thing to his satisfaction, he carefully covered the trap and chain with snow, removed all the twigs and leaves he had scattered about, and returned to his camp. he employed himself until dark in gathering his evening's supply of fire-wood, and then lay down on his bed of boughs, well satisfied with his day's work. as it grew dark, it seemed to him that his camp became the center of attraction to every wild animal in the woods for a circle of ten miles around. the owl flew down around his fire, uttering his dismal scream; the barking of foxes was heard in all directions; and, now and then, a dark object would come out of the bushes, and gaze at him a moment with eyes that shone through the darkness like coals of fire, and then beat a hasty retreat. once or twice he heard a sound that made him reach, rather hurriedly, for his gun--the same sound that the trapper, the night before, had pronounced the "sniff of a painter." frank did not feel exactly safe in going to sleep, and sat for a long time with his gun in his hand. several times he was half inclined to shoot at some of the animals that came around the camp; but he finally concluded to keep the peace as long as they would. in a few moments after he had made this resolution, he sank back on his blanket, and was soon fast asleep. near midnight he was awakened by a chorus of loud yells. starting up, he found his camp surrounded by wolves. the fire had almost gone out, and the wolves appeared to be growing bolder by degrees, having already approached quite close to the cabin. frank started to his feet and threw a firebrand among them, when they scattered in every direction, and were out of sight in a moment. he was not disturbed again, and when he awoke it was daylight. after putting a good supply of wood on the fire, and hanging his coffee-pot on the crane, he shouldered his gun, and started toward the place where the trap had been set, hoping to find something in it that would make a breakfast for him. there _was_ something in it, beyond a doubt, for both trap and clog were gone; and the way brave growled and showed his teeth led him to believe that he had caught something besides a deer. the hole in which he had placed the trap was trodden down as though a flock of sheep had passed over it. it was a matter of some difficulty to follow the trail of the animal that had been caught in the trap, for he had moved directly up the path, and the only "sign" that frank had to guide him was, now and then, a slight scraping in the snow, which he knew had been made by the clog, as the animal dragged it after him. he followed the trail in this manner for nearly half a mile, when it suddenly turned off into the woods, where he could follow it up considerably faster. here he discovered that there was a bear in the trap, for the prints of his great feet were in the snow. his progress had evidently been retarded a good deal, for, at intervals along the trail, the broken bushes and trodden snow showed where the clog had caught and held him fast. brave led the way, but they had not gone far before he began to show signs of uneasiness. a little further on, he suddenly came to a halt, and stood gazing steadily before him, toward a thicket of bushes, that looked as though it would afford a splendid hiding-place for a wild animal. frank began to be excited now, and his hand was none of the steadiest as he cocked his gun and stooped down to caress his dog. he had faced the wounded panther without flinching, but he did not like the idea of attacking that bear in his den, for such it undoubtedly was, as under an immense pile of limbs and bushes frank could see something dark, that looked like a cave. brave ran around the bushes, with every hair on his body sticking toward his head, and now and then making a dash at the den, as though challenging the bear to come out. but the cave was as silent as death. frank could not see how he could attack the bear in there, and the question was, how to get him out into open ground, so that he could have a fair shot at him, and a good opportunity to retreat, if that shot should not prove fatal. after waiting nearly half an hour for the bear to come out and give them battle, frank grew impatient, and determined to commence fight himself. grasping his gun firmly in one hand, he set to work with his hunting-knife to cut a passage through the bushes, so that he could get a fair view of the mouth of the cave. while thus employed, he heard a slight rustling of leaves in the den, accompanied by a low, wailing cry, and followed by a hoarse growl. he bravely stood his ground, holding his gun in readiness; but, as the bear did not come out, frank went on with his work, more determined than ever to effect the destruction of the animal, for that wailing noise was the cry of a cub, which he was determined to have. he knew that this would be no boy's play, for, of course, the old bear must be killed before he could venture down into the cave. he was also well aware that she would fight for her young with a ferocity and stubbornness, against which only the most determined courage and a steady hand and quick eye could avail. he had heard uncle joe relate a story of a man, and one not wanting in courage either, who, upon discovering a couple of young bears playing together in the woods, had shouldered his rifle and made for home at the top of his speed. the least cry from one of those clumsy little fellows would have brought upon him an enemy that the bravest hunter would not care to encounter. but frank had great confidence in himself, and worked away industriously, now and then pausing to look down into the cave and listen. he had cut away most of the bushes before the opening, and as soon as he could get a good view of the interior, threw himself flat upon the snow and looked in. it was dark as midnight inside the cave, but he could see two fiery eyeballs glaring upon him through the darkness, which appeared to be approaching the opening. this afforded a fine mark, and one that he thought he could not possibly miss; so, throwing forward his gun, he took a steady aim, and fired. the report was followed by a howl that made the cold sweat start from every pore of his body; but, without hesitating a moment, he discharged the other barrel, and then, springing to his feet, rapidly retreated, just as the enormous head and shoulders of the bear rose out of the opening. after running a little distance, and finding that he was not pursued, he turned and looked behind him, and saw the bear, in front of the cave, rolling over and over in the snow. the "ole settler" was fast to one of her hind-legs, and the clog had caught and was holding her fast. frank immediately commenced to reload his gun, keeping his eye on the bear, ready to retreat again if she should succeed in freeing herself. he hastily rammed down the charges, and poured a handful of buck-shot into each barrel, and then crawled toward the bear, which, almost beside herself with rage and pain, was tearing at her wounds, and pulling up all the bushes within her reach. frank felt comparatively safe now, knowing that the bear could not escape; and besides, if she should succeed in getting the clog loose, she could not overtake him, incumbered as she was with the heavy trap. he waited until a fair mark was presented, and then fired again. the wound was mortal. after a few struggles, the bear lay motionless on the snow. the next work was to draw her away from the mouth of the cave and take off the trap. this was no easy task, for the animal was very heavy, and, as dick had predicted, the "ole settler" "stuck tighter nor a brother." after much exertion, this was accomplished, and frank was about to commence skinning the bear, when, all at once, the thought struck him, where was the father of the family? this thought made him spring to his feet rather hurriedly, and cast anxious glances at the cave. "the old fellow can't be in there," he soliloquized, "or he would certainly have come out before this time; but i'll just keep an eye open for him, and if he shows himself, and undertakes to interfere in this business, he'll get the worst of the bargain." he was not disturbed, however. the old bear, if he was about, probably thought that his family was capable of taking care of itself and fighting its own battles. as soon as he had taken off the bear's skin, he began to make preparations to enter the cave and bring out the cubs, which, all the while, had kept up an impatient cry. he first cut down a stout sapling, and, after he had lopped off all its branches, fastened his hunting-knife firmly to it. this he intended to use as a spear, in case he should be attacked while in the den. grasping it in one hand, and his gun in the other, he crawled down into the cave. it was so dark that he could scarcely see his hand before him; but, after a few moments' search, he discovered the cubs, nicely covered up in a bed of leaves. there were two of them, and they were about the size of a cat. they fought and screamed furiously as frank took them up, but he unceremoniously thrust them into the capacious pockets of his hunting-shirt, and crawled out of the cave. when he reached his camp he found that the fire had gone out. it was soon rekindled, when, after wrapping the cubs up in his overcoat, and putting them carefully away in one corner of the tent, he sat down on his bed of boughs, and made a hearty breakfast on cold venison and bread. while he was eating, he began to think seriously of setting out for "home," as he called the encampment where he had left his companions. he had accomplished much more than he had expected he could during the two days that he had been in the woods, and now had about as much on hand as he could conveniently attend to. the skins of the panther and bear must be prepared for stuffing, which would require his close attention; the cubs, also, must be taken care of and watched, for they would escape, if left to themselves. if he was at home, they could be shut up in the cabin while he was off hunting, and he could have his cousin's assistance in curing the skins. so, after resting an hour, he pulled on his overcoat again, stowing the cubs away in his pockets, folded up his blanket, strapped it fast to his belt, shouldered his gun, and set out. it was dark before he reached the cabin. his companions had just finished eating their supper, and had not expected his return that night. "why, frank, how are you?" exclaimed archie, springing to his feet and seizing his cousin's hand. "i'm glad to see you back safe. what kind of a time did you have?--rather lonesome, i guess. what have you got?" he continued, as one of the cubs, thinking that something unusual was going on, again set up a furious yelping. "i've the skin of the panther that killed the white buck," answered frank, "and also a bearskin, and two young cubs." as he spoke, he drew the cubs from his pocket. "you keerless feller!" exclaimed dick, who had not yet spoken; "i know'd you'd be in some scrape or other." "so did i," chimed in harry, "and that's the reason why i wouldn't go with him. it's a wonder you ain't all clawed to pieces." "hain't had any supper yet i reckon?" said the trapper. "come an' set down here, an' tell us all about it." frank was quickly relieved of his gun and overcoat, while a plateful of venison, some bread and butter, and a cup of hot coffee were passed over to him. stretching his feet out toward the fire, he related the details of his adventures, while the trapper sat by, smoking his pipe, apparently deeply interested in his story. chapter ix. close quarters with a grizzly. "wal," said dick, as soon as frank had finished his story, "that war about the keerlessest trick i ever hearn tell on. here, in the woods, it's jest the same as it is in a city; let a boy have his own way, an' he'll make an eend of himself in a tarnal hurry. don't you know that that bar could have chawed you up in a minit?" "yes," answered frank, "i suppose she could; but i had to run the risk of that in order to get the cubs." "yes, that's another of your boy tricks," continued dick, knocking the ashes from his pipe, "an' it 'minds me of some scrapes i had when i war a youngster. it war while my ole man war livin'. him an' me were onct huntin' somewhar nigh the head-waters o' the colorado river. i war about seventeen year ole, an' a purty good boy i war for my age, too. it tuk a smart, lively young injun to take my measure on the ground, an' i used to think that what i didn't know about trappin', shootin', and fightin' grizzly bars, warn't wuth knowin'. i was allers gettin' into some scrape or another, an' sometimes i used to get pawed up purty badly, too; but as long as i could crawl round i war all right. "i 'member onct that i had been over to a little creek about two mile from the camp, to 'tend to some traps i had sot for muskrats, an' as i war comin' home through the woods, i seed a young bar, jest about the size of them you brought home. he come out of the bushes, an' looked at me a minit, an' then jumped back agin. i thought he war a purty little feller, an' made up my mind that i would ketch him an' take him to camp with me. i had a kinder hankerin' arter pets, jest like you, frank, an' i wanted to tame this young bar, an' i thought me an' him would have some tall fights when he growed up; so i put arter him, an' finally ketched the little feller, an' tuk him in my arms, an' started for camp. he hollered an' fit like the mischief; but i hung on to him, an' arter half an hour's walk reached home. my ole man warn't there; he had gone off to 'tend to his traps; but i didn't keer, for i war used to bein' alone in the woods. arter feelin' in all my pockets, i found a long strip o' buckskin, an' i thought i would tie the little feller to a saplin' that stood close by the cabin; so i sot down on the ground an' war tyin' the string fast to his neck--he hollerin' an' fightin' all the while--when, all to onct, i heerd a loud growlin' and crashin' in the bushes behind me. i looked up, an' seed the ole bar a comin'. she had heered her baby squallin', an' was comin' arter him. i jumped up an' let the young bar fall, as though he had been a live coal. my gun war standin' agin a tree, close by, but i knowed i wouldn't have time to reach it, so i turned an' begun to go up the saplin'. you better believe i climbed _some_, an' i thought i war gettin' along mighty fast; but i warn't a minit too quick. i hadn't hardly got out of reach afore the bar made a grab at me, an' pulled off one of my moccasins. i war fairly treed; an' there i had to stay, too, 'cause the ole bar kept a close watch on me; but the tree war too small for her to climb, so i knowed i war safe. 'bout an hour afore dark i heered the ole man a comin', an' the bar left off watchin' me, an' begun to get ready for him. so, i hollered to the ole man, an' he put a chunk o' lead into her. as soon as i see that she war done for, i slid down the saplin' as fast as i could to ketch the young bar; but the ole man, who knowed in a minit what i had been doin', give him a clip side the head with the butt of his rifle, that knocked the daylights out of him; an' then, bars an' buffaler, didn't he scold me for bein' so keerless; but, law sakes, it didn't do a bit o' good, for, in about three days arterward, i war in a wusser scrape nor that. "arter 'tendin' to my traps, as usual, i started out through the mountains, on a hunt. 'bout noon i killed a big-horn, an' while i war cookin' my dinner, i happened to see, in a rocky place up the side o' the mountain, a small openin' 'bout large enough for a man to crawl into, an' i knowed it war a sort of cave. i didn't stop to think any more 'bout dinner jest then, but picked up my rifle an' started up the mountain. i wanted to see what kind of a place the cave war. when i got purty nigh to the openin' i seed a kind o' path runnin' up to it, an' i knowed the cave must be the home of some wild animal. this made me prick up my ears, an' be a little more keerful. i didn't like the idee of havin' a varmint jump down on me afore i knowed it. but i reached the mouth o' the cave without seein' any thing, and poked my head in, keepin' my gun ready to crack away at the first live thing i should set eyes on; but the cave war so dark that i couldn't see into it two foot; but i _heered_ something, an' i scrambled up into the openin' an' listened. it war a faint moanin' kind of a noise--somethin' like the squall of a young kitten, an' i knowed in a minit what it war that made it; it war a young painter. now, if i had knowed any thing, i would have climbed down out o' that place as fast as my legs would let me. but, no; i tuk it into my head all to onct that i must have them young painters. i wanted one of 'em to play with; an' without stoppin' to think, i begun to crawl down into the cave, an' along a narrer, crooked passage that must a been twenty yards long. one little feller kept up his cryin', an' it kept growin' louder an' louder, an' i knowed that he warn't a great way off. at last i come to a place where the cave seemed to widen into quite a large room, an' after a few minits' lookin'--or, i should say, feelin'--for the cave war as dark as a nigger's pocket--i found the young painters--three of 'em--in a nice bed of leaves made up in one corner. i didn't mind the hollerin' they made when i tuk hold of 'em, but chucked 'em all into my cap, an' started back. i had tuk good keer to 'member my bearin's, an' i knowed i should have no trouble in findin' my way out; so i crawled along keerless like, as usual, chucklin' over my good luck, an' thinkin' what nice pets i would make of the young painters, when all to onct i come within sight of the mouth o' the cave. bars and buffaler! i would have give all the beaver-skins i ever expected to be wuth, if i had been safe out o' that cave. the ole painter was comin' in. she had smelt my tracks, an' i could see by the light that come in, in little streaks on each side of her, that every hair on her body war stickin' toward her head. she meant mischief. any greenhorn could a told that i war in somethin' of a fix. i dropped the cubs, an' as i did so, they all set up a yell. the ole lady couldn't stand that, an' givin' a growl that made my blood run cold, she begun to get ready to spring at me. i used to think i war tall timber at rifle shootin', but, although the painter war not thirty feet from me, i war 'most afraid to risk the shot. but i knowed i didn't have much time to waste in sich thoughts, an' drawin' up my shootin' iron, i blazed away, expectin' to have the painter grab me the next minit. but when the smoke cleared away, i see the old lady stretched out, stone dead. i have been in tight places since then, in fights with varmints an' wild injuns, an' many a time a single chunk o' lead has saved my scalp; but that war the best shot i ever made. it war a thing that many a rocky mountain trapper wouldn't keer to undertake. i like to hunt now as well as i ever did, an' expect to be in a good many rough-an'-tumble fights with injuns an' grizzly bars, but i'd rather be excused from crawlin' down into a dark hole like that agin. but arter i had got out o' the cave, i didn't stop to think o' the danger i had been in; the cubs war mine, an' that's all i keered for." here the trapper paused, and thrusting his hand into the pocket of his hunting-shirt, he drew forth a clasp-knife and a plug of tobacco, and after cutting off a generous "chaw," as he called it, and stowing it away in his cheek, he continued: "but 'bout the nighest i ever come to bein' rubbed out, war while i war trappin' on the missouri river, with my chum, bill lawson--the poor fellow is gone now"--and here the trapper lowered his voice almost to a whisper, in reverence to the memory of his departed companion, and hastily drew his hand across his eyes--"an' i am left alone. it'll be lonesome on the prairy when i get back there, an' when i visit the places where me an' him used to camp an' trap together, i shall miss the ole man. he war one of the best trappers i ever come acrost. he war generally very good natered an' jolly; but he had strange ways with him sometimes, an' when he got one of his gloomy fits on him, there would be days when--although we ate at the same fire, an' p'rhaps slept under the same blanket--he wouldn't speak to me. i knowed something war troublin' him, an' it war a sorry sight for me to see that strong man weepin' like a child; but i trapped with him for better nor five years afore he told me his story. there would be weeks at a time when he would seem to forget his troubles, an' then it done me good to lay beside our camp-fire an' listen to his stories. he war a'most as big agin as i am, an' strong as a hoss. he could pull up a saplin' that two common men couldn't budge; and he war as brave as he war strong--as brave as a man could be; he didn't seem to keer for any thing, for i never see him frightened in my life, an' i war with him for better nor twenty years. an' he war a great injun fighter, too. it tuk a mighty lively red-skin, an' one that could pick up his feet in a tarnal hurry, to get away when ole bill onct set eyes on his trail; for the way he could run war a caution to owls, an' if there war one of them varmints in the country for fifty miles round, ole bill allers knowed it. he used to tell me that he could smell an injun further than he could see him; an' i believe he could. "but what i started to tell you 'bout war a little scrape we onct had with a grizzly. as i said, we war trappin' on the missouri river, right among the mountains. one mornin', arter a good breakfast on buffaler hump, i war gettin' ready to start out to 'tend to my traps, when ole bill said: "'dick, i see some grizzly bar tracks down in the gully last night. let's go an' hunt up the varmint. i would have follered him up last night, only it war too dark.' "in course i agreed, an' we ketched our hosses, which we had picketed close by the cabin, an' started out--ole bill leadin' the way. "huntin' a grizzly is fine sport sometimes; but if a feller is any way skeery, he had better not take a hand in it. even the injuns don't keer to meddle with the varmint, unless a dozen or two of 'em, well mounted an' armed, can ketch him out in clar open ground; an' even then they have to handle themselves round purty lively, for if the bar onct gets his claws on a hoss he has to go under. you couldn't hire a red-skin to go into the mountains alone an' hunt up a grizzly. the varmint allers lives in the thickest part of the woods; an' if you don't plug him through the brain at the first shot, or if your hoss gets tangled in the bushes, you're in a mighty onpleasant fix the first thing you know. but me an' bill had hunted grizzlies plenty o' times, an' allers come out o' the fight right side up, an' we war used to the sport. "wal, as i was sayin', we started out toward the place where bill had seed the trail o' the bar, an', arter four hours' hard ridin' over rocks an' fallen logs an' thick bushes, we come to the gully. it war 'bout a hundred feet deep an' a quarter of a mile broad, an' the banks on both sides war as steep as the roof o' this cabin, an' covered with bushes so thick that a hoss couldn't hardly work a way through 'em. it war a fine place for a bar, an' many a trapper wouldn't have liked the idea o' goin' down in there to hunt one up, an' i couldn't help sayin': "'ugly place, ain't it?' "'yes,' answered ole bill. 'but look over there;' an' he pinted acrost the gully to a sort o' clar spot, where there warn't no bushes, an' the timber didn't grow very thick. 'if the bar gets arter us,' he went on to say, 'we must run for that ar place; an' if we onct get him up there, he's ourn, sure.' "arter stoppin' a few minits to give our hosses a chance to rest, we took a look at our rifles, to see that they war all right, an' then begun to work our way down into the gully. it must have tuk us an hour to reach the bottom, for the brake war higher than our hosses' heads, an' it war hard work to get through it. we had sent out the dogs--we had two of the best bar dogs i ever happened to see--when we first started down, and jest as we reached the bottom of the gully, they give notice, by their howlin', that they had found the grizzly's trail. we rid up to the place as fast as we could, an' ole bill jumped off his hoss an' examined the tracks. they war fresh. the bar had jest passed along, an' we knowed that he warn't far off. "'hunt 'em up, dogs! hunt 'em up! off with you!' shouted ole bill; an' he jumped on to his hoss agin, and the dogs, understandin' what he meant, war out o' sight in no time. we follered them as fast as we could, an', purty quick, we heered a great crashin' in the brake, an' the dogs broke out into a reg'lar yelpin'. we knowed that they had started the bar, an' war arter him. in a few minits we come up with 'em, and see the bar settin' on his haunches. the dogs war jumpin' round him, now an' then takin' a grab at his hams, an' they kept the varmint spinnin' round as though he war sot on a pivot. ole bill drew his rifle up to his shoulder, an' sent an ounce-ball into the bar's hide, which brought him to the ground; but he war on his pins agin in less than no time, an', leaving the dogs, he took arter ole bill, who made straight acrost the gully toward the clar spot he had spoken of. the dogs follered close at the bar's heels, onct in awhile makin' a grab at his back settlements, which seemed to bother him a good deal; but he didn't stop to fight 'em, cause he thought the ole trapper war bigger game. the bushes an' trees war so thick that for some time i couldn't get a chance to put in a shot. i didn't want to fire till i war sartin of killin' the bar, 'cause it war only throwin' away powder without doin' no good. so i cheered on the dogs, hopin' that they would bring the bar to a stand-still; an' i warn't mistakened, for they begun to pitch in so rough, that the varmint had to stop to keep 'em off. this war what i war waitin' for, an' i sent another chunk o' cold lead atween his ribs. but he didn't seem to mind it at all; an', arter beating off the dogs, he started agin for the trapper. "ole bill had made mighty good use of his time, an' the way he stuck his heels into his hoss' sides war a thing to look at. he tried to load up his rifle, but the bushes war so thick that he had to lay close along his hoss, to keep from bein' swept off by them. "i drawed up long enough to ram home a ball, an' then started on agin, an' when i come up with bill, i found that he had got into a reg'lar laurel brake. the bushes war thicker than ever, an' as tough as green hickory, an' bill's hoss couldn't hardly make no headway at all. but they didn't seem to bother the varmint any, for he tumbled along as though the bushes hadn't been more'n straws; an' he war gainin' on bill. "it war a fine sight to see the way the ole feller carried himself then. he held his knife in one hand, an' his clubbed rifle in the other, keepin' his eyes on the bar all the while, an' leavin' his hoss to pick out his own way. he didn't look the least bit skeery, but i knowed he war kalkerlatin' how many clips he could get at the bar afore the varmint could grab him. the dogs war bitin' at the bar's legs all the while, an' purty soon he had to stop agin to fight 'em off. he raised on his haunches, an' struck at the hounds, which war as spry as cats, an' had been in barfights often enough to know how to keep out of his reach. "'now's your time, dick,' said ole bill. 'shoot close! my hoss ar purty nigh tuckered.' "i war all ready, an' ridin' up purty close, so as to get in a good shot, i drawed a bead on him, an' fired, expectin' to bring him, sure. but a bush atween me an' him glanced the ball, so that i only made an ugly wound in his shoulder. he give an angry growl, an', beatin' off the dogs, he dropped on all-fours, an' made arter me. "'now,' thinks i, 'dick lewis, you're in a blamed ugly scrape;' and so i war. the bar warn't more'n twenty feet from me; and afore my hoss had made three jumps, the bar made a claw at him, an' pulled out half his tail. the animal was doin' his best, but i see that it warn't healthy to stay on his back, an', as we passed under a tree, i grabbed hold of a limb jest above my head, an' swung myself clar off the saddle, jest in time to see the varmint put both paws on my hoss, an' pull him to the ground. but that war his last move, for ole bill sent a bullet through his brain that throwed him dead in his tracks. "i come down out of my tree, feelin' about as mean as any feller you ever see, for a man might as well be on the prairy without his head as without his hoss, an' mine war one of the best that ever wore a saddle. but the bar had done the work for him, an' no amount of grievin' could fetch me another; so i choked down my feelin's, an' begun to help ole bill to take off the grizzly's hide. but there war plenty of injuns about, an' it warn't long afore i had another hoss; an' 'bout a year arter that i ketched one for which many a trapper would have give all the beaver-skins he ever had. but that's another story." chapter x. a beaver hunt. the next morning, as soon as they had eaten their breakfast, the trapper went to the door, and, after listening, and looking at the sky a few moments, said: "youngsters, if we intend to ketch any of them beaver, we had better do it to-day. we are goin' to have a storm as is a storm, an' afore two days the woods will be blocked up so that we can't do no huntin' at all." frank and george were eager to accompany the trapper, for beaver-hunting was something entirely new to them; but archie and harry concluded to make another attempt to capture the black fox; for the trapper's description of his swiftness and cunning had rendered him an object worthy of attention, and made the young hunters more anxious than ever to catch him. frank and george drew on their overcoats, strapped their blankets fast to their belts, and filled their haversacks. when all was ready, each shouldered his gun and an ax, and followed the trapper from the cabin. about noon they came to a halt on the banks of a large pond that lay hemmed in on all sides by the trees. near the center of this pond were several objects of a conical shape, looking like drifts of snow. these were the beavers' houses. the boys were entirely at a loss to conceive how they were to go to work to capture the beaver. if they began to cut through the houses, the animals would take the alarm in a moment, and dive under the ice, where they would be safe from all pursuit. "i'll show you how it is done," said the trapper, who perceived that they did not understand it. "in the first place, take your axes and go and pound on every house you can see." "why, that will frighten out all the beaver," said frank. "that's jest what i want to do," said dick; "but you must know that a beaver can't live under the ice any longer than me or you." he then went on to explain that the banks on each side of the pond were supplied with "breathing-holes," which were dug into the bank, and extended upward above the level of the water, and that the beaver, when frightened out of their houses, would seek refuge in these holes, where they could be easily captured. "but how do we know where these holes are?" asked george. "easy enough," answered dick. "all you have got to do is to go along the bank an' strike the ice with an ax, an' you can tell by the sound where they are. but i fixed all that when i first diskivered this pond. i know jest where the holes are. now, you go an' pound on them houses, an' drive out the beaver." the boys accordingly laid down their guns, and commenced an attack on the dwellings of the beaver, when the animals at once plunged into the water under the ice. after every house had been visited, and the boys were satisfied that they had made noise sufficient to drive out all the beaver, they returned to the place where they had left the trapper, and found him engaged in cutting a hole in the ice close to the bank. as the boys came up, he directed one of them to fasten his hunting-knife to a long sapling for a spear, and the other to chop a hole in the bank directly opposite to the one he had cut in the ice. by the time the spear was finished, an opening had been cut down into the "breathing-hole," and the hunters discovered three beaver crouching in the furthest corner. useless thrust his head into the hole, and contented himself with barking at the game; but brave squeezed himself down into the opening among the beavers, and attacked them furiously. the animals made a desperate resistance, and in a few moments brave backed out of the hole, with his ears and nose bleeding from several wounds, which showed that the long teeth of the beaver had been used to a good advantage. frank gazed in surprise at the dog's lacerated head, and exclaimed: "there's something besides a beaver in there." "no, i reckon not," replied the trapper. "your dog is jest about as keerless as you be, an' hasn't got no more sense than to pitch into every wild varmint he comes acrost. you must understand that a beaver can get up a tarnal good fight if he onct makes up his mind to it. an' when you get one of 'em cornered up, it takes somethin' besides a 'coon dog to whip him." frank made no reply, and the trapper reached down with his long spear, when one after the other of the beavers were killed and pulled out on the bank. the attack on the houses was then renewed, to drive out any of the animals which might have returned. in the next breathing-hole two beavers were found, but only one was secured, the other making his escape by plunging back under the ice. while they were cutting into the next hole, a large mink suddenly popped out from under the roots of a tree into which the trapper was chopping; and although george made a frantic blow at him with the handle of his ax, he succeeded in getting past him, and started across the pond toward the opposite shore. the boys immediately went in pursuit, george leading the way, and frank following close behind him, brandishing his spear, and shouting to the dogs, which were close upon the mink's heels. the little animal made headway through the snow with a rapidity that was surprising; but the long bounds of the dogs were rapidly diminishing the distance between them, and when about half way across the pond, useless overtook and seized him. the boys increased their speed, fearful that the dog might spoil the skin, which was one of the finest they had ever seen. "useless!" shouted george, "get out! drop that"---he did not finish the sentence; for suddenly there was a loud crack, and the ice opened beneath him, and he sank out of sight in the cold water. frank, as we have said, was following close behind him, and at the rate of speed at which he was running, it was impossible to stop; and the trapper, who had been watching the race, and had witnessed the accident with an expression of great concern depicted on his weather-beaten countenance, expected to see frank disappear also. but the young naturalist always had his wits about him, and summoning all his strength, he sprang into the air, and cleared the hole into which george had fallen, by an extraordinary leap, and landed on the firm ice on the opposite side. george rose almost instantly, for he was an expert swimmer; but his sudden immersion into the cold water seemed to have paralyzed his limbs, and rendered him incapable of action. frank turned immediately and made a desperate clutch at george's long hair; but he was too late, for the unfortunate young hunter again sank slowly out of sight. frank's mind was made up in an instant, and hastily pulling off his fur cap and comforter, he unbuckled his belt and began to divest himself of his overcoat. "take care now, youngster," exclaimed the trapper, who at this moment came up. "don't let george get a hold of you, or you'll both go down together;" and dick threw himself on his knees, and stretched his long arm out over the water ready to catch george if he should come up within his reach, while frank stood upon the edge of the ice, ready to plunge into the water the moment his companion should rise again. but his intentions were anticipated; for at this moment brave came bounding to the spot, carrying the mink in his mouth. understanding, in an instant, that something was wrong, he dropped his game and sprang into the water. at this moment george's head appeared at the surface, and the dog seized him, when, to the horror of the hunters, both disappeared together. but they arose a moment afterward, and brave, holding the rescued hunter by the collar of his coat, swam toward his master, and george was drawn out on the ice, in a state of insensibility. "here! here!" exclaimed dick, running around to the place where frank was kneeling, holding george in his arms; "give him to me, an' you run back an' get the axes." the trapper raised his young companion in his arms as easily as though he had been an infant, and started toward the bank at the top of his speed; while frank, after pulling brave out of the water, ran back after the axes, as dick had directed. when he again found the trapper, he was on the bank, kneeling beside george, and engaged in chafing his hands and temples. "now, youngster!" he exclaimed, hurriedly, "if you ever worked in your life, work now. build a fire and throw up a shantee. we must get his wet clothes off him to onct." frank, as may be supposed, worked with a will, knowing that the life of his companion depended on his exertions. in a short time a roaring fire was started, and a rude shelter erected, when george's wet and frozen clothes were pulled off and hung up to dry, and he was warmly wrapped up in blankets. the rubbing was continued a few moments longer, when they had the satisfaction of seeing him open his eyes and gaze about him. dick now left the hut. in a short time he returned, with a bunch of herbs in his hand, and soon afterward a cup of strong, nauseating tea was pressed to george's lips, and he was compelled to swallow the whole of it. he was then enveloped in more blankets, and ordered to "go to sleep." while frank and the trapper were seated beside the fire, talking over the accident, they heard the noise of approaching footsteps on the crust, and presently archie and harry hurried up to the hut. "what's the matter with george?" inquired the latter, hurriedly, for he saw that dick and frank were the only ones at the fire. "o, he got a duckin' in the pond, that's all," replied the trapper. "don't be alarmed. he's sleepin' nicely now." "we thought somebody was drowned, sure," said archie, "for we saw the hole in the ice, and your guns and overcoats scattered about, as though they had been thrown down in a great hurry." in about an hour george awoke, and, of course, was immediately assailed with innumerable questions. among others, his brother asked him why he didn't swim when he fell into the water. "why didn't i swim!" repeated george; "i couldn't move. it seemed as though every drop of blood in my body was frozen solid as soon as i touched the water. but where's the black fox you were going to bring back with you? did you catch him?" archie replied in the negative; and then went on to tell how they had found the trail in the gully, followed it for a mile, then suddenly lost it again, all efforts to recover it proving unsuccessful. about the middle of the afternoon, george, declaring that he was able to travel, was allowed to put on his clothes, and the hunters shouldered their guns and started for home. the sight of their snug little cabin was a pleasant thing to the eyes of the trappers that evening, for the day's hunt had been a hard as well as a profitable one. a fire was quickly started, and, while their supper was cooking, george changed his wet clothes; and a strong cup of coffee, as the trapper remarked, "set _him_ all right again." after supper, how soft and comfortable their blankets felt! they lay for a long time in silence, watching the sparks as they arose slowly toward the opening in the roof that served as a chimney, and listening to the whistling of the wind and the sifting of the snow against the walls of the cabin; for the storm that the trapper had predicted had already set in. chapter xi. breaking up a moose-pen. on awaking the next morning, they found that the cabin was almost covered with snow, and the woods were filled with drifts, that rendered it impossible for them to resume their hunting. the two days that followed were passed in-doors, curing the skins of the animals they had taken, and listening to the trapper's stories. on the third day, a heavy thaw set in, and at night the wind changed around to the north, and covered the snow with a crust that would easily bear a man. early the next morning the hunters set out. george and frank accompanied the trapper, to assist in breaking up a moose-pen, which the latter had discovered a few days previous to the storm, and archie and harry determined to again attempt the capture of the black fox. the trapper led his young companions through the woods, and across the pond where george had met with his accident. about a mile further on, he came to a halt, and said, almost in a whisper: "now, youngsters, we are a'most to the moose-pen. you stay here, george; an' remember, don't go to movin' up on the game till you hear me shoot." "i don't see any moose," said george. "in course you don't," said the trapper. "but they are in the woods here, an' me and frank will go an' surround them. it'll take mighty keerful steppin', though," he continued, turning to frank, "for moose have got an ear like an injun's. be keerful now how you walk." so saying, the trapper shouldered his heavy rifle, and moved off through the woods, accompanied by frank. about half a mile further on, the latter was stationed on the banks of a deep ravine; and dick, after repeating his instructions, continued on alone. the stalwart form of the trapper had scarcely disappeared, when frank heard a noise in the bushes, and presently a large moose appeared, leisurely wading through the deep snow, and cropping the branches as he approached. as if by instinct, frank's gun was leveled; but remembering the trapper's instructions, the weapon was lowered, and the young hunter stepped back into the bushes, and watched the motions of the animal. he was a noble fellow--very much like the one with which frank had engaged in that desperate struggle in the woods--with antlers fully four feet in length. the animal appeared totally unconscious of danger, and, after browsing about among the bushes for a few moments, walked back into the woods again, but almost instantly reappeared, and made for the ravine at the top of his speed. at this moment, the well-known report of the trapper's rifle echoed through the woods. it was followed by a crashing in the crust, and presently another moose appeared, and, like the former, ran toward the ravine. a short distance behind him came the trapper, holding his rifle in one hand and his huge hunting-knife in the other, and rapidly gaining on the deer, which sank through the crust into the deep snow at every step. frank and brave immediately joined in the pursuit, and the moose had not run far before he was overtaken and seized by the dog. frank, remembering his first experience in moose-hunting, halted at a safe distance, and was about to "make sure work" of the game, when the trapper darted past him, exclaiming: "don't shoot, youngster. that's a young moose; an' if you can ketch him, he'll be worth more nor all the stuffed critters you've got at home." here was an opportunity which, to frank, was too good to be lost. hastily dropping his gun, and producing a piece of rope from the pocket of his overcoat, he ran up to the game, and, after a brief struggle, succeeded in fastening it around his neck. the dog was then ordered to let go his hold, when the moose instantly sprang to his feet and started to run. frank was thrown flat in the snow, but he clung to the rope with all his strength. after a short time the young moose, wearied with his useless efforts to escape, ceased his struggles, and his captors led, or rather pulled, him along through the woods toward the place where the game had first been started. "now," said the trapper, "you've got a pet that is worth something. he's jest the thing you want. you won't have to drag your sleds home now." "why not?" inquired frank. "cause this yere moose can pull you four fellers further in one day than you can travel in two. i knowed a trader at fort laramie that had one o' them critters, and he used to hitch him up to a sled, an' think nothin' o' travelin' sixty miles a day." while they were talking, george came up, and, after the hunters had collected their game, dick led the way toward home, while frank brought up the rear, leading the young moose. meanwhile, archie and harry were in hot pursuit of the black fox. they found the trail, as before, in the gully, and sport started off on it, and met with no difficulty until they arrived on the banks of a small stream that ran a short distance from the cabin. here the trail came to an abrupt termination, and all efforts to recover it were unavailing. this was the identical spot where they had lost it before. for almost an hour they continued, but without any success; and harry exclaimed, as he dropped the butt of his gun to the ground, and leaned upon the muzzle with rather a dejected air: "it's no use. we're fooled again. that fox has got his regular run-ways, and we might as well call off the dogs, and go home." "not yet," said archie; "i can't give up in this way; neither do i believe that any fox that ever lived can fool sport. hunt 'em up! hunt 'em up!" he continued, waving his hand to the dog, which was running about, tearing the bushes with his teeth, and whining, as if he, too, felt the disgrace of being so easily defeated. the obedient animal sprang upon the trail and followed it to its termination, and then commenced circling around through the bushes again; and archie walked across the stream and examined the banks for the twentieth time, but no signs of a trail could be found. at length, harry suddenly exclaimed: "look here, archie; here's where the rascal went to;" and he pointed to a small tree that had been partially uprooted by the wind, and leaned over until its top reached within ten feet of the ground. "you see," harry went on to say, "that the tops of all the other trees are almost loaded down with snow, but this one hasn't got a bit on it. the fox must have shaken it off when he jumped up there." archie, who was ready to catch at any thing that looked like encouragement, hurriedly recrossed the stream, and, after examining the top of the tree, climbed up on it, when he discovered the tracks of the fox in the snow that had fallen on the trunk. he descended to the ground, and the boys ran along up the stream, carefully examining every log and stick that was large enough for a fox to walk upon, and finally, to their joy, discovered the trail, which ran back toward the gully from which it had started. the dogs immediately set off upon it, and the boys, who had learned considerable of the "lay of the land," struck off through the woods, in an almost contrary direction to the one the dogs were pursuing, toward a ridge that lay about three miles distant. archie led the way at a rapid pace, now and then looking over his shoulder, and exclaiming, "hurry up, harry." half an hour's run brought them to the ridge, and their feelings were worked up to the highest pitch of excitement, when they discovered that the fox had not yet passed. "we're all right now," said archie, joyfully; "that black fox is ours." "yes," said harry, "provided this is his runway." "o, don't begin to throw cold water on our expectations," said archie. "it'll be too bad if----. there they come, now; get out of sight, quick." as archie spoke, a long, drawn-out bay came faintly to their ears, and the dogs appeared to be coming up the ridge. the young hunters hastily concealed themselves, and archie had just cocked his gun, when the black fox broke from the bushes, and, as if suspicious of danger ahead, turned off down the ridge. it was a long shot, but archie, without a moment's hesitation, raised his gun to his shoulder and fired. "i told you he was ours," he shouted, as the smoke cleared away, and the black fox was seen struggling in the snow. a blow on the head with a stick stilled him, and the boys, after examining their prize, which was the finest of his species they had ever seen, started down the ridge to meet the dogs, and soon arrived at the cabin with their prize, and were delighted to find how successful their comrades had been in capturing the moose. frank and archie immediately set to work to break the young moose to harness. he proved very tractable, and soon learned to draw the boys in a sled, over the ice, with all the regularity of a well-broken horse, more than compensating them for all the care they had bestowed upon him. chapter xii. the moose shows his qualities a severe storm having set in, rendering hunting or trapping impossible, the hunters passed a few succeeding days in-doors, and busied themselves in making a sled and harness for the moose, which, since his capture, had received a large share of frank's attention. he had been hitched to a sled regularly every day, and had been trained until he had learned to obey almost as well as a horse. he was very much afraid of a whip, and his only fault was a desire to get over the ground as fast as possible. sometimes, when fairly started, it was a difficult task to restrain him. but the boys, far from considering this a failing, looked upon it as a quality worth cultivating; and their horned horse was always allowed to show off his speed to the very best advantage. one morning, after the weather became settled, archie proposed taking a ride up the creek, to which the others readily agreed. the moose was brought from the barn, and after considerable trouble--for the new harness had been made too small--he was finally hitched to the sled. it was their intention to camp in the woods and eat their dinner. after providing the necessary articles, an ax, plenty of ammunition, a supply of coffee, salt, and pepper, a camp-kettle and frying-pan, they sprang into the sled, and waving their hands to uncle joe and the trapper, who stood in the door, watching their departure, they shouted to their horned horse, which set off up the creek at a rapid pace. "let him out now!" shouted frank to his cousin, who was driving. "let him out. we've got all day before us, and let us see how fast he can go." archie pulled his cap down over his ears, and commenced shouting to the moose, which almost redoubled his pace, and whirled them over the snow at a rate the boys had never seen equaled by a living animal. his gait was an awkward, shambling trot; and as the boys watched his movements, they could not help laughing outright, whereupon the dogs joined in the chorus, yelping and barking furiously. this frightened the moose, which uttered a loud snort, and throwing back his head, ran faster than ever; and archie, who began to fear that he was running away with them, pulled and jerked at the lines, but all to no purpose; the moose ran faster and faster, and the boys, who did not pause to consider the danger they might be in, laughed and shouted until they were hoarse. at length frank exclaimed: "you had better check him up a little. the first thing you know, the concern will run away with us." "i believe that is what the rascal is trying to do now," answered archie, pulling with all his strength at the reins. "he has got a mouth like iron." "well, let him go then, until he gets tired," said george; "he can't run this way all day, and besides, if we are obliged to spend a night in the woods, it will be no new thing to us. get up there! hi! hi!" archie, finding that it was impossible to stop the "concern," as frank had called it, turned his entire attention to keeping him in the creek, in which he succeeded very well, until, as they came suddenly around a bend, they discovered before them a huge log, lying across the ice. to avoid it was impossible, for the log reached entirely across the creek. "stop him! stop him!" shouted harry. "if he hits that log he'll break the sled all to smash. stop him, i tell you!" "i can't," replied archie, pulling at the reins. "let him go, then," said frank. "lay on the whip, and perhaps he will carry us, sled and all, clean over the log." this was a desperate measure; but before archie had time to act upon the suggestion, or the others to oppose it, they reached the log. the moose cleared it without the least exertion, but the next moment there was a loud crash, and frank, who had seated himself on the bottom of the sled, and was holding on with both hands, suddenly arose in the air like a rocket, and pitching clear over his cousin, turned a complete somersault, and landed on the crust with such force, that it broke beneath his weight, and he sank out of sight in the snow. the next moment he felt a heavy weight upon him, and heard a smothered laugh, which he knew was uttered by archie. the latter regained his feet in an instant, and making a blind clutch at his cousin--for his face was so completely covered up with snow that he could not see--inquired, as he helped him to his feet: "who's this?" "it is i," answered frank. "but where is the moose?" "gone off to the woods, i suppose," answered archie. "it's just our luck. eh! what? no, he hasn't--he's here, safe." he had succeeded in clearing his eyes of the snow, and saw the moose struggling desperately to free himself from the sled, which had caught against the log, and was holding him fast. frank and his cousin at once sprang to secure him, and, while the former lifted the sled over the log, archie seized the lines, and, in order to render escape impossible, made them fast to a tree. by this time george and harry had come up, and at once commenced searching about in the snow for their weapons, and the others busied themselves in repairing the runners of the sled, both of which were broken. in a short time every thing was ready for the start. george volunteered to act as driver, provided the dogs could be kept quiet, and, after a few objections from harry, who "didn't like the idea of riding after that moose," they again set out. fortunately no one was injured in the least--not even frightened--the only damage sustained by the establishment being the breaking of the runners. boy-like, they gave not one thought to the danger they had been in, but amused themselves in laughing at the comical figures they must have cut, as they all "pitched head-over-heels out of the sled together." the dogs, however, did not seem to regard it in the light of an amusing adventure, for they could not be induced to enter the sled again. they ran along behind it, keeping at a respectful distance, and the moment the sled stopped, and their masters began trying to coax them in, they would retreat precipitately. the moose now seemed to have become quieted. whether it was for the reason that the dogs were kept still, and there was less noise behind him, or that he had been fatigued by his sharp run, the boys were unable to decide. he trotted along at an easy gait, but still going as fast as they wished to travel, until harry announced "that it was half past eleven o'clock, and high time that they were looking up a place to eat their dinner." a suitable spot for an encampment was soon selected, and, after the moose had been unharnessed and fastened to a tree, frank and harry set out to procure something for dinner, leaving the others to attend to the duties of the camp. the newfoundlander, which accompanied the hunters, was sent on ahead to start up any game that might be in his way. after he had led them about a mile from the camp, his loud barking announced that he had discovered something. the boys hurried forward, and found the dog seated on his haunches at the foot of a tall hemlock, barking furiously at something which had taken refuge among the branches. "it's a bear," exclaimed harry, as soon as he could obtain a view of the animal. "yes, so i see," answered frank, coolly pouring a handful of buck-shot into each barrel of his gun. "we'll soon bring him down from there. you be ready to finish him, in case i should miss." "shoot close, then," answered harry; "for if you only wound him, he will prove a very unpleasant fellow to have about." frank, in reply, raised his gun to his shoulder, and a loud report echoed through the woods, followed by a savage growl. the shot was not fatal, for, when the smoke cleared away, they discovered the bear clinging to the tree, apparently none the worse for an ugly-looking wound in his shoulder. "shoot me if the rascal isn't coming down!" exclaimed harry. "try the other barrel, frank, quickly." it was as harry had said. the bear was beginning to descend the tree, and his whole appearance indicated that he meant fight. frank was a good deal surprised at this, for he had great confidence in his double-barrel, and in his skill as a marksman, and had been sanguine of either killing or disabling him at the first shot; but the celerity of the animal's movements proved that his wound did not trouble him in the least. it was evident that their situation would soon be any thing but a pleasant one, unless the other barrel should prove fatal. frank could not pause long to debate upon the question, for the bear was every moment nearing the ground, now and then turning toward his enemies, and displaying a frightful array of teeth, as if warning them that it was his intention to take ample revenge on them. again he raised his gun to his shoulder, his nerves as steady as if he were about to shoot at a squirrel, and carefully sighting the head of their shaggy enemy, pulled the trigger. the bear uttered another of his terrific growls, and after trying in vain to retain his hold upon the tree, fell to the ground. brave was upon him in an instant, but the bear, easily eluding him, raised on his haunches, and seized the dog in his paws. one smothered howl came from brave's throat, and frank, clubbing his gun, was rushing forward to the rescue of the newfoundlander, whose death now seemed inevitable, when another charge of buck-shot, from harry's gun, rattled into the bear's head, and again brought him to the ground. brave was released from his dangerous situation, and the moment he regained his feet he attacked the bear with redoubled fury; but the animal easily beat him off, and rushed, with open mouth, upon frank. "run! run!" shouted harry; "the rascal isn't hurt a bit." but with frank, retreat was impossible; the bear was close upon him, and he would have been overtaken in an instant. bravely standing his ground, he struck the animal a powerful blow, which staggered him for an instant; but, before he had time to repeat it, his gun went flying out of his hands, and he was stretched, stunned and bleeding, on the snow. the bear, no doubt, considered him disposed of, for he kept on after harry, who, being unable to fire for fear of wounding either frank or the dog, had been compelled to witness the struggle, without having the power of lending any assistance. the bear had struck frank a severe blow, which, for a few seconds, rendered him incapable of action; but as soon as he had recovered, he ran for his gun, and while he was ramming home the charge, he saw harry's coat-tails disappearing in a thicket of bushes, and the bear, seated on his haunches, engaged in fighting the dog, which, having experienced some pretty rough handling, had learned to keep out of reach of the dangerous claws. as soon as frank had loaded his gun, he hurried forward to put an end to the fight, when a sheet of flame shot out from the bushes, and the bear ceased his fighting, and lay motionless on the snow. a moment afterward harry appeared, and, upon seeing frank, exclaimed: "i've finished the job for him! but he gave you fits, didn't he? your face is all bloody. i guess he made your head ache!" "i guess he did, too," replied frank. "i tell you, he hit me an awful crack. i had as soon be struck with a sledge-hammer." fortunately, there were no bones broken. after frank's wounded head had been bandaged with his handkerchief, the boys proceeded to remove the skin of the bear, which was the largest of his species they had ever seen. selecting some of the choice parts of the meat, they then started toward the camp. their appearance relieved the anxiety the others had begun to feel at their prolonged absence. the story of their adventure afforded abundant material for conversation while they were eating their dinner, which frank, who had experienced no serious inconvenience from the blow he had received, speedily served up; and many were the speculations in regard to the lecture they would be certain to receive from the trapper, for their "keerlessness." it was nearly four o'clock in the afternoon before the boys started for uncle joe's cabin. as it promised to be a fine, moonlight night, they were in no hurry. allowing the moose to trot along at an easy gait, they sat in the bottom of the sled, enveloped in furs, amusing themselves in shouting and singing, when archie suddenly exclaimed: "look there, boys! now, see me make that varmint jump." the boys looked in the direction indicated, and saw a large, gaunt wolf standing on the bank of the creek, regarding them attentively, and seeming to be not the least concerned about their approach. as archie spoke, he raised his gun; but the wolf, as if guessing his intention, suddenly turned, and disappeared in the bushes. "boys," said frank, "that little circumstance has set me to thinking. supposing that a pack of those fellows should get after us to-night, wouldn't we be in a fix?" "that's so," answered the others, in a breath, their cheeks blanching at the very thought. "i never thought of that," said archie. "hurry up, harry. lay on the goad, and let's get home as soon as possible." the joking and laughing instantly ceased, and the boys bent suspicious glances on the woods, on each bank of the creek, over which darkness was fast settling, and their hands trembled as they reached for their guns, and placed them where they could be found at a moment's warning. harry urged on the moose, intent on reaching the tree where the accident had happened in the morning, if possible, before dark. that passed, they would feel comparatively safe; for if the wolves should overtake them before they reached the tree, escape would be impossible. the moose shuffled over the snow at a rapid rate, as if he, too, knew that they were in danger; but harry kept him completely under his control, and in less than half an hour the tree was in sight. after considerable exertion, the sled was lifted over the obstruction, and as the boys resumed their seats, they felt relieved to know that the worst part of the ride had been accomplished; but they had not gone far when, faintly, to their ears came the sound for which they had been waiting and listening--the mournful howl of a wolf. the moose heard it too, for, with a bound like a rocket, he set off on that break-neck pace that had so amused the boys in the morning. but it was far from a laughing matter now. the moose was not running from a harmless noise behind him, but from a danger that threatened them as well. presently the dreadful sound was repeated from another part of the woods, still distant, but nearer than before. the boys had often heard the same sound, when seated around their blazing camp-fire, and had smiled to think what a momentary horror would seize upon them as the sound first came pealing from the depths of the woods. but they had no camp-fire to protect them now; nothing but the speed of their horned horse and their own bravery could save them. in a few moments, another and another joined in the hideous chorus, each nearer and more fearfully distinct than the others. the wolves were closing in behind them from all sides; but with their usual cowardice, were delaying the attack, until a sufficient force could be collected to render an easy victory certain. up to this time not a wolf had been seen, save the one that archie had first discovered; but in a few moments they could be heard dashing through the bushes on either side of the creek, and, soon after, the boldest began to show themselves on the ice behind them. to describe the thoughts that ran with lightning speed through the minds of the terrified boys were impossible. in spite of the piercing cold, so intense were their feelings of horror, that they were covered with perspiration, and every thing they had done in their lives--minute incidents, long since forgotten--seemed spread out before their eyes like a panorama. rapidly ran the terrified moose; but nearer and nearer came their dreadful pursuers, each moment increasing in numbers, and growing more bold. the moment was fast approaching when they would make the attack. "let us commence the fight, boys," said frank, in as firm a voice as he could command. "we must kill as many of them as we can, before they close on us. george, take harry's gun. archie, you and i will fire first. remember now, no putting two charges into one wolf. harry, keep on the ice. ready--now!" the guns cracked in rapid succession, and the howls which followed proved that the ammunition had not been thrown away. the wolves sprang upon their wounded comrades and commenced to devour them, and george seized the opportunity to put in two excellent shots. during the delay thus occasioned, short as it was, the wolves were left far behind, and the boys had ample opportunity to load their guns. harry, although generally very timid, when he found himself placed in danger, was the most cool and collected one of the party; and it was well that it was so, for it required all his presence of mind and power of muscle to keep the moose on the ice. he was struggling desperately, first to relieve himself of the weight of the sled, and, failing in this, he would make frantic endeavors to turn into the woods. if any part of the harness should break, they would be left at the mercy of their pursuers. again and again did the fierce animals overtake them, and as often were some of their number stretched on the snow. at length, a loud hurrah from harry announced that they were nearing home; and a few moments afterward, just as the wolves were closing around them again, the sled entered uncle joe's "clearing." the noise of purling waters to the desert-worn pilgrim never sounded sweeter than did the sharp crack of rifles and the familiar voices of the trapper and his brother, to the ears of the rescued boys. the inmates of the cabin had heard the noise of the pursuit, and had rushed out to their assistance. the moose was speedily unhitched from the sled, and after the boys had closed and fastened the doors of the cabin, they began to breathe more freely. chapter xiii. the black mustang. supper over, the hunters drew their chairs around the fireplace, and dick, after filling his pipe, and drawing a few puffs by way of inspiration, said: "i believe i onct told you 'bout havin' my hoss pulled out from under me by a grizzly bar, didn't i? wal, i told you, too, that i ketched another, an' i had a job to do it, too--to ketch the one i wanted; an' the time you've had tryin' to ketch that black fox reminds me of it. you know, i s'pose, that large droves of wild hosses roam all over the prairy, an' them droves ar allers led by some splendid animal--allers a stallion--one that has got the legs to go like lightnin', an' the wind to keep it up. an' he's allers the cock o' the walk, too--the best fighter in the drove; an' when he moves round, it would make you laugh to see the other hosses get out of his way. he holds his place until he dies, unless some other hoss comes along an' wallops him. then he takes his place with the common fags o' the drove, an' the new one is king till he gets licked, an' so on. it ar a mighty hard thing to capture one o' them leaders. you can ketch one o' the others easy enough, but when it comes to lassoin' the 'king,' it's a thing that few trappers can do. jest arter my scrape with the grizzly bar, bill lawson an' me fell in with a lot o' fellers that war goin' to spend a season on the saskatchewan, an' they wanted me an' bill to join 'em; so i bought me a hoss of an ole injun for a couple o' plugs o' tobacker--reg'lar jeems river it war, too--an' we started out. my new hoss was 'bout as ugly a lookin' thing as i ever happened to set eyes on. he war big as all out-doors, an' you could see every bone in his body. an' he war ugly actin', too; an' if a feller come within reach of his heels, the way he would kick war a caution to injuns. but i hadn't been on the road more'n a day afore i diskivered that he could travel like a streak o' greased lightnin'. that war jest the kind of a hoss i wanted, an' i didn't care 'bout his ugly looks arter that. "for more'n three year, me an' bill had been keepin' an eye on a hoss that we wanted to ketch. he war the leader of a large drove. he war a sort o' iron-gray color, with a thick, archin' neck--a purty feller; an' the way he could climb over the prairy was a caution to cats. we warn't the only ones arter him, either, for a'most every trapper in the country had seed him, an' had more'n one chase arter him. but, bars and buffaler! it war no use 't all, for he could run away from the fastest hosses, an' not half try; an' many a poor feller, who straddled a hoss that every body thought couldn't be tuckered out, had left his animal dead on the prairy, an' found his way back to his camp on foot. we war in hopes that we should see him, for we war travelin' right through his country; an' i knowed that if we did find him, i would stand as good a chance o' ketchin' him as any one, for my ugly-lookin' hoss was the best traveler in the crowd. "one night we camped on a little stream, called bloody creek. we called it so from a fight that a party of us fellers had there with the injuns. about an hour arter supper, while we war all settin' round the fire, smokin' an' telling stories, ole bob kelly--the oldest an' best trapper in the country--started up off his blanket, an', cockin' his ear for a moment, said, 'somebody's comin', boys.' an', sure 'nough, in a few minits up walked a stranger. "it ar a mighty uncommon thing to meet a teetotal stranger on the prairy, an' a man don't know whether he is a friend or foe; but we war mighty glad to see him, and crowded round him, askin' all sorts o' questions; an' one took his rifle, an' another pulled off his powder-horn an' bullet-pouch, an' a big feller dragged him to the fire, where we could all get a good look at him, an' made him drink a big cup o' coffee. "'whar do you hail from, stranger?' inquired ole bob kelly, who allers took them matters into his own hands, an' we little fellers had to set round an' listen. "'i b'long anywhere night ketches me,' answered the stranger. 'i'm an ole trapper in these yere parts.' "'whar's your hoss?' asked ole bob. "'i left him dead on the prairy--dead as a herrin'. i rid him a leetle too hard, i reckon. i war chasin' up the black mustang.' "if i should live to be a hundred year older 'n i'm now, an' should live among the blackfoot injuns the hull time, i shouldn't expect to hear another sich a yell as 'em trappers give when the stranger mentioned the black mustang. they crowded round him like a flock o' sheep, all askin' him questions; an' he tried to answer 'em all to onct; an' sich a row as there war round that camp-fire for a few minits! it war wusser nor any injun war-dance i ever seed. now, me an' bill hadn't never seed the black mustang, nor heerd o' him afore, 'cause we hadn't trapped in that part o' the country for a'most three year, but we knowed in a minit that it must be the leader o' some drove. but bill had lived among the injuns so much that he had got kinder used to their ways, an' he didn't like to see them trappers carryin' on so, an' actin' like a parcel o' young'uns jest turned loose from school; so, as soon as he could make himself heered, he yelled: "'what in tarnation's the matter with you fellers? as soon as you git through hollerin', me an' dick would like to know what all this yere fuss is about.' "'why, the black mustang has been within ten mile of this yere camp to-night,' said one of the trappers. "'wal, an' what o' that?' said bill. 'ar the black mustang any better hoss than the gray king?' "they all set up another yell at this, an' one of 'em said: "'why, the gray ain't nothin' 'long side o' the black mustang. he could run away from him in less'n two minits. i guess you hain't hearn tell of him, have you?' "'in course i hain't,' said bill. "'then you ain't no great shakes of a trapper,' said another. "now, the rascal knowed that war a lie, for there warn't no trapper in the country that could lay over bill, 'cept ole bob kelly, an' every one said as how he war the best trapper agoin'; an' the way bill eyed the feller, made him kinder keerful of his we'pons for a day or two arterward. "arter talking a little while, we found out the black mustang war the leader o' the largest drove on the prairy. he had been round for 'bout a year, an' every trapper in that part of the country had had a chase arter him; but it war like chasin' the wind; an' besides this, he could run all day, an' be jest as fresh at night as when he started in the mornin'. "'wal,' thinks i, 'dick, here's a good chance for you to try your hoss's travelin' qualities;' an' i made up my mind that i would start off an' foller the black mustang till i ketched him, if it tuk me my lifetime. "the next mornin', arter breakfast, one o' the trappers proposed that we should spend three or four days in huntin' up the mustang, an', in course, we all agreed to it. the stranger wanted to go, too, but we had no hoss to give him; so, arter biddin' us all good-by, he shouldered his rifle an' started out alone acrost the prairy. wal, we spent a week tryin' to find that hoss, but didn't even get a sight at him; so one mornin' old bob kelly concluded that we had better make another strike for the saskatchewan. we packed up an' got all ready to start, when i tuk them a good deal by surprise by tellin' 'em that i war goin' to stay an' hunt up the black mustang. how they all laughed at me! "'laugh away, boys,' says i, as i got on to my hoss. 'i'll see you on the saskatchewan in a month or so, an' i'll either bring the mustang with me, or he'll be a dead hoss. if i can't ketch him, i can shoot him, you know; an' i won't see you agin till i do one or the other. good-by, fellers.' an' i turned my hoss an' rode away from the camp. "wal, i rode all over them prairies for a'most six weeks, without seein' the sign of a hoss; an' one arternoon i stopped on the top of a high swell to take my reckonin'. i found myself on the east side o' the black hills, an' i knowed that my first job was to get on the _other_ side; the mustang had prob'bly struck off toward the mountains. so i began to look around for a good place to get over. the hills rose from the prairy reg'lar bluff-like--sometimes a hundred feet high, an' so steep that a sheep couldn't climb up 'em. jest as it begun to grow dark, i come to a deep ravine, that seemed to run up into the hills a good way; an' the bottom of this yere ravine was as hard an' smooth as a floor, an' looked as if it had been traveled over a good deal. but i war kinder tired with my day's tramp, an' didn't notice it much, for i thought it war nothin' more'n a buffaler road; so i picked out a good place an' camped for the night. "'arly the next mornin' i set out agin; but as soon as i got on the road i knowed that no buffaler had made them tracks; they war mustangs, an' there war the prints of their hoofs in the dust, plain as a bar's ears. when i come to examine the signs, i found, as nigh as i could kalkerlate, that there war about three hundred hosses in the drove, an' i knowed, from the looks of the tracks, that they had been along lately; so i pushed ahead as fast as my hoss could carry me, an' that wasn't slow, i tell you. i rid him all day at a tearin' rate, an' at dark he seemed as willin' to go as when i started out. this put me in high spirits, an' i made up my mind that if me and my hoss ever got arter that black mustang, he would have to pick up his feet mighty lively to get away from us. the next day, about noon, i war riding along at a thumpin' rate, when all to onct i come to a place where the ravine opened into a small prairy, and scattered all over it war the wild hosses, feedin' away as peaceably as if no one had ever thought of disturbin' them there. i pulled up so quick that it a'most brought my hoss on his haunches; but the mustangs had seed me, an' the way they snorted an' galloped about war a purty thing to look at. i drawed off into the bushes as quick as i could, an' gathered up my lasso, which i allers carried at my saddle-bow, an' then looked toward the drove agin. the first hoss i seed was the black mustang. he war runnin' about, tossin' his head an' snortin' as though he didn't hardly understand the matter. he war the purtiest hoss i ever sot eyes on; but i couldn't stop to examine his pints then. then i tuk a look round the prairy, an' saw that the hills rose on all sides of it; there was but one way the hosses could get out, an' that war through the ravine. i war in luck for onct in my life. now, you boys, if you had been there, would, most like, run out into the prairy to onct, an' tried to ketch him, but that would have been a reg'lar boy trick, and would have spiled it all. i knowed that i had the black hoss surrounded, but if i begun to race him round that prairy, he would dodge me, an' be off down the ravine like a shot; so i kept still in the bushes; an' my hoss knowed his own bisness, and stood as though he war made of rock. "purty soon the hosses begun to get over their skeer an' commenced comin' toward me--the black hoss leadin' the way. he would come a few steps, an' then stop an' paw the ground, an' then come a little nearer, an' so on, till he come within 'bout half a lasso-throw, when, all of a sudden, i give my hoss the word, an' he jumped out o' them bushes like a streak o' lightnin'. it would have made you laugh to see the way them hosses put off; the black hoss, seemed to me, war on wings; but he hadn't made three jumps afore my lasso war around his neck. _the black mustang war mine!_ "in about three weeks i reached the saskatchewan, an' if you could have heard the yell them trappers give when i rode up to the camp on the mustang, it would have done your heart good. i had kept my promise." chapter xiv. a brush with the greasers. dick replenished his pipe and prepared to rest, after his tale was completed, when frank suddenly inquired: "dick, how came that scar on your face?" the "scar" frank had reference to, was an ugly-looking wen, extending entirely across the trapper's face, and completely "spilin' his good looks," as he sometimes used to remark. "that war done in a fight with some tarnal greasers," answered dick. "i come mighty nigh havin' my neck stretched that night, an' the way it happened war this:" after a few whiffs at his pipe, he continued: "when our government war settlin' our little dispute with the mexikin greasers, i, like a good many other trappers, thought that i should like to take a hand in the muss. i hate a greaser wusser nor i do an injun. so, arter a little talk, me an' bill jined a company o' rangers that war raised by an ole trapper we used to call cap'n steele. a'most every man in the company war a trapper or hunter, for the cap'n wouldn't take only them as could show the claws o' three or four grizzlies they had rubbed out, an' as many injun scalps. "wal, when we got together, i reckon we war about the roughest lookin' set o' men you ever see. each one dressed as suited him best, an' all armed with rifles, tomahawks, an' huntin'-knives. but our looks didn't seem to set ole gen'ral taylor agin us, for when we rode up to his camp, an' our cap'n had told him what we war, an' what we could do, he seemed mighty glad to see us; and we war sent to onct to the quarter-master, an' detailed to take care o' his cattle an' hosses, fight guerrillas, an' carry letters from one place to another. we knowed the country purty well, for there were few of us that hadn't traveled over it more'n onct in our lives; but whenever we war sent off anywhere we used to have a mexikin guide, who showed us the short cuts through the mountains. "wal, just arter the battle o' monterey, our company war cut up into little squads, an' scattered all over the country; some went with the gen'ral, an' some war put in cap'n morgan's company, an' sent scoutin' around, an' four of us war left at monterey with the quarter-master. "one day ole bill come to me an' said: "'dick, the kurnel wants to see you. i guess he's got some business for you to 'tend to.' "i went up to the head-quarters, an' the kurnel told me that he had some very important letters which he wanted to send to major davis, who was then stationed at a little town called alamo, an' as i had the finest hoss in the town, he thought it best to send me. alamo war on the other side o' the mountains, an' about a hundred an' fifty miles off. as the kurnel had said, i had the best hoss in the hull camp, an', in course, it wouldn't have been no trouble to have gone there if the country had been clear--the ride wasn't nothin'; but the mexikins war comin' down toward monterey, an' the kurnel thought that they war goin' to try to take the city from us agin. i knowed there war danger in it, but i didn't mind that. i war used to it, an' if i got into a scrape, it wouldn't be the first one i war in; so i started off arter my hoss, an' in a few minits i war ready an' waitin' at the kurnel's door for the letters. purty soon he come out an' give 'em to me, sayin': "'now, dick, be mighty keerful of 'em, 'cause there's some news in 'em that i shouldn't like to have the mexikins get hold of. this man,' pintin' to a greaser that stood a little behind me, holdin' his hoss, 'will be your guide. he knows all about the mountains.' then, movin' up a little closer to me, he whispered: 'he'll bear watchin', i think; i don't know much about him, but he is the only man i have got to send with you, an' them letters must be in major davis's hands by to-morrow night.' "'all right, kurnel,' i answered; 'i'll look out for him. i never see a greaser yet that could pull the wool over my eyes. i'll give the letters to major davis afore this time to-morrow. good by.' an' me an' the guide rid off. "as soon as i had got out of the city, i turned to have a look at my guide, an' i thought, as the kurnel had said, that he would bear watchin'. he war the most villainous lookin' mexikin i ever sot eyes on. he war a young feller, not more'n twenty-two or twenty-three year old; but he had an eye that looked like an eagle's, an' it wasn't still a minit. he war dressed in a reg'lar greaser's rig, with a slouch hat, short jacket, all covered with gold lace, an' pantaloons, wide at the bottom, an' open on the side as far as his knees. he had a splendid hoss, an' war armed with a carbine, short saber, an' a lasso; an' i knowed that if me an' him got into a muss, that lasso would bother me more'n his sword or shootin'-iron. the greasers, as a gen'ral thing, ain't no great shakes at shootin', an' in a rough-an'-tumble fight they ain't nowhere; but them ar raw-hide lassoes ar the meanest things in the world to fight; they'll have one of 'em around your neck afore you know it. i had a little experience in that line afore i got back. arter we had got outside o' the pickets a little way, he turned in his saddle, an' tried to commence a talk with me in spanish; but i made him believe that i couldn't understand a word he said. i thought that if i should tell him that i couldn't talk his lingo, it would make him a little keerless; an' so it did. "we rid all day as fast as our hosses could travel, an' afore dark we got acrost the mountains, an' stopped afore a little house, where the guide said would be a good place to pass the night. i didn't much like the idee; had rather camp right down in the woods; but, in course, that would only put him on the look-out, an' i knowed that the best way to do war to act as though i thought every thing war all right. a man come to the gate as we rid up, an', as soon as he see my guide, he touched his hat to him in reg'lar soldier style. the guide answered the salute, an' asked the man, in spanish: "'are you alone, josã©?' "'yes, gen'ral,' answered the man. then making a slight motion toward me, which, i made believe i didn't notice, he asked: "'but the american?' "'o, he can't understand spanish,' said my rascally guide. 'no fear of him; he thinks it's all right. did you receive my letter?' "'yes, gen'ral,' answered the man, touching his hat agin. "'don't make so many motions, you fool,' said my guide; 'the american is not blind. you got my letter all right, you say? then bastian, with five hundred men, will be here at midnight?' "'yes, gen'ral.' "the guide seemed satisfied, for he got off his hoss, an' motioned me, with a good many smiles an' grimaces, to do the same. i could see that i war in a purty tight place, an' i had a good notion to draw one o' my six-shooters an' kill both o' the rascals where they stood. but, thinks i, there may be more of these yere yaller-bellies around here somewhere, an' besides, if i wait, i may get a chance to capture the gen'ral, for my guide war none other than gen'ral cortinas, an' one o' the best officers the mexikins had. he had bothered us more'n their hull army, an' the kurnel had offered to give a thousand dollars for him alive, or five hundred for his scalp. i didn't care a snap for the money, 'cause it warn't no use to me on the prairy; all i wanted war a good kentucky rifle, plenty o' powder an' lead, an' a good hoss, an' i war satisfied. but i wanted to capture that gen'ral, an' take him into camp, for he war a nuisance. in battle he never showed no quarter, an' if he tuk any prisoners, it war only that he might let his men try their hands at shootin'. he seemed to understand fightin' better nor the rest o' the mexikins, an' it showed that he war a brave feller when he would come right into camp, with sich a price sot on his head. "i warn't long in makin' up my mind what i ought to do, an' i got down off my hoss, as though there warn't a greaser within a hundred miles o' me; but, instead o' givin the hoss into charge o' the man, i hit him a cut with my whip that sent him flyin' up the road. i knowed that he wouldn't be far off when i wanted him, an' i knowed, too, that my saddle an' pistols war safe, 'cause nobody couldn't ketch him besides me. arter goin' a little way up the road, he turned an' looked back, an' then jumped over a hedge into a field, an' begun to eat. i could see that the mexikins didn't like it a bit, for they looked at each other an' scowled, an' josã© said: "'_carrajo!_ do you s'pose the american suspects any thing, gen'ral?' "'it don't make no difference whether he does or not, said my guide, turnin' on his heel, an' motionin' me to follow him to the house; 'he's in our power, an' don't leave this place alive.' "now, you wouldn't have called that very pleasant news, i take it. wal, it did make me feel rather onpleasant; but i didn't exactly believe what the ole rascal had said about my not goin' away alive. thinks i, shootin' is a game two can play at, an' as long as you don't bring them tarnal lassoes round, i'm all right. i had never seed a six-shooter afore i went into the army, but i had l'arnt to use 'em a'most as well as i could my rifle. i found that they war mighty handy things in a fight. i had four of 'em, two in my huntin'-shirt, and two had gone off with my hoss; an' i knowed that when the time come i could get up a nice little fight for the greasers. "there war only two women in the house, an' they seemed mighty glad to see him, an' sot out a cheer for him; but they scowled at me, an' left me to stand up. but that didn't trouble me none, for i helped myself to a seat, an' listened to what my guide war sayin' to 'em. he war mighty perlite, an' talked an' laughed, an' told the women as how he war goin' to rub me out as soon as his men come; an' then he war goin' to pitch into cap'n morgan, who war out scoutin' with his company, an' had camped a little piece back in the mountains. "it war the kurnel's order that i should see him as we passed through the mountains, an' send him to monterey to onct, afore the mexikins could ketch him. but my rascally guide had heered the order, an' had led me out o' my way, so that i shouldn't see him. i listened with both my ears, an' arter i had heered all the rascal's plans, which were purty nicely laid out for a boy, i made up my mind that he would be a leetle disappointed when he tried to ketch cap'n morgan. "in a little while the man that had tuk charge o' the gen'ral's hoss come in, an' i soon found out that he war the man that war expected to do the business of cuttin' my throat. but the gen'ral told him not to try it till midnight, when he would have plenty of men to back him up. this showed me that, brave as the young greaser war when leadin' his men, he didn't like the idee o' pitchin' into an american single-handed. i guess he knowed by my looks that i could do some purty good fightin'. "arter eatin' a hearty supper, an' smokin' a cigar with the gen'ral, i wrapped myself up in my blanket, which i had tuk from my saddle afore lettin' my hoss go, an' laid myself away in one corner of the room. the mexikins didn't like this, an' one o' the women made me understand by signs that there war a bed for me up stairs. but i thought that my chances for escape would be much better where i war; so i motioned her to go away, an' pretended to go to sleep. the gen'ral an' his man had a long talk about it, an' i expected every minit to hear him tell the feller to shoot me. if he had, it would have been the signal for his own death, for i had both my revolvers under my blanket. but no sich order war given, an' finally the gen'ral, arter tellin' the man to keep a good watch on me, went into another room an' went to bed, an' his man stretched himself out on his cloak, right afore the door. "wal, i waited about two hours for him to go to sleep, an' then made up my mind that i might as well be travelin'. so i throwed off my blanket an' war risin' to my feet, when 'bang' went the feller's pistol, an' the bullet whizzed by my head an' went into the wall. i warn't more'n ten feet from him, an' i'll be blamed if he didn't miss me. the next minit i had him by the throat, an' a blow from the butt of one o' my six-shooters done the work for him. i dragged him away from the door, jumped down the steps, an' made tracks through the garden. "the night war purty dark, but i knowed which way to go to get out o' the yard, which war surrounded by a palin' eight foot high. you'd better believe i run _some_; but i hadn't gone twenty yards from the house afore i run slap agin somebody. i thought at first that it war the gen'ral, an' i muzzled him. '_carrajo!_ what does this mean?' said the mexikin, in spanish. as soon as i heered his voice, i knowed that he warn't the feller i wanted; most likely he war one o' the men the gen'ral had been expectin'; so i give him a settler with my knife, an' tuk to my heels agin. "the pistol that the mexikin had fired in the house had set the women a goin'; an', when i reached the fence, i heered 'em yellin' an' wailin' over the feller i had knocked down. i didn't stop to listen to 'em, but jumped over into the field where my hoss war, an' commenced whistlin' for him. i thought he war a long while a coming an' i ran along whistlin', an' wonderin' where he had gone to. purty soon i heered his whinny, an' see him comin' toward me like mad; an' right behind him war three or four mexikins, with their lassoes all ready to ketch him. but my hoss war leavin' 'em behind fast; for the way he could climb over the ground when he onct made up his mind to run, war a caution to them greasers. he come right up to me, an' in a minit i war on his back. "i now felt safe. the first thing i did war to pull out my huntin'-knife an' fasten it to my wrist with a piece o' buckskin; then, drawin' one o' my revolvers, i turned in my saddle, an' thought i would stir up the greasers a little, when all to onct somethin' struck me in the face like a club, an' i war lifted from my saddle clean as a whistle, and the next minit i war bumpin' an' draggin' over the ground in a mighty onpleasant kind of a way. one o' the greasers had slipped his lasso over me, an' war pullin' me along as fast as his hoss could travel. i fell right flat on my face, an' every step the greaser's hoss tuk plowed my nose in the ground, an' my eyes war so full o' dirt an' blood that i could scarcely see. "but i war not quite so fast as the greaser had thought for. the lasso hadn't gone down round my neck, but had ketched jest above my chin. i hadn't never been in sich a mighty onpleasant fix afore, but i warn't long in gettin' my wits about me. reachin' up with my huntin'-knife, i made a slash at the lasso, an' the next minit wor standin' on my feet agin. i had hung onto my revolver, an', drawin' a bead on the greaser that had ketched me, i tumbled him from his saddle in a twinklin'. my hoss hadn't run an inch arter i war pulled off his back, an' i war soon in the saddle agin. "i knowed i war safe now, for, as i galloped over the field, i see the greasers travelin' down the road as though gen'ral taylor's army war arter 'em. they war three to my one, but didn't think themselves a match for a single american." chapter xv. caught at last. "but that isn't all the story," said the trapper, again filling his pipe. "as soon as the greasers had got out o' sight, i galloped back toward the road an' tuk the back track, intendin' to find cap'n morgan, an' tell him that the mexikins were kalkerlatin' on ketchin' him, an' then go on with my dispatches. "i had paid purty good attention to what the gen'ral had told the women, an' i knowed exactly what road to take to find the cap'n's camp; an' you'd better believe i rid _some_. purty soon some one yelled out: "'who goes there?' "'friend!' i shouted, 'an' i want to see cap'n morgan to onct. i've got some news for him.' "you'd better believe the ole cap'n opened his eyes when i told him my story; an' arter furnishin' me with a fresh hoss--the best one in the camp--he set to work gettin' ready for the greasers. i didn't much like the idee o' startin' out agin, for i didn't know the short cuts through the country as well as i ought to, an' the cap'n had no guide to send with me. but i knowed that them letters must be in alamo by night, an' i shouldn't ever be able to look ole bill lawson in the face agin if i didn't obey my orders; so, arter biddin' the boys good-by, an' wishin' 'em good luck in fightin' the mexikins, i set out. "i did plenty of doublin' an' twistin' to get clear o' the greasers, for i met 'em about half way atween the mountains an' the house where we had stopped, goin' up to ketch the cap'n. they war in high spirits, but when they come down agin, about two hours arterward, they were runnin' like white-heads, an' the texas boys were close at their heels. "i war used to hard work, but when i got off my hoss that night in alamo, i war about as tired a man as you ever see. two days arterward i war back in monterey agin. ole bill didn't know me, for my face war purty well cut up. i told him the story of the mexikin gen'ral, an' arter talkin' the matter over, me an' him concluded we would capture that greaser, an' started up to head-quarters to have a talk with the kurnel about it. "'you can't do it, boys,' says he. 'if cortinas war an injun, you would be jist the fellers to do it; but you don't know enough about soldierin'. howsomever, you can try.' "the next mornin', when me an' bill rid up to the kurnel's head-quarters to bid him good-by, you wouldn't a knowed us. we had pulled off our huntin'-shirts an' leggins, an' war dressed in reg'lar mexikin style. we left our rifles behind, an' tuk carbines in their place. we didn't like to do this; but if we had carried our long shootin'-irons into a mexikin camp, any one would a knowed what we war. we had our six-shooters and huntin'-knives stowed away in our jackets. "'good-by, kurnel,' said bill, shakin' the ole soldier's hand. 'we'll ketch that greaser, or you'll never see us agin.' "'do your best, boys,' said the kurnel. 'bring back the greaser, an' the thousand dollars are yourn.' "we follered the same path that the gen'ral had led me--takin' keer not to ride too fast, 'cause we didn't know what we might have for our hosses to do--an' afore dark we come to the house where me an' my guide had stopped, an' knocked at the gate. when it war opened we could see that the place war full o' greasers; but that didn't trouble us any, for we knowed that we should have to go into their camp if we wanted to ketch the gen'ral. we told the greaser that come to the gate, that we were mexikin soldiers, an' wanted to stay there all night, an' he war as perlite as we could wish--asked us to walk in, an' sent a man to take keer of our hosses. "this war the first time we had met a soldier in our new rig, an' we were a little afeered that he might diskiver who we were; but we could both talk spanish as well as he could, an' the rascal didn't suspect us. "we asked to see the commandin' officer, an' when we found him we reported to him as scouts belongin' to gen'ral santa anna's head-quarters, an' that we had come with very important news for gen'ral cortinas. what that news was we didn't know ourselves; but we knowed that we could get up a purty good story when the time come. "'all right,' said the greaser cap'n. 'i'm goin' up to gen'ral cortinas' camp to-morrow, an' you can ride right up with me.' "we touched our hats to him an' left the room. i hated mighty bad to salute that dirty greaser jest as i would my kurnel. i had rather put a bullet in his yaller hide; but we war in for it, an' we knowed that the hull thing depended on our behavin' ourselves properly. as we passed out o' the house we met the women, an' i begun to shake in my boots agin, 'cause i knowed them women had sharp eyes, an' i war afeered it war all up with us. but they didn't suspect nothin', an' i knowed that we war safe; 'cause if they couldn't see through the game we war playin', nobody could. "wal, we went out into the yard an' eat supper, an' lay down around the fire with them ar dirty mexikins, an' listened to their insultin' talk agin the americans, an', in course, jined in with 'em. they thought me an' ole bill war lucky dogs in bein' with a great gen'ral like santa anna; but i couldn't see what there war great in a man who, with an army o' fifty thousand men, would run from six thousand. but we told 'em a good many things about the gen'ral that i guess they never heered afore, an' we hadn't heered of 'em neither; but they believed every thing we said war gospel truth, an' we made our kalkerlations that in less nor a month the american army would all be prisoners. "the next mornin' we made an 'arly start, an' that arternoon drew up in the mexikin camp. it war a purty sight, i tell you--nothin' to be seen but white tents as far as our eyes could reach. there warn't less nor a hundred thousand men in that ar camp, an' i begun to feel rather shaky when i thought of our small army at monterey. while me an' bill war lookin' about, a spruce little greaser come up, an' said that gen'ral cortinas war waitin' to see us. we found the rascal in a large tent, with a sentry afore the door, an' when i sot eyes on him, my fingers ached to ketch him by the throat. he looked jest as he did when me an' him set out from monterey together, only he had on a blue uniform. "'wal, boys,' said he, smilin' an' motionin' us to set down, 'i understand that you're from gen'ral santa anna, an' have news for me.' "'yes, gen'ral,' said ole bill, takin' off his slouch-hat, an' scratchin' his head as if thinkin' what to say. 'we've got news for you. if you want to ketch cap'n morgan an' his band o' cutthroats, i'll tell you jest how you can do it.' "'how can it be done, my good feller,' said the gen'ral, rubbin' his hands. 'i thought i should capture him the other night, but he had too many men for me.' "'wal,' said ole bill, 'me an' this feller here'--pintin' to me--'war in monterey yesterday, an' heered an order read to cap'n morgan to march out o' the city at midnight, an' jine cap'n davis at alamo. now, if you want to ketch him, all you have got to do is to take fifty men, an' wait for him in the mountains. he has got jest twenty-eight men in his company.' "'i'll do it,' said the greaser. 'but i'll take a hundred men, to make sure of him. which road is he going to take?' "'that's what we can't tell exactly,' said ole bill. 'but me an' this feller thought that we would come an' tell you, so that you could have every thing ready, an' then go back and find out all their plans.' "'very well,' said the greaser; an', arter writin' somethin' on a piece o' paper, he handed it to ole bill, sayin': 'here's a pass for you an' your friend to go in an' out o' the lines whenever you please. now, you go back to monterey, an' find out all cap'n morgan's plans, an' i'll go out with a hundred men an' ketch him.' "this war exactly what me an' bill wanted. we were afeered at first that he would send some one else instead o' goin' himself; but now we knowed that we war all right; the gen'ral war ourn, an' no mistake. "as soon as we got out o' sight o' the camp, we made good time, an' afore midnight we war in the kurnel's head-quarters. as soon as he heered our story, he sent for one o' his officers, an' told him to march 'arly the next evenin' with eighty men, an' draw up an ambush, in a deep gorge, through which ran the road that led to alamo. an' he ordered cap'n morgan, who had reached monterey the day afore, to be ready to march through that gorge at midnight. "arter me an' bill had rested a little while, we set out on fresh hosses, an', in a few hours, were back in the mexikin camp agin. that arternoon we rid out, side by side, with gen'ral cortinas, an' about ten o'clock in the evenin' we reached the gorge. every thing war as silent as death; but i knowed that eighty western rifles war stowed away among the trees, on each side o' the road, an' behind 'em war sturdy hunters an' trappers, achin' to send a bullet in among us. "arter the gen'ral had fixed his men to suit him, we drawed back into the bushes, an' waited for cap'n morgan to come up. jest a little afore midnight we heered a faint tramp, an' in a few minits the rangers swept down into the gorge. for a minit nothin' war heered but the noise o' their hosses' hoofs on the road. it war a fine sight to see them brave men ridin' right down into that ambush, knowin', as they did, that death war on each side o' them. nigher an' nigher they come; an' the gen'ral war about to give the order to fire, when, all to onct, a yell like an injun's burst from among the trees, an' the reports of eighty rifles echoed through the mountains. you never seed a more astonished greaser nor that gen'ral cortinas war about that time. "'_carrajo_,' he yelled, 'you have betrayed me.' "'shouldn't wonder if we had, you tarnal yaller-hided scoundrel,' said ole bill; an' afore the greaser could make a move, we had him by the arms, an' two six-shooters were lookin' him in the face. his cowardly men didn't fire a shot, but throwed down their guns, an' run in every direction. but our boys closed up about 'em, an' out o' them ar hundred men that come out to ketch cap'n morgan, not half a dozen escaped. the only prisoner we tuk back to monterey war the gen'ral." after dick had got through his tale, the hunters held a consultation over the state of their larder. as their coffee, bread, and other supplies were exhausted, and they did not like the idea of living on venison and water, they concluded to break up camp. the next morning they packed their baggage into the sled, and, taking a last look at the place where they had spent so many happy hours, set out for uncle joe's cabin, which they reached a little before dark. chapter xvi. the lost wagon-train. uncle joe met them at the door, and, while they were relieving themselves of their overcoats and weapons, asked innumerable questions about their sojourn in the woods. dick took the part of spokesman, and described, in his rude, trapper's style, the scenes through which they had passed, dwelling with a good deal of emphasis on the "keerlessness" displayed by the young naturalist in attacking the moose, and in starting off alone to fight the panther. the trapper tried hard to suppress the feelings of pride which he really felt, and favored the young hunter with a look that was intended to be severe, but which was, in fact, a mingling of joy and satisfaction. frank bore the scolding which uncle joe administered with a very good grace, for he knew that he deserved it. "i'd like to take the youngster out on the prairy," said dick, seating himself before the fire, and producing his never-failing pipe. "i'll bet that, arter he had follered me and useless a year or two, he wouldn't be in no great hurry to pitch into every wild varmint he come acrost." frank made no reply, but taking the cubs from the pockets of his overcoat, allowed them to run about the cabin--a proceeding which the dogs, especially brave, regarded with suspicion, and which they could not be persuaded to permit, until they had received several hearty kicks and cuffs from their masters. "you can't blame the critters," said the trapper, puffing away at his pipe. "it's their natur', an' i sometimes think that them dogs have a deal more sense than their human masters, an'"---"supper's ready," interrupted bob, the cook and man-of-all-work, and this announcement put an end to all further conversation on the subject. the boys were highly delighted to find themselves seated at a well-filled table once more, and uncle joe's good things rapidly disappeared before their attacks. it made no difference to the trapper, however. with him a few weeks "roughing it" in the woods was, of course, no novelty. a log for a table, and a piece of clean bark for a plate, answered his purpose as well as all the improvements of civilization, which those who have been brought up in the settlements regard as necessary to their very existence. after supper, they drew their chairs in front of the fire, and uncle joe and his brother solaced themselves with their pipes, while bob busied himself in clearing away the table and washing the dishes. "this bill lawson," said the trapper, after taking a few puffs at his pipe, to make sure that it was well lighted, "used to take it into his head onct in awhile to act as guide for fellers as wanted to go to californy. he knowed every inch of the country from st. joseph to the mines, for he had been over the ground more'n you ever traveled through these yere woods, an' he was called as good a guide as ever tuk charge of a wagon-train. in course, i allers went with him on these trips, as a sort o' pack-hoss an' hunter, cause ole bill couldn't think o' goin' anywhere without me; an' i have often thought that the reason why he made them trips as guide, was jest to get a good look at the folks; it reminded him o' the time when he had parents, an' brothers an' sisters. he never laughed an' joked round the camp-fires, as he used to do when me and him war off alone in the mountains. he hardly ever said a word to any body besides me, an' allers appeared to be sorrowful. this give him the name of 'moody bill,' by which he was knowed all through the country. every trader on the prairy war acquainted with him, an' he allers tuk out a big train. i never knowed him to lose but one, an' he lost himself with it. the way it happened war this: "one night, arter we had got about a week's journey west of fort laramie, we stopped in a little oak opening, where we made our camp. it war right in the heart o' the wust injun country i ever see, an' near a place where me an' ole bill had often _cached_ our furs an' other fixins, an' which we used as a kind o' camp when we war in that part o' the country trappin' beaver an' fightin' injuns. it war a cave in the side of a mountain, an' the way we had it fixed nobody besides ourselves couldn't find it. we never went in or come out of it until arter dark, 'cause the comanches were a'most allers huntin' 'bout the mountains, an' we didn't want em to break up our harborin' place. we had made up our minds that, arter we had seed our train safe through, we would come back to our 'bar's hole,' as we called it, an' spend a month or so in fightin' the comanches an' skrimmagin' with the grizzlies in the mountains. "wal, as i war sayin' we made our camp, an' while i war dressin' a buck i had shot, ole bill, as usual, leaned on his rifle, an' watched the emigrants unpack their mules an' wagons, an' make their preparations for the night. arter supper he smoked a pipe, an' then rolled himself up in his blanket an' said----'dick, you know this place, but you ain't no trapper;' an', without sayin' any more, he lay down and went to sleep, leavin' me to station the guards, an' see that every thing went on right durin' the night. "i knowed well enough what ole bill meant when he said, 'dick, you ain't no trapper.' he had seed injun sign durin' the day, an' war pokin' fun at me, cause i hadn't seed it too. i don't know, to this day, how it war that i had missed it, for i had kept a good look-out, an' i had allers thought that i war 'bout as good an injun hunter as any feller in them diggins, (allers exceptin' ole bill and bob kelly;) but the way the ole man spoke tuk me down a peg or two, an' made me feel wusser nor you youngsters do when you get trounced at school for missin' your lessons. "wal, as soon as it come dark, i put out the guards, an' then shouldered my rifle, an' started out to see if i could find any sign o' them injuns that ole bill had diskivered. it war as purty a night as you ever see. the moon shone out bright an' clear, an', savin' the cry of a whippoorwill, that come from a gully 'bout a quarter of a mile from the camp, an' the barkin' o' the prairy wolves, every thing war as still as death. you youngsters would have laughed at the idea o' goin' out to hunt injuns on such a night; but i knowed that there must be somethin' in the wind, for ole bill never got fooled about sich things. here in the settlements he wouldn't have knowed enough to earn his salt; but out on the prairy he knowed all about things. "wal, i walked all round the camp, an' back to the place where i had started from, an' not a bit of injun sign did i see. there war a high hill jest on the other side of the gully, an' i knowed that if there war any injuns about, an' they should take it into their heads to pounce down upon us, they would jest show themselves in that direction; so i sot down on the prairy, outside o' the wagons, which war drawn up as a sort o' breastwork round the camp, and begun to listen. i didn't hear nothin', however, until a'most midnight, and then, jest arter i had changed the guards, an' was goin' back to my place, i heered somethin' that made me prick up my ears. it war the hootin' of an owl, an' it seemed to come from the hill. "now, you youngsters would'n't have seed any thing strange in that; but a man who has spent his life among wild injuns and varmints can tell the difference atween a sound when it comes from an owl's throat, and when it comes from a comanche's; an' i to onct made up my mind that it war a signal. presently from the gully come the song of a whippoorwill. it didn't sound exactly like the notes i had heered come from that same gully but a few minits afore, an' i knowed that it war another signal. when the whippoorwill had got through, i heered the barkin' of a prairy wolf further up the gully to the right o' the camp; an' all to onct the wolves, which had been barkin' an' quarrelin' round the wagons, set up a howl, an' scampered away out o' sight. this would have been as good a sign as i wanted that there war injuns about, even if i hadn't knowed it afore; so i sot still on the ground to see what would be the next move. "in a few minits i heered a rustlin' like in the grass a little to one side of me. i listened, an' could tell by the sound that there was somebody in there, crawlin' along on his hands an' knees. nearer an' nearer it come, an' when it got purty clost to me it stopped, an' i seed an' injun's head come up over the top o' the grass, an' i could see that the rascal war eyein' me purty sharp. i sot mighty still, noddin' my head a leetle as if i war fallin' asleep, keepin' an' eye on the ole feller all the time to see that he didn't come none of his injun tricks on me, and finally give a leetle snore, which seemed to satisfy the painted heathen, for i heered his 'ugh!' as he crawled along by me into camp. "what made you do that?" interrupted archie, excitedly. "why didn't you muzzle him?" "that the way you youngsters, what don't know nothin' about fightin' injuns, would have done," answered the trapper, with a laugh, "an' you would have had your har raised for your trouble. but, you see, i knowed that he had friends not a great way off, an' that the fust motion i made to grab the rascal, i would have an arrer slipped into me as easy as fallin' off a log. but i didn't like to have the varlet behind me; so, as soon as i knowed that he had had time to get into the camp, i commenced noddin' agin, an' finally fell back on the ground, ker-chunk. "i guess them injuns that were layin' round in the grass laughed _some_ when they see how quick i picked up my pins. i got up as though i expected to see a hull tribe of comanches clost on to me, looked all round, an', arter stretchin' my arms as though i had enjoyed a good sleep, i started along toward the place where one o' the guards war standin'. i walked up clost to him, an' whispered: "'don't act as though you thought that any thing was wrong, but keep your eyes on the grass. there's injuns about.' "the chap turned a leetle pale when he heered this; but although he was as green as a punkin, as far as injun fightin' war consarned, he seemed to have the real grit in him, for he nodded in a way that showed that he understood what i meant. i then dropped down on all-fours, an' commenced crawlin' into the camp to find the injun. the fires had burned low, an' the moon had gone down, but still there war light enough for me to see the rascal crawlin' along on the ground, an' making toward one of the wagons. when he reached it, he raised to his feet, an', arter casting his eyes about the camp, to make sure that no one seed him, he lifted up the canvas an' looked in. now war my time. droppin' my rifle, i sprung to my feet, an' started for the varlet; but jest as i war goin' to grab him, one o' the women in the wagon, who happened to be awake, set up a screechin'. the injun dropped like a flash o' lightnin', an', dodgin' the grab i made at him, started for the other side o' the camp, jumpin' over the fellers that were layin' round as easy as if he had wings. i war clost arter him, but the cuss run like a streak; an finding that i war not likely to ketch him afore he got out into the prairy, i jumped back for my rifle an' tuk a flyin' shot at him, jest as he war divin' under a wagon. i don't very often throw away a chunk o' lead, an', judgin' by the way he yelled, i didn't waste one that time. he dropped like a log, but war on his feet agin in a minit, an', without waitin' to ax no questions, set up the war-whoop. i tell you, youngsters, the sound o' that same war-whoop war no new thing to me. i've heered it often--sometimes in the dead o' night, when i didn't know that there war any danger about, an' it has rung in my ears when i've been runnin' for my life, with a dozen o' the yellin' varlets clost to my heels; but i never before, nor since, felt my courage give way as it did on that night. scarcely a man in the hull wagon-train, exceptin' me an ole bill, had ever drawed a bead on an injun, an' i war a'most sartin that i should have a runnin' fight with the rascals afore mornin'. "the whoop war answered from all round the camp, an' the way the bullets an' arrers come into them ar wagons warn't a funny thing to look at. my shot had 'wakened a'most every one in the camp, but there warn't much sleepin' done arter the injuns give that yell. men, women, an' children poured out o' the wagons, an' run about, gettin' in everybody's way; an' sich a muss as war kicked up in that ar camp i never heered afore. there war about seventy men in the train, an' they war all good marksmen, but there war scarcely a dozen that thought o' their rifles. they kept callin' on me an' ole bill to save 'em, an' never onct thought o' pickin' up their we'pons an' fightin' to save themselves; an', in spite of all we could do, them ar cowardly sneaks would get behind the women an' children for protection. it war enough to frighten any one; an' although that ar warn't the fust muss o' the kind i had been in, i felt my ole 'coon-skin cap raise on my head when i thought what a slaughter there would be when them comanches onct got inside o' the camp. there war only a few of us to fight 'em, an' we did the best we could, sendin' back their yells, an' bringin' the death-screech from some unlucky rascal at every shot. but the injuns warn't long in findin' out how the land lay, an', risin' round us like a cloud, they come pourin' into camp." chapter xvii. the struggle in the cave. "me an ole bill warn't hired to run away, an' we wouldn't need to have done it if them ar cowards had stood up to the mark like men; but when i seed them injuns comin', i knowed that the game war up--it warn't no use to fight longer. i jest ketched a glimpse of ole bill makin' for his hoss, an' i did the same, 'cause i knowed that he would stay as long as there war any chance o' beatin' back the injuns. "to jump on my hoss, an' cut the lasso with which he war picketed, warn't the work of a minit, an' then, clubbin' my rifle, i laid about me right an' left, an' my hoss, knowin' as well as i did what war the matter, carried me safely out o' the camp. "as i rode out on to the prairy, the injuns started up on all sides o' me, but my hoss soon carried me out o' their reach. as soon as i thought i war safe, i hauled up to load my rifle, an' wait for ole bill. i felt a leetle oneasy about him, 'cause, if the comanches should onct get a good sight at him, they would be sartin to know who he war, an' wouldn't spare no pains to ketch him; an' if they succeeded, he couldn't expect nothin' but the stake. "wal, arter i had loaded up my rifle, an' scraped some bullets, i started back toward the camp, to see if i could find any thing o' bill; an' jest at that minit i heered a yell that made my blood run cold. by the glare o' the camp-fires, which the comanches had started agin, i seed the cause of the yell, for there war ole bill on foot, an' makin' tracks for the gully, with a dozen yellin' varlets clost at his heels. in course i couldn't help the old man any; an', besides, i knowed that they would take him alive at any risk, an' that, if i kept out o' the scrape, i might have a chance to save him. wal, jest at the edge o' the gully he war ketched, an' arter a hard tussle--for the ole man warn't one of them kind that gives up without a fight--he war bound hand an' foot, an' carried back to the camp. "in course the news spread among the comanches like lightnin', an' it had the effect o' stoppin' the slaughterin' that war goin' on, for the injuns all wanted to have a look at the man who had sent so many o' their best warriors to the happy huntin'-grounds. "finally, some o' the varlets yelled out my name--the rest took it up, an' clouds of the warriors went scourin' through the camp an' over the prairy to find me; 'cause they knowed that whenever the ole man war to be found, i warn't a great way off. it begun to get mighty onhealthy for me in them diggins, so i turned my hoss, an' made tracks acrost the prairy. i rid _some_, now, i reckon, an', in a short time, war out o' hearin' o' the yells o' the savages. "as soon as i thought i war safe, i camped down on the prairy, an', with my hoss for a sentinel, slept soundly until mornin'. i then started for the camp, or, rather, the place where the camp had been, for when i got there, i found nothin' but its ruins. the injuns had burned every thing they did not want or could not carry away, an' made off with their prisoners. their trail war plain enough, an' i to onct commenced follerin' it up, determined that i would either save ole bill or die with him; an', on the fourth day, durin' which time i had lived on some parched corn i happened to have in the pockets o' my huntin'-shirt, an' war in constant danger of being ketched by stragglers, i seed the injuns enter their camp. in course there war a big rejoicin' over the prisoners an' plunder they had brought in, an' it war kept up until long arter dark. "the camp, which numbered 'bout fifty lodges, war pitched in a small prairy, surrounded on three sides by the woods. the nearest i could get to it without bein' diskivered war half a mile; an' here i tied my hoss in the edge o' the woods, an' lay down to sleep. "'arly the next mornin' i war aroused by a yellin' and the noise o' drums, an' found the hull camp in motion. near the middle o' the village war a small clear spot, where the prisoners war stationed. they war not bound, but a single glance at a dozen armed warriors, who stood at a little distance, showed that escape warn't a thing to be thought of. all except two o' the prisoners sot on the ground, with their heads on their hands, as if they wished to shut out all sights an' sounds o' what war going on around 'em. the two who were standin' seemed to take matters more easy. they stood leanin' against a post with their arms folded, an' watched the motions o' the injuns as though they war used to sich sights. one o' these i picked out as ole bill, but, in course, i couldn't tell sartin which one war him, it war so far off. "a little way from the prisoners were the principal chiefs o' the tribe, holdin' a palaver regardin' what should be done, an' a little further off stood the rest o' the tribe--men, women, an' children--waitin' the word to begin their horrid work. "it war nigh noon afore the council broke up; then one o' the chiefs commenced shoutin' some orders, an' one o' the prisoners was led out o' the camp by two injuns, while the rest o' the varlets set up a yell, an' armin' themselves with whatever they could lay their hands on, commenced formin' themselves in two lines; the prisoner, whoever he was, must run the gauntlet. while the savages war fixin' themselves, the white chap stood between the injuns who had led him out, watchin' what war goin' on, an' i could easy tell what he war thinkin' of, 'cause i had been in sich scrapes myself. i knowed that, as he looked through them long lines o' screechin' injuns, an' seed the tomahawks, clubs, knives, an' whips, all ready to give him a cut as he passed, he thought of every thing he had done durin' his life. but he warn't given much time for thinkin', for, purty quick, the chief set up a yell to let the prisoner know that the time had come. the chap didn't hesitate a minit, but jumped from the place where he war standin', like a streak o' lightnin'. i see him disappear atween the lines, and made up my mind that that chap war a goner, when, all to onct, out he come, all right, and made toward the place where i war standin'. i guess them injuns never see any thing done quite so purty afore, an' i knowed well enough now who the fellow war, 'cause there warn't but one man livin' that could come through them lines in that way, an' that war bill lawson. in course, the hull tribe, yellin' an' screechin' like a pack o' wolves, war arter him in less nor the shake of a buck's tail, and tomahawks, bullets, an' arrers whizzed by the prisoner in a mighty onpleasant kind o' way; but bill kept jumpin' from one side to the other in a way that made him a mighty onhandy mark to shoot at, an' the way he did climb over that prairy was somethin' for owls to look at. but, fast as he run, i could see that there war one injun gainin' on him, an' i made up my mind that if the ole man could hold out long enough to fetch him within pluggin' distance o' my shootin'-iron, i would put an end to his jumpin' for awhile. nearer an' nearer they come, the injun all the while gainin' purty fast, an' when they got within 'bout forty rod o' me, i could see that the varlet war gettin' ready to throw his tomahawk. i watched him until he raised his arm, an' sent a bullet plumb atween his eyes. the next minit the ole man jumped into the bushes. "there warn't no time for talkin' or sayin' how de do?' for the rest o' the injuns war comin' up, an' we must put a good stretch o' prairy atween us an' them afore we war safe. "'bill, says i, there's my hoss. i'm younger nor you be, so jump on him, and be off in a hurry; i'll meet you at the ole bar's hole, good-by.' "i didn't wait to give the ole man a chance to say a word, 'cause i knowed that he didn't like to take that hoss; but i made off through the bushes. ole bill seed that i war gone, an' jumpin' on the hoss, he rode out on the prairy in plain sight, to get the comanches to foller him, which some of 'em did; but the ole braves, who had heered my shot, an', in course, knowed that there war more'n one feller 'bout, couldn't be fooled easy, an' thinkin' they could ketch a man on foot sooner nor a man on hossback, they kept on arter me. but i war fresh for a long run--a week's travelin' acrost the prairy on foot warn't no new thing for me--an' as i never see the injun yet that could beat me in a fair race, i felt safe, an' knowed that i should come out all right. i didn't waste time in tryin' to throw 'em off my trail, but kept straight ahead at a steady pace, an' whenever an injun come in sight, me an' my rifle settled things with him in a tarnal hurry. this made 'em kind o' keerful, an' afore sundown i war out o' hearin o' their yells, an' a greenhorn wouldn't have thought that there war an injun in them woods. but i war too ole a coon to believe that they had give up the chase, an' it warn't until the next mornin' that i camped to take a leetle sleep, an' eat a squirrel i had shot. "wal, i traveled for 'bout ten days, durin' which time i didn't see a bit o' injun sign, an' finally found myself gettin' purty nigh the ole bar's hole. as soon as i come to the woods that run down from the mountain, i tuk to a creek that run clost by the cave, an' walked along in the water, all the while keepin' a good look-out for injun sign an' for ole bill. arter i had gone 'bout a mile, i come to the mouth o' the cave. it war a hole jest large enough for a man to squeeze himself through, an' so covered up with bushes that a feller might hunt a week without findin' it. the cave itself war 'bout as large as this yere cabin; an' right acrost from the entrance war a passage which led up to the top o' the hill. me an' ole bill had made this ourselves, so that, in case our harborin' place should be diskivered, we would have a chance for escape. "when i come to the cave it war purty dark; so, arter listenin' awhile for signs of injuns, if there war any around, i crawled along into the hole, which war, in course, as dark as pitch, an' commenced fumblin' around for a torch that i had left stuck into the wall o' the cave, all ready to be lighted. arter searchin' 'bout for a long time i found it--not where i had left it, but lyin' on the ground in the middle o' the cave. this seemed suspicious, an' i begun to be afraid that something war wrong. i hadn't seed no injun sign near the cave, neither had i seed any thing of ole bill, an' i knowed that that torch couldn't get moved clear acrost that cave without somebody had been foolin' with it. i reckon my hand war none o' the steadiest, as i lifted the torch an' commenced feelin' in my possible-sack for my flint an' steel, thinkin' that as soon as i could strike a light, i would jest examine into things a leetle. "wal, i hadn't made more 'n one blow at my flint, when the cave echoed with the war-whoop, an' the next minit i found myself lyin' flat on my back, with a big comanche on top o' me. "when i first heered the yell, i thought the cave war full of injuns, an' i'll allow it made me feel a heap easier when i found that the feller that clinched me war alone, for i knowed that if any one injun could master my scalp, he must be a tarnal sight smarter nor any red-skin i had ever met; an', without waitin' to ask no questions, i made a grab at the varmint, an', by good luck, ketched the hand that held his knife; an' then commenced one o' the liveliest little fights i war ever in. "the injun war mighty strong, an' as wiry as an eel, an', although i could keep him from usin' his knife, i could not get him off me, neither could i get my left arm free, which, in fallin', he had pinned to my side; but i kept thrashin' about in a way that made it mighty onhandy for him to hold me. but findin' that i could do nothin' in that way, i all to onct let go the hand that held the knife, an' give him a clip 'side the head that would have knocked down a buck. it kinder staggered his daylight some, i reckon', for i made out to get my arm free, an', ketchin' the varlet by the scalp-lock, i had him on his back in a minit. he yelled an' kicked wusser nor i i did when he had me down, an' slashed right an' left with his scalpin'-knife; but it didn't take long to settle matters, an' all fears that our harborin' place had been broke up war put at rest by the death o' the comanche." chapter xviii. end of the trapper and black mustang. "my first job, arter i war sartin that the comanche war done for, war to light the torch an' examine the cave. first makin' sure that thar war no more injuns about, i crawled along up the passage that led to the top o' the hill, where i found that the log which covered the hole had been moved, an' i knowed in a minit that that war the place where the comanche had come in. i didn't care 'bout showin' myself much, 'cause i didn't know how many more o' the savages there might be about; so i pulled the log over the hole agin' an' crawled back into the cave. i stuck my torch in the ground, an' arter movin' the comanche up in one corner out of the way, i pulled over a pile of hemlock-boughs, that had many a time served me an' ole bill for a bed, an' found a kag o' spruce beer, an' enough jerked meat to last a month. me an' bill allers took good keer to leave plenty o' provender at the cave when we left, so that if we should get hard pressed by the injuns, or game should get scarce, we would know where to go to find good livin'. as i hadn't had a good meal since we lost the train, i eat a heap o' that jerked meat, an' then lay down to sleep, hopin' that when i woke i should find ole bill with me. i warn't much anxious about him, 'cause i knowed he war on as good a hoss as ever tracked a prairy, an' war too ole in injun fightin' to be ketched easy; an' i went to sleep, sartin that he would turn up all right afore daylight. "wal, i slept like a top until 'arly the next mornin', but didn't see nothin' of ole bill. arter a breakfast on jerked meat an' spruce beer, i smoked a pipe, an' crawled up the passage to the top o' the hill, pushed off the log, an' settled down to listen. for two days, i kept watch at that hole, listenin' an' peepin', but there war no signs of ole bill. on the second arternoon, i heered the tramp of a hoss in the creek, an' a'most at the same minit a big comanche poked his head over the bushes not ten foot from where i war, an' looked toward the place where the sound come from. how the rascal got there without seein' me, i didn't stop to think; but, risin' to my feet, i chucked my tomahawk at him, an' there war one injun less in them woods. nigher and nigher come the trampin' o' the hoss, an' i war sartin it war ole bill; so when he got within yellin' distance, i give the gobble of a turkey, jest to let him know that there war danger ahead. the ole man heered it, for the trampin' o' the hoss stopped, an', for a minit, the woods war as still as death; but all to onct i heered the crack of a rifle, follered by the death-screech of a comanche, an' then the clatter of hoofs an' a loud laugh told me that the ole man war retreatin'. i knowed there warn't no use o' watchin' any more, so i pulled the log over the hole agin, crawled back into the cave, an' went to sleep. it war night when i woke, an' takin' my rifle, i crawled out into the gully an' lay down in the shade o' the bushes. i lay there till near midnight without hearin' any thing, an' had a'most made up my mind that ole bill warn't comin', when the low hootin' of an owl come echoin' down the gully. i answered it, an', in a few minits, up come bill an' crawled into the cave. "'here i am,' said he, 'an' i had mighty hard work to get here, too--the timmer's chuck full o' the outlyin' varlets.' "'where's my hoss?' i asked. "'he's down in the bushes, all right side up with keer, an' hid away where the rascals will have to hunt a long time to find him. he's worth his weight in beaver-skins, that hoss is. "ole bill eat his supper in silence; but, arter fillin' his pipe, said: "'dick, them 'ar comanches have got my hoss, an' i'm goin' back arter it.' "now a feller would think that, arter what bill had gone through, he wouldn't be in no hurry about goin' back among the injuns agin. but sich scrapes warn't no new thing to him; an' when he said 'go,' in course i warn't goin' to stay behind. so, arter takin' another smoke, the ole man tuk the knife and tomahawk o' the injun i had killed in the cave, an' led the way out into the gully. as he had said, the timmer was full of injuns, an', as we crawled along on our hands an' knees, we could hear 'em talkin' to each other all around us. but we got past 'em all right, an' as soon as we got out o' the gully, the ole man rose to his feet and said: "'that hoss knows that there's somethin' wrong; he hasn't moved an inch; he knows a'most as much as a human man, he does;' an' pullin' aside the branches of a thicket of scrub pines, i see my hoss standin' as quiet an' still as could be, jest as bill had left him. he seemed mighty glad to see me agin, an' rubbed his head agin my shoulder, as i fastened on the saddle an' jumped on his back. "it war a good two weeks' work to get back to that camp, for the prairy an' woods war full o' comanches huntin' around for bill, an' sometimes we had to go miles round to get out o' their way. "when we reached the camp, we found it nearly deserted by the braves; still, there war enough left to ketch me an' ole bill, if we should be diskivered. wal, we lay round in the woods until dark, but not a glimp could we get o' the ole man's mustang. the critter might be in the camp, but more 'n likely as not he war carryin' a comanche on his back, an' scourin' the prairy in search o' bill. "as soon as it war fairly dark, the ole man stuck out his hand, and said: "'dick, i'm goin' now. good-by.' "i never before felt so bad at partin' from him. somehow i knowed that somethin' mighty onpleasant war goin' to happen; but it warn't no use to try to keep him from goin'; so i bid him good-by, an' he commenced crawlin' through the grass toward the camp. i watched him as long as he war in sight, an' then settled back agin a tree, an' waited to see what would turn up. for two hours i sot there listenin', an' thinkin' of all the fights me an' ole bill had been in, an' wonderin' when the time would come when we must part--not as we had now, for a little while, but forever--when all to onct i heered the barkin' of a dog in the camp. in course the hull village war aroused to onct, an' a loud yell told me that ole bill had been diskivered. the yell was follered by the crack of a rifle, an' the ole man come gallopin' out o' the camp on his own hoss, shoutin': "'come on now, dick, i'm even with the rascals. there's one less comanche in the world.' "the injuns were clost on to bill's trail, an' come pourin' out o' the camp on foot an' on hossback; an', seem' one big feller far ahead of the others, i hauled up for a minit, sent him from his saddle, an' then, jumpin' on my hoss, started arter the ole man. in course the yellin' hounds war soon left behind, 'cause there warn't no hosses on them prairies that could hold a candle to ourn; an' we war beginnin' to grow jolly over our good luck, when, the fust thing we knowed, crack went a couple o' rifles, an' bill throwed his arms above his head an' fell from his saddle. "we had run chuck into a party o' comanches who had been out huntin' the ole man, an' had give up the chase, an' were 'turnin' to camp. the minit ole bill fell i war by his side, an', while i war liftin' him from the ground, the rascals charged toward us with loud yells, sartin that they had now got both of us in their power. "'dick,' said the ole man, a'most in a whisper, 'i've sent a good many o' them screechin' imps out o' the world, an' it's my turn to go now. they have finished me at last. you can't help me--so save yourself; but remember that every comanche that crosses your trail falls, to pay for this. leave me.' "'bill, me an' you have been together too long for that. when i leave you it'll be arter this, said i, an', liftin him in my arms, i got him on my hoss, an' started off agin. the way that little mustang got over the ground carried us ahead of all except two o' the comanches, who kept bangin' away at us as fast as they could load their rifles. if i hadn't had ole bill in my arms i would have put an eend to their shootin' an' yellin' in a tarnal hurry. "it war no light load that hoss had to carry, an' i knowed that we must come to closer quarters soon, 'cause he couldn't stand that gait long. but he carried us five mile 'bout as quick as i ever traveled, an' then, all to onct, commenced to run slow. he war givin' out fast. the yellin' varlets kept comin' nearer an' nearer, an' i had only one chance for life, an' a poor one at that. i would stick to the hoss as long as he could step, an' then try it on foot. so i turned toward a strip o' woods which lay 'bout a mile off, but he hadn't made a dozen jumps when one o' the pursuin' injuns sent a ball through his head, an' we all come to the ground together. "the minit i touched the prairy i dropped ole bill an', at the crack o' my rifle, one o' the injuns fell; the other then commenced circlin' round me, 'fraid to come to clost quarters. but i kept my eye on him, an' jest as he war goin' to fire, i dropped behind my hoss, and kept dodgin' 'bout till i got my rifle loaded, and then i settled matters to onct. i war safe--but ole bill war dead. i tuk him up in my arms agin, and carried him into the woods, where i rolled a log from its place, an' arter scoopin' out some o' the ground, i put him in, an' pulled the log back over him. it war the best i could do for him, an' arter swearin' above his grave that a comanche should fall for every har on his head, i shouldered my rifle, an', jest as the sun war risin', struck out acrost the prairy, which i knowed i must now tread alone. "is it a wonder, then, that i hate an injun? the bones of many a brave that lay scattered 'bout the prairy can tell how well i have kept my oath. of all the injuns that have crossed my trail since ole bill's death, the three that camped in this shantee that night ar the only ones that ever escaped. i am not done with 'em yet; an' when i go back to the prairy, the comanches will have further cause to remember the night that see the eend of ole bill lawson an' the black mustang." chapter xix. the indians again. the next morning the boys were up before the sun, and after a hearty breakfast, set out to spend the day in the woods; frank and harry, bending their steps toward the creek that ran through the woods, about a mile from the cabin, to set their traps for minks, while archie and george started toward a ridge--the well-known "fox run-way" as it was called--to engage in their favorite sport. the trapper and uncle joe set off in an opposite direction, to cut down a bee-tree, which the latter had discovered a few days before. when frank and harry arrived at the creek, the latter said: "now i want to understand something about this business, before we commence operations we're after minks, and nothing else; and i don't want you to endanger a fellow's life by getting him into any more wolf scrapes, or any thing of that kind." "all right," answered frank, with a laugh. "i'll not get you into any scrape to-day." this satisfied harry, and he was ready to begin the hunt. they found plenty of mink tracks on the bank of the creek. after eating their dinner, they commenced following up some of them, and, before night, succeeded, with brave's assistance, in capturing two large minks, after which they returned to the cabin, well satisfied with their day's work. they found uncle joe and his brother seated at the supper-table, and a large plate full of honey, which was rapidly disappearing before their attacks, proved that they also had been successful. archie and george came in shortly after dark, tired and hungry. a fox-skin, which the former threw down in the corner, bore testimony to the fact that sport was losing none of those hunting qualities of which his young master so often boasted. the day's hunt had been successful on all hands; and the boys being pretty well tired out, the trapper's stories were omitted, and all the inmates of the cabin sought their couches at an early hour. the next morning the boys were "fresh and fierce" for the woods again, and once more started out in their respective directions, leaving uncle joe and the trapper seated before the fire, solacing themselves with their pipes. frank and harry, as usual, went together; the latter, as on the previous morning, exacting a promise that frank would not get him into any "scrapes," to which the latter, as before, readily agreed, little dreaming what was to happen before night. a few moments' walk brought them to the place at which they had set their first trap, in a hollow stump, where they had noticed a multitude of "mink signs," as the trapper would have called them, and as harry bent down and looked into the stump, frank exclaimed: "look at these tracks; somebody besides ourselves has been here." "yes, some other hunters, i suppose," answered harry, peering into the stump. "i hope they were gentlemen enough not to interfere with our arrangements here. but where's that trap gone to?" "these tracks were not made by white persons," said frank, bending over and examining them, "for the hunters in this part of the country all wear boots. these fellows wore moccasins, and the tracks all toe in." "indians, as sure as i'm alive!" ejaculated harry; "and, shoot me, if our trap isn't gone." and thrusting his arm into the stump, he commenced feeling around for the article in question, but it could not be found. "yes, sir," he continued, rising to his feet, "it is gone, and no mistake. feel in there." frank accordingly got down on his knees and made an examination of the stump; but the trap, beyond a doubt, had been carried off. "now, that is provoking!" he exclaimed. "there was a mink in the trap, too," continued harry, pointing to some bits of fur that lay scattered about over the snow. "i wish the rascals that took it had it crammed down their throats." "it does no good to scold, harry," said frank, "for that won't mend the matter. but let us go around and visit the other traps; perhaps they have carried off all of them." the boys accordingly went around to every place where they had left their traps, but not one of them could be found. "now, there's thirteen dollars gone to the dogs," said harry, angrily; "for every one of those traps was worth a dollar, at least. i wish dick was here. we would follow up the scoundrels and recover our property. what shall we do?" "let's follow them up, any how," replied frank. "perhaps we can catch them--the trail seems plain enough. how many of them do you suppose there were?" "there were two indians and as many dogs," answered harry. "here's a track made by a fellow that must have had a foot as big as all out-doors; and here's another, of very respectable size." the boys commenced measuring the tracks, and found, as harry had said, that there were but two different sizes. as soon as this had been determined, frank exclaimed: "well, we mustn't waste any more time. let's start after the rascals; and if we catch them, we'll make them give up those traps or fight." harry shrugged his shoulders, and answered: "if you are going in for a fight, just count me out, will you? one of those indians must be a strapping big fellow, judging by the size of his feet; and the other, although he may be a smaller man, would probably prove a tough customer. if dick was here, i wouldn't mind it. let us go after him." "o no," answered the reckless frank. "i guess we and our double-barrel shot-guns, with brave's assistance, can recover those traps. if we can't catch the thieves, we'll make the trail, at any rate." harry made no reply, but ran along after frank, who commenced following up the trail of the indians, which, as no care had been taken to conceal it, was very plain. as on the former occasion, it appeared as if the tracks had been made by one person; but, on closer examination, frank discovered that the larger savage had taken the lead, and that his companion had stepped exactly in his tracks. the trail ran directly away from uncle joe's cabin, and then turned abruptly and ran parallel with a ridge for the same distance; and here the boys came to a place where there was a confused mingling of tracks, conspicuous among which were some made by boots. there were also the tracks of two more dogs, and several drops of blood on the snow. "the thieves have received reinforcements here," said harry. "a couple of white hunters, or else two more indians, with boots on." "yes, it looks like it," answered frank. "and they must have killed some game, for here's blood on the snow." "i guess we've gone about far enough," said harry. "four men and four dogs are more than a match for us." "no matter; i'm going to see the end of it now. you won't leave me to go on alone!" "o no. if you are bound to go on, i shall stick to you." frank immediately set off on the trail, which turned suddenly to the left, and led toward a ravine. after running a short distance, he said: "these last fellows that joined them are not indians, harry, because they didn't step in each other's tracks." the trail led directly through the gully, and up the other side; and while the boys were climbing up the bank, they heard the angry barking of dogs, followed by the report of a gun, and a yell that made their blood run cold. harry immediately drew back, but frank kept on; and when he reached the top of the bank, he saw a sight that filled him with horror, and which disturbed his sleep for many a night afterward. but let us now return to archie and george, whom we left starting out with their hounds. when they reached the bottom, through which the creek ran, they found sport standing over a fox-trail; and, at his master's command, he at once set off upon it, followed by lightfoot, while the boys struck off through the woods toward a ridge which they knew the fox would be certain to follow. they reached it just as the hounds passed; and were about to start off again, when they were startled by the crack of two rifles in rapid succession, accompanied by a howl of anguish. the baying of the hound ceased, and, the next moment, lightfoot came running back, and took refuge behind his master. "what's the matter, i wonder?" inquired archie, in alarm. "somebody has shot sport," answered george, as the howls of pain continued to come from the part of the woods where the shots had been heard. "sport shot!" repeated archie, indignantly. "i won't stand that, you know. come on; let's see who it was." as the boys commenced running up the ridge, the howls ceased, and archie began to be afraid that his hound had been killed; but, in a few moments, he saw sport coming toward him. he bore an ugly-looking wound on his back, which had been made by a bullet; and although it had at first disabled him, he was fast recovering his strength and ferocity, and answered his master's caresses by showing his teeth, and giving vent to angry growls. "i'm going to find out who that was," said archie. "hunt 'em up, sport! hunt 'em up, sir!" the hound was off on the instant, and led the way to the place where he had been shot, which was marked by a little pool of blood on the snow, and here he turned off to the left of the ridge and ran down into a gully. instead of baying as when on the trail of a fox, he ran in silence, and the boys soon lost sight of him; but just as they reached the bottom of the gully, they heard his bark, followed by a yell, and a crashing in the bushes, as if a severe struggle was going on; and when they gained the top of the bank, they found sport resolutely defending himself against two indians and their dogs. the latter--large, shaggy animals, of the wolf species--had closed with the hound, which would undoubtedly have proved more than a match for both of them, had not the indians (who could not use their rifles for fear of wounding their own dogs) attacked him with clubs. but sport was valiantly holding his own against their combined assaults, now and then seizing one of the dogs in his powerful jaws, and giving him a tremendous shaking, and then turning fiercely upon one of the indians, who found it necessary to retreat, in order to save himself. the boys comprehended the state of affairs at a glance. running fearlessly up to the place where the fight was going on, archie placed the muzzle of his gun against the head of one of the dogs, and killed him on the spot, exclaiming: "turn about is fair play, you know. i'll teach you to shoot my hound when he isn't bothering you." the large indian immediately ceased his attacks upon sport, and, turning upon archie with a yell, threw his brawny arms about him, and hurled him to the ground. but archie still retained his presence of mind, and, while struggling with his assailant, shouted to his companion: "shoot the other dog! shoot the other dog!" george had just time to act upon this suggestion, when the smaller savage closed with him. of course the boys, although they fought desperately, were speedily overpowered by the athletic indians, who at once commenced beating them most unmercifully with their clubs. archie, especially, was being punished most severely, when the hound, finding himself at liberty, sprang upon the indian, and pulled him to the ground. archie was on his feet in an instant; and, cheering on the dog, was about to spring to george's assistance, when he noticed that his late assailant was in a most dangerous situation, the long teeth of the hound being fastened in his throat; and although he struggled desperately, he could not release himself. archie at once hurried to his relief, and endeavored to choke off the hound, while the smaller indian continued to shower his blows upon george, who received them without giving vent to a single cry of pain. such was the scene presented to frank's gaze as he came up out of the gully. of course he was entirely ignorant of the cause of the trouble, but, seeing george's situation, he at once ran to his assistance. the indian, seeing him approach, uttered a yell, and, springing to his feet, was about to "make himself scarce," when the sight of frank's double-barrel, which the latter aimed straight at his head, brought him to a stand-still. by this time, archie, with harry's aid, had succeeded in releasing the indian, but it required their utmost strength to prevent the hound from renewing his attacks. the savage, however, had not fared so badly as they had at first supposed; for, although during the last few moments of the struggle he had lain so still that archie began to fear that he was dead, the moment he was released he sprang to his feet, and, uttering the usual "ugh," was about to retreat, when he also was brought to a halt by frank's double-barrel. the circumstances which had brought the boys together in so singular a manner were speedily explained, after which frank commenced an examination of the "possible-sacks" that the indians carried slung over their shoulders, which resulted in the recovery of the missing traps. "now, what shall we do with these rascals?" he inquired. "they're the same ones that camped in the cabin that night," answered archie; "and this is the second time they have been guilty of stealing traps, and i say let's take 'em prisoners, and let dick pass judgment upon them." this plan was hailed with delight by the others; and the savages, who, during the conversation, had stood with their arms folded, as if they were in no wise concerned in what was going on, were at once relieved of their knives and hatchets, and, in obedience to archie's order, fell in behind frank, who led the way toward the cabin. george and harry followed close after them, carrying the weapons that had been taken from the prisoners, and ready to resist the first attempt that should be made at escape, while archie brought up the rear, struggling hard to restrain the hound, which, every moment, renewed his endeavors to reach the indians. in this order they marched through the woods, and, just before dark, reached the cabin. frank entered first, standing with his gun at a shoulder-arms until the prisoners had passed him and the rest of the boys had entered and closed the door. "eh! what?" ejaculated the trapper, who had watched these movements in surprise. "what did you youngsters fetch them ar tarnal varlets back here for?" the affair was soon explained, and uncle joe and the trapper rolled up their eyes in astonishment. at length the latter said: "they stole your traps, did they, an' shot the hound, an' you follered 'em up an' ketched 'em, did you?" "yes," answered archie, "and they mauled george and me with clubs; and we have brought them here to know what to do with them." "wal, i never _did_ see sich keerless fellers as you youngsters be," said dick. "you get wusser every day. why didn't you come arter me?" "we should have lost too much time. besides, we wanted to catch them ourselves." "wal, 'cordin' to prairy law," continued the trapper, "there oughter be short work made of 'em; but what's law on the prairy won't do in the settlements. pitch 'em out-doors, and don't never bring no more injuns here." "shall we give them their guns?" asked frank. "no; don't give 'em nothin'. open that door." frank did as the trapper ordered, and the latter walked up to the large indian, and, seizing him around the body, lifted him from his feet, and threw him headlong into a deep snow-drift outside of the cabin. a smothered "ugh" broke from his lips as he sank out of sight. after considerable struggling, he reappeared, completely covered with snow, looking very unlike the sedate indian that had stood in the cabin but a moment before, and started, at the top of his speed, for the woods. as soon as he had disappeared in the darkness, the trapper seized the smaller indian, and served him in the same manner; then, without waiting to see what became of him, closed the door, and returned to his seat in front of the fire. chapter xx. the journey homeward. next morning, as soon as they had finished their breakfast, in accordance with the promise they had made their parents before starting, that they would be at home before the holidays, the boys began to make preparations to leave the woods. the sled was brought around to the door, and, while george and harry were engaged in loading it, frank and his cousin went to the barn to harness the young moose, which had become very tractable, and would trot off with a load as well as a horse. their traps and guns, together with the furs they had taken, were stowed carefully away in the bottom of the sled; then came the cubs, and the skins of the moose, bear, white buck, and panther, and the whole was crowned by the huge antlers of the moose, to give it, as harry said, "an imposing appearance." after the moose had been hitched to the sled, and all was ready for the start, the boys turned to shake hands with uncle joe and the trapper. dick seemed to regret their parting very much. after drawing his coat-sleeve across his eyes, he seized frank's hand, and said: "good-by, youngster! we have had some good times in these yere woods this winter. i'm sorry that the partin' time has come, for i hate to have you leave us. you are a gritty feller--jest sich a one as i like to see; an' i have tuk to you jest the same as poor ole bill lawson onct tuk to me. as soon as spring opens i shall start agin for the prairy. the woods here are too small for me. we prob'bly shall never meet agin, but i hope you won't forget your ole friend, dick lewis. good-by! an' may your trail never be as rugged an' rough as mine has been." "i shall never forget you, dick," replied frank, as he returned the trapper's hearty grasp. "you saved my life." at length the farewells had all been said, and the boys got into the sled. frank took up the reins, and the moose broke into a rapid trot, that soon carried them out of sight of the cabin. there was no danger that the boys would soon forget the wild scenes through which they had passed during their short sojourn in the woods. each had something to remind him of some exciting hunt which he had gone through. frank thought of his desperate struggle with the buck, during which he had received scars that would go with him through life. harry remembered his adventure with the wolves. george shivered as he thought of his cold bath in the pond. and archie, in imagination, was again in pursuit of the black fox. "well," said the latter, at length, "we've had some fine times since we traveled over this road." "yes," said george, "and i should like to go through them again--ducking and all." "i had rather be excused," said frank. "so had i," chimed in harry. "i shouldn't like the idea of going through the fight with that moose again," continued frank. "nor i shouldn't like to meet those wolves again, and have them pull off my boots as i was climbing up a tree," said harry. "i wonder what the folks will think, when they see us coming home in this rig?" said archie. that question was answered when, about an hour before dark, they turned up off the creek into the road, in full view of the cottage. they were first discovered by aunt hannah, who, after shading her eyes with her hand, and gazing at them a few moments, ran into the house. a moment afterward the whole family appeared at the door. "there's my folks!" exclaimed archie. "i thought they would be here to spend the holidays. show them what we can do, frank." his cousin accordingly put the moose through his best paces, and in a few moments they whirled through the gate, and drew up before the door. "well, boys, i'm glad to see you all back safe," said mr. winters, as soon as the greeting was over. "it's a wonder that archie didn't shoot some of you--he's so careless with his gun." "o no, father," replied the boy, "i've got over that. i always hold my gun muzzle down, as you told me." the boys began to unload the sled, and one after another of the articles were taken out and laid on the portico. finally, harry drew out the panther's skin. "a panther!" exclaimed mr. winters. "where did you buy that skin?" "buy it!" repeated archie. "we didn't buy it. frank killed the panther that once wore this skin; with a shot-gun, too; and that isn't all he killed, either. look here!" and he threw out the bear and moose-skins, and finally the cubs. "he had a nice time killing that moose," archie went on to say, "and he came near being"---here he was interrupted by a look from his cousin. he was about to say, "and came near being killed himself;" but finished his sentence by saying, "he came near killing the moose at the first shot, but didn't quite." mr. winters had seen the glances that the boys exchanged, and knew that it meant something more than they were willing to reveal; but he made no remark. after the things had all been taken out, with the exception of those that belonged to george and harry, and the cubs had been taken into the kitchen and delivered into aunt hannah's especial charge, the boys got into the sled again and started for mr. butler's. their appearance in the village created a great commotion. after driving around to the post-office for the mail, as well as to show off the qualities of their horned horse, they started home again. that evening was passed in a pleasant manner, in the recital of the boys' adventures in the woods, which also formed the topic of conversation for many days. in spite of the emphatic instructions frank had given his companions "not to say a word about his fight with the moose," it gradually "leaked out somewhere," as archie expressed it, and frank became a hero in his own family, and in the village. * * * * * here we will leave them, only to introduce them again in other and more stirring scenes on the western prairies. the end. famous castlemon books. gunboat series. by harry castlemon. illustrated. 6 vols. 16mo. cloth, extra, black and gold. frank the young naturalist. frank on a gunboat. frank in the woods. frank before vicksburg. frank on the lower mississippi. frank on the prairie. rocky mountain series. by harry castlemon. illustrated. 3 vols. 16mo. cloth, extra, black and gold. frank among the rancheros. frank at don carlos' rancho. frank in the mountains. sportsman's club series. by harry castlemon. illustrated. 3 vols. 16mo. cloth, extra, black and gold. the sportsman's club in the saddle. the sportsman's club afloat. the sportsman's club among the trappers. go-ahead series. by harry castlemon. illustrated. 3 vols. 16mo. cloth, extra, black and gold. tom newcombe. go-ahead. no moss. frank nelson series. by harry castlemon. illustrated. 3 vols. 16mo. cloth, extra, black and gold. snowed up. frank in the forecastle. boy traders. boy trapper series. by harry castlemon. illustrated. 3 vols. 16mo. cloth, extra, black and gold. the buried treasure; or, old jordan's haunt. the boy trapper; or, how dave filled the order. the mail-carrier. roughing it series. by harry castlemon. illustrated. 16mo. cloth, extra, black and gold. george in camp. _other volumes in preparation._ entered according to act of congress, in the year 1865, by r. w. carroll & co., in the clerk's office of the district court of the united states, for the southern district of ohio. [illustration: ant. lopez de s^ta anna] [illustration: battle of palo alto 8^th. may 1846. lith. by e. weber & co. balto.] [illustration: battle of resaca de la palma 9^th may 1846. lith. by e. weber & co. balto.] history of the war between mexico and the united states, with a preliminary view of its origin; by brantz mayer, formerly secretary of the united states legation in mexico, and author of "mexico as it was and as it is." ne dites à la posterité que ce qui est digne de la posterité.--voltaire. volume i. new york & london. wiley and putnam. mdcccxlviii. entered according to the act of congress, in the year 1847, by brantz mayer, in the clerk's office of the district court for the district of maryland. book first: preliminary view of the origin of the war. history of the war between mexico and the united states. book i. chapter i. introductory views of mexico--the people and government. the war which broke out between the united states of north america and the mexican republic, in the spring of 1846, is an event of great importance in the history of the world. profound peace had reigned among christian nations, since the downfall of napoleon; and, with the exception of internal discords in france, belgium, poland and greece, the civilized world had cause to believe that mankind would henceforth resort to the cabinet rather than the field for the settlement of international disputes. the recent conflicts between the french and the arabs in algeria, and between the british and indian races, have been characterized by ferocity and endurance. but, it will be recollected these encounters took place between nations unequal alike in religion, morals, law, and civilization. the temper or character of mahomedans was not to be measured by that of christians nor had we just reason to hope for a pacific or temporizing spirit in people whose savage habits have ever rendered them prompt to return invasion by a blow, and make war the precursor of negotiation. it was, thus, reserved for the mexicans, whose blood is mixed with that of an arab ancestry, to exhibit the spectacle of continual domestic broils, and, latterly of a positive warfare against a nation whose friendly hand was the first to summon them into the pale of national independence. the disorganized condition of our neighbor for nearly thirty years, may, partly account for and palliate this fault. with administrations shifting like the scenes of a drama, and with a stage, at times dyed with blood, and at others imitating the mimic passions and transports of the real theatre, it may be confessed that much should be pardoned by a forbearing nation whose aggregate intelligence and force are not to be compared with the fragmentary and impulsive usurpations in mexico. to judge faithfully of the justice or injustice of this war, and to comprehend this history in truth and fairness, we must not only narrate in chronological order the simple events that occurred between the two nations; but the student of this epoch must go back a step in order to master the scope and motives of the war. he must study the preceding mexican history and character; and, it will speedily be discovered that when he attempts to judge the spanish republics by the ordinary standards applied to free and enlightened governments, he will signally fail in arriving at truth. he must neither imagine that when the name of republic was engrafted on the mexican system, that it accommodated itself at once to our ideal standard of political power, nor that the dominant faction was willing to adopt the simple machinery which operates so perfectly in the united states. there are many reasons why this should not be the case. the spanish race, although it has achieved the most wonderful results in discovery, conquest, colonial settlement, diplomacy, feats of arms, and success of domestic power, has proved itself, within the present century, to be one of the few opponents of the progressive principles of our age. a castilian pride of remembered greatness, and a superstitious reluctance to cast off the bondage of the past, have made the spaniards content to cling devotedly to their ancient edifice without bestowing on it those repairs or improvements without which governments, must evidently crumble and decay. spain believed that what had produced national power and greatness in one age must ever continue to effect the same results, and, thus, she was content to bear the evils of the present time rather than disjoint a fragment of her ancient temple, lest the whole should fall in indiscriminate ruin. the blindness of national vanity was made more profound by the universal glare of progressive civilization that surrounded this doomed country, whilst superstitious influences clogged every avenue to progress which might have saved and regenerated both the parent and her colonies. it may be urged by the apologists for spain, that, being nearly as deep in moral, political and social degradation as france was at the period of the revolution, she naturally contemplated such an event with horror, especially when she remembered the sensitive and excitable race that peopled her vallies and sierras, and the likelihood that the bloody dramas of paris would be frightfully exaggerated in madrid. but i still believe that the true cause will be found more deeply seated, in the nature of the people; and that spain,--made up as she is of many nations, incompetent for self-government, uneducated and bigoted,--will ever be content to find her ideal future in her traditionary past. spain and the spaniards have few more zealous admirers than the author of this history. the nation contains individuals who in patriotism, love of liberty, and devotion to science, literature, and art, are unsurpassed by any people of the world. as americans we owe a debt of gratitude to the noble discoverers and conquerors of this continent. in deeds of bravery, in chivalrous enterprise, and in intellectual power, with what people may they not be matched in their perfect period. but their golden age has passed, and manifold corruptions in church and state have preyed upon the country with paralyzing influence. for a long time we received from england with the submissive credulity of children, all her traditionary ignorance and abuse of spain, much of which was owing to political animosity, as well as to the rivalry that grew up between that country and the rest of europe during the reign of philip the second. but the study of her language, history and literature, has unveiled the legendary falsehoods with which we were cheated. whilst a large portion of her past history should be admired and lauded, her present downfall should be regarded with compassionate censure and sympathy. we should endeavor, in writing history, to make ourselves men of the times and nations we describe, and it is in this manner alone, that we can establish the spiritual sympathy between ourselves and foreign countries, which will enable us to enter into their feelings and motives, and thus become not only merciful but true and discreet judges. * * * * * the two great impressions made on this continent by the spaniards were in mexico and peru. avarice and ambition induced the conquest of the latter, while that of mexico may also be attributed to the same motives, although the hero who added the aztec empire to the spanish dominions, modified his victories by personal qualities which were infinitely superior to those of the conqueror of peru.[1] yet, in neither of these great adventures do we find any of the fruits of peaceful acquisition, or of those well regulated advances in civilization which always mark a people whose conquest is undertaken under the immediate direction and legal restraints of government. the conquests in america were, in truth, chiefly individual enterprises, and, of course, could not be conducted in a spirit of temperance and justice. the exploits of cortéz and pizarro, especially those of the latter, are characterized by ferocity and barbarism which would place them in the category with freebooters and buccaneers, were they not saved from it by the splendor of their successful results. the indians of the countries they subjected to spain, were utterly vanquished; yet, unlike the hardy and warlike aborigines of the north, they remained on their native soil, content to serve or mingle with their conquerors.--wherever the white man came at the north, the indian retreated to his congenial wilderness;--he could not inhabit the same country or breathe the same air with the intruder;--but, as the spaniard advanced at the south, the semi-civilization of the enervated native, induced him to linger near the homes of his ancestors, and, with a tame heart, to obey his conqueror rather than to resist him or enjoy the fierce independence of the forest. the territory thus seized by violence was held by fear.--loyalty can never be the tenure of conquerors, and, especially, of the conquerors of an inferior race. the spaniard and indian lived together in a spirit of lordly dominion on the one hand, and of crushed dependence on the other, whilst the castilian derived from the native nothing but his habits of savage life, and the indian, in turn, learned nothing from the castilian but his vices. a conquest thus achieved, an empire founded in blood and terror, would naturally seem to have a doubtful destiny. it is unquestionably true that spain made humane laws, and that charles the fifth passed a decree by which his american possessions were declared to be integral parts of the spanish kingdom. it is true, moreover, that he sought to abolish the special grants to discoverers and conquerors by which they were invested with almost absolute authority; and, by mitigating the system _repartimientos_[2] or of vassalage among the indians, to raise them to the dignity of spanish subjects. but, at the same time, these humane laws were badly administered in a country so difficult of access as america was at that period from spain; and viceroys and governors acted as they pleased, with but little regard to the people or the country, except for their individual interests. whilst this system of maladministration made the royal and beneficent laws nugatory, spain seems to have been engaged in creating a colonial system which was calculated to paralyze the energies of mexico and peru. she taught them to look exclusively to mining for wealth, and to their indians for labor. all the laws relative to the natural development of a new country were disregarded, and civilized existence in america began on artificial principles. the example of the last fifty years has proved that america is capable of producing all the necessaries, and most of the luxuries of life quite as abundantly as europe. yet, spain denied her colonies the privilege of an effort. for instance,--she resolved at the outset not to allow them to be independent in agriculture, commerce or manufactures. she would not permit them to cultivate the soil save for the merest daily necessaries. wine and oil were to be made in the old world. cotton and wool were not to be woven into the beautiful fabrics for which the ancient peruvians were so celebrated. the church aided the strong arm of government by the weight of her exactions and the power of superstitious control. the inquisition put its veto on the spread of knowledge by restraining the sale and publication of books. foreigners were not allowed to navigate spanish seas or enter american harbors. and these distant shores were only visited at stated seasons by national vessels, carrying such produce at exorbitant prices, as spain might think proper to despatch from seville or cadiz.[3] * * * * * i have thought it proper to state in my introductory chapter, thus much of the laws and system under which mexico began her national existence;--for laws modify the character whenever they are not self-imposed. let us now, for a moment consider the population which was subjected to the bad administration of such laws; and we shall then understand better the character of the belligerents. the blood of the spaniards, even at home, is a mixed blood. but when we remember the various races that have overrun, resided in, ruled, and incorporated themselves with spain, we cannot be surprised at detecting so many and diverse characteristics in mexico. the celti-gallic, celt-iberian, carthagenian, roman, vandalic, visigothic, and moorish blood have mingled again in mexico and peru with the indian, and in some cases have been dashed even with the negro.[4] mexicans are thus, as i have observed elsewhere, grafts rather of the wild arab on the american indian, than of the spanish don on the noble aztec.[5] when mexico was completely conquered and emigration began to fill up the land, the soil was divided, in large estates, among the adventurers and the indians, by a system of _repartimientos_, were apportioned to the land holders.[6] this created an absolute vassalage, and bound the indian, virtually and forever, to the spot where he was born. as it became wearisome to the planters to dwell in the seclusion of these vast and lonely estates, they left them and their indians to the care of an _administrador_, and retreated to the chief cities of the provinces or to the capital. thus all the intelligence and cultivation of mexico became compacted in the towns, whilst the original ignorance and semi-civilization remained diffused over the country. it is, therefore, not at all surprising to find that out of a population of seven millions, four millions are indians and only one million purely white, while more than two millions, of the rest, are zambos, mestizos and mulattos. nor is it singular that of this whole population of seven millions, not more than six hundred thousand whites and eighty thousand of other castes, can read and write.[7] indeed it may be said with truth,--as agriculture has received but little attention beyond the ordinary wants of life, and as the great proprietors of estates have chiefly devoted their attention to the _raising of cattle_,--that the ancient nomadic habits of the indian and half-breed, have remained unchanged, and, consequently, that the great body of this semi-civilized people is quite as much at home on horseback with sword and lance as in the _corral_ or _hacienda_.[8] the ranchero, who has played so conspicuous a part in this war, is the natural offspring of such a state of society. this class of men is composed of individuals, half spanish half indian, who resemble the _gauchos_ of the south american pampas. gaunt, shrivelled and bronzed by exposure, though hardy and muscular from athletic exercise, they are, indeed, the arabs of our continent. living half the time in their saddles, for they are matchless horsemen, they traverse the plains and mountains, with lasso[9] in hand, either searching for, or tending their herds. the slaughter of beasts and preparation and sale of hides is their chief means of livelihood, varied occasionally by the cultivation of a small patch of ground, or by taking part in the civil wars that are always waging. their costume generally consists of a pair of tough leggings of skin and leathern trousers, over which is a _serape_ or blanket, with a hole in the centre large enough for the head to pass through, whence it falls in graceful folds over the chest and shoulders, leaving room for the play of hands and arms. add to this a broad _sombrero_, and the _lasso_, hanging ready for use at his saddle bow, and the reader will have a picture of the _ranchero_ as he appears in peace or in the ordinary pursuit of his occupation. join to this garb a long sabre, a horse as savage and untamed as himself, and a belt plentifully studded with pistols and _machetes_, and the _ranchero_ presents himself ready either to join a troop of banditti, or to serve in a body of cavalry. cowardly as they generally are in the open field when encountering regular troops, yet, in ambuscade, a sudden fight, or, as _guerillas_, they are both a formidable and cruel foe. their power of endurance is inexhaustible. fatigue is almost unknown to them, and a scanty meal, each day, of jerked beef and corn or plantain, is sufficient to sustain them on the longest marches. such are the _rancheros_, who, by discipline, might be rendered the best light troops in the world. these are the men who form the material of the mexican cavalry; and they bear the same relation to the armies of that republic that the cossacks do to the russians;--ever on the alert,--easily lodged,--capable of supporting fatigue or hunger,--and untiring in pursuit of an enemy, when even the most trifling plunder is to be obtained.[10] * * * * * another large and formidable body in mexico is that of the _indians_, amounting, as we have seen, to four millions; whose knowledge of their governors' language is generally confined to such phrases as will enable them to buy and sell, or perform the ordinary functions of life. formerly they lived, and usually still live, in narrow huts built of mud, thatched with straw or palm leaves, and which have scarcely the merit of being picturesque. in these miserable lairs, they nestle with their families, their domestic animals, and a table or altar on which they erect a cross or place the figure of a patron saint. their food is mostly maize, and their dress corresponds with this grovelling wretchedness. five out of every hundred may perhaps possess two suits of clothes, but their general vesture consists of a large cotton shirt, a pair of leathern trousers, and a blanket. even the indian women, who elsewhere, like their sex in civilized countries, are always fond of personal adornment, exhibit no desire to appear decent or to rival each other in tasteful ornaments when they go abroad. they are as foul and ill-clad on their festivals at church, as in their hovels at home, so that few things are more disgusting to a foreigner than to mingle in an indian crowd.[11] it is impossible to imagine such a population capable of becoming landed proprietors; and, consequently, we find them contented with the annual product of their small fields, amounting, perhaps, to thirty or fifty _fanegas_ of corn. when they live on the large estates of mexican proprietors, they are, in reality, vassals, although free from the nominal stain of slavery.[12] on these plantations they are beaten when they commit faults, and, if then found incorrigible, are driven beyond their limits,--a punishment deemed by them the severest that can be inflicted, and which they bear with as much difficulty as our indians do their banishment from the "hunting grounds" of their forefathers. when they have gained a little money by labor, they hasten to squander it by making a festival in honor of their favorite saint, and thus consume their miserable earnings in gluttony, gambling, masses, fire works, and drunkenness. when it is not absolutely necessary to toil for the necessaries of life,--especially in the _tierras calientes_, or warmer portions of mexico,--they pass their time in utter idleness or sleep. zavala declares that in many portions of the country, the _curates_ maintain such entire dominion over the indians, that they order them to be publicly whipped whenever they fail to pay their _ovenciones_, or tributes, at the regular time, or commit some act of personal disobedience. but the degradation of this class does not stop even here, for the same author alleges that he has frequently seen many indians and their wives flogged at the village church door, because they had failed to come to mass upon some sunday or festival, whilst, after the punishment, these wretches were obliged to kiss the hand of the executioner![13] it will be seen from this sketch and description that the vicious colonial system of spain formed only two great classes in america,--the proprietor and the vassal,--and that, in the nature of things, it was utterly impossible for the latter to amalgamate with the former except by creating an inferior race, whose sympathies were with the indian rather than the spaniard, and whose type is the nomadic _ranchero_. this fact was proved in the revolution which broke out in spanish america. the war cry was against the spaniard[14] and his pure descendants. the _creole_[15] rose against the _gachupin_,[16] and the ferocity with which the soldiers of old spain carried on the war against the natives confirmed their hereditary animosity. * * * * * the struggle for domestic power commenced as soon as the independence of mexico was achieved, and the people began to establish a system of government upon a republican basis after the downfall of the emperor iturbidé. the spaniards had taught a lesson of privileged classes which was never forgotten; so that, when the revolution took place, the people were only used to effect national emancipation rather than to establish general political liberty. the nobles or great proprietors, and the clergy, had, in the olden time, formed the influential class of society which ruled the land. the theory of republicanism was marvellously captivating so long as there was an european foe to subdue. but, when the last remnant of spanish power disappeared, the men who had governed during the revolution were loath to surrender power and subside into the insignificance of mere citizenship. in such a country as mexico, and in such a war as had just occurred, this controlling influence in public affairs was, of course, to be chiefly found in the army; so that when the nation looked around for men to direct her at a period when spain had not yet recognized her independence and might again assail her, she naturally turned to the military chieftains whose valor sustained her cause so bravely. thus it was that in her first moments of peace, the army obtained an important ascendancy, which it has ever since contrived to retain during all administrations. it is not just to the spanish colonies to blame them for such a procedure, especially when we remember that even our republic is beginning to manifest a marked partiality for military men. the great deed rather than the great thought,--the brilliant act rather than beneficent legislation,--arrests and captivates the multitude. in republics, where an eager strife for wealth, distinction or power, is constantly going on, the notice and position that each man obtains must be won either by intrigue or by the irresistible power of talents and achievements. ambitious parties sometimes even compromise for the weakest, rather than yield the palm to superior merit of which they are meanly jealous. the great mass of the country has no time to pause in the midst of its earnest labor to meditate wisely on the political abilities and moral claims of individuals. they cannot weigh them in the golden scales of justice;--but, by a more rapid and easy process, they yield their suffrages promptly to those whose manifestations of genius or power are so resistless as to compel admiration. thus is it that the brave soldier, performing his noble exploit on the field of battle, speaks palpably to the eye and ear of the greedy multitude. his is, indeed, the language of action, and each new deed makes national glory more distinct, and national vanity more confident. but the more quiet and unobtrusive statesman, with a field infinitely less glaring or attractive, exacts from his judges a suspension of party feeling, an investigation of motive and merit, a calm and forbearing justice, which the impatient masses have seldom the time or talent to bestow. it is, therefore, by no means surprising to find in history, that the sword has commonly been mightier than the pen, and that military chieftains become the natural heads of republics which are created by long and bitter revolutions. it must be remembered that the army in mexico is not what armies are generally understood to be in other countries. in europe they are designed to restrain the aggressive ambition of rival powers, to act as military police, and, by their imposing skill, discipline and numbers, to preserve the balance of national power. but in mexico, whilst the members of an immensely rich hierarchy constitute a distinct _order_ in society, the army forms another.--the policy of the existing military chieftains was to sustain, foster and increase their individual power and patronage. the mere domestic police of the country could surely never require, in time of peace, so large a numerical force under arms as that which has always been supported in it; yet the military presidents, at once, sought to establish an _army of officers_, and by the enlistment of a body of commanders, entirely disproportionate to the number of rank and file, they immediately created a _military order_ upon whose support they could rely so long as they possessed the means of patronage. the officers thus became armed and paid politicians, whilst the common soldiers formed a military police;--the one an element of all political revolutions, the other a tool by which those revolutions were effected. the great practical idea of government, it will be perceived, was derived from _compulsory force_. the church wielded the spiritual power, whilst the army held the physical; and, between the two, _the people_,--composed of merchants, professional men, farmers, proprietors, and artisans,--were refused all participation in authority, or progress in civil order which might have placed mexico among the foremost nations of the world. in this manner a central despot has always found means and instruments to suppress federalism;--for whilst near _thirty_ revolutions have occurred in mexico since her independence, every one of her presidents has been a military chieftain.[17] macaulay, in his essay on the life of lord bacon describes the condition of england when she was governed by warriors whose rude courage was neither guided by science nor softened by humanity, and by priests whose learning and abilities were habitually devoted to the defence of power. the description of that age in england is by no means inapplicable to mexico in the nineteenth century. "on the one side," says he, "the hotspurs, the nevilles, the cliffords, rough illiterate and unreflecting, brought to the council-board the fierce and impetuous despotism which they had acquired amid the tumult of predatory war or in the gloomy repose of the garrisoned and moated castle. on the other side was the calm and placid prelate, versed in all that was considered as learning; trained in the schools to manage words, and, in the confessional, to manage hearts;--seldom superstitious, but skilful in practising on the superstitions of others; false as it was natural for a man to be whose profession imposed on all who were not saints the necessity of being hypocrites;--selfish as it was natural that a man should be who could form no domestic ties and cherish no hope of legitimate posterity;--more attached to his order than to his country, and guiding the politics of england with a constant side glance to rome."[18] and so it was in mexico. the sojourner in her capital is continually warned of this double dominion over the soul and body of the people. the drum and the bell resound in his ears from morning to night fall. priests and soldiers throng the streets; and, whilst the former enjoy the comfortable revenues which are derived from the one hundred millions of property owned by the church, the latter live upon the labor of the people, whom they are paid to control and transfer from one military despot to another. the mexican revolution,--like the revolutions of england, but unlike that of france,--was political rather than social. the great foundations of society were therefore undisturbed, and the priest and soldier took the ranks of the ancient privileged classes, whilst the mixed people and the native indians remained what they had ever been--the subjects of government. of all the officers who have commanded the army and enjoyed the presidency, santa anna has occupied the most distinguished position since the death of iturbidé, and it is with him and the nation thus described, that we shall deal in the following pages. footnotes: [1] see prescott's conquest of peru, 2nd vol. pages 199: 245. [2] the word _repartimiento_ means, division, partition, distribution, or apportionment. in the old spanish historians and english books, such as zaraté, garcilasso de la vega, fernandez, robertson, it is uniformly used to denote the well known allotment of lands and vassal indians (_genuine adscripti glebæ_) granted to the first conquerors in reward of their services. in some later writers, this word is applied to the _monopoly of sales to the indians_ exercised by the _corregedores_, under pretext of protecting the indians from imposition, by the official distribution of goods. n. a. review, vol. xx. p. 287. "indeed the spanish court made no scruple of regarding the indians in the same light as the beasts and the soil, disposing of them as the rightful property of the crown; for it was not till 1537, nearly fifty years after the discovery, that the pope issued a mandate declaring them to be really and truly men,--"_ipsos veros homines_,"--and capable of receiving the christian faith." n. a. review, vol. xix. p. 198. [3] the american trade was confined to seville until 1720, when it was removed to cadiz, as a more convenient port. on the subject of these oppressions and misgovernment, see zavala's "revoluciones de mexico," introduction;--and north american review. vol. xx. p. 158. [4] the subjoined list shows the varieties of parentage and blood forming the castes throughout spanish america: parents. 1. original races. white. european _whites_ are called _gachupines_ or chapetones. _whites_, born in the colonies, are called creoles. negro. indian. parents. children. 2. castes of white race. white father and negro mother mulatto. white father and indian mother mestizo. white father and mulatta mother quarteron. white father and meztiza mother creole, (only distinguishable from the white by a pale brown complexion.) white father and china mother chino-blanco. white father and quarterona mother quintero. white father and quintera mother white. 3. castes of negro race. negro father and mulatta mother zambo-negro. negro father and meztiza mother mulatto-oscuro. negro father and china mother zambo-chino. negro father and zamba mother zambo & negro (perfectly black.) negro father and quarterona mother dark mulatto. negro father and quintera mother dark mulatto. 4. castes of indian race. indian father and negro mother chino. indian father and mulatta mother chino-oscuro. indian father and mestiza mother mestizo-claro (often very beautiful.) indian father and china mother chino-cholo. indian father and zamba mother zambo-claro. indian father and china-chola mother indian (with short, frizzly hair.) indian father and quarterona mother brown meztizo. indian father and quintera mother brown meztizo. 5. mulatto corruptions. mulatto father and zamba mother zambo (a miserable race.) mulatto father and zamba mother chino (rather clear race.) mulatto father and china mother chino (rather dark.) besides these specified castes there are many others not distinguished by particular names. the best criterion for judging is the hair of the women which is infinitely less deceiving than the complexion. the short woolly hair, or the coarse indian locks may always be detected on the head or back of the neck. this tabular statement exhibits at a glance the mongrel corruptions of the human race in spanish america, and forms an interesting subject for students of physiology. see tschudi's peru, p. 80, am. ed. [5] preface to 3d ed. of mexico as it was and as it is, p. 12. [6] zavala's "revoluciones de mexico," vol. 1. p. 15, gives an account of the manner in which estates are divided in mexico. [7] see mexico as it was and as it is, p. 301. [8] _corral_ signifies cattle yard; _hacienda_, plantation; _rancho_, small farm. [9] _the lasso_ is a long rope, with a running noose at the end of it. the mexicans learn to fling this with great accuracy so as to catch a bull, a horse, or a man with equal facility. all classes have some skill in the use of this weapon, and i have seen children, with cords, attempting to _lasso_ chickens and even butterflies! [10] see head's rough notes of a journey over the pampas. the mexican ranchero is somewhat superior to the _gaucho_ of the pampas. [11] mexico as it was and is, p. 144. [12] id. p. 201; and see stephens' travels in yucatan,--where, he says, the maxim is that "los indios no oyen sino por las nalgas,"--the indians only hear through their backs. [13] zavala revoluciones de mejico, vol. i, pp. 15, 16. "este escandalo estaba autorizado por la costumbre de mi provincia." zavala was one of the wisest and most illustrious patriots of mexico. his history was published in paris in 1831. [14] it will be recollected that the outburst of the mexican revolution was not in favor of republicanism; but only against misgovernment. it was not against the _form_ of rule, but against the _men_ who ruled. even the plan of iguala offered the crown of mexico to ferdinand, as a separate kingdom. see robinson's memoirs of the mexican revolution. "it is related that hidalgo, the celebrated priestly leader of the revolutionary movement, was accustomed to travel from village to village preaching a crusade against the spaniards, exciting the _creoles_ and indians; and one of his most effective tricks is said to have been the following. although he had thrown off the cassock for the military coat, he wore a figure of the virgin mary suspended by a chain around his neck. after haranguing the mob on such occasions, he would suddenly break off, and looking down at his breast, address himself to the holy image, after the following fashion: 'mary! mother of god! holy virgin! patron of mexico! behold our country,--behold our wrongs,--behold our sufferings! dost thou not wish they should be changed? that we should be delivered from our tyrants? that we should be free? that we should slay the gachupines! that we should kill the spaniards?' "the image had a moveable head fastened to a spring, which he jerked by a cord concealed beneath his coat, and, of course the virgin responded with a nod! the effect was surprising--and the air was filled with indian shouts of obedience to the present miracle."--mexico as it was and as it is, p. 230. [15] the term _creole_ is a corruption of the spanish word _criollo_, which is derived from _criar_, to create or foster. the spaniards apply the term criollo not merely to the human race, but to animals born in the colonies, if they are of _pure european blood_. [16] see robinson's memoirs mexican revolution, page 15. the term _gachupin_ has been always used by the creoles and indians as a word of contempt towards the spaniards. its origin and exact signification are unknown; but it is believed to be an indian, and perhaps aztec, term of scorn and opprobrium. [17] a _federal_ government, similar to our own, was established in mexico in 1824, and overthrown in 1835, to yield to a _central_ constitution. in the meanwhile, the centralists were almost always at war, openly or secretly, against the _federalists_. [18] macaulay's essays, vol. 2d, p. 356, bost. ed. chapter ii. origin of the war considered--true objects of contemporaneous history --motives for war--no single act caused it--difference between war and hostilities--mexican revolution--federalism and centralism- operation of the constitution of 1824--history of our commercial and diplomatic relations--bad conduct of mexico in regard to our claims, compared with that of other nations--commission--award of umpire- subsequent course of mexico--history of the seizure and surrender of monterey, on the pacific, by commodore jones in 1842--secretary upshur's censure of his conduct--ill feeling in mexico towards the united states in consequence of this seizure. an artist in portraying a face or delineating a landscape, does not imprint upon his canvass, each line and wrinkle, each blade of grass or mossy stone, yet a spectator recognizes in the complete painting, those broad characteristics of truth which establish a limner's fidelity. so it is with the historian. whilst seeking for accuracy in all his details, he aims, chiefly, at exactness in his ruling principles and general effect, but he leaves the minute inelegances and tasteless incidents to those whose critical fervor delights in detecting them. it is not alone in the detail of facts that the historian is liable to incur censure, especially when he writes a contemporaneous narrative. it is almost impossible to suppose that he will divest himself so completely of party feeling, as to compose an unprejudiced work. some critics have even declared that a historian should possess neither religion nor country, and would thus force us to believe it utterly impossible to be impartial unless an author were an infidel or a cosmopolite. the age is so characterized by political rancor and so little by true statesmanship, that it is not surprising to hear such opinions even from experienced and patient scholars. yet i have always thought that a writer who undertakes the task of delineating national annals in no sectarian spirit but with broad and christian tolerance,--honestly seeking to do justice in politics and religion to all,--may so far separate himself from the strifes of the day as to pronounce opinions as honest, though perhaps not as learned, as those that issue from the bench. there is, too, a great advantage which should not escape our notice in recording contemporaneous history and fixing permanently the facts of the time as they occur. he who describes events or periods long since past, is forced to throw himself back, if possible, into the scenes of which he writes, whilst he remains free from sympathy with their factions and parties. but if a writer of the present day will place himself on the impartial ground of religious and political freedom, and make himself what madame de stael has so felicitously styled "contemporaneous posterity," i think he will be better able than those who come after us to narrate with vivid freshness the story of this sanguinary war. the impression of public feeling both in mexico and the united states is still distinct in our recollection; the political motives influencing or controlling both the great parties in our country, have not yet ceased to operate; and the errors that may innocently creep into a narrative may be corrected by intelligent men who took part in the war as soldiers or civilians. a history thus dispassionately written, must, it seems to me, have the truth and value of a portrait taken from life, rather than of a sketch made from memory whose coloring lacks all the freshness of vitality. * * * * * the very threshold of this history is embarrassed by the party controversies to which i have alluded. the origin of the war was attributed by the president and his adherents to the wrong doings of mexico, whilst the opponents of the executive did not hesitate to charge its unnecessary inception and all its errors directly on the cabinet. documents, messages, speeches, essays, and reviews, were published to sustain both sides of the question, and the whole subject was argued with so much ability and bitterness, so much zeal and apparent sincerity, that an impartial mind experiences extraordinary difficulty in detecting the actual offender. that grievances existed in the conduct of mexico against us during a long series of years cannot be denied; but, it is equally true, that, between governments well administered and entirely reasonable on both sides, none of those provocations justified war. yet, when offended power on one side, and passion on the other, become engaged in discussion, it requires but little to fan the smallest spark into a flame, and thus to kindle a conflagration, which the stoutest arms may fail to suppress. it frequently occurs in the affairs of ordinary life, that neighbors are the bitterest enemies. men often dislike each other at their first interview, especially if they belong to families in which mutual prejudices have existed. they find it impossible to assign reasons for their aversion; nevertheless it exists in all its marvellous virulence. a slight disagreement as to limits between neighboring landholders, a paltry quarrel among servants, the malicious representation of innocent remarks, a thousand vain and trifling incidents, may effectually create a degree of ill feeling and cause them never to meet without scornful looks and quickened pulses. at length, this offensive temper is manifested in personal annoyance or insulting language, and blows are struck in the first encounter without pausing to debate the justice of an assault. it is with nations as it is with persons. the boasted discretion of statesmen, and the provident temper of politicians have, in all ages, failed to control the animosity of mankind; and we thus find as much littleness in the conduct of governments as in the petulance of men. i have therefore, in studying this subject carefully, been led to the opinion that no single act or cause can be truly said to have originated the war between the united states and mexico; but that it occurred as the result of a series of events, and as the necessary consequence of the acts, position, temper, passions, ambition and history of both parties since our international relations commenced. the reader will observe that i draw a distinction between the _war_ and _hostilities_. i shall discuss the latter question in the portion of this volume which relates to events on the rio grande.[19] * * * * * in the preceding chapter i have glanced at the character of the people of mexico, and i trust that the sketch i gave will be continually remembered as illustrating the people with whom we are dealing. when our first envoy, mr. poinsett, was despatched, he found mexico pausing to recover breath after her revolution. the bad government of spain had been followed by the turmoil and bloodshed of the rebellion, and that, in turn, was succeeded by the anarchy of a distracted republic. revolution has followed revolution so rapidly since then, that the historian, at a loss to discover their causes, can scarcely detect their pretexts. for twenty years past we have been so accustomed to hear of a new military outbreak in mexico that the familiarized act seems to be only the legitimate order of constitutional change. passion, ambition, turbulence, avarice, and superstition, have so devoured the country, that during the whole of this period, mexico, whilst presenting to foreign nations, the external appearance of nationality, has, in fact, at home, scarcely ever enjoyed the benefit of a real or stable government that could make an impression upon the character of the people or their rulers. it is true that, at first, she sought to adopt our federal system; but the original difference between the colonial condition of things in the two countries, made the operation of it almost impossible. the british provinces of north america, with their ancient and separate governments, very naturally united in a federation for national purposes, whilst they retained their freedom and laws as independent states. but the viceroyalty of mexico, when it revolutionized its government, was forced to reverse our system,--to destroy the original central power, and, subsequently to divide the territory into departments, or states. until the year 1824, nothing of this kind existed in mexico. the whole country from the sabine to its utmost southern limit, was under the central rule of a viceroy, with the same laws, religion, priests, judges, and civil as well as military authorities. the constitution of 1824, for the first time broke up the consolidated nation into nineteen states, and then, by the same legislative act, recomposed them in a federative union. the constitutions of these nineteen states, consequently, were creative of differences that never existed before, and the unity of power, will, and action, which previously existed was destroyed forever. this was, naturally the origin of jealousies, parties, and sectional feeling; and the result was, that the revenues of the country became wasted whilst their collection was impeded, and that a people unused to freedom and chiefly composed of illiterate _creoles_, were confounded by a scheme of government whose machinery was too intricate.[20] the state and municipal governments of mexico were, consequently, always quite as incompetent for self-rule as the central authority. in addition to this, they were cordially jealous of the national powers. this arose from the state fears of consolidation; and, as it was with these municipal authorities, as well as with the corrupt government officers, that our citizens were chiefly brought in contact in the ports, it is not at all wonderful to find them soon complaining of oppression and burthening the records of our legation with their grievances. when our ministers sought to obtain redress, the mexican government was reluctant to undertake the investigation of the subject; and, when it did so, continually encountered delay and equivocation on the part of the local authorities. the distant peculator was anxious to escape the penalty of his fault by procrastination, and the mexican secretary of state, ever willing to uphold his national pride by concealing or not confessing the villainy of his subordinate, was ready to sustain him by an interminable correspondence. the history of the diplomatic and commercial relations between the united states and mexico, as exhibited by congress in all the published volumes of national documents, presents a series of wrongs, which the reader will find ably recapitulated in a report[21] made by mr. cushing in the year 1842. our claims, arising from injuries inflicted by mexico, were no ordinary demands founded on mere querulousness, or contrived with a view to obtain money fraudulently from that republic. they were brought to the notice of the ministry of foreign affairs by all our envoys, and their justice urged with ample proof; until, at length, upon the return of mr. powhatan ellis to the united states, in the year 1837, after demanding his passports, they became the subject of a message from president jackson in which he alleges that all his efforts of pacific negotiation had been fruitless and that he found it both just and prudent to recommend reprisals against mexico. this serious aspect of our difficulties immediately commended the subject to the notice of committees in both houses of congress, and whilst they sustained the president's opinion of the character of our wrongs, they recommended that a forbearing spirit should still characterize our conduct, so that, "after a further demand, should prompt justice be refused by the mexican government, we might appeal to all nations not only for the equity and moderation with which we had acted towards a sister republic but for the necessity which will then compel us to seek redress for our wrongs either by actual war or reprisals."[22] "shortly after these proceedings"--says president polk--"a special messenger was despatched to mexico, to make a final demand for redress; and on the 20th of july, 1837, the demand was made. the reply of the mexican government bears date on the 29th of the same month, and contains assurances of the anxious wish of the mexican government 'not to delay the moment of that final and equitable adjustment which is to terminate the existing difficulties between the two governments;' that nothing 'should be left undone which may contribute to the speediest and most equitable termination of the subjects which have so seriously engaged the attention of the united states,' that the 'mexican government would adopt, as the only guides for its conduct, the plainest principles of public right, the sacred obligations imposed by international law, and the religious faith of treaties,' and that 'whatever reason and justice may dictate respecting each case will be done.' the assurance was further given that the decision of the mexican government upon each cause of complaint, for which redress had been demanded, should be communicated to the government of the united states by the mexican minister at washington. "these solemn assurances, in answer to our demand for redress, were disregarded. by making them, however, mexico obtained further delay. president van buren, in his annual message to congress of the 5th of december, 1837, states that 'although the larger number' of our demands for redress, and 'many of them aggravated cases of personal wrongs, have been now for years before the mexican government, and although the causes of national complaint, and those of the most offensive character, admitted of immediate, simple, and satisfactory replies, it is only within a few days past that any specific communication in answer to our last demand, made five months ago, has been received from the mexican minister;' and that 'for not one of our public complaints has satisfaction been given or offered; that but one of the cases of personal wrong has been favorably considered, and but four cases of both descriptions, out of all those formally presented, and earnestly pressed, have as yet been decided upon by the mexican government.' president van buren, believing that it would be vain to make any further attempt to obtain redress by the ordinary means within the power of the executive, communicated this opinion to congress, in the message referred to, in which he said that 'on a careful and deliberate examination of the contents,' of the correspondence with the mexican government, 'and considering the spirit manifested by the mexican government, it became his painful duty to return the subject, as it now stands, to congress, to whom it belongs, to decide upon the time, the mode, and the measure of redress.' "instead of taking redress into our own hands, a new negotiation was entered upon with fair promises on the part of mexico. this negotiation, after more than a year's delay, resulted in the convention of the 11th of april, 1839, 'for the adjustment of claims of citizens of the united states of america upon the government of the mexican republic.' the joint board of commissioners created by this convention to examine and decide upon these claims was not organized until the month of august, 1840, and under the terms of the convention they were to terminate their duties within eighteen months from that time. four of the eighteen months were consumed in preliminary discussions on frivolous and dilatory points raised by the mexican commissioners; nor was it until the month of december, 1840, that they commenced the examination of the claims of our citizens upon mexico. fourteen months only remained to examine and decide upon these numerous and complicated cases. in the month of february, 1842, the term of the commission expired, leaving many claims undisposed of for want of time. the claims which were allowed by the board and by the umpire, authorized by the convention to decide in case of disagreement between the mexican and american commissioners, amounted to _two millions twenty-six thousand one hundred and thirty-nine dollars and sixty-eight cents_. there were pending before the umpire when the commission expired additional claims which had been examined and awarded by the american commissioners, and had not been allowed by the mexican commissioners, amounting to _nine hundred and twenty-eight thousand and twenty-seven dollars and eighty-eight cents_, upon which he did not decide, alleging that his authority ceased with the termination of the joint commission. besides these claims, there were others of american citizens amounting to _three millions three hundred and thirty-six thousand eight hundred and thirty-seven dollars and five cents_, which had been submitted to the board, and upon which they had not time to decide before their final adjournment. "the sum of two millions twenty-six thousand one hundred and thirty-nine dollars and sixty-eight cents which had been awarded to the claimants, was an ascertained debt by mexico, about which there could be no dispute, and which she was bound to pay according to the terms of the convention. soon after the final awards for this amount had been made, the mexican government asked for a postponement of the time of making payment, alleging that it would be inconvenient to pay at the time stipulated. in the spirit of forbearing kindness towards a sister republic, which mexico has so long abused, the united states promptly complied with her request. a second convention was accordingly concluded between the two governments on the thirtieth of january, 1843, which upon its face declares, that, 'this new arrangement is entered into for the accommodation of mexico.' by the terms of this convention, all the interest due on the awards which had been made in favor of the claimants under the convention of the 11th of april, 1839, was to be paid to them on the 30th of april, 1843, and "the principal of the said awards, and the interest accruing thereon," was stipulated to "be paid in five years, in equal instalments every three months." notwithstanding this new convention was entered into at the request of mexico, and for the purpose of relieving her from embarrassment, the claimants only received the interest due on the 30th of april, 1843, and three of the twenty instalments. although the payments of the sum thus liquidated, and confessedly due by mexico to our citizens as indemnity for acknowledged acts of outrage and wrong, was secured by treaty, the obligations of which are ever held sacred by all just nations, yet mexico violated this solemn engagement by failing and refusing to make the payment. the two instalments due in april and july, 1844, under the peculiar circumstances connected with them, were assumed by the united states and paid to the claimants. but this is not all of which we have just cause of complaint. to provide a remedy for the claimants whose cases were not decided by the joint commission under the convention of april the 11th, 1839, it was expressly stipulated by the sixth article of the convention of the 30th of january, 1843, that 'a new convention shall be entered into for the settlement of all claims of the government and citizens of the united states against the republic of mexico which were not finally decided by the late commission which met in the city of washington, and all claims of the government and citizens of mexico against the united states.' "in conformity with this stipulation, a third convention was concluded and signed at the city of mexico on the 20th of november, 1843, by the plenipotentiaries of the two governments, by which provision was made for ascertaining and paying these claims. in january, 1844, this convention was ratified by the senate of the united states, with two amendments, which were manifestly reasonable in their character. "upon a reference of the amendments proposed to the government of mexico, the same evasions, difficulties, and delays were interposed which have so long marked the policy with that government towards the united states. it has not even yet decided whether it would or would not accede to them, although the subject has been repeatedly pressed upon its consideration. "mexico thus violated a second time the faith of treaties, by failing or refusing to carry into effect the sixth article of convention of january, 1843."[23] the allegations made in this message are unquestionable. they rest upon the evidence of documents which are accessible to all in the published papers of the government.[24] the outrages of mexico consisted in seizure of property, illegal imprisonment of citizens, deprivation of just rights, interference with our lawful commerce, forced loans, violations of contracts, and arbitrary expulsion from the territory without trial. all these misdeeds formed the exasperating burthen of our complaint, and their perpetration was in fact proved beyond the possibility of cavil by the awards in favor of our claimants made by the baron von roenne, who, as prussian minister, was umpire between the mexican and american commissioners. it must not be forgotten that we had claims also against spain, france, england, denmark and naples, which were adjusted by negotiation and liquidated in strict accordance with treaties. these, demands, however, originated during the wars in europe which followed the french revolution, so that it remained for mexico to peculate on our commerce and persecute our people during a period of entire international peace, and without any excuse save the direct villainy of her government, or the corrupt ignorance of her subordinate officers. * * * * * we must now retrace our steps, in order to narrate an event of interest in the series of causes that originated this war. it appears that the mexican government, in anticipation of some attack on its distant territories of california, had, in the summer of 1842, sent a number of troops thither, under the command of don manuel micheltorena, who was appointed commandant general and inspector of both the californias. these troops arrived at san diego, the southernmost port on the pacific side of california, in the middle of october, and were on their way to monterey, the capital, when the occurrences in question took place. monterey, on the pacific, is a small village founded by the spaniards in 1771, at the southern extremity of a bay of the same name, near the 36th degree of latitude, about a hundred miles south of the great bay of san francisco, and about three hundred and fifty miles north from the town of angeles, where the commandant micheltorena was resting with his troops when the events in question occurred. whilst commodore jones was visiting the port of callao, in september, 1842, he received from mr. john parrott, our consul at mazatlan, a copy of a mexican newspaper of the 4th of june, containing three official declarations against the united states, which he regarded as "highly belligerent."[25] he also obtained a newspaper published in boston, quoting a paragraph from the new orleans advertiser of the 19th april, 1842, in which it was asserted,--upon what the editor deemed authentic information,--that mexico had ceded the californias to england for seven millions of dollars. these documents reached our sensitive commodore at a moment when his suspicions were aroused by other circumstances. for, on the 5th of september, rear-admiral thomas, a british commander, sailed from callao in the dublin having previously despatched two of his fleet with sealed orders just received from england. the whole fleet, he believed, was secretly on its way to panama to embark reinforcements of troops, from the west indies, to take armed possession of the californias in conformity with the allegation of the boston and new orleans editors.[26] commodore jones immediately hastened from the port of callao to lima, where, in a conversation with the american chargé d'affaires, mr. pickett, he formed the decided opinion that there would be war not only with mexico but with great britain also.[27] accordingly, he lost no time in preparing for sea, and on the 7th of september, sailed for the coast of mexico. on the 19th of october, jones arrived at monterey, in the frigate united states, accompanied by the cyane, captain stribling. they did not communicate with the shore or endeavor, in any authentic way, to ascertain the state of our political relations; but at four o'clock in the afternoon, captain armstrong, the flag captain of the united states, landed, and delivered to the acting governor, don juan alvarado, a letter from commodore jones, requiring the immediate surrender of the place, with its forts, castles, ammunitions and arms, to the united states, in order to save it from the horrors of war, which would be the immediate consequences of a refusal to submit. alvarado, upon this summons, consulted the military and civil authorities; and, finding that the garrison consisted of only twenty-nine men, that the artillery was composed of eleven pieces, entirely useless from the rottenness of their carriages, and that the whole number of muskets and carbines, good and bad, did not exceed a hundred and fifty, he surrendered the place, which was taken possession of by the americans early on the 20th of october. the articles of capitulation signed on the occasion provide, that the mexican soldiers shall march out with colors flying, and shall remain as prisoners of war until they can be sent to mexico, and that the inhabitants shall be protected in their persons and property, so long as they conduct themselves properly, and do not infringe the laws of the united states. commodore jones at the same time issued a proclamation to the californians, declaring that "he came in arms as the representative of a powerful nation, against which the existing government of mexico had engaged in war, but not with the intention of spreading dismay among the peaceful inhabitants," and inviting them to submit to the authority of a government which would protect them forever in the enjoyment of liberty. the evening and night of the 20th passed quietly; but, on the next day, the commodore seems to have reflected on the results of a bloodless conquest which was even more easily won than the victories of cortéz and pizarro three hundred years before. learning that there was late and pacific news from mexico, and, forthwith despatching his private secretary and chaplain to seek for it, they discovered, in the office of the mexican commissary, several packages containing unopened files of gazettes, as late as the 4th of august. "the general tone of the articles,"--says the commodore,--"relating to the united states, in these papers, was pacific, whilst the certainty that mexico had not commenced hostilities against us, up to the 22d of august, was established by private commercial letters from mazatlan." thus, it seemed to him, that the crisis had passed; that his victory was barren, that the reported cession of the californias to england was untrue and could not have been prevented even by his valor. the war which had been recklessly undertaken upon surmises or newspaper articles, and stimulated by the sailing of an english fleet with sealed orders, came to an end as it began--by mexican journals. accordingly, on the 21st of the month, commodore jones addressed another letter to the acting governor, alvarado, announcing that information received since the capture of the place, left him no reason to doubt that the difficulties between mexico and the united states had been adjusted; and that, being anxious to avoid all cause of future controversy, he was ready to restore the place, with its forts and property, to the mexicans, in the same condition in which they were before the seizure. monterey was therefore at once evacuated by the americans, and reoccupied by the mexicans, whose flag, on being rehoisted, was saluted by our ships. if the commodore of our squadron had prudently despatched his secretary and chaplain on a pacific mission of inquiry under a flag of truce, immediately upon his arrival, it is extremely probable that they would either have discovered on the 20th the newspapers they found on the 21st, or have received the commercial letter which terminated the capture. this would have prevented an angry diplomatic correspondence; it would have allayed the irritation of national sensibility, and, whilst it saved us from the imputation of attempting to intimidate a weak power, would not have subjected our forces to the mortification of mistake upon such grievous subjects as peace and war. the mexican papers, of course, viewed the matter as a national insult; and the government gazette, published in the capital, unequivocally asserted that commodore jones attacked monterey, agreeably to orders from his government, with the view of conquering california, but that finding the country in a state of defence, (for which thanks were due to president santa anna and his efficient minister of war,) he was obliged to abandon his plan and invent a story for his justification.[28] it is scarcely possible for a citizen of the united states to take a different view of the subject without a full knowledge of the facts; for it could hardly be believed that the commander of a naval station, during a period of profound peace, would venture to summon towns to surrender, to land forces, take prisoners, and hoist our national flag on friendly soil, without the authority or connivance of his government.[29] footnotes: [19] this river is known by various names in different authors. by some it is called rio bravo, by others, rio del norte, and by others, again, rio grande. i shall adhere to the latter throughout this work. [20] see the natchez daily courier of 18th january, 1843, for an excellent article on mexico, signed ego et alter. [21] report no. 1096 to the h. of r., 27th congress, 2d session. [22] see senate documents of that session. [23] president polk's annual message to congress, 8th dec. 1846, p. 6. [24] see doc. no. 139, 24 cong. 2d sess. h. of r.--senate doc. no. 320, 2d sess. 27 cong.--doc. no. 57, h. of r. 27 cong. 1st sess.--senate doc. no. 411, 27 cong. 2d sess.--doc. no. 1096, h. of r. 27 cong. 2d sess.--doc. no. 158, h. of r. 28 cong. 2d sess.--doc. no. 144, h. of r. 28 cong. 2d sess.--senate doc. no. 85, 29 cong. 1st sess.--senate doc. no. 151, 29 cong. 1 sess. [25] this paper contained the circular of the mexican minister of foreign relations to the diplomatic corps, dated 31st may, 1842,--(answered by mr. thompson on the 1st of june,)--relative to public meetings in the united states favorable to texas; the aid furnished texas by _volunteers_ from the united states; and the trade in arms and munitions of war with texas. doc. no. 266, h. of r., 27th congress, 2d session. [26] see doc., no. 166, h. of r., 27th congress, 3d session, page 85. [27] id. pages 15, 68, 73. [28] diario del gobierno--mexico, 1842. [29] a correspondence relative to this seizure of monterey took place at washington between mr. webster, secretary of state, and gen. almonté, the mexican minister; and, in mexico, between señor bocanegra, minister of foreign affairs, and mr. waddy thompson, our diplomatic representative. mexico complained bitterly of our insulting descent on her territory, and our ministers apologized gracefully for the unauthorised act. the correspondence between the governments and with commodore jones will be found in document no. 166, h. of r., 97th congress, 3d session, 1843. the recall of commodore jones by the secretary of the navy is the following words: "navy department, january 24, 1843. "sir: although no official intelligence of the recent occurrences at monterey has reached this department, yet the leading facts have been communicated in a form sufficiently authentic to justify and render necessary my immediate action. in the opinion of this government it is due to the friendly relations subsisting between the united states and mexico, and to the respect which every nation owes to the rights of other nations, that you should be recalled from the command of the squadron in the pacific. "in adopting this course it is not designed to prejudge the case, _nor even to indicate any opinion as to the propriety or impropriety of your conduct in the matter alluded to_. that will of course be made the subject of proper inquiry after you return to the united states, when full justice will be done as between yourself and your own country. the present order has reference only to the just claims of mexico on this government for such a disavowal of the attack on monterey as will fully recognize the rights of mexico, and at the same time place the conduct of this government in a proper light before the nations of the world. commodore dallas will relieve you as soon as he can conveniently reach the station and you will return to the united states in such mode as may be most convenient and agreeable to yourself. "i am respectfully yours, "a. p. upshur. "com. thos. ap. c. jones, commanding pacific squadron." i believe that the commodore was not tried by a court of inquiry or a court martial after his return, but that the affair has slumbered since the date of the above letter. chapter iii. the origin of the war--history of the pacification between spain and holland in 1609--spain and mexico should have followed the example--the texas question--origin of the texas revolution- true history of it--resistance to the central despotism of santa anna--mexican war against texas--independence of texas--santa anna's retraction in 1846 of his anti-federative opinions. the student of mexican history, at this period, will derive instruction from a narrative of the connexion which once existed between spain and the netherlands and its fatal rupture. after the fall of the duke of burgundy in 1477, his daughter mary brought the low countries to austria by her marriage with the emperor maximilian; and his grandson, charles v, united these provinces with spain. during the reign of charles, their ancient liberties were carefully respected, and the country prospered whilst the protestant religion spread throughout it in spite of stern opposition. but when his successor, philip ii, mounted the throne, all prudence in the government of the belgic and batavian provinces seems to have been abandoned, and unbridled persecution was let loose on the civil and religious rights of the people. granvella and the bloody duke of alva were the monarch's instruments in this sad misgovernment, which resulted in a total renunciation of allegiance to the king of spain. long and bitter was the rebellion,--continuing from the middle of the sixteenth century to the year 1609,--when the spanish claim to the sovereignty of the new republic of holland was virtually resigned under the form of a truce for twelve years between the belligerents.[30] the independence of the united provinces was thus, in fact achieved, and it was recognized by all the great powers of europe except spain; still holland went through the thirty years war, before her nationality was secured by the peace of westphalia. from this sketch it will be perceived that spain, although willing to forego the continuance of war, and to save the point of honor between herself and the rebellious provinces when it was impossible to recover her dominion over them, nevertheless, clung with stupid pride to her abstract right of reconquest for a long period after she had substantially acknowledged their freedom. the dismemberment of spain was, of course, an event which the monarch could not behold without regret, for it was natural that he should seek to transmit his dominions to posterity uncurtailed of their fair proportions. yet, in the adoption of a diplomatic _ruse_,--in the truce of twelve years,--there was a degree of wisdom which it would have been well for spain to recollect when it became evident that the revolt of her american colonies was about to terminate in their independence. the passions between the belligerents would have had time to cool. the common ties of blood and language might gradually have bound up the wounds made by war. the intervention of friendly powers would have obtained concessions from the discreet parent,--and thus peru and mexico might still have shone as the brightest jewels in the spanish crown. no quarrel ever terminated in perfect re-establishment of amity without tolerance or retraction on the part of one of the disputants. superior force may overawe into silence or crush by its ponderous blows, yet the non-resistance and taciturnity which ensue are but the repose that precedes the hurricane, in which the elements seem gathering strength to pour forth their wrath with irresistible fury. so was it with spain and her american colonies. instead of soothing and pacific measures, tending to allay resentment and bring back the rebel to allegiance, the utmost violence was at once adopted both in deeds and language, and scenes of barbarity were enacted by calleja and his myrmidons from which the heart recoils with horror.[31] severe as was the lesson taught by the conduct of spain to mexico, that republic, nevertheless, resolved not to profit by it when she, in turn, saw one of her states discontented with her misrule and usurpations. if texas had been soothed; if justice had been speedily done; if the executive had despatched discreet officers, and reconciled the differences between the north american emigrants and the spaniards, not only in civil and municipal government, but in religion and temper,--texas might not have been lost to mexico,--but, invigorated by a hardy and industrious population, would have poured commercial wealth into her coffers, and furnished her factories among the mountains with an abundance of that staple which the native indians are as unused as they are unwilling to cultivate. had mexico been even as wise as philip, in 1609, and saved her punctilious honor by a twelve years truce, she would only have postponed the settlement of her difficulties, until her internal affairs became sufficiently pacific to enable a firm government to act with discretion and justice. * * * * * since the year 1843 the texas question has been so much a matter of party dispute in the united states that the true history of the revolt seems to be almost forgotten. i shall not hesitate therefore to recount some of the events connected with it, because they are relevant to the issue between us and mexico, as well as necessary to the elucidation of the justice of her quarrel. it is an error that the texan rebellion was conceived in a spirit of sheer fraud upon mexico; and writers who seek to stigmatize it thus are entirely ignorant of its origin. the contest that arose between the central and federal parties in mexico immediately after the establishment of independence has been narrated in a preceding chapter. the first _federal_ constitution is an almost literal copy of our own; but its equitable and progressive principles did not suit the military despots who, whilst they commanded the army, held the physical power of mexico in their hands. the consequence was that during the administration of the first president, victoria, there were _pronunciamientos_ against federation and in favor of centralism, by _padre arénas_, and at tulancingo, under the "plan of montayno." quarrels in the party lodges of the yorkinos and escossceses--the liberalists and centralists--next arose;--and, finally, the revolution under the "plan of toluca," destroyed the cherished constitution of 1824, by striking a death blow at the federative principle. this plan vested the power in a central government, abolished state legislatures, and changed those states into departments under the control of military governors, who were responsible to the chief authorities of the nation alone. these principles were embodied in the new constitution of 1836, and were, of course, distasteful to every friend of genuine liberty.[32] meanwhile, the beautiful province of texas had not been an unconcerned spectator of events. bordering on the gulf of mexico, and stretching along our southern boundary, it contained an extensive territory, fine rivers, wide prairies, and a soil capable of maintaining near ten millions of people.--such a country naturally attracted the attention of the people of the united states, numbers of whom are always ready, with the adventurous spirit that characterises our race, to seek new lands and improve their fortunes by emigrating from the crowded places of their birth. the project of colonizing texas, had, therefore, struck an intelligent citizen of our country; and, on the 17th of january, 1821, moses austin obtained permission from the supreme government of the eastern internal provinces of new spain at monterey, to settle a colony of emigrants in texas. accordingly, in the following winter, his son, stephen f. austin, who undertook the enterprize in obedience to a testamentary request of his father, appeared on the brazos with the first anglo-american settlers. in january, 1823, a national colonization law, approved by the emperor iturbidé, was adopted by the mexican congress, and, on the 18th of february, a decree was issued authorizing austin to proceed with the founding of his colony. this decree, after iturbidé's abdication and the downfall of the imperial government, was confirmed by the first executive council in accordance with a special order of the mexican congress. in 1824, the federal constitution was adopted and proclaimed as the established polity of the land;--and, at this period, the character of texas begins for the first time to assume an independent aspect, for, by a decree of the 7th of may, it was united with coahuila, and, under the name of coahuila and texas, formed one of the constituent, sovereign states of the mexican confederacy. up to this period, whilst all was proceeding well in the capital, the scheme of emigration, seems to have met with no discouragement. by an act passed in august, 1824, another _general_ colonization law was established;--and, by a _state_ colonization law of coahuila and texas, foreigners were invited to settle within the limits of that especial jurisdiction. thus it was that state sovereignty first accrued to texas and coahuila under the federal system,--a system similar to the one under which the colonists had formerly lived in our union and under which, by the adoption of their own state laws, they signified their willingness to become members of the mexican confederacy. this state sovereignty was never resigned, but, on the contrary, was always distinctly asserted. the federation existed precisely for the same purposes that the union of our states was formed; and, as soon as the constitution was destroyed by intrigue and revolutionary violence in 1835, the several states were remitted to their inherent rights, independent of any military despot who succeeded in seizing the central power. meanwhile our people had flocked to texas under the belief that a constitution which was a transcript of our own, would secure peace and prosperity to settlers. accustomed to find laws observed and the constitution indestructible, they expected to encounter the same regularity and firmness in that virgin state. they were industrious in their pursuits, and willing to abide the settlement of all quarrels in the capital; nor was it until long after the federal and centralist disputes commenced, that they began even to notice the political convulsions which were so ominous of disaster. the quiet and orderly conduct of our emigrants was, nevertheless, not regarded so favorably by the mexicans. the rapidly growing strength of the texans and their strict devotion to republicanism, attracted the jealousy of the supreme government; and when a mexican begins either to fear or to doubt, the provocation is quite enough to convert him into an oppressor. accordingly, on the 6th of april, 1830, an arbitrary law was passed by which the future immigration of american settlers to texas was prohibited. military posts of _surveillance_ were established over the state, and ignorant and insolent soldiers of another race, began to domineer over a people whom they regarded as inferiors. at length the civil authorities of texas were entirely disregarded, and the emigrants hitherto unused at home or abroad to an armed police, or to the sight of a uniform except on parade days, suddenly found themselves subjected to the capricious tyranny of military rule.[33] on the 26th of june, 1832, the colonists took arms against this despotic interference with their constitutional freedom and besieged and captured the fort at velasco. the garrison at anahuac and that at nacogdoches, were next reduced; and, in december of that year, when hostilities were suspended between santa anna and bustamante, the colonists were again restored to the enjoyment of their rights guarantied under the constitution. in may 1824, texas had been promised a separate state constitution as soon as she was prepared for it, but upon application to congress in 1833, after framing a suitable instrument in general convention at san felipe, her request was denied. in 1835 the crisis at length arrived. the federal constitution fell. the resistance of several states to this despotism was suppressed by force. the legislature of coahuila and texas was dispersed at the point of the bayonet. zacatecas, a brave stronghold of federalism, was assaulted by the central chiefs and her people butchered. and, finally, the whole republic, save texas, yielded to santa anna. as this state at once resolved to maintain her sovereignty and federative rights, corresponding committees of safety and vigilance were promptly formed in all the municipalities. an immediate appeal to arms proclaimed the people's resolution to adhere to the constitution; and at gonzales, goliad, bexar, conception, sepantillan, san patricio, and san antonio, they were victorious over the centralists. in november, 1835, the delegates of the texan people assembled in "general consultation," and declared that "they had taken up arms in defence of the federal constitution of 1824, and that they would continue faithful to the mexican confederacy as long as it should be governed by the laws that were framed for the protection of their political rights; that they were no longer morally or politically bound by the compact of union; yet, stimulated by the generous sympathy of a free people, they offered their assistance to such members of the confederacy as would take up arms against military despotism. this patriotic manifesto declaring at once the freedom of texas and offering to other parts of mexico a defensive alliance in favor of constitutional liberty, found no response from the overawed states, and thus texas was abandoned to the mercy of a military president, who signalized his campaign of 1836 by acts of brutality which must forever consign his name to infamy."[34] notwithstanding santa anna's successes at san antonio and his frightful massacres, general houston, the commander of the texan forces, met and conquered the mexicans on the 21st of april, 1836, in the brilliant action at san jacinto, and thenceforth, in the emphatic language of an american statesman "the war was at an end."[35] "no hostile foot found rest" within her territory for six or seven years ensuing this event, and mexico, by confining her assaults to border forays practically abstained from all efforts to re-establish her dominion.[36] in this peaceful interval the country rapidly filled up with emigrants; adopted a constitution; established a permanent government, and obtained an acknowledgement of her independence by the united states and other powers. it was then supposed that nearly one hundred thousand people occupied the territory; and, in 1837, they sought to place themselves under the protection of our confederacy. but our government declined the proposition made through the texan plenipotentiary, upon the ground that the treaty of amity and peace between the united states and mexico should not be violated by an act which necessarily involved the question of war with the adversary of texas.[37] * * * * * this brief history of the texan revolt against centralism seems to place the authorities of that country on a firm basis of natural and constitutional right. in the constant conflicts that have taken place throughout mexico between the federalists and centralists, or rather between democracy and despotism, texas attempted no more than any of the liberal states of mexico would have done, had not the free voice of educated patriots been elsewhere stifled by military power. the only difference between them is, that in texas there was an anglo-american population bold and strong enough to maintain republicanism, whilst in mexico, the mongrel race of spaniards and indians was too feeble to resist effectually. * * * * * from 1836 to 1846 santa anna diligently persevered in the support of his central usurpation. but in the latter year the principles of the texan revolution obtained a decided victory over military despotism, and even santa anna himself, who had been the originator of all the revolutions of his country, the disturber of its peace, and destroyer of its political morality was forced to make a humiliating confession of his errors. it will be remembered that he was exiled from mexico in the year 1845, and resided in havana until the summer of 1846, when a revolution against the government of paredes prepared the way for his return. on the 8th of march, 1846, in writing to a friend a letter which has since been published he declares that: "the love of provincial liberties being firmly rooted in the minds of all, and the democratic principle predominating every where, nothing can be established in a solid manner, in the country, which does not conform with these tendencies; nor without them can we attain either order, peace, prosperity, or respectability among foreign nations. to draw every thing to the centre, and thus to give unity of action to the republic, as i at one time considered best, is no longer possible; nay more, i say it is dangerous; it is contrary to the object which i proposed for myself in the unitarian system, because we thereby expose ourselves to the separation of the northern departments, which are the most clamorous for freedom of internal administration."[38] in this remarkable retraction of santa anna's despotic principles, texas finds a perfect vindication of her revolt. it would have been well for mexico had her military president been willing to make the same concessions before the memorable battle of san jacinto! footnotes: [30] arnold's third lecture on modern history. [31] robinson's memoirs of the mexican revolution, pages 20, 22, 24. [32] mexico as it was and as it is, pp. 336, 339. foote's history of texas. [33] document no. 40, h. of r. 25th cong. 1st sess. p. 4. [34] a full account of this campaign will be found in a work entitled "primera campaña de tejas," published in mexico in august 1837, by don ramon martinez caro, who was santa anna's military secretary during the campaign. he treats his former chief with unsparing severity, and very clearly attributes to him all the ferocious acts of the war. in thompson's "recollections of mexico," a conversation of the ex-minister with santa anna will be found, in which his exculpation is attempted, pp. 68, _et seq._ [35] mr. webster's letter to waddy thompson, 8th july, 1842. [36] webster to thompson _ut antea_. [37] letter of mr. forsyth to general hunt, 25th aug. 1847. doc. no. 40, h. of r., 25th congress, 1st session. [38] translation of a letter from general santa anna, in mexico as it was and as it is.--4th edition, page 414. chapter iv. origin of the war continued--proposed annexation of texas to the united states by treaty--efforts of several administrations to recover texas after the florida treaty--president tyler's objects--mexican opinions--british intrigue--british views relative to texas--defeat of the treaty in the senate--french opinions. there is no doubt that although the government of the united states was anxious to preserve a strict neutrality between the belligerents in 1837, and, thus, to avoid assuming the war with mexico by annexing an insurgent state, it, nevertheless, refused the proffered union with regret. from the earliest period, our statesmen contended that, by the louisiana treaty, we acquired a title to texas extending to the rio grande, and that we unwisely relinquished our title to spain by the treaty of 1819 which substituted the sabine for the rio grande as our western boundary.[39] but, divested as we were by solemn compact with spain, of what may have been our territory under the treaty with france, it was idle to regard texas as a proper subject for restoration to the union whilst active hostilities were waged by mexico. nevertheless, such was the evident value of the province, and such the anxiety to regain our ancient limits that before the outbreak of the revolution, mr. clay, as secretary of state under the administration of mr. adams, in march of the years 1825 and 1827, directed mr. poinsett, our envoy in mexico, to negotiate for the transfer of texas. this direction was repeated by mr. van buren to our minister in august, 1829; and was followed by similar instructions from mr. livingston on the 20th of march, 1833, and by mr. forsyth on the 2d of july, 1835. president jackson, however, was not contented with negotiations for that province alone; but, looking forward, with statesmanlike forecast, to the growth and value of our commerce in the pacific ocean as well as on the west coast of america, he required the secretary of state, in august, 1835, to seek from mexico a cession of territory, whose boundary, beginning at the mouth of the rio grande, would run along the eastern bank of that river to the thirty-seventh degree of latitude, and continue thence, by that parallel, to the pacific. this demand, if granted by mexico, not only secured texas, but would have included the largest and most valuable portion of california together with the noble bay of san francisco, in which our navy and merchantmen might find a safe and commodious refuge.[40] our anxiety to reannex texas by peaceable negotiation was not met, however, by a correspondent feeling upon the part of mexico. mr. poinsett, on his return from mexico, informed mr. clay that he had forborne even to make an overture for the repurchase of texas, because he knew that such a negotiation would be impracticable, and believed that any hint of our desire would aggravate the irritations already existing between the countries.[41] the events which subsequently transpired in texas, during the period when emigration increased from the united states, to that of the actual outbreak of hostilities, prevented the formation, in mexico, of any party favorable to such an enterprise; and, after the war began, all hope of negotiation between us was dispelled. "a leading member of the mexican cabinet once remarked to me," says mr. thompson, in his recollections of mexico,[42] "that he believed the tendency of things was towards the annexation of texas to the united states, and that he greatly preferred such a result either to the independence of texas or any connection or dependence of texas upon england; that if it became an independent power, other departments of mexico would unite with it either voluntarily or by conquest, and that if there was any connexion between texas and england, english merchandize would be smuggled into mexico through texas to the utter ruin of mexican manufactures and revenue. "in one of my last interviews with santa anna," continues the american minister, "i mentioned this conversation. he replied with great vehemence that he would 'war forever for the reconquest of texas, and that if he died in his senses his last words should be an exhortation to his countrymen never to abandon the effort to recover the province;' and, added he: 'you know, sir, very well, that to sign a treaty for the alienation of texas would be the same thing as signing the death warrant of mexico, for, by the same process, the united states would take one after another of the mexican provinces, until they possessed them all.'" such were the feelings of mexico in regard to annexation, and such the anxieties in cabinets of all parties in the united states to restore our ancient limits, when the presses of our country intimated, in the year 1844, that president tyler was negotiating a treaty of union with texas as an independent power. it was on the eve a presidential canvass; and whilst the incumbent of the executive chair sought very naturally to present himself to the people with the successful results of a popular and beneficial negotiation, there were other candidates who opposed the measure both on principle and policy, as well as on account of the mode in which it was to be effected. i might very properly in this historical sketch pass over the narrative of annexation, and, deal with the union, ultimately effected between texas and the united states as the only important fact. texas, bound to the north american confederacy by a solemn act of congress,--the indisputable constitutionality of which is implied in its passage,--is, indeed, the only subject which the historian is compelled to regard. whatever results ensued, whether they were perceived and predicted by the statesmen of the time, or, were entirely latent until developed during the last two years, must be entirely attributed to the act of congress which consummated annexation and reposed in the hands of a president the executive power of solemnizing the union. nevertheless, i believe it due to impartial history that i should state concisely the causes which seem to have provoked annexation, and, indeed, rendered it almost necessary at the time when it occurred. we have seen that active hostilities by mexico against the insurgents had either ceased for nearly seven years, or had been confined to such border forays as resembled predatory incursions rather than civilized hostilities. statesmen, in all parties, regarded the war as ended; for mexico, impoverished by the thriftless administrations that ruled and plundered her during the short intervals between her revolutions, was in no condition to carry it on with reasonable prospects of success. france, england, belgium and the united states, had acknowledged texan independence and established diplomatic relations with the republic. emigrants settled the interior, and invited accessions. the constitution and laws of the nation were fixed upon a firm basis, while the government was conducted with ability. a lucrative commerce from foreign countries began to pour into the territory. new towns sprang up every where, and texas exhibited to the world every evidence of an orderly, well regulated government, with infinitely greater strength and stability than the military republic from which she was divorced. mexico, nevertheless, refused to recognize her independence notwithstanding her inability to make any effort for reconquest. the leading men of texas anxiously desired that their national independence should continue, and the moral sense of the world, in contrasting the superior progress of the anglo-american race with the anarchy and feebleness of mexico, was naturally solicitous to behold the infant colony successful rather than to see it fall a prey to the passions of a people with whom it had no sympathy, and, in whose victory, they might witness the outpouring of a pent up wrath which would never cease in its vindictive persecutions until the province was entirely desolated.[43] this was not alone the common feeling in the united states, but it prevailed in europe also. the british minister of foreign affairs, lord aberdeen, and that zealous partizan of liberty, lord brougham, took occasion in the house of peers in august, 1843, to express their solicitude as to the prospects of texas. lord brougham characterized it as a country as large as france, possessing the greatest natural capabilities, but, at the same time he perceived in it an embryo state, (a large portion of whose soil was adapted to cultivation by white labor,) which might become a boundary and barrier against the slavery of the united states of america. if, by the good offices of england, mexico could be induced to acknowledge texan independence upon the condition of abolishing slavery, he suggested the hope that it would lead to the extinction of slavery in the southern states of our union. lord aberdeen replied to lord brougham, that england had not only acknowledged her independence, but had also negotiated with texas a treaty of commerce as well as one for the abolition of the slave trade. he did not believe that there was any importation of slaves into texas by sea, but, he alleged, there was a large influx of slaves from the united states to that country. as soon as negotiations were commenced with texas, the utmost endeavors of england had been used to end the war which prevented the full recognition of the independence of texas by mexico; but all their endeavors had been met by difficulties, although he was happy to declare that an armistice had been established between the two powers which he hoped would lead to the absolute acknowledgment of her independence. in the existing state of negotiations between the parties, however, he thought it would not contribute to an useful end to express any opinion as to the state of those negotiations, nevertheless he assured his noble friend that the matter would be pressed by every means in the power of her majesty's ministers. the answer of lord brougham to this conversational speech of the minister of foreign affairs, was brief but ominous. nothing, he declared, could be more satisfactory to him, whilst the statement of his lordship "would be hailed with joy by all who were favorable to the object of anti-slavery societies."[44] * * * * * i do not design in this history to discuss either the slavery question or the british project of propagating seditious opinions upon negro servitude by means of diplomacy on this continent. but, when we remember the guaranties of our constitution and the preponderance of the black population in our southern states, it must be conceded that it requires no great degree of sensibility to alarm the white inhabitants of that section and to render them anxious to counteract the avowed machinations of great britain. the abstract question of the right of slavery is altogether distinct from slavery as it exists in this union, and as the foundation of property, population, labor, and, even, existence in the south. for many years past the fanaticism of freedom has been warring against slavery, until it has created in our country a fanaticism of slavery which was quite as relentless in its obstinacy. it was therefore, natural that individuals who had refused our own congress the right to interfere with slavery, by denying the privilege of petition for the abolition of slavery in the district of columbia, should resist most ardently the jesuitical propagandism of a foreign power. this was a question of grave importance to the south. it was an avowal of european policy that struck a death blow at american property; nor was it therefore at all surprising to see mr. calhoun, our secretary of state, who was a native and inhabitant of that part of the union, at once seize upon the project of prompt annexation as the only means of counteracting the evils of british diplomacy. if expressions, similar to those used by lords aberdeen and brougham in the english parliament, had been casually uttered in the warm debates of our congress, perhaps but little attention would have been paid them by reflecting men; yet the most trifling observations of british statesmen always deserve notice, because they are well pondered and deliberately made. the opinions of lord brougham, assented to by the silence of lord aberdeen, had consequently an emphatic significance; and although the british minister of foreign affairs, as well as the envoy at washington, subsequently disclaimed any attempt to interfere with the internal system of the united states, yet there can be no doubt that they wished to modify the condition and laws of a southern neighbor so as to effect indirectly what prudence taught them to avoid openly.[45] "great britain," said lord aberdeen, in a despatch to the hon. mr. pakenham, on the 26th december, 1843, "does not desire to establish in texas, whether partially dependent on mexico or entirely independent, any dominant influence. she only wishes to share her influence equally with other nations. her objects are purely commercial, and she has no thought or intention of seeking to act directly or indirectly, in a political sense, on the united states through texas." it cannot be expected--for it is not the nature or policy of governments--that statesmen should disclose to each other, with perfect frankness, all their international ambitions, projects or hopes. a wise diplomacy conceals these things whilst in progress. but all governments take means to obtain secretly, as far as they are able, an insight into the views of each other. the diplomacy of the united states, although generally very frank, is nevertheless employed sometimes in this way, and, i believe our records will show, that wherever it became necessary for our departments to get information upon projects touching the interests of our country, they have always found means to discover the truth. it is fortunate for the history of this annexation question that the commercial designs alluded to by lord aberdeen have been revealed to us. some of the statements are made anonymously, yet, from the very nature of such disclosures whilst negotiations were pending, it cannot be expected that the names of informants would be revealed. their value and character must be vouched for alone by the officers who communicate them to the world, and deem them sufficient to authorize the action of government. the authorities, to which i allude, were communicated to congress by president tyler in may, 1844, and were submitted to him by mr. calhoun, as secretary of state, on the 16th of that month.[46] * * * * * by a convention, concluded in london on the 14th of november, 1840, between her majesty's government and the republic of texas, it was agreed that the queen should tender her good offices to mexico as mediator between the belligerents. mexico, however, saw fit to reject this offer. but texas, still animated by a desire for peace, sought to obtain a triple mediation of the three great powers,--the united states, france and england,--with the hope that under their auspices a settlement might speedily be made. to this arrangement, the governments of france and the united states assented with alacrity; while the government of great britain, though expressing an ardent desire to do all in its power by private mediatorial efforts, inclined to the opinion that it would be better, on all accounts, for each party to act alone, though similarly in point of tone and argument, in urging the mexican government to recognize the independence of texas. this suggestion was communicated through lord cowley the british ambassador in paris, to the french government, by whom it was approved.[47] by this act of the british cabinet, it preserved its independence of all others, and abstained from combined action which would, necessarily, have disclosed its motives as well as its conduct. the objects of the ministers in retaining their independence of all other cabinets will now become more manifest. if an abstract love of liberty is, indeed, the true cause why england seeks to abolish slavery throughout the world and has set the example of emancipation in her west india colonies, she may really deserve the high commendation of philanthropists. but it cannot be denied that whilst she diffuses a spirit of individual freedom, she does not regret to behold national dependence on herself established by interest and necessity. we find among the documents transmitted to congress by president tyler, a number of private letters, in which it is alleged that the primary object of great britain's interference was to prevent absolute annexation to the united states. indeed, lord aberdeen, in may, 1844, declared to mr. everett that he "shared with lord brougham the hope and belief that the treaty for annexation would not be ratified by our senate."[48] if the independence of texas could be secured on the only probable ground upon which mexico would acknowledge it,--a pledge that she would not subsequently join the united states;--and if so desirable a result,--which appealed directly to the ambition and vanity of the leading men of texas, could be effected by the secret negotiations of her ministers, england foresaw that she would obtain a decided advantage over us in future negotiations, without a positive treaty stipulation to that effect. texas, with every element of prosperity in her people and territory, was war-worn, and suffering from pecuniary embarrassments in which her revolution plunged her. for an agricultural and commercial people, peace and stability, under almost any liberal government, are all that is requisite to insure progress. england, a free, maritime and manufacturing country, deeply interested in mexico as a purchaser, and in the united states as a rival, was precisely the nation to secure these advantages for texas, especially as that republic offered a _point d'appui_ which she could not find elsewhere on this continent. the "free trade" policy of great britain was consequently addressed to the cupidity of texas as a bewitching allurement; and this was, perhaps, secretly coupled with pecuniary offers which would enable her to struggle against adverse fortune during the first years of independence. this liberal system, while it attracted to england the cotton of texas in british vessels, would necessarily raise the national duties of the republic to the highest standard on american produce and provisions, at the same time that it introduced the manufactures of england without imposts. the schemers who had achieved emancipation in the british west indies[49] imagined that the same result might be produced in texas by sufficient inducements, and that white labor or _apprentices_ would supply the place of slaves, thus striking an indirect blow at slavery in the southern states of our union. besides this, england would find a market for her manufactures which might temptingly address itself to the cupidity of the united states and of mexico as well as of texas. for, with such an extent of frontier on all sides, and with wastes between us, inhabited by a sparse or reckless population, the greatest inducements would be offered to convert texas into a smuggling ground not only for our union but especially for mexico, whence british fabrics are almost excluded by exorbitant tariffs. the policy of england would thus affect simultaneously our manufactures as well as our commerce. instead of sending her merchandize to new york, she would find in galveston a readier market to supply our southern states through the medium of contraband.[50] her goods would naturally have been carried in british vessels, and thus the labor and commerce of the united states would be directly injured by england until we could afford to navigate and manufacture at cheaper rates.[51] the impolicy of permitting our carrying trade and home market, in such a country, to pass out of our hands into those of a commercial rival, and the dangers of counteracting or creating a contraband system which would almost immediately ensue, commended this annexation promptly to the notice of president tyler. he perceived in british supremacy in texas a multitude of evils. collisions would arise which must endanger our peace. the power and influence of england would be intruded, geographically, on territory lying between us and mexico. a large increase of our military forces would be necessary, not only to protect the united states from daily disputes with texans, but to guard the border inhabitants against hostile inroads from indians. texas, he was authoritatively told, would seek the friendship of other nations if denied the protection of ours; and, in a condition of almost hopeless abandonment, would naturally fall an easy prey to any power that would protect her, should we refuse our alliance.[52] such were some of the reasons that induced the president, in 1844, to direct mr. upshur, who was the secretary of state, to negotiate a treaty of annexation between the united states and mexico, and thus, in his emphatic language,--"to break up and scatter to the winds the web of european intrigues."[53] this treaty was transmitted to the senate on the 22nd of april, 1844, and immediately became the topic of discussion throughout the country. it was opposed and defended by some of the most distinguished men in the country. general jackson pleaded that the golden moment might not be lost, and that we should not throw texas into the arms of england.[54] mr. clay, whose nomination as a presidential candidate was expected to be shortly made, and mr. van buren whose name was also speedily to come before a democratic convention assembled to select a candidate for the chief magistracy, both published long and argumentative letters against the project. the debate on the treaty in the senate was eager, and able. the northern abolitionists regarded it as a measure frought with danger to their cause, and as the basis of perpetual slavery, whilst the southern slave owners hailed annexation as a boon, which, at least for a season, would stay the aggressive arm that was raised against their rights and interests. at length, the senate finally rejected the treaty; but president tyler, by a message to the house of representatives, dated the 10th of june, transmitted the rejected document to the popular branch of the national legislature, so that, without suggesting the mode of annexation, the house of representatives might decide whether it should be accomplished in any shape. at that moment, however, new elements of political commotion were introduced in the nomination of mr. clay and mr. polk by the respective party conventions held in baltimore, and the project passed from the national legislature to the people for discussion during the presidential canvass. note.--the opinions and arguments adduced by the president in support of annexation have been singularly fortified by disclosures subsequent to the union between texas and the united states. the british cabinet, mortified by defeat, has been silent upon the subject, but singular developments were made in debate in the french chambers. on the 12th and 20th of january, 1846, a discussion took place between messieurs guizot, thiers, berreyer and others, in which the texas question, and the position of france, in the event of war between the united states and england, upon the oregon question, was warmly debated. the minister, guizot, alleged that in all the negotiations with texas, france had sought commercial relations in consequence of the advantages offered of markets for french goods. he declared that it was his policy to interpose _an independent state in the midst of the united states_, and _that he believed it to be advisable to multiply the number of secondary independent states on our continent_, as the commercial and political interests of france would suffer materially by the foundation of a governmental unity in america. he watched our progress with a jealous eye, and he considered the policy of the united states in refusing to be the _ally_ of any european power both right and wise in our view of the question. m. thiers, the former minister, replied to m. guizot; and, after asserting that texas had been annexed to our union "to the great displeasure of england, and, as far as could be discovered, to the great displeasure of france," he declared that it was the true interest of his government to place texas under the patronage of a powerful nation like ours rather than to abandon it to the influence of england. "you are aware," said he, "that _texas is of great importance to the united states_, and that its possession was anxiously desired by that power: _i will add that never was an annexation made in a more regular manner_. for more than ten years texas had been separated from mexico, and all the powers, including france, had recognised it." he regarded the union of england and france in diplomacy between mexico, texas, and the united states, as adopted only to redeem the faults of the french cabinet during the last five years, and as a truckling peace-offering for its conduct on the question of the "right of search." but, of all the french orators and statesmen, none denounced the conduct of the cabinet with more zeal than the eloquent berreyer. he proved by facts and documents that it was at the instance of england, and in subservience to her, that the french government interposed, (as will be seen in the following chapter,) to maintain the separate independence of texas:--"we have not limited ourselves"--exclaimed he--"to a wish and a counsel that texas should retain her freedom, but we have been led to take a part in that which i regret i am compelled to regard as nothing else than an _intrigue_, which, unfortunately for our national dignity has borne all the marks of an _intrigue_, and has met, at last, its humiliation."--niles' register, vol. 70, pp. 25, 26, 27, 28, and vol. 68, p. 290. footnotes: [39] see mr. clay's letter on the texas question, raleigh, n. c., april, 1844. i shall discuss the boundary elsewhere in this volume. when texas offered herself in 1837 to the united states it was only two years after mexico had overthrown the federal constitution, and not even one after the battle of san jacinto. a great change however took place in the general aspect of affairs between that period and the final annexation. [40] executive document, no. 42, h. of r., 25th congress, 1st session, contains the letters referred to. [41] mr. clay's letter on annexation, _ut antea_. [42] recollections of mexico, p. 238. [43] it was evidently the intention of mr. webster, whilst secretary of state, to adopt some prudent scheme for the settlement of the war between texas and mexico. in january, 1843, he addressed a despatch to mr. thompson, who was then our envoy in mexico, in which he directs him to use his good offices with the mexican secretary to mitigate the animosity of the government. "mexico," says he, "has an undoubted right to resubjugate texas, if she can, so far as other states are concerned, by the common and lawful means of war. _but other states are interested,--especially the united states, a near neighbor of both parties, are interested,--not only in the restoration of peace between them, but also in the manner in which the war shall be conducted if it shall continue._ these suggestions may suffice for what you are requested to say amicably and kindly to the mexican secretary, _at present; but i may add, for your information, that it is in the contemplation of this government to remonstrate, in a more formal manner, with mexico, at a period not far distant, unless she shall consent to make peace with texas, or shall show the disposition and ability to prosecute the war with respectable forces_. executive document, no. 271, h. of r., 28th cong., 1st sess., p. 69. for the opinions of french statesmen on this question see the debate between guizot, thiers, berreyer and others, reported in vol. 70, of niles' register, p. 25, 26. [44] debates in the british house of lords, friday 18th august, 1843, reported in the london morning chronicle of the 19th; and see executive document, no. 271, h. of r., 28th congress, 1st session. [45] ex. doc. no. 271, h. of r., 28 cong., 1st sess. p. 48, _et seq_:--in an interview between lord aberdeen and mr. everett, in november, 1843, the secretary of foreign affairs told him that england had long been pledged to encourage the abolition of the slave trade _and of slavery_, as far as her influence extended and in every proper way, but had no wish to interfere with the _internal_ concerns of governments. in reference to texas, he said that "the suggestion that england had made or intended to make the abolition of slavery the _condition_ of any treaty arrangement with her was wholly without foundation."--id. page 38. the _direct_ interference of england in the _internal_ affairs of other governments has often been very distinctly manifested notwithstanding lord aberdeen's disavowal. there is scarcely a country in europe which has been unvisited by her arms or her diplomacy, either when it became her interest to do so, or when she had the necessary force to make success unquestionable. her policy is, perhaps, not so much one of ambition as of avarice or necessity. she must feed her multitudes at home; and an extension of her wide spread commerce, with co-extensive privileges in new countries, will open new sources of wealth to her people. nations are not to be blamed for seeking such advantages; but the nearer neighbor should be equally blameless for grasping, if possible, the benefit for herself, so as to keep off a dangerous rival and secure the revenues which otherwise would flow into that rival's coffers. the excursive _philanthropy_ of england was admirably depicted by the frenchman, who, according to the london times remarked that: "your englishman knows all about timbuctoo, or hindoostan, or the frozen regions about the north pole; but ask him about ireland, the country lying next his own, and he is perfectly innocent of any information on the subject. africa he investigates--ireland he neglects. he weeps for the suffering of the negro, but allows his irish fellow subject to live in ignorance and filth, and often to die of starvation." [46] ex. doc. no. 271, h. of r., 28th cong., 1st sess. p. 101, _et seq._ [47] id.--p. 70. letter of mr. van zandt to mr. webster. [48] id.--p. 100. washington, 24th january, 1843. [49] see lord brougham's speech, _ut antea_. [50] any one who is familiar with the condition of our canadian frontier will understand the ease with which smuggling in british fabrics is carried on between the countries. an extensive business has, doubtless, always been sustained; and it is not unusual even for the ladies of certain towns along the frontier, to _shop_ in canada, with the understanding that their purchases are to be _delivered at the risk of the british vender, on the other side of the american line_! [51] executive document, 271, h. of r., 28th cong., 1st sess. letter of mr. allen to hon. r. j. walker, and other letters copied on pages 103 and 105 of the same document. the government of the united states entertained such views of the grasping policy of england for reasons which are clearly set forth in an able despatch from mr. calhoun to mr. king, our envoy at the court of france. "the question," says the secretary of state, "is, by what means can great britain regain and keep a superiority in tropical cultivation, commerce and influence? or shall that be abandoned and other nations, suffered to acquire the supremacy even to the extent of supplying british markets to the destruction of the capital already vested in their production? these are the questions which now profoundly occupy the attention of her statesmen and have the greatest influence over her councils. "in order to regain her superiority she not only seeks to revive and increase her own capacity to produce tropical productions, but to diminish and destroy the capacity of those who have so far outstripped her in consequence of her error. in pursuit of the former, she has cast her eyes to her east india possessions, to central and eastern africa, with the view of establishing colonies there, and even to restore, substantially, the slave trade itself, under the specious name of transporting free laborers from africa to her west india possessions, in order, if possible, to compete successfully with those who have refused to follow her suicidal policy. her main reliance, however, is on the other alternative, to cripple or destroy the productions of her successful rivals. there is but one way by which it can be done, and that is by abolishing african slavery throughout this continent; and that she avows to be the constant object of her policy and exertions." senate doc. no. 1, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 44. [52] president tyler's message to the senate. 22nd april, 1844. [53] letter of president tyler to the richmond enquirer in 1847. [54] president jackson's letter 17th march, 1844, written in consequence of a private mission to him from president houston of texas. chapter v. change of public feeling as to annexation--election of president polk --mr. clay defeated by the abolitionists--almonté's threat- president tyler attempts to soothe mexico--his failure to do so --mexican projects of reconquest--want of confidence in santa anna--loans--downfall and disgrace of santa anna--his expulsion to cuba--herrera made provisional president--congress of united states reconsiders annexation--joint resolution passed with an alternative of negotiation--president tyler adopts the first clause, and why- european intrigues--france and england operating on texas and mexico --mexico offers independence provided texas will not annex herself to the united states--defeat of the foreign scheme. when congress met in december, 1844, a remarkable change had come over the political would in the united states. the extraordinary popularity of mr. clay induced reflective men to believe, at the close of the last session, that he would be elected president, and that the prospects of immediate annexation would probably be blighted by that event. the great body of his partizans opposed the project of president tyler; but the democratic convention, assembled in baltimore, in may, inscribed the fortunes of texas on its banner together with the name of that party's candidate. the south immediately rallied around it, whilst the north assumed strange grounds of objection to the course of mr. clay. the native american and abolition parties in new york professed to vote with the friends of that gentleman in consequence of his opposition to annexation, and yet a sufficient number to defeat his election cast their ballots in direct contradiction of their principles. this was but another lesson of the danger of confiding in men or parties who have but a single idea. the folly of fanaticism commonly leads to violent inconsistencies, but perhaps a more palpable one was never exhibited than in the result of the presidential election of 1844. when the project of annexation was first discussed in 1843 in the gazettes of the day, and before any decided action by the president or secretary of state, general almonté, who was then mexican envoy at washington, protested earnestly against the act, and even threatened, by express order of his government, that on sanction being given to the incorporation of texas into the united states, he would consider his mission as ended, seeing that the mexican government was resolved to declare war as soon as it received information of such a deed.[55] but mr. tyler, disregarding the irascible temper of the minister and his government, despatched pacific and soothing instructions to our chargé at mexico, intimating a desire to act justly towards that republic, and to settle all questions growing out of the treaty as well as of boundary on the most liberal terms.[56] the mexican government, however, would listen to no proposals of accommodation. the texan question, as we have seen, was always one of great annoyance to the mexican authorities; for although they acknowledged, in effect, that their dominion was really lost over texas, yet their national pride and public feeling forced them to project, if they did not attempt, its reconquest.[57] besides this, darkness was gathering around the fate of santa anna, who dared not undertake negotiations upon a subject so unpopular. when a new congress assembled in mexico in january, 1844, it was disposed to aid the executive in his scheme of reconquest. four millions of dollars were therefore granted him; but when he claimed ten millions for the same purpose, whilst it was notorious that the first grant had not yet been collected, the members of congress absolutely refused to sustain santa anna's measures for the recovery of the lost territory. this refusal was not grounded upon any aversion of the mexicans from reconquest, but solely because they believed the money would be extorted from the people only to be plundered by the president and his myrmidons. the politicians and country had alike, lost confidence in him; and santa anna, observing the rising storm, obtained permission from congress to retire to his estate of manga de clavo near the sea coast at vera cruz, whilst his friend don valentin canalizo took his place in the capital as president _ad interim_. santa anna hardly reached his estate when a fatal blow was struck against his administration from the departmental junta of jalisco. this revolt was lead by general paredes, and after a multitude of military and diplomatic manoeuvres, resulted in santa anna's downfall on the 4th of january, 1845. the ex-president fled towards the sea-coast; but was captured by a detachment of volunteers at the village of jico, whence he was transferred under a strong escort to the castle of peroté. it is difficult even to imagine the bitter wrath with which the mexican people assailed the captured chief. he, who but a few months before exercised despotic sway over the land, was now a prisoner and at the mercy of the mob. his friends interposed in this emergency to save his life both from popular fury and judicial action which might make it the penalty of his misrule. the strife was long and anxious, but, at length, an amnesty was declared, under which santa anna departed for cuba on the 29th of may, 1845, accompanied by his wife and daughter.[58] the fury of the people against the exile may be imagined from the fact that they exhausted every means by which they could manifest their hatred of his deeds and memory. they thronged the streets singing ribald songs, and hawking ridiculous caricatures;--they tore his pictures from the walls, and hurled his statues from their pedestals; and, with the fiendishness of hyenas, they even snatched from the grave the leg he had lost in battle with the french at vera cruz, and tossed it about the streets of mexico![59] * * * * * the result of santa anna's downfall was the establishment of a provisional government under general herrera, president of the council. this person is represented to have been a discreet officer, whose judgment naturally led him to see the wisdom of a pacific course towards the united states, but whose destiny was finally controlled by the rash and unprincipled conduct of insurrectionary demagogues. meanwhile the congress of the united states reconsidered the texan question, and after a long and ardent debate, finally passed a joint resolution for annexation, with an alternative permission to the executive to negotiate; provided he thought proper to adopt that course. this was a solemn decision of the question by the representatives of the people, and it was sustained by the president who did not permit himself to be influenced by the threats of mexico or the hostile preparations made by that country. in fact, mr. tyler had been careful to guard against military surprises, for, in consequence of the early menaces of mexico, he deemed it his duty, as a precautionary measure, to concentrate in the gulf and its vicinity a large portion of the home squadron under the command of commodore conner, and, at the same time to assemble at fort jesup on the texan border, as large a military force as the demands of the service at other encampments would allow. thus, the joint resolution for annexing texas to the united states, with its alternative power to negotiate, came to president tyler and was approved by him on the 1st of march, 1845. on the fourth of the same month, james k. polk, who had been chosen president of the united states, at the last election, was to assume the reins of government. president tyler believed that the necessity for annexation was immediate and urgent in consequence of the reasons he had already presented to congress in his several messages. the only doubt therefore, that he experienced in making his selection, arose from a point of delicacy to his successor. the first section of the joint resolution authorized the erection of a new state of our union out of the republic of texas under certain conditions contained in the second section; whilst the third authorized the president to negotiate with that republic for admission either by treaty to be submitted to the senate, or by articles of agreement to be presented to our houses of congress, as the president might direct. under these circumstances a cabinet council was summoned for the 2nd of march, and the point was resolved by informing the president's successor, mr. polk, of the proposed action, and, if he desired it, submitting to his perusal the despatch to texas. mr. calhoun, our secretary of state, at the president's request, accordingly waited upon mr. polk, explained to him mr. tyler's selection of the first and second sections of the joint resolution, and expressed a readiness to exhibit the despatch to mr. a. j. donelson, who had been appointed chargé to texas.[60] mr. polk courteously declined expressing an opinion concerning the executive action, accompanying his remark with some complimentary declaration; and, on that evening, a bearer of despatches with the requisite documents, was on his way to mr. donelson.[61] this is a brief and accurate summary of the history of annexation so far as the action of our government is involved, and as is necessary for this narrative. the terms of annexation which were offered by the united states were accepted by texas, and the public faith of both nations was solemnly pledged to a compact of union, which was finally consummated at the following session of congress, when texas became a member of our confederacy. there were other circumstances, however, which properly induced the prompt course of president tyler in sending the joint resolution for the action of texas; but, in order to understand these perfectly, it is necessary for us to direct our attention to the french and english negotiations between that republic and mexico. in 1840, as we have seen, england preferred separate action on behalf of texas, but she was now willing to unite with france against the aggrandizement of the united states. monsieur de saligny and the hon. mr. elliott were the representatives of these european courts in texas, and to the former of them was entrusted the active part of the diplomacy. whilst the discussions were going on in the united states mr. elliott was never at rest. he was heard of in charleston, in new orleans, in havana, in mexico, and, again, in texas. the restlessness of the agent denoted the anxiety of his government and of france. the rejection of the annexation treaty by congress, in 1844, had almost deprived texas of hope. she believed it impossible to expect a union with the united states, and was prepared to receive the mediation of france and england which would secure her independence. this was surely gratifying to the emissaries of these powers and they eagerly undertook the task of obtaining the coveted boon from mexico. the mexican ministry, ever anxious to thwart the union with our confederacy, was equally pleased to avert it by any diplomatic _ruse_ that would save the point of honor, and place her erect before the world. besides this, the mexicans relied on a hope that increasing difficulties between the united states and england upon the oregon boundary question, would make us loath to undertake a war with a southern neighbor whilst our north and our sea board were menaced by great britain. this hope of a counter-menace from england inspirited the mexican cabinet and made it solicitous to resist us successfully. herrera's ministry was composed of discreet and patriotic men; but, in the first moments of their power, they dared not oppose popular prejudices. the revolution which overthrew santa anna was one of the few that sprang from the popular branches of the nation, and originated neither in factions, the army, or the church, but derived its success from the universal feeling that existed against the oppressive misrule of the executive.[62] nevertheless popular feeling was against our country, and the cabinet took its tone from its patrons. there can be little doubt of the fact, that the notion of probable difficulties between the united states and england on the boundary question, was studiously fostered by emissaries who were hostile to us. herrera's cabinet therefore hailed with delight the propositions which were brought to mexico by mr. elliott, and were presented by the hon. charles bankhead and baron alleye de cyprey, the british and french ministers. these propositions, señor cuevas laid before the mexican congress on the 21st of april, 1845. the preliminary conditions offered by texas, under french and english mediation, and transmitted from that republic by president jones, on the 29th of march, were the following: 1st. that mexico shall consent to acknowledge the independence of texas. 2nd. that texas shall engage and stipulate in the treaty _not to annex herself to or become subject to any country whatever_. 3rd. the limits and other conditions shall be matter of arrangement by final treaty. 4th. that texas should be willing to remit disputed points _concerning territory and other matters to the arbitration of umpires_. these spiteful stipulations, evidently aimed against the united states, and bearing the marks of their european parentage, suited the taste of mexico precisely. her congress, therefore, at once deemed it advisable to entertain the texan proposals, and to proceed to the celebration of a treaty. but when the baron de cyprey announced this assent to the president of texas, on the 20th of may, it was already too late for the success of european diplomacy. our congress had passed the joint-resolution, our president had approved it, and our minister, mr. donelson, was in texas preparing the cabinet to act favorably upon our propositions. accordingly when mr. elliott returned in june to texas in a french corvette, the public mind was already manifesting its anxiety to accede to our liberal offers, which were finally sanctioned by the texan convention on the 4th of july, 1845. had the resolution for annexation not been adopted at the preceding session of congress, the pretensions of mexico, instead of being lowered, would have been raised still higher than they were on the receipt of the propositions from president jones. the mediatorial powers of mr. elliott would, in all probability, have been employed in negotiating truces and treaties until the foundation was laid for the operation of those peaceful means by which lord aberdeen declared it his intention to promote his philanthropic views. "abandoned by the united states, oppressed by debt, and wearied by the increasing burthens and privations of war, texas would have been at the mercy of britain, and her statesmen would have accepted almost any terms to secure independence and peace."[63] footnotes: [55] senate doc. no. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 95. [56] senate doc. no. 1, 28th cong. 2d sess. p. 53. [57] general almonté, the mexican envoy, in a conversation in new york, confessed to the writer, in the spring of 1843, that texas was lost to mexico, but that all then desired by his countrymen was to save the point of honor before they acknowledged its independence. [58] mexico as it was and as it is, 4th ed. letter xxv. p. 367. [59] id. page 382. [60] house of rep., doc. no. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 125. [61] the election of the 1st and 2nd sections of the joint resolution made by president tyler was subsequently approved by president polk, as he declares both in his negotiations and in his message to congress of the 2nd december, 1845. h. of r., doc. no. 2, 29th cong. 1st session, p. 3. [62] mexico as it was and as it is--p. 390, 4th ed. [63] letter from mr. donelson to mr. buchanan, 2nd june, 1845, h. of r., doc. no. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 52. i do not discuss the question of the _mode_ of annexation, whether by treaty, joint resolution, or negotiation, as that would require almost a volume by itself to present a true sketch of the debate that occurred upon it. it is my purpose rather to narrate events than to discuss all the various subordinate questions arising from them. "annexation," is made one of the great motives or causes for war by mexico, no matter in what way it is effected or attempted. "_mexico would never agree to annexation_;"--said señor cuevas, the mexican secretary of foreign affairs, in april, 1845.--mexico as it was and as it is. p. 391, 4th ed. chapter vi. general almonté demands passports and leaves--shannon and rejon and cuevas--views of the mexican cabinet and people--animosity--revolt in mexico--political condition of mexico--her right of reconquering texas--mr. buchanan despatches mr. slidell as envoy--rejection of all accommodation between us--the reason why mexico refused to negotiate, after promising to receive a commissioner from the united states--subterfuges--ill feeling in mexico on the texas question- herrera overthrown by paredes--paredes and the monarchical party- unpopularity of his scheme--miserable state of mexican affairs- review of the texas question. in march, 1845, as soon as congress passed the joint-resolution, gen. almonté demanded his passports and departed. a correspondence which took place in mexico between mr. shannon, our envoy, and señor rejon, the minister of foreign affairs, relative to the projected union resulted fruitlessly; and, on the 2d of april, señor cuevas, who had succeeded rejon in office, announced to our legation that his government could neither continue diplomatic intercourse with ours, nor maintain friendship with a republic that violated her obligations and usurped a portion of mexican territory. he declared, moreover, that the relations between the two countries could not be re-established before a complete reparation of that injury should be made.[64] this violent and denunciatory language, together with the hint to our minister to depart, was of course not calculated to allay ill-feeling in either country. the mexican congress was not less bitter in its animadversions, thereby spreading the animosity among the people. it promptly seconded the wishes of the cabinet, and offered two projects, both of which asserted the unalienated rights of mexico over texas, and the national resolve to maintain them by force. meantime, however, domestic discontent was again brewing. a certain gen. rangel attempted to revolutionize the government, and is said to have been favored by the partizans of the late administration. the insurgents seized the palace, capturing the president and three of his ministers of state; but they were speedily overpowered and the insurrection suppressed. in june and july of this year all the mexican papers were loud in their clamors for vengeance. the minister of war, garcia condé, wrote despatch after despatch; and, with the usual spirit of national gasconade, denounced our "perfidy," and continually alluded to "the war which mexico waged against the united states," in consequence of our "treachery." on the 16th of the latter month, he despatched to the minister of foreign relations and justice a note detailing a plan for covering the national frontiers, and asserted that mexico would maintain her rights by force, or fall in the struggle. "she will not consent," says he, "to give up one half of her territory from the base fear of losing the other!" patriotic and stirring as are these declarations, they cannot but be regarded otherwise than as the most inflated bombast when we recollect that they were made in defiance of the united states, and after a failure for seven years to reconquer even texas, feeble as she was. what just hope could distracted mexico reasonably entertain of ultimate victory? several years before this period, her discreet statesmen and reflecting citizens privately acknowledged that texas was lost forever. pecuniary embarrassments, political misrule, and repeated revolutions had still more impaired her national strength, and yet, an obstinacy as inveterate as it was silly, forced her to make declarations of intended hostilities which only served to kindle and spread the excitement among the masses. it is just that we should concede to national pride and honor all they reasonably demand of respect, yet i have greatly misunderstood this spirit of our century, if it does not require nations to be as reasonable in their quarrels as individuals. empires, kingdoms, states, republics, and men, are equally amenable to the great tribunal of the world's common sense, and all are obliged, if they consult their interests, to yield to the force of circumstances they cannot control. what then becomes of the mere abstract and visionary "right of reconquest" which mexico asserted, even if she really possessed it after the central usurpation, and destruction of the federal system in 1824? what hope was there in a war with the united states, after a failure in that with texas? it is true that mexico had the power to annoy us, and procrastinate her fate; she might oppose and resist; she might develope all the evil passions of her people and let them loose on our armies in irregular warfare; but these, after all were nothing more than spiteful manifestations of impotent malice, disgraceful to the nation that encouraged them. the cause of genuine humanity, which, i believe, in our age, truly seeks for peace, demanded the pacification of texas. the cruelty with which the war was waged, and the brutal treatment received by some of the prisoners of the santa fé expedition in 1841 and 1842, convince us that a strong power should have imposed peace on mexico. national propriety demanded it; for how long was the "right of reconquest" to continue? england, the proudest nation on earth, acknowledged the independence of the united states after a seven years war. the great powers of europe interfered to protect oppressed greece. england has several times interposed in the affairs of spain and portugal; and our geographical as well as political affinity to texas clearly indicated that it was our national interest to establish a firm and friendly government on our border. * * * * * there can be no doubt that when general herrera was, almost unanimously, elected president in august, 1845, he saw things in this light, and was prudently disposed to bend to inevitable fate. notwithstanding the warlike despatches, speeches, and proclamations of the mexicans in the earlier part of the year, our secretary of state seems to have sufficiently understood their gasconading habits, to disregard these inflated productions. he therefore authorized mr. black, who remained in mexico as consul, upon mr. shannon's withdrawal, to propose that we should send an envoy with full powers to adjust all the questions in dispute between the two countries. mexico, notwithstanding her open bravado, secretly assented to our proposal, declaring that she would receive "the commissioner of the united states who might come to the capital with full powers to settle the present dispute in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner." accordingly, mr. slidell was hastily despatched so as to be sure of meeting the same persons in power with whom the arrangement had been made; for in mexico, the delay of even a day may sometimes change a government, and create new or unwilling negotiators. nevertheless when our minister presented himself in the capital early in december, having travelled rapidly but unostentatiously, so as to avoid exciting ill feeling among the mexicans as to the purposes of his mission, he found the secretary unprepared to receive him. it was objected that mr. slidell's commission had not been confirmed by the senate of the united states and that the president had no constitutional right to send him; that mexico agreed to receive a commissioner to settle the texas dispute, and not a resident envoy; that the reception of such an envoy would admit the minister on the footing of a friendly mission during a period of concord between nations, which would not be diplomatically proper so long as our amity was in the least interrupted;--and, finally, that the government had not expected a commissioner until after the session of congress began in january, 1846. there may be some force in technical diplomacy, between the mission as agreed on by messieurs black and peña, and the one despatched by mr. buchanan, for the letter of credence declares that mr. slidell is "_to reside_ near the government of the mexican republic in the quality of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, and that he is well informed of the president's desire to _restore_, cultivate, and strengthen friendship and good correspondence between us." a point of extreme etiquette raised at such a moment, when both parties were confessedly anxious for peace, naturally excites some inquiry as to its probable origin. accordingly we find that it was a mere subterfuge, urged by a tottering administration to avert its ruin. the violence of the cabinet against annexation had done its work among the people. when herrera and peña accepted, in october, our proposal to treat, they hoped the popular elections, as well as judicious overtures to the departments and citizens, would so modify national opinion as to permit their independent and liberal action. but such forbearance could scarcely be expected from the watchfulness of mexican intriguers. herrera was a federalist, but his failure to proclaim the federal system, and to throw himself on that party as soon as he attained power, alienated a large portion of it and made the rest but feeble supporters. the church and the centralists soon coalesced in hostility to his government; and, although his measures were moderate, and all his efforts designed to correct abuses, yet every political symptom denoted his speedy fall. of all the popular clamors, probably none was louder in the mob and the army, than that which arose in consequence of his effort to negotiate a peace with our union. general paredes took advantage of this unpopularity, and, at the head of five thousand of the soldiery, pronounced against the government of the president. it will be perceived from this sketch how completely this texas question and the war with our country have been made electioneering and revolutionary elements in mexico: not, however, with patriotic hopes, or reasonable expectations of reconquest, but with the contemptible anxiety of usurping a temporary power which, for a while, enabled the aspirant to govern the country without the least prospect of settling the difficulty with us or of regaining texas.[65] this revolution commenced with the army of reserve stationed at san luis potosi, and was seconded by the military men generally. on the 15th of december, 1845, paredes issued a bombastic proclamation[66] from his headquarters; and, in the latter part of the month the revolutionary forces reached the capital, when a portion of the garrison pronounced in favor of the insurgent chief. this induced an early accommodation between the parties, and finished the outbreak without bloodshed. yet paredes, having overthrown herrera, partly in consequence of his friendly disposition for peace with us, could not now attempt negotiations successfully. mr. slidell renewed his offers to the cabinet, but was repulsed and left the country. the lame reliance of mexico upon bombastic proclamations was again adopted. yet the people were discontented with paredes who soon began to manifest the despotic tendency of his nature and education. the military life of this chieftain naturally inclined him towards centralism, but he was altogether unfit either by character or habits for civil authority. as soon as he assumed the reins of government, a party which had long drooped began again to lift its head. the monarchists, led by the archbishop manuel posada y garduño, and the wily don lucas alaman, soon got possession of the insurgent general. they were joined by a large portion of the higher clergy, some influential men of fortune, a few soldiers, and a number of silly citizens, who promised themselves a futurity of progress and felicity by calling to the mexican throne a monarch from beyond the sea. this party of royalists was strengthened by dissensions at home, and by the expected attack from the united states. many reflecting men cherished no hope of national progress so long as the turbulent army was unrestrained by paramount authority. they desired at once to crush freedom and domestic despotism by a foreign prince supported by european soldiery, whilst they believed that the continental sovereigns would greedily seize the opportunity of throwing their forces into america so as to check the aggressive ambition of the united states.[67] as soon as this scheme of paredes was disclosed, his unpopularity increased. his intemperate habits were well known and destroyed confidence in his judgment. the financial condition of the country was exceedingly embarrassed, and foreigners, who were the usual bankers of the government, refused loans on any terms. payment was denied by the treasury to all employed in the civil departments, while money was disbursed to none but the army. the freedom of the press moreover was suspended; and, to crown the national difficulties, it was at this very moment that mexico dreamed of overthrowing the republic at home and establishing a monarchy in its stead, whilst it simultaneously encountered our armies abroad in order to reconquer texas! with such deplorable fatuity was mexico misruled, and entangled in a double war upon the rights of her own people and against the united states. it was unfortunate that she fell at this crisis into the hands of a despot and drunkard, whose mind, perplexed between ambition and intemperance, gave a permanent direction to that false public sentiment, which herrera had been anxious to convert into one of peace and good will towards the united states. i have thus succinctly narrated the events that led to the war between the united states and mexico. the annexation of texas, without the previous assent of mexico, may have annoyed that government. it was mortifying to patriotic pride, and we should laud the republic for manifesting a proper sensibility. but true national pride is always capable of manly and dignified opposition. it does not expend itself in bravado, petulance or querulousness. it does not assail by threats, but by deeds; and never provokes an attack until it is prepared to return the blow with earnest force. it is silent as the storm until it bursts forth in overwhelming wrath. all other kinds of resistance are nothing but miserable exhibitions of mortified vanity, and invoke the world's contempt instead of respectful compassion. our government, from the beginning, desired and attempted to allay excitement, whilst that of mexico, revolutionary, disorganized and impotent as it was at home, and as it subsequently proved itself to be in the field of battle, did all it could to foment animosity between the two countries. this sturdy resistance of mexico did not arise from prudence, patriotism or courage, but from intestine factions, exasperated by rival usurpers. our efforts to make peace and establish a boundary upon the most liberal principles were rejected with disdain.[68] the authorities, basing their refusal upon a frivolous subterfuge of diplomatic etiquette, would not even hear our proposals, or receive our minister. our presidents were disposed to concede every thing reasonable in negotiation that could have saved the honor of mexico and placed our future relations on the salutary foundation of alliance.[69] instead of meeting us with the pacific and compromising temper of our age, her demagogue chieftains stimulated the passion and vanity of the mob, until the stormy natures of an ignorant people became so completely excited that they were unable to control the evil spirit raised by their wicked incantations. blundering onward and blinded by passion, this unfortunate nation reminds us of that passage in the ænead wherein the sightless giant is described:- "summo quum monte videmus ipsum inter pecudes vastâ se mole moventem pastorem polypheum, et littera nota petentem; _monstrum horrendum, informe, ingens, cui lumen ademptum!_ ænead, b. 3, v. 655. footnotes: [64] mexico as it was and as it is--see original letter in 4th ed. p. 387. [65] see mexico as it was and is, 4th ed. p. 396--and slidell's correspondence with our government. senate doc. no. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. [66] see mexico as it was and as it is, p. 400. [67] tributo á la verdad, vera cruz, p. 3. [68] see wheaton's elements of international law. ed. of 1836, part 2d chap. 1, pp. 88, 89, 90, 91. on the right of interference of governments for the pacification of belligerent nations. [69] mr. slidell was fully empowered to negotiate on liberal terms. book second: military operations in texas and on the rio grande. book ii. military operations in texas and on the rio grande. chapter i. boundary of texas defined by almonté--description of texas--rivers of texas--army of observation--general taylor--army of occupation--how formed--difficulty of landing in texas--aransas bay--army lands at st. joseph's island--kinney's rancho--corpus christi--state of the army during the winter--sufferings of the troops--alarms of war- general gaines's views--necessity of ample preparation--our first aggressive war. the scene of our observation is now about to change from the cabinet to the field. the theatre of war properly attracts our attention, and the spot of earth which was the chief cause of dispute between mexico and the united states, and where our armies assembled, justly demands our first notice. texas, until she attained the rank of an independent state, seems to have been almost an unknown country even to the mexicans. this was natural for a people who are not essentially agriculturists, but pass their lives as herdsmen, miners, or merchants, and whose central government is far removed from its outposts. in the year 1834, general almonté was deputed by the mexican authorities to visit this northern province, and prepare a statistical report upon its extent and character. according to this valuable document, texas proper lies between 28° and 35° of north latitude, and 17° and 25° of longitude, west from washington. it is bounded on the north by the territory of arkansas; east by louisiana; south by the gulf of mexico and state of tamaulipas; and west by coahuila, chihuahua, and new mexico. almonté was informed, by the state government of coahuila and texas, that instead of the rio de las nueces forming the boundary between coahuila and texas, as the map denoted, the true limit commenced at the embouchure of the rio aransaso which it followed to its source, whence it continued by a direct line until it reached the junction of the medina with the san antonio, and thence proceeded along the eastern bank of the medina to its source, terminating, finally, on the borders of chihuahua. the territory comprised within these limits is estimated at near two hundred thousand square miles--a surface almost as extensive as that of france.[70] but, since texas receded from the mexican central government, these confines have been changed. by an act of her congress, in december, 1836, the boundary was declared to begin at the mouth of the rio grande, and thence to run up the principal stream of the said river to its source; thence due north to the 42° of latitude, and thence, along the boundary as defined in the treaty between the united states and spain, to the beginning.[71] * * * * * the great body of the territory of mexico is rich in upland vallies, extensive plains, noble mountains, fertile soil, beautiful groves, and rich mines, but it is almost entirely deprived of rivers, whilst texas is singularly favored in this respect. on the east, the gulf of mexico affords her an extensive sea coast indented by the mouths of the sabine river and lake, the rio naches, the rio trinidad, the rio san jacinto, galveston bay, the rio brazos, matagorda bay, the rio colorado, the rios san antonio and guadalupe, aransaso bay and the rio grande, besides numerous smaller streams that drain her soil and almost cover it with an interlacing network of water. texas presents to the traveller three distinct natural regions. along the shores of the gulf from the sabine to the rio grande, a flat country extends from thirty to one hundred miles in the interior, widening, towards its centre on the colorado, and gradually diminishing towards the nueces. the sandy wastes and lagunes of the coast give place, at some distance in the interior, to a rich alluvial country, diversified by skirts of timber, insulated groves, and open prairies. a large portion of this part of texas is described as being singularly free from those large collections of stagnant water, which, combined with a burning sun and prolific vegetation, create malaria in our southern states. westward of this level skirt, begins the rolling region. the land gradually swells in gentle undulations, "covered with fertile prairies and valuable woodlands, enriched with springs and rivulets." farther westward still, these beautiful hills tower up into the steeps of the _sierra madre_, that great chain of gigantic mountains, which, broken at the junction of the rio grande with the puerco, takes thence a north-easterly course, and enters texas near the source of the nueces. these elevations are of the third and fourth magnitude, and abound with forests of pine, oak, cedar, and an extraordinary variety of shrubbery. wide vallies of alluvial soil, commonly susceptible of irrigation from copious streams in the highlands, wind through the recesses of these mountains and afford a delightful region for the purposes of agriculture. the table lands beyond these ranges have been but little explored, and still less is known of the northern region extending to the 42° of north latitude, as well as of that portion lying between the nueces and the rio grande. but such, in brief, is texas from the gulf to the mountains;--a country adapted alike to the planter, the grazier and the farmer, while it offers to commerce a wide extent of sea coast whose harbors may be made perfectly secure by the skill of modern science.[72] * * * * * i have already stated that in 1844 president tyler stationed an army of observation under general taylor, at fort jesup, as soon as he negotiated the annexation treaty.[73] this corps, but poorly sheltered from the weather, and in an inhospitable climate, was, for a long time, left inactive on the banks of the sabine. in midsummer of 1845, after the joint resolution was passed, and when our difficulties with mexico began to thicken, it was at length ordered to advance, under the same commander, towards the southern frontier of texas. the army then consisted of but two regiments of infantry, one of dragoons, and a single company of artillery, in all about fifteen hundred efficient men. as the climate was known to the sickly, the war department despatched only such an unacclimated force as was deemed absolutely necessary to protect a tropical region in the month of july, awaiting the colder months before its numbers were increased. this body was called the army of occupation, whose appointments seem to have been extremely imperfect. "the dragoon regiment had just been formed from a rifle corps; half of its men were raw, undisciplined recruits, and many of them unable to ride, while their recently purchased horses were small, weak and undrilled. the infantry regiments were enfeebled by their long exposure, in miserable tents, to the withering heats and drenching rains of a low southern latitude; and the artillerists were without their guns. towards the end of june, 1845, a company of the last mentioned arm of the service, equipped as infantry, at fort moultrie, was ordered to new orleans. this body, armed only with muskets, sailed from charleston on the 26th of the month, and on its arrival in louisiana on the 19th of july, found that it was destined for service in texas. the instructions to the commanding officer informed him that his company was to be mounted and equipped as flying artillery for the campaign under taylor; that horses would be sent him and a battery shipped from new york, upon the arrival of which he was to join his general at the mouth of the sabine."[74] fortunately for these troops they encountered general taylor in new orleans, though they were obliged to depart without their ordnance, which did not reach them for two months afterwards, while their horses were even still longer in attaining their destination. the war in texas, and the unsettled state of that country, had prevented the preparation of an accurate map, or indeed, even of a survey of the coasts or interior. it was difficult, therefore, to find any one in new orleans acquainted with the harbors and rivers of the new state, or who was willing to incur the responsibility of directing the army's steps. the topographical bureau at washington had, with infinite pains and ingenuity, constructed a map of the country from the scant materials in its possession; but this chart has since been proved to be almost entirely useless as a guide. however, after considerable difficulty, general taylor procured a pilot for large wages, who professed a thorough acquaintance with the texan waters, and a particular knowledge of his destination at aransas bay. this individual was immediately put in charge of one of the transports loaded with troops, and under his lead, the commander in chief sailed from new orleans with three ships and two steamers in search of the port of his disbarkation. the blundering pilot grounded his vessel among the breakers where it would inevitably have been wrecked, had it not been extricated by timely assistance, while the captain of another transport coasted the low shores of the gulf for several days, in sight of land, seeking an inlet, and when his ship was at length anchored off st. joseph's, he asserted that it was the island of espiritu santo.[75] this bay of aransas was perhaps one of the most unsuitable for the disbarkation of troops on the coast of texas, and was selected in utter ignorance of the country. indeed we seem to have committed two great and often fatal errors in warfare when we contemplated hostilities with mexico--first, in despising our foe; and secondly, in failing to inform ourselves of his country's geography. aransas bay lies between the south end of st. joseph's and the northern point of mustang island, quite close to the latter, and almost at right angles with the coast. it has a narrow but shifting sand bar at its entrance, upon which the depth of water varies according to the action of the winds. the bay is about twenty-five miles in length and twelve in width, but is obstructed by a shoal and a range of islands that traverse it.[76] on the third of august our whole army had landed on st. joseph's island, about thirty miles from the rio nueces, across which it was to pass to its proposed encampment on corpus christi bay, near a smuggling village known as kinney's _rancho_. as corpus christi and aransas bays are connected by a shallow and winding channel, it was at once discovered that steamers were altogether inadequate for the transportation of troops from the islets to the mainland; and our forces would have remained where they disembarked had not a few skiffs of light draft, together with some sail and row boats, been obtained in the neighborhood at considerable expense. in these frail vessels a detachment of forty men, armed only with muskets, crossed the nueces, and landed on the stormy coast as pioneers in a country asserted to be mexican. had the authorities of that republic been prepared to resist our landing, a few field pieces might have presented the alleged invasion, as our general was unable to protect the disembarkation of his troops by cannon. in addition to these mistakes, the 2d regiment of dragoons was not despatched from fort jesup in time to co-operate with our forces when they first landed at corpus christi; and, as the artillery had not yet been forwarded from our arsenals, the campaign may be said to have commenced with _infantry alone_. this was a novelty in military science, and indicated an ignorance of war, an unpardonable imprudence, or a conviction that the whole drama was got up only to intimidate an enemy we despised. * * * * * it is impossible to narrate every circumstance of interest that occurred during the encampment of our forces west of the nueces, a position taken by general taylor with the concurrence of the war department. but a history of this war would be incomplete were not the position as well as the condition of our army accurately stated. our government, relying probably on the acknowledged feebleness of mexico, and on the fact that she had not yet declared war, imagined that the mere presence of american troops would pacify texas or prevent hostilities. this was an unfortunate mistake, especially in the unsettled condition of things; for in may, 1845, mr. donelson, our chargé to texas, had warned the government to be prepared for an immediate blow upon mexico, if she should unfortunately declare war against us, and that declaration might have been expected at any moment. the details of the organization of our forces seem, nevertheless, to have been sadly neglected. sailing vessels, alone, were relied on to convey despatches to general taylor; and, from the wreck of one of them, a drummer boy, strolling along the beach, on the 15th of august, rescued a valuable package containing the proclamation of the mexican government in which the people were summoned to unite in an army for national preservation, under the sonorous title of "defenders of independence and the laws."[77] the day after this despatch was received, the smugglers along the coast reported that arista was rapidly advancing to attack us with three thousand choice troops. without artillery to defend the camp, or dragoons to act as scouts, our general could do nothing but order entrenchments to be thrown up. entrenching tools, however, had not been furnished; and, with only a few old and broken spades the troops labored briskly, and erected, in a few days, a solid field-work a few yards from the beach, protected in the rear by the bay. but the battery had not yet arrived, nor was gen. taylor able to obtain from the sloop of war st. mary's, which was on the station, any guns of a suitable calibre. fortunately, however, he procured three pieces, indifferently equipped, and a small supply of ammunition, from the citizens of corpus christi. these guns added materially to the strength of our position in case we were attacked, but were entirely unsuitable for field service.[78] * * * * * the proclamation to which we have alluded, and the rumors of vigorous hostility on the part of mexico, produced great alarm in the united states, especially along our southern frontier. in new orleans, indignation was openly expressed that our gallant men had been despatched on this forlorn enterprize without the amplest means of defence and attack, while our arsenals were filled with all the munitions of war. a large force of volunteers was, therefore, ordered out in the south, while two companies of artillery were immediately despatched to taylor's succor under the command of maj. gally. the report of arista's progress, however, proved to be false, so that we were fortunately saved from attack. yet the sufferings of our army did not cease with those military inconveniences. "two thirds of the tents furnished our soldiers were worn out or rotten, and had been condemned by boards of survey appointed by the proper authorities in accordance with the army regulations. transparent as gauze, they afforded little or no protection against the intense heat of summer or the drenching rains and severe cold of winter. even the dews penetrated the thin covering almost without obstruction. such were the tents provided for campaigners in a country almost deluged three months in the year, and more variable in its climate than any other region, passing from the extreme of heat to that of cold in a few hours. during the whole of november and december, either the rains were descending with violence, or the furious "northers" which ravage this coast were breaking the frail tent-poles or rending the rotten canvas. for days and weeks every article in hundreds of tents was thoroughly soaked; and during these terrible months, the sufferings of the sick, in the crowded hospital tents, were indescribably horrible. every day added to the frightfulness of the mortality. at one time a sixth of the entire camp was on the sick list, and at least one-half unfit for service, in consequence of dysentery and catarrhal fevers which raged like a pestilence."[79] the camp was without fires, and, being situated on the edge of a vast prairie sparsely covered with muskeet trees, was but scantily supplied with wood even for the most needful purposes. the quarter-master's department furnished only the weak and stunted _mustangs_ of the country; and the little and inefficient ponies, geared in the large harness made at the north for american horses, looked as if they would jump through their collars instead of use them for traction. with such teams only a sufficiency of wood could be drawn for cooking, and none for camp fires to comfort the sick and suffering soldiers. "as winter advanced, the prairie became a quagmire, the roads almost impassable, and as the _mustangs_ died in large numbers, wood enough for cooking even, could not be procured. the encampment now resembled a marsh, the water, at times, being three or four feet deep in the tents of whole wings of regiments. all military exercises were suspended, and the bleak gloomy days were passed in inactivity, disgust and sullenness. the troops, after being thoroughly drenched all day, without fires to dry them, lay down at night in wet blankets on the soaked ground, as plank for tent floors was not furnished by the quarter-masters until the rainy season was over. at times the men, at tattoo, gasped for breath in the sultry night air, and, at reveille, found their moist blankets frozen around them and their tents stiff with ice. a portion of the men were kept without pay for six months, and the rest for four months, although the law strictly requires payment every two months. "officers and soldiers, destitute of funds, were compelled to borrow, upon the strength of pay due, of their more fortunate companions, or of the shylocks, in search of victims, that polluted the camp. sick soldiers, directed by their surgeons to return to the united states, had either to remain and die, or to submit to exorbitant exactions from unfeeling villains in their pension certificates and pay accounts, though the law requires the paymasters to cash them in specie. "on the first landing of the 3d and 4th infantry at corpus christi, "kinney's rancho," though a lawless, smuggling town, under the vigorous sway of its martial proprietor, was as quiet and peaceful as a village in new england. but every fresh arrival of troops was followed by some portion of that vast horde of harpies, that are ever to be found in the train of all armies, ready to prey upon the simple and unsuspecting among the soldiers. in a short time, hundreds of temporary structures were erected on the outskirts of the "rancho," and in them, all the cut-throats, thieves, and murderers of the united states and texas, seem to have congregated. no sight could have been more truly melancholy than that of their bloated and sin-marked visages, as they lounged through the purlieus of this modern pandemonium. the air, by day, was polluted with their horrid oaths and imprecations,--and the savage yells, exulting shouts, and despairing groans of their murderous frays, made night hideous. but, not content with confining their hellish deeds to their own worthy fraternity, they laid their worthless hands on the troops. many of the soldiers, enticed to their dram-shops, were drugged with stupefying potions, and then robbed of their hard earnings, or murdered in cold blood." general taylor, looking to the probability of a movement against mexico, warned the department that a ponton train was indispensable in a country wherein streams abounded and wood for bridges was scarce; but it was not despatched until after the next meeting of congress. "six months after the army had taken the field, there were not teams and wagons enough to transport one half of the troops; so that, in case of hostilities, had a forward movement been ordered, it could only have been effected by detachments, and, in consequence, that most fatal of all military errors would have been committed, of permitting the enemy to attack and beat in detail. the few teams furnished, it is natural to think, were the choicest to be found in the west. for, it had been said, that though the "army of occupation" was small, the great celerity of its movements, from the superiority of the american horses, would contribute, as well as the greater bravery of its men, to make it more than a match for the largest mexican force. ninety yoke of oxen and several hundred mustangs were therefore bought, but not a single american horse! * * * * * "three batteries of artillery were added to the one which, at length reached the company from charleston. horses were sent with two of them, to manoeuvre them rapidly on the field of battle, and to transport them wherever the army might go. but the third came unprovided with cavalry. "when the new orleans volunteers left corpus christi, their artillery horses were turned over to the company from charleston. this company, having always acted as infantry, had never even seen a flying artillery drill,--half of the men could not ride,--many had never ridden at all, and, in mounting for the first time, made mr. winkle's mistake as to which stirrup to use. it was certainly an original idea, to convert, _in a single day_, a company of foot into light artillery. however, as horses had at length been given to the company from charleston, it was the ardent desire of the lieutenant commanding, to teach his men to ride and drive, and the sabre exercise. this the loyal quarter-masters resolved to prevent, and, at the same time, to show the world how economical they were. they, therefore, refused to purchase any more hay and told the dragoons and light artillery, that they, themselves, must cut and haul the dry and sapless broom straw of the prairie, and forage their horses on that."[80] such is a picture of the sufferings of our army of occupation, drawn by an eye-witness, and scarcely colored by the warmth of his feelings. if the advice of military men, and the opinion of persons whose experience as campaigners entitled them to respect, had been heeded, this war would have been speedily ended. ever since the rumor of annexation in 1843, but, especially, since the inaugural address of president polk in 1845, in which he pronounced so emphatic an opinion as to our right to the whole of oregon, our political firmament had been clouded. prudent men thought it probable that there would be war with mexico or hostilities with england, and that the two sources of irritation, by distracting our powers, would materially increase each other's virulence. at this time, general gaines, a chieftain who has become venerable in the service of his country, and whose skill and bravery on many a field have manifested his character in actions that no citizen can ever forget, commanded on our south-western frontier. the delicate character of our foreign relations, to which allusion has just been made, attracted his anxious attention in 1845; and his responsibility as chief on a long, exposed frontier, compelled him to give timely warning to the department. it seemed to this officer, if we engaged hastily in war with mexico or england, at such a crisis, and with no preparations either for an army or its instruction, that the conflict would be disastrous or procrastinated, especially as the latter power had so far surpassed us in applying steam to naval purposes. long years of peace had rendered us indifferent to war; and unvarying success in other conflicts had made us confident. accordingly, he recommended the concentration of a large force of volunteers on the borders of the probable theatre of war, where they should be trained in military science, together with the regulars commanded by general taylor, until the spring of 1846. if war could not be averted before that period, we might then be able to march against the enemy with a powerful and disciplined army. he contended that the true policy of our country, in such an assault, was to pursue with relentless energy the military bandits who swayed the destinies of mexico, whilst, on all sides, we protected the persons and property of non-combatants; so that in pushing onward to the capital we would leave throughout the country traversed an indelible impression of our justice. thus the confidence of the best portions of mexico would be secured, the _prestige_ of her army promptly destroyed, and peace obtained before she was able to rally. on the other hand, general gaines believed that if we began war without large and instructed forces, we might count on a protracted struggle, as in the seminole campaigns from 1836 to 1842. the precipices upon the doubtful verge of whose summits we tottered during the war, prove the wisdom of these suggestions. the faithful page of history admonishes that nations as well as individuals who recklessly disregard the essential maxims that prescribe their prudent duties, must sooner or later pay the penalty of neglect. but politicians, uneducated even in the pleasant discipline of militia trainings, do not view matters in the same light as military men whose knowledge of detail, and of the responsibilities of real service, make them unwilling to engage in war, or even to threaten hostilities, without the amplest preparation to perform all they promise. without such true and earnest discipline warlike array is but a military cheat. it is vain to predict what might have been the result had the advice of the gallant and prudent gaines been adopted; yet it cannot be doubted that a well equipped body of twenty-five or thirty thousand men would have marched to the city of mexico and dictated peace at the cost of one fourth the blood and treasure that were subsequently expended. a lingering policy of hesitation together with the acknowledged inefficiency of mexico, may palliate the errors of our cabinet; but wise politicians will not henceforth fail to be impressed with the necessity of military preparation which this conflict has taught us. a war which was originally supposed to be one exclusively of defence, was suddenly changed to an aggressive conflict, and is, perhaps, an additional excuse for our unpreparedness. most of the events in this narrative derive peculiar interest from the fact that it is the first and only offensive war into which we have been forced. with every known principle of defence we had been long acquainted; for, in the school of washington, we acquired a sound, practical knowledge, which subsequent experience, under the most perfect system of self-government, enabled us to improve. but it is to be hoped that many years will elapse before our volunteers will be again called from their peaceful duties to take part in an aggressive war, and especially against a government whose theory of rule is the same as our own. note.--general gaines, who commanded the western division, was censured by the war department for having made a requisition on the governor of louisiana for state troops to be sent to the army in texas under taylor's command, at the moment of apprehended danger described in this chapter. general taylor, for more than a year previous to september, 1845, commanded one of the brigades of gaines's division, and the latter never knew _by authority_ that the former had been disconnected from him, except upon temporary service, until advised by the secretary of war on the 13th of september. he never received a copy of the authority given to taylor to go to texas until after the date of his requisition for louisiana volunteers, on the 15th of august, 1845; consequently he _then_ considered himself responsible for the strength and support of one of his own brigades, and bound to succor it speedily when he believed it to be in imminent danger.--see senate doc. no. 378, for his correspondence, and especially p. 48. footnotes: [70] almonté's report. kennedy's texas, chap. 1. [71] senate doc. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 56. [72] kennedy's texas, chap. 1. [73] senate doc. no. 341, 28th cong. 1st sess. p. 76. [74] an account of the army of observation and occupation, written by one of its officers, in the southern quarterly review for april, 1846. [75] s. q. review, _ut antea_, p. 442. (april, 1846.) [76] kennedy's texas, chap. 2d. [77] niles' reg. vol. 68, p. 305. [78] s. q. rev. _ut antea_. senate doc. no. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 93. [79] s. q. rev. _ut antea_. [80] southern quarterly review, _ut antea_. these statements are made by an able and distinguished officer of our army, who was on the field, and is perfectly versed in all the matters he discusses. chapter ii. our position at corpus christi--instructions to taylor as to the boundary of the rio grande--taylor's views--review and history of the boundary question--letter from mr. adams--santa anna's agreements with texas, &c.--march to the rio grande ordered--justification in a military point of view of the occupation of the disputed territory--anecdote of frederick the great--war in silesia and austria--madison's conduct to spain in 1810--right of declaration of war--justifiable causes of war--opinion of sir j. mackintosh--war and diplomacy contrasted. one of the most inclement winters in the gulf of mexico had passed in the comfortless manner described in the last chapter. our attempts to negotiate with mexico were repulsed, and although our minister had not yet returned to the united states--having delayed at jalapa with the hope of finding paredes more accessible than herrera--every thing indicated an ultimate defeat of diplomacy. meanwhile our forces at corpus christi were gradually augmenting, under the command of generals taylor and worth. in october, 1845, the troops amounted to near four thousand, and general taylor made every preparation, by reconnoissances between the nueces and the rio grande for the ultimate defence of soil which had been claimed by our government as part of texas.[81] as a military man it was not his duty to affix the boundaries that were to be the subject of negotiation or war; but simply to ascertain precisely the extent of defence required along a disputed territory, and to dispose his troops accordingly.[82] in october, 1845, therefore, general taylor reviewed the instructions from the war department, and, seeing that he had been ordered to select and occupy near the rio grande such a site as would consist with the health of the troops, and was best adapted to repel invasion, he ventured to suggest an advance of his army. this however, was done by him whilst he felt great diffidence in touching topics that might become matter of delicate diplomacy. nevertheless, taking a soldier's view of the topographical and not the diplomatic question, he informed our government, that if it made the rio grande an _ultimatum_ in adjusting a boundary, he doubted not that the settlement would be facilitated by taking possession, at once, of one or two suitable points on, or quite near, that river. at these spots, our strength would be displayed in a manner not to be mistaken, while the position of our troops at the remote camp of corpus christi, with arid wastes between them and the outposts of mexico, altogether failed to impress that government with our readiness to vindicate by force of arms our title to the country as far as the rio grande.[83] moreover, general taylor felt encumbered by the orders from our war department of the 8th july, in which he was told that mexico held military establishments on the east side of the rio grande, whose forces he should not disturb until our peaceful relations were finally destroyed.[84] accordingly, on the 13th of january, 1846, our commander-in-chief was directed to advance with his troops to the rio grande.[85] this movement was made in consequence of the anticipated failure of our negotiations, clearly indicated by the conduct of the mexican government immediately upon the arrival of mr. slidell in the capital. but before these orders were despatched to general taylor, he had already in august, 1845, been apprised of his duties in the event of hostile demonstrations on the part of the enemy. in case of an invasion of texas by the mexicans, he was directed to drive them back beyond the rio grande; and, although it was desirable that he should confine himself as much as possible to defensive measures, yet, in the event of such a repulse, he was authorized to seize and hold possession of matamoros and other places on the soil of mexico. this resolution of our government was made the subject of grave complaint by persons who opposed the war. the order to advance from corpus christi to the rio grande was alleged to be an act of invasion, and consequently, that _hostilities_ were commenced by us and not by mexico. it may be pardoned if we pause awhile to consider a subject of such vital importance. the solution of the question was placed by one party upon the determination whether the rio grande was the boundary between texas and mexico before the battle of san jacinto; and, if not, whether it has been made so since by competent authority. up to that period it was asserted to be a recognized fact that the nueces was the western boundary of texas. mr. john quincy adams, in his controversy with don luis de onis, upon the spanish boundary question, in march, 1818;[86] and messieurs pinckney and monroe, in their argument with cevallos at madrid in april, 1805,[87] claimed the rio grande as the true limit between the united states and mexico, by virtue of the ancient rights of france and the treaties between that sovereignty and the spanish king.[88] it was asserted, therefore, that by the cession of louisiana all the rights of france over texas, as an integral part of her territory, accrued to us; and consequently that when the state of texas was united to this country it was only _re_-annexed with what were _claimed_ to be its ancient limits. but this was not a true statement of the controversy, for after our treaty with spain the aspect of the affair changed. the question then was no longer what had been the boundary under the laws between france and spain, or between spain and the united states,--but what were the limits either under the colonial government of the mexican viceroyalty, or under the laws of mexico, when she became an independent republic. it was asserted that no map or geography existed since the establishment of the republic that did not lay down the boundary north of the rio grande. the map of texas, compiled by stephen h. austin, the parent of texan colonization, published at philadelphia in 1835, and setting forth all the mexican grants in texas, represents the rio nueces as the western boundary. general almonté in 1834, as i have previously stated, alleged, upon the authority of the state government of coahuila and texas that the boundary between them was even east of the nueces. this was probably in accordance with the ancient spanish division; for, in 1805 cevallos declared to our ministers at madrid that the province of texas, "where the spaniards have had settlements from the 17th century, was bounded on the east by louisiana, and contains the extensive country which lies between the river medina _where the government of coahuila ends_, and the post now abandoned." authorities to this effect might be extensively multiplied.[90] brazos de santiago was a mexican port of entry, which continued to be held up to the period of hostilities, and laredo was a small mexican town, occupied by a mexican garrison. if such was the geographical division between texas and mexico on the lower rio grande, near its mouth in the gulf, it was asserted that there could be infinitely less right to claim it as a limit nearer its source, since santa fé, the capital of new mexico, had never been within the jurisdiction of texas, and since the boundaries of chihuahua commenced near the head waters of the nueces. these were some of the arguments used by individuals who deemed the march to point isabel an invasion of mexican territory. it is just that a few reasons should also be presented on behalf of those who believed it to be lawful or expedient. when santa anna was captured after the battle of san jacinto in 1836, the leading men in texas had great difficulty in rescuing him from popular vengeance for the massacres he had committed. the victory over the central chief--the despot and dictator of mexico--was generally believed to be a crowning measure of success, for the bitter persecutor soon dwindled into the humble supplicant, and pledged his name and his oath to secure the independence of the rebellious state. accordingly, with every appearance and promise of good faith and honor, he executed contracts with the texan authorities which deserve consideration in discussing this question. on the 14th of may, 1836, at velasco, two of these documents were signed by santa anna, burnet, collingsworth, hardiman and grayson,--the first being a public, and the second a secret convention between the parties. the third article of the first paper stipulates that the mexican troops shall evacuate the _territory_ of texas, _passing to the other side of the rio grande_, while the fourth article of the secret agreement declares that a treaty of amity, commerce and limits shall be made between mexico and texas, _the territory of the latter power not to extend beyond the rio bravo del norte, or rio grande_. in conformity with these contracts, texas set free the prisoner, whose "prompt release and departure for vera cruz," according to their tenor, "were necessary for the fulfilment of his _solemn oath_," to obtain a recognition of the independence of texas, and to dispose the mexican cabinet for the reception of commissioners.[91] santa anna returned to his country in disgrace after his disastrous campaign, and lurked in retirement at his farm until the french attacked vera cruz, when he threw himself again at the head of the departmental forces. in the action he fortunately lost a limb, and by the skilful display of his mutilation in defence of mexico, he renewed his claims to national gratitude. instead, however, of using his influence to obtain the treaty, promised as the boon for his life, he became at once the bitterest foe of texas, and pledged himself to fight "forever for its reconquest." texas, meanwhile, acting in good faith, and presuming to adopt the spirit and letter of the convention with santa anna, whom she naturally regarded as the dictator of mexico, passed the act of december 19, 1836, establishing the rio grande as her boundary from the gulf to its source. besides this, her congress created senatorial and representative districts west of the nueces; organized and defined limits of counties extending to the rio grande; created courts of justice; spread her judicial system over the country wherever her people roamed, and performed other acts of sovereignty which we are compelled not to disregard. it cannot be contended that these acts and agreements were alone sufficient, under the laws of nations, to confer upon texas unquestionable rights over the soil between the nueces and the rio grande, for a contract with the captive president and general was not legally binding; but it is equally clear that all these arguments of the old authorities as to the original boundary, and all the new claims set up by texas, under her statutes, as well as stipulations with santa anna, made that territory a disputed ground whose real ownership could only be equitably settled by negotiation. the strong language of both the contracts, just recited, seems to _concede_ the fact that the president of mexico regarded, at least the lower rio grande, as already the real boundary between mexico and texas, notwithstanding the opinion of almonté in 1834; and consequently that it was neither the subject of treaty or agreement at that moment, nor could it become so afterwards when commissioners were appointed. when texas was annexed to the united states she was received with these asserted limits, though she did not join the union with any specific boundaries.[92] it was thought best by both parties to leave the question of confines open between mexico and our country, so as not to complicate the national entanglements. after the congress of the united states and convention in texas had acted upon the joint resolution it was impossible for us to recede. the course of our presidents, therefore, was at once pacific and soothing towards mexico. for although they believed that republic had no right to be consulted as to the annexation of texas, a free and independent state, they nevertheless admitted all her natural and just privileges in regard to boundary. mr. tyler and mr. polk therefore despatched envoys to mexico with the offer of liberal negotiations as soon as a favorable opportunity presented itself. but the chargé and minister of mr. tyler were scornfully rejected, while mr. slidell, as has been already related, was refused an audience upon frivolous pretences at a moment when the mexican secretary was secretly craving to receive him.[93] in such a juncture what was the duty of the united states? it is an easy matter for speculative philosophers or political critics to find fault with the conduct of statesmen and to become prophets of woe _after_ the occurrence of events they deprecate. but such men are timid actors on the world's stage, and especially in such a theatre of folly as the mexican republic. governments have but two ways of settling international disputes,--either by negotiation or war,--and, even the latter must be concluded by diplomacy, for nations rarely fight until one of them is completely annihilated. negotiation, or the attempt to negotiate, had been completely exhausted by us. meanwhile mexico continued to excite our curiosity by spasmodic struggles in nerving her people for the war, as well as by gasconading despatches which breathed relentless animosity to our country for the annexation of texas. nevertheless, this sensitive and vaunting nation would neither make peace, establish boundaries, negotiate, nor declare war. was it reasonable that such a frantic state of things should be permitted to continue? could this perverse aversion to fighting or friendship be tolerated? were our countries to conclude an eternal compact of mutual hatred and non intercourse? was such childish obstinacy and weakness to be connived at in our country? was it due to common sense, justice, or the preservation of a good neighborhood that we should remain supine under insane threats and dishonorable treatment? we asserted that, upon the texas question, we had rightly no dispute with mexico, except as to the boundary involved in the territory our forces were then occupying or about to cross. we did not design discussing our right to annex texas. that was an act accomplished and unalterable. it was, doubtless, exceedingly convenient for mexico to maintain this pacific state of _quasi-war_ and to reject, alike, our amity and hostilities, as long as she owed us many millions of dollars and refused either to pay principal or interest, or to conclude a treaty for the settlement of unadjusted claims. whilst her government was able to enforce non-intercourse, it was free from importunity and payment. but this adroit scheme of insolvency was unjust to our citizens, and only served to augment the liabilities of mexico. what then remained to be done? the reply may be found in a significant anecdote related by mr. adams in a speech in congress on the oregon question, on the 2d of january, 1846. "after negotiating"--said he--"for twenty years about this matter we may take possession of the subject matter of negotiation. indeed, we may negotiate after we take possession, and this is the military way of doing business. when frederick the great came to the throne of prussia he found that his father had equipped for him an army of a hundred thousand men. meeting soon after the austrian minister, the latter said to him: "your father has given you a great army, but ours has seen the wolf, whilst your majesty's has not." "well--well!" exclaimed frederick, "i will soon give it an opportunity to see the wolf!" frederick then added, in his memoirs:--"i had some excellent old _pretensions_ to an austrian province, which some of my ancestors owned one or two centuries before; accordingly i sent an ambassador to the court of austria stating my claim, and presenting a full exposition of my right to the province. the same day my ambassador was received in vienna, i entered silesia with my army!"[94] such would be a prompt and impulsive answer to the manifold prevarications of seditious mexico. but the army we advanced and the country we occupied, were neither the army of frederick nor the pleasant vales of rich and populous silesia. a nearly desolate waste, stretched from the nueces to the rio grande, barren alike in soil and inhabitants, and tempting none to its dreary wilderness but nomadic _rancheros_ or outlaws who found even mexico no place of refuge for their wickedness. it was, surely, not a land worthy of bloodshed, and yet, in consequence of its sterility, it became of vast importance on a frontier across whose wide extent enemies might pass unobserved and unmolested. with the entire command of the rio grande from its source to its mouth in the hands of our enemy, and the whole of this arid region flanking the stream and interposing itself between mexico and our troops, it is evident that our adversaries would possess unusual advantages over us either for offensive or defensive war. the mere control of the embouchure of the river was no trivial superiority, for, on a stormy and inhospitable coast, it was almost impossible to support an effectual blockade and thus prevent the enemy from being succored along his whole frontier with arms and provisions from abroad. by seizing, however, the usual points of transit and entrance on the lower rio grande many of these evils might be avoided; and, if mexico ultimately resolved on hostilities, we should be enabled to throw our forces promptly across the river, and by rapid marches obtain the command of all the military positions of vantage along her north-eastern boundary. the foresight of frederick the great disclosed to him the military value of silesia in the event of a war with austria, and it was probably that circumstance, quite as much as his alleged political rights, that induced him to enter it with an army on the day when he commenced negotiations. he began the war with austria by surprising saxony, and, during all his difficulties, clung tenaciously to the possession of silesia. saxony was important as a military barrier covering prussia on the side of austria, while silesia indented deeply the line of the austrian frontier and flanked a large part of bohemia.[95] thus saxony and silesia formed a natural fortification for prussia, just as the deserts of the disputed land, when in our rear, covered the undefended confines of texas at the same time that they gave us the keys to the enemy's country at point isabel and matamoros. * * * * * it may be asserted that, when vacant or nearly vacant territory is in controversy between two nations, and forms the only subject of real dispute between them, it would be better for both to refrain from an attempt to occupy it, provided they are willing to arbitrate the quarrel, or settle it by diplomacy. but, when both parties assert claims, both have equal rights to enter it, when negotiation fails. the decision is then to be made only by intimidation or war. there is no alternative by which collision can be escaped, and it is the duty of the wiser of the disputants to place his national forces in such an advantageous position as either to defend his acknowledged territory or force himself to be driven from the soil he claims. "i do not consider the march to the rio grande to have been the cause of the war"--said a distinguished statesman, "anymore than i consider the british march on concord or lexington to have been the cause of the american revolution, or the crossing of the rubicon to have been the cause of the civil war in rome. the march to the rio grande brought on the _collision of arms_, but, so far from being the cause of the war, it was itself the effect of those causes." * * * * * the power of declaring war is expressly reserved by the constitution to congress, and, though the president is commander in chief of the army when called into actual service, he should be extremely cautious in issuing orders or doing acts which may lead to hostilities resulting in war. our congress was in session in january, 1846, when mr. slidell was rejected by mexico, when our international relations were complicated as i have described, and when the secretary of war, by the president's direction, gave the order for taylor's advance to the rio grande. this was an act that brought the armies of mexico and the united states in front of each other; and although there can be no doubt that congress would have authorised the movement of our troops under the military advice of general taylor,--provided the rio grande was to be made an ultimatum in the ratification of a treaty by our senate,--it is, nevertheless, to be profoundly regretted that the question was not previously submitted to our national representatives. at that moment the public mind was distracted between mexico and england; but the oregon question nearly absorbed the apparently minor difficulties with our restive neighbor. congress contemplated the solemn probability of war with one of the mightiest nations of our age, and even some of our experienced statesmen,--as we have seen in the example of mr. adams,--recommended the most stringent measures of armed occupation. at such a crisis, and with a confidential knowledge of all our foreign relations, it was the duty of the president to represent these matters frankly to congress and to ask the opinion of his constitutional advisers, as he subsequently did in the settlement of the dispute with great britain. this prudent act would have saved the executive from needless responsibility, whilst it indicated a sensitive devotion to the behests of our constitution. congress met whilst our troops were encamped at corpus christi, as an army of observation, whose hostile, though protective character, was unquestionable; yet our representatives neither ordered its return nor refused it supplies. this denoted a willingness to sanction measures which might either pacify mexico, or impose upon that republic the immediate alternative of war. it is not improbable that congress would have adopted such a course, because, according to the pretensions of mexico, our troops had already invaded her domains. this is an important view of the question which should not be passed by silently. mexico, it must be remembered, never relinquished her right to reconquer texas, but always claimed the _whole_ province as her own, asserting a determination to regard its union with our confederacy as justifiable cause of war. the joint-resolution, alone, was therefore a belligerent act of the congress of the united states, sufficient, according to the doctrine of mexico, to compel hostile retaliation. but, moreover, as the entire soil of texas, from the sabine to the nueces or rio grande was still claimed by mexico as her unsurrendered country, the landing of a single american soldier anywhere south of our ancient boundary with spain, was quite as hostile an invasion of mexican territory as the passage of our army from corpus christi to point isabel. occasions upon which the eminent right of self protection has been adopted as a principle of action in the united states, are not wanting in our political history. the circumstances in all, are of course not precisely the same, but the policy is identical. the conduct of our government in regard to general jackson's invasion of florida for the suppression of indian cruelties may be referred to. but congress might have found a still more analogous case, in the dispute between spain and the united states as to the eastern limits of louisiana. spain alleged that florida extended to the mississippi, embracing what was then a wilderness, but, now, forms the populous states of alabama and mississippi; while our government asserted that all the territory eastward of the mississippi and extending to the rio perdido belonged of right to us by virtue of the treaty concluded at paris on the 30th of april, 1803. by acts of congress in 1803 and 1804 the president was authorized to take possession of the territory ceded by france, to establish a provisional government, to lay duties on goods imported into it; and, moreover, _whenever he deemed it expedient_, to erect the bay and river mobile into a separate district, in which he might establish a port of entry and delivery. in 1810, president madison believing that the united states had too long acquiesced in the temporary continuance of this territory under spanish domain, and that nothing was to be gained from spain by candid discussion and amicable negotiation for several years, solved the difficulty by taking possession of mobile and baton rouge and extending our jurisdiction to the perdido. this possession, he took means to ensure, if needful, by military force. mr. madison's conduct was assailed in congress by the federalists who regarded it as an unjustifiable and offensive demonstration against spain, but it was defended with equal warmth by the opposition,--especially by mr. clay,--and the rio perdido has ever since continued to form the western limit of florida.[96] * * * * * when nations are about to undertake the dread responsibility of war, and to spread the sorrow and ruin which always mark the pathway of victorious or defeated armies, they should pause to contemplate the enormity of their enterprise as well as the principles that can alone justify them in the sight of god and man. human life cannot be lawfully destroyed, assailed or endangered for any other object than that of just defence of person or principle, yet it is not a legal consequence that defensive wars are always just.[97] "it is the right of a state," said that profound moralist and statesman, sir james mackintosh, "to take all measures necessary for her safety if it be attacked or threatened from without: provided always that reparation cannot otherwise be obtained; that there is a reasonable prospect of obtaining it by arms; and that the evils of the contest are not probably greater than the mischiefs of acquiescence in the wrong; including, on both sides of the deliberation, the ordinary consequences of the example as well as the immediate effects of the act. if reparation can otherwise be obtained, a nation has no necessary, and therefore no just cause of war; if there be no probability of obtaining it by arms, a government cannot, with justice to their own nation, embark it in war; and, if the evils of resistance should appear on the whole greater than those of submission, wise rulers will consider an abstinence from a pernicious exercise of right as a sacred duty to their own subjects, and a debt which every people owes to the great commonwealth of mankind, of which they and their enemies are alike members. a war is just against the wrongdoer when reparation for wrong cannot otherwise be obtained; but is then only conformable to all the principles of morality when it is not likely to expose the nation by whom it is levied to greater evils than it professes to avert, and when it does not inflict on the nation which has done the wrong, sufferings altogether disproportioned to the extent of the injury. when the rulers of a nation are required to determine a question of peace or war, the bare justice of their case against the wrongdoer never can be the sole, and is not always the chief matter on which they are morally bound to exercise a conscientious deliberation. prudence in conducting the affairs of their subjects is in them a part of justice." these are the true principles by which mexico should have judged the controversy between us, before she rejected all our efforts to negotiate, and forced our government to prepare for hostilities. * * * * * the idea of war, for mere conquest, seems now to be obsolete among civilized nations. to political dominion, as exhibited in the various governments of the old world, and in most of the new, geographical limits are definitely assigned. this fact must, hereafter, greatly modify the objects of war, by narrowing them to _principles_ instead of _territory_. principles, however, are always the fair subjects of controversy for the diplomatic art. yet such is the perversity of human nature, that, although we are convinced of the propriety and possibility of adjusting our disputes by reason, we nevertheless go to war for these very principles, and, after having done each other an incalculable amount of injury, at last sit down like cripples, to negotiate the very matters which ought to have been treated and terminated diplomatically at first. it is, perhaps, the folly of mankind to believe that there is more wisdom in negotiators and diplomacy when nations are lame and weakened by war than when they are full of the vigorous energy and intelligence of peace! note.--it may be useful to record the following proclamation of general woll, before annexation, in order to show, that the agreements between santa anna and the texans in 1836, are not the only mexican documents in existence which seemed to open the boundary question between texas and tamaulipas. "_headquarters of the army of the north, mier, june 20, 1844._ "i, adrian woll, general of brigade, &c., make known: "1. the armistice agreed on with the department of texas having expired, and the war being, in consequence, recommenced against the inhabitants of that department, all communication with it ceases. "2. every individual, of whatever condition, who may contravene provisions of the preceding article, shall be regarded as a traitor, and shall receive the punishment prescribed in article 45, title 10, treatise 8, of the articles of war. "3. _every individual who may be found at the distance of one league from the left bank of the rio bravo, will be regarded as a favorer and accomplice of the usurpers of that part of the national territory, and as a traitor to his country; and, after a summary military trial, shall receive the said punishment._ "4. every individual who may be comprehended within the provisions of the preceding article, and may be rash enough to fly at the sight of any force belonging to the supreme government, shall be pursued until taken, or put to death. "5. in consideration of the situation of the towns of la reda and santa rita de ampudia, as well as of all the _farm houses beyond the rio bravo_, i have this day received, from the supreme government, orders to determine the manner by which those interested are to be protected; but, until the determination of the supreme government be received, i warn all those who are beyond the limits here prescribed, to bring them within the line, or to abandon them; as those who disobey this order, will infallibly suffer the punishment here established. adrian woll. footnotes: [81] on the 15th of june, 1845, mr. bancroft, as acting secretary of state, wrote to general taylor as follows: "the point of your ultimate destination is the western frontier of texas, where you will select and occupy, on or near the rio grande del norte, such a site as will consist with the health of the troops, and will be best adapted to repel invasion, and to protect what, in the event of annexation, will be our western border." on the 30th of july, 1845, the secretary of war, mr. marcy, declared to him that "the rio grande is claimed to be the boundary between the two countries, and up to this boundary you are to extend your protection, only excepting any posts on the eastern side thereof which are in the actual occupancy of mexican forces, or mexican settlements over which the republic of texas did not exercise jurisdiction at the period of annexation, or shortly before that event. it is expected that, in selecting the establishment for your troops, you will approach as near the boundary line--the rio grande--as prudence will dictate. with this view, the president desires that your position, for a part of your forces, at least, should be west of the river nueces." this, and even more forcible language, was repeated in letters from the same source on the 23d and 30th of august, and on the 16th of october, 1845. in the last letter the secretary of war states distinctly that the western boundary of texas is the rio grande. see senate doc. no. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 75, 77, 80, 81, 82. [82] that this was general taylor's view of the question is proved by a remark in his letter to general ampudia on the 12th of april, 1846, on being warned by that officer to break up his camp and to retire to the other bank of the nueces. general taylor says: i need hardly advise you that charged as i am, _in only a military capacity, with the performance of specific duties, i cannot enter into a discussion of the international question involved in the advance of the american army_.--id. p. 124. [83] see senate doc. no. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. p. 99. [84] id. p. 75. [85] id. p. 82. [86] american state papers, vol. 4, p. 468. [87] id. vol. 2, p. 662. [88] as it may be important that the reader should understand the title to louisiana under which the boundary of the rio grande was claimed, the following is a summary of its history. louisiana originally belonged to france, but by a secret compact between that country and spain in 1762, and by treaties, in the following year, between france, spain, and england, the french dominion was extinguished on all the continent of america. in consequence of the treaty between this country and england in 1783, the mississippi became the western boundary of the united states from its source to the 31° of north latitude, and thence, on the same parallel to the st. mary's. france, it will be remembered, always had _claimed_ dominion in louisiana to the rio bravo or rio grande, by virtue 1st. of the discovery of the mississippi from near its source to the ocean. 2d. _of the possession taken, and establishment made by la salle, at the bay of st. bernard, west of the rivers trinity and colorado, by authority of louis xiv, in 1685_; notwithstanding the subsequent destruction of the colony. 3d. of the charter of louis xiv, to crozat in 1712. 4th. the historical authority of du pratz, champigny, and the count de vergennes. 5th. of the authority of de lisle's map, and of the map published in 1762 by don thomas lopez, _geographer to the king of spain_, as well as of various other maps, atlases, and geographical and historical authorities. by an article of the secret treaty of san ildefonso, in october, 1800, spain retroceded louisiana to france; yet this treaty was not promulgated till the beginning of 1802. the paragraph of cession is as follows: "his catholic majesty engages to retrocede to the french republic, six months after the full and entire execution of the conditions and stipulations above recited relative to his royal highness, the duke of parma, the colony and province of louisiana, with the same extent that it already has in the hands of spain, _and that it had when france possessed it_, and such as it should be, after the treaties passed subsequently between spain and other powers." in 1803, bonaparte, the first consul of the french republic, ceded louisiana to the united states, as fully and in the same manner as it had been retroceded to france by spain in the treaty of san ildefonso; and, by virtue of this grant, messieurs madison, monroe, adams, clay, van buren, and jackson contended that the original limits of the state had been the rio grande. however, by the 3rd article of our treaty with spain in 1819, all our pretensions to extend the territory of louisiana towards mexico or the rio grande, were resigned and abandoned by adopting the river sabine as our southern confine in that quarter. see lyman's diplomacy of the united states. vol. 1, p. 368, and vol. 2, p. 136. the following extract from a valuable letter with which the author was favored by ex-president adams, who, as secretary of state, conducted the negotiations with spain, will explain his opinions and acts upon a subject of so much importance. quincy, 7th july, 1847. * * * * * "whoever sets out with an inquiry respecting the right of territories in the american hemisphere claimed by europeans, must begin by settling certain conventional principles of right and wrong before he can enter upon the discussion. "for example what right had columbus to cat island, otherwise called guanahani? who has the right to it now and how came they by it? the flag of st. george and the dragon now waves over it; but who had the right to take possession of it because christopher columbus found it,--the paltriest island in the midst of the ocean. european statesmen, warriors, and writers on what are called the laws of nations, have laid down a system of laws upon which they found this right. have the carribee indians, in whose possession that island was discovered by columbus, ever assented to that system of right and wrong? "you remember that hume, in commencing his history of england by the roman conquest says--"that without seeking any more justifiable reasons of hostility than were employed by the later europeans in subjecting the africans and the americans, they sent over an army under the command of plautius, an able general, who gained some victories, and made a considerable progress in subduing the inhabitants." then, no european has ever had any better right to take possession of america, than julius cæsar and the romans had to take possession of the island of britain. "what then was the right either of france or spain to the possession of the province of texas? to come to any question of right between the parties upon the subject you must agree upon certain conventional principles: where and when your question of right must become applicable to the facts; and, as between them, it was a disputed question, and had been so from the discovery of the mouth of the mississippi river by la salle, and from his second expedition to find the mouth of the mississippi coming from the ocean, in which he perished. "spain had prior claims to the country, but the claim of france was founded upon the last voyage of la salle, and by extending a supposed derivative right, from the spot where la salle landed half way to the nearest spanish settlement. "mr. monroe and mr. charles pinckney, in their correspondence with cevallos, assumed this as a settled principle between european nations, in the discussion of right to american territory. it was not contested, but was not assented to on the part of spain; and, having found it laid down by messieurs monroe and pinckney, i argued upon it, and it was never directly answered by don luis de onis, who could not controvert it without going to the pope's bull.[89] "as between france and spain therefore, i maintained that the question of right, had always been disputed and never was settled, from which opinion i have not since varied. that we had a shadow of right beyond the sabine i never believed since the conclusion of the florida treaty, and, it is from the date of that treaty, that great britain had not a shadow of right upon the oregon territory until we have been pleased to confer it upon her." * * * * * "i am, dear sir, with great respect, your very obedient servant, j. q. adams." to brantz mayer, esq., baltimore." [89] alexander vith's bull of donation. [90] see "matthew carey's general map of the world,"--29th map--published 1814.--kennedy's texas, p. 4.--mrs. holley's texas.--history of texas, by d. b. edwards, preceptor of gonzales seminary, texas, 1836, p. 14. he says:--"texas is bounded on the north by red river, which divides it from arkansas, ozark district, and new mexico; on the south by the gulf of mexico and the rio de las nueces, _which divides it from the states of coahuila and tamaulipas_; on the east by the eastern branch of the river sabine and the state of louisiana; on the west by the state of coahuila and the territory of new mexico." accompanying the work is a map of texas with boundaries, as laid down above. in a note on one corner of the map, speaking of the rio grande, he says: "_if_ this river should ever become the western boundary of texas (as desired by the inhabitants) it will add a hundred miles to its sea-coast and fifty thousand square miles to its superficies; the southern section of the surface is sandy, barren prairie, almost destitute of water; and its northern rocky, sterile mountains, nearly as destitute of timber." [91] primera campaña de tejas: by ramon martinez caro, secretary of santa anna, pp. 122, 125. [92] mr. donelson wrote to mr. buchanan on the 2d july, 1845, from washington, texas, as follows: "_my position is_ that we can hold corpus christi and all other points up the nueces. if attacked, the right of defence will authorise us to expel the mexicans to the rio grande. it is better for us to await the attack than incur the risk of embarrassing the question of annexation with the consequences of immediate possession of the territory on the rio grande. * * * the government left for treaty arrangement the boundary question in the propositions for a definitive treaty of peace. h. of r. doc. no. 2, 29th cong. 1st sess. pp. 78, 79. [93] i am informed by mr. parrott, the secretary of legation who accompanied mr. slidell, that no form of letters of credence--or evidence of powers as "_commissioner to settle the texan dispute_," would have secured a hearing for our envoy. the mob, the army, and paredes were determined that no missionary of peace should be received from the united states. [94] the _claim_ of frederick the iind to silesia was considered _plausible_. as bohemia renounced not only the possession, but all its rights to silesia by the treaties of breslau and berlin and other subsequent treaties, the kings of prussia pretended, that by virtue of the renunciation, they became sovereign dukes of the country and not subject to the emperor in their new character. to this claim it was replied that bohemia being an imperial state, could not, of its own authority, destroy the feudal tenure by which silesia was attached to it, and through it to the empire. the question was rendered more intricate, for one party considered bohemia feudal only as to the electoral dignity, but as a kingdom free and independent of germany. the germans argued that silesia was part of the empire, the prussians considered it a separate and independent state. frederick took advantage of these "state right" doctrines to sustain his claim, as texas took advantage of her state right sovereignty when the central despotism of santa anna overthrew the federal constitution of 1824. [95] arnold's fourth lecture on modern history. [96] waite's state papers, 1809-11, p. 261; and clay's speech on the line of the perdido. [97] pufendorf, lib. viii, c. 6.--note by barbeyrac. chapter iii. army marches from corpus christi--taylor prepares the mexicans for his advance--description of the march--beautiful prairie and desolate sand wilderness--rattlesnakes--chapparal--the arroyo colorado--first hostile demonstrations of the mexicans--expected fight--cross the colorado--worth and taylor separate--true nature of discipline- characters of mexican and american soldiers contrasted. on the 8th of march, 1846, the joyous news ran through the american camp, at corpus christi, that the tents were at last to be struck. the worn out soldiery had nothing to regret in quitting a spot where their eyes were only relieved by looking from the dreary sea in front to the desolate prairie in the rear. general taylor had already taken means to prepare the mexicans for his advance, although he scarcely expected resistance. respectable citizens from matamoros had frequently visited his camp; and to all of those who were represented as possessing influence at home he proclaimed the unhostile feelings of our government towards their country, and that when our army marched southward it would not pass the rio grande unless mexico provoked war. he invariably apprized these strangers of his resolution to protect the peaceful inhabitants in all their rights and usages, as well as to pay for every thing needed by his forces instead of plundering the country for support. accordingly, on the morning of the 8th of the month, the advanced guard, composed of the cavalry and major ringgold's light artillery,--the whole under the command of colonel twiggs, and numbering twenty-three officers and three hundred and eighty-seven men,--took up its line of march towards matamoros. this corps was succeeded by the brigades of infantry, the last of which departed on the 11th followed immediately by the commander in chief with his staff. the weather was favorable; the roads in tolerable order; the troops in good condition notwithstanding the winter's hardships; while a general spirit of animation pervaded the whole body, inspired as it was with the hope of adventure in the neighborhood of an enemy. all, therefore, departed on this day from corpus christi by land, except the command of major monroe, who was to reach the brazos de santiago in transports under convoy of the united states brig porpoise and the woodbury. this officer was to embark with a siege train and field battery, in season to reach his destination when the army would be in the vicinity of point isabel. the last adieus of our forces to their dreary winter quarter were by no means tearful, as with colors flying and music playing, they crossed the sandy hills that concealed it forever from their sight. the first day's march passed through alternate patches of prairies and timber to the nueces; but, on the two next, these sad wastes were exchanged for splendid fields blossoming with flowers of every hue. a delicious fragrance filled the air, and the whole surface of the earth as far as the eye could reach, seemed covered with a beautiful carpet. the edge of the horizon, in every direction, was crowded with wild animals. on one side thousands of mustangs curvetted over the gentle elevations of the rolling prairie; on another herds of deer might be seen standing for a moment filled with wonder at the unwonted sight of human beings, and then bounding off until they were lost in the vast distance. beautiful antelopes, nimble as the wind, were beheld in countless numbers, while pecarys and wild bulls rushed in droves across the path of our men. but, on the fourth day of the march, this scene of enchantment suddenly vanished. uncultivated prairies and immense herds of savage beasts had already testified the abandoned state of the country; yet the region our forces now entered disclosed the frightful "nakedness of the land." the water became exceedingly bad, and there was scarcely fuel enough for culinary purposes. the blooming vegetation of the preceding days was exchanged for sands through which the weary men and cattle toiled with extreme difficulty. salt lagunes spread out on every side. at each step the fatigued soldier plunged ankle-deep in the yielding soil, while a scorching sun shone over him and not a breath of air relieved his sufferings. at times, a verdant forest loomed up along the heated horizon, fringed by limpid lakes, and our wearied columns moved on gaily, cheated, again and again, by the hope of shade and water. suddenly the beautiful groves dwindled into jagged clumps of thorns or aloes, and the fairy lakes changed to salt and turbid lagunes. "the wormwood star had fallen on every thing and turned the waters to bitterness." the plant whose piercing spines and sword-like leaves have entitled it to the name of the "spanish bayonet," was the hermit shrub of this dreadful zaharah. around its roots the snakes lurked and crawled. whenever the soldiers' path was unimpeded by these annoyances, scarifying his limbs as he advanced, the ground seemed heated and sinking like the _scoriæ_ of vesuvius. man and beast sank exhausted and panting on the earth. the want and value of delicious water are never known till we pass a day like this under the burning rays of a tropical sun, toiling on foot over a scorched and arid soil without refreshment! at length the word ran along the line that it was approaching a lake whose waters were not salt. "under the excitement of hope the faint and exhausted infantry pressed onward with renewed life, while, some miles ahead, the artillery were seen to halt enjoying the luxury of _water_. as the soldiers reached it all discipline was forgotten; their arms were thrown down, and they rushed boldly in, thrusting their heads beneath the waves in their desire to quench the thirst that was consuming their vitals."[98] such is the natural aspect and character of the desolate region between the nueces and the rio grande,--a chequered wilderness of sand and verdure,--fit only for the wild beasts that inhabit it, and properly described in former days, as a suitable frontier between the great republics of north america. * * * * * on the 21st of march, all our forces concentrated on the arroyo colorado,--a salt stream or lagune nearly one hundred yards broad, and so deep as to be scarcely fordable,--situated about thirty miles north of matamoros. had the enemy attacked us here his assault would have been formidable, wearied as were our troops with the distressing marches of previous days. bold, bluff banks, twenty or thirty feet high, hem in the stream, whose borders, on both sides, are lined, for a considerable breadth, with impervious thickets of _chapparal_. these thorny groves are to be found in all sections of the south, varying in size from a few yards to a mile in thickness, so closely interlaced and matted with briers and bushes as to prevent the passage of animals larger than a hare. they are the sorest annoyances of travellers in mexico, and often force the wayfarer to make a long circuit to pass their limits, though they reward him for his trouble by supplying an abundance of the _tuna_--a luscious fruit of the prickly pear,--which grows luxuriantly on these natural and impenetrable walls. such, with the barrier of the stream, was the fortification nature had interposed for the safe guard of mexico at the arroyo colorado. but the inert natives seemed indisposed to take advantage of those rare defences, though not without some hostile demonstration which the resolute conduct of taylor soon overcame. when our advanced corps encamped near the banks of the stream on the 19th, an armed _reconnoisance_ was sent forward to examine the country. on reaching the river, our scouts discovered that the opposite side was lined with a body of _ranchero_ cavalry, from whom they learned, although no opposition was made to our examination of the ford, that we should be treated as enemies if we attempted to pass it. impossible as it was to ascertain accurately the amount of the opposing force, our men were prepared for the worst, and, at an early hour of the 20th, the cavalry and first brigade of infantry were thrown in position, at the ford, while the batteries of field artillery were formed so as to sweep the opposite bank. all was now anxiety and eagerness among our gallant men. far along the borders of the river, above and below, the bugles of the enemy were heard ringing out in the clear morning air. but the hope of frightening our men by overwhelming numbers was of no avail. our pioneers worked steadily on the road they were cutting to the brink of the river; and, when all was ready for the passage, the adjutant general of the mexican forces appeared on the ground for a final effort of intimidation. with spanish courtesy, he informed our general that positive orders were given to his men to fire upon our forces if they attempted to cross, and that our passage of the river would be considered a declaration of war. at the same time he placed in taylor's hands a warlike proclamation issued by mejia at matamoros on the 18th, containing unequivocal manifestations of the intention of the mexicans to molest us. our commander-in-chief, however, was not to be deterred by these threats from the fulfilment of the orders he had received to pass the rio grande. he answered the officer that he would "_immediately_ cross the river, and that if his hostile party showed itself on the other bank after our passage was commenced, it would unquestionably receive the fire of our artillery." in the meantime the second brigade, which had encamped some miles in our rear, came up and formed on the extreme right; and, as the road to the river bank was by this time completed, the order to advance was given. it was a moment of intense excitement. what forces might not lurk behind the dense walls of _chapparal_, ready to dash upon our ranks as they deployed on the other side? our artillerists stood to their aimed and loaded guns. the mexicans were doubtless eager and panting for resistance in the rear of the bristling plants that lined the lofty parapet of the river's bank. every eye was strained upon the first daring rank that was to plunge into the stream as a "forlorn hope." mexico would fight now if ever; for her mettle was as yet untried! for an instant, profound silence reigned along the anxious line which the next moment might be involved in the fire of battle. suddenly the gallant worth spurred to the head of our troops, and dashing boldly into the flood, waved them on to the further shore. but not a shot was fired by the recreant foe, and as our men rose shouting from the water and rushed up the steeps of the opposite bank they beheld the valiant mexicans in brisk retreat towards matamoros! the fugitives were unmolested;--a laugh of scorn and pity ran through our ranks;--and, before nightfall, the first and second brigades of infantry, with a train of two hundred wagons had crossed the stream and encamped three miles from its banks. this was an important affair, as it was the first in which the mexicans showed themselves in a decidedly hostile attitude; and it furnished an excellent opportunity to try the mettle of our men both in spirit and discipline. not a soldier faltered. * * * * * on the morning of the 23d of march, general taylor departed with his whole army from the camp near the colorado. after a march of fifteen miles he reached, on the 24th, a position on the route from matamoros to point isabel,--distant about eighteen miles from the former and ten from the latter,--where he left the infantry brigades under the command of general worth, with instructions to press on in the direction of matamoros until a suitable position for encampment was obtained, at which he might halt, holding the route in observation, whilst the commander-in-chief proceeded with the cavalry to point isabel. at that post general taylor expected to meet the transports from corpus christi with the force under major monroe, and to make the necessary arrangements for the establishment and defence of a depot. as soon as the army left the colorado a new object, of more interest in natural history than military memoirs, presented itself to the notice of our troops. the soil was covered with a long wiry grass among which glided immense numbers of huge rattlesnakes, more appalling to our soldiers than the mexicans. the country literally swarmed with serpents. from the colorado to within a few miles of point isabel their warning rattle was heard on all sides. they crept between the ranks as our men marched through the long herbage, and at night coiled themselves comfortably under their blankets for warmth. * * * * * familiar as we are with the campaigns of frederick and napoleon, and willing to record as classical the great deeds of the old world's heroes, we are still often loath to do justice to the brave men in our own country who have served the state so zealously in florida and mexico. it is not simple bravery in battle that commends a soldier to admiration, for few are cowards when the excitement of action hurries them headlong among their foes amid the shouts and thunder of actual carnage. but it is the preparatory discipline that tests a military character. the camp and the march are the soldier's training. the dreary winter-quarter passed in patient service, and the wearying advance over burning plains or snowy mountains, are the real touchstones of courage, and prove those powers of _endurance and subordination_ which make resistance staunch and stubborn. these are the sources of discipline; and it was with troops that had borne the winter hardships at corpus christi, i have described, and made the short but arduous march to point isabel, that taylor felt sure of victory. they had encountered extraordinary fatigue, and yet were ready at a moment's notice for battle without flinching. with such schooling an army becomes a gigantic instrument moving with the accuracy of clock-work, put in motion by the general's genius. it can endure as well as perform all he requires, and he knows that the result of a battle depends alone on his numbers, his position, or his individual skill in military combination. the common soldier and the officer thus react upon each other, and the electric chain of mutual _confidence_ makes success an impulse. the american and the mexican soldier are essentially different, though both, according to the report of distinguished officers, are almost equally brave. in the anglo-saxon race bravery is the balance between prudence and courage, exercised with an indomitable resolution to achieve a desired end. the american soldier is fearless, yet he values life and seeks to protect it. his object is to subdue or slay his foe, still he determines to avoid, if possible, a fatal catastrophe. this renders him intrepid while it teaches the importance of discipline and obedience to resolute and skilful officers. he perceives at once the object to be secured or the thing to be done, and he marches on with the mingled caution and spirit requisite for success. it may be said that a certain degree of timidity is necessary in every balanced character in order to ensure reflection, for natural courage, unaided by sensitiveness, would render it rash. but the mexican soldier seems to be guided by a different system, and to be brave without either prudence or enduring discipline. he is trained in manoeuvres; and, believing that when he masters his manual he is equal to all military emergencies, he supposes that a battle is little more than a parade. as mexican troops are rather political engines, designed for the domestic police of cities, than for actual service in the field, the soldier is more of a plaything than a tool or weapon. vague, ideal notions of roman patriotism, are infused into his mind by the demagogues of the army in bombastic proclamations, and he imagines it better to perish than surrender to his foe. but this murderous doctrine of "revenge or death" serves rather to animate him _before_ battle than to carry him steadily through its perils. he has the ability to perceive the beauty of abstract virtue, but lacks the sustained energy, the profound endurance, to realize it. he rushes onward without deliberation, or regard of consequences. an international war is, in his estimation, a personal not a political quarrel. a brutal ferocity marks every headlong movement, and deprives him of the control of reason. besides this, _life_, has not the same value to a mexican as to an american warrior, for the objects and hopes of their lives are incapable of comparison. one lives for practical liberty and progress, the other's existence is a mere strife for bread under military despotism. a mahomedan fatalism--derived, perhaps, from his moorish kindred--tinges the nature of a mexican, and the impulsive blood of a tropical climate subjects him almost exclusively to his instincts. hence spanish wars have been long and sanguinary butcheries, while their civil dissensions are the feted ferment of corruption. the mexican, hot and fretful in controversy, is ever quick and sometimes secret, in ridding himself of his foe;--the american is equally prompt with his pistol, but gives his insulting enemy an equal chance. a sudden conflict with knives ends a spanish rencontre or dispute; while periods of deliberation and cool arrangements precede the fatal field between our countrymen. the american officer is scientifically educated in military schools and _leads_ his men to battle. the mexican is ignorant of all but ordinary drills, and either _follows_ his impulsive squadrons, or, flies at the approach of personal danger. the one has nerve and endurance, the other impulse and passion; hence, while the mexican strikes his blow and retreats to his lair if foiled, the american, equally unchanged by victory or defeat, moves onward with indomitable purpose until his object is successfully accomplished. the one dwindles too often into the cruel assassin or relentless persecutor,--the other, as frequently, attains the dignity of a clement hero. these general observations apply, of course, only to the masses, for truly brave and patriotic men exist in all countries, and nowhere are the examples of heroic qualities more conspicuous than among the spanish races. the fault lies more in temperament than in soul. an equipoise between intellect and passion is alone deficient in the nature of the mexican people, for the savage has not been entirely extirpated from the mingled blood of indian and spaniard. when the remarkable energy of men, born in genial climates, is tempered by self restraint, it produces that urbane and chivalrous character which once made war the school of gentlemen. but the modern ideas of liberty and patriotism have deprived standing armies of all exclusive claim to national protection; and, as long as each citizen feels that the defence of his native land or of his country's rights depends upon himself, the volunteer as well as the regular will be prompt to discharge his military duty with skill, alacrity and irresistible resolution. footnotes: [98] army on the rio grande, p. 13. chapter iv. character of mexican diplomacy--genius of the spanish language--paredes's proclamation--hostilities authorized by him--taylor goes to isabel- description of the brasos st. jago and point isabel--burning of the custom-house--made a depot and fortified--taylor and worth unite and plant the american flag opposite matamoros--worth's interview with la vega and césares--fruitless efforts of our generals to establish amity--description of the country round matamoros--appearance of the town. the qualities which characterize the mexican soldier, as described in the last chapter, mark also the statesman of that country. their loud and vain-glorious professions of resolve; their bombastic proclamations; their short, passionate and revolutionary governments; their personal rivalries and universal anarchy, denote impulsive tempers utterly incapable of sustained self-rule or resistance. to those who are familiar with mexican history, this is not a novel fact, yet it has been astonishingly manifested in the war between our countries. it would be a tedious task to recount the various manifestos and despatches that were written to control and satisfy public sentiment in regard to the pending difficulties. diplomacy is the weapon of weak powers, and the pen is a most important implement when defeat, inaction or incompetency are to be excused to the mexicans. there is something perhaps in the genius of the spanish language that renders it peculiarly appropriate to appease the vanity of those who speak it. the natural vehicle of eloquence, its magic words, its magnificent phrases and its sonorous sentences march along in solemn and pompous procession, and compel the attention of every listener. simple sentiments, clothed in the expressions of this beautiful tongue assume new and striking shapes, and the judgment is charmed or swayed by sympathy with the ear. the statesmen of mexico are aware of these extraordinary advantages, and whether they have to account for a lost battle, tranquillize a passionate mob, or satisfy an importunate _diplomat_, they are equally ready to resort to the armory of their resounding language for defence. we have already seen that paredes overthrew herrera's administration by means of the texan question and opposition to negotiation with our government. when general taylor advanced towards the rio grande this chieftain was still president and quite as unable to fulfil the promises to repel us as his predecessors had been in 1844 and 1845. feeling, under the peculiar views of the controversy they entertained, that the honor of their country required our expulsion from texas, they had announced and pledged this auspicious result to the people. but at the moment when all these extraordinary boasts were made, they were, doubtless, designed only to serve a temporary purpose, under the hope that some fortuitous circumstance might occur which would exonerate them from war. i have heretofore stated that the mexicans were encouraged in resistance by the belief of impending difficulties with england. in addition to this, paredes probably relied on foreign interference in consequence of his monarchical schemes; nor was it until the spring and summer of 1846, that all these prospects were blighted by the energetic course of our senate and the discretion the british cabinet in regard to oregon. but it was then too late to retreat, for hostilities had already commenced. loud as were the mexicans in their fulminations against our alleged usurpation, i am inclined to believe they never seriously contemplated the invasion of texas, but hoped either to let the question sleep for many years in the portfolios of negotiators whilst a rigorous non-intercourse was preserved, or to solicit, finally, the mediatorial influence of great britain and france in order to prevent war if our congress intimated a disposition to declare it. this opinion is founded upon the remarkable proclamation issued in mexico on the 21st of march, 1846, by general paredes.[99] his language is still decided in regard to mexican rights over texas; but he asserts that "_the authority to declare war against the united states is not vested in him_," and that the congress of the nation, which is about to assemble, must consider what is necessary in the approaching conflict. this proclamation was issued in the capital after it was known that our army was advancing to the rio grande, and on the very day when mr. slidell's passports were sent him at jalapa by the mexican government. but between the 21st of march and the 23d of april the provisional president's opinion of his rights underwent a change, for, on that day, he published another proclamation in which he asserts that he had "sent orders to the general in chief of the division of the northern frontier to _act in hostility_ against the army which is in hostility against us; to oppose war to the enemy which wars upon us;" though, in conclusion, he announces that still he "does _not declare war_ against the government of the united states of america."[100] thus, under the masked name of _hostilities, the mexican government authorised the first warlike blows to be struck_, because, as it alleged, we had invaded the national domain by marching to matamoros. it was the forced realization of all those gasconading manifestos, which for the last two years had breathed war and defiance against the united states. such, then, was the actual origin of the collision, for the troops and officers of general taylor religiously abstained from acts of military violence, and confined themselves exclusively to the defence of the territory they were directed to hold. that mere _protection_ was the undoubted purpose of our government, will not be questioned by the reader when he recollects the smallness of our army, and its entire want of preparation to molest or invade a nation of more than seven millions of inhabitants. * * * * * in the last chapter, general taylor was left on his way to point isabel, while worth moved in the direction of matamoros.[101] during the march of our column towards the sea shore it was approached, on its right flank, by a party of mexicans bearing a white flag, which proved to be a civil deputation from matamoros desiring an interview with the commander-in-chief. general taylor apprised the representatives of tamaulipas that he would halt at the first suitable place on the road to afford them a reception; but it was found necessary to pass on to point isabel without delay in consequence of the want of water elsewhere on the route. the deputation, however, declined accompanying our forces towards their destination, and halting a few miles from the point, sent a formal protest of the prefect of the northern district of tamaulipas against our occupation of the disputed country. at this moment it was discovered that the buildings of point isabel were in flames. the retreating mexicans had set fire to the edifices to prevent our occupation; and, as general taylor considered this a direct and vexatious evidence of hostility, and was unwilling to be trifled with by the tools of the military authorities of matamoros, he dismissed the deputation with the information that he would answer the protest when he was opposite the city. the cavalry was forthwith pushed on to the burning town in time to arrest the fire which consumed but three or four houses; yet the inhabitants had already fled, and the officer, who committed the incendiary act under the orders, it is said, of general mejia, was nowhere to be found. as our troops entered the village they were gratified to find that the transports from corpus christi had exactly answered their land movement, and that the steamers had arrived in the harbor with the convoy close in their rear, only a few hours before our forces entered from the desert. general taylor immediately directed the engineers to examine the ground with a view of tracing lines of defence and strengthening a position, which he decided should form the great depot of our forces. * * * * * point isabel is approached from the sea through the brazos de santiago. it is a wild and desolate sea coast, defended by bars and strewn with wrecks. in former years, a small mexican village and fort, containing a couple of cannons, stood upon the brazos point, but during one of those terrific storms which ravage the mexican coast, the sea rose above the frail barrier of shifting sand, and when the tempest subsided, it was discovered that the village and fortification had been engulfed beneath the waves. few places are more inhospitable on the american coast than the bar of brazos. there is no friendly shore under whose protecting lee ships may seek safety during the awful hurricanes that so often descend upon them without a moment's warning. but when a vessel has fairly passed the entrance, she moves along securely over the waters of the bay, and anchors under cover of the sand hills to the left whilst her passengers and freight are landed in boats or lighters. on a bluff promontory jutting out into the bay and sloping gradually inland, stands the village of isabel. its houses denoted the character of its people. the spars of wrecked vessels, a few reeds, and the _debris_ of a stormy shore, thatched with grass and sea weed, formed the materials of which they were built, while a vagabond race, fifty or sixty in number, constituted the official but smuggling population, which was prepared to protect the revenue of mexico or receive bribes from contrabandists, as their interests might dictate. a certain señor rodriguez was the captain of this important port at the period of our occupation; and, being a person equally ready to take pay from importers or exporters of goods as well as to receive further compensation for concealing his roguery from the government, he deemed it his duty, as a faithful officer, to destroy the custom house by the conflagration that incensed general taylor against the prefect of tamaulipas.[102] such was point isabel and its vagrant inhabitants, when abandoned to our forces, and adopted as a depot. * * * * * while the engineers were engaged in fortifying a position, which was soon to become of so much importance in the war, general taylor rejoined the division under worth's command, and on the morning of the 28th of march, the order was given for all the columns to advance towards matamoros. at half past six the movement began. the arms were closely inspected, and every man was directed to be on the alert in case of sudden attack. yet no symptom of fear was exhibited in our ranks, while the squadrons pressed on gaily, with merry songs and pleasant chat. about a mile from the rio grande they saw the first house on their route of more than one hundred and fifty miles from corpus christi. the dark eyed mexicans were lounging with apparent indifference about their doors, and returned civil answers to our inquiries. soon after, the city of matamoros came in sight; and, with bands playing, and regimental colors flying to the wind, we arrived opposite the town at noon. from the head quarters of general mejia, the mexican standard was displayed, and, in a short time a temporary flagstaff, prepared by the eighth regiment, under the superintendence of lieut. col. belknap, was raised aloft bearing the american ensign; but no other manifestation of joy was given than by the national airs which were pealed forth from our regimental bands. the moment our flag was displayed, it was saluted, from matamoros, by the _consulate_ flags of france and england; while the absence of our own banner from the opposite shore denoted the departure or restraint of the commercial representative of our union.[103] as soon as our colors were raised on the eastern bank of the rio grande, general worth and his staff descended to the water's edge, bearing a white flag and a communication from the commander-in-chief, announcing formally the purpose of our advance to the dividing stream. general taylor believed that this would be the means either of establishing friendly relations between the posts, or of eliciting the final decision of the mexican government. as soon as worth and his companions were perceived from the opposite bank two cavalry officers crossed with an interpreter. after some delay in parleying, it was announced that general la vega would receive our messenger on the right bank of the river, to which he immediately passed, accompanied by his aid-de-camp lieutenant smith, and lieutenants magruder, deas, and blake, attached to his staff, and lieutenant knowlton as interpreter. on arriving at the mexican quarters, general worth was courteously received by la vega and introduced to don juan garza, _oficial de defensores_, and to the _licenciado_ césares, who represented the authorities of matamoros. la vega informed general worth that he had been directed to receive such communications as might be presented, and accompanied his tender with the remark that the march of the united states troops through a portion of tamaulipas was considered by his country as an act of war. this was no time to discuss the international question, and worth, properly refraining from conversation upon so vexatious a topic, proceeded, as an act of courtesy, to read the open document he bore, which he afterwards withdrew inasmuch as it had not been received personally by general mejia the commander-in-chief at matamoros. a demand to see our consul was refused by the mexicans, and although we learned that he was not under restraint but still continued in the exercise of his official duties, all communication with that functionary was peremptorily denied. thus terminated, unsatisfactorily, another effort on our part to employ diplomacy in the establishment of harmonious feelings with the local authorities of matamoros; and notwithstanding general worth was assured that "mexico had not declared war against the union," and that "the countries were still at peace," he returned to the american camp with gloomy forebodings for the future.[104] * * * * * if there was little to hope from the people of mexico, or little attractive in the prospect of social intercourse between the camp and town, there was much to gratify the eye of our fatigued soldiers in the scenery that lay before them. on their long and toilsome march they had been relieved from the dreary wastes of texas as soon as they beheld the blue haze hanging over the distant windings of the rio grande. the city of matamoros, as seen from the opposite side of the river, skirts the stream for more than a mile with its neat and comfortable dwellings. as the trade of this town is chiefly carried on with the interior, there has been no need of encroaching with wharves and walls on the margin of the river. hence the city is somewhat removed from the banks, and embowered amid extensive groves and gardens, from the midst of whose luxuriant foliage its towers and dwellings rise in broken but graceful lines. there is but little timber near the river, which traverses beautiful prairies as it approaches the sea. the hand of culture has taken these waving meadows under its protection; and, on all sides the landscape is dotted with abundant vegetation. the grass covered banks are screened by shrubbery or grazed by cattle; while the stream, winding along in easy curves, is so narrow near the city that conversation may be easily carried on from its opposite sides. "the rich verdure of the shores,--the cultivated gardens scattered around,--the clustering fig and pomegranate trees," contrasted with the desert through which our troops had passed, converted this land into a scene of enchantment. the fatigued soldiers were repaid for all their toils. existence, alone, in so beautiful a climate and with such delicious prospects, was sufficient recompense for our men, and they gazed with delight at the hostile shore as martial _don_ and gay _donzella_ poured out in crowds from the walls of matamoros to behold the foreign flag and the bold intruders clustered beneath its folds. footnotes: [99] see mexico as it was, &c., 4th ed. p. 407. [100] diario oficial--april 24. [101] i desire it may be remembered that the important facts related by me in regard to our military and diplomatic movements are all given upon the authority of official papers published by congress. the reader who wishes to verify them will do well to provide himself with the volumes of executive documents, for i shall not deem it necessary to incumber the margins of my pages with continual references. i have been scrupulously accurate in all my quotations from american authorities, and have observed the same course in regard to the mexican reports, proclamations and manifestos. see especially, (for this volume,) senate doc. no. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess.--h. of r. doc. no. 197, id.--senate doc. no. 378, id.--senate doc. no 388, id.--h. of r. doc. no. 4, 29th cong. 2d sess.--h. of r. doc. no. 19, id.--h. of r. doc. no. 42, id.--senate doc. no. 107, id.--h. of r. doc. no. 119, id. [102] our army on the rio grande, chap. v. [103] army on the rio grande, chap. ii. [104] see senate doc. 337, 29th cong. 1st sess. for a memorandum of general worth's spirited interview with la vega and césares. chapter v. military and civil proclamations against the united states at matamoros in april, 1846--general taylor's pacific policy--desertion from our army promoted by ampudia and arista--shooting of deserters, seen swimming the river, ordered--construction of the fort opposite matamoros--guerillas on the left bank--ampudia and arista arrive- death of colonel cross--expedition of lieutenants dobbins and porter --death of porter--surprise and surrender of captain thornton's party of dragoons--ampudia and general taylor on the blockade of the mouth of the river--fort capable of defence; left under the command of major brown--walker's men surprised on the prairie--taylor goes to point isabel--cannonade heard from matamoros--may with his dragoons and walker sent to the fort for tidings--their adventures--return to point isabel--taylor calls on texas and louisiana for reinforcements --character and quality of the texan ranger. the months of march and april, 1846, were fruitful in civil and military proclamations at matamoros, manifesting a hostile spirit against our country, but general taylor persisted in his pacific conduct and directed all under his command to observe a scrupulous regard to the municipal rights and religious usages of the quiet mexicans whom they found in the neighborhood of the rio grande. in order that no pretext of ignorance might be pleaded by our adversaries, in this respect, his orders were published in spanish as well as english, and freely distributed among the people. it is to be regretted that a similar forbearance was not exhibited by our opponents. as soon as our forces appeared in the vicinity of matamoros they began to intrigue with our subalterns. it was known that our army, made up at random from a population of natives and emigrants, contained individuals born in europe; and, to the religious and political prejudices of this class, the authorities addressed themselves.[105] in consequence of these seditious appeals, the evil of desertion increased to an alarming extent, and the most effectual measures were necessary to prevent the contagion from spreading. as our deserters, by merely swimming the narrow river, were at once within the enemy's lines, pursuit and apprehension, with a view to trial, were out of the question. general taylor, therefore, deemed it his duty, warranted by the hostile attitude of the mexicans, to order that all men seen swimming across the river should be hailed by our pickets and ordered to return, and, in case they did not obey this summons, they should be shot. these stringent orders were verbally given to the several commanders, about the beginning of april, and checked the practice, though it is believed that only two men,--privates of fifth and seventh infantry, from france and switzerland,--fell victims to the fatal command. thus failed so dastardly an attempt to interfere by intrigue with the _morale_ of our army. taylor was undoubtedly justified in resorting to the most efficient means to prevent the decimation of his scant forces; and although some sensitive politicians in our union were scandalized by the severity of his orders, yet, when they learned that the men who were induced to desert had been used in subsequent actions against us by the mexicans, their philanthropic clamor was drowned in the universal voice of approval. * * * * * the manifestly warlike appearance of the mexicans, and the attempts they were making to fortify the right bank of the river, induced general taylor to strengthen the position of his camp on the opposite side. accordingly on the 6th of april a battery for four eighteen pounders, bearing directly on the public square and in good range for demolishing the town, had already been completed and the guns mounted, whilst the engineers were busy in laying out a strong bastioned field fort for a garrison of five hundred men in the rear of the battery. but the mexicans did not leave us long in doubt as to their ultimate designs. their chief embarrassment seemed to consist in a want of troops and efficient commanders, yet this was remedied by the arrival of considerable reinforcements in the course of the month. meantime, however, the chapparals and lonely prairies of the left bank of the rio grande, swarmed with ranchero cavalry, not authorized perhaps by the powers in matamoros to attack us directly, but whose predatory habits and arab warfare were encouraged against small bodies of our men until the main army should be enabled to strike a decisive blow. on the 10th of april, colonel cross, a deputy quarter-master-general mounted his horse and proceeded to ride, as usual, for exercise, but the night passed without his return, nor was his fate known until ten days after, when a skeleton, found on the plains, was identified as that of the unfortunate officer. the mode of his death or the names of his slayers have never been discovered. but it was generally reported and believed that he had been captured by the lawless band of romano falcon, a ranchero bandit, and, after being robbed of every thing valuable, was shot with a pistol by the robber captain. with a view to check the depredations of these guerillas, lieutenants dobbins of the third infantry, and porter of the fourth,--two bold and hardy soldiers,--were authorised to scour the country with a body of picked men, and capture or destroy any such parties they might encounter. it appears that they separated in quest of the enemy, and that lieutenant porter at the head of his own detachment surprised an armed troop, numbering nearly one hundred and fifty, engaged in jerking beef. upon the approach of our officer one of the mexicans snapped a musket at him, a salutation which lieutenant porter returned by the discharge of his double barreled gun. upon this the mexicans fled to the screen of the chapparal. porter took possession of the horses and blankets of the fugitives, and, mounting his men, started for head quarters. at this moment, however, the rain began to pour down with the violence that is only witnessed in tropical climates, and whilst the lieutenant and his party were passing through a dense copse of chapparal they were fired on by the enemy from an ambush. shot followed shot from the secret foe in rapid succession, but our unfortunate men were unable to sustain the contest, as their powder had been soaked by the sudden shower. they wisely retreated, therefore, to the chapparal, and, separating into three parties, found their way to camp; but the luckless porter, having been wounded in the thigh, was seized by the mexicans as soon as his men departed, and despatched with their knives whilst they shrieked and yelled over his mangled body like a band of infuriate demons. acts like these, characteristic of the worst periods of border raids, denoted the approaching storm. the country east of the rio grande bristled with irregular troopers. it was unsafe to go beyond the hail of sentinels, and the peaceful aspect of nature which had charmed our men so greatly upon their arrival was changed for the stern alarums of war. by the joyous peals of the church bells, the shouts of acclamation, and the report of spies, we learned that general ampudia had arrived in matamoros, and that, some days later, he was followed by arista, who immediately assumed the chief command and apprised general taylor, in courteous terms, that he considered hostilities commenced and was resolved to prosecute them. * * * * * among all these notes of warlike preparation, none perhaps were more significant than the adventure which must be now recorded. on the 24th of april a squadron of dragoons, sixty-three in number, under the orders of captains thornton and hardee, and of lieutenants mason and kane, was despatched by general taylor to reconnoitre the river for thirty miles above the camp in the direction of la rosia. when the troopers arrived within three miles of the post they learned that the enemy had crossed and occupied the country in considerable force. this was about twenty-eight miles from our camp, and as soon as the news was received, the guide, by name capito, refused to proceed any further. it appears from all the documents i have been able to examine that captain thornton exercised a wise precaution on the march and in the disposition of his troops, by throwing out advance and rear guards although it was impossible to avail himself of the advantage of flankers in consequence of the nature of the road which was often a perfect defile, admitting, at times, of the passage only of a single horseman. as he had reason to doubt the fidelity of his guide, he resolved to advance without him, redoubling, however, his vigilance, and increasing his van guard, under the command of lieutenant mason, whom he ordered not to fire upon the enemy unless assaulted. the rear was assigned to captain hardee, and, in this order, the party cautiously proceeded until it reached a large plantation bordering the river and hemmed in by a fence of lofty and impenetrable chapparal. captain thornton endeavored to approach the houses at the upper end of this enclosure by entering its lower extremity, but failing to accomplish his object, he passed around the thicket and reached the field across a pair of bars which served for gateway. the edifice was situated about two hundred yards from this narrow aperture in the bristling wall, and, towards it, the whole command directed its steps in single file, without placing a sentinel at the bars, or observing any other precaution to prevent surprise. it seems that captain thornton, though a skilful and brave officer, as his campaigns against the indians in florida had proved, was prepossessed with the idea that the mexicans had not crossed the river, and that even if they had, they would not fight. it was a fatal mistake. captain hardee, as has been stated, was charged with the rear guard and was therefore the last to enter with his horsemen. as he approached the dwelling he perceived the troopers who were already within the enclosure scattered in every direction seeking for some one with whom to communicate. at length an old mexican was discovered, and, while thornton was conversing with him, the alarm was given that the enemy were seen in numbers at the bars. this was a bewildering surprise. yet the gallant commander immediately gave the order to charge and personally led the advance to cut his way through the mexicans. but it was too late; the enemy had already secured the entrance, and it was impossible to force their serried lines. cooped and hampered as were our men within the impervious walls of chapparal and aloes, their flight was almost hopeless. the mexican infantry had been stationed in the field on the right of the road while their cavalry lined the exterior fence, so that our retreat was entirely cut off. seeing this, thornton turned to the right, and skirted the interior of the chapparal with his command, whilst the enemy poured in their vollies in every direction. by this time disorder was triumphant. hardee dashed up to thornton and urged that the only hope of safety was in concentrated action and in the destruction of the fence; but, though the order was immediately given, he could neither stop his men nor his horse. our troopers, perfectly ensnared, seem to have become frantic with rage, and consequently to have lost the control of discipline. like so many animals at bay, each one sought safety for himself, by attempting to traverse or leap the thorny boundaries of the farm. yet all efforts were useless, for, by this time, the enemy had gained on our men with great numbers, and, completely surrounded as the plantation was, nothing remained but to surrender according to the usages of civilized nations. general torrejon, who commanded the mexicans, received the submission of captain hardee; and, together with lieutenant kane, who had also been captured, he was conducted to matamoros on the 27th, where they were lodged with general ampudia and treated most graciously by arista. forty-five of our cavalry were taken prisoners in this disastrous affair, but the brave mason was slain during the conflict. sergeant tredo, a valiant soldier, fell in the first charge;--sergeant smith was unhorsed and killed,--and the bodies of seven men were found on the field of strife.[106] this was a disheartening event for the americans, and a subject of exultation for the mexicans. it was neither a battle nor even an affray; yet, bearing to warfare the same relation that trapping does to sportsmanship, it nevertheless afforded material for mexican gasconade. "this,"--said arista in his letter of acknowledgment to torrejon,--"has been a day of rejoicing to the division of the north which has just received the joyous news of the triumph of your brigade. the delighted country will celebrate this preliminary to the glorious deeds that her happy sons will in future present her!" for some days it was supposed that thornton had been slain, but on the 29th his comrades were delighted to hear that he had cut his way through the enemy, and after running the gauntlet of his foes, had been captured only in consequence of the fall of his horse. * * * * * as soon as ampudia assumed the command he ordered all americans to leave matamoros within twenty-four hours for victoria, a town in the interior of tamaulipas; and on the twelfth of april he addressed a note to general taylor requiring him, within the same peremptory period of time to break up his camp, and retire to the other bank of the nueces, whilst their respective governments were deciding their quarrel by negotiation. he informed our commander that if he persisted in remaining on the alleged soil of tamaulipas, arms, alone, could decide the dispute, but that the war, which would necessarily ensue, should be conducted, upon the part of mexico, conformably to the principles and rights established by the civilized world. general taylor did not delay his reply. on the same day he answered the mexican chief, that inasmuch as he was charged with the military and not the diplomatic duties of the controversy, he could not discuss the international question involved in the advance of the american army, but that he would unhesitatingly continue to occupy the positions he held at isabel and opposite matamoros in spite of all menaces. the hostile declarations and alternative presented by ampudia induced taylor to order the stringent blockade of the rio grande, so as to stop all supplies for the city, and the naval commander at the brazos de santiago was directed to dispose his forces accordingly. a body of texan rangers, under the command of captain walker, a tried and daring soldier of the frontier, was stationed on the road to point isabel. during the night of the 27th and 28th of april, the troops, at the latter place, consisting chiefly of two companies of artillery, under the command of major monroe, were in momentary expectation of attack in consequence of rumors from the enemy, for it was known that large bodies of mexicans had crossed the river and were striving to interpose themselves between isabel and the fort opposite matamoros in order to cut off supplies for the garrison. several teams that departed from the depot for the fort were forced to return, and, on the morning of the 28th the camp of walker was surprised on the prairie by a party of bold rancheros who killed five of our rangers and dispersed the rest, while the officer of the company and half of his command were absent on detached service. by this time the works opposite matamoros were well advanced, yet, owing to the peculiar nature of the country and our deficiency in the proper description of light troops, we were kept in ignorance of the enemy's movements on the left bank. it was ascertained, however, with sufficient certainty, that they were continuing to throw considerable forces on the eastern shore, with the design of attacking our command; and general taylor received information, upon which he could rely, that arista had prepared to pass the rio grande, below matamoros, in order to effect a junction with his forces from above. it was not believed, however, that he would assault the position opposite that city even with four thousand men, and hence our commander-in-chief supposed that the depot at isabel was the object of his movement. this impression was strengthened by the fact that since a rigid blockade of the river was maintained, provisions had become exceedingly scarce at matamoros; and, therefore, hastening the completion of the field work, he was able by great exertions on the part of our troops, to bring it to a good state of defence by the first of may. the seventh infantry under major brown, captain lowd's and lieutenant bragg's companies of artillery, together with the sick of the army, were left in the work; and, on the afternoon of that day, general taylor moved with the main force under his immediate command in the direction of point isabel. at eleven o'clock, the army, by a rapid march, was enabled to bivouac on the prairie at a distance of ten miles from the depot, and on the next day, it reached its destination without encountering the enemy, though the scouts surprised and shot several men belonging to the mexican pickets. on the morning and during the day of the 3d of may, a heavy cannonade in the direction of matamoros announced to general taylor that an attack had probably been commenced on the american fort. this was a different result from his anticipations, and made him extremely anxious for the fate of the small but brave command that had been left, with slender supplies of rations and ammunition, in the incomplete field work. accordingly, on the evening of that day, a squadron of one hundred dragoons under captain may, accompanied by walker and ten of his daring rangers, was despatched to pass, if possible, through the hordes of mexican guerillas that lined the road. they were ordered to proceed within a few miles of fort brown and reconnoitre the country on the left towards the river; next to take a position on the edge of the chapparal, and, if the commander heard no firing from our fort, he was then to despatch a small command under walker to communicate with major brown. after this he was to await the return of the gallant rangers, and repair to point isabel. may and his troopers, alert for such an adventurous enterprize, stole onward towards matamoros, under cover of night, and, about nine o'clock, beheld the enemy's camp fires on the field of palo alto. avoiding the outposts and cautiously circling the mexican front, he passed the foe, and galloped towards the american fort, until, hearing no sound of cannon in that direction, he halted with his command under the protecting screen of an extensive chapparal, about seven miles from matamoros. here he detached walker and six of his rangers, best skilled in woodcraft, to communicate according to orders, with major brown, while he awaited their return in his concealed position. it was between two and three o'clock in the morning that walker crept up to the bastions of our fort and was hailed by the sentinel. as soon as he was recognized his party was placed in a secure position, and the bold ranger admitted by a ladder to the fort. major brown reported the facts of the assault from matamoros and the condition of his defences, as speedily as possible, and walker and his men, mounting fresh horses, dashed off towards may so as to pass the enemy's lines before day-light. but, as he approached the thicket where he left the command, he found the troopers gone; and returning to the fort, which he reached before _reveille_, he awaited the approach of night before he again attempted to perform his dangerous service. meanwhile may and his men had remained in their saddles until about half an hour before day, when, from the protracted absence of the ranger, they believed that the enemy's scouts had detected him. walker had been already away about six hours; and as may's force was unable to cope with the supposed numbers of the mexicans, and peremptory orders had been given to retire to isabel, he immediately passed down the enemy's lines at a brisk gallop over the prairie. about twelve miles from our camp he suddenly discovered a hundred and fifty lancers drawn up across the road to dispute his passage, but speedily forming his line, he charged the troop, and, driving it towards the mexican camp, followed the fugitives for three miles on his wearied horses. fearing, however, that larger forces might be lying in ambush in the fields, and perceiving that the enemy's cavalry was fleeter than his own, he abandoned the pursuit and reached point isabel about nine o'clock. but walker was not to be defeated in his gallant effort to bear tidings to taylor of the fortunes of the fort. as soon as it was dark on the 4th, he remounted with his trusty band and concealed on his person the despatch which major brown had prepared in the interval. every copse and thicket along the road, suitable for an ambush, was filled with foes anxious to cut off his return to camp, for, as it was subsequently ascertained, the mexicans had obtained information of his purposes. but walker passed unhurt through all these impediments, and brought the cheerful news that all was as yet safe in the staunch little fort. * * * * * late in april, and while the events, related in this chapter, were occurring, by which it became evident that serious hostilities were, at length, intended, general taylor prudently began to strengthen his army by demands for reinforcements under the discretionary powers vested in him by government. in march, he had already called the notice of the war department to the necessity of sending recruits to fill up the regiments even to the extent of the existing feeble establishment; but, in april he authorized the raising of two companies of mounted men from texas, and called upon the governor of that state for four regiments of volunteers, two of which were to act as cavalry and two to serve on foot. as some delay might occur in collecting these troops, he, moreover, desired the governor of louisiana to despatch four regiments of infantry as soon as practicable, and, with this auxiliary force of nearly five thousand men, he hoped to prosecute the impending war with energy, or to carry it, if needful, into the enemy's country. on the sixth of may, lieutenant mcphail reached point isabel with some recruits for the army; and, after filling up the permanent garrison with the men who were still too raw to encounter the dangers of actual field service, general taylor determined to march on the following day with the main body of the forces to open a communication with major brown and to throw forward the needful supplies of ordnance and provisions. the language of our chief did not betoken the fears which, at that moment, were felt throughout the country for the fate of his brave command, surrounded as it was believed to be, by an imposing army of mexicans led by their bravest generals. "if the enemy oppose my march, in whatever force," said taylor, "_i shall fight him_!" it was this little phrase that inspirited the anxious heart of his country and denoted the energetic character of the hero whose skill and genius were so soon to be developed in active warfare. when he marched from the banks of the rio grande on the 1st of may, the mexicans believed that he fled to secure his personal safety at point isabel, whilst he abandoned the infantry and artillery in the fort opposite matamoros as an easy prey to their valiant arms. accordingly, the bells of the city rang their merry peals, and repeated bursts of military music denoted that it was a gala day in the ancient city. at that moment the great body of the mexican army crossed the stream under the orders of general torrejon, and these were the forces that walker and his rangers had eluded while bearing to isabel the cheering despatch from major brown. * * * * * at the close of this chapter, and while we are preparing for graver subjects, it may not be uninteresting for the reader to obtain a careful picture of those texan rangers, whose services had already proved so useful, and who were to play an important part in this bloody drama. these were the bold and reckless children of the frontier, who lived forever in warlike harness, prompt to suppress the savage raids of the indians and mongrel mexicans who harrassed the settlements of western texas in the neighborhood of the guadalupe, la vaca and san antonio. organizing themselves in regular companies for mutual protection along a ravaged border, they were continually prepared alike for camp or battle, and opposed themselves to the enemy at the outpost barriers of civilization. it must not be supposed that men whose life is passed in the forest, on the saddle, or around the fire of a winter bivouac, can present the gallant array of troopers on parade, hence the texan ranger is careless of external appearance, and adapts his dress strictly to the wants of useful service. his first care is to provide himself with a stalwart and nimble horse, perfectly broken and capable of enduring fatigue in a southern climate. his spanish saddle, or saddle frame, is carefully covered with the skins of wild animals, while, from its sides depend some twenty or thirty leathern thongs to which are attached all the various trappings needed in the woods. no baggage is permitted to accompany the troop and encumber it in the wilderness. a braided _lariat_ and a _cabaros_ of horse-hair are coiled around his saddle bow, the latter to be unwound at nightfall and laid in circles on the ground to prevent the approach of reptiles which glide off from the sleeper when they touch the bristling hair of the instrument, while his horse, tethered by the long and pliant _lariat_ trailing along the ground, wanders but little from the spot where his master reposes. stout buckskin leggings, hunting shirt, and cap, protect the ranger's body from the sharp spines of aloes, or the briars and branches of the matted forest. his weapons, next to his horse, exact his attention. his long and heavy rifle carries from fifty to sixty bullets to the pound; around his waist is belted a bowie-knife or home made hanger, and sometimes, a brace of revolving pistols is added to this powerful armory. across his right side are slung his pouch of balls and powder-horn, and the strap by which they are suspended is widened or padded over the shoulder to relieve the weight and pressure of his gun. a practised shot, he can hit his mark unerringly in full career. he may be called a "picked man," though not in the sense of the phrase as ordinarily used in military affairs. nevertheless he is a choice soldier, for none but men of equal stamp and hardihood find their way to the border and congregate naturally for the hazardous life they endure. from the period of the battle of san jacinto to the year 1841, when they formed themselves into regular squadrons of rangers, these were the hardy woodsmen, who defended the frontier as independent troops, free from the control of state or government. whenever indians or mexicans approached the settlements, runners were quickly despatched along the streams to sound the alarm, and in a few hours the wild huntsmen were roused for a campaign of months. all they needed for the foray was their horse, their weapons, their blankets, their pouch with fifty balls, and their bushel of parched and pounded corn. in hot weather or cold, in wet or dry, they carried no tents, and required no fresh food save the game of the forest. such was the texan ranger at the outbreak of this war,--light in heart, indomitable in courage, capable of vast endurance, and sworn in his hatred of indians and mexicans. his life was one of continual anxiety and surprises which made him alert and watchful. he was neither a troubadour nor a crusader, yet his mode of existence had charms for multitudes of adventurers. it was not disgust with society or disregard of its comforts that forced these knights errant to the forest and kept them in a state of continual excitement; but there was a certain degree of romance in their wandering career that entitled them to respect and consideration even from the more sentimental inhabitants of cities. a life without restraint, except needful subordination when on actual duty, is always attractive, and the forester realizes it completely. thinking much and speaking little, he considers his officer of no more value or importance than himself. hence he yields obedience only because he knows the necessity of discipline in a hazardous service, while, off of duty, he is as familiar with his commander as with a private. thus the ranger's existence has ever been a scene of fierce independence; and though approaching the _ranchero_ in some of his restless habits, he has, nevertheless, always been distinguished from that vile compound of ferocity, treachery and cruelty, by the remnants of civilization he has borne to the solitudes of the wilderness. he was destined to be of infinite value to the regular army in a country where it was important to obtain information by reckless means among an almost arab population. subsequent events proved that no scouting service was so severe, no adventure so dangerous, that he would not risk his life and exercise the cunning of his craft in performing it either on the thorny banks of the rio grande or among the mountain defiles of monterey. footnotes: [105] the following document was circulated by mexican emissaries and spies among our troops: "_the commander-in-chief of the mexican army to the english and irish under the orders of the american general taylor_: "know ye: that the government of the united states is committing repeated acts of barbarous aggression against the magnanimous mexican nation; that the government which exists under "the flag of the stars" is unworthy of the designation of christian. recollect that you were born in great britain; that the american government looks with coldness upon the powerful flag of st. george, and is provoking to a rupture the warlike people to whom it belongs, president polk boldly manifesting a desire to take possession of oregon, as he has already done of texas. now, then, come with all confidence to the mexican ranks, and i guarantee to you, upon my honor, good treatment, and that all your expenses shall be defrayed until your arrival in the beautiful capital of mexico. "germans, french, poles, and individuals of other nations! separate yourselves from the yankees, and do not contribute to defend a robbery and usurpation which, be assured, the civilized nations of europe look upon with the utmost indignation. come, therefore, and array yourselves under the tri-colored flag, in the confidence that the god of armies protects it, and that it will protect you equally with the english. pedro de ampudia. francisco r. moreno, adj. of the commander-in-chief. _head quarters, upon the road to matamoros, april, 2, 1846._" another and similar appeal was made by arista on the 20th of april. [106] captains thornton's and hardee's reports to general taylor. h. of r. doc. no. 119, 29th cong. 2d sess. pp. 19 and 20. chapter vi. the battle of palo alto. on the night of the 7th of may, with a force of over two thousand men and a supply train of two hundred and fifty wagons, general taylor bivouacked on the plains about seven miles from point isabel. the whole of the country is extremely flat in the neighborhood of the river and on the road to matamoros. in some places, broad thickets cover the levels, in others, wide prairies spread out dotted, here and there, with bushes and ponds. early on the morning of friday, the 8th, our camp was broken up and the little army set in motion towards the fort. about noon the scouts reported that the mexicans were drawn up in our front, covering the road with all their forces; and as soon, therefore, as we reached the broad field of palo alto, a halt was ordered to refresh our men, and form our line of battle with due deliberation. far across the prairie, at the distance of three quarters of a mile, were discerned the glittering masses of the enemy. infantry and cavalry were ranged, alternately, on the level field and stretched out for more than a mile in length, backed by the wiry limbs of the tall trees from which the battle ground has taken its name. the left wing, composed of heavy masses of horse, occupied the road, resting on a thicket of chapparal, and flanked by ponds, while large bodies of infantry were discovered on the right, greatly outnumbering our own force and standing somewhat in a curved line, ready, as it were, to embrace our advancing columns. orders were directly given on the american side to form the array for action. on our extreme right were ranged the fifth infantry under colonel mcintosh; major ringgold's artillery; the third infantry commanded by captain l. m. morris; two eighteen pounders drawn by twenty yoke of oxen and commanded by lieutenant churchill, and lastly, the fourth infantry under major allen. the third and fourth regiments, formed the third brigade under lieutenant colonel garland, and all these corps, together with two squadrons of dragoons led by ker and may, composed the right wing under the orders of colonel twiggs. the left was composed of a battalion of artillery commanded by colonel childs, captain duncan's light artillery, and the eighth infantry under captain montgomery,--all constituting the first brigade under the orders of lieutenant colonel belknap. the train, meanwhile, was packed near a pond under the direction of captains crossman and myers, and protected by the squadron of ker's dragoons. it was about two o'clock in the afternoon that our march against the enemy began by heads of columns, whilst the eighteen-pounder battery followed slowly along the road. during our advance it was deemed especially important to ascertain with accuracy the number and calibre of the enemy's cannon, and for this hazardous reconnoissance on an open plain, lieutenant blake, of the topographical engineers, immediately volunteered. passing the advanced guard at full speed, he dashed over the long grass that concealed the opposing forces, until he approached within about eighty yards of the line where he had a distinct view of the enemy. the mexicans gazed with surprise at this daring act, while blake alighted from his horse, surveyed the whole array with his glass, counting the squadrons and ordnance carefully, and then galloped down their front to the other wing of their extended line.[107] scarcely had this gallant officer reported to our general when two of the enemy's batteries opened on us vigorously. taylor immediately ordered our columns to halt, and deploying into line, our artillery returned the fire, whilst the eighth infantry, on our extreme left, was thrown back to secure that flank;--and, thus, with the distance of only seven hundred yards between the opposing lines, the battle began with rattling vollies of ball and grape bounding over our heads. the first fires of the enemy injured us but little, while the heavy metal of our eighteen-pounders, and the smaller shot of ringgold's battery, quickly dispersed the masses of cavalry on the left. duncan's battery, supported by may's dragoons, was then thrown forward on that flank, and for more than an hour the incessant thunder of a cannonade raged along both fronts, making sad gaps in the battalions, rending the prairie, filling the air with dust and smoke, killing and wounding a few, yet, producing no decided effect. the mexicans, unskilled in gunnery, fired without precision; but, at almost every discharge of the american ordnance, the shot told with wonderful precision among the mexicans. our artillery was directed not only to masses and groups of the enemy, but often to particular men, so that the officers felt as certain of their aim, as if firing with rifles. meanwhile our infantry had been hitherto rather spectators of the artillery's prowess, than active combatants; but as the battle thickened the manoeuvring of the enemy to outflank us commenced. with infinitely smaller forces than the mexicans, our policy had been to act on the defensive as much as possible, and to _feel_ the enemy before we engaged at closer quarters. hence we awaited their first assault, made by a regiment of mexican lancers led by torrejon and supported by two pieces of artillery, which threatened our right flank by moving through the chapparal in the direction of our train. the fifth infantry was immediately detached together with a section of ringgold's battery and walker's texans, to check this dangerous movement. the gallant regiment was thrown into a square with the ranger and twenty of his troopers on its right, and thus stood ready to repulse the charge. on came the advancing squadrons in splendid array, moving in solid masses of men and horse, each lance tipped with its gay and fluttering pennon. ringgold, from his advanced position, galled them as they trotted onward; ridgely, from his closer ground, poured into them rapid vollies of grape and canister; still they surged onward in spite of all resistance. at length, when within shot of the impervious square, suddenly, a sheet of deadly flame burst from the regiment, and breaking their array, forced them to recoil in confusion. nevertheless the daring troop was not dismayed by the carnage. forming rapidly from its ruins an imposing mass, again it dashed towards the train, until the third infantry on our extreme right, under the orders of colonel twiggs, crippled its advance so completely, that it was impossible to rally. this was the last effort of the brave lancers. repulsed in every effort, they began to retreat rapidly but in order; yet ringgold, ridgely, and the regiments of infantry, still hung upon their flank, and with their terrible discharges of grape and bullets, mowed wide openings in the flying ranks until they reached their line. meantime the incessant blaze of our artillery had set fire to the withered prairie, whose tall grasses touched the very muzzles of our guns, and for a while the armies were concealed from each other in the mingled smoke of the recent battle and of the burning field. * * * * * there was a pause in the conflict, as if the two combatants, like gallant boxers, stopped a moment to take breath and survey each other with looks of defiance. the enemy's left had been driven back in confusion; and, as their cannonade ceased, the road remained free for the advance of our eighteen-pounders close to the first position that had been occupied by the mexican cavalry. this was promptly ordered by general taylor who caused the first brigade to take a new post on the left of that formidable battery. the fifth was also advanced to the extreme right of our new line, while the train was moved accordingly to suit the altered front. as the battalion of artillery advanced slowly over the field it came up to a private of the fifth, a gallant veteran of the old world who had escaped the fires of austerlitz and waterloo to die at palo alto. he was one of the first who fell in the action, and as his fellow soldiers paused a moment to compassionate his sufferings, when they saw the blood gushing with each pulsation from his shattered limbs--he waved them onward--"go on companions, regardless of me,"--shouted he,--"i've got but what a soldier enlists for,--strike the enemy;--let _me_ die!" such were the exclamations of napoleon's soldiers, at marengo, when the advancing squadrons of cavalry hesitated to leap over the heaps of wounded frenchmen: "tread on _me_ comrades; make a bridge of my body! long live france! vive la liberte!" the romantic fervor of warlike enthusiasm deprives battle of half its horrors, and makes death on the field a glorious exit from the sufferings of humanity. * * * * * the movements we made in changing our line were answered by corresponding alterations of the mexican front, and, after a suspension of action for nearly an hour the battle was resumed. the effect of these changes was to edge our right flank somewhat nearer matamoros, and to enable our forces to hold the road against the mexicans who rested their lines on the thickets in their rear. the attack was recommenced by a destructive fire of artillery. wide openings were continually torn in the enemy's ranks by our marksmen, and the constancy with which the mexican infantry endured the incessant hurricane of shot was the theme of universal admiration. captain may, detached with his squadron to make a demonstration on the left of the enemy, suffered severely from the copper grape of the mexican artillery. whilst passing the general and his staff with his troopers, the enemy concentrated the fire of their batteries upon him, killing six of his horses and wounding five dragoons. nevertheless he succeeded in gaining his desired position in order to charge the cavalry, but found the foe in such overwhelming numbers as to render utterly ineffectual any assault by his small command. the fourth infantry, which had been commanded to support the eighteen-pounders, was also exposed to a galling fire by which several men were killed and captain page mortally wounded. the great effort of the mexicans was to silence that powerful battery, whose patient oxen had dragged it into the midst of the fight. hence they directed their aim almost exclusively upon these tremendous pieces and upon the light artillery of major ringgold, who was fatally struck by a cannon ball at this period of the conflict.[108] meanwhile the battalion of artillery under colonel childs had been brought up to support the artillery on our right, and a strong demonstration of cavalry was now made by the enemy against this part of our line, while the column continued to advance under a severe fire from the eighteen-pounders. the battalion was instantly formed into square and held ready to receive the charge; but when the advancing squadrons were within close range, a storm of canister from the eighteen-pounders dispersed them. a rattling discharge of small arms was then opened upon the square, but well aimed vollies from its front soon silenced all further efforts of the mexicans in that quarter. it was now nearly dark, and the action terminated on our right, as the enemy were completely driven back from their position and foiled in every attempt either to break or outflank our gallant lines. while these actions were occurring on our right under the eye of general taylor, the mexicans had made a serious attempt against our left. the smoke hung densely over the field and bushes so as almost to obscure the armies from each other, and under cover of this misty veil and of approaching night, the enemy suddenly rushed towards that wing and the train with an immense body of cavalry and infantry under the command of colonel montero. the movement was rapid and daring, but it did not escape the quick eye of duncan, who dashed back with his battery to the left flank in full view of the enemy and engaged them within point blank range of his deadly guns. so sudden and unexpected was this gallant manoeuvre to the enemy, who, a moment before, saw this battery disappear in the opposite direction behind the smoke of the burning prairie,--that their whole column halted in amazement before a shot had been fired or a gun unlimbered. but they were neither repulsed nor dismayed. a strong body of infantry, supported by two squadrons of cavalry, debouched from the extreme right of the chapparal, and moved steadily forward to attack us. one section of duncan's battery began to play upon them with round shot, shells, and spherical case, so well directed that the whole advance, both horse and foot, fell back in disorder to the bushes. meantime the other section opened upon the masses of cavalry that halted at the first sight of our approaching guns, and although these shots were well delivered and each tore a vista through an entire squadron, the enemy remained unshaken. at every discharge the havoc was frightfully destructive, but the gaps in the mexican ranks were immediately closed with fresh horsemen as they pressed on to assail us. the column of cavalry and infantry, driven back into the chapparal by the other section, re-formed in the thicket, and, a second time, dauntlessly advanced in order. after it approached about a hundred yards from the screen of bushes, the section that was previously ordered to repel it, re-opened a deadly fire and drove the foe head long into the forest. the supporting cavalry rushed back upon the ranks that hitherto withstood our shot, and the hurried retreat became a perfect rout. squadron after squadron joined tumultuously in the race, and the whole right wing of the mexicans was soon in rapid flight, while our relentless sections continued to send their vollies into the broken and scampering columns until they disappeared in the chapparal or were lost in the darkness of night. thus ended the brilliant affair of palo alto. the enemy retired behind a protecting wood, and our army bivouacked on the ground it had won and occupied during the protracted fight. * * * * * both parties slept on the battle field. it had been a fierce and dreadful passage of arms, yet it was not a decided victory. we had repulsed the mexicans, fatally, in every attempt; we had gained a better position, enabling us to press onward towards matamoros, and had inflicted serious injury on the foe; but the enemy still rested on their arms and seemed disposed to dispute the field with us again on the morrow. they were sadly crippled though not defeated, and had exhibited a degree of nerve, mettle, and firmness that was entirely unexpected from the vanquished soldiery of san jacinto. wearied by the excessive labor of nearly six hours fighting, our infantry and artillery sank on the ground wherever they found a resting place, whilst the alert dragoons circled the sleeping camp and rode on their outposts, among heaps of the enemy whose dying groans were heard on all sides from the thickets to which they had crept. all night long the medical staff was busy in its work of mercy, while the officers who felt the dangerous responsibility of their situation collected in groups to discuss their prospects. some were doubtful of success, some anxious to obtain reinforcements, some full of hope and animation, but all were satisfied that it was prudent to hold a council on the impending fortunes of the army. after a full examination of the difficulties and a proper display of their resources, the enthusiasm of the young and the experience of the old, alike, sanctioned the heroic determination of taylor to advance without succor. this brave resolve reassured the army, and all prepared with alacrity and confidence for the dangers of the 9th. footnotes: [107] lieutenant blake died about the time our fight commenced at resaca de la palma, on the 9th, from a wound inflicted by one of his own pistols. he had thrown his sword, to which his pistols were attached, on the ground on entering his tent. one pistol was discharged accidentally in the fall, and the ball entered his thigh, but was cut out of his breast. he died three hours afterwards. [108] ringgold died the day after the battle, but page survived some time though he was shockingly mangled by the ball which shot off the lower part of his face. chapter vii. the battle of resaca de la palma--defence of fort brown--the great western. when the sun rose on the morning of the 9th a mist of mingled smoke and vapor hung over the battle field of palo alto, but, as the haze lifted from the levels, the mexicans were perceived retreating by their left flank, in order, perhaps, to gain a more advantageous position on the road in which they might resist our progress towards matamoros. this movement inspirited our troops, who, craving the interest of a new position, were loath to repeat the battle of yesterday on the same field. accordingly general taylor ordered the supply train to be parked at its position and left under the guard of two twelve-pounders and the fatal eighteens which had done such signal service on the 8th. the wounded men and officers were next despatched to point isabel, and we then moved across the llano burro towards the edge of the dense chapparal which extends for a distance of seven miles to the rio grande. the light companies of the first brigade under captain smith, of the second artillery; and a select detachment of light troops, all commanded by captain mccall, were thrown forward into the thickets to feel the enemy and ascertain the position he finally took. in our advance we crossed the ground occupied by the mexicans on the 8th where their line had been mowed by our artillery. shattered limbs, riven skulls, slain and wounded horses, dying men, military accoutrements, gun stocks and bayonets lay strewn around, the terrible evidences of war and havoc. as our men pressed on they encountered, at every step, appeals to their humanity, from the famished and thirsty remnants of the mexican army whose wounds did not permit them to advance with their compatriots; but it may be recorded to the honor of the troops, that our maimed enemies were in no instance left without succor, and that officers and men vied with each other in relieving their wants and despatching them to our hospitals. about three o'clock in the afternoon a report was sent from the scouts that the enemy were again in position on the road, which they held with at least two pieces of artillery. the command was immediately put in motion, and, about an hour after, came up with captain mccall. the field of palo alto was an open plain, well adapted for the fair fight of a pitched battle, but resaca de la palma, which we now approached, possessed altogether different features. the position was naturally strong, and had been judiciously seized by the mexicans. the matted masses of chapparal, sprinkled in spots with small patches of prairie, formed an almost impassable barrier on both sides of the road along which we were forced to advance. the resaca de la palma, or, ravine of the palm, fifty yards wide and nearly breast high, crosses the road at right angles, and then bends, at both ends, in the shape of a horse shoe. the low portions of the gully are generally filled with water, forming long and winding ponds through the prairie, whilst, in the rainy season, these pools unite across the ridge which forms the road and flow off towards the rio grande. along the banks of this ravine the thickets of chapparal, nourished by the neighboring water, grow more densely than elsewhere, and, at the period of the battle, formed a solid wall penetrated only by the highway. it was along the edges of this hollow that the mexicans, led by arista and ampudia, had posted themselves in two lines,--one under the front declivity, and the other entrenched behind the copse of chapparal which shielded the bank in the rear. in the centre of each line, on the right and left of the road, a battery was placed, whilst other batteries were disposed so as to assail us in flank. in this strongly fortified position, supported by infantry, cavalry and ordnance, several thousand mexicans stood around the curving limits of the ravine, ready to rake us with their terrible cross-fires as we advanced by the road between the horns of the crescent.[109] it will be perceived, from this description, that the character of the action was essentially changed from the affair of the 8th. almost entrenched as were the mexicans behind the ravine and chapparal, they now stood on the defensive resolutely awaiting our assault, whilst, at palo alto, they had assumed an offensive attitude, aiming either to capture or destroy our army. in the passage of our troops between matamoros and point isabel, the practiced eye of our military men often remarked the value of this ravine as a point of strength; and it had been already supposed that when the enemy halted, to resist our march, they would avail themselves of it for a battle ground. hence this excellent position was not unknown to general taylor, and he promptly prepared a combined attack of infantry, artillery and cavalry by which he might succeed in driving the american army like a wedge, through the narrow but only aperture that admitted its transit to our fort. accordingly, as soon as captain mccall received his orders, in the earlier part of the day, he advanced with his men, and directed captain c. f. smith, of the second artillery, with the light company of the first brigade, to move to the right of the road, whilst he proceeded on the left with a detachment of artillery and infantry. walker and a small force of rangers was despatched to make a hazardous reconnoissance of the road in front, while lieutenant plesanton, with a few of the second dragoons, marched in rear of the columns of infantry. after following the trail of the enemy for about two miles and a half across the llano burro, and learning from walker that the road was clear, mccall pushed the rangers into the chapparal, within supporting distance, and soon dislodged some parties of mexicans. on reaching the open ground near resaca, the head of his column received three rounds of canister from a masked battery, which forced his men to take cover, after killing one private and wounding two sergeants. they rapidly rallied however, and captain smith's detachment being brought to the left of the road, it was proposed to attack by a flank movement, what, at the moment, was supposed to be only the rear guard of the retiring army. but after a quick examination of the field by dobbins and mccoun, who discovered large bodies of mexicans in motion on our left, while the road, in front, was held by lancers, mccall resolved to despatch three dragoons to the commander in chief with the news and await his arrival. it was about four o'clock in the afternoon that general taylor came up with the skirmishers and received an exact report of the enemy's position. lieutenant ridgely, who, upon the major's fall, had succeeded to the command of ringgold's battery, was immediately ordered to advance on the highway, while the fifth infantry and one wing of the fourth were thrown into the chapparal with mccall's command on the left, at the same time that the third and the other wing of the fourth entered the thicket on the right with smith's detachment. these corps were employed to cover the battery, to act as skirmishers, and engage the mexican infantry. the action, at once became general, spirited and bloody, for although the enemy's infantry gave way before the steady fire and resistless progress of our own, yet his artillery was still in position to check our advance by means of the fatal pieces which commanded the pass through the ravine. this was the moment, however, when the centre was destined to be penetrated and broken--ridgely, as has been stated, had been ordered to the road, and, after advancing cautiously for a short distance, he descried the enemy about four hundred yards in advance. pressing onward until within perfect range of his guns he began to play upon the foe with deadly discharges. but the resolute mexicans were not to be repulsed. returning shot for shot, their grape surged through our battery in every direction, yet without repulsing the intrepid ridgely, who, as soon as the opposing fire slackened, limbered up and moved rapidly forward, never unlimbering unless he perceived the enemy in front or found from the fire of their infantry that they still hung upon his flank. during this fierce advance into the jaws of the mexican crescent, he frequently threw into it discharges of canister when not over one hundred yards from the opposing batteries and their support. after hammering the centre for some time with this iron hail, and keeping the wings of the mexicans engaged with the other troops, a movement with dragoons was planned for the final onslaught. may, with his powerful corps, was directed to report to the general, and immediately received orders from taylor to charge the enemy's battery. thridding the mazes of the chapparal and of the road with his dense squadron he came up with ridgely, and halting a moment while that gallant soldier poured a volley into the enemy, which was answered by a shower of rattling grape, he dashed at the head of his troopers, like lightning from the midst of the cloud of smoke, over the guns of the astonished mexicans. as the dragoons rushed at full tilt, with gleaming swords, along the road, the artillerists leaped upon their pieces and cheered them on. the infantry in the chapparal took up the shout, and before the combined thunder of cannon, huzzas, and galloping cavalry had died away, may and his troopers had charged through the seven opposing pieces, and rose again on the heights in rear of the ravine. graham, winship and plesanton led the movement on the left of the road, whilst the captain, with inge, stevens and sackett, bore off to the right. but, after gaining the elevation, only six dragoons could be rallied, and with these may charged back upon the gunners who had regained their pieces, drove them off, and took prisoner the brave la vega who stood to his unwavering artillery during the heat of the dreadful onslaught. meanwhile ridgely, as soon as may had passed him, followed the charge at a gallop, only halting on the edge of the ravine where he found three pieces of deserted artillery. here the mexican infantry poured into him a galling fire at a distance of not more than fifty paces, and a most desperate and murderous struggle ensued, for the charge of cavalry had not been promptly sustained by the infantry in consequence of the difficulty it experienced in struggling through the masses of chapparal. it was about this time that the eighth regiment was encountered by may who informed colonel belknap of the exploit which had been rendered almost unavailing for want of supporting infantry. belknap promptly ordered the regiment to form on the road with a part of the fifth, whence, it was impetuously charged on the enemy's guns. this admirable assault was executed with the greatest celerity; the battery was secured; the infantry sprang across the ravine amidst a sheet of fire from front and right, and drove the supporting column before it, destroying in vast numbers the troops that pertinaciously resisted until forced headlong from the fatal hollow. montgomery with his regiment pursued the mexicans vigorously into the chapparal on the opposite side of the resaca until from their rapid flight, further attempts were utterly useless. thus was the centre of the enemy's lines completely broken. the task would be endless were i to recount the valiant deeds of the american and mexican wings in the thickets on the right and left of the road. it was a short but severe onset, disputed on both sides, with an intrepidity that resembled rather the bitterness of a personal conflict than a regular battle. the nature of the ground among the groves was such as to forbid any thing but close quarters and the use of the bayonet, knife, or sword. officers and men fought side by side, supporting more than leading each other upon the opposing ranks. bayonets were crossed, swords clashed, stalwart arms held foes at bay, and american and mexican rolled side by side on the blood stained earth. i have dwelt upon the action in the centre because it controlled the road, dispersed the foe and won the day; but the effort would be invidious were i to relate instances of individual hardihood and skill, when all the valiant actors in the drama were fearless and unfaltering. the charge of may was not unlike the assault at waterloo of ponsonby's victorious cavalry, supported by vandeleur's light horse, upon the twenty-four pieces of d'erlon's battery; in regard to which napoleon was heard to exclaim, in the heat of the battle,--"how terribly those gray horsemen fight!" but in that conflict, frenchmen opposed the anglo-saxons, and milhaud's steel clad cuirassiers, charging ponsonby's brigade after it had carried the guns and attacked even a third line of artillery and lancers, readily overcame the exhausted troopers and slew their gallant leader. at resaca de la palma, however the result was different. the artillery battalion, which, with the exception of the flank companies, had been ordered to guard the train on the morning of the 9th, was now ordered up to pursue the routed enemy; and the third infantry, ker's dragoons and duncan's battery followed the mexicans rapidly to the river. shouting, singing, almost frantic with delight at their eminent success, our men rushed after the flying mexicans. the pursuit became a perfect rout as they pressed on to the banks of the rio grande, and numbers of the enemy were drowned in attempting the passage of the fatal stream. the pursuing corps encamped near the rio grande, while the remainder of the army rested for the night on the field of battle. the want of a _ponton train_[110] prevented us from following the foe across the river on the night of the 9th; but, as the government had failed to provide general taylor with that useful equipage, notwithstanding his frequent warnings of its need, he was deprived of the first chance in this war to annihilate the mexican army and to seize all the arms and ammunition collected in matamoros. the capture, however, of arista's camp and its equipage was a recompense for our men who had fought so bravely. the mexican chief had gone into the campaign with every comfort around him, and was evidently unprepared for defeat at resaca de la palma, for, at the moment of our victory, his camp-kettles were found simmering over the fires filled with viands from which he had doubtless designed to make a savory meal after our capture. the food however was destined to other uses; and, after a communication with the fort which held out staunchly against the enemy during both contests, our men sat down to enjoy the repast which the mexicans had cooked. * * * * * unable as we were to secure the best results of victory, from the cause already narrated, these battles were, nevertheless, of great importance. we had achieved success in the face of brave foes outnumbering us more than two to one, and had conquered an army of mexican veterans, perfectly equipped and appointed. in the battle of palo alto our force, engaged, had been one hundred and seventy-seven officers, two thousand one hundred and eleven men, or an aggregate of two thousand two hundred and eighty-eight;--in the action of resaca de la palma we brought into the field one hundred and seventy-three officers and two thousand and forty nine men, or, an aggregate of two thousand two hundred and twenty-two, while the actual number _engaged_ with the enemy did not exceed seventeen hundred. in the first affair we had nine killed, forty-four wounded[111] and two missing; but in the second, our loss was three officers and thirty-six men killed, and seventy-one wounded. lieutenant inge fell at the head of his platoon while charging with may; lieutenants cochrane and chadburne likewise met their death in the thickest of the fight; while lieutenant colonels payne and mcintosh; captains montgomery and hooe; and lieutenants fowler, dobbins, gates, jordan, selden, maclay, burbank and morris, were wounded on the field of resaca de la palma. the mexican army, under arista and ampudia, amounted to at least six thousand men, having been strongly reinforced with cavalry and infantry after the battle of the 8th; and it is highly probable that the whole of this force was opposed to us in their choice position. in one of his despatches, after the battles, arista confesses that he still had under arms four thousand troops exclusive of numerous auxiliaries, and that he lost in the affair at palo alto four officers and ninety-eight men killed;--eleven officers and one hundred and sixteen men wounded, and twenty-six privates and non-commissioned officers missing;--while in the battle of resaca de la palma, six officers and one hundred and fifty-four men were slain; twenty-three officers and two hundred and five wounded, and three officers and one hundred and fifty-six missing,--making a total loss of seven hundred and fifty-five. eight pieces of artillery, several colors and standards, a great number of prisoners, including fourteen officers, and a large quantity of camp equipage, muskets, small arms, mules, horses, pack-saddles, subsistence, personal baggage, and private as well as regimental papers, fell into our hands. the plan of campaign, as alleged to have been developed by arista's port-folio, was based upon the "reconquest of the lost province," into which the mexican forces were to have been pushed as soon as our army was demolished on the rio grande. if it should be necessary to secure the fruits of victory by further military efforts, it was arranged that ample reinforcements were to be brought into the field, and subsequently that president paredes, himself, should march an army of occupation into texas and bear his conquering eagles to the sabine! * * * * * after this narrative of our actions in the field let us recur for a moment to the gallant garrison which had been shut up in the fort since the beginning of the month, and in regard to whose fate the liveliest anxiety was experienced. when the commander-in-chief departed on the 1st of may to open the line of communication with point isabel, prevent an attack upon the depot, and, finally, to succor the fort with subsistence and munitions, the field work, though capable of defence, was not completed. the events of the few preceding days had denoted a resolution on the part of the mexicans to assail us immediately, and warned our small garrison to prepare for all emergencies. accordingly the labor of ditching and embanking on the unfinished front was resumed; but neither the draw-bridge nor the interior defences were yet commenced, and to all these works, mansfield, with his engineers and detachments of infantry, devoted themselves unceasingly during the whole of the bombardment, which began at day-break, on sunday, the 3d of may. the mexicans had been engaged for some time erecting fortifications along the river front of their town opposite our field work, and by this time had prepared them for action. they commenced their attack from the fort and mortar battery called _la redonda_, which they had placed under the orders of a french officer of artillery, who manifested a perfect knowledge of his profession during the conflict. nine pieces of ordnance,--four omortars, and the remainder six and eight-pounders,--poured into our works an incessant shower of shot and shells; but our batteries returned the fire so effectually, that in thirty minutes, _la redonda_ was abandoned. passing from this fortification to another lower down, the enemy again opened upon us from _la fortina de la flecha_, as well as from intermediate batteries and a mortar in their vicinity. it soon became evident that our six-pounders produced no serious effects in consequence of the distance; and, desiring to husband his resources for greater emergencies, major brown ordered the firing to cease entirely on our side of the river. the garrison had been left with only one hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition for each eighteen-pounder while the six-pounders were as badly provided! the silence of our guns in the presence of an assailing foe, disheartened our men for an instant, but they immediately betook themselves energetically to their task on the defences, though the enemy's shells exploded in every direction about them. on the 4th the mexicans again resumed the fight and continued their vollies until midnight. at nine o'clock on that evening irregular discharges of musketry were heard in our rear apparently extending a mile up the river, and continuing until near the termination of the cannonade. every soldier in the fort therefore stood to his arms all night long, manning each battery and point of defence in expectation of an assault from the forces that had crossed the river and filled the adjacent plains and thickets. but the anxious night passed without an attack at close quarters, and, at day-light, on the 5th, the enemy again commenced their fire from the distant batteries. the sound of war was gratifying to the mexicans, but its conflicts were safer from behind the walls and parapets of their forts, with an intervening river, than in dangerous charges against the muzzles of our guns! as soon as the cannonade recommenced, it was immediately returned by a few discharges from the eighteen-pounders and six-pounder-howitzer; and the voice of our guns once more exhilarated the men, though their shots were ineffectual. both batteries ceased firing simultaneously, and our indefatigable soldiers again set to work on the defences, completed the ramparts, and made rapid progress in the construction of a bomb-proof and traverse in rear of the postern. these were anxious days and hours for a garrison short of ammunition, assailed by an enemy equipped with every species of deadly missile, probably surrounded by superior numbers concealed on the left bank of the river, and yet forced to labor on the very fortifications which were to keep off the foe. during all this time, however, no one desponded. day and night they toiled incessantly on the works amid the shower of shot and bombs, nor was a sound of sorrow heard within the little fort until its brave commander fell, mortally wounded by a shell, on the 6th of may. the game was kept up during all this day; mounted men were seen along the prairie, while infantry were noticed creeping through the thickets; but a few rounds of canister, from bragg's battery, dispersed the assailants. about four o'clock of this day a white flag was observed at some old buildings in the rear of our work, and a parley was sounded by the enemy. two officers were soon descried approaching us, and an equal number were despatched by captain hawkins, (who had succeeded major brown in the command of the fort,) to meet them within two hundred and fifty yards of our lines. a communication from general arista was delivered by the herald, and the mexicans were requested to retire a short distance and await the reply. in this document arista declared that our fort was surrounded by forces adequate to its capture, while a numerous division, encamped in the neighborhood, was able to keep off all succors that might be expected. he alleged that his respect for humanity urged him to mitigate as much as possible the disasters of war, and he therefore summoned our garrison to surrender, in order to avoid by capitulation, the entire destruction of the command. this mingled mission of humanity and revenge demanded the immediate notice of our troops, and, accordingly, a brief council was held in which it was unanimously resolved to decline the philanthropic proposal. hawkins, at once despatched his courteous but firm reply, and the enemy acknowledged its receipt by a storm of shot and shell which was literally showered into the works. it would be but repeating a narrative of one day's scenes were we to detail the events of the 7th, 8th and 9th of may. the bravado contained in arista's despatch, had failed in its effort to intimidate us; nevertheless we were compelled to undergo the severest task that a soldier can suffer in passive non-resistance, whilst the enemy, from afar, strove to bury our fort under the weight of their projectiles. bombs and shot were, however, unavailing. the defences proved equal to our perfect protection; and all continued to work cheerfully in the trenches until the distant sounds of battle were heard booming from palo alto and resaca. anxiety was dispelled, and hope ripened into certainty as the cannonade grew louder and drew nearer the river, until, at last, on the evening of the ninth, the mexican squadrons raced past the fort and received the reserved shot of the eighteens which poured their masses of grape among the flying groups. as our pursuing forces rushed out from behind the thickets and beheld the american flag still aloft in the works, they sent forth a cheer which was answered by the rejoicing garrison, and the valley of the rio grande reverberated with the exultation of delight. victory and relief; a routed foe and succored friends, enlivened every heart, and even the foremost and bitterest in pursuit halted a moment to exchange congratulations upon the events of the glorious day. thus the separate forces of the united states were again brought together; and fort brown,--which now received its name from the brave major who died on the 9th,--was found to have lost but two by death and only fourteen wounded during the whole bombardment. * * * * * every war produces its singular characters whose influence or example are not without their due effect upon the troops, and, at the conclusion of these chapters, which are so stained with blood and battle, it may not be useless to sketch, even upon the grave page of history, the deeds of a woman whose courageous spirit bore her through all the trials of this bombardment, but whose masculine hardihood was softened by the gentleness of a female heart. woman has every where her sphere of power over the rougher sex, but the women of a camp must possess qualities to which their tender sisters of the saloon are utter strangers. some years ago, in the far west, a good soldier joined one of our regiments, with his tall and gaunt wife, whose lofty figure and stalwart frame almost entitled her as much as her husband to a place in the ranks of the gallant seventh. unwilling to abandon her liege lord upon his enlistment, this industrious female was immediately employed as one of the laundresses, three of whom are allowed to draw rations in each company, and are required to wash for the soldiers at a price regulated by a council of officers. the "great western,"--for by this soubriquet was she known in the army,--arrived at corpus christi with her husband, and up to the period of our departure for the rio grande performed all her appropriate duties, keeping, in addition, a "mess" for the younger officers of the regiment. when the army advanced, the women, with some exceptions, were despatched by sea to point isabel, while a few procured ponies to follow the soldiers in their tedious march. the husband of the great western was sent in one of the transports to the brazos, but his hardy spouse did not deign to accompany him in this comfortable mode of transit, declaring that "the boys of her mess must have some one to take care of them on their toilsome march." accordingly, having purchased a cart and loaded it with luggage, cooking utensils, and supplies, she mounted behind her donkey with whip in hand, and displayed during the wearisome advance, qualities which the best teamster in the train might have envied. throughout the whole journey she kept her boarders well provided with excellent rations; and, when her brigade reached the banks of the colorado she was one of the first who offered to cross in the face of the resisting enemy. after calmly surveying the scene, which has been described in another chapter, she remarked, with great coolness, that "if the general would give her a stout pair of tongs she would wade the river and whip every scoundrel mexican that dared show his face on the opposite side!" when taylor marched to point isabel on the 1st of may, the great western was of course left behind with the seventh infantry. together with the eight or ten women who remained, she moved, at once into the fort, where her mess was soon re-established in a tent near the centre of the works. the enemy's fire began on the 3d, as she was commencing her preparations for breakfast, and the women were, of course, immediately deposited for safety in the almost vacant magazines. but it may be recorded to their honor that they were not idle during the siege. nobly did they ply their needles in preparing sand bags from the soldiers' and officers' tents to strengthen the works and protect the artillerists whilst serving at their guns; yet, the great western, declining either to sew or to nestle in the magazine, continued her labors over the fire in the open air. after the discharge of the first gun all were at their posts, answering the shot from the mexican forts; and, when the hour for breakfast arrived, none expected the luxury that awaited them. nevertheless the _mess_ was as well attended as if nothing but a morning drill, with blank cartridges, had occurred, and, in addition, a large supply of delicious coffee awaited the thirsty, who had but to come and partake, without distinction of rank. to some of the artillerists who were unable to leave their guns, the beverage was carried by this excellent female; and, as may readily be believed, no _belle_ of orleans, ever met a more gracious reception. the fire of the artillery was kept up almost incessantly until near the dinner hour, when the great western again provided a savory soup which she distributed to the men without charge. thus did she continue to fulfil her duties during the seven days that the enemy kept up an incessant cannonade and bombardment. she was ever to be found at her post; her meals were always ready at the proper hour, and always of the best that the camp afforded. when the despatches, sent by walker, were made up for general taylor on the evening of the 4th, a number of officers and men wrote to their friends at point isabel; and among them this courageous woman found time to communicate with her husband who had not been despatched from the depot to fort brown. in this document she expressed her full confidence in the ability of the garrison to sustain itself, and only regretted the absence of her spouse. to supply his place, however, she applied, early in the action, for a musket and ammunition which she placed in security, expressing her determination to have full satisfaction whenever the enemy dared to approach within range of her piece. this they never did, and our indomitable heroine must rest contented with the reflection that she nobly performed her duty, and will long be remembered by the besieged garrison of fort brown. note.--the reader who desires to verify the accounts of the actions narrated in the two last chapters, will find all the authentic papers upon which they are founded, in the national documents relative to the war published during the two sessions of the twenty-ninth congress. * * * * * it will be observed that the name of general worth does not occur in the account of these recent transactions on the rio grande. this excellent soldier had left florida in september, 1845, and was early on the ground at corpus christi in command of the first brigade consisting of one artillery battalion and the eighth regiment of infantry. his march and acts on the rio grande have been recounted in the preceding chapters; but soon after his arrival he received the mortifying intelligence that he had been superseded in rank by an arrangement announced from the war department. he, therefore, deemed it due to himself as an officer to demonstrate his sensibility by resigning at once, especially as he was convinced that there would be no engagement between the armies, and that the war would be concluded by despatches and bulletins instead of arms. nevertheless he left the american camp with regret, (tendering his services "out of authority," to the general in command,) and travelled with despatch to washington. on arriving there he learned that hostilities had actually commenced; and waiving all his personal feeling, he immediately withdrew his resignation, with a request for permission to return forthwith to the command of the troops from which he was separated, by army orders, in april, 1846. his wish was granted by the secretary of war as soon as it was made known on the 9th of may, and worth hastened back to mexico, where his bravery and skill were subsequently so conspicuous.--see niles's register, vol. 70, p. 313. footnotes: [109] army on the rio grande, p. 93, and see plan of the battle. [110] in may 1846, _after these battles_, an act of congress was finally passed authorising the organization of a company of sappers, miners and pontoniers. the war department had not the right to form such a corps previous to this enactment. [111] page and ringgold died subsequently. +-----------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | inconsistent hyphenation and spelling in the | | original document have been preserved. | | | | typographical errors corrected in the text: | | | | page 2 ^ shows that the following letters are | | superscript | | page 9 bucaneers changed to buccaneers | | page 13 repartiamentos changed to repartiamientos | | page 16 leatheren changed to leathern | | page 24 felitously changed to felicitously | | page 31 cannister changed to canister | | page 46 beseiged changed to besieged | | page 47 cohuila changed to coahuila | | page 50 campaga changed to campaña | | page 57 preponderence changed to preponderance | | page 62 maratime changed to maritime | | page 63 exhorbitant changed to exorbitant | | page 70 statutes changed to statues | | page 76 herera changed to herrera | | page 83 petulence changed to petulance | | page 89 guadelupe changed to guadalupe | | page 93 neuces changed to nueces | | page 96 reveillee changed to reveille | | page 97 villians changed to villains | | page 97 stupifying changed to stupefying | | page 97 portions changed to potions | | page 97 exhorbitant changed to exorbitant | | page 123 puffendorf changed to pufendorf | | page 125 matamoras changed to matamoros | | page 125 seige changed to siege | | page 135 metamoros changed to matamoros | | page 136 exhonerate changed to exonerate | | page 140 moments changed to moment's | | page 140 engulphed changed to engulfed | | page 144 pomegranite changed to pomegranate | | page 154 bivouack changed to bivouac | | page 155 canonnade changed to cannonade | | page 159 leatheren changed to leathern | | page 159 bivouack changed to bivouac | | page 160 presure changed to pressure | | page 165 manoeuvreing changed to manoeuvring | | page 176 pleasanton changed to plesanton | | page 178 curiassiers changed to cuirassiers | | page 183 exhilerated changed to exhilarated | | page 188 superceded changed to superseded | +-----------------------------------------------------+ ahead of the army -----------------------------------------------------------------------[illustration: it was severe work, but it was done with eager enthusiasm (see page 277)] -----------------------------------------------------------------------ahead of the army by w. o. stoddard author of "the errand boy of andrew jackson," "jack morgan," "the noank's log," etc. illustrated by c. chase emerson boston lothrop publishing company -----------------------------------------------------------------------copyright, 1903, by lothrop publishing company. all rights reserved published june, 1903 -----------------------------------------------------------------------preface lest any one should suspect exaggeration in the pictures of mexican affairs in the old time, which are presented by señor carfora, it may be well to offer a few facts by way of explanation. during sixty-three years of the national life of the republic of mexico, from the establishment of its independence in 1821 to the year 1884, nearly all of its successive changes of government were accompanied by more or less violence and bloodshed. there have been fifty-five mexican presidents; at one revolutionary period, four within three months, and to this list must be added two emperors and one regency. both of the emperors were shot, so were several of the presidents, and nearly all of the others incurred the penalty of banishment. how this came to be so will possibly be better understood by the young americans who will kindly travel with señor carfora and his generals and his two armies, commanded for him by general scott and general santa anna. it is the wish of the author that all his young friends may cultivate a deeper and kinder interest in the wonderful land of anahuac and its people. the now peaceful and rapidly improving republic of the south is, in fact, only a kind of younger brother of the united states. mexico has no more sincere well-wisher than william o. stoddard. -----------------------------------------------------------------------contents page far-away guns 11 the race of the goshawk 22 the fortune of war 47 completely stranded 69 the work of the norther 84 forward, march 99 the land of the montezumas 119 out of the tierra caliente 136 leaving the hacienda 157 pictures of the past 167 ned's news 181 a storm coming 193 the revolution 207 the despatch-bearer 221 under fire 240 general scott and his army 254 the mountain passes 267 señor carfora trapped 281 the stars and stripes in tenochtitlan 294 -----------------------------------------------------------------------illustrations page it was severe work, but it was done with eager enthusiasm frontispiece "do you see that? what does it mean?" 30 "we have orders to take care of you" 114 ned saw a long, bright blade of a lance pointed at his bosom 286 -----------------------------------------------------------------------ahead of the army chapter i. far-away guns "boom! boom! boom!" the long surges of the gulf of mexico were beating heavily upon the sandy beach of point isabel, but the dull and boding sounds were not the roar of the surf. there came a long silence, and then another boom. each in succession entered the white tents of the american army on the upland, carrying with it a message of especial importance to all who were within. it was also of more importance to the whole world than any man who heard it could then have imagined. it spoke to the sentries at their posts, and compelled them to turn and listen. it halted all patrolling and scouting parties, making them stand still to utter sudden exclamations. more than one mounted officer reined in his horse to hear, and then wheeled to spur away toward the tent of general zachary taylor, commanding the forces of the united states upon the rio grande. in one small tent, in the camp of the seventh infantry, the first boom stirred up a young man who had been sleeping, and he may have been dreaming of home. he was in the uniform of a second lieutenant, and in one respect he was exactly like all the other younger officers and most of the men of that army, for never before had they heard the sound of a hostile cannon. war was new to them, and they were not aware how many of them were now entering a preparatory school in which they were to be trained for service in a war of vastly greater proportions and for the command of its contending armies, on either side. up sprang the young lieutenant and stepped to the door of his tent. he was short, strongly built, and his alert, vigorous movements indicated unusual nerve, vitality, and muscular strength. "grant, my boy," he muttered to himself, "that comes from the fort! the mexicans are attacking! it's more than twenty miles away. i didn't know you could hear guns as far as that, but the wind's in the right direction. hurrah! the war has begun!" he was only half right. the war had been begun long years before by aggressive american settlers in the spanish-mexican state of texas. now, at last, the united states had taken up the same old conflict, and only about half of the american people at all approved of it. grant did not linger in front of his tent. he walked rapidly away to where stood a group of officers, hardly any of them older than himself. "meade," he demanded of one of them, "what do you think of that?" "i think i don't know how long that half-finished fort can hold out," responded lieutenant meade, and half a dozen other voices instantly agreed with him as to the perils surrounding the small besieged garrison. it was hardly possible, they said, that it could hold out until the arrival of the main army. this, too, would have to fight all the way against superior numbers, but that was a thing which it could do, and they were all wild with eagerness to be on the march, in answer to the summons of those far-away guns. there were no railroads to speak of, and only the first small beginnings of telegraphs in the year 1846. the news of the first fighting would therefore be slow in reaching the president and congress at washington, so that they might lawfully make what is called a formal declaration of war. much had already been taken for granted, but the american government was at that hour anxiously leaning southward and listening for the expected roar of mexican cannon. it came, as rapidly as general taylor could send it. a swift despatch-boat, with all her canvas up, went speeding across the gulf to new orleans. thence, in the hands of special couriers, it would gallop all the remaining distance. meantime, the struggle at the rio grande frontier would continue, just as if all the legal arrangements had been made, but it would be weeks before europe could be advised of what was going on. all this, too, when this fight over the annexation of texas was about to lift the republic into a foremost place among the nations. it was to give her all the pacific coast which she now has, except oregon and alaska, with the gold of california and the silver of the mountains. among its consequences were to be the terrible civil war, the abolition of slavery, the acquisition of the sandwich islands, and many another vast change in the history of our country and in that of these very european nations which were then ignorantly sitting still and thinking little about it, because they had no ocean cable telegraphs to outrun the swift clipper ships. there were couriers racing inland in all directions to tell the people of mexico, also, that war had come, but the despatches of the general commanding their forces on the texas border were carried by a swift schooner from matamoras, on the coast, directly to vera cruz. a messenger from that port had before him a gallop of only two hundred and sixty miles to the city of mexico. president paredes, therefore, had full information of the attack on the american fort sooner than did president polk by a number of very important days. these were bright may days, and during all of them there were other things going on which had a direct relation to the cannon-firing and the siege. for instance, all the commerce between mexico and the rest of the world was deeply interested, and so were all the warships of the united states, which were prepared to interfere with that commerce pretty soon, and shut it off. there were merchant vessels at sea to whose captains and owners it was a serious question whether or not cruisers carrying the stars and stripes would permit them to reach their intended port and deliver their cargoes. whatever may have been the case with all the rest of these vessels, one of them in particular appeared to be rushing along in a great hurry at the very hour when lieutenant grant woke up so suddenly and walked out of his tent. she carried an american flag, somewhat tattered, and she was spreading quite as much canvas as a prudent skipper might have considered safe under the strong gale that was blowing. she was bark-rigged, of about four hundred tons burden, and was headed westward in the nicholas channel, off the northerly coast of the island of cuba. there was a high sea running, but the ship stood up well, and the few men who were on deck could get about easily. even a boy of apparently not over seventeen, who came to a halt near the mainmast, managed to keep his balance with some help from a rope. that he did so was a credit to him, and it helped to give him a sailor-like and jaunty air. so did his blue trousers, blue flannel shirt with a wide collar, and the sidewise pitch of his tarpaulin hat. he might as well have remarked aloud that he was one of those boys who are up to almost anything, and who think small potatoes of a mere storm at sea. near him, however, stood a pair of men, either of whom might have felt as much at home under another flag than the one which was now fluttering its damaged bunting above them. the shorter of the two was a very dark-faced gentleman of perhaps forty, with piercing black eyes. in spite of his civilian dress, he wore an expression that was decidedly warlike, or soldierly. "captain kemp," he said to his companion, "will you be good enough to tell me why we are in the nicholas channel?" "no, señor zuroaga," growled the large-framed, roughly rigged and grim-looking sailor. "i'm cap'n o' this ship, and i don't give explanations. we've had gales on gales since we left port. one course is as good as another, if you're not losing distance. we'll reach vera cruz now three or four days sooner than we reckoned. all those war insurance risks were paid for for nothing." "i'm not so sure of that," was slowly and thoughtfully responded. "not if one of uncle sam's officers should get a look into the hold of this ship." "you're a mexican, anyhow," said captain kemp, surlily. "you know enough to keep your mouth shut. you don't really have to know anything about the cargo. besides, it was peace when we sailed. we shall make a safe landing,--if nothing happens on the way." "captain," said the mexican, "it does not take long to make a declaration of war when both sides are determined to have one." "you're wrong there, señor zuroaga," replied the captain, emphatically. "mexico doesn't want a brush with the states. she isn't strong enough. the yankees can whip her out of texas any day." "that is not the point at all," replied zuroaga, sadly. "the fact is, the texan yankees want a war for revenge, and the american party in power would like to annex a great deal more than texas. president paredes needs a war to keep himself in power and help him put on a crown. old santa anna wants a war to give him a chance to return from exile and get control of the army. if we ever do reach vera cruz, we shall hear of fighting when we get there." "perhaps," said the captain, "but it will be only a short war, and at the end of it the united states will have stolen texas." "no, señor," said zuroaga, with a fierce flash in his eyes. "all educated mexicans believe that texas or any other of the old spanish provinces has a right to set up for itself. almost every state has actually tried it. we have had revolution after revolution." "anarchy after anarchy!" growled the captain. "such a nation as that needs a king of some kind, or else the strong hand of either england or france or the united states." "mexico! a nation!" exclaimed señor zuroaga, after a moment of silence. "we are not a nation yet. within our boundaries there are several millions of ignorant indians, peons, rancheros and the like, that are owned rather than ruled by a few scores of rich landholders who represent the old spanish military grants. just now president paredes is able to overawe as many of these chiefs as he and others have not murdered. so he is president, or whatever else he may choose to call himself. the mere title is nothing, for the people do not know the difference between one and another. now, captain kemp, one sure thing is that the yankees have taken texas and mean to keep it. they will fight for it. one other sure thing is that general antonio lopez de santa anna will come back if he can, to carry on that war and supersede paredes. if he does so, there is danger ahead for some men. he will settle with all his old enemies, and he loves bloodshed for its own sake. when he cannot be killing men, he will sit in a cockpit all day, just for the pleasure of seeing the birds slaughtering one another. i believe he had my own father shot quite as much for love of murder as for the opportunity it gave him for confiscating our family estates in oaxaca." "you seem to have enough to hate him for, anyhow, and i don't blame you," replied the captain, as he turned away to give some orders to the sailors, and all the while the boy who stood near them had been listening. "well, ned crawford," he muttered to himself, "that's it, is it? father didn't seem to believe there would be any war. he said there would be plenty of time, anyhow, for this old _goshawk_ bark to make the round trip to new york by way of vera cruz." a great lurch of the ship nearly swung him off his feet just then, and he was holding on very firmly to his rope when he added: "he said i'd learn a great deal all the way, and i shouldn't wonder if i'm learning something new just now. what do they mean by that dangerous cargo in the hold, and our being captured by american ships of war? that's a thing father didn't know anything about. i guess i can see how it is, though. captain kemp isn't an american, and he'd do almost anything to make money. anything honest, i mean. how it does blow! well, let her blow! father said he was putting me into a first-rate commercial school, and here i am right in the middle of it." ned was indeed at school, and he seemed likely to have unexpected teachers, but so is every other wide-awake young fellow, just like ulysses grant and his crowd of young associates in their hot weather war school over there on the texas border. señor zuroaga also had now walked away, and ned was left to hold by his rope, looking out upon the tossing sea and wondering more and more what sort of adventures he and the _goshawk_ might be so swiftly racing on into. chapter ii. the race of the goshawk a long day had passed and a dark night had come. the air of it was hot and sultry over all the regions around the gulf of mexico. something appeared to be weighing it down, as if it might be loaded with the great events which were about to come. it was gloomy enough at and around the besieged american fort on the texas side of the rio grande, but every now and then the darkness and the silence were broken by the flashes and thunders of the mexican artillery, and the responses of the cannon of the bravely defended fortress. this was already partly in ruins, and the besiegers had good reasons for their expectation that in due season they were to see the stars and stripes come down from the shattered rampart. it did not seem to them at all possible that the small force under general taylor, twenty miles away at the seaside, could cut through overwhelming numbers to the relief of the garrison. it was just as dark in the american camp on the coast, but there were many campfires burning, and by the light of these and numberless lanterns there were busy preparations making for the forward march, which was to begin in the morning. there was an immense amount of anxiety in the minds of all the americans who were getting ready, but it was only on account of the fort and garrison, for that little army had a remarkable degree of confidence in its own fighting capacity. it is never as dark on the land, apparently, as it is at sea, where even the lights hung out by a ship seem to make all things darker, except the white crests of the billows. one ship's lantern, however, was so hung that it threw down a dim light upon a pair who were sitting on the deck near the stern. "señor zuroaga," said one of them, "i wish it was daylight." "so do i," responded his companion, with hardly a trace of foreign accent. "the storm's nearly over, but i had so much on my mind that i could not sleep. the fact is, i came up to try and make up my mind where we are. i must reach vera cruz before santa anna does, if i can. if i do not, i may be shot after landing. i shall be safer, too, after president paredes has marched with his army for the rio grande. so i hope for war. anyhow, the commander at vera cruz is a friend of mine." "i guess i understand," said ned. "i heard what you said about the way things are going. but what did you mean about our being in the nicholas channel? what has that got to do with it?" "talk spanish!" replied the señor, with whom the boy appeared to be upon good terms. "i do not want any of those sailors to understand me, though i'm very glad that you can. how did that happen?" "well," said ned, "father's been all his life in the cuban and mexican trade, and i'm to grow up into it. i can't remember just when they began to teach me spanish. i was thinking about the war, though. if it's coming, i want to see some of the fighting." "you may see more than you will like," said his friend in his own tongue. "now, as to where we are, remember your geography." "i can remember every map in it," said ned, confidently. "good!" said the señor. "now! you know that the gulf stream runs along the coast of florida. our road from liverpool to the gulf was to have taken us by that way. instead of that, we came around below the bahama islands, and here we are off the north coast of cuba. captain kemp's reason is that there might be too many american cruisers along the florida coast, and he does not care to be stopped by one of them, if the war has already begun. we would not be allowed to go any further." "i see," said ned. "of course not. they would stop us, to keep us from being captured by the mexicans when we got to vera cruz." "not exactly," said the señor, half laughing, "but it might cost your father and his partners their ship and cargo. that is the secret the sailors are not to know. away up northward there, a hundred miles or so, are the florida keys, and among them is the united states naval station at key west. there are ships of war there, and captain kemp will not sail any nearer to them than he can help. ned, did you have any idea that you were sitting over a mexican powder-magazine?" "no!" exclaimed ned. "what on earth do you mean?" "i think i had better tell you," said the señor. "i half suspected it before we sailed, and i learned the whole truth afterward. the new york and liverpool firm that your father belongs to sent on board an honest and peaceable cargo, but there was a good deal of room left in the hold, and the captain filled it up with cannon-balls, musket-bullets, and gunpowder from the english agents of no less a man than general santa anna himself. it is all for his army, whenever he gets one, but it goes first to the castle of san juan de ulua, at vera cruz. if war has been declared, or if it has in any way begun, the whole thing is what they call contraband of war, and the _goshawk_ is liable to be captured and confiscated." "phew!" whistled ned. "wonder how father'd like that! anyhow, we don't know there's any war." "we'd be in trouble anyhow," said the señor. "but we are all in the dark about it. we have been over three weeks on the way, and all the war news we had when we started was nearly a month old. we can only guess what has been going on. here we are, though, in a storm that is driving us along first-rate into the gulf of mexico. we may be four days' sail from vera cruz in a bee-line, and the _goshawk_ is a racer, but we may not be able to make a straight course. well, well, the captain will keep on all the canvas that's safe, and we may get there. hullo! the day is beginning to dawn. now our real danger begins." he said no more, and ned walked forward with something altogether new on his mind. an american boy, crammed full of patriotism, and wishing that he were in general taylor's army, he was, nevertheless, by no fault of his own, one of the crew of a ship which was carrying ammunition to the enemy. he almost felt as if he were fighting his own country, and it made him sick. he had an idea, moreover, that señor zuroaga was only half willing to help his old enemy santa anna. "i don't care if captain kemp is an englishman," he said to himself, "he had no business to run father and his partners into such a scrape." that might be so, and perhaps neither kemp, nor zuroaga, nor even ned himself, knew all about the laws of war which govern such cases, but just then there flashed across his mind a very dismal suggestion, as he stared down at the deck he stood on. "what," he asked himself, "if any accident should touch off those barrels of powder down there? why, we'd all be blown sky-high and nobody'd ever know what had become of us. there'd be nothing but chips left." he tried not to think about that, and went below to get his breakfast, while captain kemp ordered his sailors to send up another sail, remarking to señor zuroaga: "we must make the most we can of this wind. every hour counts now. i'll take the _goshawk_ to vera cruz, or i'll run her under water." "have you any idea where we are just now?" asked the señor. "well on into the gulf," said the captain, cheerfully. "we made a splendid run in the night, thanks to the gale. i hope it will blow on, and i think there is no danger of our being overhauled until we are off the mexican coast. i wish, though, that i knew whether or not the war has actually been declared." "the declaration isn't everything," replied the señor. "if there has been any fighting at all, american cruisers have a right, after that, to question ships bound for a hostile port, and to stop and seize all contraband of war. after goods are once seized, it isn't easy to get them back again." "sail ho!" came down from aloft at that moment. "where away?" called back the captain. "northerly, sir. looks like a shark, sir." "can you make out her flag?" was inquired, almost anxiously. the man on the lookout plied his telescope a full half-minute before he responded: "stars and stripes, sir. sloop-o'-war, sir. she's changin' her course, and she's makin' for us, i reckon." "let her head!" growled the captain. "this bark'll bear more sail. hoist away there, men. let her have it! señor, there's one thing i'll do right off. it may be our best chance if she should overhaul us." he did not explain his meaning just then, but another sail went up and something else came down. in a few minutes more, when ned came on deck again, he suddenly felt worse than ever. not long before, when the sun was rising, he had been on an american ship, with the flag of his country flying above him, but now his first glance aloft drew from him a loud exclamation, for he found that while below he had apparently been turned into an englishman, and away up yonder the gale was playing with the red cross banner of the british empire. he stared at it for a moment, and then he made an excited rush for señor zuroaga. he might have reached him sooner, but for a lurch of the _goshawk_, which sent him sprawling full length upon the deck. it did not hurt him much, however, and as soon as he was on his feet, he blurted out, angrily: "señor! i say! do you see that? what does it mean?" the mexican laughed aloud, but not only ned crawford but several of the sailors were eyeing that unexpected bunting with red and angry faces. they also were americans, and they had national prejudices. "you don't like the british flag, eh?" he said. "i do, then, just now. an american cruiser would not fire a shot at that flag half so quick as it would at your own." "why wouldn't she?" asked ned. [illustration: "do you see that? what does it mean?"] "because," said the señor, a little dryly, "the american skipper hasn't any british navy behind him, ready to take the matter up. it's a protection in case we can't outrun that sloop-of-war. the men won't care a cent, as soon as they know it's only a sea dodge to get into port with." sailor-like, they were indeed easily satisfied with whatever the captain chose to tell them, and on went the _goshawk_ as a british craft, but she was nevertheless carrying supplies to the mexican army. señor zuroaga had brought up a double spy-glass of his own, and, after studying the stranger through it, he handed it to ned, remarking: "take a look at her. she's a beauty. she is drawing nearer on this tack, but nobody knows yet whether she can outrun us or not." ned took the glass with an unexpected feeling growing within him that he hoped she could not do so. he did not wish to be caught on board a british vessel taking powder and shot to kill americans with. as he put the glass to his eyes, however, the sloop-of-war appeared to have suddenly come nearer. it was as if the _goshawk_ were already within reach of her guns, and she became a dangerous thing to look at. she was not, as yet, under any great press of canvas, for her commander may not have imagined that any merchant vessel would try to get away from him. there were two things, however, about which nobody on board the _goshawk_ was thinking. the first was that, while the american ship-of-war captain had not heard the firing at the fort on the rio grande, he was under a strong impression that war had been declared. the other thing came out in a remark which he made to a junior officer standing by him. "it won't do!" he declared, emphatically. "i don't at all like that change of flags. it means mischief. there is something suspicious about that craft. we must bring her to, and find out what's the matter with her." the distance between the two vessels was still too great for anything but a few signals, to which captain kemp responded with others which may have been of his own invention, for the signal officer on board the yankee cruiser could make nothing of them. the _goshhawk_, moreover, did not shorten sail, and her steersman kept her away several points more southerly, instead of bringing her course nearer to that of the cruiser. "i see!" said her captain, as he watched the change. "she means to get away from us. it won't do. as soon as we are within range, i'll give her a gun. she may be a mexican privateer, for all i know." at all events, under the circumstances, as he thought, the change of flags had made it his duty to inquire into her character, and he decided to do so, even if, as he said, he should have to send one shot ahead of her and then a dozen into her. there is something wonderfully exciting about a race of any kind. men will make use of anything, from a donkey to a steamboat, to engineer a trial of speed and endurance. then they will stand around and watch the running, as if the future welfare of the human race depended upon the result. even the _goshhawk_ sailors, who had previously grumbled at the british flag above them, were entirely reconciled to the situation, now that it included the interesting question whether or not their swift bark could show her heels to the cruiser. they were very much in doubt about it, for the ships of the american navy had a high and well-earned reputation as chasers. they might have been somewhat encouraged if they had known that the _portsmouth_, sloop-of-war, had been at sea a long time without going into any dock to have her bottom scraped clean of its accumulated barnacles. she was by no means in the best of training for a marine race-course. an hour went by and then another. the two vessels were now running on almost parallel lines, so that any attempt of the sloop to draw nearer cost her just so much of chasing distance. it might be that they were, in fact, nearly matched, now that the wind had lulled a little, and both of them were able to send up more canvas without too much risk of having their sticks blown out of them. it looked like it, but the yankee captain had yet another idea in his sagacious head. "let her keep on," he said. "the old _kennebec_ is out there, somewhere westerly, not far away. that vagabond may find himself under heavier guns than ours before sunset. lieutenant, give him a gun." "ay, ay, sir!" came back, and in a moment more there was a flash and a report at the bow of the _portsmouth_. both range and distance had been well calculated, for an iron messenger, ordering the _goshhawk_ to heave to, fell into the water within a hundred yards of her stern. "that's near enough for the present," said the american commander, but captain kemp exclaimed, in astonishment: "they are firing on the british flag, are they? then there is something up that we don't know anything about. we must get away at all risks." they were not doing so just now, although another change of course and a strong puff of the gale carried the _goshhawk_ further out of range. the fact was that her pursuer did not feel quite ready to land shot on board of her, believing that he was doing well enough and that his prize would surely be taken sooner or later. besides, if she were, indeed, to become a prize, no sound-minded sea-captain could be willing to shoot away her selling value or that of her cargo. noon came, and there did not appear to be any important change in the relative positions of the two ships. at times, indeed, the _goshhawk_ had gained a quarter-mile or so, but only to lose it again, as is apt to be the case in ocean races. she was not at all tired, however, and both of the contestants had all the wind they needed. two hours more went slowly by, and captain kemp began to exhibit signs of uneasiness at the unexpected persistence with which he was followed. "what on earth can be the matter?" he remarked, aloud. "i'd have thought she'd get tired of it before this--" "captain!" sharply interrupted zuroaga, standing at his elbow, glass in hand. "another sail! off there, southerly. seems to be a full-rigged ship. what are we to do now?" "keep on!" roared the captain, and then he turned to respond to a similar piece of unpleasant information which came down from the lookout. "we'll soon know what she is," he remarked, but not as if he very much wished to do so. "what i'd like to do would be to sail on into the darkest kind of a rainy night. that's our chance, if we can get it." it might be, but at that very moment the commander of the _portsmouth_ was asserting to his first lieutenant: "there comes the _kennebec_, my boy. we'll have this fellow now. we'll teach him not to play tricks with national flags and man-o'-war signals." the race across the gulf of mexico was now putting on new and interesting features, but ned crawford, posted well forward to watch the course of events and what might have been called the race-course, sagely remarked: "i don't know that two horses can run any faster than one can. we are as far ahead as ever we were." that would have been of more importance if the newcomer had not been so much to the southward and westward, rather than behind them. she was, of course, several miles nearer to the _goshhawk_ than she was to the _portsmouth_, and neither of these had as yet been able to make out her flag with certainty. that she was a full-rigged ship was sure enough, and if ned had been upon her deck instead of upon his own, he would have discovered that she was heavily armed and in apple-pie order. at this very moment a burly officer upon her quarter-deck was roaring, angrily, in response to some information which had been given him: "what's that? a british ship chased by a yankee cruiser? lieutenant, i think the _falcon_'ll take a look at that. these yankees are getting too bumptious altogether. it's as if they thought they owned the gulf! put her head two points north'ard. humph! it's about time they had a lesson." there had been some temporary trouble with the flag of the _falcon_, but it had now been cleared of its tangle, and was swinging out free. it was of larger size than the british bunting displayed by the goshawk. it was only a few minutes, therefore, before captain kemp had a fresh trouble on his mind, for his telescope had told him the meaning of that flag. "worse than ever!" he exclaimed. "she'd make us heave to and show our papers. then she'd hand us right over, and no help for it. no, sir! our only way is to scud from both of them. some of our english frigates are slow goers, and this may be one of that kind." he was in less immediate peril, perhaps, because of the determination of the angry british captain to speak to the yankee first, and demand an explanation of this extraordinary affair. this it was his plain duty to do, and the attempt to do it would shortly put him and all his guns between the _portsmouth_ and the _goshhawk_. this operation was going on at the end of another hour, when captain kemp's lookout shouted down to him: "sail ho, sir! 'bout a mile ahead o' the british frigate. can't quite make her out yet, sir." "i declare!" groaned the captain. "this 'ere's getting kind o' thick!" the weather also was getting thicker, and all three of the racers were shortly under a prudent necessity for reducing their excessive spreads of canvas. the first mate of the _goshhawk_ had even been compelled to expostulate with his overexcited skipper. "some of it's got to come down, sir," he asserted. "if we was to lose a spar, we're gone, sure as guns!" "in with it, then," said the captain. "i wish both of 'em 'd knock out a stick or two. it'd be a good thing for us." at all events, a lame horse is not likely to win a race, and the _goshhawk_ was doing as well as were either of the others. under such circumstances, it was not long before the _falcon_ and the _portsmouth_ were within speaking-trumpet distance of each other, both of them losing half a mile to the _goshhawk_ while they were getting together. rapid and loud-voiced indeed were the explanations which passed between the two commanders. at the end of them, the wrath of the englishman was turned entirely against the culprit bark, which had trifled with his flag. "we must take her, sir!" he shouted. "she's a loose fish o' some kind." it was while this conversation was going on that señor zuroaga, after long and careful observations, reported to captain kemp concerning the far-away stranger to the westward. "she is a frenchman, beyond a doubt. are all the nations making a naval rendezvous in the gulf of mexico?" "nothing extraordinary," said the captain. "but they're all more'n usually on the watch, on account o' the war, if it's coming." it was precisely so. war surely brings disturbance and losses to others besides those who are directly engaged in it, and all the nations having commercial relations with mexico were expecting their cruisers in the gulf to act as a kind of sea police. moreover, a larger force than usual would probably be on hand and wide awake. the day was going fast, and the weather promised to shorten it. ned was now wearing an oilskin, for he would not have allowed any amount of rain to have driven him below. he and all the rest on board the _goshhawk_ were aware that their pursuers were again beginning to gain on them perceptibly. it was a slow process, but it was likely to be a sure one, for the men-of-war could do better sailing in a heavy sea and under shortened canvas than could a loaded vessel like the saucy merchant bark. "i'm afraid they'll catch us!" groaned ned. "i s'pose they could make us all prisoners of war,--if there is any war. oh, i wish all that powder and shot had been thrown overboard!" it did not look, just now, as if the mexican army would ever get any benefit from it, for even the french stranger to leeward seemed to be putting on an air of having evil intentions. captain kemp had made her out to be a corvette of moderate size, perhaps a sixteen-gun ship, and she would be quite likely to co-operate with the police boats of england and america in arresting any suspicious wanderer in those troubled waters. darker grew the gloom and a light mist came sweeping over the sea. both pursuers and pursued began to swing out lights, and before long the mate of the _goshhawk_ came to captain kemp to inquire, in a puzzled way: "i say, cap'n, what on earth do you do that for? it'll help 'em to foller us, and lose us all the benefit o' the dark." "no, it won't," growled the captain. "you wait and see. i've sighted one more light, off there ahead of us, and i'm going to make it do something for the _goshhawk_. those other chaps can't see it yet." "what in all the world can he be up to?" thought ned, as he listened, but the cunning skipper of the bark had all his wits about him. the lookouts of the men-of-war had indeed been taking note thus far of only their own lanterns and the glimmer on their intended prize. they may even have wondered, as did her own mate, why she should aid them in keeping track of her. at all events, they had little doubt of having her under their guns before morning. señor zuroaga himself sat curled up under his waterproof well aft, and now and then he appeared to be chuckling, as if he knew something which amused him. half an hour later, when all the lights of the _goshhawk_ suddenly went out, he actually broke into a ringing laugh. her course was changed to almost due north at that very moment. this would bring her across the track of the _portsmouth_ and within a mile of that dangerous cruiser's bow guns. they might not be quite so dangerous, however, if her gunners should be unable to see a mark at that distance through the mist. the fifth light, dead ahead, now became itself only the fourth, and it was immediately the sole attraction for the watchers in the rigging of the several war police-boats. this stranger was going westwardly, at a fair rate of speed, and its light was exceptionally brilliant. in fact, it grew more and more so during an anxious thirty minutes that followed, but it was the french corvette which first came within hailing distance, to receive an answer in angry portuguese, which the french officers could not make head or tail of. even after receiving further communications in broken portuguese-spanish, all they could do was to compel the brazilian schooner, _gonzaga_, laden with honest coffee from rio for new orleans, to heave to as best she might until the next arrival came within hail. this proved to be the british frigate, and her disappointed captain at once pretty sharply explained to the frenchmen the difference between a two-master from rio and a british-yankee runaway bark from nobody knew where. then came sweeping along the gallant _portsmouth_, and there was need for additional conversation all around. some of it was of an exceedingly discontented character, although the several captains were doing their best to be polite to each other, whatever derogatory remarks they might feel disposed to make concerning the craft which was carrying ned crawford and his badly wounded patriotism. far away to the northwest, hidden by the darkness, the _goshhawk_ was all this while flying along, getting into greater safety with every knot she was making, and captain kemp remarked to ned: "my boy, your father won't lose a cent, after all--not unless we find vera cruz blockaded. but our danger isn't all over yet, and it's well for us that we've slipped out of this part of it." "captain kemp!" exclaimed ned, "i believe father'd be willing to lose something, rather than have the mexicans get that ammunition." "very likely he would," laughed the captain, "but i'm an englishman, and i don't care. what's more, i'm like a great many americans. millions of them believe that the mexicans are in the right in this matter." that was a thing which nobody could deny, and ned was silenced so far as the captain's sense of national duty was concerned. hundreds of miles to the westward, at that early hour of the evening, far beyond the path of the storm which had been sweeping the eastern and southern waters of the gulf, the american army, under general taylor, lay bivouacked. it was several miles nearer the besieged fort than it had been in the morning, for this was the 8th of may. there had been sharp fighting at intervals since the middle of the forenoon, beginning at a place called palo alto, or "the tall trees," and the mexicans had been driven back with loss. any cannonading at the fort could be heard more plainly now, and it was certain that it had not yet surrendered. near the centre of the lines occupied by the seventh regiment, a young officer sat upon the grass. he held in one hand a piece of army bread, from which he now and then took a bite, but he was evidently absorbed in thought. he took off his hat at last and stared out into the gloom. "the mexican army is out there somewhere," he remarked, slowly. "we are likely to have another brush with them to-morrow. well! this is real war. i've seen my first battle, and i know just how a fellow feels under fire. i wasn't at all sure how it would be, but i know now. he doesn't feel first-rate, by any means. those fellows that say they like it are all humbugs. i've seen my first man killed by a cannon-ball. poor page! poor ringgold! more of us are to go down to-morrow. who will it be?" very possibly, the list of american slain would contain the announcement that a mere second lieutenant, named ulysses s. grant, had been struck by a chance shot from one of the mexican batteries. chapter iii. the fortune of war the morning of the 9th of may dawned brightly on the ocean and on the shore. there was a heavy sea running on the gulf of mexico, but the wind that was blowing was little more than a ten-knot breeze. before this, at distances of a few miles from each other, a trio of armed vessels, representing three of the great powers of the world, were dashing along under full sail, as if they were in a hurry. they were so, for they all were searching hungrily after a double-flagged bark, which they had caught the day before, but which had managed to escape from them in the night. she had done it mysteriously and impudently. instead of her, there now toiled along, away behind them, a dingy-looking brazilian coffee schooner, the skipper of which did not conceal his satisfaction over the idea that he had unintentionally aided some other sailor--he did not care who--to get away from all those war-sharks. well to the westward, with every sail spread that she could carry, the _goshhawk_ sped along in apparent safety, but she was once more carrying the american flag, and ned crawford, busy below at his breakfast, felt a great deal easier in his patriotic mind. he could almost forget, for the moment, that he was taking a cargo of the worst kind of contraband of war goods to the armies of the enemies of his country. he was shortly on deck again, to be heartily greeted by captain kemp with: "hullo, my boy, where are all your ships of war?" ned took a long, sweeping glance around the horizon, and replied: "it looks as if we'd lost 'em." "we've done it!" chuckled the captain. "i think we'll not see any more of that lot. we made a fine run in the night, and we may be within three days' sail of vera cruz. but that depends a great deal on the wind and on our luck in keeping out of difficulties." the captain turned away to his duties, and ned went forward among the sailors. he could always manage to have good chats with them, and they were especially ready just now to discuss the war and their chances for running against more cruisers. ned did not count as one of them exactly, but he was not to be looked down upon as a mere passenger. his father had sent him out as a kind of honorary supercargo, or ship's clerk, in the hope that he might learn something which would be of use to him when he should grow up into a full-sized merchant. perhaps he had already found out a number of things upon which his father had not calculated when he said good-by to him. he was about to learn some other things which were not upon the ship's books, for he had reached the heel of the bowsprit, where señor zuroaga was standing, gazing dreamily westward. "good morning, señor!" said ned. "we did get away." "i don't know how good a morning it is for me," replied the dark-faced mexican, wearily. "i may have only three or four days to wait before i shall know whether or not i am to be shot at vera cruz by order of his excellency, president paredes. my best chance is that he cannot know that i am coming. after i get ashore, my life may very soon depend upon his being beaten out of power by the armies of the united states." "it couldn't be so in any other country," said ned. "what have you ever done against him?" "i won't say just now," replied the señor, "but he knows that i am his enemy. so i am of santa anna, if he is to get back. he murdered my father and confiscated our property in oaxaca. do you know where that is?" "no," said ned; "i don't know anything about the states of mexico. it's hard enough to keep track of the united states. they make a new one every few weeks. they may have let in half a dozen while we've been at sea." "no," said zuroaga, "but they've tightened their grip on texas, and i hope they'll hold on hard, if only to keep paredes and santa anna from murdering all the best men in it. well, oaxaca lies due south of the state of vera cruz, and i can escape into it if i have half a chance. i'd be safe then, for i have plenty of friends there. we have owned huge tracts of land in oaxaca ever since the spaniards conquered mexico." "how did your folks get so much of it?" inquired ned. "i'll tell you," said the señor, proudly, and with a fiery flash in his coal-black eyes. "a man by the name of hernando cortes really conquered mexico, without much help from the king of spain. the king made a great deal of him for it, at first. he made him a marquis, which was a great thing in those days, whatever it is now. he also gave him a royal grant of some of the land he had won for spain. this land was the valley of the tehuantepec river, that empties into the pacific ocean near the eastern boundary of oaxaca. so his title was marquis del valle, and his descendants hold a great deal of that land to this day. i am one of them,--one of the marquisanas, as they call us. i am a direct descendant of hernando cortes, and that isn't all. one of my ancestors married an aztec princess, and so i am also descended from the montezumas, who were emperors of mexico before the spaniards came. i'm an indian on one side, and i've more than one good reason for hating a spaniard and a tyrant." ned crawford had read the story of the conquest of mexico, like a great many other american boys. that is, he had read it as if it had been a tip-top novel rather than a reality. he had admired hernando cortes, as a hero of fiction, but here he was, now, actually talking with one of the hero's great-great-grandchildren, who was also, after a fashion, one of the montezumas. it was like a short chapter out of some other novel, with the night race of the _goshhawk_ thrown in by way of variation. he was thinking about it, however, rather than asking questions, and the señor went on: "it's a rich, beautiful country, all that eastern part of oaxaca. there are splendid mountains and great forests of mahogany, rosewood, and pine. through it runs the coatzacoalcos river, northerly, to the gulf. along the rivers and through the mountain passes, there is an old road that cortes himself made to lead his little army across to the pacific." "i'd like to go over on it!" exclaimed ned. "i guess i will, some day. i want to know all about mexico." he made up his mind, from what his companion went on to tell him, that there would be a great deal worth seeing, but at that time nobody was dreaming how many americans, older and younger, were soon to travel over the old cortes road. california was to be annexed, as well as texas, and before ned crawford would be old enough to cast his first vote, there was to be a great tide of eager gold hunters pouring along what was called the tehuantepec route to the placers and diggings. the days of california gold mining had not yet come, and while ned and the señor talked on about the terrible history of mexico, with its factions, its bloody revenges, its pronunciamentos, and its fruitless revolutions, the _goshhawk_ sailed swiftly along toward vera cruz and the powder-needing garrison of the castle of san juan de ulua. whether or not the war had actually begun was still a puzzling question in the mind of captain kemp, but he would have had no doubt whatever if he had been with general taylor and his remarkable gathering of young students of the art of war. they all obtained several important lessons that day. one of these was that it is both difficult and dangerous for an advancing army to push on through dense bushes and high grass in hot weather, with mexican lancers ready to pounce upon them among the lanes of the chaparral. it was found, not only before but after the short, sharp collision with the mexican forces at resaca de la palma that a number of valuable lives had been lost in the bushy wilderness. the american army moved slowly forward, and before nightfall the long lines of its blue uniforms went over the prairie rolls in full sight of the fort. the stars and stripes were still flying above the badly damaged ramparts, and cheer after cheer went up from thousands of throats, including those of the rescued garrison. they had not really lost many men, killed or wounded, but among the killed was their commander, major brown, after whom the fort was now named. in later years, a town grew up around the site of the frontier fortress, and it is called brownsville. general taylor's men had triumphantly cut their way through the difficult twenty miles from the sea to the siege, but perhaps any individual hero among them might have safely quoted the wise remark of lieutenant grant, as he looked at the fort and recalled his exploits of the day. "well, after all," he said to himself, "i don't know but what the battle of resaca de la palma would have been won just as well if i had not been there." long years afterward, it was to be said of a number of other battles that they would not have been won just as well if he had not been there to win them, and the same would be equally true of several of his young companions, as inexperienced as himself, and as ignorant of the great things before them in the far future. their army went into camp near the fort; and the mexican forces, for the greater part, were believed to have retreated across the rio grande. it is said that after every storm there comes a calm, but it was not a pleasant calm in the neighborhood of the american camp. there were all the while strong parties of mexican lancers hovering around in all directions, on the lookout for imprudent stragglers, and a sharp watch had to be kept to guard against sudden dashes at the outposts, for the "rancheros," as the mexican horsemen were called, were both well-mounted and enterprising. there was yet another kind of calm of a curious character. general taylor absolutely did not know what to do next, and he could not know until after he should hear from the president what the statesmen in congress had decided. beyond a doubt, war was going on right here, but there was a dispute as to the nature of it and as to what was to be done with it. the mexican geographers claimed that the southern boundary of texas, even if it had been legally annexed to the united states, was at the nueces river, and that all their country south of that line was still their own. according to them, therefore, general taylor's army was not in texas at all, but in mexico. on the other hand, the american geographers placed the boundary at the rio grande, many miles south of the nueces, and claimed that the forces defeated by general taylor had invaded the united states. if both parties were right, then it might have been said that all that land between the rivers did not belong to anybody until the title to it should be settled by a military court and gunpowder arguments. that was really the way in which it was finally settled, and there is now no more dispute about it. history tells us that so have all the great national land titles of the world been argued and determined. there was what some people call a waiting spell, and all things on sea or land might be spoken of as feverishly quiet for a day or two. in the afternoon of the third day, however, there was a sort of change in the weather at one spot away out on the gulf. there was not a cloud in the sky, indeed, and the _goshhawk_ was skimming along under full sail so steadily that part of her crew had nothing better to do than to lie around on the deck, and feel satisfied that the breeze was so very good. in the same manner, the american soldiers in the neighborhood of fort brown were lying around in and out of their tents, and wishing that they had more shade to protect them from the hot sun of texas or mexico, whichever it might be. at that hour, however, there arrived upon the _goshhawk_ a bit of unexpected news which awakened everybody, for the man at the lookout announced, excitedly: "schooner under mexican flag, sir! well away to loo'ard. looks as if she might come pretty nigh us." "just the thing i wanted!" shouted captain kemp, springing to his feet. "we'll bear away for her. up with the british flag, too. she'd shy the stars and stripes. they wouldn't tell us what the news is, either." once more, therefore, the _goshhawk_ became an englishman, and her chase after the latest news did not have to be a long one. not many minutes later, the two vessels were within hailing distance, and the stranger spoke first, in a tone of evident anxiety: "what ship is that?" "_goshhawk_, from liverpool to vera cruz, with supplies for the castle of san juan de ulua. what ship is that?" "schooner _tampico_, from havana to matamoras, with supplies for general ampudia," came much more cheerfully back. "we had to run away from matamoras in ballast to escape the gringos. their cruisers are around like hawks. you won't get to vera cruz if they can help it." captain kemp already knew something about the reckless ways of men-of-war, but he did not say so. he merely responded: "is that so? how about the war? we've no news at all." "war?" shouted the mexican skipper, triumphantly. "why, there have been three great battles already. we have whipped the americans! general taylor is surrounded, and will have to surrender. so will the fort on the rio grande. we shall drive the gringos out of texas. i did not know until now that you british were going to help us." there could be no further conversation, for the _goshhawk_ was sweeping on out of hearing, but ned crawford exclaimed, indignantly: "our army defeated? how can that be? i don't believe it!" everybody on deck could hear the captain when he laughingly responded: "the victories were won in that fellow's head, most likely. he was on board his schooner at matamoras, and he didn't see it done. all he knows is that the war is really begun. it takes a long time, men, to make either an american or a british army think of surrendering. we shall hear a good deal more about those battles one of these days. i'd like to read the newspaper reports, though, on both sides." "they would be good fun," dryly remarked señor zuroaga. "there is nobody on earth that can win victories like a newspaper editor." "hullo!" suddenly exclaimed ned. "something's the matter with the captain! did you hear that?" there was quite enough to hear. a long, loud hail that came down from the rigging was followed by almost a yell from captain kemp. "we're chased again!" he said. "thank god, she's astern! men, we're in for it! now for vera cruz or a prison! i'm ready!" rapid orders went out, but hardly anything more could be done to increase the speed of the ship. in fact, the lookout must almost have taken it for granted that the strange sail away off yonder belonged to a united states cruiser. very likely it did, but it would have to draw a good deal nearer before there could be any absolute certainty. in the meantime, all on board the _goshhawk_ might attend to whatever duties they had, and discuss the remarkable tidings brought by the mexican schooner. while doing so, they could hardly have guessed correctly what was doing and saying on board the other vessel which had caused their anxiety. she was, indeed, a man-of-war, and she had received from a returning army transport ship a whole lot of fresh news from general taylor's army, by way of point isabel on the coast, where he had been encamped. something like this had been shouted across the water by an enthusiastic officer of the transport: "awful fightin'! half a dozen battles! taylor's whipped the greasers into smithereens! he's goin' to march right on into mexico. i don't keer if uncle sam annexes the hull half-spanish outfit. i'm goin' in for one o' them there big silver mines, if we do. hurrah for gineral taylor!" a chorus of ringing cheers had answered that, but here, also, there were men of experience ready to question the entire accuracy of such tremendous war news. the one thing, however, which was brought out clearly to the mind of a naval commander was his greatly increased duty of watchfulness to prevent any kind of munitions of war from reaching the mexican ports. that was the reason why he was now following at his best speed what might after all prove to be an entirely innocent trader. he even went below to consider the matter, and it was a full hour later when the officer in charge of the deck came hastily down to tell him: "same fellow we chased before, sir. i've made him out. he's under british colors again. are we to chase?" "chase, sir?" roared the captain. "of course we must chase! we know what it means now. the old _portsmouth_ must catch that rascal this time. i'll come on deck." just as good glasses as those on board of her had been watching her during that hour of swift sailing, and captain kemp was even now lowering his telescope with what sounded like a sigh of relief. "mate," he said, "it's the same sloop that followed us before. it makes me feel better. we know what's about the best she can do. if this wind holds, i think we can fetch vera cruz at nightfall. no one yankee'd dare to follow us under the guns of san juan de ulua." "i reckon not," slowly responded the mate of the _goshhawk_, "but we don't need to get under that chap's bow-chasers, either." "no," said captain kemp, "but i'll risk a shot or two." ned crawford heard him, for he had been following him pretty closely, to know what was coming. "i don't know," he was thinking, "how far one o' those cannon of hers'll carry. i don't believe, either, that they can hit a mark that is plunging along as we are. it'd be worse than shooting at a bird on the wing. still, it's kind of awful to be shot at by our own people." the sailors of the _goshhawk_ were also thinking, and they were beginning to look at one another very doubtfully. not only were they americans, most of them, but they had not shipped for any such business as this, and they did not fancy the idea of being killed for nothing. moreover, ned himself heard one of them muttering: "there's an ugly look to this thing. if a shot from that cruiser were to strike us amidships, we'd all be blown into the air." decidedly that was not a pleasant thing to think of. neither was there any great amount of comfort in a suggestion made by another of the men: "well, we'd never know what hurt us. we must keep out o' range." not long afterward there was a flash at one of the bow-ports of the cruiser. the report which followed was a peremptory order to heave to, under penalty of consequences. the gun was shotted, and a great many eyes watched anxiously for the dipping of that well-aimed ball of iron. it skipped from crest to crest of several waves before it sank, and then captain kemp shouted: "all right, men! half a mile short! we shall get there. the coast's in full sight now, and we've less than five miles to run." "ay, ay, sir!" came back from them, half cheerfully, but one voice was heard to grumble: "it's all right, is it? well, if it wasn't for that half-mile o' shortage, there'd be a mutinee-e on board o' this ship. i'd start it. i ain't a-goin' to get myself knocked on the head by uncle sam's own men." there would very likely have been a mutiny, even as it was, if there had now been time for it to take shape. thus far, the excitement of the chase had been in the captain's favor, but the seamen would have been legally justified in resisting him and bringing the ship to. his authority would have ceased, for he had no right to compel them to break the law or to run the risk of a broadside from a man-of-war. nearer, nearer, nearer, came both the dim outline of the mexican coast and the white sails of the pursuing _portsmouth_. louder and more ominous grew the but half-suppressed murmurs of the sailors, but captain kemp's face was now wearing a hard, set look, and he was known to be a dangerous man to deal with. something, which looked like the handle of a pistol, stuck out of one of his side pockets, and his fingers wandered to it now and then, as if he might be turning over in his mind the possibility of soon having to shoot a mutineer. ned was staring anxiously back at the yankee cruiser at the moment when his shoulder was gripped hard, and señor zuroaga almost whirled him around, exclaiming: "look! look yonder! that's the castle of san juan de ulua! oh, but don't i wish it were a half-mile nearer! hear that firing?" the guns of the _portsmouth_ were indeed sounding at regular intervals, and she was evidently almost within range. she was also, however, well within the prescribed distance line which a hostile cruiser may not pass without being regarded as making the attack herself. beyond a doubt, too, there must have been observers at the fort, who were already watching the operations of the two approaching vessels. minutes passed, which were counted by ned with a heart that beat so he almost thought he could hear it. "i think we are safe now," began the señor, but he had been looking at the fort, and there was one important fact of which he was not aware. only a couple of minutes earlier, the captain of the _portsmouth_ had shouted angrily to his first lieutenant: "no, sir! i will not let her get away. i will take her or sink her! out with that starboard battery, and let them have it!" around swung the sloop, like the perfect naval machine that she was, and there quickly followed the reports of several guns at once. it was not a full broadside, but there was enough of it to have sunk the _goshhawk_, if the iron thrown had struck her at or near the water-line. none of it did so, but the next exclamation of señor zuroaga was one of utter dismay, for the foremast of the bark had been cut off at the cap and there was a vast rent in her mainsail. down tumbled a mass of spars and rigging, forward, and the ship could no longer obey her helm. "all hands cut away wreckage!" shouted captain kemp. "we're all right. she won't dare come any nearer. hurrah!" it was a deep, thunderous roar from the castle which had called out that apparently untimely hurrah. it was the voice of a 64-pounder gun from the nearest rampart, and the shot it sent fell within ten feet of the _portsmouth's_ bows. "hullo!" exclaimed her captain, more angrily than ever. "we've run in almost to pointblank range of those heavy guns. about! about! lieutenant, we must get out of this." "all right, sir," was anxiously responded. "it isn't worth while to risk any more shot of that size--not for all there's likely to be under the hatches of that wretched bark. i think we barked her, anyhow." he may have meant that for a kind of small joke, but she had been worse hurt than he could know, for one 32-pounder shot had shattered her stern, barely missing her sternpost and rudder gearing, and she was no longer the trim and seaworthy vessel that she had been. one more heavy gun had sounded from the seaward battery of the castle, but her garrison had been in a genuinely mexican condition of unreadiness, and it was several minutes before they could bring up more ammunition and make further use of their really excellent artillery. during those minutes, the _portsmouth_ had ample opportunity given her to swing around and sweep swiftly out of danger. she had barely escaped paying dearly for her pursuit of the _goshawk._ her satisfaction, however, consisted only in part of the damage she had done to the bark, for, in getting around, she had let drive her entire larboard broadside. it was a waste of ammunition, certainly, but no yankee man-of-war commander would ever have forgiven himself if he had failed to make a good reply to a shot from the castle of san juan de ulua. moreover, the sloop's gunners were ready to swear solemnly that every ball they had sent had hit the fort. the excitement on board the _goshhawk_ had been at fever heat, but it was now diminishing rapidly, for she did not contain a man who was not well pleased to see the _portsmouth_ give the matter up. all signs of mutiny disappeared, of course, for there was no more duty of a military character to be required of the men. the bark was soon set free of her wreckage, and prepared to make her way in still further, under the protection of the fort batteries. captain kemp was too busy for any kind of conversation, and señor zuroaga came aft, to where ned was curiously studying the work of the 32-pound shot at the stern. the señor leaned over the side and did the same for a long moment before he remarked: "we have had a narrow escape. a few feet lower, and that shot would have let the water in. fifty feet forward, and it would have touched off the gunpowder. as it is, our voyage is ended, and i shall know, in an hour or two, whether or not i am to be shot in the morning." chapter iv. completely stranded "there don't seem to be any mexican warships in the harbor," said ned to the señor, as they looked landward from the deck of their badly mauled bark. "there isn't one in sight to come out after that sloop." "there are two good reasons for it," growled the señor, gloomily. "one is that there isn't any harbor here. nothing but an open roadstead, exposed to all the storms that come, so that to anchor off vera cruz is to run a fair chance of being wrecked. the other is that my unfortunate country has no navy. there isn't a mexican vessel afloat that would care to go out after a yankee man-of-war. we are not yet a nation, and i'm half-afraid we never will be. this war may do something for us. there they come! i shall know very soon now." as he spoke, he pointed at several boats which were pulling out toward the _goshawk._ some of them appeared to come from the wharves of the city, but one, which was nearer, was evidently from the castle, and it was in this that the señor took the deepest interest. besides its half-dozen of oarsmen, it contained a tall man in a gorgeous uniform, and it was only a minute or so before zuroaga exclaimed: "yes, that is colonel guerra himself. i am glad he is all alone!" the bark was now drifting pretty rapidly landward, under such canvas as she had left, and the _portsmouth_ was safely out of range of the mexican guns, which were throwing away an occasional shot at her. she had not been touched by one of them, and she had the honor of being the first united states ship to try her batteries upon the renowned old spanish fortress. it was, indeed, a well-built fortification, and it carried many guns, most of which had been brought over long ago from the foundries of old spain. it did not stand upon the main shore, but on an island about half a mile out, and it therefore seemed unassailable, except from the sea or by heavy siege-guns on the shore. it had been one of the last places surrendered when the spanish government reluctantly gave up mexico. from that day onward, in each of the successive revolutions, it had been a first object with each new tyrant of the nominal republic or empire to get control of the fortress, which dominated nearly all of the commerce of mexico with the outer world. at the present time, it was commanded by an officer whom president paredes believed that he could trust--or he would have shot him. this, of course, was the main reason for the dark doubts of señor zuroaga. on the other hand, it might be taken into account that any prominent mexican officer, like colonel guerra, would be willing to strengthen himself for such political changes as were entirely likely to come. for the sake of old friendship and family ties, for instance, he might be even desirous of binding to his own interests a man who was known to have a large number of personal adherents in the important state of oaxaca. that very man stood aft upon the deck of the _goshhawk_ when the boat of colonel guerra touched her side, but he did not at once come forward to extend a greeting. that ceremony was performed sufficiently well by captain kemp, and the responses of the castle commander were to the last degree enthusiastic. according to him, indeed, the fort could not have held out against a siege for a week without the powder in the hold of the bark. therefore, it might be that not much of it was likely to be distributed among the other forces of mexico. the captain had many things to say, but before long colonel guerra walked slowly aft without anybody following him. he may have merely desired to look over the side and examine the injuries inflicted by the shot of the _portsmouth_, for that was the first thing he did, without so much as appearing to recognize any human being in the neighborhood. one of the two persons who were there, however, drew slowly near him, and, as he did so, he heard the colonel mutter, in a very low tone: "my dear friend, you have done well to bring me the powder. thank you for your devotion to me and to santa anna, but you are in deadly peril. the orders of paredes are out against you. general morales, whom paredes trusts, will soon be here to supersede me, but he will really come to hold this place for our general when he returns from exile. consider that i do not know that you are here, for my next in command is a spy on me. this ship will never put to sea again. the captain and crew will be cared for, but that gringo boy is not safe, now that there has been bloodshed on the rio grande. take him with you to the house of your cousin, colonel tassara, in the lower part of the city. then get away to oaxaca as soon as you can. president paredes is still in the city of mexico, and he will not go to take command of the army in the north for some time. you and i believe, of course, that he is really gathering it to have it led by our one-legged hero, santa anna. paredes, however, suspects that a revolution is springing up under him, and he is watching for it. of course, for that reason, he would shoot you at once as a returned conspirator against him. as for that matter, be careful how you land, for there are many spies. no doubt you can go where you please, after you get back among your own people. farewell, but do not speak to me." he turned and strolled carelessly away, and the señor bowed his head for a moment, as if in deep thought, while ned crawford was aware of an entirely new idea, which had crept into his mind as he had listened to the warning utterances of colonel guerra. "i declare!" he said to himself, "he believes that señor zuroaga brought the powder, and he didn't. he believes that the señor is going in for old santa anna, and he isn't. he believes that the señor and i are enemies of paredes, and so we are. i am! i hope that he'll be beaten out of his boots by general taylor, and then upset by the new revolution. i guess he's right, though, about this ship, and i must find out how i can send a letter home. i want father and mother to know all about this business. go ashore and hide? i'm ready for that, but i'd like to get a good look at the old city somehow." ned had been laboring under many perplexities and a great deal of depression of spirits during several days, but now he felt a kind of exhilarating fever creeping all over him, and at first he did not know exactly what it might be. when his father had taken him with him across the atlantic,--it seemed so long ago now,--he had gone eagerly enough, and he had had a grand time looking at liverpool and london. it had been a rare treat for a youngster who had but recently passed up from a grammar school into the counting-room of a new york shipping-house. after that, when he had been sent on this trip, to make his voyage home by way of mexico, he had considered himself exceedingly lucky. but what was all that in comparison with this in the way of strange and wild adventure? why, he had sailed through a naval engagement, cannonading and all, and right on out of that into a full-grown war and a half-grown revolution. the thrill which went over him was, therefore, the adventure fever. something like this fever, in the veins of all sorts of men, young and old, has made the world what it is, discovering its new countries, its new sciences, its new institutions, and leading it forward and upward out of its old-time dullness and barbarism. so ned stood straighter and felt older and had a pair of very brave, bright eyes when he walked forward to try and have a few words with captain kemp. "captain," he asked, "when can i go ashore?" "not quite yet," said the captain. "don't bother me now. of course, the ammunition for the castle goes out first. then all the rest of the cargo must go ashore as fast as it can, and you are bound to attend to that. i'm glad that all of it is apparently on english account, and not for the american part of the concern. that makes all things easy. i hardly know what to do with the ship, though. we can't repair her here." that was evidently the disadvantage of having a vessel get out of order in a place where there were no good dockyards. as for the unlading, there were already "lighter" barges on their way from the fort, and others, no doubt, would soon be on hand from the city. haste was the main object, under the circumstances, and the entire work would be rapidly accomplished. zuroaga went below, and ned followed him, for there was nothing more that he could do on deck just then. "señor," he asked, as soon as they were in the cabin, "how can i send a letter home? i don't know exactly what to say, either." "say anything you please," replied the señor. "your letter will go by the mail of the english consul, and the mails for england will not be meddled with by the mexican authorities." "i'll sit right down and begin one," said ned, but the señor interrupted him very soberly with: "one word before you begin, please. i know you overheard what colonel guerra said to me. you and i must get on shore as soon as we can, and it will not do for either of us to remain in vera cruz. i have decided that i must take you with me to oaxaca." "well," hesitated ned, "i understand that you must go, but what am i in danger of if i should stay here?" "edward, my dear fellow," said the señor, "i will tell you, and you had better put it into your letter. first, you just wait and see what becomes of the _goshhawk_. she will never sail out of the gulf of mexico again. the captain and crew will get away as best they can, and i can't tell how long it will be before they can do it. meantime, you would be around on shore, and you would be known for a yankee, a gringo. that might mean danger for you from any evil-minded mexican. some of this coast population are worse than savages, and they all carry knives. you'd never know who hurt you." "that's awful!" exclaimed ned. "i never thought of that." "there is another reason," calmly continued the señor, "for your not lingering down here in the _tierra caliente_--the hot country--any later in the season. it is the yellow fever, and that is pretty sure to show itself before long. it takes people from the north quicker, a good deal, than it does those who were born here. i have even heard that there is a rumor of some cases occurring already. your father is an old friend of mine, and he would never forgive me if i were to permit you to be exposed to it, when you can so easily get away into the uplands, where it is never heard of. be a good clerk now, and attend to your cargo, and be glad that it hasn't been sent to the bottom of the gulf." ned had been thinking of that pretty seriously, and he sat down to write his home letter, well pleased that he had nothing to do with the unloading of the contraband of war part of the cargo. with reference to that, moreover, he had learned from zuroaga that a mexican post-commander of the rank of colonel guerra was a kind of local military dictator. only so much of the ammunition as he might see fit to send would ever find its way into any other hands than his own. the señor had added that it was almost the same with whatever customs duties were collected by the civil officers of the port, with the one drawback that a dishonest army collector, if discovered, might possibly get himself shot as a kind of supposable revolutionist, stealing the profits of the others. the lighter barges were now swarming around the bark, and a hundred busy workmen were doing their best, quite patriotically, for the guns and gunners of the castle. it was easy to see that the american sailors did not fancy that job, and were willing to keep out of it. so they sauntered around, attending to a few ship's duties here and there, while now and then one or another of them might have been heard to grumble his unwillingness to ever again go to sea under an english captain. the truth was that they had excellent reasons for discontent concerning the scrape into which they had been led, and they were well aware that they had not yet by any means seen the end of it. almost the best they could hope for was that they were to be sent back to some country of europe, on some ship or other which had not yet arrived at vera cruz, and which might not sail away with them on board for a number of weeks to come. any man among them was now almost willing to have had the _portsmouth_ sink the _goshhawk_. heavy shot may be craned over into boats, and kegs or barrels of gunpowder may be let down tenderly, gently, as well by moonlight and lantern-light as by any other. therefore, the coming on of night did not interfere with the landing processes. moreover, any amount of sleep may be performed by a healthy boy in a battered ship lying safely at anchor. so ned made up, more or less, for the sleep he had lost during the long race of the _goshhawk_, and it was not early when he came on deck the next morning. when he did so, he found his duties as nominal supercargo cut out for him, and captain kemp appeared to be especially anxious that a son of one of the owners should supervise whatever was to be done with the peaceable part of his cargo. he even explained to ned that he might yet be called upon in some law court to testify to the honest accuracy of all the papers he was now to sign. "it'll take about two days more," he told him, "and you mustn't go ashore till the ship's empty. the american consul hasn't taken his passports yet, but he expects to get away soon, somehow or other. most likely, he'll be taken off by a ship of war. so, perhaps, will other americans. you might wait and get away then, if you think best, but you can't hope to ever go on this ship." ned had an increasingly strong feeling that he did not now care to go on that or any other craft of war or peace. he would much rather go to oaxaca than to new york, and he felt more sure than ever that his father would not wish him to run any risk of the dreadful yellow fever. so he worked on industriously, learning a great deal concerning the processes required in getting a cargo out of a ship. during several hours, he was so occupied that he almost forgot the existence of his mexican friend, but he was dimly aware that a small rowboat had come to the off-shore side of the ship, and had shortly pulled away without any interference on the part of the officials, military or civil. perhaps she was understood to have come there by order of colonel guerra. toward nightfall, however, that boat came again, as she did before, not running in among the barges, but seeming to avoid them. there were five men in her, and one of them stood up to say to a sailor at the rail: "i wish to see young señor carfora. is he on board?" "hullo!" thought ned. "that's the spanish name señor zuroaga told me i was to go by." then he sang out aloud, as he hurried across the deck, "here i am. what do you want of me?" "lean over and talk low," responded the man in the boat, but the one sailor near them did not understand a word of spanish, and he might suppose, if he wished to do so, that it was something about the cargo. ned himself listened eagerly, while the speaker went on: "i am colonel tassara. señor zuroaga must not come to the ship again. i will be here to-morrow evening. may i be assured that you will then be ready to come to my house?" "tell him of course you will!" said a voice behind ned, peremptorily, and it was captain kemp who had come over for a few words with tassara. "i'll be ready, colonel," said ned, when his turn came to speak, and the boat pulled away, leaving him and the captain by themselves. "it's a good arrangement for you, my boy," said the captain. "unless i am mistaken, though, there are signs of the worst kind of a northeasterly storm. this is a dangerous anchorage for that sort of thing. i don't think i shall risk having too many men on board when the norther gets here. the cargo will be all out, and the ship's well insured. the american consul doesn't know a thing about the ammunition or the running away from the cruisers. he has enough else on his hands just now." ned did not care a great deal about that, but he was more than ever in a hurry to see the end of his supercargo business. the fact was that an air of something like mystery appeared to be gathering around him, and there is a tremendous fascination in anything mysterious. what if he were now getting right in behind the war, after a fashion, and at the same time into the darkest kind of revolution or rebellion against the power of president paredes, in company with that wonderful adventurer, general santa anna, and all the desperate characters of mexico? chapter v. the work of the norther during the rest of that day and the earlier part of the next the weather continued fairly good, and the unloading went steadily on. in the many intervals of his duties, ned tried hard to drive his mental fever away, and amused himself as best he might. the city itself was worth looking at, with its tiers of streets rising one above another from the shore. he saw several churches, and some of them were large, with massive towers and steeples. "the mexicans must have been richer than they are now," he said to himself, "when those things were built. they cost piles of money." he had no idea how rich a country it is, or how much richer it might be, if its wonderful natural resources were to be made the most of. as for the city, he had heard that vera cruz contained about seven or eight thousand people, besides its military garrison, its foreigners, and a continually varying mob of transient visitors from the interior. zuroaga had told him, moreover, that it was from the latter that any gringo like himself would be in danger of violence. they were a vindictive, bloodthirsty class of men, most of them, for they retained undiminished the peculiar characteristics of their indian ancestors. "i don't care to run against any of them," thought ned. "i don't like this _tierra caliente_ country, anyhow. it's too hot to live in." then he thought a great deal of the wonderful land of forests and mountains which lay beyond the fever-haunted lowlands, and he longed more and more for a good look at the empire which hernando cortes won from the old montezumas and their bloody war-god, huitzilopochtli. in the afternoon of the second day the sky was manifestly putting on a threatening aspect. the wind began to rise and the sea began to roughen. the men discharging the cargo hastened their work, and it was evident that the last of the lighter barges would soon be setting out for the shore. ned was staring at them and recalling all the yarns he had heard concerning the destructive power of a gulf "norther," when captain kemp came walking slowly toward him, with a face which appeared to express no sort of unusual concern for anything in the world. nevertheless, he said: "get ready now, ned, as sharp as you can. there comes your boat. i shall send some papers by the colonel. señor zuroaga's luggage all went on shore yesterday. i think some other men will have to be looking out for themselves before long. if the _goshhawk_ should drag her anchors and go ashore, i hope there won't be too much sea running for good boats to live in." "i'm all ready now!" exclaimed ned, as he sprang away, but he went with a curious question rising in his mind: "what if a cable were more'n half cut through? wouldn't it be likely to break and let go of an anchor, if it were pulled at too hard by a gale of wind? i don't really know anything about it, but señor zuroaga thinks that captain kemp is a curious man to deal with. father thinks that he is a good sailor, too." all the wardrobe that ned had on board was easily contained in a waterproof satchel of moderate size, and he was half-glad now that there was no more of it, it went so quickly over into the large yawl that was waiting alongside when he returned on deck. it was a four-oared boat, and colonel tassara, at the stern, beckoned to him without speaking, as if he might have reasons for silence as well as haste. "in with you, ned," said captain kemp. "i'll try to see you within a day or two. take good care of yourself. good day, colonel." the mexican officer only bowed, and in a moment more the yawl was fighting her difficult way over the rapidly increasing waves, for the first strength of the norther had really come, and there might soon be a great deal more of it,--for the benefit of the _goshhawk_. "there!" muttered captain kemp, as he saw them depart, "i haven't more than a good boat's crew left on board. we'll take to the life-boat as soon as the cable parts. there isn't any use in trying to save this bark under all the circumstances. i've done my duty. i couldn't have calculated on heavy shot first, and then for a whole gang of cruisers watching for me off the coast. this 'ere norther, too! well, i didn't make the war, and i don't see that i ought to lose any money by it. i won't, either." whatever was his exact meaning, the mate and four other men who remained evidently agreed with him, from what they were shortly saying to one another. it might also have been taken note of by a careful observer that the mate was a scotchman, and that the four others were all from liverpool. whoever had put so much contraband of war on board the _goshhawk_ had not entrusted it entirely to the eccentricities of a lot of out-and-out american sailors, with peculiar notions concerning their flag. on went colonel tassara's yawl, and it was not likely to meet any other boat that evening. as the rollers increased in size momentarily, ned began to have doubts as to whether such a boat had any reasonable hope of reaching the shore. it was now pitch-dark also, and he could but feel that his adventures in mexico were beginning in a remarkably unpleasant manner. the landing could not have been made at any place along the beach, where the surf was breaking so dangerously, and it looked almost as perilous to approach the piers and wharves. "how on earth are we to do it?" exclaimed ned, in english, but no answer came from the hard-breathing rowers. colonel tassara seemed now to be steering a southerly course, instead of directly landward, and ned calculated that this would carry them past all of the usual landing-places. it also gave them narrow escapes from rolling over and over in the troughs between several high waves. on the whole, therefore, it was a pretty rough boating excursion, but it was not a long one. it did take them almost past the city front, and at last ned thought he saw a long, black shadow reaching out at the boat. it was better than a shadow, for it was a long wooden pier, old enough to have been built by cortes himself. the waves were breaking clean over it, but, at the same time, it was breaking them, so that around in the lee of it the water was less boisterous, and the yawl might reach the beach in safety. there was no wharf, but all ned cared for was that he saw no surf, and he felt better than he had at any moment since leaving the _goshhawk_. it was the same, for they said so, emphatically, with the boatmen and colonel tassara. "one of the men will take your bag," said the colonel to ned, as soon as they were out on shore. "we will go right along to my house, and we shall hardly meet anybody just now. i'm glad of that. santa maria, how dark it is getting! this will be the worst kind of norther." a couple of lanterns had been taken from the boat. they had previously been lighted by the colonel with much difficulty, and without them it would have been impossible to follow the stony, grassy pathway by which ned crawford made his first invasion of the mexican territory. he did not now feel like annexing any of it, although mexican patriots asserted that their title to vera cruz or the city of mexico itself was no better than their right to texas. his gloomy march was a short one, and only a few shadowy, unrecognized human beings passed him on the way. the party came to a halt before a one-story stone dwelling, with a long piazza in front of it, close to the weedy sidewalk of a crooked and straggling street. it was apparent that this was not in the aristocratic quarter of the city, if it had one. a door in the middle of the house swung open as they arrived, and the boatman who carried ned's bag put it down on the threshold. the lanterns went away with him and his fellow rowers, but other lights made their appearance quickly,--after the door had closed behind ned and colonel tassara. not one of the boat's crew had obtained a peep into the house, or had seen any of its occupants. ned was now aware that he had entered a broad hall-like passageway, which appeared to run through the house, and to have several doors on each side. one of these doors had opened to let the new light in, and through it also came señor zuroaga, two other men, and a young girl, who at once threw her arms around the neck of colonel tassara. "o father!" she exclaimed, "i am so glad! mother and i were so frightened! we were afraid you would be drowned." "my dear little daughter," he responded, sadly, "i fear there will be more than one lot of poor fellows drowned to-night. this storm is fearful!" it seemed, in fact, to be getting worse every minute, and ned was thinking of the _goshhawk_ and the state of her cable, even while he was being introduced to the pretty señorita felicia tassara, and then to her mother, a stately woman, who came to meet her husband without condescending to say how badly she had been alarmed on his account. "she's just about the proudest-looking woman i ever saw," thought ned, for, although she welcomed him politely, she at once made him aware that she did not consider him of any importance whatever. he was only a young gringo, from nobody knew where, and she was a mexican lady of high rank, who hated americans of all sorts. ned's only really hearty greeting came from señor zuroaga, who seemed to him, under the circumstances, like an old friend. "carfora, my dear fellow," he said, "you and the colonel must come in to your supper----" "why, señor," expostulated ned, "i'm wet through, and so is he." "i declare!" exclaimed zuroaga. "what's in my head that i should overlook that? you must change your rig. come this way with me." ned followed him, bag in hand, through a narrow passage which opened at the right, and they went on almost to the end of it. the room which they then entered was only seven feet wide, but it was three times as long, and it was oddly furnished. instead of a bedstead, a handsome hammock, with blankets, sheets, and a pillow in it, hung at one side, and the high window was provided with mosquito nettings. there was no carpet on the floor, but this was clean, and a good enough dressing-bureau stood at the further end of the room. before the mirror of this, the señor set down the lamp he had been carrying, and said to ned: "my dear carfora, i have explained to the haughty señora that you are the son of an american merchant, and of a good family, so that she will not really treat you like a common person. she is descended from the oldest families of spain, and there is no republicanism in her. the sooner you are ready, the better. i will be back in five minutes." open came the bag, but the best ned could do in the way of style was a very neat blue suit. what he would have called the swallow-tails, which señora tassara might have expected as the dinner dress of a more important guest, could hardly be required of a young fellow just escaped from a norther. as soon as he felt that he had done his best, he turned toward the door, but it opened to let in señor zuroaga in full regulation dinner costume. how he could have put it on so quickly puzzled ned, but he asked no questions. it was quite possible, however, that even the descendant of cortes and the montezumas was a little bit in awe of the matronly descendant of the ancient spanish grandees. she might be a powerful personage in more ways than one. at all events, ned was led out to the central hall and across it, to where an uncommonly wide door stood open, letting out a flood of illumination. "walk in, señors," said colonel tassara, from just inside this portal, and the next moment ned was altogether astonished. he had been impressed, on reaching this house, that it was an old and even dingy affair, of no considerable size, but he did not yet know that the older spanish mansions were often built with only one story and around a central courtyard. moreover, at least in mexico, they were apt to show few windows in front, and to be well calculated for use as a kind of small forts, if revolutionary or similar occasions should ask for thick walls, with embrasures for musketry. one glance around señora tassara's dining-room was enough to work a revolution in ned's ideas relating to that establishment. it was large, high-ceilinged, and its carpetless floor was of polished mahogany. the walls and ceiling were of brilliant white stucco. upon the former were hung several trophies of weapons and antlers of deer. in the centre, at the right, in a kind of ornamental shrine, was an ivory and ebony crucifix, which was itself a priceless work of art. the long dining-table had no cloth to conceal the fact that it was of the richest mahogany, dark with age and polished like a mirror. on the table was an abundance of fine china ware, none of it of modern manufacture, but all the more valuable for that reason. at the end nearest ned stood a massive silver coffee-urn, beautifully molded, and it was not wonderful that he stood still a moment to stare at it, for it had taken him altogether by surprise. almost instantly a change came over the dark, handsome features of señora tassara. she smiled brightly, for ned's undisguised admiration of that mass of silver had touched her upon a tender spot, and she now spoke to him with at least four times as much cordiality as she had shown him in the hall. "ah, my young friend," she said, turning gracefully toward him, "so you are pleased with my coffee-urn? no table in your city of new york can show anything like it. it is of the oldest seville workmanship, and there are not many such remaining in all the world. it is an heirloom." "señor carfora," at that moment interrupted colonel tassara, "i will show you something else that is worth more than any kind of silver ware. take a good look at this!" he stepped to a trophy of arms which hung upon the wall near him, and took from it a long, heavy sword, with a worn-looking but deeply chased gold hilt. he drew it from the sheath, gazing with evident pride at its curving blade of dull blue steel. "i think you have never before seen a sword like that," he said. "it may have been made at toledo, for all i know, but it is centuries old. it was won from a moor by an ancestor of mine, at the taking of granada, when the moorish power was broken forever by the heroes of spain. who can tell? it may have come down from the days of the cid campeador himself." whoever that military gentleman may have been, ned had no idea, but he determined to find out some day, and just now he was glad to grasp the golden hilt, and remember all that he had ever heard about the moors. he had not at all expected to hear of them again, just after escaping from a norther in the gulf of mexico, but, without being aware of it, he was learning a great deal about the old spanish-mexican aristocracy, and why it could not easily become truly republican, even in the new world, which is beginning to grow old on its own account. dinner was now ready, and ned voted it a prime good one, for it consisted mainly of chicken, with capital corn-cakes and coffee. it was a tremendous improvement upon the dinners he had been eating at sea, cooked in the peculiar style of the caboose of the _goshhawk_. one large idea was becoming firmly fixed in the acute mind of the young adventurer, and it tended to make him both watchful and silent. not only was he in a country which was at war with his own, but he was in a land where men were apt to be more or less suspicious of each other. it was also quite the correct thing in good manners for him to say but little, and he was the better able to hear what the others were saying. therefore, he could hardly help taking note that none of the party at the dinner-table said anything about the powder on the _goshhawk_, or concerning a possible trip to be made to oaxaca by any one there. they all appeared ready, on the other hand, to praise the patriotism, statesmanship, and military genius of that truly great man, president paredes. they made no mention whatever of general santa anna, but they spoke confidently of the certainty with which generals ampudia and arista were about to crush the invading gringos at the north, under taylor. they also were sure that these first victories were to be followed by greater ones, which would be gained by the president himself, as soon as he should be able to take command of the mexican armies in person. if any friend of his, a servant, for instance, of the tassara family, had been listening, he would have had nothing to report which would have made any other man suppose that the rulers of mexico had bitter, revengeful foes under that hospitable roof. the dinner ended, and ned was once more in his room, glad enough to get into his hammock and go to sleep. if the norther did any howling around that house, he did not hear it, but he may have missed the swing motion which a hammock obtains on board a ship at sea. his eyes closed just as he was thinking: "this is great, but i wonder what on earth is going to happen to me to-morrow." chapter vi. forward, march the sun of the next morning arose upon a great deal of doubt and uncertainty in many places. some of the soldiers of general taylor's army were altogether uncertain into what bushes of the neighboring chaparral the norther had blown their tents, and they went out in search of their missing cotton duck shelters. the entire force encamped at the rio grande border was in the dark as to what it might next be ordered to do, and all sorts of rumors went around from regiment to regiment, as if the rumor manufacturer had gone crazy. general taylor himself was sure of at least the one point, that he had no right to cross the muddy river in front of him and make a raid into mexico until he should hear again from the government at washington, and be officially informed that the war, which he was carrying on so well, had really begun. he and all his army believed that it was already going on, and they grumbled discontentedly that they were compelled to remain in camp, and watch for ranchero lancers on texan soil, if it was legally texan at all, until permission arrived to strike their tents and march forward. the news of the fighting and of what were described as the great battles on the mexican border had reached new orleans and key west. it was travelling northward at full speed, but it had not yet been heard by the government or by the people of the north and west. none of these had as yet so much as imagined what a telegraphic news-bringer might be, and so they could not even wish that they had one, or they would surely have done so. the uncertainties of that morning, therefore, hampered all the councils of the nation. almost everybody believed that there would soon be a war, although a great many men were strongly opposed to the idea of having one. taking the war for granted, however, there were doubts and differences of opinion among both military and unmilitary men as to how it was to be carried on. some were opposed to anything more than a defence of the rio grande boundary-line, but these moderate persons were hooted at by the out-and-out war party, whom nothing promised to satisfy but an invasion which intended the capture of the city of mexico. nothing less than this, they said, would obtain the objects of the war, and secure a permanent peace at the end of it. then, supposing such an invasion to be decided on, an important question arose as to how and where the mexican territory might best be entered by a conquering army. many declared that general taylor's forces were already at the right place for pushing ahead, but the commander-in-chief, general winfield scott, by all odds the best general the country possessed, responded that the march proposed for taylor was too long, too difficult, and that it was likely to result in disaster. the shorter and only practicable route, he asserted, was by way of the sea and vera cruz. he was also known to be politically opposed to any war whatever. thereupon, a number of prominent men, who disagreed with him, set themselves at work to have him removed or put aside, that a commander might take his place who was not so absurdly under the influence of military science, common sense, and of the troubles which might be encountered in marching seven hundred miles or more through an enemy's country. there were, it was said, eloquent politicians, who did not know how to drill an "awkward squad," but who felt sure of their ability to beat old scott in such an agreeable affair as a military picnic party to the city of mexico. the young military scholars in the camp near fort brown were ignorant of all this. they were satisfied with their present commander, as well they might be, for he was a good one. they were satisfied with themselves, and were enthusiastically ready to fight anything which should be put in front of them. they were dreadfully dissatisfied with camp life, however, and especially with the fact that they and all the other raw troops of that army were forced to undergo a great deal of drill and discipline in hot weather. perhaps, if this had not been given them, they would hardly have rendered so good an account of themselves in the severe tests of soldiership which they underwent a few months later. the first doubt that came to ned crawford that morning, as his eyes opened and he began to get about half-awake, related to his hammock and to how on earth he happened to be in it. swift memories followed then of the norther, the perilous pull ashore, the arrival at the tassara place, and the people he had met there. he recalled also something about silver coffee-urns and moorish warriors, but the next thing, he was out upon the floor, and his head seemed to buzz like a beehive with inquiries concerning his immediate future. "here i am," he said aloud. "i'm in mexico; in vera cruz; at this house with señor zuroaga; and i don't know yet what's become of the _goshhawk_. i don't really ever expect to see her again, but i hope that captain kemp and the sailors didn't get themselves drowned. i must see about that, first thing. then i suppose i must see the american consul, write another letter home, see the merchants our goods were delivered to,--and what i'm to do after that i don't know." there was a loud rap at his door just then, and in a moment more he was almost repeating that speech to señor zuroaga. "please say very little to colonel tassara or anybody else in this house," replied the senor, emphatically. "get used, as soon as you can, to being called carfora. we must make you look like a young mexican right away. i've bought a rig which will fit you. it is well that you are so dark-complexioned. a red-haired fellow would never pass as you will. all the american residents of vera cruz are already under military protection, and i am glad there are so few of them, for there are said to have been two or three assassinations. part of the mountain men who are loafing in town just now are wild indians, as reckless and cruel as any of your sioux warriors on a war-path. come along to breakfast. you won't meet the ladies this time, but i believe the señora and señorita like you a little, because you had the good taste to admire their silver and china." "oh, that old coffee-urn!" said ned. "well, it's as fine as anything i ever saw, even in a jewelry window." "yes," laughed the señor, "but the señora wants to have the american consul killed because he told her she had better have that thing melted and made over into one of the modern patterns. she will never forgive him. tell her again, when you have a chance, that the old-time seville silversmiths could beat anything we have nowadays, and she will love you. i do not really believe myself that we are getting much ahead of those ancient artists. they were wonderful designers." ned was willing to believe that they were, and he made up his mind to praise señora tassara's pet urn to the best of his ability. he was not to have an opportunity for doing so immediately. their breakfast was ready for them in the dining-room, but they were allowed to eat it by themselves. it seemed to ned a very good one, but several times he found himself turning away from it to stare at the silver marvel and at the weapons on the walls. there was no apparent reason for haste, but neither of them cared to linger, and before long they were out on the piazza in front, zuroaga with his hat pulled down to his eyes and his coat collar up. ned was at once confirmed in his previous idea that the house was anything but new, and to that he added the conviction that it was much larger than it had appeared to be in the night. he believed, too, that it must have cost a deal of money to build it long ago. he had only a moment for that calculation, however, for his next glance went out toward the gulf, and he came near to being astonished. the path which he had followed in coming up from the shore had been a steep one, and he was now standing at a place from which he had a pretty good view of the tossing water between the mainland and the castle of san juan de ulua. the old fortress was there, unharmed by the norther, but not in any direction, as far as his eyes could reach, was there any sign of a ship, at anchor or otherwise. "señor!" he exclaimed. "what has become of them? they are all gone! do you suppose they have been wrecked?" "not all of them, by any means," replied the señor, but he also was searching the sea with a serious face. "as many as could lift their anchors in time to make a good offing before the norther came were sure to do so. if there were any that did not succeed, i can't say where they may have gone to just now." "the _goshhawk_--" began ned, but the señor gripped his arm hard, while he raised his right hand and pointed up the road. "silence!" he commanded, in a sharp whisper. "look! there he comes. don't even call him by his name. wait and hear what he has to say. he can tell us what has become of the bark. they are a used-up lot of men." so they were, the five who now came walking slowly along from somewhere or other on the coast upon which the disastrous storm had blown. "captain kemp and the crew of his life-boat," thought ned, but he obeyed the señor at first, and was silent until the haggard-looking party arrived and came to a halt in front of him. then, however, he lost his prudence for a moment, and anxiously inquired: "were any of you drowned?" "not any of us that are here," responded the captain, grimly. "no, nor any other of the _goshhawk_ men, but there are more wrecks in sight below, and i don't know how many from them got ashore. our bark stranded this side of them, and she's gone all to pieces. we took to the life-boat in time, but we've had a hard pull of it. we went ashore through the breakers, about six miles below this, and here we are, but i don't want to ever pass such another night. i'm going on down to the consul's now, to report, and ned had better be there as soon as he can. then, the sooner he's out o' vera cruz, the better for him and all of us." "i think so myself," said señor zuroaga. "don't even stay here for breakfast. nobody from here must come to the consul's with señor carfora." "of course not," said the captain, wearily, and away he went, although ned felt as if he were full to bursting with the most interesting kind of questions concerning the captain's night in the life-boat and the sad fate of the swift and beautiful _goshhawk_. "come into the house," said the señor, "and put on your mexican rig. i have a message from colonel guerra that we must get away to-night. i must not bring any peril upon the tassara family. up to this hour no enemy knows that i was a passenger on the powder-boat, as they call it." "all right," said ned. "i'll write one more letter home. i couldn't get out of the city in any other way just now, and i want to see mexico." that idea was growing upon him rapidly, but his next errand was to the señor's own room, to put on what he called his disguise. he followed his friend to a large, handsome chamber in the further end of the house, and, as he entered it, his first thought was: "hullo! are they getting ready for a fight?" in the corners of the room and leaning against the walls here and there were weapons enough to have armed half a company of militia, if the soldiers did not care what kinds of weapons they were to carry, for the guns and swords and pistols were of all patterns except those of the present day. ned saw at least one rusty firelock, which put him in mind of pictures he had seen of the curious affairs the new england fathers carried when they went to meeting on sunday. he had no time to examine them, however, for here were his new clothes, and he must be in them without delay. he admired each piece, as he put it on, and then one look into the señor's mirror convinced him that he was completely disguised. he had been turned into a somewhat stylish young mexican, from his broad-brimmed straw hat to his vera cruz made shoes. he still wore a blue jacket, but this one was short, round-cornered, and had bright silver buttons. his new trousers were wide at the bottoms, with silver-buttoned slashes on the outsides below the knees. he had not worn suspenders on shipboard, but now his belt was of yellow leather and needlessly wide, with a bright buckle and a sword-catch on the left side. as to this matter, the señor showed him a short, straight, wide-bladed sort of cutlas, which he called a machete. "that is to be yours," he said. "you need not carry it in town, but you will as soon as we get away. you will have pistols, too, and a gun. it won't do to go up the road to oaxaca unarmed. now you may make the best of your way to the consul's, and i'll stay here to finish getting ready." he appeared to be laboring under a good deal of excitement, and so, to tell the truth, was the disguised young american. out he went into the hall, trying hard to be entirely collected and self-possessed, but it was only to be suddenly halted. before him stood the stately señora tassara, and clinging to her was the very pretty señorita felicia, both of them staring, open-eyed, at the change in his uniform. the señorita was of about fourteen, somewhat pale, with large, brilliant black eyes, and she was a very frank, truthful girl, for she exclaimed: "oh, mother, do look at him! but it does not make a mexican of him. he's a gringo, and he would fight us if he had a chance. i want them all to be killed!" "no, my dear," said the señora, with a pleasant laugh. "señor carfora will not fight us. he and his ship brought powder for colonel guerra and the army. i am sorry he must leave us. you must shake hands with him." "oh, no!" said the wilful felicia, spitefully. "i don't want to shake hands with him. he is one of our enemies." "no, i'm not!" stammered ned. "but did you know that our ship was wrecked in the norther? if you had been on board of her when she went ashore, you would have been drowned. the men in the life-boat had a hard time in getting ashore. i'm glad you were at home." "there, dear," said her mother. "that is polite. you heard what señor zuroaga said about the wrecks. they were terrible! can you not say that you are glad señor carfora was not drowned?" "no, mother," persisted felicia. "i'll say i wish he had been drowned, if--if he could have swum ashore afterward. good enough for him." señora tassara laughed merrily, as she responded: "you are a dreadfully obstinate young patriot, my darling. but you must be a little more gracious. the gringo armies will never come to vera cruz. they are away up north on the rio grande." "well, mother, i will a little," said the señorita, proudly. "señor carfora, your generals will be beaten all to pieces. you wait till you see our soldiers. you haven't anything like them. they are as brave as lions. my father is a soldier, and he is to command a regiment. i wish i were a man to go and fight." her eyes were flashing and she looked very warlike, but the only thing that poor ned could think of to say just then was: "señora tassara, if you are not careful, somebody will get in some day and steal your beautiful coffee-urn." "ah me!" sighed the señora. "this has been attempted, my young friend. thieves have been killed, too, in trying to carry off the tassara plate. there would be more like it, in some places, if so much had not been made plunder of and melted up in our dreadful revolutions. some of them were only great robberies. i understand that you must go to your business now, but we shall see you again this evening." "good morning, señora tassara," said ned, as he bowed and tried to walk backward toward the outer door. "good morning, señorita tassara. you would feel very badly this morning if you had been drowned last night." the last thing he heard, as he reached the piazza, was a ringing peal of laughter from the señora, but he believed that he had answered politely. he knew his way to the office of the american consul, and the distance was not great in so small a town, but as he drew near it, he saw that there was a strong guard of soldiers in front of the building. they were handsomely uniformed regulars from the garrison of san juan de ulua, and there was cause enough for their being on duty. all up and down the street were scattered groups of sullen-looking men, talking and gesticulating. none of them carried guns, but every man of them had a knife at his belt, and not a few of them were also armed with machetes of one form or another. they would have made a decidedly dangerous mob against anything but the well-drilled and fine-looking guards who were protecting the consulate. ned remembered what felicia had said about her soldiers, and he did not know how very different were these disciplined regulars from the great mass of the levies which were to be encountered by the troops of the united states. he was admiring them and he was thinking of battles and generals, when one of the most ferocious-looking members of the mob came jauntily sauntering along beside him. he was a powerfully built man, almost black with natural color and sunburn. he was not exactly ragged, but he was barefooted, and his broad-brimmed sombrero was by no means new. a heavy machete hung from his belt, and he appeared to be altogether an undesirable new acquaintance. ned looked up at him almost nervously, for he did not at all like the aspect of affairs in that street. he was thinking: "i guess they were right about the excitement of the people. this isn't any place for fellows like me. i must get out of vera cruz as soon as i can. it's a good thing that i'm disguised. i must play mexican." at that moment a good-natured smile spread across the gloomy face of his unexpected companion, and he said, in a low tone of voice: "say nothing, señor carfora. walk on into the consulate. i belong to general zuroaga. there are four more of his men here. we have orders to take care of you. you are the young englishman that brought us the powder. there was not a pound to be bought in vera cruz, but some of those fellows would knife you for a gringo." [illustration: "we have orders to take care of you"] quite a useless number of queer spanish oaths were sprinkled in among his remarks, but ned did not mind them. he only nodded and strictly obeyed the injunction against talking, even while he was asking himself how on earth his friend, the señor, ever became a general. he concluded, for the moment, that it might be a kind of militia title, such as he had heard of in the united states. however that might be, he and his guide soon reached the door of the consulate, and he himself was promptly admitted, as if the keeper of the door had been expecting to see him. there were guards inside the house as well as in the street, and they motioned ned on through a narrow entry-way, at the end of which was an open room. he passed on into this, and the next moment he was exclaiming: "hullo, captain kemp! i'm so glad you are here! what am i to do next?" "almost nothing at all," said the captain, quietly. "just sign your papers and get away. the consul himself has gone to the city of mexico, with united states government despatches for president paredes, and we shall finish our business as easy as rolling off a log. you have nothing to do with the wrecking of the _goshhawk_, for you weren't on board when she parted her cable. but just look at those people!" ned did so, for the room, a large and well-furnished office, was almost crowded with americans of all sorts, mostly men, whose faces wore varied expressions of deep anxiety. "what are they all here for?" asked ned. "safety!" growled the captain. "and to inquire how and when they can find their way out of this city of robbers. i hear that a whole regiment is to be on guard duty to-night, and that the mob is to be put down. if i ever see your father again, i'll explain to him why i sent you away." before ned could make any further remarks, he was introduced to the vice-consul, a dapper, smiling little man, who did not appear to be in the least disturbed by his unpleasant surroundings. almost a score of papers, larger and smaller, required the signature of the young supercargo of the unfortunate _goshhawk_. they were speedily signed, although without any clear idea in ned's mind as to what they all were for, and then captain kemp took him by the arm and led him away into a corner of the room. "ned, my boy," he said, "you see how it is. you must keep away from the seacoast for awhile. after things are more settled, you can come back and get away on a british, or french, or dutch vessel, if the port isn't too closely blockaded. whether i shall get out alive or not, i don't know. you haven't enough money. i'll let you have a couple of hundred dollars more in mexican gold. you'd better not let anybody suspect that you carry so much with you. this country contains too many patriots who would cut their own president's throat for a gold piece. don't ever show more than one shiner at a time, or you may lose it all." ned took the two little bags that were so cautiously delivered to him, and while he was putting them away in the inner pockets of his jacket, his mind was giving him vivid pictures of the knives and machetes and their bearers, whom he had seen in the street. "captain," he said, "those fellows out there wouldn't wait for any gold. a silver dollar would buy one of them." "half a dollar," replied the captain. "not one of them is worth a shilling. they ought all to be shot. but look here. i mustn't come to colonel tassara's place again. i find that he is under some kind of suspicion already, and president paredes makes short work of men whom he suspects of plotting against him. go! get home!" "that's just about what i'd like to do," said ned to himself, as he hurried out of the consulate, but the next moment his courage began to come back to him, for here was señor zuroaga's ferocious-looking follower, and with him were four others, who might have been his cousins or his brothers, from their looks, for they all were oaxaca indians, of unmixed descent. their tribe had faithfully served the children and grandchildren of hernando cortes, the conquistador, from the day when he and his brave adventurers cut their way into the tehuantepec valley. chapter vii. the land of the montezumas "father crawford, do read that newspaper! the war has begun! they are fighting great battles on the rio grande! oh, how i wish you hadn't sent ned to mexico! he may get killed!" she was a woman of middle age, tall, fine-looking, and she was evidently much excited. she was standing at one end of a well-set breakfast table, and was holding out a printed sheet to a gentleman who had been looking down at his plate, as if he were asking serious questions of it. "my dear," he said, as he took the paper, "i knew it was coming, but i didn't think it would come so soon as this. i don't really see that ned is in any danger. captain kemp will take care of him." "but," she said, "the _goshhawk_ may be captured." "no," replied mr. crawford, confidently. "she hasn't sailed across prairie to the rio grande. there won't be any fighting at vera cruz for ever so long. there can't be any on the sea, for mexico has no navy. the _goshhawk_ is entirely safe, and so is ned. it'll be a grand experience for him." "i don't want him to have so much experience at his age," she said, anxiously. "i'd rather he'd be at home,--if there's going to be a war." "i've often wished that i could see a war," replied her husband, as he glanced over the black-typed headings of the newspaper columns. "i've travelled a good deal in mexico, and i wanted ned to learn all he could of that country. he will hardly have any chance to do so now." "he might see too much of it if he were taken prisoner," she exclaimed. "i can't bear to think of it! oh, how i wish he were at home!" mr. crawford was silent, and again he appeared to be thinking deeply. he was not a pale-faced man at any time, but now his color was visibly increasing. his face was also changing its expression, and it wore a strong reminder of the look which had come into his son ned's countenance when the fever of mexican exploration took hold of him. people say "like father, like son," and it may be that ned's readiness for a trip into the interior belonged to something which had descended to him from a father who had been willing to educate his son for the southern trade by sending him to sea with captain kemp. the united states has had a great many commercial men of that stamp, and there was a time when almost all the navy the nation possessed was provided by the merchant patriots, who armed and sent out, or themselves commanded, its fleets of privateers. very likely the crawfords and a number of other american families could point back to as adventurous an ancestry as could any spaniard whose forefathers had fought moors or won estates for themselves in mexico or peru. as for mrs. crawford, she was hardly able to drink her coffee that morning, after reading the newspaper, and she might have been even more willing to have ned come home if she had known what had become of the _goshhawk_, and in what company he was a couple of hours after she arose from her table. company? that was it. he was now walking along one of the streets of vera cruz with a squad of men of whom she would have decidedly disapproved, but whose character her husband would have understood at sight. ned's first acquaintance, pablo, as he called himself, with his four comrades, made up so thoroughly mexican a party at all points that it was in no danger of being interfered with by the mob. every member of this had seen, often enough, the son of some wealthy landholder from the upland country attended by a sufficient number of his own retainers to keep him from being plundered, and it was well enough to let him alone. on they went, but it was by a circuitous route and a back street that they reached the tassara place. even then, they did not enter it by the front door, but by a path which led down to the stables in the rear of the house. no outsider would afterward be able to say that he saw that party of men march into the courtyard to be welcomed by colonel tassara and the mysterious personage whom ned was trying to think of as general zuroaga. "he may be of more importance than i had any idea of," said ned to himself, "and i wish i knew what was coming next." he was not to find out immediately, for zuroaga motioned him to go on into the house, while he himself and tassara remained to talk with pablo and the other machete-bearers. hardly was ned three steps inside of the dwelling, when he was met by señora tassara, apparently in a state of much mental agitation. "my dear young friend!" she exclaimed, "i am so glad you have escaped from them! come in. we shall have no regular dinner to-day. you will eat your luncheon now, however. we are all busy packing up. we must set out for the country as soon as it is dark. the colonel's enemies are following him like so many wolves! felicia, my dear, you will see that señor carfora is properly attended to." the saucy señorita was standing a little behind her mother, and she now beckoned to ned, as if she had no hostility for him whatever. "come right along in," she said, peremptorily. "i must eat my luncheon, too. i want to hear where you have been, and what you have been doing. is there any more news from the war? have your gringo generals been beaten again? tell me all you know!" she was evidently in the habit of being obeyed by those around her, and ned felt decidedly obedient, but this was his first intimation that it was fully noon. time had passed more rapidly than he had been aware of, for his mind had been too busy to take note of it. he was hungrily ready to obey, however, especially concerning the luncheon, and his first bit of news appeared to please his little hostess exceedingly. "not another ship is in," he told her, "and i don't believe there is going to be any war, anyhow, but i saw some of your soldiers. they were guarding the american consulate from the mob. they were splendid-looking fellows. is your father's regiment of that kind of men?" "father's regiment?" she said, angrily. "that's just the difficulty now. he hasn't any soldiers. those that he had were taken away from him. so he must go and gather some more, or president paredes will say that he is not patriotic. they took his old regiment away from him after he had made it a real good one. tell me about your gringo soldiers. are there a great many of them? do they know how to fight? i don't believe they do." she was all on fire about the war and her father's enemies, and ned was ready to tell her all he knew of the american army, if not a little more. at least, he described to her the elegant uniforms which were worn on parade occasions by the new york city militia regiments, feathers, flags, brass bands, and all, rather than the external appearance of any martial array that general taylor was likely to take with him when he invaded mexico. felicia was especially interested in those magnificent brass bands and wished that she could have some of them taken prisoners to come and play in front of her house, but all the while they were talking he was glancing furtively around the room. this had undergone a remarkable change during his brief absence. the trophies of arms were all gone, and the wonderful seville coffee-urn had disappeared. perhaps it had walked away, beyond the reach of possible thieves, and with it may have gone the other silverware of the tassara family. señorita felicia's quick eyes had followed his own, for she was watching him. "yes, señor carfora," she said, "it's all gone. the china is all stored away in the deep cellar. i don't believe they could find it, and if they did they could not carry it away to melt it up and make dollars of it. that's what they did with all the silver one of my aunts had, except some spoons that were hid in the stable, under the hay. one of the robbers went into the stable to hunt, too, and a good mule kicked him dead. if anybody comes to rob this house while we are gone, i wish he might be kicked by one of our mules at the hacienda. he would not steal any more." ned had other things to tell her, about the united states forts, troops, and ships of war, and she had stories to tell with excited vivacity that set forth sadly enough the wretchedly unsettled condition of her country, which she appeared to love so well, after all. troubled as it was, it was her own land, and she hated its enemies. it was a hot, oppressive day, with a promise of greater heat soon to come, and the weather itself might be a good enough reason why any family should be in a hurry to get out of the _tierra caliente_. as for the removal of valuable property, ned had already learned that vera cruz was haunted not only by bad characters from the interior, but by desperadoes from up and down the coast and from the west india islands. he was not near enough to hear, however, when zuroaga remarked to his friend tassara: "you are right, my dear colonel. the americans will hold the texan border with a strong hand, but if paredes does not promptly come to terms with them, we shall see a fleet and army at vera cruz before long. this is the weak point of our unhappy republic." "i think not," replied tassara, gloomily. "i wish it were a solid nation, as strong as the castle out yonder. our weak point is that we are cut up into factions, and cannot make use of the strength that we really have undeveloped. as for anything else, one case of yellow fever was reported yesterday, and i am informed that his excellency, president paredes, talks of coming here shortly to confer with colonel guerra. that may mean trouble for him, and neither you nor i would wish to be brought before any such council of war as might be called together." "it might not consist altogether of our friends," said zuroaga. "in my case, if not in yours, it might be followed quickly by an order for a file of soldiers and a volley of musketry. i should not look for mercy from a tiger." "on the other hand," responded the colonel, "it would be well for him to be careful just now. he will need all the strength he can obtain." "humph!" exclaimed zuroaga. "he will try to leave no living, or, at least, no unimprisoned enemies behind him when he marches for the border." it was plain that they were not to be numbered among their president's friends, whether or not they were altogether just to him. bloody severity in putting down sedition was the long-established custom in mexico, and one man might not be more to blame for it than another. it had been handed down from the old days of spanish rule, and the record which had been made is not by any means pleasant reading. when the luncheon was over, the señorita left ned to himself, appearing to feel somewhat more friendly than at first, but still considering him as a gringo and a foreigner. she said she had some things to pack up, and he went to look after his own. these did not require much packing, and before long he had again found his way out to the courtyard and the stables. these were indeed the most interesting spots about the place, for they contained all the men, the horses, and the mules. ned shortly concluded that here were also gathered most of the firearms and at least a dozen of the wildest kind of mexican indians, all ragged and all barefooted. preparations for a journey were going forward under señora tassara's direction, and ned pretty quickly understood that the men were a great deal more afraid of her than they were of her husband. he felt so himself, and he instantly got out of her way, as she told him to do, when he unwisely undertook to help her with her packing. the horses were of several sorts and sizes, and more like them were shortly brought in. one large spring wagon and a covered carryall carriage were in good order. both were of american manufacture, and so was the harness of the teams which were to draw them. ned was feeling a certain degree of curiosity as to what kind of carriage was to carry him, when señor zuroaga beckoned him to one side and said: "we shall be with colonel tassara's party only the first day. but i have been thinking. when we were on the _goshhawk_, you told me that you had never ridden a horse in your life----" "why, i'm a city boy," interrupted ned. "there isn't any horseback riding done there. i'd rather go on wheels." "of course you would," laughed zuroaga. "but there won't be any use for wheels on some of the roads i am to follow. i've picked you out a pony that you can manage, though, and you will soon learn. you will have to be a horseman if you are to travel in mexico." "so father used to tell me," said ned. "he can ride anything. which of these is my horse? they all look skittish----" "neither of these would do for you," replied the señor. "but listen to me sharply. twice you have called me general. don't do it again until we are beyond the mountains. i'm only a plain señor in all this region of the country. i only hope that some men in vera cruz do not already know that i am here. if they did, i am afraid i should not get out so easily. this is your horse. he is a good one." hitched to a post near the wall was a fat, undersized animal, black as jet, and with more mane and tail than was at all reasonable. he carried a mexican saddle with wooden stirrups and a tremendous curb-bit bridle. in front of the saddle were pistol holsters, and behind it hung an ammunition case, as if ned were about to become a trooper. he went to examine the holsters, and found that each of them contained a large horse-pistol with a flintlock. he also found powder and bullets in the case, and he wondered whether or not he would ever be able to shoot anybody with one of those heavy, long-barrelled things without having something to rest it on. "i practised for an hour once in a pistol-gallery," he remarked, "but it wasn't with anything like that." "you didn't hit centre even then, eh?" laughed the señor. "well, not many men can do much with them, but they are better than nothing. they are too heavy for a hand like yours. here is your machete. put it on." ned felt a queer tingle all over him, as he took the weapon and hitched it at his belt. then he drew it from the sheath and looked at it, swinging it up and down to feel its weight. it was a straight, one-edged blade, with a sharp point, and a brass basket hilt, and he remarked: "señor zuroaga, i could hit with that, i guess." his face had flushed fiery red, and it could be seen, from his handling of the machete, that his muscles were unusually strong for his size and age. the señor nodded his approbation, as he remarked: "i think you will do. there is fight in you, but i hope we shall have no fighting to do just now. i shall try to find a safe road home." "a fellow could cut down bushes with this thing," said ned. "that's exactly what our rancheros use them for," replied the señor. "they will do almost anything with a machete. they will cut their way through thick chaparral, kill and cut up beef cattle, split wood, fight men or animals, and on the whole it's about the most useful tool there is in a mexican camp or hacienda." "what's that?" asked ned. "any kind of farm with a house on it," said the señor. "you may have to learn all about haciendas before you get home." "just what i'd like to do," said ned. "i'll learn how to ride, too. how soon are we to set out?" "not till after dark," said the señor. "but you need not be in any hurry to get into the saddle. you will have quite enough of it before you get out of it again. there is a long ride before us to-night." "i'm ready," replied ned, but nevertheless he looked at that mexican saddle with doubtful eyes, as if he were thinking that it might possibly prove to be a place of trial for a beginner. at that very hour there were several gentlemen in uniform closeted with colonel guerra in one of the rooms of the castle of san juan de ulua. the colonel appeared to have been giving them a detailed report of the condition of the fortress and of its means for defence, whether or not he had stated exactly the amount of the ammunition brought him by the ill-fated _goshhawk_. other subjects of conversation must now have come up, however, for one of them arose with great dignity of manner, remarking: "my dear colonel, i am glad that i shall be able to make so encouraging a report to his excellency. as for colonel tassara, we shall serve our warrant upon him some time to-morrow. we are informed that, beyond a doubt, the traitor zuroaga intends to return from europe shortly. as sure as he does, he will be engaged in dangerous intrigues against the existing order of things, and the good of the country requires that he shall be brought to justice before he can put any of his nefarious plans in operation. at the same time, we are assured that the invaders upon the rio grande will soon be defeated yet more thoroughly." all the rest had arisen while he was speaking, and one of them, a fat, short man in a brilliant uniform, added, enthusiastically: "we feel that we can rely upon you, colonel guerra. we pity the gringos if they should attempt to beleaguer this impregnable fortress. for my own part, i believe that colonel tassara's court martial can have but one result. his disobedience must be paid for with his life. all conspirators like zuroaga should be shot as soon as they are captured. this is not a time, my friends, for undue leniency." "gentlemen," responded colonel guerra with graceful courtesy, "i bid you all a brief farewell with sincere regret. your visit has given me unmixed satisfaction. do not forget that all of you are to dine with me to-morrow. from my very heart i can echo your noble sentiments of valor and patriotism and of devotion to our beloved commander-in-chief, his heroic excellency, president paredes." then followed smiles and handshakings of mutual confidence all around, and the visiting officers took their departure. hardly had the door closed behind them, however, before colonel guerra again sat down, hoarsely muttering between his set teeth: "the snake-hearted villains! what they really hoped for was to find the fort and garrison in bad condition and unprovided, so that they might ruin me. they want my disgrace and removal, to make room for one of them. i don't believe they will catch either tassara or zuroaga this time. the colonel will soon raise his new regiment, and my old friend will be down in oaxaca in safety, waiting for the hour that is to come. paredes would give something to see my last letter from santa anna." so there were many plots and counterplots, and the politest men might not be always what they seemed. chapter viii. out of the tierra caliente those were days of great commotion in the congress of the united states. the whole nation, south as well as north, was divided in opinion as to the righteousness and expediency of the war with mexico. there were two great parties, both of which have long since passed away, for the question of the annexation of texas is no longer before the people, and all this was more than half a century ago. one of the parties called itself "whig," but its enemies described its members as "coons," in the habit of roosting up a tree out of reach. the other party called itself "democratic," while its opponents lampooned its members as "loco-focos," comparing them to the blue-headed sulphur matches of that name, which were largely manufactured and did not burn very well. party feeling ran high, and the debates in congress were red-hot. the democratic president, james k. polk, was a man of far greater ability and statesmanship than his party enemies were willing to give him credit for, and he was supported by a brilliant array of politicians. on the other hand, the whig party contained a number of our most distinguished statesmen, and, curiously enough, most of the generals of the army, including winfield scott and zachary taylor, were well-known whigs. it was not altogether unnatural, therefore, that the democratic party in power should wish to put the command of any army preparing for the invasion of mexico into the hands of officers who were in favor of the war which they were to carry on. questions like this, and some others relating to the unprepared condition of the american army for so tremendous an undertaking, were responsible for the fact that there was a long delay in all military operations, even after the hard and successful fighting done by general taylor's forces at the rio grande. american cruisers were tacking to and fro over the waters of the gulf of mexico and the caribbean sea, without any especial errand of which their commanders were aware. regiments of eager volunteers were forming in several of the states, and were trying hard to discover officers who knew how to drill and handle them. the politicians were everywhere calling each other harder and harder names. not one soul in all the united states, however, knew anything of a party of mounted men, a carriage, and a spring-wagon, which quietly made its way out of the city of vera cruz, not long after sunset, one sultry and lazy evening. at the head of this cavalcade rode two men, who sat upon their spirited horses as if they were at home in the saddle. at their right, however, was a young fellow on a black pony who was entirely satisfied with the fact that the beast under him did not seem to have any spirit at all. he was at that moment steadying his feet in the stirrups, and remarking to himself: "i'm glad none of them saw me mount him. i got upon a high box first, and even then my machete was tangled with my legs, and i all but fell over him. i'll get the señor to show me how, or i'll be laughed at by the men." he was doing fairly well at present, for the road went up a hill, and the night was not one for foolishly fast travelling. he could listen all the better, and one of his companions was saying to the other: "my dear zuroaga, we have gained four miles. every one of them is worth something handsome to you and me. in my opinion, we did not get away a moment too soon to save our necks." "not one minute!" replied the other, with strong emphasis. "not even if guerra can succeed in gaining for us the best part of another day, as he believed he could. perhaps our best chance, after all, is that he has only one company of lancers, and that any officer sent with it might have instructions which would take him by another road than this." "the inspector-general had with him an escort of his own," said tassara. "if he should send those fellows, they would be likely to know how to find us. they are not under the orders of guerra." "if," exclaimed zuroaga, fiercely, "they do not overtake us until after the middle of our second day out, i believe they would be unlucky to try to arrest us. i hope they will be wise, and not tire out their horses with too much haste. i feel as if i could shoot pretty straight if i should see them coming within range." "so could i," replied tassara. the road which they were then following ran between cultivated lands on either side. it was not tree-shadowed, and, as ned looked back, the moonlight showed him something that made him think rapidly. additional horsemen had joined them after they had left the city behind them, and it occurred to him that arrangements had been made beforehand for something like a small war. there were not less than twenty armed men, besides himself and the pair who were with him. for some reason or other, moreover, the wagon, which was drawn by four mules, and the carriage, drawn by a pair of fine animals of the same sort, were driven on well in advance. it appeared, therefore, as if no danger was expected to meet them from the opposite direction, and that señora tassara and her daughter were fairly well protected from any peril which might come after them along the road from vera cruz. the next thing that struck ned, little as he knew about war, was that these horsemen were riding two and two, not in a straggling procession, but in as perfect order as if they had been trained cavalry. if he had known a little more, he would have declared: "that is just what they are." he might not also have known that all but six of them were from the tassara estates, and that the odd half-dozen were lifelong servants of the proscribed descendant of hernando cortes. if he could have understood those men, he might also have comprehended one important feature of the tangled politics of mexico, and why ambitious military men were every now and then able to set up for themselves, and defy the central government until it could manage to capture them, and have them shot as rebels. wiser men than he, looking at the matter from the outside, might also have understood how greatly it was to the credit of president paredes that he was making so good a stand against the power of the united states while hampered by so many difficulties. ned was no politician at all, and it was a mere impulse, or a tired feeling, which led him to pull in his pony and let the men catch up with him, so that he might chat with them, one after another, and get acquainted. he found that they were under no orders not to talk. on the contrary, every man of them seemed to know that ned had come home from the school which he had been attending in england, and that he had been instrumental in procuring powder and bullets for them and for the mexican army. they were full of patriotism of a peculiar kind. it would have made them fight gringos or any other foreigners to-day, and to-morrow to fight as readily in any causeless revolution which their local leaders might see fit to set going. they were eager for all the news ned could give them, and he was soon on good terms with them, for he took pains not to let them know how uncomfortable he felt in that saddle. they surely would have despised any young mexican who had forgotten how to ride while he was travelling in europe. hour after hour went by, and on every level stretch of road the wheeled vehicles were driven at a moderate trot. the horses of what ned called the cavalry also trotted occasionally, but it was well for him that his pony did not seem to know how. whenever he was asked to go faster, he struck into a rocking canter, which was as easy and about as lazy as a cradle, so that his rider received hardly any shaking, and was able to keep both his seat and his stirrups. brief halts for rest were made now and then. bridges were crossed which ned understood were over small branches of the blanco river, but they were still in the lowlands when, at about midnight, the little column wheeled out of the road and went on for a hundred yards or more into a magnificent forest, where the moonlight came down among the trees to show how old and large they were. "halt! dismount!" came sharply from colonel tassara. "it is twelve o'clock. we have made over twenty miles. we will camp here until daylight. pablo, put up the tents." every rider but ned was down on his feet in a twinkling, but he remained upon his pony's back as still as a statue. he saw a white tent leave the top of the baggage in the wagon and set itself up, as if by magic. another and another followed, and he said to himself: "they are little picnic tents. one is for the señora and felicia; one for the colonel; and one for señor zuroaga. not any for me or for the men. oh, dear! how shall i ever get down? i can't move my legs. if i can't, i shall have to go to sleep in the saddle!" that was just what he might have done if it had not been for his kind and thoughtful friend, the general,--if he was one,--for zuroaga now came to the side of the pony to inquire, with a merry laugh: "how are you now, my boy? i knew how it would be. tired out? stiff with so long a ride? lean over this way and i'll help you down. come!" ned leaned over and tried to pull his feet out of the stirrups. they did come out somehow, and then he made an extra effort not to fall asleep with his head on the general's shoulder. "used up completely!" exclaimed zuroaga. "can you walk? stretch your legs. kick. it's your first long ride? you'll soon get used to it. there! now i'll put you into my tent, but we must be on the march again by six o'clock in the morning. you can sleep till breakfast." "i can walk, thank you," responded poor ned, and he did so, after a lame and awkward fashion, but he was glad to reach the tent. "it's big enough for two," he said, as he crawled in. "is it?" said the general. "bah! i do not use one half the time. i am a soldier and a hunter, and i prefer to bivouac in such weather as this. i must be on the lookout, too, to-night. crawl in and go to sleep." ned was already in. down he went upon a blanket, without even unbuckling his machete, and that was the last that he knew that night of the camp or of anybody in it. probably, nothing less than the report of a cannon fired over that tent would have aroused him to go for his horse-pistols or draw his mexican sabre. señora tassara and her daughter had disappeared immediately, and they, also, must have been wearied with their long, hot journey, but all the rest of the party were old campaigners, and they were ready to take care of the horses and eat cold rations, for no fires were kindled. a few minutes later, if ned had been awake instead of sleeping so soundly, he might have heard what two men were saying, in half-whispers, close to the door of his tent. "colonel," said zuroaga, "we are well-hidden in here. the bushes are very thick along the edge of the road." "hark!" interrupted tassara. "do you hear that? there they are!" "i hear them," replied the general. "it may be so. if it is, they have followed us well. but there cannot be more than half a dozen of them. it is not any mere squad like that that we need be afraid of." "this may be only an advance party, i think," said his friend, thoughtfully. "a larger force may be on our trail before to-morrow night. but they must not take us. they might merely arrest me, to have me shot at vera cruz, but they would cut down you and poor young carfora at once. he is an american, and they would show him no mercy." there had been a sound of horse hoofs on the road, and it had gone by, but before zuroaga could make any response to so gloomy a prophecy, his own man, pablo, stood before him. pablo had been running fast, but he had breath enough left to say, quite coolly and not loudly: "lancers, general. officer and four men. they have been running their horses, and they won't travel far to-morrow. i was in the bushes." "all right, pablo," said zuroaga. "it was kind of colonel guerra to order them to use up their horses. we shall not hear of that squad again. put andrea on watch, and go to sleep. our first danger is over." pablo bowed and turned away without another word, and zuroaga resumed his conference with tassara, for those two were brave men, and were well-accustomed to the peril-haunted lives they were leading. "colonel," he said, "it is evident that my young friend carfora must go with you. he is not fit for a swift ride of three hundred miles. besides, he must have any chance which may happen to turn up for getting home. will you take care of him? he is a fine young fellow, but he cannot ride." therefore the pony and that saddle had done something good for ned, and colonel tassara cheerfully responded: "with great pleasure, my dear general. i shall be glad to make american friends. i may need them. he will be safe enough with me, but i fear it will be a long time before he can get out of mexico. as for me, i shall meet more than a hundred of my own men at orizaba, ready to escort me across the sierra into my own state of puebla. after that, my reputation for loyalty will soon be reëstablished by raising my new regiment. i think, however, that it will not march into the city of mexico until his excellency president paredes has set out for the rio grande, or as far north as the luck of this war will permit him to travel. very possibly, he may be hindered by the gringos before he reaches the border. carfora will remain with me until then. you are right. he would not be safe anywhere else. as for yourself, you must push on." "i think," said zuroaga, "that i shall be almost safe after i am a few miles beyond teotitlan. i may have a fight or two on the way. carfora must not be killed in any skirmish of that kind. you will not see me again, dead or alive, until a week or two after the americans have taken the city of mexico, as in my opinion they surely will. i shall be there then, with five hundred lancers, to uphold the new government which will take the place of the bloody dictatorship of paredes, unless the new affair is to be santa anna. in any event, i shall be able to help you, and i will." "you are a gloomy prophet," responded tassara, "but you are an old student of military operations. do you really think the americans will capture our capital? it will be well defended." "bravely enough, but not well," replied zuroaga. "we have not one scientific, thoroughly educated engineer officer fit to take charge of the defences against, for instance, general scott. not even santa anna himself, with all his ability, is a general capable of checking the invaders after they have taken vera cruz, and that they will do. he is a scheming politician rather than a military genius. he and paredes and some others whom you and i could name must be whipped out of power before we can put up an entirely new government, better than any we have ever had yet. what do you think about it?" "think?" exclaimed tassara, angrily. "i think it will be after you and i are dead and buried before this miserable half-republic, half-oligarchy, will be blessed with a solid government like that of the united states." "and that, too, might get into hot water," muttered his friend, but neither of the two political prophets appeared to have much more to say. they separated, as if each might have something else to employ him, and shortly all the night camp in the grand old forest seemed to be asleep. the remaining hours of darkness passed silently, and the sun arose with a promise of another hot day. small fires were kindled for coffee-making, but the preparations for breakfast were hurried. before six o'clock the mules were harnessed, the horses were saddled, and all things were made ready for a diligent push southward. it had been a difficult business to get ned crawford out of his tent, but here he was, trying his best to move his legs as if they belonged to him. his coffee and corn-cakes did a great deal for him, and he made out to pretend to help pablo in getting the fat pony ready for the road. then, however, he was willing to see pablo walk away, and he bravely led the pony to the side of what may have been an old and apparently abandoned ant-hill. "i can get on board," he said, as if his patient quadruped had been the _goshhawk_. "i saw how some of them mounted. you put your left foot into the stirrup, and then you make a kind of spring into the saddle. if my knees will bend for me, i can do it without anybody's help." it was the ant-hill that helped him, for he did not make any spring. after his foot was in the stirrup, he made a tremendous effort, and he arose slowly, painfully to the level of the pony's back. then his right leg went over, and he was actually there, hunting a little nervously for the other stirrup, with his machete away around behind him. "glad you have done it!" exclaimed a decidedly humorous voice near the pony's head. "we are all ready to be off now. before long, you will be able to mount as the rancheros do, without touching the stirrup. but then, i believe that most of them were born on horseback." they also appeared to be able to do pretty well without much sleep, for ned could not see that they showed any signs of fatigue. the camping-place was speedily left behind them, but it was no longer a night journey. ned was almost astonished, now that the darkness was gone, to discover that this was by no means a wild, unsettled country. not only were there many farms, with more or less well-built houses, but the cavalcade began to meet other wayfarers,--men and women,--on foot and on horseback, and hardly any of them were willing to be passed without obtaining the latest news from vera cruz and from the war. "i guess they need it," thought ned. "the general says there are no newspapers taken down here, and that, if there were, not one person in five could read them. they seem a real good-natured lot, though." so they were, as much so as any other people in the world, and they were as capable of being developed and educated to better things. as to this being a new country, it came slowly back into ned's mind that there had been a great and populous empire here at a time when the island upon which the city of new york was afterward built was a bushy wilderness, occupied by half-naked savages, who were ready to sell it for a few dollars' worth of kettles and beads. "i guess i'm beginning to wake up," thought ned. "when the _goshhawk_ was lying in the bay of vera cruz, i was too busy to see anything. no, i wasn't. i did stare at the orizaba mountain peak, and they told me it is over seventeen thousand feet high. first mountain i ever saw that could keep on snow and ice in such weather as this. i don't want to live up there in winter. well! now i've seen some of the biggest trees i ever did see. i wonder if any of them were here when the spaniards came in. i guess they were, some of them." he was really beginning to see something of mexico, and it almost made him forget the hardness of that unpleasant saddle. at the end of another mile, he was saying to himself: "that field yonder is tobacco, is it? the one we just passed was sugar-cane, and pablo said the plantation across the road was almost all coffee. he says that further on he will show me orange groves, bananas, and that sort of thing. but what on earth are grenaditas and mangoes? they'll be something new to me, and i want to find out how they taste." nothing at all of a military or otherwise of an apparently dangerous character had been encountered by the fugitive travellers when, at about the middle of the forenoon, they came to a parting of the ways. a seemingly well-travelled road went off to the left, or southward, while the one they were on turned more to the right and climbed a hill, as if it were making a further effort to get out of the _tierra caliente_. a great many things had been explained to ned, as they rode along, and he was not surprised, therefore, when señor zuroaga said to him: "my young friend, this is the place i told you of. we must part here. you and your pony will go on with colonel tassara, and i will take my chances for reaching my place of refuge in oaxaca. it is not a very good chance, but i must make the best of it that i can. take good care of yourself. i have already said good-by to the señora and the señorita. i think they will soon be out of danger." ned was really grateful, and he tried to say so, but all he could think of just then was: "general zuroaga, i do hope you'll get through all right. i hope i shall see you again safe and sound." "you never will," said zuroaga, as he wheeled his horse, "unless i get out of this cordoba road. it is a kind of military highway, and i might meet my enemies at any minute--too many of them." "good-by!" shouted ned, and the general, who was still a great mystery to him, dashed away at a gallop, followed by pablo and the wild riders from the oaxaca ranches. the cavalcade had hardly paused, and it now went on up the long, steep slope to the right. not many minutes later, it was on high enough ground to look down upon the road which had been taken by zuroaga. ned was not looking in that direction, but at some snow-capped mountains in the distance, northward, and he was saying to himself: "so that is the sierra madre, is it? this country has more and higher mountains in it-hullo! what's that? is she hurt?" his change of utterance into an anxious exclamation was produced by a piercing scream from the carriage, and that was followed by the excited voice of señora tassara calling out: "husband! the general is attacked! look! hear the firing!" "o father! can we not help him?" gasped señorita felicia. her mother was holding to her eyes with trembling hands what ned took for an opera-glass, and he wished that he had one, although he could make out that something like a skirmish was taking place on the other road. it was too far to more than barely catch the dull reports of what seemed to be a number of rapidly fired pistol-shots. "they are fighting!" he exclaimed. "i wish i was there to help him! he may need more men. i could shoot!" whether he could or not, he was almost unconsciously unbuckling the holster of one of his horse-pistols, when the señora spoke again. "santa maria!" she exclaimed. "the dear general! they are too many for him. madre de dios! our good friend will be killed!" "give me the glass, my dear," said her husband. "your hands are not steady enough. i will tell you how it is." "oh, do!" she whispered, hoarsely, as she handed it to him. "they are lancers in uniform. oh, me! this is dreadful! and they may follow us, too." colonel tassara took the glass with apparently perfect coolness, and ned took note that it did not tremble at all, as he aimed it at the distant skirmish. it was a number of seconds, however, before he reported: "hurrah! the general rides on, and he rides well. i feel sure that he is not badly wounded, if at all. he has now but three men with him. there are riderless horses. there are men on the ground. there are four only that are riding back toward the cordoba road. thank god! the general has made good his escape from that party of unlucky lancers. he is a fighter!" then he lowered the glass to turn and shout fiercely to his own men: "forward! we must reach orizaba before the news of this skirmish gets there, if we kill all our horses doing it. push on!" chapter ix. leaving the hacienda it was near the close of a bright summer day, and a deeply interested company had gathered in the dining-room of the crawford home in new york. dinner was on the table, but nobody had yet sat down. the number of young persons present suggested that ned must have older brothers and sisters. "father crawford," exclaimed one of the grown-up young men, "what is this about another letter from edward? i came over to hear the news." "letter?" said mr. crawford. "i should say so! i guess i'd better read it aloud. it was a long time getting out and coming around by way of england. there are all sorts of delays in war-time. it is the last of three that he wrote before escaping into the interior of mexico with his new friends. i am glad that he did go with them, though, and there must be other letters on the way. we shall hear from him again pretty soon." they all were silent then, and he read the letter through, with now and then a few words of explanation, but mrs. crawford had evidently read it before, and all she could say now was: "oh, dear! i don't like it! i wish he had come home!" "it's all right, mother," said mr. crawford, "for i have something more to tell. captain kemp is here, and, from what he says, it is plain that it would not have done for ned to have remained anywhere on the coast. he will be safe where he is, and he will learn a great deal. i would not have him miss it for anything. what's pretty good, too, we have been paid all our insurance money for the loss of the _goshhawk_, and our firm has been given a contract to furnish supplies for the army. i shall be down on the gulf before long myself, in charge of a supply ship, and i can make inquiries about ned. he will turn up all right." everybody appeared to be encouraged except ned's mother, and it was a pity she could not have seen how well he was looking at that very time. if, for instance, she had possessed a telescope which would have reached so far, she might have seen a fine, large bay horse reined in to a standstill in front of a modern-appearing country-house, well built of a nearly white kind of limestone. around this residence was a wide-spreading lawn, with vines, shrubbery, flowers, and other evidences of wealth and refinement. the rider of the horse appeared to sit him easily, and he was a picture of health and high spirits, but for an expression of discontent that was upon his sunburned face. "this is all very beautiful," he said, as he glanced around him, "but i wish i were out of it. i want to hear from home. they must have my letters by this time, but they couldn't guess where i am now." he was silent for a moment, and the horse curveted gracefully under him, as if in doubt whether to gallop away again, or to ask his rider to get off. "well!" said ned, with a pull on the rein. "it seems like a long, wonderful dream since i saw general zuroaga ride away from us at the cross-roads. what a skirmish that was! then we made our way through the mountains, and came here, and hasn't it been a curious kind of life ever since? i've learned how to ride like a mexican. i've seen all there is to see for miles and miles around this place. i've seen lots of old ruins, all that's left of ancient houses and temples and altars. i believe the señora likes nothing better than to tell me yarns about the montezuma times and about her ancestors in spain. that's a great country. i think i'll go over there, some day, and see granada and the alhambra and the old castles and the spanish people. i like the mexicans first-rate, all that i have seen of them. they will be a splendid nation one of these days, but they're awfully ignorant now. why, every one in these parts believes that our army is all the while being whipped all to pieces by theirs, and i can't exactly swallow that. i'd like to know just what is really going on. i'm all in the dark." "señor carfora!" called out a clear, ringing voice. he turned in the saddle, from seeming to gaze at the distant forest, and there, in the piazza which ran all along the front of the house, stood señorita felicia, her usually pale face flushed with excitement. "we have a letter from father!" she shouted. "he has completed his regiment, and he is to command it. president paredes is going north, to drive the gringos out of mexico, and father may have to go with him. he says it is time for us to move to the city of mexico. we are to live with my aunt, mercedes paez, and you are to come with us. is it not grand?" "it is just what i was wishing for!" exclaimed ned. "i'd give almost anything to see that city, after what your mother has told me." "oh," said felicia, "she was born there, and she'll make you see all there is of it. but we were all ready, you know, and we are to set out early to-morrow morning." "hurrah!" responded ned. "but i'd like to hear from general zuroaga. i wish i knew whether or not he was much hurt in that fight in the road." "father does not believe he was," said felicia. "sometimes i almost think he knows all about it. but there are some things he won't speak of, and general zuroaga is one of them." ned sprang to the ground, and a barefooted "peon" servant took charge of his horse. it was not at all the kind of dismounting he had performed at the camp in the woods on the road from vera cruz. neither did he now have any machete dangling from his belt, to entangle himself with, and there were no pistol holsters in front of the saddle. he went on into the house with the señorita, and in a moment more he was hearing additional news from her mother. señora tassara was as stately as ever, but it was apparent that she had taken a liking to her young american guest, whether it was on account of his deep interest in her old stories, or otherwise. it may have been, in part, that company was a good thing to have in a somewhat lonely country-house, for she could not have thought of associating with mexican neighbors of a social rank lower than her own. was she not descended from spanish grandees, and were they not, for the greater part, representatives of the mere aztecs and toltecs, whom her forefathers had conquered? it was that very feeling, however, which in the minds of such men as paredes and similar leaders was standing in the way of every effort to construct a genuine republic out of the people of the half-civilized states of mexico. ned's next questions related to the war, and he inquired how many more great battles colonel tassara had reported. "battles?" exclaimed señora tassara. "why, there has not been one fought since resaca de la palma. but he says that general ampudia sends word that the american army is about to advance upon him. they will attack him at the city of monterey, and they never can take so strong a place as that is. he is ready for them, but president paredes believes that it is time for him to take command of the army in person." it certainly was so. the mexican president was a cunning politician, and he had been by no means an unsuccessful general. he was well aware that it would not be wise for him to now allow too many victories to be won by any other mexican. it might interfere with his own popularity. on the other hand, if general ampudia should be defeated, as he was quite likely to be, then it was good policy for the commander-in-chief, the president, to be promptly on hand with a larger force, to overwhelm the invaders who had ruined ampudia. therefore, it might be said that the americans had the tangled factions and corrupt politics of mexico working for them very effectively. ned crawford already knew much about the condition of military and political affairs, but he was not thinking of them that evening. it was a great deal pleasanter to sit and talk with señorita felicia about the city of mexico and others of the historical places of the ancient land of anahuac. she still could remind him, now and then, that she hated all kinds of gringos, but at all events she was willing to treat one of them fairly well. he, on his part, had formed a favorable opinion of some mexicans, but he was as firm as ever in his belief that their army could never drive the americans out of texas. there was one place which was even busier and more full of the excitement of getting ready for a new movement than was the tassara hacienda. it was among the scattered camps of general taylor's army, near matamoras, at the mouth of the rio grande. reinforcements had made the army more than double its former size, but it was understood that it was still of only half the numbers of the force it was soon to meet, under general ampudia. it was a curious fact, however, that all of general taylor's military scholars were entirely satisfied with that computation, and considered that any other arrangement would have been unfair, as they really outnumbered their opponents when these were only two to one. what was more, they were willing to give them the advantage of fighting behind strong fortifications, for they knew that they were soon to attack the mountain city of monterey. part of what was now genuinely an invading army was to go up the river in boats for some distance. the other part was to go overland, and it was an open question which of them would suffer the more from the hot summer sun. it was to be anything but a picnic, for here were nearly seven thousand americans of all sorts, who were obtaining their first experiences of what war might really be, if made in any manner whatever in the sultriest kind of southern weather. much more agreeable for them might have been a march across the central table-lands beyond, at an elevation of four thousand feet above the sea level and the _tierra caliente_. that was precisely the kind of pleasant journey that was performed by ned crawford and the imposing tassara cavalcade on the morrow and during a couple of wonderful days which followed. there being no railway, whatever the señora wished to take with her had to be conveyed in wagons or on pack-mules, and the ladies themselves now preferred the saddle to any kind of carriage. in fact, ned shortly discovered that señorita felicia was more at home on horseback than he was, and he more than once congratulated himself that she had never witnessed his first performances in mounting his fat pony. "how she would have laughed at me!" he thought. "but at that time there wasn't another spare saddle-horse, and she and her mother didn't care a cent whether i could ride or not. they were thinking of guerra's lancers." the scenery was exceedingly beautiful as well as peaceful. there was nothing whatever to suggest that a dreadful war was going on. there were houses of friends to stop at, instead of hotels. there were towns and villages of some importance to be rapidly investigated by a tourist like ned, from new york by way of england, and now a good young mexican for the time being. then there was an exciting evening, when all who were on horseback rode ahead of the wagons and on into the city, which occupies the site of the wonderful tenochtitlan, which was captured by hernando cortes and his daring adventurers ever so long ago. from that time onward, during a number of busy days, ned became better and better satisfied with the fact that his father had sent him across the sea to learn all that he could of mexico and the mexicans. chapter x. pictures of the past "oh, how i wish we had some news from the war!" exclaimed ned. "well," said señorita felicia, doubtfully, "there isn't much, but i suppose there is some almost ready to come." "i'm tired of waiting for it," replied ned, "and if there isn't to be any war news, i wish i had some books!" the thought that was in ned crawford's mind had broken out suddenly, as he sat at the dinner-table of señora mercedes paez, at the end of those first days after his arrival in the city of mexico. there were a number of persons at the table, and at the head of it was señora paez herself. she was shorter and stouter, but she was every ounce as stately and imposing as was even señora tassara. in front of her sat one affair which had, from the beginning of his visit in that house, made him feel more at home than he might otherwise have done. he had become used to it, and it seemed like an old friend. that seville coffee-urn had ornamented the table in the house at vera cruz, his first refuge after he came ashore out of the destructive norther. it had winked at him from a similar post of honor in the country-house out in puebla, and señora tassara had affectionately brought it with her to the residence of her city cousin. she had said that she thought it would be safer here, even if the city should be captured by those terrible robbers, the americans. they could not be intending to steal and melt up all the old silver in mexico. "why, señor carfora!" exclaimed señorita felicia, indignantly. "did you not know? aunt paez has piles and piles of books. they are up in the library. if you wish to read them, she will let you go there. i had forgotten that you know how to read. he may do it, may he not, aunt mercedes?" "of course he may," replied the señora, "but it is a curious idea for a boy of his age." "oh, thank you!" exclaimed ned. "but what i'd like to have are some books that tell about old mexico and about the city of tenochtitlan, that stood here before the spaniards came. i've been all around everywhere. i've seen the swamps and the lakes and the walls and forts and everything. the great cathedral--" "that," interposed señora tassara, "stands on the very spot where an old temple of the aztec war-god stood. there were altars in it, where they used to kill and burn hundreds and thousands of human sacrifices to huitzilopochtli, and there were altars to other gods." "i can't exactly speak that name," said ned, "but i want to know all about him and the sacrifices. i want to learn, too, just how cortes and his men took the old city. i suppose that when the americans come, it will be a different kind of fight--more cannon." "they won't get here at all," quietly remarked a military-looking old gentleman sitting near the other end of the table. "it is a long road from the rio grande, and president paredes is to march, in a few days, to crush our enemies with an army of twenty thousand men. they have not so much as taken monterey yet. you are right, though. if they should ever get here, they will find the city harder to take than cortes did. they will all die before the walls." he spoke with a great deal of patriotic enthusiasm, and ned knew that it was his turn to keep still, for the old gentleman had no idea that he was talking to a wicked young gringo. señora paez, however, calmly replied: "ah, colonel rodriguez, my dear friend, the president himself has said that, after he has beaten them at the northern border, as he surely will, the americans are sure to make another attempt by way of vera cruz. that, too, was the opinion of our brave friend, colonel guerra, and he is making every preparation for a siege. it is part of our grateful hospitality to our guest, señor carfora, that his friends have supplied the castle of san juan de ulua with the ammunition which will be needed. he came over on the ship which brought it, and he has remained with us ever since." just then ned crawford knew what it was to feel very mean indeed. he felt as if he himself were telling a large lie, and his cheeks flushed red-hot. he was aware, nevertheless, that even señora tassara had not been told everything, and that señora paez was reasonably honest in what she had been saying. there was no necessity for enlightening colonel rodriguez. hardly, therefore, had the old gentleman vehemently exclaimed, "they never can take san juan de ulua!" than ned went hastily back to his first subject of the ancient history. "that's it," he said. "i want to find out how cortes got ashore, and how he fought his way from the coast to this place. he must have had to cross the mountains, through the passes, just as our party did when we came." "yes," said the colonel. "he had to climb seven thousand and five hundred feet up out of the _tierra caliente_, and, if any gringos ever try that path, they will find all the passes full of fighting mexicans and good artillery well posted. hernando cortes had all the gunpowder there was in america when he tried that road." "my dear young friend," said señora paez, "you will find plenty of the books you wish for. my husband was fond of collecting them. after dinner, the señorita will show you the library, and you may read anything there." ned was silent once more, for he was still feeling mean, and was asking himself whether he were not, after all, a kind of spy in the mexican camp, going around in disguise, and all the while wishing that he could help the american army to capture the city. "anyhow," he thought, "i can't help myself just now, and when the city is taken, everything in the paez house will be entirely safe. i shouldn't wonder if that old coffee-urn will be safer from thieves than it is now. there have been half a dozen burglaries since we came, and i've seen hundreds of the wildest-looking kinds of fellows from the mountains. every man of them looked as if he'd like to steal some silver." while he was thinking, he was also listening, with a great deal of interest, to a description which the old officer was giving of the defences of monterey, and of the reasons why the american troops would surely be defeated. it appeared that he had at one time been the commander of the garrison of the fortress known as the black fort, just outside of the walls of monterey, on the north, and he evidently believed it to be impregnable. ned was no soldier, and it did not occur to him to ask, as general taylor might have done, whether or not it was possible to take the town without wasting time in taking the fort first. "come, señor carfora," said felicia, as they all arose from the table, "i will show you the library. you can't do much reading there to-night, though, for the lamps have all been taken away. i do not wish to go there, anyhow, except in the daytime. it is a pokerish kind of place. do you believe in ghosts? i do not, but, if i were a ghost, i would pick out that library for a good place to hide in. come along. you are a foreigner, and any kind of good mexican ghost won't like you." whether she herself did so or not, she led the way, and no lamp was as yet needed, although the day was nearly over and the shadows were coming. up-stairs they went and through a short passageway in the second story of the paez mansion, and they were almost in the dark when she said to him: "here we are. hardly any one ever comes here, and it will be dreadfully dusty. books are dusty old things anyhow." she turned the big brass knob in the dusky door before them, and shoved against it with all her might, but ned had to help her with his shoulder, or the massive mahogany portal would not have yielded an inch. it did go slowly in, upon its ancient-looking bronze hinges, and then they were in a room which was worth looking at. it was not so very large, only about fifteen feet by twenty, but it was unusually high, and it had but one tall, narrow slit of a window. close by this, however, were a finely carved reading chair and table, ready to receive all the light which the window might choose to let in. ned was staring eagerly around the room, when his pretty guide remarked: "you had better see all you can before it gets any darker. take down as many books as you want. i don't care much for those fusty-musty old histories. i must go away now--" "hullo, señorita!" exclaimed ned. "there is a lamp on the table. i have some matches--" "i don't believe you can make it burn," she said, "but you can try. it has not been lighted for this ever so long, and the oil may have dried up." around she whirled and away she went, leaving ned to his own devices. his next thought was almost impolite, after all, for he was more than half glad that she did go, so that he might have the library all to himself to rummage in. he did not instantly examine the lamp, for he had never before been in just this kind of room, and it fascinated him. all its sides were occupied by high bookcases, every one of them crammed full of volumes of all sorts and sizes. he thought that he had never seen larger books than were some of the fat folios on the lower shelves. there were great, flat, atlas-looking concerns leaning against them, and out on the floor stood several upright racks of maps. old señor paez may have been what is called a book-worm. at all events, ned had understood that he was a very learned man, with a strong enthusiasm for american history. "heavens and earth!" suddenly exclaimed ned. "what is that?" he darted forward to a further corner of the room, as if he were in a great hurry to meet somebody who had unexpectedly come in. it certainly was something almost in human shape, but it had been standing there a long while, and the hand which it appeared to hold out to him was of steel, for it was nothing in the wide world but a complete suit of ancient armor. it was so set up in that corner, however, that it almost seemed alive, with its right hand extended, and its left holding a long, pennoned lance. its helmet had a barred vizor, so that if there had been any face behind that, it would have been hidden. ned went and stood silently before it for a moment, staring at that vizor. "i say," he muttered, as if he did not care to speak any louder. "i don't believe general taylor's men would care to march far with as much iron as that on them--not in hot weather. but the old aztecs didn't have anything that would go through that kind of uniform. if cortes and his men wore it, there is no wonder that they went on killing the indians without being much hurt themselves." in fact, not all of them had been dressed up in precisely such a manner, although they did wear armor. ned examined the whole affair, piece by piece, from head to foot, and then he turned away from his inspection, for the room behind him was getting dim and it was time for him to look at his lamp. he took out a match as he went toward the table at the window, and in a moment more he was busy with a wick which seemed to be determined not to burn for him. "it's an old whale-oil lamp," he remarked. "mother had one, once. i remember seeing her try to light it and it would sputter for ever so long. there! it's beginning to kindle, but it's too big for me to carry around and hunt for books with. i wish i had a smaller one. hullo! here's one of the biggest of those old concerns, right here on the table." it was a folio bound in vellum, and when he opened it a great deal of dust arose from the cover which banged down. then ned uttered a loud exclamation, and was glad he had succeeded in lighting the lamp, for there before his eyes was a vividly colored picture of a most extraordinary description. moreover, it unfolded, so that it was almost twice the size, length, and width of the book pages. "they are all in spanish," he said, "but i guess i can read them. they're more than a hundred years old. people don't print such books, nowadays. nobody would have time enough to read them, i suppose, and they couldn't sell 'em cheap enough. this is wonderful! it's a picture of the old mexican god, huitzilopochtli." there was an explanatory inscription, and the artist had pictured the terrible deity sitting upon a throne of state, gorgeously arrayed in gold and jewels, and watching with a smile of serene satisfaction the sacrifice of some unfortunate human victims on the altar in the foreground at the right. one of the priests attending at the altar had just cut open the bosom of a tall man lying before him, and was tossing a bleeding heart upon the smoking fire, where other similar offerings were already burning. "that must have been a horrible kind of religion," thought ned. "i'm glad that cortes and his men in armor came to put an end to it. señora paez told me that in only a few years before he came, and her great-grandfather and his father with him, those priests cut up more than twenty thousand men, women, and children. he's a curious kind of god, i should say, to sit there and grin while it was going on." he could not linger too long over one picture, however, for he had discovered that there were others in that volume which were as brilliantly colored and as interesting. on the whole, it was not necessary to hunt for anything better than this the first evening, and it appeared as if he were asking a useless question of the steel-clad warrior in the corner, when at last he turned to him to say: "did you ever see anything like this before? i never did. were you there, in any of these battles? this is the way that cortes and his cavalry scared the indians, is it? they were awfully afraid of horses. you can buy horses for almost nothing, nowadays, anywhere in mexico. i've learned how to ride 'em, too, but didn't i get pitched off by some of those ponies! it would have scared mother half to death. i wish i could see her to-night, and show her some of these pictures. i'd like to see bob and the girls, too. they never saw a book like this." he had examined a number of the pictures, and the lamp was burning fairly well, but a long time had elapsed since he came into that room, and he was not at all aware of it. "señor carfora?" called out a voice in the doorway. "oh, you are here. you did light the lamp. i was almost afraid you were in the dark." "no, i'm not," said ned. "i made it burn, and i've been looking at all sorts of things. these pictures are just wonderful." "oh!" she said, "i would not be in this room in the dark for anything! i know all those things in that book, though. they are hideous! but they say that that suit of armor has the worst kind of ghost in it." "maybe it has," said ned. "i don't believe he can get out, anyhow. he's just stuck in it. i'd rather wear the clothes i have on." "well," she replied, "mother sent me to find if you were here, and it is dreadfully late--" "oh, yes!" interrupted ned. "i suppose it is time for me to go to bed. i'll go, but i mean to see all there is in this library, señorita. i won't try to read it all. i don't care for ghosts, but i'd like to see one." "i do not care for them in the daytime, either," she told him. "but old margarita, the tlascalan, says that they come at night and sit here and tell stories of all the mexican idol gods. all of them hate us, too, because we turned them out of their temples, and i hate them." "i'm glad they are gone, anyhow," said ned, but it was really time to go, and he carried some of the most brilliant of those illustrations into some of his dreams that night. chapter xi. ned's news "hullo, young man! i've been looking for you. how are you?" "captain kemp!" shouted ned, in astonishment. "where did you come from? who dreamed of seeing you here?" "nobody, i hope," said the captain; "but here i am, and i've brought you half a dozen letters. they are among my baggage. first thing, though, tell me all about yourself. where have you been?" they were standing in the grand plaza, not many paces from the front of the cathedral, and ned had come there for another look at the building which had taken the place of the old-time temple of the murderous mexican god of war. he was wildly excited for a moment, and he began to ask questions, rather than to tell anything about himself. "keep cool, now, my boy," said the captain. "we don't know who's watching us. i didn't have much trouble in running the yankee blockade at vera cruz. i brought a cargo from new york, just as if it had been sent from liverpool, but i've had to prove that i'm not an american ever since i came ashore. spin us your yarn as we walk along." ned was now ready to do so, and the captain listened to him with the most intense interest, putting in remarks every now and then. "all this," he said, "is precisely what your father wishes you to do, if you can do it. the way of it is this. he knows, and we all know, that this war can't be a long one. as soon as it's over, his concern means to go into the mexican trade heavier than they ever did before. they think it will be worth more, and i mean to be in it myself. so it just suits him to have you here, making friends and learning all about the country you are to deal with. he says you are in the best kind of business school. there will be a fortune in it for you some day." "i don't exactly see how," remarked ned, doubtfully. "well," replied the captain, "not many young american business men know ten cents' worth about mexico. you'd better go right on and learn all there is to know. keep shy of all politics, though. this war is going to break paredes and a lot of others. after they are out of power, your own friends, like tassara, zuroaga, and the rest of them, may be in office, and you will be in clover. it's a wonderfully rich country, if it were only in the right hands and had a good government. i'll give you the letters when we get to my lodgings. then i must make my way back to vera cruz, but i had to come all this distance to get my pay from the authorities. i obtained it, even now, only by promising to bring over another cargo of british gunpowder, to fight the yankees with." that was a thing which ned did not like, but he could not do anything to prevent it. he could not expect an englishman to be an american, and it was all a matter of trade to captain kemp, aside from his personal friendship for ned and his father. there was more talk of all sorts, and ned obtained a great deal of information concerning the war and what the united states were likely to do. after he had received his precious letters, however, and had said good-by to captain kemp, he almost ran against people in his haste to reach the paez mansion. he did not pause to speak to anybody on arriving, but darted up-stairs and made his way to the library. it was lighter now in the wonderful book-room, and the man in armor did not say anything as ned came in. in a moment he was in the chair by the window, and he appeared to himself to be almost talking with the dear ones at home, from whom he had so long been separated. "stay where you are," he read from his father's long letter, and at that hour he felt as if he did not wish to stay. he dropped the letter on the table, and leaned back in his chair and looked around him. pretty soon, however, a little slowly to begin with, but then faster and faster, the strong and fascinating spirit of adventure came once more upon him. his very blood tingled, and he sprang to his feet to all but shout to his mailed acquaintance in the corner: "yes, sir, i'll stay! i'll do anything but become a mexican. tell you what, before the war's over, i mean to be in the american army, somehow. i don't exactly see how i'm to do it, though." it was time to go down-stairs and report to his faithful friends, for he knew it would be very mean not to do so, and the first person he met was señora tassara herself. "i have letters from home!" he exclaimed, bluntly--"newspapers, too!" and she held up both hands in astonishment, as she responded: "letters from the united states? how on earth did they come through the blockade, and how did they know where you are?" "i guess they didn't," said ned. "the english captain that used to command the _goshhawk_ brought them. i met him at the plaza, hunting for me. he was a friend of general zuroaga, and besides, the british consul at vera cruz knew i was with colonel tassara's family. so, if i hadn't met him, he would have tried to find you. my father writes that i am to stay in mexico, and learn all about it." "i am glad of that," she said. "why, you could not get out at all just now without danger to yourself and getting all of us into trouble." "i wouldn't do that for anything!" exclaimed ned, and then he went on with his tremendous budget of miscellaneous news. it was an exceedingly interesting heap of information, for the captain had given him both english and american journals, which were a rare treat at that time in the interior of the beleaguered mexican republic. señora tassara was busy with these, when ned and all the other news-bringers were pounced upon by a yet more eager inquirer. "señor carfora!" exclaimed felicia, her black eyes flashing curiously at him. "where did you get them? i never before saw such big newspapers. they won't tell us about our army, though." "yes, they will," he said, and, while she was searching the broad-faced prints for army information, he repeated for her benefit all that he had previously told her mother. poor señorita felicia! she did not obtain at all what she wanted, for there were no accounts of brilliant mexican victories. all of these must have been meanly omitted by the editors, and at last she angrily threw down a newspaper to say to him: "señor carfora, i am glad you are to stay here, but you will never be anything better than a gringo, no matter how much you learn. i was up in the library this morning, and i pulled out six more books for you. you may read them all, if they will do you any good. one of them is about spain, too. what i want to do is to travel all over spain. it must be the most beautiful country in the world." ned had noticed long ago that her eyes always grew dreamy whenever her thoughts were turned toward the peninsula which has had so wonderful a history, but he did not know that his own longings for foreign travel were very like her own in their origin when he replied: "well, i'd like to see spain. i mean to some day, but i want to see england first, and scotland and ireland. one of my ancestors was an irishman, and the crawfords were from scotland. it isn't as hot a country as spain is. you are a mexican, not a spaniard." "so i am," she said, "and most of the mexicans are indians. we ought to have more spaniards, but we can't get them. anyhow, we don't want too many gringos to come in. they are all heretics, too." ned knew what she meant, and he hastened to tell her that his country contained more church people of her religion than mexico did, and he added, to her great disgust: "and our priests are a hundred times better than yours are. general zuroaga says so, and so does your father. i don't like your mexican priests. the general says he wishes they were all dead, and their places filled by good, live men from europe and the united states." "felicia," interrupted her mother, "you must not talk with señor carfora about such things. what i wish is that we had the american common schools all over our poor, ignorant country. oh, dear! what if this horrible war should prove to be really a blessing to us? as things look now, we are to have another revolution within a year. more men will be shot, just as they have been before, and nobody can see what the end is to be." it was now time for the noonday luncheon, and they went to the dining-room, where señora paez herself was glad to see the foreign journals and to know that ned had letters from home. many things appeared to be settled, as far as he was concerned. at all events, his mind was no longer to busy itself with wild plans for squirming out from among the aztecs and finding his way to the united states. after luncheon he went up to the library again. at first it was only to read his letters over and over, and then it was a kind of relief to go to his books and try to forget everything else in going on with his queer schooling. it was unlike any that his old schoolmates at the north were having, and he caught himself wondering what kind of man it might make of him. he could not tell, but he was to have yet another lesson that day, and with it came a promise of a strange kind of vacation. it came to him in the evening, when he was so tired of books that he preferred the company of señorita felicia, no matter what saucy or overpatriotic things she might see fit to say to him. they were sitting near one of the drawing-room windows, when señora paez came quietly behind him and touched him on the shoulder. "come with me," she said. "there is a man up in señora tassara's room who wishes to see you." "o señor carfora!" whispered felicia. "don't say a word! i know who it is. go right along. he is an old friend of yours." up jumped ned, and he and the señorita followed señora paez eagerly. half a minute later, he felt as if he had never been so astonished before in all his life, for his hand was heartily grasped, and the voice of general zuroaga said to him: "here i am, señor carfora. how are you?" "oh, but i'm glad to see you!" exclaimed ned. "i'm all right, but isn't it awfully dangerous for you to be here?" "it would be, if some men knew it," replied zuroaga, "or if i were unwise enough to remain too long. the fact is that i can give you only a few minutes, anyhow, this evening. i must be out of the city before daylight, if i can, but i will return at the end of a week or so. then i shall take you with me to the valley of the tehuantepec. you must see all that region. after that i shall have a tour to make on political affairs, through several states, and you will have a chance to see two thirds of the republic before winter." "that is just what my father would wish me to do," said ned, and he proceeded to tell the general the contents of his letters and all the news he had heard from captain kemp. "very good!" said zuroaga, at last. "i would have been glad to have seen the captain. he is a rough sort of fellow, but he can be depended on. it is evident that your father's firm trusts him, but i believe they do not know exactly all that he has been doing. he is quite willing to make a few dollars for himself while he is working for others." the general was in good spirits, but more than once he spoke of the necessity he was under of keeping out of the reach of his old enemies, and among these he appeared to consider the absent santa anna even more dangerous, in the long run, than president paredes himself. señora tassara had now joined them, but she seemed disposed to be silent, and most of the conversation was in the hands of señora paez. it was noticeable that she appeared to have a remarkably good knowledge of the politics of her country. perhaps, if ned had been a few years older and the least bit of a politician, he might have suspected the truth, that she was one of the most subtle plotters in the whole country. if she was also a deadly enemy of president paredes, it was because she was a sister of a revolutionary leader whom he had caused to be shot, years ago, without the formality of a court-martial. ned saw her eyes flash and her bosom heave when she spoke of him, and after that he somehow felt safer than ever under her roof. he also saw that she and general zuroaga were the best of friends, and that they had a long private conference of their own. "i guess he feels at home here," thought ned, as he went down-stairs with felicia and señora tassara, and his confidence in that state of affairs grew stronger as he walked along the central hall of the house. "pablo!" he exclaimed, to a man who lay sprawled out upon the floor, but the general's oaxaca follower made him no reply. he and three more like him, who lay near him, were sound asleep, and there was no good cause for stirring them up just then. "they are all well armed," said ned to himself. "the general will be protected when he rides away in the morning. but this is the biggest kind of thing to come to me. the best _i_ can do will be to take to my books till he gets back. oh, but won't it be grand fun to make a complete tour of the mountains and of all the pacific coast of mexico? he says i shall see the tallest peaks of the cordilleras and that i may visit some of the great silver mines." with all that exciting expectation running through his head, it was not easy for him to get to sleep that night. when he arose in the morning, his friend, the mysterious general, had already departed. chapter xii. a storm coming "a monarchy! a monarchy! nothing but the one-man power will ever do anything for this miserable multitude of indians, negroes, and rebellion-making spanish aristocrats. royalty is our only resource, and i am nearly ready to strike the required blow. i think that don maria paredes would make as good an emperor as augustin de yturbide, and he will wear the crown of mexico somewhat longer. but i must look out for santa anna. if he were to return from cuba too soon, there would be nothing left for me but to have him shot as soon as he came ashore. or else he might have me shot not many days afterward. his emissaries and spies are all the while working against me, but i shall catch some of them. oh, how i would like to get hold of that venomous conspirator, zuroaga!" the president and practically the dictator of the nominal republic of mexico was standing in his own luxurious chamber of the government palace in the city of mexico. he was in the full uniform of a general officer, for he was preparing to ride out and attend a review of a division of the really large army which he had gathered to move against the american invaders at the north. he deemed himself favored by fortune, for all things had thus far appeared to operate in the direction of his high ambition. he was in possession of undisputed power, and his time for making his supremacy permanent had arrived. it was the morning of the 4th of august, 1846, and it promised to be a splendid day for a parade. he had eloquently appealed to all the patriotism in the land, and he had used his last dollar in raising the troops who were to win his victories and place him firmly upon the throne of anahuac, the lost throne of the montezumas. a large part of his forces had already marched, and he was now to follow with the remainder. it was high time that he should do so, for general taylor's army was daily drawing nearer the mexican lines at the city of monterey. not many minutes later, he rode away from the palace, attended by a brilliant staff, through crowded streets, where every hat went off and all the voices shouted "viva paredes" with every appearance of enthusiasm. that morning ned crawford had not felt like going out of the city to see any review. days had passed since the departure of general zuroaga, but ned's head was full of what his friend had said to him, and he did not care much in what direction his feet might take him. so, having all that responsibility to themselves, they carried him on across the city until, when he looked around him, he saw that he had almost reached the front gate of the out-of-date fort, which was known as "the citadel." it always contained a large garrison, not by any means for the defence of the capital from external foes, but for the protection of whatever might be the "government" for the time being from any sudden tumult or attempted revolution. there were officers and a squad of soldiers standing a few paces out in front of the wide-open military portal, and they all were gazing intently in the same direction. ned also turned to look, but all that he could see was a solitary rider, upon what seemed to be an all but exhausted horse, urging the panting animal toward the citadel. "colonel guerra!" exclaimed ned. "what has brought him all the way from vera cruz? has our army come? is the city taken?" nothing of that kind had yet occurred, but there was a reason for the arrival of the trusted commander of the important fortress on the sea. ned was very near him when the horse fell, and his rider sprang to the earth, covered with dust and evidently in great excitement. the officers at the gate rushed forward toward him, and one of them loudly demanded: "colonel guerra! what is it? has he come? all is ready here!" guerra himself had not fallen with his horse. off came his hat and his sword flashed from the sheath, while his voice rang out clearly, fiercely: "viva santa anna! the entire force at vera cruz and the garrison of san juan de ulua have pronounced for him. he is now on his way home from havana. we shall soon have with us the one hero who can save us from the american invaders and from the tyranny of king paredes!" possibly, this had been the day calculated upon for the arrival of precisely such tidings. it might even have been that all these officers and soldiers were gathered there, prepared both to hear and to act, while president paredes should be temporarily absent from the city. at all events, they were swinging their hats, drawing their swords, and their enthusiastic acclamations for the returning general were at once followed by a rush back into the citadel and a hasty closing of its gates. when that was done, and when the rest of the garrison had joined in "pronouncing" for santa anna, the military control of the mexican capital had passed out of the hands of president paredes. it was startling news, therefore, which was brought out to him by a friendly messenger, as he rode so proudly on in front of his shouting soldiery, believing that they were all his own and ready to do his bidding. the grand review ended instantaneously, and he came galloping back in all haste to look out for his tumbling crown. he came with his brilliant staff and a mixed crowd of friends and unfriends, only to discover that crown and throne and scepter had disappeared like the changing figures in a kaleidoscope. he could not even order anybody to be arrested and shot, for the vice-president, general bravo, and all the members of the national congress, then in session, were thoughtfully saying to themselves, if not to each other: "santa anna is coming! the seacoast forces are already his. he will be right here in a few days. we must be careful what we say or do just now. we do not even know what these new troops will say to this thing." they were not to remain long in ignorance upon that point. as the news went out from regiment to regiment that afternoon, the undisciplined, ragged mobs of raw recruits began to shout for santa anna. perhaps many of them had previously served under the one-legged veteran of the old french and texan wars and at least half a dozen revolutions. ned crawford turned and hurried homeward, as soon as he felt sure that his head was still upon his shoulders and that he had heard his remarkable news correctly. his eyes were busy, too, and he heard what men were saying to each other. excited shouts were carrying the errand of colonel guerra swiftly over the city, and everywhere it was discovering hearers as ready for it as had been the officers at the gate. he may have been looking a little pale when he entered the parlor of the paez mansion, for señora paez at once arose and came to meet him, inquiring, anxiously: "señor carfora, what is the matter? has anything happened?" "santa anna--" began ned, but she stepped quickly forward and put her hand upon his mouth, whispering sharply: "speak lower! we do not know who may hear you. what is it?" she took away her hand, and ned also whispered, as he hurriedly told her what he had seen and heard at the citadel. as he did so, her face and that of señora tassara, standing by her, grew much paler than his own. "my dear mercedes," said señora tassara to her cousin, "this is all as my husband and general zuroaga predicted. but the tiger is not here yet, and by the time he arrives they will be beyond his reach. it takes some days to travel from vera cruz to the city of mexico. señor carfora, you are in no danger. neither are we." "no!" angrily exclaimed señora paez. "not for to-day nor to-morrow, perhaps, but down goes the paredes monarchy! ah, me! there is a terrible time coming for poor mexico. who shall tell what the end of it all will be!" "nobody!" said señora tassara, sadly, but felicia whispered to ned: "señor carfora, the gringos could not do us much harm if their army had a revolution springing up behind it at home. i wish they had one." "i don't," replied ned. "if we did have one, though, it would be bigger than this is. i don't believe we have any santa annas to make one, anyhow. there isn't a man in all america that would think of being king. i guess that if we found one we'd hang him." "well," said felicia, "president paredes would like to hang a great many people, or shoot them, but i hope he can't. what are you going to do?" "he does not know, dear," interposed her mother. "we must stop talking about this thing now. some of our friends are coming in. it is better to let them tell us what has happened, just as if we had not heard it at all. be very careful what you say." perhaps everybody in the paez mansion was accustomed to that kind of caution, and when a number of excited women neighbors poured into the parlor to bring the great tidings and discuss the situation, they found no one in it who was to be surprised into saying a word which might not have been heard without offence by the friends of either paredes or santa anna. great changes in public affairs may produce changes in the plans of individuals, and it was not remarkable if general zuroaga's intended week of absence should be somewhat shortened. it may have ended at the moment when the garrison of the citadel "pronounced" in favor of the tyrant in exile and against the tyrant in nominal power. ned, however, had a small surprise waiting for him. it actually arrived not a great while after luncheon, when he was feeling as if he would like to sit down by himself and think over this very curious piece of political business. he went up into the library, as the safest kind of thinking-place, and, hardly had he opened the door, before he discovered that it had another tenant besides the man in armor in the corner. "general zuroaga!" he exclaimed, in astonishment. "not quite so loud, please," quietly responded the general. "yes, carfora, here i am. here i must hide, too, for a few hours. the camp is no longer a safe place for me, even in the disguise i was wearing. there is really nothing more to keep me there now. i do not need to run any further risks on account of paredes and his tin monarchy. he is already utterly ruined. i must get out of the reach of santa anna's lieutenants, however, if i do not wish to be locked up. you and i can slip away all the more easily while this tumult is going on, and by noon to-morrow we may be well out on the road to oaxaca. will you be ready?" "it's just what i was wishing for!" exclaimed ned. "i know enough to see that it isn't a good thing for señora paez to have me in the house. she has troubles enough of her own. so has señora tassara. if an enemy of theirs found that they had a gringo here, it would make things worse for them. they've been real good to me, but i want to go with you." "right!" said the general. "and there will be sharp eyes on the watch while santa anna's friends are getting ready for his arrival. he may appear to come peaceably, but do i not know him? he never yet forgot or forgave an enemy. he will come back to settle up all old accounts." "well," said ned, "we need not be here to be shot at. i packed up, all ready, days ago. but, general, i guess i can ride better than i did the other time. i don't need to have so fat a pony." "my dear fellow," replied the general, soberly, "you will be mounted on a horse that can make a swift run, if necessary. i am glad that you will know what to do with him." in other things than horsemanship, ned had made wonderful advances since he came ashore out of the norther, in the bay of vera cruz. it was as if he had grown a number of years older in becoming so much more experienced. moreover, he knew so much already about the plots and counterplots which were going on that it was of little use to keep some things from him. he was, in fact, almost full-grown as a mexican conspirator, and he was sure to do whatever he could against either a monarchy under paredes or a dictatorship under santa anna. it was a full hour later when they were joined by señora paez. she came on a special errand, for almost her first remark was: "general, there will be danger from robbers of all sorts. i shall not dare to keep a great deal of money in the house. i have not much, either, that i can spare for yourself, but you must take this and spend it to beat them. what's more, i want you to take my jewels with you and hide them somewhere in the mountains. señora tassara's are already in a safe place. i hope señor carfora has enough." "oh, yes!" exclaimed ned. "i have hardly spent anything, and captain kemp gave me another hundred, from father. i almost wish it were all in bank-bills, though, for gold and silver are heavy things to carry." "well, as to that," laughed the general, "i do not know what kind of paper money we could make in mexico, just now. that sort of thing will do only under a pretty solid government. but then, a dollar will go further in this country than it will in the united states. it looks as if horses were worth only five dollars a head, and men about half as much. there are too many that seem ready to sell themselves for nothing." he said that wearily and sadly, for he was at heart a true patriot and he believed himself to be doing his best to bring a better state of things out of all this anarchy and confusion. señora paez left the room. ned and the general lay down on the floor to sleep for awhile, and it was just when the first dim light of dawn was beginning to creep in at the narrow window that pablo came to awaken them. he put his finger on his lip as he did so, and they understood that there might be danger close at hand. it was not until they were out of the house, however, leaving it silently by way of the back door, that he ventured to whisper: "general, there is a guard already stationed in front. president paredes is making his last effort to stop his downfall, and he has heard that you are in the city. all your friends will be closely watched, to-day." "i wanted to say good-by to them," began ned, but here they were. "general, this is the jewel case," said señora paez, as she handed him a small rosewood box. "here is the money. now, señor carfora, be a brave fellow. learn all you can of our poor country. i hope to see you again." señora tassara was saying something in a very low voice to zuroaga, when felicia turned to ned and said to him: "you are a wicked gringo, but i like you pretty well and i do hope you will get away safely. take good care of yourself." "well, señorita," replied ned, "i will do that, and so must you. i'd rather be out among the mountains than here in the city. you'd be safer there, too. anyhow, you are not a mexican. you are a spaniard and you would rather be in spain." "maybe i would, just now," she told him with a very melancholy look in her brilliant black eyes. "but i do love mexico, and i do know enough to wish we were not to have any more revolutions. that is, not any more after paredes and santa anna and some other men have been killed." "that is the way they all feel about each other," broke in the general. "come, carfora. we have horses waiting for us on one of the back streets." there were a few hasty good-bys then. the three fugitives passed out of sight among the shadows of the buildings, and the women returned to the house to wait for the downfall of king or emperor paredes. chapter xiii. the revolution there had been a curious impression upon the minds of some american statesmen that general santa anna would return to his native country with a purpose of making peace. it was for that reason that he was permitted to pass unhindered through the blockading fleet in the gulf, but he had no such idea in his cunning and ambitious head. his real objects in returning were to take vengeance upon his enemies, to restore himself to the supreme power which he had lost by the revolution of 1840, and, for that purpose, to prosecute the war with the united states with all possible vigor. his personal feeling in that matter might have been understood by recalling the fact that his downfall had resulted from his severe defeat in attempting to conquer the earlier american settlers in texas. on his arrival in vera cruz, on the 16th of august, a proclamation which he at once issued, denouncing alike the monarchical ambition of president paredes and the wicked invasion of mexico by the armies of the northern republic, opened the eyes of all concerned. when, however, with all the troops at his disposal, he slowly approached the city of mexico, he put on a cloak of patriotic moderation. the existing government, consisting of vice-president bravo and the congress, had succeeded in imprisoning and then in banishing their would-be emperor, paredes. they now, as the returning exile drew near the capital, offered him a temporary dictatorship of the disordered national affairs, but he modestly replied that he did not desire so much. he had returned, he said, as a pure and unselfish patriot, only to serve his country. all that he would be willing to accept would be the absolute control of the army, as if any power worth speaking of might be supposed to remain outside of his bayonets and lances. this small request was readily granted, and from that hour onward he was, for the time being, more completely the dictator of mexico than he or any other man had ever been before. he entered the city and assumed command on the 15th of september. only a week later, on the 22d and 23d, the fall and surrender of monterey strengthened his hold upon the people, for it made them feel more keenly than ever their need of a good general. he certainly did act with great energy, for, as early as the 8th of october, he had advanced with his army as far north as san luis potosi, and was straining every possible resource to prepare for his coming conflict with general taylor. it is said that he even mortgaged his private property to obtain the money required for his military supplies. during all these weeks and months there had been stormy times in the congress of the united states, and the war of the politicians was by no means ended. general winfield scott, however, had been left at the head of the army, with authority to invade mexico in any manner he might choose, but with about half as many troops as he declared to be necessary for such an undertaking. it was late in december, 1846, when general scott in person arrived at the mouth of the rio grande and assumed the direction of military operations. as he did not propose any considerable further advance into mexico, except by way of vera cruz, he decided to take his best troops with him to that field of the coming campaign. this meant that general taylor was to lose nearly all his regular army men and officers, their places being filled, as to numbers, by new regiments of exceedingly brave but untried volunteers. he was therefore left to face, with raw troops, any intended onslaught of santa anna, who would bring with him several times as large a force, of all sorts, most of it composed of recent levies, imperfectly organized and disciplined. it remained to be seen which of the two kinds of men, the mexican indian or the american rifleman, could be the more rapidly changed into a trained soldier, fitted for a hard day's fight. throughout all the interior of mexico there was a fair degree of peace and order, although robber bands were reported here and there. no signs of a coming revolution appear to have been discovered, for nearly all the great leaders who might have set one on foot were either banished or shot, or were serving in santa anna's army, half hoping for his defeat and destruction that he might be taken out of the way of their ambitions. there came one cloudless day near the end of february, when a kind of cool and beautiful summer seemed to rule over all the fair land of anahuac, except among the snow-clad cordilleras. there were roses in bloom in many gardens of the city of mexico, and all things in and about the national capital wore an exceedingly peaceful air. the very guards at the citadel were pacing listlessly up and down, as if they were lazily aware that all evil-minded gringos and other foes of their comfort were several hundreds of miles away. at the city gates there were no sentries of any kind, and a young fellow who rode in on a spirited pony, at an hour or so after noon, was not questioned by anybody as to where he came from or what he was doing there. he cast sharp glances in all directions as he rode onward, but he seemed to have no need for inquiring his way. he went steadily, moreover, as if he might have business rather than pleasure on his hands, and he did not pull in his pony until he had reached the front of the paez mansion. there was no one on the piazza but a short, fat old woman, in a blazing red cotton gown, who sprang to her feet almost as if he had frightened her, exclaiming: "señor carfora!" "dola!" he responded, sharply. "don't say another loud word! are either of the señoras at home? i must see them right away." "oh, yes!" she said, turning to run into the house. "i will tell them. they are in the parlor, and the señorita." down sprang ned and hitched his pony to a post, but then he hurried through the front door as quickly as dola herself had done. perhaps it was well that he should get in without being recognized by too many eyes. he did not have to actually get into the parlor before he was welcomed, for a light form sprang out into the hall, and felicia herself shouted, eagerly: "oh, señor carfora! are you here? this is wonderful!" "señorita," he interrupted her, "i have letters for your mother and señora paez. where are they?" "they are right here," she said, "but we have letters, too. all the flags in the city are out and they are firing salutes of rejoicing." "i saw the flags," he said, "and i heard some firing, but what on earth are they rejoicing over? is there any news?" the two grown-up women were standing behind her, with faces in which there was no joy whatever when felicia exultingly told him: "why, have not you heard? general santa anna has beaten your gringo army all to pieces. the united states fleet is coming to vera cruz with another army, and the american soldiers will not dare to come on shore. all they can do will be to sit there in their ships and look at the city." "come in, señor carfora," said señora paez. "i cannot tell you how glad we are to see you. yes, we have very important letters. i may suppose that yours are from the general. please let me have them." "do, señor carfora!" said señora tassara. "i cannot wait a moment. we will retire to read them, and, while we are gone, felicia may tell you all the news from the great battle at the north." "yes, so i will," she exclaimed. "and i want him to tell me all about the places he has been in, and what he has been doing." in a moment more they two were alone in the parlor, and she was repeating to him the substance of santa anna's report of the manner in which, at the hard-fought battle of angostura, or buena vista, on the 22d of february, he had shattered the american army under general taylor. he had, he said, effectively prevented its further advance into mexico, and there was really a strong appearance of truth in his way of presenting the consequences of the battle, for the american army seemed to have retreated. horse after horse had been ridden to death in taking such great tidings to the city of mexico, and, for the hour, at least, the great mexican commander was more firmly fixed in supreme power than ever. of course, the triumphant bulletin did not make any mention of the fact that general taylor had had no intention of advancing any further, being under express orders from general scott not to do so, and that santa anna's well-planned and at first nearly successful attempt to crush the northern invaders had really proved a failure. ned crawford listened to felicia's enthusiastic account of the battle with a curious question in his mind which he was too polite to utter. "why," he thought, "if santa anna was so completely victorious, did he not make general taylor surrender?" there was no one to inform ned that the mexican commander had invited general taylor to do so before the fight was half over, and that the stubborn old american had unkindly refused the invitation. at this moment, however, the señorita's tongue began to busy itself with quite another matter. the united states fleet, under commodore connor, had, indeed, begun to arrive in front of vera cruz on the 18th of february, with a vast convoy of transport ships under its protection, having on board the army of general scott. neither ned nor the señorita was aware, however, how many important questions have to be answered before so many military passengers might undertake to land, with all their baggage, within possible reach of the artillery of an enemy. felicia, for her part, was positive that they all were too badly scared by the castle of san juan de ulua and by the bad news from buena vista to so much as try to make a landing. "general santa anna himself is now marching down to meet them," she told him, "with his whole victorious army, and he will crush them as fast as they can get out of their ships." owing to the grand reports from their army, this was precisely the idea which was forming in the minds of all the people of mexico. "oh, señorita felicia!" said ned, as if he were quite willing to change the subject. "i've had a wonderful time. i've been travelling, travelling, travelling, everywhere with the general." "tell me all about it!" she commanded him. "i want to know. it seems to me as if i had been shut up here and had not seen anybody." "well, i can't tell it all just now," he said, "but when we left here we hurried all the way to oaxaca. then we stayed there awhile, among his own people, and nobody gave us any trouble. no, i mustn't forget one thing, though. a band of those mountain robbers came one night, and we had an awful fight with them--" "did you kill any of them?" she asked, hastily. "they all ought to be killed. they are ready to murder anybody else." "well," said ned, "we beat them, and ten of them were shot. i was firing away all the while, but i don't know if i hit any of them. it was too dark to tell. the rest of them got away. but i've hunted deer, and i killed a good many of them. i shot a lynx, too, and a lot of other game. there's the best kind of fishing on the general's estates. i like fishing. then we went south, to the yucatan line, and i saw some queer old ruins. after that, the general's business took him away up north of oaxaca, and i went with him, and i saw half the states of mexico before we finished the trip. i've seen the silver mines and popocatepetl and istaccihuatl, and i don't care to ever see any higher mountains than they are." "i have seen popocatepetl," she said, "and it almost made me have the headache. they say it is full of sulphur, to make gunpowder with." before she could tell anything more about the possible uses of the tall, old volcano, her mother reëntered the parlor. "señor carfora," she said, "felicia will have to give you up. here are some letters for you that came while you were absent. you had better read them now, for i cannot say how long it will be best for you to remain here. step this way a moment, if you will." ned followed her, all in a sudden whirl of excitement at the unexpected prospect of hearing from his far-away home, but she still held his promised envelopes in her own hand, while she said to him: "my dear young friend, you know that colonel tassara is with his regiment. he was in the thickest of the fight at angostura. he was wounded, but he hopes to recover soon, and we have not told felicia. he writes me that it was really a lost battle, and that the fall of santa anna is surely coming, but that nobody can foretell what course he will take, cruel or otherwise, when he and his army return to fight with general scott, on the road from the sea to this city. go and read your letters, and then i will see you again." felicia had to give him up, and away he went. the best place to read home letters seemed to him to be the library, and when he entered the dim old room, he half imagined that the man in armor nodded at him, and tried to say how d'ye do. after that, ned almost forgot that he was in mexico, while he devoured the news from home. it was a grand thing to learn, too, that the letters which he had feared would never get to new york had all been carefully delivered under the kindly care of the british consular system. he had never before felt quite so high an admiration for the british empire as he acquired just then. "i'll do something good for the next englishman i get hold of!" he declared, with energy, and then he sat still and stared around the room. "it was just as well," he said, "that i did not stay here and try to read all those books. i read enough about the ancient times, too. what father wanted me to know about is mexico as it is now, and i've seen a great deal of it. what i want to see next is our army, and i'm going to find my way to vera cruz. then i'll get on board an american ship, somehow or other. i wonder if the mexican officers will manage to arrest me between this and the seacoast." that was a point worth thinking of, for general zuroaga had told him very plainly that some ignorant or overhasty patriot might easily find an excuse for calling him a spy, and having him shot at a moment's notice. he did not have a long time to consider that matter, however, for the door opened, and the two señoras walked in, with clouded faces. "señor carfora," said señora tassara, "you will have no time to lose. general zuroaga is right, and his letter must go at once to his friend, general morales, who is now in command at vera cruz. so must one from my own husband. it is important, for the best interest of mexico, that morales should know the whole truth. that is, he must be informed that he cannot expect any help from santa anna's beaten army. are you too tired to set out immediately? i can give you a fresh horse." "i'll go!" exclaimed ned. "my pony isn't tired. he is a first-rate traveller. i want something to eat, though, and i wish i knew whether or not the army patrols will stop me on the way." "i can take care of that," said señora paez. "i have had to send special messengers before this. you will be able to show a government pass." as she spoke, she held out to him a sealed envelope. where or how she had obtained such a thing, she did not explain, but it was an official envelope, and on it was a printed lettering which might have been translated: "government business. from the headquarters of the army. despatches from his excellency, general bravo." in her own handwriting was added, moreover: "to his excellency, general morales, vera cruz." "there!" she said. "if it becomes necessary, show that, and any man hindering you will be promptly punished. do not show it if you can help it, however, for there are many kinds of army officers nowadays." "i have seen some of them," said ned, but what he was really thinking about most seriously, at that moment, was the supper he had asked for, and he was well pleased to be led down into the dining-room. chapter xiv. the despatch-bearer there are hills to climb, on the crooked highway from the city of mexico to the sea, but the greater part of the distance is down, down, down, for its highest point is over seven thousand feet above tidewater. it was in a pass leading over this ridge that ned crawford looked around him, up and down and ahead, and exclaimed, as well as his chattering teeth would let him: "well, i'm glad there are no snow-drifts in my way. i suppose the army men look out for that. but don't i wish i had an overcoat and some furs! old mount orizaba can get up a first-class winter on his own account." it looked like it, and this part of his experiences had not been at all provided for. the cordillera was very white, and its garment of snow and ice went down nearer to its feet than when ned had first seen it. moreover, the pony which had travelled so well when he cantered away from the paez mansion, some days before, was showing signs of exhaustion, and it was manifestly well for him that he was now going down instead of climbing. so it was for ned, and his uppermost wish was to hurry down into a more summery climate. he was still doing so, to the best of his shivering ability, two hours later, when a loud summons to halt sounded in the road before him. "whoop!" shouted ned, and the soldier, who had presented his bayonet so sternly, was greeted as if he had been an old friend. rapid explanations followed, in spanish, but before they were completed an officer had made his appearance from a small but comfortable guard-house at the side of the road. he was only a lieutenant, and he appeared to gaze with more than a little awe upon the superscription of ned's precious government envelope. he turned it over and over, and almost smelled of it. "señor carfora!" he exclaimed. "this must not be delayed for a moment! you must ride on, if it kills you. come in and get a dinner. we will give you a fresh mount. tell us the news while you are eating." "i will do so," replied ned, with a tremendous effort to stop shivering and look important. "but i will say that i was told that any man interfering with that despatch would be shot in one hour." "beyond a doubt!" declared the lieutenant, with emphasis. "it would serve him right, too. this is no time for trifling with orders." a hearty dinner by a blazing log fire made the despatch-bearer feel a great deal better, but at the end of it no mercy was shown him. his fresh pony was ready, and he was ordered to mount and ride. he did so without offering any objections, and he carried with him the lieutenant's written pass, for possible use further down the mountain. it was a good thing to have, but he was called upon to present it only twice, receiving in each instance positive instructions to push onward if it killed him and his new pony. "i can't stand this much longer!" he exclaimed, as the sun was setting. "i'm almost beyond the snow-line. i think i'll disobey the guards a little, but i'll keep on obeying señora paez. she told me on no account to try to sleep in a large town or village. they are all military posts, and too many questions might be asked. i'll try a hacienda, just as i did on the other side of the mountains. everybody wants to hear the news." everybody in that region was also genuinely hospitable, and it was barely dusk when ned rode in at the gate of a substantial farmhouse, to be welcomed with the utmost cordiality. men, women, and children crowded eagerly around him, to hear all he could tell them of the great battle and victory of angostura, and of the current doings in the capital city. a warm bed was given him, and after a long sleep he awoke somewhat better fitted for whatever else might be before him. once more he pushed on, but before noon of that day all signs of winter were far behind him. he had passed through more than one considerable village, but so had other travellers, coming or going, who bore about them no appearance of being worth the attention of the military authorities. another and another night in wayside farmhouses compelled him to admire more than ever the simple ways and the sincere patriotism of the mexican farmers. all the while, however, his anxieties concerning the result of his perilous errand were growing upon him, and he was obediently using up his army pony. it was the forenoon of the third day before he was aroused from his other thoughts into anything like enthusiasm for the exceeding beauty of the luxuriant vegetation on either side of the road. "leaves! flowers! grass!" he exclaimed. "oh, how beautiful they all are! summer here, and winter only a few miles away. hurrah for the _tierra caliente_! it's a bully place at this time o' year." at all events, it was a pleasanter place to be in than any icy pass among the mexican sierras, and his thoughts were at liberty to come back to his present situation. he was not now upon the cordoba road, by which he had left the gulf coast ever so long ago. this was the highway from the city of jalapa. he was cantering along only a short distance from the seashore, and he was within a few miles of the gates of vera cruz. "i remember them," he was thinking. "i never had a good chance for a look at the walls, but i suppose i shall have one pretty soon. i wonder if they are thick enough to stop a cannon-ball. captain kemp told me they were built all around the city, but he didn't say how high they are." walls there were, indeed, but their masonry was not the next thing that was to be of especial interest to ned. there is no kind of stonework which can compare, under certain circumstances, with the point of a lance or the edge of a machete, and the bearers of a number of such weapons were to be seen coming toward him at a gallop. "it looks like a whole company of lancers!" exclaimed the anxious despatch-carrier. "now i'm in for it! everybody i met on the way was civil enough, but these may be a different kind of fellows." whether they were or not, the whole force under general morales was in a state of unusual excitement that day, for the report was going around that the american army brought by commodore connor's fleet was rapidly coming ashore near sacrificios island, only three miles south of vera cruz. if ned himself had been aware of it, he might have changed his plans and ridden right in among his own friends. as it was, however, in less than three minutes he had cantered in among a swarm of angry mexicans and glittering spear-points. their state of discipline was witnessed to by the fact that the captain in nominal command of them had some difficulty in obtaining from them permission to ask his own questions of this newcomer. when at last he succeeded in doing so, without first having his captive run through by a lance, it shortly looked as if ned had been learning diplomacy, if not strategy also, during his varied and wonderful mexican experiences. "señor captain," he said, quite coolly, pulling out his official envelope, "i am ordered to deliver this to general morales in person. i am commanded to answer no questions. any man daring to hinder the delivery of my despatches will be shot. they are important." "where are you from?" came savagely back. ned only pointed at the envelope and shut his mouth hard. "what is your errand to general morales?" ned's brain was working with tremendous rapidity just then, and one of his swift thoughts got away from him. "captain," he said, "you had better ask that question of his excellency, general antonio lopez de santa anna." the officer's swarthy face turned pale for a moment, and all the men who had heard ned's reply broke out into loud vivas for their great commander-in-chief, the illustrious victor of the bloody field of angostura. the entire company became at once the zealous guardians of that sacred envelope, which so few of them could have read, and the captain was forced to restrain his curiosity, and allow ned to continue, keeping his mouth closed. for all that, however, the despatch-bearer was still a prisoner, and was to be conducted as such to the presence of general morales. the lancers turned their horses toward the city, and the gates were reached as quickly as ned's tired pony could carry him. at this barrier, of course, there were other guards and officers of higher rank, and there might have been further delay, or even danger, if ned had not promptly exhibited the magical envelope, while the captain himself repeated his own words for him, and curtly added: "his excellency, general bravo! viva morales! viva santa anna!" that last word sealed the matter. the envelope was returned to its bearer, and he was conducted onward under the care of two colonels, several other officials, and a half-dozen of watchful lancers. ned shortly understood that general morales had returned from the castle of san juan de ulua to go out for a telescopic inspection of the american landing, and was now at his headquarters in the city. "i guess i shall feel better after i get to him," thought ned, as he and his excited party halted before the headquarters building. "i may get stuck with a machete yet, if i have to wait long out here." he was neither to be delayed nor slaughtered, and in a few minutes more he was ushered into a handsomely furnished chamber, where the general was sitting, apparently entirely calm and self-possessed, surrounded by his staff and a throng of other important men, soldiers and civilians. he did not say a word while a colonel of the escort was delivering his report concerning this messenger, but he was all the while sharply scrutinizing ned from head to foot. "gentlemen," he then said to those around him, "this may be something of extraordinary importance. come with me, carfora!" he arose from his chair, and ned silently followed him into another room. as soon as they were shut in here by themselves, he turned fiercely upon the young despatch-bearer and demanded: "have you said anything to those men? have you told a living soul what you know about these tidings?" "no, general, not one word to anybody," replied ned, bravely, but there was a strange thrill at his heart, for he saw that he was in deadly peril. morales tore open the envelope, and found in it several official-looking papers which it did not take him long to read; but now ned took out from an inner pocket three others which were much smaller. the general's face flushed fiery red, and his eyes were flashing with excitement while he swiftly examined them. "carfora," he exclaimed, "you are too young to have been sent on such an errand as this. general bravo! colonel tassara! señora paez! general zuroaga! ah, santa maria! and our brave army was shattered at angostura, after all. this is dreadful news! you shall die before i will allow you to spread it among my men!" "i shall not do so," said ned, with his heart in his throat "but may i not tell them that general santa anna has checked the invasion at the north? ought i not to say that he is now marching down to defend the capital, and that he is going to strengthen your army at vera cruz? why, general, that is just what he is going to do." the general was silent for a moment, and appeared to be lost in thought. "no, not now!" he then whispered between his set teeth, but ned heard him. "if i shot him, it would make enemies of zuroaga and the tassaras and señora paez. bravo would not care. carfora," he added, aloud, "you may go. you may talk as you have said, but you must not leave the city, and, if you say one word about our being defeated at buena vista, i will have you shot. there are too many desertions already, and i can't afford to have my whole army stampeded by bad news." there was, therefore, an imperative military reason for keeping secret the truth concerning santa anna's great victory, and ned responded: "general morales, everybody will be asking me questions. i guess i know exactly what you wish me to tell. i was ordered to keep my mouth shut." "see that you do!" growled the general. "or a musket-ball will shut it for you. go out now. if i want you, i shall be able to find you." they walked out of the inner room together, and they found the main office crowded, as if many more had hurried in to hear the expected news. "gentlemen! fellow citizens!" shouted the general, enthusiastically, as he waved his packet of despatches over his head. "this is glorious! our illustrious commander-in-chief, after having given such a severe lesson to our barbarous invaders at the north, is marching with his entire force to our own assistance. he will soon crush our assailants on the seacoast as he has the gringo mob under taylor!" a storm of cheers responded, and the entire crowd seemed disposed to exchange hugs and handshakes, while he turned to an officer at a table. "by the way, major," he said, "write an order for quarters and rations for general bravo's messenger, carfora. i may need him again in a few days. keep track of him. he is a civilian, but he is a trusted agent of certain parties whom you may know." the major began to write something, and, as he did so, ned believed that he heard him muttering words which sounded like: "humph! messenger of his excellency, santa anna! we will take good care of him!" then the general carelessly signed the paper, which the major prepared for him, and ned walked quietly out into the open air. once there, however, he took a hasty look at his "order for rations," and discovered that with it he had now in his possession a full headquarters army pass, which permitted him to come and go anywhere, through the gates and all the lines, without hindrance from anybody. he was established as an accepted and even honored confidential despatch-bearer of the commander-in-chief of all the armies of mexico. he was not now to get entirely away without difficulty, however, for the whole building had been full of men who were eager for all the news he could give them, and they had followed him. they seized upon him as if he had been the last edition of an evening newspaper, containing the reports of all the past and with, probably, the news for to-morrow morning also somewhere inside of him. he did not get away from them for some time, and when he did so, at last, he was sure of being recognized by a considerable number of patriotic mexicans, if they ever should meet him again. that might make him safer, although he was no longer in any immediate danger. moreover, although he was not in uniform, the cut and quality of his clothing informed every person he met that he belonged to the higher orders, while the machete at his side and the pistols in his belt appeared to indicate that he was in some way connected with the army. "i know what i want to do next," he was thinking. "my pony and my satchel are at the headquarters stables. i can get them whenever i want them. i must go to the tassara place. i can find it. then i must manage to put them there, so that i won't have to show myself at the headquarters unless i'm sent for." he had no difficulty in finding the tassara homestead, and there was no observer anywhere near him when he stood in front of the dwelling which had been his first hospitable refuge in mexico. it had now, of course, a lonely and shut-up look, and there was no getting in at the front door, for much knocking failed to bring a door-keeper. giving that up, therefore, he made his way around to the rear, through the unoccupied stables. "there is hay enough here for my pony," he remarked, "but i had half expected that the house would be turned into quarters for troops." he may have overlooked the fact that the tassaras were friends of general morales, and that their house was under his protection. if it were supposed to be so, nevertheless, he had cause to forget it again when he came to the back door, for it stood wide open, with an appearance of having been unlocked with a hammer. "hullo!" he exclaimed. "i wonder if there is anybody in there now?" the thought somehow made him draw his machete, and he went on into the house as if he were looking for a fight. the dining-room was entered first, and it was utterly empty. not so much as a chair was left, although its owners had certainly not taken any furniture away with them in their hasty escape by night, with ned and zuroaga. it looked a little queer, to say the least, and, as he went on from room to room, he found precisely such a state of things everywhere else. "i declare!" said ned. "either their friends or some robbers have cleaned this place of all there was in it that was worth stealing. not so much as a bed left. i'll go and take a look at my old room. it was a cubby-hole of a place, but it would do first-rate for me now." perhaps it was so small and so out of the way that ned had an agreeable surprise ready for him when he reached it, for there still hung his hammock, and nothing else in the room had been molested. "hurrah!" he shouted. "i've looked into every other room in the house, and this is the only one they didn't finish. i guess i'll camp here to-night, after i've been out to get something to eat." it was true that he had orders for army rations, if he had known where to find them, but he was also able to purchase whatever he might need, and he preferred to do so. at the same time, he had a clear understanding that, if he expected to ever see the united states again, he had better not show a great deal of cash in the city of vera cruz just now. "there are plenty of fellows here," he remarked, "who would cut my throat for a silver dollar, let alone a gold piece." he sheathed his machete peaceably, and went out by the back door, determining to let as few people as possible suspect that the tassara mansion contained a boarder,--or it was more nearly correct to say lodger. this was a wise decision to make, but he was not to hunt far for his supplies that evening. hardly had he gone a hundred paces from the tassara place before he was unceremoniously halted, and it was not by a lancer this time. before him, blocking his way, stood a very fat and apparently much astonished woman. "madre de dios!" she loudly exclaimed. "señor carfora! santa maria! santa catarina! san jago! diablos! where did you come from?" ned had never before heard himself called by all those pet names, but he knew at a glance that this was no other than anita, formerly the cook of señora tassara, and believed to be a devoted friend of the family. "anita!" he exclaimed. "i'll tell you!" and he proceeded to do so, to her great gratification, for she was as hungry for news as he was for his rations. "you come to my house," she said, "and i will give you something fit to eat, and that is a good deal to say in vera cruz in these days. santa maria! how these ragged banditti do devour everything. we are to be devoured by the accursed gringos, too, and we must eat while we can." her idea, as a good cook, appeared to be that, if several thousands of people were about to be shut up and starved to death, they ought all to feed themselves as liberally as possible before the actual process of starvation should begin. ned felt a strong sympathy with that notion, as he walked along with her, and he was ready to tell her anything but the perilous truth concerning the lost battle at the north. as to that, it was quite enough to assure her and half a dozen other patriotic mexican women, who were at her humble home when he went in, that the great and successful general santa anna was hastening to rescue them from the american barbarians who were at this hour getting ashore with a great deal of difficulty through the surf, which was wetting every uniform among them. if anything at all resembling a "norther" had been blowing, the landing would necessarily have been postponed until it had blown over. among other things, however, ned told anita of his visit to the house, and when the very good supper was ended, she led him to a room which must have contained at least a third of all the space under her roof. it was anything but hollow space now, for it was heaped to the ceiling with furniture, beds, bedding, and a miscellaneous collection of other household goods. "there, señor carfora!" she said, exultingly. "the puebla robbers did get some things, but we saved all these. they were not ready to carry off heavy stuff, and when they came again, with a cart, at night, it had all been cared for. the señora has not lost so much, after all." "you are a faithful woman!" said ned, admiringly. "i'm glad, too, that they could not steal the house, for i want to sleep there." "it's the best place you can find," she told him. "but you had better always bar the door at night, and sleep with your machete and pistols where you can reach them." chapter xv. under fire "where am i?" exclaimed ned, as his eyes came lazily open the next morning, and in a moment more they were open very widely. he knew the room he was in, and his thoughts came swiftly back to him. there hung his sheathed machete at the head of the hammock, and his pistols lay at his side. there was as yet only just enough light to see them by, but he sprang out and began to get ready for his first day in a besieged city. his satchel and pony, he remarked, would be safe enough at headquarters, and he could go after them whenever he might need them. "i'll go to anita's for breakfast," he added. "i can pay her for it, too. then i want to see the american fleet, if i can. oh, but am i not glad that general zuroaga gave me that old telescope? i've seen lots of mountains with it, and now i'll make it show me the ships and the army. oh, my soul and body! i'm part of the garrison of vera cruz." that was stretching the facts of the case a little, but he certainly was serving under the wrong flag that morning. he felt queer and lonely in that empty, robber-haunted house, and he was glad to get out of it without being seen. anita welcomed him enthusiastically, for he had brought to her and her neighbors the good news of the coming of santa anna's victorious army, and he was a young mexican patriot for whom she was glad to cook a good breakfast for a fair price. after that was eaten, however, ned's perplexities began, for the first mexican officer whom he met, on leaving anita's house, curtly demanded a look at his papers. he was altogether too well dressed a fellow to be allowed to pass by unnoticed. with almost a fainting heart, ned produced the pass given him by the major at headquarters, but the next moment the brave soldier's arms were around him, and he was hugged as a true comrade who had ridden hard and far to bring good tidings. "i will show you the gates myself!" exclaimed the lieutenant, for such he was. "i shall be in command of a patrol that is going out toward sacrificios for a look at the gringos. come on with me." this was precisely what ned was wishing for, and, as they hurried along, he was pumped for all the news he had and a good deal more. in fact, he found it a task of some difficulty to obey the stern commands of general morales and still keep within the truth. a gate was reached and passed, the officer at the gate receiving a kind of pay in news, and then ned drew a long breath, for he suddenly remembered that he had left the city, contrary to orders. "never mind," he said to himself, "i'm inside the mexican army lines." in a moment more, he had forgotten everything but his spy-glass, a pretty good one, for he and the squad of patrollers were at the summit of a low sand-hill, and there before them, only two miles away, the boats of the ships of war and the transport ships were coming and going through the surf with loads of american soldiers. with them, and on all the vessels in the offing, ned saw something which had never before seemed to shine so splendidly, and it brought the hot blood fiercely from his heart to his cheeks, because he could not just then break out into a hurrah for the stars and stripes. the hurrah did get up into his throat, but there it had to stop, and it almost choked him. his prudence got the better of it, somehow, and his next thought was: "oh, but won't they have a tough time getting their cannon ashore!" he was not so far wrong, for that was a problem which was troubling general scott and his engineers, but there was one thing more which ned did not so much as dream of. in one of those boats a tall man, who was not in uniform, was leaning forward and gazing earnestly at the shore. "mexico!" he muttered. "ned is in there somewhere. i must have a hunt for him as soon as i can. i wonder if i did right to ever let him go. even after we take vera cruz, there will be a long campaign and any amount of hard fighting. o ned, my son, where are you?" ned was there, indeed, very near and yet very far, and he was wondering, as were many american officers and soldiers, why the mexicans did not cannonade the invading army while it was coming ashore. they might have done so effectively, and in a day or two they did put a few guns in position to send an occasional shot, but all the harm they did was to kill one man. the patrol party had now performed its duty, and it marched back again, but in that morning adventure ned had discovered that he was really free to come and go. perhaps the mexican commander had forgotten him in the pressure of his other affairs. even when ned went to the headquarters for his pony and baggage, he was treated by everybody as a young fellow of no importance whatever, and at dinnertime he was able to tell anita all about the terrible ships and the swarms of invading gringos on the shore. that night the lonely room in the tassara house was almost too lonely. ned lay awake in his hammock through long hours, and was glad that he had two armies to think of, so that he might keep from listening for possible footsteps outside of his little chamber, or for an attempt by some marauder to force open his door. he had barred that, and he had fastened his window firmly, but he could not feel entirely secure, and he got up twice to go to the door and listen. day after day went by from that time in very much the same manner, and ned believed that he was learning a great deal about war, whether or not it would ever do him any good in business affairs after the war had come to an end. the entire american army, guns and all, reached the shore in safety, and all the while santa anna and his army were reported as coming, coming, but they did not come, and the hearts of the besieged garrison and the terror-stricken people began to die within them. "they will be too late now," thought ned, but he did not dare to say as much to any of his mexican friends. from time to time he had been out to ply his telescope upon the fleet and upon the army. he knew that all the american camps had been established beyond the reach of any guns in the city fortifications, and he had watched with intense interest the slow, sure processes of a regular siege, conducted by a rarely capable general. he had seen the erection of battery after battery, of which general scott's artillerymen were as yet making hardly any apparent use. he did not quite understand that, in merely being there, more and more of them, those batteries were already capturing the city. they were sending so few shots at the walls, or even at the grim castle of san juan de ulua, because the american general wished to take vera cruz without bloodshed, if he could, and he came very near to the accomplishment of his humane purpose. undoubtedly, he would have succeeded in starving out the city, if he, too, had not received daily notice of the nearer approach of santa anna and all the forces which he could gather. nobody but that general himself and his confidential officers knew how really few they were, or how unfit to assail the americans in their fortified camps on the shore of the sea. so, a final day came when the surrender of vera cruz was formally demanded, under the awful penalty of a general bombardment by the american fleet and army in case of a refusal. resistance, it was declared, was now hopeless, and there was no military necessity for killing anybody. general morales sent back a positive rejection, for he still entertained a faint hope of the timely arrival of assistance, and he did not inform general scott how sadly he had failed in all his attempts to obtain supplies for the inhabitants and his army. famine was already beginning to threaten all of the poorer classes who had neglected their opportunities to leave the city, or who had been unable to do so. as for ned crawford's provisions, he had continued to board with anita, or with any mess of military men among whom he might happen to be. he had made many acquaintances, and he had found the ragged, unpaid, illiterate mexican soldiers a genuinely hospitable lot of patriotic fellows. he came to his supper somewhat late on the evening of march 21st, and that night, after going to care for his pony, he came back and slept on a blanket on the floor of anita's kitchen. on the morning of the 22d, he had but just walked out into the street when suddenly all the air around him seemed to be full of thunder. roar followed roar, and peal followed peal, and then he heard affrighted shrieks in all directions. the bombardment had begun! "o madre de dios!" moaned the voice of poor anita behind him. "o señor carfora! we shall all be killed! what shall we do? oh, the wicked gringos! what did they come here for? i never did them any harm." that was a terrible war question which was troubling ned himself. whatever might have been the evil doings of either of the two governments, or of all the scheming, ambitious politicians, the helpless people of mexico were in no manner to blame. why, then, he asked himself, should any of them, like anita, for instance, be killed by cannon-shot or torn in pieces by bursting shells? he could not settle the matter in his mind just then, but he said to her, encouragingly: "don't be so badly scared. up here in this northern part of the town, we are as far away from the shooting as we could be. i'll go over to the southern side of the city and see what is going on. as soon as i find out, i'll come back and tell you." "oh, do!" she said, "but do not get killed. come back and get some dinner. i will cook you a real good one, if you will." that was something of a promise, for he knew that she was one of the prudent folk who had looked out for their supplies in time, but he walked away toward the southerly wall and the forts with a strong feeling that he must be in the middle of a kind of dreadful dream. he reached the line of antiquated and defective defences, which had been good enough long ago, but which were not constructed to resist modern artillery. old as it might be, the wall was in the way of his intended sightseeing, but he saw a ladder leaning against the masonry, and up he went without asking permission of anybody. he was now standing upon the broad parapet, with his glass at his eye, and he was obtaining a first-rate view of the bombardment. on the land, stretching away to the west and south, were the long lines of the american batteries, within a not very long range of him, and from each of them at intervals the red sheets of fire burst forth, while over them the black clouds of powder smoke arose to be carried away by the brisk march wind that was blowing. far away to his right, or seaward, all at anchor in the positions assigned them, lay the united states ships of war, of all kinds and sizes, and these, too, were getting at work, although they were as yet by no means putting forth their whole destructive power. it was as if they were but studying this siege business, getting the ranges correctly, and were preparing to do worse things than this in the days which were to come. ned was gazing intently at a great 44-gun ship, which appeared to be sending her missiles at the castle, when a heavy shot from one of the batteries struck the wall within a few yards of him. it seemed to go deeply in, and the entire top of the parapet was torn away for a width of several feet. ned hurried at once to get a good look down into the chasm, for it was the first time that he had seen anything of the kind. "i wonder if our shot are doing this kind of thing for their batteries yonder," he said aloud, in the spanish which was now habitual with him, but at that moment a not unfriendly hand was laid upon his shoulder, and a quiet, firm voice said to him: "what are you doing here, señor carfora? you seem to have no fear." "general morales!" exclaimed ned, in astonishment. "no, your excellency. i was not thinking of that, but of this big hole. i was wondering if the walls of the castle are not stronger than these. if they are not--" "they are much stronger, my brave fellow," interrupted the general. "i am going over now to see how they are standing it. the americans are very accurate gunners. now, sir, you must not expose yourself in this manner. you are not a soldier. go back into the city!" "general," said ned, pointing in the direction of the cathedral, "do, please, look! some of their shot go over the wall and strike away inside. i am safer here than i would be in yonder. what i am afraid of is that a great many of the women and children may be killed. i think, sir, that you ought not to be here, either. you are the general." "my boy," said morales, sadly, "i was thinking of the non-combatants myself. this firing of the yankees at the city is hideous. but it is war, and it cannot be helped. ah, me! feeling as i do this morning, i would ask nothing better than that one of these accursed shot or shell should come for me. i would a hundred times rather die than be compelled to surrender vera cruz." he again motioned ned toward the ladder, and no disobedience was possible. he himself followed, for his solitary reconnoissance was ended, and he had been practically assured that his walls were of small value against heavy siege-guns. when he reached the ground, several subordinate officers came to join him, and ned heard him say to them: "that reckless young scamp, carfora, has the nerves of an old soldier. he will make a good one by and by. we need more like him, for some of our artillerymen left their guns under the american fire." there was never any lack of courage among men of his kind, a spaniard descended from the old conquistadors, while some of the officers around him were indians fit to have led their tribes for montezuma against the men of hernando cortes. as ned walked homeward, he halted several times to tell some of his army acquaintances what he had seen from the wall, and how he had talked about it with general morales. no doubt they esteemed him more highly than ever for his patriotism and high social standing, but he spoke also of the danger to the people, and they were sure that his heart was with them. truth to tell, so it was, for the bombardment shortly became to him more horrible than ever. something he could not see passed over his head, with a hiss that was almost like a human screech. then followed a loud explosion, and there before him, on the bloody pavement, he saw the mangled corpses of a mexican mother and two small children, who had been killed while they were hurrying away to a place of safety. "oh, the poor things!" sobbed ned, as he burst out into tears. "what had they to do with the war!" he could not bear to take a second look at them, and he hurried on, but when he reached the house he did not say anything about them to anita. he told her about the batteries and the ships, and about the brave general on the parapet, and then she and her friends who were with her went away back into the kitchen, to be as safe as possible from flying shot and shell. it was not, they appeared to think, at all likely that any wicked gringo gunner would take aim at that kitchen. as for ned, he had only come in to go out again, for keeping indoors, with all that cannonading going on, was altogether out of the question. chapter xvi. general scott and his army "there they come! they are going to march right in! but what i want, most of all, is to see the general himself. there he is!" telescope in hand, ned crawford was standing on the parapet, near one of the southerly gates of vera cruz, watching the triumphant entrance of the american army. he could hardly have told whether he was more glad to see them come, or because the siege and the bombardment were over. he was already familiar with the various troops of mexico, and he knew that some of them, but not many, could perform their military evolutions in pretty good style. the one thing which struck him most forcibly now, however, as his glass was aimed here and there over the approaching columns and lines, was that at no point was there a flaw or a defect in the orderly movements of the american soldiers. with admirable drill and under perfect management, they swung forward across the broad level between their earthwork batteries and the badly shattered wall of the captured city. compared with them, the garrison which had surrendered was, for the greater part, only a little better than an ill-provided, half-armed, undisciplined mob. wealth, arms, civilization, scientific generalship, had all been on the side of the great republic of the north, and there had been no doubt, from the beginning, as to what the result must be. the one important seaport of mexico, with all its foreign commerce, was now under the control of the united states, and could not be taken from them. ned saw one of the advancing lines melt beautifully into the shape of a long column, and file through the gate near him. then followed a section of field artillery and a small detachment of cavalry. all these were to be admired, of course, but his eyes watched them only for a moment, for just behind the horsemen came an exceedingly brilliant cavalcade, in front of which rode the remarkable man whom ned was most anxious to see. beyond a doubt, general winfield scott had many severe critics and not a few personal enemies. by these, he was said to be arrogant, blunt in manners, opinionated, and also a military martinet with terribly unvolunteer ideas relating to the rigid discipline required for success in war. he had seen, however, a deal of hard service in the war of 1812 and otherwise, and his military record was without a flaw. there were good judges, both in america and europe, who believed and declared that for the management of a difficult campaign he had no superior among the generals then living. he was now actually called upon to prove that he could perform apparent impossibilities under very trying circumstances and with somewhat limited resources. physically, he was a large, fine-looking man, and he was even excessively particular concerning the fit and elegance of his parade uniform. he was therefore looking his best when he rode in to take possession of vera cruz. ned went down a ladder as soon as he could, after breathlessly staring at the great commander, but he did not succeed in witnessing the formalities of the surrender, whatever they were. the crowds in his way were too much for him, but not long after general scott and his staff disappeared through the portal of the building which had been the headquarters of poor general morales, ned worked his way through a throng of downcast mexicans toward a young officer who appeared to be in command of about a half company of infantry. from the excitement of the moment and from a good many months of daily custom, he spoke to the lieutenant in mexican spanish, in a recklessly eager manner and without touching his hat. "what on earth do you want?" was the curt and gruff reply. "i'm only lieutenant grant. you'll have to see somebody else, whatever it is. you had better go and speak to one of the staff." if ned had really been a young mexican, speaking no tongue but his own, he might not have understood that perfectly. as it was, however, he at once broke out with energy into a language to which he had for some time been unaccustomed. even now, nevertheless, he forgot to touch his hat. "well, mr. grant," he said, "i've been all over the country. i've been in the city of mexico and among their troops, and i believe i know a lot of things that i ought to report to general scott, or somebody." it was a patriotic idea which had been growing in his mind all that morning, and it had driven out of him every ounce of bashfulness. "you have, have you?" said grant. "i declare. seems to me you speak english pretty well for a greaser--almost like a born american. i guess the general's willing to hear almost anything. but you will have to see some member of the staff. hullo! i say! captain lee! here's a kind of spy. i think you'd better hear him. i can't leave my post." "spy?" exclaimed ned. "no, i'm not any such thing, but my name is edward crawford, and i'm from new york. i got stuck in mexico and i couldn't get out. i've been all around everywhere. things are mixed--" "grant," said captain lee, "he may have something worth while. i'll take him in to see schuyler hamilton. let the captain pump him." captain robert e. lee was not exactly off duty at that hour, for he and other engineer officers had been ordered to make a survey of the fortifications, but he was there to receive instructions and he could take ned in with him. he was a taller, handsomer fellow than grant, and he was all of three times as polite in his treatment of ned. perhaps, however, grant's first manners had been damaged by being addressed in such a style, in spanish, by an excited young mexican. in went ned and lee, and there was no difficulty in obtaining an interview with captain hamilton. ned had never heard of him before, but he was now aware, from captain lee, that he was a descendant of general philip schuyler and general alexander hamilton of the revolutionary war. ned thought of señora tassara's great ancestors for a moment, and then he did not really care a cent for pedigree. he even startled hamilton himself by the energy and rapidity with which he told what he knew of the condition of things throughout the country, the movements of santa anna, and the political plots and conspiracies. hamilton was a slender, graceful young man, handsomer than even lee, and with piercing black eyes. "lee," he said, "the cub is a genuine curiosity. i can't imagine how on earth he learned so much. he isn't a fool, by any means. general scott will be at liberty in a few minutes, and crawford must see him." "all right," said lee. "i have my instructions now, and i'll leave him with you. they say the old castle's badly knocked in pieces." if, as lee intimated, the fortress of san juan de ulua was just then in bad condition, so was ned when he heard what they were going to do with him. he had supposed that his errand had been completely done to the sharp-eyed staff officer, but now they threatened to bring him before the general, whom he considered the most tremendous man on the earth. it was a little too much, but he drew a long breath and stood as straight as a ramrod, looking very red indeed. in three minutes more he was brought face to face with the commander-in-chief of the armies of the united states, and he felt as if he had been surrounded and compelled to surrender. captain hamilton reported the matter in the fewest words possible, but all the while the general had been watching ned, looking right through him, and in a moment ned found himself feeling perfectly easy. if general scott had been his uncle, he could not have spoken to him in a kinder or more carelessly familiar way. he questioned him about all his experiences, and an acute listener might have gathered that he paid more attention to ned's political information than to anything of a strictly military nature. "hamilton," he slowly remarked, at last, "general taylor did an exceedingly good thing for us down here, after all. the battle of buena vista was our own battle. santa anna will not be able to raise another army like the one that was so roughly handled up there. if it had been here, in good shape, we would have had ten times as much trouble in taking vera cruz. santa anna's power is already half broken." "perhaps a little more," suggested hamilton. "perhaps," said the general, "but our patriotic young friend here has made a valuable report. ah, mcclellan! you and beauregard are to make the inspection of the castle with captain lee. take crawford back to grant, as you go. he may serve with the seventh as an unenlisted man. let him have his orders, hamilton. he is a brave fellow." out went ned with a pair of as yet undistinguished officers, both of whom were to be heard of again in after time, and it did not occur to the very much elated "scout," as he now considered himself, to correct general scott's apparent idea that lieutenant ulysses s. grant was a particular friend and guardian of his. "now, if this isn't bully!" he thought. "i've been on the mexican side all the while till now. i've been kind of part of the garrison of vera cruz, but i've been praised by general scott, for all that. i wonder what our folks at home would say to it!" it was a grand thing to think of, and ned felt as proud as if he had been promoted for storming an enemy's entrenchments. there was another experience of an entirely unexpected character just before him, however. hardly had mcclellan and beauregard turned him over to grant, and while the latter was inspecting the order written by captain hamilton, ned was suddenly shaken from head to foot. not that anybody, mexican or american, was actually handling him roughly, but that a hoarse, eager voice at his right ear exclaimed: "edward! my son! is this you? are you a prisoner?" "no, mister," responded grant, before ned could gather his wits to utter a word. "he isn't a prisoner, but i'm ordered to stick him into the outside of the seventh somewhere. is he your son?" "he is, lieutenant," said mr. crawford. "and, oh, how glad i am!" "father!" ned had shouted, as a pair of strong arms went around him. "how did you happen to be here?" "i came on one of our own supply-ships," said mr. crawford. "i'll tell you all about it by and by. i had all but given up hearing anything of you, and we sail for new york to-morrow. lieutenant, i haven't seen him for more'n a year. i want a good long talk." "of course you do!" said grant, heartily. "take him along, and let him report at the camp of the seventh to-morrow morning. you may go now, my young greaser, but you'd better get on another rig than that before you come." "he will do that," said mr. crawford. "come along, ned. let's go where we can be by ourselves. i want to hear your whole yarn, from beginning to end, and i've all sorts of things to tell you." "father," said ned, "i know just the place. we'll go and get supper at old anita's, and we can talk all the way. hurrah! how's mother?" all the most important home news followed quickly after that, and ned felt that the capture of vera cruz was more important than ever. "i am going to let you stay here, though," said his father. "you can learn more than in any other way that i know of." "that's what i want," said ned. "and now i shall be in our army." the father and son were not walking very fast, but they could talk rapidly, and they had a great many things to say. they had some things to see, as well, for everywhere, as they went, they encountered detachments of united states soldiers patrolling the city, restoring order and setting things to rights. that they were doing so appeared to be a tremendous surprise to large numbers of the inhabitants, who had almost been expecting to be ruthlessly plundered, if not murdered outright, by these cruel barbarians from the awful republic of the north. not all of them were panic-stricken in this way, however, for when the house of old anita was reached, she was standing in the doorway, and she greeted them loudly with: "o señor carfora! i knew all the while that you were a gringo. i am so glad that we have surrendered! santa maria gloriosa! praise all the saints! we shall have no more cannonading! we shall have plenty to eat!" "that is just what we want, anita," replied ned. "this is my father. he has come to see me, and you must give him some dinner. then i will tell you all about general scott and the american soldiers." she had neighbors with her, as usual, and some of them had become accustomed to regarding ned as a kind of newsboy. they were now also prepared to thank a large number of religious personages that he was a genuine gringo, and on good terms with the conquering invaders, who were henceforth to have the control of affairs in vera cruz. it was late that night when ned said good-by to his father, and it was like pulling teeth to let him go, but there was no help for it, as the sailing of the supply-ship could not be delayed. ned was once more alone in mexico, and it took all his enthusiasm for his expected army life to reconcile him to the situation. perhaps there was not a great deal of sound sleeping done, in the hammock that swung in the little room in the tassara mansion, but at an early hour next morning he was on his way to hunt up the camp of the seventh infantry and the tent of lieutenant grant. this was accomplished without much difficulty, and almost immediately ned made a discovery. his probable coming had, of course, been reported to the colonel commanding the regiment, and that officer's common-sense remark was: "unenlisted orderly, eh? yankee boy that can speak spanish, and that knows every corner of this miserable city? just what we want. i'm glad old fuss and feathers sent him to us. he is the greatest general in the world. send your scout right here to me. i've errands for him." therefore, the next chapter in ned's mexican experiences was that he found himself sent out, soldierlike, upon a long list of duties, for which he was peculiarly well prepared by knowing where to find streets and houses which were as yet unknown to the rank and file of the gallant seventh. the men, on their part, soon came to regard him as a soldier boy, like themselves, and he had a fine opportunity for learning, from day to day, the processes by which general scott was organizing his force for his intended march across the sierra, on the road he had selected for reaching the city of mexico. it was soon to be plainly understood that, whenever that army should march, it would do so as a sort of human machine, ready to perform any military work which its commander might require of it. chapter xvii. the mountain passes "grant," said captain lee, "what did crawford say to you about that cerro gordo road? i want to know all i can." "well, captain lee," replied grant, "here he is, to speak for himself. he says he came down that trail in midwinter. he studied it, too, because his friend, general zuroaga, told him it was built by a spanish fellow by the name of cortes." "good!" said lee. "seems to me i've heard of him somewhere, but who is zuroaga? tell me about him, crawford. does he know anything?" by this time, ned had become pretty well acquainted with lee and a number of other officers, and with their free, open-hearted way of dealing with each other. he could tell, therefore, without any restraint or bashfulness, all that was necessary concerning his distinguished mexican friend and benefactor. "i see," said the captain. "he is one of their many revolutions. all right. but i wish old man cortes hadn't left his road so narrow and steep as they say it is. tell me all you saw, crawford. i have other accounts, but i want yours. look at this map and answer my questions." he held in his hand what purported to be a very rough sketch of the highway from the city of jalapa to the city of mexico. it also pretended to give a fair idea of the section of that road which crossed the mountain spur known as cerro gordo. "from there to there," said lee, "how is it?" "crooked as a rail fence," replied ned. "it isn't like that at all. it's a zigzag, with rocks on one side and ravines on the other." "just as i supposed," said lee. "now, mark the zigzags on this other paper, as well as you can remember them." they were sitting in grant's tent, in the camp of the seventh regiment, and the entire advance-guard of the army was encamped in like manner, waiting for orders from general scott to climb the mountains before them. ned took the crayon handed him, and he really appeared to do pretty well with it, but he explained that the rough weather and the condition of his pony had compelled him to dismount and come part of the way down the mountain on foot, so that he had more time for making observations. "if they put cannon on a breastwork on that road," he said, "they can blow anything in front of them all to pieces." "grant," said lee, "that's just what they can do. santa anna has posted his artillery at crawford's zigzags, and that cerro gordo position cannot be carried in front. it is perfectly unassailable." "what on earth are we to do, then?" said grant. "our only road to mexico seems to be shut and bolted." "i don't know about that," said lee. "there are others, if we chose to try them. but the general has ordered me, with an engineer party, to go out and find if there is not some way for getting around santa anna's obstructions. i want you to let crawford go with me." "o lieutenant grant!" eagerly exclaimed ned, "general zuroaga told me there was another place as good for a road as that is." "go along, of course," said grant. "i'd give a month's pay to go with you. anything but this sleepy camp." ned was ready in a minute, but he found that he was not expected to carry with him any other weapon than his machete. "take that," said captain lee. "it will do to cut bushes with. i believe i'll carry one myself. we shall have a few riflemen, but we must be careful not to do any firing. we must scout like so many red indians." ned had formerly been on the wrong side of the army lines. during all the long months of what he sometimes thought of as his captivity among the mexicans, he had been occasionally worried by a feeling of disgrace. he had felt it worst when he was a member of the garrison of vera cruz, and on such remarkably good terms with the rest of the garrison and its commander. so he had been exceedingly rejoiced when general scott battered down his walls and compelled him to surrender. it had been a grand restoration of his self-respect when he found himself running errands for the officers of the seventh, but now he suddenly felt that he had shot up into full-grown manhood, for, with a bush-cutting sword at his side, he was to accompany one of the best officers in the american army upon an expedition of great importance and much danger. it was still early in the day when captain lee's party, all on foot, passed through the outer lines of the american advance, at the base of the mountain. all of them were young men, as yet without any military fame, and there was no one there who could tell them that their little band of roadhunters contained one commander-in-chief and one lieutenant-general of the armies of the southern confederacy, and one commander-in-chief and four major-generals, or corps commanders, of the armies of the united states. it was not by such subordinates as these that general santa anna was assisted in his engineering or other military operations. that day, however, and for a few days more, he felt perfectly sure of his really well-chosen position among the rocks and chasms of the cerro gordo. the engineering party was well aware that its movements might possibly be observed from the heights beyond, as long as it remained in the open, therefore it wheeled out into the fields as it went onward, and was soon lost to view among woodlands. "now, crawford," said captain lee, "recall and tell me, as well as you can, all that zuroaga told you about his proposed new road." ned proceeded to do so, but, at the end of his recollections, he added: "well, the general said it would cost a pot of money to do it, now, and that cortes had no gunpowder to throw away. he could not have done any rock-blasting." "our difficulty about that is as bad as his was," replied the captain. "we can have all the gunpowder we need, but we can't use any of it, for fear of letting his excellency, general santa anna, know what we are up to. as for the cost of a new road, there is no government in mexico that will think of undertaking it. it would cost as much, almost, as a brand-new revolution." there was a great deal of hard work done after that, searching, climbing, and bush-cutting, and ned wondered at the ready decisions made here and there, by the engineers. it seemed to him, too, that captain lee and other officers paid a great deal of deference to a young lieutenant by the name of mcclellan. a small force of riflemen was with them and a party of sappers and miners, but there had not been a sign of military opposition to the work which they were trying to do. nevertheless, it began to dawn upon ned's mind that sometimes picks and spades and crowbars may be as important war weapons as even cannon. that is, there may be circumstances in which guns of any kind are of little use until after the other tools have been made to clear the way for them. night came, and the entire reconnoitring party camped among the cliffs of cerro gordo, but at about the middle of the next forenoon all the officers gathered for a kind of council. they were not yet ready to send in a full and final report, but they had formed important conclusions, and at the end of the council ned was called for. "crawford," said captain lee, "take that despatch to captain schuyler hamilton, or whoever else is on duty at general scott's headquarters. in my opinion, this zuroaga road will do, after we shall have made it, and we can climb around into the rear of the mexican army. if so, all their batteries in the old road are but so many cannon thrown away." ned's heart gave a great thump of pride as he took that carefully folded and sealed up paper. to carry it was a tremendous honor, and he was not half sure that it did not make him, for the time being, a regular member of general scott's corps of military engineers. he hastened back to the jalapa highway, and the first advanced post that he came to furnished him with a pony. then he galloped on to the camps and to the general's headquarters, as if he had been undergoing no fatigue whatever. he seemed to himself, however, to have seen hardly anything or anybody until he stood before captain hamilton, and held out that vitally important despatch. even then he did not quite understand that it was almost as important as had been the surrender of vera cruz. but for that surrender, the american expedition would have been stopped at the seashore. but for this feat of the engineers, it would have been disastrously halted at the foot of the cerro gordo pass. one minute later, ned's heart jumped again, for he heard the deep voice of the general himself commanding: "hamilton, bring crawford in. he seems to know something." whether he did or not, he could answer questions quite bravely, and he could tell a great many things which had not been set forth in the brief report of the engineers. probably they had not felt ready to say or assert too much until they had done and learned more, but ned was under no such restriction, and he thoroughly believed in what he still regarded as general zuroaga's road. that is, if somebody like cortes, for instance, could and would afford the necessary amount of gunpowder to blast away the rocks which he had seen were in the way. "that will do," said the general, at last. "you may go, crawford. captain hamilton, we have beaten santa anna!" there may have been a slightly arrogant sound in that confident assertion, but it was altogether in accord with the positive and self-reliant character of general winfield scott. he had unbounded faith in his own mental resources, and, at the same time, he had perfect confidence in the men and officers of his army. it was, therefore, less to be wondered at that they on their part entertained an almost absurd respect for their martinet commander. orders went out immediately for putting all the force which could be employed upon the construction of the mountain road. much of the work would have to be performed at night, to keep it secret, and the mexicans, behind their impassable entrenchments on the old cerro gordo pass, had no idea of the hidden plans of their enemies. santa anna himself may have believed that his antagonist had given up the hope of ever reaching the city of mexico by that route. the new one, by which he did intend to reach it, grew rapidly to completion, and ned crawford obtained from his friend grant repeated permissions to go and see if captain lee wanted him, and then to come back and report progress to his own camp. "lieutenant grant's a man that hardly ever says anything," said ned to himself, "but he's a prime good fellow, and i like him. he says he isn't much of an engineer, though, and he couldn't build that road." such a road it was, too, with bridges over chasms, where the builders had to climb up and down like so many cats. even after it was said to be complete, it was fit for men only, for not even the most sure-footed mule could have passed over it. it was finished on the 17th of april, and on the following day general scott issued his orders for all the various parts of the coming battle of cerro gordo. strong bodies of infantry were to engage the mexican front, and keep santa anna's army occupied, while the engineers piloted another and stronger column to the real war business of the day. ned had managed to get himself tangled up with this climbing force, if only to see what use was to be made of his and zuroaga's new road. the morning came, and even before the sun was up some of the troops were moving. "i guess it'll be an all-day's job," thought ned, as he and one of the engineer officers reached the first steep declivity. "hullo! they are unhitching those artillery horses. what's that for?" he was soon to know, for strong men took the places of the animals, and the guns were hauled up and over the mountain by human hands. it was severe work, but it was done with eager enthusiasm, and a few hours later ned was able to shout: "hurrah! here we are, right in behind them. hurrah for general scott!" anything else that he might have felt like saying was drowned in the wild cheering which arose from thousands of soldiers, for there was no longer any need for silence or secrecy. that part of the mexican army which had been posted beyond the head of the pass was taken utterly by surprise. its commanders were for the moment unable to imagine whence had come this numerous body of united states infantry, which appeared so suddenly upon their unprotected flank. they therefore retreated, and the mexican army was cut in two, so that all of it which had been stationed in the pass itself was caught as in a trap, and compelled to surrender. these trapped prisoners were about three thousand in number, and ned kindly remarked concerning them: "oh, but ain't i glad we didn't have to kill 'em! we didn't catch old santa anna himself, though. they say the mexicans made him president for the battle of angostura. i guess they wouldn't have done it if they had waited till now." whether or not he was correct in that calculation, the road to the city of mexico seemed now to be open, unless the unfortunate republic could provide its president with another army. as for the american commander, his troops had more faith in him than ever, and with better reasons for it. it was afterward said that general scott's written orders for the battle of cerro gordo, and for others which followed, would answer very well for full reports of them after they were won. the whole american army, except the garrison of vera cruz and small parties posted here and there along the road, had now escaped from the _tierra caliente_ and the yellow fever. immediately after the battle of cerro gordo, it marched on to the old city of jalapa, among the mountains, where its quarters were cool and comfortable. not many miles beyond jalapa begins the great central tableland of anahuac, and it was needful that the road leading into it should be taken possession of before the remnant of santa anna's army should rally and construct barriers at positions from which it might prove difficult to drive them. "if they do," thought ned, when he heard that matter under discussion by the soldiers, "i hope general scott'll send for me and the other engineers. i'd like to trap some more prisoners." he was not to have any such chance as that, but he was not to be idle altogether,--he and his engineers and his army. the division to which he and the seventh regiment belonged, under the command of general worth, was shortly ordered on in the advance, to take and hold a strong position, known as the town and castle of perote, and here there was indeed a long delay which was not engineered by the military forces of mexico. the politicians and particularly the congress of the united states had interfered very effectively on behalf of president santa anna. they had spent so much time in debates upon the legislation required for the gathering of fresh troops that the terms of enlistment of about half of the soldiers under scott were expiring. it was of no use for him to move forward with a steadily vanishing army, and he was compelled to wait for months at and about perote, until the new men could arrive and take the places of those who were going home. "i guess i won't enlist," thought ned, as that idea came again and again into his mind. "neither mother nor father would wish me to do so. but i'm getting to be an old soldier, after all, and i won't leave the seventh till it gets into the city of mexico." whether it ever was to accomplish that feat was only to be determined by hard fighting, and there came a day, the 7th of august, 1847, when the division of general worth, then encamped at puebla, received orders to go forward. the entire army was to move, and general scott had about as many soldiers with him as when he had landed at vera cruz in the spring. "hurrah for the city!" shouted ned, when the news reached him. "i want to make a morning call at the paez house." chapter xviii. señor carfora trapped "i never saw anything finer than this," said ned, aloud, as he slowly turned his telescope from one point to another. "it is the old battle-ground of cortes, when he and his spaniards and tlascalans took the city of mexico. it was called tenochtitlan, then." he was standing upon a granite ledge, on the slope of the mountains south of the city, and below him the nearest objects of interest were the white tents of the american army, encamped there while negotiations for peace were going forward between the united states government and santa anna. these were not progressing well, for the invaders were demanding more than any mexican government could be ready to grant. not only was texas itself demanded, but with it also all the vast territories of california, new mexico, and arizona. "here we are," said ned again, "but it has taken us two weeks of awful fighting to get here. there isn't any use in disputing the pluck of the mexicans. away yonder is churubusco, and over there is contreras. didn't they fight us there! general scott and his engineers laid out the battles, but i was with the seventh everywhere it went. i'll have loads of yarns to spin when i get home, if i ever do." battle after battle had been fought, and the americans had paid dearly for the long delay in the arrival of their reinforcements. all that time had been employed by the mexican president, with really splendid energy, in raising a new army and in fortifying the approaches to the city. it was almost pitiful to see with what patriotism and self-sacrifice the mexican people rallied for their last hopeless struggle with superior power. it was not, however, that they were to contend with superior numbers, for the forces under santa anna were at least three times those under general scott. the difference was that the latter was a perfect army led by a great general, while the former were not an army at all and had very few capable officers. ned had apparently gazed long enough, and he now made his way down the rugged slope. he did not halt until he reached the door of his own tent, and there he was met by his friend and supervisor somewhat tartly. "well! you are back, at last, are you? i didn't know but what you'd run away. you may come along with me to-night. you may try and see your friends. the provision train i am to take in will get out again about daylight. you may stay there one day, and come away with a train that will run in to-morrow night, but you'd better wear your mexican rig, if you don't mean to have your throat cut." "all right, sir," said ned. "i'll run the risk." "i might not let you," said grant, "if you were an enlisted man, but you may learn something of value to them and to us, too. get ready!" the fact was that ned and his army, commanded for him by general scott, were in a somewhat peculiar position. an armistice had been declared while the negotiations were going on, and while, at the same time, the power of santa anna was crumbling to pieces under him. it had been agreed, on both sides, that all military operations should temporarily cease, and that american army-trains of wagons might come into the city, with armed escorts, to obtain supplies. after some unpleasant experiences with the angry mob of the city, it had been deemed best that the trains should come and go in the night, when the unruly mexican soldiers were in their quarters, and the too patriotic citizens were in their beds. ned had several times asked permission to accompany a train, and it had been refused, but it was now explained that this train would like to have one more man with it who could talk spanish. when, however, an hour or so later, he reported for duty, lieutenant grant remarked to him: "well, yes, you can talk it and you can look it, but you can't walk it. don't step off so lively, if you mean to pass for a mexican." "hold on, grant," said another officer, standing near them. "don't you think the mexicans have been lively enough since we left perote? i've had to step around a good deal myself on their account." "just so," said grant. "but that's while they're fighting. when they're at anything like work, though, it's a different kind of movement. don't walk fast, ned, or they'll shoot you for a gringo." it was nearly midnight when the supply-train, commanded by lieutenant grant, entered the city, and an hour was consumed in obtaining the supplies and getting them into the wagons, for not a pound of anything had been made ready for delivery. no true-hearted mexican really wished to sell provisions to the enemies of his country. "lieutenant, may i go now?" asked ned, as the last wagon prepared to move away. "there isn't a patrol in sight, and the paez place is within a few squares from this." grant replied only by a wave of the hand, for at that moment he had become engaged in a sharp controversy with the one mexican officer who was present on duty for his own side. he had been fairly polite, but he had not pretended to be pleased to see gringos in mexico. therefore, it was almost without express permission that ned slipped away from his train and his escort upon his exceedingly perilous errand. the streets were dark and deserted, for the heavy-hearted people had nothing to call them out of their houses at that hour. nevertheless, ned was feverishly on the alert, and, almost without his knowing it, his machete had jumped out of its sheath, ready for whatever might turn up. "halt!" suddenly came from a deep voice at his right, as he stealthily turned a street corner, and a tall form stepped out of the near shadows to stand in front of him. ned saw the long, bright blade of a lance pointed at his bosom, and there seemed but one thing left for him to do. the holder of the lance was beyond his reach, even if he had wished to strike him, but the lance itself was not. all the strength he had in him seemed to go into the sudden blow with which he severed the wooden shaft, an inch or so behind its fitting of sharp steel. "diablos!" exclaimed the astonished mexican, as he struck back a heavy blow with the cudgel which remained in his hand. ned parried as well as he could with his machete, but there was some force left in the stick when it reached his head, and down he went. he had made a discovery at that very moment, however. "pablo!" he exclaimed, just as a second mexican sprang toward him with a long knife in his hand. "señor carfora!" loudly responded pablo. "hold back your knife, manuelo! it is one of our own men. o santos! my lance! i have no other weapon. i told them it was of the soft wood. how are you here, señor?" [illustration: ned saw a long, bright blade of a lance pointed at his bosom] "to see señora paez and general zuroaga," said ned. "is he in the city?" "hush! be careful, señor carfora!" said pablo, as manuelo almost reluctantly sheathed his too ready long knife. "we were waiting here for him. he has been to the palace, to meet general bravo. our regiment has already joined the army, but he is not yet sure about santa anna and some other men. it is a dark time, señor!" "now, pablo," said ned, "there isn't much to tell about me. i was captured when vera cruz surrendered. i was with general morales. i got in to-night, and i have a great deal to say to the general and señora paez and the tassaras." "zuroaga is here now," said a low, cautiously speaking voice behind him. "put up your sword, carfora, and come along with me. i want to see you more than you do me. i must know the latest news from general scott's army. pablo, it was of no use. santa anna would make no terms with me, but his day is nearly over. bravo's government has rejected the treaty offered by the united states, and we are to fight it out to the bitter end. the gates have been shut, and there will be no more sending out of supplies. i think the war will begin again to-morrow." "oh, dear me!" thought ned. "there goes all my chance for getting out again until after our army has captured the city. how my head does ache!" the rap from pablo's lance-staff had not really injured him, however, and all three of them walked on till they reached the paez place without saying another word. here it was at once evident that they, or, at least, the general and pablo, were waited for. the front door opened to admit them, and shut quickly behind them as they passed in. "señora paez," said zuroaga to a shadow in the unlighted hall, "the armistice is ended, but i shall command my oaxaca regiment in the fighting which is now sure to come. let us all meet in the parlor and hear from señor carfora the american account of these lost battles." "carfora?" she exclaimed. "is he here? oh, how i do wish to hear him! i believe we have been told altogether too many lies. our troops do not half know how badly they have been beaten, nor what is the real strength of the american army." they walked on into the parlor, and here there were lights burning, but ned was not thinking of them. he was gazing at the pale face of a man in uniform and on crutches, who came slowly forward between a woman and a young girl, with a mournful smile upon his face. "colonel tassara!" exclaimed ned. "i knew you were wounded, but are you not getting well?" "señor carfora!" quickly interrupted señorita felicia. "he was hit in the leg by a bullet at angostura. he had a bayonet wound, too, and they thought he would die, but they made him a general--" "i am getting better, carfora," said general tassara, courageously, "but i can do no more fighting just now. i sincerely wish that there might not be any. the plans of santa anna--" "tassara!" exclaimed zuroaga. "what we heard is true. he is utterly ruined. but the peace terms are rejected by all the government we have left, and our city defences must soon go down as did those at cerro gordo, contreras, and churubusco. we are to hear more about those affairs from señor carfora. he was an eye witness of them." "oh, my dear young friend," said señora tassara, "were you with the american army in all those battles?" "no, not exactly," said ned. "i was with general morales at vera cruz. then i came on with general scott all the way from the seacoast to this place. he has troops enough now, and he will fight his way in. i'm real sorry about it, too, for no more men need to be killed." "i think the gringos are just terrible," said felicia, as she came over and sat down by ned. "i want to hear about them. i do hope they won't be defeated now, though, for if they are nobody can guess who will be emperor of mexico when they are driven away." "she is not so far wrong," said tassara, sadly. "the future of our country is all in the dark. please let us hear your report." pablo, of course, had not followed his superiors into the parlor, and all who were there were free to discuss the situation. the morning sun was looking in at the windows when all of the talk was finished. ned had learned that only the family and a few trusted servants remained in the house, but he would have eaten his breakfast with even a more complete sense of security from any emissaries of the military authorities if he had known how much they had upon their hands that day, the 4th of september, 1847. there had already been a sharp correspondence between the commanders of the two armies, and now general scott himself declared the armistice at an end. all the angry patriotism of the mexican people arose to meet the emergency, and every possible preparation was rapidly made for the last desperate struggle in defence of their capital. it was as if the idea prevailed that, if this american force now here could be defeated, the united states would give the matter up, instead of sending more troops to the assistance of their first insufficient battalions. "señor carfora," said senorita felicia, "you must not go out of the house. i do not want you to be killed." "that is so," added her father. "as the affair stands now, they would surely regard you as a spy. you would be shot without a trial. all is confusion. i fear that even general zuroaga is safe from arrest only among his own men. the army is the government. this nation needs a change." "general tassara," said ned, "isn't our army bringing one?" "the war is promising a great deal," replied tassara, gloomily. "it has already delivered us from king paredes and santa anna and from half a dozen other military usurpers. moreover, all the lands which the united states propose to take away will be rescued from any future anarchy and will be made some use of. they will be lost to mexico forever within one week from to-day, for we cannot hold the city." general zuroaga had quietly disappeared. very soon, the tassara family went to their own room. then not even the servants could tell what had become of señora paez. ned crawford did not at all know what to do with himself. he walked around the rooms below; then he went out to the stables and back again, but he was all alone, for pablo and the oaxaca men had gone to their regiment. he went up to the library and had a one-sided talk with the man in armor, but it did not do him any good, and he did not care a cent for all the books on the shelves. they could tell only of old wars, fought long ago, and here was a real war right on hand, that seemed to be wandering all around the house. during all the long, hot days of the armistice, a kind of dull quiet had appeared to brood over the city and its forts and over the camps and entrenchments of the besiegers. it had been something like a thundercloud, which was all the while growing blacker and hanging lower, and before the end of the first day of renewed hostilities the anxious watchers in the city houses could hear something which sounded like distant thunder. it was the occasional roar of a gun from one or another of the batteries on either side, as a warning of the more terrible things which were about to come, and more than once ned groaned to himself: "oh, how i wish i were out there, with lieutenant grant and the seventh. this is worse than being shut up in vera cruz. i didn't have any regiment of my own, then, but now i belong in general scott's army." evening came at last, and all of the family was gathered behind the lattices of the parlor windows, to watch the detachments of soldiers march past, and to wonder where they were going. general zuroaga was not there, but there had been a message from him that there would be a great battle in the morning, for the americans were moving forward. "we are in greater numbers than they are," muttered general tassara. "but we have no general scott, and we have no officers like his. almost all that we really have is courage and gunpowder, and these are not enough to defeat such an attack as he will make. the city is lost already!" chapter xix. the stars and stripes in tenochtitlan "what a roar it is! and so very near! i hope general scott will not bombard this city, as he did vera cruz. it would be awful to see bombshells falling among these crowds of people!" the american commander had not the slightest idea of doing anything of the kind, but there had been almost continuous fighting in the days following the termination of the armistice. perhaps the hardest of it had been at molino del rey, and the defences there had been carried by the assailants. there appeared now to be but the one barrier of the chapultepec hill between them and a final victory. a hand was on ned's shoulder, and a trembling voice said to him: "oh, señor carfora! where have you been? i'm so frightened! are those cannon coming right on into the city?" "no," said ned, "but i have been out all day. i went almost everywhere, and it seems as if the city were full of wounded men. the soldiers are crowding in. oh, how i wish i knew how things are going!" there was a sound of sobbing behind them, and in a moment more the arms of señora paez were around felicia. "my darling! my dear little girl!" she exclaimed. "señor carfora, too! the end has come. the americans have stormed chapultepec, and the city is at their mercy. alas, for me! general bravo was taken prisoner, and my beloved old friend, zuroaga, was killed at the head of his regiment. we shall never see him again!" ned felt as if somebody had struck him a heavy blow. he could not say a word for a moment, and then he whispered: "poor general zuroaga! why, i had no idea that he would be killed!" that is always so after a battle. those who read the lists of the killed and wounded expect to find the names of other people's friends there, and not the names of those from whom they were hoping to hear an account of the victory. "felicia," said the señora, "your father and mother are in their room. do not go there just now. you must not go out again, señor carfora. you have been running too many risks. talk with me for awhile." whether or not he had been in any danger, it had been impossible for ned to remain in the house during an entire week of military thunder storm, and he had ventured out almost recklessly. there had, indeed, been so much confusion that little attention had generally been paid to him, and he had even gone out through the gates to use his telescope upon the distant clouds of smoke and the movements of marching men. he had seen, therefore, the steady, irresistible advances of the american troops, and he had almost understood that to general scott the capture of the city was merely a matter of mathematical calculation, like an example in arithmetic. he went into the parlor with señora paez and felicia, and there they sat, almost in silence, until long after their usual bedtime, but the sound of guns had ceased, for the siege of mexico was ended. it was during that night that general santa anna, with nearly all that was left of his army, marched silently out of the city, and the last remnants of his political power passed from him as the american troops began to march in, the next morning. of all the negotiations between the remaining mexican authorities and general scott, ned crawford knew nothing, but there was disorder everywhere, and it would have been more perilous than ever for a fellow like him to have been caught in the streets by any of the reckless, angry men who swarmed among them. on the evening of the 14th of september, nevertheless, he was standing in the paez piazza with señorita felicia, and he saw a column of soldiers coming up the street. "señorita!" he suddenly exclaimed. "look! our flag! our men! hurrah! those are the colors of the seventh! it is my own regiment, and if there isn't lieutenant grant himself!" "do not go!" she said. "do not leave me!" but she was too late, for he had darted away, and in a moment more he was greeted with: "hullo, ned! i'm glad you didn't make out to get killed. i knew you couldn't get out, and i'd about given you up. is that where you live?" "it's the house i told you of," said ned. "they are the best kind of people--" "go back there, then," commanded the lieutenant. "your father is out among the hospitals just now, taking care of the wounded, but i want to know where to send him. i'll see you again. i must go on to my post." back he ran to the piazza, and even felicia was compelled to admit that her friend señor carfora's own regiment was splendid, as its close ranks swung away in such perfect order. "but," she said, "you might have been killed, if you had been with them, and i am glad you did not have to kill any of our people." "so am i," said ned, "now that it is all over. i guess this is the end of the war. but how i shall miss poor general zuroaga!" rapidly and prudently, general scott was occupying the city and restoring order. with such wisdom and moderation did he perform his duties as military governor that almost immediately the previously distressed inhabitants began to regard the arrival of the united states army as a positive blessing. at the same time, it was obvious to everybody that months might be required for the necessary peace negotiations. a new and firm mexican government would have to be established, and much difficult legislation would be called for on the part of the congress of the united states, since that body was to appropriate large sums of money in payment for the territory to be acquired from mexico. during three whole days, ned went from camp to camp and from hospital to hospital, in search of his father, but mr. crawford had heard tidings of his son which satisfied him, and he stuck to his wounded soldiers. it was not, therefore, until the afternoon of the third day that ned found a grand reception prepared for him in the parlor of the paez mansion. "father!" he shouted, as he hurried in, after felicia, at the door, had warned him of what was before him. "hurrah! here i am!" what happened or was said next, he did not know until he felt himself somewhat roughly shaken by somebody, and was forced to exclaim: "hullo, captain kemp! are you here, too? i declare!" "here i am," said the captain, "and i'm going to take you and your father back to new york on the ship that brought us. you have been in mexico long enough." ned did not so much as have time to hurrah again before señora tassara came forward to say to him: "that is not all, señor carfora. for the sake of my husband's health, and for other reasons, he and i and felicia and señora paez are intending to spend our next winter in the united states. we have accepted your father's invitation to be passengers with you. what do you think of that?" ned could hardly say what he thought, but he tried to, and perhaps his best effort was made when he said to felicia: "isn't it tip-top! i'll show you all over the city,--but i'm afraid you will get awfully seasick on the way. i did at first." "she will have to run the risk of that," laughed her mother, but after ned's long conference with his father was ended, she and ned spent the rest of the evening in a discussion of the sights which were to be seen in the great city of the americans. "there would be no use in your remaining here now," mr. crawford had said to ned. "my business with the army will run right along for a time, but nothing else can be done until all things are quiet and settled. then we may try and find out what good your mexican experience has done you." mr. crawford went away at a late hour, but ned was out of the house early enough the next morning. he had a strong notion in his head, and it led him to the grand plaza, to stand in front of the government building which had been the headquarters of so many different kinds of governments of mexico. it was really a fine and costly affair, but the mexican national banner was no longer floating from its tall flagstaff. instead of it was a broad and beautiful stars and stripes, and it had never before appeared to ned so very beautiful. he was gazing up at that evidence that the city was in the hands of general scott and his army, when a voice that he knew hailed him with: "hullo, youngster! that's our flag. where's your friend grant? have you seen him?" "captain lee!" exclaimed ned. "yes, i've seen him. he's all right." "so i hear," said lee. "and they say he distinguished himself at molino del rey. his regiment lost a number of men, too." "well," said ned, "i wasn't with my regiment in these battles here, but i'm glad that my army has taken mexico. grant's a splendid fellow." "my regiment! my army!" laughed captain lee. "all right; that's the way every american boy ought to feel. i guess you are right about grant, too. he may be heard of again some day." "tell you what," said ned. "when i get to new york, i mean to join one of our city regiments as soon as i can. then, if there ever is another war, i'm going to join him. i'd like to serve under him." "good!" said lee. "and then i may hear of colonel crawford, of grant's division, united states volunteers. good-by. take care of yourself." the end. -----------------------------------------------------------------------w. o. stoddard's books ahead of the army. four illustrations by c. chase emerson. 12mo. pictorial cover in color. price, $1.00, net; postpaid, $1.15. this is a lively narrative of the experiences of an american boy who arrives in mexico as the war with the united states is beginning, is thrown into contact with such young officers as lieutenant grant and captains lee and mcclellan, all of them destined to become famous later in american military history. the errand boy of andrew jackson: a war story of 1812. illustrated by will crawford. cloth, 12mo, $1.00, net; postpaid, $1.12. this tale is of the war of 1812, and describes the events of the only land campaign of 1812-1814 in which the americans were entirely successful. jack morgan: a boy of 1812. illustrated by will crawford. 12mo, 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illustrated. 12mo, postpaid, $1.25. a capital story of american life. lothrop publishing company--boston -----------------------------------------------------------------------george cary eggleston's juveniles the bale marked circle x a blockade running adventure illustrated by c. chase emerson. 12mo, red cloth, illustrated cover. net, $1.20. postpaid, $1.35. another of mr. eggleston's stirring books for youth. in it are told the adventures of three boy soldiers in the confederate service who are sent in a sloop on a secret voyage from charleston to the bahamas, conveying a strange bale of cotton which holds important documents. the boys pass through startling adventures: they run the blockade, suffer shipwreck, and finally reach their destination after the pluckiest kind of effort. camp venture a story of the virginia mountains illustrated by w. a. mccullough. 12mo, dark red cloth, illustrated cover, $1.50. the _louisville courier journal_ says: "george cary eggleston has written a decidedly good tale of pluck and adventure in 'camp venture.' it will be of interest to young and old who enjoy an exciting story, but there is also a great deal of instruction and information in the book." the last of the flatboats a story of the mississippi illustrated by charlotte harding. 12mo, green cloth, illustrated cover, $1.50. the _brooklyn eagle_ says: "mr. george cary eggleston, the veteran editor and author, has scored a double success in his new book, 'the last of the flatboats,' which has just been published. written primarily as a story for young readers, it contains many things that are of interest to older people. altogether, it is a mighty good story, and well worth reading." lothrop publishing company--boston -----------------------------------------------------------------------personal memoirs of u. s. grant, part 6. by u. s. grant (plus footnotes for parts 1 to 6) chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg--canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas--capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. when news of sherman being in possession of savannah reached the north, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. among others who went was the secretary of war, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. mr. draper, the collector of customs of new york, who was with mr. stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. savannah was then turned over to general foster's command to hold, so that sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. i sent the chief engineer of the army of the potomac (general barnard) with letters to general sherman. he remained some time with the general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from sherman as to what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward. i must not neglect to state here the fact that i had no idea originally of having sherman march from savannah to richmond, or even to north carolina. the season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and i should not have thought of ordering such a move. i had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry sherman and his army around to the james river by water, and so informed him. on receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the carolinas. i was only too happy to approve this; for if successful, it promised every advantage. his march through georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that state, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. if north and south carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding lee's army was concerned, the confederate garrison at richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the state of virginia; and, although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. i approved sherman's suggestion therefore at once. the work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with admiral dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the south carolina and georgia coast, and general foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he (sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of charleston. this provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. he also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. this letter was brought to city point by general barnard at a time when i happened to be going to washington city, where i arrived on the 21st of january. i cannot tell the provision i had already made to co-operate with sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., jan. 21, 1865. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill div. of the mississippi. general:--your letters brought by general barnard were received at city point, and read with interest. not having them with me, however, i cannot say that in this i will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. as i arrived here at one p.m., and must leave at six p.m., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the secretary and general halleck, i must be brief. before your last request to have thomas make a campaign into the heart of alabama, i had ordered schofield to annapolis, md., with his corps. the advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from cincinnati. the corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. i was induced to do this because i did not believe thomas could possibly be got off before spring. his pursuit of hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. the command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst thomas followed far behind. when hood had crossed the tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, thomas had not much more than half crossed the state, from whence he returned to nashville to take steamer for eastport. he is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. he also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. this report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to selma under an energetic leader. he has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. no reply is yet received. canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards montgomery and selma. thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to canby. without further reinforcements canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. fort fisher, you are aware, has been captured. we have a force there of eight thousand effective. at new bern about half the number. it is rumored, through deserters, that wilmington also has fallen. i am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about fort caswell, and that on the 18th terry moved on wilmington. if wilmington is captured, schofield will go there. if not, he will be sent to new bern. in either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements. from either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. there have been about sixteen thousand men sent from lee's army south. of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at fort fisher having overtaken about two thousand. all these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. they will be so instructed. from about richmond i will watch lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. in the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, i can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about richmond. to resume: canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the gulf. a. j. smith may go from the north, but i think it doubtful. a force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from new bern or wilmington, or both. you can call for reinforcements. this will be handed you by captain hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. if there is anything i can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieut.-general. i had written on the 18th of january to general sherman, giving him the news of the battle of nashville. he was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at thomas for permitting hood to cross the tennessee river and nearly the whole state of tennessee, and come to nashville to be attacked there. he, however, as i had done, sent thomas a warm congratulatory letter. on the 10th of january, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to sherman and his army passed by congress were approved. sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions. he had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison. by the middle of january all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with. he proposed to move in two columns, one from savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening charleston. he commenced the advance by moving his right wing to beaufort, south carolina, then to pocotaligo by water. this column, in moving north, threatened charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit charleston. south carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the south for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the south was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the north and also largely entertained by people of the south, that the state of south carolina, and charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. in fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, because charleston had been left out. to pass into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and foster's troops. it is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. sherman therefore passed it by. by the first of february all preparations were completed for the final march, columbia, south carolina, being the first objective; fayetteville, north carolina, the second; and goldsboro, or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. the right wing went from pocotaligo, and the left from about hardeeville on the savannah river, both columns taking a pretty direct route for columbia. the cavalry, however, were to threaten charleston on the right, and augusta on the left. on the 15th of january fort fisher had fallen, news of which sherman had received before starting out on his march. we already had new bern and had soon wilmington, whose fall followed that of fort fisher; as did other points on the sea coast, where the national troops were now in readiness to co-operate with sherman's advance when he had passed fayetteville. on the 18th of january i ordered canby, in command at new orleans, to move against mobile, montgomery and selma, alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. on the 8th of february i ordered sheridan, who was in the valley of virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of richmond at or about lynchburg; and on the 20th i made the order to go to lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying: "as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. * * * this additional raid, with one starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry; one from eastport, mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; canby, from mobile bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma and montgomery; and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina--is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday last." on the 27th of february, more than a month after canby had received his orders, i again wrote to him, saying that i was extremely anxious to hear of his being in alabama. i notified him, also, that i had sent grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. i further suggested that forrest was probably in mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. i still further informed him that thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into mississippi on the 20th of february, or as soon as possible thereafter. this force did not get off however. all these movements were designed to be in support of sherman's march, the object being to keep the confederate troops in the west from leaving there. but neither canby nor thomas could be got off in time. i had some time before depleted thomas's army to reinforce canby, for the reason that thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. i ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. general granger had got down to new orleans, in some way or other, and i wrote canby that he must not put him in command of troops. in spite of this he asked the war department to assign granger to the command of a corps. almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, i said to canby: "i am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. i have directed that none be sent. thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the west. if there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the north, where we already had the troops. i expected your movements to be co-operative with sherman's last. this has now entirely failed. i wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. take mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to montgomery and to selma. destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. by this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken." most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. the enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of hardee's troops and wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in richmond, as i was sure would be the case, to retard sherman's movements. everything possible was being done to raise troops in the south. lee dispatched against sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve fort fisher, which, including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men. after thomas's victory at nashville what remained, of hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, general joseph e. johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the south though not in favor with the administration (or at least with mr. davis), was put in command of all the troops in north and south carolina. schofield arrived at annapolis in the latter part of january, but before sending his troops to north carolina i went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as i could give fuller directions after being on the ground than i could very well have given without. we soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to cape fear river. both new bern and wilmington are connected with raleigh by railroads which unite at goldsboro. schofield was to land troops at smithville, near the mouth of the cape fear river on the west side, and move up to secure the wilmington and charlotteville railroad. this column took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of wilmington. a large body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. they succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of february. i took the precaution to provide for sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching north carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. i also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in virginia. the gauge of the north carolina railroads being the same as the virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change. on the 31st of january i countermanded the orders given to thomas to move south to alabama and georgia. (i had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to terry.) i directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send stoneman through east tennessee, and push him well down toward columbia, south carolina, in support of sherman. thomas did not get stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when i had supposed he was on his march in support of sherman i heard of his being in louisville, kentucky. i immediately changed the order, and directed thomas to send him toward lynchburg. finally, however, on the 12th of march, he did push down through the north-western end of south carolina, creating some consternation. i also ordered thomas to send the 4th corps (stanley's) to bull gap and to destroy no more roads east of that. i also directed him to concentrate supplies at knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward lynchburg. goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from savannah. sherman's march was without much incident until he entered columbia, on the 17th of february. he was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. there was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. a formidable river had to be crossed near columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under general wade hampton. there was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. hampton left as sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. there has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set columbia on fire. sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and hampton denies it on the part of the confederates. one thing is certain: as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand. in any case, the example set by the confederates in burning the village of chambersburg, pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act of firing the seat of government of the state most responsible for the conflict then raging, not imperative. the confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the national forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. he then, however, co-operated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. when he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. he remained in columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. while at columbia, sherman learned for the first time that what remained of hood's army was confronting him, under the command of general beauregard. charleston was evacuated on the 18th of february, and foster garrisoned the place. wilmington was captured on the 22d. columbia and cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of charleston and augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored. among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old madeira, silverware, and furniture. i am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. there was found at columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition. these, of course were among the articles destroyed. while here, sherman also learned of johnston's restoration to command. the latter was given, as already stated, all troops in north and south carolina. after the completion of the destruction of public property about columbia, sherman proceeded on his march and reached cheraw without any special opposition and without incident to relate. the railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way. sherman remained a day or two at cheraw; and, finally, on the 6th of march crossed his troops over the pedee and advanced straight for fayetteville. hardee and hampton were there, and barely escaped. sherman reached fayetteville on the 11th of march. he had dispatched scouts from cheraw with letters to general terry, at wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he enumerated. the scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which sherman had asked as were in store at wilmington; unfortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing. four days later, on the 15th, sherman left fayetteville for goldsboro. the march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy. besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of hood's army. frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. i presume, however, that johnston did not have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men. the people had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions. there was some fighting at averysboro on the 16th between johnston's troops and sherman's, with some loss; and at bentonville on the 19th and 21st of march, but johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d. sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. sherman's troops at last reached goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and there his men were destined to have a long rest. schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to wilmington. sherman was no longer in danger. he had johnston confronting him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. he had lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but i was holding lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce johnston, sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from schofield and terry, would have been able to hold the confederates at bay for an indefinite period. he was near the sea-shore with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. he had a railroad to both wilmington and new bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea. then, too, sherman knew that if lee should escape me i would be on his heels, and he and johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. with the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached north carolina. johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. the men of both lee's and johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the north, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners --an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg--sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line --the line of battle of white oak road. on the last of january, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called confederate states presented themselves on our lines around petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at city point. they proved to be alexander h. stephens, vice-president of the confederacy, judge campbell, assistant-secretary of war, and r. m. t. hunt, formerly united states senator and then a member of the confederate senate. it was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and i at once conducted them to the steam mary martin, a hudson river boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. i at once communicated by telegraph with washington and informed the secretary of war and the president of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between he united states and, as they termed it, the confederate government. i was instructed to retain them at city point, until the president, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them. they remained several days as guests on board the boat. i saw them quite frequently, though i have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. it was something i had nothing to do with, and i therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. for my own part i never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government. there had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. as long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and i found them all very agreeable gentlemen. i directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every way possible. no guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. they were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters. i had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and i had been a particular admirer of mr. stephens. i had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when i saw him in the dusk of the evening i was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. when he got down on to the boat i found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the south during the rebellion. the cloth was thicker than anything of the kind i had ever seen, even in canada. the overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. he took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and i was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it. after a few days, about the 2d of february, i received a dispatch from washington, directing me to send the commissioners to hampton roads to meet the president and a member of the cabinet. mr. lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration. it was not a great while after they met that the president visited me at city point. he spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first: that the union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. if they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the union and be one people. he always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the southern people, and i never heard him abuse an enemy. some of the cruel things said about president lincoln, particularly in the north, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition and i saw a great deal of him at city point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital. right here i might relate an anecdote of mr. lincoln. it was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at hampton roads. after a little conversation, he asked me if i had seen that overcoat of stephens's. i replied that i had. "well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" i said yes. "well," said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?" long afterwards i told this story to the confederate general j. b. gordon, at the time a member of the senate. he repeated it to stephens, and, as i heard afterwards, stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of mr. lincoln. the rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents. on one occasion during this period, while i was visiting washington city for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under general wade hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section. it was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the confederates. it was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies taking what the confederate army otherwise would have gotten. as appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the mississippi river near port hudson on their way from texas to supply the confederate army in the east. one of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before petersburg. i felt that the situation of the confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and i was afraid, every morning, that i would awake from my sleep to hear that lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. he had his railroad by the way of danville south, and i was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence. i knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than i, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year. i was led to this fear by the fact that i could not see how it was possible for the confederates to hold out much longer where they were. there is no doubt that richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the confederate army. when it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. then, too, desertions were taking place, not only among those who were with general lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole confederacy. i remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this, general butler remarked that the confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though i am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave." the south, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. the latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. general butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which i afterwards used in writing a letter to mr. washburn. it was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. it was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. then too i knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as earnestly, i take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. many of them were making application to be sent north where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their southern homes. for these and other reasons i was naturally very impatient for the time to come when i could commence the spring campaign, which i thoroughly believed would close the war. there were two considerations i had to observe, however, and which detained me. one was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. it was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. the other consideration was that general sheridan with the cavalry of the army of the potomac was operating on the north side of the james river, having come down from the shenandoah. it was necessary that i should have his cavalry with me, and i was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the james river. let us now take account of what he was doing. on the 5th of march i had heard from sheridan. he had met early between staunton and charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command. early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. on the 12th i heard from him again. he had turned east, to come to white house. he could not go to lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. he had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered. i had supplies sent around to white house for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. we had intended to abandon it because the james river had now become our base of supplies. sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by custer and devin. general merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition. they stopped at charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward lynchburg. he also sent a division along the james river canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. all mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also. sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to white house was now somewhat hazardous. he determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. he did this, destroying the canal as far as goochland, and the railroad to a point as near richmond as he could get. on the 10th he was at columbia. negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal. his cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. he had captured most of early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. when he reached ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. he resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the south and north anna, going north, and reached white house safely on the 19th. the time for sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from goldsboro where he then was. supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. i had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of goldsboro on the 18th of april, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. sherman was anxious that i should wait where i was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but i had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. i had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until sheridan, who was on his way from the shenandoah valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which i had in mind. however, having arrived at white house on the 19th of march, i was enabled to make my plans. prompted by my anxiety lest lee should get away some night before i was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into north carolina to join with johnston in attempting to crush out sherman, i had, as early as the 1st of the month of march, given instructions to the troops around petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken. it is now known that early in the month of march mr. davis and general lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. they, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. general lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around petersburg. the night of the 24th of march was fixed upon for this assault, and general gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. the point between fort stedman and battery no. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack. the attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines. lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape. the plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line. gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. for some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the confederate general knew. taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to desert. when they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. in the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. this plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce gordon had to be brought from the north side of the james river and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. the charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between fort stedman and battery no. 10. then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. continuing the charge, they also carried batteries eleven and twelve to our left, which they turned toward city point. meade happened to be at city point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to meade's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. general tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was willcox. hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into fort stedman. on the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by willcox early in the morning. parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. the artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. they all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. this effort of lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours. after the recapture of the batteries taken by the confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held. this, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later. the day that gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of march) i issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. ord, with three divisions of infantry and mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the james river and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. he left weitzel with the rest of the army of the james to hold bermuda hundred and the north of the james river. the engineer brigade was to be left at city point, and parke's corps in the lines about petersburg. (*42) ord was at his place promptly. humphreys and warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. they were directed on the arrival of ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross hatcher's run and extend out west toward five forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the south side railroad and ultimately the danville railroad. there was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the army of the james had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. this was what was known as the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac --sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. sheridan reached city point on the 26th day of march. his horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. a few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. immediately on general sheridan's arrival at city point i prepared his instructions for the move which i had decided upon. the movement was to commence on the 29th of the month. after reading the instructions i had given him, sheridan walked out of my tent, and i followed to have some conversation with him by himself --not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. in preparing his instructions i contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing five forks, driving the enemy from petersburg and richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. but the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise. knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, i provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the army of the potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the danville railroad, or near it, across the roanoke, get in the rear of johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with sherman in destroying johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which sherman already had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around petersburg and richmond. i saw that after sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the army of the potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. i said to him: "general, this portion of your instructions i have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. i told him that, as a matter of fact, i intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther. his face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said: "i am glad to hear it, and we can do it." sheridan was not however to make his movement against five forks until he got further instructions from me. one day, after the movement i am about to describe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at dabney's mills. he met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. although my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about city point and in the lines around petersburg, he asked sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that i send for him. i did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. knowing as i did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, i determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after i had started out the roads were still very heavy. orders were given accordingly. finally the 29th of march came, and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. on that date i moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about petersburg. it soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of virginia and other southern states. it became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. the army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. the next day, march 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting sheridan with his cavalry over by dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to five forks, thus menacing the right of lee's line. this movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or five forks. the column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. the forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and five forks. my hope was that sheridan would be able to carry five forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. general wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which i intended to order as soon as information reached me of sheridan's success. he was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get. it is natural to suppose that lee would understand my design to be to get up to the south side and ultimately to the danville railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. these roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in richmond and petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. he did on the 30th send pickett with five brigades to reinforce five forks. he also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the james river to come over on call. he came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank. sheridan moved back to dinwiddie court-house on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to five forks. he had only his cavalry with him. soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. he gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of five forks. here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. in this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send wright's corps to his assistance. i replied to him that it was impossible to send wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (humphreys's) and 5th (warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at five forks, and that i would send warren. accordingly orders were sent to warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to dinwiddie court house and put himself in communication with sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. he was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. when he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at gravelly run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. he was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by general meade. he now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that sheridan determined to move forward without him. however, ayres's division of warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under sheridan. warren reported to sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting. this did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with ayres's division did most excellent service during the day. crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. once there it did very excellent service. sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon five forks itself. he was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to dinwiddie court-house, or even further than that for the night. it was at this junction of affairs that sheridan wanted to get crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted warren. he sent staff officer after staff officer in search of warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. at all events sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. finally he went himself. he issued an order relieving warren and assigning griffin to the command of the 5th corps. the troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. i was so much dissatisfied with warren's dilatory movements in the battle of white oak road and in his failure to reach sheridan in time, that i was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail sheridan. he was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. but i had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. he could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. he would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move. i had sent a staff officer to general sheridan to call his attention to these defects, and to say that as much as i liked general warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. it was upon that authorization that sheridan removed warren. i was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that i had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. it was dusk when our troops under sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. the two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. the flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west. this pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps across hatcher's run to just south-west of petersburg, and facing them toward it. merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of five forks. this was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of april. i then issued orders for an assault by wright and parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. i also ordered the 2d corps, general humphreys, and general ord with the army of the james, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front. i notified mr. lincoln at city point of the success of the day; in fact i had reported to him during the day and evening as i got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that i wanted to relieve his mind as much as i could. i notified weitzel on the north side of the james river, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of richmond. i was afraid that lee would regard the possession of five forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. it was for this reason that i had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as i had received the news of the capture of five forks. the corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. but we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the james river, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning. at that hour parke's and wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. wright swung around to his left and moved to hatcher's run, sweeping everything before him. the enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. as you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about hatcher's run they must be nearly two miles apart. both parke and wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners--wright about three thousand of them. in the meantime ord and humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before wright got up to that point, ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. the second corps soon followed; and the outer works of petersburg were in the hands of the national troops, never to be wrenched from them again. when wright reached hatcher's run, he sent a regiment to destroy the south side railroad just outside of the city. my headquarters were still at dabney's saw-mills. as soon as i received the news of wright's success, i sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at bermuda hundred and those on the north side of the james, and to the president at city point. further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did i sent the additional news to these points. finding at length that they were all in, i mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. when i arrived there i rode my horse over the parapet just as wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. i was soon joined inside by general meade and his staff. lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. before noon longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the james river thus bringing the bulk of lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. as soon as i learned this i notified weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have hartsuff, commanding the bermuda hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; hartsuff especially should do so, for this would separate richmond and petersburg. sheridan, after he had returned to five forks, swept down to petersburg, coming in on our left. this gave us a continuous line from the appomattox river below the city to the same river above. at eleven o'clock, not having heard from sheridan, i reinforced parke with two brigades from city point. with this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. he also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy. lee brought additional troops and artillery against parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses. the enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, fort gregg and fort whitworth. we thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. about one o'clock in the day, fort gregg was assaulted by foster's division of the 24th corps (gibbon's), supported by two brigades from ord's command. the battle was desperate and the national troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in fort whitworth evacuated the place. the guns of fort gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of fort whitworth surrendered. i had ordered miles in the morning to report to sheridan. in moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the white oak road and the claiborne road. the enemy fell back to sutherland station on the south side road and were followed by miles. this position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. sheridan now came up and miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which sheridan gave. by this time humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over miles, who commanded a division in his corps. i had sent an order to humphreys to turn to his right and move towards petersburg. this order he now got, and started off, thus leaving miles alone. the latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards. hearing that miles had been left in this position, i directed humphreys to send a division back to his relief. he went himself. sheridan before starting to sweep down to petersburg had sent merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some confederate cavalry that had assembled there. merritt drove them north to the appomattox river. sheridan then took the enemy at sutherland station on the reverse side from where miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three confederate corps, to flight. sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. i cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to city point that evening: boydton road, near petersburg, april 2, 1865.--4.40 p.m. colonel t. s. bowers, city point. we are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the appomattox below petersburg to the river above. heth's and wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the white oak road to sutherland station on the south side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. not knowing whether sheridan would get up in time, general humphreys was sent with another division from here. the whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. i do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * i think the president might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. during the night of april 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below. i ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five a.m., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated petersburg early in the morning. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. general meade and i entered petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast there. as we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the confederate army. i did not have artillery brought up, because i was sure lee was trying to make his escape, and i wanted to push immediately in pursuit. at all events i had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and i hoped to capture them soon. soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the army of northern virginia. he said that lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from richmond, and falling back into this prepared work. this statement was made to general meade and myself when we were together. i had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the appomattox for the purpose of heading off lee; but meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the appomattox there at once and move against lee in his new position. i knew that lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the james and appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the potomac and the james. then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. it would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. my judgment was that lee would necessarily have to evacuate richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the danville road. accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of lee, and i told meade this. he suggested that if lee was going that way we would follow him. my reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (meade) believed him to be in at that time, i wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the danville railroad, at its crossing of the appomattox river, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. i had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the danville road early in the morning, supposing that lee would be gone during the night. during the night i strengthened sheridan by sending him humphreys's corps. lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. davis was at church when he received lee's dispatch. the congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. the rebel government left richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. at night lee ordered his troops to assemble at amelia court house, his object being to get away, join johnston if possible, and to try to crush sherman before i could get there. as soon as i was sure of this i notified sheridan and directed him to move out on the danville railroad to the south side of the appomattox river as speedily as possible. he replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. i then ordered the rest of the army of the potomac under meade to follow the same road in the morning. parke's corps followed by the same road, and the army of the james was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the south side railroad to burke's station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. that road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives. mr. lincoln was at city point at the time, and had been for some days. i would have let him know what i contemplated doing, only while i felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then i would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. but when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us godspeed, remained there to hear the result. the next morning after the capture of petersburg, i telegraphed mr. lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while i would await his arrival. i had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the national army left petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. there was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. we had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the president arrived. about the first thing that mr. lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was: "do you know, general, that i have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this." our movements having been successful up to this point, i no longer had any object in concealing from the president all my movements, and the objects i had in view. he remained for some days near city point, and i communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. mr. lincoln knew that it had been arranged for sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of lee's army. i told him that i had been very anxious to have the eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. the western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the mississippi river to the state of north carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of richmond, asking admittance. i said to him that if the western armies should be even upon the field, operating against richmond and lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. it might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of congress of the east and those of the west in some of their debates. western members might be throwing it up to the members of the east that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. mr. lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done. the army of the potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. the army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the united states. its loss would be the loss of the cause. every energy, therefore, was put forth by the confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. everything else would go if it went. lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the south in another quarter. i never expected any such bickering as i have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians. possibly i am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. when our conversation was at an end mr. lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to city point, while i and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. up to this time i had not received the report of the capture of richmond. soon after i left president lincoln i received a dispatch from general weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. the city was in the most utter confusion. the authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. the city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. in fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that lee had gained an important victory somewhere around petersburg. weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. the city was on fire. our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. the fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army. all authorities deny that it was authorized, and i presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. be that as it may, the national troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. the troops that had formed lee's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the appomattox river until finally they took water and crossed over. i left mr. lincoln and started, as i have already said, to join the command, which halted at sutherland station, about nine miles out. we had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. this caused further delay. general wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. they did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the army of the potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. so the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at deep creek, and driven them north to the appomattox, where, i presume, most of them were forced to cross. on the morning of the 4th i learned that lee had ordered rations up from danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at farmville. this showed that lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of farmville. i notified sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach lee. he responded that he had already sent crook's division to get upon the road between burkesville and jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought crook must be there now. the bulk of the army moved directly for jetersville by two roads. after i had received the dispatch from sheridan saying that crook was on the danville road, i immediately ordered meade to make a forced march with the army of the potomac, and to send parke's corps across from the road they were on to the south side railroad, to fall in the rear of the army of the james and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. our troops took possession of jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations from danville. the dispatch had not been sent, but sheridan sent a special messenger with it to burkesville and had it forwarded from there. in the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. at this time merritt and mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the army of the potomac was marching on and the appomattox river, and were attacking the enemy in flank. they picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. lee intrenched himself at amelia court house, and also his advance north of jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. the country was very poor and afforded but very little. his foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the army of northern virginia. griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of jetersville, and sheridan notified me of the situation. i again ordered meade up with all dispatch, sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting lee's entire army. meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. humphreys moved at two, and wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as i have said, the wagons being far in the rear. i stayed that night at wilson's station on the south side railroad. on the morning of the 5th i sent word to sheridan of the progress meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack lee. we had now no other objective than the confederate armies, and i was anxious to close the thing up at once. on the 5th i marched again with ord's command until within about ten miles of burkesville, where i stopped to let his army pass. i then received from sheridan the following dispatch: "the whole of lee's army is at or near amelia court house, and on this side of it. general davies, whom i sent out to painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. we can capture the army of northern virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. my cavalry was at burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the danville road, last night. general lee is at amelia court house in person. they are out of rations, or nearly so. they were advancing up the railroad towards burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point." it now became a life and death struggle with lee to get south to his provisions. sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards farmville, moved davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. davies found the movement had already commenced. he attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. he also captured five pieces of artillery. the confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow davies, and they came to his relief in time. a sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. meade himself reached jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. the head of humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at meade's request, the latter still being very sick. he extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of griffin's corps, and one division to the right. the cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. he wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. at this juncture sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished i was there myself. the letter was dated amelia court house, april 5th, and signed by colonel taylor. it was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the confederate army. sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. i received a second message from sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence. this was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. it was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. this was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. it would cause no surprise at all to see a confederate soldier chewing tobacco. it was nearly night when this letter was received. i gave ord directions to continue his march to burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and farmville. i then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join meade's army. the distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. however, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where sheridan was bivouacked. we talked over the situation for some little time, sheridan explaining to me what he thought lee was trying to do, and that meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. we then together visited meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. i explained to meade that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, i had no doubt that lee was moving right then. meade changed his orders at once. they were now given for an advance on amelia court house, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville--correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. the appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood of the richmond and danville railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. sailor's creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the appomattox between the high bridge and jetersville. near the high bridge the stage road from petersburg to lynchburg crosses the appomattox river, also on a bridge. the railroad runs on the north side of the river to farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. the roads coming up from the south-east to farmville cross the appomattox river there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the lynchburg and petersburg railroad well to the left. lee, in pushing out from amelia court house, availed himself of all the roads between the danville road and appomattox river to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. in this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army. as expected, lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon amelia court house soon encountered them. there was a good deal of fighting before sailor's creek was reached. our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. a severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. there was as much gallantry displayed by some of the confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. the armies finally met on sailor's creek, when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into action. our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. the enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. this engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. when the move towards amelia court house had commenced that morning, i ordered wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. the object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the valley of virginia. the 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between burkesville and the high bridge. on the morning of the 6th he sent colonel washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy high bridge and to return rapidly to burkesville station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. soon after washburn had started ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent colonel read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. very shortly after this he heard that the head of lee's column had got up to the road between him and where washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. he rode on to farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off, and washburn confronting apparently the advance of lee's army. read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. he then gave the order to charge. this little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. colonel read fell mortally wounded, and then washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. the remainder then surrendered. the confederates took this to be only the advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the confederate army. this stoppage of lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the high bridge, and attempted to destroy it. he did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed lee to the intersection of the road crossing at farmville with the one from petersburg. here lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being intrenched. humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. he put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return. our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of prince edward's court house, along with the 5th corps (griffin's), ord falling in between griffin and the appomattox. crook's division of cavalry and wright's corps pushed on west of farmville. when the cavalry reached farmville they found that some of the confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. these troops retreated to the north side of the appomattox to join lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. considerable fighting ensued there between wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve humphreys, arriving there that night. i had stopped the night before at burkesville junction. our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and ord's command was extended from that point towards farmville. here i met dr. smith, a virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with general ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, ewell had said that when we had got across the james river he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. the authorities thought differently, however. now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. he said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. he was not sure that lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the president, but he hoped he would. i rode in to farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. sheridan and ord were pushing through, away to the south. meade was back towards the high bridge, and humphreys confronting lee as before stated. after having gone into bivouac at prince edward's court house, sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before lee's army could secure them. he wrote me a note telling me this. this fact, together with the incident related the night before by dr. smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with general lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. i therefore wrote to him on this day, as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., 5 p.m., april 7, 1865. general r. e. lee commanding c. s. a. the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows: april 7, 1865. general: i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant, commanding armies of the u. s. this was not satisfactory, but i regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows: april 8, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia is just received. in reply i would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will be received. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's army was rapidly crumbling. many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the state where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. i know that i occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at farmville, which had probably been used as a confederate hospital. the next morning when i came out i found a confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. he said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. i told him to stay there and he would not be molested. that was one regiment which had been eliminated from lee's force by this crumbling process. although sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. they began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. nothing seemed to fatigue them. they were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. the infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. sheridan sent custer with his division to move south of appomattox station, which is about five miles south-west of the court house, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. they got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. the other four were held by custer. the head of lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, i suppose, that there were any union soldiers near. the confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains. however, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. in the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards farmville, and the fight continued. so far, only our cavalry and the advance of lee's army were engaged. soon, however, lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. but our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found griffin's corps and the army of the james confronting them. a sharp engagement ensued, but lee quickly set up a white flag. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. on the 8th i had followed the army of the potomac in rear of lee. i was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. i spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. during the night i received lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. (*43) but it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and i answered him as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of yesterday is received. as i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. i was not more than two or three miles from appomattox court house at the time, but to go direct i would have to pass through lee's army, or a portion of it. i had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. when the white flag was put out by lee, as already described, i was in this way moving towards appomattox court house, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what lee had done. lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise meade and one to the front to sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until i could be communicated with. as they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. they were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the army of northern virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. they, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. it was found that, from the route i had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me. april 9, 1865. general: i received your note of this morning on the picket-line whither i had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. r. e. lee, general. lieutenant-general u. s. grant commanding u. s. armies. when the officer reached me i was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant i saw the contents of the note i was cured. i wrote the following note in reply and hastened on: april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. armies. your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the richmond and lynchburg road to the farmville and lynchburg road. i am at this writing about four miles west of walker's church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i was conducted at once to where sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the confederate army near by. they were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the confederates to get away. they said they believed that johnston was marching up from north carolina now, and lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if i would only let them go in. but i had no doubt about the good faith of lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. i found him at the house of a mr. mclean, at appomattox court house, with colonel marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my arrival. the head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. before stating what took place between general lee and myself, i will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. the war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. as i have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the confederate forces. running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. general babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met general lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. the story had no other foundation than that. like many other stories, it would be very good if it was only true. i had known general lee in the old army, and had served with him in the mexican war; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while i would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of general scott in the mexican war. when i had left camp that morning i had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. i was without a sword, as i usually was when on horseback on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who i was. when i went into the house i found general lee. we greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. i had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. what general lee's feelings were i do not know. as he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it. whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. i felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, i believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. i do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. general lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the state of virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. in my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, i must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. but this was not a matter that i thought of until afterwards. we soon fell into a conversation about old army times. he remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and i told him that as a matter of course i remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages), i had thought it very likely that i had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. our conversation grew so pleasant that i almost forgot the object of our meeting. after the conversation had run on in this style for some time, general lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms i proposed to give his army. i said that i meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. he said that he had so understood my letter. then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. this continued for some little time, when general lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms i proposed to give his army ought to be written out. i called to general parker, secretary on my staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following terms: appomattox c. h., va., ap 19th, 1865. gen. r. e. lee, comd'g c. s. a. gen: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., i propose to receive the surrender of the army of n. va. on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. very respectfully, u. s. grant, lt. gen. when i put my pen to the paper i did not know the first word that i should make use of in writing the terms. i only knew what was in my mind, and i wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. as i wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. no conversation, not one word, passed between general lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. he appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. when he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, i thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. then, after a little further conversation, general lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the united states (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. i told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. he then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear. i then said to him that i thought this would be about the last battle of the war--i sincerely hoped so; and i said further i took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. the whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. the united states did not want them and i would, therefore, instruct the officers i left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. he then sat down and wrote out the following letter: headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. general:--i received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant. while duplicates of the two letters were being made, the union generals present were severally presented to general lee. the much talked of surrendering of lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. the word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until i wrote it in the terms. there was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment i wrote it down. if i had happened to omit it, and general lee had called my attention to it, i should have put it in the terms precisely as i acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses. general lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. i told him "certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. his answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and i authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to appomattox station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. as for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. generals gibbon, griffin and merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of lee's troops before they should start for their homes--general lee leaving generals longstreet, gordon and pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. lee and i then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at appomattox. soon after lee's departure i telegraphed to washington as follows: headquarters appomattox c. h., va., april 9th, 1865, 4.30 p.m. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington. general lee surrendered the army of northern virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. the accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. when news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. i at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. the confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. i determined to return to washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what i now deemed other useless outlay of money. before leaving, however, i thought i (*44) would like to see general lee again; so next morning i rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag. lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. we had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which lee said to me that the south was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us. he expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. i then suggested to general lee that there was not a man in the confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies i had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. but lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the president first. i knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right. i was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the confederate lines. they finally asked permission of lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. they went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned. when lee and i separated he went back to his lines and i returned to the house of mr. mclean. here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. for the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. after an hour pleasantly passed in this way i set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for burkesville junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south --president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. after the fall of petersburg, and when the armies of the potomac and the james were in motion to head off lee's army, the morale of the national troops had greatly improved. there was no more straggling, no more rear guards. the men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as i have already stated, striving to get to the front. for the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. on the other hand, the confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of sailor's creek. they threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. i have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel i met at farmville. as a result of these and other influences, when lee finally surrendered at appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. it was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, north and south, that lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. as a matter of official record, and in addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between march 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 confederates, to say nothing of lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. the same record shows the number of cannon, including those at appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named. there has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the south magnifying the number of union troops engaged and belittling their own. northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. i have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal to the union, speak of what a splendid fight the south had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. i will add to their argument. we had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the south. but the south had rebelled against the national government. it was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. the whole south was a military camp. the occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of state and intended national government. the old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. the slaves, the non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plough. the four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the north, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. women did not work in the fields in the north, and children attended school. the arts of peace were carried on in the north. towns and cities grew during the war. inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field. in the south no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. no rear had to be protected. all the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. the press of the south, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the southern cause. in the north, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace. the furnace was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the north and the troops invading the south, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. in the north the press was free up to the point of open treason. the citizen could entertain his views and express them. troops were necessary in the northern states to prevent prisoners from the southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our northern cities. plans were formed by northern and southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. the copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the union army. it was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the confederate army. the north would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the union sentiment was in the south, than we were as the battle was fought. as i have said, the whole south was a military camp. the colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. the cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. the conscription took all of them. before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. it would have been an offence, directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the south, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the confederate army. he would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the north showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. i know they did not. during 1862 and '3, john h. morgan, a partisan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the army of the ohio in kentucky and tennessee. he had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. the army operating against the south, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the north, from which all supplies had to come to the front. every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. these guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. morgan was foot-loose and could operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. during the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. he destroyed many millions of property in addition. places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the national front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. it is safe to say that more than half the national army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. then, again, large forces were employed where no confederate army confronted them. i deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the national numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy. while i was in pursuit of general lee, the president went to richmond in company with admiral porter, and on board his flagship. he found the people of that city in great consternation. the leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. general weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the confederate capital. the president sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, admiral porter and a leading citizen of virginia being also present. after this interview the president wrote an order in about these words, which i quote from memory: "general weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the legislature of virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the virginia troops from the confederate armies." immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. this call, however, went very much further than mr. lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the "legislature of virginia" but "the body which called itself the legislature of virginia." mr. stanton saw the call as published in the northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the president was nearer the spot than he was. this was characteristic of mr. stanton. he was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he wanted to do. he was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. in this latter particular i entirely agree with the view he evidently held. the constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. while it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. the constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war. those in rebellion against the government of the united states were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the south was then fighting. it would be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the union intact, should be restrained by a constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of the confederation of the states. after i left general lee at appomattox station, i went with my staff and a few others directly to burkesville station on my way to washington. the road from burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when i reached city point. as soon as possible i took a dispatch-boat thence to washington city. while in washington i was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. but by the 14th i was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in burlington, new jersey, attending school. mrs. grant was with me in washington at the time, and we were invited by president and mrs. lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. i replied to the president's verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that i was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if i could get through my work during the day i should do so. i did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending mr. lincoln word, of course, that i would not be at the theatre. at that time the railroad to new york entered philadelphia on broad street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the delaware river, and then ferried to camden, at which point they took the cars again. when i reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of philadelphia, i found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the president and mr. seward, and of the probable assassination of the vice president, mr. johnson, and requesting my immediate return. it would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the president. i knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the united states enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. i knew also the feeling that mr. johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the southern people, and i feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. i felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. i immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to washington city; but mrs. grant was with me; it was after midnight and burlington was but an hour away. finding that i could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the philadelphia station, i went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train. the joy that i had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in washington when i left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. i have stated what i believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that i was right. i believe the south would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by mr. johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his administration. be this as it may, mr. lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation. mr. johnson's course towards the south did engender bitterness of feeling. his denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, "treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those men of the south who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. he uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. the president of the united states is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of mr. lincoln, i believe the great majority of the northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. they believed, i have no doubt, as i did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. the people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. they surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. i do not believe that the majority of the northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. they supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but mr. johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the south not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. this was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. the southerners had the most power in the executive branch, mr. johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact south, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the north, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. thus mr. johnson, fighting congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the south on the other, drove congress, which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. there being a solid south on one side that was in accord with the political party in the north which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the states, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. in this work, i shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of congress in this particular proved a wise one. it became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the president and the blindness of the southern people to their own interest. as to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, i gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, i favored immediate enfranchisement. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman--capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis--general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. when i left appomattox i ordered general meade to proceed leisurely back to burkesville station with the army of the potomac and the army of the james, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. general johnston, as has been stated before, was in north carolina confronting general sherman. it could not be known positively, of course, whether johnston would surrender on the news of lee's surrender, though i supposed he would; and if he did not, burkesville station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. the army which i could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away. with the loss of their capital and the army of northern virginia it was doubtful whether johnston's men would have the spirit to stand. my belief was that he would make no such attempt; but i adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable. simultaneously with my starting from city point, i sent a messenger to north carolina by boat with dispatches to general sherman, informing him of the surrender of lee and his army; also of the terms which i had given him; and i authorized sherman to give the same terms to johnston if the latter chose to accept them. the country is familiar with the terms that sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely. general sherman had met mr. lincoln at city point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what mr. lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at hampton roads, viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: one being that the union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. he had also seen notices in the newspapers of mr. lincoln's visit to richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the legislature of virginia. sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that i had made with general lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the president of the united states. but seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. they signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. as the world knows, sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the president and secretary of war in very bitter terms. some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor --a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to johnston and his army. if sherman had taken authority to send johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own states, without submitting the question to the authorities at washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. but the feeling against sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the american people. when, some days after my return to washington, president johnson and the secretary of war received the terms which general sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and i was sent for. there seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. a message went out directing the troops in the south not to obey general sherman. i was ordered to proceed at once to north carolina and take charge of matter there myself. of course i started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. i repaired to raleigh, where sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence. when i arrived i went to sherman's headquarters, and we were at once closeted together. i showed him the instruction and orders under which i visited him. i told him that i wanted him to notify general johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms i had given general lee. i sent sherman to do this himself. i did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so i left it to sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that i was anywhere near the field. as soon as possible i started to get away, to leave sherman quite free and untrammelled. at goldsboro', on my way back, i met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and i found in them indications of great excitement in the north over the terms sherman had given johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the president and secretary of war. i knew that sherman must see these papers, and i fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though i do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own. but like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions i had given him, obtained the surrender of johnston's army, and settled down in his camp about raleigh, to await final orders. there were still a few expeditions out in the south that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. with these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of lee and johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. the three expeditions which i had tried so hard to get off from the commands of thomas and canby did finally get off: one under canby himself, against mobile, late in march; that under stoneman from east tennessee on the 20th; and the one under wilson, starting from eastport, mississippi, on the 22d of march. they were all eminently successful, but without any good result. indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. the war was practically over before their victories were gained. they were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the confederate armies to a surrender. the only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by stoneman's getting near lynchburg about the time the armies of the potomac and the james were closing in on lee at appomattox. stoneman entered north carolina and then pushed north to strike the virginia and tennessee railroad. he got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of lynchburg. his approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. he then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between sherman and johnston for the latter's surrender. in this raid stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success. canby appeared before mobile on the 27th of march. the city of mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--spanish fort, on the east side of the bay, and fort blakely, north of the city. these forts were invested. on the night of the 8th of april, the national troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, spanish fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of lee's surrender, blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. on the 11th the city was evacuated. i had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. it finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever. wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. he was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. he now had principally conscripts. his conscripts were generally old men and boys. he had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of wilson's cavalry. selma fell on the 2d of april, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. tuscaloosa, montgomery and west point fell in quick succession. these were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. they were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. macon surrendered on the 21st of april. here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of johnston's army. wilson belonged to the military division commanded by sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. this stopped all fighting. general richard taylor had now become the senior confederate officer still at liberty east of the mississippi river, and on the 4th of may he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. general e. kirby smith surrendered the trans-mississippi department on the 26th of may, leaving no other confederate army at liberty to continue the war. wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. this occurred at irwinsville, georgia, on the 11th of may. for myself, and i believe mr. lincoln shared the feeling, i would have been very glad to have seen mr. davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: i feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. the young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year. the northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes. mr. lincoln, i believe, wanted mr. davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. he knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-confederate president, for high treason. he thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. at all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. but his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of the confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. all things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. this reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as abraham lincoln. he would have proven the best friend the south could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a president who at first wished to revenge himself upon southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. the story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the president is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. these laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the statute books of the united states, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought. much was said at the time about the garb mr. davis was wearing when he was captured. i cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but i have been under the belief, from information given to me by general wilson shortly after the event, that when mr. davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. naturally enough, mr. davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. if captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. he represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record. every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers. as my official letters on file in the war department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon general thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that i give my estimate of him as a soldier. the same remark will apply also in the case of general canby. i had been at west point with thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. he was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. he possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. he gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. this implies a very valuable quality. it is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it. thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. he could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. he was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. i do not believe that he could ever have conducted sherman's army from chattanooga to atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. on the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better. thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5. general canby was an officer of great merit. he was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. there have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. his knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the military division of the gulf. he was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. i presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against general thomas harris in missouri in 1861. neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. had canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, i have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. he was afterwards killed in the lava beds of southern oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile modoc indians. his character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. his services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. i have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes --grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton --estimate of the different corps commanders. things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in north carolina and virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the south to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several states, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes. i do not know how far this was necessary, but i deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued. i think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. sherman marched his troops from goldsboro, up to manchester, on the south side of the james river, opposite richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to savannah to see what the situation was there. it was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. halleck had been sent to richmond to command virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even sherman's own troops from obeying his, sherman's, orders. sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. on his arrival at fortress monroe returning from savannah, sherman received an invitation from halleck to come to richmond and be his guest. this he indignantly refused, and informed halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. he also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for halleck not to show himself, because he (sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received. very soon after that, sherman received orders from me to proceed to washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops. there was no incident worth noting in the march northward from goldsboro, to richmond, or in that from richmond to washington city. the army, however, commanded by sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the west and had marched from the mississippi through the southern states to the sea, from there to goldsboro, and thence to washington city, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the army of the potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation of the union. the march of sherman's army from atlanta to the sea and north to goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted. it had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. all the states east of the mississippi river up to the state of georgia, had felt the hardships of the war. georgia, and south carolina, and almost all of north carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. their newspapers had given such an account of confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves. even during this march of sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the southern people. as the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. in turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise. another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of georgia was entirely cut off from the confederate armies. as the troops advanced north from savannah, the destruction of the railroads in south carolina and the southern part of north carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in virginia and north carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage. in due time the two armies, one from burkesville junction and the other from the neighborhood of raleigh, north carolina, arrived and went into camp near the capital, as directed. the troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. i doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle. the armies of europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. there was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting north. i remember one little incident which i will relate as an anecdote characteristic of mr. lincoln. it occurred a day after i reached washington, and about the time general meade reached burkesville with the army. governor smith of virginia had left richmond with the confederate states government, and had gone to danville. supposing i was necessarily with the army at burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the commonwealth of the state of virginia, he had temporarily removed the state capital from richmond to danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the federal authorities. i give this letter only in substance. he also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. general meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that i was not present. he read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. meeting mr. lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, i repeated its contents to him. mr. lincoln, supposing i was asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of governor smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain irishman (giving the name) he knew in springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. these friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. they asked pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented. he had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. after a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. so holding the glass behind him, he said: "doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself." i do not remember what the instructions were the president gave me, but i know that governor smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. i also know that if mr. lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. he would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice. on the 18th of may orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the president and his cabinet of sherman's and meade's armies. the review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the president's house. sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the president and his cabinet. here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the secretary of war, by refusing to take his extended hand. sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the potomac. during the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the capitol. promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review. sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the army of the potomac. the latter had been operating where they received directly from the north full supplies of food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the army of the potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. they exhibited also some of the order of march through georgia where the "sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as sherman's army went marching through. in the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the men. negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it. the sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the capitol to the treasury building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. the national flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. the city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new president takes his seat. it may not be out of place to again allude to president lincoln and the secretary of war, mr. stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. there is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the president. with mr. stanton the case is different. they were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability. mr. lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. he preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. it distressed him to disappoint others. in matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way. mr. stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. he cared nothing for the feeling of others. in fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. he felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. if his act was not sustained, he would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so. it was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other. the secretary was required to prevent the president's being imposed upon. the president was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. i do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people. it is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. mr. lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust. mr. lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. the secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the confederate capital. he could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. the enemy would not have been in danger if mr. stanton had been in the field. these characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after early came so near getting into the capital. among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the states, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers i have not yet given any estimate, are meade, hancock, sedgwick, burnside, terry and hooker. there were others of great merit, such as griffin, humphreys, wright and mackenzie. of those first named, burnside at one time had command of the army of the potomac, and later of the army of the ohio. hooker also commanded the army of the potomac for a short time. general meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. he had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. he never had, i believe, a command of less than a brigade. he saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. his first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. he was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. he was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. he was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. no one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. this made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. in spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country. general burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. he was not, however, fitted to command an army. no one knew this better than himself. he always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. it was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. of hooker i saw but little during the war. i had known him very well before, however. where i did see him, at chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of lookout mountain and into chattanooga valley was brilliant. i nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. he was not subordinate to his superiors. he was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. his disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors. hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. he commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. he was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance. tall, well-formed and, at the time of which i now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. his genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. no matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them. sedgwick was killed at spottsylvania before i had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation. i had known him in mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. he stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. he was brave and conscientious. his ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. he was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. he declined the command of the army of the potomac once, if not oftener. general alfred h. terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. his way was won without political influence up to an important separate command--the expedition against fort fisher, in january, 1865. his success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. he is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. as a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time. griffin, humphreys, and mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention. all three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the potomac and the james, which culminated at appomattox court house, on the 9th of april, 1865. the sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. i regarded mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. graduating at west point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. this he did upon his own merit and without influence. conclusion. the cause of the great war of the rebellion against the united status will have to be attributed to slavery. for some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "a state half slave and half free cannot exist." all must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. i took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, i have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. hence the people of the south were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. they were enabled to maintain this control long after the states where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the northern states. they saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the northern states by enacting such laws as the fugitive slave law. by this law every northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a southern man. northern marshals became slave-catchers, and northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution. this was a degradation which the north would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute books. prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the north had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. but they were not willing to play the role of police for the south in the protection of this particular institution. in the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the states were each almost a separate nationality. at that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. but the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the states got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the national government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. it is probably well that we had the war when we did. we are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. the civilized nations of europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people. then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. but this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. the conduct of some of the european states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the european nations thought it would be well to give us a check. we might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. hence, england was constantly finding fault with the administration at washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade. she also joined, at first, with france and spain in setting up an austrian prince upon the throne in mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that mexico had of being treated as an independent power. it is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted. mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon mexico as a foothold for establishing a european monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. i, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the united states by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the united states would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. i often spoke of the matter to mr. lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. i inferred that they felt a good deal as i did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands. all of the powers except france very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an austrian prince upon the throne of mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. after the surrender of lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, i sent sheridan with a corps to the rio grande to have him where he might aid juarez in expelling the french from mexico. these troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the rio grande, where sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of mexico bordering on that stream. this soon led to a request from france that we should withdraw our troops from the rio grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. finally bazaine was withdrawn from mexico by order of the french government. from that day the empire began to totter. mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. france is the traditional ally and friend of the united states. i did not blame france for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the mexican republic. that was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. he had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. he tried to play the part of the first napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. he sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. like our own war between the states, the franco-prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to france all it cost her people. it was the completion of the downfall of napoleon iii. the beginning was when he landed troops on this continent. failing here, the prestige of his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. he must achieve a success or fall. he tried to strike down his neighbor, prussia--and fell. i never admired the character of the first napoleon; but i recognize his great genius. his work, too, has left its impress for good on the face of europe. the third napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act. to maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. there can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate european powers for a time until we could prepare for them. we should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the finest possible condition. neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime. money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. the work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security. england's course towards the united states during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother country. i regretted it. england and the united states are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. they speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. we together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world. england governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. she is just to the conquered, but rigid. she makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. she does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government. the hostility of england to the united states during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. it was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. i am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in england a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the union, or, as they called it, in favor of the north. even in manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the north at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. it is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. the condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. but he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens. it was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of santo domingo during the time i was president of the united states. santo domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. the island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. the products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. i took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race. they would still be states of the union, and under the protection of the general government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored. by the war with mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. it was seen that the volunteers of the mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the pacific coast country. their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. after our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. the mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there. this territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. railroads traverse it in every direction, north, south, east, and west. the mines are worked. the high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. this is the work of the volunteer. it is probable that the indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. we must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. in fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. so much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. before, new territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread and vegetables. all the streams abounded with fish. trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the states once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey. little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. this is all changed now. the war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. the feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. there is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea"; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography. the war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. we have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter. i feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between the federal and confederate. i cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but i feel it within me that it is to be so. the universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of the answer to "let us have peace." the expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country, nor to a division of the people. they came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the protestant, the catholic, and the jew; and from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. politics did not enter into the matter at all. i am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because i was the object of it. but the war between the states was a very bloody and a very costly war. one side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. i commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. i was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. it is a significant and gratifying fact that confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. i hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. appendix. report of lieutenant-general u. s. grant, of the united states armies 1864-65. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., july 22, 1865. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. sir: i have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the united states from the date of my appointment to command the same. from an early period in the rebellion i had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. the resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. the armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. it was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. from the first, i was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. i therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. these views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. all i can say is, that what i have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what i conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country. at the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: the mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal troops, from st. louis, missouri, to its mouth. the line of the arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the mississippi, north of that stream. a few points in southern louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the rio grande. all the balance of the vast territory of arkansas, louisiana, and texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. the let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. but the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through missouri, arkansas, and along the mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. to the east of the mississippi we held substantially with the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the state of tennessee. south of chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in georgia, sufficient to protect east tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at dalton, georgia. west virginia was substantially within our lines. virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the potomac river, a small area about the mouth of james river, covered by the troops at norfolk and fort monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the potomac lying along the rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at plymouth, washington, and new bern, in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, fort pulaski, and port royal, in south carolina; fernandina and st. augustine, in florida. key west and pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. the accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to general sherman and other commanders in march, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy. behind the union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. in the south, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. this enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. the enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the mississippi into two armies, commanded by generals r. e. lee and j. e. johnston, his ablest and best generals. the army commanded by lee occupied the south bank of the rapidan, extending from mine run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the potomac. the army under johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at dalton, georgia, covering and defending atlanta, georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under major-general w. t. sherman. in addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under forrest, in north-east mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the shenandoah valley, and in the western part of virginia and extreme eastern part of tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. these two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. major-general w. t. sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the mississippi river to the alleghanies and the department of arkansas, west of the mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against johnston. major-general george g. meade had the immediate command of the army of the potomac, from where i exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. general sherman was instructed to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. if the enemy in his front showed signs of joining lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while i would prevent the concentration of lee upon him, if it was in the power of the army of the potomac to do so. more specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that i had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. major-general n. p. banks, then on an expedition up red river against shreveport, louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of march, of the importance it was that shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than general sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by general sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold shreveport and the red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of new orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that new orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that i had directed general steele to make a real move from arkansas, as suggested by him (general banks), instead of a demonstration, as steele thought advisable. on the 31st of march, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows: "1st. if successful in your expedition against shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the red river to general steele and the navy. "2d. that you abandon texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the rio grande. this can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. at least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. "3d. by properly fortifying on the mississippi river, the force to guard it from port hudson to new orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. according to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against mobile. to this i expect to add five thousand men from missouri. if however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, i would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against mobile. with these and such additions as i can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon mobile. two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to admiral farragut. this gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. you can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. my own idea of the matter is that pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the gulf department, you will know best about the matter. it is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. all i would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general n. p. banks." major-general meade was instructed that lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever lee went he would go also. for his movement two plans presented themselves: one to cross the rapidan below lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond or going north on a raid. but if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. if we took the other route, brandy station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the york or james rivers. of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route. the following letter of instruction was addressed to major-general b. f. butler: "fort monroe, virginia, april 2, 1864. "general:-in the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. "it will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. but, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. by such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. lee's army and richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. the necessity of covering washington with the army of the potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. i propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: the army of the potomac will act from its present base, lee's army being the objective point. you will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--i should say not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south side of james river, richmond being your objective point. to the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from south carolina, under major-general gillmore, who will command them in person. major-general w. f. smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. "general gillmore will be ordered to report to you at fortress monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. "when you are notified to move, take city point with as much force as possible. fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. from city point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. "the fact that has already been stated--that is, that richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the potomac--must be your guide. this indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the james river as you advance. then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in richmond, the army of the potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. "all the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. if, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. "you will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." on the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. on the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of general meade, he was informed that i expected him to move from fort monroe the same day that general meade moved from culpeper. the exact time i was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of april; that it was my intention to fight lee between culpeper and richmond, if he would stand. should he, however, fall back into richmond, i would follow up and make a junction with his (general butler's) army on the james river; that, could i be certain he would be able to invest richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the james, above the city, i would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. in co-operation with the main movements against lee and johnston, i was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies operating against them. a very considerable force, under command of major-general sigel, was so held for the protection of west virginia, and the frontiers of maryland and pennsylvania. whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. by such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. general sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from beverly and charleston, under command of generals ord and crook, against the east tennessee and virginia railroad. subsequently, general ord having been relieved at his own request, general sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by beverly, and to form two columns, one under general crook, on the kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. the one on the shenandoah to assemble between cumberland and the shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while general crook would take possession of lewisburg with part of his force and move down the tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the new river bridge and the salt-works, at saltville, va. owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of may, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of may. my first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that general butler should succeed in his movement against richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. if he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of richmond. it was well understood, by both generals butler and meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the james river, in case of failure to destroy lee without it. before giving general butler his instructions, i visited him at fort monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. believing, however, in the practicability of capturing richmond unless it was reinforced, i made that the objective point of his operations. as the army of the potomac was to move simultaneously with him, lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of james river. i may here state that, commanding all the armies as i did, i tried, as far as possible, to leave general meade in independent command of the army of the potomac. my instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. the campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. his commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received. the movement of the army of the potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of may, under the immediate direction and orders of major-general meade, pursuant to instructions. before night, the whole army was across the rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at germania ford, and the second corps at ely's ford, the cavalry, under major-general sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. the average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. this i regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions i had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, major-general g. k. warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near mine run. the battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. general burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the army of the potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the rappahannock river and alexandria railroad, holding the road back to bull run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. this crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. by six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the rappahannock and rapidan rivers. considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. the battle of the wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. after dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. but the promptness of general sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. on the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. from this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. i therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. on the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards spottsylvania court house, the fifth corps moving on the most direct road. but the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. on the 8th, general warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at spottsylvania. this force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. on the morning of the 9th, general sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with richmond. the 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier major-general john sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. major-general h. g. wright succeeded him in command. early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. the second corps, major-general hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of johnson's division of ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. but the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from washington. deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at spottsylvania court house, orders were issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the north anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. late in the afternoon of the 19th, ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. this delayed the movement to the north anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. but the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the north anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. the fifth corps reached the north anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. the second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between that and jericho ford. general warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. on the 25th, general sheridan rejoined the army of the potomac from the raid on which he started from spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at beaver dam and ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at yellow tavern; carried the first line of works around richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the chickahominy at meadow bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to haxall's landing, on the james river, where he communicated with general butler. this raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. general butler moved his main force up the james river, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of may, general gillmore having joined him with the tenth corps. at the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of west point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under general kautz, from suffolk, to operate against the road south of petersburg and richmond. on the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both city point and bermuda hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. on the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. on the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the petersburg and richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. on the 9th he telegraphed as follows: "headquarters, near bermuda landing, may 9, 1864. "hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. "our operations may be summed up in a few words. with one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the peninsula, forced the chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position. these were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards richmond. "general kautz, with three thousand cavalry from suffolk, on the same day with our movement up james river, forced the black water, burned the railroad bridge at stony creek, below petersburg, cutting into beauregard's force at that point. "we have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of lee's army. i have ordered up the supplies. "beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by kautz. that portion which reached petersburg under hill i have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. "general grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to lee from beauregard's force. "benj. f. butler, major-general." on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at drury's bluff, or fort darling, with small loss. the time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of richmond and petersburg, enabling, as it did, beauregard to collect his loose forces in north and south carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. on the 16th, the enemy attacked general butler in his position in front of drury's bluff. he was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the james and appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. it required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there. on the 12th, general kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the danville railroad, which he struck at coalfield, powhatan, and chula stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the south side road, struck it at wilson's, wellsville, and black's and white's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to city point, which he reached on the 18th. on the 19th of april, and prior to the movement of general butler, the enemy, with a land force under general hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked plymouth, n. c., commanded by general h. w. wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. the gunboat smithfield was sunk, and the miami disabled. the army sent to operate against richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at bermuda hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by beauregard against the army of the potomac. in addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under breckinridge from the western part of virginia. the position of bermuda hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. i determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, i directed that they be sent forward, under command of major-general w. f. smith, to join the army of the potomac. on the 24th of may, the 9th army corps, commanded by major-general a. e. burnside, was assigned to the army of the potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of major-general meade's command. finding the enemy's position on the north anna stronger than either of his previous ones, i withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the north anna, and moved via hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right. generals torbert's and merritt's divisions of cavalry, under sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the pamunkey river at hanover town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the enemy at hawes's shop. on the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the hanover court house and cold harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the chickahominy. late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. an attack was immediately ordered by general meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. on the 31st, general wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the south anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. general sheridan, on the same day, reached cold harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and general smith's command, which had just arrived, via white house, from general butler's army. on the 1st day of june an attack was made at five p.m. by the 6th corps and the troops under general smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. this resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of general smith. during the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. that night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. the 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. on the 3d of june we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. in this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, i have reason to believe, was comparatively light. it was the only general attack made from the rapidan to the james which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. i would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as i had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. from the proximity of the enemy to his defences around richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. i was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the james. while the former might have been better as a covering for washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea, from the start, had been to beat lee's army north of richmond, if possible. then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the james river, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. after the battle of the wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. he acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of life than i was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that i had designed north of richmond. i therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to charlottesville and gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between richmond and the shenandoah valley and lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the james river, by the enemy's right flank, where i felt i could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. on the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under general sheridan, got off on the expedition against the virginia central railroad, with instructions to hunter, whom i hoped he would meet near charlottesville, to join his forces to sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the potomac by the route laid down in sheridan's instructions. on the 10th of june, general butler sent a force of infantry, under general gillmore, and of cavalry under general kautz, to capture petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the appomattox. the cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. general gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to bermuda hundred without attempting one. attaching great importance to the possession of petersburg, i sent back to bermuda hundred and city point, general smith's command by water, via the white house, to reach there in advance of the army of the potomac. this was for the express purpose of securing petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. the movement from cold harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. one division of cavalry, under general wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the chickahominy at long bridge, and moved out to white oak swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. the advance corps reached james river, at wilcox's landing and charles city court house, on the night of the 13th. during three long years the armies of the potomac and northern virginia had been confronting each other. in that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. the southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture washington and march on to new york, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. hence, antietam, gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. their army believed this. it produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. the battles of the wilderness, spottsylvania, north anna and cold harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. his losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. the details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of major-general meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. during the campaign of forty-three days, from the rapidan to the james river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, brigadier-general r. ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. the movement in the kanawha and shenandoah valleys, under general sigel, commenced on the 1st of may. general crook, who had the immediate command of the kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to general averell. they crossed the mountains by separate routes. averell struck the tennessee and virginia railroad, near wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to new river and christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including new river bridge, forming a junction with crook at union on the 15th. general sigel moved up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy at new market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind cedar creek. not regarding the operations of general sigel as satisfactory, i asked his removal from command, and major-general hunter appointed to supersede him. his instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to major-general h. w. halleck, chief of staff of the army: "near spottsylvania court house, va. "may 20, 1864. * * * * * * * "the enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through staunton. on the whole, therefore, i think it would be better for general hunter to move in that direction; reach staunton and gordonsville or charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. if he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * * "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." "jericho ford, va., may 25, 1864. "if hunter can possibly get to charlottesville and lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. the railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about gordonsville join this army. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." general hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. on the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of june. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached lynchburg a short time before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of kanawha. this lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north. had general hunter moved by way of charlottesville, instead of lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. if it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the james river canal, on the main line of communication between lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. i have never taken exception to the operations of general hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for i have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. the promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. to return to the army of the potomac: the 2d corps commenced crossing the james river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at wilcox's landing. the laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. after the crossing had commenced, i proceeded by steamer to bermuda hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of petersburg. the instructions to general butler were verbal, and were for him to send general smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. i told him that i would return at once to the army of the potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. general smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that i have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of petersburg from the appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. this was about seven p.m. between the line thus captured and petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced petersburg with a single brigade from any source. the night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. general hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached general smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. but instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into petersburg, he requested general hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. by the time i arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. an attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under smith and the 2d and 9th corps. it required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. the attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by general smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. the 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. the advantages of position gained by us were very great. the army then proceeded to envelop petersburg towards the south side railroad as far as possible without attacking fortifications. on the 16th the enemy, to reinforce petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of bermuda hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the james to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. general butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between petersburg and richmond. as soon as i was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it i ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, general wright commanding, that were embarking at wilcox's landing, under orders for city point, to report to general butler at bermuda hundred, of which general butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him. about two o'clock in the afternoon general butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. general wright, with his two divisions, joined general butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. but instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line. on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by general butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the james, at deep bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with bermuda hundred. on the 19th, general sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the virginia central railroad, arrived at the white house just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. the result of this expedition was, that general sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near trevilian station, on the morning of the 11th of june, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. he left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. on the 12th he destroyed the railroad from trevilian station to louisa court house. this occupied until three o'clock p.m., when he advanced in the direction of gordonsville. he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. on the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. night closed the contest. not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from general hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the north anna, and commenced his return march, reaching white house at the time before stated. after breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the james river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. he commenced crossing on the 25th, near fort powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the potomac. on the 22d, general wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of the potomac, and general kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the james moved against the enemy's railroads south of richmond. striking the weldon railroad at reams's station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the south side road about fifteen miles from petersburg, to near nottoway station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. he reached burkesville station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the danville railroad to roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. he then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the weldon railroad crossing of stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching reams's station (supposing it to be in our possession). at this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. in this last encounter, general kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. general wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. it severed all connection by railroad with richmond for several weeks. with a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near richmond to the anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of july the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the james river and joined the force general butler had there. on the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. on the 28th our lines were extended from deep bottom to new market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. the fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. the first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, i determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting petersburg before he could get his force back there. one division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. the other two divisions of the 2d corps and sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of petersburg. on the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. had they done this, i have every reason to believe that petersburg would have fallen. other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. the captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that general hunter was retreating from lynchburg by way of the kanawha river, thus laying the shenandoah valley open for raid into maryland and pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. as soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, general hunter, who had reached the kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to harper's ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. it became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. for this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in hampton roads from the gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the red river expedition. the garrisons of baltimore and washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. one division under command of general ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under general wright, were subsequently sent to washington. on the 3d of july the enemy approached martinsburg. general sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the potomac at shepherdtown; and general weber, commanding at harper's ferry, crossed the occupied hagerstown, moving a strong column towards frederick city. general wallace, with rickett's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. his force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable general wright to reach washington with two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. from monocacy the enemy moved on washington, his cavalry advance reaching rockville on the evening of the 10th. on the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of fort stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. a severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. the enemy's loss was probably greater. he commenced retreating during the night. learning the exact condition of affairs at washington, i requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven p.m., on the 12th, the assignment of major-general h. g. wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push early to the last moment. general wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at snicker's ferry, on the shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, general averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. learning that early was retreating south towards lynchburg or richmond, i directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that hunter should remain in the shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. i felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave washington. subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to return to the james. about the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon maryland and pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of harper's ferry. the rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into pennsylvania which on the 30th burned chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of west virginia. from the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between washington and city point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. it took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. to remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the department of west virginia, washington, susquehanna, and the middle department, and i so recommended. on the 2d of august, i ordered general sheridan to report in person to major-general halleck, chief of staff, at washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against early. at this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of winchester, while our forces, under general hunter, were concentrated on the monocacy, at the crossing of the baltimore and ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western maryland and southern pennsylvania. from where i was, i hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at monocacy, lest by so doing i should expose washington. therefore, on the 4th, i left city point to visit hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. on arrival there, and after consultation with general hunter, i issued to him the following instructions: "monocacy bridge, maryland, august 5, 1864--8 p.m. "general:--concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of harper's ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. from harper's ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. if it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. in detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from washington via rockville may be taken into account. "there are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. these will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the potomac. one brigade will probably start to-morrow. in pushing up the shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. it is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. "bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. be guided in your course by the course he takes. "make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general d. hunter." the troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached halltown that night. general hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, i telegraphed to have general sheridan, then at washington, sent to harper's ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on general hunter at monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. i remained at monocacy until general sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, i returned to city point by way of washington. on the 7th of august, the middle department, and the departments of west virginia, washington, and susquehanna, were constituted into the "middle military division," and major-general sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. two divisions of cavalry, commanded by generals torbert and wilson, were sent to sheridan from the army of the potomac. the first reached him at harper's ferry about the 11th of august. his operations during the month of august and the fore part of september were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. the two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the opequon creek covering winchester, and our forces in front of berryville--that either could bring on a battle at any time. defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the states of maryland and pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. under these circumstances i hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. finally, the use of the baltimore and ohio railroad, and the chesapeake and ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving pennsylvania and maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that i determined the risk should be taken. but fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than i did of general sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, i left city point on the 15th of september to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. i met him at charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that i saw there were but two words of instructions necessary--go in! for the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at harper's ferry. i asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing tuesday morning. his reply was, that he could before daylight on monday. he was off promptly to time, and i may here add, that the result was such that i have never since deemed it necessary to visit general sheridan before giving him orders. early on the morning of the 19th, general sheridan attacked general early at the crossing on the opequon creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from opequon creek to winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. the enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at fisher's hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. sheridan pursued him with great energy through harrisonburg, staunton, and the gaps of the blue ridge. after stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to strasburg, and took position on the north side of cedar creek. having received considerable reinforcements, general early again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of october, his cavalry encountered ours near strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. on the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between middletown and newtown. at this juncture, general sheridan, who was at winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. the enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. the wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of staunton and lynchburg. pursuit was made to mount jackson. thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the shenandoah valley. i was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the potomac, and to send one division from sheridan's army to the army of the james, and another to savannah, georgia, to hold sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from petersburg to reinforce early in the shenandoah valley. i therefore sent the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the potomac, and a force of general butler's army, on the night of the 13th of august, to threaten richmond from the north side of the james, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. in this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. the enemy having withdrawn heavily from petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the weldon railroad. during the day he had considerable fighting. to regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. on the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg returned to the front at petersburg. on the 25th, the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, while at reams's station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. by the 12th of september, a branch railroad was completed from the city point and petersburg railroad to the weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of petersburg. the extension of our lines across the weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the james for the defence of richmond. on the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, major-general birney, and the 18th corps, major-general ord commanding, of general butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the james, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below chaffin's farm, known as fort harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the new market road and intrenchments. this success was followed up by a gallant assault upon fort gilmer, immediately in front of the chaffin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. the position captured from the enemy was so threatening to richmond, that i determined to hold it. the enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. on the morning of the 30th, general meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. in this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near poplar spring church. in the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. our cavalry under gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. on the 7th of october, the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry north of the james, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. this he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. on the 27th, the army of the potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. the 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it towards the south side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the boydton plank road where it crosses hatcher's run. at this point we were six miles distant from the south side railroad, which i had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. but finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, i determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. orders were given accordingly. immediately upon receiving a report that general warren had connected with general hancock, i returned to my headquarters. soon after i left the enemy moved out across hatcher's run, in the gap between generals hancock and warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on general hancock's right and rear. general hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position. in support of this movement, general butler made a demonstration on the north side of the james, and attacked the enemy on the williamsburg road, and also on the york river railroad. in the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. from this time forward the operations in front of petersburg and richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. by the 7th of february, our lines were extended to hatcher's run, and the weldon railroad had been destroyed to hicksford. general sherman moved from chattanooga on the 6th of may, with the armies of the cumberland, tennessee, and ohio, commanded, respectively, by generals thomas mcpherson, and schofield, upon johnston's army at dalton; but finding the enemy's position at buzzard's roost, covering dalton, too strong to be assaulted, general mcpherson was sent through snake gap to turn it, while generals thomas and schofield threatened it in front and on the north. this movement was successful. johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of may 15th. a heavy battle ensued. during the night the enemy retreated south. late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. the next morning, however, he had again disappeared. he was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the etowah. while these operations were going on, general jefferson c. davis's division of thomas's army was sent to rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. general sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d, for dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at allatoona. on the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under general hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to new hope church, near dallas. several sharp encounters occurred at this point. the most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted general mcpherson at dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. on the 4th of june, johnston abandoned his intrenched position at new hope church, and retreated to the strong positions of kenesaw, pine, and lost mountains. he was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on kenesaw, where, on the 27th, generals thomas and mcpherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. on the night of the 2d of july, sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned kenesaw and retreated across the chattahoochee. general sherman remained on the chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of july, when he resumed his operations, crossed the chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to augusta, and drove the enemy back to atlanta. at this place general hood succeeded general johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon sherman in the vicinity of atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of july. about one p.m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted mcpherson was killed. general logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by major-general howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division. in all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, general sherman, after securing his line of communications across the chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the montgomery and macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. in this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near rough-and-ready, jonesboro, and lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of september occupied atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. about the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at dalton, and driven into east tennessee, whence it proceeded west to mcminnville, murfreesboro, and franklin, and was finally driven south of the tennessee. the damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. during the partial investment of atlanta, general rousseau joined general sherman with a force of cavalry from decatur, having made a successful raid upon the atlanta and montgomery railroad, and its branches near opelika. cavalry raids were also made by generals mccook, garrard, and stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with atlanta. the first two were successful the latter, disastrous. general sherman's movement from chattanooga to atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. the history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. his own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign. he was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from nashville to the point where he was operating. this passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. the cavalry force of the enemy under forrest, in northern mississippi, was evidently waiting for sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. to guard against this danger, sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against forrest in west tennessee. he directed general washburn, who commanded there, to send brigadier-general s. d. sturgis in command of this force to attack him. on the morning of the 10th of june, general sturgis met the enemy near guntown, mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. by this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon sherman's line of communications. the persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. in the meantime, major-general a. j. smith, with the troops of the army of the tennessee that had been sent by general sherman to general banks, arrived at memphis on their return from red river, where they had done most excellent service. he was directed by general sherman to immediately take the offensive against forrest. this he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. on the 14th of july, he met the enemy at tupelo, mississippi, and whipped him badly. the fighting continued through three days. our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. having accomplished the object of his expedition, general smith returned to memphis. during the months of march and april this same force under forrest annoyed us considerably. on the 24th of march it captured union city, kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked paducah, commanded by colonel s. g. hicks, 40th illinois volunteers. colonel h., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. on the 13th of april, part of this force, under the rebel general buford, summoned the garrison of columbus, kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from colonel lawrence, 34th new jersey volunteers, that being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. on the morning of the same day forrest attacked fort pillow, tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of tennessee cavalry and the 1st regiment alabama colored troops, commanded by major booth. the garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. on the 14th, general buford, having failed at columbus, appeared before paducah, but was again driven off. guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by forrest's operations, were also very active in kentucky. the most noted of these was morgan. with a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the state through pound gap in the latter part of may. on the 11th of june they attacked and captured cynthiana, with its entire garrison. on the 12th he was overtaken by general burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the state. this notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near greenville, tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by general gillem. in the absence of official reports of the commencement of the red river expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by general sherman under general a. j. smith, i am unable to give the date of its starting. the troops under general smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left vicksburg on the 10th of march, and reached the designated point on red river one day earlier than that appointed by general banks. the rebel forces at fort de russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, smith pushed forward to fort de russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. our loss was but slight. on the 15th he pushed forward to alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. on the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at henderson's hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery. on the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel general taylor, at cane river. by the 26th, general banks had assembled his whole army at alexandria, and pushed forward to grand ecore. on the morning of april 6th he moved from grand ecore. on the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the enemy near pleasant hill, and drove him from the field. on the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond pleasant hill, but was again compelled to retreat. on the 8th, at sabine cross roads and peach hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. during the night, general banks fell back to pleasant hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. during the night, general banks continued his retrograde movement to grand ecore, and thence to alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of april. here a serious difficulty arose in getting admiral porter's fleet which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. at the suggestion of colonel (now brigadier-general) bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. the army evacuated alexandria on the 14th of may, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached morganzia and point coupee near the end of the month. the disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of mobile. on the 23d of march, major-general steele left little rock with the 7th army corps, to cooperate with general banks's expedition on the red river, and reached arkadelphia on the 28th. on the 16th of april, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near elkin's ferry, in washita county, by general thayer, who had marched from fort smith. after several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, general steele reached camden, which he occupied about the middle of april. on learning the defeat and consequent retreat of general banks on red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at mark's mill, in dallas county, general steele determined to fall back to the arkansas river. he left camden on the 26th of april, and reached little rock on the 2d of may. on the 30th of april, the enemy attacked him while crossing saline river at jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. major-general canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "military division of the west mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied. before starting general a. j. smith's troops back to sherman, general canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the mississippi river. general smith met and defeated this force near lake chicot on the 5th of june. our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. in the latter part of july, general canby sent major-general gordon granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with admiral farragut against the defences of mobile bay. on the 8th of august, fort gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. fort powell was blown up and abandoned. on the 9th, fort morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. the total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery. about the last of august, it being reported that the rebel general price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached jacksonport, on his way to invade missouri, general a. j. smith's command, then en route from memphis to join sherman, was ordered to missouri. a cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from memphis, under command of colonel winslow. this made general rosecrans's forces superior to those of price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check price and drive him back; while the forces under general steele, in arkansas, would cut off his retreat. on the 26th day of september, price attacked pilot knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the missouri river, and continued up that river towards kansas. general curtis, commanding department of kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of kansas, while general rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. the enemy was brought to battle on the big blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. he made a precipitate retreat to northern arkansas. the impunity with which price was enabled to roam over the state of missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. there is no reason why general rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven price before the latter reached pilot knob. september 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under forrest, crossed the tennessee near waterloo, alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at sulphur branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the nashville and chattanooga railroad near tullahoma and dechard. on the morning of the 30th, one column of forrest's command, under buford, appeared before huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. he withdrew in the direction of athens which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of october, but without success. on the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. another column under forrest appeared before columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. on the morning of the 3d he moved towards mount pleasant. while these operations were going on, every exertion was made by general thomas to destroy the forces under forrest before he could recross the tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to corinth, mississippi. in september, an expedition under general burbridge was sent to destroy the saltworks at saltville, virginia. he met the enemy on the 2d of october, about three miles and a half from saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. during the night he withdrew his command and returned to kentucky. general sherman, immediately after the fall of atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. the great length of road from atlanta to the cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. during this time jefferson davis made a speech in macon, georgia, which was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling general sherman to fully meet them. he exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. in execution of this plan, hood, with this army, was soon reported to the south-west of atlanta. moving far to sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about big shanty, and moved north on it. general sherman, leaving a force to hold atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to gadsden, alabama. seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold atlanta, general sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows: "centreville, georgia", october 10--noon. "dispatch about wilson just received. hood is now crossing coosa river, twelve miles below rome, bound west. if he passes over the mobile and ohio road, had i not better execute the plan of my letter sent by colonel porter, and leave general thomas with the troops now in tennessee to defend the state? he will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach nashville. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." for a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, i quote from the letter sent by colonel porter: "i will therefore give my opinion, that your army and canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get wilmington, you strike for savannah and the river; that canby be instructed to hold the mississippi river, and send a force to get columbus, georgia, either by the way of the alabama or the appalachicola, and that i keep hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on augusta, columbia, and charleston, to be ready as soon as wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city of savannah is in our possession." this was in reply to a letter of mine of date september 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which i informed him of a proposed movement against wilmington, and of the situation in virginia, etc. "city point, virginia, "october 11, 1864--11 a.m. "your dispatch of october 10th received. does it not look as if hood was going to attempt the invasion of middle tennessee, using the mobile and ohio and memphis and charleston roads to supply his base on the tennessee river, about florence or decatur? if he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the tennessee river. if you were to cut loose, i do not believe you would meet hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. hood would probably strike for nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. if there is any way of getting at hood's army, i would prefer that, but i must trust to your own judgment. i find i shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on savannah. your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of richmond takes place. i am afraid thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent hood from going north. with wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." "kingston, georgia, "october 11--11 a.m. "hood moved his army from palmetto station across by dallas and cedartown, and is now on the coosa river, south of rome. he threw one corps on my road at acworth, and i was forced to follow. i hold atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. this reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. we cannot remain here on the defensive. with the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. i would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from chattanooga to atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through georgia, smashing things, to the sea. hood may turn into tennessee and kentucky, but i believe he will be forced to follow me. instead of my being on the defensive, i would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. the difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. i can make savannah, charleston, or the mouth of the chattahoochee. "answer quick, as i know we will not have the telegraph long. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." "city point, virginia, "october 11,1864--11.30 p.m. "your dispatch of to-day received. if you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of dalton or chattanooga, as you think best. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." it was the original design to hold atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. in other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the mississippi river. general sherman's plan virtually effected this object. general sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch hood. becoming satisfied that hood had moved westward from gadsden across sand mountain, general sherman sent the 4th corps, major-general stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, back to chattanooga to report to major-general thomas, at nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through georgia. with the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that general thomas could hold the line of the tennessee, or, in the event hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. it was therefore readily consented to that sherman should start for the sea-coast. having concentrated his troops at atlanta by the 14th of november, he commenced his march, threatening both augusta and macon. his coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. the blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of richmond and east of the mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and sherman's route to his own choice. how that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of fort mcallister, on the savannah river, and the occupation of savannah on the 21st of december, are all clearly set forth in general sherman's admirable report. soon after general sherman commenced his march from atlanta, two expeditions, one from baton rouge, louisiana, and one from vicksburg, mississippi, were started by general canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with mobile and detain troops in that field. general foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, via broad river, to destroy the railroad between charleston and savannah. the expedition from vicksburg, under command of brevet brigadier-general e. d. osband (colonel 3d united states colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of november, and destroyed the mississippi central railroad bridge and trestle-work over big black river, near canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. the expedition from baton rouge was without favorable results. the expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of brigadier-general john p. hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up broad river and debarked at boyd's neck on the 29th of november, from where it moved to strike the railroad at grahamsville. at honey hill, about three miles from grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. during the night general hatch withdrew. on the 6th of december general foster obtained a position covering the charleston and savannah railroad, between the coosawhatchie and tulifinny rivers. hood, instead of following sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. at all events, had i had the power to command both armies, i should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. on the 26th of october, the advance of hood's army attacked the garrison at decatur, alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the tennessee river, near florence. on the 28th, forrest reached the tennessee, at fort heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. on the 2d of november he planted batteries above and below johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. on the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. the gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. about a million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. on the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the tennessee river, above johnsonville, moving towards clifton, and subsequently joined hood. on the night of the 5th, general schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch the movements of hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of general a. j. smith's command from missouri, and until general wilson could get his cavalry remounted. on the 19th, general hood continued his advance. general thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. the enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by general schofield, at franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. his loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. this was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and i am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. during the night, general schofield fell back towards nashville. this left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned--so that general thomas's whole force might be brought together. the enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of nashville on the 2d of december. as soon as it was ascertained that hood was crossing the tennessee river, and that price was going out of missouri, general rosecrans was ordered to send to general thomas the troops of general a. j. smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. the advance of this reinforcement reached nashville on the 30th of november. on the morning of the 15th december, general thomas attacked hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. before the battle of nashville i grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. this impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the cumberland into kentucky. i feared hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. after urging upon general thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, i started west to superintend matters there in person. reaching washington city, i received general thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. i was delighted. all fears and apprehensions were dispelled. i am not yet satisfied but that general thomas, immediately upon the appearance of hood before nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. but his final defeat of hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. after hood's defeat at nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. on the 28th of december our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. about this time, the rains having set in heavily in tennessee and north alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, general thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the tennessee river. a small force of cavalry, under colonel w. j. palmer, 15th pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's pontoon-bridge. the details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in general thomas's report. a cavalry expedition, under brevet major-general grierson, started from memphis on the 21st of december. on the 25th he surprised and captured forrest's dismounted camp at verona, mississippi, on the mobile and ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for hood's army, four thousand new english carbines, and large amounts of public stores. on the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the mississippi central railroad at winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at grenada, arriving at vicksburg january 5th. during the operations in middle tennessee, the enemy, with a force under general breckinridge, entered east tennessee. on the 13th of november he attacked general gillem, near morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to knoxville. following up his success, breckinridge moved to near knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by general ammen. under the directions of general thomas, general stoneman concentrated the commands of generals burbridge and gillem near bean's station to operate against breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into virginia --destroy the salt-works at saltville, and the railroad into virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. on the 12th of december he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. on the 16th he struck the enemy, under vaughn, at marion, completely routing and pursuing him to wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. returning to marion, he met a force under breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of saltville, that had started in pursuit. he at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found breckinridge gone. he then moved directly to saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned general burbridge to lexington and general gillem to knoxville. wilmington, north carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. the navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of wilmington, but with only partial effect. the nature of the outlet of cape fear river was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of new inlet, or fort fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. to secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which i agreed to furnish. immediately commenced the assemblage in hampton roads, under admiral d. d. porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. this necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. the enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. this caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of november, when, being again called upon by hon. g. v. fox, assistant secretary of the navy, i agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with major-general butler, to hampton roads, where we had a conference with admiral porter as to the force required and the time of starting. a force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. the time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of december, if not before. learning, on the 30th of november, that bragg had gone to georgia, taking with him most of the forces about wilmington, i deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of bragg, and directed general butler to make all arrangements for the departure of major-general weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment. on the 6th of december, the following instructions were given: "city point, virginia, december 6, 1864. "general: the first object of the expedition under general weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of wilmington. if successful in this, the second will be to capture wilmington itself. there are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after sherman in georgia. the directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. the object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between cape fear river and the atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds fort fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. these in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of wilmington would be sealed. should fort fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture wilmington by a forced march and surprise. if time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. "the details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops. "should the troops under general weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near fort fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against richmond without delay. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." general butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. they were so sent, but general weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read general butler's published official report of the fort fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. i had no idea of general butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from bermuda hundred, and then did not dream but that general weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. i rather formed the idea that general butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. the expedition was detained several days at hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. the importance of getting the wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon general butler, and he advised to so notify admiral porter. the expedition finally got off on the 13th of december, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off new inlet, near fort fisher, on the evening of the 15th. admiral porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. the sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. the powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of general butler from beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press. on the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under brevet brigadier-general curtis, pushed up towards the fort. but before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, general butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. the re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. on the return of the expedition officers and men among them brevet major-general (then brevet brigadier-general) n. m. curtis, first-lieutenant g. w. ross, 117th regiment new york volunteers, first-lieutenant william h. walling, and second-lieutenant george simpson, 142d new york volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss. soon after the return of the expedition, i received a dispatch from the secretary of the navy, and a letter from admiral porter, informing me that the fleet was still off fort fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. the natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. finding it had not, however, i answered on the 30th of december, advising admiral porter to hold on, and that i would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. this time i selected brevet major-general (now major-general) a. h. terry to command the expedition. the troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. the latter it was never found necessary to land. i communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions: "city point, virginia, january 3, 1865. "general: the expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture fort fisher, n. c., and wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. you will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off cape fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to admiral d. d. porter, commanding north atlantic blockading squadron. "it is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. i suggest, therefore, that you consult with admiral porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. it would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. i have served with admiral porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. i would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. the first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which fort fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. you want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. if such a position can be obtained, the siege of fort fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. "my own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into cape fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. land forces cannot invest fort fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. "a siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to fort monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. all other supplies can be drawn from beaufort as you need them. "keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. when you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to fort monroe, to report for orders. "in case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. you will not debark at beaufort until so directed. "general sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. these troops will be brought to fort monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. should you require them, they will be sent to you. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "brevet major-general a. h. terry." lieutenant-colonel c. b. comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this. it will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault fort fisher. this was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. the expedition sailed from fort monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock p.m. was completed without loss. on the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of fort fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. this reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. in the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. on the 16th and the 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up fort caswell and the works on smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. this gave us entire control of the mouth of the cape fear river. at my request, mayor-general b. f. butler was relieved, and major-general e. o. c. ord assigned to the department of virginia and north carolina. the defence of the line of the tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, i determined to find other fields of operation for general thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. general thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at eastport, in readiness for orders. on the 7th of january, general thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of hood south from corinth, to send general schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. this direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to fort fisher and new bern. on the 26th he was directed to send general a. j. smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to general canby. by the 7th of february the whole force was en route for its destination. the state of north carolina was constituted into a military department, and general schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of major-general sherman. the following instructions were given him: "city point, va., january 31, 1865. "general:-* * * your movements are intended as co-operative with sherman's through the states of south and north carolina. the first point to be attained is to secure wilmington. goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from wilmington or new bern, or both, as you deem best. should you not be able to reach goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. the enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give general sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. as soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, wilmington or new bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. you will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. i believe general palmer has received some instructions direct from general sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. you will learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. a supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. "make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at city point. communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to fortress monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. "the supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command. "the movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid sherman. in such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. you will report, however, what you purpose doing. the details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. i would urge, however, if i did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of february; this limits your time very materially. "if rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of wilmington, it can be supplied from washington. a large force of railroad men have already been sent to beaufort, and other mechanics will go to fort fisher in a day or two. on this point i have informed you by telegraph. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general j. m. schofield." previous to giving these instructions i had visited fort fisher, accompanied by general schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with general terry and admiral porter as to what was best to be done. anticipating the arrival of general sherman at savannah his army entirely foot-loose, hood being then before nashville, tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion--i sent orders to general sherman on the 6th of december, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to city point with the balance of his command. on the 18th of december, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of hood's army by general thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, i wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. a few days after this i received a communication from general sherman, of date 16th december, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. also that he had expected, upon reducing savannah, instantly to march to columbia, south carolina, thence to raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of january. the confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, i directed him, on the 28th of december, to make preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in north and south carolina, and join the armies operating against richmond as soon as he could. on the 21st of january i informed general sherman that i had ordered the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at fort fisher, about eight thousand men; at new bern, about four thousand; that if wilmington was captured, general schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to new bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. in obedience to his instructions, general schofield proceeded to reduce wilmington, north carolina, in co-operation with the navy under admiral porter, moving his forces up both sides of the cape fear river. fort anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. after fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards goldsboro' during the night. preparations were at once made for a movement on goldsboro' in two columns--one from wilmington, and the other from new bern--and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply general sherman by cape fear river, towards fayetteville, if it became necessary. the column from new bern was attacked on the 8th of march, at wise's forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. on the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. on the 14th the neuse river was crossed and kinston occupied, and on the 21st goldsboro' was entered. the column from wilmington reached cox's bridge, on the neuse river, ten miles above goldsboro', on the 22d. by the 1st of february, general sherman's whole army was in motion from savannah. he captured columbia, south carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on goldsboro', north carolina, via fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of march, opening up communication with general schofield by way of cape fear river. on the 15th he resumed his march on goldsboro'. he met a force of the enemy at averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. our loss in this engagement was about six hundred. the enemy's loss was much greater. on the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under joe johnston, attacked his advance at bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. general slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward. on the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. from there sherman continued to goldsboro', which place had been occupied by general schofield on the 21st (crossing the neuse river ten miles above there, at cox's bridge, where general terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from new bern and wilmington. among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of charleston, south carolina. it was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of february, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. on the morning of the 31st of january, general thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under general stoneman, from east tennessee, to penetrate south carolina well down towards columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to east tennessee by way of salisbury, north carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. of the feasibility of this latter, however, general stoneman was to judge. sherman's movements, i had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. general stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and sherman having passed out of the state of south carolina), on the 27th of february i directed general thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards lynchburg as far as he could. this would keep him between our garrisons in east tennessee and the enemy. i regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from richmond, he might fall back to lynchburg and attempt a raid north through east tennessee. on the 14th of february the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, va., february 14, 1865. "general canby is preparing a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama. his force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides a. j. smith's command. the cavalry you have sent to canby will be debarked at vicksburg. it, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose sherman. (i take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. it is so asserted in the richmond papers, and a member of the rebel congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to south carolina to oppose sherman.) this being true, or even if it is not true, canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. i think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. the object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. tuscaloosa and selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. this, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into alabama. discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. "now that your force has been so much depleted, i do not know what number of men you can put into the field. if not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, i think it will be sufficient. it is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. i do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as i learn. if you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. "to insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. i would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. no guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. "please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." on the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off. i deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against richmond, that all communications with the city, north of james river, should be cut off. the enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from richmond, and desiring to reinforce sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, i determined to make a move from the shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of the objects. i therefore telegraphed general sheridan as follows: "city point, va., february 20, 1865--1 p.m. "general:--as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after mosby's gang. from lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in virgina to the westward of danville, and push on and join general sherman. this additional raid, with one now about starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from eastport, mississippi, then thousand cavalry, canby from mobile bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma, and montgomery, and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday 1st. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the 25th i received a dispatch from general sheridan, inquiring where sherman was aiming for, and if i could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of charlotte, north carolina. in answer, the following telegram was sent him: "city point, va., february 25, 1865. "general:--sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. if strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to georgetown, s. c., and fit out for a new start. i think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. i believe he has passed charlotte. he may take fayetteville on his way to goldsboro'. if you reach lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. before you could possibly reach sherman, i think you would find him moving from goldsboro' towards raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to wilmington or new bern. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." general sheridan moved from winchester on the 27th of february, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. on the 1st of march he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the shenandoah, at mount crawford, and entered staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to waynesboro'. thence he pushed on to waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under general early. without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. the prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to winchester. thence he marched on charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards richmond and lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the rivanna river and awaited the arrival of his trains. this necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing lynchburg. on the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to scottsville, whence it marched up the james river canal to new market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. from here a force was pushed out from this column to duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the james river at that place, but failed. the enemy burned it on our approach. the enemy also burned the bridge across the river at hardwicksville. the other column moved down the railroad towards lynchburg, destroying it as far as amherst court house, sixteen miles from lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at new market. the river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the south side railroad about farmville, and destroy it to appomattox court house, the only thing left for him was to return to winchester or strike a base at the white house. fortunately, he chose the latter. from new market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of goochland, concentrating the whole force at columbia on the 10th. here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at white house, which reached me on the night of the 12th. an infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of white house, and supplies were forwarded. moving from columbia in a direction to threaten richmond, to near ashland station, he crossed the annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the pamunkey to white house, which place he reached on the 19th. previous to this the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, virginia, march 7, 1865--9.30 a.m. "general:--i think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in east tennessee, and throw a good force up to bull's gap and fortify there. supplies at knoxville could always be got forward as required. with bull's gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of east tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards lynchburg, or into north carolina. i do not think stoneman should break the road until he gets into virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." thus it will be seen that in march, 1865, general canby was moving an adequate force against mobile and the army defending it under general dick taylor; thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from middle tennessee under brevet major-general wilson against the enemy's vital points in alabama, the other from east tennessee, under major-general stoneman, towards lynchburg--and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from east tennessee; general sheridan's cavalry was at white house; the armies of the potomac and james were confronting the enemy, under lee, in his defences of richmond and petersburg; general sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of general schofield, was at goldsboro'; general pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under kirby smith and price, west of the mississippi; and general hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of winchester, virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. after the long march by general sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at white house. at this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about petersburg and richmond for the purpose of uniting with johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or i was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. on the 24th of march, general sheridan moved from white house, crossed the james river at jones's landing, and formed a junction with the army of the potomac in front of petersburg on the 27th. during this move, general ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the chickahominy. on the 24th of march the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against richmond were issued: "city point, virginia, march 24, 1865. "general: on the 29th instant the armies operating against richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under general sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the south side and danville railroads. two corps of the army of the potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing hatcher's run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards dinwiddie court house. "the cavalry under general sheridan, joined by the division now under general davies, will move at the same time by the weldon road and the jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching stony creek. general sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. all dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to brigadier-general benham, to be added to the defences of city point. major-general parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about petersburg and city point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the army of the potomac. the 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. if, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the weldon road. all troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. "general ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the potomac. in the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the potomac, and the colored division the right column. during the movement major-general weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the james. "the movement of troops from the army of the james will commence on the night of the 27th instant. general ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. a cavalry expedition, from general ord's command, will also be started from suffolk, to leave there on saturday, the 1st of april, under colonel sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about hicksford. this, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. they should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from norfolk and portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the blackwater. the crossing should probably be at uniten. should colonel sumner succeed in reaching the weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between hicksford, weldon, and gaston. the railroad bridge at weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the roanoke. all the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. to avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the james the same number of days' supplies with the army of the potomac, general ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. the densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. "all necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. the reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. while i would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. in case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. to prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. general weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. a success north of the james should be followed up with great promptness. an attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. in that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of richmond. preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the james, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. "by these instructions a large part of the armies operating against richmond is left behind. the enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. it cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. the very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. i would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. i would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. in like manner, i would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-generals meade, ord, and sheridan." early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the appomattox river towards our left), and carried fort stedman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. general meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. the enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. general sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at city point on the 27th of march, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of april, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of richmond and petersburg. general sherman proposed in this movement to threaten raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the roanoke at gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the richmond and danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of burkesville, or join the armies operating against richmond, as might be deemed best. this plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the meantime. i explained to him the movement i had ordered to commence on the 29th of march. that if it should not prove as entirely successful as i hoped, i would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the danville and south side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of lee's and johnston's armies. i had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. i was firmly convinced that sherman's crossing the roanoke would be the signal for lee to leave. with johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. by moving out i would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of lee and johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. i therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. on the night of the 27th, major-general ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, major-general gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, brigadier-general birney commanding, and mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. on the 28th the following instructions were given to general sheridan: "city point, va., march 28, 1865. "general:--the 5th army corps will move by the vaughn road at three a.m. to-morrow morning. the 2d moves at about nine a.m., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching dinwiddie court house. move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. you may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. it is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. i shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. should i not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the danville road. if you find it practicable, i would like you to cross the south side road, between petersburg and burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. i would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the danville road, which i would like you to strike as near to the appomattox as possible. make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. you can then pass on to the south side road, west of burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. "after having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into north carolina and join general sherman. should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that i may send orders to meet you at goldsboro'. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. at night the cavalry was at dinwiddie court house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the quaker road, near its intersection with the boydton plank road. the position of the troops from left to right was as follows: sheridan, warren, humphreys, ord, wright, parke. everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of petersburg and richmond, if the proper effort was made. i therefore addressed the following communication to general sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so: "gravelly creek, march 29, 1865. "general:--our line is now unbroken from the appomattox to dinwiddie. we are all ready, however, to give up all, from the jerusalem plank road to hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. after getting into line south of hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. general griffin was attacked near where the quaker road intersects the boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. humphreys reached dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. "i now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. i do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. in the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. the movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. we will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. the signal-officer at cobb's hill reported, at half-past eleven a.m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from richmond towards petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." from the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. during the 30th, sheridan advanced from dinwiddie court house towards five forks, where he found the enemy in full force. general warren advanced and extended his line across the boydton plank road to near the white oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. general humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the hatcher, near burgess's mills. generals ord, wright, and parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. the two latter reported favorably. the enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from richmond to our extreme left, i conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. i determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce general sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. the result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted fort stedman, particularly favored this. the enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. preparations were at once made to relieve general humphreys's corps, to report to general sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. on the morning of the 31st, general warren reported favorably to getting possession of the white oak road, and was directed to do so. to accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. a division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the white oak road gained. sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the five forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards dinwiddie court house. here general sheridan displayed great generalship. instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. this compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. at this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on dinwiddie court house. general mackenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. soon after receiving a report from general meade that humphreys could hold our position on the boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to sheridan, they were so ordered at once. thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of warren, because of his accessibility, instead of humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. on the morning of the 1st of april, general sheridan, reinforced by general warren, drove the enemy back on five forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. about the close of this battle, brevet major-general charles griffin relieved major-general warren in command of the 5th corps. the report of this reached me after nightfall. some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon general sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. to guard against this, general miles's division of humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (april 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. general wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. he was closely followed by two divisions of general ord's command, until he met the other division of general ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near hatcher's run. generals wright and ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in petersburg, while general humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined general wright on the left. general parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. general sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned general miles to his proper command. on reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding petersburg, a portion of general gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the most salient and commanding south of petersburg--thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. the enemy south of hatcher's run retreated westward to sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by miles's division. a severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of general sheridan, who was moving from ford's station towards petersburg, and a division sent by general meade from the front of petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. this force retreated by the main road along the appomattox river. during the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated petersburg and richmond, and retreated towards danville. on the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. general sheridan pushed for the danville road, keeping near the appomattox, followed by general meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while general ord moved for burkesville, along the south side road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. on the 4th, general sheridan struck the danville road near jetersville, where he learned that lee was at amelia court house. he immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of general meade, who reached there the next day. general ord reached burkesville on the evening of the 5th. on the morning of the 5th, i addressed major-general sherman the following communication: "wilson's station, april 5, 1865. "general: all indications now are that lee will attempt to reach danville with the remnant of his force. sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. we hope to reduce this number one-half. i shall push on to burkesville, and if a stand is made at danville, will in a very few days go there. if you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with lee's and johnston's armies. whether it will be better for you to strike for greensboro', or nearer to danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." on the morning of the 6th, it was found that general lee was moving west of jetersville, towards danville. general sheridan moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to general meade on his reaching jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. general ord advanced from burkesville towards farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under brevet brigadier-general theodore read, to reach and destroy the bridges. this advance met the head of lee's column near farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until general read was killed and his small force overpowered. this caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled general ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself. in the afternoon, general sheridan struck the enemy south of sailors' creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. the movements of the 2d corps and general ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. on the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by prince edward's court house; the 6th corps, general ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on farmville; and the 2d corps by the high bridge road. it was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at high bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. the 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at farmville to its support. feeling now that general lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, i addressed him the following communication from farmville: "april 7, 1865. "general--the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, i received at farmville the following: "april 7, 1865. "general: i have received your note of this date. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." to this i immediately replied: "april 8, 1865. "general:--your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia, is just received. in reply, i would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon --namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of the northern virginia will be received. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. general meade followed north of the appomattox, and general sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for appomattox station, followed by general ord's command and the 5th corps. during the day general meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. late in the evening general sheridan struck the railroad at appomattox station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for lee's army. during this day i accompanied general meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from general lee: april 8, 1865. "general:--i received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. in mine of yesterday i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the army of northern virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the confederate states forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. to-morrow on the old stage-road to richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." early on the morning of the 9th i returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the appomattox: "april 9, 1865. "general:--your note of yesterday is received. i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." on this morning of the 9th, general ord's command and the 5th corps reached appomattox station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. the infantry was at once thrown in. soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. before reaching general sheridan's headquarters, i received the following from general lee: "april 9, 1865. "general:--i received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither i had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the interview was held at appomattox court-house, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence: appomattox court-house, virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, i propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern virginia on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." "headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: i have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the command of major-general gibbon, the 5th army corps under griffin, and mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at appomattox court-house until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. the remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of burkesville. general lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. on the receipt of my letter of the 5th, general sherman moved directly against joe johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through raleigh, which place general sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. the day preceding, news of the surrender of general lee reached him at smithfield. on the 14th a correspondence was opened between general sherman and general johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the president. this agreement was disapproved by the president on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to general sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at raleigh, north carolina, in obedience to your orders. notice was at once given by him to general johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. on the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to general lee. the expedition under general stoneman from east tennessee got off on the 20th of march, moving by way of boone, north carolina, and struck the railroad at wytheville, chambersburg, and big lick. the force striking it at big lick pushed on to within a few miles of lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between new river and big lick, and then turned for greensboro', on the north carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between danville and greensboro', and between greensboro' and the yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. at salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under general gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. at this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards charlotte. thence he moved to slatersville. general canby, who had been directed in january to make preparations for a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of march. the 16th corps, major-general a. j. smith commanding, moved from fort gaines by water to fish river; the 13th corps, under major-general gordon granger, moved from fort morgan and joined the 16th corps on fish river, both moving thence on spanish fort and investing it on the 27th; while major-general steele's command moved from pensacola, cut the railroad leading from tensas to montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested fort blakely. after a severe bombardment of spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of april. during the night the enemy evacuated the fort. fort blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. these successes practically opened to us the alabama river, and enabled us to approach mobile from the north. on the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. the expedition under command of brevet major-general wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until march 22d, when it moved from chickasaw, alabama. on the 1st of april, general wilson encountered the enemy in force under forrest near ebenezer church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the cahawba river. on the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of selma, defended by forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. on the 4th he captured and destroyed tuscaloosa. on the 10th he crossed the alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to general canby, marched on montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. at this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. thence a force marched direct on columbus, and another on west point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. at the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. at the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. on the 20th he took possession of macon, georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by general howell cobb. general wilson, hearing that jeff. davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of may 11th. on the 4th day of may, general dick taylor surrendered to general canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the mississippi. a force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under kirby smith, west of the mississippi, was immediately put in motion for texas, and major-general sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of may, and before they reached their destination, general kirby smith surrendered his entire command to major-general canby. this surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vice-president; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property. owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the united states, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the rio grande, the orders for troops to proceed to texas were not changed. there have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that i have not mentioned. many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, i regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported. for information touching our indian difficulties, i would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred. it has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and the east fight battles, and from what i have seen i know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. all that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. the western armies commenced their battles in the mississippi valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in north carolina. the armies of the east commenced their battles on the river from which the army of the potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at appomattox court house, virginia. the splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. all have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the united states. let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the end __________ footnotes (*1) afterwards general gardner, c.s.a. (*2) general garland expressed a wish to get a message back to general twiggs, his division commander, or general taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer. lieutenant grant offered his services, which were accepted.--publishers. (*3) mentioned in the reports of major lee, colonel garland and general worth.--publishers. (*4) note.--it had been a favorite idea with general scott for a great many years before the mexican war to have established in the united states a soldiers' home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, i believe, in france. he recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the secretary of war, but never got any hearing. now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money. in addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at cerro gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220,000. portions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. after the war was over and the troops all home, general scott applied to have this money, which had never been turned into the treasury of the united states, expended in establishing such homes as he had previously recommended. this fund was the foundation of the soldiers' home at washington city, and also one at harrodsburgh, kentucky. the latter went into disuse many years ago. in fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, i believe, finally sold. (*5) the mexican war made three presidential candidates, scott, taylor and pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high office. it made also governors of states, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation. the rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the union side. on the other side, the side of the south, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the south was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it. (*6) c. b. lagow, the others not yet having joined me. (*7) note.--since writing this chapter i have received from mrs. w. h. l. wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the field of shiloh, a letter from general lew. wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. at the date of this letter it was well known that the confederates had troops out along the mobile & ohio railroad west of crump's landing and pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near shiloh. this letter shows that at that time general lew. wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between shiloh and his position, extending from crump's landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from adamsville to the pittsburg landing and purdy road. these two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over owl creek, where our right rested. in this letter general lew. wallace advises general w. h. l. wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "april 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of general w. h. l. wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps." this modifies very materially what i have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of general lew. wallace at the battle of shiloh. it shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road. the mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. this falling back had taken place before i sent general wallace orders to move up to pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. but my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to general wallace, so that i am not competent to say just what order the general actually received. general wallace's division was stationed, the first brigade at crump's landing, the second out two miles, and the third two and a half miles out. hearing the sounds of battle general wallace early ordered his first and third brigades to concentrate on the second. if the position of our front had not changed, the road which wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the river road. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, june 21, 1885. (*8) note: in an article on the battle of shiloh which i wrote for the century magazine, i stated that general a. mcd. mccook, who commanded a division of buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on monday, april 7th, because of the condition of his troops. general badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. out of justice to general mccook and his command, i must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of savannah on the morning of the 6th. from the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. the division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. it was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed. in fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the army of the tennessee. general sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. general mccook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. i refer to these circumstances with minuteness because i did general mccook injustice in my article in the century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. i am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that i have done one, i am always willing to make the fullest admission. (*9) note.--for gallantry in the various engagements, from the time i was left in command down to 26th of october and on my recommendation, generals mcpherson and c. s. hamilton were promoted to be major-generals, and colonels c. c. marsh, 20th illinois, m. m. crocker, 13th iowa j. a. mower, 11th missouri, m. d. leggett, 78th ohio, j. d. stevenson, 7th missouri, and john e. smith, 45th illinois, to be brigadiers. (*10) colonel ellet reported having attacked a confederate battery on the red river two days before with one of his boats, the de soto. running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. however, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. with the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the new era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at grand gulf and reaching the vicinity of vicksburg. (*11) one of colonel ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on february the 2d and been sunk in the red river. (*12) note.--on this occasion governor richard yates, of illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to carthage. i furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the state officers who accompanied him. (*13) note.--when general sherman first learned of the move i proposed to make, he called to see me about it. i recollect that i had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. i was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when sherman came up. after a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. we passed into the house together and shut the door after us. sherman then expressed his alarm at the move i had ordered, saying that i was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. i was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. he said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. he pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. this was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. i said this would take us back to memphis. sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from memphis to grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. to this i replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the north and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. the problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. no progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. sherman wrote to my adjutant general, colonel j. a. rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. colonel rawlins showed me the letter, but i did not see any reason for changing my plans. the letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between sherman and myself to the end of the war, that i remember of. i did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. general sherman furnished a copy himself to general badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. i did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. i make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation. (*14) meant edward's station. (*15) chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general w. t. sherman: enclosed herewith i send you copy of instructions to major-general thomas. you having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. it is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between cleveland and dalton, and longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. i will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the tennessee above chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to cleveland or thereabouts. u. s. grant maj.-gen'l. chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general geo. h. thomas, chattanooga: all preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on missionary ridge by saturday at daylight. not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. however, the general plan, you understand, is for sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the tennessee river just below the mouth of chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. you will co-operate with sherman. the troops in chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. this division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. your effort then will be to form a junction with sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of missionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. the junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. lookout valley, i think, will be easily held by geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the cumberland. howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at chattanooga or with sherman. it should be marched on friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. all these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. you will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. u. s. grant, major-general. (*16) in this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. (*17) chattanooga, november 24,1863. major-general. ceo. h. thomas, chattanooga general sherman carried missionary ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. his right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at chickamauga creek. i have instructed general sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. if hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. u. s. grant, major-general. (*18) washington, d. c., december 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. maj.-general u. s. grant: understanding that your lodgment at knoxville and at chattanooga is now secure, i wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. god bless you all, a. lincoln, president u. s. (*19) general john g. foster. (*20) during this winter the citizens of jo davies county, ill., subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for general grant, which was always known as the chattanooga sword. the scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which general grant had participated. congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for vicksburg and chattanooga. all such things are now in the possession of the government at washington. (*21) washington, d. c. december 29, 1863. maj.-general u. s. grant: general foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? it is possible that schofield will be sent to your command. h. w. halleck general-in-chief. (official.) (*22) see letter to banks, in general grant's report, appendix. (*23) [private and confidential.] headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., april 4, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding military division of the mississippi. general:--it is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. for your information i now write you my programme, as at present determined upon. i have sent orders to banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of red river to general steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to new orleans; to abandon all of texas, except the rio grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. to this i will add five thousand men from missouri. with this force he is to commence operations against mobile as soon as he can. it will be impossible for him to commence too early. gillmore joins butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against richmond from the south side of the james river. this will give butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, w. f. smith commanding the right wing of his forces and gillmore the left wing. i will stay with the army of the potomac, increased by burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against lee's army, wherever it may be found. sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under ord and averell, to start from beverly, virginia, and the other, under crook, to start from charleston on the kanawha, to move against the virginia and tennessee railroad. crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about saltville, and move east from there to join ord. his force will be all cavalry, while ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. i do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. as stated, banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. gillmore is ordered to report at fortress monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. sigel is concentrating now. none will move from their places of rendezvous until i direct, except banks. i want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. but all i can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. i know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but i believe you will accomplish it. from the expedition from the department of west virginia i do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way i can take troops from there. with the long line of railroad sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. in this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. in other words, if sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*24) see instructions to butler, in general grant's report, appendix. (*25) in field, culpeper c. h., va., april 9, 1864. maj.-general geo. g. meade com'd'g army of the potomac. for information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone. so far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the red river to general steele and the navy, to abandon texas with the exception of the rio grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on mobile. this he is to do without reference to other movements. from the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave new orleans before the 1st of may, if so soon. sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, jo. johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of georgia his ultimate aim. if successful he will secure the line from chattanooga to mobile with the aid of banks. sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. this he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under major-general ord; the other from charleston, va., principally cavalry, under brig.-general crook. the former of these will endeavor to reach the tennessee and virginia railroad, about south of covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to lynchburg and return to its base by way of the shenandoah valley, or join you. the other will strike at saltville, va., and come eastward to join ord. the cavalry from ord's command will try tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the virginia and tennessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting richmond with all the south and south-west. gillmore will join butler with about 10,000 men from south carolina. butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. the force will be commanded by maj.-general w. f. smith. with smith and gillmore, butler will seize city point, and operate against richmond from the south side of the river. his movement will be simultaneous with yours. lee's army will be your objective point. wherever lee goes, there you will go also. the only point upon which i am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the rapidan above or below him. each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond and going north on a raid. but if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. we separate from butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. by the other route brandy station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the york or james rivers. these advantages and objections i will talk over with you more fully than i can write them. burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., i will give him the defence of the road from bull run as far south as we wish to hold it. this will enable you to collect all your strength about brandy station and to the front. there will be naval co-operation on the james river, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should lee fall back into his intrenchments at richmond, butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. what i would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. one wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. should by lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to white house on the pamunkey. your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. if not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the james river or elsewhere. if lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. i would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. by the other, half the amount would be sufficient. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*26) general john a. logan, upon whom devolved the command of the army of the tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and general g. m. dodge, graphically describing to general sherman the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "the disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under fuller and mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy." (*27) union army on the rapidan, may 5, 1864. [compiled.] lieutenant-general u. s. grant, commander-in-chief. major-general george g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. maj.-gen. w. s. hancock, commanding second army corps. first division, brig.-gen. francis c. barlow. first brigade, col. nelson a. miles. second brigade, col. thomas a. smyth. third brigade, col. paul frank. fourth brigade, col. john r. brooke. second division, brig.-gen. john gibbon. first brigade, brig.-gen. alex. s. webb. second brigade, brig.-gen. joshua t. owen. third brigade, col. samuel s. carroll. third division, maj.-gen. david b. birney. first brigade, brig.-gen. j. h. h. ward. second brigade, brig.-gen. alexander hays. fourth divisin, brig.-gen. gershom mott. first brigade, col. robert mcallister. second brigade, col. wm. r. brewster. artillery brigade, col. john c. tidball. maj.-gen. g. k. warren, commanding fifth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. charles griffin. first brigade, brig.-gen. romeyn b. ayres. second brigade, col. jacob b. sweitzer. third brigade, brig.-gen. j. j. bartlett. second division, brig.-gen. john c. robinson. first brigade, col. samuel h. leonard. second brigade, brig.-gen. henry baxter. third brigade, col. andrew w. denison. third division, brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford. first brigade, col. wm mccandless. third brigade, col. joseph w. fisher. fourth division, brig.-gen. james s. wadsworth. first brigade, brig.-gen. lysander cutler. second brigade brig.-gen. james c. rice. third brigade, col. roy stone artillery brigade, col. s. s. wainwright. maj.-gen. john sedgwick, commanding sixth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. h. g. wright. first brigade, col. henry w. brown. second brigade, col. emory upton. third brigade, brig.-gen. d. a. russell. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. alexander shaler. second division, brig.-gen. george w. getty. first brigade, brig.-gen. frank wheaton. second brigade, col. lewis a. grant. third brigade, brig.-gen. thos. h. neill. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. henry l. eustis. third division, brig.-gen. james ricketts. first brigade, brig.-gen. wm. h. morris. second brigade, brig.-gen. t. seymour. artillery brigade, col. c. h. tompkins maj.-gen. p. h. sheridan, commanding cavalry corps. first division, brig.-gen. a. t. a. torbert. first brigade, brig.-gen. g. a. custer. second brigade, col. thos. c. devin. reserve brigade, brig.-gen. wesley merritt second division, brig.-gen. d. mcm. gregg. first brigade, brig.-gen. henry e. davies, jr. second brigade, col. j. irvin gregg. third division, brig.-gen. j. h. wilson. first brigade, col. t. m. bryan, jr. second brigade, col. geo. h. chapman. maj.-gen. a. e. burnside, commanding ninth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. t. g. stevenson. first brigade, col. sumner carruth. second brigade, col. daniel leasure. second division, brig.-gen. robert b. potter. first brigade, col. zenas r. bliss. second brigade, col. simon g. griffin. third division, brig.-gen. orlando willcox. first brigade, col. john f. hartranft. second brigade, col. benj. c. christ. fourth division, brig.-gen. edward ferrero. first brigade, col. joshua k. sigfried. second brigade, col. henry g. thomas. provisional brigade, col. elisha g. marshall. brig.-gen. henry j. hunt, commanding artillery. reserve, col. h. s. burton. first brigade, col. j. h. kitching. second brigade, maj. j. a. tompkins. first brig. horse art., capt. j. m. robertson. second brigade, horse art., capt. d. r. ransom. third brigade, maj. r. h. fitzhugh. general headquarters....... provost guard, brig.-gen. m. r. patrick. volunteer engineers, brig.-gen. h. w. benham. confederate army. organization of the army of northern virginia, commanded by general robert e. lee, august 31st, 1834. first army corps: lieut.-gen. r. h. anderson, commanding. maj.-gen. geo. e. pickett's division. brig.-gen. seth m. barton's brigade. (a) brig.-gen. m. d. corse's " " eppa hunton's " " wm. r. terry's " maj.-gen. c. w. field's division. (b) brig.-gen. g. t. anderson's brigade " e. m. law's (c) " " john bratton's " maj.-gen. j. b. kershaw's division. (d) brig.-gen. w. t. wofford's brigade " b. g. humphreys' " " goode bryan's " " kershaw's (old) " second army corps: major-general jubal a. early, commanding maj.-gen. john b. gordon's division. brig.-gen. h. t. hays' brigade. (e) " john pegram 's " (f) " gordon's " (g) brig.-gen. r. f. hoke's " maj.-gen. edward johnson's division. stonewall brig. (brig.-gen. j. a. walker). (h) brig.-gen. j m jones' brigade. (h) " geo h. stewart's " (h) " l. a. stafford's " (e) maj.-gen. r. e. rodes' division. brig.-gen. j. daniel's brigade. (i) " geo. dole's " (k) " s. d. ramseur's brigade. " c. a. battle's " " r. d. johnston's " (f) third army corps: lieut.-gen. a. p. hill, commanding. maj.-gen. wm. mahone's division. (l) brig.-gen. j. c. c. sanders' brigade. mahone's " brig.-gen. n. h. harris's " (m) " a. r. wright's " " joseph finegan's " maj.-gen. c. m. wilcox's division. brig.-gen. e. l. thomas's brigade (n) " james h. lane's " " sam'l mccowan's " " alfred m. scale's " maj.-gen. h. heth's division. (o) brig.-gen. j. r. davis's brigade. " john r. cooke's " " d. mcrae's " " j. j. archer's " " h. h. walker's " _unattached_: 5th alabama battalion. cavalry corps: lieutenant-general wade hampton, commanding.(p) maj.-gen. fitzhugh lee's division brig.-gen. w. c. wickham's brigade " l. l. lomax's " maj.-gen. m. c. butler's division. brig.-gen. john dunovant's brigade. " p. m. b. young's " " thomas l. rosser's " maj.-gen. w. h. f. lee's division. brig.-gen. rufus barringer's brigade. " j. r. chambliss's " artillery reserve: brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton, commanding. brig.-gen. e. p. alexander's division.* cabell's battalion. manly's battery. 1st co. richmond howitzers. carleton's battery. calloway's battery. haskell's battalion. branch's battery. nelson's " garden's " rowan " huger's battalion. smith's battery. moody " woolfolk " parker's " taylor's " fickling's " martin's " gibb's battalion. davidson's battery. dickenson's " otey's " brig.-gen. a. l. long's division. braxton's battalion. lee battery. 1st md. artillery. stafford " alleghany " cutshaw's battalion. charlotteville artillery. staunton " courtney " carter's battalion. morris artillery. orange " king william artillery. jeff davis " nelson's battalion. amherst artillery. milledge " fluvauna " brown's battalion. powhatan artillery. 2d richmond howitzers. 3d " " rockbridge artillery. salem flying artillery. col r. l.walker's division. cutt's battalion. ross's battery. patterson's battery. irwin artillery. richardson's battalion. lewis artillery. donaldsonville artillery. norfolk light " huger " mclntosh 's battalion. johnson's battery. hardaway artillery. danville " 2d rockbridge artillery. pegram's battalion. peedee artillery. fredericksburg artillery. letcher " purcell battery. crenshaw's battery. poague's battalion. madison artillery. albemarle " brooke " charlotte " note. (a) col. w. r. aylett was in command aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) inspection report of this division shows that it also contained benning's and gregg's brigades. (c) commanded by colonel p. d. bowles. (d) only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. organization of the army of the valley district. (e) constituting york's brigade. (f) in ramseur's division. (g) evan's brigade, colonel e. n. atkinson commanding, and containing 12th georgia battalion. (h) the virginia regiments constituted terry's brigade, gordon's division. (i) grimes' brigade. (k) cook's " (l) returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) colonel joseph m. jayne, commanding. (n) colonel thomas j. simmons, commanding. (o) four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) on face of returns appears to have consisted of hampton's, fitz-lee's, and w. h. f. lee's division, and dearing's brigade. *but one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and alexander's name not on the original. (*28) headquarters armies u. s., may ii, 1864.--3 p.m. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. warren and wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. there is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by mott's division and the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*29) headquarters, armies u. s., may 11, 1864.-4 p.m. major-general a. e. burnside, commanding 9th army corps. major-general hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. you will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow the 12th inst. let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. i send two of my staff officers, colonels comstock and babcock, in whom i have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and general hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. generals warren and wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*30) headquarters armies u. s., may 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. the enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. we have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (johnson's), one brigade (doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*31) spottsylvania c. h., may 13, 1864. hon e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington, d. c. i beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: brigadier-general h. g. wright and brigadier-general john gibbon to be major-generals; colonel s. s. carroll, 8th ohio volunteers colonel e. upton, 121st new york volunteers; colonel william mccandless, 2d pennsylvania reserves, to be brigadier-generals. i would also recommend major-general w. s. hancock for brigadier-general in the regular army. his services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. in making these recommendations i do not wish the claims of general g. m. dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. i would also ask to have general wright assigned to the command of the sixth army corps. i would further ask the confirmation of general humphreys to the rank of major-general. general meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. he and sherman are the fittest officers for large commands i have come in contact with. if their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major-generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and i would feel personally gratified. i would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*32) quarles' mills, va., may 26, 1864. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the relative position of the two armies is now as follows: lee's right rests on a swamp east of the richmond and fredericksburg road and south of the north anna, his centre on the river at ox ford, and his left at little river with the crossings of little river guarded as far up as we have gone. hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at chesterfield ford and covers the right wing of lee's army. one division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the anna at ox ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. the 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the anna from a short distance above ox ford to little river, and parallel with and near to the enemy. to make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. to turn the enemy by his right, between the two annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. to turn him by the left leaves little river, new found river and south anna river, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. i have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near hanover town. this crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. during the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. as soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for hanover town to seize and hold the crossings. the balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. the left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. lee's army is really whipped. the prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. a battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. i may be mistaken, but i feel that our success over lee's army is already assured. the promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. we are destroying all the rails we can on the central and fredericksburg roads. i want to leave a gap on the roads north of richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. even if a crossing is not effected at hanover town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the pamunkey until a crossing is effected. i think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from port royal to the white house. i wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*33) near cold harbor, june 3, 1864, 7 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. i shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*34) cold harbor, june 5,1864. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. a full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. to do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea from the start has been to beat lee's army if possible north of richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the james river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. i now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. they act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of human life than i am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that i had designed outside of the city. i have therefore resolved upon the following plan: i will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the army of the potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the virginia central railroad from about beaver dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. when this is effected i will move the army to the south side of the james river, either by crossing the chickahominy and marching near to city point, or by going to the mouth of the chickahominy on north side and crossing there. to provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. once on the south side of the james river, i can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. if hunter succeeds in reaching lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. should hunter not succeed, i will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. the feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*35) cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. major-general d. hunter commanding dept. w. va. general sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to charlottesville, va., and to commence there the destruction of the va. cen. r. r., destroying this way as much as possible. the complete destruction of this road and of the canal on james river is of great importance to us. according to the instructions i sent to general halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to lynchburg and commence there. it would be of great value to us to get possession of lynchburg for a single day. but that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. i see, in looking over the letter to general halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from staunton via charlottesville. if you have so understood it, you will be doing just what i want. the direction i would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between staunton and lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road. from thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join general sheridan. after the work laid out for general sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the army of the potomac by the route laid out in general sheridan's instructions. if any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back. if on receipt of this you should be near to lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*36) from a statement of losses compiled in the adjutant-general's office. field of action and date. | killed. | wounded. | missing. | aggregate. | wilderness, may 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 | spottsylvania, may 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601| north anna, may 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 | totopotomoy, may 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | cold harbor, may 31st to june 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 | total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 | (*37) city point, va., june 17, 1864. 11 a.m. major-gen. halleck, washington, d. c. * * * * * * * the enemy in their endeavor to reinforce petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of bermuda hundred. they no doubt expected troops from north of the james river to take their place before we discovered it. general butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between richmond and petersburg, which i hope to retain possession of. too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*38) city point, va., july 24, 1864. major-general meade, commanding, etc. the engineer officers who made a survey of the front from bermuda hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. the chances they think will be better on burnside's front. if this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. all officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through. to the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. the field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. one thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. general ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from bermuda hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the appomattox and james rivers, as may be deemed best. this should be done by tuesday morning, if done at all. if not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as hicksford at least, and to weldon if possible. * * * * * * * whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at petersburg, burnside's mine will be blown up.... u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*39) see letter, august 5th, appendix. (*40) see appendix, letters of oct. 11th. (*41) city point, va., december 2,1864. major-general thomas, nashville tenn. if hood is permitted to remain quietly about nashville, you will lose all the road back to chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the tennessee. should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 2, 1864.--1.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. with your citizen employees armed, you can move out of nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. after the repulse of hood at franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. at this distance, however, i may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. you will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if hood is not speedily disposed of. put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. should you get him to retreating give him no peace. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 5, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. is there not danger of forrest moving down the cumberland to where he can cross it? it seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after forrest, hood should be attacked where he is. time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 6, 1864--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. attack hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. there is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the ohio river. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 8, 1864.--8.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. your dispatch of yesterday received. it looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the cumberland river, and are scattered. why not attack at once? by all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or hood, can beat to the ohio. if you think necessary call on the governors of states to send a force into louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. you clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. if destroyed he never can replace it. use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 11, 1864.--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. if you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. let there be no further delay. hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. if he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. i am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. washington, d. c., december 15, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. i was just on my way to nashville, but receiving a dispatch from van duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, i shall go no further. push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up hood's army and render it useless for future operations. do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. much is now expected. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*42) see orders to major-general meade, ord, and sheridan, march 24th, appendix. (*43) see appendix. (*44) note.--the fac-simile of the terms of lee's surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of general ely s. parker, military secretary on general grant's staff at the time of the surrender. three pages of paper were prepared in general grant's manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by general parker at the suggestion of general grant. after such alteration it was handed to general lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to general grant. the original was then transcribed by general parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished general lee. the fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures. there is a popular error to the effect that generals grant and lee each signed the articles of surrender. the document in the form of a letter was signed only by general grant, in the parlor of mclean's house while general lee was sitting in the room, and general lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to general grant. personal memoirs of u. s. grant volume i. by u. s. grant preface. "man proposes and god disposes." there are but few important events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice. although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs i had determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. at the age of nearly sixty-two i received an injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my general health. this made study a pleasant pastime. shortly after, the rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. this was followed soon after by universal depression of all securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of the income still retained, and for which i am indebted to the kindly act of friends. at this juncture the editor of the century magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. i consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment i was living upon borrowed money. the work i found congenial, and i determined to continue it. the event is an important one for me, for good or evil; i hope for the former. in preparing these volumes for the public, i have entered upon the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the national or confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special mention is due. there must be many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men engaged. there were thousands of instances, during the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. the troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. the first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before i had reason to suppose i was in a critical condition of health. later i was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for weeks. i have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should devote to such work. i would have more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public if i could have allowed myself more time. i have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, f. d. grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of fact given. the comments are my own, and show how i saw the matters treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. with these remarks i present these volumes to the public, asking no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, july 1, 1885. contents volume i. chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. chapter ii. west point--graduation. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico --supplying transportation. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second-lieutenant--army of occupation. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz --siege and capture of vera cruz. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey --storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army--mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast --crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast--promoted captain--flush times in california. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting --mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment--general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo. --jefferson city--cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah --headquarters at cairo. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont--a narrow escape--after the battle. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy--assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight--retreat and defeat of the confederates. chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates--intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston --remarks on shiloh. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth--occupation of corinth--the army separated. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis --escaping jackson--complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen --occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs --collecting forage and food. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general mcclernand in command--assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence--operations at yazoo pass. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press--running the batteries--loss of the indianola --disposition of the troops. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf--movement up the big black--battle of raymond. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy--battle of champion's hill. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black --investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. chapter xxxvii. siege of vicksburg. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines's bluff --explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. volume one begins: chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. my family is american, and has been for generations, in all its branches, direct and collateral. mathew grant, the founder of the branch in america, of which i am a descendant, reached dorchester, massachusetts, in may, 1630. in 1635 he moved to what is now windsor, connecticut, and was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty years. he was also, for many years of the time, town clerk. he was a married man when he arrived at dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. his eldest son, samuel, took lands on the east side of the connecticut river, opposite windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. i am of the eighth generation from mathew grant, and seventh from samuel. mathew grant's first wife died a few years after their settlement in windsor, and he soon after married the widow rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his first wife, on the ship mary and john, from dorchester, england, in 1630. mrs. rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and others by her second. by intermarriage, two or three generations later, i am descended from both the wives of mathew grant. in the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, noah grant, and his younger brother, solomon, held commissions in the english army, in 1756, in the war against the french and indians. both were killed that year. my grandfather, also named noah, was then but nine years old. at the breaking out of the war of the revolution, after the battles of concord and lexington, he went with a connecticut company to join the continental army, and was present at the battle of bunker hill. he served until the fall of yorktown, or through the entire revolutionary war. he must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as i believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the close. soon after this he emigrated to westmoreland county, pennsylvania, and settled near the town of greensburg in that county. he took with him the younger of his two children, peter grant. the elder, solomon, remained with his relatives in connecticut until old enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the british west indies. not long after his settlement in pennsylvania, my grandfather, captain noah grant, married a miss kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this time to ohio, and settled where the town of deerfield now stands. he had now five children, including peter, a son by his first marriage. my father, jesse r. grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second marriage. peter grant went early to maysville, kentucky, where he was very prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at the mouth of the kanawha river, virginia, in 1825, being at the time one of the wealthy men of the west. my grandmother grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. this broke up the family. captain noah grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son peter, in maysville. the rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of deerfield, my father in the family of judge tod, the father of the late governor tod, of ohio. his industry and independence of character were such, that i imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his maintenance. there must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge tod and his wife, with all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of benefactors. i have often heard him speak of mrs. tod as the most admirable woman he had ever known. he remained with the tod family only a few years, until old enough to learn a trade. he went first, i believe, with his half-brother, peter grant, who, though not a tanner himself, owned a tannery in maysville, kentucky. here he learned his trade, and in a few years returned to deerfield and worked for, and lived in the family of a mr. brown, the father of john brown--"whose body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on." i have often heard my father speak of john brown, particularly since the events at harper's ferry. brown was a boy when they lived in the same house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic and extremist in whatever he advocated. it was certainly the act of an insane man to attempt the invasion of the south, and the overthrow of slavery, with less than twenty men. my father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at ravenna, the county seat of portage county. in a few years he removed from ravenna, and set up the same business at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. during the minority of my father, the west afforded but poor facilities for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions for whatever learning they obtained. i have often heard him say that his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while living with judge tod. but his thirst for education was intense. he learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in his eightieth year. books were scarce in the western reserve during his youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where he lived. this scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in it. the habit continued through life. even after reading the daily papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important information they contained. he made himself an excellent english scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant contributor to western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the west at that time. he always took an active part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, i believe, that he was the first mayor of georgetown. he supported jackson for the presidency; but he was a whig, a great admirer of henry clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after jackson. my mother's family lived in montgomery county, pennsylvania, for several generations. i have little information about her ancestors. her family took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when i was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. on the other side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in windsor, connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, lawson grant --still living--was the heir. he was so much interested in the subject that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when i was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners for a consideration--three thousand dollars, i think. i remember the circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing beyond their homes. from these he refused to receive any recompense. my mother's father, john simpson, moved from montgomery county, pennsylvania, to clermont county, ohio, about the year 1819, taking with him his four children, three daughters and one son. my mother, hannah simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years of age. her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several children. she still lives in clermont county at this writing, october 5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the democratic party lost control in 1860. her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in kentucky before the war. he was the only one of the children who entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living in clermont county, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as active in mind as ever. he was a supporter of the government during the war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the democratic party means irretrievable ruin. in june, 1821, my father, jesse r. grant, married hannah simpson. i was born on the 27th of april, 1822, at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. in the fall of 1823 we moved to georgetown, the county seat of brown, the adjoining county east. this place remained my home, until at the age of seventeen, in 1839, i went to west point. the schools, at the time of which i write, were very indifferent. there were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. they were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the a b c's up to the young lady of eighteen and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three r's, "reading, 'riting, 'rithmetic." i never saw an algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in georgetown, until after i was appointed to west point. i then bought a work on algebra in cincinnati; but having no teacher it was greek to me. my life in georgetown was uneventful. from the age of five or six until seventeen, i attended the subscription schools of the village, except during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. the former period was spent in maysville, kentucky, attending the school of richardson and rand; the latter in ripley, ohio, at a private school. i was not studious in habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the outlay for board and tuition. at all events both winters were spent in going over the same old arithmetic which i knew every word of before, and repeating: "a noun is the name of a thing," which i had also heard my georgetown teachers repeat, until i had come to believe it--but i cast no reflections upon my old teacher, richardson. he turned out bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous places in the service of their states. two of my contemporaries there --who, i believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have held seats in congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these are wadsworth and brewster. my father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the community in which he lived. mindful of his own lack of facilities for acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the education of his children. consequently, as stated before, i never missed a quarter from school from the time i was old enough to attend till the time of leaving home. this did not exempt me from labor. in my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. it was only the very poor who were exempt. while my father carried on the manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and tilled considerable land. i detested the trade, preferring almost any other labor; but i was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which horses were used. we had, among other lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the village. in the fall of the year choppers were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. when i was seven or eight years of age, i began hauling all the wood used in the house and shops. i could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that time, but i could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at the house unload. when about eleven years old, i was strong enough to hold a plough. from that age until seventeen i did all the work done with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still attending school. for this i was compensated by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the ground. while still quite young i had visited cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also maysville, kentucky, often, and once louisville. the journey to louisville was a big one for a boy of that day. i had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to toledo, ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to flat rock, kentucky, about seventy miles away. on this latter occasion i was fifteen years of age. while at flat rock, at the house of a mr. payne, whom i was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in georgetown, i saw a very fine saddle horse, which i rather coveted, and proposed to mr. payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two i was driving. payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that i was allowed to do as i pleased with the horses. i was seventy miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and mr. payne said he did not know that his horse had ever had a collar on. i asked to have him hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. it was soon evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no viciousness, and i expressed a confidence that i could manage him. a trade was at once struck, i receiving ten dollars difference. the next day mr. payne, of georgetown, and i started on our return. we got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog that frightened the horses and made them run. the new animal kicked at every jump he made. i got the horses stopped, however, before any damage was done, and without running into anything. after giving them a little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. that instant the new horse kicked, and started to run once more. the road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet deep on the opposite side of the pike. i got the horses stopped on the very brink of the precipice. my new horse was terribly frightened and trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my companion, mr. payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and took passage on a freight wagon for maysville. every time i attempted to start, my new horse would commence to kick. i was in quite a dilemma for a time. once in maysville i could borrow a horse from an uncle who lived there; but i was more than a day's travel from that point. finally i took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal use then--and with this blindfolded my horse. in this way i reached maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my friend. here i borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we proceeded on our journey. about half my school-days in georgetown were spent at the school of john d. white, a north carolinian, and the father of chilton white who represented the district in congress for one term during the rebellion. mr. white was always a democrat in politics, and chilton followed his father. he had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine at their father's school--who did not go the same way. the second brother died before the rebellion began; he was a whig, and afterwards a republican. his oldest brother was a republican and brave soldier during the rebellion. chilton is reported as having told of an earlier horse-trade of mine. as he told the story, there was a mr. ralston living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which i very much wanted. my father had offered twenty dollars for it, but ralston wanted twenty-five. i was so anxious to have the colt, that after the owner left, i begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. my father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted i was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the twenty-five. i at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. when i got to mr. ralston's house, i said to him: "papa says i may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, i am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you twenty-five." it would not require a connecticut man to guess the price finally agreed upon. this story is nearly true. i certainly showed very plainly that i had come for the colt and meant to have him. i could not have been over eight years old at the time. this transaction caused me great heart-burning. the story got out among the boys of the village, and it was a long time before i heard the last of it. boys enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day did, and in later life i have found that all adults are not free from the peculiarity. i kept the horse until he was four years old, when he went blind, and i sold him for twenty dollars. when i went to maysville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, i recognized my colt as one of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. i have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the whole. i did not like to work; but i did as much of it, while young, as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time. i had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and probably more than most of them. i have no recollection of ever having been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. but at school the case was different. the rod was freely used there, and i was not exempt from its influence. i can see john d. white--the school teacher --now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. it was not always the same one, either. switches were brought in bundles, from a beech wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were intended. often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. i never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. mr. white was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in which he lived. he only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. chapter ii. west point--graduation. in the winter of 1838-9 i was attending school at ripley, only ten miles distant from georgetown, but spent the christmas holidays at home. during this vacation my father received a letter from the honorable thomas morris, then united states senator from ohio. when he read it he said to me, "ulysses, i believe you are going to receive the appointment." "what appointment?" i inquired. "to west point; i have applied for it." "but i won't go," i said. he said he thought i would, and i thought so too, if he did. i really had no objection to going to west point, except that i had a very exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get through. i did not believe i possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing. there had been four boys from our village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from west point, and never a failure of any one appointed from georgetown, except in the case of the one whose place i was to take. he was the son of dr. bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. young bailey had been appointed in 1837. finding before the january examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. before the next examination he was dismissed. dr. bailey was a proud and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he forbade his return home. there were no telegraphs in those days to disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the alleghanies, and but few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other people's private affairs. consequently it did not become generally known that there was a vacancy at west point from our district until i was appointed. i presume mrs. bailey confided to my mother the fact that bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his son's return home. the honorable thomas l. hamer, one of the ablest men ohio ever produced, was our member of congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. he and my father had been members of the same debating society (where they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal friends from their early manhood up to a few years before. in politics they differed. hamer was a life-long democrat, while my father was a whig. they had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some act of president jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, i think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. i know both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the advance. under these circumstances my father would not write to hamer for the appointment, but he wrote to thomas morris, united states senator from ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at west point from our district, and that he would be glad if i could be appointed to fill it. this letter, i presume, was turned over to mr. hamer, and, as there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. this healed the breach between the two, never after reopened. besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to west point--that "he thought i would go"--there was another very strong inducement. i had always a great desire to travel. i was already the best travelled boy in georgetown, except the sons of one man, john walker, who had emigrated to texas with his family, and immigrated back as soon as he could get the means to do so. in his short stay in texas he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would form going there now. i had been east to wheeling, virginia, and north to the western reserve, in ohio, west to louisville, and south to bourbon county, kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country within fifty miles of home. going to west point would give me the opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, philadelphia and new york. this was enough. when these places were visited i would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any other accident happen, by which i might have received a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to enter the academy. nothing of the kind occurred, and i had to face the music. georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. it is, and has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. there was probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could have been afforded, it would not have voted for jefferson davis for president of the united states, over mr. lincoln, or any other representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of john morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through ohio, spent a few hours in the village. the rebels helped themselves to whatever they could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered meals to be prepared for them by the families. this was no doubt a far pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a like service for union soldiers. the line between the rebel and union element in georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the churches. there were churches in that part of ohio where treason was preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the bible. there were men in georgetown who filled all the requirements for membership in these churches. yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing arms--furnished the union army four general officers and one colonel, west point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of volunteers, that i can think of. of the graduates from west point, all had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except possibly general a. v. kautz, who had remained in the army from his graduation. two of the colonels also entered the service from other localities. the other seven, general mcgroierty, colonels white, fyffe, loudon and marshall, majors king and bailey, were all residents of georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at the close, returned there. major bailey was the cadet who had preceded me at west point. he was killed in west virginia, in his first engagement. as far as i know, every boy who has entered west point from that village since my time has been graduated. i took passage on a steamer at ripley, ohio, for pittsburg, about the middle of may, 1839. western boats at that day did not make regular trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of time, for passengers or freight. i have myself been detained two or three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. on this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days pittsburg was reached. from pittsburg i chose passage by the canal to harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. this gave a better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of western pennsylvania, and i had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. at that time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more pleasant, when time was not an object. from harrisburg to philadelphia there was a railroad, the first i had ever seen, except the one on which i had just crossed the summit of the alleghany mountains, and over which canal boats were transported. in travelling by the road from harrisburg, i thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. we travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an hour. this seemed like annihilating space. i stopped five days in philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited girard college (which was then in course of construction), and got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. my sojourn in new york was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see the city very well. i reported at west point on the 30th or 31st of may, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. a military life had no charms for me, and i had not the faintest idea of staying in the army even if i should be graduated, which i did not expect. the encampment which preceded the commencement of academic studies was very wearisome and uninteresting. when the 28th of august came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--i felt as though i had been at west point always, and that if i staid to graduation, i would have to remain always. i did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in fact i rarely ever read over a lesson the second time during my entire cadetship. i could not sit in my room doing nothing. there is a fine library connected with the academy from which cadets can get books to read in their quarters. i devoted more time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. much of the time, i am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy sort. i read all of bulwer's then published, cooper's, marryat's, scott's, washington irving's works, lever's, and many others that i do not now remember. mathematics was very easy to me, so that when january came, i passed the examination, taking a good standing in that branch. in french, the only other study at that time in the first year's course, my standing was very low. in fact, if the class had been turned the other end foremost i should have been near head. i never succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one study, during the four years. i came near it in french, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. early in the session of the congress which met in december, 1839, a bill was discussed abolishing the military academy. i saw in this an honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for i was selfish enough to favor the bill. it never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, i would have been sorry to have seen it succeed. my idea then was to get through the course, secure a detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course different from my plans. at the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending from the close of the june examination to the 28th of august. this i enjoyed beyond any other period of my life. my father had sold out his business in georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if i should ever be able to retire on a competency. he had moved to bethel, only twelve miles away, in the adjoining county of clermont, and had bought a young horse that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle during my furlough. most of my time was spent among my old school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at west point. persons acquainted with the academy know that the corps of cadets is divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. these companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and qualifications. the adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieutenants are taken from the first, or senior class; the sergeants from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or sophomore class. i had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when i returned from furlough i found myself the last but one--about my standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. the promotion was too much for me. that year my standing in the class--as shown by the number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the sergeants, and i was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. during my first year's encampment general scott visited west point, and reviewed the cadets. with his commanding figure, his quite colossal size and showy uniform, i thought him the finest specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. i could never resemble him in appearance, but i believe i did have a presentiment for a moment that some day i should occupy his place on review--although i had no intention then of remaining in the army. my experience in a horse-trade ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate chum. the next summer martin van buren, then president of the united states, visited west point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress me with the awe which scott had inspired. in fact i regarded general scott and captain c. f. smith, the commandant of cadets, as the two men most to be envied in the nation. i retained a high regard for both up to the day of their death. the last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they still seemed about five times as long as ohio years, to me. at last all the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. i was anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but there was only one regiment of dragoons in the army at that time, and attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at least four brevet second lieutenants. i recorded therefore my first choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. again there was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of september. again i went to ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and again i found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides a horse and buggy that i could drive--but i was not in a physical condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. for six months before graduation i had had a desperate cough ("tyler's grip" it was called), and i was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though i had grown six inches in stature in the mean time. there was consumption in my father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which made my symptoms more alarming. the brother and sister next younger than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and i seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with different uniforms, i could not get a uniform suit until notified of my assignment. i left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to make the uniform until i notified him whether it was to be for infantry or dragoons. notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. this was a time of great suspense. i was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. the conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste for military uniform that i never recovered from. soon after the arrival of the suit i donned it, and put off for cincinnati on horseback. while i was riding along a street of that city, imagining that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when i first saw general scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for weeks, turned to me and cried: "soldier! will you work? no, sir--ee; i'll sell my shirt first!!" the horse trade and its dire consequences were recalled to mind. the other circumstance occurred at home. opposite our house in bethel stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, the stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. on my return i found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down the outside seams in imitation of mine. the joke was a huge one in the mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but i did not appreciate it so highly. during the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in visiting friends in georgetown and cincinnati, and occasionally other towns in that part of the state. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. on the 30th of september i reported for duty at jefferson barracks, st. louis, with the 4th united states infantry. it was the largest military post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. colonel steven kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but without vexatious rules or regulations. every drill and roll-call had to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without making written application to state where they were going for how long, etc., so that they were back for their next duty. it did seem to me, in my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. i noticed, however, a few years later, when the mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. they had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. they were right; but they did not always give their disease the right name. at west point i had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was room-mate also--f. t. dent, whose family resided some five miles west of jefferson barracks. two of his unmarried brothers were living at home at that time, and as i had taken with me from ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, i soon found my way out to white haven, the name of the dent estate. as i found the family congenial my visits became frequent. there were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. there was still an older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at boarding-school in st. louis, but who, though through school, had not yet returned home. she was spending the winter in the city with connections, the family of colonel john o'fallon, well known in st. louis. in february she returned to her country home. after that i do not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become more enjoyable. we would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit the neighbors, until i became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the younger sisters. if the 4th infantry had remained at jefferson barracks it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the matter with me; but in the following may a circumstance occurred which developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. the annexation of texas was at this time the subject of violent discussion in congress, in the press, and by individuals. the administration of president tyler, then in power, was making the most strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day. during these discussions the greater part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "dismounted rifles"--was stationed at fort jessup, louisiana, some twenty-five miles east of the texas line, to observe the frontier. about the 1st of may the 3d infantry was ordered from jefferson barracks to louisiana, to go into camp in the neighborhood of fort jessup, and there await further orders. the troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down the mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. about the time they started i obtained a leave of absence for twenty days to go to ohio to visit my parents. i was obliged to go to st. louis to take a steamer for louisville or cincinnati, or the first steamer going up the ohio river to any point. before i left st. louis orders were received at jefferson barracks for the 4th infantry to follow the 3d. a messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but before he could reach me i was off, totally ignorant of these events. a day or two after my arrival at bethel i received a letter from a classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post marked st. louis or jefferson barracks, until the expiration of my leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along for me. his advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to me. i now discovered that i was exceedingly anxious to get back to jefferson barracks, and i understood the reason without explanation from any one. my leave of absence required me to report for duty, at jefferson barracks, at the end of twenty days. i knew my regiment had gone up the red river, but i was not disposed to break the letter of my leave; besides, if i had proceeded to louisiana direct, i could not have reached there until after the expiration of my leave. accordingly, at the end of the twenty days, i reported for duty to lieutenant ewell, commanding at jefferson barracks, handing him at the same time my leave of absence. after noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to join my regiment in louisiana. i then asked for a few days' leave before starting, which he readily granted. this was the same ewell who acquired considerable reputation as a confederate general during the rebellion. he was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars --both in my estimation unholy. i immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no baggage with me, of course. there is an insignificant creek--the gravois--between jefferson barracks and the place to which i was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its mouth. there is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. on this occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, i found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. i looked at it a moment to consider what to do. one of my superstitions had always been when i started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. i have frequently started to go to places where i had never been and to which i did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and if i got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, i would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and come in by the other side. so i struck into the stream, and in an instant the horse was swimming and i being carried down by the current. i headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. i went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my --future--brother-in-law. we were not of the same size, but the clothes answered every purpose until i got more of my own. before i returned i mustered up courage to make known, in the most awkward manner imaginable, the discovery i had made on learning that the 4th infantry had been ordered away from jefferson barracks. the young lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for when the regiment left. before separating it was definitely understood that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the removal of a regiment trouble us. this was in may, 1844. it was the 22d of august, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. my duties kept me on the frontier of louisiana with the army of observation during the pendency of annexation; and afterwards i was absent through the war with mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the annexation itself. during that time there was a constant correspondence between miss dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four years and three months. in may, 1845, i procured a leave for twenty days, visited st. louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the union, which had not been asked for before. as already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. accordingly, soon after i was settled at jefferson barracks, i wrote a letter to professor church--professor of mathematics at west point--requesting him to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be made. assistant professors at west point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular branch of study they are assigned to teach. the answer from professor church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt i should have been detailed a year or two later but for the mexican war coming on. accordingly i laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in garrison, with regularity, if not persistency. i reviewed my west point course of mathematics during the seven months at jefferson barracks, and read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. to help my memory i kept a book in which i would write up, from time to time, my recollections of all i had read since last posting it. when the regiment was ordered away, i being absent at the time, my effects were packed up by lieutenant haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken along. i never saw my journal after, nor did i ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. often since a fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands of some malicious person who would publish it. i know its appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. the 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at fort jessup, about midway between the red river and the sabine. our orders required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further instructions. those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine woods, between the old town of natchitoches and grand ecore, about three miles from each, and on high ground back from the river. the place was given the name of camp salubrity, and proved entitled to it. the camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in front and rear. the springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that region in great multitudes and of great voracity. in the valley they swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. the regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. there was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry to the western border of louisiana was occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of texas, but it was generally understood that such was the case. ostensibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into texas, but really as a menace to mexico in case she appeared to contemplate war. generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but not so all of them. for myself, i was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of mexico. it extended from the sabine river on the east to the rio grande on the west, and from the gulf of mexico on the south and east to the territory of the united states and new mexico--another mexican state at that time--on the north and west. an empire in territory, it had but a very sparse population, until settled by americans who had received authority from mexico to colonize. these colonists paid very little attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the state almost from the start, though the constitution of mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. soon they set up an independent government of their own, and war existed, between texas and mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very nearly ceased upon the capture of santa anna, the mexican president. before long, however, the same people--who with permission of mexico had colonized texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the state to the united states, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the american union. even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon mexico cannot. the fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any claim to, as part of the new acquisition. texas, as an independent state, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the nueces river and the rio grande. mexico had never recognized the independence of texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the state had no claim south of the nueces. i am aware that a treaty, made by the texans with santa anna while he was under duress, ceded all the territory between the nueces and the rio grande--, but he was a prisoner of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. he knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the texans, if they should ever capture him. the texans, if they had taken his life, would have only followed the example set by santa anna himself a few years before, when he executed the entire garrison of the alamo and the villagers of goliad. in taking military possession of texas after annexation, the army of occupation, under general taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed territory. the army did not stop at the nueces and offer to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently in order to force mexico to initiate war. it is to the credit of the american nation, however, that after conquering mexico, and while practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was likely to be, to mexico. to us it was an empire and of incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other means. the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war. nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. the 4th infantry went into camp at salubrity in the month of may, 1844, with instructions, as i have said, to await further orders. at first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. as the summer heat increased these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. the summer was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting those stationed at, and near, fort jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the red river, and the citizens of natchitoches and grand ecore. there was much pleasant intercourse between the inhabitants and the officers of the army. i retain very agreeable recollections of my stay at camp salubrity, and of the acquaintances made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living who were there at the time. i can call to mind only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself, who were at camp salubrity with the regiment, who are now alive. with a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my hopes of being ordered to west point as instructor vanished. at the time of which i now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. generally lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff corps. if they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would retain. in the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the regiment. under these circumstances i gave up everything like a special course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and not very much for that, until the war was over. i kept a horse and rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely recovered from the cough which i had carried from west point, and from all indications of consumption. i have often thought that my life was saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an administrative act, and a war, both of which i disapproved. as summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the tents e were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and "further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the hardship. men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as officers. the outlay by the government in accomplishing this was nothing, or nearly nothing. the winter was spent more agreeably than the summer had been. there were occasional parties given by the planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the red river were called. the climate was delightful. near the close of the short session of congress of 1844-5, the bill for the annexation of texas to the united states was passed. it reached president tyler on the 1st of march, 1845, and promptly received his approval. when the news reached us we began to look again for "further orders." they did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of may following i asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose of visiting--st. louis. the object of this visit has been before stated. early in july the long expected orders were received, but they only took the regiment to new orleans barracks. we reached there before the middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. the yellow fever was raging in new orleans during the time we remained there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous well-observed sunday. i recollect but one occasion when this observance seemed to be broken by the inhabitants. one morning about daylight i happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, i looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. i observed a couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces." i do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties engaged. i do not believe i ever would have the courage to fight a duel. if any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill him, i would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating us, when i executed him. if i should do another such a wrong as to justify him in killing me, i would make any reasonable atonement within my power, if convinced of the wrong done. i place my opposition to duelling on higher grounds than here stated. no doubt a majority of the duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those engaged to decline. at camp salubrity, and when we went to new orleans barracks, the 4th infantry was commanded by colonel vose, then an old gentleman who had not commanded on drill for a number of years. he was not a man to discover infirmity in the presence of danger. it now appeared that war was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command of the regiment at a battalion drill. only two or three evolutions had been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to his own quarters, dropped dead. he had not been complaining of ill health, but no doubt died of heart disease. he was a most estimable man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico--supplying transportation. early in september the regiment left new orleans for corpus christi, now in texas. ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made in sailing vessels. at that time there was not more than three feet of water in the channel at the outlet of corpus christi bay; the debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an island in the channel called shell island, the ships anchoring some miles out from shore. this made the work slow, and as the army was only supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison equipage, etc. there happened to be pleasant weather while this was going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable distance apart. the men and baggage were let down to a point higher than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. after i had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at shell island, quite six miles from the ship, i had occasion for some reason or other to return on board. while on the suviah--i think that was the name of our vessel--i heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes," etc. in a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he was, and crying, that his men had mutinied. it was necessary to sustain the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors charged with mutiny were in irons. i rather felt for a time a wish that i had not gone aboard just then. as the men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, i always doubted if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. by the time i was ready to leave the ship again i thought i had learned enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer below, and determined to let myself down without assistance. without saying anything of my intentions to any one, i mounted the railing, and taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, i put one foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as i did so some one called out "hold on." it was too late. i tried to "hold on" with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so rapidly that my hold broke, and i plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me i never would stop. when i came to the surface again, being a fair swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, i swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and i was drawn up without a scratch or injury. i do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with me in the least when they found me uninjured. i rather enjoyed the joke myself. the captain of the suviah died of his disease a few months later, and i believe before the mutineers were tried. i hope they got clear, because, as before stated, i always thought the mutiny was all in the brain of a very weak and sick man. after reaching shore, or shell island, the labor of getting to corpus christi was slow and tedious. there was, if my memory serves me, but one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry arrived. others were procured later. the distance from shell island to corpus christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. the channel to the bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged over the bottom when loaded. not more than one trip a day could be effected. later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. corpus christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by the entrance of the nueces river into tide-water, and is on the west bank of that bay. at the time of its first occupancy by united states troops there was a small mexican hamlet there, containing probably less than one hundred souls. there was, in addition, a small american trading post, at which goods were sold to mexican smugglers. all goods were put up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for loading on pack mules. two of these packages made a load for an ordinary mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. the bulk of the trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. the mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in exchange except silver. the trade in tobacco was enormous, considering the population to be supplied. almost every mexican above the age of ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. nearly every mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. the cigarettes were made by the smokers as they used them. up to the time of which i write, and for years afterwards--i think until the administration of president juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of the revenue collected from internal sources. the price was enormously high, and made successful smuggling very profitable. the difficulty of obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. i know from my own experience that when i was at west point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. i failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. under spanish rule mexico was prohibited from producing anything that the mother-country could supply. this rule excluded the cultivation of the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate were well adapted. the country was governed for "revenue only;" and tobacco, which cannot be raised in spain, but is indigenous to mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of government. the native population had been in the habit of using "the weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more rapidly and universally than good ones, and the spanish colonists adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these places farmed out the privilege at a very high price. the tobacco when raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the capacity of the people to pay. all laws for the government of the country were enacted in spain, and the officers for their execution were appointed by the crown, and sent out to the new el dorado. the mexicans had been brought up ignorant of how to legislate or how to rule. when they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. the only change was, that mexico became her own executor of the laws and the recipient of the revenues. the tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of the obnoxious imposts to be repealed. now, the citizens are allowed to cultivate any crops the soil will yield. tobacco is cheap, and every quality can be produced. its use is by no means so general as when i first visited the country. gradually the "army of occupation" assembled at corpus christi. when it was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry --the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as infantry--not more than three thousand men in all. general zachary taylor commanded the whole. there were troops enough in one body to establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for all they were capable of in case of battle. the rank and file were composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the union. the men engaged in the mexican war were brave, and the officers of the regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. a more efficient army for its number and armament, i do not believe ever fought a battle than the one commanded by general taylor in his first two engagements on mexican--or texan soil. the presence of united states troops on the edge of the disputed territory furthest from the mexican settlements, was not sufficient to provoke hostilities. we were sent to provoke a fight, but it was essential that mexico should commence it. it was very doubtful whether congress would declare war; but if mexico should attack our troops, the executive could announce, "whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.," and prosecute the contest with vigor. once initiated there were but few public men who would have the courage to oppose it. experience proves that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. the history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with that of the northern man who aided him by conspiring against his government while protected by it. the most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. mexico showing no willingness to come to the nueces to drive the invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the rio grande, to a point near matamoras. it was desirable to occupy a position near the largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. the distance from corpus christi to matamoras is about one hundred and fifty miles. the country does not abound in fresh water, and the length of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water supplies. besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who travelled constantly between corpus christi and the rio grande, and some by the buffalo. there was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between corpus christi and matamoras. it was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. the army was but indifferently supplied with transportation. wagons and harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses could not so readily be brought. the american traders and mexican smugglers came to the relief. contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven dollars each. the smugglers furnished the animals, and took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. i doubt whether the mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring them. such is trade; such is war. the government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated price. between the rio grande and the nueces there was at that time a large band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination commenced. the mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and bring them into the american settlements and sell them. a picked animal could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. some of these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. the horses were generally very strong, formed much like the norman horse, and with very heavy manes and tails. a number of officers supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when grazing was the only means of supplying forage. there was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the necessary preparations for a move. in the meantime the army was engaged in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. twice, that i remember, small trains were sent from corpus christi, with cavalry escorts, to san antonio and austin, with paymasters and funds to pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. general taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. i accompanied one of them in december, 1845. the distance from corpus christi to san antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. now that roads exist it is probably less. from san antonio to austin we computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter place back to corpus christi at over two hundred miles. i know the distance now from san antonio to austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. there was not at the time an individual living between corpus christi and san antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering mexican settlements along the san antonio river. the people in at least one of these hamlets lived underground for protection against the indians. the country abounded in game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. on the nueces, about twenty-five miles up from corpus christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called san patricio, but the inhabitants had all been massacred by the indians, or driven away. san antonio was about equally divided in population between americans and mexicans. from there to austin there was not a single residence except at new braunfels, on the guadalupe river. at that point was a settlement of germans who had only that year come into the state. at all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would hastily construct for temporary occupation. from austin to corpus christi there was only a small settlement at bastrop, with a few farms along the colorado river; but after leaving that, there were no settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the old town of goliad. some of the houses were still standing. goliad had been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before there had been a mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been killed or driven away. this, with the massacre of the prisoners in the alamo, san antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in all, furnished the strongest justification the texans had for carrying on the war with so much cruelty. in fact, from that time until the mexican war, the hostilities between texans and mexicans was so great that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in superior numbers or possessed of superior arms. the man we found living there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near fort jessup, louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had known him and his family. he had emigrated in advance of his family to build up a home for them. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second lieutenant--army of occupation. when our party left corpus christi it was quite large, including the cavalry escort, paymaster, major dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except lieutenant benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of mexico --lieutenant, now general, augur, and myself, concluded to spend their allotted time at san antonio and return from there. we were all to be back at corpus christi by the end of the month. the paymaster was detained in austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our leave. we concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their food, it was a good six days' journey. we had to sleep on the prairie every night, except at goliad, and possibly one night on the colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and prepared ourselves. the journey was hazardous on account of indians, and there were white men in texas whom i would not have cared to meet in a secluded place. lieutenant augur was taken seriously sick before we reached goliad and at a distance from any habitation. to add to the complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at his capture--gave out. it was absolutely necessary to get for ward to goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. by dint of patience and exceedingly slow movements, goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our patient. we remained over a day, hoping that augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. he did not, however, and knowing that major dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on. i had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. on this trip there was no minute of time while travelling between san patricio and the settlements on the san antonio river, from san antonio to austin, and again from the colorado river back to san patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great numbers. each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. i, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun; except, being detained over a day at goliad, benjamin and i concluded to go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the pecan--and bring back a few turkeys. we had scarcely reached the edge of the timber when i heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant i saw two or three turkeys flying away. these were soon followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from just over my head. all this time i stood watching the turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never once thought of levelling it at the birds. when i had time to reflect upon the matter, i came to the conclusion that as a sportsman i was a failure, and went back to the house. benjamin remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back. after the second night at goliad, benjamin and i started to make the remainder of the journey alone. we reached corpus christi just in time to avoid "absence without leave." we met no one not even an indian --during the remainder of our journey, except at san patricio. a new settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave protection against the indians. on the evening of the first day out from goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves, directly in our front. the prairie grass was tall and we could not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. to my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. the part of ohio that i hailed from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before i left. benjamin was from indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. he understood the nature of the animal and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number of them. he kept on towards the noise, unmoved. i followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. i have no doubt that if benjamin had proposed returning to goliad, i would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave augur sick there in the first place; but benjamin did not propose turning back. when he did speak it was to ask: "grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack?" knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought i would over-estimate the number, i determined to show my acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and answered: "oh, about twenty," very indifferently. he smiled and rode on. in a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. there were just two of them. seated upon their haunches, with their mouths close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. i have often thought of this incident since when i have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted their associates. there are always more of them before they are counted. a week or two before leaving corpus christi on this trip, i had been promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full second-lieutenant, 7th infantry. frank gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was promoted to the 4th in the same orders. we immediately made application to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. on my return, i found that our application had been approved at washington. while in the 7th infantry i was in the company of captain holmes, afterwards a lieutenant-general in the confederate army. i never came in contact with him in the war of the rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous service in his high rank. my transfer carried me to the company of captain mccall, who resigned from the army after the mexican war and settled in philadelphia. he was prompt, however, to volunteer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general in the union army. i was not fortunate enough to meet him after he resigned. in the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. our relations were always most pleasant. the preparations at corpus christi for an advance progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been there. the principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting them broken to harness. the process was slow but amusing. the animals sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. usually a number would be brought in by a company of mexicans, partners in the delivery. the mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. the mexicans,--who were all experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. a lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. while he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by another mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. this would bring the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "u. s." ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten around the throat if pulled. with a man on each side holding these ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to rise. with more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and fastened there. the delivery of that mule was then complete. this process was gone through with every mule and wild horse with the army of occupation. the method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. it is a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same uses. at that time in northern mexico the mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except for the saddle or pack. at all events the corpus christi mule resisted the new use to which he was being put. the treatment he was subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. the soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to harness. numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not perform. five mules were allotted to each wagon. a teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same color and general appearance for his team. with a full corps of assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules together. in two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. two ropes would be put about the neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if too unruly. they were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. two men remained on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. all being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. the first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. after repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to run. this would bring the breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. in time all were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a mexican mule get entirely loose. their drivers were all teamsters by the time they got through. i recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the saddle, not only for some time at corpus christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite matamoras, then to camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during the night. he did not run away at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster he always got out of the way. at last, growing tired of the constant effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. nothing short of a mexican with his lasso could have caught him. regulations would not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of another to take his place. i am a competent witness, for i was regimental quartermaster at the time. while at corpus christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept horses. the animals cost but little in the first instance, and when picketed they would get their living without any cost. i had three not long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at one time. a colored boy who gave them all the attention they got --besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to water and leading the other two. the led horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. they never were heard of afterwards. shortly after that some one told captain bliss, general taylor's adjutant-general, of my misfortune. "yes; i heard grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he replied. that was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when i got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. i never suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. at last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the advance to begin on the 8th of march. general taylor had an army of not more than three thousand men. one battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by water to brazos santiago, at the mouth of the rio grande. a guard was left back at corpus christi to look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick to be removed. the remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry independent. colonel twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. he was followed by the three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. thus the rear brigade did not move from corpus christi until the 11th of march. in view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's march. general taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, i doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his instructions from washington demanded. his orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of the army. all officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. as already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of horses" but a short time before i determined not to get another, but to make the journey on foot. my company commander, captain mccall, had two good american horses, of considerably more value in that country, where native horses were cheap, than they were in the states. he used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. he was quite anxious to know whether i did not intend to get me another horse before the march began. i told him no; i belonged to a foot regiment. i did not understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to start, he said: "there, grant, is a horse for you." i found that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant went a-foot. he had found a mustang, a three-year old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the colored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. it was probably the only horse at corpus christi that could have been purchased just then for any reasonable price. five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the mustang. i was sorry to take him, because i really felt that, belonging to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. but i saw the captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the trip. the day we started was the first time the horse had ever been under saddle. i had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. at no time during the day could i choose exactly the part of the column i would march with; but after that, i had as tractable a horse as any with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. he never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick within the length of his picket rope. a few days out from corpus christi, the immense herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between the nueces and the rio grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. it was the very band from which the horse i was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. the column was halted for a rest, and a number of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd. the country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's curvature. as far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd extended. to the left, it extended equally. there was no estimating the number of animals in it; i have no idea that they could all have been corralled in the state of rhode island, or delaware, at one time. if they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would have given out the first day. people who saw the southern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of the texas band of wild horses in 1846. at the point where the army struck the little colorado river, the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. the water was brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. here the whole army concentrated before attempting to cross. the army was not accompanied by a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge building. to add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the "assembly," and other military calls. like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour general taylor and his army. there were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the "invader." a few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. i do not remember that a single shot was fired. the troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest part. teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. the bank down to the water was steep on both sides. a rope long enough to cross the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules into the water. this latter rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of the forward one back, to be used over again. the water was deep enough for a short distance to swim the little mexican mules which the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left them to show their obstinacy. in this manner the artillery and transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the colorado river. about the middle of the month of march the advance of the army reached the rio grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite the city of matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the lower end of the town. there was not at that time a single habitation from corpus christi until the rio grande was reached. the work of fortifying was commenced at once. the fort was laid out by the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general directions. the mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. they captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by captains thornton and hardee. the latter figured as a general in the late war, on the confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both armies. lieutenant theodric porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with a small detachment; and major cross, the assistant quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. there was no base of supplies nearer than point isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the rio grande and twenty-five miles away. the enemy, if the mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. i have already said that general taylor's whole command on the rio grande numbered less than three thousand men. he had, however, a few more troops at point isabel or brazos santiago. the supplies brought from corpus christi in wagons were running short. work was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. all the men who could be employed, were kept at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. with all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. by the latter part of april the work was in a partially defensible condition, and the 7th infantry, major jacob brown commanding, was marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. all the supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the army to point isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken with the army. early on the second day after starting the force reached its destination, without opposition from the mexicans. there was some delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. while general taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little garrison up the river was besieged. as we lay in our tents upon the sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the rio grande could be distinctly heard. the war had begun. there were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. what general taylor's feelings were during this suspense i do not know; but for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, i felt sorry that i had enlisted. a great many men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. when they say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach danger they become more subdued. this rule is not universal, for i have known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. but the number of such men is small. on the 7th of may the wagons were all loaded and general taylor started on his return, with his army reinforced at point isabel, but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the rio grande. the road from point isabel to matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the rio grande is reached. this river, like the mississippi, flows through a rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the compass at times within a few miles. formerly the river ran by resaca de la palma, some four or five miles east of the present channel. the old bed of the river at resaca had become filled at places, leaving a succession of little lakes. the timber that had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was still standing. this timber was struck six or eight miles out from the besieged garrison, at a point known as palo alto--"tall trees" or "woods." early in the forenoon of the 8th of may as palo alto was approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in line of battle just in front of the timber. their bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. the force was composed largely of cavalry armed with lances. where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-needle. general taylor halted his army before the head of column came in range of the artillery of the mexicans. he then formed a line of battle, facing the enemy. his artillery, two batteries and two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at intervals along the line. a battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by lieutenant-colonel childs, of the artillery, as reserves. these preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective companies. when the men were all back in their places in line, the command to advance was given. as i looked down that long line of about three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, i thought what a fearful responsibility general taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. the mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry. at first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was continued. as we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through the ranks. they hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them and open ranks and let them pass. when we got to a point where the artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle opened on both sides. the infantry under general taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. at the distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without your finding it out. the artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot; but general taylor had with him three or four twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders before spoken of, that had a long range. this made a powerful armament. the mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. we had greatly the advantage in this arm. the artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened fire. the infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step out of their way. it could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers did a great deal of execution. on our side there was little or no loss while we occupied this position. during the battle major ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally wounded, and lieutenant luther, also of the artillery, was struck. during the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became evident that the mexicans were falling back. we again advanced, and occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. in this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops, and some execution was done. one cannon-ball passed through our ranks, not far from me. it took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of captain page of my regiment, while the splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one officer, lieutenant wallen, --hurting them more or less. our casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded. at the break of day on the 9th, the army under taylor was ready to renew the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our front during the night. the chaparral before us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. a body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. it was better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be relieved. to get to them the chaparral had to be passed. thus i assume general taylor reasoned. he halted the army not far in advance of the ground occupied by the mexicans the day before, and selected captain c. f. smith, of the artillery, and captain mccall, of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where the enemy had gone. this left me in command of the company, an honor and responsibility i thought very great. smith and mccall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until they came up to the succession of ponds, before describes, at resaca. the mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite bank. this position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches and open places. smith and mccall deployed on each side of the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once commenced. as we came up we were deployed in like manner. i was with the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the enemy. at last i got pretty close up without knowing it. the balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting the limbs of the chaparral right and left. we could not see the enemy, so i ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be enforced. we kept our position until it became evident that the enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to advance upon. by this time some progress had been made on our left. a section of artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been taken. the mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of them had, no doubt, left early. i at last found a clear space separating two ponds. there seemed to be a few men in front and i charged upon them with my company. there was no resistance, and we captured a mexican colonel, who had been wounded, and a few men. just as i was sending them to the rear with a guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where i was. the ground had been charged over before. my exploit was equal to that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. when asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied: "some one had done that before." this left no doubt in my mind but that the battle of resaca de la palma would have been won, just as it was, if i had not been there. there was no further resistance. the evening of the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the fort, and the garrison was relieved. the siege had lasted a number of days, but the casualties were few in number. major jacob brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was named. since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the north by the press and the reports came back to us. at the same time, or about the same time, we learned that war existed between the united states and mexico, by the acts of the latter country. on learning this fact general taylor transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and matamoras was occupied. we then became the "army of invasion." up to this time taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year commenced arriving. the army remained at matamoras until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. general taylor was not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. he felt his responsibility as going no further. if he had thought that he was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to determine what should be done. if the judgment was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the public. no soldier could face either danger or responsibility more calmly than he. these are qualities more rarely found than genius or physical courage. general taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or retinue. in dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. i can call to mind only one instance when i saw him in uniform, and one other when i heard of his wearing it, on both occasions he was unfortunate. the first was at corpus christi. he had concluded to review his army before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. colonel twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the command of the review. colonel and brevet brigadier-general worth, a far different soldier from taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to command. worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to twiggs until the question was settled by the highest authority. this broke up the review, and the question was referred to washington for final decision. general taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. he was assigned to duty, however, by the president, with the rank which his brevet gave him. worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. the question was submitted to washington, and no response was received until after the army had reached the rio grande. it was decided against general worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. this kept him out of the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma. either the resignation was not accepted, or general worth withdrew it before action had been taken. at all events he returned to the army in time to command his division in the battle of monterey, and served with it to the end of the war. the second occasion on which general taylor was said to have donned his uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the flag officer of the naval squadron off the mouth of the rio grande. while the army was on that river the flag officer sent word that he would call on the general to pay his respects on a certain day. general taylor, knowing that naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his guest in the same style. his uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. the flag officer, knowing general taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's dress, left off his uniform for this occasion. the meeting was said to have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally apologetic. the time was whiled away pleasantly enough at matamoras, while we were waiting for volunteers. it is probable that all the most important people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently existed. it was the policy of the commanding general to allow no pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded than the people had ever known before. among the troops that joined us at matamoras was an ohio regiment, of which thomas l. hamer, the member of congress who had given me my appointment to west point, was major. he told me then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. i have said before that hamer was one of the ablest men ohio ever produced. at that time he was in the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. but he was taken sick before monterey, and died within a few days. i have always believed that had his life been spared, he would have been president of the united states during the term filled by president pierce. had hamer filled that office his partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt i should have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the army--the pay department probably--and would therefore now be preparing to retire. neither of these speculations is unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny. reinforcements having arrived, in the month of august the movement commenced from matamoras to camargo, the head of navigation on the rio grande. the line of the rio grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade mexico from the north. in that case the most natural route to take was the one which general taylor selected. it entered a pass in the sierra madre mountains, at monterey, through which the main road runs to the city of mexico. monterey itself was a good point to hold, even if the line of the rio grande covered all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. it is built on a plain two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the situation healthy. on the 19th of august the army started for monterey, leaving a small garrison at matamoras. the troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which i belonged, were moved up the river to camargo on steamers. as there were but two or three of these, the boats had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were up. those who marched did so by the south side of the river. lieutenant-colonel garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. one day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the month of august, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for northern men. the order of marching was changed and night marches were substituted with the best results. when camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the mexican hamlet. i was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the regiment. the teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from corpus christi to the rio grande over the level prairies of texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a mountainous country. to obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with mexicans to pack and drive them. i had charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack train to supplement them. there were not men enough in the army to manage that train without the help of mexicans who had learned how. as it was the difficulty was great enough. the troops would take up their march at an early hour each day. after they had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be lashed to the backs of the mules. sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. it took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing so long with their loads on their backs. sometimes one would start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they would take the other. i am not aware of ever having used a profane expletive in my life; but i would have the charity to excuse those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of mexican pack mules at the time. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. the advance from camargo was commenced on the 5th of september. the army was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's march. the advance reached cerralvo in four days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. by the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as before, a day separating the divisions. the forward division halted again at marin, twenty-four miles from monterey. both this place and cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of los grengos--"the yankees." from marin the movement was in mass. on the 19th general taylor, with is army, was encamped at walnut springs, within three miles of monterey. the town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. to the north, between the city and walnut springs, stretches an extensive plain. on this plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of "black fort." its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of their range. there were two detached spurs of hills or mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also fortified. on one of these stood the bishop's palace. the road to saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of the guns from these heights. the lower or eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. to the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of foot-hills. the plaza in the centre of the city was the citadel, properly speaking. all the streets leading from it were swept by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. the house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for parapets. such were the defences of monterey in september, 1847. general ampudia, with a force of certainly ten thousand men, was in command. general taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in three divisions, under generals butler, twiggs and worth. the troops went into camp at walnut springs, while the engineer officers, under major mansfield--a general in the late war--commenced their reconnoissance. major mansfield found that it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the black fort and the works on the detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the saltillo road. with this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the interior. general worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given the task of gaining possession of the saltillo road, and of carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. he started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. the divisions under generals butler and twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the movement under general worth. worth's was regarded as the main attack on monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. his march this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about the bishop's palace and the other outside fortifications on their left. general worth reached a defensible position just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked for the night. the engineer officers with him--captain sanders and lieutenant george g. meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious national army at the battle of gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the saltillo road under cover of night. during the night of the 20th general taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon black fort. a natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest the enemy. the 4th infantry, then consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while they were intrenching themselves and their guns. i was regimental quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp and the public property at walnut springs. it was supposed that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning. the point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. at daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. my curiosity got the better of my judgment, and i mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. i had been there but a short time when an order to charge was given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where i had been ordered to stay--i charged with the regiment as soon as the troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of black fort. as they advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. about one-third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. we retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from walnut springs. i was, i believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the charge who was on horseback. when we got to a lace of safety the regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. the adjutant of the regiment, lieutenant hoskins, who was not in robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. i offered him my horse and he accepted the offer. a few minutes later i saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. i ran to him, took his horse and was back with the regiment in a few minutes. in a short time we were off again; and the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that i recollect of being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower batteries. the adjutant to whom i had loaned my horse was killed, and i was designated to act in his place. this charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. we belonged to the brigade commanded by lieutenant-colonel garland, and he had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended should be decisive. by a movement by the left flank garland could have led his men beyond the range of the fire from black fort and advanced towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as could be expected. there was no undue loss of life in reaching the lower end of monterey, except that sustained by garland's command. meanwhile quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the houses without much loss. colonel garland's brigade also arrived at the suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. an entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses protected our troops so long as they were inactive. on the west general worth had reached the saltillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss. he turned from his new position and captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. this gave him possession of the upper or west end of monterey. troops from both twiggs's and butler's divisions were in possession of the east end of the town, but the black fort to the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the possession of the enemy. our camps at walnut springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. a regiment of kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against black fort. practically monterey was invested. there was nothing done on the 22d by the united states troops; but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from black fort and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of the city. during the night they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held undisputed possession of the east end of monterey. twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered from the fire of the enemy. but the streets leading to the plaza--all spanish or spanish-american towns have near their centres a square called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. the houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. all advances into the city were thus attended with much danger. while moving along streets which did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably encountered. the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. the loss of the 3d infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. there were only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers present, and five of these officers were killed. when within a square of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a halt. placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring houses. the exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our soldiers. we had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our ammunition was growing low. i volunteered to go back (*2) to the point we had started from, report our position to general twiggs, and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. we were at this time occupying ground off from the street, in rear of the houses. my ride back was an exposed one. before starting i adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, i started at full run. it was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but these i crossed at such a flying rate that generally i was past and under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. i got out safely without a scratch. at one place on my ride, i saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. finding that the house was full of wounded american officers and soldiers, i dismounted and went in. i found there captain williams, of the engineer corps, wounded in the head, probably fatally, and lieutenant territt, also badly wounded his bowels protruding from his wound. there were quite a number of soldiers also. promising them to report their situation, i left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with the troops at the east end. before ammunition could be collected, the two regiments i had been with were seen returning, running the same gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with comparatively little loss. the movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. the poor wounded officers and men i had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. while this was going on at the east, general worth, with a small division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the city. he resorted to a better expedient for getting to the plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. instead of moving by the open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from one to another. without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza during the night that before morning, ampudia, the mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. this stopped all further hostilities. the terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. the prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and personal property with them. my pity was aroused by the sight of the mexican garrison of monterey marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. many of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their riders out of town. the men looked in but little better condition. i thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about." after the surrender of the garrison of monterey a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. as had been the case on the rio grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with the "yankees" in the pleasantest manner. in fact, under the humane policy of our commander, i question whether the great majority of the mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. property and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. the educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small percentage of the whole population. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz--siege and capture of vera cruz. the mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. general scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by president polk, or marcy, his secretary of war. scott was a whig and the administration was democratic. general scott was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. it would not do therefore to give him command of the "army of conquest." the plans submitted by scott for a campaign in mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. this was on the 27th of may, 1846. four days later general scott was notified that he need not go to mexico. general gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field. colonel zachary taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was therefore left in command. he, too, was a whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the whig papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the presidency. something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. he could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent. it was finally decided to send general scott to mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture vera cruz and march upon the capital of the country. it was no doubt supposed that scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter taylor or destroy his chances for the presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize. the administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. it was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the presidency. it was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. the problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. the fact is, the administration of mr. polk made every preparation to disgrace scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself. general scott had opposed conquest by the way of the rio grande, matamoras and saltillo from the first. now that he was in command of all the forces in mexico, he withdrew from taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. indeed scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the rio grande, and authorized taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. general taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon buena vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the rio grande. scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture vera cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. he was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the president, but his sincere good wishes. the promises were all broken. only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and scott had scarcely started for mexico before the president undertook to supersede him by the appointment of senator thomas h. benton as lieutenant-general. this being refused by congress, the president asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing benton to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and scott remained in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. general scott reached brazos santiago or point isabel, at the mouth of the rio grande, late in december, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to camargo, where he had written general taylor to meet him. taylor, however, had gone to, or towards tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. he had started on this march before he was aware of general scott being in the country. under these circumstances scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate. general taylor's victory at buena vista, february 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the presidency by the whigs a foregone conclusion. he was nominated and elected in 1848. i believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the presidency of the united states. when general scott assumed command of the army of invasion, i was in the division of general david twiggs, in taylor's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of general william worth, in which i served to the close of the war. the troops withdrawn from taylor to form part of the forces to operate against vera cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the rio grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. i found general worth a different man from any i had before served directly under. he was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. there was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but general worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. the length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. general worth on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much. general worth belonged to this latter class. he enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him. the army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the rio grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. the transports were all sailing vessels. the passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the rio grande to the time of debarkation south of vera cruz. the trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. the transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. the transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of anton lizardo, some sixteen miles south of vera cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from the north. with the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind i had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. at that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were sidewheelers. this little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. i recollect that lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom i happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances." finally on the 7th of march, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given scott to invade a country with a population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. the debarkation took place inside of the little island of sacrificios, some three miles south of vera cruz. the vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; general scott had provided these before leaving the north. the breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. the men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. the mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. during the debarkation one shot took off the head of major albertis. no other, i believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. on the 9th of march the troops were landed and the investment of vera cruz, from the gulf of mexico south of the city to the gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. the landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. vera cruz, at the time of which i write and up to 1880, was a walled city. the wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. there were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. in front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the gulf, stands san juan de ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. after the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. these batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. if a sortie had been made at any time by the mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. no serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away. the siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of march, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. upon this general morales, who was governor of both the city and of san juan de ulloa, commenced a correspondence with general scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. on the 29th vera cruz and san juan de ulloa were occupied by scott's army. about five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. the casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. general scott had less than twelve thousand men at vera cruz. he had been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity. twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. in fact, there were at that time but two roads from vera cruz to the city of mexico that could be taken by an army; one by jalapa and perote, the other by cordova and orizaba, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the city of mexico after the range of mountains is passed. it was very important to get the army away from vera cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the north, was arriving very slowly. it was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. at that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of general scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period. not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong. this force was composed of three divisions, under generals twiggs, patterson, and worth. the importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. on the 8th of april, twiggs's division started for jalapa. he was followed very soon by patterson, with his division. general worth was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. it was the 13th of april before this division left vera cruz. the leading division ran against the enemy at cerro gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to jalapa, and went into camp at plan del rio, about three miles from the fortifications. general patterson reached plan del rio with his division soon after twiggs arrived. the two were then secure against an attack from santa anna, who commanded the mexican forces. at all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of april. general scott had remained at vera cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. he at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by santa anna and of the troops holding it. cerro gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of jalapa, and santa anna had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army. the road, said to have been built by cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended at every turn by artillery. on either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. a direct attack along the road was an impossibility. a flank movement seemed equally impossible. after the arrival of the commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack. these reconnoissances were made under the supervision of captain robert e. lee, assisted by lieutenants p. g. t. beauregard, isaac i. stevens, z. b. tower, g. w. smith, george b. mcclellan, and j. g. foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. the reconnoissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. this was accomplished without the knowledge of santa anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible. on the same day general scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th. the attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. animals could not. these had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. the engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed. artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece. in like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes. in this way scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. the attack was made, the mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. on the left general pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. i am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that i saw. there were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated. the surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores. the prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. the battle of buena vista was probably very important to the success of general scott at cerro gordo and in his entire campaign from vera cruz to the great plains reaching to the city of mexico. the only army santa anna had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of vera cruz, was the one he had with him confronting general taylor. it is not likely that he would have gone as far north as monterey to attack the united states troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south. when taylor moved to saltillo and then advanced on to buena vista, santa anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet general scott in the mountain passes west of vera cruz. his attack on taylor was disastrous to the mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to cerro gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before scott got there. if he had been successful at buena vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at cerro gordo. had the battle of buena vista not been fought santa anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat. after the battle the victorious army moved on to jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast. jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. it was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify in our front. worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this result. the division marched to perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains. there is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the castle of perote. this, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament. general scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of vera cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. the troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to vera cruz should be cut off. it being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the city of mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the american army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through vera cruz during the season of the vomito. this reduced scott's force in the field to about five thousand men. early in may, worth, with his division, left perote and marched on to puebla. the roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs. notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart. nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of amozoque--an easy day's march east of puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. a battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared. on the 15th of may we entered the city of puebla. general worth was in command at puebla until the latter end of may, when general scott arrived. here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. during his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. the brigade to which i was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. on one occasion general worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. he galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of santa anna with an army vastly superior to his own. general scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of santa anna and his myriads. there were, of course, bodies of mounted mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too far out. these always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. after the arrival of general scott i was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. we had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. we procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more. there had been great delay in obtaining the authority of congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. a bill was before the national legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of february before it became a law. appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to mexico. it was august before general scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. his moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by generals twiggs, worth, pillow and quitman. there was also a cavalry corps under general harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons. the advance commenced on the 7th of august with twiggs's division in front. the remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between. the marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack. i had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land. the contrast between the two was very marked. general taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. he moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation. often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. he was very much given to sit his horse side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. general scott was the reverse in all these particulars. he always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be expected. this was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed. on these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. his staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order. orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. in their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. general scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment. taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. he knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. but with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. both were pleasant to serve under--taylor was pleasant to serve with. scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. his plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. taylor saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey--storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. the route followed by the army from puebla to the city of mexico was over rio frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. the pass through this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving puebla. the city of mexico lies west of rio frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and south. between the western base of rio frio and the city of mexico there are three lakes, chalco and xochimilco on the left and texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the city of mexico. chalco and texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the city runs. xochimilco is also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with lake chalco by a narrow channel. there is a high rocky mound, called el penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground dividing the lakes. this mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. scott's army was rapidly concentrated about ayotla and other points near the eastern end of lake chalco. reconnoissances were made up to within gun-shot of el penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south side of lake chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. a way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of august troops were in st. augustin tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south from the plaza of the capital. between st. augustin tlalpam and the city lie the hacienda of san antonio and the village of churubusco, and south-west of them is contreras. all these points, except st. augustin tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to san antonio. this made the approach to the city from the south very difficult. the brigade to which i was attached--garland's, of worth's division--was sent to confront san antonio, two or three miles from st. augustin tlalpam, on the road to churubusco and the city of mexico. the ground on which san antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. to the south-west is the pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. from the position occupied by garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the defences of san antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry. if contreras, some three miles west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the city. under these circumstances general scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. on the 18th of august, the day of reaching san augustin tlalpam, garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced intrenchments of san antonio, but where his troops were protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose than defense. general scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that place. the pedregal on the north and north-east, and the mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. this affair, like that of cerro gordo, was an engagement in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. in fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary field. the very strength of each of these positions was, by the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting parties while securing their positions for final attack. all the troops with general scott in the valley of mexico, except a part of the division of general quitman at san augustin tlalpam and the brigade of garland (worth's division) at san antonio, were engaged at the battle of contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. the assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. the brigade commanded by general riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. from the point occupied by garland's brigade we could see the progress made at contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. the mexicans all the way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. we moved out at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. clarke's brigade of worth's division now moved west over the point of the pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to clear san antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading to churubusco and the city of mexico. when he approached churubusco his left, under colonel hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. about an hour after, garland was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. san antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes waving over contreras. the troops that had been engaged at contreras, and even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way of san antonio and churubusco. it was expected by the commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of his position at churubusco, before turning east to reach the san antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the valley of mexico. general scott coming upon the battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. this shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. the enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners, artillery and small arms. the balance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. i recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their ground, were deserters from general taylor's army on the rio grande. both the strategy and tactics displayed by general scott in these various engagements of the 20th of august, 1847, were faultless as i look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. as before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he could use on an ordinary march. i mean, up to the points from which the attack was to commence. after that point is reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before contemplated. the enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of defeats this day, that the city of mexico could have been entered without much further bloodshed. in fact, captain philip kearney --afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. he had not heard the call for a halt. general franklin pierce had joined the army in mexico, at puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. he had consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the battle of contreras. by an unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. the next day, when his brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the road from san augustin tlalpam to the city, general pierce attempted to accompany them. he was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and fainted. this circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the presidency. whatever general pierce's qualifications may have been for the presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. i was not a supporter of him politically, but i knew him more intimately than i did any other of the volunteer generals. general scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because mr. nicholas p. trist, the commissioner on the part of the united states to negotiate a treaty of peace with mexico, was with the army, and either he or general scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would be more possible while the mexican government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader. be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. the army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as tacubaya. negotiations were at once entered into with santa anna, who was then practically the government and the immediate commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. a truce was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the armistices, but authorized general scott to draw supplies for his army from the city in the meantime. negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between mr. trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of mexico, until the 2d of september. at that time mr. trist handed in his ultimatum. texas was to be given up absolutely by mexico, and new mexico and california ceded to the united states for a stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. i do not suppose mr. trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries. the war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new states might be carved. at all events the mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. the terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. the first train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob. this, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the citizens in bed. the circumstance was overlooked and negotiations continued. as soon as the news reached general scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of september, he wrote a vigorous note to president santa anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. general scott, with worth's division, was now occupying tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the city of mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. more than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands molino del rey. the mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in length. at the period of which i speak general scott supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of guns. this, however, proved to be a mistake. it was valuable to the mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. the building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for infantry. chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line between molino del rey and the western part of the city. it was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous sides. the city of mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on strong stone arches. one of these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or near molino del rey, and runs north close to the west base of chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the city by the garita san cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to the city. the second aqueduct starts from the east base of chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to the city. this aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. the arches supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those engaged defensively. at points on the san cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in each. at the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the san cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of sandbags. the roads leading to garitas (the gates) san cosme and belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. such were the defences of the city of mexico in september, 1847, on the routes over which general scott entered. prior to the mexican war general scott had been very partial to general worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for some reason, worth had become estranged from his chief. scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart. he did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. it was understood at the time that he gave worth authority to plan and execute the battle of molino del rey without dictation or interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. the effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. the battle of molino del rey was fought on the 8th of september. the night of the 7th, worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for the morrow. these orders contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the mills before daylight. the engineers had reconnoitred the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. by daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at molino were all at the places designated. the ground in front of the mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was over. worth's troops entered the mills by every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to chapultepec. had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt americans and mexicans would have gone over the defences of chapultepec so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. the defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering their own men. this was not done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the 8th. i do not criticise the failure to capture chapultepec at this time. the result that followed the first assault could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept on without orders. it is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. the loss on our side at molino del rey was severe for the numbers engaged. it was especially so among commissioned officers. i was with the earliest of the troops to enter the mills. in passing through to the north side, looking towards chapultepec, i happened to notice that there were armed mexicans still on top of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. not seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the building, i took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet of the top. by this i climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by some other way. there were still quite a number of mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the building. they still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had surrounded, all by himself. i halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. molino del rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and property, were marched back to their quarters in tacubaya. the engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged. during the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play upon the fortifications of chapultepec. the bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during this day than that of the artillery. general scott assigned the capture of chapultepec to general pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment. two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. they were commanded by captains mckinzie and casey respectively. the assault was successful, but bloody. in later years, if not at the time, the battles of molino del rey and chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. when the assaults upon the garitas of san cosme and belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the mills until west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from chapultepec. in like manner, the troops designated to act against belen could have kept east of chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of chapultepec. molino del rey and chapultepec would both have been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have been turned. general quitman, a volunteer from the state of mississippi, who stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting against belen. general worth commanded the column against san cosme. when chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. i was on the road to san cosme, and witnessed most that took place on that route. when opposition was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. we encountered no serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. i have described the defences of this position before. there were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that i can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached. one of these officers was a lieutenant semmes, of the marine corps. i think captain gore, and lieutenant judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. our progress was stopped for the time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it. west of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the south-west angle made by the san cosme road and the road we were moving upon. a stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. i watched my opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south wall. proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, i peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. i then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. all that were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, i watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. our men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would fire at it. our crossing was thus made practicable without loss. when we reached a safe position i instructed my little command again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the san cosme road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. when we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, i saw some united states troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. this was the company of captain horace brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. i explained to brooks briefly what i had discovered and what i was about to do. he said, as i knew the ground and he did not, i might go on and he would follow. as soon as we got on the road leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. no reinforcements had yet come up except brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a force. it was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. later in the day in reconnoitring i found a church off to the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back of the garita san cosme. i got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. the road being in possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the church. this took us over several ditches breast deep in water and grown up with water plants. these ditches, however, were not over eight or ten feet in width. the howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by the men to its destination. when i knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. with the little spanish then at my command, i explained to him that he might save property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, i intended to go in whether he consented or not. he began to see his duty in the same light that i did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so. the gun was carried to the belfry and put together. we were not more than two or three hundred yards from san cosme. the shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created great confusion. why they did not send out a small party and capture us, i do not know. we had no infantry or other defences besides our one gun. the effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so marked that general worth saw it from his position. (*3) he was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, lieutenant pemberton--later lieutenant-general commanding the defences of vicksburg--to bring me to him. he expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. i could not tell the general that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. i took the captain with me, but did not use his gun. the night of the 13th of september was spent by the troops under general worth in the houses near san cosme, and in line confronting the general line of the enemy across to belen. the troops that i was with were in the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the town. during the night santa anna, with his army--except the deserters--left the city. he liberated all the convicts confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after santa anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to general scott to ask--if not demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal affairs. general scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved themselves properly. general quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at belen that worth's troops did about san cosme. after the interview above related between general scott and the city council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. the troops under worth were to stop at the alameda, a park near the west end of the city. quitman was to go directly to the plaza, and take possession of the palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which congress has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all located, the president resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. this is the building generally designated as the "halls of the montezumas." chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army --mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. on entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. the streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. in this firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, garland, was badly wounded, lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. he died a few days after, and by his death i was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) i had gone into the battle of palo alto in may, 1846, a second lieutenant, and i entered the city of mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present at any one engagement. my regiment lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the mexican war. the mexicans were not so discriminating. they sometimes picked off my juniors. general scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. i wonder that he was not fired upon, but i believe he was not; at all events he was not hurt. he took quarters at first in the "halls of the montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect of all who study them. lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the city of mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. the people began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south and south-west. whether general scott approved of the mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, i have no means of knowing. his orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. on the other hand, general taylor's, i think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties. both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation. earlier in this narrative i have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of perote, extends to the cities of puebla and mexico. the route travelled by the army before reaching puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. this pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. again, the highest point of the road-bed between vera cruz and the city of mexico is over rio frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. but by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. the road from perote to the city of mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our west. arriving due north from puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the city of mexico. it is true this road would have brought troops in by guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name --and at this point lake texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. it has always seemed to me that this northern route to the city of mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. but my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. i know just enough about the mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. it is natural that an important city like puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. in this same way the city of mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field. but general scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. he invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the government. credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. i had now made marches and been in battle under both general scott and general taylor. the former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming. the road was broad and the country open except in crossing the rio frio mountain. general taylor pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. he moved even in smaller bodies. i never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. i supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains. later i found the fallacy of this belief. the rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under scott and taylor. the victories in mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers. there were two reasons for this. both general scott and general taylor had such armies as are not often got together. at the battles of palo alto and resaca-de-la-palma, general taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at west point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in indian wars. the rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. a better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by general taylor in the earliest two engagements of the mexican war. the volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. they were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. they became soldiers themselves almost at once. all these conditions we would enjoy again in case of war. the mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. the private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. he was turned adrift when no longer wanted. the officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. with all this i have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as i have ever seen made by soldiers. now mexico has a standing army larger than that of the united states. they have a military school modelled after west point. their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. the mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. the mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. they celebrate the anniversaries of chapultepec and molino del rey as of very great victories. the anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. at these two battles, while the united states troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the mexicans suffered. the mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. the trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. with us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers --who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from donelson to vicksburg and to chattanooga; and in the east from gettysburg to appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. there is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories. i would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but i would like to see truthful history written. such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the american citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. the justice of the cause which in the end prevailed, will, i doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time. for the present, and so long as there are living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. as time passes, people, even of the south, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. after the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary. general scott at once began the preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. he contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the people. his plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. from the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. this policy was to be pursued. there were not troops enough in the valley of mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the rio grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of vera cruz. military possession was taken of cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the city of mexico; of toluca, nearly as far west, and of pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. vera cruz, jalapa, orizaba, and puebla were already in our possession. meanwhile the mexican government had departed in the person of santa anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the united states commissioner, mr. trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. a temporary government, however, was soon established at queretaro, and trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back to washington, but general scott prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. the treaty was finally signed the 2d of february, 1848, and accepted by the government at washington. it is that known as the "treaty of guadalupe hidalgo," and secured to the united states the rio grande as the boundary of texas, and the whole territory then included in new mexico and upper california, for the sum of $15,000,000. soon after entering the city of mexico, the opposition of generals pillow, worth and colonel duncan to general scott became very marked. scott claimed that they had demanded of the president his removal. i do not know whether this is so or not, but i do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. at last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. this act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. he had asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the president himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to procure the appointment of benton: and the administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. about the middle of february orders came convening a court of inquiry, composed of brevet brigadier-general towson, the paymaster-general of the army, brigadier-general cushing and colonel belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from washington, relieving scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning major-general william o. butler of kentucky to the place. this order also released pillow, worth and duncan from arrest. if a change was to be made the selection of general butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so far as i remember to have heard expressions on the subject. there were many who regarded the treatment of general scott as harsh and unjust. it is quite possible that the vanity of the general had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the start. the court tried the accuser quite as much as the accused. it was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet in frederick, maryland. general scott left the country, and never after had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. he certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in high places. the efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made them both candidates for the presidency. general taylor was nominated in 1848, and was elected. four years later general scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with his defeat.(*5) chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. the treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the commissioners of each side early in february, 1848. it took a considerable time for it to reach washington, receive the approval of the administration, and be finally ratified by the senate. it was naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there must be delay they contented themselves as best they could. every sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay their fifty cents. i attended one of them--just one--not wishing to leave the country without having witnessed the national sport. the sight to me was sickening. i could not see how human beings could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on these occasions. at these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. the audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. when all is ready a bull is turned into the ring. three or four men come in, mounted on the merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling down. the men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a needle. other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and explosives about the size of a musket cartridge. to each of these explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. before the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to him. the pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the animal becomes frantic. as he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. he turns towards his last tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is allowed to take it on his horns. the flag drops and covers the eyes of the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and the torment is renewed. when the animal is worked into an uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores --literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or eighteen inches long, and sharp. the trick is to dodge an attack from the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. if these efforts fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife blade into the spinal column just back of the horns. he is then dragged out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same performance is renewed. on the occasion when i was present one of the bulls was not turned aside by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc., etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. the horse was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. the bull was then lassoed and killed in the manner above described. men came in and carried the dead man off in a litter. when the slaughtered bull and horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on a litter but a few minutes before. he was only dead so far as that performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who might not be so fortunate. there was a feeling of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he had come to life again. i confess that i felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. i did not stay for the conclusion of the performance; but while i did stay, there was not a bull killed in the prescribed way. bull fights are now prohibited in the federal district--embracing a territory around the city of mexico, somewhat larger than the district of columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. during one of my recent visits to mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at puebla and at pachuca. i was not notified in advance so as to be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases i civilly declined to attend. another amusement of the people of mexico of that day, and one which nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and layman, was monte playing. regular feast weeks were held every year at what was then known as st. augustin tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. there were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. in many of the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not bet more than a few pennies at a time. in other booths silver formed the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed if there should be a run of luck against the bank. in some there was no coin except gold. here the rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a single day. all this is stopped now. for myself, i was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. my regiment was stationed in tacubaya. i was regimental quartermaster and commissary. general scott had been unable to get clothing for the troops from the north. the men were becoming--well, they needed clothing. material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and people employed to make it up into "yankee uniforms." a quartermaster in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. a regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. i had to look after this matter for the 4th infantry. then our regimental fund had run down and some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a number of months. the regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. there was authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. so many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various grades, and the remainder the pay of privates. this would not secure a band leader, nor good players on certain instruments. in garrison there are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. the best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers instead of flour. the ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one hundred and forty pounds of bread. this saving was purchased by the commissary for the benefit of the fund. in the emergency the 4th infantry was laboring under, i rented a bakery in the city, hired bakers--mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and i also got a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large amount of hard bread. in two months i made more money for the fund than my pay amounted to during the entire war. while stationed at monterey i had relieved the post fund in the same way. there, however, was no profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. in the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit popocatapetl, the highest volcano in america, and to take an escort. i went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous positions before the country. of those who "went south," and attained high rank, there was lieutenant richard anderson, who commanded a corps at spottsylvania; captain sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the khedive of egypt; captain george crittenden, a rebel general; s. b. buckner, who surrendered fort donelson; and mansfield lovell, who commanded at new orleans before that city fell into the hands of the national troops. of those who remained on our side there were captain andrew porter, lieutenant c. p. stone and lieutenant z. b. tower. there were quite a number of other officers, whose names i cannot recollect. at a little village (ozumba) near the base of popocatapetl, where we purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules with forage for our horses. high up on the mountain there was a deserted house of one room, called the vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. the pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now become wild. it was possible to go on horseback as far as the vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. sometimes it was very narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the other side. at one of these places one of our mules loaded with two sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the bottom. the descent was steep but not perpendicular. the mule rolled over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course the poor animal was dashed to pieces. what was our surprise, not long after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent. the load had protected the animal from serious injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the path leading up to the hut where we were to stay. the night at the vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant i ever knew. it was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. a little higher up the rain ceased and snow began. the wind blew with great velocity. the log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly better then a sieve. there was little or no sleep that night. as soon as it was light the next morning, we started to make the ascent to the summit. the wind continued to blow with violence and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. the clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space between them. the wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. we labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to return. the descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got below the snow line. at the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night were at ozumba. the fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us to bed early. our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a blanket under us. soon all were asleep; but long before morning first one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating pain in the eyes. not one escaped it. by morning the eyes of half the party were so swollen that they were entirely closed. the others suffered pain equally. the feeling was about what might be expected from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. we remained in quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. this relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. the swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. we moved back to the village of ameca ameca, some six miles, and stopped again for the night. the next morning all were entirely well and free from pain. the weather was clear and popocatapetl stood out in all its beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to return. about half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and concluded to do so. the remainder--i was with the remainder--concluded that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of mexico, some ninety miles from where we then were, on the road to acapulco. the party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they encountered in their first attempt. three of them--anderson, stone and buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the time. i made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but it seems to me that i can see the whole of it as vividly as if it were but yesterday. i have been back at ameca ameca, and the village beyond, twice in the last five years. the scene had not changed materially from my recollection of it. the party which i was with moved south down the valley to the town of cuantla, some forty miles from ameca ameca. the latter stands on the plain at the foot of popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight thousand feet above tide water. the slope down is gradual as the traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. in the morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are those common to the united states, we halted in the evening in a tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were flourishing. we had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. soon after the capture of the city of mexico an armistice had been agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective armies were not to go during its continuance. our party knew nothing about these limits. as we approached cuantla bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the town towards us. our party halted, and i tied a white pocket handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on to the town. captains sibley and porter followed a few hundred yards behind. i was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized that i should be conducted to him. i had been with the general but a few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. the mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us to be there. however, as we had no special authority from our own commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to cuernavaca the next morning. cuernavaca is a town west of guantla. the country through which we passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions and rich in scenery. at one point, about half-way between the two places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly all full-blooded indians. very few of them even spoke spanish. the houses were built of stone and generally only one story high. the streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before cortez visited the country. they had not been graded, but the paving had been done on the natural surface. we had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that town. on a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. we ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced civilization. the next day we went into cuernavaca. after a day's rest at cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey to the great caves of mexico. we had proceeded but a few miles when we were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. the guard promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. at night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. again in the morning there was no reply. the second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger to the department commander. we determined therefore to go on unless stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. after a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the one at cuantia occurred. the commanding officer sent a guide to conduct our party around the village and to put us upon our road again. this was the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. it must have been a saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. their coin was principally copper, and i do not believe there was a man among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. they were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. i recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a card. monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the window of the room occupied by the officers of our party. the next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. we explored to a distance of about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. some of the former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor; some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. the stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with water. the water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral matter. evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. this in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. i recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side of it. some of our party became satisfied with their explorations before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to take explorers, and started back without guides. coming to the large column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of the fact. when the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the torches of an approaching party. we could not conceive who these could be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but ourselves at the entrance when we started in. very soon we found it was our friends. it took them some time to conceive how they had got where they were. they were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast--crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. my experience in the mexican war was of great advantage to me afterwards. besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to make them personally acquainted. it also brought them in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. then, in my particular case, i had been at west point at about the right time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. graduating in 1843, i was at the military academy from one to four years with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. these classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding high commands. all the older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion, i had also served with and known in mexico: lee, j. e. johnston, a. s. johnston, holmes, hebert and a number of others on the confederate side; mccall, mansfield, phil. kearney and others on the national side. the acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion--i mean what i learned of the characters of those to whom i was afterwards opposed. i do not pretend to say that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. but my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge. the natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. a large part of the national army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed general lee with just such qualities, but i had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that i felt this. the treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of mexico by united states troops was ordered. early in june the troops in the city of mexico began to move out. many of them, including the brigade to which i belonged, were assembled at jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival of transports at vera cruz: but with all this precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a july sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with great virulence in vera cruz, not two miles away. i can call to mind only one person, an officer, who died of the disease. my regiment was sent to pascagoula, mississippi, to spend the summer. as soon as it was settled in camp i obtained a leave of absence for four months and proceeded to st. louis. on the 22d of august, 1848, i was married to miss julia dent, the lady of whom i have before spoken. we visited my parents and relations in ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to my post at sackett's harbor, new york. in april following i was ordered to detroit, michigan, where two years were spent with but few important incidents. the present constitution of the state of michigan was ratified during this time. by the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the united states residing within the state at the time of the ratification became citizens of michigan also. during my stay in detroit there was an election for city officers. mr. zachariah chandler was the candidate of the whigs for the office of mayor, and was elected, although the city was then reckoned democratic. all the officers stationed there at the time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. i did not offer mine, however, as i did not wish to consider myself a citizen of michigan. this was mr. chandler's first entry into politics, a career he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. in the spring of 1851 the garrison at detroit was transferred to sackett's harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry was ordered to the pacific coast. it was decided that mrs. grant should visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own family at their st. louis home until an opportunity offered of sending for her. in the month of april the regiment was assembled at governor's island, new york harbor, and on the 5th of july eight companies sailed for aspinwall. we numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. passage was secured for us on the old steamer ohio, commanded at the time by captain schenck, of the navy. it had not been determined, until a day or two before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the ohio; consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. the addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in july. in eight days aspinwall was reached. at that time the streets of the town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed from place to place on raised foot-walks. july is at the height of the wet season, on the isthmus. at intervals the rain would pour down in streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's sun. these alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in the afternoons. i wondered how any person could live many months in aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. in the summer of 1852 the panama railroad was completed only to the point where it now crosses the chagres river. from there passengers were carried by boats to gorgona, at which place they took mules for panama, some twenty-five miles further. those who travelled over the isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the chagres river were propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. these boats carried thirty to forty passengers each. the crews consisted of six men to a boat, armed with long poles. there were planks wide enough for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat from end to end. the men would start from the bow, place one end of their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. in this way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the current of the river. i, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and had also to look after the transportation. a contract had been entered into with the steamship company in new york for the transportation of the regiment to california, including the isthmus transit. a certain amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. the regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as above described, for gorgona. from this place they marched to panama, and were soon comfortably on the steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. i, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to cruces, a town a few miles higher up the chagres river than gorgona. there i found an impecunious american who had taken the contract to furnish transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds for the freight and so much for each saddle animal. but when we reached cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. the contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the morning. in the morning he said that they were on the way from some imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. this went on until i saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price he had promised to furnish them for. the unusual number of passengers that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. some of the passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in that market at other times. meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and men were dying every hour. to diminish the food for the disease, i permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to panama. the captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and i was left alone with the sick and the soldiers who had families. the regiment at panama was also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. there were also hospital tents on shore on the island of flamingo, which stands in the bay. i was about a week at cruces before transportation began to come in. about one-third of the people with me died, either at cruces or on the way to panama. there was no agent of the transportation company at cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring transportation at a price which would secure it. i therefore myself dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more than double the original price. thus we finally reached panama. the steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the regiment was detained still longer. altogether, on the isthmus and on the pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. about one-seventh of those who left new york harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of july, now lie buried on the isthmus of panama or on flamingo island in panama bay. one amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in panama bay. in the regiment there was a lieutenant slaughter who was very liable to sea-sickness. it almost made him sick to see the wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. soon after his graduation, slaughter was ordered to california and took passage by a sailing vessel going around cape horn. the vessel was seven months making the voyage, and slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of destination. on landing in california he found orders which had come by the isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should have been ordered to the northern lakes. he started back by the isthmus route and was sick all the way. but when he arrived at the east he was again ordered to california, this time definitely, and at this date was making his third trip. he was as sick as ever, and had been so for more than a month while lying at anchor in the bay. i remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between his hands, and looking the picture of despair. at last he broke out, "i wish i had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy; if i had done so, i should not have had to go to sea so much." poor slaughter! it was his last sea voyage. he was killed by indians in oregon. by the last of august the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe to start. the disease did not break out again on the way to california, and we reached san francisco early in september. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast --promoted captain--flush times in california. san francisco at that day was a lively place. gold, or placer digging as it was called, was at its height. steamers plied daily between san francisco and both stockton and sacramento. passengers and gold from the southern mines came by the stockton boat; from the northern mines by sacramento. in the evening when these boats arrived, long wharf--there was but one wharf in san francisco in 1852--was alive with people crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and to "have a time." of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. many were young men of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. their parents had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. from 1849 to 1853 there was a rush of people to the pacific coast, of the class described. all thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the gold fields on the pacific. some realized more than their most sanguine expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. many of the real scenes in early california life exceed in strangeness and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. those early days in california brought out character. it was a long way off then, and the journey was expensive. the fortunate could go by cape horn or by the isthmus of panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. this took an entire summer. they were very lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. all other means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the missouri river. the immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far from friends. time pressed, for the little means that could be realized from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man long at california prices. many became discouraged. others would take off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. these succeeded as a rule. there were many young men who had studied professions before they went to california, and who had never done a day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. some supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage wagons, until they could do better. more became discouraged early and spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. they were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners who proved good customers. my regiment spent a few weeks at benicia barracks, and then was ordered to fort vancouver, on the columbia river, then in oregon territory. during the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the columbia river being taken from oregon to make washington territory. prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the pacific coast from 1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies as he kept, at new orleans wholesale prices. a cook could not be hired for the pay of a captain. the cook could do better. at benicia, in 1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other articles in proportion. in 1853 at vancouver vegetables were a little lower. i with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. i bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were very poor. they recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to break up the ground with. i performed all the labor of breaking up the ground while the other officers planted the potatoes. our crop was enormous. luckily for us the columbia river rose to a great height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in june, and overflowed and killed most of our crop. this saved digging it up, for everybody on the pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be profitable. in 1853 more than three-quarters of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown away. the only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. while i was stationed on the pacific coast we were free from indian wars. there were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity of portland in oregon, and of fort vancouver in washington territory. they had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except in individual cases. the hudson's bay company had held the north-west with their trading posts for many years before the united states was represented on the pacific coast. they still retained posts along the columbia river and one at fort vancouver, when i was there. their treatment of the indians had brought out the better qualities of the savages. farming had been undertaken by the company to supply the indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle and horses; and they had now taught the indians to do the labor of the farm and herd. they always compensated them for their labor, and always gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. before the advent of the american, the medium of exchange between the indian and the white man was pelts. afterward it was silver coin. if an indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for american half dollars. these he could count. he would then commence his purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. he would not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. at that day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were common on the pacific coast. they were called slugs. the indians, along the lower columbia as far as the cascades and on the lower willamette, died off very fast during the year i spent in that section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had acquired also their diseases. the measles and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. in their wild state, before the appearance of the white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of game, and over-eating. instinct more than reason had taught them a remedy for these ills. it was the steam bath. something like a bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. the tops of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every opening was filled. just inside the open end of the oven the floor was scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of water. these ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big spring, or pool of water. when a patient required a bath, a fire was built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. the cavity at the front was then filled with water. when the stones were sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the patient could stand it no longer. he was then withdrawn from his steam bath and doused into the cold stream near by. this treatment may have answered with the early ailments of the indians. with the measles or small-pox it would kill every time. during my year on the columbia river, the small-pox exterminated one small remnant of a band of indians entirely, and reduced others materially. i do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the hudson bay company took the matter in hand and established a hospital. nearly every case he treated recovered. i never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. the decimation among the indians i knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a hudson's bay building not a stone's throw from my own quarters. the death of colonel bliss, of the adjutant general's department, which occurred july 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then stationed at humboldt bay, california. the notice reached me in september of the same year, and i very soon started to join my new command. there was no way of reaching humboldt at that time except to take passage on a san francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. red wood, a species of cedar, which on the pacific coast takes the place filled by white pine in the east, then abounded on the banks of humboldt bay. there were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber for the san francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to market, furnished the only means of communication between humboldt and the balance of the world. i was obliged to remain in san francisco for several days before i found a vessel. this gave me a good opportunity of comparing the san francisco of 1852 with that of 1853. as before stated, there had been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--long wharf. in 1853 the town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf when i first saw it. streets and houses had been built out on piles where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the wharf. there was no filling under the streets or houses. san francisco presented the same general appearance as the year before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous for their number and publicity. they were on the first floor, with doors wide open. at all hours of the day and night in walking the streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by the sight of players at faro. often broken places were found in the street, large enough to let a man down into the water below. i have but little doubt that many of the people who went to the pacific coast in the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over san francisco bay. besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in city lots. these were sold "on change," much as stocks are now sold on wall street. cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker; but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. he was charged at the rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides commissions. the sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a vara being a spanish yard. these were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many thousands of dollars. the brokers did a fine business, and so did many such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final crash came. as the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still further out. the temporary houses, first built over the water in the harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. the main business part of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest class lay at anchor in the early days. i was in san francisco again in 1854. gambling houses had disappeared from public view. the city had become staid and orderly. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. my family, all this while, was at the east. it consisted now of a wife and two children. i saw no chance of supporting them on the pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. i concluded, therefore, to resign, and in march applied for a leave of absence until the end of the july following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of that time. i left the pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my future home. that expectation and that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the lieutenant-generalcy bill was introduced into congress in the winter of 1863-4. the passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further west. in the late summer of 1854 i rejoined my family, to find in it a son whom i had never seen, born while i was on the isthmus of panama. i was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our support. my wife had a farm near st. louis, to which we went, but i had no means to stock it. a house had to be built also. i worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. if nothing else could be done i would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. i managed to keep along very well until 1858, when i was attacked by fever and ague. i had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in ohio. it lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work i was able to perform. in the fall of 1858 i sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. in the winter i established a partnership with harry boggs, a cousin of mrs. grant, in the real estate agency business. i spent that winter at st. louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. our business might have become prosperous if i had been able to wait for it to grow. as it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families. while a citizen of st. louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, i was a candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. the incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members. my opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. i now withdrew from the co-partnership with boggs, and, in may, 1860, removed to galena, illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. while a citizen of missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at a presidential election occurred. i had been in the army from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although i was a whig by education and a great admirer of mr. clay. but the whig party had ceased to exist before i had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the know-nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and the republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name. it had no existence in the slave states except at points on the borders next to free states. in st. louis city and county, what afterwards became the republican party was known as the free-soil democracy, led by the honorable frank p. blair. most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with whig proclivities. they had been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many had become know-nothings, or members of the american party. there was a lodge near my new home, and i was invited to join it. i accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another afterwards. i have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the american party; for i still think native-born citizens of the united states should have as much protection, as many privileges in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. but all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first bring them together. no political party can or ought to exist when one of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship god "according to the dictate of one's own conscience," or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the state laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever cost. up to the mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the presidency of the united states. they were noisy but not numerous. but the great majority of people at the north, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. they did not hold the states where slavery existed responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the institution. opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political party. in some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the democratic party, and in others to the whigs. but with the inauguration of the mexican war, in fact with the annexation of texas, "the inevitable conflict" commenced. as the time for the presidential election of 1856--the first at which i had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run high. the republican party was regarded in the south and the border states not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the owners. the most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that emancipation meant social equality. treason to the government was openly advocated and was not rebuked. it was evident to my mind that the election of a republican president in 1856 meant the secession of all the slave states, and rebellion. under these circumstances i preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell. with a democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the slave states, there could be no pretext for secession for four years. i very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, i believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. i therefore voted for james buchanan for president. four years later the republican party was successful in electing its candidate to the presidency. the civilized world has learned the consequence. four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country have been opened to their children. the nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. while living in galena i was nominally only a clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated salary. in reality my position was different. my father had never lived in galena himself, but had established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest. when i went there it was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. he lived until september, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the close of life. a more honorable man never transacted business. in september, 1861, i was engaged in an employment which required all my attention elsewhere. during the eleven months that i lived in galena prior to the first call for volunteers, i had been strictly attentive to my business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in the same line with myself. when the election took place in november, 1860, i had not been a resident of illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote. i was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for stephen a. douglas, who had no possible chance of election. the contest was really between mr. breckinridge and mr. lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority. i wanted, as between these candidates, to see mr. lincoln elected. excitement ran high during the canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of galena many nights during the campaign. i did not parade with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes" --republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. it was evident, from the time of the chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that the election of the republican candidate would be the signal for some of the southern states to secede. i still had hopes that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool down; for the southerners to think well before they took the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. but i was mistaken. the republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of the north-west, and i presume the same order of people throughout the entire north, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. it was very much discussed whether the south would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the "divine" institution of slavery. for there were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there are now people who believe mormonism and polygamy to be ordained by the most high. we forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid their practice. it was generally believed that there would be a flurry; that some of the extreme southern states would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession. but the common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for the south, that the movement would not spread over much of the territory and would not last long. doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. each colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves. if there had been a desire on the part of any single state to withdraw from the compact at any time while the number of states was limited to the original thirteen, i do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination might have been regretted. the problem changed on the ratification of the constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one state to withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new states, at least so far as the new states themselves were concerned. it was never possessed at all by florida or the states west of the mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. texas and the territory brought into the union in consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and texas, with a domain greater than that of any european state except russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the public lands within its borders. it would have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this state to withdraw from the union after all that had been spent and done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, texas must necessarily have gone with the south, both on account of her institutions and her geographical position. secession was illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution. now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. when people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable. but any people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. in the case of the war between the states it would have been the exact truth if the south had said,--"we do not want to live with you northern people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered. so long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the north to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing to live with you. you have been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the union no longer." instead of this the seceding states cried lustily,--"let us alone; you have no constitutional power to interfere with us." newspapers and people at the north reiterated the cry. individuals might ignore the constitution; but the nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction put upon it by the southerners themselves. the fact is the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to 1865. its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. if they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a state or states to withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers. the framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of their descendants to the latest days. it is preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. at the time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. rude machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. the instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with the devil. immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones. we could not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly unanticipated. the fathers themselves would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable. they would surely have resisted secession could they have lived to see the shape it assumed. i travelled through the northwest considerably during the winter of 1860-1. we had customers in all the little towns in south-west wisconsin, south-east minnesota and north-east iowa. these generally knew i had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the mexican war. consequently wherever i stopped at night, some of the people would come to the public-house where i was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the future. my own views at that time were like those officially expressed by mr. seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days." i continued to entertain these views until after the battle of shiloh. i believe now that there would have been no more battles at the west after the capture of fort donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory. there is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of the south would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as that of any other. but there was no calm discussion of the question. demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the north; against its aggressions upon the south; its interference with southern rights, etc., etc. they denounced the northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one southern man was equal to five northern men in battle; that if the south would stand up for its rights the north would back down. mr. jefferson davis said in a speech, delivered at la grange, mississippi, before the secession of that state, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of mason and dixon's line if there should be a war. the young men who would have the fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the aggressiveness of the north and its cowardice. they, too, cried out for a separation from such people. the great bulk of the legal voters of the south were men who owned no slaves; their homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the north; they too needed emancipation. under the old regime they were looked down upon by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according to direction. i am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction i reassert the statement. the shot-gun was not resorted to. masked men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every state with a sort of divine right to control public affairs. if they could not get this control by one means they must by another. the end justified the means. the coercion, if mild, was complete. there were two political parties, it is true, in all the states, both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the institution which stood paramount in southern eyes to all other institutions in state or nation. the slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. had politics ever divided the slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. i do not know that the southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs. there was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed. the states of virginia and kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one state defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. but when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. the cotton-gin probably had much to do with the justification of slavery. the winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excitement. south carolina promptly seceded after the result of the presidential election was known. other southern states proposed to follow. in some of them the union sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force. maryland, delaware, kentucky and missouri, all slave states, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called confederate states. the governor and lieutenant-governor of missouri, in 1861, jackson and reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. the governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the state; was recognized as such by the confederate government, and continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. the south claimed the sovereignty of states, but claimed the right to coerce into their confederation such states as they wanted, that is, all the states where slavery existed. they did not seem to think this course inconsistent. the fact is, the southern slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property. they convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves. meanwhile the administration of president buchanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere; that the nation had no power to save its own life. mr. buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild term--in the cause of secession as mr. davis or any southern statesman. one of them, floyd, the secretary of war, scattered the army so that much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the cannon and small arms from northern arsenals throughout the south so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. the navy was scattered in like manner. the president did not prevent his cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its resources or storing them in the south until a de facto government was established with jefferson davis as its president, and montgomery, alabama, as the capital. the secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. in their own estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them birth. loyal men were put into their places. treason in the executive branch of the government was estopped. but the harm had already been done. the stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen. during all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the southerners were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the union. on the other hand men at the north--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the south into submission to the laws of the land; that if the north undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers. a portion of the press of the north was constantly proclaiming similar views. when the time arrived for the president-elect to go to the capital of the nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a president-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled into the capital. he disappeared from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced at the capital. there is little doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his journey. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting--mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. the 4th of march, 1861, came, and abraham lincoln was sworn to maintain the union against all its enemies. the secession of one state after another followed, until eleven had gone out. on the 11th of april fort sumter, a national fort in the harbor of charleston, south carolina, was fired upon by the southerners and a few days after was captured. the confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred themselves of all right to claim protection under the constitution of the united states. we did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an independent nation. upon the firing on sumter president lincoln issued his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening congress in extra session. the call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days' service. if the shot fired at fort sumter "was heard around the world," the call of the president for 75,000 men was heard throughout the northern states. there was not a state in the north of a million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been necessary. as soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached galena, posters were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house in the evening. business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a time there were no party distinctions; all were union men, determined to avenge the insult to the national flag. in the evening the court-house was packed. although a comparative stranger i was called upon to preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that i had been in the army and had seen service. with much embarrassment and some prompting i made out to announce the object of the meeting. speeches were in order, but it is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than patriotic ones. there was probably no one in the house, however, who felt like making any other. the two principal speeches were by b. b. howard, the post-master and a breckinridge democrat at the november election the fall before, and john a. rawlins, an elector on the douglas ticket. e. b. washburne, with whom i was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, i understood afterwards, a little surprise that galena could not furnish a presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. he came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the patriotism of the meeting. after the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a company. the quota of illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from galena. the company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned officers elected before the meeting adjourned. i declined the captaincy before the balloting, but announced that i would aid the company in every way i could and would be found in the service in some position if there should be a war. i never went into our leather store after that meeting, to put up a package or do other business. the ladies of galena were quite as patriotic as the men. they could not enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to the field uniformed. they came to me to get a description of the united states uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material; procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. in a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the state capital for assignment. the men all turned out the morning after their enlistment, and i took charge, divided them into squads and superintended their drill. when they were ready to go to springfield i went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a regiment. there were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, richard yates. the legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to his relief. a law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional district, for one month, to be paid by the state, but pledged to go into the service of the united states if there should be a further call during their term. even with this relief the governor was still very much embarrassed. before the war was over he was like the president when he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something he could give to all who wanted it." in time the galena company was mustered into the united states service, forming a part of the 11th illinois volunteer infantry. my duties, i thought, had ended at springfield, and i was prepared to start home by the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. up to that time i do not think i had been introduced to governor yates, or had ever spoken to him. i knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same hotel and i often saw him at table. the evening i was to quit the capital i left the supper room before the governor and was standing at the front door when he came out. he spoke to me, calling me by my old army title "captain," and said he understood that i was about leaving the city. i answered that i was. he said he would be glad if i would remain over-night and call at the executive office the next morning. i complied with his request, and was asked to go into the adjutant-general's office and render such assistance as i could, the governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. i accepted the proposition. my old army experience i found indeed of very great service. i was no clerk, nor had i any capacity to become one. the only place i ever found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than myself. but i had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the field. the army forms were familiar to me and i could direct how they should be made out. there was a clerk in the office of the adjutant-general who supplied my deficiencies. the ease with which the state of illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close of the war is evidence of the efficiency of mr. loomis as an accountant on a large scale. he remained in the office until that time. as i have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments. i had charge of mustering these regiments into the state service. they were assembled at the most convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. i detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three in the southern part of the state myself. one of these was to assemble at belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of st. louis. when i got there i found that only one or two companies had arrived. there was no probability of the regiment coming together under five days. this gave me a few idle days which i concluded to spend in st. louis. there was a considerable force of state militia at camp jackson, on the outskirts of st. louis, at the time. there is but little doubt that it was the design of governor claiborn jackson to have these troops ready to seize the united states arsenal and the city of st. louis. why they did not do so i do not know. there was but a small garrison, two companies i think, under captain n. lyon at the arsenal, and but for the timely services of the hon. f. p. blair, i have little doubt that st. louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all its arms and ammunition. blair was a leader among the union men of st. louis in 1861. there was no state government in missouri at the time that would sanction the raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect united states property, but blair had probably procured some form of authority from the president to raise troops in missouri and to muster them into the service of the united states. at all events, he did raise a regiment and took command himself as colonel. with this force he reported to captain lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. it was whispered that lyon thus reinforced intended to break up camp jackson and capture the militia. i went down to the arsenal in the morning to see the troops start out. i had known lyon for two years at west point and in the old army afterwards. blair i knew very well by sight. i had heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but i had never spoken to him. as the troops marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal, blair was on his horse outside forming them into line preparatory to their march. i introduced myself to him and had a few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. this was my first personal acquaintance with the honorable--afterwards major-general f. p. blair. camp jackson surrendered without a fight and the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. up to this time the enemies of the government in st. louis had been bold and defiant, while union men were quiet but determined. the enemies had their head-quarters in a central and public position on pine street, near fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. the union men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, i did not know where, and i doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. as soon as the news of the capture of camp jackson reached the city the condition of affairs was changed. union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if you will, intolerant. they proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect for the union. the secessionists became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. they had been playing the bully. the union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from the building on pine street. the command was given in tones of authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in st. louis. i witnessed the scene. i had heard of the surrender of the camp and that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. i had seen the troops start out in the morning and had wished them success. i now determined to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. i stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and pine streets, and saw a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. there were squads of other people at intervals down the street. they too were quiet but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult to, what they called, "their" flag. before the car i was in had started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day --stepped in. he was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt for the union and for those who had just perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. there was only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man entered. he evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull down a flag they adored. he turned to me saying: "things have come to a ---pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. where i came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the union we hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to." i replied that "after all we were not so intolerant in st. louis as we might be; i had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of them who ought to be, however." the young man subsided. he was so crestfallen that i believe if i had ordered him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "more yankee oppression." by nightfall the late defenders of camp jackson were all within the walls of the st. louis arsenal, prisoners of war. the next day i left st. louis for mattoon, illinois, where i was to muster in the regiment from that congressional district. this was the 21st illinois infantry, the regiment of which i subsequently became colonel. i mustered one regiment afterwards, when my services for the state were about closed. brigadier-general john pope was stationed at springfield, as united states mustering officer, all the time i was in the state service. he was a native of illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent men in the state. i was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. while i was on duty at springfield the senators, representatives in congress, ax-governors and the state legislators were nearly all at the state capital. the only acquaintance i made among them was with the governor, whom i was serving, and, by chance, with senator s. a. douglas. the only members of congress i knew were washburne and philip foulk. with the former, though he represented my district and we were citizens of the same town, i only became acquainted at the meeting when the first company of galena volunteers was raised. foulk i had known in st. louis when i was a citizen of that city. i had been three years at west point with pope and had served with him a short time during the mexican war, under general taylor. i saw a good deal of him during my service with the state. on one occasion he said to me that i ought to go into the united states service. i told him i intended to do so if there was a war. he spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of the state, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and that he would do all he could for me. i declined to receive endorsement for permission to fight for my country. going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with general pope, i wrote from galena the following letter to the adjutant-general of the army. galena, illinois, may 24, 1861. col. l. thomas adjt. gen. u. s. a., washington, d. c. sir:--having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at west point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has been educated at the government expense to offer their services for the support of that government, i have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. i would say, in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. since the first call of the president i have been serving on the staff of the governor of this state, rendering such aid as i could in the organization of our state militia, and am still engaged in that capacity. a letter addressed to me at springfield, illinois, will reach me. i am very respectfully, your obt. svt., u. s. grant. this letter failed to elicit an answer from the adjutant-general of the army. i presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not have been submitted to higher authority. subsequent to the war general badeau having heard of this letter applied to the war department for a copy of it. the letter could not be found and no one recollected ever having seen it. i took no copy when it was written. long after the application of general badeau, general townsend, who had become adjutant-general of the army, while packing up papers preparatory to the removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. it had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. i felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether i would be equal to the position. but i had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in from the state of illinois, and some from indiana, and felt that if they could command a regiment properly, and with credit, i could also. having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments authorized by the state legislature, i asked and obtained of the governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in covington, kentucky, immediately opposite cincinnati. general mcclellan had been made a major-general and had his headquarters at cincinnati. in reality i wanted to see him. i had known him slightly at west point, where we served one year together, and in the mexican war. i was in hopes that when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. i called on two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either occasion, and returned to springfield. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment --general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. while i was absent from the state capital on this occasion the president's second call for troops was issued. this time it was for 300,000 men, for three years or the war. this brought into the united states service all the regiments then in the state service. these had elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with their organizations as they were, except in two instances. a chicago regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the colonelcy. when it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made lieutenant-colonel. the 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their selection in any position. while i was still absent governor yates appointed me colonel of this latter regiment. a few days after i was in charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near springfield. my regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social position as any in their section of the state. it embraced the sons of farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions themselves. there were also men in it who could be led astray; and the colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. it was said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. when there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some one else to lead them. i found it very hard work for a few days to bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. the ten regiments which had volunteered in the state service for thirty days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the national service if called upon within that time. when they volunteered the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. men were called now for three years or the war. they felt that this change of period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. when i was appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the state service. about the time they were to be mustered into the united states service, such of them as would go, two members of congress from the state, mcclernand and logan, appeared at the capital and i was introduced to them. i had never seen either of them before, but i had read a great deal about them, and particularly about logan, in the newspapers. both were democratic members of congress, and logan had been elected from the southern district of the state, where he had a majority of eighteen thousand over his republican competitor. his district had been settled originally by people from the southern states, and at the breaking out of secession they sympathized with the south. at the first outbreak of war some of them joined the southern army; many others were preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which national troops had to pass in southern illinois, as it was in kentucky or any of the border slave states. logan's popularity in this district was unbounded. he knew almost enough of the people in it by their christian names, to form an ordinary congressional district. as he went in politics, so his district was sure to go. the republican papers had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. some were very bitter in their denunciations of his silence. logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by threats. he did, however, come out in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of congress which was convened by the president soon after his inauguration, and announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the union. but i had not happened to see that speech, so that when i first met logan my impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. mcclernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the maintenance of the union and had been praised accordingly by the republican papers. the gentlemen who presented these two members of congress asked me if i would have any objections to their addressing my regiment. i hesitated a little before answering. it was but a few days before the time set for mustering into the united states service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. i had some doubt as to the effect a speech from logan might have; but as he was with mcclernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were well known, i gave my consent. mcclernand spoke first; and logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force and eloquence. it breathed a loyalty and devotion to the union which inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear arms against it. they entered the united states service almost to a man. general logan went to his part of the state and gave his attention to raising troops. the very men who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in southern illinois became the defenders of the union. logan entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of major-general. his district, which had promised at first to give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for troops, without resorting to the draft. there was no call made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for. that congressional district stands credited at the war department to-day with furnishing more men for the army than it was called on to supply. i remained in springfield with my regiment until the 3d of july, when i was ordered to quincy, illinois. by that time the regiment was in a good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the company drill. there was direct railroad communication between springfield and quincy, but i thought it would be good preparation for the troops to march there. we had no transportation for our camp and garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d of july we started. there was no hurry, but fair marches were made every day until the illinois river was crossed. there i was overtaken by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been changed to ironton, missouri, and ordering me to halt where i was and await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the illinois river to take the regiment to st. louis. the boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. we remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an illinois regiment was surrounded by rebels at a point on the hannibal and st. joe railroad some miles west of palmyra, in missouri, and i was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to their relief. we took the cars and reached quincy in a few hours. when i left galena for the last time to take command of the 21st regiment i took with me my oldest son, frederick d. grant, then a lad of eleven years of age. on receiving the order to take rail for quincy i wrote to mrs. grant, to relieve what i supposed would be her great anxiety for one so young going into danger, that i would send fred home from quincy by river. i received a prompt letter in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany me. it came too late. fred was already on his way up the mississippi bound for dubuque, iowa, from which place there was a railroad to galena. my sensations as we approached what i supposed might be "a field of battle" were anything but agreeable. i had been in all the engagements in mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in command. if some one else had been colonel and i had been lieutenant-colonel i do not think i would have felt any trepidation. before we were prepared to cross the mississippi river at quincy my anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came straggling into town. i am inclined to think both sides got frightened and ran away. i took my regiment to palmyra and remained there for a few days, until relieved by the 19th illinois infantry. from palmyra i proceeded to salt river, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the enemy. colonel john m. palmer at that time commanded the 13th illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding this bridge. palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as long as we remained together. the bridge was finished in about two weeks, and i received orders to move against colonel thomas harris, who was said to be encamped at the little town of florida, some twenty-five miles south of where we then were. at the time of which i now write we had no transportation and the country about salt river was sparsely settled, so that it took some days to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's supply of provision and some ammunition. while preparations for the move were going on i felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road and found every house deserted i was anything but easy. in the twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed ours. as soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses could carry them. i kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. we halted at night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. the hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. as we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. i would have given anything then to have been back in illinois, but i had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; i kept right on. when we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view i halted. the place where harris had been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. my heart resumed its place. it occurred to me at once that harris had been as much afraid of me as i had been of him. this was a view of the question i had never taken before; but it was one i never forgot afterwards. from that event to the close of the war, i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though i always felt more or less anxiety. i never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as i had his. the lesson was valuable. inquiries at the village of florida divulged the fact that colonel harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was being collected took time by the forelock and left florida before i had started from salt river. he had increased the distance between us by forty miles. the next day i started back to my old camp at salt river bridge. the citizens living on the line of our march had returned to their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us now. they had evidently been led to believe that the national troops carried death and devastation with them wherever they went. in a short time after our return to salt river bridge i was ordered with my regiment to the town of mexico. general pope was then commanding the district embracing all of the state of missouri between the mississippi and missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of mexico. i was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery. there was one regiment encamped by the side of mine. i assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for his regiment for the night. when he was informed that the countersign sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted interference of one colonel over another. no doubt he attributed it for the time to the presumption of a graduate of west point over a volunteer pure and simple. but the question was soon settled and we had no further trouble. my arrival in mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. they carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they found take the oath of allegiance to the government. i at once published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private property to their own or to government uses. the people were no longer molested or made afraid. i received the most marked courtesy from the citizens of mexico as long as i remained there. up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some training on the march from springfield to the illinois river. there was now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. while i was at west point the tactics used in the army had been scott's and the musket the flint lock. i had never looked at a copy of tactics from the time of my graduation. my standing in that branch of studies had been near the foot of the class. in the mexican war in the summer of 1846, i had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since. the arms had been changed since then and hardee's tactics had been adopted. i got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day to the commands i had thus learned. by pursuing this course from day to day i thought i would soon get through the volume. we were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when i got my regiment in line and rode to the front i soon saw that if i attempted to follow the lesson i had studied i would have to clear away some of the houses and garden fences to make room. i perceived at once, however, that hardee's tactics--a mere translation from the french with hardee's name attached --was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied to scott's system. the commands were abbreviated and the movement expedited. under the old tactics almost every change in the order of march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the "forward march." with the new tactics all these changes could be made while in motion. i found no trouble in giving commands that would take my regiment where i wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. i do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that i had never studied the tactics that i used. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo.--jefferson city --cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah--headquarters at cairo. i had not been in mexico many weeks when, reading a st. louis paper, i found the president had asked the illinois delegation in congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first on a list of seven. i was very much surprised because, as i have said, my acquaintance with the congressmen was very limited and i did not know of anything i had done to inspire such confidence. the papers of the next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. when appointed brigadier-general i at once thought it proper that one of my aides should come from the regiment i had been commanding, and so selected lieutenant c. b. lagow. while living in st. louis, i had had a desk in the law office of mcclellan, moody and hillyer. difference in views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. i asked him to accept a place on my staff. i also wanted to take one man from my new home, galena. the canvass in the presidential campaign the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of john a. rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the state. he was also a candidate for elector on the douglas ticket. when sumter was fired upon and the integrity of the union threatened, there was no man more ready to serve his country than he. i wrote at once asking him to accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of captain, on my staff. he was about entering the service as major of a new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the state; but he threw this up and accepted my offer. neither hillyer nor lagow proved to have any particular taste or special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned during the vicksburg campaign; the latter i relieved after the battle of chattanooga. rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the general of the army--an office created for him--before the war closed. he was an able man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing the matter. general rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways than this. i became very much attached to him. shortly after my promotion i was ordered to ironton, missouri, to command a district in that part of the state, and took the 21st illinois, my old regiment, with me. several other regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same time. ironton is on the iron mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of st. louis, and situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. when i reached there, about the 8th of august, colonel b. gratz brown --afterwards governor of missouri and in 1872 vice-presidential candidate --was in command. some of his troops were ninety days' men and their time had expired some time before. the men had no clothing but what they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay on. general hardee--the author of the tactics i did not study--was at greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was said, with five thousand confederate troops. under these circumstances colonel brown's command was very much demoralized. a squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been since. i relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or two, to be mustered out of service. within ten days after reading ironton i was prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at greenville. i sent a column east out of the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west and come into the greenville road ten miles south of ironton. another column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. i was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the movement. my experience against harris, in northern missouri, had inspired me with confidence. but when the evening train came in, it brought general b. m. prentiss with orders to take command of the district. his orders did not relieve me, but i knew that by law i was senior, and at that time even the president did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. i therefore gave general prentiss the situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and started for st. louis the same day. the movement against the rebels at greenville went no further. from st. louis i was ordered to jefferson city, the capital of the state, to take command. general sterling price, of the confederate army, was thought to be threatening the capital, lexington, chillicothe and other comparatively large towns in the central part of missouri. i found a good many troops in jefferson city, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person knew where they all were. colonel mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. i found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to the number of men they brought into the service. there were recruiting stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that station would be received. the law required all volunteers to serve for three years or the war. but in jefferson city in august, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others were not to be sent out of the state. the recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for three years if the war lasted that long. the city was filled with union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with the national troops. they were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the government gave them. they had generally made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. a little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into the wagon. all else of their worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former neighbors; for the union man in missouri who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under the protection of the national troops, was at perpetual war with his neighbors. i stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. order was soon restored. i had been at jefferson city but a few days when i was directed from department headquarters to fit out an expedition to lexington, booneville and chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to st. louis. the western army had not yet been supplied with transportation. it became necessary therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those of union men. this afforded an opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. they accepted the service with alacrity. as fast as troops could be got off they were moved west some twenty miles or more. in seven or eight days from my assuming command at jefferson city, i had all the troops, except a small garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the next day. but my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, i saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be colonel jefferson c. davis. i had never met him before, but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him to proceed to jefferson city and relieve me of the command. the orders directed that i should report at department headquarters at st. louis without delay, to receive important special instructions. it was about an hour before the only regular train of the day would start. i therefore turned over to colonel davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out the department instructions already described. i had at that time but one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by an adjutant-general. in an hour after being relieved from the command i was on my way to st. louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to follow the next day with our horses and baggage. the "important special instructions" which i received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east missouri, embracing all the territory south of st. louis, in missouri, as well as all southern illinois. at first i was to take personal command of a combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of colonel jeff. thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the possession of south-east missouri. troops had been ordered to move from ironton to cape girardeau, sixty or seventy miles to the south-east, on the mississippi river; while the forces at cape girardeau had been ordered to move to jacksonville, ten miles out towards ironton; and troops at cairo and bird's point, at the junction of the ohio and mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness to go down the mississippi to belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved west from there when an officer should come to command them. i was the officer who had been selected for this purpose. cairo was to become my headquarters when the expedition terminated. in pursuance of my orders i established my temporary headquarters at cape girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at jackson, to inform me of the approach of general prentiss from ironton. hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations to jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. neither general prentiss nor colonel marsh, who commanded at jackson, knew their destination. i drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until i should hear of the junction of our troops at jackson. two or three days after my arrival at cape girardeau, word came that general prentiss was approaching that place (jackson). i started at once to meet him there and to give him his orders. as i turned the first corner of a street after starting, i saw a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. i turned and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the column. i found there general prentiss himself, with a large escort. he had halted his troops at jackson for the night, and had come on himself to cape girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him in the morning. i gave the general his orders--which stopped him at jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. he had been a brigadier, in command at cairo, while i was mustering officer at springfield without any rank. but we were nominated at the same time for the united states service, and both our commissions bore date may 17th, 1861. by virtue of my former army rank i was, by law, the senior. general prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to remain at jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as approaching cape girardeau. i then ordered the general very peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to jackson. he obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to jackson, and went to st. louis and reported himself. this broke up the expedition. but little harm was done, as jeff. thompson moved light and had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. he was as much at home in arkansas as he was in missouri and would keep out of the way of a superior force. prentiss was sent to another part of the state. general prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he would not have committed later in the war. when i came to know him better, i regretted it much. in consequence of this occurrence he was off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the west was going on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be obtained. he would have been next to myself in rank in the district of south-east missouri, by virtue of his services in the mexican war. he was a brave and very earnest soldier. no man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. on the 4th of september i removed my headquarters to cairo and found colonel richard oglesby in command of the post. we had never met, at least not to my knowledge. after my promotion i had ordered my brigadier-general's uniform from new york, but it had not yet arrived, so that i was in citizen's dress. the colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the neighboring states of missouri and kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. he evidently did not catch my name when i was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the district of south-east missouri, colonel richard j. oglesby to command the post at bird's point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one identify me. but he surrendered the office without question. the day after i assumed command at cairo a man came to me who said he was a scout of general fremont. he reported that he had just come from columbus, a point on the mississippi twenty miles below on the kentucky side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to seize paducah, at the mouth of the tennessee. there was no time for delay; i reported by telegraph to the department commander the information i had received, and added that i was taking steps to get off that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important point. there was a large number of steamers lying at cairo and a good many boatmen were staying in the town. it was the work of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. troops were also designated to go aboard. the distance from cairo to paducah is about forty-five miles. i did not wish to get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in the stream until the time to start. not having received an answer to my first dispatch, i again telegraphed to department headquarters that i should start for paducah that night unless i received further orders. hearing nothing, we started before midnight and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours. it proved very fortunate that the expedition against jeff. thompson had been broken up. had it not been, the enemy would have seized paducah and fortified it, to our very great annoyance. when the national troops entered the town the citizens were taken by surprise. i never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of the people. men, women and children came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invader. they were expecting rebel troops that day. in fact, nearly four thousand men from columbus were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of paducah on their way to occupy the place. i had but two regiments and one battery with me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to columbus. i stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my return to cairo. before leaving, however, i addressed a short printed proclamation to the citizens of paducah assuring them of our peaceful intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. this was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much preferred the presence of the other army. i reinforced paducah rapidly from the troops at cape girardeau; and a day or two later general c. f. smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at cairo and was assigned to the command of the post at the mouth of the tennessee. in a short time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland. the state government of kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the north and the south, and the governor really seemed to think the state had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. the rebels already occupied two towns in the state, columbus and hickman, on the mississippi; and at the very moment the national troops were entering paducah from the ohio front, general lloyd tilghman--a confederate--with his staff and a small detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as i have already said, nearly four thousand confederate troops were on kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. but, in the estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did not justify the national authorities in invading the soil of kentucky. i informed the legislature of the state of what i was doing, and my action was approved by the majority of that body. on my return to cairo i found authority from department headquarters for me to take paducah "if i felt strong enough," but very soon after i was reprimanded from the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offence. soon after i took command at cairo, general fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at camp jackson in the month of may. i received orders to pass them through my lines to columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. quite a number of these prisoners i had been personally acquainted with before the war. such of them as i had so known were received at my headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed by their presence. on one occasion when several were present in my office my intention to visit cape girardeau the next day, to inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. something transpired which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles above cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. a major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. it was hard to persuade him that i was not there. this officer was major barrett, of st. louis. i had been acquainted with his family before the war. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont --a narrow escape--after the battle. from the occupation of paducah up to the early part of november nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. i was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. by the 1st of november i had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. they were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. i asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against columbus. it could have been taken soon after the occupation of paducah; but before november it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. in the latter part of october general fremont took the field in person and moved from jefferson city against general sterling price, who was then in the state of missouri with a considerable command. about the first of november i was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the mississippi river with the view of detaining the rebels at columbus within their lines. before my troops could be got off, i was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the st. francis river about fifty miles west, or south-west, from cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. i dispatched colonel oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. on the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from columbus to be moved by boats down the mississippi and up the white river, in arkansas, in order to reinforce price, and i was directed to prevent this movement if possible. i accordingly sent a regiment from bird's point under colonel w. h. l. wallace to overtake and reinforce oglesby, with orders to march to new madrid, a point some distance below columbus, on the missouri side. at the same time i directed general c. f. smith to move all the troops he could spare from paducah directly against columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to await further orders from me. then i gathered up all the troops at cairo and fort holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. my force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. we dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of columbus, debarked a few men on the kentucky side and established pickets to connect with the troops from paducah. i had no orders which contemplated an attack by the national troops, nor did i intend anything of the kind when i started out from cairo; but after we started i saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. i did not see how i could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to cairo without an effort to do something. columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force i had with me. it would not do, therefore, to attack that point. about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, i learned that the enemy was crossing troops from columbus to the west bank to be dispatched, presumably, after oglesby. i knew there was a small camp of confederates at belmont, immediately opposite columbus, and i speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the missouri side, capture belmont, break up the camp and return. accordingly, the pickets above columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the boats moved out from shore. in an hour we were debarking on the west bank of the mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at columbus. the ground on the west shore of the river, opposite columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. the soil is rich and the timber large and heavy. there were some small clearings between belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with the native forests. we landed in front of a cornfield. when the debarkation commenced, i took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against surprise. at that time i had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. in the woods, at a short distance below the clearing, i found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water became a slough or bayou. i placed the men in the hollow, gave them their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were properly relieved. these troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our transports. up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. from columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports loaded with troops. but the force from paducah was threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if columbus was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. they doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on columbus before their divided command could be united. about eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching by the flank. after moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, i halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as skirmishers. by this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon belmont and sent out troops to meet us. soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. this continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. early in this engagement my horse was shot under me, but i got another from one of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was reached. the officers and men engaged at belmont were then under fire for the first time. veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. at this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. the enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected him from our shots and from view. this precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the national forces to pick their way without hinderance through the abatis--the only artificial defence the enemy had. the moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. they galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the union cause and the achievements of the command. all this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our transports. i saw at the same time two steamers coming from the columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. i tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. my efforts were in vain. at last i directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. this drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of columbus. they had abstained from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. about this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. the alarm "surrounded" was given. the guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. at first some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. but when i announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. they formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. the enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. again the confederates sought shelter under the river banks. we could not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our transports than we were. it would be prudent to get them behind us; but we were not again molested on our way to the boats. from the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. i now set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. after this had gone on for some little time i rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit the guard i had stationed over the approach to our transports. i knew the enemy had crossed over from columbus in considerable numbers and might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. this guard would be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. my surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the trench. riding back to the boat i found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. at first i ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men together and march them back to their position, i countermanded the order. then fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, i rode out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the enemy was passing. the field was grown up with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly along the rows. even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. i had not gone more than a few hundred yards when i saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty yards away. i looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when i thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me. when at the river bank i still had to ride a few hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay. the cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a dense forest. before i got back the enemy had entered this forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. our men, with the exception of details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them. those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed off. i was the only man of the national army between the rebels and our transports. the captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. my horse seemed to take in the situation. there was no path down the bank and every one acquainted with the mississippi river knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular. my horse put his fore feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single gang plank. i dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. the mississippi river was low on the 7th of november, 1861, so that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the steamers. the rebels were some distance back from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but little harm. our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. when i first went on deck i entered the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. i did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what was going on. i had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it and lodged in the foot. when the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it with vigor. they were well out in the stream and some distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. their position very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. the execution was very great, as we could see at the time and as i afterwards learned more positively. we were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to cairo, every man feeling that belmont was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it. our loss at belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. about 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. we returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. the loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. we had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. the enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of belmont. the two objects for which the battle of belmont was fought were fully accomplished. the enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from columbus. his losses were very heavy for that period of the war. columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical treatment or burial. i learned later, when i had moved further south, that belmont had caused more mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. the national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at belmont that did not desert them through the war. the day after the battle i met some officers from general polk's command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at belmont and also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. when our men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. some of the officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was refused with the statement that we had no dead there. while on the truce-boat i mentioned to an officer, whom i had known both at west point and in the mexican war, that i was in the cornfield near their troops when they passed; that i had been on horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. this officer was on general polk's staff. he said both he and the general had seen me and that polk had said to his men, "there is a yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but nobody fired at me. belmont was severely criticised in the north as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the beginning. if it had not been fought, colonel oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. then i should have been culpable indeed. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. while at cairo i had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the columbus garrison. they seemed to be very fond of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. on two or three occasions i went down in like manner. when one of their boats was seen coming up carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at fort holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no farther. i would then take a steamer and, with my staff and occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. there were several officers among them whom i had known before, both at west point and in mexico. seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the south possessed over the north at the beginning of the rebellion. they had from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the nation. they had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own states. in this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. the whole loaf was leavened. the north had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. in the army of the potomac there was what was known as the "regular brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. so, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number to each, were men educated for their profession. some of these went into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely without military training. this state of affairs gave me an idea which i expressed while at cairo; that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers. the register should be kept up, but the names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close, should be stricken from it. on the 9th of november, two days after the battle of belmont, major-general h. w. halleck superseded general fremont in command of the department of the missouri. the limits of his command took in arkansas and west kentucky east to the cumberland river. from the battle of belmont until early in february, 1862, the troops under my command did little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them. the enemy at this time occupied a line running from the mississippi river at columbus to bowling green and mill springs, kentucky. each of these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the tennessee and cumberland rivers near the tennessee state line. the works on the tennessee were called fort heiman and fort henry, and that on the cumberland was fort donelson. at these points the two rivers approached within eleven miles of each other. the lines of rifle pits at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. these positions were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. with fort henry in our hands we had a navigable stream open to us up to muscle shoals, in alabama. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee at eastport, mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. this road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be of use to them for through traffic the moment fort henry became ours. fort donelson was the gate to nashville--a place of great military and political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in kentucky. these two points in our possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the memphis and charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication. the designation of my command had been changed after halleck's arrival, from the district of south-east missouri to the district of cairo, and the small district commanded by general c. f. smith, embracing the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. early in january, 1862, i was directed by general mcclellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of brigadier-general don carlos buell, who commanded the department of the ohio, with headquarters at louisville, and who was confronting general s. b. buckner with a larger confederate force at bowling green. it was supposed that buell was about to make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from columbus, fort henry or donelson to buckner. i at once ordered general smith to send a force up the west bank of the tennessee to threaten forts heiman and henry; mcclernand at the same time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west kentucky, threatening columbus with one column and the tennessee river with another. i went with mcclernand's command. the weather was very bad; snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were intolerable. we were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. the object of the expedition was accomplished. the enemy did not send reinforcements to bowling green, and general george h. thomas fought and won the battle of mill springs before we returned. as a result of this expedition general smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture fort heiman. this fort stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry on the opposite side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of fort henry. this report of smith's confirmed views i had previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the tennessee and cumberland rivers. with us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the state of kentucky. on the 6th of january, before receiving orders for this expedition, i had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at st. louis. my object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. now that my views had been confirmed by so able a general as smith, i renewed my request to go to st. louis on what i deemed important military business. the leave was granted, but not graciously. i had known general halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at west point or during the mexican war. i was received with so little cordiality that i perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than i might have done, and i had not uttered many sentences before i was cut short as if my plan was preposterous. i returned to cairo very much crestfallen. flag-officer foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the neighborhood of cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was subject to the command of general halleck. he and i consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up the tennessee. notwithstanding the rebuff i had received from my immediate chief, i therefore, on the 28th of january, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, i could take and hold fort henry on the tennessee." this time i was backed by flag-officer foote, who sent a similar dispatch. on the 29th i wrote fully in support of the proposition. on the 1st of february i received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon fort henry. on the 2d the expedition started. in february, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at cairo for want of employment, the mississippi river being closed against navigation below that point. there were also many men in the town whose occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from captain down to deck hand but there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time the 17,000 men i proposed to take with me up the tennessee. i loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent general mcclernand in command. i followed with one of the later boats and found mcclernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles below fort henry. seven gunboats under flag-officer foote had accompanied the advance. the transports we had with us had to return to paducah to bring up a division from there, with general c. f. smith in command. before sending the boats back i wanted to get the troops as near to the enemy as i could without coming within range of their guns. there was a stream emptying into the tennessee on the east side, apparently at about long range distance below the fort. on account of the narrow water-shed separating the tennessee and cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in february, it was a torrent. it would facilitate the investment of fort henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. to test whether this could be done i boarded the gunboat essex and requested captain wm. porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw its fire. after we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. in consequence i had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. one shot passed very near where captain porter and i were standing, struck the deck near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the river. we immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek. when the landing was completed i returned with the transports to paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops. i got back on the 5th with the advance the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them. at ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up. being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, i issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the 6th. i felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time. fort henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. the camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to donelson and dover. the garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements from donelson halted some miles out. there were seventeen heavy guns in the fort. the river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. a portion of the ground on which fort henry stood was two feet deep in water. below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. on the west bank fort heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry. the distance from fort henry to donelson is but eleven miles. the two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. prompt action on our part was imperative. the plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. the troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters. general smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear of heiman. at the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. general smith found fort heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. the gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest fort henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. this delay made no difference in the result. on our first appearance tilghman had sent his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to dover and donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on donelson. he stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape. tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. all the gunboats engaged were hit many times. the damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was slight, except to the essex. a shell penetrated the boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. on several occasions during the war such details were made when the complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before them. after the fall of fort henry captain phelps, commanding the iron-clad carondelet, at my request ascended the tennessee river and thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the memphis and ohio railroad. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy --assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. i informed the department commander of our success at fort henry and that on the 8th i would take fort donelson. but the rain continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon trains. then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. at least it would have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force. on the 7th, the day after the fall of fort henry, i took my staff and the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works at donelson. i had known general pillow in mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how small, i could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. i said this to the officers of my staff at the time. i knew that floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and i judged that he would yield to pillow's pretensions. i met, as i expected, no opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the topography of the country on the way and around fort donelson, found that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the village of dover, the other to donelson. fort donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from dover. the fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. on the east it fronted the cumberland; to the north it faced hickman's creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the cumberland. this also was filled with back-water from the river. the fort stood on high ground, some of it as much as a hundred feet above the cumberland. strong protection to the heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. to the west there was a line of rifle pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. this line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the fort. the ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very broken and generally wooded. the trees outside of the rifle-pits had been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. the limbs had been trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an abatis in front of the greater part of the line. outside of this intrenched line, and extending about half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and opening into hickman creek at a point north of the fort. the entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long abatis. general halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from cairo. general hunter sent men freely from kansas, and a large division under general nelson, from buell's army, was also dispatched. orders went out from the war department to consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in the western states so as to make full companies, and to consolidate companies into regiments. general halleck did not approve or disapprove of my going to fort donelson. he said nothing whatever to me on the subject. he informed buell on the 7th that i would march against fort donelson the next day; but on the 10th he directed me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. i received this dispatch in front of fort donelson. i was very impatient to get to fort donelson because i knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly. i felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than 50,000 a month later. i asked flag-officer foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about cairo to proceed up the cumberland river and not to wait for those gone to eastport and florence; but the others got back in time and we started on the 12th. i had moved mcclernand out a few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on transports. it was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded by colonel thayer, of nebraska. as the gunboats were going around to donelson by the tennessee, ohio and cumberland rivers, i directed thayer to turn about and go under their convoy. i started from fort henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. that afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible. general smith had been directed to leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts henry and heiman. he left general lew. wallace with 2,500 men. with the remainder of his division he occupied our left, extending to hickman creek. mcclernand was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from dover. his right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into the cumberland south of the village. the troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. our line was generally along the crest of ridges. the artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. the men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. the greatest suffering was from want of shelter. it was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. it would not do to allow camp-fires except far down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. in the march over from fort henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. there was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. during the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of wallace and thayer on the 14th, the national forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict further than what was brought on by ourselves. only one gunboat had arrived. there was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front of mcclernand's command. that general had undertaken to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. without orders or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. the battery was in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army present. of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men engaged. in this assault colonel william morrison fell badly wounded. up to this time the surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were overcrowded. owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering was not so great as it might have been. the hospital arrangements at fort donelson were as complete as it was possible to make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of but one or two rooms. on the return of captain walke to fort henry on the 10th, i had requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his expedition up the tennessee, and get possession of the cumberland as far up towards donelson as possible. he started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the carondelet, towed by the steamer alps. captain walke arrived a few miles below donelson on the 12th, a little after noon. about the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at long range. on the 13th i informed him of my arrival the day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that i might take advantage of any diversion. the attack was made and many shots fell within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. the investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of. during the night of the 13th flag-officer foote arrived with the iron-clads st. louis, louisville and pittsburg and the wooden gunboats tyler and conestoga, convoying thayer's brigade. on the morning of the 14th thayer was landed. wallace, whom i had ordered over from fort henry, also arrived about the same time. up to this time he had been commanding a brigade belonging to the division of general c. f. smith. these troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and general lew. wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed of the brigade of colonel thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the same day. this new division was assigned to the centre, giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger line. the plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and silence his guns if possible. some of the gunboats were to run the batteries, get above the fort and above the village of dover. i had ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the river above dover in case they should be needed there. that position attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. by three in the afternoon of the 14th flag-officer foote was ready, and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. after coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. i occupied a position on shore from which i could see the advancing navy. the leading boat got within a very short distance of the water battery, not further off i think than two hundred yards, and i soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly disabled. then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for the day. the gunboat which flag-officer foote was on, besides having been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. the tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped helplessly back. two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. the enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men on board. of course i only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse. subsequent reports, now published, show that the enemy telegraphed a great victory to richmond. the sun went down on the night of the 14th of february, 1862, leaving the army confronting fort donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. the weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. two of the strongest of our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of rendering any present assistance. i retired this night not knowing but that i would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills. on the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger from flag-officer foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to me. i at once made my preparations for starting. i directed my adjutant-general to notify each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. from the heavy rains that had fallen for days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. the intense cold of the night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. this made travel on horseback even slower than through the mud; but i went as fast as the roads would allow. when i reached the fleet i found the flag-ship was anchored out in the stream. a small boat, however, awaited my arrival and i was soon on board with the flag-officer. he explained to me in short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and suggested that i should intrench while he returned to mound city with his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. i saw the absolute necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but i should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. but the enemy relieved me from this necessity. when i left the national line to visit flag-officer foote i had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless i brought it on myself. the conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. from the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under general l. wallace and 2,500 men brought over from fort henry belonging to the division of c. f. smith. the enemy, however, had taken the initiative. just as i landed i met captain hillyer of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of the national troops. he said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered mcclernand's division, which was in full retreat. the roads, as i have said, were unfit for making fast time, but i got to my command as soon as possible. the attack had been made on the national right. i was some four or five miles north of our left. the line was about three miles long. in reaching the point where the disaster had occurred i had to pass the divisions of smith and wallace. i saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by smith; wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. he had, at an opportune time, sent thayer's brigade to the support of mcclernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines. i saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. when i came to the right appearances were different. the enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. mcclernand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. his men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. there was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. when the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. the division broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. it must have been about this time that thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. at all events the enemy fell back within his intrenchments and was there when i got on the field. i saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. no officer seemed to be giving any directions. the soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. i heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. they seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. i turned to colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." i determined to make the assault at once on our left. it was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening abatis. i directed colonel webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." this acted like a charm. the men only wanted some one to give them a command. we rode rapidly to smith's quarters, when i explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. the general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the abatis intervening between them and the enemy. the outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th general smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. there was now no doubt but that the confederates must surrender or be captured the next day. there seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in dover during the night of the 15th. general floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one. he was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. as secretary of war he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution of the united states and to uphold the same against all its enemies. he had betrayed that trust. as secretary of war he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred. about a year before leaving the cabinet he had removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. he continued in the cabinet of president buchanan until about the 1st of january, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of united states territory. well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of national troops. he would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he been captured. general pillow, next in command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services in the mexican war. he telegraphed to general johnston, at nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the southern troops had had great success all day. johnston forwarded the dispatch to richmond. while the authorities at the capital were reading it floyd and pillow were fugitives. a council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. general buckner, who was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, a. s. johnston, should get back to his headquarters at nashville. buckner's report shows, however, that he considered donelson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. being assured that johnston was already in nashville, buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. floyd turned over the command to pillow, who declined it. it then devolved upon buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. floyd and pillow took possession of all the river transports at dover and before morning both were on their way to nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000. some marched up the east bank of the cumberland; others went on the steamers. during the night forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. they had to ford or swim over the back-water in the little creek just south of dover. before daylight general smith brought to me the following letter from general buckner: headquarters, fort donelson, february 16, 1862. sir:--in consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, i propose to the commanding officer of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. to brigadier-general u. s. grant, com'ding u. s. forces, near fort donelson. to this i responded as follows: headquarters army in the field, camp near donelson, february 16, 1862. general s. b. buckner, confederate army. sir:--yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, u. s. grant, brig. gen. to this i received the following reply: headquarters, dover, tennessee, february 16, 1862. to brig. gen'l u. s. grant, u. s. army. sir:--the distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. i am, sir, your very ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. general buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify national troops in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. white flags were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the fort. as soon as the last letter from buckner was received i mounted my horse and rode to dover. general wallace, i found, had preceded me an hour or more. i presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of general buckner. i had been at west point three years with buckner and afterwards served with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. in the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command i would not have got up to donelson as easily as i did. i told him that if he had been in command i should not have tried in the way i did: i had invested their lines with a smaller force than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full 5,000 strong, around by water; i had relied very much upon their commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. i asked general buckner about what force he had to surrender. he replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to nashville while we were about fort henry; that floyd and pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them; and that forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said i would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000. he asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. i gave directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. i have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with the sight of confederates passing to and fro that i have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. the most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of the army. some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and i bade them go. the actual number of confederates at fort donelson can never be given with entire accuracy. the largest number admitted by any writer on the southern side, is by colonel preston johnston. he gives the number at 17,000. but this must be an underestimate. the commissary general of prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 fort donelson prisoners at cairo, as they passed that point. general pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual numbers than the officers of mcclernand's division, for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that division, and were buried or cared for by buckner after the surrender and when pillow was a fugitive. it is known that floyd and pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than 3,000 men. forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all night. it is probable that the confederate force at donelson, on the 15th of february, 1862, was 21,000 in round numbers. on the day fort donelson fell i had 27,000 men to confront the confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. during the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. during the siege general sherman had been sent to smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland river, to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. at that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. but every boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at the front i might send for him and he would waive rank. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. the news of the fall of fort donelson caused great delight all over the north. at the south, particularly in richmond, the effect was correspondingly depressing. i was promptly promoted to the grade of major-general of volunteers, and confirmed by the senate. all three of my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer service. my chief, who was in st. louis, telegraphed his congratulations to general hunter in kansas for the services he had rendered in securing the fall of fort donelson by sending reinforcements so rapidly. to washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to general c. f. smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will applaud." on the 19th there was published at st. louis a formal order thanking flag-officer foote and myself, and the forces under our command, for the victories on the tennessee and the cumberland. i received no other recognition whatever from general halleck. but general cullum, his chief of staff, who was at cairo, wrote me a warm congratulatory letter on his own behalf. i approved of general smith's promotion highly, as i did all the promotions that were made. my opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of fort donelson the way was opened to the national forces all over the south-west without much resistance. if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the alleghanies, he could have marched to chattanooga, corinth, memphis and vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the north there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them. rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. on the other hand there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the south-western states, who had not gone into the confederate army in february, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. if our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. providence ruled differently. time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the ohio river. i promptly informed the department commander of our success at fort donelson and that the way was open now to clarksville and nashville; and that unless i received orders to the contrary i should take clarksville on the 21st and nashville about the 1st of march. both these places are on the cumberland river above fort donelson. as i heard nothing from headquarters on the subject, general c. f. smith was sent to clarksville at the time designated and found the place evacuated. the capture of forts henry and donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from columbus to bowling green, and it was known that he was falling back from the eastern point of this line and that buell was following, or at least advancing. i should have sent troops to nashville at the time i sent to clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were many prisoners to be forwarded north. none of the reinforcements from buell's army arrived until the 24th of february. then general nelson came up, with orders to report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to cairo. i knew general buell was advancing on nashville from the north, and i was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the south. i had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking buell would like to have his troops again, i ordered nelson to proceed to nashville without debarking at fort donelson. i sent a gunboat also as a convoy. the cumberland river was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. nashville is on the west bank of the cumberland, and buell was approaching from the east. i thought the steamers carrying nelson's division would be useful in ferrying the balance of buell's forces across. i ordered nelson to put himself in communication with buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from nashville to return below the city and await orders. buell, however, had already arrived in person at edgefield, opposite nashville, and mitchell's division of his command reached there the same day. nelson immediately took possession of the city. after nelson had gone and before i had learned of buell's arrival, i sent word to department headquarters that i should go to nashville myself on the 28th if i received no orders to the contrary. hearing nothing, i went as i had informed my superior officer i would do. on arriving at clarksville i saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same that had taken nelson's division--and troops going aboard. i landed and called on the commanding officer, general c. f. smith. as soon as he saw me he showed an order he had just received from buell in these words: nashville, february 25, 1862. general c. f. smith, commanding u. s. forces, clarksville. general:--the landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this side at every hazard. if the enemy should assume the offensive, and i am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. i have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your command. so important do i consider the occasion that i think it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and i send four boats, the diana, woodford, john rain, and autocrat, to bring you up. in five or six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you. very respectfully, your ob't srv't, d. c. buell, brigadier-general comd'g. p. s.--the steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. general smith said this order was nonsense. but i told him it was better to obey it. the general replied, "of course i must obey," and said his men were embarking as fast as they could. i went on up to nashville and inspected the position taken by nelson's troops. i did not see buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that i had been in nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. on my return to the boat we met. his troops were still east of the river, and the steamers that had carried nelson's division up were mostly at clarksville to bring smith's division. i said to general buell my information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. general buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve miles away. i said: "quite probably; nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all he can. the fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away with." buell spoke very positively of the danger nashville was in of an attack from the enemy. i said, in the absence of positive information, i believed my information was correct. he responded that he "knew." "well," i said, "i do not know; but as i came by clarksville general smith's troops were embarking to join you." smith's troops were returned the same day. the enemy were trying to get away from nashville and not to return to it. at this time general albert sidney johnston commanded all the confederate troops west of the alleghany mountains, with the exception of those in the extreme south. on the national side the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate departments. johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the national side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from washington. at the beginning of 1862 johnston's troops east of the mississippi occupied a line extending from columbus, on his left, to mill springs, on his right. as we have seen, columbus, both banks of the tennessee river, the west bank of the cumberland and bowling green, all were strongly fortified. mill springs was intrenched. the national troops occupied no territory south of the ohio, except three small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown out from louisville to confront that at bowling green. johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior to that of the national troops; but this was compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all the confederate forces at the west, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of his rear without any detail of soldiers. but when general george h. thomas moved upon the enemy at mill springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts henry and heiman fell into the hands of the national forces, with their armaments and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat from bowling green on nashville. he reached this latter place on the 14th of february, while donelson was still besieged. buell followed with a portion of the army of the ohio, but he had to march and did not reach the east bank of the cumberland opposite nashville until the 24th of the month, and then with only one division of his army. the bridge at nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any national troops that could have been brought against it within ten days after the arrival of the force from bowling green. johnston seemed to lie quietly at nashville to await the result at fort donelson, on which he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the states of kentucky and tennessee. it is true, the two generals senior in rank at fort donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even claiming great confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when they must have been preparing for their individual escape. johnston made a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to floyd, who he must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. if these officers had been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he should have left nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to donelson himself. if he had been captured the result could not have been worse than it was. johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of national troops. he wrote to richmond on the 8th of february, "i think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take fort donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in cooperation." after the fall of that place he abandoned nashville and chattanooga without an effort to save either, and fell back into northern mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. from the time of leaving cairo i was singularly unfortunate in not receiving dispatches from general halleck. the order of the 10th of february directing me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that purpose, reached me after donelson was invested. i received nothing direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in possession of donelson. i was reporting regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent to cairo, soon after the troops left there, to receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the st. louis headquarters. cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph wire. another line was started at once from cairo to paducah and smithland, at the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland respectively. my dispatches were all sent to cairo by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to forward them. this operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his dispatches with him. a telegram from general mcclellan to me of february 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of march. on the 2d of march i received orders dated march 1st to move my command back to fort henry, leaving only a small garrison at donelson. from fort henry expeditions were to be sent against eastport, mississippi, and paris, tennessee. we started from donelson on the 4th, and the same day i was back on the tennessee river. on march 4th i also received the following dispatch from general halleck: maj.-gen. u. s. grant, fort henry: you will place maj.-gen. c. f. smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at fort henry. why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command? h. w. halleck, major-general. i was surprised. this was the first intimation i had received that general halleck had called for information as to the strength of my command. on the 6th he wrote to me again. "your going to nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at washington, so much so that i was advised to arrest you on your return." this was the first i knew of his objecting to my going to nashville. that place was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared in orders, were "not defined." nashville is west of the cumberland river, and i had sent troops that had reported to me for duty to occupy the place. i turned over the command as directed and then replied to general halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from further duty under him. later i learned that general halleck had been calling lustily for more troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only be sufficiently reinforced. mcclellan asked him what force he then had. halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command was concerned, but i received none of his dispatches. at last halleck reported to washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that i had gone to nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at bull run had been by defeat. general mcclellan, on this information, ordered that i should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be made into any charges against me. he even authorized my arrest. thus in less than two weeks after the victory at donelson, the two leading generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition should be made of me, and in less than three weeks i was virtually in arrest and without a command. on the 13th of march i was restored to command, and on the 17th halleck sent me a copy of an order from the war department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. he forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. on the contrary, he wrote to me, "instead of relieving you, i wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories." in consequence i felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. i never knew the truth until general badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns. general halleck unquestionably deemed general c. f. smith a much fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than i was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. it is probable that the general opinion was that smith's long services in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such command. indeed i was rather inclined to this opinion myself at that time, and would have served as faithfully under smith as he had done under me. but this did not justify the dispatches which general halleck sent to washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. on receipt of the order restoring me to command i proceeded to savannah on the tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. general smith was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the treatment i had received. he was on a sick bed at the time, from which he never came away alive. his death was a severe loss to our western army. his personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence of those he commanded as well as of those over him. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight --retreat and defeat of the confederates. when i reassumed command on the 17th of march i found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the tennessee at savannah, while one division was at crump's landing on the west bank about four miles higher up, and the remainder at pittsburg landing, five miles above crump's. the enemy was in force at corinth, the junction of the two most important railroads in the mississippi valley--one connecting memphis and the mississippi river with the east, and the other leading south to all the cotton states. still another railroad connects corinth with jackson, in west tennessee. if we obtained possession of corinth the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or supplies until that running east from vicksburg was reached. it was the great strategic position at the west between the tennessee and the mississippi rivers and between nashville and vicksburg. i at once put all the troops at savannah in motion for pittsburg landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at corinth and collecting an army there under johnston. it was my expectation to march against that army as soon as buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with the army of the ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was the place to start from. pittsburg is only about twenty miles from corinth, and hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile or two nearer. i had not been in command long before i selected hamburg as the place to put the army of the ohio when it arrived. the roads from pittsburg and hamburg to corinth converge some eight miles out. this disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of each other. before i arrived at savannah, sherman, who had joined the army of the tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad east of corinth. the rains had been so heavy for some time before that the low-lands had become impassable swamps. sherman debarked his troops and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. the guns had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. on the 17th of march the army on the tennessee river consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by generals c. f. smith, mcclernand, l. wallace, hurlbut and sherman. general w. h. l. wallace was temporarily in command of smith's division, general smith, as i have said, being confined to his bed. reinforcements were arriving daily and as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a division, and the command given to general prentiss, who had been ordered to report to me. general buell was on his way from nashville with 40,000 veterans. on the 19th of march he was at columbia, tennessee, eighty-five miles from pittsburg. when all reinforcements should have arrived i expected to take the initiative by marching on corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration. mcpherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. he did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran. the new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. the fact is, i regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained. this view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy. johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. on the 1st of april this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated. on the 2d johnston left corinth in force to attack my army. on the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from pittsburg on the corinth road. colonel buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and general sherman followed buckland taking the remainder of a brigade. the pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had occurred. at this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad. my apprehension was much greater for the safety of crump's landing than it was for pittsburg. i had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place. but i feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before wallace could be reinforced. lew. wallace's position i regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed. at this time i generally spent the day at pittsburg and returned to savannah in the evening. i was intending to remove my headquarters to pittsburg, but buell was expected daily and would come in at savannah. i remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than i otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. the skirmishing in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of april that i did not leave pittsburg each night until an hour when i felt there would be no further danger before the morning. on friday the 4th, the day of buckland's advance, i was very much injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while i was trying to get to the front where firing had been heard. the night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. under these circumstances i had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. i had not gone far, however, when i met general w. h. l. wallace and colonel (afterwards general) mcpherson coming from the direction of the front. they said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. on the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. the extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. as it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my boot had to be cut off. for two or three days after i was unable to walk except with crutches. on the 5th general nelson, with a division of buell's army, arrived at savannah and i ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over to crump's landing or pittsburg as occasion required. i had learned that general buell himself would be at savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. affairs at pittsburg landing had been such for several days that i did not want to be away during the day. i determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet buell, and thus save time. he had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact and i was not aware of it until some time after. while i was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of pittsburg landing, and i hastened there, sending a hurried note to buell informing him of the reason why i could not meet him at savannah. on the way up the river i directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to crump's landing, so that i could communicate with general lew. wallace. i found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and i directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he might receive. he replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move. up to that time i had felt by no means certain that crump's landing might not be the point of attack. on reaching the front, however, about eight a.m., i found that the attack on pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at crump's. captain baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order general wallace to march immediately to pittsburg by the road nearest the river. captain baxter made a memorandum of this order. about one p.m., not hearing from wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, i sent two more of my staff, colonel mcpherson and captain rowley, to bring him up with his division. they reported finding him marching towards purdy, bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from pittsburg by several miles than when he started. the road from his first position to pittsburg landing was direct and near the river. between the two points a bridge had been built across snake creek by our troops, at which wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. wallace did not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. general wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by captain baxter was simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from pittsburg to purdy where it crosses owl creek on the right of sherman; but this is not where i had ordered him nor where i wanted him to go. i never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to pittsburg landing, without specifying by what route. his was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt. later in the war general wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of april, 1862. i presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country. some two or three miles from pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house called shiloh. it stood on the ridge which divides the waters of snake and lick creeks, the former emptying into the tennessee just north of pittsburg landing, and the latter south. this point was the key to our position and was held by sherman. his division was at that time wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but i thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. mcclernand was on sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at forts henry and donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western troops had become such at that stage of the war. next to mcclernand came prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, stuart with one brigade of sherman's division. hurlbut was in rear of prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. the division of general c. f. smith was on the right, also in reserve. general smith was still sick in bed at savannah, but within hearing of our guns. his services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. the command of his division devolved upon brigadier-general w. h. l. wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a veteran too, for he had served a year in the mexican war and had been with his command at henry and donelson. wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his division was much weakened. the position of our troops made a continuous line from lick creek on the left to owl creek, a branch of snake creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west. the water in all these streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. the enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. this he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the national side, but suffering much heavier on his own. the confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. the ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. there was also considerable underbrush. a number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where sherman was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. but the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks, the national troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer pittsburg landing. when the firing ceased at night the national line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning. in one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by general prentiss did not fall back with the others. this left his flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of his officers and men. general badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. he may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. general prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past five. i was with him, as i was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the last time i was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly and the general was as cool as if expecting victory. but no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. if it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the confederate side. with the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from snake creek or its tributaries on the right to lick creek or the tennessee on the left above pittsburg. there was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. it was a case of southern dash against northern pluck and endurance. three of the five divisions engaged on sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their states to the field. many of them had arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. their officers were equally ignorant of their duties. under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. in two cases, as i now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. in these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by them. better troops never went upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at shiloh. during the whole of sunday i was continuously engaged in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. in thus moving along the line, however, i never deemed it important to stay long with sherman. although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. mcclernand was next to sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. mcclernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. a casualty to sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at shiloh. and how near we came to this! on the 6th sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. in addition to this he had several horses shot during the day. the nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; i therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of whom there were many. when there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments or brigades. on one occasion during the day i rode back as far as the river and met general buell, who had just arrived; i do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. this meeting between general buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and savannah. it was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. as we left the boat together, buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. i saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. he even threatened them with shells from the gunboats near by. but it was all to no effect. most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. i have no doubt that this sight impressed general buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. if he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. could he have come through the confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. the distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. later in the war, while occupying the country between the tennessee and the mississippi, i learned that the panic in the confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. some of the country people estimated the stragglers from johnston's army as high as 20,000. of course this was an exaggeration. the situation at the close of sunday was as follows: along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at pittsburg landing, colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up the river. this line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the tennessee. hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this artillery, extending west and possibly a little north. mcclernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. his division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty. sherman came next, his right extending to snake creek. his command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. all three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day. the division of w. h. l. wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of shiloh. the right of my line rested near the bank of snake creek, a short distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the purpose of connecting crump's landing and pittsburg landing. sherman had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge over which wallace was expected and the creek above that point. in this last position sherman was frequently attacked before night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance in order to make room for lew. wallace, who came up after dark. there was, as i have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. the tennessee river was very high and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. the gunboats tyler and lexington, gwin and shirk commanding, with the artillery under webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. before any of buell's troops had reached the west bank of the tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. there was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but i do not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. as his troops arrived in the dusk general buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly for some minutes, but i do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury. the attack had spent its force. general lew. wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. thus night came, wallace came, and the advance of nelson's division came; but none --unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved shiloh on that first day against large odds. buell's loss on the 6th of april was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th indiana infantry. the army of the tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men. the presence of two or three regiments of buell's army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of pittsburg landing. so confident was i before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that i visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field. i directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. to sherman i told the story of the assault at fort donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at shiloh. victory was assured when wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. i was glad, however, to see the reinforcements of buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. during the night of the 6th the remainder of nelson's division, buell's army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. two other divisions, crittenden's and mccook's, came up the river from savannah in the transports and were on the west bank early on the 7th. buell commanded them in person. my command was thus nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. during the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. i made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. my ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that i could get no rest. the drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without this additional cause. some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, i moved back to the log-house under the bank. this had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. the sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and i returned to my tree in the rain. the advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the confederates on the day before. it is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of buell's command. possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. the position of the union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows: general lew. wallace on the right; sherman on his left; then mcclernand and then hurlbut. nelson, of buell's army, was on our extreme left, next to the river. crittenden was next in line after nelson and on his right, mccook followed and formed the extreme right of buell's command. my old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under buell constituted the left wing of the army. these relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from the field. in a very short time the battle became general all along the line. this day everything was favorable to the union side. we had now become the attacking party. the enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. the last point held by him was near the road leading from the landing to corinth, on the left of sherman and right of mcclernand. about three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, i gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. at this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. i knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier. after marching to within musket-range i stopped and let the troops pass. the command, charge, was given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy broke. (*7) chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates --intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston--remarks on shiloh. during this second day of the battle i had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. in the early part of the afternoon, while riding with colonel mcpherson and major hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. we were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. there did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. the shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. i do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. in the sudden start we made, major hawkins lost his hat. he did not stop to pick it up. when we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. mcpherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. on examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through. in a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. a ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. there were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard. all were thankful that it was no worse. after the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. the enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following. i wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and i did (*8) not feel disposed to positively order buell, or any part of his command, to pursue. although the senior in rank at the time i had been so only a few weeks. buell was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while i commanded only a district. i did not meet buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but had i seen him at the moment of the last charge i should have at least requested him to follow. i rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns. about five miles out we found their field hospital abandoned. an immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns. shiloh was the severest battle fought at the west during the war, and but few in the east equalled it for hard, determined fighting. i saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. on our side national and confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were confederates. on one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. there was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. the smaller ones were all cut down. contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the army i was then commanding, we were on the defensive. we were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. the officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. the result was a union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. the enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. they failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. after the battle i gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried. the latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by mcclernand. the heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions. the criticism has often been made that the union troops should have been intrenched at shiloh. up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the west. i had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. under all these circumstances i concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications. general buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as i ever knew. i had been two years at west point with him, and had served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the mexican war, several years more. he was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. he was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. he was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. one system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. the other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation. general buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. no one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. when i came into command of the army in 1864, i requested the secretary of war to restore general buell to duty. after the war, during the summer of 1865, i travelled considerably through the north, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. the opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend general buell against what i believed to be most unjust charges. on one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge i had so often refuted--of disloyalty. this brought from general buell a very severe retort, which i saw in the new york world some time before i received the letter itself. i could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. i replied to him, but not through the press. i kept no copy of my letter, nor did i ever see it in print; neither did i receive an answer. general albert sidney johnston, who commanded the confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the first day. this wound, as i understood afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. but he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. the news was not long in reaching our side and i suppose was quite an encouragement to the national soldiers. i had known johnston slightly in the mexican war and later as an officer in the regular army. he was a man of high character and ability. his contemporaries at west point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the confederacy would produce. i once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of johnston i am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier. my judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions. all the disasters in kentucky and tennessee were so discouraging to the authorities in richmond that jefferson davis wrote an unofficial letter to johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. the letter was not a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had been one. general johnston raised another army as rapidly as he could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at corinth. he knew the national troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. but he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still more. we have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the forces at shiloh and crush them; then to cross the tennessee and destroy the army of buell, and push the war across the ohio river. the design was a bold one; but we have the same authority for saying that in the execution johnston showed vacillation and indecision. he left corinth on the 2d of april and was not ready to attack until the 6th. the distance his army had to march was less than twenty miles. beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the national troops would attack the confederates in their intrenchments; second, we were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. johnston not only listened to the objection of beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. on the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. during this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the national troops opening fire on the enemy. this seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle of shiloh. it also seems to me to settle the question as to whether there was a surprise. i do not question the personal courage of general johnston, or his ability. but he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. he did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. general beauregard was next in rank to johnston and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. his tactics have been severely criticised by confederate writers, but i do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. some of these critics claim that shiloh was won when johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. ifs defeated the confederates at shiloh. there is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and if all of theirs had taken effect. commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. there was, in fact, no hour during the day when i doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although i was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour. the description of the battle of shiloh given by colonel wm. preston johnston is very graphic and well told. the reader will imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards the tennessee river, which was a little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset. if the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the national troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. but i witnessed the fight from the national side from eight o'clock in the morning until night closed the contest. i see but little in the description that i can recognize. the confederate troops fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of april, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues. the reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the national side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands for many days. on the union side but few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second day. the admissions of the highest confederate officers engaged at shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. the victory was not to either party until the battle was over. it was then a union victory, in which the armies of the tennessee and the ohio both participated. but the army of the tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of nelson's division. the confederates fought with courage at shiloh, but the particular skill claimed i could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since. but the confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the union troops engaged at shiloh as are many northern writers. the troops on both sides were american, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. it is possible that the southern man started in with a little more dash than his northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring. the endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. this they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. the object of the confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. we were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. as it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of prentiss, we took more prisoners on monday than the enemy gained from us on sunday. on the 6th sherman lost seven pieces of artillery, mcclernand six, prentiss eight, and hurlbut two batteries. on the 7th sherman captured seven guns, mcclernand three and the army of the ohio twenty. at shiloh the effective strength of the union forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. lew. wallace brought 5,000 more after nightfall. beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. according to the custom of enumeration in the south, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. with us everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is counted. excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. on the 7th buell brought 20,000 more. of his remaining two divisions, thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service. our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing. of these, 2,103 were in the army of the ohio. beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. this estimate must be incorrect. we buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of mcclernand and sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. beauregard reports the confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. the navy gave a hearty support to the army at shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently when i was in command. the nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. the country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the foe. but about sundown, when the national troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. after nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. this was done with effect, as is proved by the confederate reports. up to the battle of shiloh i, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. donelson and henry were such victories. an army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. bowling green, columbus and hickman, kentucky, fell in consequence, and clarksville and nashville, tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. the tennessee and cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured. but when confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from memphis to chattanooga, knoxville and on to the atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, i gave up all idea of saving the union except by complete conquest. up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether union or secession. after this, however, i regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of confederate armies i regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. i continued this policy to the close of the war. promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our northern depots. but much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. this policy i believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end. the battle of shiloh, or pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between national and confederate troops during the entire rebellion. correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by sherman, badeau and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by general prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed. i myself made no report to general halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing the result. a few days afterwards general halleck moved his headquarters to pittsburg landing and assumed command of the troops in the field. although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, i was ignored as much as if i had been at the most distant point of territory within my jurisdiction; and although i was in command of all the troops engaged at shiloh i was not permitted to see one of the reports of general buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the war department long after the event. for this reason i never made a full official report of this engagement. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth --occupation of corinth--the army separated. general halleck arrived at pittsburg landing on the 11th of april and immediately assumed command in the field. on the 21st general pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of island number ten in the mississippi river. he went into camp at hamburg landing five miles above pittsburg. halleck had now three armies: the army of the ohio, buell commanding; the army of the mississippi, pope commanding; and the army of the tennessee. his orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. major-general george h. thomas, who had been in buell's army, was transferred with his division to the army of the tennessee and given command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except mcclernand's and lew. wallace's divisions. mcclernand was assigned to the command of the reserve, composed of his own and lew. wallace's divisions. buell commanded the centre, the army of the ohio; and pope the left wing, the army of the mississippi. i was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. orders were given to all the commanders engaged at shiloh to send in their reports without delay to department headquarters. those from officers of the army of the tennessee were sent through me; but from the army of the ohio they were sent by general buell without passing through my hands. general halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but i positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports of a part of the army engaged at shiloh without their coming through me. he admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to washington. preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on corinth. owl creek, on our right, was bridged, and expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different routes could reinforce each other. all commanders were cautioned against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it would be better to retreat than to fight. by the 30th of april all preparations were complete; the country west to the mobile and ohio railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to corinth as far as monterey twelve miles from pittsburg. everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to fight battles. corinth, mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. it is about four miles south of the line dividing the states of tennessee and mississippi, and at the junction of the mississippi and chattanooga railroad with the mobile and ohio road which runs from columbus to mobile. from pittsburg to corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that makes high hills to pass over. in 1862 the greater part of the country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with ease. there are two small creeks running from north of the town and connecting some four miles south, where they form bridge creek which empties into the tuscumbia river. corinth is on the ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. the creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy. on the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched. corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. we ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of donelson and nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at pittsburg landing after the battle of shiloh. in fact the arrival of pope should not have been awaited. there was no time from the battle of shiloh up to the evacuation of corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. the demoralization among the confederates from their defeats at henry and donelson; their long marches from bowling green, columbus, and nashville, and their failure at shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of kentucky and tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible. beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. he appealed to the people of the south-west for new regiments, and received a few. a. s. johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of shiloh, but in a different way. he had negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks. the people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes. it is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home. beauregard, however, was reinforced by van dorn immediately after shiloh with 17,000 men. interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to the strength at corinth. with these reinforcements and the new regiments, beauregard had, during the month of may, 1862, a large force on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. we estimated his strength at 70,000. our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. the defensible nature of the ground at corinth, and the fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. on the 30th of april the grand army commenced its advance from shiloh upon corinth. the movement was a siege from the start to the close. the national troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not to bring on an engagement." "it is better to retreat than to fight." the enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become battles. all the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage the enemy. roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case of attack. the national armies were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the tennessee river to corinth. for myself i was little more than an observer. orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. my position was so embarrassing in fact that i made several applications during the siege to be relieved. general halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. on the 3d of may he was at seven mile creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to farmington, within four miles of corinth. his troops had quite a little engagement at farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. there would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. on the 8th of may he moved again, taking his whole force to farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. again he was ordered back. by the 4th of may the centre and right wing reached monterey, twelve miles out. their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. the left wing moved up again on the 25th of may and intrenched itself close to the enemy. the creek with the marsh before described, separated the two lines. skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either line at this point. our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of the right wing was probably five miles from corinth and four from the works in their front. the creek, which was a formidable obstacle for either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our right. here the enemy occupied two positions. one of them, as much as two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. a heavy wood intervened between this work and the national forces. in rear to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by infantry. sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of may, and on that day the investment of corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made. thomas' right now rested west of the mobile and ohio railroad. pope's left commanded the memphis and charleston railroad east of corinth. some days before i had suggested to the commanding general that i thought if he would move the army of the mississippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, i believed, no serious artificial one. the ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. to the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. i was silenced so quickly that i felt that possibly i had suggested an unmilitary movement. later, probably on the 28th of may, general logan, whose command was then on the mobile and ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into corinth with his brigade. trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of corinth constantly. some of the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. they said loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming in. subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of corinth on the 26th of may and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of may general halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. corinth had already been evacuated and the national troops marched on and took possession without opposition. everything had been destroyed or carried away. the confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train to create the impression among the yankees that reinforcements were arriving. there was not a sick or wounded man left by the confederates, nor stores of any kind. some ammunition had been blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. the possession of corinth by the national troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. it was nearly bloodless. it is a question whether the morale of the confederate troops engaged at corinth was not improved by the immunity with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then withdraw themselves. on our side i know officers and men of the army of the tennessee--and i presume the same is true of those of the other commands--were disappointed at the result. they could not see how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed. they believed that a well-directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army defending corinth. for myself i am satisfied that corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of shiloh. general halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the whole national army to do it. all commanding points two or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. it was expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. they were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man them. it was probably thought that a final battle of the war would be fought at that point. these fortifications were never used. immediately after the occupation of corinth by the national troops, general pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and general buell soon followed. buell was the senior of the two generals and commanded the entire column. the pursuit was kept up for some thirty miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were willing captives. on the 10th of june the pursuing column was all back at corinth. the army of the tennessee was not engaged in any of these movements. the confederates were now driven out of west tennessee, and on the 6th of june, after a well-contested naval battle, the national forces took possession of memphis and held the mississippi river from its source to that point. the railroad from columbus to corinth was at once put in good condition and held by us. we had garrisons at donelson, clarksville and nashville, on the cumberland river, and held the tennessee river from its mouth to eastport. new orleans and baton rouge had fallen into the possession of the national forces, so that now the confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with richmond to the single line of road running east from vicksburg. to dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first importance. the possession of the mississippi by us from memphis to baton rouge was also a most important object. it would be equal to the amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. after the capture of corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. in addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. but the work of depletion commenced. buell with the army of the ohio was sent east, following the line of the memphis and charleston railroad. this he was ordered to repair as he advanced --only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way. if he had been sent directly to chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining chattanooga. bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east tennessee and kentucky; the battles of stone river and chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; burnside would not have been besieged in knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of chattanooga would not have been fought. these are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after corinth fell into the possession of the national forces. the positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to atlanta, to vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of corinth in the interior of mississippi. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis--escaping jackson --complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. my position at corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that i asked permission of halleck to remove my headquarters to memphis. i had repeatedly asked, between the fall of donelson and the evacuation of corinth, to be relieved from duty under halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town. i then obtained permission to leave the department, but general sherman happened to call on me as i was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that i concluded to remain. my application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of june i started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. there was a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to the railroad. i went under cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to la grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men i had with me. from la grange to memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. there were no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. not knowing where this party would be found i halted at la grange. general hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country house. the proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he invited general hurlbut and me to dine with him. i accepted the invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a thorough southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. after dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a recital of the services he was rendering the cause. he was too old to be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his means enabled him to be useful in other ways. in ordinary times the homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of mississippi. now he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the "patriotism" of those better off. the crops around me looked fine, and i had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be gathered the "yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the rebellion instead of its support. i felt, however, the greatest respect for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive. the 23d of june, 1862, on the road from la grange to memphis was very warm, even for that latitude and season. with my staff and small escort i started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty miles of memphis. at this point i saw a very comfortable-looking white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little distance from the road. i let my staff and escort ride ahead while i halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. i was invited at once to dismount and come in. i found my host very genial and communicative, and staid longer than i had intended, until the lady of the house announced dinner and asked me to join them. the host, however, was not pressing, so that i declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. about a mile west from where i had been stopping a road comes up from the southeast, joining that from la grange to memphis. a mile west of this junction i found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the road. i, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the afternoon, and then rode into memphis. the gentleman with whom i had stopped twenty miles from memphis was a mr. de loche, a man loyal to the union. he had not pressed me to tarry longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a dr. smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as if something had hit him. mr. de loche knew that the rebel general jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. his neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was mr. de loche in that of the union. the exact location of jackson was entirely unknown to mr. de loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant to him after the call of dr. smith. i have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding workmen who were repairing the railroad east of memphis. on the day i entered memphis, jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had been sent east for the troops so engaged. the drovers were not enlisted men and he released them. a day or two after one of these drovers came to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he was six or seven miles south of the memphis and charleston railroad when he learned that i was stopping at the house of mr. de loche, and had ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that from la grange and memphis, where he learned that i had passed three-quarters of an hour before. he thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms in our hands with which to defend ourselves. general jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the soldiers the facts related were learned. a day or two later mr. de loche called on me in memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility in not insisting on my staying for dinner. he said that his wife accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his neighbor, he had felt restless until i got away. i never met general jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his very comfortable summer home at manitou springs, colorado. i reminded him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he was thankful now he had not captured me. i certainly was very thankful too. my occupation of memphis as district headquarters did not last long. the period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to me. up to that time i had not occupied any place in the south where the citizens were at home in any great numbers. dover was within the fortifications at fort donelson, and, as far as i remember, every citizen was gone. there were no people living at pittsburg landing, and but very few at corinth. memphis, however, was a populous city, and there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought that even the "yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they could only be induced to make an honest confession. it took hours of my time every day to listen to complaints and requests. the latter were generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints were not always, or even often, well founded. two instances will mark the general character. first: the officer who commanded at memphis immediately after the city fell into the hands of the national troops had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the soldiers. army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. second: at the beginning of the war the confederate congress had passed a law confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the south, including the debts of southerners to northern men. in consequence of this law, when memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the evidences he could obtain of such debts. almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. the gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a christian. he was a deacon in the church which had been defiled by the occupation of union troops, and by a union chaplain filling the pulpit. he did not use the word "defile," but he expressed the idea very clearly. he asked that the church be restored to the former congregation. i told him that no order had been issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. he said of course the congregation could not hear a northern clergyman who differed so radically with them on questions of government. i told him the troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed from the pulpit. this closed the argument on the first point. then came the second. the complainant said that he wanted the papers restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the "confederate states government" had been the attorney for a number of large business houses at the north; that "his government" had confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the "government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar received. he said that his "government," when it came in possession of all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims he had surrendered to the provost-marshal. his impudence was so sublime that i was rather amused than indignant. i told him, however, that if he would remain in memphis i did not believe the confederate government would ever molest him. he left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance as i was at the brazenness of his request. on the 11th of july general halleck received telegraphic orders appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in washington. his instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and interests of his previous command. i was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at corinth. i was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my headquarters or not. i telegraphed asking if i was to take my staff with me, and received word in reply: "this place will be your headquarters. you can judge for yourself." i left memphis for my new field without delay, and reached corinth on the 15th of the month. general halleck remained until the 17th of july; but he was very uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what i had been called to corinth for. when general halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief i remained in command of the district of west tennessee. practically i became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that position over me and i made my reports direct to the general-in-chief; but i was not assigned to the position of department commander until the 25th of october. general halleck while commanding the department of the mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from chattanooga north. my district only embraced west tennessee and kentucky west of the cumberland river. buell, with the army of the ohio, had, as previously stated, been ordered east towards chattanooga, with instructions to repair the memphis and charleston railroad as he advanced. troops had been sent north by halleck along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as columbus. other troops were stationed on the railroad from jackson, tennessee, to grand junction, and still others on the road west to memphis. the remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered corinth on the 30th of may had now become so scattered that i was put entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to the union. one of the first things i had to do was to construct fortifications at corinth better suited to the garrison that could be spared to man them. the structures that had been built during the months of may and june were left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design but suited to the command available to defend them. i disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the situation as rapidly as possible. the forces at donelson, clarksville and nashville, with those at corinth and along the railroad eastward, i regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. the mobile and ohio railroad was guarded from rienzi, south of corinth, to columbus; and the mississippi central railroad from jackson, tennessee, to bolivar. grand junction and la grange on the memphis railroad were abandoned. south of the army of the tennessee, and confronting it, was van dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to forty thousand men, after being reinforced by price from missouri. this movable force could be thrown against either corinth, bolivar or memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. nothing could be gained on the national side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present could guard. the most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the time the army of the tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall of corinth and memphis and before i was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. the enemy also had cavalry operating in our rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our supplies. headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of the command except memphis and the mississippi below columbus. with these points communication was had by the railroad to columbus, then down the river by boat. to reinforce memphis would take three or four days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have taken at least two days. memphis therefore was practically isolated from the balance of the command. but it was in sherman's hands. then too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary. during the two months after the departure of general halleck there was much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the mexican war which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they occurred. about the 23d of july colonel ross, commanding at bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be reinforced from jackson and corinth. on the 27th there was skirmishing on the hatchie river, eight miles from bolivar. on the 30th i learned from colonel p. h. sheridan, who had been far to the south, that bragg in person was at rome, georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way of mobile) to chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join him at rome. price was at this time at holly springs, mississippi, with a large force, and occupied grand junction as an outpost. i proposed to the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed that, while i had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops was not to scatter them, but hold them ready to reinforce buell. the movement of bragg himself with his wagon trains to chattanooga across country, while his troops were transported over a long round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. buell was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. more men were required the farther the national troops penetrated into the enemy's country. i, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed bragg, was purely on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far inferior to my own. on the 2d of august i was ordered from washington to live upon the country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far as practicable. i was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and from our lines. i do not recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. i am aware that a great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to joliet, illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my order. i had all such released the moment i learned of their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order. there were many citizens at home who deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was afforded to inflict an injury to the national cause. this class was not of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and i deemed it better that a few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should suffer. on the 14th of august i was ordered to send two more divisions to buell. they were sent the same day by way of decatur. on the 22d colonel rodney mason surrendered clarksville with six companies of his regiment. colonel mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at shiloh. he was by nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his action when the battle was over. he came to me with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to have another trial. i felt great sympathy for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison clarksville and donelson. he selected clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. but when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his constitutional weakness overcame him. he inquired the number of men the enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered and informed his subordinate at donelson of the fact, advising him to do the same. the guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet them and drove them away. among other embarrassments, at the time of which i now write, was the fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the south and directed me to give every facility toward that end. pay in gold was authorized, and stations on the mississippi river and on the railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be received. this opened to the enemy not only the means of converting cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and intelligent information in regard to our position and strength. it was also demoralizing to the troops. citizens obtaining permits from the treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared none of their dangers. on the 30th of august colonel m. d. leggett, near bolivar, with the 20th and 29th ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be about 4,000 strong. the enemy was driven away with a loss of more than one hundred men. on the 1st of september the bridge guard at medon was attacked by guerillas. the guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen wounded. on the same day colonel dennis, with a force of less than 500 infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in strong force, a few miles west of medon, and drove them away with great loss. our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. on the 2d of september i was ordered to send more reinforcements to buell. jackson and bolivar were yet threatened, but i sent the reinforcements. on the 4th i received direct orders to send granger's division also to louisville, kentucky. general buell had left corinth about the 10th of june to march upon chattanooga; bragg, who had superseded beauregard in command, sent one division from tupelo on the 27th of june for the same place. this gave buell about seventeen days' start. if he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside, and chattanooga must have been reached by the national forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. the road between nashville and chattanooga could easily have been put in repair by other troops, so that communication with the north would have been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the national troops. if buell had been permitted to move in the first instance, with the whole of the army of the ohio and that portion of the army of the mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and guard it. granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of september. i was at the station at corinth when the troops reached that point, and found general p. h. sheridan with them. i expressed surprise at seeing him and said that i had not expected him to go. he showed decided disappointment at the prospect of being detained. i felt a little nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which i had served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the pacific coast when the war broke out. he was promoted to a captaincy in may, 1861, and before the close of the year managed in some way, i do not know how, to get east. he went to missouri. halleck had known him as a very successful young officer in managing campaigns against the indians on the pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west missouri. there was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the use of public transportation for private purposes. he asked to be relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and his request was granted. when general halleck took the field in april, 1862, sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. during the advance on corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d michigan cavalry. governor blair, of michigan, telegraphed general halleck asking him to suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he would appoint a good man without reference to his state. sheridan was named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when corinth was reached he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the army of the mississippi. he was in command at booneville on the 1st of july with two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times as numerous as his own. by very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of attack he completely routed the enemy. for this he was made a brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about corinth. on this account i was sorry to see him leaving me. his departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services in his new field. granger and sheridan reached louisville before buell got there, and on the night of their arrival sheridan with his command threw up works around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from the front. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. at this time, september 4th, i had two divisions of the army of the mississippi stationed at corinth, rienzi, jacinto and danville. there were at corinth also davies' division and two brigades of mcarthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. this force constituted my left wing, of which rosecrans was in command. general ord commanded the centre, from bethel to humboldt on the mobile and ohio railroad and from jackson to bolivar where the mississippi central is crossed by the hatchie river. general sherman commanded on the right at memphis with two of his brigades back at brownsville, at the crossing of the hatchie river by the memphis and ohio railroad. this made the most convenient arrangement i could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon any threatened point. all the troops of the command were within telegraphic communication of each other, except those under sherman. by bringing a portion of his command to brownsville, from which point there was a railroad and telegraph back to memphis, communication could be had with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. in case it became necessary to reinforce corinth, by this arrangement all the troops at bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail by the way of jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops from brownsville could march up to bolivar to take their place. on the 7th of september i learned of the advance of van dorn and price, apparently upon corinth. one division was brought from memphis to bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the enemy. i was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing of bragg in middle tennessee. already the army of northern virginia had defeated the army under general pope and was invading maryland. in the centre general buell was on his way to louisville and bragg marching parallel to him with a large confederate force for the ohio river. i had been constantly called upon to reinforce buell until at this time my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms. this included everything from cairo south within my jurisdiction. if i too should be driven back, the ohio river would become the line dividing the belligerents west of the alleghanies, while at the east the line was already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the war. it is true nashville was never given up after its first capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in west tennessee had been compelled to fall back. to say at the end of the second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the east was pushed north of maryland, a state that had not seceded, and at the west beyond kentucky, another state which had been always loyal, would have been discouraging indeed. as it was, many loyal people despaired in the fall of 1862 of ever saving the union. the administration at washington was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. but i believe there was never a day when the president did not think that, in some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. up to the 11th of september rosecrans still had troops on the railroad east of corinth, but they had all been ordered in. by the 12th all were in except a small force under colonel murphy of the 8th wisconsin. he had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet been brought in to corinth. on the 13th of september general sterling price entered iuka, a town about twenty miles east of corinth on the memphis and charleston railroad. colonel murphy with a few men was guarding the place. he made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. i was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops into tennessee to reinforce bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to be. the authorities at washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were very anxious, as i have said, about affairs both in east and middle tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as for any danger threatening my command. i had not force enough at corinth to attack price even by stripping everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far on his way across the tennessee. to prevent this all spare forces at bolivar and jackson were ordered to corinth, and cars were concentrated at jackson for their transportation. within twenty-four hours from the transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train getting off the track and stopping all the others. this gave a reinforcement of near 8,000 men, general ord in command. general rosecrans commanded the district of corinth with a movable force of about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left behind. it was known that general van dorn was about a four days' march south of us, with a large force. it might have been part of his plan to attack at corinth, price coming from the east while he came up from the south. my desire was to attack price before van dorn could reach corinth or go to his relief. general rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at iuka, where his command was spread out along the memphis and charleston railroad eastward. while there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the surrounding country. he was also personally familiar with the ground, so that i deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach. we had cars enough to transport all of general ord's command, which was to go by rail to burnsville, a point on the road about seven miles west of iuka. from there his troops were to march by the north side of the railroad and attack price from the north-west, while rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south of corinth by way of the jacinto road. a small force was to hold the jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force moved on the fulton road which comes into iuka further east. this plan was suggested by rosecrans. bear creek, a few miles to the east of the fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in september, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. the tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried price's army to the rear of the national forces and isolated it from all support. it looked to me that, if price would remain in iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. on the morning of the 18th of september general ord moved by rail to burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of the programme. he was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously. troops enough were left at jacinto and rienzi to detain any cavalry that van dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into corinth until i could be notified. there was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. i detained cars and locomotives enough at burnsville to transport the whole of ord's command at once, and if van dorn had moved against corinth instead of iuka i could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived. i remained at burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from ord's command and communicated with my two wings by courier. ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving burnsville. quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed. he maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning. i was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch from rosecrans after midnight from jacinto, twenty-two miles from iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as jacinto. he said, however, that he would still be at iuka by two o'clock the next day. i did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. it might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault. i immediately sent ord a copy of rosecrans' dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or south-east. he was instructed to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. during the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either towards the point where ord was, or to burnsville where i had remained. a couple of hours before dark on the 19th rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at garnets, the point where the jacinto road to iuka leaves the road going east. he here turned north without sending any troops to the fulton road. while still moving in column up the jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. in this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. the wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either ord or me. neither he nor i nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. after the engagement rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. this was brought by a courier. there was no road between burnsville and the position then occupied by rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback. the courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to jacinto before he found a road leading to burnsville. this made it a late hour of the night before i learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon. i at once notified ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. the next morning rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into iuka with but little resistance. ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time. rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. word was soon brought to me that our troops were in iuka. i immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. i ordered pursuit by the whole of rosecrans' command and went on with him a few miles in person. he followed only a few miles after i left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. i was disappointed at the result of the battle of iuka--but i had so high an opinion of general rosecrans that i found no fault at the time. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. on the 19th of september general geo. h. thomas was ordered east to reinforce buell. this threw the army at my command still more on the defensive. the memphis and charleston railroad was abandoned, except at corinth, and small forces were left at chewalla and grand junction. soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and bolivar became our most advanced position on the mississippi central railroad. our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. we were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. it was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. we, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it. on the 22d bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of grand junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. i reinforced bolivar, and went to jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be made upon. the troops from corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. our cavalry followed the enemy south of davis' mills in mississippi. on the 30th i found that van dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike the mississippi river above memphis. at the same time other points within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. there was at this juncture a large union force at helena, arkansas, which, had it been within my command, i could have ordered across the river to attack and break up the mississippi central railroad far to the south. this would not only have called van dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies. geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to. van dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above memphis, as had apparently been his intention. he was simply covering a deeper design; one much more important to his cause. by the 1st of october it was fully apparent that corinth was to be attacked with great force and determination, and that van dorn, lovell, price, villepigue and rust had joined their strength for this purpose. there was some skirmishing outside of corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. the rebels massed in the north-west angle of the memphis and charleston and the mobile and ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at corinth and all possible reinforcements. any fresh troops for us must come by a circuitous route. on the night of the 3d, accordingly, i ordered general mcpherson, who was at jackson, to join rosecrans at corinth with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. hurlbut had been ordered from bolivar to march for the same destination; and as van dorn was coming upon corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. on the 4th van dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. in that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of corinth and held at bay all the union troops that arrived. in fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about corinth to hold them. he came near success, some of his troops penetrating the national lines at least once, but the works that were built after halleck's departure enabled rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both mcpherson and hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear. the enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. the loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with van dorn's. mcpherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of rosecrans just after the repulse. his approach, as well as that of hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. general rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although i had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. he did not do so, and i repeated the order after the battle. in the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. general ord had joined hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command of his troops. this force encountered the head of van dorn's retreating column just as it was crossing the hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from corinth. the bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat. ord followed and met the main force. he was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on hurlbut. rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road. moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. his march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies. two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. even when he did start, if rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon van dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as van dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril. i now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after rosecrans reached jonesboro, i ordered him to return. he kept on to ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. i thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" upon this i ordered rosecrans back. had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than van dorn had at corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army. the battle of corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. the enemy lost many more. rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. we fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity. among the killed on our side was general hackelman. general oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally, wounded. i received a congratulatory letter from the president, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. this battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as i had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as i now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at corinth. since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the north. the battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements i suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against vicksburg. on the 23d of october i learned of pemberton's being in command at holly springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from alabama and texas. the same day general rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded buell in the command of the army in middle tennessee. i was delighted at the promotion of general rosecrans to a separate command, because i still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which i, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. as a subordinate i found that i could not make him do as i wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day. at the close of the operations just described my force, in round numbers, was 48,500. of these 4,800 were in kentucky and illinois, 7,000 in memphis, 19,200 from mound city south, and 17,500 at corinth. general mcclernand had been authorized from washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening the mississippi. these new levies with other reinforcements now began to come in. on the 25th of october i was placed in command of the department of the tennessee. reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the 2d of november i was prepared to take the initiative. this was a great relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready to give information of our every move. i have described very imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during this time. to describe all would take more space than i can allot to the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9) chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen--occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs--collecting forage and food. vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below memphis. from there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the southern states. a railroad also starts from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as shreveport, louisiana. vicksburg was the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the parts of the confederacy divided by the mississippi. so long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. hence its importance. points on the river between vicksburg and port hudson were held as dependencies; but their fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. the campaign against vicksburg commenced on the 2d of november as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words: "i have commenced a movement on grand junction, with three divisions from corinth and two from bolivar. will leave here [jackson, tennessee] to-morrow, and take command in person. if found practicable, i will go to holly springs, and, may be, grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as i go." at this time my command was holding the mobile and ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles south of corinth, north to columbus, kentucky; the mississippi central from bolivar north to its junction with the mobile and ohio; the memphis and charleston from corinth east to bear creek, and the mississippi river from cairo to memphis. my entire command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the defensive. by moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force for field operations. my moving force at that time was about 30,000 men, and i estimated the enemy confronting me, under pemberton, at about the same number. general mcpherson commanded my left wing and general c. s. hamilton the centre, while sherman was at memphis with the right wing. pemberton was fortified at the tallahatchie, but occupied holly springs and grand junction on the mississippi central railroad. on the 8th we occupied grand junction and la grange, throwing a considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. the road from bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the troops advanced. up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always covered and guarded in all forward movements. there was delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front. by my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government stores. the stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the country itself. it was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "freedman's bureau" took its origin. orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily. humanity forbade allowing them to starve. with such an army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about grand junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. there was no special authority for feeding them unless they were employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. this labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. the plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. to do this work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a competent chief was necessary. on inquiring for such a man chaplain eaton, now and for many years the very able united states commissioner of education, was suggested. he proved as efficient in that field as he has since done in his present one. i gave him all the assistants and guards he called for. we together fixed the prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. the cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. at once the freedmen became self-sustaining. the money was not paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. they gave me no trouble afterwards. later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the mississippi river to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. a good price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with fuel). those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. in this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never known before. at this stage of the campaign against vicksburg i was very much disturbed by newspaper rumors that general mcclernand was to have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate against vicksburg by way of the mississippi river. two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case i did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. i feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. but on the 12th i received a dispatch from general halleck saying that i had command of all the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where i pleased. the next day my cavalry was in holly springs, and the enemy fell back south of the tallahatchie. holly springs i selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from columbus, kentucky, except the few stores collected about la grange and grand junction. this was a long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's country. on the 15th of november, while i was still at holly springs, i sent word to sherman to meet me at columbus. we were but forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to take the rail to columbus and sherman a steamer for the same place. at that meeting, besides talking over my general plans i gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the mississippi central railroad if he could. sherman, who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to cottage hill, ten miles north of oxford. he brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry. further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north to memphis. about this time general halleck ordered troops from helena, arkansas (territory west of the mississippi was not under my command then) to cut the road in pemberton's rear. the expedition was under generals hovey and c. c. washburn and was successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired. the tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad bridge destroyed and pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. a crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. i sent the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. this caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition of hovey and washburn. the enemy was followed as far south as oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles farther by mcpherson's command. here the pursuit was halted to repair the railroad from the tallahatchie northward, in order to bring up supplies. the piles on which the railroad bridge rested had been left standing. the work of constructing a roadway for the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. during the delay at oxford in repairing railroads i learned that an expedition down the mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, i ordered sherman on the 8th of december back to memphis to take charge. the following were his orders: headquarters 13th army corps, department of the tennessee. oxford, mississippi, december 8,1862. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding right wing: you will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to memphis, tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. on your arrival at memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of general curtis's forces at present east of the mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. as soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of flag-officer porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may dictate. the amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. the quartermaster at st. louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of memphis. on arriving in memphis, put yourself in communication with admiral porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. i will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary. leave the district of memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there. u. s. grant, major-general. this idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of december i asked halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south of the yallabusha and move a force from helena and memphis on vicksburg. on the 5th again i suggested, from oxford, to halleck that if the helena troops were at my command i though it would be possible to take them and the memphis forces south of the mouth of the yazoo river, and thus secure vicksburg and the state of mississippi. halleck on the same day, the 5th of december, directed me not to attempt to hold the country south of the tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at memphis by the 20th for the vicksburg expedition. i sent sherman with two divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether i should command the expedition down the river myself or send sherman. i was authorized to do as i though best for the accomplishment of the great object in view. i sent sherman and so informed general halleck. as stated, my action in sending sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. i feared that delay might bring mcclernand, who was his senior and who had authority from the president and secretary of war to exercise that particular command,--and independently. i doubted mcclernand's fitness; and i had good reason to believe that in forestalling him i was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me. neither my orders to general sherman, nor the correspondence between us or between general halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going further south than the yallabusha. pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the territory held by us in west tennessee and kentucky. i hoped to hold pemberton in my front while sherman should get in his rear and into vicksburg. the further north the enemy could be held the better. it was understood, however, between general sherman and myself that our movements were to be co-operative; if pemberton could not be held away from vicksburg i was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the yallabusha. with that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the yazoo until communications could be opened with the mississippi was contemplated. it was my intention, and so understood by sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back i would follow him even to the gates of vicksburg. i intended in such an event to hold the road to grenada on the yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the yazoo, or at vicksburg itself, with grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. it should be remembered that at the time i speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. a halt was called at oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. on the 18th of december i received orders from washington to divide my command into four army corps, with general mcclernand to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the mississippi. this interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. mcclernand was at that time in springfield, illinois. the order was obeyed without any delay. dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. on the 20th general van dorn appeared at holly springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by colonel murphy, of the 8th wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. the capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not to the troops under him. at the same time forrest got on our line of railroad between jackson, tennessee, and columbus, kentucky, doing much damage to it. this cut me off from all communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained in the regular way. this demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. i determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with columbus as a base, and returned to la grange and grand junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to memphis, making the mississippi river the line over which to draw supplies. pemberton was falling back at the same time. the moment i received the news of van dorn's success i sent the cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. he had start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. all these he found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. van dorn did not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at holly springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put together. murphy was also warned of van dorn's approach, but made no preparations to meet him. he did not even notify his command. colonel murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated iuka on the approach of the enemy. general rosecrans denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and punished. i sustained the colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and i thought he had done well to get away without falling into their hands. his leaving large stores to fall into price's possession i looked upon as an oversight and excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. he should, however, have destroyed them. this last surrender demonstrated to my mind that rosecrans' judgment of murphy's conduct at iuka was correct. the surrender of holly springs was most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of colonel murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross cowardice. after the war was over i read from the diary of a lady who accompanied general pemberton in his retreat from the tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. the roads were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and trains. why there should have been a panic i do not see. no expedition had yet started down the mississippi river. had i known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, i would have been in pursuit of pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear. after sending cavalry to drive van dorn away, my next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front back to grand junction, leaving two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. i was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. it showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. this taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days' rations by the commissary. our loss of supplies was great at holly springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught. the news of the capture of holly springs and the destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in oxford. they came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to ask what i was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. i told them that i was not disturbed; that i had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side of the road. countenances soon changed, and so did the inquiry. the next was, "what are we to do?" my response was that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. i advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general m'clernand in command --assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence --operations at yazoo pass. this interruption in my communications north--i was really cut off from communication with a great part of my own command during this time --resulted in sherman's moving from memphis before mcclernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach mcclernand. pemberton got back to vicksburg before sherman got there. the rebel positions were on a bluff on the yazoo river, some miles above its mouth. the waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the high bluffs. these were fortified and defended at all points. the rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought against its front. sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. his efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing. sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but i had no opportunity of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on the 20th. he did not know but what i was in the rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the troops with me. i had, before he started from memphis, directed him to take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the yazoo, not knowing but that i might want them to supply me after cutting loose from my base at grenada. on the 23d i removed my headquarters back to holly springs. the troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. the road was not damaged south of holly springs by van dorn, at least not to an extent to cause any delay. as i had resolved to move headquarters to memphis, and to repair the road to that point, i remained at holly springs until this work was completed. on the 10th of january, the work on the road from holly springs to grand junction and thence to memphis being completed, i moved my headquarters to the latter place. during the campaign here described, the losses (mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their holly springs capture, which they could not hold. when sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men, taken from memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at helena, arkansas. the troops on the west bank of the river had previously been assigned to my command. mcclernand having received the orders for his assignment reached the mouth of the yazoo on the 2d of january, and immediately assumed command of all the troops with sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th, and all of sherman's, the 15th. sherman, and admiral porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the yazoo. after consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render service to the cause where they were, and learning that i had withdrawn from the interior of mississippi, they determined to return to the arkansas river and to attack arkansas post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. sherman had learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other supplies intended for his command. the man had made his escape. mcclernand approved this move reluctantly, as sherman says. no obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of the fort. after three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. i was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was understood i regarded it as very important. five thousand confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the mississippi. immediately after the reduction of arkansas post and the capture of the garrison, mcclernand returned with his entire force to napoleon, at the mouth of the arkansas river. from here i received messages from both sherman and admiral porter, urging me to come and take command in person, and expressing their distrust of mcclernand's ability and fitness for so important and intricate an expedition. on the 17th i visited mcclernand and his command at napoleon. it was here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful of mcclernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. it would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into such danger. by this time i had received authority to relieve mcclernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river expedition, or to assume command in person. i felt great embarrassment about mcclernand. he was the senior major-general after myself within the department. it would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign a junior over him. nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the command myself. i would have been glad to put sherman in command, to give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the december before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was junior to mcclernand. sherman's failure needs no apology. on the 20th i ordered general mcclernand with the entire command, to young's point and milliken's bend, while i returned to memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me secure. general hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. the memphis and charleston railroad was held, while the mississippi central was given up. columbus was the only point between cairo and memphis, on the river, left with a garrison. all the troops and guns from the posts on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. on the 29th of january i arrived at young's point and assumed command the following day. general mcclernand took exception in a most characteristic way--for him. his correspondence with me on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. it was highly insubordinate, but i overlooked it, as i believed, for the good of the service. general mcclernand was a politician of very considerable prominence in his state; he was a member of congress when the secession war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the union at all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of where he stood in the contest before the country. he also gave up his seat in congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had proclaimed. the real work of the campaign and siege of vicksburg now began. the problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which the troops could operate against vicksburg. the mississippi river, from cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up to two or more hundred feet above the river. on the west side the highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest water. through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. at places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. after leaving memphis, there are no such highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until vicksburg is reached. the intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water--many of them navigable for steamers. all of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally impracticable. the strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the yallabusha, or to jackson, mississippi. at this time the north had become very much discouraged. many strong union men believed that the war must prove a failure. the elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the union if it took the last man and the last dollar. voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the north, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. it was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from vicksburg to memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. there was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. this was in my mind from the moment i took command in person at young's point. the winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. to get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many miles of river front. we had to occupy the levees and the ground immediately behind. this was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under general mcpherson, was at lake providence, seventy miles above vicksburg. it was in january the troops took their position opposite vicksburg. the water was very high and the rains were incessant. there seemed no possibility of a land movement before the end of march or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time. the effect would be demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. friends in the north would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it. i always admired the south, as bad as i thought their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by press or by individuals, within their control. war at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. but, once entered into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation. vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the river's edge, below that on which memphis stands. the bluff, or high land, follows the left bank of the yazoo for some distance and continues in a southerly direction to the mississippi river, thence it runs along the mississippi to warrenton, six miles below. the yazoo river leaves the high land a short distance below haines' bluff and empties into the mississippi nine miles above vicksburg. vicksburg is built on this high land where the mississippi washes the base of the hill. haines' bluff, eleven miles from vicksburg, on the yazoo river, was strongly fortified. the whole distance from there to vicksburg and thence to warrenton was also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them. from young's point the mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they were in range of the upper batteries. since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. north of the yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with bayous, and much overflowed. a front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. the problem then became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the mississippi without an apparent retreat. then commenced a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public generally. i, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. nevertheless i was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. in 1862 general thomas williams had come up from new orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from young's point to the river below. the distance across was a little over a mile. it was williams' expectation that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without doing any execution in the way of cutting. mr. lincoln had navigated the mississippi in his younger days and understood well its tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. he set much store accordingly by this canal. general mcclernand had been, therefore, directed before i went to young's point to push the work of widening and deepening this canal. after my arrival the work was diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out until the excavation was completed. this was on the 8th of march. even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. it runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite side, or east bank, of the river. as soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout its length. this battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. had the canal been completed it might have proven of some use in running transports through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. while this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the batteries. on the 30th of january, the day after my arrival at the front, i ordered general mcpherson, stationed with his corps at lake providence, to cut the levee at that point. if successful in opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry us to the mississippi river through the mouth of the red river, just above port hudson and four hundred miles below vicksburg by the river. lake providence is a part of the old bed of the mississippi, about a mile from the present channel. it is six miles long and has its outlet through bayou baxter, bayou macon, and the tensas, washita and red rivers. the last three are navigable streams at all seasons. bayous baxter and macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with dense forests overhanging the channel. they were also filled with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. the land along the mississippi river, from memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the boundary of the valley through which it winds. bayou baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the macon. there was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time. to get through it, even with vessels of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to make a passage way. as the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great magnitude. on the 4th of february i visited general mcpherson, and remained with him several days. the work had not progressed so far as to admit the water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. with this we were able to explore the lake and bayou as far as cleared. i saw then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country. the distance from lake providence to the point where vessels going by that route would enter the mississippi again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. the distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which this new route would carry us. the enemy held port hudson, below where the red river debouches, and all the mississippi above to vicksburg. the red river, washita and tensas were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. i let the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. this work was abandoned after the canal proved a failure. lieutenant-colonel wilson of my staff was sent to helena, arkansas, to examine and open a way through moon lake and the yazoo pass if possible. formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the mississippi river into moon lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through yazoo pass to coldwater, along the latter to the tallahatchie, which joins the yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below moon lake and forms the yazoo river. these were formerly navigated by steamers trading with the rich plantations along their banks; but the state of mississippi had built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the mouth of the yazoo several hundreds of miles below. on the 2d of february this dam, or levee, was cut. the river being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. the bayous were soon filled and much of the country was overflowed. this pass leaves the mississippi river but a few miles below helena. on the 24th general ross, with his brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. the rebels had obstructed the navigation of yazoo pass and the coldwater by felling trees into them. much of the timber in this region being of greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of march ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under the command of lieutenant-commander watson smith, confronting a fortification at greenwood, where the tallahatchie and yallabusha unite and the yazoo begins. the bends of the rivers are such at this point as to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the river. this island was fortified and manned. it was named fort pemberton after the commander at vicksburg. no land approach was accessible. the troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of ground which was discovered above water. the gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of march. both efforts were failures and were not renewed. one gunboat was disabled and we lost six men killed and twenty-five wounded. the loss of the enemy was less. fort pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. in hope of enlisting the elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the mississippi levee, this time directly opposite helena, or six miles above the former cut. it did not accomplish the desired result, and ross, with his fleet, started back. on the 22d he met quinby with a brigade at yazoo pass. quinby was the senior of ross, and assumed command. he was not satisfied with returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether anything could be accomplished. accordingly fort pemberton was revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time without an attack. quinby, with his command, returned with but little delay. in the meantime i was much exercised for the safety of ross, not knowing that quinby had been able to join him. reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on board of their transports. relief had to come from another quarter. so i determined to get into the yazoo below fort pemberton. steel's bayou empties into the yazoo river between haines' bluff and its mouth. it is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. it approaches to within one mile of the mississippi at eagle bend, thirty miles above young's point. steel's bayou connects with black bayou, black bayou with deer creek, deer creek with rolling fork, rolling fork with the big sunflower river, and the big sunflower with the yazoo river about ten miles above haines' bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the winding of the river. all these waterways are of about the same nature so far as navigation is concerned, until the sunflower is reached; this affords free navigation. admiral porter explored this waterway as far as deer creek on the 14th of march, and reported it navigable. on the next day he started with five gunboats and four mortar-boats. i went with him for some distance. the heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also the short turns in so narrow a stream. the gunboats, however, ploughed their way through without other damage than to their appearance. the transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. the road was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. in the evening i returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. sherman went in person on the 16th, taking with him stuart's division of the 15th corps. they took large river transports to eagle bend on the mississippi, where they debarked and marched across to steel's bayou, where they re-embarked on the transports. the river steamers, with their tall smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that the gunboats got far ahead. porter, with his fleet, got within a few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. he could do nothing with gunboats against sharpshooters. the rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000 men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out black bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. on the night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. sherman at once returned through black bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. they tried to force their way through black bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. it was night when they landed, and intensely dark. there was but a narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush or cane. the troops lighted their way through this with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open plantation. here the troops rested until morning. they made twenty-one miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to rescue the fleet. porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. more welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this occasion. the vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous on the mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of vicksburg. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press --running the batteries--loss of the indianola--disposition of the troops. the original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of march. the effort to make a waterway through lake providence and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. at milliken's bend, and also at young's point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing richmond, louisiana, enter the mississippi at carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above grand gulf. the mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these points, is carried through these same channels to the river below. in case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. the dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, i determined to open these other channels, if possible. if successful the effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our transports. there was a good road back of the levees, along these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. as early as the 4th of february i had written to halleck about this route, stating that i thought it much more practicable than the other undertaking (the lake providence route), and that it would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country. the upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for a distance of several miles from their source. it was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. this work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to richmond, louisiana, emerged from the water. one small steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. beyond this it was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter was whiled away. all these failures would have been very discouraging if i had expected much from the efforts; but i had not. from the first the most i hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used below vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that city. this long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about vicksburg. the river was higher than its natural banks from december, 1862, to the following april. the war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the south, further than the production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. malarial fevers broke out among the men. measles and small-pox also attacked them. the hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. because i would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. they were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. mcclernand, fremont, hunter and mcclellan were all mentioned in this connection. i took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as i understood it, to the best of my ability. every one has his superstitions. one of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position. while at cairo i had watched with very great interest the operations of the army of the potomac, looking upon that as the main field of the war. i had no idea, myself, of ever having any large command, nor did i suppose that i was equal to one; but i had the vanity to think that as a cavalry officer i might succeed very well in the command of a brigade. on one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, i said that i would give anything if i were commanding a brigade of cavalry in the army of the potomac and i believed i could do some good. captain hillyer spoke up and suggested that i make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. i then told him that i would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned this superstition. in time of war the president, being by the constitution commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the selection of commanders. he should not be embarrassed in making his selections. i having been selected, my responsibility ended with my doing the best i knew how. if i had sought the place, or obtained it through personal or political influence, my belief is that i would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown in case of disaster. somebody must be responsible for their failures. with all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both president lincoln and general halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. i had never met mr. lincoln, but his support was constant. at last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points at milliken's bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success. i had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. this could not be undertaken until the waters receded. i did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. my recollection is that admiral porter was the first one to whom i mentioned it. the co-operation of the navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise. i had no more authority to command porter than he had to command me. it was necessary to have part of his fleet below vicksburg if the troops went there. steamers to use as ferries were also essential. the navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries. porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. i was glad to accept his proposition, not only because i admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs. porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth of the yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense forests that intervened. even spies could not get near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. our river guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the river near the east shore, from the direction of vicksburg, towards the fleet. on overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of discovery. the boat, crew and passengers were brought ashore to me. the chief personage aboard proved to be jacob thompson, secretary of the interior under the administration of president buchanan. after a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more i allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of mr. thompson and his flag. admiral porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. the great essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. this he accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. the hay and grain would be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy roads over which we expected to march. before this i had been collecting, from st. louis and chicago, yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. by the 16th of april porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. the advance, flagship benton, porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes by the lafayette with a captured steamer, the price, lashed to her side, the louisville, mound city, pittsburgh and carondelet--all of these being naval vessels. next came the transports --forest queen, silver wave and henry clay, each towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when below the batteries. the gunboat tuscumbia brought up the rear. soon after the start a battery between vicksburg and warrenton opened fire across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then by batteries all along the line. the gunboats ran up close under the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably without much effect. they were under fire for more than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the gunboats. the transports did not fare so well. the henry clay was disabled and deserted by her crew. soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's edge. the burning mass, however, floated down to carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. the enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the louisiana side. the sight was magnificent, but terrible. i witnessed it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go. my mind was much relieved when i learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. during the running of the batteries men were stationed in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. all damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direction of admiral porter. the experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. admiral farragut had run the batteries at port hudson with the flagship hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below vicksburg. the 13th of february admiral porter had sent the gunboat indianola, lieutenant-commander george brown commanding, below. she met colonel ellet of the marine brigade below natchez on a captured steamer. two of the colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the greatest consternation among the people along the mississippi from vicksburg (*10) to the red river. the indianola remained about the mouth of the red river some days, and then started up the mississippi. the confederates soon raised the queen of the west, (*11) and repaired her. with this vessel and the ram webb, which they had had for some time in the red river, and two other steamers, they followed the indianola. the latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid current of the mississippi. the confederate fleet overtook her just above grand gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th of february. the indianola was superior to all the others in armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. as it was she fought them for an hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition. the armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. officers and crew then surrendered. i had started mcclernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of march, by way of richmond, louisiana, to new carthage, hoping that he might capture grand gulf before the balance of the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. some miles from new carthage the levee to bayou vidal was broken in several places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. boats were collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across the overflowed interval. by the 6th of april mcclernand had reached new carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these boats. on the 17th i visited new carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. the water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. mcclernand had already found a new route from smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred, to perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below new carthage. this increased the march from milliken's bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet of bridging in all. the river falling made the current in these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "yankee soldier" was equal to any emergency. the bridges were soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). this, if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. these bridges were all built by mcclernand's command, under the supervision of lieutenant hains of the engineer corps. i returned to milliken's bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops: headquarters department of the tennessee, milliken's bend, louisiana, april 20, 1863. special orders, no. 110. * * * * * * * viii. the following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "army in the field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the mississippi river, from which vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads. first.--the thirteenth army corps, major-general john a. mcclernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. second.--the fifteenth army corps, major-general w. t. sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing. third.--the seventeenth army corps, major-general james b. mcpherson commanding, will constitute the centre. fourth.--the order of march to new carthage will be from right to left. fifth.--reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. when the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. sixth.--troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. seventh.--in the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by general orders no. 160, a. g. o., series of 1862. eighth.--all the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army. ninth.--as fast as the thirteenth army corps advances, the seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the fifteenth army corps. tenth.--two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from richmond to new carthage. eleventh.--general hospitals will be established by the medical director between duckport and milliken's bend. all sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. the force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from duckport to milliken's bend. they will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. twelfth.--the movement of troops from milliken's bend to new carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous orders. thirteenth.--commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. all such irregularities must be summarily punished. fourteenth.--brigadier-general j. c. sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to new carthage. his particular attention is called to general orders, no. 69, from adjutant-general's office, washington, of date march 20, 1863. by order of major-general u. s. grant. mcclernand was already below on the mississippi. two of mcpherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately. the third had not yet arrived from lake providence; it was on its way to milliken's bend and was to follow on arrival. sherman was to follow mcpherson. two of his divisions were at duckport and young's point, and the third under steele was under orders to return from greenville, mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our transports. it had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between milliken's bend and perkins' plantation. accordingly six more steamers were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with supplies. they took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. on the night of the 22d of april they ran the batteries, five getting through more or less disabled while one was sunk. about half the barges got through with their needed freight. when it was first proposed to run the blockade at vicksburg with river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. volunteers were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating the western rivers. captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we were moving through this dangerous ordeal. most of them were from logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of illinois and from missouri. all but two of the steamers were commanded by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. in this instance, as in all others during the war, i found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether mechanical or professional. colonel w. s. oliver was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. on the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at perkins' plantation. reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land above grand gulf. there was none practicable. accordingly the troops were set in motion for hard times, twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite grand gulf. the loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water. some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured. all the troops, therefore, except what could be transported in one trip, had to march. the road lay west of lake st. joseph. three large bayous had to be crossed. they were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12) on the 27th mcclernand's corps was all at hard times, and mcpherson's was following closely. i had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, mcclernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. about 10,000 men were so embarked. the plan was to have the navy silence the guns at grand gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. the following order was issued: perkins plantation, la., april 27,1863. major-general j. a. mcclernand, commanding 13th a. c. commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. all the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite grand gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, general mcpherson is ordered to send one division. the plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. the first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement. admiral porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. it may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past grand gulf and land at rodney. in case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. in this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below grand gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. there will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at grand gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board. should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade. if not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. u. s. grant, major-general. at 8 o'clock a.m., 29th, porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. for nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. all this time mcclernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. i occupied a tug from which i could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves. about half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. the enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. i immediately signalled the admiral and went aboard his ship. the navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. a large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. the sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as i boarded the ship was sickening. grand gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it. it is as defensible upon its front as vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. i therefore requested porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be wanted below. there is a long tongue of land from the louisiana side extending towards grand gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the same distance below. the land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. i had had this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of rodney. it was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. i had intended to make this request, but he anticipated me. at dusk, when concealed from the view of the enemy at grand gulf, mcclernand landed his command on the west bank. the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully. the troops marched across the point of land under cover of night, unobserved. by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with national troops. when the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that we would have to go to rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a good landing would be found at bruinsburg, a few miles above rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to port gibson some twelve miles in the interior. the information was found correct, and our landing was effected without opposition. sherman had not left his position above vicksburg yet. on the morning of the 27th i ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the yazoo and threatening an attack on haines' bluff. my object was to compel pemberton to keep as much force about vicksburg as i could, until i could secure a good footing on high land east of the river. the move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about vicksburg and doubts about our real design. sherman moved the day of our attack on grand gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which porter had left above vicksburg. he debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at haines' bluff. this move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service. on the first of may sherman received orders from me (sent from hard times the evening of the 29th of april) to withdraw from the front of haines' bluff and follow mcpherson with two divisions as fast as he could. i had established a depot of supplies at perkins' plantation. now that all our gunboats were below grand gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the big black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies. mcpherson was at hard times with a portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his command. the night of the 29th i directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position. the embarkation below grand gulf took place at de shroon's, louisiana, six miles above bruinsburg, mississippi. early on the morning of 30th of april mcclernand's corps and one division of mcpherson's corps were speedily landed. when this was effected i felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. i was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. but i was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. all the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of december previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. i had with me the 13th corps, general mcclernand commanding, and two brigades of logan's division of the 17th corps, general mcpherson commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. these were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of logan's division and crocker's division of the 17th corps. on the 7th of may i was further reinforced by sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. my total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. the enemy occupied grand gulf, haines' bluff and jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. jackson is fifty miles east of vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. my first problem was to capture grand gulf to use as a base. bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. the bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. it was natural to expect the garrison from grand gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. bayou pierre enters the mississippi just above bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by port gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. this more than doubled the distance from grand gulf to the high land back of bruinsburg. no time was to be lost in securing this foothold. our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during the day, april 30th, and early evening. mcclernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. the bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and mcclernand was pushed on, hoping to reach port gibson and save the bridge spanning the bayou pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. port gibson, too, is the starting point of roads to grand gulf, vicksburg and jackson. mcclernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of port gibson at thompson's plantation. there was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. the enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the grand gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under general bowen. his hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under loring could reach him from vicksburg; but loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of port gibson. two brigades of mcpherson's corps followed mcclernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way. the country in this part of mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. this makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. near the point selected by bowen to defend, the road to port gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. these roads unite just outside the town. this made it necessary for mcclernand to divide his force. it was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. one flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. mcclernand put the divisions of hovey, carr and a. j. smith upon the right-hand branch and osterhaus on the left. i was on the field by ten a.m., and inspected both flanks in person. on the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. on the left, however, osterhaus was not faring so well. he had been repulsed with some loss. as soon as the road could be cleared of mcclernand's troops i ordered up mcpherson, who was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of logan's division. this was about noon. i ordered him to send one brigade (general john e. smith's was selected) to support osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. this movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. it was successful and unattended by heavy loss. the enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset. while the movement to our left was going on, mcclernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. i had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. we followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from port gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf --movement up the big black--battle of raymond. we started next morning for port gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. we were soon in the town, and i was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. the troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the south fork of the bayou pierre. at this time the water was high and the current rapid. what might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. colonel j. h. wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. officers and men generally joined in this work. when it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the north fork that day. one brigade of logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the north fork to repair the bridge there. the enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. before leaving port gibson we were reinforced by crocker's division, mcpherson's corps, which had crossed the mississippi at bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days' rations. mcpherson still had one division west of the mississippi river, guarding the road from milliken's bend to the river below until sherman's command should relieve it. on leaving bruinsburg for the front i left my son frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after grand gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that i had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at thompson's hill--called the battle of port gibson--found his way to where i was. he had no horse to ride at the time, and i had no facilities for even preparing a meal. he, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached grand gulf. mr. c. a. dana, then an officer of the war department, accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. he was in the same situation as fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. the first time i call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. my son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. he looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. his age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. when the movement from bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train. the train still west of the mississippi was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from milliken's bend to hard times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of port gibson. my own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what i had on, was with this train. general a. j. smith happened to have an extra horse at bruinsburg which i borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. i had no other for nearly a week. it was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. i directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. in it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. the making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. no formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them. it was at port gibson i first heard through a southern paper of the complete success of colonel grierson, who was making a raid through central mississippi. he had started from la grange april 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. on the 21st he had detached colonel hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between columbus and macon and then return to la grange. hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at okalona and tupelo, and arriving in la grange april 26. grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the vicksburg and meridian railroad and the new orleans and jackson railroad, arriving at baton rouge may 2d. this raid was of great importance, for grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against vicksburg. during the night of the 2d of may the bridge over the north fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. it was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from grand gulf to vicksburg. every commanding position from this (grindstone) crossing to hankinson's ferry over the big black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress. mcpherson, however, reached hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to vicksburg. when the junction of the road going to vicksburg with the road from grand gulf to raymond and jackson was reached, logan with his division was turned to the left towards grand gulf. i went with him a short distance from this junction. mcpherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of port gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. mcpherson was ordered to hold hankinson's ferry and the road back to willow springs with one division; mcclernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. i did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear. on the way from the junction to grand gulf, where the road comes into the one from vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, i learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to vicksburg. i left logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while i rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. admiral porter had already arrived with his fleet. the enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. when i reached grand gulf may 3d i had not been with my baggage since the 27th of april and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as i could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. the first thing i did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship. then i wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from cairo, orders to general sullivan commanding above vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. about twelve o'clock at night i was through my work and started for hankinson's ferry, arriving there before daylight. while at grand gulf i heard from banks, who was on the red river, and who said that he could not be at port hudson before the 10th of may and then with only 15,000 men. up to this time my intention had been to secure grand gulf, as a base of supplies, detach mcclernand's corps to banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of port hudson. the news from banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. to wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month. the reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. the enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than banks could have brought. i therefore determined to move independently of banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of vicksburg and invest or capture the city. grand gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at washington were notified. i knew well that halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. the time it would take to communicate with washington and get a reply would be so great that i could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. even sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four states of the confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. he urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life." to this i replied: "i do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from grand gulf. i know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. what i do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." we started from bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. a delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. mcclernand's and mcpherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days' rations in haversacks. beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance. quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. all these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. but the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the yazoo above vicksburg. while the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations i ordered reconnoissances made by mcclernand and mcpherson, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the big black and attack the city at once. on the 6th sherman arrived at grand gulf and crossed his command that night and the next day. three days' rations had been brought up from grand gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. orders were given for a forward movement the next day. sherman was directed to order up blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from milliken's bend to hard times with two brigades. the quartermaster at young's point was ordered to send two hundred wagons with blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. on the 3d hurlbut, who had been left at memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to milliken's bend to relieve blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. the four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay. during the night of the 6th mcpherson drew in his troops north of the big black and was off at an early hour on the road to jackson, via rocky springs, utica and raymond. that night he and mcclernand were both at rocky springs ten miles from hankinson's ferry. mcpherson remained there during the 8th, while mcclernand moved to big sandy and sherman marched from grand gulf to hankinson's ferry. the 9th, mcpherson moved to a point within a few miles west of utica; mcclernand and sherman remained where they were. on the 10th mcpherson moved to utica, sherman to big sandy; mcclernand was still at big sandy. the 11th, mcclernand was at five mile creek; sherman at auburn; mcpherson five miles advanced from utica. may 12th, mcclernand was at fourteen mile creek; sherman at fourteen mile creek; mcpherson at raymond after a battle. after mcpherson crossed the big black at hankinson's ferry vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. it is not probable, however, that pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement. the broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the big black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. it was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of vicksburg, and approach from that direction. accordingly, mcpherson's troops that had crossed the big black were withdrawn and the movement east to jackson commenced. as has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. the troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. mcclernand's corps was kept with its left flank on the big black guarding all the crossings. fourteen mile creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by mcclernand and sherman with slight loss. mcpherson was to the right of sherman, extending to raymond. the cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack. in making this move i estimated pemberton's movable force at vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at haines' bluff and jackson. it would not be possible for pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and i determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. this was done with success, but i found afterwards that i had entirely under-estimated pemberton's strength. up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. my line was now nearly parallel with the jackson and vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. the right was at raymond eighteen miles from jackson, mcpherson commanding; sherman in the centre on fourteen mile creek, his advance thrown across; mcclernand to the left, also on fourteen mile creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. mcclernand's left was on the big black. in all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the big black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. mcpherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under general gregg, about two miles out of raymond. this was about two p.m. logan was in advance with one of his brigades. he deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. mcpherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of logan's division, and crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. the order was obeyed with alacrity. logan got his division in position for assault before crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at jackson. in this battle mcpherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing --nearly or quite all from logan's division. the enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. i regarded logan and crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command. crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered. his weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. he died not long after the close of the rebellion. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy --battle of champion's hill. when the news reached me of mcpherson's victory at raymond about sundown my position was with sherman. i decided at once to turn the whole column towards jackson and capture that place without delay. pemberton was now on my left, with, as i supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as i learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. a force was also collecting on my right, at jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with vicksburg connect. all the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. as i hoped in the end to besiege vicksburg i must first destroy all possibility of aid. i therefore determined to move swiftly towards jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon pemberton. but by moving against jackson, i uncovered my own communication. so i finally decided to have none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. i then had no fears for my communications, and if i moved quickly enough could turn upon pemberton before he could attack me in the rear. accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. mcpherson was ordered at daylight to move on clinton, ten miles from jackson; sherman was notified of my determination to capture jackson and work from there westward. he was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to raymond. mcclernand was ordered to march with three divisions by dillon's to raymond. one was left to guard the crossing of the big black. on the 10th i had received a letter from banks, on the red river, asking reinforcements. porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and i now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. i looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held port hudson and vicksburg as a waste of time and material. general joseph e. johnston arrived at jackson in the night of the 13th from tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the confederate troops in mississippi. i knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. on the 6th i had written to general halleck: "information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from tullahoma." up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary. mcpherson reached clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. sherman's advance reached raymond before the last of mcpherson's command had got out of the town. mcclernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at edward's station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. on the night of the 13th, mcpherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon jackson, only fifteen miles away. sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from raymond to jackson, which is south of the road mcpherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. mcclernand was ordered to move one division of his command to clinton, one division a few miles beyond mississippi springs following sherman's line, and a third to raymond. he was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by mississippi springs. mcclernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. with one division at clinton he was in position to reinforce mcpherson, at jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond mississippi springs was equally available to reinforce sherman; the one at raymond could take either road. he still had two other divisions farther back now that blair had come up, available within a day at jackson. if this last command should not be wanted at jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city. but the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. this i expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by johnston to make this very move. i notified general halleck that i should attack the state capital on the 14th. a courier carried the dispatch to grand gulf through an unprotected country. sherman and mcpherson communicated with each other during the night and arranged to reach jackson at about the same hour. it rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. the roads were intolerable, and in some places on sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. but the troops never murmured. by nine o'clock crocker, of mcpherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. they were outside of the intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of raymond. johnston had been reinforced; during the night by georgia and south carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. he was now on the south and south-west of jackson confronting the confederates behind their breastworks, while mcpherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the vicksburg railroad. artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. mcpherson brought up logan's division while he deployed crocker's for the assault. sherman made similar dispositions on the right. by eleven a.m. both were ready to attack. crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. these troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. this stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. mcpherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the next move. it was now about noon. while this was going on sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the mississippi springs road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to pass. by detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. this brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the north, west and south sides from the pearl river north of the city to the same river south. i was with sherman. he was confronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. appearances did not justify an assault where we were. i had directed sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the pearl river. this force, tuttle's division, not returning i rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. tuttle's movement or mcpherson's pressure had no doubt led johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. i rode immediately to the state house, where i was soon followed by sherman. about the same time mcpherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. he captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the national flag over the rebel capital of mississippi. stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. our loss in this engagement was: mcpherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded; sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured. seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. on this day blair reached new auburn and joined mcclernand's 4th division. he had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. i slept that night in the room that johnston was said to have occupied the night before. about four in the afternoon i sent for the corps commanders and directed the dispositions to be made of their troops. sherman was to remain in jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and manufacturing city of military supplies. he did the work most effectually. sherman and i went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of yankee troops. our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. we looked on for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "c. s. a." woven in each bolt. there was an immense amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. finally i told sherman i thought they had done work enough. the operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. in a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. the proprietor visited washington while i was president to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. he asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by national troops, so that he might use it with congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. i declined. on the night of the 13th johnston sent the following dispatch to pemberton at edward's station: "i have lately arrived, and learn that major-general sherman is between us with four divisions at clinton. it is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. if practicable, come up in his rear at once. to beat such a detachment would be of immense value. all the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. time is all-important." this dispatch was sent in triplicate, by different messengers. one of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from memphis some months before by hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. there was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. he delivered his copy of johnston's dispatch to mcpherson who forwarded it to me. receiving this dispatch on the 14th i ordered mcpherson to move promptly in the morning back to bolton, the nearest point where johnston could reach the road. bolton is about twenty miles west of jackson. i also informed mcclernand of the capture of jackson and sent him the following order: "it is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the big black, and beat us into vicksburg. we must not allow them to do this. turn all your forces towards bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there. move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." and to blair i wrote: "their design is evidently to cross the big black and pass down the peninsula between the big black and yazoo rivers. we must beat them. turn your troops immediately to bolton; take all the trains with you. smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. if practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train." johnston stopped on the canton road only six miles north of jackson, the night of the 14th. he sent from there to pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of jackson, and the following order: "as soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. i am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. can grant supply himself from the mississippi? can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him." the concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. mcpherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. mcclernand's command was, one division (hovey's) on the road mcpherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. one (osterhaus) was at raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near champion's hill; one (carr's) had to pass over the same road with osterhaus, but being back at mississippi springs, would not be detained by it; the fourth (smith's) with blair's division, was near auburn with a different road to pass over. mcclernand faced about and moved promptly. his cavalry from raymond seized bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. the night of the 15th hovey was at bolton; carr and osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; smith was north of raymond with blair in his rear. mcpherson's command, with logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached hovey and went into camp; crocker bivouacked just in hovey's rear on the clinton road. sherman with two divisions, was in jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military factories. i rode in person out to clinton. on my arrival i ordered mcclernand to move early in the morning on edward's station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success. i naturally expected that pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which i have shown were to attack us at clinton. this, indeed, i knew he could not do; but i felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. it turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from edward's station and get between me and my base. i, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. on the 15th pemberton had actually marched south from edward's station, but the rains had swollen baker's creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. this brought him back to the jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over baker's creek. some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join johnston at clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected. about five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed on the jackson and vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. they reported that they had passed through pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. they reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five thousand men. i had expected to leave sherman at jackson another day in order to complete his work; but getting the above information i sent him orders to move with all dispatch to bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. within an hour after receiving this order steele's division was on the road. at the same time i dispatched to blair, who was near auburn, to move with all speed to edward's station. mcclernand was directed to embrace blair in his command for the present. blair's division was a part of the 15th army corps (sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. the 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. mcpherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow hovey's division as closely as possible. mcclernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at edward's station, over which to march his troops. hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the clinton) still farther north. mcclernand was directed to move blair's and a. j. smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and osterhaus and carr by the middle road. orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy. smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. about the same time hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from jackson to vicksburg. mcpherson was hastening up to join hovey, but was embarrassed by hovey's trains occupying the roads. i was still back at clinton. mcpherson sent me word of the situation, and expressed the wish that i was up. by half-past seven i was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. when i arrived hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle. mcclernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than mcpherson. i sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. these orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting mcclernand's advance. champion's hill, where pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. it is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. on the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at baker's creek. it was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. the ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. the left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. the bolton and edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to baker's creek, nearly a mile away. on the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. there was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. from raymond there is a direct road to edward's station, some three miles west of champion's hill. there is one also to bolton. from this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching bolton and leads direct to the same station. it was along these two roads that three divisions of mcclernand's corps, and blair of sherman's, temporarily under mcclernand, were moving. hovey of mcclernand's command was with mcpherson, farther north on the road from bolton direct to edward's station. the middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to baker's creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches edward's station. pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. but he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. mcpherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, logan in front, and posted them on the right of hovey and across the flank of the enemy. logan reinforced hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. i ordered crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. mcpherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution. from logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. he did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. up to this time i had kept my position near hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon i moved with a part of my staff by our right around, until i came up with logan himself. i found him near the road leading down to baker's creek. he was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; hovey, reinforced by two brigades from mcpherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; mcclernand two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions, blair's and a. j. smith's, were confronting the rebel right; ransom, with a brigade of mcarthur's division of the 17th corps (mcpherson's), had crossed the river at grand gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. neither logan nor i knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. just at this juncture a messenger came from hovey, asking for more reinforcements. there were none to spare. i then gave an order to move mcpherson's command by the left flank around to hovey. this uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. during all this time, hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from logan and another from crocker, and by crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. the enemy fled precipitately. this was between three and four o'clock. i rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of carr's division just coming in. osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. hovey's division, and mcpherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. i sent orders to osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to carr, whom i saw personally, i explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the big black, and to cross it if he could; osterhaus to follow him. the pursuit was continued until after dark. the battle of champion's hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. every man of hovey's division and of mcpherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. no other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. osterhaus's and a. j. smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. mcclernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing. i sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. these traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come. it is true, in front of mcclernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. instead of this he sent orders to hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. to obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as mcclernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. of course i did not permit hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior. we had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. this excludes those that did not get up, all of mcclernand's command except hovey. our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his division. had mcclernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had i known the ground as i did afterwards, i cannot see how pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. as it was he lost over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in pursuit. loring's division, which was the right of pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into vicksburg. pemberton himself fell back that night to the big black river. his troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200. mcpherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. the pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. the night of the 16th of may found mcpherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to vicksburg. carr and osterhaus were at edward's station, and blair was about three miles south-east; hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. i pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept in advance until after night. finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. as no troops came up we moved back a mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. we had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. while a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black--investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. we were now assured of our position between johnston and pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. pemberton might have made a night march to the big black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to johnston. but this would have given us vicksburg. it would have been his proper move, however, and the one johnston would have made had he been in pemberton's place. in fact it would have been in conformity with johnston's orders to pemberton. sherman left jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. his rear guard did not get in until two a.m. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. he paroled his prisoners at jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. at bolton he was informed of our victory. he was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to bridgeport on the big black river, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy. blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible. this movement brought sherman's corps together, and at a point where i hoped a crossing of the big black might be effected and sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army. i informed him that i would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. the advance division, carr's (mcclernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at half-past three a.m. on the 17th, followed closely by osterhaus, mcpherson bringing up the rear with his corps. as i expected, the enemy was found in position on the big black. the point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. a bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the big black at ordinary stages. when the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. the bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. at this time there was a foot or two of water in it. the rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. the whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. at the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. carr's division was deployed on our right, lawler's brigade forming his extreme right and reaching through these woods to the river above. osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of carr and covered the enemy's entire front. mcpherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance. while the troops were standing as here described an officer from banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from general halleck, dated the 11th of may. it had been sent by the way of new orleans to banks to be forwarded to me. it ordered me to return to grand gulf and to co-operate from there with banks against port hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege vicksburg. i told the officer that the order came too late, and that halleck would not give it now if he knew our position. the bearer of the dispatch insisted that i ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when i heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. i immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; i think not even to this day. the assault was successful. but little resistance was made. the enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. many tried to escape by swimming the river. some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. the enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. but for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, i have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around vicksburg. as the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. it was but little after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place. as soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. one was taken charge of by lieutenant hains, of the engineer corps, one by general mcpherson himself and one by general ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. my recollection is that hains built a raft bridge; mcpherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. a bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose. by eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. sherman reached bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found blair with the pontoon train already there. a few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning. on the 18th i moved along the vicksburg road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined sherman. my first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the yazoo river above vicksburg. sherman's line of march led him to the very point on walnut hills occupied by the enemy the december before when he was repulsed. sherman was equally anxious with myself. our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers. there were some detached works along the crest of the hill. these were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from haines' bluff had not all got past on their way to vicksburg. at all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. in a few minutes sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the december before on the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. he turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. this, however, he said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and i ought to make a report of it at once. vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. i do not claim to quote sherman's language; but the substance only. my reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on. mcpherson, after crossing the big black, came into the jackson and vicksburg road which sherman was on, but to his rear. he arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. mcclernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to mount albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from baldwin's ferry to vicksburg. this brought him south of mcpherson. i now had my three corps up the works built for the defence of vicksburg, on three roads --one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. by the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. mcpherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the jackson road. mcclernand took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line. on the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. the enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at champion's hill and the big black, and i believed he would not make much effort to hold vicksburg. accordingly, at two o'clock i ordered an assault. it resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy. the 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from yazoo river or chickasaw bayou. most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. they had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. i remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that i heard him, "hard tack." in a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "hard tack! hard tack!" i told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. the cry was instantly changed to cheers. by the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. the bread and coffee were highly appreciated. i now determined on a second assault. johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one i had with me, and i knew he was being reinforced. there was danger of his coming to the assistance of pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. the immediate capture of vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive johnston from the state. but the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try. the attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. all the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. the attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. general mcclernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements. i occupied a position from which i believed i could see as well as he what took place in his front, and i did not see the success he reported. but his request for reinforcements being repeated i could not ignore it, and sent him quinby's division of the 17th corps. sherman and mcpherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of mcclernand. this last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. as soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon vicksburg. chapter xxxvii siege of vicksburg. i now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. the experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. with the navy holding the river, the investment of vicksburg was complete. as long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. these could not last always. the crossing of troops at bruinsburg commenced april 30th. on the 18th of may the army was in rear of vicksburg. on the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won by the union forces; the capital of the state had fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from vicksburg to port hudson, had become ours. the union force that had crossed the mississippi river up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men. one division of these, blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the battle of champion's hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade, ransom's of mcpherson's corps, reached the field after the battle. the enemy had at vicksburg, grand gulf, jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. they were in their own country, where no rear guards were necessary. the country is admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. all their troops had to be met. we were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at port gibson seven or eight thousand; at raymond, five thousand; at jackson, from eight to eleven thousand; at champion's hill, twenty-five thousand; at the big black, four thousand. a part of those met at jackson were all that was left of those encountered at raymond. they were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. our loss up to this time was: killed wounded missing port gibson..... 131 719 25 south fork bayou pierre..... .. 1 .. skirmishes, may 3 ..... 1 9 .. fourteen mile creek..... 6 24 .. raymond............... 66 339 39 jackson..... 42 251 7 champion's hill..... 410 1,844 187 big black..... 39 237 3 bridgeport..... .. 1 .. total..... 695 3,425 259 of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. not half of them were disabled for any length of time. after the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege began. sherman occupied the right starting from the river above vicksburg, mcpherson the centre (mcarthur's division now with him) and mcclernand the left, holding the road south to warrenton. lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line. in the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the yazoo river and chickasaw bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. the troops had been without these from the time of crossing the mississippi up to this time. all was now ready for the pick and spade. prentiss and hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the big black, and to observe johnston. i knew that johnston was receiving reinforcements from bragg, who was confronting rosecrans in tennessee. vicksburg was so important to the enemy that i believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere. my line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from haines' bluff to vicksburg, thence to warrenton. the line of the enemy was about seven. in addition to this, having an enemy at canton and jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defence facing the other way. i had not troops enough under my command to man these. general halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch. the ground about vicksburg is admirable for defence. on the north it is about two hundred feet above the mississippi river at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. but here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small streams. the enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a southwesterly direction to the river. deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defences. as there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. to follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. the work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. the problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. we had but four engineer officers with us. captain prime, of the engineer corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. his health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by captain comstock, also of the engineer corps. to provide assistants on such a long line i directed that all officers who had graduated at west point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to their other duties assist in the work. the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. the chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a sap-roller. as soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, i let him off. the general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall. we had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the west to draw from. admiral porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. the first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. the enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. in no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. it was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. to give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. on top of these, logs were put. by these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. the enemy used in their defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but i do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. when they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. in these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. the enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it freely. splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind. there were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. these answered as cochorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy. the labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. the work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were advanced. by the 30th of june there were two hundred and twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. we were now as strong for defence against the garrison of vicksburg as they were against us; but i knew that johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east. he had at this time a larger force than i had had at any time prior to the battle of champion's hill. as soon as the news of the arrival of the union army behind vicksburg reached the north, floods of visitors began to pour in. some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the christian and sanitary associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. they did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. but the intention was good. among the earliest arrivals was the governor of illinois, with most of the state officers. i naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. in sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. i therefore took them to sherman's headquarters and presented them. before starting out to look at the lines--possibly while sherman's horse was being saddled --there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the north had been so imperfectly informed. there was a little knot around sherman and another around me, and i heard sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from walnut hills upon the land below on the 18th of may, adding: "grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; i opposed it. i wrote him a letter about it." but for this speech it is not likely that sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. his untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. he could not have done more if the plan had been his own. (*13) on the 26th of may i sent blair's division up the yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the big black and the yazoo. the country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. blair was instructed to take all of it. the cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. blair went forty-five miles and was gone almost a week. his work was effectually done. i requested porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful, up to haines' bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent. on the 26th i also received a letter from banks, asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at port hudson. of course i could not comply with his request, nor did i think he needed them. he was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. on the 3d of june a brigade from hurlbut's command arrived, general kimball commanding. it was sent to mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of haines' bluff and about midway between the big black and the yazoo. a brigade of blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on blair's return from the yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the big black river, to destroy the roads in his (blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. on the 7th of june our little force of colored and white troops across the mississippi, at milliken's bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men from richard taylor's trans-mississippi command. with the aid of the gunboats they were speedily repelled. i sent mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the tensas bayou; and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. this was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. these men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well. on the 8th of june a full division arrived from hurlbut's command, under general sooy smith. it was sent immediately to haines' bluff, and general c. c. washburn was assigned to the general command at that point. on the 11th a strong division arrived from the department of the missouri under general herron, which was placed on our left. this cut off the last possible chance of communication between pemberton and johnston, as it enabled lauman to close up on mcclernand's left while herron intrenched from lauman to the water's edge. at this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. through this opening no doubt the confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night. on the 14th general parke arrived with two divisions of burnside's corps, and was immediately dispatched to haines' bluff. these latter troops--herron's and parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of sent by halleck in anticipation of their being needed. they arrived none too soon. i now had about seventy-one thousand men. more than half were disposed across the peninsula, between the yazoo at haines' bluff and the big black, with the division of osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the jackson road to baldwin's ferry and below. there were eight roads leading into vicksburg, along which and their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. on the 17th i received a letter from general sherman and one on the 18th from general mcpherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by general mcclernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. this order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. the order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of mcclernand's command until brought in this way. i at once wrote to mcclernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. he did so, and i at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and ordered him back to springfield, illinois. the publication of his order in the press was in violation of war department orders and also of mine. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines' bluff--explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. on the 22d of june positive information was received that johnston had crossed the big black river for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release pemberton. the correspondence between johnston and pemberton shows that all expectation of holding vicksburg had by this time passed from johnston's mind. i immediately ordered sherman to the command of all the forces from haines' bluff to the big black river. this amounted now to quite half the troops about vicksburg. besides these, herron and a. j. smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce sherman. haines' bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the big black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. the work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. we were now looking west, besieging pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by johnston. but as against the garrison of vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, i think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. we were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but i did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon pemberton's army, while i would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by johnston. from the 23d of may the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. at three points on the jackson road, in front of leggett's brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of june we had it undermined and the mine charged. the enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. at this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. in fact this parapet was also our protection. the soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the union soldiers for the tobacco of the confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them. our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. this caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. on the 25th of june at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. a heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. the effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. the breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. in fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. there were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. all that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. i remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. he was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. some one asked him how high he had gone up. "dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply. general logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. as soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. the enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. from here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. the compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. the enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. during the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. we found it impossible to continue this work. another mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of july, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. no attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. the enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. we lost none in the second. from this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and i determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. we were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us. at this time an intercepted dispatch from johnston to pemberton informed me that johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at vicksburg. i knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. the picket lines were so close to each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets--that the men could converse. on the 21st of june i was informed, through this means, that pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. the rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. afterwards this story was verified: on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. all necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. our pickets were doubled; admiral porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the louisiana side. had the attempt been made the garrison of vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the louisiana side. general richard taylor was expected on the west bank to co-operate in this movement, i believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. the mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of vicksburg and of port hudson. we had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from lake providence to opposite bruinsburg. the roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force. by the 1st of july our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. at ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of july. the debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches. on the night of the 1st of july johnston was between brownsville and the big black, and wrote pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him. on july 1st pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders: "unless the siege of vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. i see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. you are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation." two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. pemberton had previously got a message to johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement. on the 3d about ten o'clock a.m. white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. they proved to be general bowen, a division commander, and colonel montgomery, aide-de-camp to pemberton, bearing the following letter to me: "i have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of vicksburg. to this end, if agreeable to you, i will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. i make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. this communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by major-general john s. bowen." it was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. the troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the union sure to be saved. bowen was received by general a. j. smith, and asked to see me. i had been a neighbor of bowen's in missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. he then suggested that i should meet pemberton. to this i sent a verbal message saying that, if pemberton desired it, i would meet him in front of mcpherson's corps at three o'clock that afternoon. i also sent the following written reply to pemberton's letter: "your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. the useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and i can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. i do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because i have no terms other than those indicated above." at three o'clock pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. generals ord, mcpherson, logan and a. j. smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. it was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "the true cross." pemberton and i had served in the same division during part of the mexican war. i knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. he soon asked what terms i proposed to give his army if it surrendered. my answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "the conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. i said, "very well." general bowen, i saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. his manner and remarks while pemberton and i were talking, showed this. he now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. i had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. smith and bowen accordingly had a conference, during which pemberton and i, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines were in conversation. after a while bowen suggested that the confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. this was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. the interview here ended, i agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night. word was sent to admiral porter soon after the correspondence with pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. it was agreed on my paging with pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. when i returned to my headquarters i sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting vicksburg. half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for johnston. i informed them of the contents of pemberton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that i was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. this was the nearest approach to a "council of war" i ever held. against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council i sent the following letter: "in conformity with agreement of this afternoon, i will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of vicksburg, public stores, etc. on your accepting the terms proposed, i will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight a.m. to-morrow. as soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. the rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. if these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. the same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. the paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." by the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either aiken's landing below dutch gap on the james river, or to vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. there was a confederate commissioner at vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. i did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. had i insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the mississippi. thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to washington or baltimore; thence again by steamer to aiken's--all at very great expense. at aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the confederates did not have union prisoners to give in exchange. then again pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; i knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. a large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes. late at night i received the following reply to my last letter: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. in the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of vicksburg, i have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. at ten o'clock a.m. to-morrow, i propose to evacuate the works in and around vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. after which you will take possession. officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." this was received after midnight. my reply was as follows: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d july. the amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. it will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. again, i can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. while i do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, i cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. the property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. if you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, i will make no objection to it. should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock a.m. i shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men." pemberton promptly accepted these terms. during the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. all rebels were known as "johnnies," all union troops as "yanks." often "johnny" would call: "well, yank, when are you coming into town?" the reply was sometimes: "we propose to celebrate the 4th of july there." sometimes it would be: "we always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "we are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." the garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. they knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. the vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "yankee" boast that they would take dinner in vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was "first ketch your rabbit." the paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper. the last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had "caught our rabbit." i have no doubt that pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday, the anniversary of the declaration of american independence. holding out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter particular. at the appointed hour the garrison of vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good order. our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. the enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. i myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. it was accepted with avidity and with thanks. pemberton says in his report: "if it should be asked why the 4th of july was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. i believed that upon that day i should obtain better terms. well aware of the vanity of our foe, i knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of july into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." this does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. but it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock a.m., july 3d. it then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. he knew that johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. he knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth. in our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. it was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. on the 4th of july general holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the trans-mississippi department, made an attack upon helena, arkansas. he was totally defeated by general prentiss, who was holding helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers. holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed; but as prentiss buried 400, holmes evidently understated his losses. the union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing. this was the last effort on the part of the confederacy to raise the siege of vicksburg. on the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, i notified sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against johnston, drive him out of the state and destroy his army if he could. steele and ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join sherman as soon as the surrender took place. of this sherman was notified. i rode into vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. at that time i found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. the ridges upon which vicksburg is built, and those back to the big black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone. the magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. a door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. in some instances i saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. in these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and dav without intermission. i returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move into the town until the sixth. on the afternoon of the fourth i sent captain wm. m. dunn of my staff to cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. it was as follows: "the enemy surrendered this morning. the only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. this i regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. it saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on johnston, to drive him from the state. i will send troops to the relief of banks, and return the 9th army corps to burnside." this news, with the victory at gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the president, his cabinet and the loyal people all over the north. the fate of the confederacy was sealed when vicksburg fell. much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the morale was with the supporters of the union ever after. i at the same time wrote to general banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying i would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the mississippi river. general banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of general gardner, who was then in command of port hudson. gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the national forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. he added that if this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. general banks gave him assurances that vicksburg had been surrendered, and general gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of july. port hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell into the hands of the union forces: from that day to the close of the rebellion the mississippi river, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the national troops. pemberton and his army were kept in vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. the paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, federals and confederates), and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us. several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but i declined. it also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. he wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. this request was also declined. it was precisely what i expected and hoped that they would do. i told him, however, that i would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. by the eleventh, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the confederate garrison marched out. many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the james river to be paroled. as soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. the prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. no restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. they were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. the men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. when they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. really, i believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists. the day before the departure the following order was issued: "paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. they will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to edward's ferry, (*14) and on by way of raymond. instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed." chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. the capture of vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the north. new hopes for the final success of the cause of the union were inspired. the victory gained at gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. now the mississippi river was entirely in the possession of the national troops; for the fall of vicksburg gave us port hudson at once. the army of northern virginia was driven out of pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861. the army of the tennessee united with the army of the gulf, dividing the confederate states completely. the first dispatch i received from the government after the fall of vicksburg was in these words: "i fear your paroling the prisoners at vicksburg, without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. such has been the case elsewhere. if these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders." halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of major watts, confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. at vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. the small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old united states flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the belgian musket imported early in the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at--and a few new and improved arms. these were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. the enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. after the surrender i authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter. a large number of arms turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the union army in the capture of vicksburg. in this narrative i have not made the mention i should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. neither have i made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. suffice it to say, the close of the siege of vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. a military education was acquired which no other school could have given. men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. logan and crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies. general f. p. blair joined me at milliken's bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. he commanded a division in the campaign. i had known blair in missouri, where i had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for congress. i knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. i dreaded his coming; i knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination. it affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. there was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. he was one man as a soldier, another as a politician. the navy under porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. it could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. the most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. there never was a request made, that i am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with. the campaign of vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. the elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. a forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. accordingly i resolved to get below vicksburg, unite with banks against port hudson, make new orleans a base and, with that base and grand gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against vicksburg. upon reaching grand gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, i received a letter from banks informing me that he could not be at port hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. the time was worth more than the reinforcements; i therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. with a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. a rapid movement west was made; the garrison of vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. it looks now as though providence had directed the course of the campaign while the army of the tennessee executed the decree. upon the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg there were three things that required immediate attention. the first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the state. the second was to send reinforcements to banks near port hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the stars and stripes. the third was to inform the authorities at washington and the north of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. soon after negotiations were opened with general pemberton for the surrender of the city, i notified sherman, whose troops extended from haines' bluff on the left to the crossing of the vicksburg and jackson road over the big black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the state as soon as vicksburg surrendered. steele and ord were directed to be in readiness to join sherman in his move against general johnston, and sherman was advised of this also. sherman moved promptly, crossing the big black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at bolton, twenty miles west of jackson. johnston heard of the surrender of vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on jackson. on the 8th of july sherman was within ten miles of jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town. the siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. the weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but sherman sent one division, steele's, to brandon, fourteen miles east of jackson. the national loss in the second capture of jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. the confederate loss was probably less, except in captured. more than this number fell into our hands as prisoners. medicines and food were left for the confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind. a large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in jackson. medicine and food were also sent to raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as i thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. i wrote to sherman: "impress upon the men the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. they should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people." provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from bruinsburg to jackson and back to vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. sherman was ordered back to vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before--from the big black to haines' bluff. having cleaned up about vicksburg and captured or routed all regular confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, i felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed. i suggested to the general-in-chief the idea of a campaign against mobile, starting from lake pontchartrain. halleck preferred another course. the possession of the trans-mississippi by the union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the mississippi. i am well aware that the president was very anxious to have a foothold in texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the confederate states. this, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western louisiana and eastern texas, by sending a garrison at once to brownsville on the rio grande. halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against mobile, so that i was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as i had been a year before in west tennessee. it would have been an easy thing to capture mobile at the time i proposed to go there. having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against general bragg's army. this would necessarily have compelled bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. if he had not done this the troops from mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and lee's were yet receiving their supplies. i was so much impressed with this idea that i renewed my request later in july and again about the 1st of august, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near mobile. i also asked for a leave of absence to visit new orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against mobile should be approved. both requests were refused. so far as my experience with general halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one. but i did not regard this as a favor. it was simply in line of duty, though out of my department. the general-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least good. by orders, i sent to banks a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to kentucky and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to schofield in missouri where price was raiding the state. i also detached a brigade under ransom to natchez, to garrison that place permanently. this latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when ransom arrived there. the enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from texas to feed the eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through texas from the rio grande and which were on the way to lee's and other armies in the east. the troops that were left with me around vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. the guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. the country back of vicksburg was filled with deserters from pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from johnston's also. the men determined not to fight again while the war lasted. those who lived beyond the reach of the confederate army wanted to get to their homes. those who did not, wanted to get north where they could work for their support till the war was over. besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. it is not probable that pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. on the 7th of august i further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps, general ord commanding, to banks. besides this i received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the mississippi. having received this order i went to new orleans to confer with banks about the proposed movement. all these movements came to naught. during this visit i reviewed banks' army a short distance above carrollton. the horse i rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to new orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. i was rendered insensible, and when i regained consciousness i found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. my leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit. the pain was almost beyond endurance. i lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. i had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was carried to it on a litter. i was then taken to vicksburg, where i remained unable to move for some time afterwards. while i was absent general sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. no orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of sherman. on the 13th of september, while i was still in new orleans, halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to memphis and thence to tuscumbia, to co-operate with rosecrans for the relief of chattanooga. on the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to rosecrans. this was received on the 27th. i was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but i at once ordered sherman to send one division to memphis as fast as transports could be provided. the division of mcpherson's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join steele in arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to hurlbut at memphis. hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there. halleck suggested that some good man, like sherman or mcpherson, should be sent to memphis to take charge of the troops going east. on this i sent sherman, as being, i thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. he was directed to take with him another division of his corps. this left one back, but having one of mcpherson's divisions he had still the equivalent. before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of chickamauga had been fought and rosecrans forced back into chattanooga. the administration as well as the general-in-chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. mr. charles a. dana, an officer of the war department, was sent to rosecrans' headquarters. i do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in chattanooga when i arrived there at a later period. it seems that halleck suggested that i should go to nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west. i received the following dispatch dated october 3d: "it is the wish of the secretary of war that as soon as general grant is able he will come to cairo and report by telegraph." i was still very lame, but started without delay. arriving at columbus on the 16th i reported by telegraph: "your dispatch from cairo of the 3d directing me to report from cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th. left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for cairo." end of volume i. the lone ranche a tale of the staked plain by captain mayne reid ________________________________________________________________________ this was quite a hard book to transcribe, and i hope there are not now too many errors remaining. for one thing several of the people of the book speak a very rough version of the language, so that there are many hundreds of "words" appearing in the book, that are not in the dictionary. and the "new" words are not always consistently spelt. there are numerous spanish or mexican words used in the book, but i am no scholar in these tongues. i just did my best to get them right. another problem was that the type used to print the book had been damaged in many places, which meant that it was sometimes very hard to decipher. after much poring there remains only one damaged word in the book, of which i am not certain. as if this were not enough i made the mistake of scanning the book too dark, which meant that in very many cases a full stop following the letters `t' and sometimes `e' had not come correctly through the ocr process; and also any stains on the pages obscured the letters under them. this greatly increased the amount of work needed to transcribe the book. i suppose this is among the very first "cowboy and indian" books. if you are interested in this genre, here is the book for you. nh ________________________________________________________________________ the lone ranche a tale of the staked plain by captain mayne reid chapter one. a tale of the staked plain. "hats off!" within the city of chihuahua, metropolis of the northern provinces of mexico--for the most part built of mud--standing in the midst of vast barren plains, o'ertopped by bold porphyritic mountains--plains with a population sparse as their timber--in the old city of chihuahua lies the first scene of our story. less than twenty thousand people dwell within the walls of this north mexican metropolis, and in the country surrounding it a like limited number. once they were thicker on the soil; but the tomahawk of the comanche and the spear of the apache have thinned off the descendants of the _conquistadores_, until country houses stand at wide distances apart, with more than an equal number of ruins between. yet this same city of chihuahua challenges weird and wonderful memories. at the mention of its name springs up a host of strange records, the souvenirs of a frontier life altogether different from that wreathed round the history of anglo-american borderland. it recalls the cowled monk with his cross, and the soldier close following with his sword; the old mission-house, with its church and garrison beside it; the fierce savage lured from a roving life, and changed into a toiling _peon_, afterwards to revolt against a system of slavery that even religion failed to make endurable; the neophyte turning his hand against his priestly instructor, equally his oppressor; revolt followed by a deluge of blood, with ruinous devastation, until the walls of both _mission_ and military _cuartel_ are left tenantless, and the redskin has returned to his roving. such a history has had the city of chihuahua and the settlements in its neighbourhood. nor is the latter portion of it all a chronicle of the olden time. much of it belongs to modern days; ay, similar scenes are transpiring even now. but a few years ago a stranger entering its gates would have seen nailed overhead, and whisked to and fro by the wind, some scores of objects similar to one another, and resembling tufts of hair, long, trailing, and black, as if taken from the manes or tails of horses. but it came not thence; it was human hair; and the patches of skin that served to keep the bunches together had been stripped from human skulls! they were _scalps_--the scalps of indians, showing that the comanche and apache savages had not had it all their own way. beside them could be seen other elevated objects of auricle shape, set in rows or circles like a festooning of child peppers strung up for preservation. no doubt their procurement had drawn tears from the eyes of those whose heads had furnished them, for they were human ears! these ghastly souvenirs were the _bounty warrants_ of a band whose deeds have been already chronicled by this same pen. they were the trophies of "scalp hunters"--vouchers for the number of indians they had killed. they were there less than a quarter of a century ago, waving in the dry wind that sweeps over the plains of chihuahua. for aught the writer knows, they may be there still; or, if not the same, others of like gory record replacing or supplementing them. it is not with the "scalp hunters" we have now to do--only with the city of chihuahua. and not much with it either. a single scene occurring in its streets is all of chihuahuaense life to be depicted in this tale. it was the spectacle of a religious procession--a thing far from uncommon in chihuahua or any other mexican town; on the contrary, so common that at least weekly the like may be witnessed. this was one of the grandest, representing the story of the crucifixion. citizens of all classes assisted at the ceremony, the soldiery also taking part in it. the clergy, of course, both secular and regular, were its chief supports and propagators. to them it brought bread, and if not butter-since there is none in chihuahua--it added to their incomes and influence, by the sale of leaden crosses, images of the virgin mother, and the numerous sisterhood of saints. in the _funcion_ figured the usual scripture characters:--the redeemer conducted to the place of passion; the crucifix, borne on the shoulders of a brawny, brown-skinned simon; pilate the oppressor; judas the betrayer--in short, every prominent personage spoken of as having been present on that occasion when the son of man suffered for our sins. there is, or was then, an american hotel in chihuahua, or at least one conducted in the american fashion, though only a mere _posada_. among its guests was a gentleman, stranger to the town, as the country. his dress and general appearance bespoke him from the states, and by the same tokens it could be told that he belonged to their southern section. he was in truth a kentuckian; but so far from representing the type, tall, rough, and stalwart, usually ascribed to the people "kaintuck," he was a man of medium size, with a build comparable to that of the belvidere apollo. he had a figure tersely set, with limbs well knitted; a handsome face and features of amiable cast, at the same time expressing confidence and courage. a costly guayaquil hat upon his head, and coat to correspond, bespoke him respectable; his _tout ensemble_ proclaimed him a man of leisure; while his air and bearing were unmistakably such as could only belong to a born gentleman. why he was in chihuahua, or whence he had come to it, no one seemed to know or care. enough that he was there, and gazing at the spectacular procession as it filed past the posada. he was regarding it with no eye of wonderment. in all likelihood he had seen such before. he could not have travelled far through mexico without witnessing some ceremony of a similar kind. whether interested in this one or no he was soon notified that he was not regarding it in the manner proper or customary to the country. standing half behind one of the pillars of the hotel porch, he had not thought it necessary to take off his hat. perhaps placed in a more conspicuous position he would have done this. frank hamersley--for such was his name--was not the sort of man to seek notoriety by an exhibition of bravado, and, being a protestant of a most liberal creed, he would have shrunk from offending the slightest sensibilities of those belonging to an opposite faith--even the most bigoted roman catholic of that most bigoted land. that his "guayaquil" still remained upon his head was due to simple forgetfulness of its being there; it had not occurred to him to uncover. while silently standing with eyes turned towards the procession, he observed scowling looks, and heard low growlings from the crowd as it swayed slowly past. he knew enough to be conscious of what this meant; but he felt at the same time disinclined to humiliate himself by a too facile compliance. a proud american, in the midst of a people he had learned to despise--their idolatrous observances along with them--no wonder he should feel a little defiant and a good deal exasperated. enough yielding, he thought, to withdraw farther back from behind the pillar, which he did. it was too late. the keen eye of a fanatic had been upon him--one who appeared to have authority for meting out chastisement. an officer, bearded and grandly bedizened, riding at the head of a troop of lancers, quickly wheeled his horse from out of the line of march, and spurred him towards the porch of the posada. in another instant his bared blade was waving over the hatted head of the kentuckian. "_gringo! alto su sombrero! abajo! a sus rodillas_!" ("off with your hat, greenhorn! down upon your knees!") were the words that came hissing from the moustached lips of the lancer. as they failed to beget compliance, they were instantly followed by a blow from the blade of his sabre. it was given sideways, but with sufficient sleight and force to send the guayaquil hat whirling over the pavement, and its wearer reeling against the wall. it was but the stagger of a sudden and unexpected surprise. in another instant the "gringo" had drawn a revolving pistol, and in yet another its bullet would have been through the brain of the swaggering aggressor, but for a third personage, who, rushing from behind, laid hold of the kentuckian's arm, and restrained the firing. at first it seemed to hamersley the act of another enemy; but in a moment he knew it to be the behaviour of a friend--at least a pacificator bent upon seeing fair play. "you are wrong, captain uraga," interposed he who had intermeddled, addressing himself to the officer. "this gentleman is a stranger in the country, and not acquainted with our customs." "then it is time the heretico should be taught them, and, at the same time, respect for the holy church. but what right, colonel miranda, have you to interfere?" "the right, first of humanity, second of hospitality, and third that i am your superior officer." "bah! you mistake yourself. remember, senor coronel, you are not in your own district. if it was in albuquerque, i might take commands from you. this is the city of chihuahua." "chihuahua or not, you shall be made answerable for this outrage. don't imagine that your patron, santa anna, is now dictator, with power to endorse such base conduct as yours. you seem to forget, captain uraga, that you carry your commission under a new regime--one that holds itself responsible, not only to fixed laws, but to the code of decency-responsible also for international courtesy to the great republic of which, i believe, this gentleman is a citizen." "bah!" once more exclaimed the bedizened bully. "preach your _palabras_ to ears that have time to listen to them. i shan't stop the procession for either you or your yankee protege. so you can both go to the devil." with this benevolent permission the captain of lancers struck the spurs into his horse, and once more placed himself at the head of his troop. the crowd collected by the exciting episode soon scattered away--the sooner that the strange gentleman, along with his generous defender, had disappeared from the portico, having gone inside the inn. the procession was still passing, and its irresistible attractions swept the loiterers along in its current--most of them soon forgetting a scene which, in that land, where "law secures not life," is of too frequent occurrence to be either much thought of or for long remembered. chapter two. a friend in need. the young kentuckian was half frenzied by the insult he had received. the proud blood of his republican citizenship was boiling within his veins. what was he to do? in the agony of his dilemma he put the question to the gentleman who, beyond all doubt, had restrained him from committing manslaughter. the latter was an entire stranger to him--never seen him before. he was a man of less than thirty years of age, wearing a broad-brimmed hat upon his head, a cloth jacket, slashed _calzoneras_, and a red crape scarf around his waist--in short, the _ranchero_ costume of the country. still, there was a military bearing about him that corresponded to the title by which the lancer captain had addressed him. "caballero," he said in reply, "if your own safety be of any consequence to you i should advise you to take no further notice of the incident that has arisen, however much it may have exasperated you, as no doubt it has done." "pardon me, senor; but not for all the world would i follow your advice--not for my life. i am an american--a kentuckian. we do not take blows without giving something of the same in return. i must have redress." "if you seek it by the law i may as well warn you, you won't have much chance of finding it." "i know that. the law! i did not think of such a thing. i am a gentleman; i suppose this captain uraga supposes himself to be the same, and will not refuse to give me the usual satisfaction." "he may refuse, and very likely will, on the plea of your being a stranger--only a barbarian, a _tejano_ or _gringo_, as he has put it." "i am alone here--what am i to do?" the kentuckian spoke half in soliloquy, his countenance expressing extreme chagrin. "_fuez, senor_!" responded the mexican colonel, "if you're determined on a _desafio_ i think i might arrange it. i feel that i am myself a little compromised by my interference; and if you'll accept of me for your second, i think i can answer for it that captain uraga will not dare to deny us." "colonel miranda--your name, i believe--need i attempt to express my thanks for so much generosity? i cannot--i could not. you have removed the very difficulty that was in my way; for i am not only a stranger to you, but to every one around. i arrived at chihuahua but yesterday, and do not know a soul in the place." "enough; you shall not be disappointed in your duel for the want of a second. as a preliminary, may i ask if you are skilled in the use of the sword?" "sufficiently to stake my life upon it." "i put the question, because that is the weapon your adversary will be certain to choose. you being the challenger, of course he has the choice; and he will insist upon it, for a reason that may perhaps amuse you. it is that we mexican gentlemen believe you americans somewhat _gauche_ in the handling of the rapier, though we know you to be adepts in the use of the pistol. i take captain gil uraga to be as thorough a poltroon as ever wore epaulettes, but he will have to meet you on my account; and he would perhaps have done so anyhow--trusting to the probability of your being a bad swordsman." "in that he may find himself disappointed." "i am glad to hear it; and now it only needs to receive your instructions. i am ready to act." the instructions were given, and within two hours' time captain gil uraga, of the zacatecas lancers, was in receipt of a challenge from the kentuckian--colonel miranda being its bearer. with such a voucher the lancer officer could not do otherwise than accept, which he did with cooler confidence for the very reason miranda had made known. a _tejano_, was his reflection--what should he know of the sword? and swords were the weapons chosen. had the captain of zacatecas lancers been told that his intended adversary had spent a portion of his life among the creoles of new orleans, he would have been less reliant on the chances likely to turn up in his favour. we need not describe the duel, which, if different from other encounters of the kind, was by being on both sides bitter, and of deadly intent. suffice it to say, that the young kentuckian displayed a skill in swordsmanship sufficient to disarrange several of gil uraga's front teeth, and make an ugly gash in his cheek. he had barely left to him sufficient command of his mouth to cry "basta!" and so the affair ended. "senor hamersley," said the man who had so effectively befriended him, after they had returned from the encounter, and were drinking a bottle of paso wine in the posada, "may i ask where you intend going when you leave chihuahua?" "to santa fe, in new mexico; thence to the united states, along with one of the return caravans." "when do you propose starting?" "as to that, i am not tied to time. the train with which i am to cross the plains will not be going for six months to come. i can get to santa fe by a month's travel, i suppose?" "less than that. it is not a question of how soon you may arrive there, but when you leave here. i advise you to start at once. i admit that two days is but a short time to see the sights of even so small a place as chihuahua. but you have witnessed one of them--enough, i should say. if you take my advice you will let it content you, and kick the chihuahua-ense dust from your feet before another twenty-four hours have passed over your head." "but why, colonel miranda?" "because so long as you remain here you will be in danger of losing your life. you don't know the character of the man with whom you have crossed swords. i do. although wearing the uniform of an officer in our army, he is simply a _salteador_. a coward, as i told you, too. he would never have met you if he had thought i would have given him a chance to get out of it. perhaps he might have been tempted by the hopes of an easy conquest from your supposed want of skill. it would have given him something to boast about among the dames of chihuahua, for captain gil deems himself no little of a lady-killer. you have spoilt his physiognomy for life; and, depend upon it, as long as life lasts, he will neither forget nor forgive that. i shall also come in for a share of his spite, and it behoves both of us to beware of him." "but what can he do to us?" "caballero, that question shows you have not been very long in this country, and are yet ignorant of its customs. in mexico we have some callings not congenial to your people. know that stilettoes can here be purchased cheaply, with the arms of assassins to use them. do you understand me?" "i do. but how do you counsel me to act?" "as i intend acting myself--take departure from chihuahua this very day. our roads are the same as far as albuquerque, where you will be out of reach of this little danger. i am returning thither from the city of mexico, where i've had business with the government. i have an escort; and if you choose to avail yourself of it you'll be welcome to its protection." "colonel miranda, again i know not how to thank you. i accept your friendly offer." "reserve your thanks till i have done you some service beyond the simple duty of a gentleman, who sees another gentleman in a dilemma he had no hand in creating. but enough, senor; we have no time to spend in talking. even now there may be a couple of poignards preparing for us. get your things ready at once, as i start two hours before sunset. in this sultry weather we are accustomed to travel in the cool of the evening." "i shall be ready." that same afternoon, two hours before the going down of the sun, a party of horsemen, wearing the uniform of mexican dragoons of the line, issued from the _garita_ of chihuahua, and took the northern road leading to santa fe, by el paso del norte. colonel miranda, his ranchero dress changed for the fatigue uniform of a cavalry officer, was at its head, and by his side the stranger, whose cause he had so generously and gallantly espoused. chapter three. the colonel commandant. six weeks have elapsed since the day of the duel at chihuahua. two men are standing on the _azotea_ of a large mansion-like house close to the town of albuquerque, whose church spire is just visible through the foliage of trees that shade and surround the dwelling. they are colonel miranda and the young kentuckian, who has been for some time his guest; for the hospitality of the generous mexican had not terminated with the journey from chihuahua. after three weeks of toilsome travel, including the traverse of the famed "dead man's journey," he was continuing to extend it in his own house and his own district, of which last he was the military commandant, albuquerque being at the time occupied by a body of troops, stationed there for defence against indian incursions. the house on whose roof the two men stood was that in which colonel miranda had been born--the patrimonial mansion of a large estate that extended along the rio del norte, and back towards the sierra blanca, into territories almost unknown. besides being an officer in the mexican army, the colonel was one of the _ricos_ of the country. the house, as already said, was a large, massive structure, having, like all mexican dwellings of its class, a terraced roof, or _azotea_. what is also common enough in that country, it was surmounted by a _mirador_, or "belvedere." standing less than half a mile distant from the soldier's _cuartel_, the commandant found it convenient to make use of it as his headquarters. a small guard in the _saguan_, or covered entrance below, with a sentinel stationed outside the gate in front, indicated this. there was no family inside, wife, woman, or child; for the colonel, still a young man, was a bachelor. only _peons_ in the field, grooms and other servants around the stables, with domestics in the dwelling-all, male and female, being indians of the race known as "indios mansos"--brown-skinned and obedient. but though at this time there was no living lady to make her soft footsteps heard within the walls of the commandant's dwelling, the portrait of a lovely girl hung against the side of the main _sola_, and on this his american guest had more than once gazed in silent admiration. it showed signs of having been recently painted, which was not strange, since it was the likeness of colonel miranda's sister, a few years younger than himself--at the time on a visit to some relatives in a distant part of the republic. frank hamersley's eyes never rested on it without his wishing the original at home. the two gentlemen upon the housetop were leisuring away the time in the indulgence of a cigar, watching the water-fowl that swam and plunged on the bosom of the broad shallow stream, listening to the hoarse croakings of pelicans and the shriller screams of the _guaya_ cranes. it was the hour of evening, when these birds become especially stridulent. "and so you must go to-morrow, senor francisco?" said his host, taking the cigaritto from between his teeth, and looking inquiringly into the face of the kentuckian. "there is no help for it, colonel. the caravan with which i came out will be leaving santa fe the day after to-morrow, and there's just time for me to get there. unless i go along with it, there may be no other opportunity for months to come, and one cannot cross the plains alone." "well, i suppose i must lose you. i am sorry, and selfishly, too, for, as you see, i am somewhat lonely here. there's not one of my officers, with the exception of our old _medico_, exactly of the sort to be companionable. true, i have enough occupation, as you may have by this time discovered, in looking after our neighbours, the _indios bravos_, who, knowing the skeleton of a regiment i've got, are growing saucier every day. i only wish i had a score or two of your stalwart trappers, who now and then pay a visit to albuquerque. well, my sister will soon be here, and she, brave girl, has plenty of life in her, though she be but young. what a joyous creature she is, wild as a mustang filly fresh caught. i wish, don francisco, you could have stayed to make her acquaintance. i am sure you would be delighted with her." if the portrait on the wall was anything of a faithful likeness, hamersley could not have been otherwise. this was his reflection, though, for certain reasons, he did not in speech declare it. "it is to be hoped we shall meet again, colonel miranda," was his ingenious rejoinder. "if i did not have this hope, i should now be parting from you with greater regret. indeed, i have more than a presentiment we shall meet again; since i've made up my mind on a certain thing." "on what, don francisco?" "on returning to new mexico." "to settle in the country?" "not exactly that; only for a time--long enough to enable me to dispose of a cargo of merchandise in exchange for a bag of your big mexican dollars." "ah! you intend to become one of the prairie merchants, then?" "i do. that intention has been the cause of my visiting your country. i am old enough to think of some calling, and have always had a fancy for the adventurous life of the prairie trader. as i have sufficient means to stock a small caravan for myself, i think now of trying it. my present trip has been merely one of experiment and exploration. i am satisfied with the result, and, if no accident arise, you may see me back on the del norte before either of us be twelve months older." "then, indeed, is there a hope of our meeting again. i am rejoiced at it. but, senor don francisco," continued his host, changing to a serious tone, "a word lest i might forget it--a word of counsel, or warning, i may call it. i have observed that you are too unsuspicious, too regardless of danger. it does not all lie upon the prairies, or among red-skinned savages. there is as much of it here, amid the abodes of our so-called civilisation. when you are travelling through this country bear your late antagonist in mind, and should you at any time meet, beware of him. i have given you some hints about the character of gil uraga. i have not told you all. he is worse than you can even imagine. i know him well. do you see that little house, out yonder on the other side of the river?" hamersley nodded assent. "in that hovel he was born. his father was what we call a _pelado_--a poor devil, with scarce a coat to his back. himself the same, but something worse. he has left in his native place a record of crimes well known, with others more than suspected. in short, he is, as i have told you, a robber. no doubt you wonder that such a man should be an officer in our army. that is because you are ignorant of the state of our service--our society as well. it is but the result of constantly recurring changes in our political system. still you may feel surprise at his holding this commission, with the patriotic party--the pure one-in power, as it now is. that might be inexplicable even to myself, since i know that he will be traitor to our cause when convenient to him. but i also know the explanation. there is a power, even when the party exercising it is not in the ascendant--an influence that works by sap and secrecy. it is that of our hierarchy. gil uraga is one of its tools, since it exactly suits his low instincts and treacherous training. whenever the day is ripe for a fresh _pronunciamento_ against our liberties--if we are so unfortunate as to have one--he will be amongst the foremost of the traitors. _carrai_! i can think of him only with disgust and loathing. would you believe it, senor, that this fellow, now that epaulettes have been set on his shoulders--placed there for some vile service--has the audacity to aspire to the hand of my sister? adela miranda standing in bridal robes by the side of gil uraga! i would rather see her in her shroud!" hamersley's bosom heaved up as he listened to the last words, and with emotion almost equalling that which excited his host. he had just been thinking about the portrait upon the wall, and how beautiful the original must be. now hearing her name coupled with that of the ruffian whose blow he had felt, and whose blood he had spilled, he almost regretted not having ended that duel by killing his adversary outright. "but surely, colonel miranda," he said at length, "there could be no danger of such an event as that you speak of?" "never, so long as i live. but, amigo, as you have learnt, this is a strange land--a country of quick changes. i am here to-day, commanding in this district, with power, i may almost say, over the lives of all around me. to-morrow i may be a fugitive, or dead. if the latter, where is she, my poor sister, going to find the arm that could protect her?" again the breast of hamersley heaved in a convulsive manner. strange as it might appear, the words of his newly-made friend seemed like an appeal to him. and it is just possible some such thought was in the mind of the mexican colonel. in the strong man by his side he saw the type of a race who can protect; just such an oak as he would wish to see his sister extend her arms tendril-like around, and cling on to for life. hamersley could not help having vague and varied misgivings; yet among them was one purpose he had already spoken of--a determination to return to albuquerque. "i am sure to be back here," he said, as if the promise was meant to tranquillise the apprehensions of the colonel. then, changing to a more careless tone, he added,-"i cannot come by the spring caravans; there would not be time enough to make my arrangements. but there is a more southern route, lately discovered, that can be travelled at any season. perhaps i may try that. in any case, i shall write you by the trains leaving the states in the spring, so that you may know when to expect me. and if, colonel miranda," he added, after a short reflective pause, in which his countenance assumed a new and graver form of expression, "if any political trouble, such as you speak of, should occur, and you may find it necessary to flee from your own land, i need not tell you that in mine you will find a friend and a home. after what has happened here, you may depend upon the first being true, and the second hospitable, however humble." on that subject there was no further exchange of speech. the two individuals, so oddly as accidentally introduced, flung aside the stumps of their cigars; and, clasping hands, stood regarding one another with the gaze of a sincere, unspeakable friendship. next morning saw the kentuckian riding away from albuquerque towards the capital of new mexico, an escort of dragoons accompanying him, sent by the mexican colonel as a protection against marauding indians. but all along the road, and for months after, he was haunted with the memory of that sweet face seen upon the _sola_ wall; and instead of laughing at himself for having fallen in love with a portrait, he but longed to return, and look upon its original--chafing under an apprehension, with which the parting words of his new mexican host had painfully inspired him. chapter four. a pronunciamento. a little less than a quarter of a century ago the navajo indians were the terror of the new mexican settlements. it was no uncommon thing for them to charge into the streets of a town, shoot down or spear the citizens, plunder the shops, and seize upon such women as they wanted, carrying these captives to their far-off fastnesses in the land of navajoa. in the _canon_ de chelley these savages had their headquarters, with the temple and _estufa_, where the sacred fire of _moctezuma_ was never permitted to go out; and there, in times past, when mexico was misruled by the tyrant santa anna, might have been seen scores of white women, captives to the navajo nation, women well born and tenderly brought up, torn from their homes on the rio del norte, and forced to become the wives of their red-skinned captors--oftener their concubines and slaves. white children, too, in like manner, growing up among the children of their despoilers; on reaching manhood to forget all the ties of kindred, with the _liens_ of civilised life--in short, to be as much savages as those who had adopted them. at no period was this despoliation more rife than in the time of which we write. it had reached its climax of horrors, day after day recurring, when colonel miranda became military commandant of the district of albuquerque; until not only this town, but santa fe, the capital of the province itself, was menaced with destruction by the red marauders. not alone the navajoes on the west, but the apaches on the south, and the comanches who peopled the plains to the east, made intermittent and frequent forays upon the towns and villages lying along the renowned rio del norte. there were no longer any outlying settlements or isolated plantations. the grand _haciendas_, as the humble _ranchos_, were alike lain in ruins. in the walled town alone was there safety for the white inhabitants of nuevo mexico, or for those indians, termed _mansos_, converted to christianity, and leagued with them in the pursuits of civilisation. and, indeed, not much safety either within towns--even in albuquerque itself. imbued with a spirit of patriotism, colonel miranda, in taking charge of the district--his native place, as already known--determined on doing his best to protect it from further spoliation; and for this purpose had appealed to the central government to give him an increase to the forces under his command. it came in the shape of a squadron of lancers from chihuahua, whose garrison only spared them on their being replaced by a troop of like strength, sent on from the capital of the country. it was not very pleasant to the commandant of albuquerque to see captain gil uraga in command of the subsidy thus granted him. but the lancer officer met him in a friendly manner, professing cordiality, apparently forgetful of their duelling feud, and, at least outwardly, showing the submission due to the difference of their rank. engaged in frequent affairs with the indians, and expeditions in pursuit of them, for a while things seemed to go smoothly enough. but as adela miranda had now returned home, and was residing with her brother, in the interludes of tranquillity he could not help having some concern for her. he was well aware of uraga's aspirations; and, though loathing the very sight of the man, he was, nevertheless, compelled to tolerate his companionship to a certain extent, and could not well deny him the _entree_ of his house. at first the subordinate bore himself with becoming meekness. mock humility it was, and soon so proved itself. for, as the days passed, rumours reached the distant department of new mexico that the old tyrant santa anna was again returning to power. and, in proportion as these gained strength, so increased gil uraga's confidence in himself, till at length he assumed an air of effrontery--almost insolence--towards his superior officer; and towards the sister, in the interviews he was permitted with her, a manner significantly corresponding. these were few, and still less frequent, as his brusque behaviour began to manifest itself. observing it, colonel miranda at length came to the determination that the lancer captain should no longer enter into his house--at least, by invitation. any future relations between them must be in the strict execution of their respective military duties. "yes, sister," he said, one afternoon, as adela was buckling on his sword-belt, and helping to equip him for the evening parade, "uraga must come here no more. i well understand the cause of his contumacious behaviour. the priest party is again getting the ascendency. if they succeed, heaven help poor mexico. and, i may add, heaven help us!" drawing the girl to his bosom with a fond affectionate embrace, he gave her a brother's kiss. then, striding forth, he sprang upon a saddled horse held in waiting, and rode off to parade his troops on the _plaza_ of albuquerque. a ten minutes' trot brought him into their presence. they were not drawn up in line, or other formation, to receive him. on the contrary, as he approached the _cuartel_, he saw strange sights, and heard sounds corresponding. everything was in confusion--soldiers rushing to and fro, uttering seditious cries. among these were "viva santa anna!" "viva el general armijo!" "viva el _coronel_ uraga!" beyond doubt it was a _pronunciamento_. the old regime under which colonel miranda held authority was passing away, and a new one about to be initiated. drawing his sword and putting spur to his horse, he dashed in among the disaffected men. a few of the faithful ran up, and ranged themselves by his side. then commenced a struggle, with shouting, shooting, sabring, and lance-thrusts. several fell--some dead, some only disabled; among the last, colonel miranda himself, gravely wounded. in ten minutes it was all over; and the commandant of albuquerque, no longer commanding, lay lodged in the garrison _carcel_; captain gil uraga, now colonel, replacing him as the supreme military officer of the district. while all around ran the rumour that don antonio lopes de santa anna was once more master of mexico; his satellite, manuel armijo, again governor of santa fe. chapter five. "why comes he not?" "what delays valerian? what can be keeping him?" these questions came from adela miranda, on the evening of that same day, standing in the door of her brother's house, with eyes bent along the road leading to albuquerque. valerian was her brother's baptismal name, and it was about his absence she was anxious. for this she had reasons--more than one. though still only a young girl, she quite understood the political situation of the mexican republic; at all times shifting, of late more critical than usual. in her brother's confidence, she had been kept posted up in all that transpired in the capital, as also the district over which he held military command, and knew the danger of which he was himself apprehensive--every day drawing nigher and nigher. shortly after his leaving her she had heard shots, with a distant murmur of voices, in the direction of the town. from the _azolea_, to which she had ascended, she could note these noises more distinctly, but fancied them to be salutes, vivas, and cheers. still, there was nothing much in that. it might be some jubilation of the soldiery at the ordinary evening parade; and, remembering that the day was a _fiesta_, she thought less of it. but, as night drew down, and her brother had not returned, she began to feel some slight apprehension. he had promised to be back for a dinner that was long since due--a repast she had herself prepared, more sumptuous than common on account of the saint's day. this was it that elicited the anxious self-asked interrogatories. after giving utterance to them, she paced backward and forward; now standing in the portal and gazing along the road; now returning to the _sola de comida_, to look upon the table, with cloth spread, wines decantered, fruits and flowers on the epergne--all but the dishes that waited serving till valerian should show himself. to look on something besides--a portrait that hung upon the wall, underneath her own. it was a small thing--a mere photographic carte-de-visite. but it was the likeness of one who had a large place in her brother's heart, if not in her own. in hers, how could it? it was the photograph of a man she had never seen--frank hamersley. he had left it with colonel miranda, as a souvenir of their short but friendly intercourse. did colonel miranda's sister regard it in that light? she could not in any other. still, as she gazed upon it, a thought was passing through her mind somewhat different from a sentiment of simple friendship. her brother had told her all--the circumstances that led to his acquaintance with hamersley; of the duel, and in what a knightly manner the kentuckian had carried himself; adding his own commentaries in a very flattering fashion. this, of itself, had been enough to pique curiosity in a young girl, just escaped from her convent school; but added to the outward semblance of the stranger, by the sun made lustrous--so lustrous inwardly--adela miranda was moved by something more than curiosity. as she stood regarding the likeness of frank hamersley she felt very much as he had done looking at hers--in love with one only known by portrait and repute. in such there is nothing strange nor new. many a reader of this tale could speak of a similar experience. while gazing on the carte-de-visite she was roused from the sweet reverie it had called up by hearing footsteps outside. someone coming in through the _saggan_. "valerian at last!" the steps sounded as if the man making them were in a hurry. so should her brother be, having so long delayed his return. she glided out to meet him with an interrogatory on her lips. "valerian?"--this suddenly changing to the exclamation, "_madre de dios_! 'tis not my brother!" it was not, but a man pale and breathless--a _peon_ of the establishment--who, on seeing her, gasped out,-"senorita! i bring sad news. there's been a mutiny at the cuartel--a _pronunciamento_. the rebels have had it all their own way, and i am sorry to tell you that the colonel, your brother--" "what of him? speak! is he--" "not killed, _nina_; only wounded, and a prisoner." adela miranda did not swoon nor faint. she was not of the nervous kind. nurtured amid dangers, most of her life accustomed to alarms from indian incursions, as well as revolutionary risings, she remained calm. she dispatched messengers to the town, secretly, one after another; and, while awaiting their reports, knelt before an image of the virgin, and prayed. up till midnight her couriers went, and came. then one who was more than a messenger--her brother himself! as already reported to her, he was wounded, and came accompanied by the surgeon of the garrison, a friend. they arrived at the house in hot haste, as if pursued. and they were so, as she soon after learnt. there was just time for colonel miranda to select the most cherished of his _penates_; pack them on a _recua_ of mules, then mount, and make away. they had scarce cleared the premises when the myrmidons of the new commandant, led by the man himself, rode up and took possession of the place. by this time, and by good luck, the ruffian was intoxicated--so drunk he could scarce comprehend what was passing around him. it seemed like a dream to him to be told that colonel miranda had got clear away; a more horrid one to hear that she whom he designed for a victim had escaped from his clutches. when morning dawned, and in soberer mood he listened to the reports of those sent in pursuit--all telling the same tale of non-success--he raved like one in a frenzy of madness. for the escape of the late commandant of albuquerque had robbed him of two things--to him the sweetest in life--one, revenge on the man he heartily hated; the other, possession of the woman he passionately loved. chapter six. surrounded. a plain of pure sand, glaring red-yellow under the first rays of the rising sun; towards the east and west apparently illimitable, but interrupted northward by a chain of table-topped hills, and along its southern edge by a continuous cliff, rising wall-like to the height of several hundred feet, and trending each way beyond the verge of vision. about half-distance between this prolonged escarpment and the outlying hills six large "conestoga" waggons, locked tongue and tail together, enclosing a lozenge-shaped or elliptical space--a _corral_--inside which are fifteen men and five horses. only ten of the men are living; the other five are dead, their bodies lying a-stretch between the wheels of the waggons. three of the horses have succumbed to the same fate. outside are many dead mules; several still attached to the protruding poles, that have broken as their bodies fell crashing across them. fragments of leather straps and cast gearing tell of others that have torn loose, and scoured off from the perilous spot. inside and all around are traces of a struggle--the ground scored and furrowed by the hoofs of horses, and the booted feet of men, with here and there little rivulets and pools of blood. this, fast filtering into the sand, shows freshly spilled--some of it still smoking. all the signs tell of recent conflict. and so should they, since it is still going on, or only suspended to recommence a new scene of the strife, which promises to be yet more terrible and sanguinary than that already terminated. a tragedy easy of explanation. there is no question about why the waggons have been stopped, or how the men, mules, and horses came to be killed. distant about three hundred yards upon the sandy plain are other men and horses, to the number of near two hundred. their half-naked bodies of bronze colour, fantastically marked with devices in chalk-white, charcoal-black, and vermillion red--their buckskin breech-clouts and leggings, with plumes sticking tuft-like above their crowns--all these insignia show them to be indians. it is a predatory band of the red pirates, who have attacked a travelling party of whites--no new spectacle on the prairies. they have made the first onslaught, which was intended to stampede the caravan, and at once capture it. this was done before daybreak. foiled in the attempt, they are now laying siege to it, having surrounded it on all sides at a distance just beyond range of the rifles of those besieged. their line forms the circumference of a circle of which the waggon clump is the centre. it is not very regularly preserved, but ever changing, ever in motion, like some vast constricting serpent that has thrown its body into a grand coil around its victim, to close when ready to give the fatal squeeze. in this case the victim appears to have no hope of escape--no alternative but to succumb. that the men sheltered behind the waggons have not "gone under" at the first onslaught is significative of their character. of a surety they are not common emigrants, crossing the prairies on their way to a new home. had they been so, they could not have "corralled" their unwieldy vehicles with such promptitude; for they had started from their night camp, and the attack was made while the train was in motion--advantage being taken of their slow drag through the soft, yielding sand. and had they been but ordinary emigrants they would not have stood so stoutly on the defence, and shown such an array of dead enemies around them. for among the savages outside can be seen at least a score of lifeless forms lying prostrate upon the plain. for the time, there is a suspension of hostilities. the red men, disappointed by the failure of their first charge, have retreated back to a safe distance. the death-dealing bullets of the whites, of which they have had fatal proof, hold them there. but the pause is not likely to be for long, as their gestures indicate. on one side of the circle a body of them clumped together hold counsel. others gallop around it, bearing orders and instructions that evidently relate to a changed plan of attack. with so much blood before their eyes, and the bodies of their slain comrades, it is not likely they will retire from the ground. in their shouts there is a ring of resolved vengeance, which promises a speedy renewal of the attack. "who do you think they are?" asks frank hamersley, the proprietor of the assaulted caravan. "are they comanches, walt?" "yis, kimanch," answers the individual thus addressed; "an' the wust kind o' kimanch. they're a band o' the cowardly tenawas. i kin tell by thar bows. don't ye see that thar's two bends in 'em?" "i do." "wal, that's the sort o' bow the tenawas carry--same's the apash." "the indians on this route were reported friendly. why have they attacked us, i wonder?" "injuns ain't niver friendly--not tenawas. they've been riled considerably of late by the texans on the trinity. besides, i reck'n i kin guess another reezun. it's owin' to some whites as crossed this way last year. thar war a scrimmage atween them and the redskins, in the which some squaws got kilt--i mout say murdered. thar war some mexikins along wi' the whites, an' it war them that did it. an' now we've got to pay for their cussed crooked conduk." "what's best for us to do?" "thar's no best, i'm afeerd. i kin see no chance 'cept to fight it out to the bitter eend. thar's no mercy in them yells--ne'er a morsel o' it." "what do they intend doing next, think you?" "jest yet 'taint easy to tell. thar's somethin' on foot among 'em--some darned injun trick. clar as i kin see, that big chief wi' the red cross on his ribs, air him they call the horned lizard; an' ef it be, thar ain't a cunniner coon on all this contynent. he's sharp enough to contrive some tight trap for us. the dose we've gin the skunks may keep 'em off for a while--not long, i reck'n. darnation! thar's five o' our fellows wiped out already. it looks ugly, an' like enuf we've all got to go under." "don't you think our best way will be to make a dash for it, and try to cut through them. if we stay here they'll starve us out. we haven't water enough in the waggons to give us a drink apiece." "i know all that, an' hev thort o' 't. but you forget about our hosses. thar's only two left alive--yours and myen. all the rest air shot or stampedoed. thurfor, but two o' us would stand a chance o' gettin' clar, an' it slim enough." "you are right, walt; i did not think of that i won't forsake the men, even if assured of my own safety--never!" "nobody as knows you, frank hamersley, need be tolt that." "boys!" cries out hamersley, in a voice that can be heard all through the corral; "i needn't tell you that we're in a fix, and a bad one. there's no help for us but to fight it out. and if we must die, let us die together." a response from eight voices coming from different sides--for those watching the movements of the enemy are posted round the enclosure-tells there is not a craven among them. though only teamsters, they are truly courageous men--most of them natives of kentucky and tennessee. "in any case," continues the owner of the caravan, "we must hold our ground till night. in the darkness there may be some chance of our being able to steal past them." these words have scarce passed the lips of the young prairie merchant, when their effect is counteracted by an exclamation. it comes from walt wilder, who has been acting as guide to the party. "dog-goned!" he cries; "not the shadder o' a chance. they ain't goin' to give us till night. i knewed the horned lizard 'ud be after some trick." "what?" inquire several voices. "look whar that lot's stannin' out yonder. can't ye guess what they're at, frank hamersley?" "no. i only see that they have bows in their hands." "an' arrers, too. don't you obsarve them wroppin' somethin' round the heads o' the arrers--looks like bits o' rags? aye, rags it air, sopped in spittles and powder. they're agoin' to set the waggons afire! they air, by god!" chapter seven. fiery messengers. the teamsters, each of whom is watching the post assigned to him, despite the danger, already extreme, see fresh cause of alarm in wilder's words. some slight hope had hitherto upheld them. under the protection of the waggons they might sustain a siege, so long as their ammunition lasts; and before it gave out some chance, though they cannot think what, might turn up in their favour. it was a mere reflection founded on probabilities still unscrutinised--the last tenacious struggle before hope gives way to utter and palpable despair. hamersley's words had for an instant cheered them; for the thought of the indians setting fire to the waggons had not occurred to any of the party. it was a thing unknown to their experience; and, at such a distance, might be supposed impossible. but, as they now look around them, and note the canvas tilts, and light timbers, dry as chips from long exposure to the hot prairie sun; the piles of dry goods--woollen blankets, cotton, and silk stuffs--intended for the stores of chihuahua, some of which they have hastily pulled from their places to form protecting barricades--when they see all this, and then the preparations the indians are engaged in making, no wonder that they feel dismay on walt wilder shouting out, "they're agoin' to set the waggons afire!" the announcement, although carrying alarm, conveys no counsel. even their guide, with a life-long experience on the prairies, is at a loss how they ought to act in this unexpected emergency. in the waggons water there is none--at least not enough to drown out a conflagration such as that threatened; and from the way the assailants are gesturing the traders can predict that ere long, a shower of fiery shafts will be sent into their midst. none of them but have knowledge sufficient to admonish them of what is intended. even if they had never set foot upon a prairie, their school stories and legends of early life would tell them. they have all read, or heard, of arrows with tinder tied around their barbs, on fire and spitting sparks, or brightly ablaze. if any are ignorant of this sort of missile, or the mode of dispatching it on its mischievous errand, their ignorance is not destined longer to continue. almost as soon as wilder has given utterance to the warning words, half a score of the savages can be seen springing to the backs of their horses, each bearing a bow with a bunch of the prepared arrows. and before a single preventive step can be taken by the besieged traders, or any counsel exchanged between them, the pyrotechnic display has commenced. the bowmen gallop in circles around the besieged enclosure, their bodies concealed behind those of their horses--only a leg and an arm seen, or now and then a face for an instant, soon withdrawn. not exactly in circles but in spiral rings--at each turn drawing closer and nearer, till the true distance is attained for casting the inflammatory shafts. "stand to your guns, men!" is the hurried command of the guide, backed by a kind of encouragement from the proprietor of the caravan. "now, boys!" adds the guide, "ye've got to look out for squalls. keep two an' two of ye thegither. while one brings down the hoss, t' other take care o' the rider as he gits unkivered. make sure afore ye pull trigger, an' don't waste so much as the snappin' o' a cap. thar goes the first o' the fire works!" as wilder speaks, a spark is seen to shoot out from one of the circling cavaliers, which rising rocket-like into the air, comes in parabolic curve towards the corral. it falls short some twenty yards and lies smoking and sputtering in the sand. "they han't got thar range yit," cries the guide; "but this child hez got his--leastwise for that skunk on the clay-bank mustang. so hyar goes to rub him off o' the list o' fire shooters." and simultaneous with the last word is heard the crack of wilder's rifle. the young prairie merchant by his side, supposing him to have aimed only at the indian's horse, has raised his own gun, ready to take the rider as soon as uncovered. "no need, frank," shouts the guide, restraining him. "walt wilder don't waste two charges o' powder that way. keep yur bullet for the karkidge o' the next as comes 'ithin range. look yonder! i know'd i'd fetch him out o' his stirrups--tight as he's tried to cling to 'em. thar he goes to grass!" hamersley, as the others on the same side of the corral, were under the belief that the shot had been a miss; for the indian at whom it was aimed still stuck to his horse, and was carried for some distance on in curving career. nor did the animal show any sign of having been hit. but the rider did. while engaged in the effort of sending his arrow, the savage had exposed his face, one arm, and part of the other. ere he could withdraw them, walt's bullet had struck the arm that supported him, breaking the bone close to the elbow-joint. he has clung on with the tenacity of a shot squirrel, knowing that to let go will be certain death to him. but, despite all his efforts, the crippled arm fails to sustain him; and, with a despairing cry, he at length tumbles to the ground. before he can rise to his feet, his body is bored by a leaden messenger from one of the men watching on that side, which lays him lifeless along the sand. no cheer of triumph ascends from among the waggons; the situation of those who defend them is too serious for any idle exhibition. the man who has fired the last shot only hastens to re-load, while the others remain mute and motionless--each on the look-out for a like opportunity. the fall of their comrade has taught the freebooters a lesson, and for a time they make their approach with more caution. but the shouts of those standing spectators in the outer circle stimulate them to fresh efforts, as the slightest show of cowardice would surely cause them to be taunted. those entrusted with the fiery arrows are all young warriors, chosen for this dangerous service, or volunteers to perform it. the eyes of their chief, and the braves of the tribe, are upon them. they are thirsting for glory, and hold their lives as of little account, in the face of an achievement that will gain them the distinction most coveted by an indian youth--that which will give him rank as a warrior, and perhaps some day raise him to a chieftaincy. stimulated by this thought, they soon forget the check caused by the fall of their comrade; and, laying aside caution, ride nearer and nearer, till their arrows, one after another, hurtle through the air, and dropping like a continuous shower of spent rocket-sticks upon the covers of the corralled waggons. several of them fall to shots from the barricade, but then places are supplied by fresh volunteers from the outer circle; and the sparkling shower is kept up, till a curl of smoke is seen soaring above the white tilts of the waggons, and soon after others at different places and on different sides of the enclosure. as yet the besieged have not seen this. the powder-smoke puffing up from their own guns, discharged in quick repetition, obscures everything in a thick, sulphurous cloud; so that even the white covers of the waggons are scarce distinguishable, much less the spots where it has commenced smoking. not long, however, till something besides smoke makes itself visible, as also audible. here and there flames flicker up, with a sharp crackling noise, which continues. the one is not flashes from the guns, nor the other a snapping of percussion-caps. wilder, with eyes turning to all points, is the first to perceive this. "we're on fire, boys!" he vociferates; "on fire everywhar!" "great god! yes! what are we to do?" several ask, despairingly. "what air we to do?" shouts the guide, in response. "what kin we do, but fight it out to the death, an' then die! so let us die, not like dogs, but as men--as americans!" chapter eight. knife, pistol, and hatchet. the brave words had scarce passed from walt wilder's lips when the waggons became enveloped in a cloud of smoke. from all sides it rolled into the corral till those inside could no longer see one another. still through the obscurity rang their cries of mutual encouragement, repeating the determination so tersely expressed. they knew they had no water by which to extinguish the fast-threatening flames; yet in that moment of emergency they thought of an expedient. there were shovels in the waggons; and laying hold of these, they commenced flinging sand over the places that had caught fire, with the intent to smother the incipient blaze. left alone, and with time, they might have succeeded. but they were not left alone, for the savages, seeing the advantage they had gained, were now fast closing for a final charge upon the corral, and the implements of industry had to be abandoned. these were thrown despairingly aside; and the besieged, once more grasping their rifles, sprang back into the waggons--each with eager eye searching for an assailant. though themselves half blinded by the smoke, they could still see the enemy outside; for the indians, grown confident by the _coup_ they had made, were now riding recklessly near. quick came the reports of rifles--faster and more frequent than ever; fast as ten men, all practised marksmen, could load and fire. in less than sixty seconds nearly a score of savages dropped to the death-dealing bullets, till the plain appeared strewn with dead bodies. but the crisis had come--the time for a general charge of the whole band; and now the dusky outside ring was seen gradually contracting towards the corral--the savages advancing from all sides, some on foot, others on horseback, all eager to secure the trophy of a scalp. on they came, violently gesticulating, and uttering wild vengeful shouts. with the besieged it was a moment for despair. the waggons were on fire all around them, and in several places flames were beginning to flicker up through the smoke. they no longer thought of making any attempt to extinguish them. they knew it would be idle. did they think of surrender? no--not a man of them. that would have been equally idle. in the voices of the advancing foe there was not an accent of mercy. surrender! and be slain afterwards! before which to be tortured, perhaps dragged at the horse's tail, or set up as a target for the tenawa sharpshooters to practise at. no! they would have to die anyhow. better now than then. they were not the men to offer both cheeks to the insulter. they could resign sweet life, but death would be all the sweeter with corpses of indians lying thickly around them. they would first make a hecatomb of their hated foes, and then fall upon it. that is the sort of death preferred by the prairie man--hunter, trapper, or trader--glorious to him as the cannon-furrowed field to the soldier. that is the sort of death of which walt wilder spoke when he said, "let us die, not like dogs, but as men--as americans!" by this time the smoke had completely enveloped the waggons, the enclosed space between, and a fringe of some considerable width around them. but a still darker ring was all around--the circle of savage horsemen, who from all sides were galloping up and dismounting to make surer work of the slaughter. the warriors jostled one another as they pressed forward afoot, each thirsting for a scalp. the last throe of the conflict had come. it was no longer to be a duel at a distance--no more a contest between rifle-bullets and barbed arrows; but the close, desperate, hand-to-hand contest of pistol, knife, spear, club, and hatchet. the ten white men--none of them yet _hors de combat_--knew well what was before them. not one of them blanched or talked of backing. they did not even think of surrender. it would have been too late to sue for mercy, had they been so inclined. but they were not. attacked without provocation, and treacherously, as they had been, their fury was stronger than their fear; and anger now nerved them to frenzied energy of action. the savages had already closed around the waggons, clustering upon the wheels, some like snakes, wriggling through the spaces left undefended. rifles ceased to ring; but pistols cracked--repeating pistols, that dealt death at every shot, sending redskin after redskin to the happy hunting grounds. and by the pistol's flash blades were seen gleaming through the smoke--now bright, anon dimmed, and dripping blood. for every white man that fell, at least three red ones went down upon the sand. the unequal contest could not long continue. scarce ten minutes did it last, and but for the obscuring smoke five would have finished it. this was in favour of the assailed, enabling them to act with advantage against the assailants. such a quick, wholesale slaughter did the white men make with their revolvers that the savages, surprised and staggered by it, for a moment recoiled, and appeared as if again going to retreat. they did not--they dared not. their superior numbers--the shame of being defeated by such a handful of foes--the glory of conquest--and, added to it, an angry vengeance now hot in their hearts--all urged them on; and the attack was renewed with greater earnestness than ever. throughout every scene in the strife frank hamersley had comported himself with a courage that made his men feel less fear of death, and less regret to die by his side. fighting like a lion, he had been here, and there, and everywhere. he had done his full share of slaving. it was all in vain. though standing in the midst of thick smoke, unseeing and unseen, he knew that most of his faithful men had fallen. he was admonished of this by their less frequent responses to his cries of encouragement, telling him the struggle was close upon its termination. no wonder his fury was fast giving place to despair. but it was no craven fear, nor any thought of escape. his determination not to be taken alive was strong as ever. his hand still firmly clasped his bowie-knife, its blade dripping with the blood of more than one enemy; for into the body of more than one had he plunged it. he clutched it with the determination still farther to kill--to take yet another life before parting with his own. it was hopeless, useless slaughter; but it was sweet. almost insane with anger, he thought it sweet. three dusky antagonists lay dead at his feet, and he was rushing across the corral in search of a fourth. a giant figure loomed up before him, looking more gigantic from the magnifying effect of the smoke. it was not that of a savage; it was walt wilder. "dead beat!" hoarsely and hurriedly muttered the guide. "we must go under, frank. we're boun' to go under, if we don't--" "don't what, walt?" "git away from hyar." "impossible." "no. thar's still a chance, i think--for us two anyways. there ain't many o' the others left, an' ef thar war, we can't do 'em any good now. our stayin' 'ud be no use--no use dyin' along wi' 'em; while ef we get clar, we mout live to revenge 'em. don't ye see our two horses are still safe? thar they air, cowerin' clost in agin one o' the waggons. 'tain't much kit? i admit; still thar's a shadder. come, frank, and let's try it." hamersley hesitated. it was at thought of deserting even the last of his faithful followers, who had sacrificed, or were still sacrificing, their lives in his service. but, as the guide had truly said what good could he do them by staying and getting killed? and he might survive to avenge them! the last reflection would have decided him! but wilder had not waited for him to determine. while speaking the urgent words, he laid his huge hand upon hamersley's shoulder and half led, half dragged him in the direction of the horses. "keep hold o' yur rifle, though it air empty," hurriedly counselled the guide. "if we shed get away, it will be needed. we mout as well go under hyar as be upon the pararira without a gun. now mount!" almost mechanically the young kentuckian climbed upon the back of the horse nearest to him--his own. the guide had not yet mounted his; but, as could be seen through the smoke, was leaning against the wheel of one of the waggons. in an instant after hamersley perceived that the vehicle was in motion, and could hear a slight grating noise as the tire turned in the sand. the great conestoga, with its load had yielded to the strength of the colossus. in another instant he had sprung upon his horse's back and riding close to hamersley, muttered in his ear, "now i've opened a crack atween two o' the wehicles. let's cut out through it. we kin keep in the kiver o' the smoke as far as it'll screen us. you foller, an' see that ye don't lose sight o' me. if we must go under in the eend, let it be out on the open plain, an' not shut up hyar like badgers in a barr'l. follow me clost, frank. now or niver!" almost mechanically the young kentuckian yielded obedience; and in ten seconds after the two horsemen had cleared the waggon clump, with the shouting crowd that encircled it and were going at full gallop across the sand-strewn plain. chapter nine. quarrelling over scalps. nearly simultaneous with the departure of the two horsemen came the closing scene of the conflict. indeed it ended on the instant of their riding off. for of their comrades left behind there was not one upon his feet--not one able to fire another shot, or strike another blow. all lay dead, or wounded, among the waggons; some of the dead, as the wounded, clasping the handle of a knife whose blade reeked with blood, or a pistol from whose muzzle the smoke was still oozing. but soon among the whites there were no wounded, for the hovering host, having closed in from all sides, leaped from their horses, swarmed over the barrier between, tomahawking the last that showed signs of life, or thrusting them with their long lances, and pinning them to the sand. through the body of every white man at least a half-dozen spear-blades were passed, while a like number of savages stood exultingly over, or danced triumphantly around it. and now ensued a scene that might be symbolised only among wild beasts or fiends in the infernal regions. it was a contest for possession of the scalps of those who had fallen--each of the victors claiming one. some stood with bared blades ready to peel them off, while others held out hands and weapons to prevent it. from the lips of the competitors came shouts and expostulations, while their eyes flashed fire, and their arms rose and fell in furious gesticulations. amidst their demoniac jargon could be heard a voice louder than all, thundering forth a command. it was to desist from their threatening strife and extinguish the flames that still flared up over the waggons. he who spoke was the one with the red cross upon his breast, its bars of bright vermilion gleaming like fire against the sombre background of his skin. he was the chief of the tenawa comanches--the horned lizard--as wilder had justly conjectured. and as their chief he was instantly obeyed. the wranglers, one and all, promptly suspended their disputes; and flinging their weapons aside, at once set to carrying out his orders. seizing upon the shovels, late dropped from the hands of their now lifeless antagonists, and plying them to better purpose, they soon smothered the flame, and the smoke too, till only a thin drift stole up through the sand thrown thickly over it. meanwhile a man, in appearance somewhat differing from the rest, was seen moving among them. indian in garb and guise, savage in his accoutrements, as the colour of his skin, he nevertheless, showed features more resembling races that are civilised. his countenance was of a cast apparently caucasian, its lineaments unlike those of the american aboriginal; above all, unlike in his having a heavy beard, growing well forward upon his cheeks, and bushing down below the chin. true, that among the comanche indians bearded men are occasionally met with--_mestizos_, the descendants of renegade whites. but none paraded as he, who now appeared stalking around the ruined caravan. and there was another individual by his side, who had also hair upon his cheeks, though thinner and more straggling; while the speech passing between the two was not the guttural tongue of the tenawa comanches, but pure mexican spanish. both were on foot, having dismounted; he with the heavy beard leading, the other keeping after as if in attendance. the former flitted from one to another of those who lay slain; in turn stooping over each corpse, and scrutinising it--to some giving but a cursory glance, to others more careful examination--then leaving each with an air of disappointment, and a corresponding exclamation. at length, after going the complete round of the dead, he faced towards his satellite, saying,-"_por dios_! he don't appear to be among them! what can it mean? there could be no doubt of his intention to accompany the caravan. here it is, and here we are; but where is he? _carajo_! if he has escaped me, i shall feel as if i'd had all this trouble for nothing." "think of the precious plunder," rejoined the other. "these grand _carretas_ are loaded with rich goods. surely they don't count for nothing." "a fig for the goods! i'd give more for his scalp than all the silks and satins that were ever carried to santa fe. not that i'd care to keep such a trifle. the horned lizard will be welcome to it, soon as i see it stripped from his skull. that's what i want to see. but where is it? where is he? certainly not among these. there isn't one of them the least like him. surely it must be his party, spoken of in his letter? no other has been heard of coming by this route. there they lie, all stark and staring--men, mules, and horses--all but him." the smoke has thinned off, only a thin film still wafting about the waggons, whose canvas tilts, now consumed, expose their contents--some of them badly burnt, some but slightly scorched. the freebooters have commenced to drag out boxes and bales, their chief by a stern command having restrained them from returning to take the scalps of the slain. all has been the work of only a few moments--less than ten minutes of time--for it is scarce so much since wilder and hamersley, stealing out between the wheels, rode off under cover of the cloud. by this he with the beard, speaking spanish, has ceased to scrutinise the corpses, and stands facing his inferior, his countenance showing an air of puzzled disappointment, as proclaimed by his repeated speeches. once again he gives speech to his perplexity, exclaiming: "_demonios_! i don't understand it. is it possible that any of them can have got away?" as he puts the question there comes a shout from outside, seeming to answer it. for it is a cry half in lamentation--a sort of wail, altogether unlike the charging war-whoop of the comanches. acquainted with their signals, he knows that the one he has heard tells of an enemy trying to escape. hurrying outside the corral, he sees two mounted men, nearly a mile off, making in the direction of the cliffs. and nearer, a score of other men, in the act of mounting, these being indians, who have just caught sight of the fugitives, and are starting to pursue. more eager than any, he rushes direct to his horse, and, having reached, bestrides him at a spring. then, plunging deep the spur, he dashed off across the plain towards the point where the two men are seen making away. who both may be he knows not, nor of one need he care; but of one he does, feeling sure it is the same for whom he has been searching among the slain. "not dead yet, but soon shall be!" so mutters he, as with clenched teeth, bridle tight-drawn, and fingers firmly clasping the butt of a double-barrelled pistol, he spurs on after the two horsemen, who, heading straight for the cliff, seem as if they had no chance to escape; for their pursuers are closing after them in a cloud, dark as the dreaded "norther" that sweeps over the texan desert, with shout symbolising the clangour that accompanies it. chapter ten. a brave steed abandoned. in making his bold dash, walt wilder was not acting without a preconceived plan. he had one. the smoke, with its covering cloud, might be the means of concealment, and ultimate salvation; at all events, it would cover their retreat long enough to give them a start of the pursuers, and then the speed of their horses might possibly be depended upon for the rest. they at first followed this plan, but unfortunately soon found that it would not long avail them. the smoke was not drifting in the right direction. the breeze carried it almost straight towards the line of the cliffs, while their only chance was to strike for the open plain. at the cliffs their flight would be stopped. so far the smoke had favoured them. thick and stifling in the immediate vicinity of the waggons, it enabled them to slip unobserved through the ruck of savages. many of these, still mounted, had seen them pass outward, but through the blue film had mistaken them for two of their own men. they perhaps knew nothing of there having been horses inside the corral, and did not expect to see any of their caged enemies attempting to escape in that way. besides, they were now busy endeavouring to extinguish the fires, all resistance being at an end. as yet there was no sign of pursuit, and the fugitives rode up with the projecting _nimbus_ around them. in the soft sand their horses' hoofs made no noise, and they galloped towards the cliff silent as spectres. on reaching its base, it became necessary for them either to change the direction of their flight, or bring it to a termination. the bluff towered vertically above them, like a wall of rude masonwork. a cat could not have scaled it, much less horse, or man. they did not think of making the attempt. and now, what were they to do? ride out from the smoke-cloud, or remain under its favouring shelter? in either case they were sure of being discovered and pursued. it would soon clear off, and they would be seen from the waggons. already it was fast thinning around them; the indians having nearly extinguished the fires in order to save the treasure, which had no doubt been their chief object for attacking the caravan. soon there would be no smoke--and then? the pursued men stayed not to reflect further. delay would only add to their danger; and with this thought urging them on, they wheeled their horses to the left, and headed along the line of the bluff. six seconds after they were riding in a pure atmosphere, under clear dazzling sunlight. but it gave them no delight. a yell from the savages told them they were seen, and simultaneously with the shout, they perceived a score of horsemen spurring from the crowd, and riding at full speed towards them. they were both splendidly mounted, and might still have had a fair chance of escape; but now another sight met their eyes that once more almost drove them to despair. a promontory of the cliff, stretching far out over the sandy plain, lay directly in their track. its point was nearer to the pursuers than to them. before they could reach, and turn it, their retreat would be intercepted. was there still a chance to escape in the opposite direction? again suddenly turning, they galloped back as they had come; again entered the belt of smoke; and, riding on through it, reached the clear sunlight beyond. again a torturing disappointment. another promontory--twin to the first--jutted out to obstruct them. there was no mystery in the matter. they saw the mistake they had made. in escaping under cover of the cloud they had gone too far, ridden direct into a deep embayment of the cliff! their pursuers, who had turned promptly as they, once more had the advantage. the outlying point of rocks was nearer to them, and they would be almost certain to arrive at it first. to the fugitives there appeared no alternative but to ride on, and take the chance of hewing their way through the savages surrounding--for certainly they would be surrounded. "git your knife riddy, frank!" shouted wilder, as he dug his heels into his horse's side and put the animal to full speed. "let's keep close thegither--livin' or dead, let's keep thegither!" their steeds needed no urging. to an american horse accustomed to the prairies there is no spur like the yell of an indian; for he knows that along with it usually comes the shock of a bullet, or the sting of a barbed shaft. both bounded off together, and went over the soft sand, silent, but swift as the wind. in vain. before they could reach the projecting point, the savages had got up, and were clustering around it. at least a score, with spears couched, bows bent, and clubs brandishing, stood ready to receive them. it was a gauntlet the pursued men might well despair of being able to run. truly now seemed their retreat cut off, and surely did death appear to stare them in the face. "we must die, walt," said the young prairie merchant, as he faced despairingly toward his companion. "maybe not yet," answered wilder, as with a searching glance, he directed his eye along the facade of the cliff. the red sandstone rose rugged and frowning, full five hundred feet overhead. to the superficial glance it seemed to forbid all chance either of being scaled, or affording concealment. there was not even a boulder below, behind which they might find a momentary shelter from the shafts of the pursuers. for all that, wilder continued to scan it, as if recalling some old recollection. "this must be the place," he muttered. "it is, by god!" he added more emphatically, at the same time wrenching his horse around, riding sharp off, and calling to his companion to follow him. hamersley obeyed, and rode after, without knowing what next. but, in another instant, he divined the intent of this sudden change in the tactics of his fellow fugitive. for before riding far his eyes fell upon a dark list, which indicated an opening in the escarpment. it was a mere crack, or chine, scarce so wide as a doorway, and barely large enough to admit a man on horseback; though vertically it traversed the cliff to its top, splitting it from base to summit. "off o' yur hoss!" cried wilder, as he pulled up in front of it, at the same time flinging himself from his own. "drop the bridle, and leave him behint. one o' 'em'll be enough for what i want, an' let that be myen. poor critter, it air a pity! but it can't be helped. we must hev some kiver to screen us. quick, frank, or the skunks will be on to us!" painful as it was to abandon his brave steed, hamersley did as directed without knowing why. the last speeches of the guide were somewhat enigmatical, though he presumed they meant an important signification. slipping down from his saddle, he stood by his horse's side, a noble steed, the best blood of his own state, kentucky, famed for its fine stock. the animal appeared to know that its master was about to part from it. it turned its head towards him; and, with bent neck, and steaming nostrils, gave utterance to a low neigh that, while proclaiming affection, seemed to say, "why do you forsake me?" under other circumstances the kentuckian would have shed tears. for months he and his horse had been as man and man together in many a long prairie journey--a companionship which unites the traveller to his steed in liens strong as human friendship, almost as lasting, and almost as painful to break. so frank hamersley felt, as he flung the bridle back on the animal's withers--still retaining hold of the rein, loth to relinquish it. but there was no alternative. behind were the shouting pursuers quickly coming on. he could see their brandished spears glancing in the sun glare. they would soon be within reach, thrusting through his body; their barbed blades piercing him between the ribs. no time for sentiment nor dallying now, without the certainty of being slain. he gave one last look at his steed, and then letting go the rein, turned away, as one who, by stern necessity, abandons a friend, fearing reproach for what he does, but without the power to explain it. for a time the abandoned steed kept its place, with glances inquiringly sent after the master who had forsaken it. then, as the yelling crew came closer behind, it threw up its head, snorted, and tore off with trailing bridle. hamersley had turned to the guide, now also afoot, but still retaining hold of his horse, which he was conducting towards the crack in the cliff, with all his energies forcing it to follow him; for the animal moved reluctantly, as though suspecting danger inside the darksome cleft. still urging it on, he shouted back to the kentuckian, "you go first, frank! up into the kanyon, without losin' a second's time. hyar, take my gun, an' load both, whiles i see to the closin' o' the gap." seizing both guns in his grasp, hamersley sprang into the chine, stopping when he got well within its grim jaws. wilder went after, leading his steed, that still strained back upon the bridle. there was a large stone across the aperture, over which the horse had to straddle. this being above two feet in height, when the animal had got its forelegs over wilder checked it to a stand. hitherto following him with forced obedience, it now trembled, and showed a strong determination to go back. there was an expression, in its owner's eye it had never seen before--something that terribly frayed it. but it could not now do this, though ever so inclined. with its ribs close pressing the rocks on each side, it was unable to turn; while the bridle drawn firmly in front hindered it from retiring. hamersley, busily engaged in loading the rifles, nevertheless found time to glance at wilder's doings, wondering what he was about. "it air a pity!" soliloquised the latter, repeating his former words in similar tones of commiseration. "f'r all that, the thing must be done. if thar war a rock big enough, or a log, or anythin'. no! thar ain't ne'er another chance to make kiver. so hyar goes for a bit o' butcherin'." as the guide thus delivered himself, hamersley saw him jerk the bowie knife from his belt, its blade red and still reeking with human gore. in another instant its edge was drawn across the throat of the horse, from which the blood gushed forth in a thick, strong stream, like water from the spout of a pump. the creature made a last desperate effort to get off, but with its forelegs over the rocks and head held down between them, it could not stir from the spot. after a convulsive throe or two, it sank down till its ribs rested upon the straddled stone; and in this attitude it ended its life, the head after a time drooping down, the eyes apparently turned with a last reproachful look upon the master who had murdered it! "it hed to be did; thar war no help for it," said wilder, as he hurriedly turned towards his companion, adding: "have you got the guns charged?" hamersley made answer by handing him back his own rifle. it was loaded and ready. "darn the stinkin' cowarts!" cried the guide, grasping the gun, and facing towards the plain. "i don't know how it may all eend, but this'll keep 'em off a while, anyhow." as he spoke he threw himself behind the body of the slaughtered steed, which, sustained in an upright position between the counterpart walls, formed a safe barricade against the bullets and arrows of the indians. these, now riding straight towards the spot, made the rocks resound with exclamations of surprise--shouts that spoke of a delayed, perhaps defeated, vengeance. they took care, however, not to come within range of that long steel-grey tube, that, turning like a telescope on its pivot, commanded a semicircle of at least a hundred yards' radius round the opening in the cliff. despite all the earnestness of their vengeful anger, the pursuers were now fairly at bay, and for a time could be kept so. hamersley looked upon it as being but a respite--a mere temporary deliverance from danger, yet to terminate in death. true, they had got into a position where, to all appearance, they could defend themselves as long as their ammunition lasted, or as they could withstand the agony of thirst or the cravings of hunger. how were they to get out again? as well might they have been besieged in a cave, with no chance of sortie or escape. these thoughts he communicated to his companion, as soon as they found time to talk. "hunger an' thirst ain't nothin' to do wi' it," was wilder response. "we ain't a goin' to stay hyar not twenty minutes, if this child kin manage it as he intends ter do. you don't s'pose i rushed into this hyar hole like a chased rabbit? no, frank; i've heern o' this place afore, from some fellers thet, like ourselves, made _cache_ in it from a band o' pursuin' kimanch. thar's a way leads out at the back; an' just as soon as we kin throw dust in the eyes o' these yellin' varmints in front, we'll put straight for it. i don't know what sort o' a passage thar is--up the rocks by some kind o' raven, i b'lieve. we must do our best to find it." "but how do you intend to keep them from following us? you speak of throwing dust in their eyes--how, walt?" "you wait, watch an' see. you won't hev yur patience terrifically tried: for thar ain't much time to spare about it. thar's another passage up the cliffs, not far off; not a doubt but these injuns know it; an' ef we don't make haste, they'll git up thar, and come in upon us by the back door, which trick won't do, nohowsomdever. you keep yurself in readiness, and watch what i'm agoin' to do. when you see me scoot up back'ards, follor 'ithout sayin' a word." hamersley promised compliance, and the guide, still kneeling behind the barricade he had so cruelly constructed, commenced a series of manoeuvres that held his companion in speechless conjecture. he first placed his gun in such a position that the barrel, resting across the hips of the dead horse, projected beyond the tail. in this position he made it fast, by tying the butt with a piece of string to a projecting part of the saddle. he next took the cap from his head--a coonskin it was--and set it so that its upper edge could be seen alongside the pommel, and rising about three inches above the croup. the ruse was an old one, with some new additions and embellishments. "it's all done now," said the guide, turning away from the carcase and crouching to where his comrade awaited him. "come on, frank. if they don't diskiver the trick till we've got time to speed up the clift, then thar's still a chance for us. come on, an' keep close arter me!" hamersley went, without saying a word. he knew that wilder, well known and long trusted, had a reason for everything he did. it was not the time to question him, or discuss the prudence of the step he was taking. there might be danger before, but there was death--sure death--behind them. chapter eleven. a descent into darkness. in less than a dozen paces from its entrance the chine opened into a wider space, again closing like a pair of callipers. it was a hollow of elliptical shape--resembling an old-fashioned butterboat scooped out of the solid rock, on all sides precipitous, except at its upper end. here a ravine, sloping down from the summit-level above, would to the geologist at once proclaim the secret of its formation. not so easily explained might seem the narrow outlet to the open plain. but one skilled in the testimony of the rocks would detect certain ferruginous veins in the sandstone that, refusing to yield to the erosion of the running stream, had stood for countless ages. neither walt wilder nor the young kentuckian gave thought to such scientific speculations as they retreated through the narrow gap and back into the wider gorge. all they knew or cared for was that a gully at the opposite end was seen to slope upward, promising a path to the plain above. in sixty seconds they were in it, toiling onward and upward amidst a chaos of rocks where no horse could follow--loose boulders that looked as if hurled down from the heavens above or belched upward from the bowels of the earth. the retreat of the fugitives up the ravine, like their dash out of the enclosed corral, was still but a doubtful effort. neither of them had full confidence of being able eventually to escape. it was like the wounded squirrel clutching at the last tiny twig of a tree, however unable to support it. they were not quite certain that the sloping gorge would give them a path to the upper plain; for wilder had only a doubtful recollection of what some trapper had told him. but even if it did, the indians, expert climbers as they were, would soon be after them, close upon their heels. the ruse could not remain long undetected. they had plunged into the chasm as drowning men grasp at the nearest thing afloat--a slender branch or bunch of grass, a straw. as they now ascended the rock-strewn gorge both had their reflections, which, though unspoken, were very similar. and from these came a gleam of hope. if they could but reach the summit-level of the cliff! their pursuers could, of course, do the same; but not on horseback. it would then be a contest of pedestrian speed. the white men felt confidence in their swiftness of foot; in this respect believing themselves superior to their savage pursuers. they knew that the comanches were horse indians--a significant fact. these centaurs of the central plateaux, scarce ever setting foot upon the earth, when afoot are almost as helpless as birds with their wings plucked or pinioned. if they could reach the crest of the cliff, then all might yet be well; and, cheered by this reflection, they rushed up the rock-strewn ravine, now gliding along ledges, now squeezing their bodies between great boulders, or springing from one to the other--in the audacity of their bounds rivalling a brace of bighorns. they had got more than half-way up, when cries came pealing up the glen behind them. still were they hidden from the eyes of the pursuers. jutting points of rock and huge masses that lay loose in the bed of the ravine had hitherto concealed them. but for these, bullets and arrows would have already whistled about their ears, and perhaps put an end to their flight. the savages were near enough to send either gun-shot or shaft, and their voices, borne upward on the air, sounded as clear as if they were close at hand. the fugitives, as already said, had reached more than halfway up the slope, and were beginning to congratulate themselves on the prospect of escape. they even thought of the course they should take on arriving at the summit-level, for they knew that there was an open plain above. all at once they were brought to a stop, though not by anything that obstructed their path. on the contrary, it only seemed easier; for there were now two ways open to them instead of one, the ravine at this point forking into two distinct branches. there was a choice of which to take, and it was this that caused them to make a stop, at the same time creating embarrassment. the pause, however, was but for a brief space of time--only long enough to make a hasty reconnoissance. in the promise of an easy ascent there seemed but little difference between the two paths, and the guide soon came to a determination. "it's a toss up atween 'em," he said; "but let's take the one to the right. it looks a little the likest." of course his fellow-fugitive did not dissent, and they struck into the right-hand ravine; but not until walt wilder had plucked the red kerchief from his head, and flung it as far as he could up the left one, where it was left lying in a conspicuous position among the rocks. he did not say why he had thus strangely abandoned the remnant of his head-gear; but his companion, sufficiently experienced in the ways and wiles of prairie life, stood in no need of an explanation. the track they had now taken was of comparatively easy ascent; and it was this, perhaps, that had tempted wilder to take it. but like most things within the moral and physical world, its easiness proved a delusion. they had not gone twenty paces further up when the sloping chasm terminated. it debouched on a little platform, covered with large loose stones, and there rested after having fallen from the cliff above. but at a single glance they saw that this cliff could not be scaled. they had entered into a trap, out of which there was no chance of escape or retreat without throwing themselves back upon the breasts of their pursuers. the indians were already ascending the main ravine. by their voices it could be told that they had reached the point where it divided; for there was a momentary suspension of their cries, as with the baying of hounds thrown suddenly off the scent. it would not be for long. they would likely first follow up the chasm where the kerchief had been cast, but, should that also prove a _cul-de-sac_, they would return and try the other. the fugitives saw that it was too late to retrace their steps. they sprang together upon the platform, and commenced searching among the loose rocks, with a faint hope of finding some place of concealment. it was but a despairing sort of search, again like two drowning men who clutch at a straw. all at once an exclamation from the guide called his companion to his side. it was accompanied by a gesture, and followed by words low muttered. "look hyar, frank! look at this hole! let's git into it!" as hamersley came close he perceived a dark cavity among the stones, to which wilder was pointing. it opened vertically downward, and was of an irregular, roundish shape, somewhat resembling the mouth of a well, half-coped with slabs. dare they enter it? could they? what depth was it? wilder took up a pebble and flung it down. they could hear it descending, not at a single drop, but striking and ricochetting from side to side. it was long before it reached the bottom and lay silent. no matter for that. the noise made in its descent told them of projecting points or ledges that might give them a foothold. they lost not a moment of time, but commenced letting themselves down into the funnel-shaped shaft, the guide going first. slowly and silently they went down--like ghosts through the stage of a theatre--soon disappearing in the gloom below, and leaving upon the rock-strewn platform no trace to show that human foot had ever trodden it. chapter twelve. a storm of stones. fortunately for the fugitives, the cavity into which they had crept was a shaft of but slight diameter, otherwise they could not have gone down without dropping far enough to cause death, for the echoes from the pebbles betokened a vast vertical depth. as it was, the void turned out to be somewhat like that of a stone-built chimney with here and there a point left projecting. it was so narrow, moreover, that they were able to use both hands and knees in the descent, and by this means they accomplished it. they went but slowly, and took care to proceed with caution. they knew that a false step, the slipping of a foot or finger, or the breaking of a fragment that gave hold to their hands, would precipitate them to an unknown depth. they did not go farther than was necessary for quick concealment. there was noise made in their descent, and they knew that the indians would soon be above, and might hear them. their only hope lay in their pursuers believing them to have gone by the left hand path to the plain above. in time the indians would surely explore both branches of the ravine, and if the cunning savages should suspect their presence in the shaft there would be no hope for them. these thoughts decided them to come to a stop as soon as they could find foothold. about thirty feet from the top they found this, on a point of rock or ledge that jutted horizontally. it was broad enough to give both standing room, and as they were now in the midst of amorphous darkness, they took stand upon it. the indians might at any moment arrive on the platform above. they felt confident they could not be seen, but they might be heard. the slightest sound borne upwards to the ears of the savages might betray them, and, knowing this, they stood still, scarce exchanging a whisper, and almost afraid to breathe. it was not long before they saw that which justified their caution--the plumed head of a savage, with his neck craned over the edge of the aperture, outlined conspicuously against the blue sky above. and soon half a dozen similar silhouettes beside it, while they could hear distinctly the talk that was passing overhead. wilder had some knowledge of the comanche tongue, and could make out most of what was being said. amidst exclamations that spoke of vengeance there were words in a calmer tone--discussion, inquiry, and conjecture. from these it could be understood that the pursuers had separated into two parties, one following on the false track, by the path which the guide had baited for them, the other coming direct up the right and true one. there were bitter exclamations of disappointment and threats of an implacable vengeance; and the fugitives, as they listened, might have reflected how fortunate they had been in discovering that unfathomed hole. but for it they would have already been in the clutches of a cruel enemy. however, they had little time for reflection. the talk overhead at first expressed doubts as to their having descended the shaft, but doubts readily to be set at rest. the eyes of the indians having failed to inform them, their heads were withdrawn; and soon after a stone came tumbling down the cavity. something of this kind, wilder had predicted; for he flattened himself against the wall behind, and stood as "small" as his colossal frame would permit, having cautioned his companion to do the same. the stone passed without striking them, and went crashing on till it struck on the bottom below. another followed, and another; the third creasing hamersley on the breast, and tearing a couple of buttons from his coat. this was shaving close--too close to be comfortable. perhaps the next boulder might rebound from the wall above and strike one or both of them dead. in fear of this result, they commenced groping to ascertain if the ledge offered any better screen from the dangerous shower, which promised to fall for some time longer. good! hamersley felt his hand entering a hole that opened horizontally. it proved big enough to admit his body, as also the larger frame of his companion. both were soon inside it. it was a sort of grotto they had discovered; and, crouching within it, they could laugh to scorn the storm that still came pouring from above; the stones, as they passed close to their faces, hissing and hurtling like aerolites. the rocky rain at length ended. the indians had evidently come to the conclusion that it was either barren in result, or must have effectually performed the purpose intended by it, and for a short time there was silence above and below. they who were hidden in the shaft might have supposed that their persecutors, satisfied at what they had accomplished, were returning to the plain, and had retired from the spot. hamersley did think so; but walt, an old prairie man, more skilled in the indian character, could not console himself with such a fancy. "ne'er a bit o' it," he whisperingly said to his companion. "they ain't agoin' to leave us that easy--not if horned lizard be amongst 'em. they'll either stay thar till we climb out agin, or try to smoke us. ye may take my word for it, frank, thar's some'ut to come yet. look up! didn't i tell ye so?" wilder drew back out of the narrow aperture, through which he had been craning his neck and shoulders in order to get a view of what was passing above. the hole leading into the grotto that held them was barely large enough to admit the body of a man. hamersley took his place, and, turning his eyes upward, at once saw what his comrade referred to. it was the smoke of a fire, that appeared in the act of being kindled near the edge of the aperture above. the smoke was ascending towards the sky, diagonally drifting across the blue disc outlined by the rim of rock. he had barely time to make the observation when a swishing sound admonished him to draw back his head; then there passed before his face a ruck of falling stalks and faggots. some of them settled upon the ledge, the rest sweeping on to the bottom of the abyss. in a moment after the shaft was filled with smoke, but not that of an ordinary wood fire. even this would have been sufficient to stifle them where they were; but the fumes now entering their nostrils were of a kind to cause suffocation almost instantaneously. the faggots set on fire were the stalks of the creosote plant--the _ideodondo_ of the mexican table lands, well known for its power to cause asphyxia. walt wilder recognised it at the first whiff. "it's the stink-weed!" he exclaimed. "that darned stink-weed o' new mexico! it'll kill us if we can't keep it out. off wi' your coat, frank; it are bigger than my hunting skirt. let's spread it across the hole, an' see if that'll do." his companion obeyed with alacrity, stripping off his coat as quickly as the circumscribed space would permit. fortunately, it was a garment of the sack specialty, without any split in the tail, and when extended offered a good breadth of surface. it proved sufficient for the purpose, and, before the little grotto had become so filled with smoke as to be absolutely untenable, its entrance was closed by a curtain of broadcloth, held so hermetically over the aperture that even the fumes of assafoetida could not possibly have found their way inside. chapter thirteen. buried alive. for nearly half an hour they kept the coat spread, holding it close around the edges of the aperture with their heads, hands, knees, and elbows. withal some of the bitter smoke found ingress, torturing their eyes, and half stifling them. they bore it with philosophic fortitude and in profound silence, using their utmost efforts to refrain from sneezing or coughing. they knew that the least noise heard by the indians above--anything to indicate their presence in the shaft--would ensure their destruction. the fumigation would be continued till the savages were certain of its having had a fatal effect. if they could hold out long enough, even indian astuteness might be baffled. from what wilder had heard, their persecutors were in doubt about their having descended into the shaft; and this uncertainty promised to be their salvation. unless sure that they were taking all this trouble to some purpose, the red men would not dally long over their work. besides, there was the rich booty to be drawn from the captured waggons, which would attract the indians back to them, each having an interest in being present at the distribution. thus reasoned walt wilder as they listened to detect a change in the performance, making use of all their ears. of course they could see nothing, no more than if they had been immured in the darkest cell of an inquisitorial dungeon. only by their ears might they make any guess at what was going on. these admonished them that more of the burning brush was being heaved into the hole. every now and then they could hear it as it went swishing past the door of their curtained chamber, the stalks and sticks rasping against the rocks in their descent. after a time these sounds ceased to be heard; the indians no doubt thinking that sufficient of the inflammatory matter had been cast in to cause their complete destruction. if inside the cavern, they must by this time be stifled--asphyxiated--dead. so must have reasoned the red-skinned fumigators; for after a while they desisted from their hellish task. but, as if to make assurance doubly sure, before taking departure from the spot, they performed another act indicative of an equally merciless intention. during the short period of silence their victims could not tell what they were about. they only knew, by occasional sounds reaching them from above, that there was some change in the performance; but what it was they could not even shape a conjecture. the interregnum at length ended with a loud rumbling noise, that was itself suddenly terminated by a grand crash, as if a portion of the impending cliff had become detached, and fallen down upon the platform. then succeeded a silence, unbroken by the slightest sound. no longer was heard either noise or voice--not the murmur of one. it was a silence that resembled death; as if the vindictive savages had one and all met a deserved doom by being crushed under the falling cliff. for some time after hearing this mysterious noise, which had caused the rock to tremble around them, the two men remained motionless within their place of concealment. at length wilder cautiously and deliberately pushed aside the curtain. at first only a small portion of it--a corner, so as to make sure about the smoke. it still oozed in, but not so voluminously as at first. it had evidently become attenuated, and was growing thinner. it appeared also to be ascending with rapidity, as up the funnel of a chimney having a good draught. for this reason it was carried past the mouth of the grotto without much of it drifting in, and they saw that they could soon safely withdraw the curtain. it was a welcome relaxation from the irksome task that had been so long imposed upon them, and the coat was at length permitted to drop down upon the ledge. although there were no longer any sounds heard, or other signs to indicate the presence of the indians, the fugitives did not feel sure of their having gone; and it was some time before they made any attempt to reascend the shaft. some of the pursuers might still be lurking near, or straying within sight. they had so far escaped death, as if by a miracle, and they were cautious of again tempting fate. they determined that for some time yet they would not venture out upon the ledge, but keep inside the grotto that had given them such well-timed shelter. some sulky savage, disappointed at not getting their scalps, might take it into his head to return and hurl down into the hole another shower of stones. such a whim was probable to a prairie indian. cautious against all like contingencies, the guide counselled his younger companion to patience, and for a considerable time they remained without stirring out of their obscure chamber. at length, however, perceiving that the tranquillity continued, they no longer deemed it rash to make a reconnoissance; and for this purpose walt wilder crawled out upon the ledge and looked upward. a feeling of surprise, mingled with apprehension, at once seized upon him. "kin it be night?" he asked, whispering the words back into the grotto. "not yet, i should think?" answered hamersley. "the fight was begun before daybreak. the day can't all have passed yet. but why do you ask, walt?" "because thar's no light comin' from above. whar's the bit o' blue sky we seed? thar ain't the breadth o' a hand visible. it can't a be the smoke as hides it. that seems most cleared off. darned if i can see a steim o' the sky. 'bove as below, everything's as black as the ten o' spades. what kin it mean?" without waiting a reply, or staying for his companion to come out upon the ledge, wilder rose to his feet, and, grasping the projecting points above his head, commenced swarming up the shaft, in a similar manner as that by which he had made the descent. hamersley, who by this time had crept out of the grotto, stood upon the ledge listening. he could hear his comrade as he scrambled up; the rasping of his feet against the rocks, and his stentorian breathing. at length walt appeared to have reached the top, when hamersley heard words that sent a thrill of horror throughout his whole frame. "oh!" cried the guide, in his surprise, forgetting to subdue the tone of his voice, "they've built us up! thar's a stone over the mouth o' the hole--shettin' it like a pot lid. a stone--a rock that no mortal ked move. frank hamersley, it's all over wi' us; we're buried alive!" chapter fourteen. a savage saturnal. only for a short while had wilder's trick held the pursuers in check. habituated to such wiles, the indians, at first suspecting it to be one, soon became certain. for, as they scattered to each side of the cleft, the steel tube no longer kept turning towards them, while the coonskin cap remained equally without motion. at length, becoming convinced, and urged on by the red cross chief and the bearded savage by his side, they dashed boldly up, and, dismounting, entered the chine over the body of the butchered horse. only staying to take possession of the relinquished rifle, they continued on up the ravine fast as their feet could carry them. a moment's pause where the red kerchief lay on the rock, suspecting this also a ruse to mislead them as to the track taken by the fugitives. to make certain, they separated into two parties--one going up the gulch, that led left, the other proceeding by that which conducted to the place where the two men had concealed themselves. arriving upon the little platform, the pursuers at once discovered the cavity, at the same time conjecturing that the pursued had gone into it. becoming sure of this, they who took the left-hand path rejoined them, these bringing the report that they had ascended to the summit of the cliff, and seen nothing of the two men who were chased. then the stones were cast in; after them the burning stalks of the _ideodondo_; when, finally, to make destruction sure, the rock was rolled over, closing up the shaft as securely as if the cliff itself had fallen face downward upon the spot. the savages stayed no longer there. all were too eager to return to the waggons to make sure of their share in the captured spoils. one alone remained--he with the bushed beard. after the others were gone he stepped up to the boulder, and, stooping down, placed his ear close to it. he appeared as if trying to catch some sound that might come from the cavity underneath. none came--no noise, even the slightest. within the shut shaft all was still as death. for death itself must be down there, if there ever was life. for some time he crouched beside the rock, listening. then rising to his feet, with a smile of satisfaction upon his grim, sinister features, he said, in soliloquy,-"they're down there, no doubt of it; and dead long before this. one of the two must have been he. who the other matters not _carrai_! i'd like to have had a look at him too, and let him see who has given him his quietus. bah! what does it signify? it's all over now, and i've had my revenge. _vamos_! i must get back to the waggons, or my friend the horned lizard may be taking his pick of the plunder. luckily these redskins don't know the different values of the goods; so i shall bestow the cotton prints with a liberal hand, keeping the better sorts to myself. and now to assist in the partition of spoils." so saying, he strode away from the rock, and, gliding back down the gulch, climbed over the carcass of the dead horse. then, finding his own outside, he mounted and rode off to rejoin his red-skinned comrades engaged in sacking the caravan. on reaching it a spectacle was presented to his eyes--frightful, though not to him. for he was a man who had seen similar sights before--one with soul steeped in kindred crime. the waggons had been drawn partially apart, disclosing the space between. the smoke had all ascended or drifted off, and clear sunlight once more shone upon the sand--over the ground lately barricaded by the bodies of those who had so bravely defended it. there were thirteen of them--the party of traders and hunters being in all but fifteen. of those slain upon the spot there was not one now wearing his hair. their heads were bare and bloody, the crown of each showing a circular disc of dark crimson colour. the scalping-knife had already completed its work, and the ghastly trophies were seen impaled upon the points of spears-some of them stuck upright in the sand, others borne triumphantly about by the exulting victors. their triumph had cost them dear. on the plain outside at least thirty of their own lay extended, stone dead; while here and there a group bending over some recumbent form told of a warrior wounded. by the orders of their chief, some had set about collecting the corpses of their slain comrades, with the intent of interring them. others, acting without orders, still continued to wreak their savage spite upon the bodies of their white victims, submitting them to further mutilation. they chopped off their heads; then, poising these on the points of spears, tossed them to and fro, all the while shouting in savage glee, laughing with a cacchination that resembled the mirth of a madhouse. withal, there was stern vengeance in its tones. a resistance, they little expected, causing them such serious loss, had roused their passions to a pitch of the utmost exasperation; and they tried to allay their spiteful anger by expending it on the dead bodies of those who, while living, had so effectually chastised them. these were slashed and hacked with tomahawks, pierced with spears, and arrows, beaten with war clubs, then cut into pieces, to be tied to the tails of their horses, and dragged in gallop to and fro over the ground. for some time this tragical spectacle held play. then ensued a scene savouring of the ludicrous and grotesque. the waggons were emptied of their contents, while the rich freight, transported to a distance, was spread out upon the plain, and its partition entered upon--all crowding around to receive their share. the distribution was superintended by the horned lizard, though he with the beard appeared to act with equal, or even greater, authority. backed by the second personage, who wore hair on his cheeks, he dictated the apportionment. and as he had said in soliloquy, the cotton prints of gaudy patterns satisfied the cupidity of his red-skinned companions, leaving to himself and his confidential friend the costlier fabrics of silken sheen. among the traders' stock were knives of common sort--the cheapest cutlery of sheffield; guns and pistols of the brummagem brand, with beads, looking glasses, and such-like notions from the new england boston. all these, delectable in the eyes of the horned lizard and his tenawas, were left to them; while the bearded man, himself selecting, appropriated the silks and satins, the laces and real jewellery that had been designed to deck the rich _doncellas_ of santa fe, el paso, chihuahua, and durango. the distribution over, the scene assumed a new aspect. it was now that the ludicrous came prominently into play. though not much water had been found in the waggons, there was enough fluid of stronger spirit. a barrel of monongahela whisky was part of the caravan stores left undestroyed. knowing the white man's firewater but too well, the indians tapped the cask, and quaffed of its contents. in a short time two-thirds of the band became intoxicated. some rolled over dead drunk, and lay a-stretch along the sand. others tottered about, uttering maudlin speeches. still others of stronger stomach and steader brain kept their feet, as also their senses; only that these became excited, increasing their cupidity. they wanted more than they had got, and would gamble to get it. one had a piece of cotton print, and so had another. each wished to have both or none. how was it to be decided? by cards? by dice? no. there was a way more congenial to their tastes--more _a propos_ to their habits. it should be done by their horses. they knew the sort of game, for it is not the first time they have played it. the piece of print is unrolled, and at each end tied to a horse's tail. the owners spring to the backs of the animals, then urge them in the opposite directions till the strain comes; at the pluck the web gives way, and he who holds the longer part becomes possessor of the whole. others, not gamblers, out of sheer devilry and diversion, similarly attach their stuffs, and gallop over the ground with the prints trailing fifty yards behind them. in the frenzied frolic that had seized hold of them they forgot their slain comrades, still unburied. they whoop, shout, and laugh till the cliffs, in wild, unwonted echo, send back the sound of their demoniac mirth. a riot rare as original--a true saturnal of savages. chapter fifteen. a living tomb. literally buried alive, as walt wilder had said, were he and his companion. they now understood what had caused the strange noise that mystified them--the rumbling followed by a crash. no accidental _debacle_ or falling of a portion of the cliff, as they had been half supposing; but a deed of atrocious design--a huge rock rolled by the united strength of the savages, until it rested over the orifice of the shaft, completely coping and closing it. it may have been done without any certain knowledge of their being inside--only to make things sure. it mattered not to the two men thus cruelly enclosed, for they knew that in any case there was no hope of their being rescued from what they believed to be a living tomb. that it was such neither could doubt. the guide, gifted with herculean strength, had tried to move the stone on discovering how it lay. with his feet firmly planted in the projections below, and his shoulder to the rock above, he had given a heave that would have lifted a loaded waggon from its wheels. the stone did not budge with all this exertion. there was not so much as motion. he might as successfully have made trial to move a mountain from its base. he did not try again. he remembered the rock itself. he had noticed it while they were searching for a place to conceal themselves, and had been struck with its immense size. no one man could have stirred it from its place. it must have taken at least twenty indians. no matter how many, they had succeeded in their design, and their victims were now helplessly enclosed in the dark catacomb--slowly, despairingly to perish. "all up wi' us, i reck'n," said the guide, as he once more let himself down upon the ledge to communicate the particulars to his companion. hamersley ascended to see for himself. they could only go one at a time. he examined the edge of the orifice where the rock rested upon it. he could only do so by the touch. not a ray of light came in on any side, and groping round and round he could detect neither crevice nor void. there were weeds and grass, still warm and smouldering, the _debris_ of what had been set on fire for their fumigation. the rock rested on a bedding of these; hence the exact fit, closing every crack and crevice. on completing his exploration hamersley returned to his companion below. "hopeless!" murmured wilder, despondingly. "no, walt; i don't think so yet." the kentuckian, though young, was a man of remarkable intelligence as well as courage. it needed these qualities to be a prairie merchant-one who commanded a caravan. wilder knew him to be possessed of them-in the last of them equalling himself, in the first far exceeding him. "you think thar's a chance for us to get out o' hyar?" he said, interrogatively. "i think there is, and a likely one." "good! what leads ye to think so, frank?" "reach me my bowie. it's behind you there in the cave." wilder did as requested. "it will depend a good deal upon what sort of rock this is around us. it isn't flint, anyhow. i take it to be either lime or sandstone. if so, we needn't stay here much longer than it would be safe to go out again among those bloodthirsty savages." "how do you mean, frank? darn me if i yet understan ye." "it's very simple, walt. if this cliff rock be only sandstone, or some other substance equally soft, we may cut our way out--under the big stone." "ah! i didn't think o' thet. thar's good sense in what ye say." "it has a softish feel," said the kentuckian, as he drew his hand across one of the projecting points. "i wish i only had two inches of a candle. however, i think i can make my exploration in the dark." there was a short moment of silence, after which was heard a clinking sound, as of a knife blade being repeatedly struck against a stone. it was hamersley, with his bowie, chipping off a piece from the rock that projected from the side of the shaft. the sound was pleasant to the kentuckian's ear, for it was not the hard metallic ring given out by quartz or granite. on the contrary, the steel struck against it with a dull, dead echo, and he could feel that the point of the knife easily impinged upon it. "sandstone," he said; "or something that'll serve our purpose equally as well. yes, walt, there's a good chance for us to get out of this ugly prison; so keep up your heart, comrade. it may cost us a couple of days' quarrying. perhaps all the better for that; the indians are pretty sure to keep about the waggons for a day or so. they'll find enough there to amuse them. our work will depend a good deal on what sort of a stone they've rolled over the hole. you remember what size the boulder was?" "'twas a largish pebble; looked to me at least ten feet every way. it sort o' serprised me how the skunks ked a budged it. i reck'n 'twar on a coggle, an' rolled eezy. it must ha' tuk the hul clanjamfry o' them." "if we only knew the right edge to begin at. for that we must go by guess-work. well, we mustn't lose time, but set about our stone-cutting at once. every hour will be taking the strength out of us. i only came down for the bowie to make a beginning. i'll make trial at it first, and then we can take turn and turn about." provided with his knife, the kentuckian again climbed up; and soon after the guide heard a crinkling sound, succeeded by the rattling of pieces of rock, as they got detached and came showering down. to save his crown, now uncovered by the loss of both kerchief and cap, he crept back into the alcove that had originally protected them from the stones cast in by the indians. along with the splinters something else came past walt's face, making a soft, rustling sound; it had a smell also that told what it was--the "cussed stink-weed." from the falling fragments, their size and number, he could tell that his comrade was making good way. walt longed to relieve him at his work, and called up a request to this end; but hamersley returned a refusal, speaking in a cautious tone, lest his voice might be borne out to the ear of some savage still lingering near. for over an hour wilder waited below, now and then casting impatient glances upward. they were only mechanical; for, of course, he could see nothing. but they were anxious withal; for the success of his comrade's scheme was yet problematical. with sufficient food and drink to sustain them, they might in time accomplish what they had set about; but wanting these, their strength would soon give way, and then--ah! then-the guide was still standing on the ledge, pursuing this or a similar train of reflection, when all at once a sight came, not under but above his eyes, which caused him to utter an exclamation of joy. it was the sight of his comrade's face--only that! but this had in it a world of significance. he could hot have seen that face without light. light had been let into their rock-bound abode, so late buried in the profoundest darkness. it was but a feeble glimmer, that appeared to have found admission through a tiny crevice under the huge copestone; and hamersley's face, close to it, was seen only in faint shadow--fainter from the film of smoke yet struggling up the shaft. still was it light--beautiful, cheering light--like some shore-beacon seen by the storm-tossed mariner amid the dangers of a night-shrouded sea. hamersley had not yet spoken a word to explain what had occurred to cause it. he had suddenly left off chipping the rock, and was at rest, apparently in contemplation of the soft silvery ray that was playing so benignly upon his features. was it the pleasure of once more beholding what he lately thought he might never see again--the light of day? was it this alone that was keeping him still and speechless? no, something else; as he told his comrade when he rejoined him soon after on the ledge. "walt," he said, "i've let daylight in, as you see; but i find it'll take a long time to cut a passage out. it's only the weeds i've been able to get clear of. the big rock runs over at least five feet, and the stone turns out harder than i thought of." these were not cheering words to walt wilder. "but," continued hamersley, his speech changing to a more hopeful tone, "i've noticed something that may serve better still; perhaps save us all the quarrying. i don't know whether i'm right; but we shall soon see." "what hev ye noticed?" was the question put by wilder. "you see there's still some smoke around us." "yes, frank, my eyes tell me that plain enuf. i've nigh nibbed 'em out o' thar sockets." "well, as soon as i had scooped out the crack that let in the daylight. i noticed that the smoke rushed out as if blasted through a pair of bellows. that shows there's a draught coming up. it can only come from some aperture below, acting as a furnace or the funnel of a chimney. we must try to get down to the bottom, and see if there's such a thing. if there be, who knows but it may be big enough to let us out of our prison, without having to carve our way through the walls, which i feel certain would take us several days. we must try to get down to the bottom." to accede to this request the guide needed no urging, and both--one after the other--at once commenced descending. they found no great difficulty in getting down, any more than they had already experienced, for the shaft continued all the way down nearly the same width, and very similar to what it was above the ledge. near the bottom, however, it became abruptly wider by the retrocession of the walls. they were now in a dilemma, for they had reached a point where they could go no further without dropping off. it might be ten feet, it might be a hundred--in any case enough to make the peril appalling. wilder had gone first, and soon bethought himself of a test. he unslung his powder-horn and permitted it to drop from his hand, listening attentively. it made scarce any noise; still he could hear it striking against something soft. it was the brush thrown in by the indians. this did not seem far below; and the half-burnt stalks would be something to break their fall. "i'll chance it," said walt, and almost simultaneous with his words was heard the bump of his heavy body alighting on the litter below. "you may jump without fear, frank. 'taint over six feet in the clar." hamersley obeyed, and soon both stood at the bottom of the chimney--on the hearthstone where the stalks of the creosote still smouldered. chapter sixteen. off at last! on touching _terra firma_, and finding plenty of space around, they scrambled from off the pile of loose stones and stalks cast down by the indians, and commenced groping their way about. again touching the firm surrounding of rock, they groped searchingly along it. they were not long engaged in their game of blind-man's buff, when the necessity of trusting to the touch came abruptly to an end--as if the handkerchief had been suddenly jerked from their eyes. the change was caused by a light streaming in through a side gallery into which they had strayed. it was at first dim and distant, but soon shone upon them with the brilliance of a flambeau. following the passage through which it guided them, they reached an aperture of irregular roundish shape, about the size, of the cloister window of a convent. they saw at once that it was big enough to allow the passage of their bodies. they saw, too, that it was admitting the sunbeams--admonishing them that it was still far from night. they had brought all their traps down along with them--their knives and pistols, with hamersley's gun still carefully kept. but they hesitated about going out. there could be no difficulty in their doing so, for there was a ledge less than three feet under the aperture, upon which they could find footing. it was not that which caused them to hesitate, but the fact of again falling into the hands of their implacable enemies. that these were still upon the plain they had evidence. they could hear their yells and whooping, mingled with peals of wild demon-like laughter. it was at the time when the firewater was in the ascendant, and the savages were playing their merry game with the pieces of despoiled cotton goods. there was danger in going out, but there might be more in staying in. the savages might return upon their search, and discover this other entrance to the vault. in that case they would take still greater pains to close it and besiege the two fugitives to the point of starvation. both were eager to escape from a place they had lately looked upon as a living tomb. still, they dared not venture out of it. they could not retreat by the plain so long as the indians were upon it. at night, perhaps, in the darkness, they might. hamersley suggested this. "no," said walt, "nor at night eyther. it's moontime, you know; an' them sharp-eyed injuns niver all goes to sleep thegither. on that sand they'd see us in the moonlight 'most as plain as in the day. ef we wait at all, we'll hev to stay till they go clar off." wilder, while speaking, stood close to the aperture, looking cautiously out. at that moment, craning his neck to a greater stretch, so as to command a better view of what lay below, his eye caught sight of an object that elicited an exclamation of surprise. "darn it," he said, "thar's my old clout lyin' down thar on the rocks." it was the red kerchief he had plucked from his head to put the pursuers on the wrong track. "it's jest where i flinged it," he continued; "i kin recognise the place. that gully, then, must be the one we didn't go up." walt spoke the truth. the decoy was still in the place where he had set it. the square of soiled and faded cotton had failed to tempt the cupidity of the savages, who knew that in the waggons they had captured were hundreds of such, clean and new, with far richer spoil besides. "s'pose we still try that path, frank. it may lead us to the top arter all. if they've bin up it they've long ago gone down agin; i kin tell by thar yelpin' around the waggons. they've got holt of our corn afore this; and won't be so sharp in lookin' arter us." "agreed," said hamersley. without further delay the two scrambled out through the aperture, and, creeping along the ledge, once more stood in the hollow of the ravine, at the point of its separation into the forks that had perplexed them in their ascent. perhaps, after all, they had chosen the right one. at the time of their first flight, had they succeeded in reaching the plain above, they would surely have been seen and pursued; though with superior swiftness of foot they might still have escaped. once more they faced upward, by the slope of the ravine yet untried. on passing it, walt laid hold of his "clout," as he called it, and replaced it, turban fashion, on his head. "i can only weesh," he said, "i ked as convenient rekiver my rifle; an', darn me, but i would try, ef it war only thar still. it ain't, i know. thet air piece is too precious for a injun to pass by. it's gone back to the waggons." they could now more distinctly hear the shouts of their despoilers; and, as they continued the ascent, the narrow chine in the cliff opened between them and the plain, giving them a glimpse of what was there going on. they could see the savages--some on foot, others on horseback--the latter careering round as if engaged in a tournament. they saw they were roystering, wild with triumph, and maddened with drink--the fire-water they had found in the waggons. "though they be drunk, we mustn't stay hyar so nigh 'em," muttered walt. "i allers like to put space atween me and seech as them. they mout get some whimsey into their heads, an' come this ways. they'll take any amount o' trouble to raise ha'r; an' maybe grievin' that they hain't got ourn yit, an' mout think they'd hev another try for it. as the night's bound to be a mooner, we can't git too far from 'em. so let's out o' this quick's we kin." "on, then!" said hamersley, assenting; and the next moment the two were rapidly ascending the gorge, wilder leading the way. this time they were more fortunate. the ravine sloped on up to the summit of the cliff, debouching upon a level plain. they reached this without passing any point that could bring them under the eyes of the indians. they could still hear the shouts of triumph and wild revelry; but as they receded from the crest of the cliff these grew fainter and fainter, until they found themselves fleeing over an open table-land, bounded above by the sky, all round them silent as death--silent as the heart of a desert. chapter seventeen. into the desert. the cliff, up which the young prairie merchant and his guide, after their series of hairbreadth escapes, have succeeded in climbing, is the scarped edge of a spur of the famous llano estacado, or "staked plain," and it is into this sterile tract they are now fleeing. neither have any definite knowledge of the country before them, or the direction they ought to take. their only thought is to put space between themselves and the scene of their disaster--enough to secure them against being seen by the eye of any indian coming after. a glance is sufficient to satisfy them that only by distance can they obtain concealment. far as the eye can reach the surface appears a perfect level, without shrub or tree. there is not cover enough to give hiding-place to a hare. although now in full run, and with no appearance of being pursued, they are far from being confident of escaping. they are under an apprehension that some of the savages have ascended to the upper plain, and are still on it, searching for them. if so, these may be encountered at any moment, returning disappointed from the pursuit. the fugitives draw some consolation from the knowledge that the pursuers could not have got their horses up the cliff; and, if there is to be another chapter to the chase, it will be on foot--a contest of pedestrian speed. in a trial of this kind walt wilder, at least, has nothing to fear. the colossus, with his long strides, would be almost a match for the giant with the seven-leagued boots. their only uneasiness is that the savages may have gone out upon the track they are themselves taking, and, appearing in their front, may head them off, and so intercept their retreat. as there is yet no savage in sight--no sign either of man or animal--their confidence increases; and, after making a mile or so across the plain, they no longer look ahead, but backward. at short intervals the great brown beard of the guide sweeps his left shoulder, as he casts anxious glances behind him. they are all the more anxious on observing--which he now does--that his fellow-fugitive flags in his pace, and shows signs of giving out. with a quick comprehension, and without any questions asked, wilder understands the reason. in the smoke-cloud that covered their retreat from the corralled waggons--afterwards in the sombre shadow of the chine, and the obscurity of the cave, he had not observed what now, in the bright glare of the sunlight, is too plainly apparent--that the nether garments of his comrade are saturated with blood. hamersley has scarce noticed it himself, and his attention is now called to it, less from perceiving any acute pain than that he begins to feel faint and feeble. blood is oozing through the breast of his shirt, running down the legs of his trousers, and on into his boots. and the fountain from which it proceeds is fast disclosing itself by an aching pain in his side, which increases as he strides on. a moment's pause to examine it. when the vest and shirt are opened it is seen that a bullet has passed through his left side, causing only a flesh wound, but cutting an artery in its course. scratched and torn in several other places, for the time equally painful, he had not yet perceived this more serious injury. it is not mortal, nor likely to prove so. the guide and hunter, like most of his calling, is a rough practical surgeon; and after giving the wound a hurried examination, pronounces it "only a scratch," then urges his companion onward. again starting, they proceed at the same quick pace; but before they have made another mile the wounded man feels his weakness sensibly overcoming him. then the rapid run is succeeded by a slow dog-trot, soon decreasing to a walk, at length ending in a dead stop. "i can go no farther, walt; not if all the devils of hell were at my heels. i've done my best. if they come after you keep on, and leave me." "niver, frank hamersley, niver! walt wilder ain't the man to sep'rate from a kumrade, and leave him in a fix that way. if ye must pull up, so do this child. an' i see ye must; thar's no behelp for it." "i cannot go a step farther." "enuf! but don't let's stan' to be seen miles off. squat's the word. down on yer belly, like a toad under a harrer. thar's jest a resemblance o' kiver, hyar 'mong these tussocks o' buffler-grass; an' this child ain't the most inconspicerousest objeck on the plain. let's squat on our breast-ribs, an' lay close as pancakes." whilst speaking he throws himself to the earth, flat on his face. hamersley, already tottering, drops down by his side; as he does so, leaving the plain, as far as the eye can reach, without salient object to intercept the vision--any more than might be seen on the surface of a sleeping ocean. it is in favour of the fugitives that the day has now well declined. but they do not remain long in their recumbent position before the sun, sinking behind the western horizon, gives them an opportunity of once more getting upon their feet. they do so, glad to escape from a posture whose restraint is exceedingly irksome. they have suffered from the hot atmosphere rising like caloric from the parched plain. but now that the sun had gone down, a cool breeze begins to play over its surface, fanning them to fresh energy. besides, the night closing over them--the moon not yet up--has removed the necessity for keeping any longer in concealment, and they proceed onward without fear. hamersley feels as if fresh blood had been infused into his veins; and he is ready to spring to his feet at the same time as his comrade. "frank! d'ye think ye kin go a little furrer now?" is the interrogatory put by the hunter. "yes, walt; miles further," is the response. "i feel as if i could walk across the grandest spread of prairie." "good!" ejaculates the guide. "i'm glad to hear you talk that way. if we kin but git a wheen o' miles atween us an' them yelpin' savages, we may hev a chance o' salvation yit. the wust o' the thing air, that we don't know which way to go. it's a toss up 'tween 'em. if we turn back torst the canadyen, we may meet 'em agin, an' right in the teeth. westart lies the settlement o' the del nort; but we mout come on the same injuns by goin' that direckshun. i'm not sartin they're tenawas. southart this staked plain hain't no endin' till ye git down to the grand river below its big bend, an' that ain't to be thort o'. by strikin' east, a little southart, we mout reach the head sources o' the loozyany red; an' oncest on a stream o' runnin' water, this child kin generally navigate down it, provided he hev a rifle, powder, an' a bullet or two in his pouch. thank the almighty lord, we've stuck to your gun through the thick an' the thin o't. ef we hedn't we mout jest as well lie down agin' an' make a die at oncest." "go which way you please, walt; you know best. i am ready to follow you; and i think i shall be able." "wal, at anyhow, we'd best be movin' off from hyar. if ye can't go a great ways under kiver o' the night, i reck'n we kin put enough o' parairia atween us an' these injuns to make sure agin thar spyin' us in the mornin'. so let's start south-eastart, an' try for the sources o' the red. thur's that ole beauty o' the north star that's been my friend an' guide many's the good time. thar it is, makin' the handle o' the plough, or the great bar, as i've heern that colleckshin o' stars freekwently called. we've only to keep it on our left, a leetle torst the back o' the shoulder, an' then we're boun' to bring out on some o' the head-forks o' the red--if we kin only last long enough to reach 'em. darn it! thar's no danger; an' anyhow, thar's no help for't but try. come along!" so speaking, the guide started forward--not in full stride, but timing his pace to suit the feeble steps of his disabled comrade. chapter eighteen. a lilliputian forest. guiding their course by the stars the fugitives continue on--no longer going in a run, nor even in a very rapid walk. despite the resolution with which he endeavours to nerve himself, the wounded man is still too weak to make much progress, and he advances but laggingly. his companion does not urge him to quicken his pace. the experienced prairie man knows it will be better to go slowly than get broken down by straining forward too eagerly. there is no sign or sound of indian, either behind or before them. the stillness of the desert is around them--its silence only interrupted by the "whip-whip" of the night-hawk's wings, and at intervals its soft note answering to the shriller cry of the kid-deer plover that rises screaming before their feet. these, with the constant skirr of the ground-crickets and the prolonged whine of the coyote, are the only sounds that salute them as they glide on--none of which are of a kind to cause alarm. there appears no great reason for making haste now. they have all the night before them, and, ere daylight can discover them, they will be sure to find some place of concealment. the ground is favourable to pedestrianism in the darkness. the surface, hard-baked by the sun, is level as a set flagstone, and in most places so smooth that a carriage could run upon it as on the drive of a park. well for them it is so. had the path been a rugged one the wounded man would not go far before giving out. even as it is, the toil soon begins to tell on his wasted strength. his veins are almost emptied of blood. nor do they proceed a very great distance before again coming to a halt; though far enough to feel sure that, standing erect, they cannot be descried by any one who may have ascended the cliff at the place where they took departure from it. but they have also reached that which offers them a chance of concealment--in short, a forest. it is a forest not discernible at more than a mile's distance, for the trees that compose it are "shin oaks," the tallest rising to the height of only eighteen inches above the surface of the ground. eighteen inches is enough to conceal the body of a man lying in a prostrate attitude; and as the lilliputian trees grow thick as jimson weeds, the cover will be a secure one. unless the pursuers should stray so close as to tread upon them, there will be no danger of their being seen. further reflection has by this time satisfied them that the indians are not upon the upper plain. it is not likely, after the pains they had taken to smoke them in the cave and afterwards shut them up. besides, the distribution of the spoils would be an attraction sure to draw them back to the waggons, and speedily. becoming satisfied that there is no longer a likelihood of their being pursued across the plain, wilder proposes that they again make stop; this time to obtain sleep, which in their anxiety during their previous spell of rest they did not attempt. he makes the proposal out of consideration for his comrade, who for some time, as he can see, has evidently been hard pressed to keep up with him. "we kin lie by till sun-up," says walt; "an' then, if we see any sign o' pursoot, kin stay hyar till the sun goes down agin. these shin oaks will gie us kiver enuf. squatted, there'll be no chance o' thar diskiverin' us, unless they stumble right atop o' us." his companion is not in the mood to make objection, and the two lay themselves along the earth. the miniature forest not only gives them the protection of a screen but a soft bed, as the tiny trunks and leaf-laden branches become pressed down beneath their bodies. they remain awake only long enough to give hamersley's wound such dressing as the circumstances permit, and then both sink into slumber. with the young prairie merchant it is neither deep nor profound. horrid visions float before his rapt senses--scenes of red carnage--causing him ever and anon to awake with a start, once or twice with a cry that wakes his companion. otherwise walt wilder would have slept as soundly as if reposing on the couch of a log cabin a thousand miles removed from any scene of danger. it is no new thing for him to go to sleep with the yell of savages sounding in his ears. for a period of over twenty years he has daily, as nightly, stretched his huge form along mountain slope or level prairie, and often with far more danger of having his "hair raised" before rising erect again. for ten years he belonged to the "texas rangers"--that strange organisation that has existed ever since stephen austin first planted his colony in the land of the "lone star." if on this night the ex-ranger is more than usually restless, it is from anxiety about his comrade, coupled with the state of his nervous system, stirred to feverish excitement by the terrible conflict through which they have just passed. notwithstanding all, he slumbers in long spells, at times snoring like an alligator. at no time does the ex-ranger stand in need of much sleep, even after the most protracted toil. six hours is his usual daily or nocturnal dose; and as the grey dawn begins to glimmer over the tops of the shin oaks, he springs to his feet, shakes the dew from his shoulders like a startled stag, and then stoops down to examine the condition of his wounded comrade. "don't ye git up yit, frank," he says. "we mustn't start till we hev a clar view all roun', an' be sure there's neery redskin in sight. then we kin take the sun a leetle on our left side, an' make tracks to the south-eastart. how is't wi' ye?" "i feel weak as water. still i fancy i can travel a little farther." "wall, we'll go slow. ef there's none o' the skunks arter us, we kin take our time. durn me! i'm still a wonderin' what injuns they war; i'm a'most sartint thar the tenawa kimanch--a band o' the buffler-eaters an' the wust lot on all the parairia. many's the fight we rangers used to hev wi' 'em, and many's the one o' 'em this child hev rubbed out. ef i only hed my rifle hyar--durn the luck hevin' to desart that gun--i ked show you nine nicks on her timmer as stan' for nine tenawa kimanch. ef't be them, we've got to keep well to the southart. thar range lays most in the canadyen, or round the head o' big wichitu, an' they mout cross a corner o' the staked plain on thar way home. tharfer we must go southart a good bit, and try for the north fork o' the brazos. ef we meet indian thar, they'd be southern kimanch--not nigh sech feeroshus varmints as them. do you know, frank, i've been hevin' a dream 'bout them injuns as attacked us?" "a dream! so have i. it is not strange for either of us to dream of them. what was yours, walt?" "kewrus enuf mine war, though it warn't all a dreem. i reck'n i war more 'n half awake when i tuk to thinkin' about 'em, an' 'twar somethin' i seed durin' the skrimmage. didn't you observe nothin' queery?" "rather say, nothing that was not that way. it was all queer enough, and terrible, too." "that this child will admit wi' full freedom. but i've f't redskin afore in all sorts an' shapes, yet niver seed redskin sech as them." "in what did they differ from other savages? i saw nothing different." "but i did; leastways, i suspeck i did. didn't you spy 'mong the lot two or three that had ha'r on thar faces?" "yes; i noticed that. i thought nothing of it. it's common among the comanches and other tribes of the mexican territory, many of whom are of mixed breed--from the captive mexican women they have among them." "the ha'r i seed didn't look like it grew on the face o' a mixed blood." "but there are pure white men among them--outlaws who have run away from civilisation and turned renegades--as also captives they have taken, who become indianised, as the mexicans call it. doubtless it may have been some of these we saw." "wall, you may be right, frank. sartint thar war one i seed wi' a beard 'most as big as my own--only it war black. his hide war black, too, or nigh to it; but ef that skunk wan't white un'erneath a coatin' o' charcoal an' vermilion then walt wilder don't know a kristyun from a heethun. i ain't no use spek'latin' on't now. white, black, yella-belly, or red, they've put us afoot on the parairia, an' kim darned nigh wipin' us out althegither. we've got a fair chance o' goin' un'er yet, eyther from thirst or the famishment o' empty stomaks. i'm hungry enuf already to eat a coyat. thar's a heavy row afore us, frank, an' we must strengthen our hearts to hoein' o' it. wall, the sun's up; an' as thar don't appear to be any obstrukshun, i reck'n we'd best be makin' tracks." hamersley slowly and somewhat reluctantly rises to his feet. he still feels in poor condition for travelling. but to stay there is to die; and bracing himself to the effort, he steps out side by side with his colossal companion. chapter nineteen. the departure of the plunderers. on the day after the capture of the caravan the indians, having consumed all the whisky found in the waggons, and become comparatively sober, prepared to move off. the captured goods, made up into convenient parcels, were placed upon mules and spare horses. of both they had plenty, having come prepared for such a sequel to their onslaught upon the traders. the warriors, having given interment to their dead comrades, leaving the scalped and mutilated corpses of the white men to the vultures and wolves, mounted and marched off. before leaving the scene of their sanguinary exploit, they had drawn the waggons into a close clump and set fire to them, partly from a wanton instinct of destruction, partly from the pleasure of beholding a great bonfire, but also with some thoughts that it might be as well thus to blot out all the traces of a tragedy for which the americans--of whom even these freebooters felt dread--might some day call them to account. they did not all go together, but separated into two parties on the spot where they had passed the night. they were parties, however, of very unequal size, one of them numbering only four individuals. the other, which constituted the main body of the plunderers, was the band of the tenawa comanchey, under their chief, horned lizard. these last turned eastward, struck off towards the head waters of the big witches, upon which and its tributaries lie their customary roving grounds. the lesser party went off in almost the opposite direction, south-westerly, leaving the llano estacado on their left, and journeying on, crossed the rio pecos at a point below and outside the farthest frontier settlement of new mexico towards the prairies. then, shaping their course nearly due south, they skirted the spurs of the sierra blanca, that in this latitude extend eastward almost to the pecos. on arriving near the place known as gran quivira--where once stood a prosperous spanish town, devoted to gathering gold, now only a ruin, scarcely traceable, and altogether without record--they again changed their course, almost zigzagging back in a north-westerly direction. they were making towards a depression seen in the sierra blanca, as if with the intention to cross the mountains toward the valley of the del norte. they might have reached the valley without this circumstance, by a trail well known and often travelled. but it appeared as if this was just what they wanted to avoid. one of the men composing this party was he already remarked upon as having a large beard and whiskers. a second was one of those spoken of as more slightly furnished with these appendages, while the other two were beardless. all four were of deep bronze complexion, and to all appearance pure-blooded aboriginals. that the two with hirsute sign spoke to one another in spanish was no sure evidence of their not being indians. it was within the limits of new mexican territory, where there are many indians who converse in castilian as an ordinary language. he with the whiskered cheeks--the chief of the quartet, as well as the tallest of them--had not left behind the share of plunder that had been allotted to him. it was still in his train, borne on the backs of seven strong mules, heavily loaded. these formed an _atajo_ or pack-train, guided and driven by the two beardless men of the party, who seemed to understand mule driving as thoroughly as if they had been trained to the calling of the _arriero_; and perhaps so had they been. the other two took no trouble with the pack-animals, but rode on in front, conversing _sans souci_, and in a somewhat jocular vein. the heavily-bearded man was astride a splendid black horse; not a mexican mustang, like that of his companions, but a large sinewy animal, that showed the breed of kentucky. and so should he--since he was the same steed frank hamersley had been compelled to leave behind in that rapid rush into the crevice of the cliff. "this time, roblez, we've made a pretty fair haul of it," remarked he who bestrode the black. "what with the silks and laces--to say nothing of this splendid mount between my legs--i think i may say that our time has not been thrown away." "yours hasn't, anyhow. my share won't be much." "come, come, _teniente_! don't talk in that way. you should be satisfied with a share proportioned to your rank. besides, you must remember the man who puts down the stake has the right to draw the winnings. but for me there would have been no spoils to share. isn't it so?" this truth seeming to produce an impression on roblez's mind, he made response in the affirmative. "well, i'm glad you acknowledge it," pursued the rider of the black. "let there be no disputes between us; for you know, roblez, we can't afford to quarrel. you shall have a liberal percentage on this lucky venture; i promise it. by the bye, how much do you think the plunder ought to realise?" "well," responded roblez, restored to a cheerful humour, "if properly disposed of in el paso or chihuahua, the lot ought to fetch from fifteen to twenty thousand dollars. i see some silk-velvet among the stuff that would sell high, if you could get it shown to the rich damsels of durango or zacatecas. one thing sure, you've got a good third of the caravan stock." "ha! ha! more than half of it in value. the horned lizard went in for bulk. i let him have it to his heart's content. he thinks more of those cheap cotton prints, with their red and green and yellow flowers, than all the silk ever spun since the days of mother eve. ha! ha! ha!" the laugh, in which roblez heartily joined, was still echoing on the air as the two horsemen entered a pass leading through the mountains. it was the depression in the sierra, seen shortly after parting with the horned lizard and his band. it was a pass rugged with rock, and almost trackless, here and there winding about, and sometimes continued through canons or clefts barely wide enough to give way to the mules with the loads upon their backs. for all this the animals of the travellers seemed to journey along it without difficulty, only the american horse showing signs of awkwardness. all the others went as if they had trodden it before. for several hours they kept on through this series of canons and gorges--here and there crossing a transverse ridge that, cutting off a bend, shortened the distance. just before sunset the party came to a halt; not in the defile itself, but in one of still more rugged aspect, that led laterally into the side of the mountain. in this there was no trace or sign of travel--no appearance of its having been entered by man or animal. yet the horse ridden by roblez, and the pack-mules coming after, entered with as free a step as if going into a well-known enclosure. true, the chief of the party, mounted on the kentucky steed, had gone in before them; though this scarce accounted for their confidence. up this unknown gorge they rode until they had reached its end. there was no outlet, for it was a _cul-de-sac_--a natural court--such as are often found among the amygdaloidal mountains of mexico. at its extremity, where it narrowed to a width of about fifty feet, lay a huge boulder of granite that appeared to block up the path; though there was a clear space between it and the cliff rising vertically behind it. the obstruction was only apparent, and did not cause the leading savage of the party to make even a temporary stop. at one side there was an opening large enough to admit the passage of a horse; and into this he rode, roblez following, and also the mules in a string, one after the other. behind the boulder was an open space of a few square yards, of extent sufficient to allow room for turning a horse. the savage chief wheeled his steed, and headed him direct for the cliff; not with the design of dashing his brains against the rock, but to force him into a cavern, whose entrance showed its disc in the facade of the precipice, dark and dismal as the door of an inquisitorial prison. the horse snorted, and shied back; but the ponderous mexican spur, with its long sharp rowel-points, soon drove him in; whither he was followed by the mustang of roblez and the mules--the latter going in as unconcernedly as if entering a stable whose stalls were familiar to them. chapter twenty. a transformation. it was well on in the afternoon of the following day before the four spoil-laden savages who had sought shelter in the cave again showed themselves outside. then came they filing forth, one after the other, in the same order as they had entered; but so changed in appearance that no one seeing them come out of the cavern could by any possibility have recognised them as the same men who had the night before gone into it. even their animals had undergone some transformation. the horses were differently caparisoned; the flat american saddle having been removed from the back of the grand kentucky steed, and replaced by the deep-tree mexican _silla_, with its _corona_ of stamped leather and wooden _estribos_. the mules, too, were rigged in a different manner, each having the regular _alpareja_, or pack-saddle, with the broad _apishamores_ breeched upon its hips; while the spoils, no longer in loose, carelessly tied-up bundles, were made up into neat packs, as goods in regular transportation by an _atajo_. the two men who conducted them had altogether a changed appearance. their skins were still of the same colour--the pure bronze-black of the indian--but, instead of the eagle's feathers late sticking up above their crowns, both had their heads now covered with simple straw hats; while sleeveless coats of coarse woollen stuff, with stripes running transversely--_tilmas_--shrouded their shoulders, their limbs having free play in white cotton drawers of ample width. a leathern belt, and apron of reddish-coloured sheepskin, tanned, completed the costume of an _arriero_ of the humbler class--the _mozo_, or assistant. but the change in the two other men--the chief and him addressed as roblez--was of a far more striking kind. they had entered the cave as indians, warriors of the first rank, plumed, painted, and adorned with all the devices and insignia of savage heraldry. they came out of it as white men, wearing the costume of well-to-do rancheros--or rather that of town traders--broad glazed hats upon their heads, cloth jackets and trousers--the latter having the seats and insides of the legs fended with a lining of stamped leather; boots with heavy spurs upon their feet, crape sashes around the waist, machetes strapped along the flaps of their saddles, and seraphs resting folded over the croup, gave the finishing touch to their travelling equipment. these, with the well appointed _atajo_ of mules, made the party one of peaceful merchants transporting their merchandise from town to town. on coming out of the cave, the leader, looking fresh and bright from his change of toilet and late purification of his skin, glanced up towards the sky, as if to consult the sun as to the hour. at the same time he drew a gold watch from his vest pocket, and looked also at that. "we'll be just in the right time, roblez," he said. "six hours yet before sunset. that will get us out into the valley, and in the river road. we're not likely to meet any one after nightfall in these days of indian alarms. four more will bring us to albuquerque, long after the sleepy townsfolk have gone to bed. we've let it go late enough, anyhow, and mustn't delay here any longer. look well to your mules, _mozos! vamonos_!" at the word all started together down the gorge, the speaker, as before, leading the way, roblez next, and the mozos with their laden mules stringing out in the rear. soon after, they re-entered the mountain defile, and, once more heading north-westward, silently continued on for the valley of the rio del norte. their road, as before, led tortuously through canons and rugged ravines--no road at all, but a mere bridle path, faintly indicated by the previous passage of an occasional wayfarer or the tracks of straying cattle. the sun was just sinking over the far western cordilleras when the precipitous wall of the sierra blanca, opening wider on each side of the defile, disclosed to the spoil-laden party a view of the broad level plain known as the valley of the del norte. soon after, they had descended to it; and in the midst of night, with a starry sky overhead, were traversing the level road upon which the broad wheel-tracks of rude country carts--_carretas_--told of the proximity of settlements. it was a country road, leading out from the foot-hills of the sierra to a crossing of the river, near the village of tome, where it intersected with the main route of travel running from el paso in the south through all the riverine towns of new mexico. turning northward from tome, the white robbers, late disguised as indians, pursued their course towards the town of albuquerque. any one meeting them on the road would have mistaken them for a party of traders _en route_ from the rio abajo to the capital of santa fe. but they went not so far. albuquerque was the goal of their journey, though on arriving there--which they did a little after midnight--they made no stop in the town, nor any noise to disturb its inhabitants, at that hour asleep. passing silently through the unpaved streets, they kept on a little farther. a large house or hacienda, tree shaded, and standing outside the suburbs, was the stopping place they were aiming at; and towards this they directed their course. there was a _mirador_ or belvidere upon the roof--the same beside which colonel miranda and his american guest, just twelve months before, had stood smoking cigars. as then, there was a guard of soldiers within the covered entrance, with a sentry outside the gate. he was leaning against the postern, his form in the darkness just distinguishable against the grey-white of the wall. "_quien-viva_?" he hailed as the two horsemen rode up, the hoof-strokes startling him out of a half-drunken doze. "_el coronel-commandante_!" responded the tall man in a tone that told of authority. it proved to be countersign sufficient, the speaker's voice being instantly recognised. the sentry, bringing his piece to the salute, permitted the horsemen to pass without further parley, as also the _atajo_ in their train, all entering and disappearing within the dark doorway, just as they had made entrance into the mouth of the mountain cavern. while listening to the hoof-strokes of the animals ringing on the pavement of the _patio_ inside, the sentinel had his reflections and conjectures. he wondered where the colonel-commandant could have been to keep him so long absent from his command, and he had perhaps other conjectures of an equally perplexing nature. they did not much trouble him, however. what mattered it to him how the commandant employed his time, or where it was spent, so long as he got his _sueldo_ and rations? he had them with due regularity, and with this consoling reflection he wrapped his yellow cloak around him, leaned against the wall, and soon after succumbed to the state of semi-watchfulness from which the unexpected event had aroused him. "carrambo!" exclaimed the colonel to his subordinate, when, after looking to the stowage of the plunder, the two men sat together in a well-furnished apartment of the hacienda, with a table, decanters, and glasses between them. "it's been a long, tedious tramp, hasn't it? well, we've not wasted our time, nor had our toil for nothing. come, _teniente_, fill your glass again, and let us drink to our commercial adventure. here's that in the disposal of our goods we may be as successful as in their purchase!" right merrily the lieutenant refilled his glass, and responded to the toast of his superior officer. "i suspect, roblez," continued the colonel, "that you have been all the while wondering how i came to know about this caravan whose spoil is to enrich us--its route--the exact time of its arrival, the strength of its defenders--everything? you think our friend the horned lizard gave me all this information." "no, i don't; since that could not well be. how was horned lizard to know himself--that is, in time to have sent word to you? in truth, _mio coronel_, i am, as you say, in a quandary about all that. i cannot even guess at the explanation." "this would give it to you, if you could read; but i know you cannot, _mio teniente_; your education has been sadly neglected. never mind, i shall read it for you." as the colonel was speaking he had taken from the drawer of a cabinet that stood close by a sheet of paper folded in the form of a letter. it was one, though it bore no postmark. for all that, it looked as if it had travelled far--perchance carried by hand. it had in truth come all the way across the prairies. its superscription was:-"el coronel miranda, commandante del distrito militario de albuquerque, nuevo mexico." its contents, also in spanish, translated read thus:-"my dear colonel miranda,--i am about to carry out the promise made to you at our parting. i have my mercantile enterprise in a forward state of readiness for a start over the plains. my caravan will not be a large one, about six or seven waggons with less than a score of men; but the goods i take are valuable in an inverse ratio to their bulk-designed for the `ricos' of your country. i intend taking departure from the frontier town of van buren, in the state of arkansas, and shall go by a new route lately discovered by one of our prairie traders, that leads part way along the canadian river, by you called `rio de la canada,' and skirting the great plain of the llano estacado at its upper end. this southern route makes us more independent of the season, so that i shall be able to travel in the fall. if nothing occur to delay me in the route, i shall reach new mexico about the middle of november, when i anticipate renewing those relations of a pleasant friendship in which you have been all the giver and i all the receiver. "i send this by one of the spring caravans starting from independence for santa fe, in the hope that it will safely reach you. "i subscribe myself, dear colonel miranda,-"your grateful friend,-"francis hamersley." "well, _teniente_," said his colonel, as he refolded the far-fetched epistle, and returned it to the drawer, "do you comprehend matters any clearer now?" "clear as the sun that shines over the llano estacado," was the reply of the lieutenant, whose admiration for the executive qualities of his superior officer, along with the bumpers he had imbibed, had now exalted his fancy to a poetical elevation. "_carrai-i! esta un golpe magnifico_! (it's a splendid stroke!) worthy of manuel armilo himself. or even the great santa anna!" "a still greater stroke than you think it, for it is double--two birds killed with the same stone. let us again drink to it!" the glasses were once more filled, and once more did the associated bandits toast the nefarious enterprise they had so successfully accomplished. then roblez rose to go to the _cuartel_ or barracks, where he had his place of sleeping and abode, bidding _buena noche_ to his colonel. the latter also bethought him of bed, and, taking a lamp from the table, commenced moving towards his _cuarto de camara_. on coming opposite a picture suspended against the _sala_ wall--the portrait of a beautiful girl--he stopped in front, for a moment gazed upon it, and then into a mirror that stood close by. as if there was something in the glass that reflected its shadow into his very soul, the expression of exultant triumph, so lately depicted upon his face, was all at once swept from it, giving place to a look of blank bitterness. "one is gone," he said, in a half-muttered soliloquy; "one part of the stain wiped out--thanks to the holy virgin for that. but the other; and she--where, where?" and with these words he staggered on towards his chamber. chapter twenty one. struggling among the sages. it is the fourth day after forsaking the couch among the shin oaks, and the two fugitives are still travelling upon the llano estacado. they have made little more than sixty miles to the south-eastward, and have not yet struck any of the streams leading out to the lower level of the texan plain. their progress has been slow; for the wounded man, instead of recovering strength, has grown feebler. his steps are now unequal and tottering. in addition to the loss of blood, something else has aided to disable him--the fierce cravings of hunger and the yet more insufferable agony of thirst. his companion is similarly afflicted; if not in so great a degree, enough to make him also stagger in his steps. neither has had any water since the last drop drank amid the waggons, before commencing the fight; and since then a fervent sun shining down upon them, with no food save crickets caught in the plain, an occasional horned frog, and some fruit of the _opuntia_ cactus--the last obtained sparingly. hunger has made havoc with both, sad and quick. already at the end of the fourth day their forms are wasted. they are more like spectres than men. and the scene around them is in keeping. the plain, far as the eye can reach, is covered with _artemisia_, whose hoary foliage, in close contact at the tops, displays a continuation of surface like a vast winding-sheet spread over the world. across this fall the shadows of the two men, proportioned to their respective heights. that of the ex-ranger extends nearly a mile before him; for the sun is low down, and they have its beams upon their backs. they are facing eastward, in the hope of being able to reach the brow of the llano where it abuts on the texan prairies; though in the heart of one of them this hope is nearly dead. frank hamersley has but slight hopes that he will ever again see the homes of civilisation, or set foot upon its frontier. even the ci-devant ranger inclines to a similar way of thinking. not far off are other animated beings that seem to rejoice. the shadows of the two men are not the only ones that move over the sunlit face of the artemisia. there, too, are outlined the wings of birds--large birds with sable plumage and red naked necks, whose species both know well. they are _zopilotes_--the vultures of mexico. a score of such shadows are flitting over the sage--a score of the birds are wheeling in the air above. it is a sight to pain the traveller, even when seen at a distance. over his own head it may well inspire him with fear. he cannot fail to read in it a forecast of his own fate. the birds are following the two men, as they would a wounded buffalo or stricken deer. they soar and circle above them, at times swooping portentously near. they do not believe them to be spectres. wasted as their flesh may be, there will still be a banquet upon their bones. now and then walt wilder casts a glance up towards them. he is anxious, though he takes care to hide his anxiety from his comrade. he curses the foul creatures, not in speech--only in heart, and silently. for a time the wearied wayfarers keep on without exchanging a word. hitherto consolation has come from the side of the ex-ranger; but he seems to have spent his last effort, and is himself now despairing. in hamersley's heart hope has been gradually dying out, as his strength gets further exhausted. at length the latter gives way, the former at the same time. "no farther, walt!" he exclaims, coming to a stop. "i can't go a step further. there is a fire in my throat that chokes me; something grips me within. it is dragging me to the ground." the hunter stops too. he makes no attempt to urge his comrade on. he perceives it would be idle. "go on yourself," hamersley adds, gasping out the words. "you have yet strength left, and may reach water. i cannot, but i can die, i'm not afraid to die. leave me, walt; leave me!" "niver!" is the response, in a hoarse, husky voice, but firm, as if it came from a speaking-trumpet. "you will; you must. why should two lives be sacrificed for one? yours may still be saved. take the gun along with you. you may find something. go, comrade--friend--go!" again the same response, in a similar tone. "i sayed, when we were in the fight," adds the hunter, "an' aterwards, when gallupin' through the smoke, that livin' or dyin' we'd got to stick thegither. didn't i say that, frank hamersley? i repeat it now. ef you go unner hyar in the middle o' this sage-brush, walt wilder air goin' to wrap his karkiss in a corner o' the same windin' sheet. there ain't much strength remainin' in my arms now, but enuf, i reck'n, to keep them buzzarts off for a good spell yit. they don't pick our bones till i've thinned thar count anyhow. ef we air to be rubbed out, it'll be by the chokin' o' thirst, and not the gripin' o' hunger. what durned fools we've been, not to a-thinked o' 't afore! but who'd iver think o' eatin' turkey buzzart? wall, it's die dog or swaller the hatchet; so onpalatable as thar flesh may be, hyar goes to make a meal o' it!" while speaking, he has carried the gun to his shoulder. simultaneous with his last words comes the crack, quickly followed by the descent of a zopilote among the sages. "now, frank," he says, stooping to pick up the dead bird, while the scared flock flies farther away, "let's light a bit o' a fire, an' cook it. thar's plenty o' sage for the stuffin', an' its own flavour'll do for seasonin' 'stead o' inyuns. i reck'n we kin git some o' it down, by holdin' our noses; an' at all events, it'll keep us alive a leetle longer. wagh, ef we only hed water!" as if a fresh hope has come suddenly across his mind, he once more raises himself erect to the full stretch of his gigantic stature, and standing thus, gazes eastwardly across the plain. "thar's a ridge o' hills out that way," he says. "i'd jest spied it when you spoke o' giein out. whar thar's hills, thar's a likelihood o' streams. sposin', frank, you stay hyar, whiles i make tracks torst them. they look like they wa'n't mor'n ten miles off anyhow. i ked easy get back by the mornin'. d'ye think ye kin hold out thet long by swallerin' a bit o' the buzzart?" "i think i could hold out that long as well without it. it's more the thirst that's killing me. i feel as if liquid fire was coursing through my veins. if you believe there be any chance of finding water, go, walt." "i'll do so; but don't you sturve in the meanwhile. cook the critter afore lettin' it kim to thet. ye've got punk, an' may make a fire o' the sage-brush. i don't intend to run the risk o' sturvin' myself; an' as i mayn't find any thin' on the way, i'll jest take one o' these sweet-smellin' chickens along wi' me." he has already re-loaded the rifle; and, once more pointing its muzzle towards the sky, he brings down a second of the zopilotes. "now," he says, taking up the foul carcase, and slinging it to his belt, "keep up your heart till this chile return to ye. i'm sure o' gettin' back by the mornin'; an' to make sartint 'bout the place, jest you squat unner the shadder o' yon big palmetto--the which i can see far enuff off to find yur wharabouts 'thout any defeequelty." the palmetto spoken of is, in truth, not a "palmetto," though a plant of kindred genus. it is a _yucca_ of a species peculiar to the high table plains of northern and central mexico, with long sword-shaped leaves springing aloe-like from a core in the centre, and radiating in all directions, so as to form a spherical chevaux-de-frize. its top stands nearly six feet above the surface of the ground, and high over the artemisias; while its dark, rigid spikes, contrasted with the frosted foliage of the sage, render it a conspicuous landmark that can be seen far off over the level plain. staggering on till he has reached it, hamersley drops down on its eastern side, where its friendly shadow gives him protection from the sun, fervid, though setting; while that of walt wilder is still projected to its full length upon the plain. saying not another word, with the rifle across his shoulder and the turkey buzzard dangling down his thigh, he takes departure from the spot, striking eastward towards the high land dimly discernible on the horizon. chapter twenty two. a huntress. "_vamos_, lolita! hold up, my pretty pet! two leagues more, and you shall bury that velvet snout of yours in the soft _gramma_ grass, and cool your heated hoof in a crystal stream. ay, and you shall have a half peck of pinon nuts for your supper, i promise you. you have done well to-day, but don't let us get belated. at night, as you know, we might be lost on the llano, and the wicked wolves eat us both up. that would be a sad thing, _mia yegua_. we must not let them have a chance to dispose of us in that manner. _adelante_!" lolita is a mustang pony of clear chestnut colour, with white mane and tail; while the person thus apostrophising her is a young girl seated astride upon its back. a beautiful girl, apparently under twenty of age, but with a certain commanding mien that gives her the appearance of being older. her complexion, though white, has a tinge of that golden brown, or olive, oft observed in the andalusian race; while scimitar shaped eyebrows, with hair of silken texture, black as the shadows of night, and a dark down on the upper lip, plainly proclaim the moorish admixture. it is a face of lovely cast and almost grecian contour, with features of classic regularity; while the absence of obliquity in the orbs of the eye--despite the dusky hue of her akin--forbids the belief in indian blood. although in a part of the world where such might be expected, there is, in truth, not a taint of it in her veins. the olivine tint is hispano moriscan--a complexion, if not more beautiful, certainly more picturesque than that of the saxon blonde. with the damask-red dancing out upon her cheeks, her eyes aglow from the equestrian exercise she has been taking, the young girl looks the picture of physical health; while the tranquil expression upon her features tells of mental contentment. somewhat singular is her costume, as the equipment. as already said, she bestrides her mustang man-fashion, the mode of mexico; while a light fowling-piece, suspended _en bandouliere_, hangs down behind her back. a woollen seraph of finest wool lies scarf-like across her left shoulder, half concealing a velveteen vest or spencer, close-buttoned over the rounded hemispheres of her bosom. below, an embroidered skirt--the _enagua_--is continued by a pair of white _calzoncillas_, with fringe falling over her small feet, they are booted and spurred. on her head is a hat of soft vicuna wool, with a band of bullion, a bordering of gold lace around the rim, and a plume of heron's feather curving above the crown. this, with her attitude on horseback, might seem _outre_ in the eyes of a stranger to the customs of her country. the gun and its concomitant accoutrements give her something of a masculine appearance, and at the first glance might cause her to be mistaken for a man--a beardless youth. but the long silken tresses scattered loosely over her shoulders, the finely-cut features, the delicate texture of the skin, the petticoat skirt, the small hand, with slender tapering fingers stretched forward to caress the neck of the mustang mare, are signs of femininity not to be misunderstood. a woman--a huntress; the character clearly proclaimed by a brace of hounds--large dogs of the mastiff bloodhound breed--following at the heels of the horse. and a huntress who has been successful in the chase--as proved by two prong-horn antelopes, with shanks tied together, lying like saddle-bags across the croup. the mustang mare needs no spur beyond the sound of that sweet well-known voice. at the word _adelante_ (forward) she pricks up her ears, gives a wave of her snow-white tail, and breaks into a gentle canter, the hounds loping after in long-stretching trot. for about ten minutes is this pace continued; when a bird flying athwart the course, so close that its wings almost brush lolita's muzzle, causes her rider to lean back in the saddle and check her suddenly up. the bird is a black vulture--a zopilote. it is not slowly soaring in the usual way, but shooting in a direct line, and swiftly as an arrow sent from the bow. this it is that brings the huntress to a halt; and for a time she remained motionless, her eye following the vulture in its flight. it is seen to join a flock of its fellows, so far off as to look like specks. the young girl can perceive that they are not flying in any particular direction, but swooping in circles, as if over some quarry that lies below. whatever it is, they do not appear to have yet touched it. all keep aloft, none of them alighting on the ground, though at times stooping down, and skimming close to the tops of the sage-bushes with which the plain is thickly beset. these last prevent the huntress from seeing what lies upon the ground; though she knows there must be something to have attracted the concourse of zopilotes. evidently she has enough knowledge of the desert to understand its signs, and this is one of a significant character. it not only challenges curiosity, but calls for investigation. "something gone down yonder, and not yet dead?" she mutters, in interrogative soliloquy. "i wonder what it can be! i never look on those filthy birds without fear. _santissima_! how they made me shudder that time when they flapped their black wings in my own face! i pity any poor creature threatened by them--even where it but a coyote. it may be that, or an antelope. nothing else likely to become their prey on this bare plain. come, lolita! let us go on and see what they're after. it will take us a little out of our way, and give you some extra work. you won't mind that, my pet? i know you won't." the mare wheels round at a slight pressure upon the rein; and then commenced her canter in the direction of the soaring flock. a mile is passed over, and the birds are brought near; but still the object attracting them cannot be seen. it may be down among the artemisias, or perhaps behind a large yucca, whose dark whorl rises several feet above the sage, and over which the vultures are wheeling. as the rider of lolita arrives within gun-shot distance of the yucca-tree she checks the mustang to a slower pace--to a walk in short. in the spectacle of death, in the throes and struggles of an expiring creature, even though it be but a dumb brute, there is something that never fails to excite commiseration, mingled with a feeling of awe. this last has come over the young girl, as she draws near the spot where the birds are seen circling. it has not occurred to her that the cause of their presence may be a human being, though it is a remembrance of this kind that now prompts her to ride forward reflectively. for once in her life, with others around her who were near and dear, she has been herself an object of like eager solicitude to a flock of zopilotes. but she has not the slightest suspicion of its being a human creature that causes their gathering now. there, upon the llano estacado, so rarely trodden by human feet, and even shunned by almost every species of animal, she could not. as she draws still nearer, a black disc, dimly outlined against the dark green leaves of the yucca, upon scrutiny, betrays the form of a bird, itself a vulture. it is dead, impaled upon the sharp spikes of the plant, as it came there by falling from above. a smile curls upon her lips as she sits regarding it. "so, _yegua_!" she says, bringing the mare to a stand, and half-turning her. "i've been losing my time and you your labour. the abominable birds--it's only one of themselves that has dropped dead, and they're holding a _velorio_ over it." she continues, again facing towards the dead vulture. "now, i wonder if they are only waking it, or if the wakers are cannibals, and intend making a repast on one of their own kind. that would be a curious fact for our natural historian, don prospero. suppose we stay awhile and see?" for a moment she seems undecided as to staying or going. only for a moment, when an incident occurs that changes the current of her thoughts from scientific curiosity to something of fear. the bloodhounds that have lagged behind in the scurry across the plain, now close up; and, instead of stopping by the side of lolita, rush on towards the yucca. it is not the odour of the dead buzzard--strong as that may be--that attracts them; but the scent of what is more congenial to their sanguinary instincts. on arriving at the tree they run round to its opposite side; and then spring growling back, as if something they have encountered there has suddenly brought them to bay. "a wounded bear or wolf!" is the muttered reflection of their mistress. it has scarce passed her lips, when she is made aware of her mistake. above the continued baying of the dogs she can distinguish the tones of a human voice; and at the same instant, a man's head and arm appear above the spikes of the plant--a hand clutching the hilt of a long-bladed knife! chapter twenty three. "down, dogs!" notwithstanding her apparent _sang-froid_, and the presence of mind she surely possesses, the rider of lolita is affrighted--far more than the vultures, that have soared higher at her approach. and no wonder that she is affrighted at such a strange apparition--the head of a man, with a dark moustache on his lip, holding in his hand a blade that shows blood upon it! this, too, in such a solitary place! her first thought is to turn lolita's head and hurry off from the spot. then a reflection stays her. the man is evidently alone, and the expression on his countenance is neither that of villainy nor anger. the colour of his skin, with the moustache, bespeak him a white man, and not an indian. besides, there is pallor upon his cheeks--a wan, wasted look, that tells of suffering, not sin. all this the quick eye of the huntress takes in at a glance, resolving her how to act. instead of galloping away she urges the mustang on towards the yucca. when close up to it she flings herself out of the saddle, and, whip in hand, rushes up to the hounds, that are still giving tongue and threatening to spring upon the stranger. "_abajo, perros! abajo, feos_!" (down, dogs! down, you ugly brutes!) "_a tierra_!" she continues to scold, giving each a sharp cut that at once reduces them to quiescence, causing them to cower at her feet. "do you not see the mistake you have made?" she goes on addressing the dogs; "don't you see the caballero is not an indio? it is well, sir!" she adds, turning to the caballero, "well that your skin is white. had it been copper-coloured, i'm not certain i could have saved you from getting it torn. my pets are not partial to the american aboriginal." during these somewhat bizarre speeches and the actions that accompany them, frank hamersley--for it is he--stands staring in silent wonder. what sees he before him? two huge, fierce-looking dogs, a horse oddly caparisoned, a young girl, scarce a woman, strangely and picturesquely garbed. what has he heard? first, the loud baying of two bloodhounds, threatening to tear him to pieces; then a voice, sweet and musical as the warbling of a bird! is it all a dream? dreaming he had been, when aroused by the growling of the dogs. but that was a horrid vision. what he now sees is the very reverse. demons had been assaulting him in his sleep. now there is an angel before his eyes. the young girl has ceased speaking; and as the vertigo, caused by his sudden uprising, has cleared away from his brain, he begins to believe in the reality of the objects around him. the shock of surprise has imparted a momentary strength that soon passes; and his feebleness once more returning, he would fall back to the earth did he not clutch hold of the yucca, whose stiff blades sustain him. "_valga me dios_!" exclaims the girl, now more clearly perceiving his condition. "_ay de mi_!" she repeats in a compassionate tone, "you are suffering, sir? is it hunger? is it thirst? you have been lost upon the llano estacado?" "hunger, thirst--both, senorita," he answers, speaking for the first time. "for days i have not tasted either food or drink." "_virgen santissima_! is that so?" as she says this she returns to her horse; and, jerking a little wallet from the saddle, along, with a suspended gourd, again advances towards him. "here, senor!" she says, plunging her hand into the bag and bringing forth some cold _tortillas_, "this is all i have; i've been the whole day from home, and the rest i've eaten. take the water first; no doubt you need that most. i remember how i suffered myself. mix some of this with it. trust me, it will restore your strength." while speaking she hands him the gourd, which, by its weight, contains over a pint; and then from another and smaller one she pours some liquid first into the water and then over the tortillas. it is vinegar, in which there is an infusion of _chile colorado_. "am i not robbing you?" inquires hamersley, as he casts a significant glance over the wide, sterile plain. "no, no! i am not in need, besides i have no great way to go to where i can get a fresh supply. drink, senor, drink it all." in ten seconds after the calabash is empty. "now eat the tortillas. 'tis but poor fare, but the _chili vinagre_ will be sure to strengthen you. we who dwell in the desert know that." her words proved true, for after swallowing a few morsels of the bread she has besprinkled, the famished man feels as if some restorative medicine had been administered to him. "do you think you are able to ride?" she asks. "i can walk--though, perhaps, not very far." "if you can ride there is no need for your walking. you can mount my mare; i shall go afoot. it is not very far--only six miles." "but," protests he, "i must not leave this spot." "indeed!" she exclaims, turning upon her _protege_ a look of surprise. "for what reason, senor? to stay here would be to perish. you have no companions to care for you?" "i have companions--at least, one. that is why i must remain. whether he may return to assist me i know not. he has gone off in search of water. in any case, he will be certain to seek for me." "but why should you stay for him?" "need you ask, senorita? he is my comrade, true and faithful. he has been the sharer of my dangers--of late no common ones. if he were to come back and find me gone--" "what need that signify, caballero? he will know where to come after you." "how should he know?" "oh, that will be easy enough. leave it to me. are you sure he will find his way back to this place?" "quite sure. this tree will guide him. he arranged it so before leaving." "in that case, there's not any reason for your remaining. on the contrary. i can see that you need a better bed than sleeping among these sage-plants. i know one who will give it. come with me, caballero? by the time your comrade can get back there'll be one here to meet him. lest he should arrive before the messenger i shall send, this will save him from going astray." while speaking she draws forth a small slip of paper from a pouch carried _a la chatelaine_; along with it a pencil. she is about to write, when a thought restrains her. "does your comrade understand spanish?" she asks. "only a word or two. he speaks english, or, as we call it, american." "can he read?" "indifferently. enough, i suppose, for--" "senor," she says, interrupting him, "i need not ask if you can write. take this, and put it in your own language. say you are gone south, due south, to a distance of about six miles. tell your friend to stay here till some one comes to meet and conduct him to where you'll be found." hamersley perceives the rationality of these instructions. there is no reason why he should not do as desired, and go at once with her who gives them. by staying some mischance might still happen, and he may never see his fair rescuer again. who can tell what may arise in the midst of that mysterious desert? by going he will the sooner be able to send succour to his comrade. he hesitates no longer, but writes upon the piece of paper--in large, carefully-inscribed letters, so that the _ci-devant_ ranger need have no difficulty in deciphering them:-"saved by an angel.--strike due south. six miles from this you will find me. there is a horse, and you can take up his tracks. if you stay here for a time, one will come and guide you." the huntress takes the paper from his hand, and glances at the writing, as if out of curiosity to read the script of a language unknown to her. but something like a smile playing around her lips might lead one to believe she has divined the meaning of at least the initial sentence. she makes no remark, but stepping towards the yucca and reaching up, impales the piece of paper on one of its topmost spikes. "now, caballero," she says, "you mount my mare. see, she stands ready for you." hamersley again protests, saying he can walk well enough. but his tottering steps contradict him, and he urges his objections in vain. the young girl appealingly persists, until at length the gallantry of the kentuckian gives way, and he climbs reluctantly into the saddle. "now, lolita!" cries her mistress, "see that your step is sure, or you shan't have the pinons i promised you. _adelante! nos vamos, senor_!" so saying, she strikes off through the sage, the mustang stepping by her side, and the two great hounds, like a rear guard, bringing up behind. chapter twenty four. foes or friends? mounted on the mustang mare, frank hamersley pursues his way, wondering at his strange guide. so lovely a being encountered in such an out-of-the-way corner of the world--in the midst of a treeless, waterless desert, over a hundred miles from the nearest civilised settlement! who is she? where has she come from? whither is she conducting him? to the last question he will soon have an answer; for as they advance she now and then speaks words of encouragement, telling him they are soon to reach a place of rest. "yonder!" she at length exclaims, pointing to two mound-shaped elevations that rise twin-like above the level of the plain. "between those runs our road. once there, we shall not have much farther to go; the rancho will be in sight." the young prairie merchant makes no reply. he only thinks how strange it all is--the beautiful being by his side--her dash--her wonderful knowledge exhibited with such an air of _naivete_--her generous behaviour--the picturesqueness of her dress--her hunter equipment--the great dogs trotting at her heels--the dead game on the croup behind--the animal he bestrides--all are before his mind and mingling in his thoughts like the unreal phantasmagoria of a dream. and not any more like reality is the scene disclosed to his view when, after passing around the nearest of the twin mound-shaped hills, and entering a gate-like gorge that opens between them, he sees before him and below--hundreds of feet below--a valley of elliptical form like a vast basin scooped out of the plain. but for its oval shape he might deem it the crater of some extinct volcano. but then, where is the lava that should have been projected from it? with the exception of the two hillocks on each hand, all the country around, far as the eye can reach, is level as the bosom of a placid lake. and otherwise unlike a volcanic crater is the concavity itself. no gloom down there, no black scoriae, no returning streams of lava, nor _debris_ of pumice-stone; but, on the contrary, a smiling vegetation--trees with foliage of different shades, among which can be distinguished the dark-green frondage of the live-oak and pecan, the more brilliant verdure of cottonwoods, and the flower-loaded branches of the wild china-tree. in their midst a glassy disc that speaks of standing water, with here and there a fleck of white, which tells of a stream with foaming cascades and cataracts. near the lakelet, in the centre, a tiny column of blue smoke ascends over the tree-tops. this indicates the presence of a dwelling; and as they advance a little further into the gorge, the house itself can be descried. in contrast with the dreary plain over which he has been so long toiling, to hamersley the valley appears a paradise--worthy home of the peri who is conducting him down to it. it resembles a landscape painted upon the concave sides of an immense oval-shaped dish, with the cloudless sky, like a vast cover of blue glass, arching over it. the scene seems scarcely real, and once more the young prairie merchant begins to doubt the evidence of his senses. after all, is it only a vision of his brain, distempered by the long strain upon his intellect, and the agony he has been enduring? or is it but the _mirage_ of the desert, that has so oft already deceived him? his doubts are dissipated by the sweet voice sounding once more in his ears. "_mira, caballero_! you see where you are going now? it is not far; you will need to keep a firm seat in the saddle for the next hundred yards or so. there is a steep descent and a narrow pathway. take good hold with your knees, and trust yourself to the mare. she knows the way well, and will bear you in safety. won't you, lolita? you will, my pet!" at this the mustang gives a soft whimper, as if answering the interrogatory. "i shall myself go before," the girl continues. "so let loose the rein, and leave lolita to take her own way." after giving this injunction, she turns abruptly to the right, where a path almost perpendicular leads down a ledge, traversing the facade of the cliff. close followed by the mustang, she advances fearlessly along it. certainly a most dangerous descent, even for one afoot; and if left to his own will, hamersley might decline attempting it on horseback. but he has no choice now, for before he can make either expostulation or protest, lolita has struck along the path, and continues with hind-quarters high in air and neck extended in the opposite direction, as though standing upon her head! to her rider there is no alternative but do as he has been directed--stick close to the saddle. this he manages by throwing his feet forward and laying his back flat along the croup, till his shoulders come between the crossed shanks of the prong-horns. in this position he remains, without saying a word, or even daring to look below, till he at length finds himself moving forward with face upturned to the sky, thus discovering that the animal he bestrides is once more going along level ground. again he hears the voice of lolita's mistress, saying, "now, senor, you can sit upright; the danger is past. you have behaved well, _yegua-yeguita_!" she adds, patting the mare upon the neck; "you shall have the promised pinons--a whole _cuartilla_ of them." once more stepping to the front, she strikes off among the trees, along a path which still inclines downward, though now in gentler slope. hamersley's brain is in a whirl. the strange scenes, things, thoughts, and fancies are weaving weird spells around him; and once more he begins to think that his senses have either forsaken or are forsaking him. this time it is really so, for the long-protracted suffering--the waste of blood and loss of strength--only spasmodically resuscitated by the excitement of the strange encounter--is now being succeeded by a fever of the brain, that is gradually depriving him of his reason. he has a consciousness of riding on for some distance farther--under trees, whose leafy boughs form an arcade over his head, shutting out the sun. soon after, all becomes suddenly luminous, as the mustang bears him out into a clearing, with what appears a log-cabin in the centre. he sees or fancies the forms of several men standing by its door; and as the mare comes to a stop in their midst his fair conductor is heard excitedly exclaiming,-"_hermano_! take hold of him! _alerte! alerte_!" at this one of the men springs towards him; whether to be kind, or to kill, he cannot tell. for before a hand is laid on him the strange tableau fades from his sight; and death, with all its dark obliviousness, seems to take possession of his soul. chapter twenty five. "saved by an angel!" the shadow of walt wilder is again projected over the staked plain, as before, to a gigantic length. but this time westwardly, from a sun that is rising instead of setting. it is the morning after he parted with his disabled companion; and he is now making back towards the spot where he had left the latter, the sun's disc just appearing above the horizon, and shining straight upon his back. its rays illumine an object not seen before, which lends to walt's shadow a shape weird and fantastic. it is that of a giant, with something sticking out on each side of his head that resembles a pair of horns, or as if his neck was embraced by an ox-yoke, the tines tending diagonally outwards. on looking at walt himself the singularity is at once understood. the carcase of a deer lies transversely across his back, the legs of the animal being fastened together so as to form a sling, through which he has thrust his head, leaving the long slender shanks, like the ends of the letter x, projecting at each side and high above his shoulders. despite the load thus borne by him, the step of the ex-ranger is no longer that of a man either despairing or fatigued. on the contrary, it is light and elastic; while his countenance shows bright and joyous as the beams of the ascending sun. his very shadow seems to flit over the frosted foliage of the artemisias as lightly as the figure of a gossamer-robed belle gliding across the waxed floor of a ball-room. walt wilder no longer hungers or thirsts. though the carcase on his back is still unskinned, a huge collop cut out of one of its hind-quarters tells how he has satisfied the first craving; while the gurgle of water, heard inside the canteen slung under his arm, proclaims that the second has also been appeased. he is now hastening on to the relief of his comrade, happy in the thought of being able soon to relieve him also from his sufferings. striding lightly among the sage-bushes, and looking ahead for the landmark that should guide him, he at length catches sight of it. the palmilla, standing like a huge porcupine upon the plain, cannot be mistaken; and he descries it at more than a mile's distance, the shadow of his own head already flickering among its bayonet-like blades. just then something else comes under his eyes, which at once changes the expression upon his countenance. from gay it grows grave, serious, apprehensive. a flock of buzzards, seemingly scared by his shadow, have suddenly flapped up from among the sage-plants, and are now soaring around, close to the spikes of the palmilla. they have evidently been down _upon the earth_. and what have they been doing there? it is this question, mentally put by walt wilder, that has caused the quick change in his countenance--the result of a painful conjecture. "marciful heavens!" he exclaims, suddenly making halt, the gun almost dropping from his grasp. "kin it be possyble? frank hamersley gone under! them buzzards! they've been upon the groun' to a sartinty. darnashin! what ked they a been doin' down thar? right by the bunch o' palmetto, jest whar i left him. an' no sign o' himself to be seen? marciful heavens! kin it be possyble they've been--?" interrupting himself, he remains motionless, apparently paralysed by apprehension, mechanically scanning the palmilla, as though from it he expected an answer to his interrogatory. "it air possyble," he continues after a time, "too possyble--too likesome. he war well-nigh done up, poor young fellur; an' no wonder. whar is he now? he must be down by the side o' the bush--down an' dead. ef he war alive, he'd be lookin' out for me. he's gone under; an' this deer-meat, this water, purcured to no purpiss. i mout as well fling both away; they'll reach him too late." once more resuming his forward stride, he advanced towards the dark mass above which the vultures are soaring. his shadow, still by a long distance preceding him, has frightened the birds higher up into the air, but they show no signs of going altogether away. on the contrary, they keep circling around, as if they had already commenced a repast, and, driven off, intend returning to it. on what have they been banqueting? on the body of his comrade? what else can be there? thus questioning himself, the ex-ranger advances, his heart still aching with apprehension. suddenly his eye alights on the piece of paper impaled upon the topmost spike of the palmilla. the sight gives him relief, but only for an instant; his conjectures again leading him astray. "poor young fellur!" is his half-spoken reflection; "he's wrote somethin' to tell how he died--mayhap somethin' for me to carry back to the dear 'uns he's left behind in ole kaintuck. wall, that thing shall sartinly be done ef ever this chile gets to the states agin. darnashin! only to think how near i war to savin' him; a whole doe deer, an' water enough to a drownded him! it'll be useless venison now, i shan't care no more to put tooth into it myself. frank hamersley gone dead--the man o' all others i'd 'a died to keep alive. i'd jest as soon lie down an' stop breathin' by the side o' him." while speaking he moves on towards the palmilla. a few strides bring him so near the tree that he can see the ground surface about its base. there is something black among the stems of the sage-bushes. it is not the dead body of a man, but a buzzard, which he knows to be that he had shot before starting off. the sight of it causes him again to make stop. it looks draggled and torn, as if partially dismembered. "kin he hev been eatin' it? or war it themselves, the cussed kannybals? poor frank, i reck'n i'll find him on t'other side, his body mangled in the same way. darn it, 't air kewrous, too. 'twar on this side he laid down to git shade from the sun. i seed him squat whiles i war walkin' away. the sun ain't hot enuf yit to a druv him to westward o' the bush, though thar for sartin he must be. what's the use o' my stannin' shilly-shally hyar? i may as well face the sight at oncest, ugly as i know it'll prove. hyar goes." steeling himself for the terrible spectacle, which he believes to be certainly awaiting him, he once more advances towards the tree. a dozen strides bring him up, and less than half a dozen more carry him around it. no body, living or dead--no remains of man, mutilated or otherwise! for some time wilder stands in speechless surprise, his glances going all around. but no human figure is seen, either by the palmilla or among the sage-bushes beside it. can the wounded man have crawled away? but no; why should he? still, to make sure, the ex-ranger shouts out, calling hamersley by name. he gets no response. alone he hears the echo of his own voice, mingling with the hoarse croaking of the vultures, scared by his shouts. his hunter habits now counsel him to a different course of action. his comrade cannot be dead, else the corpse would be there. the vultures could not have eaten up both body and bones. there is no skeleton, no remains. his fellow fugitive has gone off or been taken. whither? while asking the question wilder sets about the right way to answer it. as a skilled tracker he begins by examining the signs that should put him on the trace of his missing companion. at a glance he perceives the prints of a horse's hoof, and sees they are those of one unshod. this bodes ill, for the naked-hoofed horse betokens a savage rider--an indian. still, it may not be; and he proceeds to a more careful scrutiny of the tracks. in a short time he is able to tell that but one horse has been there, and presumably but one rider, which promises better. and while shaping conjectures as to who it could have been his eye ascends to the piece of paper impaled upon the spike, which he has for a time forgotten. this promises still better. it may clear up everything. hoping it will, he strides towards and takes hold of it. lifting it carefully from the leaf, he spreads it out. he sees some writing in pencil, which he prepares to read. at first sight he supposed it might be a dying record. now he believes it may be something else. his hands tremble, and his huge frame is convulsed as he holds the paper to his eyes. with a thrill of joy he recognises the handwriting of hamersley, which he knows. he is not much of a scholar; still, he can read, and at a glance makes out the first four words, full of pleasant meaning: "_saved by an angel_!" he reads no farther, till after giving utterance to a "hurrah!" that might have been heard many miles over the staked plain. then, more tranquillised, he continues deciphering the chirography of his companion to the end; when a second shout terminates the effort. "saved by a angel!" he says, muttering to himself. "a angel on the staked plain! whar can the critter hev come from? no matter whar. thar's been one hyar, for sartin. darn me ef i don't smell the sweet o' her pettikotes now! this piece o' paper--'t ain't frank's. i knows he hedn't a scrap about him. no. thar's the scent o' a woman on it, sure; an' whar thar's a woman frank hamersley ain't likely to be let die o' sturvashun. he air too good-lookin' for that. wall i reck'n it's all right an' thar ain't no more need for me to hurry. t'war rayther a scant breakfast i've hed, an' hain't gin this chile's in'ards saterfacshun. i'll jest chaw another griskin o' the deer-meat to strengthen me for this six-mile tramp southard." in less than five minutes after, the smoke from a sage-stalk fire was seen ascending from beside the palmilla, and in its blaze, quickly kindled, a huge piece of venison, cut from the fat flanks of the doe, weighing at least four pounds, spitted upon one of the stiff blades of the plant, was rapidly turning from blood red to burnt brown. as circumstances had ofttimes compelled the ex-ranger to eat his deer-meat underdone, the habit had become his _gout_; and it was, therefore, not long before the griskin was removed from the spit. nor much longer till it ceased to be a griskin--having altogether disappeared from his fingers, followed by a gurgling sound, as half the contents of the canteen went washing it down his throat. "now!" he said, springing to his feet, after he had completed his homeric repast, "this chile feels strong enuf to face the devil hisself, an' tharfor he needn't be backward 'bout the encounterin' o' a angel. so hyar goes to find out frank hamersley, an' how _he's_ farin'. anyhow, i'll take the deer along in case thar mout be a scarcity o' eetables, though i reck'n thar's no fear o' that. whar a angel makes dwelling-place thar oughter be a full crib, though it may be ambrosyer or mannar, or some o' them fixin's as a purairy man's stummick ain't used to. anyways, a bit o' doe-deer meat won't do no harum. so, walt wilder, ole coon, let's you an' me set our faces southart, an' see what's to turn up at the tarminashun o' six miles' trampin'." once more shouldering the carcase, he strides off towards the south, guiding himself by the sun, but more by the hoof-marks of the mustang. these, though scarce distinguishable, under the over-shadowing sage-plants, are descried with little difficulty by the experienced eye of the ranger. on goes he, now and then muttering to himself conjectures as to what sort of a personage has appropriated and carried off his comrade. but, with all his jocular soliloquising, he feels certain the _angel_ will turn out to be a _woman_. chapter twenty six. fallen among friends. if, before losing consciousness, hamersley had a thought that he had fallen into the hands of enemies, never in all his life could he have been more mistaken, for those now around him, by their words and gestures, prove the very reverse. six personages compose the group-four men and a girl; the sixth, she, the huntress, who has conducted him to the house. the girl is a brown-skinned indian, evidently a domestic; and so also two of the four men. the other two are white, and of pronouncedly spanish features. one is an oldish man, greyheaded, thin-faced, and wearing spectacles. in a great city he would be taken for a _savant_, though difficult to tell what he may be, seen in the llano estacado surrounded by a desert. in the same place, the other and younger man is equally an enigma, for his bearing proclaims him both gentleman and soldier, while the coat on his back shows the undress uniform of an officer of more than medium rank. it is he who answers to the apostrophe, "hermano!" springing forward at the word, and obeying the command of his sister--for such is she whom hamersley has accompanied to the spot. throwing out his arms, and receiving the wounded man as he falls insensible from the saddle, the obedient brother for a moment stands aghast, for in the face of him unconscious he recognises an old friend-one he might no more expect to see there than to behold him falling from the sky. he can have no explanation from the man held in his arms. the latter has fainted--is dying--perhaps already dead. he does not seek it, only turns to him who wears the spectacles, saying,-"doctor, is he, indeed, dead? see if it be so. let everything be done to save him." he thus addressed takes hold of hamersley's pulse, and, after a moment or two, pronounces upon it. it beats; it indicates extreme weakness, but not absolute danger of death. then the wounded man is carried inside--tenderly borne, as if he, too, were a brother--laid upon a couch, and looked after with all the skill the grey-haired _medico_ can command, with all the assiduity of her who has brought him to the house, and him she calls "hermano." as soon as the stranger has been disposed of, between these two there is a dialogue--the brother seeking explanations from the sister, though first imparting information to her. he knows the man she has saved; telling her how and where their acquaintance was made. few words suffice, for already is the story known to her. in return, she too gives relation of what has happened--how, after her chase upon the plain, coming back successful, she saw the zopilotes, and was by them attracted out of her way; narrating all the rest already told. and now nothing more can be known. the man still lives--thank heaven for that!--but lies on the couch unconscious of all around him. not quiet, for he is turning about, with quick-beating pulse, and brain in a condition of delirium. for a night and a part of a day they keep by his bedside--all three, sister, brother, and doctor, grouped there, or going and coming. they know who the wounded man is, though ignorant of how he came by his wounds, or what strange chance left him stranded on the staked plain. they have no hope of knowing until he may regain consciousness and recover. and of this the doctor has some doubt; when asked, shaking his head ominously, till the spectacles get loosened upon his nose. but, though the prognosis remain uncertain, the diagnosis is learnt in a manner unexpected. before noon of the next day the hounds are heard baying outside; and the watchers by the sick-bed, summoned forth, see one approaching--a personage whose appearance causes them surprise. any one seen there would do the same, since for months no stranger had come near them. strange, indeed, if one had, for they are more than a hundred miles from any civilised settlement, in the very heart and centre of a desert. what they see now is a man of colossal form and gigantic stature, with bearded face and formidable aspect, rendered somewhat grotesque by a deer's carcase carried over his shoulders, the shanks of the animal rising crossways over his crown. they are not dismayed by the uncouth apparition. she who has brought hamersley to the house guesses it to be the comrade of whom he spoke-describing him as "true and faithful." and, without reflecting further, she glides out, grasps the great hunter by the hand, and conducts him to the bedside of his unconscious companion. looking at her as she leads him, walt wilder mutters to himself,-"saved by a _angel_! i knowed it would turn out a _woman_, and this is one for sartin." chapter twenty seven. the lone ranche. a singular habitation was that into which frank hamersley, and after him walt wilder, had found their way. architecturally of the rudest description--a kind among mexicans especially styled _jacal_, or more generally _rancho_, the latter designation anglicised or americanised into ranche. the _rancho_, when of limited dimensions, is termed _ranchito_, and may be seen with walls of different materials, according to the district or country. in the hot low lands (_tierras calientes_) it is usually built of bamboos, with a thatching of palm-leaf; higher up, on the table lands (_tierras templadas_) it is a structure of mud bricks unburnt (adobe's); while still higher, upon the slopes of the forest-clad sierras, it assumes the orthodox shape of a log cabin, though in many respects differing from that of the states. the one which gave shelter to the fugitives differed from all these, having walls of split slabs, set stockade fashion, and thatched with a sedge of _tule_, taken from a little lake that lay near. it had three rooms and a kitchen, with some sheds at the back--one a stable appropriated to the mustang mare, another to some mules, and a third occupied by two men of the class of "peons"--the male domestics of the establishment. all, with the house itself, structures of the rudest kind, unlike as possible to the dwelling-place of a lady, to say nought of an _angel_. this thought occurs to wilder as he enters under its roof. but he has no time to dwell upon it. his wounded comrade is inside, to whom he is conducted. he finds the latter still alive--thank god for that!--but unconscious of all that is passing around. to the kindly words spoken in apostrophe he makes no reply, or only in speeches incoherent. his skin is hot, his lips parched, his pulse throbbing at ninety to the minute. he is in the throes of a raging fever, which affects his brain as his blood. the stalwart hunter sits down by his side, and stays there, tenderly nursing him. it glads him to observe there are others solicitous as himself--to find that he and hamersley have fallen among friends. though also surprising him, as does the sort of people he sees around. first, there is a lady, easily recognised as the _angel_; then a man of military aspect, who addresses her as "hermanita," unquestionably a gentleman with a second and older man wearing spectacles, by both spoken of as "el medico." strange inhabitants for a hovel, as that this should be in such an odd situation--hundreds of miles beyond the borders of civilisation, as walt well knows. no wonder at his wondering, above all when he discovers that his comrade is already known to them--to the younger of the two men, who is their host. this, however, is soon explained. walt was already aware that the young prairie trader had made a former trip to new mexico, when and where, as he is now told, the acquaintance commenced, along with some other particulars, to satisfy him for the time. in return for this confidence he gives a detailed account of the caravan and its mischances--of the great final misfortune, which explains to them why its owner and himself had been forced to take to the staked plain, and were there wandering about, helpless fugitives. to his narrative all three eagerly listen. but when he enlarges on the bravery of his young comrade, lying unconscious beside them, one bends upon the latter eyes that express an interest amounting to admiration. it is the "angel." in the days that succeed she becomes walt's fellow-watcher by the bedside of the sufferer; and often again does he observe similar glances given to their common patient. rough backwoodsman though he be, he can tell them to be looks of love. he thinks less about them because he has himself found something of like kind stealing over his thoughts. all his cares are not given to his invalided comrade; for in the hut is a fourth individual, whose habitual place is the _cocina_, coming and going, as occasion calls. a little brown-skinned beauty, half spanish, half pueblo indian, whose black eyes have burnt a hole through his buckskin hunting-shirt, and set fire to his heart. though but little more than half his height, in less than a week after making her acquaintance she has become his master, as much as if their stature were reversed. walt does not want her for his mistress. no; the hunter is too noble, too honourable, for that his glance following her as she flits about the room, taking in her dainty shape, and the expression of her pretty face, always wreathed in smiles, he has but one single-hearted desire, to which he gives muttered expression, saying,-"thet's jest the kind o' gurl a fellow ked freeze to. i ne'er seed a apple dumplin' as looked sweeter or more temptin'; an' if she's agreeable, we two air born to be bone o' one bone, and flesh o' one flesh!" chapter twenty eight. a sweet awakening. for many days the young kentuckian remains unconscious of all that is passing around. fortunately for him, he has fallen into the right hands; for the old gentleman in spectacles is in reality a medical man-a skilled surgeon as well as a physician, and devotes all his time and skill to restoring his patient to health. soon the wound shows signs of healing, and, along with it, the fever begins gradually to abate. the brain at length relieved, reason resumes its sway. hamersley becomes conscious that he still lives, on hearing voices. they are of men. two are engaged in a dialogue, which appears to be carried on with some difficulty, as one is speaking english, which the other but slightly understands. neither is the english of the first speaker of a very correct kind, nor is his voice at all euphonious. for all that, it sounds in hamersley's ears sweet as the most seraphic music, since in its tones he recognises the voice of walt wilder. a joyous throb thrills through his heart on discovering that his comrade has rejoined him. after their parting upon the plain he had his fears they might never come together again. walt is not within sight, for the conversation is carried on outside the room. the invalid sees that he is in a room, a small one, of which the walls are wood, roughly-hewn slabs, with furniture fashioned in a style corresponding. he is lying upon a _catre_, or camp bedstead, rendered soft by a mattress of bearskins, while a _serape_ of bright-coloured pattern is spread over him, serving both for blanket and counterpane. in the apartment is a table of the rudest construction, with two or three chairs, evidently from the hand of the same unskilful workman, their seats being simply hides with the hair on. on the table is a cup with a spoon in it, and two or three small bottles, that have the look of containing medicines. all these objects come under his eyes at the first dim glance; but as his vision grows clearer, and he feels strength enough to raise his head from the pillow, other articles are disclosed to view, in strange contrast with the chattels first observed. against the wall hang several articles of female apparel--all of a costly kind. they are of silk and silk-velvet, richly brocaded; while on a second table, slab like the first, he can distinguish bijouterie, with other trifles usually belonging to a lady's toilet. these lie in front of a small mirror set in a frame which appears to be silver; while above is suspended a guitar, of the kind known as _bandolon_. the sick man sees all these things with a half-bewildered gaze, for his senses are still far from clear. the costly articles of apparel and adornment would be appropriate in a lady's boudoir or bed chamber. but they appear strange, even grotesque, in juxtaposition with the roughly-hewn timbers of what is evidently a humble cottage--a log cabin! of course he connects them with her, that singular being who has succoured, and perhaps saved his life. he can have no other conjecture. he remembers seeing a house as they approached its outside. it must be that he is now in; though, from the last conscious thought, as he felt himself swooning in the saddle, all has been as blank as if he had been lying lifeless in a tomb. even yet it might appear as a dream but for the voice of walt wilder, who, outside, seems labouring hard to make himself intelligible to some personage with whom he is conversing. hamersley is about to utter a cry that will summon his comrade to his side, when he perceives that the voices are becoming fainter, as if the two speakers had gone outside the house and were walking away from it. feeling too weak even for the slightest exertion, he remains silent, taking it for granted they will soon return. it is broad daylight, the sun glancing in through an aperture in the wall that serves for a window. it has neither frame nor glass, and along with the bright beams there drifts in a cool breeze laden with the delicious fragrance of flowers, among which he can distinguish the aromatic perfume of the wild china tree. there are voices of birds mingling their music with the sough of falling water--sounds very different from those of the desert through which he has of late been straying. he lies thinking of the beautiful being who brought him thither, shaping conjectures in regard to the strangeness of the situation. he has no idea how long he may have been unconscious; nor has the whole time been like death--unless death have its dreams. for he has had dreams, all with a fair form and lovely face flitting and figuring in them. it is the wild huntress. he has a fancy that the face seemed familiar to him; or, if not familiar, one he has looked upon before. he endeavours to recall all those he had met in mexico during his sojourn there; for if encountered anywhere, it must have been there. his female acquaintances had been but few in that foreign land. he can remember every one of them. she is not of their number. if he has ever seen her before their encounter on the staked plain, it must have been while passing along the street of some mexican city. and this could scarcely be, in his silent reflection; for such a woman once seen--even but for a moment--could never be forgotten. he lies pondering on all that has passed--on all he can now recall. walt had got back, then, to the place where they parted. he must have found food and water, though it matters now no more. enough that he has got back, and both are in an asylum of safety, under friendly protection. this is evident from the surroundings. still feeble as a child, the effort of thought very soon fatigues him; and this, with the narcotic influence of the flower perfume, the songs of the birds, and the soothing monotone of the waters, produces a drowsiness that terminates in a profound slumber. this time he sleeps without dreaming. how long he cannot tell; but once more he is awakened by voices. as before, two persons are engaged in conversation. but far different from those already heard. the bird-music still swelling in through the window is less sweet than the tones that now salute his ear. as before, the speakers are invisible, outside the room. but he can perceive that they are close to the door, and the first words heard admonish him of their design to enter. "now, conchita! go get the wine, and bring it along with you. the doctor left directions for it to be given him at this hour." "i have it here, senorita." "_vaya_! you have forgotten the glass. you would not have him drink out of the bottle?" "_ay dios_! and so i have," responds conchita, apparently gliding off to possess herself of the required article, with which she soon returns. "ish!" cautions the other voice; "if he be still asleep, we must not wake him. don prospero said that. step lightly, _muchacha_!" hamersley is awake, with eyes wide open, and consciousness quite restored. but at this moment something--an instinct of dissembling-causes him to counterfeit sleep; and he lies still, with shut eyelids. he can hear the door turning upon its hinges of raw hide, then the soft rustle of robes, while he is sensible of that inexpressible something that denotes the gentle presence of woman. "yes, he is asleep," says the first speaker, "and for the world we may not disturb him. the doctor was particular about that, and we must do exactly as he said. you know, conchita, this gentleman has been in great danger. thanks to the good virgin, he'll get over it. don prospero assures us he will." "what a pity if he should not! oh, senorita, isn't he--" "isn't he what?" "handsome--beautiful! he looks like a picture i've seen in the church; an angel--only that the angel had wings, and no mustachios." "pif, girl; don't speak in that silly way, or i shall be angry with you. _vayate_! you may take away the wine. we can come again when he awakes. _guardate_! tread lightly." again there is the rustling of a dress; but this time as if only one of the two were moving off. the other seems still to linger by the side of the couch. the invalid queries which of the two it is. there is an electricity that tells him; and, for an instant, he thinks of opening his eyes, and proclaiming consciousness of what has been passing. a thought restrains him--delicacy. the lady will know that he has been awake all the while, and overheard the conversation. it has been in spanish, but she is aware that he understands this, for he has no doubt that the "senorita" is she who has saved him. he remains without moving, without unclosing his eyelids. but his ears are open, and he hears a speech pleasanter than any yet spoken. it is in the shape of a soliloquy--a few words softly murmured. they are, "_ay de mil_ 'tis true what conchita says, and as valerian told me. _he is, indeed, handsome--beautiful_!" more than ever hamersley endeavours to counterfeit sleep, but he can resist no longer. involuntarily his eyes fly open, and, with head upraised, he turns towards the speaker. he sees what he has been expecting, what he beheld in fancy throughout his long, delirious dream--the fair form and beautiful face that so much interested him, even in that hour when life seemed to be forsaking him. it is the angel of the desert, no longer in huntress garb, but dressed as a lady. there is a red tinge upon her cheek, that appears to have flushed up suddenly, as if suspecting her soliloquy has been heard. the words have but parted from her lips, and the thought is yet thrilling in her heart. can he have heard it? he shows no sign. she approaches the couch with a look of solicitude, mingled with interrogation. a hand is held out to her, and a word or two spoken to say she is recognised. her eyes sparkle with joy, as she perceives in those of the invalid that reason is once more seated on its throne. "i am so happy," she murmurs, "we are all so happy, to know you are out of danger. don prospero says so. you will now get well in a short time. but i forget; we were to give you something as soon as you should awake. it is only some wine. conchita, come hither!" a young girl is seen stepping into the chamber. a glance would tell her to be the maid, if the overheard conversation had not already declared it. a little brown-skinned damsel, scarce five feet in height, with raven hair hanging in double plait down her back, and black eyes that sparkle like those of a basilisk. provident conchila has brought the bottle and glass with her, and a portion of the famed grape juice of el paso is administered to the invalid. "how good and kind you've all been!" he says, as his head once more settles down upon the pillow. "and you especially, senorita. if i mistake not, i'm indebted to you for the saving of my life." "do not speak of that," she rejoins; "i've shown you no kindness in particular. you would not have one leave a fellow creature to perish?" "ah! but for you i should now have been in another world." "no, indeed. there you are mistaken. if i had never come near you, you'd have been saved all the same. i have good news for you. your comrade is safe, and here. he returned to your trysting-place, with both food and drink; so, as you see, i have no merit in having rescued you. but i must not talk longer. don prospero has given instructions for you to be kept quiet. i shall bring the doctor at once. now that you are awake it is necessary he should see you." without waiting for a reply, she glides out of the room, conchita having gone before. chapter twenty nine. don valerian. hamersley lies pondering on what he has seen and heard, more especially on what he has overheard--that sweet soliloquy. few men are insensible to flattery. and flattery from fair lips! he must be indeed near death whose heart-pulsations it does not affect. but don prospero! who is he? is he the owner of the voice heard in dialogue with walt wilder? may he be the owner of all? this thought troubles the kentuckian. approaching footsteps put a stop to his conjectures. there are voices outside, one of them the same late sounding so sweetly in his ears. the other is a man's, but not his who was conversing with wilder. nor is it that of the ex-ranger himself. it is don prospero, who soon after enters the room, the lady leading the way. a man of nigh sixty years of age, spare form and face, hair grizzled, cheeks wrinkled; withal hale and hearty, as can be told by the pleasant sparkle of his eye. dressed in a semi-military suit, of a subdued tint, and facings that tell of the medical staff. at a glance there is no danger in don prospero. the invalid feels easier, and breathes freely. "glad to see you looking so well," says don prospero, taking hold of his patient's wrist and trying the pulse. "ah! much more regular; it will be all right now. keep quiet, and we shall soon get you on your feet again. come, senor! a little more of this grape-juice will do you no harm. nothing like our new mexican wine for bringing back a sick man to his appetite. after that, we shall give you some wild-turkey broth and a bone to pick. in a day or two you'll be able to eat anything." other personages are now approaching the chamber. the lady glides out, calling,-"valerian!" "who is valerian?" feebly interrogates the invalid. once more the name of a man is making him unhappy. "don valerian!" responds the doctor, in a tone that tells of respect for the individual so designated; "you shall see, senor. you are about to make his acquaintance. no; i am wrong about that. i forgot. you cannot now." "cannot! why?" "because you have made it already. _mira_! he is there!" this as a tall, elegant man, under thirty years of age, steps inside the chamber, while a still taller form appears in the doorway, almost filling up the space between the posts. the latter is walt wilder, but the former--who is he? don valerian, of course! "colonel miranda!" exclaims hamersley, starting up on his couch. he has already dismissed all suspicious fears of don prospero; and now he no longer dreads valerian. "colonel miranda, is it you?" "it is, _mio amigo_, myself, as you see. and i need not tell you how glad i am to meet you again. so unexpected in this queer quarter, where i little hoped to have the pleasure of entertaining an old friend. our worthy doctor here informs us you will soon get strong again, and become more of a tax on my hospitality than you have yet been. no doubt, after your illness, you'll have the appetite of an ostrich. well, in one way, that will be fortunate, since we are living, as you may see, in a somewhat homeric fashion. _carrambo_! you will be deeming my manners quite as rude as the roughest of homer's heroes. i am forgetting to introduce you to one of whom you've heard me speak. though it don't so much signify, since the lady has made your acquaintance already. permit me to present my dear adela." it is the beautiful huntress who steps forward to be introduced, now looking more beautiful than ever. to hamersley all is explained by her presence. he remembers the portrait upon the wall, which accounts for his fancy of having seen her face before. he sees it now; his wonder giving way to an intense, ardent admiration. soon, the young lady retiring, his curiosity comes back, and he asks his host for an explanation. how came colonel miranda there, and why? by what sinister combination of circumstances has the military commandant of albuquerque made his home in the midst of a howling wilderness, for such is the llano estacado? despite the smiling oasis immediately surrounding it, it cannot have been choice. no. chance, or rather mischance, must have led to this change in the affairs of his new mexican acquaintance. more than an acquaintance--a friend who stood by him in the hour of danger, first courageously protecting, then nobly volunteering to act as his second in a duel; afterwards taking him on to his home and showing him hospitality, kind as was ever extended to a stranger in a strange land. no wonder frank hamersley holds him dear. dearer now, after seeing his sister _in propria persona_--she whose portrait had so much impressed his fancy--the impression now deepened by the thought that to her he has been indebted for his life. naturally enough, the young kentuckian is desirous of knowing all, and is anxious about the fortunes of his mexican friend, that for the time seem adverse. "no," is colonel miranda's response to his appeal. "not now, senor don francisco. our good doctor here places an embargo on any further conversation for the present. the tale i have to tell might too much excite you. therefore let it rest untold till you are stronger and more able to hear it rehearsed. now, _amigo_, we must leave you alone, or rather, i should say, in the best of good company, for such has your worthy comrade, the senor wilder, proved himself to be. no doubt you'll be anxious to have a word with one who, while your life was in danger, would have sacrificed his own to save it. don prospero permits him to remain with you and give such explanations as you may need. the rest of us are to retire. _hasta luega_." so saying, miranda steps out of the room. "keep perfectly quiet," adds the ex-army surgeon, preparing to follow. "don't excite yourself by any act or thought that may cause a return of the fever. for in that lies your greatest danger. feel confident, _caballero_, that you're in the company of friends. don gaulterio here will be able to convince you of that. ah! senor, you've a nurse who feels a great interest in seeing you restored to health." pronouncing these last words in undertone and with an accent of innuendo, accompanied by a smile which the invalid pleasantly interprets, don prospero also retires, leaving his patient alone with his old caravan guide. drawing one of the chairs up to the side of the bed, the ex-ranger sits down upon it, saying,-"wal, frank, ain't it wonderful? that we shed both be hyar, neested snug an' comfortable as two doons in the heart of a hollow tree, arter all the dangersome scrapes we've been passin' through. gheehorum! to think o' thar bein' sech a sweet furtile place lyin' plum centre in the innermost recesses o' the staked plain, whar we purairey men allers believed thar wun't nothin' 'ceptin' dry desert an' stinkin' sage-bush. instead, hyar's a sort o' puradise aroun' us, sech as i used read o' when i war a youngster in the big book. thar's the difference, that in the gardin o' eeden thar's but one woman spoken of; hyar thar's two, one o' which you yurself hev called a angel, an' ye hain't sayed anythin' beyont the downright truth. she air a angel, if iver thar was sech on airth. now, not detractin' anythin' from her merits, thar's another near hand--somewhat of a smaller sort, though jest as much, an' a little bit more, to my likin'. ye won't mind my declarin' things that way. as they say in mexican spanish, _cadder uner a soo gooster_ (cada una a su gusto), every one to his own way o' thinkin', so my belief air that in this. gardin o' eeden thar air two eves, one o' which, not countin' to be the mother o' all men, will yit, supposin' this chile to hev his way, be the mother o' a large family o' young wilders." while hamersley is still smiling at the grotesque prognostication, the ex-ranger, seizing hold of his hand, continues,-"i'm so glad you're a goin' to rekiver. leavin' out the angels we love, ther'll be some chance to git square wi' the devils we've sech reezun to hate. we may yit make them pay dear for the bloody deed they've done in the murderin' o' our innercent companyuns." "amen to that," mutters hamersley, returning the squeeze of his comrade's hand with like determined pressure. "sure as i live, it shall be so." chapter thirty. the raiders returning. an indian bivouac. it is upon a creek called "pecan," a confluent of the little witchita river, which heads about a hundred miles from the eastern edge of the llano estacado. there are no tents in the encampment; only here and there a blanket or buffalo robe extended horizontally upon upright poles--branches cut from the surrounding trees. the umbrageous canopy of the pecans protects the encamped warriors from the fervid rays of a noonday sun, striking vertically down. that they are on the maraud is evidenced by the absence of tents. a peaceful party, in its ordinary nomadic passage across the prairies, would have lodges along with it--grand conical structures of painted buffalo skins--with squaws to set them up, and dogs or ponies to transport them when struck for another move. in this encampment on the pecan are neither squaws, dogs, nor ponies; only men, naked to the breech clout, their bodies brightly painted from hip to head, chequered like a hatchment, or the jacket of a stage harlequin, with its fantastic devices, some ludicrous, others grotesque; still others of aspect terrible--showing a death's-head and cross-bones. a prairie man on seeing them would at once say, "indians on the war trail!" it does not need prairie experience to tell they are returning upon it. if there are no ponies or dogs beside them, there are other animals in abundance--horses, mules, and horned cattle. horses and mules of american breed, and cattle whose ancestral stock has come from tennessee or kentucky along with the early colonists of texas. and though there are no squaws or papooses in the encampment, there are women and children that are white. a group comprising both can be seen near its centre. it does not need the dishevelled hair and torn dresses to show they are captives; nor yet the half-dozen savages, spear-armed, keeping guard over them. their drooping heads, woeful and wan countenances, are too sure signs of their melancholy situation. what are these captives, and who their captors? two questions easily answered. in a general way, the picture explains itself. the captives are the wives and children, with sisters and grown-up daughters among them, of texan colonists. they are from a settlement too near the frontier to secure itself against indian attack. the captors are a party of comanches, with whom the reader has already made acquaintance; for they are no other than the sub-tribe of tenawas, of whom the horned lizard is leader. the time is two weeks subsequent to the attack on hamersley's train; and, judging by the spectacle now presented, we may conclude that the tenawa chief has not spent the interval in idleness. nearly three hundred miles lie between the place where the caravan was destroyed and the site of the plundered settlement, whose spoils are now seen in the possession of the savages. such quick work requires explanation. it is at variance with the customs and inclinations of the prairie freebooter, who, having acquired a booty, rarely strikes for another till the proceeds of the first be squandered. he resembles the anaconda, which, having gorged itself, lies torpid till the craving of a fresh appetite stirs it to renewed activity. thus would it have been with the tenawa chief and his band, but for a circumstance of a somewhat unusual kind. as is known, the attack on the prairie traders was not so much an affair of the horned lizard as his confederate, the military commandant of albuquerque. the summons had come to him unexpected, and after he had planned his descent on the texas settlement. sanguinary as the first affair was, it had been short, leaving him time to carry out his original design, almost equally tragical in its execution. here and there, a spear standing up, with a tuft of light-coloured hair, blood-clotted upon its blade, is proof of this. quite as successful, too. the large drove of horses and horned cattle, to say nothing of that crowd of despairing captives, proves the proceeds of the later maraud worth as much, or perhaps more, than what had been taken from the traders' waggons. horned lizard is jubilant; so, also, every warrior of his band. in loss their late foray has cost them comparatively little--only one or two of their number, killed by the settlers while defending themselves. it makes up for the severe chastisement sustained in their onslaught upon the caravan. and, since the number of their tribe is reduced, there are now the fewer to share with, so that the calicoes of lowell, the gaudy prints of manchester, with stripes, shroudings, and scarlet cloth to bedeck their bodies, hand mirrors in which to admire themselves, horses to ride upon, mules to carry their tents, and cattle to eat--with white women to be their concubines, and white children their attendants--all these fine things in full possession have put the savages in high spirits--almost maddened them with delight. a new era has dawned upon the tribe of which horned lizard is head. hitherto it has been a somewhat starving community, its range lying amid sterile tracts, on the upper tributaries of the red river and canadian. now, before it is a plentiful future--a time of feasting and revelry, such as rarely occurs to a robber band, whether amidst the forest-clad mountains of italy, or on the treeless steppes of america. the tenawa chief is both joyous and triumphant. so, too, his second in command, whose skin, with the paint cleansed from it, would show nearly white. for he is a mexican by birth; when a boy made prisoner by the comanches, and long since matriculated into the mysteries of the redman's life--its cunning, as its cruelties. now a man, he is one of the chiefs of the tribe, in authority only less than the horned lizard himself, but equal to the latter in all the cruel instincts that distinguish the savage. "el barbato" he is called, from having a beard, though this he keeps clean shaven, the better to assimilate himself to his beardless companions; while, with painted face and hair black as their own, he looks as indian as any of them. but he has not forgotten his native tongue, and this makes him useful to those who have adopted him, especially when raiding in the republic of mexico. it was through him the tenawa chief was first brought to communicate with the military robber, uraga. the indian bivouac is down in the creek bottom in a little valley, on both sides flanked by precipitous cliffs. above and below these approach each other, so near as to leave only a narrow path along the edge of the stream. the savages are resting after a long, rapid march, encumbered with their spoils and captives. some have lain down to sleep, their nude bodies stretched along the sward, resembling bronze statues tumbled from their pedestals. others squat around fires, roasting collops from cattle they have killed, or eating them half raw. a few stand or saunter by the side of the captives, upon these casting covetous glances, as if they only waited for the opportunity to appropriate them. the women are all young; some of them scarce grown girls, and some very beautiful. a heart-harrowing sight it would be for their fathers, brothers, husbands and sweethearts, could they but witness it. these may not be far off. some suspicion of this has carried the horned lizard and el barbato up to the crest of the cliff. they have been summoned thither by a sign, which the traveller on the prairies of texas or the table plains of mexico never sees without stopping to scrutinise and shape conjecture about its cause. before entering the canon through which runs pecan creek, the tenawa chief had observed a flock of turkey-buzzards circling about in the air. not the one accompanying him and his marauders on their march, as is the wont of these predatory birds. but another quite separate gang, seen at a distance behind, apparently above the path along which he and his freebooters had lately passed. as the comanche well knows, a sign too significant to be treated lightly or with negligence. and so, too, his second in command. therefore have they climbed the cliff to obtain a better view of the birds--those flying afar--and, if possible, draw a correct conclusion as to the cause of their being there. on reaching the summit they again see them, though so far off as to be barely visible--black specks against the blue canopy of the sky. still near enough to show a large number circling about over some object that appears stationary. this last observation seems satisfactory to the tenawa chief, who, turning to his fellow-freebooter, shouts out,-"nothing to fear. don't you remember, barbato, one of our horses gave out there, and was left? it's over him the zopilotes are swooping. he's not dead yet; that's why they don't go down." "it may be," rejoins the renegade. "still i don't like the look of it. over a dead horse they'd hardly soar so high. true, they keep in one place. if it were texans pursuing us they'd be moving onward--coming nearer and nearer. they're not. it must be, as you say, the horse. i don't think the people of the settlement we struck would be strong enough to come after us--at least not so soon. they may in time, after they've got up a gathering of their rangers. that isn't likely to be till we've got safe beyond their reach. they won't gain much by a march to the witchita mountains. _por cierte_! the zopilotes out yonder are over something; but, as they're not moving on, most likely it's the horse." again the horned lizard gives a grunt, expressing satisfaction; after which the two scramble back down the cliff, to seek that repose which fighting and forced marching make necessary to man, be he savage or civilised. chapter thirty one. pursuers on the path. despite common belief, the instinct of the indian is not always sure, nor his intellect unerring. an instance of the contrary is afforded by the behaviour of the tenawa chief and his subordinate barbato. about the buzzards both have been mistaken. the second flock seen by them is not hovering over a horse, but above an encampment of horsemen. not correctly an encampment, but a halt _en bivouac_--where men have thrown themselves from their saddles, to snatch a hurried repast, and take quick consultation about continuing on. they are all men, not a woman or child among them, bearded men with white skins, and wearing the garb of civilisation. this not of the most fashionable kind or cut, nor are they all in the exact drew of civilised life. for many of them wear buckskin hunting shirts, fringed leggings, and moccasins; more a costume peculiar to the savage. besides these there are some in blanket-coats of red, green, and blue; all sweat-stained and dust-tarnished, till the colours nearly correspond. others in kentucky jeans, or copper-coloured homespun. still others in sky-blue _cottonade_, product of the hand-mills of attakapas. boots, shoes, and brogans fabricated out of all kinds of leather; even that from the corrugated skin of the illigator. hats of every shape, fashion, size, and material--straw, chip, panama, wool, felt, silk, and beaver. in one respect they are all nearly alike--in their armour and accoutrements. all are belted, pouched, and powder-horned. each carries a bowie-knife and a revolving pistol--some two--and none are without a rifle. besides this uniformity there are other points of resemblance--extending to a certain number. it is noticeable in their guns, which are jagers of the us army-brand. equally apparent is the caparison of their horses; these carrying cavalry saddles, with peaks and cantles brass mounted. among the men to whom these appertain there is a sort of half-military discipline, indicated by some slight deference shown to two or three, who appear to act with the authority of officers. it is, in fact, a troop--or, as by themselves styled, a "company"--of texan rangers. about one-half the band belongs to this organisation. the others are the people of the plundered settlement--the fathers, brothers, and husbands, whom the horned lizard and his red robbers have bereft of daughters, sisters, and wives. they are in pursuit of the despoilers; a chase commenced as soon as they could collect sufficient force to give it a chance of success. luckily, a troop of rangers, scouting in the neighbourhood, came opportunely along, just in time to join them. soldiers and settlers united, they are now on the trail of the tenawas, and have only halted to breathe and water their horses, eat some food themselves, and then on. not strange their hot haste--men whose homes have been made desolate, their kindred carried into captivity. each has his own painful reflections. in that hour, at that very moment, his beloved wife, his delicate daughter, his fair sister, or sweetheart, may be struggling in the embrace of a brawny savage. no wonder that to them every hour seems a day, every minute an hour. though with a different motive, not much less impatient are their associates in the pursuit--the rangers. it chances to be a company especially rabid for defence against the incursions of the tenawa tribe; and more than once baffled by these cunning red-skins, they are anxious to make up for past disappointment. twice before have they followed the retreating trail of these same savages, on both occasions returning foiled and empty-handed. and, now that they are again on it, with surer signs to guide them, the young men of the corps are mad to come up with the red marauders, while the elder ones are almost equally excited. both resemble hounds in a hunt where the scent is hot--the young dogs dashing forward without check, the old ones alike eager, but moving with more circumspection. between them and the settlers there is the same earnestness of purpose, though stimulated by resentment altogether different. the latter only think of rescuing their dear ones, while the former are stirred by soldier pride and the instinctive antagonism which a texan ranger feels for a tenawa. many of them have old scores to settle with the horned lizard, and more than one longs to send a bullet through his heart. but, despite the general reckless impatience to proceed, there are some who counsel caution. chief among those is a man named cully, a thin wiry sexagenarian, who looks as if he had been at least half a century upon the prairies. all over buckskin, fitting tight to his body, without tag or tail, he is not one of the enrolled rangers, though engaged to act as their guide. in this capacity he exercises an influence over the pursuers almost equalling that of their leader, the ranger captain, who, with a group gathered around, is now questioning the guide as to the next move to be made. "they can't be very far off now," replies cully, in answer to the captain's interrogatory. "all the signs show they passed this hyar point a good hour arter sun-up. the dew war off the grass as they druv over it, else the blades 'ud a been pressed flatter down. besides, there's the dead hoss they've left ahint. ye see some o' 'em's cut out his tongue an' tuk it along for a tit-bit at thar next campin' place. now, as the blood that kim out o' the animal's mouth ain't been long cruddled up, thet shows to a sartinty they can't be far forrad. i reck'n i know the adzact spot whar they're squatted." "where?" "peecawn creek. there they'll get good water for thar stock, an' the shade o' trees to rest unner; the which last they'll take to in this hottish spell o' sun." "if they're upon the pecan," puts in a third speaker, a tall, lathy individual, in a green blanket coat, badly faded, "and anywhere near its mouth, we can't be more than five miles from them. i know this part of the country well. i passed through it last year along with the santa fe expedition." "only five miles!" exclaims another man, whose dress bespeaks a planter of respectability, while his woe-begone countenance proclaims him to be one of the bereaved. "oh, gentlemen i surely our horses are now rested enough. let us ride forward and fall upon them at once!" "we'd be durned foolish to do so," responded cully. "thet, mr wilton, 'ud be jest the way to defeet all our plans an' purpisses. they'd see us long afore we ked git sight o' them, an' maybe in time to run off all the stolen hosses an' cattle, but sartinly the keptyves." "what's your way, cully?" interrogates a lieutenant of the rangers. "my way air to wait till the sun go down, then steal torst 'm. thar boun' to hev fires, an' thet'll guide us right into thar camp. ef it's in the peecawn bottom, as i'm pretty sure it air, we kin surround 'em eesy. thar's bluffs a-both sides, an' we kin divide inter two lots--one slippin' roun' an' comin' from up the creek, while t'other approaches 'em from below. in thet way we'll make sure o' keepin' 'em from runnin' off the weemen; beside it'll gie us the more likelier chance to make a good count o' the redskin sculps." "what do you say, boys?" asks the ranger captain, addressing himself more especially to the men composing his command. "cully's right," is the response from a majority of voices. "then we must stay here till night. if we go forward now, they may see us before we get within shooting distance. so you think, cully, you can take up the trail at night, supposing it to be a dark one?" "pish!" retorts the old prairie-man, with a disdainful toss of his head. "take up the trail o' a tenawa injun? i'd do that in the darkest night as iver shet down over a prairie. the skunks! i ked smell the place they'd passed over." there is no further discussion. cully's opinion is all-powerful, and determines the course to be pursued. the halt intended to be temporary, is to continue till near sunset, despite expostulations, almost prayerful appeals, from those who have left desolate homes behind, and who burn with impatience to ride forward and rescue their captive kindred. chapter thirty two. the savages surprised. throughout the afternoon hours both parties remained stationary; the pursued indulging in a siesta, which days of rough riding and raiding, with nights of watchfulness, have made necessary; the pursuers, on their part, wearied as well, but unable to sleep so long as their vengeance remains unappeased, and such dread danger hangs over the heads of those near and dear to them. above the bivouacs the black vultures spread their shadowy wings, soaring and circling, each "gang" over the cohort it has been all day accompanying. every now and then between the two "gangs" one is seen coming and going, like so many mutual messengers passing between; for, although the flocks are far apart, they can see one another, and each is aware, by instinct clearer than human ken, what the other is after. it is not the first time for them to follow two such parties travelling across the texan prairie. nor will it be the first for them to unite in the air as the two troops come into collision on the earth. often have these birds, poised in the blue ether, looked down upon red carnage like that now impending. their instincts--let us call them so, for the sake of keeping peace with the naturalists of the closet--then admonish them what is likely to ensue. for if not reason, they have at least recollection; and as their eyes rest upon men with dusky skins, and others dimly white, they know that between such is a terrible antagonism, oft accruing to their own interest. many a time has it given them a meal. strange if they should not remember it! they do. though tranquilly soaring on high--each bird with outstretched neck and eye bent, in hungry concupiscence, looks below on the forms moving or at rest, saying to itself, "ere long these vermin will furnish a rich repast." so sure are they of this--the birds of both flocks-that, although the sun is nigh setting, instead of betaking themselves to their roosts, as is their wont, they stay, each by its own pet party. those accompanying the pursuers still fly about in the air. they can tell that these do not intend to remain much longer on that spot. for they have kindled no fires, nor taken other steps that indicate an encampment for the night. different with those that soar over the halting-place of the pursued. as night approaches they draw in their spread wings and settle down to roost; some upon trees, others on the ledges of rock, still others on the summits of the cliffs that overhang the camping place of the indians. the blazing fires, with meat on spits sputtering over them; the arms abandoned, spears stuck in the ground, with shields suspended; the noise and revelry around--all proclaim the resolve of the savages to stay there till morning. an intention which, despite their apparent stolidity--in contradiction to the ideas of the closet naturalist and his theory of animal instinct--the vultures clearly comprehend. about the behaviour of the birds the marauders take no note. they are used to seeing turkey-buzzards around--better known to them by the name "zopilotes." for long ere the anglo-american colonists came in contact with the comanche indians a spano-mexican vocabulary had penetrated to the remotest of these tribes. no new thing for the tenawas to see the predatory birds swooping above them all day and staying near them all night. not stranger than a wolf keeping close to the sheepfold, or a hungry dog skulking around shambles. as night draws near, and the purple twilight steals over the great texan plain, the party of chasing pursuers is relieved from a stay by all deemed so irksome. remounting their horses, they leave the scene of their reluctant halt, and continue the pursuit silently, as if moving in funeral march. the only sounds heard are the dull thumping of their horses' hoofs upon the soft prairie turf; now and then a clink, as one strikes against a stone; the occasional tinkle of a canteen as it comes in contact with saddle mounting or pistol butt; the champing of bits, with the breathing of horses and men. these last talk in low tones, in mutterings not much louder than whispers. in pursuit of their savage foe, the well-trained rangers habitually proceed thus, and have cautioned the settlers to the same. though these need no compulsion to keep silent; their hearts are too sore for speech; their anguish, in its terrible intensity, seeks for no expression, till they stand face to face with the red ruffians who have caused, and are still causing, it. the night darkens down, becoming so obscure that each horseman can barely distinguish the form of him riding ahead. some regret this, thinking they may get strayed. not so cully. on the contrary, the guide is glad, for he feels confident in his conjecture that the pursued will be found in pecan creek, and a dark night will favour the scheme of attack he has conceived and spoken of. counselled by him, the ranger captain shares his confidence, and they proceed direct towards the point where the tributary stream unites with the main river--the little witchita, along whose banks they have been all that day tracking. not but that cully could take up the indian trail. despite the obscurity he could do that, though not, as he jestingly declared, by the smell. there are other indices that would enable him, known but to men who have spent a lifetime upon the prairies. he does not need them now, sure he will find the savages, as he said, "squatted on the peecawn." and, sure enough, when the pursuers, at length at the creek's mouth, enter the canon through which it disembogues its crystal water into the grander and more turbid stream, they discovered certain traces of the pursued having passed along its banks. another mile of travelling, the same silence observed, with caution increased, and there is no longer a doubt about the truth of cully's conjecture. noises are heard ahead, sounds disturbing the stillness of the night air that are not those of the uninhabited prairie. there is the lowing of cattle, in long monotonous moans, like when being driven to slaughter, with, at intervals, the shriller neigh of a horse, as if uneasy at being away from his stable. on hearing these sounds, the ranger captain, acting by the advice of the guide, orders a halt. then the pursuing party is separated into two distinct troops. one, led by cully, ascends the cliff by a lateral ravine, and pursues its way along the upper table-land. the other, under the command of the captain, is to remain below until a certain time has elapsed, its length stipulated between the two leaders before parting. when it has passed, the second division moves forward up the creek, again halting as a light shines through the trees, which, from its reddish colour, they know to be the glare of log fires. they need not this to tell them they are close to an encampment--that of the savages they have been pursuing. they can hear their barbarous jargon, mingled with shouts and laughter like that of demons in the midst of some fiendish frolic. they only stay for a signal the guide arranged to give as soon as he has got round to attack on the opposite side. the first shot heard, and they will dash forward to the fires. seated in their saddles, with reins tight drawn, and heels ready to drive home the spur--with glances bent greedily at the gleaming lights, and ears keenly alert to catch every sound--the hearts of some trembling with fear, others throbbing with hope, still others thrilling with the thought of vengeance--they wait for the crack that is to be the signal-wait and listen, with difficulty restraining themselves. it comes at length. up the glen peals a loud report, quickly followed by another, both from a double-barrelled gun. this was the signal for attack, arranged by cully. soon as hearing it, the reins are slackened, the spurs sent home, and, with a shout making the rocks ring, and the trees reverberate its echoes, they gallop straight towards the indian encampment, and in a moment are in its midst. they meet little resistance--scarce any. too far from the settlements to fear pursuit--in full confidence they have not been followed, the red robbers have been abandoning themselves to pleasure, spending the night in a grand gluttonous feast, furnished by the captured kine. engrossed with sensual joys, they have neglected guard; and, in the midst of their festivities, they are suddenly set upon from all sides; the sharp cracking of rifles, with the quick detonation of repeating pistols, soon silences their cacchinations, scattering them like chaff. after the first fusillade, there is but little left of them. those not instantly shot down retreat in the darkness, skulking of! among the pecan trees. it is altogether an affair of firearms: and for once the bowie--the texan's trusted weapon--has no part in the fray. the first rays of next morning's sun throw light upon a sanguinary scene--a tableau terrible, though not regrettable. on the contrary, it discloses a sight which, but for the red surroundings, might give gladness. fathers, half frantic with joy, are kissing children they never expected to see again; brothers clasping the hands of sisters late deemed lost for ever; husbands, nigh broken-hearted, once more happy, holding their wives in fond, affectionate embrace. near by, things strangely contrasting--corpses strewn over the ground, stark and bleeding, but not yet stiff, all of coppery complexion, but bedaubed with paint of many diverse colours. all surely savages. a fearful spectacle, but one too often witnessed on the far frontier land of texas. chapter thirty three. a forced confession. the party of texans has made what prairie men call a "coup." on counting the corpses of their slain enemies they find that at least one-half of the tenawa warriors have fallen, including their chief. they can make an approximate estimate of the number that was opposed to them by the signs visible around the camp, as also upon the trail they have been for several days following. those who escaped have got off, some on their horses, hastily caught and mounted; others afoot, by taking to the timber. they were not pursued, as it was still dark night when the action ended, and by daylight these wild centaurs, well acquainted with the country, will have scattered far and wide, beyond all likelihood of being again encountered. the settlers are satisfied at having recovered their relatives, as also their stolen stock. as to the rangers, enough has been accomplished to slake their revengeful thirst--for the time. these last, however, have not come off unscathed; for the comanches, well armed with guns, bows, and lances, did not die unresistingly. in texas indians rarely do, and never when they engage in a fight with rangers. between them and these border _guerrilleros_--in one sense almost as much savages as themselves--war is an understood game--to the bitter end, with no quarter either asked or given. the rangers count three of their number killed and about twice as many wounded--enough, considering the advantage they had in their unwarned attack upon enemies who for once proved unwatchful. when the conflict has finally come to a close, and daylight makes manifest the result, the victors take possession of the spoil--most of it their own property. the horses that strayed or stampeded during the fight are again collected into a drove--those of the indians being united to it. this done, only a short stay is intended--just long enough to bury the bodies of the three rangers who have been killed, get stretchers prepared for such of the wounded as are unable to sit in the saddle, and make other preparations for return towards the settlements. they do not hasten their departure through any apprehension of a counter-attack on the side of the comanches. fifty texan rangers--and there are this number of them--have no fear on any part of the plains, so long as they are mounted on good horses, carry rifles in their hands, bowie-knives and pistols in their belts, with a sufficient supply of powder in their flasks, and bullets in their pouches. with all these items they are amply provided; and were there now any necessity for continuing the pursuit, or the prospect of striking another coup, they would go on, even though the chase should conduct them into the defiles of the rocky mountains. to pursue and slay the savage is their vocation, their duty, their pastime and pleasure. but the settlers are desirous of a speedy return to their homes, that they may relieve the anxiety of other dear ones, who there await them. they long to impart the glad tidings they will take with them. while the preparations for departure are going on, cully--who, with several others, has been collecting the arms and accoutrements of their slain enemies--gives utterance to a cry that brings a crowd of his comrades around him. "what is it, nat?" inquires the ranger captain. "look hyar, cap! d'ye see this gun?" "yes; a hunter's rifle. whose is it?" "that's jess the questyin; though thar ain't no questyin about it. boys, do any o' ye recognise this hyar shootin' iron?" one after another the rangers step up, and look at the rifle. "i do," says one. "and i," adds another. and a third, and fourth, make the same affirmation, all speaking in tones of surprise. "walt wilder's gun," continues cully, "sure an' sartin. i know it, an oughter know it. see them two letters in the stock thar--`ww.' old nat cully hez good reezun to recconise them, since 'twas hisself that cut 'em. i did it for walt two yeern ago, when we war scoutin' on the collyrado. it's his weepun, an' no mistake." "where did you find it?" inquires the captain. "i've jess tuk it out o' the claws o' the ugliest injun as ever made trail on a puraira--that beauty thar, whose karkidge the buzzards won't be likely to tech." while speaking cully points to a corpse. it is that of the tenawa chief, already identified among the slain. "he must a' hed it in his clutch when suddenly shot down," pursues the guide. "an' whar did he git it? boys, our ole kummerade's wiped out for sartin. i know how walt loved that thar piece. he w'udn't a parted wi' it unless along wi' his life." this is the conviction of several others acquainted with wilder. it is the company of rangers to which he formerly belonged. "thar's been foul play somewhar," continues cully. "walt went back to the states--to kaintuck, ef this chile ain't mistook. but 'tain't likely he stayed thar; he kedn't keep long off o' the purairas. i tell ye, boys, these hyar injens hev been makin' mischief somewhar'. look thar, look at them leggin's! thar's no eend o' white sculps on' 'em, an' fresh tuk, too!" the eyes of all turned towards these terrible trophies that in gory garniture fringe the buck-skin leg-wear of the savages. cully, with several others who knew wilder well, proceed to examine them, in full expectation of finding among them the skin of their old comrade's head. there are twelve scalps, all of white men, with others that are indian, and not a few that exhibit the equally black, but shorter crop of the mexican. those that are indubitably of white men show signs of having been recently taken, but none of them can be identified as the scalp of walt wilder. there is some relief in this, for his old comrades love. walt. still, there is the damning evidence of the gun, which cully declares could only have been taken from him along with his life. how has it got into the hands of the horned lizard? "i reckon we can settle that," says the captain of the rangers. "the renegade ought to know something about it." this speech refers to barbato, who has been taken prisoner, and about whose disposal they have already commenced to deliberate. his beard betrayed him as a renegade; and, the paint having been partially wiped from his skin, all perceive that he is a white man--a mexican. some are for shooting him on the spot, others propose hanging, while only a few of the more humane advocate taking him on to the settlements and there giving him a trial. he will have to die anyhow--that is pretty sure; for not only as a mexican is he their enemy, but now doubly so from being found in league with their most detested foes, the tenawa comanches. the wretch is lying on the ground near by, shaking with fear, in spite of the fastenings in which he is tightly held. he knows he is in dire danger, and has only so far escaped through having surrendered to a settler instead of to one of the rangers. "let's gie him a chance o' his life; ef he'll tell all about it," counsels cully. "what d'ye say, cap?" "i agree to that," responds the ranger captain. "he don't appear to be worth shooting; though it may be as well to take him on to the settlements, and shut him up in prison. the promise of pardon may get out of him all he knows; if not, the other will. he's not an indian, and a bit of rope looped round his neck will, no doubt, loosen his tongue. suppose we try boys?" the "boys" are unanimous in their assent, and the renegade is at once brought up for examination. the man in the green blanket coat, who, as a santa fe expeditioner, has spent over twelve months in mexican prisons, is appointed examiner. he has been long enough among the "yellerbellies" to have learnt their language. the renegade is for a time reticent, and his statements are contradictory. no wonder he declines to tell what has occurred, so compromising to himself! but when the _lariat_ is at length noosed around his neck, the loose end of it thrown over the limb of a pecan tree--the other conditions being clearly expounded to him--he sees that things can be no worse; and, seeing this, makes confession--full, if not free. he discloses everything--the attack and capture of the caravan, with the slaughter of the white men who accompanied it; he tells of the retreat of two of them to the cliff, one of whom, by the description, can be none other than walt wilder. when he at length comes to describe the horrible mode in which their old comrade has perished, the rangers are almost frenzied with rage, and it is with difficulty some of them can be withheld from breaking their given word, and tearing him limb from limb. he makes appeal to them for mercy, stating that he himself had no part in that transaction; that, although they have found him among the indians, he was only as their prisoner; and forced to fight along with them. this is evidently untrue; but, false or true, it has the effect of pacifying his judges, so far, that the _lariat_ is left loose around his neck. further examination, and cross-examination, elicit other facts about the captured caravan--in short, everything, except the secret alliance between the mexican officer and the tenawa chief. not thinking of this--in truth, having no suspicion of it--his examiners do not put any questions about it; and, for himself, the wretch sees no reason to declare it, but the contrary. he indulges in the hope of one day returning to the del norte, and renewing his relations with colonel gil uraga. "comrades!" cries the ranger captain, addressing himself to his men, as soon as the examination is concluded, "you all of you loved walt wilder--all who knew him?" "we did! we did!" is the response feelingly spoken. "so did i. well, he's dead, beyond a doubt. it's nearly a month ago, and he could not last so long, shut up in that cave. his bones will be there, with those of the other poor fellow, whoever he was, that went in with him. it's dreadful to think of it! now, from what this scoundrel says, it can't be so very far from here. and, as we can make him guide us to the place, i propose we go there, get the remains of our old comrade, and give them christian burial." with the texan rangers obedience to duty is less a thing of command than request; and this is a request of such nature as to receive instant and unanimous assent "let us go!" is the universal response. "we needn't all make this journey," continues the captain. "there's no need for any more than our own boys, the rangers, and such of the settlers as may choose to go with us. the rest, who have to look after the women, and some for driving back the stock, can make their way home at once. i reckon we've left the track pretty clear of indians, and they'll be in no further danger from them." without further discussion, this arrangement is decided upon; and the two parties commence making the preparations suitable to their respective plans. in less than half an hour after they separate; the settlers, with the women, children, and cattle, wending their way eastward; while the rangers, guided by the renegade, ride off in the opposite direction-toward the llano estacado. chapter thirty four. a proposal by proxy. day by day hamersley grows stronger, and is able to be abroad. soon after wilder, plucking him by the sleeve, makes request to have his company at some distance from the dwelling. hamersley accedes to the request, though not without some surprise. in the demeanour of his comrade there is an air of mystery. as this is unusual with the ex-ranger, he has evidently something of importance to communicate. not until they have got well out of sight of the house, and beyond the earshot of anyone inside or around it, does walt say a word. and then only after they have come to a stop in the heart of a cotton-wood copse, where a prostrate trunk offers them the accommodation of a seat. sitting down upon it, and making sign to hamersley, still with the same mysterious air, to do likewise, the backwoodsman at length begins to unburden himself. "frank," says he, "i've brought ye out hyar to hev a little spell o' talk, on a subjeck as consarns this coon consid'able." "what subject, walt?" "wal, it's about a wumman." "a woman! why, walt wilder, i should have supposed that would be the farthest thing from your thoughts, especially a such a time and in such a place as this." "true it shed, as ye say. for all that, ef this chile don't misunnerstan' the sign, a wumman ain't the furrest thing from yur thoughts, at the same time an' place." the significance of the observation causes the colour to start to the cheeks of the young prairie merchant, late so pale. he stammers out an evasive rejoinder,-"well, walt; you wish to have a talk with me. i'm ready to hear what you have to say. go on! i'm listening." "wal, frank, i'm in a sort o' a quandary wi' a critter as wears pettikotes, an' i want a word o' advice from ye. you're more practised in thar ways than me. though a good score o' year older than yurself, i hain't hed much to do wi' weemen, 'ceptin' injun squaws an' now an' agin a yeller gurl down by san antone. but them scrapes wan't nothin' like thet walt wilder heve got inter now." "a scrape! what sort of a scrape? i hope you haven't--" "ye needn't talk o' hope, frank hamersley. the thing air past hopin', an' past prayin' for. ef this chile know anythin' o' the signs o' love, he has goed a good ways along its trail. yis, sir-ee; too fur to think o' takin' the backtrack." "on that trail, indeed?" "thet same; whar cyubit sots his little feet, 'ithout neer a moccasin on 'em. yis, kummerade, walt wilder, for oncest in in his kureer, air in a difeequelty; an' thet difeequelty air bein' fool enuf to fall in love-the which he hez dun, sure, sartin." hamersley gives a shrug of surprise, accompanied with a slight glance of indignation. walt wilder in love! with whom can it be? as he can himself think of only one woman worth falling in love with, either in that solitary spot, or elsewhere on earth, it is but natural his thoughts should turn to her. only for an instant, however. the idea of having the rough ranger for a rival is preposterous. walt, pursuing the theme, soon convinces him he has no such lofty aspirations. "beyond a doubt, she's been an' goed an' dud it--that air garl concheeter. them shining eyes o' her'n hev shot clar through this chile's huntin' shirt, till thar's no peace left inside o' it. i hain't slep a soun' wink for mor'en a week o' nights; all the time dreemin' o' the gurl, as ef she war a angel a hoverin' 'bout my head. now, frank, what am i ter do? that's why i've axed ye to kum out hyar, and enter into this confaberlation." "well, walt, you shall be welcome to my advice. as to what you should do, that's clear enough; but what you may or can do will depend a good deal on what miss conchita says. have you spoken to her upon the subject?" "thar hain't yit been much talk atween us--i'deed not any, i mout say. ye know i can't parley thar lingo. but i've approached her wi' as much skill as i iver did bear or buffler. an', if signs signerfy anythin', she ain't bad skeeart about it. contrarywise, frank. if i ain't terribly mistuk, she shows as ef she'd be powerful willin' to hev me." "if she be so disposed there can't be much difficulty in the matter. you mean to marry her, i presume?" "in coorse i duz--that for sartin'. the feelin's i hev torst that gurl air diffrent to them as one hez for injun squaws, or the queeries i've danced wi' in the fandangoes o' san antone. ef she'll agree to be myen, i meen nothin' short o' the hon'rable saramony o' marridge--same as atween man an' wife. what do ye think o't?" "i think, walt, you might do worse than get married. you're old enough to become a benedict, and conchita appears to be just the sort of girl that would suit you. i've heard it said that these mexican women make the best of wives--when married to americans." hamersley smiles, as though this thought were pleasant to him. "there are several things," he continues, "that it will be necessary for you to arrange before you can bring about the event you're aiming at. first, you must get the girl's consent: and, i should think, also that of her master and mistress. they are, as it were, her guardians, and, to a certain extent, responsible for her being properly bestowed. last of all, you'll require the sanction of the church. this, indeed, may be your greatest difficulty. to make you and your sweetheart one, a priest, or protestant clergyman, will be needed; and neither can be had very conveniently here, in the centre of the staked plain." "durn both sorts!" exclaims the ex-ranger in a tone of chagrin. "ef't warn't for the need o' 'em jest now, i say the staked plain air better 'ithout 'em, as wu'd anywars else. why can't she an' me be tied thegither 'ithout any sech senseless saramony? walt wilder wants no mumblin' o' prayers at splicin' him to the gurl he's choosed for his partner. an' why shed thar be, supposin' we both gie our mutooal promises one to the tother?" "true. but that would not be marriage such as would lawfully and legally make you man and wife." "doggone the lawfulness or legullity o' it! priest or no priest, i want concheteter for my squaw; an' i've made up my mind to hev her. say, frank! don't ye think the old doc ked do it? he air a sort o' professional." "no, no; the doctor would be of no use in that capacity. it's his business to unite broken bones, not hands and hearts. but, walt, if you are really resolved on the thing, there will, no doubt, be an opportunity to carry out your intention in a correct and legitimate manner. you must be patient, however, and wait till you come across either a priest or a protestant clergyman." "doggoned ef i care which," is the rejoinder of the giant. "eyther'll do; an' one o' 'em 'ud be more nor surficient, ef 't war left ter walt wilder. but, hark'ee, frank!" he continues, his face assuming an astute expression, "i'd like to be sure 'bout the thing now--that is, to get the gurl's way o' thinking on 't. fact is, i've made up my mind to be sure, so as thar may be no slips or back kicks." "sure, how?" "by procurin' her promise; getting betrothed, as they call it." "there can be no harm in that. certainly not." "wal, i'm gled you think so; for i've sot my traps for the thing, an' baited 'em too. thet air's part o' my reezun for askin' ye out hyar. she's gin me the promise o' a meetin' 'mong these cotton woods, an' may kum at any minnit. soon's she does, i'm agoin' to perpose to her; an' i want to do it in reg'lar, straightforrard way. as i can't palaver spanish, an' you kin, i know'd ye wudn't mind transleetin' atween us. ye won't, will ye?" "i shall do that with the greatest pleasure, if you wish it. but don't you think, walt, you might learn what you want to know without any interpreter? conchita may not like my interference in an affair of such a delicate nature. love's language is said to be universal, and by it you should understand one another." "so fur's thet's consarned, i reck'n we do. but she, bein' a mexikin, may hev queery ideas about it; an' i want her promise guv in tarms from which thar'll be no takin' the back track; same's i meen to give myen." "all right, old fellow. i'll see you get such a promise, or none." "thet's satisfactory, frank. now, as this chile air agoin' to put the thing stiff an' strong, do you transleet it in the same sort." "trust me, it shall be done--_verbatim et literatim_." "thet's the way!" joyfully exclaims walt; thinking that the _verbatim et literatim_--of the meaning of which he has not the slightest conception--will be just the thing to clinch his bargain with conchita. -----------------------------------------------------------------------the singular contract between the prairie merchant and his _ci-devant_ guide has just reached conclusion as a rustling is heard among the branches of the cottonwoods, accompanied by a soft footstep. looking around, they see conchita threading her way through the grove. her steps, cautious and stealthy, would tell of an "appointment," even were this not already known to them. her whole bearing is that of one on the way to meet a lover; and the sight of walt wilder, who now rises erect to receive her, proclaims him to be the man. it might appear strange that she does not shy back, on seeing him in company with another man. she neither starts nor shows any shyness; evidence that the presence of the third party is a thing understood and pre-arranged. she advances without show of timidity; and, curtseying to the "senor francisco," as she styles hamersley, takes seat upon the log from which he has arisen; walt laying hold of her hand and gallantly conducting her to it. there is a short interregnum of silence. this conchita's sweetheart endeavours to fill up with a series of gestures that might appear uncouth but for the solemnity of the occasion. so considered, they may be deemed graceful, even dignified. perhaps not thinking them so himself, walt soon seeks relief by turning to his interpreter, and making appeal to him as follows-"doggone it, frank! ye see i don't know how to talk to her, so you do the palaverin. tell her right off, what i want. say i hain't got much money, but a pair o' arems strong enuf to purtect her, thro' thick an' thro' thin, agin the dangers o' the mountain an' the puraira, grizzly bars, injuns, an' all. she sees this chile hev got a big body; ye kin say to her thet his heart ain't no great ways out o' correspondence wi' his karkidge. then tell her in the eend, thet his body an' his hands an' heart--all air offered to her; an' if she'll except 'em they shall be hern, now, evermore, an' to the death--so help me god!" as the hunter completes his proposal thus ludicrously, though emphatically pronounced, he brings his huge hand down upon his brawny breast with a slap like the crack of a cricket bat. whatever meaning the girl may make out of his words, she can have had no doubt about their earnestness or sincerity, judging by the gestures that accompany them. hamersley can scarce restrain his inclination to laugh; but with an effort he subdues it, and faithfully, though not very literally, translates the proposal into spanish. when, as walt supposes, he has finished, the ex-ranger rises to his feet and stands awaiting the answer, his huge frame trembling like the leaf of an aspen. he continues to shake all the while conchita's response is being delivered; though her first words would assure, and set his nerves at rest, could he but understand them. but he knows not his fate, till it has passed through the tedious transference from one language to another--from spanish to his own native tongue. "tell him," is the response of conchita, given without sign of insincerity, "tell him that i love him as much as he can me. that i loved him from the first moment of our meeting, and shall love him to the end of my life. in reply to his honourable proposal, say to him yes. i am willing to become his wife." when the answer is translated to walt, he bounds at least three feet into the air, with a shout of triumph such as he might give over the fall of an indian foe. then, advancing towards the girl, he flings his great arms around her, lifts her from the ground as if she were a child's doll; presses her to his broad, throbbing breast, and imprints a kiss upon her lips--the concussion of which can be heard far beyond the borders of the cottonwood copse. chapter thirty five. a dangerous eavesdropper. however successful in his suit with conchita, walt wilder is not without a rival. hamersley has reason to suspect this soon after separating from the lovers, which he does, leaving them to themselves. it has occurred to him, that the presence of more than two on that spot can be no longer desirable. his part has been performed, and he withdraws without saying a word. there is a third man, notwithstanding--a spectator--whose breast is stirred with terrible emotion. as the kentuckian passes out through the copse, he catches sight of a figure crouching behind the trunk of a tree--apparently that of a man. twilight is now on, and beneath the leafy branches reigns an obscurity almost equalling night. what he sees may be some straying animal, or perhaps it is only fancy. his thoughts are engrossed with that which carries him on towards the house. there one will be awaiting him, in whose refined presence he will soon forget the uncouth spectacle of courtship at which he has been assisting. but the form he has observed cowering under the shadow of the cotton-woods was no fancy, nor four-footed creature, but a human being, a man--in short, manuel the indian. manuel is mad in love with the little mestiza, who, with spanish blood in her veins, is, nevertheless, maternally of his own race--that of the _indios mansos_, or "tame indians," of new mexico--so called in contradistinction to the _indios bravos_, the savages who, from the conquest till this day, have never submitted themselves to spanish rule. though christianised, after a fashion, by the franciscans, with others of the missionary fathers--living in walled towns, each with its _capilla_ or church, and cultivating the lands around, many of these so-called christian indians still continue to practice pagan rites, more or less openly. in some of their villages, it is said, the _estafa_, or sacred fire, is kept burning, and has never been permitted to go out since the time of montezuma, from whom and his people they believe themselves descended. they are undoubtedly of aztec race, and sun-worshippers, as were the subjects of the unfortunate emperor of tenochtitlas. travellers who have visited their more remote "pueblos" have witnessed something of this sun-worship, seeing them ascend to the flat roofs of their singularly constructed houses, and there stand in fixed attitude, devoutly gazing at the sun as it ascends over the eastern horizon. notwithstanding the epithet "tame," which their spanish conquerors have applied to them, they are still more than half wild; and, upon occasions, the savage instinct shows itself in deeds of cruelty and blood. this very instinct has been kindled in the heart of manuel. it was not devotion to don valerian miranda that moved him to follow the fortunes of his master into exile; his love for conchita accounts for his presence there. and he loves her with an ardour and singleness of passion such as often burns in the breasts of his people. the girl has given him no encouragement, rather the reverse. for all that, he has pursued her with zealous solicitation, regardless of rebuffs and apparently unconscious of her scorn. hitherto he has had no rival, which has hindered him from despairing. conchita is still young, in her earliest teens, having just turned twelve. but even at this age a new mexican maiden is deemed old enough for matrimony; and manuel, to do justice to him, has eyes upon her with this honest intent. for months he had made up his mind to have her for his wife--long before their forced flight into the llano estacado. and now that they are in the desert, with no competitor near--for chico does not count as one--he has fancied the time come for the consummation of his hopes. but just when the fair fruit seems ripe for plucking, like the fox in the fable, he discovers it is beyond his reach. what is worse still, another, taller than he, and who can reach higher, is likely to gather it. ever since the arrival of walt wilder in the valley he has been watching the movements of the latter. not without observing that between the great texan hunter and the little mexican _muchacha_ there has sprung up an attachment of a suspicious nature. he has not heard them express it in speech, for in this way they cannot communicate with one another; but certain looks and gestures exchanged, unintelligible to others, have been easily interpreted by the indian as the signs of a secret and mutual understanding between them. they have driven the poor peon well nigh distracted with jealousy--felt all the keener from its being his first experience of it, all the angrier from consciousness of his own honest love--while he believes that of the intruder to have a different intent. as the days and hours pass he observes new incidents to sharpen his suspicions and strengthen his jealous ire. in fine, he arrives at the conclusion that conchita--long loved by him, long vainly solicited--has surrendered her heart to the gigantic texan, who like a sinister shadow, a ghoul, a very ogre, has chanced across the sunlight of his path. under the circumstances, what is he to do? he is powerful in passion, but weak in physical strength. compared with his rival, he is nought. in a conflict the texan would crush him, squeeze the breath out of his body, as a grizzly bear would that of a prairie squirrel or ground gopher. he does not show open antagonism--does not think of it. he knows it would but end in his ruin--his utter annihilation. still, he is not despairing. with the instincts peculiar to his race, he contemplates revenge. all his idle hours are spent brooding over plans to frustrate the designs of his rival--in short, to put him out of the way altogether. more than once has a thought of poison passed through his mind as the surest way of effecting his fiendish purpose, as also the safest; and upon this mode of killing the texan he has at length determined. that very day he has been engaged in making ready for the deed-preparing the potion. certain plants he has found growing in the valley, well known among his people as poisonous, will furnish him with the means of death--a slow, lingering death, therefore all the surer to avert suspicion from the hand that has dealt it. to all appearance, walt wilder is doomed. he has escaped the spears, arrows, and tomahawks of the tenawa savages to fall a victim to a destroyer, stealthy, subtle, unseen. and is the noble texan--guide, ranger, and hunter--thus sadly to succumb? no. fate has not decreed his death by such insidious means. a circumstance, apparently accidental, steps in to save him. on this very day, when the poison it being prepared for him, the poisoner receives a summons that for the time at least, will frustrate his foul plans. his master commands him to make ready for a journey. it is an errand similar to that he has been several times sent upon before. he is to proceed to the settlements on the rio grande, where don valerian has friends with whom, in his exile, he keeps up secret correspondence, manuel acting as messenger. thence the trusted peon is to bring back, as oft before, despatches, news, provisions--the last now more than ever needed, on account of the stranger guests so unexpectedly thrown upon his hospitality. manuel is to commence his journey on the following day at the earliest hour of dawn. there will be no chance for him now to carry out his nefarious design. it must remain uncompleted till his return. while chafing at the disappointment, he sees conchita stealing out from the house and entering the cotton-wood grove. he follows her with a caution equalling her own, but from a far different cause. crouching on through the trees, he takes stand behind a trunk, and, concealed by it, becomes spectator of all that passes. he is at first surprised at seeing three where he expected only two. pleased also; for it gives him hope the girl's errand may not be the keeping of a love appointment. but as the triangular conference proceeds; above all, when it arrives at its conclusion, and he sees the texan raise conchita in his arms, giving her that kiss, the echo of which is distinctly audible to him, his blood boils, and with difficulty does he restrain himself from rushing up to the spot, and taking the lives of all three, or ending his own if he fail. for a time he stands erect, with his _machete_ drawn from its sheath, his eyes flashing with the fires of jealous vengeance. fortunately for those upon whom they are bent, an instinct of self-preservation stays him. his hand is ready, but his heart fails him. terrible as is his anger, it is yet controlled by fear. he will wait for a more favourable time and surer opportunity. a safer means, too--this more than aught else restraining him. while still in intense agitation, he sees hamersley depart, leaving the other two to themselves. and now, as other kisses are exchanged between the lovers, his jealous fury becomes freshly excited, and for the second time he is half resolved to rush forward and kill--kill. but again his fears gain the ascendency, and his hand refuses to obey the dictates of his angry heart. with the bare blade held tremblingly, he continues spectator of that scene which fills his breast with blackest, bitterest emotion. he has not the courage to interrupt it. calculating the chances, he perceives they are against him. should he succeed in killing the texan, with conchita standing by and bearing witness to the deed, would be to forfeit his own life. he could find it in his heart to kill her too; but that would lead to the same result. failing in his first blow, the great hunter would have him under his heel, to be crushed as a crawling reptile. thus cogitating, he sticks to his place of concealment, and overlooks the love scene to its termination; then permits the lovers to depart in peace--the woman he so wildly loves, the man he so madly hates. after they have gone out of the grove, he advances towards the log upon which they were seated. himself taking seat on it, he there ponders upon a plan of vengeance surer and safer than the assassin's steel. it is no longer his intent to employ poison. a new idea has entered his brain--has been in it ever since receiving notice of the journey on which he is about to set forth; in truth, suggested by this. a scheme quite as efficient as poisoning, but also having a purpose far more comprehensive, for it includes others besides his rival the ranger. of late neglectful of his duties, colonel miranda has severely chided him, thus kindling the hereditary antipathy of his race towards the white man. his master is to be among the victims--in short, all of them, his fellow-servant, chico, excepted. should the diabolical plan prove a success, not one of them can escape ruin, and most of them may meet death. chapter thirty six. a tale of peril. thanks to the skill of don prospero, exerted with kind assiduity, hamersley's wounds are soon healed, his strength completely restored. doubtless the tender nursing of the "angel" has something to do with his rapid recovery, while her presence, cheerful as gentle, does much to remove the gloom from his spirits, caused by the terrible disaster he had sustained. long before reaching convalescence he has ceased to lament the loss of his property, and only sorrows as he reflects on the fate of his brave followers, whose lives were sacrificed in the effort to preserve it. happily, however, as time passes the retrospect of the red carnage loses something of its sanguinary hue, its too vivid tints becoming gradually obscured in the oblivion of the past with the singular surroundings of the present. amid these his spirit yields itself to pleasanter reflections. how could it be otherwise? still, with restored strength, his curiosity has been increasing, till it has reached a point of keenness requiring to be satisfied. he wonders at all around him, especially the strange circumstance of finding his old friend and duelling second in such an out-of-the-way place. as yet, miranda has only given him a hint, though one pretty much explaining all. there has been a revolution; and they are refugees. but the young kentuckian is curious to learn the details, about which, for some reason, the mexican has hitherto preserved silence. his reticence has been due to an injunction of the doctor, who, still under some anxiety about the recovery of his patient, forbade imparting to him particulars that might have an injurious effect on his nervous system, sadly debilitated by the shock it has received. don prospero is an acute observer. he perceives the growing interest which hamersley takes in the sister of his host. he knows the story of the chihuahua duel; and thinks that the other story--that of the disastrous revolution--told in detail, might retard the convalescence of his patient. counselled by him, colonel miranda has refrained from communicating it. ignorant of the cause, hamersley is all the more eager to learn it. still, his curiosity does not impel him to importunate inquiry. in the companionship of such kind friends he can afford to be patient. walt wilder has no curiosity of any kind. his thoughts have become centred, his whole soul wrapped up in conchita. the heart of the colossal hunter has received a shock such as it never had before; for, as he declared himself, he is in love for the first time in his life. not but that he has made love before, after a fashion. for he has shared his tent with more than one indian squaw, drank and danced with those nondescript damsels who now and then find their way to the forts of the fur-traders scattered among the rocky mountains and along the border-land of the prairies. to all this he has confessed. but these have been only interludes, "trifling love scrapes." his present affair with the little mestiza is different. her sparkling black eyes pierced deeper and more direct--"straight plum-centre to his heart," as, in professional jargon, he described it. the invalid is at length convalescent; the doctor removes the seal of injunction placed upon the lips of colonel miranda, and the latter fulfils his promise made to give a narrative of the events which have led to their residence in that remote and solitary spot. the two seated together sipping paseno wine and smoking cigars, the mexican commences his tale. "we are refugees, as i've already stated, and came here to save our heads. at least, there was danger of my losing mine--or, rather, the certainty of it--had we not succeeded in making our escape from albuquerque. the word _pronunciamento_ explains all. a revolt of the troops under my command, with a name, that of the leader, will give you a key to the whole affair." "uraga!" exclaims hamersley, the word coming mechanically from his red lips; while a cloud passes over his brow, and a red flush flecks the pallor on his cheeks. "captain uraga! 'twas he?" "it was." "the scoundrel! i thought so." "not captain uraga now, but colonel; for the reward of his treason reached him simultaneously with its success, and the traitor is now in command of the district from which i have been, deposed. not only that, but, as i have heard, he has appropriated my house--the same where, twelve months ago, i had the pleasure of showing you some hospitality. contrasting it with our present humble abode, you will see, senor, that my family affairs have not prospered, any more than my political fortunes. but to the narration. "not long after you left us i made application to the government for an increase to the mounted force at my disposal. this had become necessary for due protection of the district from our warlike neighbours in the west--the navajoes. they had made several raids upon the river settlements, and carried off goods, cattle, and a number of captives. the force i had made requisition for was obtained; but not the right men, or at least the officers i should have chosen to command it. a troop of light cavalry was sent me--lancers. you may imagine my chagrin, not to say disgust, when i saw captain gil uraga at its head. marching into the town of albuquerque, he reported himself for duty. "i need not tell you how unpleasant it was for me to have such a fellow for subordinate. in addition to our chihuahua duel, there were many reasons for my having an aversion to him--one, and not the least, that which i have already hinted to you--his pretensions to be the suitor of my sister." hamersley writhes as he listens, the red spot on his cheek spreading and flushing redder. miranda proceeds-"he continued his ill-received attentions whenever chance gave him an opportunity. it was not often. i took care of that; though, but for precautions and my authority as his superior officer, his advances would, no doubt, have been bolder--in short, persecutions. i knew that to my sister, as to myself, his presence was disagreeable, but there was no help for it. i could not have him removed. in all matters of military duty he took care to act so that there should be no pretext for a charge against him. besides, i soon found that he was in favour with one of the government dignitaries. though i did not then know why, i learnt it afterwards; and why he, of all others, had been sent to albuquerque. the _sap_ had commenced for a new revolution, and he was one of its secret fomenters. he had been chosen by the _parti pretre_ as a fitting agent to act in that district, of which, like myself, he was a native. "having no suspicion of this, i only thought of him in regard to his impertinent solicitation of my sister; and against this i could restrain him. he was polite; obsequiously so, and cautiously guarded in his gallantries; so that i had no cause for resorting to the _desafio_. i could only wait and watch. "the vigil was not a protracted one; though, alas! it ended differently from what i expected. about two months after his coming under my command, the late _grito_ was proclaimed all over mexico. one morning as i went down to the military quarters i found confusion and disturbance. the soldiers were under arms, many of them drunk, and vociferating `_viva santa anna! viva el coronel uraga_!' hearing this, i at once comprehended all. it was a _pronunciamento_. i drew my sword, thinking to stem the tide of treason; and called around me such of my followers as were still faithful. it was too late. the poison had spread throughout the whole command. my adherents were soon overpowered, several of them killed; myself wounded, dragged to the _carcel_, and there locked up. the wonder is that i was not executed on the spot; since i know gil uraga thirsted for my life. he was only restrained, however, by a bit of caution; for, although i was not put to death on that day, he intended i should never see the sun rise upon another. in this he was disappointed, and i escaped. "i know you will be impatient to learn how," resumes the refugee, after rolling and igniting a fresh cigarrito. "it is somewhat of an incident, and might serve the writer of a romance. i owe my life, my liberty, and, what is more, my sister's safety, to our good friend don prospero. in his capacity of military surgeon he was not compromised like the rest of us; and after the revolt in the cuartel he was left free to follow his vocation. while seeking permission to dress the wound i had received, chance conducted him to a place where he could overhear a conversation that was being carried on between uraga and one of his lieutenants--a ruffian named roblez, fit associate for his superior. they were in high glee over what had happened, carousing, and in their cups not very cautious of what they said. don prospero heard enough to make him acquainted with their scheme, so diabolical you will scarcely give credence to it. i was to be made away with in the night--carried up to the mountains, and there murdered! with no traces left, it would be supposed that i had made my escape from the prison. and the good doctor heard other designs equally atrocious. what the demons afterwards intended doing when my sister should be left unprotected--" something like a groan escapes from the listener's lips, while his fingers move nervously, as if clutching at a weapon. "devoted to me, don prospero at once resolved upon a course of action. there was not a moment to be lost. he obtained permission to attend me professionally in the prison. it was a cheap grace on uraga's part, considering his ulterior design. an attendant, a sort of hospital assistant, was allowed to accompany the doctor to the cell, carrying his lints, drugs, and instruments. fortunately, i had not been quite stripped by the ruffians who had imprisoned me, and in my own purse, along with that of don prospero, was a considerable sum of gold--enough for tempting the attendant to change clothes and places with me. he was the more ready to do so, relying upon a story he intended to tell--that we had overpowered and compelled him. poor fellow! as we afterwards learnt, it did not save him. he was shot the next morning to appease the chagrin of uraga, furious at our escape. we cannot help feeling regret for his fate; but, under the circumstances, what else could have been done? "we stepped forth from the _carcel_, the doctor leading the way, and i, his assistant, bearing the paraphernalia after him. we passed out of the barracks unchallenged. fortunately, the night was a dark one, and the guards were given to carousing. the sentries were all intoxicated. "by stealth, and in silence, we hastened on to my house, where i found adela, as you may suppose, in a state of agonised distress. but there was no time for words--not even of explanation. with two of my servants whom i could trust, we hastily collected some of our animals--horses and pack-mules. the latter we loaded with such things as we could think of as being requisite for a journey. we intended it to be a long one--all the way across the great prairies. i knew there would be no safety for us within the limits of new mexico; and i remembered what you had said but a few months before--your kind proffer of hospitality, should it ever be my fate to seek refuge in your country. and to seek it we set forth, leaving my house untenanted, or only in charge of the remaining domestics, from whom gold had gained a promise not to betray us. the doctor, adela and myself, the two peons who had volunteered to accompany us, with the girl, conchita, composed our travelling party. i knew we dared not take the route usually travelled. we should be followed by hostile pursuers and forced back, perhaps slain upon the spot. i at least would have had a short shrift. knowing this, we made direct for the mountains, with whose passes i was familiar, having traversed them in pursuit of the savages. "we passed safely through the sierra, and kept on towards the rio pecos. beyond this river all was unknown to us. we only knew that there lay the llano estacado, invested with mysterious terrors--the theme of our childhood's fears--a vast stretch of desert, uninhabited, or only by savages seeking scalps, by wild beasts ravening for blood, by hideous reptiles--serpents breathing poison. but what were all these dangers to that we were leaving behind? nothing, and this thought inspired us to proceed. "we crossed the pecos and entered upon the sterile plain. we knew not how far it extended; only that on the other side lay a fertile country through which we might penetrate to the frontier settlements of your great free nation. this was the beacon of our hopes, the goal of safety. "we travelled in an easterly course; but there were days when the sun was obscured by clouds; and then, unguided, we had either to remain at rest or run the chance of getting strayed. "we toiled on, growing weak for want of food, and suffering terribly from thirst. no water was to be found anywhere--not a drop. "our animals suffered as ourselves. staggering under the weight of their loads, one by one they gave out, dropping down upon the desert plain. only one held out bravely to the last--the mustang mare that brought you to our present abode. yes, lolita survived to carry my dear sister, as if she understood the value we all placed upon her precious burden. the others gave out--first the horses ridden by don prospero and myself, then the pack-mules. fortunately, these fell near the spot where we at length found relief--near enough for their loads, and two of themselves, to be afterwards recovered. "one day, as we toiled on afoot, in the hourly expectation of death, we came in sight of this fair spot. it appeared to us a paradise, as you say it did to yourself. under our eyes were green trees and the gleam of crystal streams; in our ears the songs of birds we had never expected to hear again. chance had brought us direct to the path, the only one by which the valley can be reached from the upper plain. inspirited by the fair spectacle below, we gained strength enough to descend. we drank of the sweet water, and procured food from the branches of the trees that shaded it. it was the season when fruits and berries were abundant. afterwards we discovered game, and were successful in capturing it. "soon with restored strength we were able to go back, and recover the paraphernalia we had left upon the plain, along with two of the mules that, after resting, had regained their feet, and could stagger on a little farther. "at first we only thought of making this a temporary resting-place; though there seemed but slight hope of being able to continue our journey. but as the days passed, and we were left undisturbed, we began to realise the fact that we had found an asylum, safe as pleasant. "it was not likely that anyone would discover the track we had taken in our flight. even the resentment of uraga would scarce pursue us across the staked plain. in any case, there was no help for it but to remain in the valley, as we had not animals enough to carry us on. our only alternative was to go back to the del norte--a thing not to be thought of. we resolved, therefore, on staying, at least for a time. i had conceived a plan for communicating with my friends in new mexico, and am not without hope that sooner or later we may get tidings that will make it safe for as to return. in our country, as you know, there is nothing permanent; and we have hopes ere long to see the liberal party once more in the ascendant. "our resolution to remain here becoming fixed we sot about making our situation as comfortable as circumstances would permit. we erected this humble tenement whose roof now shelters us. we turned fishermen and hunters; in the last my sister proving more accomplished than any of us--a real huntress, as you have seen. we have enjoyed the life amazingly; more especially our worthy _medico_, who is an enthusiastic naturalist, and here finds a rare opportunity of gratifying his scientific tastes. for subsistence we have not had to depend altogether upon the chase. manuel, one of our peons, an old muleteer, makes an occasional trip to albuquerque, the route of which he has good reason to remember. i send him with messages, and to purchase provisions. he is cautious to make his approaches under cover of night, and do his marketing with circumspection. with our gold, not yet all gone, he is enabled to bring back such commodities as we stand in need of; while a friend, entrusted with the secret of our hiding-place, keeps us informed of the _novedades_. now you know all." chapter thirty seven. the intercepted letter. colonel miranda, having told the tale of his perilous escape, for a time remains silent and reflective. so does his listener. both are thinking on the same subject--the villainy of gil uraga. hamersley first breaks silence, asking the question,-"did you get my letter?" "what letter?" "i wrote you only one. now i think of it, you could not have received it. no. by the time it would reach albuquerque, you must have been gone from there." "i got no letter from you, don francisco. you say you sent one. what was the nature of its contents?" "nothing of any importance. merely to say that i was coming back to new mexico, and hoped to find you in good health." "did it particularise the time you expected to reach albuquerque?" "yes; as far as i could fix that, if i remember rightly, it did." "and the route you were to take?" "that too. when i wrote the letter i intended to make trial of a new trail lately discovered--up the canadian, and touching the northern end of the staked plain. i did make trial of it, alas! with lamentable result. but why do you ask these questions, colonel miranda?" the colonel does not make immediate answer. he appears more meditative than ever, as though some question has come before his mind calling for deliberate examination. while he is thus occupied the ex-ranger enters the room and sits down beside them. walt is welcome. indeed, don valerian had already designed calling him into their counsel. for an idea has occurred to the mexican colonel requiring the joint consideration of all three. turning to the other two, he says,-"i've been thinking a good deal about the attack on your caravan. the more i reflect on it the more i am led to believe that some of the indians who plundered you were painted." "they were all painted," is the reply of the young prairie merchant. "true, don francisco; but that isn't what i mean." "i reckon i knows what ye mean," interposes the ex-ranger, rising excitedly from his chair on hearing the mexican's remark. "it's been my own suspeeshun all along. you know what i tolt ye, frank?" hamersley looks interrogatively at his old comrade. "did i not say," continues wilder, "that i seed two men 'mong the injuns wi' ha'r upon thar faces? they wa'n't injuns; they war whites. a'n't that what ye mean, kurnel meoranda?" "_precisamente_!" is the colonel's reply. the other two wait for him to continue on with the explanation wilder has already surmised. even the young prairie merchant--less experienced in mexican ways and wickedness, in infamy so incredible--begins to have a glimmering of the truth. seemingly weighing his words, miranda proceeds,-"no doubt it was a band of comanche indians that destroyed your caravan and killed your comrades. but i have as little doubt of there being white men among them--one at least, and that one he who planned and instigated the deed." "who, colonel miranda?" is the quick interrogatory of the kentuckian, while with flashing eyes and lips apart he breathlessly awaits the answer. for all, he does not much need it; the name to be pronounced is on the tip of his own tongue. it is again "gil uraga!" "yes," replies the mexican, with added emphasis. "he is, undoubtedly, the robber who despoiled you. though done in the guise of an indian onslaught, with real indians as his assistants, he has been their instructor--their leader. i see it all now clear as sunlight. he got your letter, which you say was addressed to me as colonel commanding at albuquerque. as a matter of course, he opened it. it told him when and where to meet you; your strength, and the value of your cargo. the last has not been needed as an incentive for him to assail you, don francisco. the mark you made upon his cheek was sufficient. didn't i tell you at the time he would move heaven and earth to have revenge on you--on both of us? he has succeeded; behold his success. i a refugee, robbed of everything; you plundered the same; both ruined men!" "not yet!" cries the kentuckian, starting to his feet. "not ruined yet, colonel miranda. if the thing be as you say, i shall seek a second interview with this scoundrel--this fiend; seek till i obtain it. and then--" "hyur's one," interrupts the ex-ranger, unfolding his gigantic form with unusual rapidity, "who'll take part in that sarch. yis, frank, this chile's willin' to go wi' ye to the heart o' mexiko, plum centre; to the halls o' the montyzoomas; reddy to start this minnit." "if," resumes hamersley, his coolness contrasting with the excited air of his comrade, now roused to a terrible indignation, "if, colonel miranda, it turns out as you conjecture, that gil uraga has taken part in the destruction of my waggon-train, or even been instrumental in causing it, i shall leave no stone unturned to obtain justice." "justice!" exclaims the ex-ranger, with a deprecatory toss of the head. "in case o' this kind we want somethin' beside. to think o' thirteen innercent men attacked without word o' warnin', shot down, stabbed, slaughtered, and sculped! think o' that; an' don't talk tamely o' justice; let's shout loudly for revenge!" chapter thirty eight. the land of the "lex talionis." during the quarter of a century preceding the annexation of new mexico to the united states, that distant province of the mexican republic, like all the rest of the country, was the scene of constantly recurring revolutions. every discontented captain, colonel, or general who chanced to be in command of a district, there held sway as a dictator; so demeaning himself that martial and military rule had become established as the living law of the land. the civic authorities rarely possessed more than the semblance of power; and where they did it was wielded in the most flagitious manner. arbitrary arts were constantly committed, under the pretext of patriotism or duty. no man's life was safe who fell under the displeasure of the ruling military chieftain; and woman's honour was held in equally slight respect. in the northern frontier provinces of the republic this irresponsible power of the soldiery was peculiarly despotic and harassing. there, two causes contributed to establish and keep it in the ascendency. one of these was the revolutionary condition of the country, which, as elsewhere, had become chronic. the contest between the party of the priests and that of the true patriots, begun in the first days of mexico's independence, has been continued ever since; now one, now the other, in the ascendant. the monstrous usurpation of maximilian, supported by napoleon the third, and backed by a soldier whom all mexicans term the "bandit bazaine," was solely due to the hierarchy; while mexico owes its existing republican government to the patriot party--happily, for the time, triumphant. the province of new mexico, notwithstanding its remoteness from the nation's capital, was always affected by, and followed, its political fortunes. when the _parti pretre_ was in power at the capital, its adherents became the rulers in the distant states for the time being; and when the patriots, or liberals, gained the upper hand this _role_ was reversed. it is but just to say that, whenever the latter were the "ins," things for the time went well. corruption, though not cured, was to some extent checked; and good government would begin to extend itself over the land. but such could only last for a brief period. the monarchical, dictatorial, or imperial party--by whatever name it may be known--was always the party of the church; and this, owning three-fourths of the real estate, both in town and country, backed by ancient ecclesiastical privileges, and armed with another powerful engine--the gross superstition it had been instrumental in fostering-was always able to control events; so that no government, not despotic, could stand against it for any great length of time. for all, freedom at intervals triumphed, and the priests became the "outs;" but ever potent, and always active, they would soon get up a new "grito" to bring about a revolutionary change in the government. sanguinary scenes would be enacted--hangings, shooting, garrottings--all the horrors of civil war that accompany the bitterest of all spite, the ecclesiastical. in such an uncertain state of things it was but natural that the _militarios_ should feel themselves masters of the situation, and act accordingly. in the northern districts they had yet another pretext for their unrestrained exercise of power--in none more than new mexico. this remote province, lying like an oasis in the midst of uninhabited wilds, was surrounded on all sides by tribes of hostile indians. there were the navajoes and apaches on its west, the comanche and other apache bands on the south and east, the utahs on its north, and various smaller tribes distributed around it. they were all more or less hostile at one time or another: now on terms of an intermittent peace, secured by a "palaver" and treaty; this anon to be broken by some act of bad faith, leaving their "braves" at liberty once more to betake themselves to the war-path. of course this condition of things gave the soldiery a fine opportunity to maintain their ascendency over the peaceful citizens. rabble as these soldiers were, and poltroons as they generally proved themselves in every encounter with the indians, they were accustomed to boast of being the country's protectors, for this "protection" assumed a sort of right to despoil it at their pleasure. some few years preceding the american-mexican war--which, as well known, gave new mexico to the united states--these belligerent swaggerers were in the zenith of their arbitrary rule. their special pet and protector, santa anna, was in for a new spell of power, making him absolute dictator of mexico and disposer of the destinies of its people. at the same time, one of his most servile tools and successful imitators was at the head of the provincial government, having santa fe for its capital. this man was manuel armijo, whose character may be ascertained, by those curious to study it, from reading the chronicles of the times, especially the records of the prairie merchants, known as the "santa fe traders." it will there be learnt that this provincial despot was guilty of every act that could disgrace humanity; and that not only did he oppress his fellow-citizens with the soldiery placed at his disposal to protect them from indian enemies, but was actually in secret league with the savages themselves to aid him in his mulcts and murders! whatever his eye coveted he was sure to obtain, by fair means or foul-by open pillage or secret theft--not unfrequently accompanied by assassination. and as with the despot himself, so with his subordinates--each in his own town or district wielding irresponsible power; all leading lives in imitation of the provincial chieftain, as he of him--the great prototype and patron of all--who held dictatorial sway in the capital of the country, don antonio lopez de santa anna. a knowledge of this abnormal and changeable condition of mexican affairs will, in some measure, explain why colonel miranda so suddenly ceased to be commandant of albuquerque. santa anna's new accession to power brought in the _padres_, turning out the _patriotas_, many of the latter suffering death for their patriotism, while the adherents of the former received promotion for their support. staunchest among these was the captain of lancers, gil uraga, promoted to be colonel as also commandant of the district from which its deposed chief so narrowly escaped with his life. and now this revolutionary usurper is in full authority, his acts imitating his master, armijo, like him in secret league with the savages, even consorting with the red pirates of the plains, taking part in their murderous marauds, and sharing their plunder. chapter thirty nine. prosperous, but not happy. despite his rapid military promotion and the ill-gotten wealth he has acquired, colonel gil uraga is anything but a happy man. only at such times as he is engaged in some stirring affair of duty or devilry, or when under the influence of drink, is he otherwise than wretched. to drinking he has taken habitually, almost continually. it is not to drown conscience; he has none. the canker-worm that consumes him is not remorse, but disappointment in a love affair, coupled with a thirst for vengeance. there are moments when he is truly miserable, his misery reaching its keenest whenever he either looks into his mirror or stands before a portrait that hangs against the wall of the _sala_. it is a likeness of adela miranda; for he has taken possession of the house of his predecessor, with all its furniture and pictures, left in their hasty retreat, the young lady's portrait as the rest. the lancer colonel loves adela miranda; and though his love be of a coarse, brutal nature, it is strong and intense as that the noblest man may feel. in earlier days he believed there was a chance of his obtaining her hand. humble birth is no bar in mexico--land of revolutions--where the sergeant or common soldier of to-day may be a lieutenant, captain, or colonel to-morrow. his hopes had been a stimulant to his military aspirations; perchance one of the causes that first led him into crime. he believed that wealth might bridge over the social distinction between himself and her, and in this belief he cared not how it should be acquired. for the rest he was not ill-looking, rather handsome, and fairly accomplished. like most mexican _militarios_, he could boast of his _bonnes fortunes_, which he often did. these have become more rare since receiving the sword-thrust from his american adversary in the duel at chihuahua, which not only cost him three front teeth, but a hideous scar across the cheek. the teeth have been replaced, but the scar cannot be effaced; it remains a frightful cicatrix. even his whiskers, let grow to their extremest outcrop, will not all conceal it; it is too far forward upon the face. it was after this unfortunate affair that he made proposal to adela miranda. and now he cannot help thinking it had something to do with her abrupt and disdainful rejection of him, though the young lady's little concealed disgust, coupled with her brother's indignation, had no reference to the physical deformity. but for his blind passion he might have perceived this. fancying it so, however, it is not strange that he goes half frantic, and can be heard giving utterance to fearful oaths every time he glances in his looking-glass. after returning from his secret expedition of murder and pillage, he can gaze with more equanimity into the glass. from the man who caused the disfiguration of his visage he has exacted a terrible retribution. his adversary in the chihuahua duel is now no more. he has met with a fate sufficient to satisfy the most implacable vengeance; and often, both sober and in his cups, does gil uraga break out into peals of laughter, like the glee of a demon, as he reflects on the torture, prolonged and horrible, his hated enemy must have endured before life became extinct! but even all this does not appease his malevolent spirit. a portion of his vengeance is yet unappeased--that due to him who was second in the duel. and if it could be satisfied by the death of miranda himself, then there would still be the other thought to torture him--his thwarted love scheme. the chagrin he suffers from this is stronger than his thirst for vengeance. he is seated in the sala of miranda's house, which he occupies as his official headquarters. he is alone, his only companion being the bottle that stands upon a table beside him--this and a cigar burning between his lips. it is not wine he is drinking, but the whisky of tequila, distilled from the wild maguey. wine is too weak to calm his perturbed spirit, as he sits surveying the portrait upon the wall. his eyes have been on it several times; each time, as he takes them off, drinking a fresh glass of the mezcal and igniting another cigar. what signifies all his success in villainy? what is life worth without her? he would plunder a church to obtain possession of her--murder his dearest friend to get from adela miranda one approving smile. such are his coarse thoughts as he sits soliloquising, shaping conjectures about the banished commandant and his sister. where can they have gone to? in all probability to the united states-that asylum of rebels and refugees. in the territory of new mexico they cannot have stayed. his spies have searched every nook and corner of it, their zeal secured by the promise of large rewards. he has dispatched secret emissaries to the rio abajo, and on to the _provincias internas_. but no word of miranda anywhere--no trace can be found either of him or his sister. "_chingara_!" as if this exclamatory phrase, sent hissing through his teeth--too foul to bear translation--were the name of a man, one at this moment appears in the doorway, who, after a gesture of permission to enter, steps inside the room. he is an officer in full uniform--one whom we have met before, though not in military costume. it is lieutenant roblez, uraga's adjutant, as also his confederate in crime. "i'm glad you've come, _ayudante_," says the colonel, motioning the new-comer to a seat. "i'm feeling a little bit lonely, and i want some one to cheer me. you, roblez, are just the man for that; you've got such a faculty for conversation." this is ironical; for roblez is as silent as an owl. "sit down and give me your cheerful company," the colonel adds. "have a cigar and a _copita_ of this capital stuff; it's the best that tequila produces." "i've brought other company that may be more cheerful than mine," returns the adjutant, still keeping his feet. "ah! some of our fellows from the cuartel? bring them in." "it is not any of the officers, colonel. there's only one man, and he's a civilian. "civilian or soldier, you're free to introduce him. i hope," he adds, in an undertone, "it's one of the _ricos_ of the neighbourhood, who won't mind taking an _albur_ at _monte_ or a throw of the dice. i'm just in the vein for a bit of play." "he i'm going to introduce don't look much like a _rico_. from what i can see of him in the darkness, i should say that the blanket upon his shoulders and his sheepskin smallclothes--somewhat dilapidated by the way--are about all the property he possesses." "he's a stranger to you, then?" "as much as to yourself, as you'll say after seeing him--perhaps more." "what sort of man is he?" "for that matter, he can hardly be described as a man. at least, he's not one of the _gent-de-razon_. he's only an indian." "ha! comanche?" as he utters this interrogatory, colonel gil uraga gives a slight start, and looks a little uneasy. his relations with men of the indian race are of a delicate nature; and, although keen to cultivate their acquaintance whenever occasion requires it, he prefers keeping all indians at a distance--more especially comanches, when he has no particular need of their services. the thought has flashed across his mind that the man waiting to be ushered into his presence may be a messenger from the horned lizard; and with the tenawa chief he desires no further dealings--at least for a time. therefore, the belief of its being an emissary from his red-skinned confederate somewhat discomposes him. the reply of his subordinate, however, reassures him. "no, colonel, he's not a comanche; bears no resemblance to one, only in the colour of his skin. he appears to be a pueblo; and from his tattered costume, i take him to be some poor labourer." "but what does he want with me?" "that, colonel, i cannot say; only that he has expressed a very urgent desire to speak with you. i fancy he has something to communicate, which might be important for you to hear; else i should not have taken the liberty to bring him here." "you have him at hand?" "i have. he is outside in the _patio_. shall i usher him in?" "by all means; there can be no harm in hearing what the fellow has to say. it may be about some threatened invasion of the savages; and as protectors of the people, you, ayudante, know it's our duty to do whatever we can for warding off such a catastrophe." the colonel laughs at his sorry jest; the adjutant expressing his appreciation of it in a shrug of the shoulders, accompanied by a grim smile. "bring the brute in!" is the command that followed, succeeded by the injunction. "stay outside in the court till i send for or call you. the fellow may have something to say intended for only one pair of ears. take a glass of the _mezcal_, light cigarrito, and amuse yourself as you best may." the adjutant obeys the first two of these directions; then, stepping out of the _sala_, leaves his superior officer alone. uraga glances around to assure himself that there are weapons within reach. with a conscience like his, a soul charged with crime, no wonder. his sabre rests against the wall close to his hand, while a pair of dragoon pistols, both loaded, lie upon the table. satisfied with the proximity of these weapons, he sits upright in his chair and tranquilly awaits the entrance of the indian. chapter forty. a confidence well rewarded. only a short interval, a score of seconds elapses, when the door, once more opening, admits the expected visitor. the adjutant, after ushering him into the room, withdraws, and commences pacing to and fro in the patio. colonel gil uraga feels very much inclined to laugh as he contemplates the new-comer, and reflects on the precautions he has taken. a poor devil of an indian _peon_, in coarse woollen _tilma_, tanned sheepskin trousers reaching only to the knee, bare legs below, _guaraches_ upon his feet, and a straw hat upon his head; his long black hail hanging unkempt over his shoulders; his mien humble and looks downcast, like all of his tribe. yet it might be seen that, on occasion, his eyes could flash forth a light, indicative of danger--a fierce, fiery light, such as may have shone in the orbs of his ancestors when they rallied around guatimozin, and with clubs and stakes beat back the spears and swords of their spanish invaders. at the entrance of this humble personage, into the splendidly furnished apartment, his first act is to pull off his tattered straw hat, and make lowly obeisance to the gorgeously attired officer he sees sitting behind the table. up to this time uraga has presumed him to be a perfect stranger, but when the broad brim of the sombrero no longer casts its shade over his face, and his eyelids become elevated through increasing confidence, the colonel starts to his feet with an exclamatory speech that tells of recognition. "_carrambo_! you are manuel--mule driver for don valerian miranda?" "_si, senor; a servido de v_ (yes, sir; at your excellency's service)," is the reply meekly spoken, and accompanied with a second sweep of the straw hat--as gracefully as if given by a chesterfield. at sight of this old acquaintance, a world of thought rushes crowding through the brain of gil uraga--conjectures, mingled with pleasant anticipations. for it comes back to his memory, that at the time of colonel miranda's escape, some of his domestics went off with him, and he remembers that manuel was one of them. in the indian bending so respectfully before him he sees, or fancies, the first link of a chain that may enable him to trace the fugitives. manuel should know something about their whereabouts? and the _ci devant_ mule driver is now in his power for any purpose--be it life or death. there is that in the air and attitude of the indian which tells him there will be no need to resort to compulsory measures. the information he desires can be obtained without, and he determines to seek it by adopting the opposite course. "my poor fellow," he says, "you look distressed--as if you had just come from off a toilsome journey. here, take a taste of something to recuperate your strength; then you can let me know what you've got to say. i presume you've some communication to make to me, as the military commandant of the district. night or day, i am always ready to give a hearing to those who bring information that concerns the welfare of the state." while speaking the colonel has poured out a glass of the distilled mezcal juice. this the peon takes from his hand, and, nothing loth, spills the liquor between his two rows of white glittering teeth. upon his stomach, late unused to it, the fiery spirit produce! an effect almost instantaneous; and the moment after he becomes freely communicative--if not so disposed before. but he has been; therefore the disclosures that follow are less due to the alcohol than to a passion every whit as inflammatory. he is acting under the stimulus of a revenge, terrible and long restrained. "i've missed you from about here, manuel," says the colonel, in kindly tones, making his approaches with skill. "where have you been all this while, my good man?" "with my master," is the peon's reply. "ah, indeed! i thought your master had gone clear out of the country?" "out of the settled part of it only, senor." "oh! he is still, then, within mexican territory! i am glad to hear that. i was very sorry to think we'd lost such a good citizen and patriot as don valerian miranda. true, he and i differ in our views as regards government; but that's nothing, you know, manuel. men may be bitter political enemies, yet very good friends. by-the-way, where is the colonel now?" despite his apparent stolidity, the indian is not so stupid as to be misled by talk like this. with a full knowledge of the situation-forced upon him by various events--the badinage of the brilliant _militario_ does not for a moment blind him. circumstances have given him enough insight into uraga's character and position to know that the tatter's motives should somewhat resemble his own. he has long been aware that the lancer colonel is in love with his young mistress, as much as he himself with her maid. without this knowledge he might not have been there--at least, not with so confident an expectation of success in the design that has brought him hither. for design he has, deep, deadly, and traitorous. despite the influence of the aguardiente, fast loosening his tongue, he is yet somewhat cautious in his communications; and not until uraga repeats the question does he make answer to it. then comes the response, slowly and reluctantly, as if from one of his long-suffering race, who has discovered a mine of precious metal, and is being put to the torture to "denounce" it. "senor coronel," he says, "how much will your excellency give to know where my master now is? i have heard that there's a large bounty offered for don valerian's head." "that is an affair that concerns the state. for myself, i've nothing personally to do with it. still, as an officer of the government, it is my duty to take what steps i can towards making your master a prisoner. i think i may promise a good reward to anyone who, by giving information, would enable me to arrest a fugitive rebel and bring him before the bar of justice. can you do that?" "well, your excellency, that will depend. i'm only a poor man, and need money to live upon. don valerian is my master, and if anything were to happen to him i should lose my situation. what am i to do?" "oh, you'd easily get another, and better. a man of your strength-by the way, talking of strength, my good manuel, you don't seem to have quite recovered from your journey, which must have been long and fatiguing. take another _copita_; you're in need of it; 'twill do you good." pressure of this sort put upon an indian, be he _bravo_ or _manso_, is rarely resisted. nor is it in manuel's case. he readily yields to it, and tosses off another glass of the aguardiente. before the strong alcohol can have fairly filtered down into his stomach its fumes ascend to his skull. the cowed, cautious manner--a marked characteristic of his race--now forsakes him; the check-strings of his tongue become relaxed, and, with nothing before his mind save his scheme of vengeance, and that of securing conchita, he betrays the whole secret of colonel miranda's escape--the story of his retreat across the staked plain, and his residence in the lone valley. when he further informs uraga about the two guests who have strayed to this solitary spot, and, despite his maudlin talk, minutely describes the men, his listener utters a loud cry, accompanied by a gesture of such violence as to overturn the table, sending bottle and glasses over the floor. he does not stay to see the damage righted, but with a shout that reverberates throughout the whole house, summons his adjutant, and also the corporal of his guard. "_cabo_!" he cries, addressing himself to the latter in a tone at once vociferous and commanding; "take this man to the guard-house! and see you keep him there, so that he may be forthcoming when wanted. take heed to hold him safe. if he be missing, you shall be shot ten minutes after i receive the report of it. you have the word of gil uraga for that." from the way the corporal makes prisoner the surprised peon, almost throttling him, it is evident he does not intend running any risk of being shot for letting the latter escape. the indian appears suddenly sobered by the rough treatment he is receiving. but he is too much astonished to find speech for protest. mute, and without offering the slightest resistance, he is dragged out through the open doorway, to all appearance more dead than alive. "come, roblez!" hails his superior officer, as soon as the door has closed behind the guard corporal and his captive, "drink with me! drink! first to revenge! i haven't had it yet, as i'd thought; that has all to be gone over again. but it's sure now--surer than ever. after, we shall drink to success in love. mine is not hopeless, yet. lost! she is found again--found! ah, my darling adela!" he exclaims, staggering towards the portrait, and in tipsy glee contemplating it, "you thought to escape me; but no. no one can get away from gil uraga-friend, sweetheart, or enemy. you shall yet be enfolded in these arms; if not as my wife, my--_margarita_!" chapter forty one. an earthly paradise. "oh that the desert were my dwelling-place, with one fair spirit for my monitor! that i might all forget the human race, and, hating no one, love but only her. ye elements, in whose ennobling stir i feel myself exalted, can ye not accord me such a being? do i err in deeming such inhabit many a spot- though with them to converse can rarely be our lot." oft during his sojourn in the sequestered valley do these lines occur to the young prairie merchant. and vividly; for, in very truth, he has realised the aspiration of the poet. but, though dwelling in a desert, far different is the scene habitually before his eyes. from the front of the humble chalet that has so opportunely afforded him a shelter, seated under the spreading branches of a pecan-tree, he can look on a landscape lovely as ever opened to the eyes of man--almost as that closed against our first parents when expelled from paradise. above he beholds a sapphire sky, scarce ever shadowed by a cloud; a sun whose fierce, fervid beams become softened as they fall amid the foliage of evergreen oaks; among clustering groves that show all the varied tints of verdure, disporting upon green glassy glades, and glinting into arbours overshadowed by the sassafras laurel, the osage orange, and the wild china-tree, laced together by a trellis of grape vines. a lake in the centre of this luxurious vegetation, placid as sleep itself, only stirred by the webbed feet of waterfowl, or the wings of dipping swallows, with above and below a brawling rivulet, here and there showing cascades like the tails of white horses, or the skirts of ballroom belles floating through waltz or gallopade. in correspondence with these fair sights are the sounds heard. by day the cooing of doves, the soft tones of the golden oriole, and the lively chatter of the red cardinal; by night the booming note of the bull-bat, the sonorous call of the trumpeter swan, and that lay far excelling all--the clear song of the polyglot thrush, the famed mocking-bird of america. no wonder the invalid, recovering from his illness, after the long dark spell that has obscured his intellect, wrapping his soul, as it were, in a shroud--no wonder he fancies the scene to be a sort of paradise, worthy of being inhabited by peris. one is there he deems fair as houri or peri, unsurpassed by any ideal of hindoo or persian fable--adela miranda. in her he beholds beauty of a type striking as rare; not common anywhere, and only seen among women in whose veins courses the blue blood of andalusia--a beauty perhaps not in accordance with the standard of taste acknowledged in the icy northland. the _vigolite_ upon her upper lip might look a little bizarre in an assemblage of saxon dames, just as her sprightly spirit would offend the sentiment of a strait-laced puritanism. it has no such effect upon frank hamersley. the child of a land above all others free from conventionalism, with a nature attuned to the picturesque, these peculiarities, while piquing his fancy, have fixed his admiration. long before leaving his sick couch there has been but one world for him--that where dwells adela miranda; but one being in it--herself. surely it was decreed by fate that these two should love one another! surely for them was there a marriage in heaven! else why brought together in such a strange place and by such a singular chain of circumstances? for himself, hamersley thinks of this--builds hopes upon it deeming it an omen. another often occurs to him, also looking like fate. he remembers that portrait on the wall at albuquerque, and how it had predisposed him in favour of the original. the features of spano-mexican type--so unlike those he had been accustomed to in his own country--had vividly impressed him. gazing upon it he had almost felt love for the likeness. then the description of the young girl given by her brother, with the incidents that led to friendly relations between him and colonel miranda, all had contributed to sow the seed of a tender sentiment in the heart of the young kentuckian. it had not died out. neither time nor absence had obliterated it. far off--even when occupied with the pressing claims of business--that portrait-face had often appeared upon the retina of his memory, and often also in the visions of dreamland. now that he has looked upon it in reality--sees it in all its blazing beauty, surrounded by scenes picturesque as its own expression, amid incidents romantic as his fancy could conjure up--now that he knows it as the face of her who has saved his life, is it any wonder the slight, tender sentiment first kindled by the painted picture should become stronger at the sight of the living original? it has done this--become a passion that pervade his soul, filling his whole heart. all the more from its being the first he has ever felt-the first love of his life. and for this also all the more does he tremble as he thinks of the possibility of its being unreciprocated. he has been calculating the chances in his favour every hour since consciousness returned to him. and from some words heard in that very hour has he derived greater pleasure, and draws more hope than from aught that has occurred since. constantly does he recall that soliloquy, speech spoken under the impression that it did not reach his ears. there has been nothing afterwards--neither word nor deed--to give him proof he is beloved. the lady has been a tender nurse--a hostess apparently solicitous for the happiness of her guest--nothing more. were the words she had so thoughtlessly spoken unfelt, and without any particular meaning? or was the speech but an allusion, born from the still lingering distemper of his brain? he yearns to know the truth. every hour that he remains ignorant of it, he is in torture equalling that of tantalus. yet he fears to ask, lest in the answer he may have a painful revelation. he almost envies walt wilder his commonplace love, its easy conquest, and somewhat grotesque declaration. he wishes he could propose with like freedom, and receive a similar response. his comrade's success should embolden him; but does not. there is no parallelism between the parties. thus he delays seeking the knowledge he most desires to possess, through fear it may afflict him. not from any lack of opportunity. since almost all the time is he left alone with her he so worships. nothing stands in his way--no zealous watchfulness of a brother. don valerian neglects every step of fraternal duty--if to take such ever occurred to him. his time is fully occupied in roving around the valley, or making more distant excursions, in the companionship of the _ci-devant_ ranger, who narrates to him a strange chapter in the life-lore of the prairies. when walt chances to be indoors, he has companion of his own, which hinder him from too frequently intruding upon his comrade. enough for him the company of conchita. hamersley has equally as little to dread the intrusion of don prospero. absorbed in his favourite study of nature, the ex-army surgeon passes most of his hours in communion with her. more than half the day is he out of doors, chasing lizards into their crevices among the rocks, impaling insects on the spikes of the wild maguey plant, or plucking such flowers as seem new to the classified list of the botanist. in these tranquil pursuits he is perhaps happier than all around--even those whose hearts throb with that supreme passion, full of sweetness, but too often bringing bitterness. so ever near the shrine of his adoration, having it all to himself, hamersley worships on, but in silence. chapter forty two. a dangerous design. at length the day, the hour, is at hand when the young kentuckian purposes taking departure. he does not anticipate this with pleasure. on the contrary, the prospect gives him pain. in that sequestered spot he could linger long--for ever, if adela miranda were to be with him. he is leaving it with reluctance, and would stay longer now, but that he is stirred by a sense of duty. he has to seek justice for the assassination of his teamsters, and, if possible, punish their assassins. to obtain this he intends going on to the del norte--if need be, to albuquerque itself. the information given by the ex-commandant, with all the suspicious circumstances attending, have determined him how to act. he intends calling uraga to account; but not by the honourable action of a duel, but in a court of justice, if such can be found in new mexico. "if it turns out as we have been conjecturing," he says, in conversation with miranda, "i shall seek the scoundrel in his own stronghold. if he be not there, i shall follow him elsewhere--ay, all over mexico." "hyar's one'll be wi' ye in that chase," cries the ex-ranger, coming up at the moment. "yis, frank, go wi' ye to the heart o' mexiko, plum centre; to the halls o' the montezoomas, if ye like, enywhar to be in at the death o' a skunk like that." "surely, colonel miranda," continues hamersley, gratified, though not carried away by his old comrade's enthusiastic offer of assistance, "surely there is law in your land sufficient to give redress for such an outrage as that." "my dear don francisco," replies the mexican, tranquilly twirling a cigarrito between his fingers, "there is law for those who have the power and money to obtain it. in new mexico, as you must yourself know, might makes right; and never more than at this present time. don manuel armijo is once more the governor of my unfortunate fatherland. when i tell you that he rose to his present position by just such a crime as that we've been speaking of, you may then understand the sort of law administered under his rule. manuel armijo was a shepherd, employed on one occasion to drive a flock of thirty thousand sheep--the property of his employer, the senor chavez--to the market chihuahua. while crossing the jornado del muerte, he and one or two confederates, whom he had put up to his plan, disguised themselves as apache indians, attacked their fellow sheep-drivers, murdered them, and made themselves masters of the flock. then pulling the plumes from their heads, and washing the paint off their faces, they drove their muttons to a different market, sold them, and returned to chavez to tell a tale of indian spoliation, and how they themselves had just escaped with their scalps. this is the true history of general don manuel armijo, governor of new mexico; at least that of his first beginnings. with such and many similar deeds since, is it likely he would look with any other than a lenient eye on the doings of gil urago, his imitator? no, senor, not even if you could prove the present commandant of albuquerque, in full, open court, to have been the individual who robbed yourself and murdered your men." "i shall try, for all that," rejoins hamersley, his heart wrung with sorrow at the remembrance of his slaughtered comrades, and bursting with the bitter thought of justice thus likely to be obstructed. "don't suppose colonel miranda, that i intend resting my cause on the clemency of don manuel armijo, or any chance of right to be expected at his hands. there's a wide stretch of desert between the united states and mexico, but not wide enough to hinder the american eagle from flapping its wings across, and giving protection to all who have a right to claim it, even to a poor prairie trader. a thousand thanks, colonel miranda. i owe you that for twice saving my life, and now for setting me on the track of him who has twice endangered it. no use your trying to dissuade me. i shall go in search of this _forban_ direct to the valley of the del norte. don't fear that i shall fail in obtaining justice, whatever don manuel armijo may do to defeat it." "well, if you are determined i shall not hold out against you. only i fear your errand may be fruitless, if not worse. the two mules are at your service, and you can leave them at a place i shall indicate. when manuel returns i shall send him to bring them back." "possibly i may bring them myself. i do not intend making stay in new mexico; only long enough to communicate with the american consul at santa fe, and take some preliminary steps for the end in view. then i shall return to the--states to lay the whole affair before our government." "and you think of coming this way?" "walt, here, has been making explorations down the stream that runs through this valley; he has no doubt about its being one of the heads of the red river of louisiana, if not the texan brazos. by keeping down it we can reach the frontier settlements of texas, then on to the states." "i'm glad you intend returning this way. it will give us the pleasure of soon again seeing you." "colonel miranda," rejoins hamersley, in a tone that tells of something on his mind, a proposition he would make to his host, and feels delicacy in declaring it, "in coming back by the llano estacado i have another object in view besides the idea of a direct route." "what other object, _amago mio_?" "the hope of inducing you to accompany me to the states--you and yours." "senor don francisco, 'tis exceedingly kind of you. but the period of our banishment may not be long. i've had late news from our friends, telling me things are taking a turn and the political wheel must soon make another revolution, the present party going below. then i get back to my country, returning triumphant. meanwhile we are happy enough here, and i think safe." "in the last i disagree with you. i'm sorry to say, but have reasons. now that i know the real character of this ruffian uraga--his deeds actually done, and others we suspect--he's just the man who'll leave no stone unturned to discover your hiding place. he has more than one motive for doing so, but one that will move him to follow you here into the desert--aye, to the uttermost end of the earth!" the motive in the speaker's mind is uraga's desire to possess adela. after a pause, this though: passing him, he adds,-"no, don valerian, you are not safe here." then, continuing,-"how know you that your servant manuel has not been recognised while executing some of those errands on which you've sent him; or that the man himself may not turn traitor? i confess, from what i've seen of the fellow, he has not favourably impressed me." the words make an impression upon miranda anything but pleasant. it is not the first time for him to have the thought suggested by them. more than once has he entertained suspicions about the peon's fidelity. it is possible the man might prove traitor; if not then, at some future time--aye, and probable, too, considering the reward offered for the exile's head. miranda, knowing and now thinking of it, admits the justice of his friend's fear. more; he sees cause for raising alarm. so does don prospero, who, at the moment coming up, takes part in the conference. it ends in the refugees resolving to stay in the valley till hamersley and walt can return to them; then to forsake that asylum, no longer deemed safe, and retire to one certainly so--the land over which waves a flag powerful to protect its citizens and give the same to their friends--the star-spangled banner. chapter forty three. the last appeal. "i have news for you, _nina_." it is colonel miranda speaking to his sister, shortly after the conversation reported. "what news, valerian?" "well, there are two sorts of them." "both good, i hope." "not altogether; one will be pleasant to you, the other, perhaps, a little painful." "in that case they should neutralise one another; anyhow, let me hear them." "i shall tell the pleasant ones first. we shall soon have an opportunity of leaving this lonely place." "do you call that good news? i rather think it the reverse. what will the bad be?" "but, dear adela, our life here, away from all society, has been a harsh experience--to you a terrible one." "in that, _hermano mio_, you're mistaken. you know i don't care a straw for what the world calls society--never did. i prefer being free from its stupid restraints and silly conventionalities. give me nature for my companion--ay, in her wildest scenes and most surly moods." "surely you've had both to a surfeit." "nothing of the kind; i'm not tired of nature yet. i have never been happier than in this wilderness home. how different from my convent school--my prison, i should rather call it! oh, it is charming! and if i were to have my way, it should never come to an end. but why do you talk of leaving this place? do you suppose the troubles are over, and we can return safely? i don't wish to go there, brother. after what has happened, i hate new mexico, and would prefer staying in the llano estacado." "i have no thought of going back to new mexico." "where, then, brother?" "in the very opposite direction--to the united states. don francisco advises me to do so; and i have yielded to his counsel." adela seems less disposed to offer opposition. she no longer protests against the change of residence. "dear sister," he continues, "we cannot do better. there seems little hope of our unfortunate country getting rid of her tyrants--at least, for some time to come. when the day again arrives for our patriots to pronounce, i shall know it in time to be with them. now, we should only think of our safety. although i don't wish to alarm you, i've never felt it quite safe here. who knows, but that uraga may yet discover our hiding-place? he has his scouts searching in all directions. every time manuel makes a visit to the settlements, i have fear of his being followed back. therefore, i think it will be wiser for us to carry out our original design, and go on to the american states." "do you intend accompanying don francisco?" she listens eagerly for an answer. "yes; but not now. it will be some time before he can return to us." "he is going home first, and will then come back?" "not home--not to his home." "where, then?" "that is the news i thought might be painful. he has resolved upon going on to our country for reasons already known to you. we suspect uraga of having been at the head of the red robbers who have plundered him and killed his people. he is determined to find out and punish the perpetrators of that foul deed. it will be difficult; nay, more, there will be danger in his attempting it--i've told him so." "dear brother, try to dissuade him!" if hamersley could but hear the earnest tone in which the appeal is spoken it would give him gratification. "i have tried, but to no purpose. it is not the loss of his property-he is generous, and does not regard it. his motive is a nobler, a holier one. his comrades have been murdered; he says he will seek the assassins and obtain redress, even at the risk of sacrificing his own life." "a hero! who could not help loving him?" adela does not say this aloud, nor to her brother. it is a thought, silent within the secret recesses of her own heart. "if you wish," continues the colonel, "i will see him, and again try to turn him from this reckless course; though i know there is little hope. stay! a thought strikes me, sister. suppose you speak to him. a woman's words are more likely to be listened to; and i know that yours will have great weight with him. he looks upon you as the saviour of his life, and may yield to your request." "if you think so, valerian--" "i do. i see him coming this way. remain where you are. i shall send him in to you." with a heart heaving and surging, hamersley stands in the presence of her, the sole cause of its tumultuous excitement. for he has been summoned thither in a manner that somewhat surprises him. "don francisco, my sister wishes a word with you," is the speech of colonel miranda, an invitation promptly responded to. what is to be the import of his interview, unexpected, unsought, apparently commanded? he asks himself this question as he proceeds towards the place where she stands waiting to receive him. coming up to her, he says,-"senorita, your brother has told me you wish to speak with me?" "i do," she replies, without quail in her look or quiver in her voice. in returning her glance hamersley feels as if his case is hopeless. that very day he had thought of proposing to her. it almost passes from his mind. so cool, she cannot care for him. he remains silent, leaving her to proceed. "senor, it is about your going to the rio del norte. my brother tells me such is your intention. we wish you not to go, don francisco. there is danger in your doing it." "it is my duty." "in what respect? explain yourself!" "my brave comrades have been slain--assassinated. i have reason to believe that in the town of albuquerque i may discover their assassins-at all events their chief, and perhaps bring him to justice. i intend trying, if it costs me my life." "do you reflect what your life is worth?" "to me not much." "it may be to others. you have at home a mother, brothers, and sisters. perhaps one dearer?" "no--not at home." "elsewhere, then?" he is silent under this searching inquisition. "do you think that danger to your life would be unhappiness to her's-your death her life's misery?" "my dishonour should be more, as it would to myself. it is not vengeance i seek against those who have murdered my men, only to bring them to justice. i must do that, or else proclaim myself a poltroon--i feel myself one--a self-accusation that would give me a life-long remorse. no, senorita adela. it is kind of you to take an interest in my safety. i already owe you my life; but i cannot permit you to save it again, at the sacrifice of honour, of duty, of humanity." hamersley fancies himself being coldly judged and counselled with indifference. could he know the warm, wild admiration struggling in the breast of her who counsels him, he would make rejoinder in different fashion. soon after he talks in an altered tone, and with changed understanding. so also does she, hitherto so difficult of comprehension. "go!" she cries. "go and get redress of your wrongs, justice for your fallen comrades; and if you can, the punishment of their assassins. but remember! if it brings death to you, there is one who will not care to live after." "who?" he asks, springing forward, with heart on fire and eyes aflame. "who?" he scarce needs to put the question. it is already answered by the emphasis on her last words. but it is again replied to, this time in a more tranquil tone; the long, dark lashes of the speaker veiling her eyes as she pronounces her own name,-"_adela miranda_!" from poverty to riches, from a dungeon to bright daylight, from the agonising struggle of drowning to that confident feeling when the feet stand firm upon terra firma--all these are sensations of a pleasantly-exciting kind. they are dull in comparison with that delirious joy, the lot of the despairing lover on finding that his despair has been all a fancy, and that his passion is reciprocated. such a joy thrills through hamersley's breast as he hears the name pronounced. it is like a cabalistic speech, throwing open to him the portals of paradise. chapter forty four. a mysterious message. as is known, hamersley's suspicions about the treachery of the peon are not without cause. on the contrary, they might seem second-sight. for, almost at the moment he is communicating them to colonel miranda, the native is telling his tale to uraga. nor does the latter lose much time in acting upon the information gained--only that short interlude given to exultation as he stepped up to the portrait of adela miranda, and stood triumphantly regarding the likeness of her he now looks upon as sure to be his. he has no hope to get possession of her by fair means; foul are alone in his thoughts. after delivering his half-frenzied apostrophe to the painted image, he returns to the table, beside which roblez has already taken a seat. they re-fill their glasses, and drink the toasts specified, with a ceremony in strange contrast to the hellish glee sparkling in the eyes of the lancer-colonel. his countenance beams with triumph, such as might be shown by satan over the ruin of innocence. for he now feels sure of his victims--alike that of his love as well as those of his revenge. not long does he remain over his cups in the company of his subordinate. he has an important matter upon his mind which calls for reflection--in silence and by himself. though often admitting his adjutant to a share in his criminal schemes, the participation is only in their profits and the act of execution. despotic even in his villainies, he keeps the planning to himself, for he has secrets even roblez must not know. and now an idea has dawned upon his mind, a purpose he does not care to communicate to the subaltern till such time as may be necessary or seem fit to him. not that he dreads treachery on the part of his fellow freebooter. they are mutually compromised, and long have been; too much to tell tales about one another. besides, roblez, though a man of undoubted courage, of the coarse, animal kind, has, neverthless, a certain moral dread of his commanding officer, and fears to offend him. he knows gil uraga to be one whose hostility, once provoked, will stop short at nothing, leave no means untried to take retribution--this of a terrible kind. hence a control which the colonel holds over him beyond that drawn from his superior military rank. hence, also, his receiving but a small share in the proceeds of their various robberies, and his being satisfied with this, or, at all events, seeming so. on his side, uraga has several motives for not letting his subordinate into the knowledge of all his complicated schemes; among them one springing from a moral peculiarity. he is of a strangely-constituted nature, secretive to the last degree--a quality or habit in which he prides himself. it is his delight to practice it whenever the opportunity offers; just as the thief and detective officer take pleasure in their respective callings beyond the mere prize to be derived from their exercise. the intelligence just received from the traitorous mule-driver, unexpected as pleasing, has opened to him the prospect of a grand success. it may enable him to strike a _coup_ covering all--alike giving gratification to his love, as his hate. but the blow must needs be dealt deftly. there are circumstances to be considered and precautions taken, not only to prevent its failing, but secure against a publicity that might cause scandal to himself, to say naught of consequent danger. and it must be struck soon--at once. it is too ticklish a matter to admit of delay, either in the design or execution. already has the matter flitted before his mind in its general outlines; almost soon as receiving the report of the peon. it is only the details that remain for consideration; and these he intends considering alone, without any aid from his adjutant. as time is an object, he speedily terminates his carousal with the subaltern; who, dismissed, returns to the military _cuartel_. soon as he is gone the colonel again seats himself, and lighting a fresh cigar, continues smoking. for several minutes he remains silent, his eyes turned upwards, and his features set in a smile. one might fancy him but watching the smoke of his cigar as it rises in spiral wreaths to the ceiling. he is occupied with no such innocent amusement. on the contrary, his grim smile betokens meditation deep and devilish. he is mentally working out a problem, a nefarious scheme, which will ere long bear evil fruit. as the cigar grows shorter he seems to draw nearer to his conclusions. and when at length there is only the stump between his teeth, he spits it out; and, taking a hand-bell from the table, rings until a domestic appears in the doorway in answer to the summons. "call in the guard-corporal!" is the order received by the servant, who withdraws without saying a word. soon the soldier shows himself, saluting as he enters the door. "_cabo_! bring your prisoner before me." the corporal retires, and shortly after returns, having the indian in charge. he is commanded to leave the latter, and himself remain waiting without. directed also to close the door; which he does on getting outside. thus closeted with the peon--still wondering why he has been made a prisoner--uraga submits him to a process of examination, which elicits from the scared creature everything he seeds to know. among the rest, he makes himself acquainted with the situation of the valley, where the exiles have found temporary asylum; the direction, distance, and means of access to it--in short, its complete topography. with all the indian is familiar, can correctly describe it, and does so. in that imposing presence he dare not attempt deception, even if inclined. but he is not. between questioner and questioned the aim and end are similar, if not the same. besides, the peon's blood has again been warmed up, and his tongue set loose, by a fresh infusion of aguardiente--so that his confessions are full as free. he tells about the life led by the mexican refugees, as also their american guests--all he knows, and this is nearly everything. for trusted, unsuspected, he has had every opportunity to learn. the only thing concealed by him is his own love affair with conchita and its disastrous ending, through the intrusion of the texan ranger. this, if told, would give his listener slight concern, alongside the grave impressions made upon him by another affair; some particulars of which the peon communicates. these points refer to tender relations existing between the young prairie trader and adela miranda, almost proving their existence. confirmed or not, on hearing of them gil uraga receives a shock which sends the blood rushing in quick current through his veins; while upon his countenance comes an expression of such bitter malignity, that the traitor, in fear for his own safety, repents having told him. but uraga has no spite against him--no motive for having it. on the contrary, he intends rewarding him, after he gets out of him certain other services for which he is to be retained. when his cross-questioning is at length brought to a close, he is once more committed to the charge of the guard-corporal, with orders to be returned to the prison. at the same time a hint is given him that his incarceration is only precautionary, with a promise it will not be for long. immediately after his removal, uraga seats himself before an escritoire, which stands on one side of the room. laying open the lid, he spreads a sheet of paper upon it, and commences to write what appears an epistle. whatever it is, the composition occupies some considerable time. occasionally he stops using the pen, as though pondering what to put down. when it is at length completed, apparently to his satisfaction, he folds the sheet, thrusts a stick of wax into the flame of a candle, and seals the document, but without using any seal-stamp. a small silver coin taken from his pocket makes the necessary impression. there does not appear to be any name appended to the epistle, if one it is; and the superscription shows only two words, without any address. the words are "el barbato." again ringing the bell, the same servant answers it. "go to the stables," commands his master, "or the corral, or wherever he may be, and tell pedrillo i want him. be quick about it!" the man bows and disappears. "it will take them--how many days to reach the tenawas' town, and how many back to the pecos?" soliloquises uraga, pacing the floor, as he makes his calculations. "three, four, five. no matter. if before them we can wait till they come. pedrillo!" pedrillo has put in an appearance. he is an indian of the tame sort, not greatly differing from the man manuel, with a countenance quite as forbidding. but we have seen pedrillo before; since he was one of the two muleteers who conducted the _atajo_ transporting the spoil from the caravan of the prairie traders. "pedrillo," directs the colonel, "catch a couple of the best roadsters in the corral--one for yourself, the other for jose. have them saddled, and get yourselves ready for a journey of two weeks, or so. make all haste with your preparations. when ready, come here, and report yourself." the muleteer disappears, and uraga continues to pace the floor, apparently yet busied with a mental measurement of time and distance. at intervals he stops before the portrait on the wall, and for a second or two gazes at it. this seems to increase his impatience for the man's reappearance. he has not a great while to wait. the scrip and staff of a new mexican traveller of pedrillo's kind is of no great bulk or complexity. it takes but a short time to prepare it. a few _tortillas_ and _frijoles_, a head or two of _chile colorado_, half a dozen onions, and a bunch of _tasojo_--jerked beef. having collected these comestibles, and filled his _xuaje_, or water gourd, pedrillo reports himself ready for the road, or trail, or whatever sort of path, and on whatever errand, it may please his master to despatch him. "you will go straight to the tenawa town--horned lizard's--on the south branch of the goo-al-pah. you can find your way to the place, pedrillo. you've been there before?" the indian nods an affirmative. "take this." here uraga hands him the sealed paper. "see you show it to no one you may chance to meet passing out from the settlements. give it to barbato, or hand it to the horned lizard himself. he'll know who it's for. you are to ride night and day, as fast as the animals can carry you. when you've delivered it you needn't wait, but come back-not here, but to the alamo. you know the place--where we met the tenawas some weeks ago. you will find me there. _vaya_!" on receiving these instructions pedrillo vanishes from, the room; a strange sinister glance in his oblique indian eyes telling that he knows himself to be once more--what he has often been--an emissary of evil. uraga takes another turn across the floor, then, seating himself by the table, seeks rest for his passion-tossed soul by drinking deep of the _mescal_ of tequila. chapter forty five. the staked plain. the elevated table-land known as llano estacado is in length over three hundred miles, with an average width of sixty or seventy. it extends longitudinally between the former spanish provinces of new mexico and texas; their respective capitals, santa fe and san antonia de bejar, being on the opposite side of it. in the days of vice-royal rule, a military road ran across it, connecting the two provincial centres, and mule trains of traders passed to and fro between. as this road was only a trail, often obliterated by the drifting sands of the desert, tall stakes were set up at intervals to indicate the route. hence the name "llano estacado"--literally, staked plain. in those days spain was a strong, enterprising nation, and her mexican colonists could travel over most parts of their vast territory without fear of being assaulted by the savages. at a later period, when spanish power began to decline, all this became changed. cities fell to ruin, settlements were deserted, mission establishments abandoned, and in the provinces of northern mexico white travellers had to be cautious in keeping to the most frequented roads, in some districts not daring even to venture beyond the walls of their haciendas or towns. many of these were fortified against indian attack, and are so to this day. under these circumstances the old spanish trail across the staked plain fell into disuse; its landmarks became lost, and of late years only expeditions of the united states army have traversed it for purposes of exploration. in physical aspect it bears resemblance to the table lands of abyssinia and southern arabia, and at its northern end many outlying spurs and detached _mesas_ remind the traveller of the abyssinian hills--known as _ambas_. a portion of this singular territory belongs to the great gypsum formation of the south-western prairies, perhaps the largest in the world; while a highly-coloured sandstone of various vivid hues, often ferruginous, forms a conspicuous feature in its cliffs. along its eastern edge these present to the lower champaign of texas a precipitous escarpment several hundred feet sheer, in long stretches, tending with an unbroken facade, in other places showing ragged, where cleft by canons, through which rush torrents, the heads of numerous texan streams. its surface is, for the most part, a dead horizontal level, sterile as the sahara itself, in places smooth and hard as a macadamised road. towards its southern end there is a group of _medanos_ (sandhills), covering a tract of several hundred square miles, the sand ever drifting about, as with _dunes_ on the seashore. high up among their summits is a lakelet of pure drinking water, though not a drop can be found upon the plateau itself for scores of miles around. sedge and lilies grow by this tarn so singularly situated. here and there the plain is indented by deep fissures (_barrancas_), apparently the work of water. often the traveller comes upon them without sign or warning of their proximity, till, standing on the edge of a precipitous escarpment, he sees yawning below a chasm sunk several hundred feet into the earth. in its bed may be loose boulders piled in chaotic confusion, as if cast there by the hands of titans; also trunks of trees in a fossilised state such as those observed by darwin on the eastern declivity of the chilian andres. nearly all the streams that head in the staked plain cut deep channels in their way to the outer world. these are often impassable, either transversely or along their course. sometimes, however, their beds are worn out into little valleys, or "coves," in which a luxuriant vegetation finds shelter and congenial soil. there flourish the pecan, the hackberry, the black walnut, the wild china, with evergreen oaks, plums, and clustering grapevines; while in the sterile plain above are only seen those forms of the botanical world that truly indicate the desert--various species of cactaceae, agaves, and yuccas--the palmilla and lechuguilla, dwarf-cedars, and mezquites, artemisia, and the strong-smelling larrea, or "creosote plant." animals are rare upon the llano estacado, although the prong-horn antelope--true denizen of the desert--is there found, as also its enemy, the mexican jackal, or coyote. to the rattlesnake and horned lizard (_agama_) it is a congenial home; and the singular snake-bird (_paisano_) may frequently be seen running over the arid waste, or skulking through the tortuous stems of the nopals. in the canons of the stream the grizzly bear makes his haunt, and in times not long gone by it was ascended and traversed by the unwieldy buffalo. the wild horse (_musteno_) still occasionally courses across it. of all the living things it is least frequented by man. even the indian rarely strays into its solitudes; and the white man, when necessitated to enter them, does so with fear and trembling, for he knows there is danger. this is chiefly due to the absence of water; but there is also the chance of going astray--getting lost in the absence of landmarks. to be astray in a wilderness of any kind is a perilous predicament for the traveller--in one without water it is death. -----------------------------------------------------------------------after their affair with the tenawas, the texan rangers directed their course towards the llano estacado. on starting, it was their intention to strike north, and get upon the main stream of the canadian, then follow it up to the place where the prairie traders met their murderous doom. from the country of the tenawa comanches this would be the correct route, and was the same taken by these freebooters returning with the spoils of the caravan. but from the mouth of the pecan creek is one more direct, leading across a spur of the plateau itself, instead of turning its north-eastern extremity. it was not known to the rangers, though cully remembered having heard something about it. but the mexican renegade declared himself familiar with, and counselled taking it. there had been hesitation before acceding to his counsel. of course, they could have no confidence in such a man, but rather suspicion of all he said or did. in guiding them across the staked plain he might have some sinister purpose--perhaps lead them into a trap. after all, how could he? the tribe of savages with which he had been consorting was now so terribly chastised, so effectually crushed, it was not probable--scarce possible--they would be encountered again. certainly not for a season. for weeks there would be weeping and wailing in the tents of the tenawas. if the renegade had any hope of being rescued from his present captivity, it could not be by them. he might have some thought of escape, taking the rangers by the route he proposed to them. on this score they had no apprehension--not the slightest. suspicious, they would keep close watch upon him; shoot him down like a dog at the first sign of his attempting to deceive them. and, as cully remembered having heard of this trail over the staked plain, it was most probable the mexican had no other object than to bring them to the end of their journey in the shortest time and straightest course. all knew it would be a near cut, and this decided them in its favour. after parting from pecan creek, with their faces set westward, they had a journey before them anything but easy or pleasant. on the contrary, one of the most difficult and irksome. for it lay across a sterile tract--the great gypsum bed of north-western texas, on which abut the bluffs of the llano estacado. mile after mile, league after league; no "land in sight," to use a prairie-man's phrase--nothing but level plain, smooth as a sleeping sea; but, unlike the last, without water--not a sheet to cheer their eyes, not a drop to quench the thirst, almost choking them. only its resemblance, seen in the white mist always moving over these arid plains--the deluding, tantalising mirage. lakes lay before them, their shores garlanded by green trees, their bosoms enamelled with islets smiling in all the verdure of spring--always before them, ever receding; the trees, as the water, never to be reached! water they do arrive at more than once--streams rushing in full flow across the barren waste. at sight they ride towards them rapidly. their horses need not to be spurred. the animals suffer as themselves, and rush on with outstretched necks, eager to assuage their thirst. they dip their muzzles, plunge in their heads till half-buried, only to draw out again and toss them aloft with snorts of disappointment shaking the water like spray from their nostrils. it is salt! for days they have been thus journeying. they are wearied, worn down by fatigue, hungry; but more than all, tortured by the terrible thirst-their horses as themselves. the animals have become reduced in flesh and strength; they look like skeletons staggering on, scarce able to carry their riders. where is the mexican conducting them? he has brought them into a desert. is the journey to end in their death? it looks like enough. some counsel killing him, and returning on their tracks. not all; only a minority. the majority cry "onward!" with a thought beyond present suffering. they must find the bones of walt wilder and bury them! brave men, true men, these texan rangers! rough in outward appearance, often rude in behaviour, they have hearts gentle as children. of all friends the most faithful, whether it be affection or pure _camaraderie_. in this case a comrade has been killed--cruelly murdered, and in a strange manner. its very strangeness has maddened them the more, while sharpening their desire to have a last look at his remains, and give them christian burial. only the fainthearted talk of retreating; the others do not think of it, and these are more than the majority. on, therefore, they ride across treeless, grassless tracks; along the banks of streams, of whose bitter, saline waters they cannot drink, but tantalising themselves and their animals. on, on! their perseverance is at length rewarded. before their eyes looms up a line of elevated land, apparently the profile of a mountain. but no; it cannot be that. trending horizontally, without curvature, against the sky, they know it is not a mountain, but a mesa--a table-land. it is the llano estacado. drawing nearer, they get under the shadow of its beetling bluffs. they see that these are rugged, with promontories projecting far out over the plain, forming what spanish americans, in their expressive phraseology, call _ceja_. into an embayment between two of the out-stretching spurs barbato conducts them. joyously they ride into it, like ships long storm-tossed entering a haven of safety; for at the inner end of the concavity there is a cleft in the precipitous wall, reaching from base to summit, out of which issues a stream whose waters are sweet! it is a branch of the brazos river, along whose banks they have been some time travelling, lower down finding its waters bitter as gall. that was in its course through the selenite. now they have reached the sandstone it is clear as crystal, and to them sweeter than champagne. "up it lies our way," says the renegade guide, pointing to the portals of the canon through which the stream debouched from the table to the lower plain. but for that night the rangers care hot to travel further. there is no call for haste. they are _en route_ to bury the bones of a dead man, not to rescue one still living. chapter forty six. a brilliant band. just as the texan rangers are approaching the staked plain on its eastern edge, another body of horsemen, about their equal in number, ascends to the same plateau, coming from the very opposite direction-the west. only in point of numbers, and that both are on horseback, is there any similitude between the two troops. individually they are unlike as human beings could be; for most of those composing the texan party are great, strapping fellows, fair-haired, and of bright complexions; whereas they coming in the counter direction are all, or nearly all, small men, with black hair and sallow visage--many of them dark as indians. between the horses of the two troops there is a proportionate disparity in size; the texans bestriding animals of nearly sixteen hands in height, while they approaching from the west are mounted on mexican mustangs, few over fourteen. one alone at their head, evidently their leader, rides a large american horse. in point of discipline the second troop shows superiority. it is a military organisation _pur sang_, and marches in regular formation, while the men composing it are armed and uniformed alike. their uniform is that of mexican lancers, very similar to the french, their arms the same. and just such are they; the lancers of colonel uraga, himself at their head. having crossed the rio pecos bottom, and climbed up the bluffs to the higher bench of the llano estacado, they strike out over the sterile plain. as it is early morning, and the air is chilly, they wear their ample cavalry cloaks of bright yellow cloth. these falling back over the flanks of their horses, with their square lancer caps, plumed, and overtopped by the points of the pennoned lances, give them an imposing martial appearance. though it is but a detachment of not over fifty men--a single troop--riding by twos, the files stretch afar in shining array, its sheen all the more brilliant from contrast with the sombre sterility of the desert. a warlike sight, and worthy of admiration, if one knew it to be an expedition directed against the red pirates of the plains, _en route_ to chastise them for their many crimes--a long list of cruel atrocities committed upon the defenceless citizens of chihuahua and new mexico. but knowing it is not this--cognisant of its true purpose--the impression made is altogether different. instead of admiration it is disgust; and, in place of sending up a prayer for its success, the spectator would feel apprehension, or earnestly desire its failure. its purpose is anything but praiseworthy. on the contrary, sinister, as may be learnt by listening to the conversation of the two who ride at the head of the detachment, some paces in advance of the first file. they are its chief and his confidential second, the ruffian roblez. uraga is speaking. "won't our worthy friend miranda be surprised when he sees us riding up to the door of his _jacal_, with these fifty fellows behind us? and the old doctor, don prospero? i can fancy his quizzical look through those great goggle spectacles he used to wear. i suppose they are still on his nose; but they'll fly off as soon as he sees the pennons of our lances." "ha! ha! ha! that will be a comical sight, colonel. but do you think miranda will make any resistance?" "not likely. i only wish he would." "why do you wish that?" "_ayadante_! you ask a stupid question. you ought to have a clearer comprehension in the brisk, bright atmosphere of this upland plain. it should make your brain more active." "well, _coronel mio_, you're the first man i ever saw on the way to make a prisoner who desired to meet resistance. _carrambia_! i can't understand that." "i don't desire to make any prisoner--at least, not don valerian miranda. for the old doctor, i shan't much care one way or the other. living or dead, he can't do any great harm. miranda i'd rather take dead." "ah! now i think i comprehend you." "if he show the slightest resistance--raise but a hand--i shall have him that way." "why can't you anyhow? surely you can deal with him as you think proper--a refugee, a rebel?" "there you again show your want of sense. you've got a thick skull, _teniente_; and would be a bad counsellor in any case requiring skilful management. this is one of the kind, and needs the most delicate manipulation." "how so?" "for several reasons. remember, roblez, we're not now acting with the horned lizard and his painted freebooters. our fellows here have eyes in their heads, and tongues behind their teeth. they might wag the latter to our disadvantage if we allowed the former to see anything not exactly on the square. and if we were to shoot or cut down miranda, he not resisting, that would be a scandal i might have difficulty in suppressing. it would spread surely, go over the country, get to the ears of the central government, and return to new mexico with a weight that might overwhelm me. besides, _amigo mio_, it would spoil my plan in several respects--notably, that with the nina and others too numerous to mention. of course, we'll kill him if we can, with fair pretext for doing so. but unless he show fight, we must take him alive, his guests along with him. i hope he will." "i think it likely you'll have your hopes. the two americanos are not men to submit tamely. remember how they fought at the attack on their waggon-train, and how they got off afterwards. they're a rough couple, and likely to give us anything but a smooth reception." "the rougher the better. that would be just as wanted, and we'll settle everything at once. if otherwise, i have my plan fixed and complete." "what is it, colonel?" "not now. i'll tell you in the proper time. first to make experiment of what's immediately before us. if it succeed, we shall return this way with only women as our prisoners. if it fail, we'll have men--four of them. a word in your ear to content you for the while. not one of the four will ever enter the prison of albuquerque." "you intend sending them to some other?" "i do." "where?" "a gaol from which there can be no escape--need i name it?" "you need not. there's but one will answer your description--the grave." with this solemn conjecture the _sotto voce_ conversation comes to a close, the ruffians riding at the head of their troop, far extending after, its files resembling the vertebrae of some grand glittering serpent on its way to seize a victim, the two in front fair types of its protruding poisonous fangs. chapter forty seven. a coming cloud. between lovers, those who truly love, the parting is ever painful frank hamersley, taking leave of adela miranda, feels this as does walt wilder separating from conchita. there may be a difference in degree, in the intensity of their respective passions; perhaps also something in its character. still the sentiment is the same. both suffer at the thought of separation, feel it keenly. all the more as they reflect on what is before them--a prospect anything but cheerful. clouds in the sky; many chances they may never see their loved ones again. no wonder they turn towards the del norte with gloom in their glances and dark forebodings in their breasts. men of less loyal hearts, less prone to the promptings of humanity, would trifle and stay; spend longer time in a dalliance so surely agreeable, so truly delightful. not so the young kentuckian and his older companion, the texan. though the love of woman is enthroned in their hearts, each has kept a corner sacred to a sentiment almost as strong, and perhaps purer. the blood of their slaughtered comrades cries from the ground, from the sand through which they saw it filtering away. they cannot find peace without responding to its appeal; and for this even the fruition of their love is to be delayed. to seek retribution they must journey on to the settlements of the del norte; not sure of success on arrival there, but more likely to meet failure-perhaps imprisonment. in this there would be nothing new or strange. they would not be the first americans to suffer incarceration without cause in a new mexican _calabozo_, and lie there for long years without trial. once more miranda represents the danger they are about to undergo. it does not daunt them. "no matter," is the reckless response. "whatever be the consequences, go we will. we must." thus determined to start off, after exchanging tender adieus with those left behind--two of them in tears. according to promise, miranda has placed his mules at their disposal, and on these they are mounted. he has, moreover, furnished them with spare dresses from his wardrobe--costumes of his native country, which will enable them to travel through it without attracting attention. starting at sunrise, it is still early morning when they reach the upper plain through the ravine between the two twin mountains. so far colonel miranda accompanies them, as also don prospero. there parting, the refugees return to the ranche, while the travellers strike out over the treeless waste, which spreads before their faces to the very verge of vision. they have no landmark to guide them, neither rock nor tree; but the sky is without a cloud, and there is a sun in it gleaming like a globe of fire. to the experienced prairie man this is sufficient for telling every point of the compass, and they but want one. their course is due west till they strike the pecos; then along its bank to the crossing, thence west again through the sierras, and on to santa fe. keeping the sun slightly on the left shoulder, they journey till near noon, when a dark object, seen a little to the right, attracts them. not to surprise, for they well know what it is--a grove. they can tell, too, that the trees composing it are oaks, of the species known as black-jack. notwithstanding their stunted growth, the black-jacks are umbrageous, and give good shade. though the sun has not yet reached meridian, its rays are of meridian heat, and strike down with fiery fervour on the surface of the parched plain. this determines them to seek the shelter of the grove, and there make their noontide halt. it is a little but of their way; but, far as they can see ahead, no other spot offers a chance of protection against the burning beams. the grove is a mere copse, covering scarce half an acre, and the topmost branches rise but a few feet above their heads. still is there shade, both for them and their animals; and cover, should they require to conceal themselves--the last a fortunate circumstance, as is soon proved. equally fortunate their not having need to kindle a fire. in their haversacks they carry provisions already cooked. dismounting, they lead their males in among the trees, and there make them secure by looping the bridles to a branch. then, laying themselves along the earth, they eat their midday meal, pull out their pipes, and follow it with a smoke. with little thought, they are burning the last bit of tobacco which remained to the refugees. at parting, their generous host, to comfort them on their journey, presented them with the ultimate ounce of his stock; with true spanish politeness saying nothing of this. as they lie watching the blue film curling up among the branches of the black-jacks, as little do they reflect how fortunate for them it is not the smoke of a fire, nor visible at any great distance. were it so, there would not be much likelihood of their ever reaching the del norte or leaving the llano estacado alive. not dreaming of danger in that desolate place--at least none caused by human kind--they remain tranquilly pulling at their pipes, now conversing of the past, anon speculating about their plans for the future. three or four hours elapse; the sun having crossed the meridian, begins to stoop lower. its rays fall less fervently, and they think of continuing their journey. they have "unhitched" the mules, led them out to the edge of the copse, and are standing by the stirrup, ready to remount, when an object catches the quick eye of the ex-ranger, causing him to utter a sharp ejaculation. something seen west, the way they want to go. pointing it out to hamersley, the two stand observing. no great scrutiny needed to tell them 'tis a cloud of dust, although in breadth not bigger than a blanket. but while they are regarding it it gradually spreads out, at the same time showing higher above the surface of the plain. it may be a swirl of the wind acting on the dry sand of the desert--the first commencement of a regular whirlwind--a thing common on the table lands of new mexico. but it has not the round pillar-like form of the _molino_, nor do they believe it to be one. both are too well acquainted with this phenomenon to be deceived by its counterfeit. if they had any doubts, as they stand gazing these are resolved. the cloud presents a dense dark head, with a nucleus of something more solid than dust. and while guessing at the true character of this opaque central part, a circumstance occurs disclosing it. a puff of wind striking the dust causes it to swirl sideways, showing underneath a body of mounted men. men, too, in military array, marching in double file, armed, uniformed, with lances borne erect, their blades glinting in the sun. "sogers!" exclaims the ex-ranger. chapter forty eight. dread conjectures. it is wilder who so emphatically proclaims the character of the cavalcade. he has no need, hamersley having already made it out himself. "yes; they are soldiers," he rejoins, mechanically, adding, "mexican, as a matter of course. none of our troops ever stray this fair west. 'tis out of united states territory. the texans claim it. but those are not texans: they are uniformed, and carry lances. your old friends, the rangers, don't affect that sort of thing." "no," responds wilder, with a contemptuous toss of the head, "i shedn't think they did. we niver tuk to them long sticks; 'bout as much use as bean-poles. in coorse they're mexikins, _lanzeeros_." "what can they be doing out here? there are no indians on the staked plain. if there were, such a small party as that, taking it to be mexican, would not be likely to venture after them." "maybe it's only a advance guard, and thar's a bigger body behint. we shell soon see, as they're ridin' deerect this way. by the 'tarnal, 'twon't do to let 'em sight us; leastwise, not till we've seen more o' them, an' know what sort they air. white men tho' they call themselves, i'd a'most as soon meet injuns. they'd be sure to take us for texans; and 'bout me there'd be no mistake in that. but they'd treet you the same, an' thar treetment ain't like to be civil. pull yur mule well back among the bushes. let's blind the brutes, or they may take it into their heads to squeal." the hybrids are led back into the grove, tied, and _zapadoed_--the last operation performed by passing a blanket, mask fashion, over their eyes. this done, the two men return to the edge of the copse, keeping themselves screened behind the outstanding trees. in their absence the moving cohort has drawn nearer, and still advances. but slowly, and, as when first sighted, enveloped in a cloud of dust. only now and then, as the wind wafts this aside, can be distinguished the forms of the individuals composing it. then but for an instant, the dust again drifting around them. still the _nimbus_ draws nigher, and is gradually approaching the spot where the travellers had concealed themselves. at first only surprised at seeing soldiers on the staked plain, they soon become seriously alarmed. the troop is advancing towards the black-jack grove, apparently intending it for a place of bivouac; if so, there will be no chance for them to escape observation. the soldiers will scatter about, and penetrate every part of the copse. equally idle to attempt flight on their slow-footed animals, pursued by over two score of cavalry horses. they can see no alternative but surrender, submit to be made prisoners, and receive such treatment as their captors may think fit to extend to them. while thus despairingly reflecting, they take note of something that restores their disturbed equanimity. it is the direction in which the mexicans are marching. the cloud moving in slow, stately progress does not approach any nearer to the copse. evidently the horsemen do not design halting there, but will ride past, leaving it on their left. they are, in truth, passing along the same path from which the travellers have late deflected; only in the counter direction. now, for the first time, a suspicion occurs to hamersley, shared by the texan, giving both far greater uneasiness than if the soldiers were heading direct towards them. it is further intensified as a fresh spurt of the desert wind sweeps the dust away, displaying in clear light the line of marching horsemen. no question as to their character now. there they are, with their square-peaked corded caps, and plumes of horsehair; their pennoned spears sloped over their shoulders; their yellow cloaks folded and strapped over the cantles of their saddles; sabres lying along thighs, clinking against spurs and stirrups--all the picturesque panoply of lancers. it is not this that strikes dismay into the minds of those who are spectators, for it is now struck into their heart of hearts. on one figure of the cavalcade the eyes of both become fixed; he who rides at its head. their attention had been first attracted to his horse, wilder gasping out, soon as he set eyes on the animal, "look yonner, frank!" "at what?" "the fellur ridin' foremost. d'ye see the anymal he's on? it's the same we war obleeged to abandon on takin' to the rocks." "by heavens! my horse!" "yurs, to a sartinty." "and his rider! the man i fought with at chihuahua, the ruffian uraga!" on recognising his antagonist in the duel, the kentuckian gives out a groan. the texan, too. for on both the truth flashes in all its fulness--all its terrible reality. it is not the possession of hamersley's horse, identifying its rider with the destroyers of the caravan. that is nothing new, and scarce surprises them. what pains--agonises them--is the direction in which the soldiers are proceeding. they can have no doubt as to the purpose of the military march, or the point to which it is tending. "yes," says walt, "they're strikin' straight fur the valley, goin' 'ithout guess-work, too. thar's a guide along, an' thar's been a treetur." "who do you think?" "that injun, manoel. ye remember he went on a errand 'bout a week ago, to fetch them some things that war needed. instead, he's made diskivery o' the hidin' place o' his master, and sold that master's head. that's what he's did, sure." "it is," mutters hamersley, in a tone that tells of affliction too deep for speech. before his mind is a fearful forecast. don valerian a prisoner to uraga and his ruffians--don prospero, too; both to be dragged back to albuquerque and cast into a military prison. perhaps worse still--tried by court-martial soon as captured, and shot as soon as tried. nor is this the direst of his previsions. there is one darker--adela in the company of a ribald crew, surrounded by the brutal soldiery, powerless, unprotected--she his own dear one, now his betrothed! overcome by his emotions he remains for some time silent, scarce heeding the remarks of his comrade. one, however, restores his attention. "i tolt ye so," says walt. "see! yonner's the skunk himself astride o' a mule at the tail o' the gang." hamersley directs his eyes to the rear of the outstretched rank. there, sure enough, is a man on muleback, dressed differently from the troopers. the coarse woollen tilma, and straw hat, he remembers as having been worn by one of mirander's male domestics. he does not identify the man. but walt's recollection of his rival is clearer, and he has no doubt that he on the mule is manuel. nor, for that matter, has hamersley. the peon's presence is something to assist in the explanation. it clears up everything. hamersley breathes hard as the dark shadows sweep through his soul. for a long time absorbed in thought, he utters scarce an ejaculation. only after the lancer troop has passed, its rearmost files just clearing the alignment of the copse, he gasps out, in a voice husky as that of one in the act of being strangled,-"they're going straight for the place. o god!" "yes," rejoins the ex-ranger, in a tone like despondent, "thar boun' thar for sartint. the darned creetur's been tempted by the blood-money set on kumel miranda's head, an' air too like to git it. they'll grup him, sure; an's like as not gie him the garota. poor gentleman! he air the noblest mexikin i iver sot eyes on, an' desarves a better fate. as for the ole doc, he may get off arter sarvin' a spell in prison, an' the saynorita--" a groan from hamersley interrupts the remark. his comrade, perceiving how much he is pained, modifies what he meant to say. "thar's no need to be so much afeard o' what may happen to her. she ain't goin' to be rubbed out, anyhow; an' if she hasn't no brother to purtect her, i reckon she's got a frien' in you, frank. an' hyar's another o' the same, as they say in the psalms o' davit." walt's words have a hopeful sound. hamersley is cheered by them, but replies not. he only presses the hand of his comrade in silent and grateful grasp. "yis," continues the ex-ranger with increased emphasis, "i'd lay down my life to save that young lady from harum, as i know you'd lay down yourn. an' thet air to say nothin' o' my own gurl. this chile ain't niver been much guv to runnin' arter white wheemen, an' war gen'rally content to put up wi' a squaw. but sech as them! as for yourn, i don't wonder yur heart beats like a chased rabbit's; myen air doin' the same for concheeter. wal, niver fear! ef thar's a hair o' eyther o' thar heads teched, you'll hear the crack o' walt wilder's rifle, and see its bullet go into the breast o' him as harms 'em. i don't care who or what he air, or whar he be. nor i don't care a durn--not the valley of a dried buffler-chip--what may come arter--hangin', garrotin', or shootin'. at all risks, them two sweet creeturs air bound to be protected from harum; an ef it comes, they shall be reevenged. i swar that, by the eturnal!" "i join you in the oath," pronounces hamersley, with emphatic fervour, once more exchanging a hand-squeeze with his companion. "yes, walt; the brave miranda may be sacrificed--i fear it must be so. but for his sister, there is still a hope that we may save her; and surely heaven will help us. if not, i shall be ready to die. ah! death would be easier to bear than the loss of adela!" "an' for this chile the same, rayther than he shed lose concheeter." chapter forty nine. a cautious commander. no need saying that the cavalcade seen passing the copse is the lancer troop of colonel uraga. some thirty hours before, they ascended to the staked plain, and are now nearly across it. guided by the traitor, they had no need to grope their way, and have made quick time. in a few hours more they will pounce upon the prey for which they have swooped so far. the two men concealed in the grove expect them to ride on without stopping, till out of sight. instead, they see them draw up at a few miles distance, though all remain mounted. two separate from the rest keep on a couple of hundred yards ahead, then also halt. these are uraga himself, with his adjutant roblez. 'tis only a temporary pause to exchange counsel about the plan of proceeding--as a falcon expands itself in the air before its last flight towards the quarry it has selected. before separating from his followers, uraga has summoned to his side the youngest commissioned officer of the troop, saying,-"alferes! go back to that indian! send the brute on to the front here." manuel is the individual thus coarsely indicated. told that he is wanted, the peon spurs his mule forward, and places himself by the side of the commanding officer, who has meanwhile dismounted. in the countenance of the indian there is an expression of conscious guilt, such as may appear in that of one not hardened by habitual crime. there is even something like compunction for what he is about to do, with remorse for what he has already done. now that he is drawing near the scene, where those betrayed by him must suffer, his reflections are anything but pleasant. rather are they tinged with regret. don valerian miranda has been an indulgent master to him, and the dona adela a kind mistress. on both he is bringing destruction. and what is to be his reward? from the time of his betraying them, the moment he parted with the secret of their hiding-place, he has lost control of it. he is no longer treated with the slightest respect. on the contrary, he to whom he communicated it behaves to him as conqueror to conquered, master to slave, forcing him forward with sword pointed at his breast, or pistol aimed at his head. if a guide, he is no longer looked upon as a voluntary one. nor would he be this, but for a thought that inspires, while keeping him true to his treasonous intent. when he thinks of conchita--of that scene in the cotton-wood grove--of the texan kissing her--holding her in his fond embrace--when the indian recalls all this, torturing his soul afresh, then no more remorse, not a spark of regret, not a ray of repentance! no; perish the dueno--the duena too! let die the good doctor, if need be--all whom his vengeance has devoted! "sirrah! are those the two peaks you spoke of?" it is uraga who puts this interrogatory, pointing to a pair of twin summits seen rising above the horizon to eastward. "_si senor coronel_; they are the same." "and you say the path leads down between them?" "goes down through a gulch, after keeping round the cliff." "and there's no other by which the valley may be entered?" "your excellency, i did not say that. there is another entrance, but not from the upper plain here. a stream runs through, and cuts it way out beyond. following its channel through the _canon_, the place can be reached from below; but not after it's been raining. then the flood fills its bed, and there's no path along the edge. as it hasn't rained lately, the banks will be above water." "and anyone could pass out below?" "they could, senor coronel." "we require to observe caution, roblez," says uraga, addressing himself to the adjutant; "else we may have made our long journey for nothing. 'twill never do to enter the cage and find the birds flown. how far is it to the point where the river runs below?" the question is put to the peon. "_cinco leguas, senor_; not less. it's a long way to get round, after going down the cliff." "five leagues there, and five back up the canon of the stream--quite a day's journey. if we send a detachment round 'twill take all of that. shall we do it?" "i don't think there's the slightest need for wasting so much time," counsels the adjutant. "but the indian says any one going down the defile between those hills can be seen from the house. supposing they should see us, and retreat by the opening below?" "no need to let them see us. we can stay above till night, then descend in the darkness. as they're not likely to be expecting visitors, there should be no great difficulty in approaching this grand mansion unannounced. let us make our call after the hour of midnight, when, doubtless, the fair adela will be dreaming of--" "enough!" exclaims uraga, a cloud suddenly coming over his countenance, as if the words of his subordinate recalled some unpleasant souvenir. "we shall do as you say, _ayadante_. give orders for the men to dismount. we shall halt here till sunset. meanwhile, see that this copper-skin is closely kept. to make safe, you may as well clap the manacles on him." in obedience, roblez takes the indian back to the halted troop, directs him to be shackled; then gives the order for dismounting. but not for a night camp, only for a temporary bivouac; and this without fires, or even unsaddling of the horses. the troopers are to stay by the stirrup, ready at any moment to remount. there stay they; no longer in formation, but, as commanded, silent and motionless; only such stir as is made by snatching a morsel from their haversacks or smoking their corn-husk cigarritos. thus till near sundown, when, remounting, they move on. chapter fifty. stalking the stalker! the spot upon which the lancer troop had halted was less than a league from the grove that gave shelter to the two americans. in the translucent atmosphere of the tableland it looked scarce a mile. the individual forms of troopers could be distinguished, and the two who had taken themselves apart. the taller of these was easily identified as the commanding officer of the troop. "if they'd only keep thar till arter sundown," mutters wilder, "especially him on yur hoss, i ked settle the hul bizness. this hyar gun the doc presented to me air 'bout as good a shootin'-iron as i'd care to shet my claws on, an 'most equal to my own ole rifle. i've gin it all sorts o' trials, tharfor i know it's good for plum center at a hundred an' fifty paces. ef yonner two squattin' out from the rest 'ill jest stay thur till the shades o' night gie me a chance o' stealin' clost enuf, thar's one o' 'em will never see daylight again." "ah!" exclaimed hamersley, with a sigh of despair, and yet half hopeful, "if they would but remain there till night, we might still head them into the valley, time enough to get our friends away." "don't you have any sech hopes, frank; thar's no chance o' that i kin see what the party air arter. they've made up thar mind not to 'tempt goin' inter the gully till they hev a trifle o' shadder aroun' them. they think that ef they're seen afore they git up to the house their victims might 'scape 'em. tharfor they purpiss approachin' the shanty unobserved, and makin' a surround o' it. that's thar game. cunnin' o' them, too, for mexikins." "yes, that is what they intend doing--no doubt of it. oh, heavens! only to think we are so near, and yet cannot give miranda a word of warning!" "can't be helped. we must put our trust in him as hes an eye on all o' us--same over these desert purairas an' mountains as whar people are livin' in large cities. sartin we must trust to him an' let things slide a bit, jest as he may direct 'em. to go out of our kiver now 'ud be the same as steppin' inter the heart o' a forest fire. them sogers air mounted on swift horses, an' 'ud ketch up wi these slow critturs o' mules in the shakin' o' goat's tail. thurfor, let's lie by till night. tain't fur off now. then, ef we see any chance to steal down inter the valley, we'll take edvantage o' it." hamersley can make no objection to the plan proposed. he sees no alternative but accede to it. so they remain watching the halted troop, regarding every movement with keen scrutiny. for several hours are they thus occupied, until the sun begins to throw elongated shadows over the plain. within half an hour of its setting the mexicans again mount their horses and move onwards. "jest as i supposed they'd do," said walt. "thar's still all o' ten miles atween them and the place. they've mezyured the time it'll take 'em to git thur--an hour or so arter sundown. thar ain't the shadder o' a chance for us to steal ahead o' 'em. we must stay in this kiver till they're clar out o' sight." and they do stay in it until the receding horsemen, who present the appearance of giants under the magnifying twilight mist, gradually grow less, and at length fade from view under the thickening darkness. not another moment do hamersley and the hunter remain within the grove, but springing to their saddles, push on after the troop. night soon descending, with scarce ten minutes of twilight, covers the plain with a complete obscurity, as if a shroud of crape had been suddenly thrown over it. there is no moon, not even stars, in the sky; and the twin _buttes_, that form the portals of the pass, are no longer discerned. but the ex-ranger needs neither moon, nor stars, nor mountain peaks to guide him for such a short distance. taking his bearings before starting from the black-jack copse, he rides on in a course straight as the direction of a bullet from his own rifle, until the two mounds loom up, their silhouettes seen against the leaden sky. "we mustn't go any furrer, frank," he says, suddenly pulling up his mule; "leastwise, not a-straddle o' these hyar conspikerous critters. whether the sogers hev goed down inter the valley or no, they're sartin to hev left some o' the party ahind, by way o' keepin' century. let's picket the animals out hyar, an' creep forrad afut. that'll gie us a chance o' seeing in, 'ithout bein' seen." the mules being disposed of as walt had suggested, the two continue their advance. first walking erect, then in bent attitude, then crouching still lower, then as quadrupeds on all-fours, and at length, crawling like reptiles, they make their approach to the pass that leads down into the valley. they do not enter it; they dare not. before getting within the gape of its gloomy portals they hear voices issuing therefrom. they can see tiny sparks of fire glowing at the lips of ignited cigars. from this they can tell that there are sentries there--a line of them across the ravine, guarding it from side to side. "it ain't no use tryin', frank," whispers wilder; "ne'er a chance o' our settin' through. they're stannin' thick all over the ground. i kin see by thar seegars. don't ye hear them palaverin? a black snake kedn't crawl through among 'em 'ithout bein' obsarved." "what are we to do?" asks hamersley, in a despairing tone. "we kin do nothin' now, 'ceptin' go back an' git our mules. we must move them out o' the way afore sun-up. 'taint no matter o' use our squattin' hyar. no doubt o' what's been done. the main body's goed below; them we see's only a party left to guard the gap. guess it's all over wi' the poor critters in the cabin, or will be afore we kin do anythin' to help 'em. ef they ain't kilt, they're captered by this time." hamersley can scarce restrain himself from uttering an audible groan. only the evident danger keeps him silent. "i say agin, frank, 'tair no use our stayin' hyar. anythin' we kin do must be did elsewhar. let's go back for our mules, fetch 'em away, an' see ef we kin clomb up one o' these hyar hills. thar's a good skirtin' o' kiver on thar tops. ef the anymals can't be tuk up, we kin leave them in some gulch, an' go on to the summut ourselves. thar we may command a view o' all that passes. the sogers'll be sartin to kum past in the mornin', bringin' thar prisoners. then we'll see who's along wi' 'em, and kin foller thar trail." "walt, i'm willing to do as you direct. i feel as if i'd lost all hope, and could give way to downright despair." "deespair be durned! thar's allers a hope while thar's a bit o' breth in the body. keep up yur heart, man! think o' how we war 'mong them wagguns. that oughter strengthen yur gizzern. niver say die till yur dead, and the crowner are holdin' his 'quest over yur karkidge. thet's the doctryne o' walt wilder." as if to give illustrative proof of it, he catches hold of his comrade's sleeve; with a pluck turns him around, and leads him back to the place where they had parted from the mules. these are released from their pickets, then led silently, and in a circuitous direction, towards the base of one of the buttes. its sides appear too steep for even a mule to scale them; but a boulder-strewed ravine offers a suitable place for secreting the animals. there they are left, their lariats affording sufficient length to make them fast to the rocks, while a _tapado_ of the saddle-blankets secures them against binneying. having thus disposed of the animals, the two men scramble on up the ravine, reach the summit of the hill, and sit down among the cedar-scrub that crowns it, determined to remain there and await the "development of events." chapter fifty one. approaching the prey. were we gifted with clairvoyance, it might at times spare us much misery, thought at other times it would make it. perhaps 'tis better we are as we are. were frank hamersley and walt wilder, keeping watch on the summit of the mound, possessed of second sight, they would not think of remaining there throughout all the night--not for an hour--nay, not so much as a minute, for they would be aware that within less than ten miles of them is a party of men with friendly hearts and strong arms, both at their disposal for the very purpose they now need such. enough of them to strike uraga's lancers and scatter them like chaff. and could the man commanding these but peep over the precipitous escarpment of the llano estacado and see those stalwart texans bivouacked below, he would descend into the valley with less deliberation, and make greater haste to retire out of it. he and his know nothing of the formidable foes so near, any more than hamersley and wilder suspect the proximity of such powerful friends. both are alike unconscious that the texans are encamped within ten miles. yet they are; for the gorge at whose mouth they have halted is the outlet of the valley stream, where it debouches upon the texan plain. without thought of being interfered with, the former proceed upon their ruthless expedition; while the latter have no alternative but await its issue. they do so with spirits impatiently chafing, and hearts sorely agonised. both are alike apprehensive for what next day's sun will show them-perchance a dread spectacle. neither shuts eye in sleep. with nerves excited and bosoms agitated they lie awake, counting the hours, the minutes; now and then questioning the stars as to the time. they converse but little, and only in whispers. the night is profoundly still. the slightest sound, a word uttered above their breath, might betray them. they can distinctly hear the talk of the lancers left below. hamersley, who understands their tongue, can make out their conversation. it is for the most part ribald and blasphemous, boasts of their _bonnes fortunes_ with the damsels of the del norte, commingled with curses at this ill-starred expedition that for a time separates them from their sweethearts. among them appears a gleam greater than the ignited tips of their cigarittos. 'tis the light of a candle which they have stuck up over a serape spread along the earth. several are seen clustering around it; while their conversation tells that they are relieving the dull hours with a little diversion. they are engaged in gambling, and ever and anon the cries, "_soto en la puerta_!" "_cavallo mozo_!" ascending in increased monotone, proclaim it to be the never-ending national game of monte. meanwhile uraga, with the larger body of the lancers, has got down into the glen, and is making way towards the point aimed at. he proceeds slowly and with caution. this for two distinct reasons--the sloping path is difficult even by day, at night requiring all the skill of experienced riders to descend it. still with the traitor at their head, who knows every step, they gradually crawl down the cliff, single file, again forming "by twos" as they reach the more practicable causeway below. along this they continue to advance in silence and like caution. neither the lancer colonel nor his lieutenant has forgotten the terrible havoc made among the tenawas by the two men who survived that fearful affray, and whom they may expect once more to meet. they know that both have guns--the traitor has told them so--and that, as before, they will make use of them. therefore uraga intends approaching stealthily, and taking them by surprise. otherwise he may himself be the first to fall--a fate he does not wish to contemplate. but there can be no danger, he fancies as he rides forward. it is now the mid-hour of night, a little later, and the party to be surprised will be in their beds. if all goes well he may seize them asleep. so far everything seems favourable. no sound comes from the direction of the lonely dwelling, not even the bark of a watch dog. the only noises that interrupt the stillness of the night are the lugubrious cry of the coyote and the wailing note of the whip-poor-will; these, at intervals blending with the sweeter strain of the tzenzontle--the mexican nightingale--intermittently silenced as the marching troop passes near the spot where it is perched. once more, before coming in sight of the solitary jacal, uraga commands a halt. this time to reconnoitre, not to rest or stay. the troopers sit in their saddles, with reins ready to be drawn; like a flock of vultures about to unfold their wings for the last swoop upon their victims--to clutch, tear, kill, do with them as they may wish! chapter fifty two. a bloodless capture. a house from which agreeable guests have just taken departure is rarely cheerful. the reverse, if these have been very agreeable--especially on the first evening after. the rude sheiling which gives shelter to the refugees is no exception. everyone under its roof is afflicted with low spirits, some of them sad--two particularly so. thus has it been since the early hour of daybreak, when the guests regretted spoke the parting speech. in the ears of adela miranda, all day long, has been ringing that painful word, "adios!" while thoughts about him who uttered it have been agitating her bosom. not that she has any fear of his fealty, or that he will prove traitor to his troth now plighted. on the contrary, she can confide in him for that, and does--fully, trustingly. her fears are from a far different cause; the danger he is about to dare. conchita, in like manner, though in less degree, has her apprehensions. the great colossus who has captured her heart, and been promised her hand, may never return to claim it. but, unacquainted with the risk he is going to run, the little mestiza has less to alarm her, and only contemplates her lover's absence, with that sense of uncertainty common to all who live in a land where every day has its dangers. colonel miranda is discomforted too. never before since his arrival in the valley have his apprehensions been so keen. hamersley's words, directing suspicion to the peon, manuel, have excited them. all the more from his having entertained something of this before. and now still more, that his messenger is three days overdue from the errand on which he has sent him. at noon he and don prospero again ascend to the summit of the pass, and scan the table plain above--to observe nothing upon it, either westwardly or in any other direction. and all the afternoon has one or the other been standing near the door of the jacal, with a lorgnette levelled up the ravine through which the valley is entered from above. only as the shades of night close over them do they desist from this vigil, proving fruitless. added to the idea of danger, they have another reason for desiring the speedy return of the messenger. certain little luxuries he is expected to bring--among the rest a skin or two of wine and a few boxes of cigars. for neither the colonel himself nor the ex-army surgeon are anchorites, however much they have of late been compelled to the habit. above all, they need tobacco, their stock being out; the last ounce given to their late guests on leaving. these are minor matters, but yet add to the cheerlessness of the time after the strangers have gone. not less at night, when more than ever one feels a craving for the nicotian weed, to consume it in some way-pipe, cigar, or cigaritto. as the circle of three assemble in their little sitting-room, after a frugal supper, tobacco is the colonel's chief care, and becomes the first topic of conversation. "carramba!" he explains, as if some new idea had entered his head, "i couldn't have believed in a man suffering so much from such a trifling cause." "what are you referring to?" interrogates the doctor. "the thing you're thinking of at this moment, _amigo mio_. i'll make a wager it's the same." "as you know, colonel, i never bet." "nor i upon a certainty, as in this case it would be. i know what your mind's bent upon--tobacco." "i confess it, colonel. i want a smoke, bad as ever i did in my life." "sol." "but why don't you both have it, then?" it is adela who thus innocently interrogates. "for the best of all reasons," rejoins her brother. "we haven't the wherewith." "what! no cigarittos? i saw some yesterday on one of the shelves." "but not to day. at this moment there isn't a pinch of tobacco within twenty miles of where we sit, unless our late guests have made a very short day's march. i gave them the last i had to comfort them on the journey." "yes, senorita," adds the doctor, "and something quite as bad, if not worse. our bottles are empty. the wine is out as well as the weed." "in that," interrupts the colonel, "i'm happy to say you're mistaken. it's not so bad as you think, doctor. true, the pigskin has collapsed; for the throat of the huge texan was as difficult to saturate as the most parched spot on the staked plain. finding it so, i took occasion to abstract a good large gourd, and set it surreptitiously aside. i did that to meet emergencies. as one seems to have arisen, i think the hidden treasure may now be produced." saying this, the colonel steps out of the room, soon returning with a large calabash bottle. conchita is summoned, and directed to bring drinking cups, which she does. miranda, pouring out the wine says,-"this will cheer us; and, in truth, we all need cheering. i fancy there's enough to last us till manuel makes his reappearance with a fresh supply. strange his not having returned. he's had time to do all his bargainings and been back three days ago. i hoped to see him home before our friends took departure, so that i could better have provided them for their journey. they'll stand a fair chance of being famished." "no fear of that," puts in don prospero. "why do you say so, doctor?" "because of the rifle i gave to senor gualtero. with it he will be able to keep both provisioned. 'tis marvellous how he can manage it. he has killed bits of birds without spoiling their skins or even ruffling a feather. i'm indebted to him for some of my best specimens. so long as he carries a gun, with ammunition to load it, you need have no fear he or his companion will perish from hunger, even on the llano estacado." "about that," rejoins miranda, "i think we need have no uneasiness. beyond lies the thing to be apprehended--not on the desert, but amid cultivated fields, in the streets of towns, in the midst of so-called civilisation. there will be their real danger." for some time the three are silent, their reflections assuming a sombre hue, called forth by the colonel's words. but the doctor, habitually light-hearted, soon recovers, and makes an effort to imbue the others with cheerfulness like his own. "senorita," he says, addressing himself to adela, "your guitar, hanging there against the wall, seems straining its strings as if they longed for the touch of your fair fingers. you've been singing every night for the last month, delighting us all i hope you won't be silent now that your audience is reduced, but will think it all the more reason for bestowing your favours on the few that remain." to the gallant speech of pure castilian idiom, the young lady answers with a smile expressing assent, at the same time taking hold of her guitar. as she reseats herself, and commences tuning the instrument, a string snaps. it seems an evil omen; and so all three regard it, though without knowing why. it is because, like the strings of the instrument, their hearts are out of tune, or rather attuned to a presentiment which oppresses them. the broken string is soon remedied by a knot; this easily done. not so easy to restore the tranquillity of thought disturbed by its breaking. no more does the melancholy song which succeeds. even to that far land has travelled the strain of the "exile of erin." its appropriateness to their own circumstances suggesting itself to the mexican maiden, she sings- sad is my fate, said the heart-broken stranger, the wild deer and wolf to the covert can flee, but i have no refuge from famine and danger, a home and a country remain not to me. "dear adela!" interrupts miranda. "that song is too sad. we're already afflicted with its spirit. change it for one more cheerful. give us a lay of the alhambra--a battle-song of the cid or the campeador-something patriotic and stirring." obedient to her brother's request, the young girl changes tune and song, now pouring forth one of those inimitable lays for which the language of cervantes is celebrated. despite all, the heaviness of heart remains, pressing upon those who listen as on her who sings. adela's voice appears to have lost its accustomed sweetness, while the strings of her guitar seem equally out of tune. all at once, while in the middle of her song, the two bloodhounds, that have been lying on the floor at her feet, start from their recumbent position, simultaneously giving utterance to a growl, and together rush out through the open door. the singing is instantly brought to an end; while don valerian and the doctor rise hastily from their chairs. the bark of watch-dog outside some quiet farmhouse, amidst the homes of civilisation, can give no idea of the startling effect which the same sound calls forth on the far indian frontier--nothing like the alarm felt by the dwellers in that lone ranche. to add to it, they hear a hoof striking on the stones outside--that of either horse or mule. it cannot be lolita's; the mustang mare is securely stalled, and the hoof-stroke comes not from the stable. there are no other animals. their late guests have taken away the two saddle mules, while the _mulas de carga_ are with the messenger, manuel. "it's he come back!" exclaims the doctor. "we ought to be rejoiced instead of scared. come, don valerian! we shall have our smoke yet before going to bed." "it's not manuel," answers miranda. "the dogs would have known him before this. hear how they keep on baying! ha! what's that? chico's voice! somebody has caught hold of him!" a cry from the peon outside, succeeded by expostulations, as if he was struggling to escape--his voice commingled with shrill screams from conchita--are sounds almost simultaneous. don valerian strides back into the room and lays hold of his sword, the doctor clutching at the first weapon that presents itself. but weapons are of no avail where there are not enough hands to wield them. into the cabin lead two entrance doors--one front, the other back--and into both is seen pouring a stream of armed men, soldiers in uniform. before miranda can disengage his sword from its scabbard, a perfect _chevaux-de-frise_ of lance-points are within six inches of his breast, while the doctor is similarly menaced. both perceive that resistance will be idle. it can only end in their instant impalement. "surrender, rebels!" cries a voice rising above the din. "drop your weapons, and at once, if you wish your lives spared! soldiers, disarm them!" miranda recognises the voice. perhaps, had he done so sooner, he would have held on to his sword, and taken the chances of a more protracted and desperate resistance. it is too late. as the weapon is wrested from his grasp, he sees standing before him the man of all others he has most reason to fear-gil uraga! chapter fifty three. a sleepless night. all night long hamersley and the hunter remain upon the summit of the mound. it is a night of dread anxiety, seeming to them an age. they think not of taking sleep--they could not. there is that in their minds that would keep them wakeful if they had not slept for a week. time passing does not lessen their suspense. on the contrary, it grows keener, becoming an agony almost unendurable. to escape from it, hamersley half forms the resolution to descend the hill and endeavour to steal past the sentinels. if discovered, to attack them boldly, and attempt cutting a way through; then on into the valley, and take such chances as may turn up for the rescue of the refugees. putting it to his companion, the latter at once offers opposing counsel. it would be more than rashness--sheer madness. at least a dozen soldiers have been left on picket at the summit of the pass. standing or sitting, they are scattered all over the ground. it would be impossible for anyone going down the gorge to get past them unperceived; and for two men to attack twelve, however courageous the former and cowardly the latter, the odds would be too great. "i wouldn't mind it for all that," says walt, concluding his response to the rash proposal, "ef thar war nothin' more to be did beyont. but thar is. even war we to cut clar through, kill every skunk o' 'em, our work 'ud be only begun. thar's two score to meet us below. what ked we do wi' 'em? no, frank; we mout tackle these twelve wi' some sort o' chance, but two agin forty! it's too ugly a odds. no doubt we ked drop a good grist o' 'em afore goin' under, but in the eend they'd git the better o' us--kill us to a sartinty." "it's killing me to stay here. only to think what the ruffians may be doing at this moment! adela--" "don't gie yur mind to thinkin' o' things now. keep your thoughts for what we may do arterward. yur adela ain't goin' to be ate up that quick, nor yet my concheeter. they'll be tuk away 'long wi' t'others as prisoners. we kin foller, and trust to some chance o' bein' able to git 'em out o' the clutches o' the scoundrels." swayed by his comrade's counsel, somewhat tranquillised by it, hamersley resigns himself to stay as they are. calmer reflection convinces him there is no help for it. the alternative, for an instant entertained, would be to rush recklessly on death, going into its very jaws. they lie along the ground listening, now and then standing up and peering through the branches at the sentries below. for a long while they hear nothing save the calls of the card-players, thickly interlarded with _carajoz, chingaras_, and other blasphemous expressions. but just after the hour of midnight other sounds reach their ears, which absorb all their attention, taking it away from the gamesters. up out of the valley, borne upon the buoyant atmosphere, comes the baying of bloodhounds. in echo it reverberates along the facade of the cliff, for a time keeping continuous. soon after a human voice, quickly followed by a second; these not echoes or repetitions of the same; for one is the coarse guttural cry of a man, the other a scream in the shrill treble of of a woman. the first is the shout of surprise uttered by chico, the second the shriek of alarm sent forth by conchita. with hearts audibly beating, the listeners bend their ears to catch what may come next, both conjecturing the import of the sounds that have already reached them, and this with instinctive correctness. walt is the first to give speech to his interpretation of it. "they're at the shanty now," he says, in a whisper. "the two houn's guv tongue on hearin' 'em approach. that fust shout war from the injun cheeko; and the t'other air hern--my gurl's. durnation! if they hurt but a he'r o' her head--wagh! what's the use o' my threetenin'?" as if seeing his impotence, the hunter suddenly ceases speech, again setting himself to listen. hamersley, without heeding him, is already in this attitude. and now out of the valley arise other sounds, not all of them loud. the stream, here and there falling in cataracts, does something to deaden them. only now and then there is the neigh of a horse, and intermittently the bark of one of the bloodhounds, as if these animals had yielded, but yet remain hostile to the intruders. they hear human voices, too, but no shout following that of chico, and no scream save the one sent up by conchita. there is loud talk, a confusion of speakers, but no report of firearms. this last is tranquillising. a shot at that moment heard by hamersley would give him more uneasiness than if the gun were aimed at himself. "thank god!" he gasps out, after a long spell of listening, "miranda has made no resistance. he's seen it would be no use, and has quietly surrendered. i suppose it's all over now, and they are captives." "wal, better thet than they shed be corpses," is the consolatory reflection of the hunter. "so long as thar's breath left in thar bodies we kin hev hope, as i sayed arready. let's keep up our hearts by thinkin' o' the fix we war in atween the wagguns, an' arterwards thet scrape in the cave. we kim clar out o' both in a way we mout call mirakelous, an' we may yit git them clar in someat the same fashion. 'slong's i've got my claws roun' the stock o' a good gun, wi' plenty o' powder and lead, i ain't a-goin' to deespar. we've both got that, tharfor niver say die!" the hunter's quaint speech is encouraging; but for all, it does not hinder him and his comrade from soon after returning to a condition of despondency, if not actual despair. a feeling which holds possession of them till the rising of the sun, and on till it reaches meridian. when the day breaks, with eyes anxiously scrutinising, they look down into the valley. a mist hangs over the stream, caused by the spray of its cataracts. lifting at length, there is displayed a scene not very different from what they have been expecting. around the ranche they see horses picketed and soldiers moving among them or standing in groups apart; in short, a picture of military life in "country quarters." their point of view is too far off to identify individual forms or note the exact action carried on. this last, left to conjecture, is filled up by fancies of the most painful kind. for long hours are they constrained to endure them--up to that of noon. then, the notes of a bugle, rising clear above the hissing of the cascades, foretell a change in the spectacle. it is the call, "boots and saddles!" the soldiers are seen caparisoning their horses and standing by the stirrup. another blast gives the order to "mount!" soon after, the "forward!" then the troop files off from the front of the jacal, disappearing under the trees like a gigantic glittering serpent. the white drapery of a woman's dress is seen fluttering at its head, as if the reptile had seized upon some tender prey--a dove from the cote--and was bearing it off to its slimy lair. for another half-hour the two men on the mound wait with nervous impatience. it requires this time to make the ascent from the centre of the valley to the upper plain. after entering among the trees, the soldiers and their captives are out of sight; but the clattering of their horses' hoofs can be heard as they strike upon the rock-strewn path. once or twice a trumpet sound proclaims their movements upon the march. at length the head of the troop appears, the leading files following one after the other along the narrow ledge. as they approach the summit of the pass the track widens, admitting a formation "by twos." at the trumpet call they change to this, a single horseman riding at their head. he is now near enough for his features to be distinguished, and hamersley's heart strikes fiercely against his ribs as he recognises them. if he had any doubt before, it is set at rest now. he sees gil uraga, certain of his being the man who caused the destruction of his caravan. his own horse, ridden by the robber, is proof conclusive of the crime. he takes note that the lancer colonel is dressed in splendid style, very different from the dust-stained cavalier who the day before passed over the desert plain. now he appears in a gorgeous laced uniform, with lancer cap and plume, gold cords and aiguillettes dangling adown his breast; for he has this morning made his toilet with care, in consideration of the company in which he intends travelling. neither hamersley nor the hunter hold their eyes long upon him; they are both looking for another individual--each his own. these soon make their appearance, their white dresses distinguishable amid the darker uniforms. during the march their position has been changed. they are now near the centre of the troop, the young lady upon her own mare lolita, while the indian damsel is mounted on a mule. they are free, both hand and limb, but a file in front, with another behind, have charge of them. farther rearward is another group, more resembling captives. this is composed of three men upon mules, fast bound to saddle and stirrup, two of them having their arms pinioned behind their backs. their animals are led each by a trooper who rides before. the two about whose security such precaution has been taken are don valerian and the doctor, the third, with his arms free, is chico. his fellow-servant manuel, also on mule-back, is following not far behind, but in his attitude or demeanour there is nothing to tell of the captive. if at times he looks gloomy, it is when he reflects upon his black treason and infamous ingratitude. perhaps he has repented, or deems the prospect not so cheerful as expected. after all, what will be his reward? he has ruined his master and many others beside, but this will not win him the love of conchita. the spectators feel somewhat relieved as colonel miranda comes in sight. still more as the march brings him nearer, and it can be seen that he sits his horse with no sign of having received any injury; and neither has don prospero. the elaborate fastenings are of themselves evidences that no hurt has happened to them. it has been a capture without resistance, as their friends hoped it would, their fears having been of a conflict to end in the death of the exiles. one by one, and two by two, the troops come filing on, till the leader is opposite the spot where the two spectators stand crouching among the trees. these are dwarf cedars, and give the best cover for concealment. thoroughly screened by their thickly-set boughs and dense dark foliage, hamersley and the hunter command a clear view of everything below. the distance to the summit of the pass is about two hundred yards in a slanting direction. as the lancer colonel approaches the spot where the picket is posted, he halts and gives an order. it is for the guard to fall in along with the rest of the troop. at this moment a similar thought is in the minds of the two men whose eyes are upon him from above. wilder is the first to give expression to it. he does so in an undertone,-"ef we ked trust the carry o' our rifles, frank." "i was thinking of it," is the rejoinder, equally earnest. "we can't i'm afraid it's too far." "i weesh i only had my old gun; she'd a sent a bullet furrer than that. a blue pill inter his stomach 'ud simplerfy matters consid'rable. 'tall events it 'ud git your gurl out o' danger, and mayhap all on 'em. i b'lieve the hul clanjamfery o' them spangled jay birds 'ud run at hearin' a shot. then we ked gie 'em a second, and load an' fire half a dozen times afore they could mount up hyar--if they'd dar to try it. ah! it's too fur. the distance in these hyar high purairas is desprit deceivin'. durned pity we kedn't do it. i fear we can't." "if we should miss, then--" "things 'ud only be wuss. i reck'n we'd better let'm slide now, and foller arter. thar boun' straight for the del norte; but whether or no, we kin eesy pick up thar trail." hamersley still hesitates, his fingers alternately tightening on his gun, and then relaxing. his thoughts are flowing in a quick current-too quick for cool deliberation. he knows he can trust his own aim, as well as that of his comrade. but the distance is doubtful, and the shots might fall short. then it would be certain death to them; for the situation is such that there could be no chance to escape, with fifty horsemen to pursue, themselves mounted upon mules, and therewith be reached without difficulty. they might defend themselves on the mound, but not for long. two against fifty, they would soon be overpowered. after all, it will be better to let the troop pass on. so counsels the ex-ranger, pointing out that the prisoners will be carried on to new mexico--to albuquerque, of course. he and his comrade are americans, and not proscribed there. they can follow without fear. some better opportunity may arise for rescuing the captives. their prison may offer this; and from what they have heard of such places it is probable enough. a golden key is good for opening the door of any gaol in mexico. only one thought hinders hamersley from at once giving way to this reasoning--the thought of his betrothed being in such company--under such an escort, worse than unprotected! once more he scans the distance that separates him from the soldiers, his gun tightly grasped. could their colonel but suspect his proximity at that moment, and what is passing through his mind, he would sit with little confidence in his saddle, bearing himself less pompously. caution, backed by the ex-ranger's counsel, asserts its sway, and the kentuckian relaxes his grasp on the gun, dropping its butt to the ground. the last files, having cleared the gap, are formed into a more compact order; when, the bugle again sounding "forward," the march is resumed, the troop striking off over the plain in the direction whence it came. chapter fifty four. a man and a mule. carefully as ever, hamersley and the texan keep to their place of concealment. they dare not do otherwise. the slope by which they ascended is treeless, the cedars only growing upon the summit. the gorge, too, by which they went up, and at the bottom of which their mules were left, debouches westwardly on the plain--the direction in which the lancers have ridden off. any of these chancing to look back would be sure to catch sight of them if they show themselves outside the sheltering scrub. they have their apprehensions about their animals. it is a wonder these have not been seen by the soldiers. although standing amid large boulders, a portion of the bodies of both are visible from the place mentioned. fortunately for their owners, their colour closely resembled the rocks, and for which the troopers may have mistaken them. more probably, in their impatience to proceed upon the return route, none of them turn their eyes in that direction. an equally fortunate circumstance is the fact of the mules being muffled. otherwise they might make themselves heard. not a sound, either snort or hinney, escape them; not so much as the stamping of a hoof. they stand patient and silent, as if they themselves had fear of the men who are foes to their masters. for a full hour after the lancers have left these stay crouching behind the cedars. even an hour does not take the troop out of sight. cumbered with their captives, they march at slow, measured pace--a walk. moreover, the pellucid atmosphere of the staked plain makes objects visible at double the ordinary distance. they are yet but five miles from the buttes, and, looking back, could see a man at their base, more surely one mounted. the two who are on the summit allow quite twenty minutes more to elapse before they think of leaving it. then, deeming it safe, they prepare to descend. still they are in no haste. their intention is to follow the cavalcade, but by no means to overtake it. nor do they care to keep it in sight, but the contrary, since that might beget danger to themselves. they anticipate no difficulty in taking up the trail of a troop like that walt confidently declares he could do so were he blindfolded as their mules, adding, in characteristic phraseology, "i ked track the skunks by thar smell." saying this he proposes a "bit o' brakwist," a proposition his comrade assents to with eagerness. they have not eaten since dinner of the day before, their provisions having been left below, and the sharp morning air has given additional edge to their appetites. this at length draws them down to their mules. taking off the _tapados_ to relieve the poor animals, who have somewhat suffered from being so scurvily treated, they snatch a hasty repast from their haversacks, then light their pipes for a smoke preparatory to setting forth. it is not yet time, for the soldiers are still in sight. they will wait till the last lance pennon sinks below the horizon. whilst smoking, with eyes bent upon the receding troop, a sound salutes their ears, causing both to start. fortunately they draw back behind one of the boulders, and there remain listening. what they heard was certainly a hoofstroke, whether of horse or mule--not of either of their own; these are by their sides, while the sound that has startled them appears to proceed from the other side of the mound, as if from the summit of the pass leading up out of the valley. they hear it again. surely it is in the gorge that goes down, or at the head of it. their conjecture is that one of the lancers has lagged behind, and is now _en route_ to overtake the troop. if it be thus what course are they to pursue? he may look back and see themselves or their animals, then gallop on and report to his comrades. 'twould be a sinister episode, and they must take steps to prevent it. they do so by hastily restoring the _tapados_ and leading the mules into a _cul-de-sac_, where they will be safe from observation. again they hear the sound, still resembling a hoofstroke, but not of an animal making way over the ground in walk, trot, or gallop, but as one that refused to advance, and was jibbing. between them and it there seems great space, a projecting spur of the butte from which they have just descended. by climbing the ridge for a score of yards or so they can see into the gorge that goes down to the valley. as the trampling still appears steadfast to the same point, their alarm gives place to curiosity, then impatience. yielding to this, they scramble up the ridge that screens the kicking animal from their view. craning their heads over its crest, they see that which, instead of causing further fear, rather gives them joy. just under their eyes, in the gap of the gorge, a man is struggling with a mule. it is a contest of very common occurrence. the animal is saddled, and the man is making attempts to get his leg over the saddle. the hybrid is restive, and will not permit him to put foot in the stirrup. ever as he approaches it shies back, rearing and pitching to the full length and stretch of the bridle-rein. soon as seeing him, they upon the ridge recognise the man thus vexatiously engaged. he is the peon manuel. "the durned scoundrel," hissed walt, through clenched teeth. "what's kep him ahint, i wonder?" hamersley responds not--he, too, conjecturing. "by jehorum!" continues the hunter, "it looks like he'd stayed back apurpose. thar ked been nothin' to hinder him to go on 'long wi' the rest. the questyun air what he's stayed for. some trick o' trezun, same as he's did afore." "something of the kind, i think," rejoins hamersley, still considering. "wal, he's wantin' to get on bad enuf now, if the mule 'ud only let him. say, frank, shell i put a payriud to their conflict by sendin' a bit o' lead that way, i kin rub the varmint out by jest pressin' my finger on this trigger." "do you mean the man or the mule?" "the man, in coorse. for what shed i shoot the harmless critter that's been carryin' him? say the word, an' i'll send him to kingdom come in the twinklin' o' a goat's tail. i've got sight on him. shall i draw the trigger?" "for your life, don't look yonder! they're not yet out of sight. they might see the smoke, perhaps hear the crack. comrade, you're taking leave of your senses!" "contemplatin' that ugly anymal below air enough to make me. it a'most druv me out o' my mind to think o' his black ungratefulness. now, seein' hisself through the sight of a rifle 'ithin good shootin' distance, shurely ye don't intend we shud let him go!" "certainly not. that would be ruin to ourselves. we must either kill or capture him. but it must be done without noise, or at least without firing a shot. they're not far enough off yet." "how d'ye devise, then?" "let's back to our mules, mount, and get round the ledge. we must head him before he gets out of the gap. come on!" both scramble back down the slope quicker than they ascended it, knowing there is good reason for haste--the best for their lives--every thing may depend on capturing the peon. should he see them, and get away, it will be worse both for them and their dear ones. in two minutes the mules are again unmuffled and mounted. in two more they are entering the gap from outside, their masters on their backs. these, spurring the animals to speed, enter the gorge, their eyes everywhere. they reach the spot where the peon was so late seen, striving to get into his saddle. they see the turf torn up by the hybrid's hoofs, but no man, no mule. chapter fifty five. a lagger lagged. the surprise of the two men is but momentary; for there can be no mystery about the peon's disappearance. he has simply gone down the ravine, and back into the valley. is he on return to the house, which they know is now untenanted, and, if so, with what intent? has he become so attached to the place as to intend prolonging his sojourn there? or has something arisen to make him discontented with the company he has been keeping, and so determined to get quit of it by hanging behind? something of this sort was on their minds as they last saw him over the crest of the ridge. while in conflict with his mule, he was ever and anon turning his eyes towards the point where the soldiers must have been last seen by him; for from the gap in which he was these were no longer visible. both hamersley and wilder had noticed an uneasy air about him at the time, attributing it to his vexation at being delayed by the obstinacy of the animal and the fear of being left behind. now that he had mounted and taken the back-track, the cause must be different. "thar's somethin' queery in what the coyoats doin'," is walt's half-soliloquised observation; adding, "though what he's arter tain't so eezy to tell. he must be tired o' their kumpany, and want to get shet o' it. he'll be supposin' they ain't likely to kum back arter him; an' i reck'n they won't, seein' they've got all out o' him they need care for. still, what ked he do stayin' hyar by himself?" walt is still ignorant of the peon's partiality for his own sweetheart. he has had a suspicion of something, but not the deep, dire passion that burns in the indian's heart. aware of this, he would not dwell on the probability of the man having any intention, any more than himself, remain behind now that conchita is gone. "arter all," he continues, still speaking in half soliloquy, "i don't think stayin's his game. there's somethin' else at the bottom on't." "can uraga have sent him back on any errand?" "no, that ain't it eyther. more like he's good on a errand o' his own. i reckon i ken guess it now. the traitur intends turnin' thief as well--doin' a leetle bit o' stealin' along wi' his treason. ye remember, frank, thar war a goodish grit o' valleyables in the shanty-the saynorita's jeweltry an' the like. jest possyble, in the skrimmage, whiles they war making capter o' thar prisoners, this ugly varmint tuk devantage o' the confusion to secret a whun o' thar gimcracks, an's now goed back arter 'em." "it seems probable enough. still, he might have some other errand, and may not go on as far as the house. in which case, we may look for his return this way at any moment. it will never do for us to start upon their trail, leaving him coming in our rear. he would see us, and in the night might slip past and give them warning they were followed." "all that air true. we must grup him now." "should we go down after him, or stay here till he comes up?" "neythur o' the two ways'll do. he moutn't kum along no time. if he's got plunder he won't try to overtake the sogers, but wait till they're well out o' his way. he knows the road to the del norte, and kin travel it by hisself." "then we should go down after him." "only one o' us. if we both purceed to the shanty there's be a chance o' passin' him on the way. he mout be in the timmer, an', seein' us, put back out hyar, an' so head us. there'd no need o' both for the capterin' sech a critter as that. i'll fetch him on his marrowbones by jest raisin' this rifle. tharfor, s'pose you stay hyar an' guard this gap, while i go arter an' grup him. i'm a'most sartin he'll be at the shanty. anyhow, he's in the trap, and can't get out till he's hed my claws roun' the scruff o' his neck an' my thumb on his thropple." "don't kill him if you can help it. true he deserves to die; but we may want a word with him first. he may give information that will afterwards prove useful to us." "don't be afeared, frank. i shan't hurt a har o' his head, unless he reesists, then i must kripple him a bit. but he ain't like to show fight, such a coyoat as he!" "all right, walt. i'll wait for you." "you won't hev long. ye'd better take kiver back o' them big stones to make sure o' not bein' seen by him, shed he by any chance slip past me. an' keep yur ears open. soon as i've treed him i'll gie a whistle or two. when ye hear that ye can kim down." after delivering this chapter of suggestions and injunctions, the ex-ranger heads his mule down the pass, and is soon lost to his comrade's sight as he turns off along the ledge of the cliff. hamersley, himself inclined to caution, follows the direction last given, and rides back behind one of the boulders. keeping in the saddle, he sits in silent meditation. sad thoughts alone occupy his mind. his prospects are gloomy indeed; his forecast of the future dark and doubtful. he has but little hope of being able to benefit don valerian miranda, and cannot be sure of rescueing his sister--his own betrothed--in time to avert that terrible catastrophe which he knows to be impending over her. he does not give it a name--he scarce dares let it take shape in his thoughts. nearly half-an-hour is spent in this painful reverie. he is aroused from it by a sound which ascends out of the valley. with a start of joy he recognises the signal his comrade promised to send him. the whistle is heard in three distinct "wheeps," rising clear above the hoarser sibillations of the cascades. from the direction he can tell it comes from the neighbourhood of the house; but, without waiting to reflect whither, he spurs his mule out, and rides down the pass as rapidly as possible. on reaching the level below he urges the animal to a gallop, and soon arrives at the ranche. there, as expected, he finds his companion, with the peon a captive. the two, with their mules, form a tableau in front of the untenanted dwelling. the ex-ranger is standing in harangue attitude, slightly bent forward, his body propped by his rifle, the butt of which rests upon the ground. at his feet is the indian, lying prostrate, his ankles lashed together with a piece of cowhide rope, his wrists similarly secured. "i ked catched him a leetle sooner," says walt to his comrade, coming up, "but i war kewrious to find out what he war arter, an' waited to watch him. that's the explication o' it." he points to a large bag lying near, with its contents half poured out-a varied collection of articles of bijouterie and virtu, resembling a cornucopia; spilling its fruits. hamersley recognises them as part of the _penates_ of his late host. "stolen goods," continues walt, "that's what they air. an' stole from a master he's basely betrayed, may be to death. a mistress, besides, that's been too kind to him. darnation! that's a tortiss-shell comb as belonged to my concheeter, an' a pair o' slippers i ken swar wur here. what shed we do to him?" "what i intended," responds hamersley, assuming a curious air; "first make him confess--tell all he knows. when we've got his story out of him we can settle that next." the confession is not very difficult to extract. with wilder's bowie-knife gleaming before his eyes, its blade within six inches of his breast, the wretch reveals all that has passed since the moment of his first meditating treason. he even makes declaration of the motive, knowing the nobility of the men who threatened him, and thinking by this means to obtain pardon. to strengthen his chances he goes still farther, turning traitor against him to whom he had sold himself--uraga. he has overheard a conversation between the mexican colonel and his adjutant, lieutenant roblez. it was to the effect that they do not intend taking their prisoners all the way back to albuquerque. how they mean to dispose of them the peon does not know. he had but half heard the dialogue relating to don valerian and the doctor. the female prisoners! can he tell anything of what is intended with them? though not in these terms, the question is asked with this earnestness. the peon is unable to answer it. he does not think they are prisoners-certainly not conchita. she is only being taken back along with her mistress. about the senorita, his mistress, he heard some words pass between uraga and roblez, but without comprehending their signification. in his own heart hamersley can supply it--does so with dark, dire misgivings. chapter fifty six. "the norte." westward, across the liana estacado, uraga and his lancers continue on their return march. the troop, going by twos, is again drawn out in an elongated line, the arms and accoutrements of the soldiers glancing in the sun, while the breeze floats back the pennons of their lances. the men prisoners are a few files from the rear, a file on each flank guarding them. the women are at the head, alongside the guide and sub-lieutenant, who has charge of the troop. for reasons of his own the lancer colonel does not intrude his company on the captives. he intends doing so in his own time. it has not yet come. nor does he take any part in directing the march of the men. that duty has been entrusted to the _alferez_; he and roblez riding several hundred paces in advance of the troop. he has thus isolated himself for the purpose of holding conversation with his adjutant, unembarrassed by any apprehension of being overheard. "well, _ayadante_," he begins, as soon as they are safe beyond earshot, "what's your opinion of things now?" "i think we've done the thing neatly, though not exactly the way you wanted it." "anything but that. still, i don't despair of getting everything straight in due time. the man manuel has learnt from his fellow-servant that our american friends have gone on to the settlements of the del norte. strange if we can't find them there; and stranger still if, when found, i don't bring them to book at last. _caraja_! neither of the two will ever leave new mexico alive." "what about these two--our mexican friends?" "for them a fate the very reverse. neither shall ever reach it alive." "you intend taking them there dead, do you?" "neither living nor dead. i don't intend taking them there at all." "you think of leaving them by the way?" "more than think; i've determined upon it." "but surely you don't mean to kill them in cold blood?" "i won't harm a hair of their heads--neither i, nor you, nor any of my soldiers. for all that, they shall die." "colonel, your speech is somewhat enigmatical. i don't comprehend it." "in due time you will. have patience for four days more--it may be less. then you will have the key to the enigma. then don valerian miranda and the old rascal don prospero shall cease to trouble the dreams of gil uraga." "and you are really determined on miranda's death?" "a silly question for a man who knows me as you. of course i am." "well, for my part, i don't care much one way or the other, only i can't see what benefit it will be to you. he's not such a bad sort of a fellow, and has got the name of being a courageous soldier." "you're growing wonderfully sentimental, _ayadante_. the tender glances of the senorita seem to have softened you." "not likely," rejoins the adjutant with a grim smile. "the eyes that could make impression upon the heart of gaspar roblez don't exist in the head of woman. if i have any weaknesses in the feminine way, it's for the goddess fortuna. so long as i can get a pack of playing cards, with some rich _gringo_ to face me in the game, i'll leave petticoats alone." in turn the colonel smiles. he knows the idiosyncracy of his confederate in crime. rather a strange one for a man who has committed many robberies, and more than once imbued his hands in blood. cards, dice and drink are his passions, his habitual pleasure. of love he seems incapable, and does not surrender himself to its lure, though there has been a chapter of it in his life's history, of which uraga is aware, having an unfortunate termination, sealing his heart against the sex to contempt, almost hatred. partially to this might be traced the fact of his having fallen into evil courses, and, like his colonel, become a robber. but, unlike the latter, he is not all bad. as in the case of conrad, linked to a thousand crimes, one virtue is left to him-courage. something like a second remains in his admiration of the same quality in others. this it is that leads him to put in a word for colonel miranda, whose bravery is known far and wide throughout the mexican army. continuing to plead for him, he says-"i don't see why you should trouble yourself to turn states' executioner. when we get to santa fe our prisoners can be tried by court-martial. no doubt they'll be condemned and shot." "very great doubt of it, _ayadante_. that might have done when we first turned their party out. but of late, things are somewhat changed. in the hills of the moctezumas matters are again getting complicated, and just now our worthy chief, el cojo, will scarce dare to sign a sentence of death, especially where the party to be _passado por les armes_ is a man of note like don valerian miranda." "he must die?" "_teniente_! turn your head round and look me straight in the face." "i am doing so, colonel. why do you wish me?" "you see that scar on my cheek?" "certainly i do." "don valerian miranda did not give the wound that's left it, but he was partly the cause of my receiving it. but for him the duel would have ended differently. it's now twelve months gone since i got that gash, at the same time losing three of my teeth. ever since the spot has felt aflame as if hell's fire were burning a hole through my cheek. it can only be extinguished by the blood of those who kindled it. miranda is one of them. you've asked the question, `must he die?' looking at this ugly scar, and into the eye above it, i fancy you will not think it necessary to repeat the question." "but how is it to be done without scandal? as you yourself have said, it won't do for us to murder the man outright. we may be held to account--possibly ourselves called before a court-martial. had he made resistance, and given us a pretext--" "my dear _ayadante_, don't trouble yourself about pretexts. i have a plan which will serve equally as well--my particular purpose, much better. as i've promised, you shall know it in good time--participate in its execution. but, come, we've been discoursing serious matters till i'm sick of them. let's talk of something lighter and pleasanter-say, woman. what think you of my charmer?" "the dona adela?" "of course. could any other charm me? even you, with your heart of flint, should feel sparks struck out of it at the sight of her." "certainly she's the most beautiful captive i've ever assisted at the taking of." "captive!" mutters uraga, in soliloquy. "i wish she were, in a sense different." then, with a frown upon his face, continuing,-"what matters it! when he is out of the way, i shall have it all my own way. woo her as tarquin did lucretia, and she will yield not as the roman matron, but as a mexican woman--give her consent when she can no longer withhold it. what is it, _cabo_?" the interrogatory is addressed to a corporal who has ridden alongside, and halts, saluting him. "colonel, the _alferez_ sends me to report that the indian is no longer with us." "what! the man manuel?" "the same, colonel." "halt!" commands uraga, shouting aloud to the troop, which instantly comes to a stand. "what's this i hear, _alferez_?" he asks, riding back, and speaking to the sub-lieutenant. "colonel, we miss the fellow who guided us. he must have dropped behind as we came out of the gorge. he was with us on leaving the house, and along the valley road." "it don't much signify," says uraga, in an undertone to roblez; "we've got all out of him we need care for. still, it may be better to bring him along. no doubt he slipped off to settle some affair of his own-some pilferings, i presume; and will be found at the ranche. _cabo_! take a file of men, go back to the valley, and bring the loiterer along with you. as i intend marching slowly, you'll easily overtake us at our night camp." the corporal, singling out the file as directed, rides back towards the buttes, still in sight, while the troop continues its uninterrupted march. uraga and roblez again go in advance, the former making further disclosure of his plans to his _particeps criminis_. their confidential dialogue has lasted about an hour, when another of the lancers riding up again interrupts it. he is a grizzled old veteran, who has once been a _cibolero_, and seen life upon the plains. "what is it, hernandez?" demands the colonel. "_senor coronel_," says the man, pointing to a little speck in the sky, that has just shown itself above the north-eastern horizon, "do you see yonder cloud?" "cloud! i see no cloud, unless you mean that spot on the horizon, scarce so large as the crown of my hat is it that you mean?" "it is, colonel. and small as it seems, there may come trouble from it. it don't look much now, but in ten minutes time it will be big enough to spread all over the sky, and over us too." "you think so? why, what is it, hernandez? el norte?" "i'm sure of it. _carramba_! i've seen it too often. trust me, colonel, we're going to have a storm." "in that case we'd better bring to a halt and get under shelter. i see nothing here that would screen a cat, save yonder clump of dwarf oaks. in a way it'll keep the blast off us, and, as we may as well stay under it for the night, it will furnish fuel for our fires. ride back to the troop. tell the _alferez_ to bring on the men to yonder grove, and quickly. let the tents be pitched there. _vaya_!" the _ci-devant_ cibolero does as directed, going at a gallop; while the colonel and his adjutant trot on to the clump of blackjacks, standing some three hundred paces out of the line of march. it was the same copse that gave shade and concealment to frank hamersley and walt wilder on the day preceding. on arriving at its edge, which they do before their followers, uraga and roblez see the tracks of the two mules. not without surprise, and they exchange some words regarding them. but the fast-darkening sky drives the subject out of their thoughts, and they occupy themselves in choosing a spot for pitching the tents. of these there are too--one which urago owns, the other, found in the ranche, an old marquee miranda had carried with him in his flight. this has been brought along for the accommodation of his sister, whom uraga has reason to treat tenderly. both tents are soon set up in the shelter of the black-jacks; the marquee, as ordered by uraga, occupied by the female captives. the lancers, having hastily dismounted, picket their horses and make other preparations for the storm, predicted by the ex-cibolero as something terrific. before long they see his prediction verified to the spirit and the letter. the sky, hitherto shining like a sapphire and blue as a turquoise, becomes changed to the sombre hue of lead; then darker, as if night had suddenly descended over the sterile plain. the atmosphere, but a moment before unpleasantly hot, is now cold as winter; the thermometer is less than twenty minutes falling over forty degrees--almost to freezing point! it is not night which causes the darkness, nor winter the cold. both come from an atmospheric phenomenon peculiar to the table-lands of texas, and far more feared by the traveller. it is that called by mexicans and styled by the ex-cibolero _el norte_; by texans known as "the norther." alike dreaded by both. chapter fifty seven. a cumbersome captive. having made prisoner of the peon, and drawn out of him all he is able to tell, his captors have a difficulty in deciding what to do with him. it will hamper them to take him along. still they cannot leave him behind; and the young kentuckian is not cruel enough to kill him, though convinced of his deserving death. if left to himself, walt might settle the question quickly. indignant at the indian's treason, he has now a new reason to dislike him--as a rival. with the ex-ranger this last weighs little. he is sure of having the affections of conchita. he has her heart, with the promise of her hand, and in his own confiding simplicity has no fear of failure in that sense--not a pang of jealousy. the idea of having for a rival the abject creature at his feet, whom he could crush out of existence with the heel of his horseskin boot, is too ridiculous for him to entertain. he can laugh it to scorn. not for that would he now put an end to the man's life, but solely from a sense of outraged justice, with the rough-and-ready retribution to which, as a texan ranger, he has been accustomed. his comrade, less prone to acts of high-handed punishment, restrains him; and the two stand considering what they are to do with their prisoner, now proving so inconvenient. while still undecided a sound reaches their ears causing them to start and turn pale. it is the trampling of horses; there can be no mistaking it for aught else. and many of them; not two or three, or half a dozen, but a whole troop. uraga and his lancers have re-entered the valley! they are riding up to the ranche! what but this can it be? no other party of horsemen could be expected in that place. and no other thought have the two men hearing the hoof strokes. they are sure it is the soldiers returning. instinctively they retreat into the house, without taking their prisoner along with them. tied, he cannot stir from the spot. if he could it would make little difference now. their determination is to defend themselves, if need be, to the death; and the hut, with its stout timber walls, is the best place they can think of. it has two doors, opening front and back, both of heavy slabs--split trunks of the palmilla. they have been constructed strongly and to shut close, for the nights are sometimes chilly, and grizzly bears stray around the ranche. hastily shutting to the doors and barring them they take stand, each at a window, of which there are also two, both being in front. they are mere apertures in the log wall, and of limited dimensions, but on this account all the better for their purpose, being large enough to serve as loopholes through which they can deliver their fire. the position is not unfavourable for defence. the cabin stands close to a cliff, with but passage way behind. in front the ground is open, a sort of natural lawn leading down to the lake; only here and there a tree diversifies its smooth surface. across this anyone approaching must come, whether they have entered the valley from above or below. on each flank the facade of the precipice projects outward, so that the abutting points can be seen from either of the windows; and, as they are both within rifle range, an assailant attempting to turn the cabin so as to enter from the back would be exposed to the enfilading fire of those inside. for security against a surround, the spot could not have been better chosen, and with anything like a fair proportion between besiegers and besieged the former would fail. under the circumstances, however, there is not likely to be this, and for the two men to attempt defending themselves would seem the certain sealing of their doom. what chance for them to hold the hut against a force of fifty armed men--soldiers--for if the whole of the troop is returning there is this number? it may be not all have re-entered the valley--only a party sent back to bring on the pilferer, who has been missed upon the march. in that case there will be some chance of withstanding their attack. at all hazards it is to be withstood. what else can the two men do? surrender, and become the prisoner of uraga? never! they know the relentless ruffian too well, and with too good reason. after their experience of him they need expect no mercy. the man who could leave them buried alive to die a lingering death in the gloomy recesses of a cavern, would be cruel enough not only to kill but torture them. they have to "go under," anyhow, as the prairie hunter expresses it, adding, "ef we must die let's do so, killin' them as kills us. i'm good for half a score o' them leetle minikin mexikins, an' i reck'n you, frank, kin wipe out as many. we'll make it a bloody bizness for them afore the last breath leeves our bodies. air you all churged an' riddy?" "i am," is the response of the kentuckian, in stern, solemn tones, showing that he, as the texan, has made up his mind to "die killing." says the latter, "they'll come out through the trees yonder, where the path runs in. let's take the fust as shows, an' drop him dead. gie me the chance, frank. i'm dyin' to try the doctor's gun." "by all means do so." "you fetch the second out o' his saddle, if a second show. that'll gie the others a scare, an' keep 'em back a bit, so's we'll hev good time to get loaded agin." all this--both speech and action--has not occupied over two minutes of time. the rush inside the cabin, the closing of the doors, and taking stand at the windows, have been done in that haste with which men retreat from a tiger or flee before a prairie fire. and now, having taken all the precautions possible, the two men wait behind the walls, gun in hand, prepared for the approach of the assailants--themselves so sheltered by the obscurity inside as not to be seen from without. as yet no enemy has made appearance. no living thing is seen outside, save the lump of copper-coloured humanity prostrate on the sward, beside the bag and swag he has been hindered from taking away. still the shod hoofs are heard striking against stones, the click sounding clearer and nearer. they inside the _jacal_ listen with bated breath, but hearts beating audibly. hearts filled with anxiety. how could it be else? in another minute they may expect to engage in a life-and-death conflict-for themselves too likely a death one. something more than anxiety stirs within them. something of apprehension, perhaps actual fear. if so, not strange; fear, under the circumstances, excusable, even in the hearts of heroes. stranger were it otherwise. whatever their emotions at the moment, they experience a sudden change, succeeded by a series. the first is surprise. while listening to the hoof strokes of the horses, all at once it appears to them that these are not coming down the valley, but up it from below. is it a sonorous deception, caused by the sough of the cascade or reverberation from the rocks? more intently they bend their ears, more carefully note the quarter whence proceeds the sound. soon to answer the above question, each to himself, in the negative. unquestionably it comes from below. they have recovered from this, their first surprise, before a second seizes upon them. mingling with the horses' tramp they hear voices of men. so much they might expect; but not such voices. for amidst the speeches exchanged arise roars of laughter, not such as could come from the slender gullets of puny mexicans, nor men of the spanish race. nor does it resemble the savage cachinnation of the comanche indians. its rough aspirate, and rude, but hearty, tone could only proceed from celtic or anglo-saxon throats. while still wondering at the sound ringing in their ears, a sight comes before their eyes which but lessens their surprise by changing it into gladness. out of the trees at the lower end of the lake a horseman is seen riding--after him a second. both so unlike uraga or any of his lancers, so different from what they would deem enemies, that the rifles of hamersley and the hunter, instead of being aimed to deliver their fire, are dropped, butts to the ground. before clearing the skirt of timber, the two horsemen make halt--only for an instant, as if to reconnoitre. they appear surprised at seeing the hut, and not less at sight of a man lying along the ground in front of it. for they are near enough to perceive that he is tied hand and foot, and to note the spilled paraphernalia beside him. as they are men not easily to be daunted, the tableau, though it somewhat mystifies, does not affright or drive them back. instead, they advance without the slightest show of fear. and behind the two first showing themselves follow two others, and two more, till fifty have filed out of the timber, and ride across the clear ground, heading direct for the house. clad in rough coats of sombre hue, jeans, blanket, and buckskin, not a few of them ragged, with hats of all shapes and styles; carrying rifles in their hands, with revolving pistols and bowie-knives in their belts, there could be no mistaking them for the gaudily-bedizened troop whose horses at sunrise of that same day trampled over the same turf. to the spectators no two cohorts could present a _coup d'oeil_ more dissimilar. though about equal in numbers, the two bodies of men were unlike in everything else--arms, dresses, accoutrements; even their horses having but slight resemblance. the horsemen late upon the spot would seem dwarfs beside those now occupying it, who in comparison might be accounted giants. whatever the impression made upon the young prairie merchant by the sight of the newly-arrived troop, its effect upon the ex-ranger might be compared to a shock of electricity, or the result that succeeds the inspiration of laughing-gas. long before the first files have reached the centre of the cleared space he has sprung to the door, pulled the bar back, slammed open the slabs, almost smashing them apart, and rushed out; when outside sending forth a shout that causes every rock to re-echo it to the remotest corner of the valley. it is a grand cry of gladness like a clap of thunder, with its lightning flash bursting forth from the cloud in which in has been pent up. after it some words spoken more coherently give the key to its jubilant tone. "texas rangers! ye've jest come in time. thank the lord!" chapter fifty eight. old acquaintances. not necessary to say that the horsemen riding up to the ranche are captain haynes and his company of rangers. they have come up the canon guided by barbato. even more than they is the renegade surprised at seeing a house in that solitary spot. it was not there on his last passing through the valley in company with his red-skinned confederates, the tenawas, which he did some twelve months before. equally astonished is he to see walt wilder spring out from the door, though he hails the sight with a far different feeling. at the first glance he recognises the gigantic individual who so heroically defended the waggon-train, and the other behind--for hamersley has also come forth--as the second man who retreated along with him. surely they are the two who were entombed! the unexpected appearance produces on the mexican an effect almost comical, though not to him. on the contrary, he stands appalled, under the influence of a dark superstitious terror, his only movement being to repeatedly make the sign of the cross, all the while muttering ave marias. under other circumstances his ludicrous behaviour would have elicited laughter from the rangers--peals of it. but their eyes are not on him, all being turned to the two men who have issued out of the cabin and are coming on towards the spot where they have pulled up. several of them have already recognised their old comrade, and in hurried speech communicate the fact to the others. "walt wilder!" are the words that leap from a dozen pairs of lips, while they, pronouncing the name with glances aghast, look as if a spectre had suddenly appeared to them. an apparition, however, that is welcome; altogether different to the impression it has produced upon their guide. meanwhile, wilder advances to meet them; as he comes on, keeping up a fire of exclamatory phrases, addressed to hamersley, who is close behind. "air this chile awake, or only dreaming? look thar, frank! that's ned haynes, my old captin'. an' thar's nat cully, an' jim buckland. durn it, thar's the hul strenth o' the kumpany." walt is now close to their horses' heads, and the rangers, assured it is himself and not his ghost, are still stricken with surprise. some of them turn towards the mexican for explanation. they suppose him to have lied in his story about their old comrade having been closed up in a cave, though with what motive they cannot guess. the man's appearance does not make things any clearer. he still stands affrighted, trembling, and repeating his paternosters. but now in changed tone, for his fear is no longer of the supernatural. reason reasserting itself, he has given up the idea of disembodied spirits, convinced that the two figures coming forward are real flesh and blood; the same whose blood he assisted in spilling, and whose flesh he lately believed to be decaying in the obscurity of a cave. he stands appalled as ever; no more with unearthly awe, but the fear of an earthly retribution--a terrible one, which he is conscious of having provoked by the cruel crime in which he participated. whatever his fears and reflections they are not for the time intruded upon. the rangers, after giving a glance to him, turn to the two men who are now at their horses' heads; and, springing from their saddles, cluster around them with questions upon their tongues and eager expectations in their eyes. the captain and cully are the two first who interrogate. "can we be sure it's you, walt?" is the interrogatory put by his old officer. "is it yourself?" "darn me ef i know, cap. jess now i ain't sure o' anythin', arter what's passed. specially meetin' you wi' the rest o' the boys. say, cap, what's fetched ye out hyar?" "you." "me!" "yes; we came to bury you." "yis, hoss," adds cully, confirming the captain's statement. "we're on the way to gie burial to your bones, not expecting to find so much flesh on 'em. for that purpiss we've come express all the way from peecawn crik. an' as i know'd you had a kindly feelin' for yur ole shootin'iron, i've brought that along to lay it in the grave aside o' ye." while speaking, cully slips out of his saddle and gives his old comrade a true prairie embrace, at the same time handing him his gun. neither the words nor the weapon makes things any clearer to walt, but rather add to their complication. with increased astonishment he cries out,-"geehorum! am i myself, or somebody else? is't a dream, or not? that's my ole shootin' stick, sartin. i left it over my hoss, arter cuttin' the poor critter's throat. maybe you've got him too? i shedn't now be surprised at anythin'. come, nat; don't stan' shilly-shallyin', but tell me all about it. whar did ye git the gun?" "on peecawn crik. thar we kim acrost a party o' tenawa kimanch, unner a chief they call horned lizart, o' the whom ye've heern. he han't no name now, seein' he's rubbed out, wi' the majority of his band. we did that. the skrimmage tuk place on the crik, whar we foun' them camped. it didn't last long; an' arter 'twere eended, lookin' about among thar bodies, we foun' thar beauty o' a chief wi' this gun upon his parson, tight clutched in the death-grup. soon's seeing it i know'd 'twar yourn; an' in coorse surspected ye'd had some mischance. still, the gun kedn't gie us any informashun o' how you'd parted wi' it. by good luck, 'mong the injuns we'd captered a mexikin rennygade--thet thing ye see out thar. he war joined in horned lizart's lot, an' he'd been wi' 'em some time. so we put a loose larzette roun' his thrapple, an' on the promise o' its bein' tightened, he tolt us the hul story; how they hed attackted an' skuttled a carryvan, an' all 'bout entoomin' you an' a kimrade--this young fellur, i take it--who war wi' ye. our bizness out hyar war to look up yur bones an' gie 'em a more christyun kind o' beril. we were goin' for that cave, the rennygade guidin' us. he said he ked take us a near cut up the gully through which we've just come-arter ascendin' one o' the heads o' the loosyvana rod. near cut! doggone it, he's been righter than i reck'n he thort o'. stead o' your bones thar's yur body, wi' as much beef on't as ever. now i've told our story, we want yourn, the which appears to be a darned deal more o' a unexplainable mistry than ourn. so open yur head, ole hoss, and let's have it." brief and graphic as is cully's narrative, it takes walt still less time to put his former associates in possession of what has happened to himself and hamersley, whom he introduces to them as the companion of his perilous adventures--the second of the two believed to have been buried alive! chapter fifty nine. mutual explanations. the arrival of the rangers at that particular time is certainly a contingency of the strangest kind. ten minutes later, and they would have found the jacal deserted; for hamersley and wilder had made up their minds to set off, taking the traitor along with them. the texans would have discovered signs to tell of the place having been recently occupied by a large body of men, and from the tracks of shod horses these skilled trailers would have known the riders were not indians. still, they would have made delay around the ranche and encamped in the valley for that night. this had been their intention, their horses being jaded and themselves wearied making their way up the canon. though but ten miles in a direct line, it was well nigh twenty by the winding of the stream--a good, even difficult, day's journey. on going out above they would have seen the trail of uraga's party, and known it to be made by mexican soldiers. but, though these were their sworn foemen, they might not have been tempted to follow them. the start of several hours, their own animals in poor condition, the likelihood of a larger force of the enemy being near--all this would have weighed with them, and they would have continued on to the cave whither the renegade was guiding them--a direction altogether different. a very singular coincidence, then, their coming up at that exact instant. it seemed the hand of providence opportunely extended; and in this light hamersley looked upon it, as also the ex-ranger. briefly as may be they make known to the new-comers all that had transpired, or as much as for the time needs to be told. then appeal to them for assistance. by the texans their cause is instantly espoused--unanimously, without one dissenting voice. on the contrary, all are uttered with an energy and warmth that give hamersley a world of hope. here are friends, whose enemies are his own. and they are in strength sufficient to pursue uraga's troop and destroy it. they may overtake it that very night; if not, on the morrow. and if not then, they will pursue it to the borders of new mexico--to the banks of the del norte itself. his heart is no more depressed. the chance of rescuing his friends from death and saving his betrothed from dishonour is no longer hopeless. there is now a probability--almost a certainty--of its success. backed by wilder, he proposes instant pursuit. to the texans the proposal is like an invitation to a ball or frontier fandango. excitement is the breath of their life, and a fight with mexicans their joy; a pursuit of these their supremest delight. such as this, moreover, having for its object not only the defeat of a hated foe, but the recovery of captives, beautiful women, as their old comrade walt enthusiastically describes them, is the very thing to rouse the rangers to energetic action, rekindling in their hearts the spirit of frontier chivalry--the same which led them to become rangers. notwithstanding their wild enthusiasm they do not proceed rashly. haynes, their captain, is an old "indian fighter," one of the most experienced chiefs of that texan border warfare, so long continued. checking their impatience to pursue at once, he counsels prudence and deliberate action. cully also recommends this course. "but why should we lose a moment?" inquires the hot-blooded kentuckian, chafing at the delay; "they cannot yet be more than ten miles off. we may overtake them before sunset." "that's just what we mustn't do," rejoins the ranger chief. "suppose they get sight of us before we're near? on the naked plain, you say it is, they'd be sure to do that. what then? their horses, i take it, are fresh, compared with ours. they might gallop off and leave us gazing after them like so many april fools. they'd have time, too, to take their prisoners along with them." this last speech makes an impression upon all. even hamersley no longer offers opposition. "let the sun go down," continues the texan captain; "that's just what we want. since they're bound due west i reckon we can easily keep on their trail, clear night or dark one. here's nat cully can do that; and if our friend walt hasn't lost his old skill he can be trusted for the same." the ranger and ex-ranger, both standing by, remain modestly silent. "our plan will be," pursues haynes, "to approach their camp under cover of night, surround, and so make certain of them. they'll have a camp; and these mexican soldiers are such greenhorns, they're sure to keep big fires burning, if it is only to give them light for their card-playing. the blaze'll guide us to their squatting-ground, wherever they may make it." the captain's scheme seems so rational that no one opposes it. walt wilder in words signifies assent to it, and hamersley, with, some reluctance, is at length constrained to do the same. it is resolved to remain two hours longer in the valley, and then start for the upper plain. that will give time to recruit their horses on the nutritious _gramma_ grass, as themselves on the game they have killed before entering the canon. this hangs plentifully over the horns of their saddles, in the shape of wild turkeys, haunches of venison, and pieces of bear meat. the fire on the cabin hearth and those kindled by the soldiers outside are still smouldering. they are quickly replenished, and the abandoned cooking utensils once more called into use. but pointed saplings, and the iron ramrods of their rifles--the ranger's ordinary spit--are in greater demand, and broiling is the style of _cuisine_ most resorted to. the turkeys are plucked and singed, the venison and bear meat cut into collops, and soon two score pieces are sputtering in the flames of half-a-dozen bivouac fires, while the horses, unbridled, are led out upon their lariats, and given to the grass. chapter sixty. cross-questioning. while the rangers are preparing for their homeric repast, a group gathered in front of the jacal is occupied with an affair altogether different. the individuals most conspicuous in it are the texan captain, the guide cully, walt wilder, and the young kentuckian, though several besides take part in the conference. two others are concerned in it, though not forming figures in the group. they are some paces apart, lying on the grass, both bound. these are the traitor manuel and the renegade barbato. both indian and mexican appear terribly cowed and crestfallen, for both feel themselves in what cully or walt wilder would call a "bad fix." they are, in truth, in a dangerous predicament; for, now that walt and the kentuckian have turned up alive, what with the story they have to tell, added to that already known to the rangers--comparing notes between the two parties--new light is let in, floods of it, falling upon spots hitherto dark, and clearing up points confused and obscure. the two culprits are again cross-examined, and, with pistols held to their heads, forced to still further confession. the peon repeats what he has already told, without adding much, not having much to add. with the renegade it is different. he has kept much back concerning the part played by uraga and his lieutenant in the affair of the destroyed waggon train. but with hamersley, who speaks his own native tongue, now cross-questioning him, and walt wilder to extract his testimony by the persuasive influence of a knife-blade glistening in his eyes, he goes further, and admits the unnatural confederation that existed between the white and red robbers--the mexican colonel and comanche chief. in short, to save his life, he makes a much cleaner breast of it than before, this time only keeping back his own special guiltiness in being their willing go-between. while he is repeating his confession, all the other rangers gather around the group to listen to him. they stand silent, with bated breath and brows contracted. when at length they become possessed of the tale in all its diabolical atrocity, all its completeness, their anger, already excited, become almost ungovernable; and it is as much as their captain can do to restrain them from at once starting in pursuit. some fling their spits in the fire with the meat upon them still untouched; others drop the pieces roasted and partly eaten; most demanding to be led on. the counsels of the more prudent prevail; and again tranquillised, they recover the morsels of meat and continue their repast. not long, till they have reason to regret the delay and deem the prudence misplaced. though this arises not from any mistake on the part of their counsellors, but from a circumstance entirely accidental. while they are still in the midst of their meal, the sky, all day long of cerulean clearness, becomes suddenly clouded. not as this term is understood in the ordinary sense, but absolutely black, as if the sun were instantly eclipsed, or had dropped altogether out of the firmament. scarce ten minutes after its commencement the obscurity has reached completeness--that of a total solar eclipse or as in a starless night. though troubled at the change, none of the rangers are dismayed by it, or even surprised. the old prairie men are the least astonished, since they know what it means. at the first portentous sign cully is heard crying out,-"a hurricane!--a norther!" wat wilder has observed it at the same time, and confirms the prognostic. this is before any of the others have noticed aught peculiar in the aspect of the sky, and when there is just the selvedge of a cloud seen above the cliff. all texans understand the significance of the word "norther"--a storm or tornado, usually preceded by a hot, stifling atmosphere, with drifting dust, accompanied by sheet or forked lightning and claps of terrific thunder, followed by wind and rain, sometimes hail or sleet, as if the sluices of heaven were drawn open, ending in a continued blast of more regular direction, but chill as though coming direct from the arctic regions. in less than ten minutes after its first sign, the tempest is around them. down into the valley pours the dust, swept from the surface of the upper plain, along with it the leaves and stalks of the wild wormwood, with other weeds of the desert. simultaneously the wind, at first in low sighs, like the sound of a distant sea; then roaring against the rocks, and swooping down among the trees, whose branches go crashing before its blast. then succeed lightning, thunder, and rain-the last falling, not in drops, but in sheets, as if spilled from a spout. for shelter the rangers rush inside the ranche, leaving their horses to take care of themselves. the latter stand cowering under the trees, neighing with affright--the mules among them giving vent to their plaintive hinney. there are dogs, too, that howl and bark, with other sounds that come from farther off--from the wild denizens of the wilderness; cries of the cougar in contralto, wolf-barkings in mezzo-soprano, screaming of eagles in shrill treble, snorting of bears in basso, and hooting of scared owls in lugubrious tone, to be likened only to the wailing of agonised spirits in purgatory. crowded within the hut, so thickly as to have scarce standing room, the rangers wait for the calming of the tempest. they submit with greater resignation, knowing it will not long continue. it is far from being their first experience of a "norther." the only thought that troubles them is the delay--being hindered from setting forth on the pursuit. true, the party to be pursued will be stayed by the same obstruction. the soldiers will have to halt during the continuance of the storm, so that the distance between will remain the same. but then their tracks will be obliterated--every vestige of them. the wind, the rain, and dust will do this. how is their trail to be taken up? "that will be easy enough," says one, whose self-esteem is greater than his prairie experience. he adds: "as they're going due west, we can't make any mistake by steering the same way." "how little he knows about it!" is the muttered remark exchanged between wilder and cully. for they know that the deflection of a single point upon the prairies--above all, upon the staked plain--will leave the traveller, like a ship at sea without chart or compass, to steer by guesswork, or go drifting at sheer chance. to most, the consoling thought is that the mexicans will halt near, and stay till the storm is over. they have some baggage--a tent or two, with other camp equipage. this is learnt from the indian; and hamersley, as also wilder, have themselves made note of it. to the returning soldiers there can be no great reason for haste, and they will not likely resume their march till the sky is quite clear. therefore they will gain nothing in distance. satisfied by such assurance given by the sager ones of the party, the rangers remain inside the hut, on the roof of which the rain dashes down, without experiencing any keen pangs of impatience. some of them even jest--their jokes having allusion to the close quarters in which they are packed, and other like trifles incidental to the situation. walt wilder for a while gives way to this humour. whatever may be the danger of don valerian and the others, he does not believe his sweetheart much exposed. the little brown-skinned damsel is not in the proscribed list; and the ex-ranger, strong in the confidence of having her heart, with the promise of her hand, has less reason to be apprehensive about the consequences. besides, he is now in the midst of his former associates, and the exchange of new histories and old reminiscences is sufficient to fill up the time, and keep him from yielding to impatient longing. of all hamersley alone is unhappy. despite the assurances spoken, the hopes felt, there is yet apprehension for the future. the position, however, is endurable, and only passes this point as a thought comes into his mind--a memory that flashes across his brain, as if a bullet had struck him between the temples. it causes him to spring suddenly to his feet, for he has been seated, at the same time wringing from him a cry of peculiar signification. "what is it, mr hamersley?" asks the ranger captain, who is close by his side. "my god!" exclaims the kentuckian. "i'd forgotten. we must be off at once, or we shall be too late--too late!" saying this, he makes a dash for the door, hurtling his way through the crowd close standing between. the rangers regard him with glances of astonishment, and doubts about his sanity. some of them actually think he has gone mad! one alone understands him--walt wilder; though he, too, seems demented. with like incoherent speech and frantic gesture, he follows hamersley to the door. both rush outside; as they do so calling back, "come on! come on!" chapter sixty one. into the storm. lightning flashes, thunder rolls, wind bellows, and rain pours down in sheets, as if from sluices; for the storm is still raging as furiously as ever. into it have rushed the two, regardless of all. the texans are astounded--for a time some of them still believing both men mad. but soon it is seen they are acting with method, making straight for the horses, while shouting and gesticulating for the rangers to come after. these do not need either the shouts or signs to be repeated. walt's old comrades know he must have reason, and, disregarding the tempest, they strike out after. their example is electric, and in ten seconds the jacal is empty. in ten more they are among their horses, drawing in the trail-ropes and bridling them. before they can get into their saddles they are made aware of what it is all about. hamersley and walt, already mounted and waiting, make known to the ranger captain the cause of their hurried action, apparently so eccentric. a few words suffice. "the way out," says the kentuckian, "is up yonder ravine, along the bed of the stream that runs through. when it rains as it's doing now, then the water suddenly rises and fills up the channel, leaving no room, no road. if we don't get out quick we may be kept here for days." "yis, boys!" adds wilder, "we've got to climb the stairs right smart, rain or shine, storm or no storm. hyar's one off for the upper storey, fast as his critter kin carry him." while speaking, he jobs his heels against the ribs of his horse--for he is now mounted on one, as also hamersley--supernumeraries of the texan troop. then, dashing off, with the kentuckian by his side, they are soon under the trees and out of sight. not of the rangers, who, themselves now in the saddle, spur after in straggling line, riding at top speed. once again the place is deserted, for, despite their precipitate leave-taking, the texans have carried the prisoners along with them. no living thing remains by the abandoned dwelling. the only sign of human occupation is the smoke that ascends through its kitchen chimney, and from the camp fires outside, these gradually getting extinguished by the downpour. still the lightning flashes, the thunder rolls, the wind bellows, and the rain pours down as from dishes. but not to deter the texans, who, drenched to their shirts, continue to ride rapidly on up the valley road. there is in reality no road, only a trail made by wild animals, occasionally trodden by the domesticated ones belonging to colonel miranda; later still by uraga's lancers. soaked by the rain, it has become a bed of mud, into which the horses of the rangers sink to their saddle girths, greatly impeding their progress. whip and spur as they may, they make but slow time. the animals baulk, plunge, stumble, some going headforemost into the mire, others striking their shoulders against the thick-standing trees, doing damage to themselves and their riders. for with the norther still clouding the sky, it is almost dark as night. other dangers assail them from falling trees. some go down bodily before the blast, while from others great branches are broken off by the wind, and strike crashing across the path. one comes near crushing half a dozen horsemen under its broad, spreading avalanche of boughs. notwithstanding all, they struggle on fearlessly, and fast as they can, hamersley and wilder at their head, haynes, cully, and the best mounted of the troop close following. walt and the kentuckian well know the way. otherwise, in the buffeting of that terrible storm, they might fail to find it. they succeed in keeping it, on to the head of the valley, where the stream comes in between the cliffs. a tiny runlet as they last looked upon it--a mere brook, pellucid and sparkling as the sand on its bed. now it is a torrent, deep, red and roaring; only white on its surface, where the froth sweeps on, clouting the cliffs on each side. against these it has risen quite six feet, and still creeps upward. it has filled the channel from side to side, leaving not an inch of roadway between the river and rock. to wade it would be impossible; to attempt swimming it destruction. the staunchest steed could not stem its surges. even the huge river-horse of africa would be swept off his feet and tossed to the surface like one of its froth-flakes. arriving on its edge, hamersley sees this at a glance. as he checks up his horse, the exclamation that leaps from his lips more resembles the anguished cry of a man struggling in the torrent than one seated safely in a saddle on its bank. after it, he gives utterance to two words in sad despairing tone, twice repeated,-"too late--too late!" again repeated by walt wilder, and twenty times again by a score of the rangers who have ridden up, and reined their horses crowdingly behind. there is no response save echo from the rocks, scarce audible through the hoarse sough of the swollen surging stream, that rolls relentlessly by, seeming to say, as in scorn, "ford me! swim across me if you can!" chapter sixty two. a short shrift. difficult--indeed, impossible--for pen to describe the scene consequent upon the arrival of the rangers by the banks of the swollen stream, and finding it unfordable. imagine a man who has secured passage by a ship bound for some far-off foreign land, and delayed by some trifling affair, comes upon the pier to see the hawser cast off, the plank drawn ashore, the sails spread, himself left hopelessly behind! his chagrin might be equal to that felt by the texans, but slight compared with what harrows the hearts of hamersley and walt wilder. to symbolise theirs, it must be a man missing his ship homeward bound, with sweetheart, wife, child awaiting him at the end of the voyage, and in a port from which vessels take departure but "few and far between." these two, better than any of the texans, understand the obstruction that has arisen, in the same proportion as they are aggrieved by it. too well do they comprehend its fatal import. not hours, but whole days, may elapse before the flood subsides, the stream can be forded, the ravine ascended, and the pursuit continued. hours--days! a single day--an hour--may seal the fate of those dear to them. the hearts of both are sad, their bosoms racked with anguish, as they sit in their saddles with eyes bent on the turbid stream, which cruelly forbids fording it. in different degree and from a different cause the texans also suffer. some only disappointment, but others real chagrin. these last men, whose lives have been spent fighting their mexican foemen, hating them from the bottom of their hearts. they are those who knew the unfortunate fanning and the lamented bowie, who gave his name to their knives; some of themselves having escaped from the red massacre of goliad and the savage butchery of the alamo. ever since they have been practising the _lex talionis_--seeking retaliation, and oft-times finding it. perhaps too often wreaking their vengeance on victims that might be innocent. now that guilty ones--real mexican soldiers in uniform, such as ruthlessly speared and shot down their countrymen at goliad and san antonio--now that a whole troop of these have but the hour before been within reach--almost striking distance--it is afflicting, maddening, to think they may escape. and the more reflecting on the reason, so slight and accidental--a shower of rain swelling a tiny stream. for all this, staying their pursuit as effectively as if a sea of fire separated them from the foe, so despised and detested. the lightning still flashes, the thunder rolls, the wind bellows, and the rain pours down. no use staying any longer by the side of the swollen stream, to be tantalised by its rapid, rushing current, and mocked by its foam-flakes dancing merrily along. rather return to the forsaken ranche, and avail themselves of such shelter as it may afford. in short, there seems no alternative; and, yielding to the necessity, they rein round, and commence the backward march, every eye glancing gloomily, every brow overcast. they are all disappointed, most of them surly as bears that had been shot in the head, and have scratched the place to a sore. they are just in the humour to kill anyone, or anything, that should chance in their way. but there is no one, and nothing; and, in the absence of an object to spend their spite upon, some counsel wreaking it on their captives--the traitor and renegade. never during life were these two men nearer their end. to all appearance, in ten minutes more both will be dangling at the end of a rope suspended from a limb of a tree. they are saved by a circumstance for them at least lucky, if unfortunate for some others. just as a half-score of the rangers have clumped together under a spreading pecan-tree, intending to hang them upon one of its branches, a horse is heard to neigh. not one of their own, but an animal some way off the track, amid the trees. the hail is at once responded to by the steeds they are bestriding; and is promptly re-answered, not by one horse, but three neighing simultaneously. a strange thing this, that calls for explanation. what horses can be there, save their own? and none of the rangers have ridden in the direction whence the "whighering" proceeds. a dozen of them do so now; before they have gone far, finding three horses standing under the shadow of a large live oak, with three men mounted on their backs, who endeavour to keep concealed behind its broad buttressed trunk. in vain. guided by the repeated neighing and continuous tramp of their horses, the rangers ride up, close around, and capture them. led out into the light, the texans see before them three men in soldier garb--the uniform of mexican lancers. it is the corporal squad sent back by uraga to bring on the truant traitor. of their errand the rangers know nought, and nothing care. enough that three of their hated foemen are in their hands, their hostility intensified by the events of the hour. no more fuel is needed to fire them up. their vengeance demands a victim, and three have offered ready to hand. as they ride back to the road, they leave behind them a tableau, telling of a spectacle just passed--one having a frightful finale. from a large limb of the live oak, extending horizontally, hang three men, the mexican lancers. they are suspended by the neck, dangling, dead! chapter sixty three. a split trail. the texans ride on to the ranche. they still chafe at being thwarted of a vengeance; by every man of them keenly felt, after learning the criminality of the lancer colonel. such unheard of atrocity could not help kindling within their breasts indignation of the deepest kind. the three soldiers strung up to the trees have been its victims. but this episode, instead of appeasing the executioners, has only roused them, as tigers who have tasted blood hindered from banqueting on flesh. they quite comprehend the position in which the norther has placed them. on the way hamersley and wilder, most discomforted of all, have made them aware of it. the swollen stream will prevent egress from the valley till it subsides. there is no outlet save above and below, and both these are now effectually closed, shutting them up as in a strong-walled prison. on each side the precipice is unscalable. even if men might ascend, horses could not be taken along; and on such a chase it would be hopeless for them to set out afoot. but men could not go up the cliff. "a cat kedn't climb it," says walt, who during his sojourn in the valley has explored every inch of it. "we've got to stay hyar till the flood falls. i reckon no one kin be sorrier to say so than this chile. but thar's no help for 't." "till the flood falls? when will that be?" no one can answer this, not even wilder himself. and with clouded brows, sullen, dispirited, they return to the jacal. two days they stay there, chafing with angry impatience. in their anger they are ready for the most perilous enterprise. but, although bitterly cursing the sinister chance that hinders pursuit, deeming each hour a day, they can do nought save wait till the swollen stream subsides. they watch it with eager solicitude, constantly going to the bank to examine it, as the captain of a ship consults his weather-glass to take steps for the safety of his vessel. all the time one or another is riding to, or returning from, the head of the valley, to bring back report of how the subsidence progresses. and long ere the stream has returned to its regular channel, they plunge their horses into it, breasting a current that almost sweeps them off their feet. but the texan horses are strong, as their riders are skilful; the obstacle is surmounted, and the rangers at length escape from their prolonged and irksome imprisonment. it is mid-day, as filing up the pass, they reach the higher level of the llano. not many moments do they remain there; only long enough for the rear files to get out of the gorge, when those in front move forward across the plain, guided by the two best trackers in texas, nat cully and walt wilder. at first there is no following of a trail, since there is none visible. wind, rain, and drifted dust have obliterated every mark made by the returning soldiers. not a sign is left to show the pursuers the path uraga's troop has taken. they know it should be westward, and strike out without waiting to look for tracks. for the first ten or twelve miles they ride at a rapid rate, often going in a gallop. their horses, rested and fresh, enable them to do so. they are only stayed in their pace by the necessity of keeping a straight course--not so easy upon a treeless plain, when the sun is not visible in the sky. unluckily for them, the day is cloudy, which renders it more difficult. still, with the twin buttes behind--so long as these are in sight they keep their course with certainty; then, as their summits sink below the level of the plain, another landmark looms up ahead, well known by walt wilder and hamersley. it is the black-jack grove where, two days before, they made their midday meal. the rangers ride towards it, with the intention also to make a short halt there and snatch a scrap from their haversacks. when upon its edge, before entering among the trees, they see that which decides them to stay even less time than intended--the hoof-prints of half a hundred horses! going inside the copse, they observe other signs that speak of an encampment. reading these with care, they can tell that it has not long been broken up. the ashes of the bivouac fires are scarce cold, while the hoof-marks of the horses show fresh on the desert dust, for the time converted into mud. wilder and cully declare that but one day can have passed since the lancers parted from the spot; for there is no question as to who have been bivouacking among the black-jacks. a day--only a day! it will take full five before the soldiers can cross the sierras and enter the valley of the del norte. there may still be a chance of overtaking them. all the likelier, since, cumbered with their captives, and not knowing they are pursued, they may be proceeding at a leisurely pace. cheered by this hope, and freshly stimulated, the texans do not even dismount, but, spurring forth upon the plain, again ride rapidly on, munching a mouthful as they go. they are no longer delayed by any doubt as to course. the trail of the lancer troop is now easily discernible, made since the storm passed over. any one of the rangers could follow it in a fast gallop. at this pace they all go, only at intervals drawing in to a walk, to breathe their blown steeds for a fresh spurt. even after night has descended they continue on, a clear moonlight enabling them to lift the trail. as next morning's sun breaks over the llano estacado they descend its western slope into the valley of the rio pecos. traversing its bottom, of no great breadth, they reach the crossing of the old spanish trail, from santa fe to san antonio de bejar. fording the stream, on its western bank, they discover signs which cause them to come to a halt, for some time perplexing them. nothing more than the tracks of the troop they have been all the while pursuing, which entered the river on its left side. now on its right they are seen the same, up the sloping causeway of the bank. but on reaching the bottom, a little aback from the water's edge, the trail splits into two distinct ramifications, one continuing westward towards the sierras, the other turning north along the stream. the first shows the hoof-marks of nigh forty horses, the second only ten or twelve. unquestionably the mexican colonel had here divided his troop, the main body proceeding due west, the detachment striking up stream. the route taken by this last would be the old spanish road for santa fe, the first party proceeding on to albuquerque. for a time the pursuing texans are at fault, as foxhounds by a fence, over which reynard has doubled back to mislead them. they have halted at the bifurcation of the trails, and sit in their saddles, considering which of the two they should take. not all remain mounted. cully and wilder have flung themselves to the ground, and, in bent attitudes, with eyes close to the surface, are scanning the hoof-marks of the mexican horses. the others debate which of the two troops they ought to take after, or whether they should themselves separate and pursue both. this course is opposed by a majority, and it is at length almost decided to continue on after the main body, which, naturally enough, they suppose to have uraga at its head, with the captives in keeping. in the midst of their deliberations a shout calls the attention of all, concentrating it on walt wilder. for it is he who has uttered the cry. the ex-ranger is seen upon his knees, his great body bent forward, with his chin almost touching the ground. his eyes are upon the hoof-marks of a horse--one of those that went off with the smaller detachment along the river's bank. that he has identified the track is evident from the speech succeeding his ejaculation. "yur hoss, hamersley! hyar's his futprint, sure. an', as he's rud by urager, the scoundrel's goed this way to a sartinty. eqwally sartin, he's tuk the captives along wi' him." on hearing their old comrade declare his prognosis, the rangers wheel their horses and ride towards him. before reaching the spot where he is still prospecting, they see him give a sudden spring forward, like a frog leaping over meadow sward, then pause again, scrutinising a track. a second examination, similar to the first, tells of another discovery. in like manner explained, by his speech close following,-"an' hyar's the track o' the mare--the yeller mustang as war rid by the saynorita. an', durn me, that's the hoof-mark o' the mule as carried my concheter. capting haynes! kumrades! no use botherin' 'bout hyar any longer. them we want to kum up wi' are goed north 'long this trail as leads by the river bank." not another word is needed. the rangers, keen of apprehension and quick to arrive at conclusions, at once perceive the justness of those come to by their old comrade. they make no opposition to his proposal to proceed after the smaller party. instead, all signify assent; and in ten seconds after they are strung out into a long line, going at a gallop, their horses' heads turned northward up the right bank of the rio pecos. chapter sixty four. a sylvan scene. perhaps no river on all the north american continent is marked with interest more romantic than that which attaches to the rio grande of mexico. on its banks has been enacted many a tragic scene--many an episode of indian and border war--from the day when the companions of cortez first unfurled spain's _pabellon_ till the lone star flag of texas, and later still the banner of the stars and stripes, became mirrored on its waves. heading in the far-famed "parks" of the rocky mountains, under the name of rio bravo del norte, it runs in a due southerly direction between the two main ranges of the mexican "sierre madre;" then, breaking through the eastern cordillera, it bends abruptly, continuing on in a south-easterly course till it espouses ocean in the great mexican gulf. only its lower portion is known as the "rio grande;" above it is the "bravo del norte." the pecos is its principal tributary, which, after running through several degrees of latitude parallel to the main stream, at length unites with it below the great bend. in many respects the pecos is itself a peculiar river. for many hundred miles it courses through a wilderness rarely traversed by man, more rarely by men claiming to be civilised. its banks are only trodden by the savage, and by him but when going to or returning from a raid. for this turbid stream is a true river of the desert, having on its left side the sterile tract of the llano estacado, on its right dry table plains that lead up to the sierras, forming the "divide" between its waters and those of the bravo del norte. on the side of the staked plain the pecos receives but few affluents, and these of insignificant character. from the sierras, however, several streams run into it through channels deeply cut into the plain, their beds being often hundreds of feet below its level. while the plateau above is often arid and treeless, the bottom lands of these tributaries show a rich luxuriant vegetation, here and there expanding into park-like meadows, with groves and copses interspersed. on the edge of one of these affluents, known as the _arroyo alamo_ (anglice "cottonwood creek"), two tents are seen standing--one a square marquee, the other a "single pole," of the ordinary conical shape. near by a half score of soldiers are grouped around a bivouac fire, some broiling bits of meat on sapling spits, others smoking corn-husk cigarettes, all gaily chatting. one is some fifty paces apart, under a spreading tree, keeping guard over two prisoners, who, with legs lashed and hands pinioned, lie prostrate upon the ground. as the soldiers are in the uniform of mexican lancers, it is needless to say they belong to the troop of colonel uraga. superfluous to add that the two prisoners under the tree are don valerian miranda and the doctor. uraga himself is not visible, nor his adjutant, roblez. they are inside the conical hut, the square one being occupied by adela and her maid. after crossing the pecos, uraga separated his troop into two parties. for some time he has sent the main body, under command of his alferez, direct to albuquerque, himself and the adjutant turning north with the captives and a few files as escort and guard. having kept along the bank of the pecos till reaching the alamo, he turned up the creek, and is now _en bivouac_ in its bottom, some ten miles above the confluence of the streams. a pretty spot has he selected for the site of his encampment. a verdant mead, dotted with groves of leafy _alamo_ trees, that reflect their shadows upon crystal runlets silently coursing beneath, suddenly flashing into the open light like a band of silver lace as it bisects a glade green with _gramma_ grass. a landscape not all woodland or meadow, but having also a mountain aspect, for the basaltic cliffs that on both sides bound the valley bottom rise hundreds of feet high, standing scarce two hundred yards apart, grimly frowning at each other, like giant warriors about to begin battle, while the tall stems of the _pitahaya_ projecting above might be likened to poised spears. it is a scene at once soft and sublime--an eden of angels beset by a serried phalanx of fiends; below, sweetly smiling; above, darkly frowning and weirdly picturesque. a wilderness, with all its charms, uninhabited; no house in sight; no domestic hearth or chimney towering over it; no smoke, save that curling aloft from the fire lately kindled in the soldiers' camp. beasts and birds are its only habitual denizens; its groves the chosen perching place of sweet songsters; its openings the range of the prong-horn antelope and black-tailed deer; while soaring above, or seated on prominent points of the precipice, may be seen the _caracara_, the buzzard, and bald-headed eagle. uraga has pitched his tents in an open glade of about ten acres in superficial extent, and nearly circular in shape, lying within the embrace of an umbrageous wood, the trees being mostly cotton woods of large dimensions. through its midst the streamlet meanders above, issuing out of the timber, and below again entering it. on one side the bluffs are visible, rising darkly above the tree-tops, and in the concavity underneath stand the tents, close to the timber edge, though a hundred paces apart from each other. the troop horses, secured by their trail-ropes, are browsing by the bank of the stream; and above, perched upon the summit of the cliff, a flock of black vultures sun themselves with out-spread wings, now and then uttering an ominous croak as they crane their necks to scan what is passing underneath. had uraga been influenced by a sense of sylvan beauty, he could not have chosen a spot more suitable for his camping-place. scenic effect has nought to do with his halting there. on the contrary, he has turned up the alamo, and is bivouacking on its bank, for a purpose so atrocious that no one would give credit to it unacquainted with the military life of mexico in the days of the dictator don antonio lopez de santa anna. this purpose is declared in a dialogue between the lancer colonel and his lieutenant, occurring inside the conical tent shortly after its being set up. but before shadowing the bright scene we have painted by thoughts of the dark scheme so disclosed, let us seek society of a gentler kind. we shall find it in the marquee set apart for adela miranda and her maid. it scarce needs to say that a change is observable in the appearance of the lady. her dress is travel-stained, bedraggled by dust and rain; her hair, escaped from its coif, hangs dishevelled; her cheeks show the lily where but roses have hitherto bloomed. she is sad, drooping, despondent. the indian damsel seems to suffer less from her captivity, having less to afflict her--no dread of that terrible calamity which, like an incubus, broods upon the mind of her mistress. in the conversation passing between them conchita is the comforter. "don't grieve so, senorita," she says, "i'm sure it will be all right yet. something whispers me it will. it may be the good virgin--bless her! i heard one of the soldiers say they're taking us to santa fe, and that don valerian will be tried by a court martial--i think that's what he called it. well, what of it? you know well he hasn't done anything for which they can condemn him to death--unless they downright assassinate him. they dare not do that, tyrants as they are." at the words "assassinate him," the young lady gives a start. it is just that which is making her so sad. too well she knows the man into whose hands they have unfortunately fallen. she remembers his design, once nigh succeeding, only frustrated by that hurried flight from their home. is it likely the fiend will be contented to take her brother back and trust to the decision of a legal tribunal, civil or military? she cannot believe it; but shudders as she reflects upon what is before them. "besides," pursues conchita, in her consolatory strain, "your gallant francisco and my big, brave gualtero have gone before us. they'll be in albuquerque when we get there, and will be sure to hear of our arrival. trust them for doing something to save don valerian." "no, no," despondingly answers adela, "they can do nothing for my brother. that is beyond their power, even if he should ever reach there. i fear he never will--perhaps, none of us." "_santissima_! what do you mean, senorita? surely these men will not murder us on the way?" "they are capable of doing that--anything. ah! conchita, you do not know them. i am in as much danger as my brother, for i shall choose death rather than--" she forbears speaking the word that would explain her terrible apprehension. without waiting for it, conchita rejoins-"if they kill you, they may do the same with me. dear _duena_, i'm ready to die with you." the _duena_, deeply affected by this proffer of devotion, flings her white arms around the neck of her brown-skinned maid, and imprints upon her brow a kiss, speaking heartfelt gratitude. for a time the two remain enlocked in each other's arms, murmuring words of mutual consolation. love levels all ranks, but not more than misery--perhaps not so much. in the hour of despair there is no difference between prince and peasant, between the high-born dame and the lowly damsel accustomed to serve her caprices and wait upon her wishes. adela miranda has in her veins the purest _sangre azul_ of andalusia. her ancestors came to new spain among the proud _conquistadores_; while those of conchita, at least on the mother's side, were of the race conquered, outraged, and humiliated. no thought of ancestral hostility, no pride of high lineage on one side, or shame of low birth on the other, as the two girls stand inside the tent with arms entwined, endeavouring to cheer one another. under the dread of a common danger, the white _doncella_ and the dusky damsel forget the difference in the colour of their skins; and for the first time feel themselves sisters in the true sisterhood of humanity. chapter sixty five. two scoundrels in council. simultaneous with the scene in the square marquee a dialogue is taking place within the conical tent, the speakers being uraga and roblez. the colonel is reclining on a bearskin, spread over the thick sward of grass, which forms a soft couch underneath. the lieutenant sits on a camp-stool beside. both are smoking; while from a canteen and two cups, resting upon the top of a bullock trunk, comes a perfume which tells they have also been indulging in a drink. uraga is thoughtful and silent; roblez patiently waiting for him to speak. the adjutant has but late entered the tent and delivered his report about the pitching of the camp, the arrangements of which he has been superintending. "you've stationed a look-out as i directed?" the colonel inquires, after a long silence. "i have." "i hope you've placed him so that he can command a good view of the valley below?" "he's on a spur of the cliff, and can see full five miles down stream. may i ask, colonel, whom we may expect to come that way? not pursuers, i take it?" uraga does not make immediate reply. there is evidently something in his thoughts he hesitates to communicate to his subordinate. the answer he at length vouchsafes is evasive. "whom may we expect? you forget those fellows left behind on the llano. the corporal and two men, whether they've found the indian or not, will make all haste after us. fear of falling in with some party of apaches will stimulate their speed. i wonder why they haven't got up long ago. something strange about that." "no doubt the storm has detained them." "do you think it's been that, ayadante?" "i can't think of anything else, colonel. anyhow, they wouldn't be likely to come here, but go on straight to albuquerque. the corporal is a skilled _rastrero_, and, reaching the place where the troop separated, he'd be pretty sure to follow the trail of the larger party. all the more from his knowing it the safer one, so far as savages are concerned." "i hope he has done so. we don't want him here." saying this, uraga resumes his thoughtful attitude and silently puffs away at his cigar, apparently watching the smoke as it curls up and spreads against the canvas. roblez, who appeared anxious about something, after a time again essays speech. he puts the interrogatory,-"how long are we to remain here?" "that will depend on--" uraga does not complete the response--at least not till after taking several whiffs at his weed. "on what?" asks the impatient subordinate. "many matters--circumstances, events, coincidences." "may i know what they are. you promised to tell me, colonel." "i did--in time. it has not yet come. one thing i may now make known. when we leave this camping-place we shall take no prisoners along with us." "you intend setting them free?" the question is asked, not with any idea that this is uraga's design, but to draw out the explanation. "free of all cares in this world, whatever may be their troubles in the next." "they are to die, then?" "they are to die." "you mean only the men--don valerian and the doctor?" "what a ruffian you are, roblez! by your question you must take me for the same--a sanguinary savage. i'm not so bloodthirsty as to think of killing women, much less one so sweet as the senorita miranda. men don't desire the deaths of their own wives--at least, not till after the honeymoon. the dona adela is to be mine--shall, and must!" "i am aware that is your wish, and as things stand you have a fair chance of obtaining it. you can have her without spilling her brother's blood. excuse me, colonel, but i can see no reason why he should not be let live, at least till we take him to santa fe, there a prison will hold him safe, and a court-martial can be called, which, with the spirit just now abroad, will condemn him in one day, and execute him on the morning of the next. that would keep you clear from all suspicion of over-haste, which may attach to you if you take the thing into your own hands here." "bah! you talk like a child, teniente! the security of a prison in new mexico, or the chances of a prisoner being condemned, far less executed, are things merely imaginary. all the more now that there's some probability of a change in the political sky. clouds have shown themselves on the horizon at the capital--talk that our good friend gameleg is going out again. before the storm comes i for one intend making myself secure. as the husband of adela miranda, owning all that belongs to her brother, and which will be hers after his death, i shall care but little who presides in the halls of the moctezumas. priest-party or patriots, 'twill be all the same to me." "why not become her husband and let the brother live?" "why? because that cannot be." "i don't see any reason against it. both are in your power. you may easily make terms." uraga, impressed with the observation, remains for a while silent, considering. to aid reflection he smokes harder than ever. resuming speech, he asks,-"how do you counsel?" "as i've said, colonel. make terms with miranda. knowing his life to be in your hands, he will listen to reason. extract from him a promise--an oath, if need be--that he will consent to his sister becoming your wife; at the same time settling a portion of his property on the newly married pair. it's big enough to afford all of you a handsome income. that's what i would do." "he might promise you here. what security against breaking his word when we get to albuquerque?" "no need waiting for albuquerque to give him the chance. you seem to forget that there are churches between, and priests not over-scrupulous. for instance, the cure of anton chico, and his reverence who saves souls in the pueblita of la mora. either one will make man and wife of you and the senorita adela without asking question beyond whether you can produce coin sufficient to pay the marriage fees. disbursing freely, you may ensure the ceremonial in spite of all protest, if any should arise. there can be none." uraga lights a fresh cigar, and continues smoking, reflecting. the counsel of his subaltern has made an impression on him--put the thing in a new light. after all, what harm in letting miranda live? enough of revenge compelling him to consent that his sister shall be the wife of one she has scornfully rejected. if he refuse--if both do so--what then? the interrogatory is addressed to roblez. "your position," answers the adjutant, "will be no worse than now. you can still carry out the design you've hinted at without doing me the honour to entrust it to me. certainly no harm can arise from trying my plan first. in ten minutes you may ascertain the result." "i shall try it," exclaims uraga, springing to his feet and facing towards the entrance of the tent. "you're right, roblez. it's a second string to the bow i had a thought about. if it snap, let it. but if it do, before long--aye, before to-morrow's sun shines into our camp--the proud beauty may find herself brotherless, her sole chance of protection being the arms of gil uraga." saying this, he pitches away the stump of his cigar, and strides forth from the tent, determined to extract from adela miranda a promise of betrothal, or in lieu of it decree her brother's death. chapter sixty six. a brother sorely tempted. after stepping forth from the tent uraga pauses to reflect. the course counselled by roblez seems reasonable enough. if he can but force the girl's consent, it will not be difficult to get it sealed. there are priests in the frontier pueblitas who will be obedient to a power superior to the church--even in mexico, that paradise of padres. gold will outweigh any scruples about the performance of the marriage ceremony, however suspicion! the circumstances under which the intending bride and bridegroom may prevent themselves at the altar. the lancer colonel is well aware of this. but there are other points to be considered before he can proceed farther with the affair. his escort must not know too much. there are ten of them, all thorough cut-throats, and, as such, having a fellow-feeling for their commanding officer. not one of them but has committed crime, and more than one stained his soul with murder. nothing strange for mexican soldiers under the regime of santa anna. not rare even among their officers. on parting with the main body uraga selected his escort with an eye to sinister contingencies. they are the sort to assist in any deed of blood. if ordered to shoot or hang the captives they would obey with the eagerness of bloodhounds let loose from the leash, rather relishing it as cruel sport. for all, he does not desire to entrust them with the secret of his present scheme. they must not overhear the conversation which he intends holding with his captives; and to prevent this a plan easily suggests itself. "holla!" he hails a trooper with chevroned sleeves, in authority over the others. "step this way, _sergente_." the sergeant advances, and saluting, awaits further speech from the colonel. "order boots and saddles!" directs the latter. the order is issued; and the soldiers soon stand by their stirrups ready to mount, wondering what duty they are so unexpectedly to be sent upon. "to horse!" commands the colonel, vicariously through his non-commissioned officer. "ride up the creek, and find if there is a pass leading out above. take all the men with you; only leave galvez to keep guard over the prisoners." the sergeant, having received these instructions, once more salutes. then, returning to the group of lancers, at some distance off, gives the word "mount!" the troopers, vaulting into their saddles, ride away from the ground, galvez alone staying behind, who, being a "familiar" with his colonel, and more than once his participator in crimes of deepest dye, can be trusted to overhear anything. the movement has not escaped the observation of the two men lying tied under the tree. they cannot divine its meaning, but neither do they augur well of it. still worse, when uraga, calling to galvez to come to him, mutters some words in his ear. their apprehensions are increased when the sentry returns to them, and, unfastening the cord from the doctor's ankles, raises him upon his feet, as if to remove him from the spot. on being asked what it is for, galvez does not condescend to give an answer, except to say in a gruff voice that he has orders to separate them. taking hold of the doctor's arm, he conducts him to a distance of several hundred yards, and, once more laying him along the ground, stands over him as before in the attitude of a sentry. the action is suspicious, awe-inspiring--not more to don prospero than miranda himself. the latter is not left long to meditate upon it. almost instantly he sees the place of his friend occupied by his enemy. gil uraga stands beside him. there is an interval of silence, with only an interchange of glances; don valerian's defiant, uraga's triumphant. but the expression of triumph on the part of the latter appears held in check, as if to wait some development that may either heighten or curb its display. uraga breaks silence--the first speech vouchsafed to his former commanding officer since making him a prisoner. "senor miranda," he says, "you will no doubt be wondering why i have ordered your fellow-captive to be taken apart from you. it will be explained by my saying that i have words for you i don't wish overheard by anyone--not even by your dear friend, don prospero." "what words, gil uraga?" "a proposal i have to make." miranda remains silent, awaiting it. "let me first make known," continues the ruffian, "though doubtless you know it already, that your life is in my power. if i put a pistol to your head and blow out your brains there will be no calling me to account. if there was any danger of that, i could avoid it by giving you the benefit of a court-martial. your life is forfeit to the state; and our military laws, as you are aware, can be stretched just now sufficiently to meet your case." "i am aware of it," rejoins miranda, his patriotic spirit roused by the reflection; "i know the despotism that now rules my unfortunate country. it can do anything, without respect for either laws or constitution." "just so," assents uraga; "and for this reason i approach you with my proposal." "speak it, then. proceed, sir, and don't multiply words. you need not fear of their effect. i am your prisoner, and powerless." "since you command me to avoid circumlocution, i shall obey you to the letter. my proposal is that, in exchange for your life--which i have the power to take, as also to save--you will give me your sister." miranda writhes till the cords fastening his wrists almost cut through the skin. withal, he is silent; his passion too intense to permit of speech. "don't mistake me, don valerian miranda," pursues his tormentor, in a tone intended to be soothing. "when i ask you to give me your sister i mean it in an honourable sense. i wish her for my wife; and to save your life she will consent to become so, if you only use your influence to that end. she will not be a faithful sister if she do not. i need not tell you that i love her; you know that already. accept the conditions i offer, and all will be well. i can even promise you the clemency of the state; for my influence in high places is somewhat different from what it was when you knew me as your subordinate. it will enable me to obtain free pardon for you." miranda still remains silent--long enough to rouse the impatience of him who dictates, and tempt the alternative threat already shaping itself on his tongue. "refuse," he continues, his brow suddenly clouding, while a light of sinister significance flashes from his eyes, "refuse me, and you see not another sun. by that now shining you may take your last look of the earth; for this night will certainly be your last on it alive. observe those vultures on the cliff! they are whetting their beaks, as if they expected a banquet. they shall have one, on your body, if you reject the terms i've offered. accept them, don valerian miranda; or before to-morrow's sun reaches meridian the birds will be feeding upon your flesh, and the wild beasts quarrelling over your bones. answer me, and without prevarication. i demand plain speech, yes or no." "no!" is the monosyllable shouted, almost shrieked, by him so menaced. "no!" he repeats; "never shall i consent to that. i am in your power, gil uraga. put your pistol to my head, blow out my brains, as you say you can do with impunity. kill me any way you wish, even torture. it could not be more painful than to see you the husband of my sister, either by my consent or her own. you cannot force mine upon such disgraceful conditions, nor yet gain her's. my noble adela! she would rather see me die, and die along with me." "ha! ha!" responded uraga, in a peal of mocking laughter, mingled with a whine of chagrin, "we shall see about that. perhaps the senorita may not treat my offer quite so slightingly as yourself. women are not so superbly stupid. they have a keener comprehension of their own interests. your sister may better appreciate the honour i am intending her. if not, heaven help her and you! she will soon be without a brother. adios, don valerian! i go to pour speech into softer ears. for your own sake, hope--pray--that my proposal may be more favourably received." saying this, uraga turns upon his heel and abruptly walks away, leaving behind his captive with hands tied and heart in a tumult of anguished emotion. chapter sixty seven. a sister sorely tried. the marquee occupied by adela miranda and her maid is not visible from the spot where her brother lies bound. the other tent is between, with some shrubbery further concealing it. but from the tenour of his last speech, don valerian knows that uraga has gone thither, as also his object. chagrined by the denial he has received from the brother, roused to recklessness, he resolves on having an answer from the sister, point-blank, upon the instant. with slight ceremony he enters her tent. once inside, he mutters a request, more like a command, for conchita to withdraw. he does this with as much grace as the excited state of his feelings permits, excusing himself on the plea that he wishes a word with the senorita-one he is sure she would not wish to be heard by other ears than her own. aroused from a despondent attitude, the young lady looks up, her large round eyes expressing surprise, anger, apprehension, awe. the mestiza glances towards her mistress for instructions. the latter hesitates to give them. only for an instant. it can serve no purpose to gainsay the wishes of one who has full power to enforce them, and whose demeanour shows him determined on doing so. "you can go, conchita," says her mistress; "i will call you when you are wanted." the girl moves off with evident reluctance, but stops not far from the tent. "now, don gil uraga," demands the lady, on being left alone with the intruder, "what have you to say to me that should not be overheard?" "come, senorita! i pray you will not commence so brusquely. i approach you as a friend, though for some time i may have appeared in the character of an enemy. i hope, however, you'll give me credit for good intentions. i'm sure you will when you know how much i'm distressed by the position i'm placed in. it grieves me that my instructions compel such harsh measures towards my two prisoners: but, in truth, i can say no discretion has been left me. i act under an order from headquarters." "senor," she rejoins, casting upon him a look of scornful incredulity, "you have said all this before. i suppose you had something else to speak of." "and so i have, senorita. something of a nature so unpleasant i hesitate to tell it, fearing it may sadly shock you." "you need not. after what has passed i am not likely to be nervous." despite her natural courage, and an effort to appear calm, she trembles, as also her voice. there is an expression on the face of the man that bodes sinister risings--some terrible disclosure. the suspense is too painful to be borne; and in a tone more firm and defiant she demands the promised communication. "dona adela miranda," he rejoins, speaking in a grave, measured voice, like a doctor delivering a prognosis of death, "it has been my duty to make your brother a prisoner--a painful one, as i have said. but, alas! the part i've already performed is nothing compared with that now required of me. you say you are prepared for a shock. what i'm going to say will cause you one." she no longer attempts to conceal alarm. it is now discernible in her large, wondering eyes. "say it!" the words drop mechanically from her lips, drawn forth by the intensity of her apprehension. "you are soon to be without a brother!" "what mean you, senor?" "don valerian dies within the hour." "you are jesting, sir. my brother has not been sick? he is not wounded? why should he die?" she speaks hurriedly, and with an incredulous stare at uraga; while at the same time her heaving, palpitating bosom shows she too truly believes what he said. "don valerian is not sick," continues the unfeeling wretch, "nor yet has he received any wound. for all this, in less than an hour he must die. it is decreed." "_madre de dios_! you are mocking me. his death decreed! by whom?" "not by me, i assure you. the military authorities of the country have been his judges, and condemned him long ago, as also don prospero. it only needed their capture to have the sentence carried out. this disagreeable duty has been entrusted to me. my orders at starting were to have both shot on the instant of making them captives. for your sake, senorita, i've so far disobeyed the rigorous command--an act which may cost me my commission. yes, dona adela, for your sake." the tale is preposterous, and might seem to her who hears it a lie, but for her knowledge of many similar occurrences in the history of her native land, "cosas de mexico." besides, her own and her brother's experience render it but too probable. "_dios de mi alma_!" she cries out in the anguish of conviction, "can this be true?" "it is true." "colonel uraga, you will not carry out this cruel sentence! it is not an execution--it is an assassination! you will not stain your soul with murder?" "i must obey orders." "my poor brother! have mercy! you can save him?" "i can." "you will? you will?" "i will!" the emphasis with which these two words are pronounced brings a flush of gratefulness over her face, and she makes a forward movement as if to thank him by a pressure of the hand. she might have given it but for the cast upon his features, telling his consent not yet obtained, nor his speech finished. there is more to come--two other words. they are-"upon conditions!" they check her bursting gratitude. conditions! she knows not what they may be. but she knows the character of gil uraga, and can predict they will be hard. "name them!" she demands. "if it be money, i'm ready to give it. though my brother's property is taken from him, as we've heard, not so mine. i have wealth--houses, lands. take all, but save valerian's life." "you can save it without expending a single _claco_; only by giving a grace." "what mean you, senor?" "to explain my meaning i'll repeat what i've said. your brother's head is forfeit. it can be saved by a hand." "still i do not understand you. a hand?" "yes, your hand." "how?" "grasped in mine--united with it in holy wedlock. that is all i ask." she starts as if a serpent had stung her, for she now comprehends all. "all i ask," he continues in a strain of fervid passion, "i who love you with my whole soul; who have loved you for long hopeless years--aye, senorita, ever since you were a schoolgirl; myself a rough, wild youth, the son of a ranchero, who dared only gaze at you from a distance. i am a peasant no longer, but one who has wealth; upon whom the state has bestowed power to command; made me worthy to choose a wife from among the proudest in our land--even to wed with the dona adela miranda, who beholds him at her feet!" while speaking he has knelt before her, and remains upon his knees awaiting her response. she makes none. she stands as if petrified, deprived of the power of speech. her silence gives him hope. "dona adela," he continues in an appealing tone, as if to strengthen the chances of an affirmative answer, "i will do everything to make you happy--everything a husband can. and remember your brother's life! i am risking my own to save it. i have just spoken to him on the subject. he does not object; on the contrary, has given consent to you being mine." "you say so?" she inquires, with a look of incredulity. "i do not believe it--will not, without hearing it from his own lips." while speaking, she springs past the kneeling suppliant, and, before he can get upon his legs or stretch forth a hand to detain her, she has glided out of the tent, and makes for the place where she supposes the prisoners to be kept. starting to his feet, uraga rushes after. his intent is to overtake and bring her back, even if he have to carry her. he is too late. before he can come up with her she has reached the spot where her brother lies bound, and kneels beside him with arms embracing, her lips pressing his brow, his cheeks moistened by her tears. chapter sixty eight. a terrible intention. not for long does the scene of agonised affection remain uninterrupted. in a few seconds it is intruded on by him who is causing its agony. uraga, hastening after, has reached the spot and stands contemplating it. a spectacle to melt a heart of stone, it has no softening effect on his. his brow his black with rage, his eyes shining like coals of fire. his first impulse is to call galvez and order him to drag brother and sister apart. his next to do this himself. he is about seizing adela's wrist, when a thought restrains him. no melting or impulse of humanity. there is not a spark of it in his bosom. only a hope, suddenly conceived, that with the two now together he may repeat his proposal with a better chance of its being entertained. from the expression upon their countenances he can see that in the interval before his coming up words have passed between them--few and hastily spoken, but enough for each to have been told what he has been saying to the other. it does not daunt; on the contrary, but determines him to renew his offer, and, if necessary, reiterate his threats. there is no one within earshot for whom he need care. galvez has taken don prospero far apart. roblez is inside the tent, though he thinks not of him; while the indian damsel, who stands trembling by, is not worth a thought. besides, he is now more than ever regardless of the result. "don valerian miranda!" he exclaims, recovering breath after his chase across the camp-ground. "i take it your sister has told you what has passed between us. if not, i shall tell you myself." "my sister has communicated all--even the falsehood by which you've sought to fortify your infamous proposal." "_carramba_!" exclaims uraga, upon whose cheeks there is no blush of shame for the deception practised. "does the offer to save your life, at risk of my own--to rescue you from a felon's death--does that deserve the harsh epithet with which you are pleased to qualify it? come, senor, you are wronging me while trifling with your own interests. i have been honest, and declared all. i love the dona adela, as you've known, long. what do i ask? only that she shall become my wife, and, by so doing, save the life of her brother. as your brother-in-law it will be my duty, my interest, my pleasure, to protect you." "that you shall never be!" firmly rejoins miranda. "no, never!" he adds, with kindling fervour, "never, on such conditions!" "does the senorita pronounce with the same determination?" asks uraga, riveting his eyes on adela. it is a terrible ordeal for the girl. her brother lying bound by her side, his death about to be decreed, his end near as if the executioner were standing over him--for in this light does uraga appear. called upon to save his life by promising to become the wife of this man-hideous in her eyes as the hangman himself; knowing, or believing, that if she does not, in another hour she may be gazing upon a blood-stained corpse--the dead body of her own brother! no wonder she trembles from head to foot, and hesitates to endorse the negative he has so emphatically pronounced. don valerian notes her indecision, and, firmly as before, repeats the words,-"no--never!" adding, "dear sister, think not of me. do not fear or falter; i shall not. i would rather die a hundred deaths than see you the wife of such a ruffian. let me die first!" "_chingara_!" hisses the man thus boldly defied, using the vilest exclamation known to the spanish tongue. "then you shall die first. and, after you're dead, she shall still be my wife, or something you may not like so well--my _margarita_!" the infamous meaning conveyed by this word, well understood by miranda, causes him to start half-upright, at the same time wrenching at the rope around his wrists. the perspiration forced from him by the agony of the hour has moistened the raw-hide thong to stretching. it yields to the convulsive effort, leaving his hands released. with a quick lurch forward he clutches at the sword dangling by uraga's side. its hilt is in his grasp, and in an instant he has drawn the blade from its scabbard! seeing himself thus suddenly disarmed, the lancer colonel springs back shouting loudly for help. miranda, his ankles bound, is at first unable to follow, but with the sword-blade he quickly cut the thongs, and is on his feet--free! in another instant he is chasing uraga across the camp-ground, the latter running like a scared hound. before he can be overtaken, the trampling of hoofs resound upon the grassy turf, and the returned lancers, with roblez and the sentry, close around the prisoner. don valerian sees himself encircled by a _chevaux de frise_ of lances, with cocked carbines behind. there is no chance of escape, no alternative but surrender. after that-he does not stop to reflect. a wild thought flashes across his brain--a terrible determination. to carry it out only needs the consent of his sister. she had rushed between their horses and stands by his side, with arms outstretched to protect him. "adela!" he says, looking intently into her eyes, "dear sister, let us die together!" she sees the sword resolutely held in his grasp. she cannot mistake the appeal. "yes; let us, valerian!" comes the quick response, with a look of despairing resignation, followed by the muttered speech of "mother of god, take us both to thy bosom! to thee we commit our souls!" he raises the blade, its point towards his sister--in another moment to be buried in her bosom, and afterwards in his own! the sacrifice is not permitted, though the soldiers have no hand in hindering it. dismayed or careless, they sit in their saddles without thought of interfering. but between their files rushes a form in whose heart is more of humanity. the intruder is conchita--opportune to an instant. two seconds more, and the fratricidal sword would have bereft her of a mistress and a master, both alike beloved. both are saved by her interference; for grasping the upraised arm, she restrains it from the thrust. roblez, close following, assists her, while several of the lancers, now dismounted, fling themselves upon miranda and disarm him. the intending sororicide and suicide is restored to his fastenings; his sister taken back to her tent; a trooper detailed to stand sentry beside and frustrate any attempt at a second escapade. chapter sixty nine. an intercepted dispatch. while the thrilling incident described is occurring in uraga's camp, the rangers, _en route_ along the banks of the pecos, are making all the haste in their power to reach it, hamersley and wilder every now and then saying some word to urge them on. in pursuit of such an enemy the texans need no pressing. 'tis only the irrestrainable impatience of the two whose souls are tortured by the apprehension of danger hovering over the heads of those dear to them. there is no difficulty in lifting the trail of the soldiers. their horses are shod, and the late storm, with its torrent of rain, has saturated the earth, obliterating all old hoof-marks, so that those later made are not only distinct but conspicuous. so clear, that the craft of cully and wilder is not called into requisition. every ranger riding along the trail can take it up as fast as his horse is able to carry him. all see that uraga has taken no pains to blind the track of his party. why should he? he can have no suspicion of being pursued; certainly not by such pursuers. along the trail, then, they ride rapidly; gratified to observe that it grows fresher as they advance for they are travelling thrice as fast as the men who made it. all at once they come to a halt--summoned to this by a sight which never fails to bring the most hurried traveller to a stand. they see before them the dead body of a man! it is lying on a sand-spit, which projects into the river. upon this it has evidently been washed by the waters, now subsiding after the freshet, due to the late tornado. beside it shows the carcase of a mule, deposited in similar manner. both are conspicuous to the rangers as they ride abreast of the spit; but their attention has been called to them long before by a flock of buzzards, some hovering above, others alighting upon the sandbank. six or seven of the texans, heading their horses down the sloping bank, ride towards the "sign"--so sad, yet terribly attractive. it would tempt scrutiny anywhere; but in the prairie wilderness, in that dangerous desert, it may be the means of guiding to a path of safety, or warding from one that is perilous. while those who have detached themselves proceed out upon the sand-bar, the main body remains upon the high bank, awaiting their return. the dead man proves to be an indian, though not of the _bravos_, or savage tribes. wearing a striped woollen _talma_, with coarse cotton shirt underneath, wide sheep-skin breeches, ex tending only a little below the knee, and rude raw-hide sandals upon his feet, he is evidently one of the christianised aboriginals. there are no marks of violence on his body, nor yet on the carcase of the mule. the case is clear at a glance. it is one of drowning; and the swollen stream, still foaming past, is evidence eloquent of how it happened. on the man's body there are no signs of rifling or robbery. his pockets, when turned inside out, yield such contents as might be expected on the person of an _indio manso_. only one thing, which, in the eyes of the examinators, appears out of place; a sheet of paper folded in the form of a letter, and sealed as such. it is saturated with water, stained to the hue of the still turbid stream. but the superscription can be read, "por barbato." so much cully and wilder, who assist at the examination, can make out for themselves. but on breaking open the seal, and endeavouring to decipher what is written inside, both are at fault, as also the others along with them. the letter is in a language that is a sealed book to all. it is in spanish. without staying to attempt translating it, they return to the river's bank, taking the piece of paper along, for the superscription has touched a tender point, and given rise to strange suspicions. walt carries the wet letter, which, soon as rejoining their comrades, he places in the hands of hamersley. the latter, translating, reads aloud: "senor barbato,--as soon as you receive this, communicate its contents to the chief. tell him to meet me on the arroyo de alamo--same place as before--and that he is to bring with him twenty or thirty of his painted devils. the lesser number will be enough, as it's not an affair of fighting. come yourself with them. you will find me encamped with a small party--some female and two male captives. no matter about the women. it's the men you have to deal with; and this is what you are to do. charge upon our camp the moment you get sight of it; make your redskins shout like fiends, and ride forward, brandishing their spears. you won't meet resistance, nor find any one on the ground when you've got there, only our two prisoners, who will be fast bound, and so cannot flee with us. what's to be done with them, amigo mio, is the important part--in fact, the whole play. tell the chief they are to be speared upon the spot, thrust through as soon as you get up to them. see to this yourself, lest there be any mischance; and i'll take care you shall have your reward." made acquainted with the contents of this vile epistle, the rage of the rangers, already sufficiently aroused, breaks from all bounds, and, for a while, seeks vent in fearful curses and asseverations. though there is no name appended to the diabolical chapter of instructions, they have no doubt as to who has dictated it. circumstances, present and antecedent, point to the man of whom they are in pursuit--gil uraga. and he to whom the epistle is superscribed, "por barbato." a wild cry ascends simultaneously from the whole troop as they face round towards the renegade, who is still with them, and their prisoner. the wretch turns pale, as if all the blood of his body were abruptly drawn out. without comprehending the exact import of that cry, he can read in fifty pairs of eyes glaring angrily on him that his last hour has come. the rangers can have no doubt as to whom the letter has been addressed, as they can also tell why it has miscarried. for the renegade has already disclosed his name, not thinking it would thus strangely turn up to condemn him to death. yes--to death; for, although promised life, with only the punishment of a prison, these conditions related to another criminality, and were granted without the full knowledge of his guilt--of connivance at a crime unparalleled for atrocity. his judges feel absolved from every stipulation of pardon or mercy; and, summoning to the judgment seat the quick, stem decreer--lynch--in less than five minutes after the trembling wretch is launched into eternity! there is reason for this haste. they know that the letter has miscarried; but he who could dictate such a damnable epistle is a wild beast at large, who cannot be too soon destroyed. leaving the body of barbato to be devoured by wolves and vultures, they spur on along the pecos, only drawing bridle to breathe their horses as the trail turns up at the bottom of a confluent creek--the arroyo de alamo. chapter seventy. a scheme of atrocity. discomfited--chagrined by his discomfiture--burning with shame at the pitiful spectacle he has afforded to his followers--uraga returns within his tent like an enraged tiger. not as one robbed of its prey--he is still sure of this as ever; for he has other strings to his bow, and the weak one just snapped scarce signifies. but for having employed it to no purpose he now turns upon roblez, who counselled the course that has ended so disastrously. the adjutant is a safe target on which to expend the arrows of his spleen, and to soothe his perturbed spirit he gives vent to it. in time, however, he gets somewhat reconciled; the sooner by gulping down two or three glasses of catalan brandy. along with the liquor, smoking, as if angry at his cigar, and consuming it through sheer spite, roblez endeavours to soothe him by consolative speech. "what matters it, after all!" puts in the confederate. "it may be that everything has been for the best. i was wrong, no doubt, in advising as i did. still, as you see, it's gained us some advantage." "advantage! to me the very reverse. only to think of being chased about my own camp by a man who is my prisoner! and before the eyes of everybody! a pretty story for our troopers to tell when they get back to albuquerque! i, colonel commanding, will be the jest of the _cuartel_!" "nothing of the kind, colonel! there is nothing to jest about. your prisoner chanced to possess himself of your sword--a thing no one could have anticipated. he did it adroitly, but then you were at the time unsuspecting. disarmed, what else could you do but retreat from a man, armed, desperate, determined on taking your life. i'd like to see anyone who'd have acted otherwise. under the circumstances only an insane man would keep his ground. the episode has been awkward, i admit. but it's all nonsense--excuse me for saying so--your being sensitive about that part of it. and for the rest, i say again, it's given us an advantage; in short, the very one you wanted, if i understand your intentions aright." "in what way?" "well, you desired a pretext, didn't you?" "to do what?" "court-martial your prisoners, condemn, and execute them. the attempt on your life will cover all this, so that the keenest scandal-monger may not open his lips. it will be perfectly _en regie_ for you to hang or shoot don valerian miranda--and, if you like, the doctor, too--after ten minutes' deliberation over a drum's head. i'm ready to organise the court according to your directions." to this proposal uraga replies with a significant smile, saying: "your idea is not a bad one; but i chance to have a better. much as i hate miranda and wish him out of the way, i don't desire to imbrue my hands in his blood; don't intend to, as i've already hinted to you." roblez turns upon his superior officer a look of incredulous _surprise, interrogating_,-"you mean to take him back, and let him be tried in the regular way?" "i mean nothing of the kind." "i thought it strange, after your telling me he would never leave this place alive." "i tell you so still." "colonel! you take pleasure in mystifying me. if you're not going to try your prisoners by court-martial, in what way are your words to be made good? surely you don't intend to have them shot without form of trial?" "i've said i won't imbrue my hands in their blood." "true, you've said that more than once, but without making things any clearer to me. you spoke of some plan. perhaps i may now hear it?" "you shall. but first fill me out another _capita_ of the catalan. that affair has made me thirsty as a sponge." the adjutant, acting as ganymede, pours out the liquor and hands the cup to his colonel, which the latter quaffs off. then, lighting a fresh cigar, he proceeds with the promised explanation. "i spoke of events, incidents, and coincidences--didn't i, _ayadante_?" "you did, colonel." "well, suppose i clump them altogether, and give you the story in a simple narrative--a monologue? i know, friend roblez, you're not a man greatly given to speech; so it will save you the necessity of opening your lips till i've got through." roblez, usually taciturn, nods assent. "before coming out here," continues the colonel, "i'd taken some steps. when you've heard what they are i fancy you'll give me credit for strategy, or cunning, if you prefer so calling it. i told you i should take no prisoners back, and that don valerian and the doctor are to die. they will go to their graves without causing scandal to any of us. to avoid it i've engaged an executioner, who will do the job without any direct orders from me." "who?" asks the adjutant, forgetting his promise to be silent. "don't interrupt!" the subordinate resumes silence. "i think," continues uraga, in a tone of serio-comicality, "you have heard of a copper-coloured gentleman called `horned lizard.' if i mistake not, you have the honour of his acquaintance. and, unless i'm astray in my reckoning, you'll have the pleasure of seeing him here this evening, or at an early hour to-morrow morning. he will make his appearance in somewhat eccentric fashion. no doubt, he'll come into our camp at a charging gallop, with some fifty or a hundred of his painted warriors behind him. and i shouldn't wonder if they should spit some of our gay lancers on the points of their spears. that will depend on whether these _valientes_ be foolish enough to make resistance. i don't think they will. more likely we shall see them gallop off at the first whoop of the indian assailants. you and i, roblez, will have to do the same; but, as gallant gentlemen, we must take the women along with us. to abandon them to the mercy of the savages, without making an effort to save them, were absolute poltroonery, and would never bear reporting in the settlements. therefore, we must do our best to take the ladies along. of course, we can't be blamed for not being able to save our male prisoners. their fate, i fear, will be for each to get half a dozen comanche spears thrust through his body, or it may be a dozen. it's sad to think of it, but such misfortunes cannot always be avoided. they are but the ordinary incidents of frontier life. now, _senor ayadante_, do you comprehend my scheme?" "since i am at length permitted to speak, i may say i do--at least, i have an obscure comprehension of it. fairly interpreted, i take it to mean this. you have arranged with the horned lizard to make a counterfeit attack upon our camp--to shoot down or spear our poor devils of soldiers, if need be?" "not the slightest need of his doing that, nor any likelihood of his being able to do it. they'll run like good fellows at the first yell of the indians. have no apprehensions about them." "in any case, the horned lizard is to settle the question with our captives, and take the responsibility off our hands. if i understand aright, that is the programme." "it is." chapter seventy one. a bootless journey. having returned to his original design--the scheme of atrocity so coolly and jestingly declared, uraga takes steps towards its execution. the first is, to order his own horse, or rather that of hamersley, to be saddled, bridled, and tied behind his own tent. the same for that ridden by roblez. also the mustang mare which belongs to adela miranda--her own "lolita"--and the mule set apart for the _mestiza_. the troop horses already caparisoned are to remain so. ignorant of their object, the troopers wonder at these precautions, though not so much as might be expected. they are accustomed to receive mysterious commands, and obey them without cavil or question. not one of the ten but would cut a throat at gil uraga's bidding, without asking the reason why. the picket placed on a spin of the cliff has orders to signal if any one is seen coming up the creek. if indians appear he is to gallop into the camp, and report in person. the alarm thus started will easily be fostered into a stampede, and at the onslaught of the savages the lancers will rush to their horses and ride off without offering resistance. in the _sauve qui peut_ none of them will give a thought to the two prisoners lying tied under the tree. these are to be left behind to the tender mercies of the tenawa chief. it will be an act of gallantry to save the female captives by carrying them off. this uraga reserves for himself, assisted by roblez. such is his scheme of vicarious assassination; in the atrocity of conception unequalled, almost incredible. he has no anxiety as to its success. for himself he is more than ever determined; while roblez, restrained by the fiasco following his advice, no longer offers opposition. uraga has no fear the tenawa chief will fail him. he has never done so before, and will not now. the new proposal, which the colonel supposes to have reached the hands of horned lizard in that letter carried by pedrillo, will be eagerly accepted. barbato will bring the chief with his cut-throats to the arroyo de alamo, sure as there is a sun in the sky. it is but a question of time. they may come up at any hour--any minute; and having arranged all preliminaries, uraga remains in his tent to await the cue for action. he little dreams at the moment he is thus expecting his red-skinned confederate, that the latter, along with the best braves of his band, has gone to the happy hunting grounds, while his go-between, barbato, is in safe keeping elsewhere. as the hours pass, and no one is reported as approaching, he becomes impatient; for the time has long elapsed since the tenawa chief should have been upon the spot. chafing, he strides forth from the tent, and proceeds towards the place where the look-out has been stationed. reaching it, he reconnoitres for himself, with a telescope he has taken along, to get a better view down the valley. at first, levelling the glass, no one can be seen. in the reach of open ground, dotted here and there with groves, there are deer browsing, and a grizzly bear is seen crossing between the cliffs, but no shape that resembles a human being. he is about lowering the telescope when a new form comes into its field of view--a horseman riding up the creek. no the animal is a mule. no matter the rider is a man. keenly scrutinising, he perceives it is an indian, though not one of the wild sort. his garb betokens him of the tamed. another glance through the glass and his individuality declares itself, uraga recognising him as one of the messengers sent to the tenawas' town. not the principal, pedrillo, but he of secondary importance, jose. "returning alone!" mutters the mexican to himself. "what does that mean? where can pedrillo be? what keeps him behind, i wonder?" he continues wondering and conjecturing till jose has ridden up to the spot, when, perceiving his master, the latter dismounts and approaches him. in the messenger's countenance there is an expression of disappointment, and something more. it tells a tale of woe, with reluctance to disclose it. "where is pedrillo?" is the first question asked in anxious impatience. "oh, _senor coronel_!" replies jose, hat in hand, and trembling in every joint. "pedrillo! _pobre pedrillito_!" "well! poor pedrillito--what of him? has anything happened to him?" "yes, your excellency, a terrible mischance i fear to tell it you." "tell it, sirrah, and at once! out with it, whatever it is!" "alas, pedrillo is gone!" "gone--whither?" "down the river." "what river?" "the pecos." "gone down the pecos? on what errand?" inquired the colonel, in surprise. "on no errand, your excellency." "then what's taken him down the pecos? why went he?" "_senor coronel_, he has not gone of his own will. it is only his dead body that went; it was carried down by the flood." "drowned? pedrillo drowned?" "_ay de mi_! 'tis true, as i tell you--too true, _pobrecito_." "how did this happen, jose?" "we were crossing at the ford, senor. the waters were up from a _norte_ that's just passed over the plains. the river was deep and running rapid, like a torrent, pedrillo's _macho_ stumbled, and was swept off. it was as much as mine could do to keep its legs. i think he must have got his feet stuck in the stirrups, for i could see him struggling alongside the mule till both went under. when they came to the surface both were drowned--dead. they floated on without making a motion, except what the current gave them as their bodies were tossed about by it. as i could do nothing there, i hastened here to tell you what happened. _pobre pedrillito_!" the cloud already darkening uraga's brow grows darker as he listens to the explanation. it has nothing to do with the death of pedrillo, or compassion for his fate--upon which he scarce spends a thought--but whether there has been a miscarriage of that message of which the drowned man was the bearer. his next interrogatory, quickly put, is to get satisfied on this head. "you reached the tenawa town?" "we did, _senor coronel_." "pedrillo carried a message to the horned lizard, with a letter for barbato. you know that, i suppose?" "he told me so." "well, you saw him deliver the letter to barbato?" "he did not deliver it to barbato." "to the chief, then?" "to neither, your excellency. he could not." "could not! why?" "they ere not there to receive it. they are no longer in this world-neither the horned lizard nor barbato. senor coronel, the tenawas have met with a great misfortune. they've had a fight with a party of tejanos. the chief is killed, barbato is killed, and nearly half of their braves. when pedrillo and i reached the town we found the tribe in mourning, the women all painted black, with their hair cut off; the men who had escaped the slaughter cowed, and keeping concealed within their lodges." a wild exclamation leaps from the lips of uraga as he listens to these disclosures, his brow becoming blacker than ever. "but, pedrillo," he inquires, after a pause; "what did he say to them? you know the import of his message. did he communicate it to the survivors?" "he did, your excellency. they could not read your letter, but he told them what it was about. they were to meet you here, he said. but they refused to come. they were in too great distress about the death of their chief, and the chastisement they had received. they were in fear that the tejanos would pursue them to their town; and were making preparations to flee from it when pedrillo and myself came away. _pobre pedrillito_!" uraga no longer stays listening to the mock humanity of his whining messenger. no more does he think of the drowned pedrillo. his thoughts are now given to a new design. murder by proxy has failed. for all that, it must still be done. to take counsel with his adjutant about the best mode of proceeding, he hastens back to the camp; plunges into his tent; and there becomes closeted--the lieutenant along with him. chapter seventy two. a mock court-martial. for the disaster that was overtaken the tenawa chief and his warriors, gil uraga does not care a jot. true, by the death of horned lizard he has lost an ally who, on some future scheme of murder, might have been used to advantage; while barbato, whose life he believes also taken, can no more do him service as agent in his intercourse with the red pirates of the prairie. it matters not much now. as military commander of a district he has attained power, enabling him to dispense with any left-handed assistance; and of late more than once has wished himself rid of such suspicious auxiliaries. therefore, but for the frustration of his present plans, he would rather rejoice than grieve over the tidings brought by the returned emissary. his suit scorned, his scheme of assassination thwarted, he is as much as ever determined on the death of the two prisoners. in the first moments of his anger, after hearing jose's tale, he felt half inclined to rush upon miranda, sword in hand, and settle the matter at once. but, while returning to the camp-ground, calmer reflections arose, restraining him from the dastardly act, and deciding him to carry out the other alternative, already conceived, but kept back as a _dernier ressort_. "sit down, _camarado_!" he says, addressing the adjutant on entering. "we must hold a court-martial, and that is too serious a ceremonial to be gone through without the customary forms. the members of the court should be seated." the grim smile which accompanies his words shows that he means them in jest only as regards the manner of proceeding. for the earnestness of his intention there is that in his eyes--a fierce, lurid light, which roblez can read. in rejoinder the adjutant asks,-"you are still resolved upon the death of the prisoners?" "still resolved! carramba! an idle question, after what has occurred! they die within the hour. we shall try, condemn, and then have them shot." "i thought you had arranged it in a different way?" "so i had. but circumstances alter cases. there's many a slip 'twixt cup and lip, and i've just heard of one. the horned lizard has failed me." "how so, colonel?" "you see that indian outside. he's one of my muleteers i'd sent as a messenger to the tenawa town. he returns to tell me there's no horned lizard in existence, and only a remnant of his tribe. himself, with the best of his braves, has gone to the happy hunting grounds; not voluntarily, but sent thither by a party of tejanos who fell foul of them on a foray." "that's a strange tale," rejoins roblez, adding, "and barbato?" "dead, too--gone with his red-skinned associates." "certainly a singular occurrence--quite a coincidence." "a coincidence that leaves me in an awkward predicament, without my expected executioners. well, we must supply their places by substituting our own cut-throats." "you'll find them willing, colonel. the little interlude of miranda getting loose, and making to run you through, has been all in your favour. it affords sufficient pretext for court-martialling and condemning both prisoners to be shot i've heard the men say so, and they expect it." "they shall not be disappointed, nor have long to wait. the court has finished its sitting, and given its verdict. without dissenting voice, the prisoners are condemned to death. so much for the sentence. now to carry it into execution." "how is the thing to be done?" "call in the sergeant. with him i shall arrange that. and when you're out, go among the men and say a word to prepare them for the measure. you may tell them we've been trying the prisoners, and the result arrived at." the adjutant steps out of the tent; and while uraga is swallowing another cup of catalan to fortify him for his fearful purpose, the sergeant enters. "_sergente_! there's some business to be done of a delicate nature, and you must take direction of it." the serjeant salutes, and stands awaiting the explanation. the colonel continues:-"we intend taking our prisoners no farther--the men, i mean. with the women we have nothing to do--as prisoners. after what you saw, we deem it necessary that don valerian miranda should die; and also the other, who is equally incriminated as a traitor to the state--a rebel, an old conspirator, well known. lieutenant roblez and i have held a court, and decreed their death. so order the men to load their carbines, and make ready to carry out the sentence." the sergeant simply nods assent, and, again saluting, is about to retire, when uraga stays him with a second speech. "let all take part in the firing except galvez. post him as sentry over the square tent. direct him to stand by its entrance and see that the flap is kept down. under no circumstances is he to let either of its occupants out. it's not a spectacle for women--above all, one of them. never mind; we can't help that i'm sorry myself, but duty demands this rigorous measure. now go. first give galvez his orders; then to the men and get them ready. make no more noise than is necessary. let your lancers be drawn up in line; afoot, of course, and single file." "where am i to place the prisoners, colonel?" "ah! true; i did not think of that." uraga steps to the entrance of the tent, and, looking forth, takes a survey of the camp-ground. his eyes seek the spot occupied by the prisoners. they are both again together, under the same tree where first placed, a sentry keeping guard over them. the tree is a cottonwood, with smooth stem and large limbs extending horizontally. another is near, so similar as to seem a twin; both being a little out from the thick timber, which forms a dark background behind them. after regarding them a moment, scanning them as a lumberman would a log intended for a saw-mill, uraga directs. "raise the prisoners upright, and tie one to each of those two trees. set their backs to the trunk. they've both been army men, and we won't disgrace the cloth by shooting them from behind. that's grace enough for rebels." the sergeant, saluting, is again about to go, only staying to catch some final words of direction. they are-"in ten minutes i shall expect you to have everything ready. when you've got the stage set i shall myself appear upon it as an actor--the star of this pretty play!" and with a hoarse laugh at his horrid jest, the ruffian retires within his tent. chapter seventy three. the hand of god. the sun is descending towards the crest of the cordillera, his rays becoming encrimsoned as twilight approaches. they fall like streams of blood between the bluffs enclosing the valley of the arroyo de alamo, their tint in unison with a tragedy there about to be enacted--in itself strangely out of correspondence with the soft, tranquil scene. the stage is the encampment of uraga and his detachment of lancers, now set for the terrible spectacle soon to take place. the two tents are still standing as pitched, several paces apart. at the entrance of the square one, with its flap drawn close and tied, a soldier keeps sentry; that of conical shape being unguarded. rearward, by the wood edge, are three horses and a mule, all four under saddle, with bridles on; these attached to the branches of a tree. there is no providence in this, but rather neglect. since the purpose for which they were caparisoned has proved abortive, they remain so only from having been forgotten. the other troop-horses have been stripped, and, scattered over the mead, are browsing at the length of their lariats. it is in the positions and attitudes of the men that a spectator might read preparation; and of a kind from which he could not fail to deduce the sequence of a sanguinary drama. not one accompanied by much noise, but rather solemn and silent; only a few words firmly spoken, to be followed by a volley; in short, a military execution, or, as it might be more properly designated, a military murder. the victims devoted are seen near the edge of the open ground--its lower edge regarding the direction of the stream. they are in erect attitude, each with his back to the trunk of a tree, to which with raw-hide ropes they are securely lashed. no need telling who they are. the reader knows them to be the prisoners lately lying prostrate near the same place. in their front, and scarce ten paces distant, the lancers are drawn up in line and single file. there are ten of them, the tenth a little retired to the right, showing chevrons on his sleeve. he is the sergeant in immediate command of the firing party. farther rearward, and close by the conical tent, and two in the uniform of officers, uraga and his adjutant. the former is himself about to pronounce the word of command, the relentless expression upon his face, blent with a grim smile that overspreads it, leading to believe that the act of diabolical cruelty gives him gratification. above, upon the cliff's brow, the black vultures also show signs of satisfaction. with necks craned and awry, the better to look below, they see preparations which instinct or experience has taught them to understand. blood is about to be spilled; there will be flesh to afford them a feast. there is now perfect silence, after a scene which preceded; once more uraga having made overtures to miranda, with promise of life under the same scandalous conditions; as before, to receive the response, firmly spoken,-"no--never!" the patriot soldier prefers death to dishonour. his choice taken, he quails not. tied to the trunk of the tree, he stands facing his executioners without show of fear. if his cheeks be blanched, and his bosom throbbing with tumultuous emotion, 'tis not at sight of the firing party, or the guns held loaded in their hands. far other are his fears, none of them for himself, but all for his dear sister--adela. no need to dwell upon or describe them. they may be imagined. and don prospero, brave and defiant too. he stands backed by the tree, his eyes showing calm courage, his long silvered beard touching his breast, not drooping or despairingly, but like one resigned to his fate, and still firm in the faith that has led to it--a second wickliffe at the stake. the moment has arrived when the stillness becomes profound, like the calm which precedes the first burst of a thunderstorm. the vultures above, the horses and men below, are all alike silent. the birds, gazing intently, have ceased their harsh croaking; the quadrupeds, as if startled by the very silence, forsaking the sweet grass, have tossed their heads aloft, and so hold them. while the men, hitherto speaking in whispers, no more converse, but stand mute and motionless. they are going to deal death to two of their fellow-creatures; and there is not one among them who does not know it is a death undeserved--that he is about to commit murder! for all this, not one has a thought of staying his hand. along the whole line there is no heart amenable to mercy, no breast throbbing with humanity. all have been in a like position before--drawn up to fire upon prisoners, their countrymen. the patriots of their country, too; for the followers of gil uraga are all of them picked adherents of the _parti preter_. "_sergente_!" asks uraga, on coming forth from his tent, "is everything ready?" "all ready," is the prompt reply. "attention!" commands the colonel, stepping a pace or two forward, and speaking in a low tone, though loud enough to be heard by the lancers. "make ready!" the carbines are raised to the ready. "take aim!" the guns are brought to the level, their bronzed barrels glistening under the rays of the setting sun, with muzzles pointed at the prisoners. they who grasp them but wait for the word "fire!" it is forming itself on gil uraga's lips. but before he can speak there comes a volley, filling the valley with sound, and the space around the prisoners with smoke. the reports of more than forty pieces speak almost simultaneously, none of them with the dull detonation of cavalry carbines, but the sharper ring of the rifle! while the last crack is still reverberating from the rocks, uraga sees his line of lancers prostrate along the sward; their guns, escaped from their grasp, scattered beside them, still undischarged! chapter seventy four. "sauve qui peut." at sight of his soldiers cut down like ripe corn before the reaper, uraga stands in stupefied amaze; his adjutant the same. both are alike under the spell of a superstitious terror. for the blow, so sudden and sweeping, seems given by god's own hand. they might fancy it a _coup d'eclair_. but the jets of fire shooting forth from the forest edge, through a cloud of sulphurous smoke, are not flashes of lightning; nor the rattle that accompanies them the rolling of thunder, but the reports of firearms discharged in rapid succession. while in shouts following the shots there is no accent of heaven; on the contrary, the cries are human, in the voices of men intoned to a terrible vengeance. though every one of the firing party has fallen, sergeant as well as rank and file, the two officers are still untouched. so far they have been saved by the interposition of the formed line. but straggling shots succeed, and bullets are whizzing past their ears. these, quickening their instincts, rouse them from their stupefaction; and both, turning from the direction of the danger, looked to the other side for safety. at first wildly and uncertain, for they are still under a weird impression, with senses half bewildered. neither has a knowledge of the enemy that has made such havoc among their men; only an instinct or intuition that the blow has been struck by those terrible _tejanos_, for the shots heard were the cracks of rifles, and the shouts, still continued, are not indian yells nor mexican vivas, but the rough hurrahs of the anglo-saxon. while standing in hesitancy, they hear a voice raised above the rest-one which both recognise. well do they remember it, pealing among the waggons on that day of real ruthless carnage. glancing back over their shoulders, they see him who sends it forth--the giant guide of the caravan. he has just broken from the timber's edge, and in vigorous bounds is advancing towards them. another is by his side, also recognised. with trembling frame, and heart chilled by fear, uraga identifies his adversary in the duel at chihuahua. neither he nor his subordinate remains a moment longer on the ground. no thought now of carrying off their female captives, no time to think of them. enough, and they will be fortunate, if they can themselves escape. better for both to perish there by the sides of their slain comrades. but they know not this, and only yield to the common instinct of cowardice, forcing them to flee. fortune seems to favour them. for animals fully caparisoned stand behind the conical tent. they are these that were in readiness for a flight of far different kind, since unthought of--altogether forgotten. good luck their being saddled and bridled now. so think uraga and roblez as they rush towards them. so thinks galvez, who is also making to mount one. the sentry has forsaken his post, leaving the marquee unguarded. when a lover no longer cares for his sweetheart, why should he for a captive. and in the _sauve-qui-peut_ scramble there is rarely a regard for rank, the colonel counting for no more than the corporal. obedient to this levelling instinct, galvez, who has arrived first on the ground, selects the best steed of the three--this being the horse of hamersley. grasping the bridle, and jerking it from the branch, he springs upon the animal's back and starts to ride off. almost as soon the two officers get astride, roblez on his own charger, the mustang mare being left to uraga. from her mistress he must part thus unceremoniously, covered with ignominious shame! the thought is torture, and for a time stays him. a dire, damnable purpose flashes across his brain, and for an instant holds possession of his heart. it is to dismount, make for the marquee, enter it, and kill adela miranda--thrust her through with his sword. fortunately for her, the coward's heart fails him. he will not have time to do the murder and remount his horse. the rangers are already in the open ground and rushing towards him, wilder and hamersley at their head. in a minute more they will be around him. he hesitates no longer, but, smothering his chagrin and swallowing his unappeased vengeance, puts whip and spur to the mustang mare, going off as fast as she can carry him. chapter seventy five. divided by duty. but for a half-score men lying dead along the earth, their warm blood welling from wounds where bullets have passed through their bodies, the gory drops here and there like dew bedecking the blades of grass, or in fuller stream settling down into the sand--but for this, the too real evidence of death, one who entered the camp of uraga as the mexican colonel is riding out of it might fancy himself spectator of a pantomime during the scene of transformation. in the stage spectacle, not quicker or more contrasting could be the change. the gaily-apparelled lancers, with their plumes, pennons, and tassels, representing the sprites and sylphides of the pantomime, are succeeded by men who look real life. big bearded men, habited in homespun; some wearing buckskin, others blanket coats; all carrying guns, bowie-knives, and pistols; the first smoking at the muzzles, as freshly fired, the last held in hand, ready to be discharged as soon as somebody worth shooting at shows himself. entering the open ground ahead of the others, hamersley and wilder glance around in search of this somebody, both thinking of the same. they see stretched along the sward ten soldiers dead as herrings on a string, but among them no one wearing the uniform of an officer-certainly not him they are after. their first glance is unrewarded, but their second gives all they seek. behind a tent, and partially screened by the trees, three men are in the act of mounting three horses. one is already in the saddle and moving away, the other two have just set foot in the stirrup. the roan mounted is unknown to the pursuers; but his animal is recognised by them. it is hamersley's own horse! of the other two but one is identified, and him only by hamersley. he sees gil uraga. a cry from the kentuckian expresses disappointment. for on the instant after sighting the mexican officers the latter have leaped into their saddles and gone off at a full gallop. a rifle shet might yet reach them; but the guns of both kentuckian and texan are empty. their revolvers are loaded to no purpose. the retreating horsemen are beyond pistol range! sure of this, they do not think of firing. and afoot, as all the rangers are--having left the horses behind to steal forward--they feel helpless to pursue for the present. while hesitating, a circumstance occurs giving hamersley a hope. the man who has mounted his horse finds a difficulty in managing him. as a mexican he sits the saddle to perfection, but cannot make the animal go the way he wants. from behind the horse has heard neighing, which he knows to come from the steeds of his own race, and, knowing this, has resolved to rub noses with them. in vain galvez kicks against his ribs, beats him about the head, and makes frantic efforts to urge him on. he but rears in the opposite direction, backing so far as to bring his rider within reach of the revolver held in the hands of hamersley. its crack rings clear--not needing to be repeated or the cylinder turned. at the first explosion the soldier is seen to spring from the saddle, dropping dead without kick or cry, while the steed, disembarrassed, sheers round and comes trotting towards the place whence the shot proceeded. in a moment more its real master has hold of the bridle-rein, his shout of joy answered by a whimper of recognition. seeing how matters stand, the rangers hasten back to get possession of their horses; others make for those of the fallen lancers, that now in affright are rearing and straining at the end of their trail-ropes in a vain endeavour to break loose. for neither can hamersley wait. it will take time, which his impatience--his burning thirst for vengeance--cannot brook. he is thinking of his slain comrades, whose bones lie unburied on the sands of the canadian; also of the outrage so near being perpetrated, so opportunely interrupted. but one thought stays him--adela. where is she? is she safe? he turns towards the marquee late guarded by galvez. a very different individual is now seen at its entrance. walt wilder, with bowie-knife bared, its blade cutting the cords that kept the tent closed. in an instant they are severed, the flap flies open, and two female forms rush forth. in another instant one of them is lying along hamersley's breast, the other in the embrace of wilder. kisses and words are exchanged. only a few of the latter, till hamersley, withdrawing himself from the arms that softly entwine him, tells of his intention to part. "for what purpose?" is the interrogatory, asked in tremulous accents, and with eyes that speak painful surprise. "to redress my wrongs and yours, adela," is the response firmly spoken. "_santissima_!" she exclaims, seeing her lover prepare to spring into the saddle. "francisco! stay with me. do not again seek danger. the wretch is not worthy of your vengeance." "'tis not vengeance, but justice. 'tis my duty to chastise this crime-the greatest on earth. something whispers me 'tis a destiny, and i shall succeed. dearest adela, do not stay me. there is no danger. i shall be back soon, bringing uraga's sword, perhaps himself, along with me." "thar's odds again ye, frank," interposes wilder. "two to one. if i foller afoot i mayn't be up in time. an' the boys that's gone arter thar critters, they'll be too late." "never mind the odds! i'll make it up with the five shots still in my revolver. see, dearest, your brother is coming this way. go meet and tell him i shall soon return with a prisoner to be exchanged for him. another kiss! _adios! hasta luego_!" tearing himself from arms so reluctant to release him, he bounds upon the back of his horse and spurs off, soon disappearing among the trees. scarce is he out of sight when another quadruped is seen galloping after--not a horse, but a hybrid. walt wilder has espied the saddled mule hitched up behind the tent--that intended for conchita. it is now ridden by the ex-ranger, who, prodding it with the point of his bowie, puts it to its best speed. and soon after go other horsemen--the texans who have recovered their steeds, with some who have caught those of the troopers, rapidly bridled and mounted them bare-back. they who stay behind become spectators of a scene strange and tender. two male prisoners unexpectedly rescued--snatched, as it were, from the jaws of death--two female captives alike saved from dishonour. a brother embracing his sister, whose noble affection but the moment before prompted her to share with him the first sooner than submit to the last. chapter seventy six. the chase. hamersley has his horse fairly astretch ere the fugitives, though out of sight, are many hundred yards ahead; for the scenes and speeches recorded occupied but a few seconds of time. he is confident of being able to overtake them. he knows his kentucky charger is more than a match for any mexican horse, and will soon bring him up with uraga and the other officer. if they should separate he will follow the former. as he rides on he sees they cannot go far apart. there is a sheer precipice on each side--the bluffs that bound the creek bottom. these will keep the pursued men together, and he will have both to deal with. the ground is such that they cannot possibly escape him except by superior speed. he can see the cliffs on each side to their bases. there is not enough underwood for a horseman to hide in. he hastens on, therefore, supposing them still before him. in ten minutes more he is sure of it--they are in sight! the timber through which the chase has hitherto led abruptly terminates, a long grassy mead of over a mile in length lying beyond; and beyond it the trees again obstruct the vista up the valley. the retreating horsemen have entered upon this open tract, but not got far over it, when hamersley spurs his horse out of the timber tract, and pursuer and pursued are in sight of other. it is now a tail-on-end chase, all three horses going at the greatest speed to which their riders can press them. it is evident that the large american horse is rapidly gaining upon the mexican mustangs, and, if no accident occur, will soon be alongside them. hamersley perceives this, and, casting a glance ahead, calculates the distance to where the timber again commences. to overtake them before they can reach it is the thought uppermost in his mind. once among the tree-trunks they can go as fast as he, for there the superior fleetness of his horse will not avail. besides, there may be a thick underwood, giving them a chance of concealment. he must come up with them before they can reach the cover, and to this end he once more urges his animal both with spur and speech. at this moment roblez looking back, perceives there is but one man in chase of them. a long stretch of open plain in his rear, and no other pursuer upon it. brigand though he be, the adjutant possesses real courage. and there are two of them, in full health and strength, both armed with sabres, himself carrying a pair of dragoon pistols in his holsters. those belonging to uraga are nearer to the hand of hamersley--having been left upon the saddle which the colonel, in his hasty retreat, had been hindered from occupying. "_carajo_!" exclaims roblez, "there's but one of them after us. the others haven't had time to get mounted, and won't be up for a while. it's some rash fool who's got your horse under him. let's turn upon him, colonel." the coward thus appealed to cannot refuse compliance. in an instant the two wheel round, and, with blades bared, await the approach of the pursuer. in a dozen more strides of his horse hamersley is on the ground. uraga now recognises his antagonist in the chihuahua duel--the man he hates above all others on earth. this, hatred, intense as it is, does not supply him with courage. in the eye of the pursuer coming on, when close up, uraga reads a terrible expression--that of the avenger! something whispers him his hour has come, and with shrinking heart and palsied arm he awaits the encounter. as said, the two mexican officers carry swords, cavalry sabres. against these the kentuckian has no weapon for parrying or defence. he is but ill-armed for the unequal strife, having only a colt's revolver with one chamber empty, and, as a _dernier ressort_, the single-barrelled pistols in the holsters. quickly perceiving his disadvantage, he checks up before coming too close, and with his revolver takes aim, and fires at the nearest of his antagonists, who is roblez. the shot tells, tumbling the lancer lieutenant out of his saddle, and making more equal the chances of the strife. but there is no more fighting, nor the show of it, for uraga, on seeing his comrade fall, and once more catching sight of that avenging glance that glares at him as if from the eyes of nemesis, wrenches the mustang round, and rides off in wild retreat; his sword, held loosely, likely to drop from his grasp. soon it does drop, for hamersley, following in close pursuit, delivers a second shot from the revolver. the bullet hits the extended sword arm; the naked blade whirls out, and falls with a ring upon the meadow turf. uraga rides on without looking back. he has not even courage to turn his face towards his antagonist. he thinks only of reaching the timber, in a despairing hope he may there find shelter and safety. it is not his destiny to reach it; the pursuer is too close upon his heels. the head of hamersley's horse is swept by the mustang's tail, its long, white hair spread comet-like behind. once more the revolver is raised, its muzzle pointed at the retreating coward. the pressing of its trigger would send a bullet into his back. it is not pressed. as if from mercy or mere caprice hamersley suddenly transfers the pistol to his left hand. then, forcing his horse to a long leap forward, he lays hold of uraga with his right. grasping the mexican by the sword-belt and jerking him out of the saddle, he dashes him down to the earth. then reining up, with the revolver once more in his right hand, he cries out-"lie still, you ruffian! don't move an inch! i have four shots to spare, and if you attempt to stir, one of them will quiet you." the admonition is not needed. uraga, stunned by the shock for a time, makes no movement. he is insensible. before he comes to himself the rangers have ridden up, with walt wilder at their head. they proceed to make prisoners of the two men, neither of whom has been killed in the encounter. better for both if they had. for they are now in the hands of men who will surely doom them to a death less easy thar that they had escaped. their fate is inevitable. chapter seventy seven. the camp transformed. another sun rises over the llano estacado, his beams gilding with ruddy glow the brown basaltic cliffs that enclose the valley of the arroyo de alamo. on projecting points of these, above the spot chosen by uraga for his camp, the black vultures are still perched. though 'tis not their usual roosting-place, they have remained there all night, now and then giving utterance to their hoarse, guttural croaks, when some howling, predatory quadruped--coyote or puma--approaching too near, has startled them from their dozing slumbers. as the first rays of the sun rouse them to activity, their movements tell why they have stayed. no longer at rest, or only at intervals, they flit from rock to rock, and across the valley from cliff to cliff, at times swooping so low that their wings almost touch the topmost twigs of the trees growing upon the banks of the stream. all the while with necks astretch, and eyes glaring in hungry concupiscence. for below they perceive the materials of a repast--a grand, gluttonous feast--no longer in doubtful expectation, but now surely provided for them. ten men lie prostrate upon the sward; not asleep, as the vultures well know--nor yet reclining to rest themselves. their attitudes are evidence against this. they lie with bodies bent and limbs stiff, some of them contorted to unnatural postures. besides, on the grass-blades around are drops and gouts of blood, grown black during the night, looking as if it had rained ink; while little pools of the same are here and there seen, dull crimson and coagulated. from these sanguinary symbols the vultures are well aware that the recumbent forms are neither asleep nor reposing. every bird knows that every man of them is dead; and, though still clad in the uniform of soldiers, with all the gay insignia of lancers, they are but clay-cold corpses. it is the firing party, still lying as it fell; not a figure disturbed, not a coat stripped off nor pocket rifled; no strap, plume, or pennon displaced since the moment when all dropped dead almost simultaneously at the detonation of the rangers' rifles. except the tents, which are still set as before, this cluster of corpses is the only thing seeming unchanged since yesterday's sun went down. for it was after sunset when the pursuers returned, bringing their prisoners along with them. as on yesterday, two captives are seen under the same tree, where late lay don valerian and the doctor. but different men, with quite another style of sentry standing over them. the latter, a rough-garbed, big-bearded texan, full six feet in height, shouldering a gun whose butt, when rested on the ground, places the muzzle within an inch of his chin. no need to say who are the two he is guarding. at his feet uraga lies, crestfallen, with a craven look upon his face, like a fox in the trap; his splendid habiliments torn, mud-bedaubed, bedraggled. besides him his adjutant, roblez--his confederate in many a crime--also showing signs of having received rough treatment, but not without resenting it. his aspect is that of a tiger encaged, chafing at the torture, regardless of what may be the end. on the camp ground are seen some sixty horses with half-a-dozen mules. about fifty of the former are under saddle and bridle, as if soon to be mounted. the others have lariats around their necks, intended to be led. a few men--those of inferior standing--look after the animals; while the larger number is gathered into a group near the centre of the camp ground. their air, attitudes, earnest speech, and excited gesticulations tell they are taking counsel on some matter of serious import. walt wilder is among them, hamersley being absent. the latter is inside the square tent, in pleasanter companionship. he is seated upon a _catre_, adela by his side, her hand clasping his. this without any bashfulness or reserve at her brother being present. which he is, along with the dear old doctor, both now released from their bonds. it is a tableau of true love, wreathed with fraternal affection. with devotion also, of an humbler kind, conchita is passing out and in, rejoicing in a general way. she pays no attention to a peon who lies tied behind the tent--jose; and gives only scorn to another seen fast bound beside him--manuel. notwithstanding her knowledge that this man is madly in love with her-for she now also knows how much he has been a traitor--her thoughts, as her eyes, are upon one more true--on her grand, gallant _tejano_! she is proud to observe the distinguished part he plays among his _compaisanos_. for, in truth, walt is doing this. standing a half head taller than any of the rangers around him, he is alike leader in their deliberations, those the most serious in which men can be engaged. no question of life and death. it has been, but is no longer. the latter has been unanimously decreed, the verdict declared, the sentence pronounced. their talk now only relates to the manner of execution. the ranger captain, who presides, puts the interrogatory thus: "well, boys, what are we to do with them? shoot or hang?" "hang!" is the response from more than a majority of voices. "shootin' is too clean a death for scoundrels sech as them," is the commentary of a voice recognisable as that of nat cully. "they ought to be scalped, skinned, an' quartered," adds a man disposed to severer punishment. "yes!" affirms another of the like inclining. "a bit of torture wouldn't be more than the rascals deserve." "come, comrades!" cries the ranger captain. "remember, we are texans, and not savages like those we're about to punish. sufficient to send them out of the world without acting inhumanly. you all declare for hanging?" "all!" "enough! where shall we string them up?" "yonner's a pick spot," responds wilder, pointing out the two trees to which don valerian and the doctor had been lately lashed. "they kin each hev a branch separate, so's not to crowd one the t'other in makin' tracks to etarnity." "jest the place!" endorses cully. "kedn't be a better gallis if the sheriff o' pike county, massoury, had rigged it up hisself. we'll gie 'em a tree apiece, as they war about to do wi' thar innocent prisoners. takin' their places'll be turn an' turn about. that's fair, i reckin." "boys!" cries walt, "look out a cupple o' layvettes, an' fetch 'em this way." several start towards the horse-drove, and soon return with the trail-ropes. then all proceed towards the two trees. each chances to have a large limb extending horizontally outward from the trunk. over each a tazo is flung, one end left loose, the other remaining in the hand of him who pitched it. before flinging them the rope has been passed through the iron ring with which all lariats are provided, thus furnishing a ready-made running noose. "who's to haul up?" asks the ranger captain; adding, "boys! 'taint a nice business, i know; but i suppose there's some of you willing to undertake it." some of them! forty voices, nearly all present, are heard crying out with one accord-"i'm willing!" in fact, every man upon the ground seems eager to take part in a duty which, under other circumstances, would be not only disagreeable, but disgusting to them. rough, rude men as most of the rangers are, little prone to delicate sentimentalism, they are, nevertheless, true to the ordinary instincts of humanity. accustomed to seeing blood spilled, and not squeamish about spilling it if it be that of a red-skinned foe, it is different when the complexion is white. in the present case they have no scruples on the score of colour. what has been told them about their two prisoners--the atrocities these have committed--puts all this aside. the tale has made a profound impression upon their minds; and, beyond any motive of mere revenge, they are stirred by a sense of just retribution. every man of them feels as if it were his sacred duty to deal out justice, and administer the punishment of death to criminals so surely deserving it. chapter seventy eight. a living scaffold. captain haynes, seeing there will be no difficulty in obtaining executioners, deems everything settled, and is about ordering the prisoners to be brought up. being a man of humane feelings, with susceptibilities that make him somewhat averse to performing the part of sheriff, it occurs to him that he can avoid the disagreeable duty by appointing a deputy. for this he selects walt wilder, who in turn chooses nat cully to assist him. the two assume superintendence of the ceremony, and the ranger captain retires from the ground. after communing for some seconds between themselves, and in _sotto voce_, as if arranging the mode of execution, walt faces round to the assembled texans, saying-"wal, boys, thar 'pears to be no stint o' hangmen among ye. this chile niver seed so many o' the jack ketch kind since he fust set foot on the soil o' texas. maybe it's the smell o' these mexikins makes ye so savagerous." walt's quaint speech elicits a general laugh, but suppressed. the scene is too solemn for an ebullition of boisterous mirth. the ex-ranger continues-"i see you'll want to have a pull at these ropes. but i reckon we'll have to disapp'int ye. the things we're agoin' to swing up don't desarve hoistin' to etarnity by free-born citizens o' the lone star state. 'twould be a burnin' shame for any texan to do the hangin' o' sech skunks as they." "what do you mean, walt?" one asks. "somebody must hoist them up!" "'taint at all necessary. they kin be strung 'ithout e'er a hand techin' trail-rope." "how?" inquire several voices. "wal, thar's a way nat cully an' me hev been speaking o'. i've heern o' them mexikins practisin' themselves on thar injun prisoners for sport. we'll gie' 'em a dose o' their own medicine. some o' you fellows go an' fetch a kupple o' pack mules. ye may take the saddles off--they won't be needed." half-a-dozen of the rangers rush out, and return leading two mules, having hastily stripped off their alparejas. "now!" cries walt, "conduct hyar the kriminals!" a party proceeds to the spot where the two prisoners lie; and taking hold, raise them to an erect attitude. then, half carrying, half dragging, bring them under the branches designed for their gallows-tree. with their splendid uniforms torn, mud-bedaubed, and stained with spots of blood, they present a sorry spectacle. they resemble wounded wolves, taken in a trap; nevertheless, bearing their misfortune in a far different manner. roblez looks the large, grey wolf--savage, reckless, unyielding; uraga, the coyote--cowed, crestfallen, shivering; in fear of what may follow. for a time neither speaks a word nor makes an appeal for mercy. they seem to know it would be idle. regarding the faces around, they may well think so. there is not one but has "death" plainly stamped upon it, as if the word itself were upon every lip. there is an interval of profound silence, only broken by the croak of the buzzards and the swish of their spread wings. the bodies of the dead lancers lie neglected; and, the rangers now further off, the birds go nearer them. wolves, too, begin to show themselves by the edge of the underwood--from the stillness thinking the time arrived to commence their ravenous repast. it has but come to increase the quantity of food soon to be spread before them. "take off thar leg fastenin's!" commands wilder, pointing to the prisoners. in a trice the lashings are loosed from their ankles, and only the ropes remain confining their wrists--these drawn behind their backs, and there made fast. "mount 'em on the mules!" as the other order, this is instantly executed; and the two prisoners are set astride on the hybrids, each held by a man at its head. "now fix the snares roun' thar thrapples. make the other eends fast by giein' them a wheen o' turn over them branches above. see as ye draw 'em tight 'ithout streetchin'." walt's orders are carried out quickly, and to the letter, for the men executing them now comprehend what is meant. they also, too well, who are seated upon the backs of the mules. it is an old trick of their own. they know they are upon a scaffold--a living scaffold--with a halter and running noose around their necks. "now, nat!" says walt, in undertone to cully. "i guess we may spring the trap? git your knife riddy." "it's hyar." "you take the critter to the left. i'll look arter that on the right." the latter is bestridden by uraga. with walt's ideas of duty are mingled memories that prompt to revenge. he remembers his comrades slaughtered upon the sands of the canadian, himself left buried alive. with a feeling almost jubilant--natural, considering the circumstances, scarce reprehensible--he takes his stand by the side of the mule which carries colonel uraga. at the same time cully places himself beside that bestridden by roblez. both have their bowie-knives in hand, the blades bare. one regarding them, a stranger to their intent, might think they meant slaughtering either the mules or the men on their backs. they have no such thought, but a design altogether different, as declared by wilder's words--the last spoken by him before the act of execution. "when i gie the signal, nat, prod yur critter sharp, an' sweep the support from unner them. they've been thegither in this world in the doin' o' many a rascally deed. let's send 'em thegither inter the next." "all right, ole hoss! i'll be riddy," is the laconic rejoinder of cully. after it another interval of silence, resembling that which usually precedes the falling of the gallows drop. so profound, that the chirp of a tree cricket, even the rustling of a leaf, would seem a loud noise. so ominous, that the vultures perched upon the summit of the cliff crane out their necks to inquire the cause. the stillness is interrupted by a shout; not the signal promised by wilder, but a cry coming from the lips of uraga. in the last hour of anguish his craven heart has given way, and he makes a piteous appeal for mercy. not to those near him, knowing it would scarce be listened to; but to the man he has much wronged, calling out his name, "colonel miranda." on hearing it don valerian rushes forth from the tent, his sister by his side, hamersley with the doctor behind. all stand in front regarding the strange spectacle, of which they have been unconscious, seemingly prepared for them. there can be no mistaking its import. the _mise en scene_ explains it, showing the stage set for an execution. if they have a thought of interfering it is too late. while they stand in suspense, a shout reaches them, followed by explanatory words. they are in the voice of walt wilder, who has said-"death to the scoundrels! now, nat, move your mule forrard!" at the same instant he and cully are seen leaning towards the two mules, which bound simultaneously forward, as if stung by hornets or bitten by gadflys. but neither brings its rider along. the latter--both of them--stay behind; not naturally, as dismounted and thrown to the earth; but, like the cradle of mahomet, suspended between earth and heaven. chapter seventy nine. after the execution. it is mid-day over the arroyo de alamo. the same sun whose early morning rays fell around the deliberating lynchers, at a later hour lighting up a spectacle of execution, has mounted to the meridian, and now glares down upon a spectacle still sanguinary, though with tableaux changed. the camp is deserted. there are no tents, no texans, no horses, nor yet any mules. all have disappeared from the place. true, uraga and his lancers are still there--in body, not in spirit. their souls have gone, no one may know whither. only their clay-cold forms remain, us left by the rangers--the common soldiers lying upon the grass, the two officers swinging side by side, from the trees, with broken necks, drooping heads, and limbs dangling down--all alike corpses. not for long do they stay unchanged--untouched. scarce has the last hoof-stroke of the texan horses died away down the valley, when the buzzards forsake their perch upon the bluff, and swoop down to the creek bottom. simultaneously the wolves--grand grey and coyote--come sneaking out from the thicket's edge; at first cautiously, soon with bolder front, approaching the abandoned bodies. to the bark of the coyote, the bay of the bigger wolf, and the buzzard's hoarse croak, a _caracara_ adds its shrill note; the fiend-like chorus further strengthened by the scream of the white-headed eagle--for all the world like the filing of a frame saw, and not unlike the wild, unmeaning laughter of a madman. both the predatory birds and the ravening beasts, with instincts in accord, gather around the quarry killed for them. there is a grand feast--a banquet for all; and they have no need to quarrel over it. but they do--the birds having to stand back till the beasts have eaten their fill. the puma, or panther, takes precedence--the so-called lion of america. a sorry brute to bear the name belonging to the king of quadrupeds. still, on the llano estacado, lord of all, save when confronted by the grizzly bear--then he becomes a cat. as no grizzly has yet come upon the ground, and only two panthers, the wolves have it almost their own way, and only the vultures and eagles have to hold back. but for the birds there is a side dish on which they may whet their appetites, beyond reach of the beasts. to their share fall the two suspended from the trees; and, driven off from the others, they attack these with beak and talon, flapping around, settling upon the branches above, on the shoulders of the corpses, thick as honey-bees upon a branch, pecking out eyes, tearing at flesh, mutilating man--god's image--in every conceivable mode. no; there is one left, peculiar to man himself. strange, at this crisis, he should appear to give exhibition of it. by pure chance--a sheer contingency--though not less deserving record. the beasts and birds while engaged in devouring the dead bodies are interrupted and scared away from their filthy repast, retreating suddenly from the ground at sight of their masters--men, who unexpectedly appear upon it. these are not the rangers returning, but a band of jicarilla apaches-young braves out on a roving excursion. they have come down the creek, making for the pecos, and so chanced to stray into the deserted camp. surprised at the spectacle there presented to their eyes, they are not the less delighted. more than a dozen dead men, with scalps untaken! they can see there has been a fight, but do not stay to think who have been the victors. their thoughts are turned towards the vanquished, their eyes resting on heads that still carry their covering of hair. in a trice their blades are bare, and it is cut off--the skin along with it--to the skull of the last lancer! neither does uraga nor his lieutenant escape the scalping-knife. before the savages part from the spot, the crowns of both show crimson, while the scalps stripped off appear as trophies on the points of two apache spears. not long do the indians dally on the ghastly ground. soon forsaking it, they continue on down the creek. not in pursuit of the party which has so opportunely furnished them with spear-pennons and fringes for their leggings. the testimony of so many dead men, with the tracks of so many horses--horses with large hoofs, evidently not ridden by mexicans, whom they contemn, but texans they terribly fear; these evidences make the apaches cautious, and, keeping on towards the pecos, they go not as pursuers, but men trying to shun the party that has passed before. in this they are successful. they never sight the returning texans, nor these them. the rangers go down the river; the savages up stream. of all apaches, of all indians, the jicarillas are the most contemptible cowards. dastards to the last degree, the young "braves" who mutilated the slain lancers will return to their tribe to tell of scalps fairly taken in fight! and while they are boasting, the wolves, eagles, and vultures will be back among the dead bodies, strip them of their flesh, and leave nought but their bones to bleach white; in time to become dust, and mingle with the earth on which they once moved in all the pride of manhood and panoply of war! chapter eighty. tranquil scenes. the last act of our drama is recorded, the last sanguinary scene. all red enough, the reader will say, while the keenly susceptible one may deem them too red. alas! the writer is not answerable for this. he but depicts life as it exists on the borderland between mexico and texas. those who doubt its reality, and would deem him drawing upon imagination, should read the texan newspapers of that time, or those of this very day. in either he will find recorded occurrences as strange, incidents as improbable, episodes as romantic, and tragedies of hue sanguinary as any recorded in this mere romance. not always with such a satisfactory termination. fortunately for our tale and its readers, nemesis, in dealing out death and meting vengeance, has necessarily allied herself with justice. the fallen deserved their fate--all, save the teamsters of the caravan, and those texans who on pecan creek succumbed to the comanche spears. these victims, like stage supernumeraries, living nameless and dying unknown, though their fate may stir our sympathy it does not appeal to the painful depths of sorrow. more easily can it be borne, reflecting on the brighter fate of the survivors. it can give no painful sensation to tell that colonel miranda and his sister accompanied frank hamersley on his return to the states, don prospero and the new mexican damsel, conchita, being of the party, which had for escort across the plains captain haynes and his company of texan rangers, their old comrade, walt wilder, travelling along, and, with nat cully, narrating around their nightly camp fires many a strange "scrape" of the mountains and prairies. two subsequent scenes alone seem worthy of record, both fairly deserving it. the first occurs in a little country church in the celebrated "blue grass district" of kentucky. within its walls have assembled some scores of the very bluest blood of this blue grass country--stalwart, handsome men, alongside a like number of lovely women. they are assisting at a marriage ceremony, not an uncommon occurrence in a church. but in the kentuckian place of worship--a little rural edifice, far away from any town--it is something unusual to see three couples standing before the altar. in the present case there is this number, none of the pairs strangers to the other two, but all three, by mutual agreement and understanding, to take hymen's oath at the same time. foremost and first to put the ring on his bride's finger is frank hamersley. she who holds out her hand to receive it is adela miranda. of the couple coming next, the bridegroom is known to the reader. a handsome man, of dark complexion and pure spanish features, remarked by the spectators as having resemblance to those of hamersley's new-made bride. not strange, he being her brother. but who is the lady, the tall, fair girl consenting to make don valerian happy, so like hamersley himself. no one asks this question, all present knowing she is his sister. a fair exchange between the brothers of the bride; each equally quick to fall in love with the sister of the other. on the sterile llano estacado it took scarce a minute for the dark mexican maiden to subdue the heart of hamersley. almost as soon, in the fertile state of kentucky, has his bright-skinned, blonde-haired sister made conquest of the mexican colonel. the third pair that presents itself to be made man and wife--who are they? the bridegroom stands six feet two in his boots; the bride, in her satin slippers, far under five. without thinking of the disproportion in their stature, the reader will recognise walt wilder and conchita. as the ex-ranger puts the ring on the finger of his blushing bride, he accompanies the act with certain ludicrous protestations of fidelity not to be found in the printed ritual of the church. -----------------------------------------------------------------------another scene ends our tale; a simple episode of every-day life; but life in a strange land, remote from the ordinary centres of civilisation. it occurs in new mexico, in itself a sort of oasis in the great middle desert of north america. locally, the scene takes place near albuquerque, on the azotea of a handsome house, which commands a view of the town. it is the mansion once belonging to don valerian miranda. that its former master has retained possession of it is evident from the fact of his being again on its roof, tranquilly smoking a cigaretto; while near by him is his sister. though one dearer stands between--his wife. adela is not distressed by her brother's preference for the new mistress of the mansion. she has a mansion of her own, independent. though far off, its master, frank hamersley, is near. near, also, in the court-yard below is walt wilder, in his grotesque way playing benedict to conchita. while up and down moves the doctor, sharing the general joy. outside, upon the plain, the white tilts of twenty waggons, with the smoke of camp-fires rising over them, tell of a trader's caravan. it is hamersley's--late arrived--_en route_ for the rio abajo and el paso del norte. its teamsters take their siesta, reposing in full confidence. no fear of indian attacks now, nor impost exactions from the tyrant governor of new mexico, don manuel armijo! a war has swept the land; a new flag floats over it. seen streaming above the towers of albuquerque, it promises security to all. for it is the banner of the "stars and stripes!" personal memoirs of u. s. grant volume ii. contents. chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans --commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address --arrival at chattanooga. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position--sherman's movements. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy--sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy--pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville --visiting knoxville--cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee --commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position--sheridan's first raid. chapter xlix. sherman s campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan--entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. chapter liii. hancock's assault--losses of the confederates--promotions recommended--discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack--reducing the artillery. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey --position of the national army. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor--correspondence with lee retrospective. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james --general lee--visit to butler--the movement on petersburg --the investment of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad--early's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg--explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg --canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas --capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners--an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg --sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line--the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac--sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville --correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south--president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman --capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis --general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes--grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton--estimate of the different corps commanders. conclusion appendix chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans--commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address--arrival at chattanooga. the reply (to my telegram of october 16, 1863, from cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the galt house, louisville, where i would meet an officer of the war department with my instructions. i left cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via indianapolis. just as the train i was on was starting out of the depot at indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the secretary of war was coming into the station and wanted to see me. i had never met mr. stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when i was in tennessee. occasionally at night he would order the wires between the war department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. on this occasion the secretary was accompanied by governor brough of ohio, whom i had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. mr. stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to indianapolis, and accompanied me to louisville. up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after i left vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of halleck's dispatches that i had better go to nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve rosecrans. soon after we started the secretary handed me two orders, saying that i might take my choice of them. the two were identical in all but one particular. both created the "military division of mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the departments of the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee, and all the territory from the alleghanies to the mississippi river north of banks's command in the south-west. one order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved rosecrans and assigned thomas to his place. i accepted the latter. we reached louisville after night and, if i remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. the secretary of war told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover. he never did. a day was spent in louisville, the secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. by the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and i left the hotel to spend the evening away, both mrs. grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in louisville. in the course of the evening mr. stanton received a dispatch from mr. c. a. dana, then in chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. as stated before, after the fall of vicksburg i urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against mobile. general rosecrans had been at murfreesboro', tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive. but after the investment of vicksburg bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen johnston, in mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. i frequently wrote general halleck suggesting that rosecrans should move against bragg. by so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay chattanooga open to capture. general halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." if true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. it would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. i, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of vicksburg had drawn from rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. finally he did move, on the 24th of june, but ten days afterwards vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from bragg were free to return. it was at this time that i recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against mobile. i knew the peril the army of the cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. if threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. those troops would necessarily come from bragg. my judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. soon it was discovered in washington that rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. the emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of bragg upon mobile. it was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred bragg south of the tennessee river, and through and beyond chattanooga. if he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. but he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until bragg's troops from mississippi began to join him. then bragg took the initiative. rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at chickamauga, some miles south-east of chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. the battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of september, and rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. the corps under major-general george h. thomas stood its ground, while rosecrans, with crittenden and mccook, returned to chattanooga. thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. bragg followed and took possession of missionary ridge, overlooking chattanooga. he also occupied lookout mountain, west of the town, which rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as bridgeport. the national troops were now strongly intrenched in chattanooga valley, with the tennessee river behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with chattanooga creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line. on the 29th halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to rosecrans. long before this dispatch was received sherman was on his way, and mcpherson was moving east with most of the garrison of vicksburg. a retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. it would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization. all supplies for rosecrans had to be brought from nashville. the railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the tennessee river; but bragg, holding lookout and raccoon mountains west of chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the tennessee, between chattanooga and bridgeport. the distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of bragg, all supplies for rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. this country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. the men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from nashville across the country. the region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof." nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. what they had was well worn. the fuel within the federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. there were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. the only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. it would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. if a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy. on the receipt of mr. dana's dispatch mr. stanton sent for me. finding that i was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where i was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. about eleven o'clock i returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. i hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. i immediately wrote an order assuming command of the military division of the mississippi, and telegraphed it to general rosecrans. i then telegraphed to him the order from washington assigning thomas to the command of the army of the cumberland; and to thomas that he must hold chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that i would be at the front as soon as possible. a prompt reply was received from thomas, saying, "we will hold the town till we starve." i appreciated the force of this dispatch later when i witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. it looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. on the morning of the 20th of october i started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as nashville. at that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so i remained in nashville until the next morning. here i met for the first time andrew johnson, military governor of tennessee. he delivered a speech of welcome. his composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. it was long, and i was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. i was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. at all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. from nashville i telegraphed to burnside, who was then at knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men; to admiral porter at cairo, that sherman's advance had passed eastport, mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from st. louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to bridgeport. on the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching stevenson alabama, after dark. rosecrans was there on his way north. he came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. my only wonder was that he had not carried them out. we then proceeded to bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. from here we took horses and made our way by jasper and over waldron's ridge to chattanooga. there had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. i had been on crutches since the time of my fall in new orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. the roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses. at jasper, some ten or twelve miles from bridgeport, there was a halt. general o. o. howard had his headquarters there. from this point i telegraphed burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. we stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. the next day we reached chattanooga a little before dark. i went directly to general thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until i could establish my own. during the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. they pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. if any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. i found general w. f. smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the army of the cumberland. i had known smith as a cadet at west point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. he explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that i could see it without an inspection. i found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. he was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. in addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between chattanooga and bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. this boat consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. i telegraphed to washington this night, notifying general halleck of my arrival, and asking to have general sherman assigned to the command of the army of the tennessee, headquarters in the field. the request was at once complied with. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. the next day, the 24th, i started out to make a personal inspection, taking thomas and smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. we crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the tennessee at brown's ferry, some three miles below lookout mountain, unobserved by the enemy. here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. there was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. they did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. they must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. but, i suppose, they looked upon the garrison of chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence. that night i issued orders for opening the route to bridgeport--a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. they had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. chattanooga is on the south bank of the tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. it is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which chattanooga creek runs. to the east of the valley is missionary ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the tennessee. on the west of the valley is lookout mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. just below the town the tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of lookout mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. the memphis and charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. east of missionary ridge flows the south chickamauga river; west of lookout mountain is lookout creek; and west of that, raccoon mountains. lookout mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. on the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. the intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of missionary ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across chattanooga valley to lookout mountain. lookout mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in lookout valley west, and on raccoon mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. in addition to this there was an intrenched line in chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to lookout mountain, to make the investment complete. besides the fortifications on mission ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. the enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. at one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. the union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. practically, the army of the cumberland was besieged. the enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. the union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. general halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by generals howard and slocum, hooker in command of the whole, from the army of the potomac to reinforce rosecrans. it would have been folly to send them to chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. they were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. before my arrival, thomas ordered their concentration at bridgeport. general w. f. smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which i was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that i deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. on the 24th of october, after my return to chattanooga, the following details were made: general hooker, who was now at bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the tennessee and march up by whitesides and wauhatchie to brown's ferry. general palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, army of the cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite whitesides, then cross and hold the road in hooker's rear after he had passed. four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under general smith directly from chattanooga. eighteen hundred of them, under general hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of lookout, down to brown's ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to brown's ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. on the 26th, hooker crossed the river at bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. smith started enough in advance to be near the river when hazen should arrive. there are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of lookout. it was over this road smith marched. at five o'clock hazen landed at brown's ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. by seven o'clock the whole of smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. this was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. by ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. the two bridges over the tennessee river--a flying one at chattanooga and the new one at brown's ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into lookout valley at wauhatchie. howard marched on to brown's ferry, while geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. the pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered. the river was now opened to us from lookout valley to bridgeport. between brown's ferry and kelly's ferry the tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. to get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. but there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from bridgeport to kelly's ferry. the latter point is only eight miles from chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the raccoon mountains on the south side of the river to brown's ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite chattanooga. there were several steamers at bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions. on the way to chattanooga i had telegraphed back to nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. his animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. in five days from my arrival in chattanooga the way was open to bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. it is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. the men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. the weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. i do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. mr. davis had visited bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as bragg described it in his subsequent report. "these dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of chattanooga for want of food and forage. possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." but the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and i doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. there was no time during the rebellion when i did not think, and often say, that the south was more to be benefited by its defeat than the north. the latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. the former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. with the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. the labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. the whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." the system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. the non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. the war was expensive to the south as well as to the north, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. the enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. he appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. his strength on lookout mountain was not equal to hooker's command in the valley below. from missionary ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from chattanooga, in order to reach lookout valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on geary at wauhatchie by longstreet's corps. when the battle commenced, hooker ordered howard up from brown's ferry. he had three miles to march to reach geary. on his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners. leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce geary. before he got up, geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. the night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. in the darkness and uproar hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. the mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. the latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. by four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed. in securing possession of lookout valley, smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. the enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. in the night engagement of the 28th-9th hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. i never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. after we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, i made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. as i have stated, chattanooga creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the tennessee river at the foot of lookout mountain. this creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. as i would be under short-range fire and in an open country, i took nobody with me, except, i believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. i rode from our right around to our left. when i came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, i heard the call, "turn out the guard for the commanding general." i replied, "never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the confederate pickets. the sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, i believe, added, "general grant." their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which i returned. the most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. at one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. general longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. seeing a soldier in blue on this log, i rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. he was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to general longstreet's corps. i asked him a few questions--but not with a view of gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and i rode off. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position --sherman's movements. having got the army of the cumberland in a comfortable position, i now began to look after the remainder of my new command. burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the army of the cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. he was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, big south fork of the cumberland river, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. the roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. his animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from cumberland gap, and far back towards lexington, ky. east tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. sherman had started from memphis for corinth on the 11th of october. his instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. the distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. his entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. the bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. a hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. often sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee river at eastport, mississippi. knowing the difficulty sherman would have to supply himself from memphis, i had previously ordered supplies sent from st. louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at eastport. these he got. i now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to stevenson, alabama, without delay. this order was borne to sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the tennessee in a canoe and floated over muscle shoals; it was delivered at iuka on the 27th. in this sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards cleveland, east tennessee, and might be going to nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. on the 1st of november he crossed the tennessee at eastport, and that day was in florence, alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at eastport, with blair bringing up the rear. sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from nashville. all indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying burnside's command in east tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. a single track could not do this. i gave, therefore, an order to sherman to halt general g. m. dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from decatur north towards nashville, and to rebuild that road. the road from nashville to decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. all the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. all the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. all bridges and culverts had been destroyed between nashville and decatur, and thence to stevenson, where the memphis and charleston and the nashville and chattanooga roads unite. the rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as stevenson over which to supply the army. from bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. general dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. he had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. with these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. he had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. when these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. but rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. there were no rails except those in use. to supply these deficiencies i ordered eight of the ten engines general mcpherson had at vicksburg to be sent to nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. i also ordered the troops in west tennessee to points on the river and on the memphis and charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the memphis and charleston to nashville. the military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. general dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. the number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles. the enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against burnside or were going to nashville, went no farther than cleveland. their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of holding east tennessee; saying the president was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. we had not at chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. reinforcements could not help burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. there was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from missionary ridge and about chattanooga. on the 4th of november longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against burnside. the situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until sherman should get up. the authorities at washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. on the 7th, before longstreet could possibly have reached knoxville, i ordered thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. i directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery. but he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. nothing was left to be done but to answer washington dispatches as best i could; urge sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. all of burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. he even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to chattanooga when the battle should begin. longstreet had a railroad as far as loudon; but from there to knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. on the 14th i telegraphed him: "sherman's advance has reached bridgeport. his whole force will be ready to move from there by tuesday at farthest. if you can hold longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, i will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between longstreet and bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. sherman would have been here before this but for high water in elk river driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross." and again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: "your dispatch and dana's just received. being there, you can tell better how to resist longstreet's attack than i can direct. with your showing you had better give up kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. every arrangement is now made to throw sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry missionary ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between cleveland and dalton. hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry lookout mountain. the enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. this favors us. to further confirm this, sherman's advance division will march direct from whiteside to trenton. the remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from whiteside to kelly's ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up lookout valley. sherman's advance has only just reached bridgeport. the rear will only reach there on the 16th. this will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. i can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at kingston and pushing for kentucky. if they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of sparta. i will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. it will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?" longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at loudon until the 13th. that being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. he was in a position threatening knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to chattanooga. the day after longstreet left loudon, sherman reached bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached chattanooga the next day. my orders for battle were all prepared in advance of sherman's arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. the possession of lookout mountain was of no special advantage to us now. hooker was instructed to send howard's corps to the north side of the tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into chattanooga valley. the plan of battle was for sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over south chickamauga river so as to threaten or hold the railroad in bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at chickamauga station. hooker was to perform like service on our right. his problem was to get from lookout valley to chattanooga valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to rossville, south of bragg's line on missionary ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to chickamauga valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. thomas, with the army of the cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. to carry out this plan, sherman was to cross the tennessee at brown's ferry and move east of chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of mission ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. there are two streams called chickamauga emptying into the tennessee river east of chattanooga--north chickamauga, taking its rise in tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the south chickamauga, which takes its rise in georgia, flows northward, and empties into the tennessee some three or four miles above the town. there were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the north chickamauga river, their presence there being unknown to the enemy. at night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. a few were to land east of the mouth of the south chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. the rest were to land on the south side of the tennessee, where missionary ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. lookout valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure missionary ridge, hooker's orders were changed. his revised orders brought him to chattanooga by the established route north of the tennessee. he was then to move out to the right to rossville. hooker's position in lookout valley was absolutely essential to us so long as chattanooga was besieged. it was the key to our line for supplying the army. but it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past lookout mountain and chattanooga valley, and up to missionary ridge. by crossing the north face of lookout the troops would come into chattanooga valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. orders were accordingly given to march by this route. but days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. the passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. it might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. after reaching chattanooga valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. i was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep lookout mountain until we got through with the troops on missionary ridge. by marching hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position, he would have chattanooga creek behind him, and the attack on missionary ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on lookout mountain. hooker's order was changed accordingly. as explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at brown's ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against missionary ridge. the next day after sherman's arrival i took him, with generals thomas and smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. i, as well as the authorities in washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for burnside's safety. burnside himself, i believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. nothing could be done for him, however, until sherman's troops were up. as soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, sherman started for bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, i believe, from kelly's ferry. sherman had left bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time. his march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. by the 20th he was himself at brown's ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (ewing's) was at trenton, sent that way to create the impression that lookout was to be taken from the south. sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. news had been received that the battle had been commenced at knoxville. burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. the president, the secretary of war, and general halleck, were in an agony of suspense. my suspense was also great, but more endurable, because i was where i could soon do something to relieve the situation. it was impossible to get sherman's troops up for the next day. i then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered thomas to move on that date. but the elements were against us. it rained all the 20th and 21st. the river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. general orlando b. willcox, a division commander under burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than knoxville --about maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the north. a dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east. the following was sent in reply: "if you can communicate with general burnside, say to him that our attack on bragg will commence in the morning. if successful, such a move will be made as i think will relieve east tennessee, if he can hold out. longstreet passing through our lines to kentucky need not cause alarm. he would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return." meantime, sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. the crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of lookout mountain. once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on lookout mountain or missionary ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. but when sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of chattanooga, howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. his crossing was in full view both from missionary ridge and the top of lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be sherman's. this enabled sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy --sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. on the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at brown's ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at knoxville; of willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was received from bragg which contained these words: "as there may still be some non-combatants in chattanooga, i deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." of course, i understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but i did not know what the intended deception was. on the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that bragg was leaving our front, and on that day buckner's division was sent to reinforce longstreet at knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. the object of bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to chattanooga. during the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in north chickamauga. the material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. hearing nothing from burnside, and hearing much of the distress in washington on his account, i could no longer defer operations for his relief. i determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the army of the cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. the position occupied by the army of the cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. the line was about a mile from the town, and extended from citico creek, a small stream running near the base of missionary ridge and emptying into the tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the south chickamauga, on the left, to chattanooga creek on the right. all commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. the important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named fort wood. it owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and missionary ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. fort wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. on the morning of the 23d thomas, according to instructions, moved granger's corps of two divisions, sheridan and t. j. wood commanding, to the foot of fort wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, sheridan on the right, wood to the left, extending to or near citico creek. palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. he supported sheridan with one division (baird's), while his other division under johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. the picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. at two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. by this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. the signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from fort wood and other points on the line. the rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. these too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. but it was not without loss on both sides. this movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. the fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. during the following night they were made strong. we lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. with the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from missionary ridge and fort wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. the advantage was greatly on our side now, and if i could only have been assured that burnside could hold out ten days longer i should have rested more easily. but we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. by the night of the 23d sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at brown's ferry. the continuous rise in the tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but i was determined to move that night even without this division. orders were sent to osterhaus accordingly to report to hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. because of the break in the bridge, hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. general w. f. smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. to him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from north chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. during the night general morgan l. smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of giles a. smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. during this night also general j. m. brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the army of the cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. he had to use sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, thomas having none. at two o'clock in the morning, november 24th, giles a. smith pushed out from the north chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. the boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of south chickamauga. here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. the guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. the remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. the work of ferrying over sherman's command from the north side of the tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. a steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. the rest of m. l. smith's division came first, then the division of john e. smith. the troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. by daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built. the work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. the ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. by a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the south chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the tennessee. sherman at once formed his troops for assault on missionary ridge. by one o'clock he started with m. l. smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of chickamauga river; j. e. smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of j. e. smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. a good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. by half-past three sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. a brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. the enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. there had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that lookout mountain and the top of missionary ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. but now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at chickamauga station. all of sherman's command was now south of the tennessee. during the afternoon general giles a. smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. howard, however, effected a crossing of citico creek and a junction with sherman, and was directed to report to him. with two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. he went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. while these operations were going on to the east of chattanooga, hooker was engaged on the west. he had three divisions: osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; geary's, 12th corps, army of the potomac; and cruft's, 14th corps, army of the cumberland. geary was on the right at wauhatchie, cruft at the centre, and osterhaus near brown's ferry. these troops were all west of lookout creek. the enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. these brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. general carter l. stevenson was in command of the whole. why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, i do not see. a hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men from the position hooker occupied. the side of lookout mountain confronting hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. on the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of chattanooga with the summit. early on the morning of the 24th hooker moved geary's division, supported by a brigade of cruft's, up lookout creek, to effect a crossing. the remainder of cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. the bridge was seized by gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. this attracted the enemy so that geary's movement farther up was not observed. a heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. he crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. he then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. by this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. by eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. while the operations at the bridge were progressing, geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. the enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by cruft and osterhaus. soon these were up abreast of geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. by noon geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. the rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of chattanooga creek. thomas and i were on the top of orchard knob. hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. it was in full view, extending from the tennessee river, where sherman had crossed, up chickamauga river to the base of mission ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to chattanooga valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of chattanooga creek, thence up the slope of lookout mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. the day was hazy, so that hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. but the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. the enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. during the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where hooker was as to stop operations for the time. at four o'clock hooker reported his position as impregnable. by a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from chattanooga to reinforce him. these troops had to cross chattanooga creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, general carlin, reported to hooker and was assigned to his left. i now telegraphed to washington: "the fight to-day progressed favorably. sherman carried the end of missionary ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at chickamauga creek. troops from lookout valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from missionary ridge." the next day the president replied: "your dispatches as to fighting on monday and tuesday are here. well done. many thanks to all. remember burnside." and halleck also telegraphed: "i congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. i fear that burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. i know you will do all in your power to relieve him." the division of jefferson c. davis, army of the cumberland, had been sent to the north chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. on the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of missionary ridge. firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy --pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. at twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, i began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to willcox to encourage burnside. sherman was directed to attack at daylight. hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on missionary ridge. thomas was not to move until hooker had reached missionary ridge. as i was with him on orchard knob, he would not move without further orders from me. the morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of orchard knob. it remained so all day. bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff officers--could be seen coming and going constantly. the point of ground which sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. a low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. the problem now was to get to the main ridge. the enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. three brigades held the hill already gained. morgan l. smith moved along the east base of missionary ridge; loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of john e. smith's division; and corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. the ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where m. l. smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. the troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. morgan l. smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. the enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. the contest lasted for two hours. corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. sherman now threatened both bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. from the position i occupied i could see column after column of bragg's forces moving against sherman. every confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the union forces was concentrated upon him. j. e. smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of corse's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. he lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. a few hundred yards brought smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of j. e. smith from the position i occupied, i directed thomas to send a division to reinforce him. baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of orchard knob. it had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position. bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. this was what i wanted. but it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and i had expected before this to see hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of rossville and compelling bragg to mass in that direction also. the enemy had evacuated lookout mountain during the night, as i expected he would. in crossing the valley he burned the bridge over chattanooga creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. he was detained four hours crossing chattanooga creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage i expected from his forces. his reaching bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for thomas's assault of the ridge. but sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. sheridan's and wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. i now directed thomas to order the charge at once (*16). i watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. the centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where thomas and i stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. turning to thomas to inquire what caused the delay, i was surprised to see thomas j. wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. i spoke to general wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. he replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. i told him to make the charge at once. he was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards missionary ridge. the confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. the retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. in fact, on that occasion the union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this charge. i watched their progress with intense interest. the fire along the rebel line was terrific. cannon and musket balls filled the air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. the pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the confederate barriers at different points in front of both sheridan's and wood's divisions. the retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. sheridan pushed forward until he reached the chickamauga river at a point above where the enemy crossed. he met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of missionary ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. it was now getting dark, but sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. the enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. to sheridan's prompt movement the army of the cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. while the advance up mission ridge was going forward, general thomas with staff, general gordon granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied orchard knob, from which the entire field could be observed. the moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, i ordered granger to join his command, and mounting my horse i rode to the front. general thomas left about the same time. sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. wood, who commanded the division to the left of sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join sheridan in the pursuit. to the left, in baird's front where bragg's troops had massed against sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. i ordered granger to follow the enemy with wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time i could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. the enemy confronting sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. as soon as sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, davis's division of the army of the cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the chickamauga, and to move forward to chickamauga station. he ordered howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow davis at four o'clock in the morning. morgan l. smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. the rest of sherman's command was directed to follow howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards graysville. hooker, as stated, was detained at chattanooga creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. he got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. at rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. this threw them on palmer. they could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. many, however, were captured. hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near rossville, extending east of the ridge. palmer was on his left, on the road to graysville. during the night i telegraphed to willcox that bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to burnside if he could hold out; to halleck i sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve burnside. before the battle of chattanooga opened i had taken measures for the relief of burnside the moment the way should be clear. thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, and up that to knoxville accompanied by the boat. in addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks. in the battle of chattanooga, troops from the army of the potomac, from the army of the tennessee, and from the army of the cumberland participated. in fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the tennessee river so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. hooker, on the right, had geary's division of the 12th corps, army of the potomac; osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; and cruft's division of the army of the cumberland. sherman had three divisions of his own army, howard's corps from the army of the potomac, and jefferson c. davis's division of the army of the cumberland. there was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. indeed, i doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. all saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. the victory at chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of bragg's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. it was known that mr. jefferson davis had visited bragg on missionary ridge a short time before my reaching chattanooga. it was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between bragg and longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. i had known both bragg and longstreet before the war, the latter very well. we had been three years at west point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. then we served together in the mexican war. i had known bragg in mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. i could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. he was also thoroughly upright. but he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. a man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. as a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. i have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of bragg. on one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. he was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. as commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. as quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. as company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. as quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. in this condition of affairs bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. the latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "my god, mr. bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!" longstreet was an entirely different man. he was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. he was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. it may be that longstreet was not sent to knoxville for the reason stated, but because mr. davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone." on several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the union army by means of his superior military genius. i speak advisedly when i saw mr. davis prided himself on his military capacity. he says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the confederate presidency. some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the confederacy. my recollection is that my first orders for the battle of chattanooga were as fought. sherman was to get on missionary ridge, as he did; hooker to cross the north end of lookout mountain, as he did, sweep across chattanooga valley and get across the south end of the ridge near rossville. when hooker had secured that position the army of the cumberland was to assault in the centre. before sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that hooker was directed to come to chattanooga by the north bank of the tennessee river. the waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. for this reason hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.-----note.--from this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the wilderness, which had been previously written) by general grant, after his great illness in april, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of july, 1885. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville--visiting knoxville-cipher cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chattanooga now being secure to the national troops beyond any doubt, i immediately turned my attention to relieving knoxville, about the situation of which the president, in particular, was very anxious. prior to the battles, i had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of burnside at the very earliest moment after securing chattanooga. we had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. general thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. general granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment missionary ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. with the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until longstreet was driven away, after which event east tennessee would furnish abundance of food for burnside's army and his own also. while following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to ringgold, i directed thomas, verbally, not to start granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that i was going to the front to more fully see the situation. i was not right sure but that bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached dalton. in that case bragg might think it well to take the road back to cleveland, move thence towards knoxville, and, uniting with longstreet, make a sudden dash upon burnside. when i arrived at ringgold, however, on the 27th, i saw that the retreat was most earnest. the enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat. when hooker moved from rossville toward ringgold palmer's division took the road to graysville, and sherman moved by the way of chickamauga station toward the same point. as soon as i saw the situation at ringgold i sent a staff officer back to chattanooga to advise thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start granger at once. feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of burnside i was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between east chickamauga creek and taylor's ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from chattanooga. i arrived just as the artillery that hooker had left behind at chattanooga creek got up. his men were attacking cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. this attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. i directed general hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. at this point sherman came up, having reached graysville with his troops, where he found palmer had preceded him. palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. i went back in the evening to graysville with sherman, remained there over night and did not return to chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. i then found that thomas had not yet started granger, thus having lost a full day which i deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of knoxville. thomas and granger were aware that on the 23d of the month burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. to effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. he was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. finding that granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, i sent word to general sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of knoxville. i also gave him the problem that we had to solve--that burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from dalton to cleveland and knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. i was very loath to send sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from memphis and hard fighting at chattanooga. but i had become satisfied that burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon general granger's movements. sherman had left his camp on the north side of the tennessee river, near chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. the weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. the two days' rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. they did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. they also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach knoxville. i was so very anxious that burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that i determined to send a message to him. i therefore sent a member of my staff, colonel j. h. wilson, to get into knoxville if he could report to burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. mr. charles a. dana was at chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before i assumed command. mr. dana volunteered to accompany colonel wilson, and did accompany him. i put the information of what was being done for the relief of knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of general longstreet. they made the trip safely; general longstreet did learn of sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. burnside had stretched a boom across the holston river to catch scows and flats as they floated down. on these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of east tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the union troops. they also drove cattle into knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. our total loss (not including burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. we captured 6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. the enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. i had at chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. it was his own fault that he did not have more men present. he had sent longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. he did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of brown's and kelly's ferries with bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. knoxville was of no earthly use to him while chattanooga was in our hands. if he should capture chattanooga, knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. i have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. then, too, after sherman had arrived, and when bragg knew that he was on the north side of the tennessee river, he sent buckner's division to reinforce longstreet. he also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached knoxville bragg ordered it back. it had got so far, however, that it could not return to chattanooga in time to be of service there. it is possible this latter blunder may have been made by bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the tennessee river at brown's ferry, in full view of bragg's troops from lookout mountain, a few days before the attack. they then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on missionary ridge until they met their assault. bragg knew it was sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the tennessee river to the relief of knoxville and that longstreet was therefore in danger. but the first great blunder, detaching longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way i know of. if he had captured chattanooga, east tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. it would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from chattanooga safely. it was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. the probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. the enemy reported his loss in killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. there was certainly great dissatisfaction with bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. then, too, chattanooga, following in the same half year with gettysburg in the east and vicksburg in the west, there was much the same feeling in the south at this time that there had been in the north the fall and winter before. if the same license had been allowed the people and press in the south that was allowed in the north, chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the union. general william f. smith's services in these battles had been such that i thought him eminently entitled to promotion. i was aware that he had previously been named by the president for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the senate had rejected the nomination. i was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. my recommendation was heeded and the appointment made. upon the raising of the siege of knoxville i, of course, informed the authorities at washington--the president and secretary of war--of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. the president especially was rejoiced that knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed. the safety of burnside's army and the loyal people of east tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the president for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops by the way of cumberland gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember burnside," "do something for burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. he saw no escape for east tennessee until after our victory at chattanooga. even then he was afraid that burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that longstreet had been driven from the field. burnside followed longstreet only to strawberry plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that longstreet would leave the state. the latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off east tennessee. foster now relieved burnside. sherman made disposition of his troops along the tennessee river in accordance with instructions. i left thomas in command at chattanooga, and, about the 20th of december, moved my headquarters to nashville, tennessee. nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at washington. while remaining at chattanooga i was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and washington. nothing occurred at nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20) so i set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. i expected to retain the command i then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against atlanta. i also had great hopes of having a campaign made against mobile from the gulf. i expected after atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off lee's army from the west by way of the road running through augusta to atlanta and thence south-west. i was preparing to hold atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to mobile if that city was in our possession: if not, to savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. but the spring campaign against mobile was not made. the army of the ohio had been getting supplies over cumberland gap until their animals had nearly all starved. i now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. accordingly i left nashville in the latter part of december by rail for chattanooga. from chattanooga i took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the clinch with the tennessee. from that point the railroad had been repaired up to knoxville and out east to strawberry plains. i went by rail therefore to knoxville, where i remained for several days. general john g. foster was then commanding the department of the ohio. it was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while i was at knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to lexington, kentucky, the first point where i could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at nashville. the road over cumberland gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as i had found it on my first trip to chattanooga over waldron's ridge. the road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from strawberry plains to lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable. i found a great many people at home along that route, both in tennessee and kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. they would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. the people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. i was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. the crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. it also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. i was back in nashville by the 13th of january, 1864. when i started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which i was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. under the rules of the war department at that time, mr. stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. the operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the war department through general stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. i was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there. as i have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the war department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. accordingly i ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to captain cyrus b. comstock, of the corps of engineers, whom i had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. the operator refused point blank to turn over the key to captain comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the war department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any one else. i told him i would see whether he would or not. he said that if he did he would be punished. i told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the war department, he yielded. when i returned from knoxville i found quite a commotion. the operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. i informed the secretary of war, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. it was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. this was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the secretary of war and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. this was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. he never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which i had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. i remonstrated against this in writing, and the secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the army. but he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. after the relief of knoxville sherman had proposed to burnside that he should go with him to drive longstreet out of tennessee; but burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of longstreet without availing himself of this offer. as before stated sherman's command had left their camps north of the tennessee, near chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. the weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the tennessee river. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee--commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. soon after his return from knoxville i ordered sherman to distribute his forces from stevenson to decatur and thence north to nashville; sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what confederates might still be left on the east bank of the mississippi river to impede its navigation by our boats. he expected also to have the co-operation of banks to do the same thing on the west shore. of course i approved heartily. about the 10th of january sherman was back in memphis, where hurlbut commanded, and got together his memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to vicksburg. he then went to vicksburg and out to where mcpherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. sherman knew that general (bishop) polk was occupying meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. he determined, therefore, to move directly upon meridian. i had sent some 2,500 cavalry under general sooy smith to sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before sherman got to memphis. hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and sherman ordered him to reinforce smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against forrest, who was then known to be south-east from memphis. smith was ordered to move about the 1st of february. while sherman was waiting at vicksburg for the arrival of hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. when these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of general polk's being at meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. smith's command was nearly double that of forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as forrest's men had had. the fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. the difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. this same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. sherman got off on the 3d of february and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the big black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached jackson, mississippi. this latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, brandon on the 8th, and morton on the 9th. up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. here, however, there were indications of the concentration of confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. he had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about decatur, mississippi, where, by the way, sherman himself came near being picked up. he entered meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward demopolis, alabama. he spent several days in meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from sooy smith, who he supposed had met forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to vicksburg. there he learned that smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the ohio river, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th. smith did meet forrest, but the result was decidedly in forrest's favor. sherman had written a letter to banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against shreveport, subject to my approval. i disapproved of sherman's going himself, because i had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. we must have them for the spring campaign. the trans-mississippi movement proved abortive. my eldest son, who had accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of january i obtained permission to go to st. louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. while i was permitted to go, i was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with washington, just as though i had remained at nashville. when i obtained this leave i was at chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of thomas in the southern part of tennessee co-operate with sherman's movement in mississippi. i directed thomas, and logan who was at scottsboro, alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against j. e. johnston, who had again relieved bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. i learned through confederate sources that johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of mobile, presumably to operate against sherman, and two more divisions to longstreet in east tennessee. seeing that johnston had depleted in this way, i directed thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides stanley's division which was already to the east, into east tennessee, and notified schofield, who was now in command in east tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements longstreet had received. my object was to drive longstreet out of east tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. about this time general foster, who had been in command of the department of the ohio after burnside until schofield relieved him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in east tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. i thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of longstreet. on the 12th of february i ordered thomas to take dalton and hold it, if possible; and i directed him to move without delay. finding that he had not moved, on the 17th i urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, i asked him if he could not start the next day. he finally got off on the 22d or 23d. the enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. he soon fell back. schofield also had to return for the same reason. he could not carry supplies with him, and longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country. longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. on the 2d of march, however, i learned of sherman's success, which eased my mind very much. the next day, the 3d, i was ordered to washington. the bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through congress and became a law on the 26th of february. my nomination had been sent to the senate on the 1st of march and confirmed the next day (the 2d). i was ordered to washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. the commission was handed to me on the 9th. it was delivered to me at the executive mansion by president lincoln in the presence of his cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors. the president in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that i might prepare a few lines of reply. the president said: "general grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the united states. with this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that, with what i here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." to this i replied: "mr. president, i accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men." on the 10th i visited the headquarters of the army of the potomac at brandy station; then returned to washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. it had been my intention before this to remain in the west, even if i was made lieutenant-general; but when i got to washington and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. no one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. i determined, therefore, before i started back to have sherman advanced to my late position, mcpherson to sherman's in command of the department, and logan to the command of mcpherson's corps. these changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. my commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of march, 1864. on the following day, as already stated, i visited general meade, commanding the army of the potomac, at his headquarters at brandy station, north of the rapidan. i had known general meade slightly in the mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. i was a stranger to most of the army of the potomac, i might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the mexican war. there had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. one was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. meade evidently thought that i might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. he said to me that i might want an officer who had served with me in the west, mentioning sherman specially, to take his place. if so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. he urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. for himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. i assured him that i had no thought of substituting any one for him. as to sherman, he could not be spared from the west. this incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of meade than did his great victory at gettysburg the july before. it is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. he was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the army of the potomac--except from the authorities at washington. all other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. i tried to make general meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if i had been in washington or any other place away from his command. i therefore gave all orders for the movements of the army of the potomac to meade to have them executed. to avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, i established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. this sometimes happened, and i had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. on the 11th i returned to washington and, on the day after, orders were published by the war department placing me in command of all the armies. i had left washington the night before to return to my old command in the west and to meet sherman whom i had telegraphed to join me in nashville. sherman assumed command of the military division of the mississippi on the 18th of march, and we left nashville together for cincinnati. i had sherman accompany me that far on my way back to washington so that we could talk over the matters about which i wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. the first point which i wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. there were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely mcclellan, burnside and fremont in the east, and buell, mccook, negley and crittenden in the west. some time in the winter of 1863-64 i had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign i thought advisable for the command under me--now sherman's. general j. e. johnston was defending atlanta and the interior of georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at dalton, about 38 miles south of chattanooga. dalton is at the junction of the railroad from cleveland with the one from chattanooga to atlanta. there could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the mississippi. johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, atlanta, the second. at the time i wrote general halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time i met general sherman, it was expected that general banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. (*22) the plan therefore was for sherman to attack johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of banks to hold a line through to mobile, or at least to hold atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. this would cut the confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the mississippi river had done before. banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. in regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, i left sherman to look after those who had been removed in the west while i looked out for the rest. i directed, however, that he should make no assignment until i could speak to the secretary of war about the matter. i shortly after recommended to the secretary the assignment of general buell to duty. i received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the secretary told me that he had offered buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. i understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either sherman or canby because he had ranked them both. both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. all of them ranked me in the old army, and sherman and buell did as brigadiers. the worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. on the 23d of march i was back in washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at culpeper court-house, a few miles south of the headquarters of the army of the potomac. although hailing from illinois myself, the state of the president, i never met mr. lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. i knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the west who had known him all their lives. i had also read the remarkable series of debates between lincoln and douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the united states senate. i was then a resident of missouri, and by no means a "lincoln man" in that contest; but i recognized then his great ability. in my first interview with mr. lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the north and congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of "military orders"--one, two, three, etc. he did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. all he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. assuring him that i would do the best i could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the war department, our first interview ended. the secretary of war i had met once before only, but felt that i knew him better. while commanding in west tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. he and general halleck both cautioned me against giving the president my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. i should have said that in our interview the president told me he did not want to know what i proposed to do. but he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as i pleased about. he brought out a map of virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the federal and confederate armies up to that time. he pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. we would then have the potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. i listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. i did not communicate my plans to the president, nor did i to the secretary of war or to general halleck. march the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. when i assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: the mississippi river was guarded from st. louis to its mouth; the line of the arkansas was held, thus giving us all the north-west north of that river. a few points in louisiana not remote from the river were held by the federal troops, as was also the mouth of the rio grande. east of the mississippi we held substantially all north of the memphis and charleston railroad as far east as chattanooga, thence along the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the state of tennessee. west virginia was in our hands; and that part of old virginia north of the rapidan and east of the blue ridge we also held. on the sea-coast we had fortress monroe and norfolk in virginia; plymouth, washington and new berne in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, port royal and fort pulaski in south carolina and georgia; fernandina, st. augustine, key west and pensacola in florida. the balance of the southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the alleghanies and north of natchez, with a large movable force about chattanooga. his command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported to sherman and were subject to his orders. this arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. in the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the federal and confederate capitals. it is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in virginia and north carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the james river and chickahominy, near richmond, to gettysburg and chambersburg, in pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the national army, sometimes to the confederate army; but in every instance, i believe, claimed as victories for the south by the southern press if not by the southern generals. the northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the union and the overwhelming success of the federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. that portion of the army of the potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the rapidan. the army of northern virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the confederate army. the country back to the james river is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. the region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain. such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. to provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. system and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. the union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the west had been concentrated into a single military division. the army of the potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. there were thus seventeen distinct commanders. before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. i determined to stop this. to this end i regarded the army of the potomac as the centre, and all west to memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the army of the james, under general butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. all such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. in this way ten thousand men were added to the army of the james from south carolina alone, with general gillmore in command. it was not contemplated that general gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under general burnside, had been rendezvoused at annapolis, maryland. this was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. the corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of norfolk, in virginia or north carolina, to operate against richmond from that direction. in fact burnside and the war department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. my general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the confederate armies in the field. there were but two such, as we have seen, east of the mississippi river and facing north. the army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee commanding, was on the south bank of the rapidan, confronting the army of the potomac; the second, under general joseph e. johnston, was at dalton, georgia, opposed to sherman who was still at chattanooga. beside these main armies the confederates had to guard the shenandoah valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from richmond to tennessee. forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the west with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west tennessee. we could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the northern states open to invasion. but as the army of the potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of washington even while it was moving on lee, so all the forces to the west, and the army of the james, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. accordingly i arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. sherman was to move from chattanooga, johnston's army and atlanta being his objective points. (*23) crook, commanding in west virginia, was to move from the mouth of the gauley river with a cavalry force and some artillery, the virginia and tennessee railroad to be his objective. either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. sigel was in command in the valley of virginia. he was to advance up the valley, covering the north from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near harper's ferry. every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which lee relied. butler was to advance by the james river, having richmond and petersburg as his objective. before the advance commenced i visited butler at fort monroe. this was the first time i had ever met him. before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign i invited his views. they were very much such as i intended to direct, and as i did direct (*24), in writing, before leaving. general w. f. smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. i found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the senate, but i insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. my wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and i assigned him to the command of one of the corps under general butler. i was not long in finding out that the objections to smith's promotion were well founded. in one of my early interviews with the president i expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. i said i wanted the very best man in the army for that command. halleck was present and spoke up, saying: "how would sheridan do?" i replied: "the very man i want." the president said i could have anybody i wanted. sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the army of the potomac. this relieved general alfred pleasonton. it was not a reflection on that officer, however, for i did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. banks in the department of the gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at new orleans in time to join in the general move, mobile to be his objective. at this time i was not entirely decided as to whether i should move the army of the potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. each plan presented advantages. (*25) if by his right--my left--the potomac, chesapeake bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of tennessee cavalry. these troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. i will leave forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. "the river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. the approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. my loss was about twenty killed. it is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with southerners." subsequently forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. at the east, also, the rebels were busy. i had said to halleck that plymouth and washington, north carolina, were unnecessary to hold. it would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to butler's command. if success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. these places had been occupied by federal troops before i took command of the armies, and i knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at plymouth. i then ordered the abandonment of washington, but directed the holding of new berne at all hazards. this was essential because new berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. general banks had gone on an expedition up the red river long before my promotion to general command. i had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. by direction of halleck i had reinforced banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from sherman's command. this reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. but banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take shreveport on the red river, and turn over the line of that river to steele, who commanded in arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the arkansas. orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for banks to return a. j. smith's command to where it belonged and get back to new orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. but the expedition was a failure. banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. nor was smith returned until long after the movements of may, 1864, had been begun. the services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the department of the gulf, were thus paralyzed. it is but just to banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. i make no criticism on this point. he opposed the expedition. by the 27th of april spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. on that day burnside left annapolis to occupy meade's position between bull run and the rappahannock. meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. on the following day butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of may, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the james river as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. he was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in washington city, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at richmond. the same day sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. sigel was in winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others. the criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the rapidan to the james river that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports. richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. to get possession of lee's army was the first great object. with the capture of his army richmond would necessarily follow. it was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. if the army of the potomac had been moved bodily to the james river by water lee could have moved a part of his forces back to richmond, called beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to washington. then, too, i ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the army of the potomac, up the james river by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. while my headquarters were at culpeper, from the 26th of march to the 4th of may, i generally visited washington once a week to confer with the secretary of war and president. on the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. colonel john s. mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the army of the potomac. on my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached warrenton junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. there was but one man at the station, and he informed us that mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of federal cavalry. had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. i was on a special train, if i remember correctly, without any guard. since the close of the war i have come to know colonel mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. he is a different man entirely from what i had supposed. he is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. he is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. there were probably but few men in the south who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command. on this same visit to washington i had my last interview with the president before reaching the james river. he had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. i explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the northern states. these troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. his answer was: "oh, yes! i see that. as we say out west, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." there was a certain incident connected with the wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression further on i will mention it here. a few days before my departure from culpeper the honorable e. b. washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some distance south, through the battle in the wilderness and, i think, to spottsylvania. he was accompanied by a mr. swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. he assured me--and i have no doubt swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. i expressed an entire willingness to have him (swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. we received richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the confederates. it was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. probably mr. swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. at all events he was not invited, and soon i found that he was corresponding with some paper (i have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. he knew of the assurance washburne had given as to the character of his mission. i never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that i recollect. he accompanied us, however, for a time at least. the second night after crossing the rapidan (the night of the 5th of may) colonel w. r. rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquarters. a short time before midnight i gave him verbal instructions for the night. three days later i read in a richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. a few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the wilderness) general meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private. there was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. one of my staff, colonel t. s. bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation between meade and myself. he called the attention of colonel rowley to it. the latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. the man proved to be swinton, the "historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping. the next i heard of mr. swinton was at cold harbor. general meade came to my headquarters saying that general burnside had arrested swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. i promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position --sheridan's first raid. the armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. they were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. lee, with the capital of the confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. johnston, with atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. it was of less importance only because the capture of johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of richmond, lee and his army. all other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. this was the plan; and i will now endeavor to give, as concisely as i can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns. as stated before, banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the red river, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand with sherman and thirty thousand against mobile. sigel's record is almost equally brief. he moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when i was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley i received instead the following announcement from halleck: "sigel is in full retreat on strasburg. he will do nothing but run; never did anything else." the enemy had intercepted him about new market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. the plan had been for an advance of sigel's forces in two columns. though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. under crook and averell his western column advanced from the gauley in west virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. they reached the virginia and tennessee railroad at dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over new river. having accomplished this they recrossed the alleghanies to meadow bluffs and there awaited further orders. butler embarked at fort monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the james river. his steamers moved first up chesapeake bay and york river as if threatening the rear of lee's army. at midnight they turned back, and butler by daylight was far up the james river. he seized city point and bermuda hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy. this was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to butler. he was to act from here, looking to richmond as his objective point. i had given him to understand that i should aim to fight lee between the rapidan and richmond if he would stand; but should lee fall back into richmond i would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the potomac and the james on the james river. he was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. butler was in position by the 6th of may and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from suffolk to cut the weldon railroad. he also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between petersburg and richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. he made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack petersburg, which was almost defenceless. about the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at drury's bluff, about half way between bermuda hundred and richmond. in the mean time beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. on the 16th he attacked butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the army of the james as a distinct factor in the campaign. i afterward ordered a portion of it to join the army of the potomac, leaving a sufficient force with butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the confederate capital. the position which general butler had chosen between the two rivers, the james and appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. his right was protected by the james river, his left by the appomattox, and his rear by their junction--the two streams uniting near by. the bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed. previous to ordering any troops from butler i sent my chief engineer, general barnard, from the army of the potomac to that of the james to inspect butler's position and ascertain whether i could again safely make an order for general butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that i was getting so near richmond; or, if i could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to white house to join me and reinforce the army of the potomac. general barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that i could do the latter with great security; but that general butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. he said that the general occupied a place between the james and appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. i then asked him why butler could not move out from his lines and push across the richmond and petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of richmond. he replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that general butler had. he then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if butler was in a bottle. he was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. this struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when i saw the hasty sketch which general barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report i used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of general butler and, i know, very much to my own. i found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of general badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, i asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. i make this statement here because, although i have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and i desire to rectify all injustice that i may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the union. general butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. the further operations of the army of the james can best be treated of in connection with those of the army of the potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. before giving the reader a summary of sherman's great atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, i will briefly mention sheridan's first raid upon lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. by thus anticipating, in point of time, i will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when i shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the rapidan. on the 8th of may, just after the battle of the wilderness and when we were moving on spottsylvania i directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac, pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through gordonsville, charlottesville and lynchburg, the other to richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the james river and draw these from butler's supplies. this move took him past the entire rear of lee's army. these orders were also given in writing through meade. the object of this move was three-fold. first, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from fredericksburg, which had now become our base. he started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. it was sixteen days before he got back to the army of the potomac. the course sheridan took was directly to richmond. before night stuart, commanding the confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. but the advance kept on, crossed the north anna, and at beaver dam, a station on the virginia central railroad, recaptured four hundred union prisoners on their way to richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between sheridan and richmond at yellow tavern, only about six miles north of the city. sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at ashland, and on the 11th arrived in stuart's front. a severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. sheridan passed through the outer defences of richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. but having no supports near he could not have remained. after caring for his wounded he struck for the james river below the city, to communicate with butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. he moved first between the chickahominy and the james, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at mechanicsville. he then turned to cross to the north side of the chickahominy by meadow bridge. he found this barred, and the defeated confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. the panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear. he was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. the defences of richmond, manned, were to the right, the chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from richmond. this force was attacked and beaten by wilson's and gregg's divisions, while sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the confederates he found there. the enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building. on the 13th sheridan was at bottom's bridge, over the chickahominy. on the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the james river at haxall's landing. he at once put himself into communication with general butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. sheridan had left the army of the potomac at spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or lee's army was now. great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. on the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. he moved by the way of white house. the bridge over the pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. on the 22d he was at aylett's on the matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. on the 24th he joined us on the march from north anna to cold harbor, in the vicinity of chesterfield. sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around lee's army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. chapter xlix. sherman's campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. after separating from sherman in cincinnati i went on to washington, as already stated, while he returned to nashville to assume the duties of his new command. his military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the alleghany mountains and east of the mississippi river, together with the state of arkansas in the trans-mississippi. the most easterly of these was the department of the ohio, general schofield commanding; the next was the department of the cumberland, general thomas commanding; the third the department of the tennessee, general mcpherson commanding; and general steele still commanded the trans-mississippi, or department of arkansas. the last-named department was so far away that sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the gulf, where general canby, who had relieved general banks, was in command. the movements of the armies, as i have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, i fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. general sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. mcpherson lay at huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the army of the cumberland, was at chattanooga; and schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at knoxville. with these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying johnston's army and capturing atlanta. he visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. one of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. he found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. he found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. he at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. in this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of may. as i have said already, johnston was at dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between chattanooga and atlanta. the country is mountainous all the way to atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. dalton is on ground where water drains towards atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. the best positions for defence had been selected all the way from dalton back to atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. his position at dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. with a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, i have no doubt that he would have succeeded. sherman's plan was to start schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from knoxville, having him move on the direct road to dalton. thomas was to move out to ringgold. it had been sherman's intention to cross mcpherson over the tennessee river at huntsville or decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from chattanooga to atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that mcpherson alone would have troops enough to cope with johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. in this he was disappointed. two of mcpherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. this furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. then, again, sherman had lent banks two divisions under a. j. smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. it is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. that department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. this left mcpherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. he was therefore brought up to chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of thomas--the two coming together about dalton. the three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. sherman soon found that dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. there was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the national and confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. through this gorge the troops would have to pass. mcpherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of snake creek gap into the rear of the enemy. this was a surprise to johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at dalton. on the 15th there was very hard fighting about resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear. again johnston fell back, our army pursuing. the pursuit was continued to kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that newton's division overtook the rear of johnston's army and engaged it. sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. he was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. this work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. the campaign to atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. it is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting --some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. on the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about atlanta more than a month was consumed. it was the 23d of may before the road was finished up to the rear of sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. this pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of allatoona. this place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. an assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. this was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called new hope church. on the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. they kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. this was the case more particularly with the cavalry. by the 4th of june johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and allatoona was left in our possession. allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary base of supplies. the railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. the rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn johnston out of his new position. while sherman's army lay here, general f. p. blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. johnston had fallen back to marietta and kenesaw mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him. at this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. but during the progress of the battle schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. these operations were completed by the 3d of july, when it was found that johnston had evacuated the place. he was pursued at once. sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. he had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the chattahoochee river. johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. this time he fell back to the chattahoochee. about the 5th of july he was besieged again, sherman getting easy possession of the chattahoochee river both above and below him. the enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. here johnston made a stand until the 17th, when sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward atlanta began. johnston was now relieved of the command, and hood superseded him. johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at richmond, or of the people of that section of the south in which he was commanding. the very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted. for my own part, i think that johnston's tactics were right. anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the north to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. in addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was about to assume the offensive. on the 20th he came out and attacked the army of the cumberland most furiously. hooker's corps, and newton's and johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. the losses were quite heavy on both sides. on this day general gresham, since our postmaster-general, was very badly wounded. during the night hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. the investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. during the night of the 21st hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d. at first the battle went very much in favor of the confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. while our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. but they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. the field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26). it was during this battle that mcpherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. in his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals. garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of atlanta and to cut it in the direction of augusta. he was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. rousseau had also come up from tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the tennessee river about decatur and made a raid into alabama. finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of sherman, and reported to him about this time. the battle of the 22d is usually known as the battle of atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of september. preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. the work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between decatur and atlanta. these lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of atlanta. on the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. on the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, general logan commanding, with great vigor. logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. these assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. the enemy's losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful. during that evening the enemy in logan's front withdrew into the town. this now left sherman's army close up to the confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. in the latter part of july sherman sent stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about macon. he was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about andersonville. there were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. but the attempt proved a failure. mccook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. he had also taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. he had lost several hundred men out of his small command. on the 4th of august colonel adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting stoneman and all but himself as lost. i myself had heard around richmond of the capture of stoneman, and had sent sherman word, which he received. the rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. a few days after colonel adams's return colonel capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of stoneman with something less than a thousand men. it seems that stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. he covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding confederate. in this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. on the 4th and 5th sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. general palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both general sherman and general schofield; but i am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with palmer as to whether schofield had any right to command him. if he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. about the same time wheeler got upon our railroad north of resaca and destroyed it nearly up to dalton. this cut sherman off from communication with the north for several days. sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of august to reach the macon road about jonesboro. he succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the confederate lines of atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. these little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. they annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of august, and on the 1st of september was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of atlanta. here he found hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. a battle ensued, but he was unable to drive hardee away before night set in. under cover of the night, however, hardee left of his own accord. that night hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped. the next morning at daylight general h. w. slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of atlanta, and notified sherman. sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from decatur on the left to atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. the campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. there was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely. it was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. the troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. the city of atlanta was turned into a military base. the citizens were all compelled to leave. sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. he limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. the news of sherman's success reached the north instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. this was the first great political campaign for the republicans in their canvass of 1864. it was followed later by sheridan's campaign in the shenandoah valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following november than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the north. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan --entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. soon after midnight, may 3d-4th, the army of the potomac moved out from its position north rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the confederate capital and the army defending it. this was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. the losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. it is true the confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. but previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture philadelphia, new york, and the national capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal north. they had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. so here was a stand-off. the campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. we had to have hard fighting to achieve this. the two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. the country over which the army had to operate, from the rapidan to the crossing of the james river, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the chesapeake bay. the crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. the country roads were narrow and poor. most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the wilderness and along the chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. all bridges were naturally destroyed before the national troops came to them. the army of the potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by generals w. s. hancock, g. k. warren, (*27) john sedgwick and p. h. sheridan. the artillery was commanded by general henry j. hunt. this arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. the surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for germania ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under general j. h. wilson. general sedgwick followed warren with the 6th corps. germania ford was nine or ten miles below the right of lee's line. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon ely's ford, six miles below germania, preceded by gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. the cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. this was undoubtedly a surprise to lee. the fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at warrenton, guarding the railroad from bull run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the rapidan should be long delayed. he was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m. giving the information that our crossing had been successful. the country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. the battle-field from the crossing of the rapidan until the final movement from the wilderness toward spottsylvania was of the same character. there were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. the roads were narrow and bad. all the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. there are two roads, good for that part of virginia, running from orange court house to the battle-field. the most southerly of these roads is known as the orange court house plank road, the northern one as the orange turnpike. there are also roads from east of the battle-field running to spottsylvania court house, one from chancellorsville, branching at aldrich's; the western branch going by piney branch church, alsop's, thence by the brock road to spottsylvania; the east branch goes by gates's, thence to spottsylvania. the brock road runs from germania ford through the battle-field and on to the court house. as spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. lee's headquarters were at orange court house. from there to fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the wilderness. this gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. these roads strike the road from germania ford in the wilderness. as soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, wilson's division by wilderness tavern to parker's store, on the orange plank road; gregg to the left towards chancellorsville. warren followed wilson and reached the wilderness tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. sedgwick followed warren. he was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of warren, by sundown. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with warren and camped about six miles east of him. before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. there never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's corps with the army of the potomac in 1864. with a wagon-train that would have extended from the rapidan to richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. to overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, general rufus ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. at a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. the wagons were also marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. as soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. by this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. they consumed theirs at the depots. i left culpeper court house after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the rapidan in advance of sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river. orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. notwithstanding this i saw scattered along the road from culpeper to germania ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence i had never witnessed before. lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of may, that the army of the potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. this i judge from the fact that at 1.15 p.m., an hour and a quarter after warren had reached old wilderness tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at mine run. here at night dispatches were received announcing that sherman, butler and crook had moved according to programme. on discovering the advance of the army of the potomac, lee ordered hill, ewell and longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, hill on the orange plank road, longstreet to follow on the same road. longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. ewell was ordered by the orange pike. he was near by and arrived some four miles east of mine run before bivouacking for the night. my orders were given through general meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. warren was to move to parker's store, and wilson's cavalry--then at parker's store--to move on to craig's meeting-house. sedgwick followed warren, closing in on his right. the army of the potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of warren, his left to reach to shady grove church. at six o'clock, before reaching parker's store, warren discovered the enemy. he sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. wright, with his division of sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to warren's right, and getty with his division, also of sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by warren's rear and get on his left. this was the speediest way to reinforce warren who was confronting the enemy on both the orange plank and turnpike roads. burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the army of the potomac had safely crossed the rapidan. by making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. meade moved his headquarters on to old wilderness tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. i remained to hasten burnside's crossing and to put him in position. burnside at this time was not under meade's command, and was his senior in rank. getting information of the proximity of the enemy, i informed meade, and without waiting to see burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where meade was. it was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. neither party had any advantage of position. warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. at nine o'clock hancock was ordered to come up to the support of getty. he himself arrived at getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. about this hour warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. getty was somewhat isolated from warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. at two o'clock hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join getty and attack the enemy. but the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. at four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and general getty received orders from meade a few minutes later to attack whether hancock was ready or not. he met the enemy under heth within a few hundred yards. hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by birney and mott, and later two brigades, carroll's and owen's, to the support of getty. this was timely and saved getty. during the battle getty and carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. one of birney's most gallant brigade commanders--alexander hays--was killed. i had been at west point with hays for three years, and had served with him through the mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. he was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. with him it was "come, boys," not "go." wadsworth's division and baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce hancock and getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position. during the afternoon sheridan sent gregg's division of cavalry to todd's tavern in search of wilson. this was fortunate. he found wilson engaged with a superior force under general rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. they soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond corbin's bridge. fighting between hancock and hill continued until night put a close to it. neither side made any special progress. after the close of the battle of the 5th of may my orders were given for the following morning. we knew longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join hill's right, near the brock road, and might arrive during the night. i was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. meade asked to have the hour changed to six. deferring to his wishes as far as i was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. hancock had now fully one-half of the army of the potomac. wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by hill, and to the right of hancock. he was directed to move at the same time, and to attack hill's left. burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between warren and wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. sedgwick and warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce hill from that quarter. burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of lee's army. hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until july. lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until longstreet got up. this is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which i had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before longstreet got up, lee was ahead in his assault on our right. his purpose was evident, but he failed. hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by general barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which longstreet was expected. this disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. hancock moved by the left of the orange plank road, and wadsworth by the right of it. the fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. i believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that lee would not have made another stand outside of his richmond defences. gibbon commanded hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. on the morning of the 6th sheridan was sent to connect with hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. he met them at the intersection of the furnace and brock roads and at todd's tavern, and defeated them at both places. later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. hancock heard the firing between sheridan and stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the brock road. another incident happened during the day to further induce hancock to weaken his attacking column. word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of todd's tavern, and brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from chancellorsville, by the road hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. at 6.50 o'clock a.m., burnside, who had passed wilderness tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. the difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. hancock followed hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. he maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, longstreet came upon him. the retreating column of hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. they were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. falling upon a brigade of hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. the enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. in this engagement the intrepid wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. the enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. the confederate general jenkins was killed and longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. his loss was a severe one to lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. after longstreet's removal from the field lee took command of his right in person. he was not able, however, to rally his men to attack hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of longstreet's or hill's commands. this brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. a brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. firing was continued after this, but with less fury. burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on hancock's right. at 4.15 in the afternoon lee attacked our left. his line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. this status was maintained for about half an hour. then a part of mott's division and ward's brigade of birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. the enemy under r. h. anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. but owing to the efforts of hancock, their success was but temporary. carroll, of gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. the ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. the killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. the woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. the wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. but the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. lee was now in distress. his men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. these facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. his troops were withdrawn now, but i revoked the order, which i had given previously to this assault, for hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. burnside, sedgwick, and warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. i had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the rapidan to be taken up except one at germania ford. the troops on sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. this left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack. but late in the afternoon of the 6th early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion. early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. the defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. early says in his memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. many officers, who had not been attacked by early, continued coming to my headquarters even after sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. during the night all of lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. on the morning of the 7th general custer drove the enemy's cavalry from catharpin furnace to todd's tavern. pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. but lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. there was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in warren's front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. this drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of lee to drive him back. this ended the battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. more desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of may. our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. we gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. in the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily repulsed. as we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. but the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. our losses in the wilderness were very severe. those of the confederates must have been even more so; but i have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. the germania ford bridge was transferred to ely's ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to washington. it may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the army of the potomac: first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. for this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. it was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength. when a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. the second was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. insulated wires--insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. the pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. there was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. there were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. the mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to. the operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. the moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. a mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. when he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. this would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. the ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. the men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles. this was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. at intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. in the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. while this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. no orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. the signal service was used on the march. the men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. when movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. they would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. it would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them. but sometimes they gave useful information. on the afternoon of the 7th i received news from washington announcing that sherman had probably attacked johnston that day, and that butler had reached city point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. i had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that lee might move rapidly to richmond to crush butler before i could get there. my order for this movement was as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., may 7, 1864, 6.30 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at spottsylvania c. h. with one army corps, at todd's tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the piney branch and spottsylvania road with the road from alsop's to old court house. if this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the ny river. i think it would be advisable in making the change to leave hancock where he is until warren passes him. he could then follow and become the right of the new line. burnside will move to piney branch church. sedgwick can move along the pike to chancellorsville and on to his destination. burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the orange and fredericksburg plank road, then follow sedgwick to his place of destination. all vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. it is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on hancock this afternoon. in case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. all the hospitals should be moved to-day to chancellorsville. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. during the 7th sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at todd's tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. soon after dark warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by sedgwick. warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where hancock's command lay on the brock road. with my staff and a small escort of cavalry i preceded the troops. meade with his staff accompanied me. the greatest enthusiasm was manifested by hancock's men as we passed by. no doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. it indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. the cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. at all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. meade and i rode in advance. we had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. we looked to see, if we could, which road sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. it seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. we had not gone far, however, when colonel c. b. comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. in a few minutes he returned and reported that lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. we returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to todd's tavern, where we arrived after midnight. my object in moving to spottsylvania was two-fold: first, i did not want lee to get back to richmond in time to attempt to crush butler before i could get there; second, i wanted to get between his army and richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. but lee, by accident, beat us to spottsylvania. our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the army of the potomac to fredericksburg, and so informed his government. accordingly he ordered longstreet's corps--now commanded by anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to spottsylvania. but the woods being still on fire, anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. by this accident lee got possession of spottsylvania. it is impossible to say now what would have been the result if lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. my belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach richmond first, and the army of the potomac would have had the shorter line. thus, twice since crossing the rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the rapidan to the james river or richmond. the first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. but accident often decides the fate of battle. sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at todd's tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. he issued the necessary orders for seizing spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the po river, which lee's troops would have to cross to get to spottsylvania. but meade changed sheridan's orders to merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at todd's tavern, and thereby left the road free for anderson when he came up. wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in merritt's orders. had he been permitted to execute the orders sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the po river which anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable warren to reinforce wilson and hold the town. anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not already made--immediately across warren's front. warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which merritt had engaged earlier in the day. he assaulted at once, but was repulsed. he soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. this time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he intrenched. his right and left divisions--the former crawford's, the latter wadsworth's, now commanded by cutler--drove the enemy back some distance. at this time my headquarters had been advanced to piney branch church. i was anxious to crush anderson before lee could get a force to his support. to this end sedgwick who was at piney branch church, was ordered to warren's support. hancock, who was at todd's tavern, was notified of warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. burnside, who was with the wagon trains at aldrich's on our extreme left, received the same instructions. sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. even then all of sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. his ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. in like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. his difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. he was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. lee had ordered hill's corps--now commanded by early--to move by the very road we had marched upon. this shows that even early in the morning of the 8th lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the army of the potomac had gone to fredericksburg. indeed, he informed the authorities at richmond he had possession of spottsylvania and was on my flank. anderson was in possession of spottsylvania, through no foresight of lee, however. early only found that he had been following us when he ran against hancock at todd's tavern. his coming detained hancock from the battle-field of spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept early back and forced him to move by another route. had i ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put hancock in the lead. it would also have given us an hour or earlier start. it took all that time for warren to get the head of his column to the left of hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. this hour, and hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush anderson before he could be reinforced. but the movement made was tactical. it kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. if an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. by a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. then, too, i had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. at that time my judgment was that warren was the man i would suggest to succeed meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. as i have before said, warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. the mattapony river is formed by the junction of the mat, the ta, the po and the ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. it takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the wilderness tavern. the po rises south-west of the place, but farther away. spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. the brock road reaches spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. lee's army coming up by the catharpin road, had to cross the po at wooden bridge. warren and hancock came by the brock road. sedgwick crossed the ny at catharpin furnace. burnside coming by aldrich's to gates's house, had to cross the ny near the enemy. he found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. this brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. about the time i received the news of this attack, word came from hancock that early had left his front. he had been forced over to the catharpin road, crossing the po at corbin's and again at wooden bridge. these are the bridges sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy spottsylvania. these movements of the enemy gave me the idea that lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. i made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and richmond if he should try to execute this design. if he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as burnside was established south of the ny. the po and the ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. the country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. it was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. by noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town. anderson was on his left extending to the po, ewell came next, then early. warren occupied our right, covering the brock and other roads converging at spottsylvania; sedgwick was to his left and burnside on our extreme left. hancock was yet back at todd's tavern, but as soon as it was known that early had left hancock's front the latter was ordered up to warren's right. he formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the po and get on the enemy's flank. the fourth division of hancock's corps, mott commanding, was left at todd's when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of sedgwick's--now wright's--6th corps. in the morning general sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. his loss was a severe one to the army of the potomac and to the nation. general h. g. wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of may, across the left flank of lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of meade's army, by the po river. but for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at wooden bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. the po at the points where hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it turns due south, and after passing under wooden bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. during the night this corps built three bridges over the po; but these were in rear. the position assumed by hancock's corps forced lee to reinforce his left during the night. accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when hancock renewed his effort to get over the po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of early's command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. he succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. the enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the wooden bridge with artillery. anderson's left rested on the po, where it turns south; therefore, for hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him from it. the stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. the idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of hancock's, and i determined to take advantage of it. accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by warren's and wright's corps, hancock to command all the attacking force. two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the po. gibbon was placed to the right of warren, and birney in his rear as a reserve. barlow's division was left south of the stream, and mott of the same corps was still to the left of wright's corps. burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. the enemy seeing barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to himself. but the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. the second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. general t. g. stevenson was killed in this move. between the lines, where warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. the slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. he was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. he then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned colonel emory upton, of the 121st new york volunteers, to the command of it. about four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, warren's and wright's corps, with mott's division of hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. the movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. the battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. meade and i occupied the best position we could get, in rear of warren. warren was repulsed with heavy loss, general j. c. rice being among the killed. he was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. to the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of mott. upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. so much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that i ordered upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that i withdrew the order. to relieve them, i ordered a renewal of the assault. by this time hancock, who had gone with birney's division to relieve barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. his corps was now joined with warren's and wright's in this last assault. it was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. at night they were withdrawn. upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. before leaving washington i had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. by this authority i conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the president. upton had been badly wounded in this fight. burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of spottsylvania court house, completely turning lee's right. he was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and i, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. he had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. burnside's position now separated him widely from wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. at night he was ordered to join on to this. this brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. i attach no blame to burnside for this, but i do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position. the enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on barlow. then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. on the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. i wrote the following letter to general halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 11, 1864--8.30 a.m. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. we have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. the result up to this time is much in our favor. but our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. we have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. i think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. i am now sending back to belle plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. the arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and i hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. my object in having them sent to belle plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. if it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to belle plain or fredericksburg, send them so. i am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. up to this time there is no indication of any portion of lee's army being detached for the defence of richmond. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. and also, i received information, through the war department, from general butler that his cavalry under kautz had cut the railroad south of petersburg, separating beauregard from richmond, and had whipped hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself. on this same day came news from sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between lee and richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. on the 8th i had directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac and pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the manner i have already described. chapter liii. hancock's assault-losses of the confederates--promotions recommended --discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack-reducing the artillery. in the reconnoissance made by mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered at the right centre. i determined that an assault should be made at that point. (*28) accordingly in the afternoon hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of warren and wright, under cover of night, to wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. the night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. it took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. the men got but little rest. burnside was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour. i sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. hancock was notified of this. warren and wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. i occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. hancock put barlow on his left, in double column, and birney to his right. mott followed birney, and gibbon was held in reserve. the morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. the ground over which hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. in front of birney there was also a marsh to cross. but, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. barlow and birney entered almost simultaneously. here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. the men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. the hand conflict was soon over. hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. about six o'clock i ordered warren's corps to the support of hancock's. burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. however, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss in return. this victory was important, and one that lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. he made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. troops were brought up from his left and attacked hancock furiously. hancock was forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. these he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. wright was ordered up to reinforce hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. he was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. at eight o'clock warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. at eleven o'clock i gave meade written orders to relieve warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. he kept lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. if the 5th corps, or rather if warren, had been as prompt as wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained. lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. his losses must have been fearful. sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. in one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. all the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. it was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. in this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. the enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere.(*30) our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. at night lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, cutler's division sent to wright, and griffin's to hancock. meade ordered his chief of staff, general humphreys, to remain with warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name. during the day i was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. about the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. she showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly union that i stopped. she said she had not seen a union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. she said her husband and son, being, union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the union army, if alive. she was without food or nearly so, so i ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if i could where the husband and son were. there was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between mott's division and the enemy. i was afraid that lee might be moving out, and i did not want him to go without my knowing it. the indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. our dead were buried this day. mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and assigned to birney's division. during this day i wrote to washington recommending sherman and meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; hancock for brigadier-general; wright, gibbon and humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers; and upton and carroll to be brigadiers. upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the senate on the nomination of the president. the night of the 13th warren and wright were moved by the rear to the left of burnside. the night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. it was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. they gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in wright's front. here upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of griffin's division, warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. there was no more battle during the 14th. this brought our line east of the court house and running north and south and facing west. during the night of the 14th-15th lee moved to cover this new front. this left hancock without an enemy confronting him. he was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. on the 15th news came from butler and averill. the former reported the capture of the outer works at drury's bluff, on the james river, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of richmond on the danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at dublin, west virginia, and the breaking of new river bridge on the virginia and tennessee railroad. the next day news came from sherman and sheridan. sherman had forced johnston out of dalton, georgia, and was following him south. the report from sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defences of richmond. the prospect must now have been dismal in richmond. the road and telegraph were cut between the capital and lee. the roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. this condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. i wrote halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 16, 1864, 8 a.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c.: we have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. the roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and fredericksburg. all offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. the army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * * * * you can assure the president and secretary of war that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. the condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. but that night hancock and wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. on this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. as stated above, hancock's and wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. news came that sigel had been defeated at new market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. not two hours before, i had sent the inquiry to halleck whether sigel could not get to staunton to stop supplies coming from there to lee. i asked at once that sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. hunter's name was suggested, and i heartily approved. further news from butler reported him driven from drury's bluff, but still in possession of the petersburg road. banks had been defeated in louisiana, relieved, and canby put in his place. this change of commander was not on my suggestion. all this news was very discouraging. all of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. in fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment i thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, but this was no time for repining. i immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. i also asked halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from fredericksburg to port royal, on the rappahannock. up to this time i had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under brigadier general robert o. tyler, just arrived. they had not yet joined their command, hancock's corps, but were on our right. this corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. tyler had come up from fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near kitching's brigade of warren's corps. tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. birney was thrown to tyler's right and crawford to his left, with gibbon as a reserve; and ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. warren had been ordered to get on ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrenchments. but his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. the army being engaged until after dark, i rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. as soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, i naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. the withdrawal of hancock from the right uncovered one road from spottsylvania to fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. this was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by general ferrero, belonging to burnside's corps. ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards fredericksburg. the enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. in consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, lee could be reinforced largely, and i had no doubt he would be. beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the confederate capital when it was in danger. butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to lee. hoke was no longer needed in north carolina; and sigel's troops having gone back to cedar creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. the wilderness and spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. it occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. before leaving spottsylvania, therefore, i sent back to the defences of washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. this relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. in fact, before reaching the james river i again reduced the artillery with the army largely. i believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to richmond, and at a distance from the main army, lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. so i issued the following orders: near spottsylvania c. h., va., may 18, 1864. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. before daylight to-morrow morning i propose to draw hancock and burnside from the position they now hold, and put burnside to the left of wright. wright and burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. to-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards richmond on the line of the fredericksburg railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. if the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. u. s. grant. on the 20th, lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey--position of the national army. we were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in virginia. the roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. no men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. the country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. by reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to guiney's station, on the fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to bowling green and milford. he was at milford by the night of the 21st. here he met a detachment of pickett's division coming from richmond to reinforce lee. they were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached guiney's station that night without molestation. burnside and wright were retained at spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold lee, if possible, while hancock and warren should get start enough to interpose between him and richmond. lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking wright and burnside alone, or by following by the telegraph road and striking hancock's and warren's corps, or even hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. but he did not avail himself of either opportunity. he seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line--the telegraph road--to make sure of keeping between his capital and the army of the potomac. he never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. the evening of the 21st burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by wright, 6th corps. burnside was to take the telegraph road; but finding stanard's ford, over the po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by hancock and warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. the night of the 21st i had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at guiney's station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and hancock. there was a slight attack on burnside's and wright's corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. the object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the confederates. by the morning of the 22d burnside and wright were at guiney's station. hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. they were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. but warren was pushed to harris's store, directly west of milford, and connected with it by a good road, and burnside was sent to new bethel church. wright's corps was still back at guiney's station. i issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day: new bethel, va., may 22, 1864 major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. to-morrow. at that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. if beyond the south anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to beaver dam station, the other to jericho bridge, then south by roads reaching the anna, as near to and east of hawkins creek as they can be found. the 2d corps will move to chesterfield ford. the 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to jericho bridge. the map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. the troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. the trains will be moved at the same time to milford station. headquarters will follow the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. warren's corps was moved from harris's store to jericho ford, wright's following. warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. the men had to wade in water up to their waists. as soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. the line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river--crawford on the left, next to the river, griffin in the centre, and cutler on the right. lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. the whole of hill's corps was sent against warren's right before it had got in position. a brigade of cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. by night wright's corps was up ready to reinforce warren. on the 23d hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the north anna river just west of where the fredericksburg railroad crosses. it was near night when the troops arrived. they found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. hancock sent two brigades, egan's and pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. the bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. several hundred prisoners were captured. the hour was so late that hancock did not cross until next morning. burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the north anna at ox ford, midway between telegraph road and jericho ford. the hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. on the 24th hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. the railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. wright's corps crossed at jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of warren's corps, extending south of the virginia central railroad. this road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. it was found, however, that burnside's corps could not cross at ox ford. lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. before the exact position of the whole of lee's line was accurately known, i directed hancock and warren each to send a brigade to ox ford by the south side of the river. they found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. a third ford was found between ox ford and jericho. burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to hancock. crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with crawford's left. potter joined hancock by way of the wooden bridge. crittenden had a severe engagement with some of hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. when joined to warren's corps he was no further molested. burnside still guarded ox ford from the north side. lee now had his entire army south of the north anna. our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. to get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. we were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. about this time the very troops whose coming i had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. pickett with a full division from richmond was up; hoke from north carolina had come with a brigade; and breckinridge was there: in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. but he did not attempt to drive us from the field. on the 22d or 23d i received dispatches from washington saying that sherman had taken kingston, crossed the etowah river and was advancing into georgia. i was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for burnside's corps to pass. meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. the lady of the house, a mrs. tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. he touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live yankees" before in their lives. the elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, "oh yes, i have; many more." "where?" said burnside. "in richmond." prisoners, of course, was understood. i read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. this threw the younger lady into tears. i found the information she had received (and i suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the south) was that lee was driving us from the state in the most demoralized condition and that in the south-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from sherman was true. i assured her that there was no doubt about it. i left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. but i presume he was in the confederate army. on the 25th i gave orders, through halleck, to hunter, who had relieved sigel, to move up the valley of virginia, cross over the blue ridge to charlottesville and go as far as lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. after doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. on the same day news was received that lee was falling back on richmond. this proved not to be true. but we could do nothing where we were unless lee would assume the offensive. i determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and richmond. i had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but i did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the james river high up. sheridan was now again with the army of the potomac. on the 26th i informed the government at washington of the position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the move i proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to white house, on the pamunkey. the wagon train and guards moved directly from port royal to white house. supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. orders had previously been sent, through halleck, for butler to send smith's corps to white house. this order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the pamunkey, and marched until they joined the army of the potomac. it was a delicate move to get the right wing of the army of the potomac from its position south of the north anna in the presence of the enemy. to accomplish it, i issued the following order: quarles' mills, va., may 25, 1864. major general meade, commanding a. p. direct generals warren and wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. send that belonging to general wright's corps as far on the road to hanover town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. send with it wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, littlepage's bridge and taylor's ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. as soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from wright's corps to make a forced march to hanover town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. at the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. the two divisions of the 9th corps not now with hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. to-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. as soon as the troops reach hanover town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. i think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to little river. here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of lee's army. under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, lee being completely deceived by wilson's feint. on the afternoon of the 26th sheridan moved, sending gregg's and torbert's cavalry to taylor's and littlepage's fords towards hanover. as soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under general russell. on the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. thus a position was secured south of the pamunkey. russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to hanover town. here barringer's, formerly gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away. warren's and wright's corps were moved by the rear of burnside's and hancock's corps. when out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. the one nearest to and north of the north anna and pamunkey was taken by wright, followed by hancock. warren, followed by burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. the trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. all the troops that had crossed the pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from north anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to richmond: "enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at hanover town." the troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. the country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. the streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. the banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. hanover town is about twenty miles from richmond. there are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the chickahominy at meadow bridge, near the virginia central railroad, the second going by new and old cold harbor. a few miles out from hanover town there is a third road by way of mechanicsville to richmond. new cold harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to white house (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the james river below the richmond defences. on the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except burnside's corps. this was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. a line was at once formed extending south from the river, wright's corps on the right, hancock's in the centre, and warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. at the same time sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards mechanicsville to find lee's position. at hawes' shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to richmond, he encountered the confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. in the evening custer came up with a brigade. the attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. this time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. but our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more confederate than union soldiers had been killed. the position was easily held, because our infantry was near. on the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of lee. wright's corps pushed to hanover court house. hancock's corps pushed toward totopotomoy creek; warren's corps to the left on the shady grove church road, while burnside was held in reserve. our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. there was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and sheridan was sent to meet it. on the 30th hancock moved to the totopotomoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. wright was moved to the right of hancock's corps, and burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of hancock. warren moved up near huntley corners on the shady grove church road. there was some skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening early attacked warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and threatening to turn our left flank. as the best means of reinforcing the left, hancock was ordered to attack in his front. he carried and held the rifle-pits. while this was going on warren got his men up, repulsed early, and drove him more than a mile. on this day i wrote to halleck ordering all the pontoons in washington to be sent to city point. in the evening news was received of the arrival of smith with his corps at white house. i notified meade, in writing, as follows: near hawes' shop, va., 6.40 p.m., may 30, 1864. major-general meade, commanding a. p. general smith will debark his force at the white house tonight and start up the south bank of the pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. it is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards cold harbor, and also on the mechanicsville road. wright should be got well massed on hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the totopotomoy if necessary. i want sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communicate with smith and to return with him. i will send orders for smith by the messenger you send to sheridan with his orders. u. s. grant. i also notified smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. the night of the 30th lee's position was substantially from atlee's station on the virginia central railroad south and east to the vicinity of cold harbor. ours was: the left of warren's corps was on the shady grove road, extending to the mechanicsville road and about three miles south of the totopotomoy. burnside to his right, then hancock, and wright on the extreme right, extending towards hanover court house, six miles south-east of it. sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards cold harbor. wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the virginia central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. he got possession of hanover court house the next day after a skirmish with young's cavalry brigade. the enemy attacked sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards cold harbor. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor --correspondence with lee--retrospective. on the 31st sheridan advanced to near old cold harbor. he found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. a hard fight ensued but the place was carried. the enemy well knew the importance of cold harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. he returned with such a large force that sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. he speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defence. night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to cold harbor passing by the rear of the army. it was expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of june before it reached its destination. before the arrival of wright the enemy had made two assaults on sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on cold harbor. smith, who was coming up from white house, was also directed to march directly to cold harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of june; but by some blunder the order which reached smith directed him to newcastle instead of cold harbor. through this blunder smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. he landed twelve thousand five hundred men from butler's command, but a division was left at white house temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. before the removal of wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, federal and confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. finding at daylight that wright had left his front, lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. at all events, soon after light on the 1st of june anderson, who commanded the corps on lee's left, was seen moving along warren's front. warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while wright was directed to move out and get on his front. warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. he seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. wright reconnoitred some distance to his front: but the enemy finding old cold harbor already taken had halted and fortified some distance west. by six o'clock in the afternoon wright and smith were ready to make an assault. in front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards and then became wooded. both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. while this was going on, the enemy charged warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. there was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than warren when the enemy forced him to it. there was also an attack upon hancock's and burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve anderson who was being pressed by wright and smith. during the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting their object. hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of wright. i expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only reached old cold harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 a.m. preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with smith: hancock's corps was got into position to the left of wright's, and burnside was moved to bethesda church in reserve. while warren and burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. the attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. i was so annoyed at this that i directed meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. on this day wilson returned from his raid upon the virginia central railroad, having damaged it considerably. but, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to atlanta that well illustrates this point. the rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. one of them said, "no use, boys, old sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder." sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. he reported favorably. during the night lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. his lines extended now from the totopotomoy to new cold harbor. mine from bethesda church by old cold harbor to the chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. an assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of hancock, wright and smith; but warren and burnside were to support it by threatening lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. the corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. the move was to commence at half-past four in the morning. hancock sent barlow and gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with birney as a reserve. barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. the guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. no (*33) assistance coming to him, he (barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. he found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. but his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. the ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. an open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put martindale's division in it, and with brooks supporting him on the left and devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably picket--rifle-pits. warren and burnside also advanced and gained ground--which brought the whole army on one line. this assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate: but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. in fact, nowhere after the battle of the wilderness did lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind him. fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. at eleven o'clock i started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of hancock's and smith's corps. smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: burnside thought something could be done in his front, but warren differed. i concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. cold harbor, june 3, 1864.-12.30 p.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. to aid the expedition under general hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with lee until the former gets well on his way to lynchburg. to do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of richmond than to have them go back there. wright and hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through general smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now held. by night we were as strong against lee as he was against us. during the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. these we were able to care for. but there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. so i wrote the following: cold harbor, va., june 5, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding confederate army. it is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. i would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. i answered this immediately by saying: cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. your communication of yesterday's date is received. i will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. i propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. i will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way i proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties i may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. i answered: cold harbor, va, june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee. commanding army, n. va. the knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of june--forty-eight hours after it commenced --before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. in the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. and i wrote to lee: cold harbor, va., june 7, 1864. 10.30 a.m. gen. r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. i regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 p.m. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. as a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th north carolina regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. i regret this, but will state that as soon as i learned the fact, i directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. these officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, i remain, &c., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i have always regretted that the last assault at cold harbor was ever made. i might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of may, 1863, at vicksburg. at cold harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the confederate side. before that, the army of northern virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the army of the potomac. they no longer wanted to fight them "one confederate to five yanks." indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. they had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the army of the potomac. this charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. the effect upon the army of the potomac was the reverse. when we reached the james river, however, all effects of the battle of cold harbor seemed to have disappeared. there was more justification for the assault at vicksburg. we were in a southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. the army of the tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. they had driven a portion of that army from port gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at grand gulf. they had attacked another portion of the same army at raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the state, and driven them back into jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms: they had captured the capital of the state of mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at champion's hill, next at big black river bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. the army of the tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. there was no telling how long a regular siege might last. as i have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a southern climate. there was no telling what the casualties might be among northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. if vicksburg could have been carried in may, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. these are reasons justifying the assault. the only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. had the assault not been made, i have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james--general lee --visit to butler--the movement on petersburg--the investment of petersburg. lee's position was now so near richmond, and the intervening swamps of the chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that i determined to make my next left flank move carry the army of the potomac south of the james river. (*34) preparations for this were promptly commenced. the move was a hazardous one to make: the chickahominy river, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and butler, by the roads i should have to travel, with both the james and the chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the army of the potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the chickahominy and the james, move rapidly on butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. then too he might spare troops enough to send against hunter who was approaching lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. but the move had to be made, and i relied upon lee's not seeing my danger as i saw it. besides we had armies on both sides of the james river and not far from the confederate capital. i knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. but i took all the precaution i knew of to guard against all dangers. sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with hunter and to break up the virginia central railroad and the james river canal, on the 7th of june, taking instructions to hunter to come back with him (*35). hunter was also informed by way of washington and the valley that sheridan was on the way to meet him. the canal and central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the army of northern virginia and the people of richmond. before sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from hunter reporting his advance to staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the confederate commander, w. s. jones, was killed. on the 4th of june the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, burnside on our right was moved up between warren and smith. on the 5th birney returned to hancock, which extended his left now to the chickahominy, and warren was withdrawn to cold harbor. wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to bottom's bridge. the cavalry extended still farther east to jones's bridge. on the 7th abercrombie--who was in command at white house, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start--was ordered to take up the iron from the york river railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to city point. on the 8th meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. on the 9th abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at white house, without debarking from their transports, to report to butler. halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to city point. on the 11th i wrote: cold harbor, va., june 11, 1864. major-gen. b. f. butler, commanding department of va. and n. c. the movement to transfer this army to the south side of the james river will commence after dark to-morrow night. col. comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at bermuda hundred. colonel comstock has not yet returned, so that i cannot make instructions as definite as i would wish, but the time between this and sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, i must do the best i can. colonel dent goes to the chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. the corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a forced march to cole's landing or ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning. this corps numbers now 15,300 men. they take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these latter marching with the balance of the army to the james river. the remainder of the army will cross the chickahominy at long bridge and at jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below city point. i directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. i am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. general smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of richmond. the balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. i wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. if there is a point below city point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. i do not want petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. if you should go there, i think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. if colonel dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--on reflection i will send the 18th corps by way of white house. the distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the chickahominy will be avoided. u. s. grant. cold harbor, va., june 11,1864. major-general g. g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. colonel comstock, who visited the james river for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below bermuda hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. it is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. the movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to cole's landing or ferry, and there embark for city point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. the 5th corps will seize long bridge and move out on the long bridge road to its junction with quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy. the other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at long bridge, and two at jones's bridge. after the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about fort powhattan. of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. the 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. the wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than jones's they should take it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--in view of the long march to reach cole's landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to white house. they should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. u. s. grant. about this time word was received (through the richmond papers of the 11th) that crook and averell had united and were moving east. this, with the news of hunter's successful engagement near staunton, was no doubt known to lee before it was to me. then sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to lee's communications and supplies. much of his cavalry was sent after sheridan, and early with ewell's entire corps was sent to the valley. supplies were growing scarce in richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. people from outside began to pour into richmond to help eat up the little on hand. consternation reigned there. on the 12th smith was ordered to move at night to white house, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for city point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. soon after dark some of the cavalry at long bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. a pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. hancock followed warren. burnside took the road to jones's bridge, followed by wright. ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by window shades and cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. it was known that the enemy had some gunboats at richmond. these might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. general butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. on the 13th i sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the enemy. as soon as warren's corps was over the chickahominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from richmond while the army passed. no attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but warren and wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. by the evening of the 13th hancock's corps was at charles city court house on the james river. burnside's and wright's corps were on the chickahominy, and crossed during the night, warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. the material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of brigadier-general benham, commanding the engineer brigade. on the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. when the wilderness campaign commenced the army of the potomac, including burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of may when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men. during the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. at the crossing of the james river june 14th-15th the army numbered about 115,000. besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one-half of the artillery was sent back to washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* in estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. we were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. the manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. in the confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, i believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field. officers and details of enlisted men are not included. in the northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. estimated in the same manner as ours, lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start. his reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. he was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his army. the citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. all circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. general lee, who had led the army of northern virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the confederate army and states, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the northern states. his praise was sounded throughout the entire north after every action he was engaged in: the number of his forces was always lowered and that of the national forces exaggerated. he was a large, austere man, and i judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. to be extolled by the entire press of the south after every engagement, and by a portion of the press north with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. it was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from eastern officers, "well, grant has never met bobby lee yet." there were good and true officers who believe now that the army of northern virginia was superior to the army of the potomac man to man. i do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. before the end i believe the difference was the other way. the army of northern virginia became despondent and saw the end. it did not please them. the national army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. the advance of the army of the potomac reached the james on the 14th of june. preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. as already stated, i had previously ordered general butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent confederate gunboats from coming down the river. butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. i ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. i then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to bermuda hundred to see general butler for the purpose of directing a movement against petersburg, while our troops of the army of the potomac were crossing. i had sent general w. f. smith back from cold harbor by the way of white house, thence on steamers to city point for the purpose of giving general butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. general butler was ordered to send smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the army of the james. he gave smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under hinks. the distance which smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the confederate advance line of works was but two miles outside of petersburg. smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. i believed then, and still believe, that petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. it only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between city point and their lines outside of petersburg. this position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. while there i informed general butler that hancock's corps would cross the river and move to petersburg to support smith in case the latter was successful, and that i could reinforce there more rapidly than lee could reinforce from his position. i returned down the river to where the troops of the army of the potomac now were, communicated to general meade, in writing, the directions i had given to general butler and directed him (meade) to cross hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from smith. i also informed general meade that i had ordered rations from bermuda hundred for hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. the rations did not reach him, however, and hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. he then moved without them, and on the road received a note from general w. f. smith, asking him to come on. this seems to be the first information that general hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. the enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. to the east side of petersburg, from the appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles, probably three. if they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of richmond. smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. by nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. all of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him; and smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. next morning, the 16th, hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at gettysburg. during the day meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. in all this we lost very heavily. the works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. up to this time beauregard, who had commanded south of richmond, had received no reinforcements, except hoke's division from drury's bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. during the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by potter during the day. during the night, however, beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. colonel j. l. chamberlain, of the 20th maine, was wounded on the 18th. he was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. he had several times been recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. on this occasion, however, i promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the war department, asking that my act might be confirmed and chamberlain's name sent to the senate for confirmation without any delay. this was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well. if general hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. the days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. i do not think there is any doubt that petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. this would have given us control of both the weldon and south side railroads. this would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. i now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. they remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when general meade ordered an advance towards the weldon railroad. we were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the south side railroad if possible. meade moved hancock's corps, now commanded by birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. general wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the weldon road. the enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the national troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. the army of the potomac was given the investment of petersburg, while the army of the james held bermuda hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the james river. the 9th corps, burnside's, was placed upon the right at petersburg; the 5th, warren's, next; the 2d, birney's, next; then the 6th, wright's, broken off to the left and south. thus began the siege of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad --early 's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg --explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. on the 7th of june, while at cold harbor, i had as already indicated sent sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the virginia central railroad. general hunter had been operating up the shenandoah valley with some success, having fought a battle near staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. after the battle he formed a junction at staunton with averell and crook, who had come up from the kanawha, or gauley river. it was supposed, therefore, that general hunter would be about charlottesville, virginia, by the time sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. i gave sheridan instructions to have hunter, in case he should meet him about charlottesville, join and return with him to the army of the potomac. lee, hearing of hunter's success in the valley, started breckinridge out for its defence at once. learning later of sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and fitz-hugh lee's. sheridan moved to the north side of the north anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. he pushed on to get to trevilian station to commence his destruction at that point. on the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of trevilian, while fitz-hugh lee was the same night at trevilian station and hampton but a few miles away. during the night hampton ordered an advance on sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. sheridan, however, by a counter move sent custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. this he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. the losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to city point. during that day, the 11th, sheridan moved into trevilian station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. there was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. in the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he left trevilian. sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that general hunter was about lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to charlottesville with a view to meet him. sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of white house, and arriving there on the 21st. here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. he had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy. white house up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops were all on the james river, it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies. sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he did on the 22d of june, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train with him. all these were over the james river by the 26th of the month, and sheridan ready to follow. in the meantime meade had sent wilson's division on a raid to destroy the weldon and south side roads. now that sheridan was safe and hampton free to return to richmond with his cavalry, wilson's position became precarious. meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of wilson. wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon repaired. after these events comparative quiet reigned about petersburg until late in july. the time, however, was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. in the meantime i had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as i could have wished. general hunter who had been appointed to succeed sigel in the shenandoah valley immediately took up the offensive. he met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and defeated him. on the 8th he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured lynchburg. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent early with his corps, a part of which reached lynchburg before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by the way of the gauley and kanawha rivers, thence up the ohio river, returning to harper's ferry by way of the baltimore and ohio railroad. a long time was consumed in making this movement. meantime the valley was left open to early's troops, and others in that quarter; and washington also was uncovered. early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on washington. in the absence of hunter, general lew wallace, with headquarters at baltimore, commanded the department in which the shenandoah lay. his surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which early had with him; but the situation of washington was precarious, and wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the monocacy. he could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until washington could be put into a state of preparation for his reception. i had previously ordered general meade to send a division to baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of washington, and he had sent ricketts's division of the 6th corps (wright's), which arrived in baltimore on the 8th of july. finding that wallace had gone to the front with his command, ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the monocacy with his entire division. they met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. the next morning early started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. learning of the gravity of the situation i had directed general meade to also order wright with the rest of his corps directly to washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that early arrived before it. the 19th corps, which had been stationed in louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about richmond, had about this time arrived at fortress monroe, on their way to join us. i diverted them from that point to washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with wright, on the 11th. the 19th corps was commanded by major-general emory. early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. he at once commenced to retreat, wright following. there is no telling how much this result was contributed to by general lew wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. if early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. farther west also the troubles were threatening. some time before, forrest had met sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. this left forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of sherman who was then advancing. sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. two divisions under a. j. smith had been sent to banks in louisiana some months before. sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack forrest. smith met and defeated him very badly. i then directed that smith should hang to forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his getting upon the memphis and nashville railroad. sherman had anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions for this order to smith, he repeated it. on the 25th of june general burnside had commenced running a mine from about the centre of his front under the confederate works confronting him. he was induced to do this by colonel pleasants, of the pennsylvania volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. burnside had submitted the scheme to meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. his position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. the position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. in the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. the position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. the work progressed, and on the 23d of july the mine was finished ready for charging; but i had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. on the 17th of july several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in richmond, and that lee was coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to georgia where the army sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. i put the army commanders, meade and butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not made. i concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that lee had had. wright's and emory's corps were in washington, and with this reduction of my force lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send west. i had other objects in view, however, besides keeping lee where he was. the mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and i wanted to take that occasion to carry petersburg if i could. it was the object, therefore, to get as many of lee's troops away from the south side of the james river as possible. accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with hancock's corps and sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of deep bottom, where butler had a pontoon bridge laid. the plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with kautz's cavalry of the army of the james, get by lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the virginia central railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. we were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the james as i expected. the mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of july was the time fixed for its explosion. i gave meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th directing how i wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged. meade's instructions, which i, of course, approved most heartily, were all that i can see now was necessary. the only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them. the gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. all was ready by the time i had prescribed; and on the 29th hancock and sheridan were brought back near the james river with their troops. under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at deep bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to burnside's corps, while ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under meade, was to form in the rear of burnside to support him when he went in. all were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and burnside had taken possession. burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by ord's and warren's corps. warren and ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. the four divisions of his corps were commanded by generals potter, willcox, ledlie and ferrero. the last was a colored division; and burnside selected it to make the assault. meade interfered with this. burnside then took ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. in fact, potter and willcox were the only division commanders burnside had who were equal to the occasion. ledlie besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among soldiers. there was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. when it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. there was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as i expected they would do. there had been great consternation in petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. they knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. we had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. they said that we had undermined the whole of petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. i somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. it was just as i expected it would be. we could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. it was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. the effort was a stupendous failure. it cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault. after being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of lee's army which had been drawn north of the james river were still there, i gave meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the weldon railroad. but misfortunes never come singly. i learned during that same afternoon that wright's pursuit of early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from washington, while i was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across chesapeake bay being broken. early, however, was not aware of the fact that wright was not pursuing until he had reached strasburg. finding that he was not pursued he turned back to winchester, where crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out. he then pushed north until he had reached the potomac, then he sent mccausland across to chambersburg, pa., to destroy that town. chambersburg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet mccausland, under early's orders, burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless. this occurred on the 30th of july. i rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the weldon railroad, and directed them to embark for washington city. after burning chambersburg mccausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley and driven into virginia. the shenandoah valley was very important to the confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about richmond. it was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. it had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from washington. it seemed to be the policy of general halleck and secretary stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. they were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western maryland and pennsylvania. i determined to put a stop to this. i started sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry. i had previously asked to have sheridan assigned to that command, but mr. stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. on the 1st of august when i sent reinforcements for the protection of washington, i sent the following orders: city point, va., august 1, 1864, 11.30 a.m. major-general halleck, washington d. c. i am sending general sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. unless general hunter is in the field in person, i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the virginia central railroad. if general hunter is in the field, give sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. all the cavalry, i presume, will reach washington in the course of to-morrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the president in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field, operating against early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch: office u. s. military telegraph, war department, washington, d. c., august 3, 1864. cypher. 6 p.m., lt. general grant, city point, va. i have seen your despatch in which you say, "i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." this, i think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. but please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. i repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. a. lincoln. i replied to this that "i would start in two hours for washington," and soon got off, going directly to the monocacy without stopping at washington on my way. i found general hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the baltimore and ohio railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. i asked the general where the enemy was. he replied that he did not know. he said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with orders from washington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. i then told the general that i would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for halltown, some four miles above harper's ferry, in the shenandoah valley. the cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. i knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south. i then wrote out general hunter's instructions. (*39) i told him that sheridan was in washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, cumberland, baltimore, or elsewhere, and give sheridan command of the troops in the field. the general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. he said that general halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. he did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. there were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. i told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for sheridan to come to the monocacy, and suggested that i would wait and meet him there. sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. i went to the station and remained there until he arrived. myself and one or two of my staff were about all the union people, except general hunter and his staff, who were left at the monocacy when sheridan arrived. i hastily told sheridan what had been done and what i wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for general hunter and directed to that officer. sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry. early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the national commander over the confederate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. as i had predicted, early was soon found in front of sheridan in the valley, and pennsylvania and maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. the importance of the valley was so great to the confederates that lee reinforced early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. to prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from richmond, i had to do something to compel lee to retain his forces about his capital. i therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the james river, to threaten richmond. hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps under birney, and gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the james during the night of the 13th-14th of august. a threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success. general meade was left in command of the few troops around petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. there was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley. i informed sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures. i also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that i should be able to prevent the going of any more. to add to my embarrassment at this time sherman, who was now near atlanta, wanted reinforcements. he was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the north-west, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. i therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the north-west be sent to him. sherman also wanted to be assured that no eastern troops were moving out against him. i informed him of what i had done and assured him that i would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. i also informed him that his real danger was from kirby smith, who commanded the trans-mississippi department. if smith should escape steele, and get across the mississippi river, he might move against him. i had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready to move from new orleans against mobile in case kirby smith should get across. this would have a tendency to draw him to the defence of that place, instead of going against sherman. right in the midst of all these embarrassments halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the north to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. he also advised taking in sail, and not going too fast. the troops were withdrawn from the north side of the james river on the night of the 20th. before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of lee's force was on that side of the river, warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the weldon railroad. he took up his line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. from our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the weldon railroad. a division was ordered from the right of the petersburg line to reinforce warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the james river to take its place. this road was very important to the enemy. the limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and i knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. he fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. lee made repeated attempts to dislodge warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. as soon as warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that source. it was on the 21st that lee seemed to have given up the weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. on the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg were sent south to destroy the weldon railroad. they were attacked on the 25th at reams's station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. but the weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of august to the close of the war. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. we had our troops on the weldon railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; sherman just getting through to atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; washington threatened but a short time before, and now early being strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. it kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. on the 10th of august sheridan had advanced on early up the shenandoah valley, early falling back to strasburg. on the 12th i learned that lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen early. it was important that sheridan should be informed of this, so i sent the information to washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. the messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached sheridan just in time. the officer went through by way of snicker's gap, escorted by some cavalry. he found sheridan just making his preparations to attack early in his chosen position. now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. on the 15th of september i started to visit general sheridan in the shenandoah valley. my purpose was to have him attack early, or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for lee's army. i knew it was impossible for me to get orders through washington to sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such orders as halleck's caution (and that of the secretary of war) would suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. i therefore, without stopping at washington, went directly through to charlestown, some ten miles above harper's ferry, and waited there to see general sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. when sheridan arrived i asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. he at once drew one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. he said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the confederates, and that he could "whip them." before starting i had drawn up a plan of campaign for sheridan, which i had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his views and so confident of success, i said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket. sheridan's wagon trains were kept at harper's ferry, where all of his stores were. by keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. as supplies of ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at winchester. knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagons trains from harper's ferry, i asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following tuesday. this was on friday. "o yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on monday." i told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and i immediately started to return to the army about richmond. after visiting baltimore and burlington, new jersey, i arrived at city point on the 19th. on the way out to harper's ferry i had met mr. robert garrett, president of the baltimore and ohio railroad. he seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. it was a large piece of property to have standing idle. i told him i could not answer then positively but would try and inform him before a great while. on my return mr. garrett met me again with the same and i told him i thought that by the wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. i gave him no further information however, and he had no suspicion of how i expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. he met early at the crossing of opequon creek, a most decisive victory--one which the country. early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy. he had sent g. t. anderson's division east of the blue ridge before i went to harper's ferry; and about the time i arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to martinsburg for the purpose destroying the baltimore and ohio railroad at that point. early here learned that i had been with sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. but his forces were separated and, as i have said, he was very badly defeated. he fell back to fisher's hill, sheridan following. the valley is narrow at that point, and early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. but sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. the pursuit was continued up the valley to mount jackson and new market. sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. the houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. finally, on the 25th, early turned from the valley eastward, leaving sheridan at harrisonburg in undisputed possession. now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished. sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. what he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. i congratulated sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around petersburg. i also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. i had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the november elections. the convention which had met and made its nomination of the democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a failure. treason was talked as boldly in chicago at that convention as ever been in charleston. it was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who talked treason. but this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in washington, and the president became very much frightened about him. he was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of general cass was said to have been, in one of our indian wars, when he was an officer of army. cass was pursuing the indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the indians pursuing him. the president was afraid that sheridan had got on the other side of early and that early was in behind him. he was afraid that sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from richmond to enable early to beat him. i replied to the president that i had taken steps to prevent lee from sending reinforcements to early, by attacking the former where he was. on the 28th of september, to retain lee in his position, i sent ord with the 18th corps and birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on richmond, to threaten it. ord moved with the left wing up to chaffin's bluff; birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while kautz with the cavalry took the darby road, still farther to the north. they got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. in that, however, they were unsuccessful. the enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. stannard's division of the 18th corps with general burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against fort harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. burnham was killed in the assault. colonel stevens who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. our troops fortified their new position, bringing fort harrison into the new line and extending it to the river. this brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the james, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. in the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon general heckman, and later general weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th corps. during the night lee reinforced his troops about fort gilmer, which was at the right of fort harrison, by eight additional brigades from petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. all their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. in one of these assaults upon us general stannard, a gallant officer who was defending fort harrison, lost an arm. our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, i,554 wounded and 324 missing. whilst this was going on general meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. parke and warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. the object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. on the 30th these troops moved out, under warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main line. our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. the number of killed and wounded was not large. the next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. this advanced warren's position on the weldon railroad very considerably. sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. i approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send wright's corps back to the james river. i further directed him to repair the railroad up the shenandoah valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force. the troops were to be sent to washington by the way of culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the blue ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. the valley was so very important, however, to the confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed. reinforcements were sent therefore to early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. early prepared to strike sheridan at harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. on the 6th of october sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle before him, early following. at fisher's hill sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of early, which, under the lead of rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. sheridan lost only about sixty men. his cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. on the 10th of october the march down the valley was again resumed, early again following. i now ordered sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the james river canal and virginia central railroad. but this order had to go through washington where it was intercepted; and when sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what i wanted him to do it was something entirely different. halleck informed sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against charlottesville and gordonsville; that he should fortify this position and provision it. sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and i was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows: city point, va., october 14, 1864.--12.30 p.m. major-general sheridan, cedar creek, va. what i want is for you to threaten the virginia central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. if you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. if you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. i deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. you need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sheridan having been summoned to washington city, started on the 15th leaving wright in command. his army was then at cedar creek, some twenty miles south of winchester. the next morning while at front royal, sheridan received a dispatch from wright, saying that a dispatch from longstreet to early had been intercepted. it directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush sheridan as soon as he, longstreet, arrived. on the receipt of this news sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley to join wright. on the 18th of october early was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. the right under general getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to middletown where it took a position and made a stand. the cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to winchester and held them for the use of our troops in falling back, general wright having ordered a retreat back to that place. sheridan having left washington on the 18th, reached winchester that night. the following morning he started to join his command. he had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. he immediately ordered the cavalry at winchester to be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. leaving members of his staff to take care of winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. as he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. his presence soon restored confidence. finding themselves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. when sheridan got to the front he found getty and custer still holding their ground firmly between the confederates and our retreating troops. everything in the rear was now ordered up. sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. this was made with vigor, and was directed principally against emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. by one o'clock the attack was repulsed. early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. he thought, no doubt, that sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was mistaken. about the middle of the afternoon sheridan advanced. he sent his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. the contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. this victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the valley of virginia. all the confederate troops were sent back to richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. wright's corps was ordered back to the army of the potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than sheridan had commanded from first to last. on more than one occasion in these engagements general r. b. hayes, who succeeded me as president of the united states, bore a very honorable part. his conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. this might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so: "any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in congress, ought to be scalped." having entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, general hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general before its close. on the north side of the james river the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry on the 7th of october, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. this was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. on the 24th i ordered general meade to attempt to get possession of the south side railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. the attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment i ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the james river in order to support this move, by detaining there the confederate troops who were on that side. he succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before turning in on the darby road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. this closed active operations around richmond for the winter. of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either petersburg or richmond. it would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not interest the general reader if given. all these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the scribners, badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the war department, including both the national and confederate reports. in the latter part of november general hancock was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by the secretary of war and ordered to washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the 1st corps. it was expected that this would give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring. it was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the blue ridge to lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. i expected, with sherman coming up from the south, meade south of petersburg and around richmond, and thomas's command in tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that state, to move from the direction of washington or the valley towards lynchburg. we would then have lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. general humphreys, chief-of-staff of the army of the potomac, was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed hancock. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. let us now return to the operations in the military division of the mississippi, and accompany sherman in his march to the sea. the possession of atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. a short time after the fall of atlanta mr. davis visited palmetto and macon and made speeches at each place. he spoke at palmetto on the 20th of september, and at macon on the 22d. inasmuch as he had relieved johnston and appointed hood, and hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to suppose that mr. davis was disappointed with general johnston's policy. my own judgment is that johnston acted very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. as sherman advanced, as i have show, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in detail. i know that both sherman and i were rejoiced when we heard of the change. hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. in his speeches mr. davis denounced governor brown, of georgia, and general johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty to the southern cause was doubtful. so far as general johnston is concerned, i think davis did him a great injustice in this particular. i had know the general before the war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. there, as i have said, i think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole south--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. the north was already growing weary, as the south evidently was also, but with this difference. in the north the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. the south was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. mr. davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of georgia and that portion of the south to come to their relief. he tried to assure his frightened hearers that the yankees were rapidly digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut them off from supplies from the north; and that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the northern states, and they were republished. of course, that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with sherman. when hood was forced to retreat from atlanta he moved to the south-west and was followed by a portion of sherman's army. he soon appeared upon the railroad in sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. at the same time also the work was begun in tennessee and kentucky which mr. davis had assured his hearers at palmetto and macon would take place. he ordered forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the south) north for this purpose; and forrest and wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. hood's army had been weakened by governor brown's withdrawing the georgia state troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. this not only depleted hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and mr. davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which mr. davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than napoleon's retreat from moscow. these speeches of mr. davis were not long in reaching sherman. he took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to break his communications. something else had to be done: and to sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. on september 10th i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., sept. 10, 1864. major-general sherman, atlanta, georgia. so soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. we want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. if we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. now that we have all of mobile bay that is valuable, i do not know but it will be the best move to transfer canby's troops to act upon savannah, whilst you move on augusta. i should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sherman replied promptly: "if i could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at augusta, or columbus, georgia, i can march to milledgeville, and compel hood to give up augusta or macon, and then turn on the other. * * * if you can manage to take the savannah river as high up as augusta, or the chattahoochee as far up as columbus, i can sweep the whole state of georgia." on the 12th i sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting sherman's views about the next campaign. city point, va., sept. 12, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill division of the mississippi. i send lieutenant-colonel porter, of my staff, with this. colonel porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than i can do in the limits of a letter. although i feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, i am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. my lines are necessarily very long, extending from deep bottom north of the james across the peninsula formed by the appomattox and the james, and south of the appomattox to the weldon road. this line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. i propose, when i do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the south side, or lynchburg and petersburg road, then if possible to keep the danville road cut. at the same time this move is made, i want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against wilmington. the way i propose to do this is to land the men north of fort fisher, and hold that point. at the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at mobile. this will give us the same control of the harbor of wilmington that we now have of the harbor of mobile. what you are to do with the forces at your command, i do not see. the difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, i plainly see. if it had not been for price's movements canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to mobile. from your command on the mississippi an equal number could have been taken. with these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to mobile and the other half to savannah. you could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten macon and augusta equally. whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. my object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. it will probably be the 5th of october before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed. if you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and i will approve them. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. this reached sherman on september 20th. on the 25th of september sherman reported to washington that hood's troops were in his rear. he had provided against this by sending a division to chattanooga and a division to rome, georgia, which was in the rear of hood, supposing that hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. at the same time sherman and hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. on the 27th of september i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., september 27, 1864--10.30 a.m. major-general sherman: i have directed all recruits and new troops from the western states to be sent to nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. on the 29th sherman sent thomas back to chattanooga, and afterwards to nashville, with another division (morgan's) of the advanced army. sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should take place against milledgeville and then to savannah. his expectation at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could make two miles to sherman's one. he depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. as i have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of sherman's army. it had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when i first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-mississippi, should move against mobile. i recommended this from time to time until i came into command of the army, the last of march 1864. having the power in my own hands, i now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the gulf about new orleans, with a view to a move against mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. before i came into command, these troops had been scattered over the trans-mississippi department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused mobile to be selected as the objective point for sherman's army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from atlanta, no longer existed. general g. m. dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of october. he was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one. sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right commanded by general o. o. howard and the left by general slocum. general dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and slocum's the 14th and 20th corps, commanded by generals jeff. c. davis and a. s. williams. generals logan and blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. about this time they left to take part in the presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to osterhaus and ransom. i have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the war department. general blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at washington. general logan did not return to his command until after it reached savannah. logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of general howard from that portion of the army of the potomac which was then with the western army, to the command of the army of the tennessee, with which army general logan had served from the battle of belmont to the fall of atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the death of mcpherson the command of the entire army of the tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. he conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement; and i can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. i will not pretend to question the motive which actuated sherman in taking an officer from another army to supersede general logan. i have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; though i doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as logan would have done. differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. the officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand effective men. all weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any european soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the machine thought. european armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. included in these sixty thousand troops, there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand men. hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of forrest, whose forces were operating in tennessee and kentucky, as mr. davis had promised they should. this part of mr. davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. i say this because i have criticised his military judgment in the removal of johnston, and also in the appointment of hood. i am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between davis and his subordinate, whom i regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants. on the 5th of october the railroad back from atlanta was again very badly broken, hood having got on the track with his army. sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. the defence of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched positions against hood's whole army; in fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at them. allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of general corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. he, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the national army and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the confederate troops between him and his subordinate. he sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching corse, would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. corse was a man who would never surrender. from a high position some of sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block house at allatoona. it was from corse. he had been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. it was at this point probably, that sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the north would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond atlanta. he proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. sherman thought hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making thomas strong enough to hold tennessee and kentucky. i, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that hood would go north, as he did. on the 2d of november i telegraphed sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up atlanta and the railroad back to chattanooga. to strengthen thomas he sent stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered schofield, commanding the army of the ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. in addition to this, a. j. smith, who, with two divisions of sherman's army, was in missouri aiding rosecrans in driving the enemy from that state, was under orders to return to thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before hood could reach nashville. in addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the north-west went to thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at bridgeport, stevenson, decatur, murfreesboro, and florence. there were already with him in nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of nashville, for its defence. also, wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. these reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. about this time beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which hood and sherman were, or might be, operating. he made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. but it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. hood soon started north, and went into camp near decatur, alabama, where he remained until the 29th of october, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. the tennessee river was patrolled by gunboats, from muscle shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the ohio river. these, with the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross the tennessee at any place where it was navigable. but muscle shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal which also obstructs navigation. hood therefore moved down to a point nearly opposite florence, alabama, crossed over and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and ammunition. all of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. on the 1st of november i suggested to sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying hood before he started on his campaign. on the 2d of november, as stated, i approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through georgia, leaving hood behind to the tender mercy of thomas and the troops in his command. sherman fixed the 10th of november as the day of starting. sherman started on that day to get back to atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. the right wing, under howard, and the cavalry went to jonesboro, milledgeville, then the capital of georgia, being sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to savannah. the left wing moved to stone mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. slocum was in command, and threatened augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the right wing at milledgeville. atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well done. sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. his artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. the ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. small rations were taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. the army was expected to live on the country, and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days. the troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. the method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. the ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. when a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on fire. this would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of georgia. all this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. some piled the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. the organization for supplying the army was very complete. each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. strict injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. the supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. the captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations. the skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous. when they started out in the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. these would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted. many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance; indeed, i am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. i suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. in one instance it was reported that a few men of sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. they immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. the lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. the soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied: "the rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one. another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. the south, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. on one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. the soldier replied, "madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound." "but this is not a bloodhound," said the lady. "well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it. notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, i do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded. on the 23d sherman, with the left wing, reached milledgeville. the right wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards savannah destroying the road as it went. the troops at milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its march. the governor, who had been almost defying mr. davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the state and all the state officers. the governor, sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the state to fall into our hands. the only military force that was opposed to sherman's forward march was the georgia militia, a division under the command of general g. w. smith, and a battalion under harry wayne. neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of sherman's army. the people at the south became so frantic at this time at the successful invasion of georgia that they took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. they even liberated the state convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army. i have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as could be found in every community, north and south--who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. they were in but little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected. the southern papers in commenting upon sherman's movements pictured him as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection of our navy. these papers got to the north and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with sherman. mr. lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if i could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. i told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as sherman had with him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. he might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could return north. i heard afterwards of mr. lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of sherman's army, that sherman was all right: "grant says they are safe with such a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at." while at milledgeville the soldiers met at the state house, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the state of georgia. the debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the south was in at that time, particularly the state of georgia. they went so far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession. the next day (24th) sherman continued his march, going by the way of waynesboro and louisville, millen being the next objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. the left wing moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as though augusta was the point they were aiming for. they moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. the cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising millen before the union prisoners could be carried away; but they failed in this. the distance from milledgeville to millen was about one hundred miles. at this point wheeler, who had been ordered from tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting sherman. hardee, a native of georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. it was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept sherman's march. he did succeed in raising some troops, and with these and those under the command of wheeler and wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention. our cavalry and wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which wheeler was driven towards augusta, thus giving the idea that sherman was probably making for that point. millen was reached on the 3d of december, and the march was resumed the following day for savannah, the final objective. bragg had now been sent to augusta with some troops. wade hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy sherman's army. if he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. hardee's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men. from millen to savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. this answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations. no further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a few miles of savannah. this place was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. one of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. no further explosion took place. on the 10th of december the siege of savannah commenced. sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would permit. in marching to the coast he encountered fort mcallister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. fort mcallister was soon captured by an assault made by general hazen's division. communication was then established with the fleet. the capture of savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of life. the garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward. when sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which i had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which i supposed he would be in need of. general j. g. foster, who commanded all the troops south of north carolina on the atlantic sea-board, visited general sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at hilton head, for the purpose of sending sherman siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be found outside. the mail on the steamer which i sent down, had been collected by colonel a. h. markland of the post office department, who went in charge of it. on this same vessel i sent an officer of my staff (lieutenant dunn) with the following letter to general sherman: city point, va., dec. 3, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding armies near savannah, ga. the little information gleaned from the southern press, indicating no great obstacle to your progress, i have directed your mails (which had been previously collected at baltimore by colonel markland, special agent of the post office department) to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, i abstain from congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been struck. i have never had a fear, however, for the result. since you left atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. the enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching against you. i think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. bragg has gone from wilmington. i am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. owing to some preparations admiral porter and general butler are making to blow up fort fisher (which, while hoping for the best, i do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. i hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that bragg will not have started back by that time. in this letter i do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea i have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. with your veteran army i hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of atlanta. the condition will be filled by holding savannah and augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of savannah and branchville. if wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you. thomas has got back into the defences of nashville, with hood close upon him. decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to chattanooga. part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. it did not look so, however, to me. in my opinion, thomas far outnumbers hood in infantry. in cavalry, hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. i hope yet that hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. the general news you will learn from the papers better than i could give it. after all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, i will run down the coast to see you. if you desire it, i will ask mrs. sherman to go with me. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general i quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period. sherman now (the 15th) returned to savannah to complete its investment and insure the surrender of the garrison. the country about savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway. for this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to the union troops, with the chance of failing altogether. sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. when he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. general hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as sherman had described. he said he was in full communication with his department and was receiving supplies constantly. hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. on the south carolina side the country was all rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that hardee had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank of the river. sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where general foster had troops stationed under general hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of south carolina, to the plank road which general hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication. while arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, sherman received information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had evacuated savannah the night before. this was the night of the 21st of december. before evacuating the place hardee had blown up the navy yard. some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms. a little incident occurred, soon after the fall of savannah, which sherman relates in his memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition. savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. shortly after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the confederates were still in possession. it was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the custom house, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected. as there was some discussion as to the authorship of sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, i want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between general sherman and myself. circumstances made the plan on which sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from atlanta forward. his suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in washington. even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the president, induced no doubt by his advisers. this went so far as to move the president to ask me to suspend sherman's march for a day or two until i could think the matter over. my recollection is, though i find no record to show it, that out of deference to the president's wish i did send a dispatch to sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that i could not do so. however this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from atlanta to savannah is easily answered: it was clearly sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. it was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (*40) i was in favor of sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. my chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as i learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at washington to stop it. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville. as we have seen, hood succeeded in crossing the tennessee river between muscle shoals and the lower shoals at the end of october, 1864. thomas sent schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades of wilson's cavalry to pulaski to watch him. on the 17th of november hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid schofield, thereby turning his position. hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by stephen d. lee, stewart and cheatham. these, with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. thomas's orders were, therefore, for schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by thomas himself. as soon as schofield saw this movement of hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to columbia. at columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. from this place schofield then retreated to franklin. he had sent his wagons in advance, and stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. cheatham's corps of hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp at spring hill, for the night of the 29th. schofield retreating from columbia on the 29th, passed spring hill, where cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the confederates were encamped. on the morning of the 30th he had arrived at franklin. hood followed closely and reached franklin in time to make an attack the same day. the fight was very desperate and sanguinary. the confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. this fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in, when the confederates drew off. general stanley, who commanded two divisions of the union troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position. the enemy's loss at franklin, according to thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing. thomas made no effort to reinforce schofield at franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. he simply ordered schofield to continue his retreat to nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day. thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive hood. the road to chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at murfreesboro, stevenson, bridgeport and chattanooga. thomas had previously given up decatur and had been reinforced by a. j. smith's two divisions just returned from missouri. he also had steedman's division and r. s. granger's, which he had drawn from the front. his quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, general j. l. donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of general z. b. tower, of the united states engineers. hood was allowed to move upon nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of hood. he had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. to me his delay was unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. it is true the weather was very bad. the rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. but i was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude thomas and manage to get north of the cumberland river. if he did this, i apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the north, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the east to head him off if he got there, general thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence. i consequently urged thomas in frequent dispatches sent from city point(*41) to make the attack at once. the country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and i was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which i have just described that is, hood would get north. it was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc. at last i had to say to general thomas that i should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. he replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. general logan happening to visit city point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, i gave him an order to proceed to nashville to relieve thomas. i directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. after logan started, in thinking over the situation, i became restless, and concluded to go myself. i went as far as washington city, when a dispatch was received from general thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement. i concluded to wait until that time. he did move, and was successful from the start. this was on the 15th of december. general logan was at louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to washington, and proceeded no farther himself. the battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. the next day the battle was renewed. after a successful assault upon hood's men in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy retreated. they sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to franklin ahead of hood's broken army by the granny white road, but too much time was consumed in getting started. they had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing. here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which the confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. they were too late. the enemy already had possession of franklin, and was beyond them. it now became a chase in which the confederates had the lead. our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other bridges over duck river. the heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward chattanooga. there was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. of course hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. up to january, 1865, the enemy occupied fort fisher, at the mouth of cape fear river and below the city of wilmington. this port was of immense importance to the confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. it was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the british government, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to recognize any blockade. for these reasons i determined, with the concurrence of the navy department, in december, to send an expedition against fort fisher for the purpose of capturing it. to show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, i will mention a circumstance that took place at fort fisher after its fall. two english blockade runners came in at night. their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. they then signalled the fort, announcing their arrival. there was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. he informed general terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and terry did as he advised. the vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the union forces. even after they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the union troops were occupying the fort. they were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. i selected general weitzel, of the army of the james, to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through general butler. he commanded the department within whose geographical limits fort fisher was situated, as well as beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against fort fisher. general butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. admiral porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in washington; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. i had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at washington seemed desirous to have it tried, i permitted it. the steamer was sent to beaufort, north carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of fort fisher. general butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of december (1864). very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. his advance arrived off fort fisher on the 15th. the naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into beaufort for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. the fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into beaufort to replenish. another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate. on the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. she was then propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. there the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. at two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the atlantic ocean would have done. indeed when the troops in fort fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the yankee gunboats. fort fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of cape fear river. the soil is sandy. back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. the fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen hundred yards. the fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. at that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. general whiting of the confederate army was in command, and general bragg was in command of the force at wilmington. both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. the governor of north carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun, to join them. in this way they got two or three hundred additional men into fort fisher; and hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from richmond. a few of these troops arrived the very day that butler was ready to advance. on the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. the damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. but the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. on the next day part of butler's troops under general adelbert ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. this was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. they formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. curtis pushed forward and came near to fort fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called the flag pond battery. weitzel accompanied him to within a half a mile of the works. here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to butler, advising against an assault. ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. these prisoners reported to butler that sixteen hundred of hoke's division of six thousand from richmond had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear. upon these reports butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. at that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. curtis had got within a few yards of the works. some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. at night butler informed porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for hampton roads. porter represented to him that he had sent to beaufort for more ammunition. he could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. butler was unchangeable. he got all his troops aboard, except curtis's brigade, and started back. in doing this, butler made a fearful mistake. my instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. but general butler seems to have lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at fort monroe on the 28th. i telegraphed to the president as follows: city point, va., dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 p.m. the wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. many of the troops are back here. delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to wilmington to defeat it. after the expedition sailed from fort monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. who is to blame will, i hope, be known. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. porter sent dispatches to the navy department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a different commander. as soon as i heard this i sent a messenger to porter with a letter asking him to hold on. i assured him that i fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that i would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. i told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. i selected a. h. terry to command. it was the 6th of january before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. they sailed from fortress monroe on that day. the object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the navy department and in the army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. general terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. he simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him, which were to be opened when out at sea. he was instructed to communicate freely with porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of service. they arrived off beaufort on the 8th. a heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at forth fisher until the 13th. the navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. this object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort with a respectable abatis in front of his line. his artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. again curtis's brigade of ame's division had the lead. by noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way. terry now saw porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. the two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. at day light the fleet commenced its firing. the time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and ames who commanded the assaulting column moved at 3.30. porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with ames's assault. they were under commander breese of the navy. these sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. the signal was given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. these they cut away, and pushed on through. the other troops then came up, pennypacker's following curtis, and bell, who commanded the 3d brigade of ames's division, following pennypacker. but the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained. the works were very extensive. the large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. traverses had, therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. the rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from these traverses one by one. the fight continued till long after night. our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10 o'clock at night the place was carried. during this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by reinforcing terry's northern line--thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of ames. the fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. by means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. during the succeeding nights the enemy blew up fort caswell on the opposite side of cape fear river, and abandoned two extensive works on smith's island in the river. our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. in addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. we had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. in this assault on fort fisher, bell, one of the brigade commanders, was killed, and two, curtis and pennypacker, were badly wounded. secretary stanton, who was on his way back from savannah, arrived off fort fisher soon after it fell. when he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. this confirmed him; and soon after i recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg--canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas--capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. when news of sherman being in possession of savannah reached the north, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. among others who went was the secretary of war, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. mr. draper, the collector of customs of new york, who was with mr. stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. savannah was then turned over to general foster's command to hold, so that sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. i sent the chief engineer of the army of the potomac (general barnard) with letters to general sherman. he remained some time with the general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from sherman as to what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward. i must not neglect to state here the fact that i had no idea originally of having sherman march from savannah to richmond, or even to north carolina. the season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and i should not have thought of ordering such a move. i had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry sherman and his army around to the james river by water, and so informed him. on receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the carolinas. i was only too happy to approve this; for if successful, it promised every advantage. his march through georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that state, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. if north and south carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding lee's army was concerned, the confederate garrison at richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the state of virginia; and, although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. i approved sherman's suggestion therefore at once. the work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with admiral dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the south carolina and georgia coast, and general foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he (sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of charleston. this provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. he also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. this letter was brought to city point by general barnard at a time when i happened to be going to washington city, where i arrived on the 21st of january. i cannot tell the provision i had already made to co-operate with sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., jan. 21, 1865. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill div. of the mississippi. general:--your letters brought by general barnard were received at city point, and read with interest. not having them with me, however, i cannot say that in this i will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. as i arrived here at one p.m., and must leave at six p.m., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the secretary and general halleck, i must be brief. before your last request to have thomas make a campaign into the heart of alabama, i had ordered schofield to annapolis, md., with his corps. the advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from cincinnati. the corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. i was induced to do this because i did not believe thomas could possibly be got off before spring. his pursuit of hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. the command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst thomas followed far behind. when hood had crossed the tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, thomas had not much more than half crossed the state, from whence he returned to nashville to take steamer for eastport. he is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. he also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. this report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to selma under an energetic leader. he has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. no reply is yet received. canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards montgomery and selma. thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to canby. without further reinforcements canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. fort fisher, you are aware, has been captured. we have a force there of eight thousand effective. at new bern about half the number. it is rumored, through deserters, that wilmington also has fallen. i am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about fort caswell, and that on the 18th terry moved on wilmington. if wilmington is captured, schofield will go there. if not, he will be sent to new bern. in either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements. from either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. there have been about sixteen thousand men sent from lee's army south. of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at fort fisher having overtaken about two thousand. all these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. they will be so instructed. from about richmond i will watch lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. in the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, i can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about richmond. to resume: canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the gulf. a. j. smith may go from the north, but i think it doubtful. a force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from new bern or wilmington, or both. you can call for reinforcements. this will be handed you by captain hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. if there is anything i can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieut.-general. i had written on the 18th of january to general sherman, giving him the news of the battle of nashville. he was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at thomas for permitting hood to cross the tennessee river and nearly the whole state of tennessee, and come to nashville to be attacked there. he, however, as i had done, sent thomas a warm congratulatory letter. on the 10th of january, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to sherman and his army passed by congress were approved. sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions. he had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison. by the middle of january all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with. he proposed to move in two columns, one from savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening charleston. he commenced the advance by moving his right wing to beaufort, south carolina, then to pocotaligo by water. this column, in moving north, threatened charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit charleston. south carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the south for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the south was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the north and also largely entertained by people of the south, that the state of south carolina, and charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. in fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, because charleston had been left out. to pass into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and foster's troops. it is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. sherman therefore passed it by. by the first of february all preparations were completed for the final march, columbia, south carolina, being the first objective; fayetteville, north carolina, the second; and goldsboro, or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. the right wing went from pocotaligo, and the left from about hardeeville on the savannah river, both columns taking a pretty direct route for columbia. the cavalry, however, were to threaten charleston on the right, and augusta on the left. on the 15th of january fort fisher had fallen, news of which sherman had received before starting out on his march. we already had new bern and had soon wilmington, whose fall followed that of fort fisher; as did other points on the sea coast, where the national troops were now in readiness to co-operate with sherman's advance when he had passed fayetteville. on the 18th of january i ordered canby, in command at new orleans, to move against mobile, montgomery and selma, alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. on the 8th of february i ordered sheridan, who was in the valley of virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of richmond at or about lynchburg; and on the 20th i made the order to go to lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying: "as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. * * * this additional raid, with one starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry; one from eastport, mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; canby, from mobile bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma and montgomery; and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina--is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday last." on the 27th of february, more than a month after canby had received his orders, i again wrote to him, saying that i was extremely anxious to hear of his being in alabama. i notified him, also, that i had sent grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. i further suggested that forrest was probably in mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. i still further informed him that thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into mississippi on the 20th of february, or as soon as possible thereafter. this force did not get off however. all these movements were designed to be in support of sherman's march, the object being to keep the confederate troops in the west from leaving there. but neither canby nor thomas could be got off in time. i had some time before depleted thomas's army to reinforce canby, for the reason that thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. i ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. general granger had got down to new orleans, in some way or other, and i wrote canby that he must not put him in command of troops. in spite of this he asked the war department to assign granger to the command of a corps. almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, i said to canby: "i am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. i have directed that none be sent. thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the west. if there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the north, where we already had the troops. i expected your movements to be co-operative with sherman's last. this has now entirely failed. i wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. take mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to montgomery and to selma. destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. by this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken." most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. the enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of hardee's troops and wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in richmond, as i was sure would be the case, to retard sherman's movements. everything possible was being done to raise troops in the south. lee dispatched against sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve fort fisher, which, including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men. after thomas's victory at nashville what remained, of hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, general joseph e. johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the south though not in favor with the administration (or at least with mr. davis), was put in command of all the troops in north and south carolina. schofield arrived at annapolis in the latter part of january, but before sending his troops to north carolina i went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as i could give fuller directions after being on the ground than i could very well have given without. we soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to cape fear river. both new bern and wilmington are connected with raleigh by railroads which unite at goldsboro. schofield was to land troops at smithville, near the mouth of the cape fear river on the west side, and move up to secure the wilmington and charlotteville railroad. this column took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of wilmington. a large body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. they succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of february. i took the precaution to provide for sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching north carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. i also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in virginia. the gauge of the north carolina railroads being the same as the virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change. on the 31st of january i countermanded the orders given to thomas to move south to alabama and georgia. (i had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to terry.) i directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send stoneman through east tennessee, and push him well down toward columbia, south carolina, in support of sherman. thomas did not get stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when i had supposed he was on his march in support of sherman i heard of his being in louisville, kentucky. i immediately changed the order, and directed thomas to send him toward lynchburg. finally, however, on the 12th of march, he did push down through the north-western end of south carolina, creating some consternation. i also ordered thomas to send the 4th corps (stanley's) to bull gap and to destroy no more roads east of that. i also directed him to concentrate supplies at knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward lynchburg. goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from savannah. sherman's march was without much incident until he entered columbia, on the 17th of february. he was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. there was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. a formidable river had to be crossed near columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under general wade hampton. there was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. hampton left as sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. there has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set columbia on fire. sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and hampton denies it on the part of the confederates. one thing is certain: as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand. in any case, the example set by the confederates in burning the village of chambersburg, pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act of firing the seat of government of the state most responsible for the conflict then raging, not imperative. the confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the national forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. he then, however, co-operated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. when he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. he remained in columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. while at columbia, sherman learned for the first time that what remained of hood's army was confronting him, under the command of general beauregard. charleston was evacuated on the 18th of february, and foster garrisoned the place. wilmington was captured on the 22d. columbia and cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of charleston and augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored. among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old madeira, silverware, and furniture. i am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. there was found at columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition. these, of course were among the articles destroyed. while here, sherman also learned of johnston's restoration to command. the latter was given, as already stated, all troops in north and south carolina. after the completion of the destruction of public property about columbia, sherman proceeded on his march and reached cheraw without any special opposition and without incident to relate. the railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way. sherman remained a day or two at cheraw; and, finally, on the 6th of march crossed his troops over the pedee and advanced straight for fayetteville. hardee and hampton were there, and barely escaped. sherman reached fayetteville on the 11th of march. he had dispatched scouts from cheraw with letters to general terry, at wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he enumerated. the scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which sherman had asked as were in store at wilmington; unfortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing. four days later, on the 15th, sherman left fayetteville for goldsboro. the march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy. besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of hood's army. frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. i presume, however, that johnston did not have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men. the people had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions. there was some fighting at averysboro on the 16th between johnston's troops and sherman's, with some loss; and at bentonville on the 19th and 21st of march, but johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d. sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. sherman's troops at last reached goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and there his men were destined to have a long rest. schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to wilmington. sherman was no longer in danger. he had johnston confronting him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. he had lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but i was holding lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce johnston, sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from schofield and terry, would have been able to hold the confederates at bay for an indefinite period. he was near the sea-shore with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. he had a railroad to both wilmington and new bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea. then, too, sherman knew that if lee should escape me i would be on his heels, and he and johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. with the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached north carolina. johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. the men of both lee's and johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the north, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners --an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg--sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line --the line of battle of white oak road. on the last of january, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called confederate states presented themselves on our lines around petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at city point. they proved to be alexander h. stephens, vice-president of the confederacy, judge campbell, assistant-secretary of war, and r. m. t. hunt, formerly united states senator and then a member of the confederate senate. it was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and i at once conducted them to the steam mary martin, a hudson river boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. i at once communicated by telegraph with washington and informed the secretary of war and the president of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between he united states and, as they termed it, the confederate government. i was instructed to retain them at city point, until the president, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them. they remained several days as guests on board the boat. i saw them quite frequently, though i have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. it was something i had nothing to do with, and i therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. for my own part i never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government. there had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. as long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and i found them all very agreeable gentlemen. i directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every way possible. no guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. they were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters. i had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and i had been a particular admirer of mr. stephens. i had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when i saw him in the dusk of the evening i was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. when he got down on to the boat i found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the south during the rebellion. the cloth was thicker than anything of the kind i had ever seen, even in canada. the overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. he took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and i was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it. after a few days, about the 2d of february, i received a dispatch from washington, directing me to send the commissioners to hampton roads to meet the president and a member of the cabinet. mr. lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration. it was not a great while after they met that the president visited me at city point. he spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first: that the union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. if they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the union and be one people. he always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the southern people, and i never heard him abuse an enemy. some of the cruel things said about president lincoln, particularly in the north, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition and i saw a great deal of him at city point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital. right here i might relate an anecdote of mr. lincoln. it was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at hampton roads. after a little conversation, he asked me if i had seen that overcoat of stephens's. i replied that i had. "well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" i said yes. "well," said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?" long afterwards i told this story to the confederate general j. b. gordon, at the time a member of the senate. he repeated it to stephens, and, as i heard afterwards, stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of mr. lincoln. the rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents. on one occasion during this period, while i was visiting washington city for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under general wade hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section. it was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the confederates. it was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies taking what the confederate army otherwise would have gotten. as appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the mississippi river near port hudson on their way from texas to supply the confederate army in the east. one of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before petersburg. i felt that the situation of the confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and i was afraid, every morning, that i would awake from my sleep to hear that lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. he had his railroad by the way of danville south, and i was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence. i knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than i, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year. i was led to this fear by the fact that i could not see how it was possible for the confederates to hold out much longer where they were. there is no doubt that richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the confederate army. when it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. then, too, desertions were taking place, not only among those who were with general lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole confederacy. i remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this, general butler remarked that the confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though i am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave." the south, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. the latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. general butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which i afterwards used in writing a letter to mr. washburn. it was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. it was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. then too i knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as earnestly, i take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. many of them were making application to be sent north where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their southern homes. for these and other reasons i was naturally very impatient for the time to come when i could commence the spring campaign, which i thoroughly believed would close the war. there were two considerations i had to observe, however, and which detained me. one was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. it was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. the other consideration was that general sheridan with the cavalry of the army of the potomac was operating on the north side of the james river, having come down from the shenandoah. it was necessary that i should have his cavalry with me, and i was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the james river. let us now take account of what he was doing. on the 5th of march i had heard from sheridan. he had met early between staunton and charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command. early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. on the 12th i heard from him again. he had turned east, to come to white house. he could not go to lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. he had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered. i had supplies sent around to white house for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. we had intended to abandon it because the james river had now become our base of supplies. sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by custer and devin. general merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition. they stopped at charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward lynchburg. he also sent a division along the james river canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. all mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also. sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to white house was now somewhat hazardous. he determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. he did this, destroying the canal as far as goochland, and the railroad to a point as near richmond as he could get. on the 10th he was at columbia. negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal. his cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. he had captured most of early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. when he reached ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. he resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the south and north anna, going north, and reached white house safely on the 19th. the time for sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from goldsboro where he then was. supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. i had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of goldsboro on the 18th of april, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. sherman was anxious that i should wait where i was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but i had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. i had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until sheridan, who was on his way from the shenandoah valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which i had in mind. however, having arrived at white house on the 19th of march, i was enabled to make my plans. prompted by my anxiety lest lee should get away some night before i was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into north carolina to join with johnston in attempting to crush out sherman, i had, as early as the 1st of the month of march, given instructions to the troops around petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken. it is now known that early in the month of march mr. davis and general lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. they, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. general lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around petersburg. the night of the 24th of march was fixed upon for this assault, and general gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. the point between fort stedman and battery no. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack. the attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines. lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape. the plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line. gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. for some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the confederate general knew. taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to desert. when they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. in the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. this plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce gordon had to be brought from the north side of the james river and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. the charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between fort stedman and battery no. 10. then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. continuing the charge, they also carried batteries eleven and twelve to our left, which they turned toward city point. meade happened to be at city point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to meade's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. general tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was willcox. hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into fort stedman. on the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by willcox early in the morning. parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. the artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. they all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. this effort of lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours. after the recapture of the batteries taken by the confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held. this, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later. the day that gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of march) i issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. ord, with three divisions of infantry and mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the james river and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. he left weitzel with the rest of the army of the james to hold bermuda hundred and the north of the james river. the engineer brigade was to be left at city point, and parke's corps in the lines about petersburg. (*42) ord was at his place promptly. humphreys and warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. they were directed on the arrival of ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross hatcher's run and extend out west toward five forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the south side railroad and ultimately the danville railroad. there was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the army of the james had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. this was what was known as the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac --sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. sheridan reached city point on the 26th day of march. his horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. a few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. immediately on general sheridan's arrival at city point i prepared his instructions for the move which i had decided upon. the movement was to commence on the 29th of the month. after reading the instructions i had given him, sheridan walked out of my tent, and i followed to have some conversation with him by himself --not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. in preparing his instructions i contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing five forks, driving the enemy from petersburg and richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. but the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise. knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, i provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the army of the potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the danville railroad, or near it, across the roanoke, get in the rear of johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with sherman in destroying johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which sherman already had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around petersburg and richmond. i saw that after sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the army of the potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. i said to him: "general, this portion of your instructions i have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. i told him that, as a matter of fact, i intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther. his face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said: "i am glad to hear it, and we can do it." sheridan was not however to make his movement against five forks until he got further instructions from me. one day, after the movement i am about to describe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at dabney's mills. he met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. although my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about city point and in the lines around petersburg, he asked sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that i send for him. i did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. knowing as i did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, i determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after i had started out the roads were still very heavy. orders were given accordingly. finally the 29th of march came, and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. on that date i moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about petersburg. it soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of virginia and other southern states. it became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. the army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. the next day, march 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting sheridan with his cavalry over by dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to five forks, thus menacing the right of lee's line. this movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or five forks. the column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. the forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and five forks. my hope was that sheridan would be able to carry five forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. general wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which i intended to order as soon as information reached me of sheridan's success. he was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get. it is natural to suppose that lee would understand my design to be to get up to the south side and ultimately to the danville railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. these roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in richmond and petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. he did on the 30th send pickett with five brigades to reinforce five forks. he also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the james river to come over on call. he came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank. sheridan moved back to dinwiddie court-house on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to five forks. he had only his cavalry with him. soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. he gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of five forks. here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. in this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send wright's corps to his assistance. i replied to him that it was impossible to send wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (humphreys's) and 5th (warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at five forks, and that i would send warren. accordingly orders were sent to warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to dinwiddie court house and put himself in communication with sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. he was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. when he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at gravelly run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. he was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by general meade. he now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that sheridan determined to move forward without him. however, ayres's division of warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under sheridan. warren reported to sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting. this did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with ayres's division did most excellent service during the day. crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. once there it did very excellent service. sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon five forks itself. he was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to dinwiddie court-house, or even further than that for the night. it was at this junction of affairs that sheridan wanted to get crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted warren. he sent staff officer after staff officer in search of warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. at all events sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. finally he went himself. he issued an order relieving warren and assigning griffin to the command of the 5th corps. the troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. i was so much dissatisfied with warren's dilatory movements in the battle of white oak road and in his failure to reach sheridan in time, that i was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail sheridan. he was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. but i had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. he could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. he would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move. i had sent a staff officer to general sheridan to call his attention to these defects, and to say that as much as i liked general warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. it was upon that authorization that sheridan removed warren. i was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that i had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. it was dusk when our troops under sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. the two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. the flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west. this pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps across hatcher's run to just south-west of petersburg, and facing them toward it. merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of five forks. this was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of april. i then issued orders for an assault by wright and parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. i also ordered the 2d corps, general humphreys, and general ord with the army of the james, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front. i notified mr. lincoln at city point of the success of the day; in fact i had reported to him during the day and evening as i got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that i wanted to relieve his mind as much as i could. i notified weitzel on the north side of the james river, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of richmond. i was afraid that lee would regard the possession of five forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. it was for this reason that i had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as i had received the news of the capture of five forks. the corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. but we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the james river, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning. at that hour parke's and wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed the abatis from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. wright swung around to his left and moved to hatcher's run, sweeping everything before him. the enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. as you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about hatcher's run they must be nearly two miles apart. both parke and wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners--wright about three thousand of them. in the meantime ord and humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before wright got up to that point, ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. the second corps soon followed; and the outer works of petersburg were in the hands of the national troops, never to be wrenched from them again. when wright reached hatcher's run, he sent a regiment to destroy the south side railroad just outside of the city. my headquarters were still at dabney's saw-mills. as soon as i received the news of wright's success, i sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at bermuda hundred and those on the north side of the james, and to the president at city point. further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did i sent the additional news to these points. finding at length that they were all in, i mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. when i arrived there i rode my horse over the parapet just as wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. i was soon joined inside by general meade and his staff. lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. before noon longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the james river thus bringing the bulk of lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. as soon as i learned this i notified weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have hartsuff, commanding the bermuda hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; hartsuff especially should do so, for this would separate richmond and petersburg. sheridan, after he had returned to five forks, swept down to petersburg, coming in on our left. this gave us a continuous line from the appomattox river below the city to the same river above. at eleven o'clock, not having heard from sheridan, i reinforced parke with two brigades from city point. with this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. he also carried in and made an abatis between himself and the enemy. lee brought additional troops and artillery against parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses. the enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, fort gregg and fort whitworth. we thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. about one o'clock in the day, fort gregg was assaulted by foster's division of the 24th corps (gibbon's), supported by two brigades from ord's command. the battle was desperate and the national troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in fort whitworth evacuated the place. the guns of fort gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of fort whitworth surrendered. i had ordered miles in the morning to report to sheridan. in moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the white oak road and the claiborne road. the enemy fell back to sutherland station on the south side road and were followed by miles. this position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. sheridan now came up and miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which sheridan gave. by this time humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over miles, who commanded a division in his corps. i had sent an order to humphreys to turn to his right and move towards petersburg. this order he now got, and started off, thus leaving miles alone. the latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards. hearing that miles had been left in this position, i directed humphreys to send a division back to his relief. he went himself. sheridan before starting to sweep down to petersburg had sent merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some confederate cavalry that had assembled there. merritt drove them north to the appomattox river. sheridan then took the enemy at sutherland station on the reverse side from where miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three confederate corps, to flight. sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. i cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to city point that evening: boydton road, near petersburg, april 2, 1865.--4.40 p.m. colonel t. s. bowers, city point. we are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the appomattox below petersburg to the river above. heth's and wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the white oak road to sutherland station on the south side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. not knowing whether sheridan would get up in time, general humphreys was sent with another division from here. the whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. i do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * i think the president might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. during the night of april 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below. i ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five a.m., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated petersburg early in the morning. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. general meade and i entered petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast there. as we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the confederate army. i did not have artillery brought up, because i was sure lee was trying to make his escape, and i wanted to push immediately in pursuit. at all events i had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and i hoped to capture them soon. soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the army of northern virginia. he said that lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from richmond, and falling back into this prepared work. this statement was made to general meade and myself when we were together. i had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the appomattox for the purpose of heading off lee; but meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the appomattox there at once and move against lee in his new position. i knew that lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the james and appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the potomac and the james. then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. it would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. my judgment was that lee would necessarily have to evacuate richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the danville road. accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of lee, and i told meade this. he suggested that if lee was going that way we would follow him. my reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (meade) believed him to be in at that time, i wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the danville railroad, at its crossing of the appomattox river, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. i had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the danville road early in the morning, supposing that lee would be gone during the night. during the night i strengthened sheridan by sending him humphreys's corps. lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. davis was at church when he received lee's dispatch. the congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. the rebel government left richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. at night lee ordered his troops to assemble at amelia court house, his object being to get away, join johnston if possible, and to try to crush sherman before i could get there. as soon as i was sure of this i notified sheridan and directed him to move out on the danville railroad to the south side of the appomattox river as speedily as possible. he replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. i then ordered the rest of the army of the potomac under meade to follow the same road in the morning. parke's corps followed by the same road, and the army of the james was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the south side railroad to burke's station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. that road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives. mr. lincoln was at city point at the time, and had been for some days. i would have let him know what i contemplated doing, only while i felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then i would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. but when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us godspeed, remained there to hear the result. the next morning after the capture of petersburg, i telegraphed mr. lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while i would await his arrival. i had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the national army left petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. there was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. we had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the president arrived. about the first thing that mr. lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was: "do you know, general, that i have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this." our movements having been successful up to this point, i no longer had any object in concealing from the president all my movements, and the objects i had in view. he remained for some days near city point, and i communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. mr. lincoln knew that it had been arranged for sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of lee's army. i told him that i had been very anxious to have the eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. the western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the mississippi river to the state of north carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of richmond, asking admittance. i said to him that if the western armies should be even upon the field, operating against richmond and lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. it might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of congress of the east and those of the west in some of their debates. western members might be throwing it up to the members of the east that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. mr. lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done. the army of the potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. the army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the united states. its loss would be the loss of the cause. every energy, therefore, was put forth by the confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. everything else would go if it went. lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the south in another quarter. i never expected any such bickering as i have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians. possibly i am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. when our conversation was at an end mr. lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to city point, while i and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. up to this time i had not received the report of the capture of richmond. soon after i left president lincoln i received a dispatch from general weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. the city was in the most utter confusion. the authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. the city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. in fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that lee had gained an important victory somewhere around petersburg. weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. the city was on fire. our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. the fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army. all authorities deny that it was authorized, and i presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. be that as it may, the national troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. the troops that had formed lee's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the appomattox river until finally they took water and crossed over. i left mr. lincoln and started, as i have already said, to join the command, which halted at sutherland station, about nine miles out. we had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. this caused further delay. general wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. they did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the army of the potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. so the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at deep creek, and driven them north to the appomattox, where, i presume, most of them were forced to cross. on the morning of the 4th i learned that lee had ordered rations up from danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at farmville. this showed that lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of farmville. i notified sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach lee. he responded that he had already sent crook's division to get upon the road between burkesville and jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought crook must be there now. the bulk of the army moved directly for jetersville by two roads. after i had received the dispatch from sheridan saying that crook was on the danville road, i immediately ordered meade to make a forced march with the army of the potomac, and to send parke's corps across from the road they were on to the south side railroad, to fall in the rear of the army of the james and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. our troops took possession of jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations from danville. the dispatch had not been sent, but sheridan sent a special messenger with it to burkesville and had it forwarded from there. in the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. at this time merritt and mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the army of the potomac was marching on and the appomattox river, and were attacking the enemy in flank. they picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. lee intrenched himself at amelia court house, and also his advance north of jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. the country was very poor and afforded but very little. his foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the army of northern virginia. griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of jetersville, and sheridan notified me of the situation. i again ordered meade up with all dispatch, sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting lee's entire army. meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. humphreys moved at two, and wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as i have said, the wagons being far in the rear. i stayed that night at wilson's station on the south side railroad. on the morning of the 5th i sent word to sheridan of the progress meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack lee. we had now no other objective than the confederate armies, and i was anxious to close the thing up at once. on the 5th i marched again with ord's command until within about ten miles of burkesville, where i stopped to let his army pass. i then received from sheridan the following dispatch: "the whole of lee's army is at or near amelia court house, and on this side of it. general davies, whom i sent out to painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. we can capture the army of northern virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. my cavalry was at burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the danville road, last night. general lee is at amelia court house in person. they are out of rations, or nearly so. they were advancing up the railroad towards burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point." it now became a life and death struggle with lee to get south to his provisions. sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards farmville, moved davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. davies found the movement had already commenced. he attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. he also captured five pieces of artillery. the confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow davies, and they came to his relief in time. a sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. meade himself reached jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. the head of humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at meade's request, the latter still being very sick. he extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of griffin's corps, and one division to the right. the cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. he wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. at this juncture sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished i was there myself. the letter was dated amelia court house, april 5th, and signed by colonel taylor. it was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the confederate army. sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. i received a second message from sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence. this was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. it was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. this was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. it would cause no surprise at all to see a confederate soldier chewing tobacco. it was nearly night when this letter was received. i gave ord directions to continue his march to burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and farmville. i then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join meade's army. the distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. however, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where sheridan was bivouacked. we talked over the situation for some little time, sheridan explaining to me what he thought lee was trying to do, and that meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. we then together visited meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. i explained to meade that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, i had no doubt that lee was moving right then. meade changed his orders at once. they were now given for an advance on amelia court house, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville--correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. the appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood of the richmond and danville railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. sailor's creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the appomattox between the high bridge and jetersville. near the high bridge the stage road from petersburg to lynchburg crosses the appomattox river, also on a bridge. the railroad runs on the north side of the river to farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. the roads coming up from the south-east to farmville cross the appomattox river there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the lynchburg and petersburg railroad well to the left. lee, in pushing out from amelia court house, availed himself of all the roads between the danville road and appomattox river to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. in this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army. as expected, lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon amelia court house soon encountered them. there was a good deal of fighting before sailor's creek was reached. our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. a severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. there was as much gallantry displayed by some of the confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. the armies finally met on sailor's creek, when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into action. our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. the enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. this engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. when the move towards amelia court house had commenced that morning, i ordered wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. the object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the valley of virginia. the 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between burkesville and the high bridge. on the morning of the 6th he sent colonel washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy high bridge and to return rapidly to burkesville station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. soon after washburn had started ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent colonel read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. very shortly after this he heard that the head of lee's column had got up to the road between him and where washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. he rode on to farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off, and washburn confronting apparently the advance of lee's army. read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. he then gave the order to charge. this little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. colonel read fell mortally wounded, and then washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. the remainder then surrendered. the confederates took this to be only the advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the confederate army. this stoppage of lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the high bridge, and attempted to destroy it. he did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed lee to the intersection of the road crossing at farmville with the one from petersburg. here lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being intrenched. humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. he put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return. our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of prince edward's court house, along with the 5th corps (griffin's), ord falling in between griffin and the appomattox. crook's division of cavalry and wright's corps pushed on west of farmville. when the cavalry reached farmville they found that some of the confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. these troops retreated to the north side of the appomattox to join lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. considerable fighting ensued there between wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve humphreys, arriving there that night. i had stopped the night before at burkesville junction. our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and ord's command was extended from that point towards farmville. here i met dr. smith, a virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with general ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, ewell had said that when we had got across the james river he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. the authorities thought differently, however. now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. he said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. he was not sure that lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the president, but he hoped he would. i rode in to farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. sheridan and ord were pushing through, away to the south. meade was back towards the high bridge, and humphreys confronting lee as before stated. after having gone into bivouac at prince edward's court house, sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before lee's army could secure them. he wrote me a note telling me this. this fact, together with the incident related the night before by dr. smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with general lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. i therefore wrote to him on this day, as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., 5 p.m., april 7, 1865. general r. e. lee commanding c. s. a. the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows: april 7, 1865. general: i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant, commanding armies of the u. s. this was not satisfactory, but i regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows: april 8, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia is just received. in reply i would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will be received. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's army was rapidly crumbling. many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the state where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. i know that i occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at farmville, which had probably been used as a confederate hospital. the next morning when i came out i found a confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. he said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. i told him to stay there and he would not be molested. that was one regiment which had been eliminated from lee's force by this crumbling process. although sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. they began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. nothing seemed to fatigue them. they were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. the infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. sheridan sent custer with his division to move south of appomattox station, which is about five miles south-west of the court house, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. they got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. the other four were held by custer. the head of lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, i suppose, that there were any union soldiers near. the confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains. however, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. in the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards farmville, and the fight continued. so far, only our cavalry and the advance of lee's army were engaged. soon, however, lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. but our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found griffin's corps and the army of the james confronting them. a sharp engagement ensued, but lee quickly set up a white flag. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. on the 8th i had followed the army of the potomac in rear of lee. i was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. i spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. during the night i received lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. (*43) but it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and i answered him as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of yesterday is received. as i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. i was not more than two or three miles from appomattox court house at the time, but to go direct i would have to pass through lee's army, or a portion of it. i had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. when the white flag was put out by lee, as already described, i was in this way moving towards appomattox court house, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what lee had done. lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise meade and one to the front to sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until i could be communicated with. as they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. they were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the army of northern virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. they, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. it was found that, from the route i had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me. april 9, 1865. general: i received your note of this morning on the picket-line whither i had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. r. e. lee, general. lieutenant-general u. s. grant commanding u. s. armies. when the officer reached me i was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant i saw the contents of the note i was cured. i wrote the following note in reply and hastened on: april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. armies. your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the richmond and lynchburg road to the farmville and lynchburg road. i am at this writing about four miles west of walker's church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i was conducted at once to where sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the confederate army near by. they were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the confederates to get away. they said they believed that johnston was marching up from north carolina now, and lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if i would only let them go in. but i had no doubt about the good faith of lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. i found him at the house of a mr. mclean, at appomattox court house, with colonel marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my arrival. the head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. before stating what took place between general lee and myself, i will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. the war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. as i have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the confederate forces. running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. general babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met general lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. the story had no other foundation than that. like many other stories, it would be very good if it was only true. i had known general lee in the old army, and had served with him in the mexican war; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while i would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of general scott in the mexican war. when i had left camp that morning i had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. i was without a sword, as i usually was when on horseback on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who i was. when i went into the house i found general lee. we greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. i had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. what general lee's feelings were i do not know. as he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it. whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. i felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, i believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. i do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. general lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the state of virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. in my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, i must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. but this was not a matter that i thought of until afterwards. we soon fell into a conversation about old army times. he remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and i told him that as a matter of course i remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages), i had thought it very likely that i had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. our conversation grew so pleasant that i almost forgot the object of our meeting. after the conversation had run on in this style for some time, general lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms i proposed to give his army. i said that i meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. he said that he had so understood my letter. then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. this continued for some little time, when general lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms i proposed to give his army ought to be written out. i called to general parker, secretary on my staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following terms: appomattox c. h., va., ap 19th, 1865. gen. r. e. lee, comd'g c. s. a. gen: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., i propose to receive the surrender of the army of n. va. on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. very respectfully, u. s. grant, lt. gen. when i put my pen to the paper i did not know the first word that i should make use of in writing the terms. i only knew what was in my mind, and i wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. as i wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. no conversation, not one word, passed between general lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. he appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. when he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, i thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. then, after a little further conversation, general lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the united states (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. i told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. he then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear. i then said to him that i thought this would be about the last battle of the war--i sincerely hoped so; and i said further i took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. the whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. the united states did not want them and i would, therefore, instruct the officers i left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. he then sat down and wrote out the following letter: headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. general:--i received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant. while duplicates of the two letters were being made, the union generals present were severally presented to general lee. the much talked of surrendering of lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. the word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until i wrote it in the terms. there was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment i wrote it down. if i had happened to omit it, and general lee had called my attention to it, i should have put it in the terms precisely as i acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses. general lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. i told him "certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. his answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and i authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to appomattox station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. as for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. generals gibbon, griffin and merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of lee's troops before they should start for their homes--general lee leaving generals longstreet, gordon and pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. lee and i then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at appomattox. soon after lee's departure i telegraphed to washington as follows: headquarters appomattox c. h., va., april 9th, 1865, 4.30 p.m. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington. general lee surrendered the army of northern virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. the accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. when news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. i at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. the confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. i determined to return to washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what i now deemed other useless outlay of money. before leaving, however, i thought i (*44) would like to see general lee again; so next morning i rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag. lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. we had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which lee said to me that the south was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us. he expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. i then suggested to general lee that there was not a man in the confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies i had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. but lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the president first. i knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right. i was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the confederate lines. they finally asked permission of lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. they went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned. when lee and i separated he went back to his lines and i returned to the house of mr. mclean. here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. for the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. after an hour pleasantly passed in this way i set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for burkesville junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south --president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. after the fall of petersburg, and when the armies of the potomac and the james were in motion to head off lee's army, the morale of the national troops had greatly improved. there was no more straggling, no more rear guards. the men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as i have already stated, striving to get to the front. for the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. on the other hand, the confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of sailor's creek. they threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. i have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel i met at farmville. as a result of these and other influences, when lee finally surrendered at appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. it was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, north and south, that lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. as a matter of official record, and in addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between march 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 confederates, to say nothing of lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. the same record shows the number of cannon, including those at appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named. there has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the south magnifying the number of union troops engaged and belittling their own. northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. i have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal to the union, speak of what a splendid fight the south had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. i will add to their argument. we had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the south. but the south had rebelled against the national government. it was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. the whole south was a military camp. the occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of state and intended national government. the old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. the slaves, the non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plough. the four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the north, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. women did not work in the fields in the north, and children attended school. the arts of peace were carried on in the north. towns and cities grew during the war. inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field. in the south no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. no rear had to be protected. all the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. the press of the south, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the southern cause. in the north, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace. the furnace was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the north and the troops invading the south, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. in the north the press was free up to the point of open treason. the citizen could entertain his views and express them. troops were necessary in the northern states to prevent prisoners from the southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our northern cities. plans were formed by northern and southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. the copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the union army. it was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the confederate army. the north would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the union sentiment was in the south, than we were as the battle was fought. as i have said, the whole south was a military camp. the colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. the cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. the conscription took all of them. before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. it would have been an offence, directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the south, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the confederate army. he would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the north showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. i know they did not. during 1862 and '3, john h. morgan, a partisan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the army of the ohio in kentucky and tennessee. he had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. the army operating against the south, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the north, from which all supplies had to come to the front. every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. these guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. morgan was foot-loose and could operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. during the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. he destroyed many millions of property in addition. places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the national front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. it is safe to say that more than half the national army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. then, again, large forces were employed where no confederate army confronted them. i deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the national numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy. while i was in pursuit of general lee, the president went to richmond in company with admiral porter, and on board his flagship. he found the people of that city in great consternation. the leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. general weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the confederate capital. the president sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, admiral porter and a leading citizen of virginia being also present. after this interview the president wrote an order in about these words, which i quote from memory: "general weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the legislature of virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the virginia troops from the confederate armies." immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. this call, however, went very much further than mr. lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the "legislature of virginia" but "the body which called itself the legislature of virginia." mr. stanton saw the call as published in the northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the president was nearer the spot than he was. this was characteristic of mr. stanton. he was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he wanted to do. he was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. in this latter particular i entirely agree with the view he evidently held. the constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. while it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. the constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war. those in rebellion against the government of the united states were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the south was then fighting. it would be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the union intact, should be restrained by a constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of the confederation of the states. after i left general lee at appomattox station, i went with my staff and a few others directly to burkesville station on my way to washington. the road from burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when i reached city point. as soon as possible i took a dispatch-boat thence to washington city. while in washington i was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. but by the 14th i was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in burlington, new jersey, attending school. mrs. grant was with me in washington at the time, and we were invited by president and mrs. lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. i replied to the president's verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that i was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if i could get through my work during the day i should do so. i did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending mr. lincoln word, of course, that i would not be at the theatre. at that time the railroad to new york entered philadelphia on broad street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the delaware river, and then ferried to camden, at which point they took the cars again. when i reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of philadelphia, i found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the president and mr. seward, and of the probable assassination of the vice president, mr. johnson, and requesting my immediate return. it would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the president. i knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the united states enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. i knew also the feeling that mr. johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the southern people, and i feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. i felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. i immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to washington city; but mrs. grant was with me; it was after midnight and burlington was but an hour away. finding that i could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the philadelphia station, i went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train. the joy that i had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in washington when i left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. i have stated what i believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that i was right. i believe the south would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by mr. johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his administration. be this as it may, mr. lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation. mr. johnson's course towards the south did engender bitterness of feeling. his denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, "treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those men of the south who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. he uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. the president of the united states is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of mr. lincoln, i believe the great majority of the northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. they believed, i have no doubt, as i did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. the people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. they surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. i do not believe that the majority of the northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. they supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but mr. johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the south not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. this was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. the southerners had the most power in the executive branch, mr. johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact south, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the north, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. thus mr. johnson, fighting congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the south on the other, drove congress, which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. there being a solid south on one side that was in accord with the political party in the north which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the states, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. in this work, i shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of congress in this particular proved a wise one. it became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the president and the blindness of the southern people to their own interest. as to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, i gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, i favored immediate enfranchisement. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman--capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis--general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. when i left appomattox i ordered general meade to proceed leisurely back to burkesville station with the army of the potomac and the army of the james, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. general johnston, as has been stated before, was in north carolina confronting general sherman. it could not be known positively, of course, whether johnston would surrender on the news of lee's surrender, though i supposed he would; and if he did not, burkesville station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. the army which i could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away. with the loss of their capital and the army of northern virginia it was doubtful whether johnston's men would have the spirit to stand. my belief was that he would make no such attempt; but i adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable. simultaneously with my starting from city point, i sent a messenger to north carolina by boat with dispatches to general sherman, informing him of the surrender of lee and his army; also of the terms which i had given him; and i authorized sherman to give the same terms to johnston if the latter chose to accept them. the country is familiar with the terms that sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely. general sherman had met mr. lincoln at city point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what mr. lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at hampton roads, viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: one being that the union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. he had also seen notices in the newspapers of mr. lincoln's visit to richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the legislature of virginia. sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that i had made with general lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the president of the united states. but seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. they signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. as the world knows, sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the president and secretary of war in very bitter terms. some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor --a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to johnston and his army. if sherman had taken authority to send johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own states, without submitting the question to the authorities at washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. but the feeling against sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the american people. when, some days after my return to washington, president johnson and the secretary of war received the terms which general sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and i was sent for. there seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. a message went out directing the troops in the south not to obey general sherman. i was ordered to proceed at once to north carolina and take charge of matter there myself. of course i started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. i repaired to raleigh, where sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence. when i arrived i went to sherman's headquarters, and we were at once closeted together. i showed him the instruction and orders under which i visited him. i told him that i wanted him to notify general johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms i had given general lee. i sent sherman to do this himself. i did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so i left it to sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that i was anywhere near the field. as soon as possible i started to get away, to leave sherman quite free and untrammelled. at goldsboro', on my way back, i met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and i found in them indications of great excitement in the north over the terms sherman had given johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the president and secretary of war. i knew that sherman must see these papers, and i fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though i do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own. but like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions i had given him, obtained the surrender of johnston's army, and settled down in his camp about raleigh, to await final orders. there were still a few expeditions out in the south that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. with these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of lee and johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. the three expeditions which i had tried so hard to get off from the commands of thomas and canby did finally get off: one under canby himself, against mobile, late in march; that under stoneman from east tennessee on the 20th; and the one under wilson, starting from eastport, mississippi, on the 22d of march. they were all eminently successful, but without any good result. indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. the war was practically over before their victories were gained. they were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the confederate armies to a surrender. the only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by stoneman's getting near lynchburg about the time the armies of the potomac and the james were closing in on lee at appomattox. stoneman entered north carolina and then pushed north to strike the virginia and tennessee railroad. he got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of lynchburg. his approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. he then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between sherman and johnston for the latter's surrender. in this raid stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success. canby appeared before mobile on the 27th of march. the city of mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--spanish fort, on the east side of the bay, and fort blakely, north of the city. these forts were invested. on the night of the 8th of april, the national troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, spanish fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of lee's surrender, blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. on the 11th the city was evacuated. i had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. it finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever. wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. he was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. he now had principally conscripts. his conscripts were generally old men and boys. he had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of wilson's cavalry. selma fell on the 2d of april, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. tuscaloosa, montgomery and west point fell in quick succession. these were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. they were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. macon surrendered on the 21st of april. here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of johnston's army. wilson belonged to the military division commanded by sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. this stopped all fighting. general richard taylor had now become the senior confederate officer still at liberty east of the mississippi river, and on the 4th of may he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. general e. kirby smith surrendered the trans-mississippi department on the 26th of may, leaving no other confederate army at liberty to continue the war. wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. this occurred at irwinsville, georgia, on the 11th of may. for myself, and i believe mr. lincoln shared the feeling, i would have been very glad to have seen mr. davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: i feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. the young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year. the northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes. mr. lincoln, i believe, wanted mr. davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. he knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-confederate president, for high treason. he thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. at all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. but his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of the confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. all things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. this reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as abraham lincoln. he would have proven the best friend the south could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a president who at first wished to revenge himself upon southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. the story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the president is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. these laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the statute books of the united states, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought. much was said at the time about the garb mr. davis was wearing when he was captured. i cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but i have been under the belief, from information given to me by general wilson shortly after the event, that when mr. davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. naturally enough, mr. davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. if captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. he represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record. every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers. as my official letters on file in the war department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon general thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that i give my estimate of him as a soldier. the same remark will apply also in the case of general canby. i had been at west point with thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. he was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. he possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. he gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. this implies a very valuable quality. it is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it. thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. he could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. he was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. i do not believe that he could ever have conducted sherman's army from chattanooga to atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. on the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better. thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5. general canby was an officer of great merit. he was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. there have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. his knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the military division of the gulf. he was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. i presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against general thomas harris in missouri in 1861. neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. had canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, i have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. he was afterwards killed in the lava beds of southern oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile modoc indians. his character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. his services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. i have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes --grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton --estimate of the different corps commanders. things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in north carolina and virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the south to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several states, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes. i do not know how far this was necessary, but i deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued. i think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. sherman marched his troops from goldsboro, up to manchester, on the south side of the james river, opposite richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to savannah to see what the situation was there. it was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. halleck had been sent to richmond to command virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even sherman's own troops from obeying his, sherman's, orders. sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. on his arrival at fortress monroe returning from savannah, sherman received an invitation from halleck to come to richmond and be his guest. this he indignantly refused, and informed halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. he also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for halleck not to show himself, because he (sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received. very soon after that, sherman received orders from me to proceed to washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops. there was no incident worth noting in the march northward from goldsboro, to richmond, or in that from richmond to washington city. the army, however, commanded by sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the west and had marched from the mississippi through the southern states to the sea, from there to goldsboro, and thence to washington city, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the army of the potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation of the union. the march of sherman's army from atlanta to the sea and north to goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted. it had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. all the states east of the mississippi river up to the state of georgia, had felt the hardships of the war. georgia, and south carolina, and almost all of north carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. their newspapers had given such an account of confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves. even during this march of sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the southern people. as the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. in turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise. another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of georgia was entirely cut off from the confederate armies. as the troops advanced north from savannah, the destruction of the railroads in south carolina and the southern part of north carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in virginia and north carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage. in due time the two armies, one from burkesville junction and the other from the neighborhood of raleigh, north carolina, arrived and went into camp near the capital, as directed. the troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. i doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle. the armies of europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. there was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting north. i remember one little incident which i will relate as an anecdote characteristic of mr. lincoln. it occurred a day after i reached washington, and about the time general meade reached burkesville with the army. governor smith of virginia had left richmond with the confederate states government, and had gone to danville. supposing i was necessarily with the army at burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the commonwealth of the state of virginia, he had temporarily removed the state capital from richmond to danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the federal authorities. i give this letter only in substance. he also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. general meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that i was not present. he read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. meeting mr. lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, i repeated its contents to him. mr. lincoln, supposing i was asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of governor smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain irishman (giving the name) he knew in springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. these friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. they asked pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented. he had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. after a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. so holding the glass behind him, he said: "doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself." i do not remember what the instructions were the president gave me, but i know that governor smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. i also know that if mr. lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. he would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice. on the 18th of may orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the president and his cabinet of sherman's and meade's armies. the review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the president's house. sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the president and his cabinet. here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the secretary of war, by refusing to take his extended hand. sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the potomac. during the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the capitol. promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review. sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the army of the potomac. the latter had been operating where they received directly from the north full supplies of food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the army of the potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. they exhibited also some of the order of march through georgia where the "sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as sherman's army went marching through. in the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the men. negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it. the sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the capitol to the treasury building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. the national flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. the city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new president takes his seat. it may not be out of place to again allude to president lincoln and the secretary of war, mr. stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. there is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the president. with mr. stanton the case is different. they were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability. mr. lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. he preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. it distressed him to disappoint others. in matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way. mr. stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. he cared nothing for the feeling of others. in fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. he felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. if his act was not sustained, he would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so. it was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other. the secretary was required to prevent the president's being imposed upon. the president was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. i do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people. it is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. mr. lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust. mr. lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. the secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the confederate capital. he could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. the enemy would not have been in danger if mr. stanton had been in the field. these characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after early came so near getting into the capital. among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the states, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers i have not yet given any estimate, are meade, hancock, sedgwick, burnside, terry and hooker. there were others of great merit, such as griffin, humphreys, wright and mackenzie. of those first named, burnside at one time had command of the army of the potomac, and later of the army of the ohio. hooker also commanded the army of the potomac for a short time. general meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. he had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. he never had, i believe, a command of less than a brigade. he saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. his first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. he was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. he was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. he was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. no one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. this made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. in spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country. general burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. he was not, however, fitted to command an army. no one knew this better than himself. he always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. it was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. of hooker i saw but little during the war. i had known him very well before, however. where i did see him, at chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of lookout mountain and into chattanooga valley was brilliant. i nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. he was not subordinate to his superiors. he was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. his disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors. hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. he commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. he was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance. tall, well-formed and, at the time of which i now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. his genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. no matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them. sedgwick was killed at spottsylvania before i had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation. i had known him in mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. he stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. he was brave and conscientious. his ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. he was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. he declined the command of the army of the potomac once, if not oftener. general alfred h. terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. his way was won without political influence up to an important separate command--the expedition against fort fisher, in january, 1865. his success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. he is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. as a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time. griffin, humphreys, and mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention. all three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the potomac and the james, which culminated at appomattox court house, on the 9th of april, 1865. the sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. i regarded mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. graduating at west point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. this he did upon his own merit and without influence. conclusion. the cause of the great war of the rebellion against the united status will have to be attributed to slavery. for some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "a state half slave and half free cannot exist." all must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. i took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, i have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. hence the people of the south were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. they were enabled to maintain this control long after the states where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the northern states. they saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the northern states by enacting such laws as the fugitive slave law. by this law every northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a southern man. northern marshals became slave-catchers, and northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution. this was a degradation which the north would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute books. prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the north had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. but they were not willing to play the role of police for the south in the protection of this particular institution. in the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the states were each almost a separate nationality. at that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. but the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the states got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the national government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. it is probably well that we had the war when we did. we are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. the civilized nations of europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people. then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. but this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. the conduct of some of the european states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the european nations thought it would be well to give us a check. we might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. hence, england was constantly finding fault with the administration at washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade. she also joined, at first, with france and spain in setting up an austrian prince upon the throne in mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that mexico had of being treated as an independent power. it is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted. mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon mexico as a foothold for establishing a european monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. i, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the united states by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the united states would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. i often spoke of the matter to mr. lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. i inferred that they felt a good deal as i did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands. all of the powers except france very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an austrian prince upon the throne of mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. after the surrender of lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, i sent sheridan with a corps to the rio grande to have him where he might aid juarez in expelling the french from mexico. these troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the rio grande, where sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of mexico bordering on that stream. this soon led to a request from france that we should withdraw our troops from the rio grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. finally bazaine was withdrawn from mexico by order of the french government. from that day the empire began to totter. mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. france is the traditional ally and friend of the united states. i did not blame france for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the mexican republic. that was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. he had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. he tried to play the part of the first napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. he sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. like our own war between the states, the franco-prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to france all it cost her people. it was the completion of the downfall of napoleon iii. the beginning was when he landed troops on this continent. failing here, the prestige of his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. he must achieve a success or fall. he tried to strike down his neighbor, prussia--and fell. i never admired the character of the first napoleon; but i recognize his great genius. his work, too, has left its impress for good on the face of europe. the third napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act. to maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. there can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate european powers for a time until we could prepare for them. we should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the finest possible condition. neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime. money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. the work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security. england's course towards the united states during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother country. i regretted it. england and the united states are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. they speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. we together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world. england governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. she is just to the conquered, but rigid. she makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. she does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government. the hostility of england to the united states during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. it was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. i am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in england a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the union, or, as they called it, in favor of the north. even in manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the north at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. it is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. the condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. but he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens. it was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of santo domingo during the time i was president of the united states. santo domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. the island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. the products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. i took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race. they would still be states of the union, and under the protection of the general government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored. by the war with mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. it was seen that the volunteers of the mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the pacific coast country. their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. after our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. the mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there. this territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. railroads traverse it in every direction, north, south, east, and west. the mines are worked. the high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. this is the work of the volunteer. it is probable that the indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. we must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. in fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. so much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. before, new territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread and vegetables. all the streams abounded with fish. trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the states once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey. little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. this is all changed now. the war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. the feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. there is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea"; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography. the war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. we have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter. i feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between the federal and confederate. i cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but i feel it within me that it is to be so. the universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of the answer to "let us have peace." the expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country, nor to a division of the people. they came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the protestant, the catholic, and the jew; and from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. politics did not enter into the matter at all. i am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because i was the object of it. but the war between the states was a very bloody and a very costly war. one side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. i commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. i was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. it is a significant and gratifying fact that confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. i hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. appendix. report of lieutenant-general u. s. grant, of the united states armies 1864-65. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., july 22, 1865. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. sir: i have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the united states from the date of my appointment to command the same. from an early period in the rebellion i had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. the resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. the armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. it was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. from the first, i was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. i therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. these views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. all i can say is, that what i have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what i conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country. at the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: the mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal troops, from st. louis, missouri, to its mouth. the line of the arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the mississippi, north of that stream. a few points in southern louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the rio grande. all the balance of the vast territory of arkansas, louisiana, and texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. the let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. but the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through missouri, arkansas, and along the mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. to the east of the mississippi we held substantially with the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the state of tennessee. south of chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in georgia, sufficient to protect east tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at dalton, georgia. west virginia was substantially within our lines. virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the potomac river, a small area about the mouth of james river, covered by the troops at norfolk and fort monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the potomac lying along the rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at plymouth, washington, and new bern, in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, fort pulaski, and port royal, in south carolina; fernandina and st. augustine, in florida. key west and pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. the accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to general sherman and other commanders in march, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy. behind the union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. in the south, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. this enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. the enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the mississippi into two armies, commanded by generals r. e. lee and j. e. johnston, his ablest and best generals. the army commanded by lee occupied the south bank of the rapidan, extending from mine run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the potomac. the army under johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at dalton, georgia, covering and defending atlanta, georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under major-general w. t. sherman. in addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under forrest, in north-east mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the shenandoah valley, and in the western part of virginia and extreme eastern part of tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. these two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. major-general w. t. sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the mississippi river to the alleghanies and the department of arkansas, west of the mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against johnston. major-general george g. meade had the immediate command of the army of the potomac, from where i exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. general sherman was instructed to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. if the enemy in his front showed signs of joining lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while i would prevent the concentration of lee upon him, if it was in the power of the army of the potomac to do so. more specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that i had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. major-general n. p. banks, then on an expedition up red river against shreveport, louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of march, of the importance it was that shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than general sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by general sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold shreveport and the red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of new orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that new orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that i had directed general steele to make a real move from arkansas, as suggested by him (general banks), instead of a demonstration, as steele thought advisable. on the 31st of march, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows: "1st. if successful in your expedition against shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the red river to general steele and the navy. "2d. that you abandon texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the rio grande. this can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. at least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. "3d. by properly fortifying on the mississippi river, the force to guard it from port hudson to new orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. according to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against mobile. to this i expect to add five thousand men from missouri. if however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, i would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against mobile. with these and such additions as i can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon mobile. two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to admiral farragut. this gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. you can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. my own idea of the matter is that pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the gulf department, you will know best about the matter. it is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. all i would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general n. p. banks." major-general meade was instructed that lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever lee went he would go also. for his movement two plans presented themselves: one to cross the rapidan below lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond or going north on a raid. but if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. if we took the other route, brandy station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the york or james rivers. of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route. the following letter of instruction was addressed to major-general b. f. butler: "fort monroe, virginia, april 2, 1864. "general:-in the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. "it will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. but, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. by such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. lee's army and richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. the necessity of covering washington with the army of the potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. i propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: the army of the potomac will act from its present base, lee's army being the objective point. you will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--i should say not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south side of james river, richmond being your objective point. to the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from south carolina, under major-general gillmore, who will command them in person. major-general w. f. smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. "general gillmore will be ordered to report to you at fortress monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. "when you are notified to move, take city point with as much force as possible. fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. from city point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. "the fact that has already been stated--that is, that richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the potomac--must be your guide. this indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the james river as you advance. then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in richmond, the army of the potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. "all the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. if, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. "you will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." on the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. on the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of general meade, he was informed that i expected him to move from fort monroe the same day that general meade moved from culpeper. the exact time i was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of april; that it was my intention to fight lee between culpeper and richmond, if he would stand. should he, however, fall back into richmond, i would follow up and make a junction with his (general butler's) army on the james river; that, could i be certain he would be able to invest richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the james, above the city, i would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. in co-operation with the main movements against lee and johnston, i was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies operating against them. a very considerable force, under command of major-general sigel, was so held for the protection of west virginia, and the frontiers of maryland and pennsylvania. whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. by such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. general sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from beverly and charleston, under command of generals ord and crook, against the east tennessee and virginia railroad. subsequently, general ord having been relieved at his own request, general sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by beverly, and to form two columns, one under general crook, on the kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. the one on the shenandoah to assemble between cumberland and the shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while general crook would take possession of lewisburg with part of his force and move down the tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the new river bridge and the salt-works, at saltville, va. owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of may, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of may. my first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that general butler should succeed in his movement against richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. if he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of richmond. it was well understood, by both generals butler and meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the james river, in case of failure to destroy lee without it. before giving general butler his instructions, i visited him at fort monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. believing, however, in the practicability of capturing richmond unless it was reinforced, i made that the objective point of his operations. as the army of the potomac was to move simultaneously with him, lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of james river. i may here state that, commanding all the armies as i did, i tried, as far as possible, to leave general meade in independent command of the army of the potomac. my instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. the campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. his commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received. the movement of the army of the potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of may, under the immediate direction and orders of major-general meade, pursuant to instructions. before night, the whole army was across the rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at germania ford, and the second corps at ely's ford, the cavalry, under major-general sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. the average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. this i regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions i had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, major-general g. k. warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near mine run. the battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. general burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the army of the potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the rappahannock river and alexandria railroad, holding the road back to bull run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. this crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. by six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the rappahannock and rapidan rivers. considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. the battle of the wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. after dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. but the promptness of general sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. on the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. from this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. i therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. on the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards spottsylvania court house, the fifth corps moving on the most direct road. but the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. on the 8th, general warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at spottsylvania. this force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. on the morning of the 9th, general sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with richmond. the 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier major-general john sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. major-general h. g. wright succeeded him in command. early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. the second corps, major-general hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of johnson's division of ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. but the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from washington. deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at spottsylvania court house, orders were issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the north anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. late in the afternoon of the 19th, ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. this delayed the movement to the north anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. but the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the north anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. the fifth corps reached the north anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. the second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between that and jericho ford. general warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. on the 25th, general sheridan rejoined the army of the potomac from the raid on which he started from spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at beaver dam and ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at yellow tavern; carried the first line of works around richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the chickahominy at meadow bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to haxall's landing, on the james river, where he communicated with general butler. this raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. general butler moved his main force up the james river, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of may, general gillmore having joined him with the tenth corps. at the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of west point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under general kautz, from suffolk, to operate against the road south of petersburg and richmond. on the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both city point and bermuda hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. on the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. on the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the petersburg and richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. on the 9th he telegraphed as follows: "headquarters, near bermuda landing, may 9, 1864. "hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. "our operations may be summed up in a few words. with one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the peninsula, forced the chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position. these were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards richmond. "general kautz, with three thousand cavalry from suffolk, on the same day with our movement up james river, forced the black water, burned the railroad bridge at stony creek, below petersburg, cutting into beauregard's force at that point. "we have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of lee's army. i have ordered up the supplies. "beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by kautz. that portion which reached petersburg under hill i have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. "general grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to lee from beauregard's force. "benj. f. butler, major-general." on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at drury's bluff, or fort darling, with small loss. the time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of richmond and petersburg, enabling, as it did, beauregard to collect his loose forces in north and south carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. on the 16th, the enemy attacked general butler in his position in front of drury's bluff. he was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the james and appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. it required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there. on the 12th, general kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the danville railroad, which he struck at coalfield, powhatan, and chula stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the south side road, struck it at wilson's, wellsville, and black's and white's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to city point, which he reached on the 18th. on the 19th of april, and prior to the movement of general butler, the enemy, with a land force under general hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked plymouth, n. c., commanded by general h. w. wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. the gunboat smithfield was sunk, and the miami disabled. the army sent to operate against richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at bermuda hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by beauregard against the army of the potomac. in addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under breckinridge from the western part of virginia. the position of bermuda hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. i determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, i directed that they be sent forward, under command of major-general w. f. smith, to join the army of the potomac. on the 24th of may, the 9th army corps, commanded by major-general a. e. burnside, was assigned to the army of the potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of major-general meade's command. finding the enemy's position on the north anna stronger than either of his previous ones, i withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the north anna, and moved via hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right. generals torbert's and merritt's divisions of cavalry, under sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the pamunkey river at hanover town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the enemy at hawes's shop. on the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the hanover court house and cold harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the chickahominy. late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. an attack was immediately ordered by general meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. on the 31st, general wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the south anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. general sheridan, on the same day, reached cold harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and general smith's command, which had just arrived, via white house, from general butler's army. on the 1st day of june an attack was made at five p.m. by the 6th corps and the troops under general smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. this resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of general smith. during the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. that night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. the 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. on the 3d of june we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. in this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, i have reason to believe, was comparatively light. it was the only general attack made from the rapidan to the james which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. i would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as i had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. from the proximity of the enemy to his defences around richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. i was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the james. while the former might have been better as a covering for washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea, from the start, had been to beat lee's army north of richmond, if possible. then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the james river, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. after the battle of the wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. he acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of life than i was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that i had designed north of richmond. i therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to charlottesville and gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between richmond and the shenandoah valley and lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the james river, by the enemy's right flank, where i felt i could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. on the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under general sheridan, got off on the expedition against the virginia central railroad, with instructions to hunter, whom i hoped he would meet near charlottesville, to join his forces to sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the potomac by the route laid down in sheridan's instructions. on the 10th of june, general butler sent a force of infantry, under general gillmore, and of cavalry under general kautz, to capture petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the appomattox. the cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. general gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to bermuda hundred without attempting one. attaching great importance to the possession of petersburg, i sent back to bermuda hundred and city point, general smith's command by water, via the white house, to reach there in advance of the army of the potomac. this was for the express purpose of securing petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. the movement from cold harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. one division of cavalry, under general wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the chickahominy at long bridge, and moved out to white oak swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. the advance corps reached james river, at wilcox's landing and charles city court house, on the night of the 13th. during three long years the armies of the potomac and northern virginia had been confronting each other. in that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. the southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture washington and march on to new york, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. hence, antietam, gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. their army believed this. it produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. the battles of the wilderness, spottsylvania, north anna and cold harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. his losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. the details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of major-general meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. during the campaign of forty-three days, from the rapidan to the james river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, brigadier-general r. ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. the movement in the kanawha and shenandoah valleys, under general sigel, commenced on the 1st of may. general crook, who had the immediate command of the kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to general averell. they crossed the mountains by separate routes. averell struck the tennessee and virginia railroad, near wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to new river and christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including new river bridge, forming a junction with crook at union on the 15th. general sigel moved up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy at new market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind cedar creek. not regarding the operations of general sigel as satisfactory, i asked his removal from command, and major-general hunter appointed to supersede him. his instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to major-general h. w. halleck, chief of staff of the army: "near spottsylvania court house, va. "may 20, 1864. * * * * * * * "the enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through staunton. on the whole, therefore, i think it would be better for general hunter to move in that direction; reach staunton and gordonsville or charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. if he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * * "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." "jericho ford, va., may 25, 1864. "if hunter can possibly get to charlottesville and lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. the railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about gordonsville join this army. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." general hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. on the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of june. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached lynchburg a short time before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of kanawha. this lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north. had general hunter moved by way of charlottesville, instead of lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. if it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the james river canal, on the main line of communication between lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. i have never taken exception to the operations of general hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for i have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. the promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. to return to the army of the potomac: the 2d corps commenced crossing the james river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at wilcox's landing. the laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. after the crossing had commenced, i proceeded by steamer to bermuda hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of petersburg. the instructions to general butler were verbal, and were for him to send general smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. i told him that i would return at once to the army of the potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. general smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that i have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of petersburg from the appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. this was about seven p.m. between the line thus captured and petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced petersburg with a single brigade from any source. the night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. general hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached general smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. but instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into petersburg, he requested general hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. by the time i arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. an attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under smith and the 2d and 9th corps. it required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. the attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by general smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. the 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. the advantages of position gained by us were very great. the army then proceeded to envelop petersburg towards the south side railroad as far as possible without attacking fortifications. on the 16th the enemy, to reinforce petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of bermuda hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the james to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. general butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between petersburg and richmond. as soon as i was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it i ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, general wright commanding, that were embarking at wilcox's landing, under orders for city point, to report to general butler at bermuda hundred, of which general butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him. about two o'clock in the afternoon general butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. general wright, with his two divisions, joined general butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. but instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line. on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by general butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the james, at deep bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with bermuda hundred. on the 19th, general sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the virginia central railroad, arrived at the white house just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. the result of this expedition was, that general sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near trevilian station, on the morning of the 11th of june, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. he left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. on the 12th he destroyed the railroad from trevilian station to louisa court house. this occupied until three o'clock p.m., when he advanced in the direction of gordonsville. he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. on the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. night closed the contest. not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from general hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the north anna, and commenced his return march, reaching white house at the time before stated. after breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the james river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. he commenced crossing on the 25th, near fort powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the potomac. on the 22d, general wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of the potomac, and general kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the james moved against the enemy's railroads south of richmond. striking the weldon railroad at reams's station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the south side road about fifteen miles from petersburg, to near nottoway station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. he reached burkesville station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the danville railroad to roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. he then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the weldon railroad crossing of stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching reams's station (supposing it to be in our possession). at this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. in this last encounter, general kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. general wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. it severed all connection by railroad with richmond for several weeks. with a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near richmond to the anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of july the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the james river and joined the force general butler had there. on the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. on the 28th our lines were extended from deep bottom to new market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. the fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. the first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, i determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting petersburg before he could get his force back there. one division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. the other two divisions of the 2d corps and sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of petersburg. on the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. had they done this, i have every reason to believe that petersburg would have fallen. other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. the captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that general hunter was retreating from lynchburg by way of the kanawha river, thus laying the shenandoah valley open for raid into maryland and pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. as soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, general hunter, who had reached the kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to harper's ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. it became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. for this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in hampton roads from the gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the red river expedition. the garrisons of baltimore and washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. one division under command of general ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under general wright, were subsequently sent to washington. on the 3d of july the enemy approached martinsburg. general sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the potomac at shepherdtown; and general weber, commanding at harper's ferry, crossed the occupied hagerstown, moving a strong column towards frederick city. general wallace, with rickett's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. his force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable general wright to reach washington with two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. from monocacy the enemy moved on washington, his cavalry advance reaching rockville on the evening of the 10th. on the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of fort stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. a severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. the enemy's loss was probably greater. he commenced retreating during the night. learning the exact condition of affairs at washington, i requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven p.m., on the 12th, the assignment of major-general h. g. wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push early to the last moment. general wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at snicker's ferry, on the shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, general averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. learning that early was retreating south towards lynchburg or richmond, i directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that hunter should remain in the shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. i felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave washington. subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to return to the james. about the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon maryland and pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of harper's ferry. the rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into pennsylvania which on the 30th burned chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of west virginia. from the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between washington and city point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. it took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. to remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the department of west virginia, washington, susquehanna, and the middle department, and i so recommended. on the 2d of august, i ordered general sheridan to report in person to major-general halleck, chief of staff, at washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against early. at this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of winchester, while our forces, under general hunter, were concentrated on the monocacy, at the crossing of the baltimore and ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western maryland and southern pennsylvania. from where i was, i hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at monocacy, lest by so doing i should expose washington. therefore, on the 4th, i left city point to visit hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. on arrival there, and after consultation with general hunter, i issued to him the following instructions: "monocacy bridge, maryland, august 5, 1864--8 p.m. "general:--concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of harper's ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. from harper's ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. if it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. in detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from washington via rockville may be taken into account. "there are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. these will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the potomac. one brigade will probably start to-morrow. in pushing up the shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. it is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. "bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. be guided in your course by the course he takes. "make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general d. hunter." the troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached halltown that night. general hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, i telegraphed to have general sheridan, then at washington, sent to harper's ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on general hunter at monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. i remained at monocacy until general sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, i returned to city point by way of washington. on the 7th of august, the middle department, and the departments of west virginia, washington, and susquehanna, were constituted into the "middle military division," and major-general sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. two divisions of cavalry, commanded by generals torbert and wilson, were sent to sheridan from the army of the potomac. the first reached him at harper's ferry about the 11th of august. his operations during the month of august and the fore part of september were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. the two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the opequon creek covering winchester, and our forces in front of berryville--that either could bring on a battle at any time. defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the states of maryland and pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. under these circumstances i hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. finally, the use of the baltimore and ohio railroad, and the chesapeake and ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving pennsylvania and maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that i determined the risk should be taken. but fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than i did of general sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, i left city point on the 15th of september to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. i met him at charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that i saw there were but two words of instructions necessary--go in! for the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at harper's ferry. i asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing tuesday morning. his reply was, that he could before daylight on monday. he was off promptly to time, and i may here add, that the result was such that i have never since deemed it necessary to visit general sheridan before giving him orders. early on the morning of the 19th, general sheridan attacked general early at the crossing on the opequon creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from opequon creek to winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. the enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at fisher's hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. sheridan pursued him with great energy through harrisonburg, staunton, and the gaps of the blue ridge. after stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to strasburg, and took position on the north side of cedar creek. having received considerable reinforcements, general early again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of october, his cavalry encountered ours near strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. on the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between middletown and newtown. at this juncture, general sheridan, who was at winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. the enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. the wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of staunton and lynchburg. pursuit was made to mount jackson. thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the shenandoah valley. i was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the potomac, and to send one division from sheridan's army to the army of the james, and another to savannah, georgia, to hold sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from petersburg to reinforce early in the shenandoah valley. i therefore sent the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the potomac, and a force of general butler's army, on the night of the 13th of august, to threaten richmond from the north side of the james, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. in this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. the enemy having withdrawn heavily from petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the weldon railroad. during the day he had considerable fighting. to regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. on the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg returned to the front at petersburg. on the 25th, the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, while at reams's station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. by the 12th of september, a branch railroad was completed from the city point and petersburg railroad to the weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of petersburg. the extension of our lines across the weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the james for the defence of richmond. on the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, major-general birney, and the 18th corps, major-general ord commanding, of general butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the james, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below chaffin's farm, known as fort harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the new market road and intrenchments. this success was followed up by a gallant assault upon fort gilmer, immediately in front of the chaffin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. the position captured from the enemy was so threatening to richmond, that i determined to hold it. the enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. on the morning of the 30th, general meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. in this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near poplar spring church. in the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. our cavalry under gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. on the 7th of october, the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry north of the james, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. this he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. on the 27th, the army of the potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. the 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it towards the south side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the boydton plank road where it crosses hatcher's run. at this point we were six miles distant from the south side railroad, which i had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. but finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, i determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. orders were given accordingly. immediately upon receiving a report that general warren had connected with general hancock, i returned to my headquarters. soon after i left the enemy moved out across hatcher's run, in the gap between generals hancock and warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on general hancock's right and rear. general hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position. in support of this movement, general butler made a demonstration on the north side of the james, and attacked the enemy on the williamsburg road, and also on the york river railroad. in the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. from this time forward the operations in front of petersburg and richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. by the 7th of february, our lines were extended to hatcher's run, and the weldon railroad had been destroyed to hicksford. general sherman moved from chattanooga on the 6th of may, with the armies of the cumberland, tennessee, and ohio, commanded, respectively, by generals thomas mcpherson, and schofield, upon johnston's army at dalton; but finding the enemy's position at buzzard's roost, covering dalton, too strong to be assaulted, general mcpherson was sent through snake gap to turn it, while generals thomas and schofield threatened it in front and on the north. this movement was successful. johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of may 15th. a heavy battle ensued. during the night the enemy retreated south. late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. the next morning, however, he had again disappeared. he was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the etowah. while these operations were going on, general jefferson c. davis's division of thomas's army was sent to rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. general sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d, for dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at allatoona. on the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under general hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to new hope church, near dallas. several sharp encounters occurred at this point. the most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted general mcpherson at dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. on the 4th of june, johnston abandoned his intrenched position at new hope church, and retreated to the strong positions of kenesaw, pine, and lost mountains. he was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on kenesaw, where, on the 27th, generals thomas and mcpherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. on the night of the 2d of july, sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned kenesaw and retreated across the chattahoochee. general sherman remained on the chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of july, when he resumed his operations, crossed the chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to augusta, and drove the enemy back to atlanta. at this place general hood succeeded general johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon sherman in the vicinity of atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of july. about one p.m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted mcpherson was killed. general logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by major-general howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division. in all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, general sherman, after securing his line of communications across the chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the montgomery and macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. in this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near rough-and-ready, jonesboro, and lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of september occupied atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. about the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at dalton, and driven into east tennessee, whence it proceeded west to mcminnville, murfreesboro, and franklin, and was finally driven south of the tennessee. the damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. during the partial investment of atlanta, general rousseau joined general sherman with a force of cavalry from decatur, having made a successful raid upon the atlanta and montgomery railroad, and its branches near opelika. cavalry raids were also made by generals mccook, garrard, and stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with atlanta. the first two were successful the latter, disastrous. general sherman's movement from chattanooga to atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. the history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. his own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign. he was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from nashville to the point where he was operating. this passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. the cavalry force of the enemy under forrest, in northern mississippi, was evidently waiting for sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. to guard against this danger, sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against forrest in west tennessee. he directed general washburn, who commanded there, to send brigadier-general s. d. sturgis in command of this force to attack him. on the morning of the 10th of june, general sturgis met the enemy near guntown, mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. by this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon sherman's line of communications. the persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. in the meantime, major-general a. j. smith, with the troops of the army of the tennessee that had been sent by general sherman to general banks, arrived at memphis on their return from red river, where they had done most excellent service. he was directed by general sherman to immediately take the offensive against forrest. this he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. on the 14th of july, he met the enemy at tupelo, mississippi, and whipped him badly. the fighting continued through three days. our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. having accomplished the object of his expedition, general smith returned to memphis. during the months of march and april this same force under forrest annoyed us considerably. on the 24th of march it captured union city, kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked paducah, commanded by colonel s. g. hicks, 40th illinois volunteers. colonel h., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. on the 13th of april, part of this force, under the rebel general buford, summoned the garrison of columbus, kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from colonel lawrence, 34th new jersey volunteers, that being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. on the morning of the same day forrest attacked fort pillow, tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of tennessee cavalry and the 1st regiment alabama colored troops, commanded by major booth. the garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. on the 14th, general buford, having failed at columbus, appeared before paducah, but was again driven off. guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by forrest's operations, were also very active in kentucky. the most noted of these was morgan. with a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the state through pound gap in the latter part of may. on the 11th of june they attacked and captured cynthiana, with its entire garrison. on the 12th he was overtaken by general burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the state. this notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near greenville, tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by general gillem. in the absence of official reports of the commencement of the red river expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by general sherman under general a. j. smith, i am unable to give the date of its starting. the troops under general smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left vicksburg on the 10th of march, and reached the designated point on red river one day earlier than that appointed by general banks. the rebel forces at fort de russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, smith pushed forward to fort de russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. our loss was but slight. on the 15th he pushed forward to alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. on the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at henderson's hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery. on the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel general taylor, at cane river. by the 26th, general banks had assembled his whole army at alexandria, and pushed forward to grand ecore. on the morning of april 6th he moved from grand ecore. on the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the enemy near pleasant hill, and drove him from the field. on the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond pleasant hill, but was again compelled to retreat. on the 8th, at sabine cross roads and peach hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. during the night, general banks fell back to pleasant hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. during the night, general banks continued his retrograde movement to grand ecore, and thence to alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of april. here a serious difficulty arose in getting admiral porter's fleet which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. at the suggestion of colonel (now brigadier-general) bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. the army evacuated alexandria on the 14th of may, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached morganzia and point coupee near the end of the month. the disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of mobile. on the 23d of march, major-general steele left little rock with the 7th army corps, to cooperate with general banks's expedition on the red river, and reached arkadelphia on the 28th. on the 16th of april, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near elkin's ferry, in washita county, by general thayer, who had marched from fort smith. after several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, general steele reached camden, which he occupied about the middle of april. on learning the defeat and consequent retreat of general banks on red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at mark's mill, in dallas county, general steele determined to fall back to the arkansas river. he left camden on the 26th of april, and reached little rock on the 2d of may. on the 30th of april, the enemy attacked him while crossing saline river at jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. major-general canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "military division of the west mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied. before starting general a. j. smith's troops back to sherman, general canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the mississippi river. general smith met and defeated this force near lake chicot on the 5th of june. our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. in the latter part of july, general canby sent major-general gordon granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with admiral farragut against the defences of mobile bay. on the 8th of august, fort gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. fort powell was blown up and abandoned. on the 9th, fort morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. the total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery. about the last of august, it being reported that the rebel general price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached jacksonport, on his way to invade missouri, general a. j. smith's command, then en route from memphis to join sherman, was ordered to missouri. a cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from memphis, under command of colonel winslow. this made general rosecrans's forces superior to those of price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check price and drive him back; while the forces under general steele, in arkansas, would cut off his retreat. on the 26th day of september, price attacked pilot knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the missouri river, and continued up that river towards kansas. general curtis, commanding department of kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of kansas, while general rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. the enemy was brought to battle on the big blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. he made a precipitate retreat to northern arkansas. the impunity with which price was enabled to roam over the state of missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. there is no reason why general rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven price before the latter reached pilot knob. september 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under forrest, crossed the tennessee near waterloo, alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at sulphur branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the nashville and chattanooga railroad near tullahoma and dechard. on the morning of the 30th, one column of forrest's command, under buford, appeared before huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. he withdrew in the direction of athens which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of october, but without success. on the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. another column under forrest appeared before columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. on the morning of the 3d he moved towards mount pleasant. while these operations were going on, every exertion was made by general thomas to destroy the forces under forrest before he could recross the tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to corinth, mississippi. in september, an expedition under general burbridge was sent to destroy the saltworks at saltville, virginia. he met the enemy on the 2d of october, about three miles and a half from saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. during the night he withdrew his command and returned to kentucky. general sherman, immediately after the fall of atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. the great length of road from atlanta to the cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. during this time jefferson davis made a speech in macon, georgia, which was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling general sherman to fully meet them. he exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. in execution of this plan, hood, with this army, was soon reported to the south-west of atlanta. moving far to sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about big shanty, and moved north on it. general sherman, leaving a force to hold atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to gadsden, alabama. seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold atlanta, general sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows: "centreville, georgia", october 10--noon. "dispatch about wilson just received. hood is now crossing coosa river, twelve miles below rome, bound west. if he passes over the mobile and ohio road, had i not better execute the plan of my letter sent by colonel porter, and leave general thomas with the troops now in tennessee to defend the state? he will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach nashville. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." for a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, i quote from the letter sent by colonel porter: "i will therefore give my opinion, that your army and canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get wilmington, you strike for savannah and the river; that canby be instructed to hold the mississippi river, and send a force to get columbus, georgia, either by the way of the alabama or the appalachicola, and that i keep hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on augusta, columbia, and charleston, to be ready as soon as wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city of savannah is in our possession." this was in reply to a letter of mine of date september 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which i informed him of a proposed movement against wilmington, and of the situation in virginia, etc. "city point, virginia, "october 11, 1864--11 a.m. "your dispatch of october 10th received. does it not look as if hood was going to attempt the invasion of middle tennessee, using the mobile and ohio and memphis and charleston roads to supply his base on the tennessee river, about florence or decatur? if he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the tennessee river. if you were to cut loose, i do not believe you would meet hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. hood would probably strike for nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. if there is any way of getting at hood's army, i would prefer that, but i must trust to your own judgment. i find i shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on savannah. your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of richmond takes place. i am afraid thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent hood from going north. with wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." "kingston, georgia, "october 11--11 a.m. "hood moved his army from palmetto station across by dallas and cedartown, and is now on the coosa river, south of rome. he threw one corps on my road at acworth, and i was forced to follow. i hold atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. this reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. we cannot remain here on the defensive. with the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. i would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from chattanooga to atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through georgia, smashing things, to the sea. hood may turn into tennessee and kentucky, but i believe he will be forced to follow me. instead of my being on the defensive, i would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. the difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. i can make savannah, charleston, or the mouth of the chattahoochee. "answer quick, as i know we will not have the telegraph long. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." "city point, virginia, "october 11,1864--11.30 p.m. "your dispatch of to-day received. if you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of dalton or chattanooga, as you think best. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." it was the original design to hold atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. in other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the mississippi river. general sherman's plan virtually effected this object. general sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch hood. becoming satisfied that hood had moved westward from gadsden across sand mountain, general sherman sent the 4th corps, major-general stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, back to chattanooga to report to major-general thomas, at nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through georgia. with the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that general thomas could hold the line of the tennessee, or, in the event hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. it was therefore readily consented to that sherman should start for the sea-coast. having concentrated his troops at atlanta by the 14th of november, he commenced his march, threatening both augusta and macon. his coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. the blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of richmond and east of the mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and sherman's route to his own choice. how that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of fort mcallister, on the savannah river, and the occupation of savannah on the 21st of december, are all clearly set forth in general sherman's admirable report. soon after general sherman commenced his march from atlanta, two expeditions, one from baton rouge, louisiana, and one from vicksburg, mississippi, were started by general canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with mobile and detain troops in that field. general foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, via broad river, to destroy the railroad between charleston and savannah. the expedition from vicksburg, under command of brevet brigadier-general e. d. osband (colonel 3d united states colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of november, and destroyed the mississippi central railroad bridge and trestle-work over big black river, near canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. the expedition from baton rouge was without favorable results. the expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of brigadier-general john p. hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up broad river and debarked at boyd's neck on the 29th of november, from where it moved to strike the railroad at grahamsville. at honey hill, about three miles from grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. during the night general hatch withdrew. on the 6th of december general foster obtained a position covering the charleston and savannah railroad, between the coosawhatchie and tulifinny rivers. hood, instead of following sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. at all events, had i had the power to command both armies, i should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. on the 26th of october, the advance of hood's army attacked the garrison at decatur, alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the tennessee river, near florence. on the 28th, forrest reached the tennessee, at fort heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. on the 2d of november he planted batteries above and below johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. on the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. the gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. about a million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. on the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the tennessee river, above johnsonville, moving towards clifton, and subsequently joined hood. on the night of the 5th, general schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch the movements of hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of general a. j. smith's command from missouri, and until general wilson could get his cavalry remounted. on the 19th, general hood continued his advance. general thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. the enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by general schofield, at franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. his loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. this was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and i am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. during the night, general schofield fell back towards nashville. this left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned--so that general thomas's whole force might be brought together. the enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of nashville on the 2d of december. as soon as it was ascertained that hood was crossing the tennessee river, and that price was going out of missouri, general rosecrans was ordered to send to general thomas the troops of general a. j. smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. the advance of this reinforcement reached nashville on the 30th of november. on the morning of the 15th december, general thomas attacked hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. before the battle of nashville i grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. this impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the cumberland into kentucky. i feared hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. after urging upon general thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, i started west to superintend matters there in person. reaching washington city, i received general thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. i was delighted. all fears and apprehensions were dispelled. i am not yet satisfied but that general thomas, immediately upon the appearance of hood before nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. but his final defeat of hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. after hood's defeat at nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. on the 28th of december our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. about this time, the rains having set in heavily in tennessee and north alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, general thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the tennessee river. a small force of cavalry, under colonel w. j. palmer, 15th pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's pontoon-bridge. the details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in general thomas's report. a cavalry expedition, under brevet major-general grierson, started from memphis on the 21st of december. on the 25th he surprised and captured forrest's dismounted camp at verona, mississippi, on the mobile and ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for hood's army, four thousand new english carbines, and large amounts of public stores. on the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the mississippi central railroad at winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at grenada, arriving at vicksburg january 5th. during the operations in middle tennessee, the enemy, with a force under general breckinridge, entered east tennessee. on the 13th of november he attacked general gillem, near morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to knoxville. following up his success, breckinridge moved to near knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by general ammen. under the directions of general thomas, general stoneman concentrated the commands of generals burbridge and gillem near bean's station to operate against breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into virginia --destroy the salt-works at saltville, and the railroad into virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. on the 12th of december he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. on the 16th he struck the enemy, under vaughn, at marion, completely routing and pursuing him to wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. returning to marion, he met a force under breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of saltville, that had started in pursuit. he at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found breckinridge gone. he then moved directly to saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned general burbridge to lexington and general gillem to knoxville. wilmington, north carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. the navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of wilmington, but with only partial effect. the nature of the outlet of cape fear river was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of new inlet, or fort fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. to secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which i agreed to furnish. immediately commenced the assemblage in hampton roads, under admiral d. d. porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. this necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. the enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. this caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of november, when, being again called upon by hon. g. v. fox, assistant secretary of the navy, i agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with major-general butler, to hampton roads, where we had a conference with admiral porter as to the force required and the time of starting. a force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. the time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of december, if not before. learning, on the 30th of november, that bragg had gone to georgia, taking with him most of the forces about wilmington, i deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of bragg, and directed general butler to make all arrangements for the departure of major-general weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment. on the 6th of december, the following instructions were given: "city point, virginia, december 6, 1864. "general: the first object of the expedition under general weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of wilmington. if successful in this, the second will be to capture wilmington itself. there are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after sherman in georgia. the directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. the object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between cape fear river and the atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds fort fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. these in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of wilmington would be sealed. should fort fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture wilmington by a forced march and surprise. if time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. "the details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops. "should the troops under general weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near fort fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against richmond without delay. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." general butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. they were so sent, but general weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read general butler's published official report of the fort fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. i had no idea of general butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from bermuda hundred, and then did not dream but that general weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. i rather formed the idea that general butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. the expedition was detained several days at hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. the importance of getting the wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon general butler, and he advised to so notify admiral porter. the expedition finally got off on the 13th of december, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off new inlet, near fort fisher, on the evening of the 15th. admiral porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. the sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. the powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of general butler from beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press. on the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under brevet brigadier-general curtis, pushed up towards the fort. but before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, general butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. the re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. on the return of the expedition officers and men among them brevet major-general (then brevet brigadier-general) n. m. curtis, first-lieutenant g. w. ross, 117th regiment new york volunteers, first-lieutenant william h. walling, and second-lieutenant george simpson, 142d new york volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss. soon after the return of the expedition, i received a dispatch from the secretary of the navy, and a letter from admiral porter, informing me that the fleet was still off fort fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. the natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. finding it had not, however, i answered on the 30th of december, advising admiral porter to hold on, and that i would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. this time i selected brevet major-general (now major-general) a. h. terry to command the expedition. the troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. the latter it was never found necessary to land. i communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions: "city point, virginia, january 3, 1865. "general: the expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture fort fisher, n. c., and wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. you will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off cape fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to admiral d. d. porter, commanding north atlantic blockading squadron. "it is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. i suggest, therefore, that you consult with admiral porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. it would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. i have served with admiral porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. i would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. the first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which fort fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. you want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. if such a position can be obtained, the siege of fort fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. "my own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into cape fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. land forces cannot invest fort fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. "a siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to fort monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. all other supplies can be drawn from beaufort as you need them. "keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. when you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to fort monroe, to report for orders. "in case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. you will not debark at beaufort until so directed. "general sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. these troops will be brought to fort monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. should you require them, they will be sent to you. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "brevet major-general a. h. terry." lieutenant-colonel c. b. comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this. it will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault fort fisher. this was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. the expedition sailed from fort monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock p.m. was completed without loss. on the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of fort fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. this reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. in the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. on the 16th and the 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up fort caswell and the works on smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. this gave us entire control of the mouth of the cape fear river. at my request, mayor-general b. f. butler was relieved, and major-general e. o. c. ord assigned to the department of virginia and north carolina. the defence of the line of the tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, i determined to find other fields of operation for general thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. general thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at eastport, in readiness for orders. on the 7th of january, general thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of hood south from corinth, to send general schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. this direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to fort fisher and new bern. on the 26th he was directed to send general a. j. smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to general canby. by the 7th of february the whole force was en route for its destination. the state of north carolina was constituted into a military department, and general schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of major-general sherman. the following instructions were given him: "city point, va., january 31, 1865. "general:-* * * your movements are intended as co-operative with sherman's through the states of south and north carolina. the first point to be attained is to secure wilmington. goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from wilmington or new bern, or both, as you deem best. should you not be able to reach goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. the enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give general sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. as soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, wilmington or new bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. you will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. i believe general palmer has received some instructions direct from general sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. you will learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. a supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. "make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at city point. communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to fortress monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. "the supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command. "the movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid sherman. in such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. you will report, however, what you purpose doing. the details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. i would urge, however, if i did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of february; this limits your time very materially. "if rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of wilmington, it can be supplied from washington. a large force of railroad men have already been sent to beaufort, and other mechanics will go to fort fisher in a day or two. on this point i have informed you by telegraph. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general j. m. schofield." previous to giving these instructions i had visited fort fisher, accompanied by general schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with general terry and admiral porter as to what was best to be done. anticipating the arrival of general sherman at savannah his army entirely foot-loose, hood being then before nashville, tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion--i sent orders to general sherman on the 6th of december, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to city point with the balance of his command. on the 18th of december, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of hood's army by general thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, i wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. a few days after this i received a communication from general sherman, of date 16th december, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. also that he had expected, upon reducing savannah, instantly to march to columbia, south carolina, thence to raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of january. the confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, i directed him, on the 28th of december, to make preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in north and south carolina, and join the armies operating against richmond as soon as he could. on the 21st of january i informed general sherman that i had ordered the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at fort fisher, about eight thousand men; at new bern, about four thousand; that if wilmington was captured, general schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to new bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. in obedience to his instructions, general schofield proceeded to reduce wilmington, north carolina, in co-operation with the navy under admiral porter, moving his forces up both sides of the cape fear river. fort anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. after fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards goldsboro' during the night. preparations were at once made for a movement on goldsboro' in two columns--one from wilmington, and the other from new bern--and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply general sherman by cape fear river, towards fayetteville, if it became necessary. the column from new bern was attacked on the 8th of march, at wise's forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. on the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. on the 14th the neuse river was crossed and kinston occupied, and on the 21st goldsboro' was entered. the column from wilmington reached cox's bridge, on the neuse river, ten miles above goldsboro', on the 22d. by the 1st of february, general sherman's whole army was in motion from savannah. he captured columbia, south carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on goldsboro', north carolina, via fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of march, opening up communication with general schofield by way of cape fear river. on the 15th he resumed his march on goldsboro'. he met a force of the enemy at averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. our loss in this engagement was about six hundred. the enemy's loss was much greater. on the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under joe johnston, attacked his advance at bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. general slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward. on the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. from there sherman continued to goldsboro', which place had been occupied by general schofield on the 21st (crossing the neuse river ten miles above there, at cox's bridge, where general terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from new bern and wilmington. among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of charleston, south carolina. it was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of february, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. on the morning of the 31st of january, general thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under general stoneman, from east tennessee, to penetrate south carolina well down towards columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to east tennessee by way of salisbury, north carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. of the feasibility of this latter, however, general stoneman was to judge. sherman's movements, i had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. general stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and sherman having passed out of the state of south carolina), on the 27th of february i directed general thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards lynchburg as far as he could. this would keep him between our garrisons in east tennessee and the enemy. i regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from richmond, he might fall back to lynchburg and attempt a raid north through east tennessee. on the 14th of february the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, va., february 14, 1865. "general canby is preparing a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama. his force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides a. j. smith's command. the cavalry you have sent to canby will be debarked at vicksburg. it, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose sherman. (i take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. it is so asserted in the richmond papers, and a member of the rebel congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to south carolina to oppose sherman.) this being true, or even if it is not true, canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. i think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. the object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. tuscaloosa and selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. this, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into alabama. discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. "now that your force has been so much depleted, i do not know what number of men you can put into the field. if not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, i think it will be sufficient. it is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. i do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as i learn. if you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. "to insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. i would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. no guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. "please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." on the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off. i deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against richmond, that all communications with the city, north of james river, should be cut off. the enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from richmond, and desiring to reinforce sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, i determined to make a move from the shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of the objects. i therefore telegraphed general sheridan as follows: "city point, va., february 20, 1865--1 p.m. "general:--as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after mosby's gang. from lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in virgina to the westward of danville, and push on and join general sherman. this additional raid, with one now about starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from eastport, mississippi, then thousand cavalry, canby from mobile bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma, and montgomery, and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday 1st. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the 25th i received a dispatch from general sheridan, inquiring where sherman was aiming for, and if i could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of charlotte, north carolina. in answer, the following telegram was sent him: "city point, va., february 25, 1865. "general:--sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. if strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to georgetown, s. c., and fit out for a new start. i think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. i believe he has passed charlotte. he may take fayetteville on his way to goldsboro'. if you reach lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. before you could possibly reach sherman, i think you would find him moving from goldsboro' towards raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to wilmington or new bern. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." general sheridan moved from winchester on the 27th of february, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. on the 1st of march he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the shenandoah, at mount crawford, and entered staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to waynesboro'. thence he pushed on to waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under general early. without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. the prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to winchester. thence he marched on charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards richmond and lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the rivanna river and awaited the arrival of his trains. this necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing lynchburg. on the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to scottsville, whence it marched up the james river canal to new market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. from here a force was pushed out from this column to duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the james river at that place, but failed. the enemy burned it on our approach. the enemy also burned the bridge across the river at hardwicksville. the other column moved down the railroad towards lynchburg, destroying it as far as amherst court house, sixteen miles from lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at new market. the river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the south side railroad about farmville, and destroy it to appomattox court house, the only thing left for him was to return to winchester or strike a base at the white house. fortunately, he chose the latter. from new market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of goochland, concentrating the whole force at columbia on the 10th. here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at white house, which reached me on the night of the 12th. an infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of white house, and supplies were forwarded. moving from columbia in a direction to threaten richmond, to near ashland station, he crossed the annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the pamunkey to white house, which place he reached on the 19th. previous to this the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, virginia, march 7, 1865--9.30 a.m. "general:--i think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in east tennessee, and throw a good force up to bull's gap and fortify there. supplies at knoxville could always be got forward as required. with bull's gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of east tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards lynchburg, or into north carolina. i do not think stoneman should break the road until he gets into virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." thus it will be seen that in march, 1865, general canby was moving an adequate force against mobile and the army defending it under general dick taylor; thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from middle tennessee under brevet major-general wilson against the enemy's vital points in alabama, the other from east tennessee, under major-general stoneman, towards lynchburg--and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from east tennessee; general sheridan's cavalry was at white house; the armies of the potomac and james were confronting the enemy, under lee, in his defences of richmond and petersburg; general sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of general schofield, was at goldsboro'; general pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under kirby smith and price, west of the mississippi; and general hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of winchester, virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. after the long march by general sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at white house. at this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about petersburg and richmond for the purpose of uniting with johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or i was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. on the 24th of march, general sheridan moved from white house, crossed the james river at jones's landing, and formed a junction with the army of the potomac in front of petersburg on the 27th. during this move, general ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the chickahominy. on the 24th of march the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against richmond were issued: "city point, virginia, march 24, 1865. "general: on the 29th instant the armies operating against richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under general sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the south side and danville railroads. two corps of the army of the potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing hatcher's run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards dinwiddie court house. "the cavalry under general sheridan, joined by the division now under general davies, will move at the same time by the weldon road and the jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching stony creek. general sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. all dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to brigadier-general benham, to be added to the defences of city point. major-general parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about petersburg and city point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the army of the potomac. the 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. if, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the weldon road. all troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. "general ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the potomac. in the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the potomac, and the colored division the right column. during the movement major-general weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the james. "the movement of troops from the army of the james will commence on the night of the 27th instant. general ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. a cavalry expedition, from general ord's command, will also be started from suffolk, to leave there on saturday, the 1st of april, under colonel sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about hicksford. this, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. they should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from norfolk and portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the blackwater. the crossing should probably be at uniten. should colonel sumner succeed in reaching the weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between hicksford, weldon, and gaston. the railroad bridge at weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the roanoke. all the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. to avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the james the same number of days' supplies with the army of the potomac, general ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. the densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. "all necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. the reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. while i would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. in case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. to prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. general weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. a success north of the james should be followed up with great promptness. an attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. in that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of richmond. preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the james, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. "by these instructions a large part of the armies operating against richmond is left behind. the enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. it cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. the very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. i would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. i would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. in like manner, i would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-generals meade, ord, and sheridan." early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the appomattox river towards our left), and carried fort stedman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. general meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. the enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. general sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at city point on the 27th of march, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of april, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of richmond and petersburg. general sherman proposed in this movement to threaten raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the roanoke at gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the richmond and danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of burkesville, or join the armies operating against richmond, as might be deemed best. this plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the meantime. i explained to him the movement i had ordered to commence on the 29th of march. that if it should not prove as entirely successful as i hoped, i would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the danville and south side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of lee's and johnston's armies. i had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. i was firmly convinced that sherman's crossing the roanoke would be the signal for lee to leave. with johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. by moving out i would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of lee and johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. i therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. on the night of the 27th, major-general ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, major-general gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, brigadier-general birney commanding, and mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. on the 28th the following instructions were given to general sheridan: "city point, va., march 28, 1865. "general:--the 5th army corps will move by the vaughn road at three a.m. to-morrow morning. the 2d moves at about nine a.m., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching dinwiddie court house. move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. you may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. it is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. i shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. should i not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the danville road. if you find it practicable, i would like you to cross the south side road, between petersburg and burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. i would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the danville road, which i would like you to strike as near to the appomattox as possible. make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. you can then pass on to the south side road, west of burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. "after having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into north carolina and join general sherman. should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that i may send orders to meet you at goldsboro'. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. at night the cavalry was at dinwiddie court house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the quaker road, near its intersection with the boydton plank road. the position of the troops from left to right was as follows: sheridan, warren, humphreys, ord, wright, parke. everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of petersburg and richmond, if the proper effort was made. i therefore addressed the following communication to general sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so: "gravelly creek, march 29, 1865. "general:--our line is now unbroken from the appomattox to dinwiddie. we are all ready, however, to give up all, from the jerusalem plank road to hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. after getting into line south of hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. general griffin was attacked near where the quaker road intersects the boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. humphreys reached dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. "i now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. i do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. in the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. the movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. we will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. the signal-officer at cobb's hill reported, at half-past eleven a.m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from richmond towards petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." from the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. during the 30th, sheridan advanced from dinwiddie court house towards five forks, where he found the enemy in full force. general warren advanced and extended his line across the boydton plank road to near the white oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. general humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the hatcher, near burgess's mills. generals ord, wright, and parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. the two latter reported favorably. the enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from richmond to our extreme left, i conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. i determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce general sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. the result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted fort stedman, particularly favored this. the enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. preparations were at once made to relieve general humphreys's corps, to report to general sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. on the morning of the 31st, general warren reported favorably to getting possession of the white oak road, and was directed to do so. to accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. a division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the white oak road gained. sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the five forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards dinwiddie court house. here general sheridan displayed great generalship. instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. this compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. at this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on dinwiddie court house. general mackenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. soon after receiving a report from general meade that humphreys could hold our position on the boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to sheridan, they were so ordered at once. thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of warren, because of his accessibility, instead of humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. on the morning of the 1st of april, general sheridan, reinforced by general warren, drove the enemy back on five forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. about the close of this battle, brevet major-general charles griffin relieved major-general warren in command of the 5th corps. the report of this reached me after nightfall. some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon general sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. to guard against this, general miles's division of humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (april 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. general wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. he was closely followed by two divisions of general ord's command, until he met the other division of general ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near hatcher's run. generals wright and ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in petersburg, while general humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined general wright on the left. general parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. general sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned general miles to his proper command. on reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding petersburg, a portion of general gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the most salient and commanding south of petersburg--thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. the enemy south of hatcher's run retreated westward to sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by miles's division. a severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of general sheridan, who was moving from ford's station towards petersburg, and a division sent by general meade from the front of petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. this force retreated by the main road along the appomattox river. during the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated petersburg and richmond, and retreated towards danville. on the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. general sheridan pushed for the danville road, keeping near the appomattox, followed by general meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while general ord moved for burkesville, along the south side road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. on the 4th, general sheridan struck the danville road near jetersville, where he learned that lee was at amelia court house. he immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of general meade, who reached there the next day. general ord reached burkesville on the evening of the 5th. on the morning of the 5th, i addressed major-general sherman the following communication: "wilson's station, april 5, 1865. "general: all indications now are that lee will attempt to reach danville with the remnant of his force. sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. we hope to reduce this number one-half. i shall push on to burkesville, and if a stand is made at danville, will in a very few days go there. if you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with lee's and johnston's armies. whether it will be better for you to strike for greensboro', or nearer to danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." on the morning of the 6th, it was found that general lee was moving west of jetersville, towards danville. general sheridan moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to general meade on his reaching jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. general ord advanced from burkesville towards farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under brevet brigadier-general theodore read, to reach and destroy the bridges. this advance met the head of lee's column near farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until general read was killed and his small force overpowered. this caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled general ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself. in the afternoon, general sheridan struck the enemy south of sailors' creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. the movements of the 2d corps and general ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. on the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by prince edward's court house; the 6th corps, general ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on farmville; and the 2d corps by the high bridge road. it was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at high bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. the 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at farmville to its support. feeling now that general lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, i addressed him the following communication from farmville: "april 7, 1865. "general--the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, i received at farmville the following: "april 7, 1865. "general: i have received your note of this date. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." to this i immediately replied: "april 8, 1865. "general:--your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia, is just received. in reply, i would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon --namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of the northern virginia will be received. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. general meade followed north of the appomattox, and general sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for appomattox station, followed by general ord's command and the 5th corps. during the day general meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. late in the evening general sheridan struck the railroad at appomattox station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for lee's army. during this day i accompanied general meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from general lee: april 8, 1865. "general:--i received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. in mine of yesterday i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the army of northern virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the confederate states forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. to-morrow on the old stage-road to richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." early on the morning of the 9th i returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the appomattox: "april 9, 1865. "general:--your note of yesterday is received. i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." on this morning of the 9th, general ord's command and the 5th corps reached appomattox station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. the infantry was at once thrown in. soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. before reaching general sheridan's headquarters, i received the following from general lee: "april 9, 1865. "general:--i received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither i had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the interview was held at appomattox court-house, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence: appomattox court-house, virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, i propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern virginia on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." "headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: i have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the command of major-general gibbon, the 5th army corps under griffin, and mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at appomattox court-house until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. the remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of burkesville. general lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. on the receipt of my letter of the 5th, general sherman moved directly against joe johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through raleigh, which place general sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. the day preceding, news of the surrender of general lee reached him at smithfield. on the 14th a correspondence was opened between general sherman and general johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the president. this agreement was disapproved by the president on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to general sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at raleigh, north carolina, in obedience to your orders. notice was at once given by him to general johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. on the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to general lee. the expedition under general stoneman from east tennessee got off on the 20th of march, moving by way of boone, north carolina, and struck the railroad at wytheville, chambersburg, and big lick. the force striking it at big lick pushed on to within a few miles of lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between new river and big lick, and then turned for greensboro', on the north carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between danville and greensboro', and between greensboro' and the yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. at salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under general gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. at this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards charlotte. thence he moved to slatersville. general canby, who had been directed in january to make preparations for a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of march. the 16th corps, major-general a. j. smith commanding, moved from fort gaines by water to fish river; the 13th corps, under major-general gordon granger, moved from fort morgan and joined the 16th corps on fish river, both moving thence on spanish fort and investing it on the 27th; while major-general steele's command moved from pensacola, cut the railroad leading from tensas to montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested fort blakely. after a severe bombardment of spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of april. during the night the enemy evacuated the fort. fort blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. these successes practically opened to us the alabama river, and enabled us to approach mobile from the north. on the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. the expedition under command of brevet major-general wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until march 22d, when it moved from chickasaw, alabama. on the 1st of april, general wilson encountered the enemy in force under forrest near ebenezer church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the cahawba river. on the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of selma, defended by forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. on the 4th he captured and destroyed tuscaloosa. on the 10th he crossed the alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to general canby, marched on montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. at this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. thence a force marched direct on columbus, and another on west point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. at the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. at the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. on the 20th he took possession of macon, georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by general howell cobb. general wilson, hearing that jeff. davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of may 11th. on the 4th day of may, general dick taylor surrendered to general canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the mississippi. a force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under kirby smith, west of the mississippi, was immediately put in motion for texas, and major-general sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of may, and before they reached their destination, general kirby smith surrendered his entire command to major-general canby. this surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vice-president; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property. owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the united states, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the rio grande, the orders for troops to proceed to texas were not changed. there have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that i have not mentioned. many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, i regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported. for information touching our indian difficulties, i would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred. it has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and the east fight battles, and from what i have seen i know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. all that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. the western armies commenced their battles in the mississippi valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in north carolina. the armies of the east commenced their battles on the river from which the army of the potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at appomattox court house, virginia. the splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. all have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the united states. let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the end __________ footnotes (*1) afterwards general gardner, c.s.a. (*2) general garland expressed a wish to get a message back to general twiggs, his division commander, or general taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer. lieutenant grant offered his services, which were accepted.--publishers. (*3) mentioned in the reports of major lee, colonel garland and general worth.--publishers. (*4) note.--it had been a favorite idea with general scott for a great many years before the mexican war to have established in the united states a soldiers' home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, i believe, in france. he recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the secretary of war, but never got any hearing. now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money. in addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at cerro gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220,000. portions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. after the war was over and the troops all home, general scott applied to have this money, which had never been turned into the treasury of the united states, expended in establishing such homes as he had previously recommended. this fund was the foundation of the soldiers' home at washington city, and also one at harrodsburgh, kentucky. the latter went into disuse many years ago. in fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, i believe, finally sold. (*5) the mexican war made three presidential candidates, scott, taylor and pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high office. it made also governors of states, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation. the rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the union side. on the other side, the side of the south, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the south was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it. (*6) c. b. lagow, the others not yet having joined me. (*7) note.--since writing this chapter i have received from mrs. w. h. l. wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the field of shiloh, a letter from general lew. wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. at the date of this letter it was well known that the confederates had troops out along the mobile & ohio railroad west of crump's landing and pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near shiloh. this letter shows that at that time general lew. wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between shiloh and his position, extending from crump's landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from adamsville to the pittsburg landing and purdy road. these two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over owl creek, where our right rested. in this letter general lew. wallace advises general w. h. l. wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "april 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of general w. h. l. wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps." this modifies very materially what i have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of general lew. wallace at the battle of shiloh. it shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road. the mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. this falling back had taken place before i sent general wallace orders to move up to pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. but my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to general wallace, so that i am not competent to say just what order the general actually received. general wallace's division was stationed, the first brigade at crump's landing, the second out two miles, and the third two and a half miles out. hearing the sounds of battle general wallace early ordered his first and third brigades to concentrate on the second. if the position of our front had not changed, the road which wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the river road. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, june 21, 1885. (*8) note: in an article on the battle of shiloh which i wrote for the century magazine, i stated that general a. mcd. mccook, who commanded a division of buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on monday, april 7th, because of the condition of his troops. general badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. out of justice to general mccook and his command, i must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of savannah on the morning of the 6th. from the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. the division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. it was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed. in fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the army of the tennessee. general sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. general mccook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. i refer to these circumstances with minuteness because i did general mccook injustice in my article in the century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. i am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that i have done one, i am always willing to make the fullest admission. (*9) note.--for gallantry in the various engagements, from the time i was left in command down to 26th of october and on my recommendation, generals mcpherson and c. s. hamilton were promoted to be major-generals, and colonels c. c. marsh, 20th illinois, m. m. crocker, 13th iowa j. a. mower, 11th missouri, m. d. leggett, 78th ohio, j. d. stevenson, 7th missouri, and john e. smith, 45th illinois, to be brigadiers. (*10) colonel ellet reported having attacked a confederate battery on the red river two days before with one of his boats, the de soto. running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. however, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. with the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the new era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at grand gulf and reaching the vicinity of vicksburg. (*11) one of colonel ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on february the 2d and been sunk in the red river. (*12) note.--on this occasion governor richard yates, of illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to carthage. i furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the state officers who accompanied him. (*13) note.--when general sherman first learned of the move i proposed to make, he called to see me about it. i recollect that i had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. i was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when sherman came up. after a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. we passed into the house together and shut the door after us. sherman then expressed his alarm at the move i had ordered, saying that i was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. i was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. he said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. he pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. this was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. i said this would take us back to memphis. sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from memphis to grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. to this i replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the north and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. the problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. no progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. sherman wrote to my adjutant general, colonel j. a. rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. colonel rawlins showed me the letter, but i did not see any reason for changing my plans. the letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between sherman and myself to the end of the war, that i remember of. i did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. general sherman furnished a copy himself to general badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. i did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. i make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation. (*14) meant edward's station. (*15) chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general w. t. sherman: enclosed herewith i send you copy of instructions to major-general thomas. you having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. it is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between cleveland and dalton, and longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. i will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the tennessee above chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to cleveland or thereabouts. u. s. grant maj.-gen'l. chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general geo. h. thomas, chattanooga: all preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on missionary ridge by saturday at daylight. not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. however, the general plan, you understand, is for sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the tennessee river just below the mouth of chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. you will co-operate with sherman. the troops in chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. this division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. your effort then will be to form a junction with sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of missionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. the junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. lookout valley, i think, will be easily held by geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the cumberland. howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at chattanooga or with sherman. it should be marched on friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. all these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. you will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. u. s. grant, major-general. (*16) in this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. (*17) chattanooga, november 24,1863. major-general. ceo. h. thomas, chattanooga general sherman carried missionary ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. his right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at chickamauga creek. i have instructed general sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. if hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. u. s. grant, major-general. (*18) washington, d. c., december 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. maj.-general u. s. grant: understanding that your lodgment at knoxville and at chattanooga is now secure, i wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. god bless you all, a. lincoln, president u. s. (*19) general john g. foster. (*20) during this winter the citizens of jo davies county, ill., subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for general grant, which was always known as the chattanooga sword. the scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which general grant had participated. congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for vicksburg and chattanooga. all such things are now in the possession of the government at washington. (*21) washington, d. c. december 29, 1863. maj.-general u. s. grant: general foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? it is possible that schofield will be sent to your command. h. w. halleck general-in-chief. (official.) (*22) see letter to banks, in general grant's report, appendix. (*23) [private and confidential.] headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., april 4, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding military division of the mississippi. general:--it is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. for your information i now write you my programme, as at present determined upon. i have sent orders to banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of red river to general steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to new orleans; to abandon all of texas, except the rio grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. to this i will add five thousand men from missouri. with this force he is to commence operations against mobile as soon as he can. it will be impossible for him to commence too early. gillmore joins butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against richmond from the south side of the james river. this will give butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, w. f. smith commanding the right wing of his forces and gillmore the left wing. i will stay with the army of the potomac, increased by burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against lee's army, wherever it may be found. sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under ord and averell, to start from beverly, virginia, and the other, under crook, to start from charleston on the kanawha, to move against the virginia and tennessee railroad. crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about saltville, and move east from there to join ord. his force will be all cavalry, while ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. i do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. as stated, banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. gillmore is ordered to report at fortress monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. sigel is concentrating now. none will move from their places of rendezvous until i direct, except banks. i want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. but all i can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. i know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but i believe you will accomplish it. from the expedition from the department of west virginia i do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way i can take troops from there. with the long line of railroad sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. in this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. in other words, if sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*24) see instructions to butler, in general grant's report, appendix. (*25) in field, culpeper c. h., va., april 9, 1864. maj.-general geo. g. meade com'd'g army of the potomac. for information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone. so far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the red river to general steele and the navy, to abandon texas with the exception of the rio grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on mobile. this he is to do without reference to other movements. from the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave new orleans before the 1st of may, if so soon. sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, jo. johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of georgia his ultimate aim. if successful he will secure the line from chattanooga to mobile with the aid of banks. sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. this he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under major-general ord; the other from charleston, va., principally cavalry, under brig.-general crook. the former of these will endeavor to reach the tennessee and virginia railroad, about south of covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to lynchburg and return to its base by way of the shenandoah valley, or join you. the other will strike at saltville, va., and come eastward to join ord. the cavalry from ord's command will try tributaries would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the virginia and tennessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting richmond with all the south and south-west. gillmore will join butler with about 10,000 men from south carolina. butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. the force will be commanded by maj.-general w. f. smith. with smith and gillmore, butler will seize city point, and operate against richmond from the south side of the river. his movement will be simultaneous with yours. lee's army will be your objective point. wherever lee goes, there you will go also. the only point upon which i am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the rapidan above or below him. each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond and going north on a raid. but if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. we separate from butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. by the other route brandy station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the york or james rivers. these advantages and objections i will talk over with you more fully than i can write them. burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., i will give him the defence of the road from bull run as far south as we wish to hold it. this will enable you to collect all your strength about brandy station and to the front. there will be naval co-operation on the james river, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should lee fall back into his intrenchments at richmond, butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. what i would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. one wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. should by lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to white house on the pamunkey. your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. if not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the james river or elsewhere. if lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. i would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. by the other, half the amount would be sufficient. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*26) general john a. logan, upon whom devolved the command of the army of the tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and general g. m. dodge, graphically describing to general sherman the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "the disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under fuller and mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy." (*27) union army on the rapidan, may 5, 1864. [compiled.] lieutenant-general u. s. grant, commander-in-chief. major-general george g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. maj.-gen. w. s. hancock, commanding second army corps. first division, brig.-gen. francis c. barlow. first brigade, col. nelson a. miles. second brigade, col. thomas a. smyth. third brigade, col. paul frank. fourth brigade, col. john r. brooke. second division, brig.-gen. john gibbon. first brigade, brig.-gen. alex. s. webb. second brigade, brig.-gen. joshua t. owen. third brigade, col. samuel s. carroll. third division, maj.-gen. david b. birney. first brigade, brig.-gen. j. h. h. ward. second brigade, brig.-gen. alexander hays. fourth divisin, brig.-gen. gershom mott. first brigade, col. robert mcallister. second brigade, col. wm. r. brewster. artillery brigade, col. john c. tidball. maj.-gen. g. k. warren, commanding fifth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. charles griffin. first brigade, brig.-gen. romeyn b. ayres. second brigade, col. jacob b. sweitzer. third brigade, brig.-gen. j. j. bartlett. second division, brig.-gen. john c. robinson. first brigade, col. samuel h. leonard. second brigade, brig.-gen. henry baxter. third brigade, col. andrew w. denison. third division, brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford. first brigade, col. wm mccandless. third brigade, col. joseph w. fisher. fourth division, brig.-gen. james s. wadsworth. first brigade, brig.-gen. lysander cutler. second brigade brig.-gen. james c. rice. third brigade, col. roy stone artillery brigade, col. s. s. wainwright. maj.-gen. john sedgwick, commanding sixth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. h. g. wright. first brigade, col. henry w. brown. second brigade, col. emory upton. third brigade, brig.-gen. d. a. russell. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. alexander shaler. second division, brig.-gen. george w. getty. first brigade, brig.-gen. frank wheaton. second brigade, col. lewis a. grant. third brigade, brig.-gen. thos. h. neill. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. henry l. eustis. third division, brig.-gen. james ricketts. first brigade, brig.-gen. wm. h. morris. second brigade, brig.-gen. t. seymour. artillery brigade, col. c. h. tompkins maj.-gen. p. h. sheridan, commanding cavalry corps. first division, brig.-gen. a. t. a. torbert. first brigade, brig.-gen. g. a. custer. second brigade, col. thos. c. devin. reserve brigade, brig.-gen. wesley merritt second division, brig.-gen. d. mcm. gregg. first brigade, brig.-gen. henry e. davies, jr. second brigade, col. j. irvin gregg. third division, brig.-gen. j. h. wilson. first brigade, col. t. m. bryan, jr. second brigade, col. geo. h. chapman. maj.-gen. a. e. burnside, commanding ninth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. t. g. stevenson. first brigade, col. sumner carruth. second brigade, col. daniel leasure. second division, brig.-gen. robert b. potter. first brigade, col. zenas r. bliss. second brigade, col. simon g. griffin. third division, brig.-gen. orlando willcox. first brigade, col. john f. hartranft. second brigade, col. benj. c. christ. fourth division, brig.-gen. edward ferrero. first brigade, col. joshua k. sigfried. second brigade, col. henry g. thomas. provisional brigade, col. elisha g. marshall. brig.-gen. henry j. hunt, commanding artillery. reserve, col. h. s. burton. first brigade, col. j. h. kitching. second brigade, maj. j. a. tompkins. first brig. horse art., capt. j. m. robertson. second brigade, horse art., capt. d. r. ransom. third brigade, maj. r. h. fitzhugh. general headquarters....... provost guard, brig.-gen. m. r. patrick. volunteer engineers, brig.-gen. h. w. benham. confederate army. organization of the army of northern virginia, commanded by general robert e. lee, august 31st, 1834. first army corps: lieut.-gen. r. h. anderson, commanding. maj.-gen. geo. e. pickett's division. brig.-gen. seth m. barton's brigade. (a) brig.-gen. m. d. corse's " " eppa hunton's " " wm. r. terry's " maj.-gen. c. w. field's division. (b) brig.-gen. g. t. anderson's brigade " e. m. law's (c) " " john bratton's " maj.-gen. j. b. kershaw's division. (d) brig.-gen. w. t. wofford's brigade " b. g. humphreys' " " goode bryan's " " kershaw's (old) " second army corps: major-general jubal a. early, commanding maj.-gen. john b. gordon's division. brig.-gen. h. t. hays' brigade. (e) " john pegram 's " (f) " gordon's " (g) brig.-gen. r. f. hoke's " maj.-gen. edward johnson's division. stonewall brig. (brig.-gen. j. a. walker). (h) brig.-gen. j m jones' brigade. (h) " geo h. stewart's " (h) " l. a. stafford's " (e) maj.-gen. r. e. rodes' division. brig.-gen. j. daniel's brigade. (i) " geo. dole's " (k) " s. d. ramseur's brigade. " c. a. battle's " " r. d. johnston's " (f) third army corps: lieut.-gen. a. p. hill, commanding. maj.-gen. wm. mahone's division. (l) brig.-gen. j. c. c. sanders' brigade. mahone's " brig.-gen. n. h. harris's " (m) " a. r. wright's " " joseph finegan's " maj.-gen. c. m. wilcox's division. brig.-gen. e. l. thomas's brigade (n) " james h. lane's " " sam'l mccowan's " " alfred m. scale's " maj.-gen. h. heth's division. (o) brig.-gen. j. r. davis's brigade. " john r. cooke's " " d. mcrae's " " j. j. archer's " " h. h. walker's " _unattached_: 5th alabama battalion. cavalry corps: lieutenant-general wade hampton, commanding.(p) maj.-gen. fitzhugh lee's division brig.-gen. w. c. wickham's brigade " l. l. lomax's " maj.-gen. m. c. butler's division. brig.-gen. john dunovant's brigade. " p. m. b. young's " " thomas l. rosser's " maj.-gen. w. h. f. lee's division. brig.-gen. rufus barringer's brigade. " j. r. chambliss's " artillery reserve: brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton, commanding. brig.-gen. e. p. alexander's division.* cabell's battalion. manly's battery. 1st co. richmond howitzers. carleton's battery. calloway's battery. haskell's battalion. branch's battery. nelson's " garden's " rowan " huger's battalion. smith's battery. moody " woolfolk " parker's " taylor's " fickling's " martin's " gibb's battalion. davidson's battery. dickenson's " otey's " brig.-gen. a. l. long's division. braxton's battalion. lee battery. 1st md. artillery. stafford " alleghany " cutshaw's battalion. charlotteville artillery. staunton " courtney " carter's battalion. morris artillery. orange " king william artillery. jeff davis " nelson's battalion. amherst artillery. milledge " fluvauna " brown's battalion. powhatan artillery. 2d richmond howitzers. 3d " " rockbridge artillery. salem flying artillery. col r. l.walker's division. cutt's battalion. ross's battery. patterson's battery. irwin artillery. richardson's battalion. lewis artillery. donaldsonville artillery. norfolk light " huger " mclntosh 's battalion. johnson's battery. hardaway artillery. danville " 2d rockbridge artillery. pegram's battalion. peedee artillery. fredericksburg artillery. letcher " purcell battery. crenshaw's battery. poague's battalion. madison artillery. albemarle " brooke " charlotte " note. (a) col. w. r. aylett was in command aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) inspection report of this division shows that it also contained benning's and gregg's brigades. (c) commanded by colonel p. d. bowles. (d) only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. organization of the army of the valley district. (e) constituting york's brigade. (f) in ramseur's division. (g) evan's brigade, colonel e. n. atkinson commanding, and containing 12th georgia battalion. (h) the virginia regiments constituted terry's brigade, gordon's division. (i) grimes' brigade. (k) cook's " (l) returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) colonel joseph m. jayne, commanding. (n) colonel thomas j. simmons, commanding. (o) four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) on face of returns appears to have consisted of hampton's, fitz-lee's, and w. h. f. lee's division, and dearing's brigade. *but one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and alexander's name not on the original. (*28) headquarters armies u. s., may ii, 1864.--3 p.m. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. warren and wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. there is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by mott's division and the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*29) headquarters, armies u. s., may 11, 1864.-4 p.m. major-general a. e. burnside, commanding 9th army corps. major-general hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. you will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow the 12th inst. let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. i send two of my staff officers, colonels comstock and babcock, in whom i have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and general hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. generals warren and wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*30) headquarters armies u. s., may 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. the enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. we have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (johnson's), one brigade (doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*31) spottsylvania c. h., may 13, 1864. hon e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington, d. c. i beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: brigadier-general h. g. wright and brigadier-general john gibbon to be major-generals; colonel s. s. carroll, 8th ohio volunteers colonel e. upton, 121st new york volunteers; colonel william mccandless, 2d pennsylvania reserves, to be brigadier-generals. i would also recommend major-general w. s. hancock for brigadier-general in the regular army. his services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. in making these recommendations i do not wish the claims of general g. m. dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. i would also ask to have general wright assigned to the command of the sixth army corps. i would further ask the confirmation of general humphreys to the rank of major-general. general meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. he and sherman are the fittest officers for large commands i have come in contact with. if their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major-generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and i would feel personally gratified. i would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*32) quarles' mills, va., may 26, 1864. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the relative position of the two armies is now as follows: lee's right rests on a swamp east of the richmond and fredericksburg road and south of the north anna, his centre on the river at ox ford, and his left at little river with the crossings of little river guarded as far up as we have gone. hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at chesterfield ford and covers the right wing of lee's army. one division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the anna at ox ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. the 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the anna from a short distance above ox ford to little river, and parallel with and near to the enemy. to make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. to turn the enemy by his right, between the two annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. to turn him by the left leaves little river, new found river and south anna river, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. i have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near hanover town. this crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. during the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. as soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for hanover town to seize and hold the crossings. the balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. the left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. lee's army is really whipped. the prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. a battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. i may be mistaken, but i feel that our success over lee's army is already assured. the promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. we are destroying all the rails we can on the central and fredericksburg roads. i want to leave a gap on the roads north of richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. even if a crossing is not effected at hanover town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the pamunkey until a crossing is effected. i think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from port royal to the white house. i wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*33) near cold harbor, june 3, 1864, 7 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. i shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*34) cold harbor, june 5,1864. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. a full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. to do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea from the start has been to beat lee's army if possible north of richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the james river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. i now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. they act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of human life than i am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that i had designed outside of the city. i have therefore resolved upon the following plan: i will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the army of the potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the virginia central railroad from about beaver dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. when this is effected i will move the army to the south side of the james river, either by crossing the chickahominy and marching near to city point, or by going to the mouth of the chickahominy on north side and crossing there. to provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. once on the south side of the james river, i can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. if hunter succeeds in reaching lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. should hunter not succeed, i will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. the feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*35) cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. major-general d. hunter commanding dept. w. va. general sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to charlottesville, va., and to commence there the destruction of the va. cen. r. r., destroying this way as much as possible. the complete destruction of this road and of the canal on james river is of great importance to us. according to the instructions i sent to general halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to lynchburg and commence there. it would be of great value to us to get possession of lynchburg for a single day. but that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. i see, in looking over the letter to general halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from staunton via charlottesville. if you have so understood it, you will be doing just what i want. the direction i would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between staunton and lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road. from thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join general sheridan. after the work laid out for general sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the army of the potomac by the route laid out in general sheridan's instructions. if any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back. if on receipt of this you should be near to lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*36) from a statement of losses compiled in the adjutant-general's office. field of action and date. | killed. | wounded. | missing. | aggregate. | wilderness, may 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 | spottsylvania, may 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601| north anna, may 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 | totopotomoy, may 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | cold harbor, may 31st to june 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 | total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 | (*37) city point, va., june 17, 1864. 11 a.m. major-gen. halleck, washington, d. c. * * * * * * * the enemy in their endeavor to reinforce petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of bermuda hundred. they no doubt expected troops from north of the james river to take their place before we discovered it. general butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between richmond and petersburg, which i hope to retain possession of. too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*38) city point, va., july 24, 1864. major-general meade, commanding, etc. the engineer officers who made a survey of the front from bermuda hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. the chances they think will be better on burnside's front. if this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. all officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through. to the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. the field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. one thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. general ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from bermuda hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the appomattox and james rivers, as may be deemed best. this should be done by tuesday morning, if done at all. if not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as hicksford at least, and to weldon if possible. * * * * * * * whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at petersburg, burnside's mine will be blown up.... u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*39) see letter, august 5th, appendix. (*40) see appendix, letters of oct. 11th. (*41) city point, va., december 2,1864. major-general thomas, nashville tenn. if hood is permitted to remain quietly about nashville, you will lose all the road back to chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the tennessee. should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 2, 1864.--1.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. with your citizen employees armed, you can move out of nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. after the repulse of hood at franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. at this distance, however, i may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. you will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if hood is not speedily disposed of. put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. should you get him to retreating give him no peace. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 5, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. is there not danger of forrest moving down the cumberland to where he can cross it? it seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after forrest, hood should be attacked where he is. time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 6, 1864--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. attack hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. there is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the ohio river. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 8, 1864.--8.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. your dispatch of yesterday received. it looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the cumberland river, and are scattered. why not attack at once? by all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or hood, can beat to the ohio. if you think necessary call on the governors of states to send a force into louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. you clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. if destroyed he never can replace it. use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 11, 1864.--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. if you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. let there be no further delay. hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. if he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. i am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. washington, d. c., december 15, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. i was just on my way to nashville, but receiving a dispatch from van duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, i shall go no further. push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up hood's army and render it useless for future operations. do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. much is now expected. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*42) see orders to major-general meade, ord, and sheridan, march 24th, appendix. (*43) see appendix. (*44) note.--the fac-simile of the terms of lee's surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of general ely s. parker, military secretary on general grant's staff at the time of the surrender. three pages of paper were prepared in general grant's manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by general parker at the suggestion of general grant. after such alteration it was handed to general lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to general grant. the original was then transcribed by general parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished general lee. the fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures. there is a popular error to the effect that generals grant and lee each signed the articles of surrender. the document in the form of a letter was signed only by general grant, in the parlor of mclean's house while general lee was sitting in the room, and general lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to general grant. generously made available by the google books library project (http://books.google.com) note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see 43589-h.htm or 43589-h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43589/43589-h/43589-h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43589/43589-h.zip) project gutenberg has the other volume of this work. volume ii: see http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/43590 images of the original pages are available through the google books library project. see http://books.google.com/books?id=ordnv3xammmc transcriber's note: text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). a carat character is used to denote superscription. a single character following the carat is superscripted (example: y^e). multiple superscripted characters are enclosed by curly brackets (example: coun^{clr}). the 'oe' ligature appears only in the words 'coeur d'alene', and is rendered as 'c[oe]ur.' words printed using "small capitals" are shifted to all upper-case. please consult the note at the end of this text for details of corrections made. [illustration: isaac stevens] the life of isaac ingalls stevens by his son hazard stevens with maps and illustrations in two volumes vol. i [illustration] boston and new york houghton, mifflin and company the riverside press, cambridge 1900 copyright, 1900, by hazard stevens all rights reserved this record of a noble and patriotic life is dedicated to the young men of america preface for many years i have felt impelled to write this life, not only in justice to general stevens's memory, but also as an act of duty to the young men of the country, that the example of his noble and patriotic career might not be lost to posterity. an only son, closely associated from boyhood with him, his chief of staff in the civil war, and always the recipient of his counsel and confidence, the opportunities thus given me to know his sentiments and characteristics, and to witness so many of his actions, plainly augment the duty of making his record more widely known. in these pages, setting aside, as far as possible, the bias of filial respect and affection, i seek to simply narrate the actual facts of his life. since beginning this work in 1877, i have been greatly assisted by data furnished by many of general stevens's contemporaries, former brother officers, and associates in the public service, many of whom have now passed on. i render my grateful thanks to them for such aid, and for their words of appreciation of general stevens and encouragement to his biographer, and especially to generals zealous b. tower, henry j. hunt, benjamin alvord, edward d. townsend, rufus ingalls, a.a. humphreys, e.o. c. ord, thomas w. sherman, joseph e. johnston, g.t. beauregard, william h. french, truman seymour, orlando m. poe, silas casey, john g. barnard, m.c. meiggs, joseph hooker, george w. cullum, david morrison, george e. randolph; colonels samuel n. benjamin, granville o. haller, henry c. hodges, john hamilton, h.g. heffron, elijah walker, moses b. lakeman; major theodore j. eckerson, major george t. clark; captains william t. lusk, robert armour, c.h. armstrong; professors w.h. c. bartlett, a.e. church, h.s. kendrick, h.e. hilgard, spencer f. baird; general joseph lane, senator james w. nesmith; general joel palmer, nathan w. hazen, esq., alexander s. abernethy, c.p. higgins; judge james g. swan, arthur a. denny; hon. elwood evans, general james tilton. my thanks are also due, for facilities for examining and copying records in their departments, to the hon. j.q. smith, former commissioner of indian affairs, and hon. a.c. towner, acting commissioner; to general h. c. corbin, adjutant-general; general john m. wilson, chief of engineers; hon. john hay, secretary of state; professor henry l. pritchett, superintendent of the coast survey; lieutenant paul brodie, formerly adjutant 79th highlanders, for copying hundreds of pages of documents in the indian office; mr. r.f. thompson, of the same office, for assistance rendered; professor f.g. young, of eugene, oregon, for a copy of colonel lawrence kip's account of the walla walla council, republished by him. sources of information savage's new england genealogies. abiel abbott's history of andover. miss sarah loring bailey's historical sketches of andover. church and town records of andover. massachusetts colonial records. family records and correspondence. history of the mexican war, by general c.m. wilcox. campaigns of the rio grande and of mexico, by major isaac i. stevens. general stevens's diary and letters (unpublished). his reports in the engineer bureau of the army (unpublished). reports of the coast survey, professor a.d. bache, for 1850 to 1853. boston post newspaper, files for 1852. pacific railroad routes explorations, vols. i. and xii., two parts. general stevens's reports to commissioner of indian affairs, with journals of indian councils and proceedings in 1854-55 (unpublished). reports of december 22, 1855, and january 29, 1856, in house document 48, 1st session, 34th congress. reports of august 28, december 5, 1856, council at fox island; october 22, 1856, second council at walla walla; april 30, 1857, with map and census of indian tribes (unpublished). reports to jefferson davis, secretary of war, august 15, december 21, 1854; february 19, march 9 and 21, may 23 (two letters), june 8, july 7 and 24, august 14, october 22, november 21 (three letters), 1856. see documents of 34th and 35th congresses. reports and correspondence of general wool, colonel george wright, and lieutenant-colonel silas casey, in said documents. governor stevens's messages to legislature of washington territory, february 28, december 5, 1854; january 20, december, 1856, the latter accompanied by reports to the secretary of war and correspondence with military officers during the indian war. see, also, above documents and messages for proceedings relative to martial law. governor stevens's speeches in 35th and 36th congresses, in congressional globe. general joseph lane's speech in 35th congress, may 13, 1858, on the indian war. three years' residence in washington territory, by james g. swan. the walla walla council, by colonel lawrence kip. account of colonel wright's campaign against the spokanes, by colonel lawrence kip. report of j. ross browne, special agent, etc., on the indian war, house document 58, 1st session, 35th congress. history of the pacific states, by h.h. bancroft, vols. xxiv.-xxvi. archives state department. records war department. circular letter to emigrants, the northwest, letter to the vancouver railroad convention, by governor stevens, published in pamphlet. the war between the states, by a.h. stephens. war records, vol. v., for army of the potomac in 1861; vol. vi., for port royal expedition; vol. xiv., for james island campaign; vol. xii., in three parts, for pope's campaign. military historical society of massachusetts, vol. ii, entitled the virginia campaign of 1862 under general pope. history of the 79th highlanders, by william todd. history of the 21st massachusetts, by general charles f. walcott. biographical register of west point graduates, by general george w. cullum. defence of charleston harbor, by major john johnson. southern historical society papers, vol. xvi. official dispatches of admiral dupont. life of charles henry davis, rear admiral. letters and statements from gentlemen named in the preface. * * * * * the author, having sought his information from original sources as far as possible, deems it unnecessary to mention the great number of histories, regimental histories, and biographies that he has perused, as they throw little light on the subject, and much of that misleading. contents chapter i ancestry.--birthplace isaac ingalls stevens, seventh in descent from john stevens, 1, one of founders of andover, mass., 1640--deacon joseph, 2--captain james, 3, captor of louisburg; deputy to general court--lieutenant james, 4, raised company for french and indian war; died in service--jonathan, 5, revolutionary soldier, bunker hill; other service; characteristics--his brother james's diary of siege of boston--isaac, 6, crippled by falling tree; marries hannah cummings,--her ancestry; hires bridges farm; untiring industry and thrift; death of wife; second marriage; characteristics; children 1 chapter ii birth.--boyhood born, marble ridge farmhouse, north andover, mass., march 25, 1818--delicate child--heroic treatment--incidents showing character--devotion to mother--her death irreparable loss--early schooling--over-study--evil effects--insists on leaving school--works in factory a year--strict treatment- no indulgence--injudicious urging--fever--rupture from over-exertion--seeks dr. warren--old put's school, franklin academy--rigorous daily life of farmer's boy--phillips academy--appearance on entering--earns board and lodgings with nathan w. hazen, esq.--takes first rank in studies--power of concentration--habits of study--proficiency in mathematics- protests against bigotry--overcomes extreme diffidence- appointed to west point 13 chapter iii west point patriotic emotions on entering west point--determines to be head of his class--better prepared rivals, biddle, halleck, and butler--distinguished classmates--extra french lessons- letters describe life and studies--father and uncle william disappointed at standing at first examination--abominates smoking and chewing--early rising--halleck and biddle compare notes--"little stevens is driving ahead like the devil"--gains first place--spends 4th of july in new york--southern contempt for yankee farmers--determined to resent it--dialectic society--second year encampment--military ball--contrasts his situation with that on entering--characteristics drawn by professors bartlett and church--extra drawing lessons, great gains--admires general miller's "i'll try, sir"--generous rivalry--eleven good friends--visit home 24 chapter iv west point.--last two years appointed assistant professor of mathematics--leading part in dialectic society--efforts at speaking--reflections on studies and authors--long walks--forbidden sweets- horsemanship--skating over thin ice--saves companion from freezing--letters to father and sisters--susan goes to missouri--again head, third year--patriotic indignation at british aggression--advises sending oliver to college--letters to hannah and oliver--avows abolition principles--founds "talisman"--his own anonymous critic--his intimate friends- graduates first in every branch--parents attend graduation exercises 48 chapter v newport ordered to newport, r.i.--phrenological chart--lieutenants mason, beauregard, hunt--ascendency over employees--newport society--mr. stevens welcomed--personal appearance--meets his future wife--benjamin hazard--horseback rides--family mansion--charming polly wanton--colonel daniel lyman--german class--marriage of susan to david h. bishop--death of grandmother--urges additional fortifications--proposes to study law--friendly letter from halleck--takes part of tilden; of h.l. smith--death of hannah--delivers address before newport lyceum--lecture on oliver cromwell--visits washington--fairhaven battery--death of susan--death of benjamin hazard--marriage, september 8, 1841 60 chapter vi charge of works: new bedford, portsmouth, portland, bucksport wedding journey to west point--returns to newport--charge of works at new bedford--moves to fairhaven--halleck asks aid for engineer corps--journal--thanksgiving in andover--hazard born, june 9--fugitive slave harbored in andover--elizabeth marries l.m. campbell in tennessee--moves his family to portsmouth, n.h.--charge of works there and portland, me.--pleasant society--examines old forts at castine--fort knox, on penobscot, buys land for--youthful appearance- backwoods uncle, warm welcome--overwork--severe illness- julia virginia born, june 27, 1844--visits andover--elizabeth and mr. campbell--moves to bucksport tavern--goes to housekeeping--new friends--assistants, richard kidder randolph, isaac osgood, a.w. tinkham--penobscot river--barge--pushes on works--fine ox-teams--judge of men--severe sickness in winter--visits washington--obtains large appropriations- confidential inquiry if he desires promotion--characteristic reply--delighted in dispensing hospitality--daughter julia virginia died, december 7, 1845--beautiful tribute by mr. brooks--organizes course of lectures--salmon weir--advocates engineer company--enlists first soldier--views on raising standard of rank and file--ordered to mexican war--speeds to boston by sleigh 78 chapter vii voyage to mexico placed in charge of pontoon and engineer train--delays in embarking--visits from relatives--death of elizabeth--letters to wife--sails on barque prompt, january 19, 1847--diary of voyage--seasickness--warm weather--passes bahamas, great abaco, hole in the wall, berry island, black chief--steward commits suicide--the weather in the gulf--arrives at the brazos--meets officers--great confusion--sails to tampico, beautiful, picturesque region--landing at vera cruz, march 9 and 10 96 chapter viii vera cruz.--cerro gordo vera cruz--defenses--american army invests city--lieutenant stevens's zeal in reconnoitring--hands torn and poisoned- horse bolts to enemy's lines--throws himself from saddle- looks out route for covered way--put in charge with large working parties--volunteers--independent ways--diary of siege--capture of city--damage by artillery fire--"moonlight magnificence and sunlight squalidity"--secures fine horse- appointed adjutant of engineer corps--diary of march to cerro gordo--national bridge--rancheros--reconnoissances of cerro gordo--disabled by rupture--compelled to remain in camp--description of battle--letter to wife 110 chapter ix jalapa.--puebla prisoners released on parole--march for jalapa--encerro, santa anna's country seat--reaches jalapa, eden of mexico--prepares memoir on conducting war against guerrillas--letters to wife--feeling address at burial of sapper carigan--march from jalapa to puebla--beautiful country--soldado--pass of la hora--las vegas--perote, its plain and castle--leaves perote with colonel clarke's brigade--san antonio--tepe ahualeo with general worth and garland's brigade--hacienda of virayes- byzantium--ojo de agua--hacienda santa annaced--nopalucan--el pinal--acajete--amasoque--column of lancers threaten attack- sheer off at fire of duncan's battery in two bodies- lieutenants stevens and mcclellan pursue one for five miles--puebla occupied--health improved--reports for duty- reconnoitres road to tlascala--examines position in city- generals scott and twiggs arrive--santa anna renounces power--his career and character--attends church--bull fight- army recruiting strength--drilling--awaiting reinforcements- engineers making maps--collecting information--wealthy mexican offers to act as spy--dominguez, robber chief, with some of his band, employed as spies and couriers--submits memoir on system of espionage and employing robbers--rumors- guerrillas invest el pinal--colonel harney marches to disperse them--arrival of volunteers--review--sorry appearance--good material--heavy defenses and eighteen thousand troops at city of mexico--character of mexican governing class--letters to wife--description of puebla--climate--people--confidence of the troops--character of general scott--arrival of general pierce 129 chapter x advance to mexico, el peã�on, contreras, churubusco advance to valley of mexico--description of defenses--general scott and staff with twiggs's division reach ayotla--daring reconnoissances of el peã±on by lieutenant stevens--march around lakes chalco and xochimilco--occupy san augustin- reconnoissances of enemy's positions--san antonio road strongly fortified--pedregal--intrenched camp at contreras- battle of contreras--lieutenant stevens urges decisive movement adopted by twiggs--"attack the enemy's left; you cut him off from reinforcements and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains"--stormy night--discouragement--scene at scott's headquarters--second day's battle--reconnoitring from church steeple at coyoacan--enemy in full retreat on san antonio road--instant advance by twiggs, led by lieutenant stevens, who comes up against fortified convent and brings on battle of churubusco--description of battle--terrible scenes of battlefield banished sleep--letter to wife--tacubaya occupied- armistice 163 chapter xi molino del rey.--chapultepec.--capture of city of mexico.--return to united states general scott and staff enter tacubaya--take quarters in bishop's palace--commissioners to negotiate peace--mexican treachery--armistice terminated--battle of molino del rey--useless attacks--severe losses--battle of chapultepec--castle stormed--quitman advances on tacubaya causeway--worth on san cosme causeway--lieutenant stevens, with worth, wounded--enemy retreat in night--american troops occupy city--lieutenant stevens's remarks on the movements--his character sketches of lee, beauregard, tower, smith, mcclellan, foster, mason--removed to city--quartered in the palace--severe wound--ups and downs--mounts crutches--journeys in ambulance with lieutenant foster to puebla--arrives at new orleans 202 chapter xii heroes home from the war proceeds to washington--flattering reception--gives full accounts to colonel totten--joyful reunion with family in newport--shoots mad dog--ordered to savannah--letter to brother--character of cromwell--makes garden--justice of mexican war--savannah orders countermanded--resumes works at bucksport--purchases house, garden, poultry--characteristic reply to inquiry as to willingness to be sent to pacific coast--brevetted captain and major--efforts to secure justice for brother officers--opinion of general taylor--brevet pay--mcclellan asks assistance for engineer company- lieutenant stevens's views--advocates reorganization of the army 226 chapter xiii coast survey professor a.d. bache tenders charge of coast survey office- accepts conditionally--retains charge of works--assumes new duties--estimate of general taylor--magnitude of coast survey office--organizes the force--reforms the office- meets "men of mexico"--general shields--approves compromise measures--puritan father condemns webster- visits bucksport--daughter gertrude maude born--wound breaks out afresh--contemplates leaving coast survey--moves family to newport--pays $400 on house--generous in money matters--spends summer in washington--letters to his wife- ideals of woman, marriage, duty, ambition--admiration for henry clay, the master spirit--compromise measures passed--fine health--carries appropriation--truth and directness superior to low cunning--office improving, duties more pleasant daily--publishes campaigns of rio grande and of mexico--general scott takes offense 241 chapter xiv life in washington moves family to washington--pleasant society--takes hold fourteen years' bill--reorganization of army--urges brother officers to do "their duty to their profession"--army man, not a corps man--moves to mrs. janney's, on 8th street--takes family to newport for summer, 1851--another phrenological chart--rents house on 3d street and goes to housekeeping--george watson stevens--letters to wife--responds to toast of army and navy at banquet to kossuth--advocates coast defenses, and writes articles--appointed member of lighthouse board--sells bucksport house--advocates election of general franklin pierce as president--articles in "boston post"--speeches in andover, newport, and portsmouth--taken to task by secretary of war conrad--pungent reply--leader among young officers--numerous calls--friendship with professor bache--continued improvement of coast survey office 257 chapter xv governor, washington territory.--exploration, northern route washington territory organized--exploration of routes to pacific determined on--appointed governor--letter of resignation from army--colonel totten's reply--silver service presented by friends on the coast survey--obtains charge of exploration of northern route--takes high ground--impresses his views on the administration--applies for captain mcclellan--letter to him--sends lieutenant donelson to montreal to procure maps and data from hudson bay company--prepares his own instructions--magnitude of task--organizes the expedition- gives mcclellan charge of construction of the military road, steilacoom to walla walla--declares independence of hudson bay company--busy scenes in 3d street house--sends officers to san francisco, st. louis, and st. paul to hasten preparation- selects territorial library--exploration fully reported in vols. i. and xii., pacific railroad reports 280 chapter xvi the party.--the start leaves washington--expedites matters in st. louis--dispatches party up missouri--up mississippi to st. paul--rouses party in camp before breakfast--breaking mules--incessant rains--roster of the party--general plan--march to sauk river--winnebago indians--canadian voyageurs--pierre boutineau--camp regulations--assimilated rank--all to stand guard--pembina train--pushing on detached parties--march to pike lake--swollen streams, bogs--crossing sauk and crow rivers--lightning lake--fish and game--relieves lieutenant du barry--discharges inefficient men--white bear lake--parties reassemble at pike lake 302 chapter xvii pike lake to fort union general course w. 10â° n.--lieutenant grover surveys separate route--country within forty miles examined by side trips--route passes near breckinridge, jamestown, minot, and great northern railroad nearly to rocky mountains--crosses chippewa river--camp regulations--bois de sioux--description of country--red river hunters--sheyenne river--lander's adventure--false alarm of indians--myriads of buffalo--the hunt--lake jessie--buffalo threaten camp; stop train--horse and mules go off with buffalo--governor stevens disabled- lander returns--inveterate horse-killer--james river--anxiety at non-return of tinkham--guns fired--parties sent back to find him--sioux reported approaching--train arranged for defense--red river hunters--tinkham returns safe--governor wilkie and red river hunters--customs--hunts--government--air tainted by slaughtered buffalo--maison du chien--coteau de missouri--mouse river--more red river hunters--exchange visits--express dispatched to fort union--assiniboine indians--council--distribution of presents--arrives at fort union 320 chapter xviii fort union to fort benton description of fort union--alexander culbertson--the blackfeet--making peace--surveys by side parties--bugbear stories--moving westward--blackfoot war party--big muddy- missouri bottom--every one ordered to walk part way daily- milk river--field order--abundant game--gros ventres--feast and council--feud with blackfeet--peace made between them- trading horses--cypress mountain--stories of indian fights--bear's paw mountains--party sent to view them--box elder creek--the three buttes, favorite resort of blackfeet- crosses marias and teton rivers--scene of bloody indian conflict--fort benton--fort campbell 347 chapter xix widespread exploring parties gathering information--lieutenant grover to bitter root valley--lieutenant mullan to muscle shell river--lieutenant donelson to examine cadotte's pass--mr. lander to marias pass--george w. stevens describes outfitting war parties--funds fall short--governor stevens takes responsibility of incurring deficiency--starts to visit main blackfoot camp--chiefs join the party--culbertson's defense of fort mckenzie--death of rotten belly--reaches marias river--express brings report from lieutenant saxton that mountains are impassable for wagons- returns to fort benton--lander ordered back--want of harmony in his party--stanley proceeds to piegan camp--lieutenants saxton and grover meet on summit of rocky mountains--tinkham returns from three buttes and marias river--outfitting with pack animals--lieutenant saxton, with culbertson and twenty-eight men, descends missouri in keelboat--doty stationed at fort benton--lander's insubordination curbed--stanley returns with thirty chiefs--talk with blackfeet--their dress--peace advocated--chief low horn--his good faith 364 chapter xx exploring the rocky mountains lieutenants saxton and grover start down the missouri--march up the teton via sun and dearborn rivers to cadotte's pass- description of country; game--governor stevens proclaims inauguration of civil government on summit of rocky mountains- descending western slope--big blackfoot and hell gate rivers- overtakes main party--fine condition of animals--bitter root valley and river--fort owen--lieutenant arnold here with train and provisions--nine passes examined--lander's erratic course- council with flatheads--chief victor--lieutenant mullan stationed at winter post in bitter root valley--lieutenant donelson with main party sent via clark's fork and pend oreille lake--dr. suckley descends rivers in canoe--tinkham to explore marias pass--proceed to fort benton--cross mountains to walla walla--governor stevens moves down the bitter root--meets the nez perces--crosses the c[oe]ur d'alene mountains--c[oe]ur d'alene mission--indians--lake--falls--spokane indians--spokane garry, head chief--forced ride to colville--meeting with mcclellan--his explorations--dilatoriness--reports against country and passes 375 chapter xxi upper columbia to puget sound mcdonald's indian tales--chemakan mission--settlements in colville valley--visits spokane house--garry's lodge--arrival of main party at camp washington--march to walla walla--pelouse river- crosses snake river--rides to old fort walla walla--visits walla walla valley--pu-pu-mox-mox--lander ordered to survey nahchess pass--descends columbia to dallas, to vancouver--colonel bonneville--ascends cowlitz river in canoe--four days in drenching rains--lander balks--tinkham ordered to cross snoqualmie pass--officers reach olympia--captain mcclellan ordered to run line to snoqualmie pass--his failure--tinkham succeeds--mcclellan aggrieved--governor stevens's opinion of pioneers--mcclellan's 396 chapter xxii organizing civil government.--the indian service wild country--scanty population--character of settlers--serious problems--governor stevens arrives at olympia--issues proclamation--organizes indian service--appoints agents--visits all parts of sound--meets governor douglass at victoria, b.c.--reports on hudson bay company's claims--first message- halleck exposes southern political schemes--purchases homestead--preparing exploration reports--secretary davis stops further surveys--drafts protested 411 chapter xxiii return to washington.--report of exploration warm welcome in san francisco--lectures on northern route- advocates three routes--via isthmus to new york--joyful family reunion in newport--proceeds to washington--complete report of exploration--deficiency provided for--general hunt relates incident--secretary davis disparages northern route--general stevens's rejoinder--his final report--severe labors--sickness- doing the work of the delegate--appointed commissioner to treat with blackfeet and other tribes--unimpaired influence 425 chapter xxiv crossing the isthmus steamer from new york--riotous scenes--stops at havana- aspinwall--forlorn place--cars to the summit--carusi's pavilion--scene at night--proceeds on mule-back--tropic rainstorms--crossing the chagres river--lost children- panama--embarks on golden age--touches at acapulco--panama fever--reaches san francisco--welcomed by friends--delayed by sickness--rebuke to general wool--steamer up the coast- into columbia--lands at vancouver--canoe trip up cowlitz river--muddy roads to olympia--disappointing appearance- second message 433 chapter xxv indian policy.--treaties on puget sound beneficent indian policy--intention to write account of his indian service frustrated by early death--indians of puget sound, helpless, ready to treat--organizes treaty force--decides on policy and terms--sends agents to assemble indians--great pains to make them fully understand and to consult with them--council and treaty of she-nah-nam or medicine creek; of point elliott or mukilteo; of point-no-point; of neah bay--speeches--visits victoria, and calls on governor douglass to restrain northern indians--napoleonic campaign--what was accomplished--present condition of the indians 448 illustrations page general isaac i. stevens, at the age of 43, from a photograph _frontispiece_. grave of john stevens _to face page_ 2 birthplace of general stevens, andover, mass 14 infant jesus. crayon drawing at west point 44 old wanton mansion in newport 66 general stevens at the age of 23, from a miniature by staigg 74 margaret lyman stevens, from a miniature by staigg 76 low horn, piegan chief 374 charles h. mason, secretary of the territory, from a photograph 414 maps and plans route, vera cruz to mexico 118 battle of cerro gordo 124 the valley of mexico 162 battlefields in the valley of mexico--contreras, churubusco, chapultepec, molino del rey, mexico 172 the life of isaac ingalls stevens chapter i ancestry.--birthplace about 1640 a mere handful of english colonists went out from boston, and made the first settlement in the town of andover, essex county, massachusetts. they laid out their homes on the cochichewick, a stream which flows out of the great pond in north andover, and falls into the merrimac river on the south side a few miles below lawrence. the infant settlement was known as cochichewick until 1646, when it was incorporated as a town under its present name, after the andover in hampshire, england, the birthplace of some of the settlers. among the first who thus planted their hearthstones in the wilderness was john stevens. his name stands fifth in an old list in the town records containing "the names of all the householders in order as they came to town." the mists of the past still allow a few glimpses of this sturdy puritan settler. he was admitted a freeman of the colony, june 2, 1641 (old style). he was appointed by the general court, may 15, 1654, one of a committee of three to settle the boundary between the towns of haverhill and salisbury, a duty satisfactorily performed. he was sergeant in the military company of the town, a post then equivalent to captain or commander. according to savage, n.e. genealogies, vol. i., p. 186, john stevens lived at caversham, county oxford, england, and came to america in the confidence from southampton in 1638. large, substantial head and foot stones of slate, sculptured and lettered in the quaint fashion of his day, still mark the resting-place of john stevens, after the storms of now two and a third centuries, in the oldest graveyard of cochichewick, situated opposite the kittredge mansion, and about half a mile north of the old parish meeting-house in north andover. he died april 11, 1662, in the fifty-seventh year of his age, and was therefore thirty-five years old when he founded his future home. john stevens was evidently a man of note and substance, the worthy progenitor of a prolific family, which has filled andover with his descendants, and put forth from time to time strong, flourishing branches into all quarters of the country. it may indeed be safely said that there is scarcely a state in the union which does not contain descendants of this sturdy puritan. his son nathan, the first male child born in andover, lies buried near him under a broad freestone slab with an inscription to "coun^{clr} nathan stevens, who deceased february y^e 19, 1717, in y^e 75 year of his age." the memorials of many others of his descendants stand thickly scattered through the quaint old burial-ground. not the least interesting of these relics is a stone "in memory of primus, who was a faithful servant of mr. benjamin stevens, jr., who died july 25, 1792, aged 72 years, 5 months, and 16 days." a vigorous, long-lived race sprang from the loins of this first settler john, a hardy, thrifty race of plain new england farmers, honest and straightforward, with plenty of solid, shrewd good sense, bearing manfully the toils and hardships of colonial days, and contributing its quota of ministers and deacons to the church, and officers and soldiers to the wars with the indians and the french. in 1679 a grant of land was made to ephraim stevens, son of the first settler, in recompense of his losses by the indians. in 1689 lieutenant john stevens, another son, perished in the expedition against louisburg. in 1698 abiel stevens, a grandson, was captured by the indians, but made his escape. in 1755 captain asa stevens and ensign james stevens died in the lake george campaign. upon the state muster-rolls appear the names of twelve stevenses of andover as soldiers in the revolution. [illustration: grave of john stevens] the subject of this work, isaac ingalls stevens, was the seventh in direct descent from john stevens, the founder of andover,--1 john stevens, 2 joseph, 3 james, 4 james, 5 jonathan, 6 isaac, 7 isaac ingalls stevens. joseph was the fourth son of the first settler john. he was deacon in the church. he married mary ingalls may 20, 1679, and died february 25, 1743, aged 88. james was the second son of joseph, married dorothy fry, march, 1712, and died may 25, 1769, aged 84. he participated in the military affairs and contests with the indians and french of his times, commanded a company at the capture of louisburg, and for his services was granted a tract of land in maine. he was a deputy to the general court. his gravestone bears the title of captain. captain james's eldest son was also named james. he was born in 1720, and married sarah peabody in 1745. this james was an energetic, promising young man, with a young wife and two boys, when in 1754 a recruiting party with colors, drum, and fife went about andover beating up recruits for the french and indian war then raging. the young men all hung back. "make me a captain," said james stevens, "and i will raise a company for the war." this remark led to his receiving the commission of ensign. he raised a company of the young men of andover, and marched away at their head to the shores of lake george, in new york, where, november 28, 1755, he died of camp fever, with the rank of lieutenant. his eldest son, jonathan, inherited a due share of his father's spirit, for we find him hastening to bunker hill, and fighting manfully in the battle. he served on other occasions during the revolutionary war, and after a successful dash upon the enemy writes the following interesting letter to his sister:- loving sister,--these will inform you that i am very well at present, and have been so ever since i came from home, and i hope you and all my friends enjoy the same state of health. we have been up to ticonderoga and took almost four hundred prisoners of the british army, and relieved one hundred of our men that were prisoners there. our army have come from ticonderoga down as far as pawlet, about sixty miles, and expect to march to stillwater very soon. so no more at present. i remain, your loving brother, jonathan stevens. pawlet, october ye 1st, 1777. jonathan married susannah bragg, december 15, 1773, and raised thirteen children,--jonathan, susannah, james, dolly, jeremy, hannah, isaac, nathaniel, dolly, moses, sarah, oliver, and william. he united the business of a currier and tanner to his ancestral pursuit of farming, and achieved the modest independence he so well merited. the house that he occupied for many years stood on the old road that passed along the western border of the cochichewick meadows, that were long since flooded and converted into a lake, the extension of the great pond, for the water supply of the woolen mills of his son nathaniel, and the cellar is still visible on the west side of the road, some three hundred yards from its junction with the road from the village of north andover to the mills. he afterwards built one of those large, square, substantial mansions, once common in new england, on the crest of the high ground east of the village, and commanding noble views of the hamlet, the great pond, and the cochichewick valley and the mills. this house was unfortunately destroyed by fire in 1876. jonathan stevens purchased, for sixpence an acre, a large tract of land in maine, which he divided into three farms, and bestowed upon his sons jonathan, james, and isaac. they settled, and named the place andover, after their native town, and the descendants of the two former still reside there. jonathan stevens was a tall, large man of fresh, ruddy complexion and fine appearance. he was fond of relating the incidents of the battle of bunker hill, and used to recount the tale to his children and grandchildren every fourth of july,--how putnam went along the line and commanded them not to fire until they could see the whites of the redcoats' eyes; and how abbot, the strongest man in town, bore a wounded comrade off the field on his back. on the anniversary of the battle he invariably invited his comrades in the fight to his house, and entertained them with new england rum and hearty, old-fashioned hospitality, while the veterans fought the battle o'er again. he sat among the veterans of the battle at webster's magnificent oration in dedication of the bunker hill monument. on his eighty-fourth birthday he worked with his men in the hay field, keeping up with the best all day, and suffered no ill effect from the unwonted exertion. he died april 13, 1834, at the age of eighty-seven. in 1799 he gave the tract of land upon which was erected franklin academy, on the hill north of the meeting-house. jonathan's brother james, captain james's other son, also served in the revolutionary war, and left a diary of the siege of boston, recently discovered in the garret of an old mansion in andover, which opens like an epic:- "april ye 19, 1775. this morning about seven o'clock we had a larum that the regulars were gone to concord. we gathered to the meeting house, and then started for concord. we went through tewksbury into billerica. we stopped at pollard's, and ate some biscuits and cheese on the common. we started and went on to bedford, and we heard that the regulars had gone back to boston. so we went through bedford. as we went into lexington we went to the meeting house, and there we came to the destruction of the regulars. they killed eight of our men, and shot a cannon ball through the meeting house. we went along through lexington, and we saw several regulars dead on the road, and some of our men, and three or four houses were burnt, and some horses and hogs were killed. they plundered in every house they could get into. they stove in windows and broke in tops of desks. we met the men a coming back very fast," etc. jonathan's fourth son was isaac, born in 1785. on reaching manhood he went before the mast on a voyage to china, and brought back, as a gift to his mother, a beautiful china tea-set. after his return from sea he went to andover, maine, to settle upon the lands bestowed by his father upon himself and brothers, jonathan and james. with characteristic energy, isaac stevens set to work clearing his land, and reducing rebellious nature to orderly submission. while thus at work in the woods one day, a heavy tree fell upon and crushed him to the earth; his left leg was terribly mangled, the bones broken in two places, and he received other serious injuries. the doctors insisted that the leg must be taken off in order to save his life, but isaac stevens with inflexible resolution refused to allow the amputation, and after a long, painful illness finally recovered. the limb, however, in the process of healing, became materially shorter and permanently stiffened, so that he was unable to bend the knee joint, and during the remainder of his life the wound broke out afresh periodically, and caused him great suffering. as soon as he was sufficiently recovered to bear the journey, he returned to his native andover, where, under his mother's careful nursing, he slowly recovered from the terrible injuries he had received. it was at this time that he formed an attachment with hannah cummings, the daughter of a sterling farmer family like his own, and who united to a warm and affectionate heart, noble and elevated sentiments, strong good sense, and untiring industry. their marriage followed soon after, on the 29th of september, 1814. he now relinquished the project of settling in maine, and hired an old farmhouse with some twenty acres of land of mr. bridges. this house, one of the oldest in andover, is situated at the end of marble ridge, a short distance south of the great pond, and at the point where the road from the village to haverhill, after crossing the essex railroad, forks, the left branch leading on to haverhill, while the other turns short to the right and conducts to marble ridge station. the solid timbers and stockaded sides of the rear part of this old house--for the front is a later structure--were the mute witnesses of a stratagem in early indian troubles as novel as it proved successful. the stout-hearted farmer settler was alone, with his wife and little ones about him, one night, when he discovered a large party of savages stealthily approaching, and spreading out so as to encompass his house. hastily barricading the doors, he seized his trumpet, which he bore as trumpeter of the military company of the settlement, stole unperceived out of the house, caught and mounted his horse, and, making a circuit through the fields, gained the high road between the indians and the village. then, putting spurs to his steed, and pealing blast upon blast from his trumpet, he charged furiously down upon the indians, now in the very act of assailing his domicile, who, thinking no doubt that the whole force of the country-side was upon them, incontinently fled into the forest. judged by the standard of these days, the young couple had an unpromising future. they were very poor, the husband a cripple, and they held as tenants a few barren acres from which to extract a livelihood. but isaac stevens now toiled early and late with untiring energy; he saved at every point, and turned everything to account with true yankee thrift. he built a malt-house, and after laboring on the farm from earliest dawn until dark, would work at preparing the malt until late in the evening. his farm embraced a large meadow lying on both sides of the cochichewick, just below where it issued from the great pond, but now flooded by the milldams still lower down, where he cut vast quantities of meadow hay, with which he filled his barns and fed a goodly number of horned stock during the long, rigorous winters, realizing thereby a handsome profit in the spring. his young wife joined her efforts to his, and frequently cut and made clothing for the neighbors around, in addition to the unceasing and arduous labors of a farmer's wife. such thrift and industry could not fail of success. the bridges house and land were purchased, largely on mortgage at first; then the wet meadow was added; then a goodly tract of generous land was bought of the father, jonathan stevens, and other fields and tracts were added from time to time. during the thirteen years following their marriage, the first scanty holding grew to a farm of one hundred and fifty acres of their own, and free from debt. seven children, too, came to bless their union and increase their cares. then the devoted wife and mother died, november 3, 1827, leaving this helpless little flock, the oldest of whom was but twelve and the youngest two years of age. henceforth life was a heavy and unceasing labor to isaac stevens. the little farm grew no larger, and all his efforts were now required to maintain his family and keep free from debt. two years afterwards he married ann poor, of north andover, impelled by his situation and circumstances, with so many helpless children about him and the household economy of the farm unprovided for. the second wife failed to restore the happiness of home. she had no children, and died in 1866, four years after her husband. isaac stevens was a man of deeply marked and noble characteristics. his fortitude was severely tested by the misfortune which left him a lifelong cripple. his cool courage and inflexible resolution are best illustrated by his manner of dealing with a dangerous bull he once owned. this animal grew daily more and more savage, until every one stood in fear of it except the owner, who, as often happens in such cases, persisted in thinking it quite harmless. at length, however, the bull one day chased a neighbor, who had imprudently ventured to cross the field in which it pastured, and overtaking him just as he reached the fence, tossed him high in air, so that falling fortunately on the farther side of the inclosure, he escaped with no more serious injuries than some severe bruises and a broken nose. the bull, furious at the escape of his prey, was bellowing and pawing the ground. "the bull must be shot!" cried the man who helped off the injured neighbor. but isaac stevens at once armed himself with a stout cudgel, coolly hobbled into the field, disregarding all remonstrances and entreaties, fixed his eye upon the enraged beast, backed him into a narrow corner where he could not escape, and thrashed him over the head with the club with such terrible severity that he was completely subdued, and ever after remained perfectly gentle and submissive. always strictly observing the sabbath, he held liberal views of religion and attended the unitarian church. he kept himself informed of the current events of the day, taking the new york "tribune" and garrison's "liberator," and manifesting the greatest interest in education, temperance, anti-slavery, and every cause that would make mankind better or happier. "how he denied himself all comforts almost, and _quietly_ sent money to free the slave and for the temperance cause! he was a strong pillar of the foundation principles of right and justice that it would be well for young men of this day to study," said one who knew him well. he was, above all, a man of perfect integrity and truth, and of a strict sense of justice. there was not a fibre of guile or indirection in his moral nature. he held strong and ardent convictions, noble and lofty ideals of duty and philanthropy, and an intense hatred and scorn of wrong or oppression in any form. he strongly opposed and denounced the use of liquors and tobacco, and became early in life a vehement and outspoken abolitionist of slavery, at a period when the advocacy of such doctrines demanded unusual moral courage as well as stern conviction of right. at his decease, years afterwards, he bequeathed five hundred dollars to the anti-slavery society, requiring only that wendell phillips should deliver a lecture in the parish church of north andover. the untiring industry which, with his frugality and good management, enabled him to achieve comparative independence so early in life, was not the course of a drudge and miser, but of an ardent, resolute spirit spurning poverty, debt, and dependence. all through life he manifested an unconquerable aversion to debt. he loved a fast horse, and the old mare which he kept until she died, over twenty-seven years old, was, in her prime, the fastest in the town. after reading a newspaper or book, he was in the habit of giving it to a neighbor, telling him to hand it to another after perusing it. he took great pains with his orchards, and planted apple-trees along the stone walls bordering his fields. he also planted the noble elms now overhanging the old farmhouse, and the long lines of this graceful tree now bordering the road from the house to the crest of the hill overlooking the village and the road over marble ridge, and the numerous clumps and rows in his fields wherever a sightly eminence seemed to require such an adornment. his children were:- hannah peabody, born september 24, 1815, died november 24, 1840. susan bragg, born february 14, 1817, died april 8, 1841. isaac ingalls, born march 25, 1818, died september 1, 1862. elizabeth barker, born july 14, 1819, died december 10, 1846. sarah ann, born january 13, 1822, died february 8, 1844. mary jane, born august 5, 1823, died june 22, 1847. oliver, born june 22, 1825. the following account of the ancestry of hannah cummings is given by her nephew, dr. george mooar, d.d., of oakland, california, who has collected much information concerning the cummings genealogy:- "hannah, wife of isaac stevens, was the third child of deacon asa and hannah (peabody) cummings, born october 23, 1785, married september 29, 1814, and died november 3, 1827. "the line from her father to the first american ancestor runs thus: asa (6), thomas (5), joseph (4), abraham (3), john (2), isaac (1). "deacon asa was born in andover, massachusetts, but removed in 1798 to albany, maine, a pioneer settler there, a trusted, intelligent, and capable citizen, who in 1803 represented his district in the general court. "captain thomas (5) was born in topsfield and died september 3, 1765. he married anna kittell, the widow of asa johnson, of andover. "captain joseph (4), of topsfield, was quite a character. the biographer of dr. manasseh cutler says that he found among the papers of that eminent person a notice of captain cummings in which he is spoken of as a remarkable man, well versed in the politics of the day, and he adds: 'from the interest dr. cutler felt in him, he must have been a stanch patriot and federalist.' in a notice which appears in the 'salem gazette' we are told that when nearly a hundred he would readily mount his horse from the ground. he died in his one hundred and second year. "abraham (3) was a resident of woburn and of dunstable. "john (2) was quite a large proprietor in boxford, massachusetts, and later was one of the first fourteen proprietors of the town of dunstable. "isaac (1) appears on a list of the 'commoners of ipswich in 1641, but appears to have arrived in america three years before. no exact knowledge of his previous residence in great britain has been obtained. the prevailing tradition gives him a scottish descent.' "an elder brother of hannah cummings was dr. asa cummings, d.d., of portland, maine, eminent for classical learning and piety, and editor of the 'christian mirror' for many years." chapter ii birth.--boyhood isaac ingalls stevens first saw the light at the old marble ridge farmhouse, on the 25th of march, 1818. he was a delicate infant, and it was impossible for his mother, with her other little ones and the engrossing labors of the farmhouse, to bestow upon him the care his condition required. his grandmother, one day visiting the farm, was shocked to see him still in his cradle, though three years old, and, remarking that unless he was taught soon he never would walk, insisted upon taking him home with her, where, under her gentle and experienced hands, he quickly learned to run about. after returning home his father used to plunge him, fresh from bed, into a hogshead of cold water every morning. such heroic treatment would be sure to kill or cure, and perhaps no better proof could be given of the native vigor of his constitution than the fact that he lived, and became strong, active, and hardy. even as a child he was active, daring, and adventurous. he used to climb the lofty elms in front of his grandfather's house, and cling like a squirrel to the topmost branches, laughing and chattering defiance to his grandmother's commands and entreaties to come down. one afternoon abiel holt, the hired man on the farm, went a-fishing for pickerel, and took isaac, who was then a very little urchin just able to run about cleverly. after catching a fine string of fish, they came to the old causeway which crossed the water where now stands the dam under the essex railroad, but which was then submerged several feet deep in the water for some distance. a rude footway had been contrived here by driving down forked stakes at suitable intervals along the causeway, and placing loose poles in the crotches from stake to stake, forming one row for the feet and another a little higher for the hands. the contrivance was rickety and unsafe to the last degree; the poles swayed and bent at every step, and it required great care and the use of both feet and hands to avoid a ducking. it was now time to drive up the cows, which were pasturing beyond the water; so holt, bidding the child remain there, crossed over after them, taking with him the string of fish, which he hung up on one of the stakes on the farther side, for he wanted the pleasure of taking his spoils home in triumph, and feared, if he left them with isaac, the latter would take them and run home while he was away. on returning he was struck with consternation to find no trace of either the child or the fish. he carefully scrutinized the water without result, and at length slowly returned to the farmhouse, filled with misgivings, and was not a little relieved to find both his charge and his fish safe at home. the child had worked his way across the water by the poles, although, standing on the lower row, he could hardly reach the upper one with extended arms, and had returned, holding the string of fish in his teeth, in the same way. his father ever after was particularly fond of relating this anecdote in proof of the daring and adventurous spirit so early manifested. [illustration: birthplace of general stevens, andover, mass. _from historical sketches of andover, by sarah loring bailey_] he was a sensitive, earnest child, not demonstrative, but having great affection and tenderness, which he lavished upon his mother. her early death was his first and greatest misfortune. when he was only seven years old, his father, who always drove furiously, in driving with his wife in his wagon rapidly around a corner, overset the vehicle. they were thrown out violently upon the ground, and the unfortunate mother struck upon her head. from this shock she never really recovered, and died two years after the unhappy accident. during this period isaac attached himself closely to his mother, and acquired no slight influence over her. the early death of this tender and devoted wife and mother well-nigh destroyed the happiness of her family. isaac ever cherished her memory with the tenderest veneration. he thought that from her were inherited great part of his talents, and that had she lived he would have been spared the injudicious forcing of his mind in his childhood, to which he always declared he owed a real mental injury. after the mother's death, a housekeeper was employed to provide for the helpless little flock, and attend to the household duties; and two years later the father married his second wife, ann poor. isaac was sent to school before his fifth year, where from the first he displayed great power of memory, close application, and devotion to study. his teachers were astonished to find that he did not stop at the end of the day's lesson, but habitually learned far beyond it, often reciting page after page. it was said that there was no need of telling isaac how much to study; it was enough to show him where to begin, and he would learn more than the teacher cared to hear. his first teacher, miss susan foster, said with astonishment one day, after hearing his lesson in arithmetic, "there is no use for me to teach him arithmetic; he is already far beyond me in that." after his tenth year he attended franklin academy, in north andover,--old put's school, as it was usually and more familiarly styled,--kept by mr. simon putnam, who attained great repute as a teacher. this was situated on the hill north of the meeting-house, on land given for the purpose by grandfather jonathan. here he studied the usual english branches. among his schoolmates were william endicott, jr., the well-known philanthropist, hon. daniel saunders, the late george b. loring, and major george t. clark. it appears that wrestling was a favorite sport with the active and hardy boys at this school. his father, proud and ambitious on his account, kept him constantly at school, and urged on to still greater efforts this earnest, ardent nature, intense in everything he undertook. the evil effects of such mistaken treatment soon made themselves felt. his mind became wearied and dull from overtasking. the teacher advised rest. the boy, then but ten years old, begged his father to take him out of school and let him work on the farm, telling him that he could no longer study; that he could not learn his lessons. but the father refused, not realizing the son's condition, and bade him go back to school and study what he could. isaac then went to his uncle nathaniel, who owned the cochichewick woolen mills, situated two miles below the farm, and obtained his permission to work in the factory for a year. he prevailed upon his grandmother to let him lodge at her house in order to be nearer the factory; and having thus decided upon his course, went home and informed his father of the arrangements he had made, who, astonished at the judgment and resolution of the boy, acquiesced. so isaac went to work in the factory, lodging at his grandfather's, rising long before daylight that he might eat a hurried breakfast, walk a mile to the factory, and begin the day's work at five o'clock in the morning, and toiling ten to twelve hours a day. he entered the weavers' room, where he soon learned to manage a loom. the best weavers were women, it seems, and able to run two looms apiece. isaac at once determined to excel the most capable; and before he left the factory, succeeded in reaching the goal of his ambition, and managed four looms unassisted. after a year of this unremitting labor, he left the mills. as he was returning home with the scanty sum he had earned in his pocket, taking it to his father, he passed a shop where some tempting hot gingerbread was displayed for sale, and felt an intense longing to buy a penny-worth; but reflecting that his earnings belonged to his father, and it would be wrong for him to spend any of them, he overcame the desire and went home. but when he handed the money to his father, and asked for a cent to buy the gingerbread with, he felt stung to the quick by the latter's refusal. in truth, the father's hard struggle with poverty and adverse circumstances had narrowed his noble nature. too much had life become to him nothing but hard work, self-sacrifice, and a severe sense of duty. he did not appreciate the sensitive nature of a child, and its needs of sympathy, recreation, and occasional indulgence. directly across the road from the house was a small pool called the frog-pond. isaac selected a corner of this pond for his garden, filled it up with stones, and covered them with rich earth brought from a distance in his little cart with great pains and labor. he eagerly seized every moment that could be spared from school and his unceasing round of morning and evening chores to devote to this darling project. at last the garden was prepared, and planted with his own favorite seeds. but his father, fearing that it might distract and take up too much time from his studies and duties about the farm, rudely uprooted his tenderly cared-for plants, and put in potatoes instead. on another occasion his father's injudicious urging nearly proved fatal. isaac was helping in the hay-field, and was working with such ardor and had accomplished so much that his father was actually astonished. instead of restraining, he praised him without stint. under this stimulus the ambitious boy redoubled his exertions until he was prostrated by a sunstroke, resulting in a raging fever, from which he barely escaped with life after a severe sickness. on another occasion, when twelve years old, he was working in the hay-field, pitching hay upon the cart; he was badly ruptured, and had to be carried to the house. as soon as he was able to travel he went alone to boston, and sought out dr. warren, a noted surgeon, and laid his case before him. dr. warren was so much struck with the lad's courage and intelligence that he refused to accept any fee. "if you do exactly what i tell you, you will get well," he said, "and i know you will do so from looking in your face." the surgeon had a truss made, and prescribed treatment, but all the remainder of his life isaac was obliged to wear the truss, although he outgrew the injury in a measure until it broke out afresh in mexico from over-exertion. measured by modern conditions, it was a severe and laborious home life in which the farmer's boy grew up, but it was a wholesome one, and well adapted to bring out all his powers. morning and evening, throughout the year, he had his round of duties, feeding and milking the cows, feeding the pigs, cutting and bringing in wood, etc. during the winter he rose long before daylight to attend to these chores and shovel snow from the paths, then after a hasty breakfast trudged away to school, and on returning again resumed the round of unending farm work. in summer there was no school for three or four months, and then he worked on the farm, hoeing corn, making hay, driving oxen, and performing all the hard and varied labors of a new england farmer's son. but the new england farmers of that day were the owners of the soil. they knew no superiors. the revolutionary struggle, as recent to them as the great rebellion is to us, was fresh and vivid in their minds, and stimulated noble ideas of liberty and national independence. the standard of personal honesty, manhood, and morals, bequeathed from their puritan ancestry, was high. such was the moral atmosphere of isaac stevens's household, heightened by his own earnest, philanthropic, and elevated sentiments. all his children were intellectual and high-minded, and nothing can be more touching than the constant ambition and striving of his five daughters for education and self-improvement. all became teachers, but died young, victims of consumption. nor was the life of the youth nothing but a round of hard work and privation. if he worked hard and studied hard, he enjoyed play with equal zest, and shared the rougher sports of those days with his cousins and other boys of his age. they were more pugnacious and rougher than nowadays. wrestling was a common sport, and boyish fights and scuffles were usual. at the age of fifteen he entered phillips academy in andover. nathan w. hazen, esq., a well-known and respected lawyer of the town, furnished him board and lodgings, in return for which he took care of the garden, and did the chores about the place. one of his schoolmates, describing his first appearance at the academy, said: "the door opened, and there quietly entered an insignificant, small boy, carrying in his arms a load of books nearly as large as himself. but the impression of insignificance vanished as soon as one regarded his large head, earnest face, and firm, searching, and fearless dark hazel eye." he remained at the academy over a year. as usual, he took the front rank from the beginning. his reputation as a scholar, especially in mathematics, extended beyond the school. besides his studies he took sole care of mr. hazen's garden, a half acre in extent, groomed the horse, milked the cow, and fed them, cut and brought in the wood, and did many other jobs about the house, performing an amount of labor, as mr. hazen declared, sufficient to dismay many a hired man. he studied early in the morning and late at night. his power of concentrating his mind upon any subject was extraordinary. his industry was untiring. the impress this boy of fifteen made upon those with whom he came in contact during his stay at this place is really remarkable. mr. hazen, who proved a considerate friend and adviser to the struggling youth, relates that every evening isaac would bring his chair close to the office table, at which the former was accustomed to read or write, in order to avail himself of the light, and would work out mathematical problems on his slate. he would remain quietly with his hand to his head in deep thought for a little time, when suddenly he would shower a perfect rainstorm of figures upon his slate without hesitation, or erasure, oftentimes completely filling it. generally the correct result was reached; but when the solution was not found the first time, he would rapidly wipe off every figure and begin again as before. his mind always sought out and mastered the bottom principle. it was remarked that, whenever he had once solved a problem, he could unhesitatingly solve all others of the same character. on one occasion a mathematician of some note, who had just published a new arithmetic, brought his work to the academy, and tested the acquirements of the scholars by giving them his new problems to solve. when isaac was called to the blackboard, he astonished the author and the teacher alike by the ease and rapidity with which he solved every example. they plied him again and again with the most difficult problems, but he mastered them in every instance. "well, sir," exclaimed the author, somewhat piqued, "i think you could make the key to this book." isaac took the book, and in three days returned it with every example worked out. a very difficult problem was sent from yale college to the academy. while the teachers and scholars were puzzling over it, isaac sat in thought for half an hour with his hand to his head, then rapidly worked out the problem on his slate and presented the solution. young as he was, it seems that he had thought enough on religious subjects to become a decided universalist and unitarian. a religious revival took place while he was at the academy, and many of the scholars were brought within its influence. among others, one of the teachers became "converted," and sought all means to promote a similar experience among his pupils. in order to remove the stumbling-blocks of doubt and ignorance, he offered to answer any questions they might propound on religious topics. the first question isaac put, "can a sincere universalist be saved?" was met by a decided and uncompromising "no." but the youth plied the unfortunate zealot with such queries that he was forced to confess his inability to answer them, and to withdraw his offer. once, when he wanted the whole class to attend one of the revival meetings, he put it to them that all who were willing to dispense with the afternoon session and attend the meeting should rise. all promptly stood up except isaac, who resolutely kept his seat. "every one in favor except stevens," exclaimed the teacher with some bitterness, realizing the protest against his own bigotry. in truth, the youth's sense of right had been shocked by the doctrines he heard advanced; he was strongly opposed to such revival meetings, and his earnest nature would not bend in a matter of principle. at one of these meetings his two sisters, hannah and susan, yielded to the exhortations and influences of the occasion, and took their seats on the converts' or mourners' bench, as it was called. perceiving this, isaac immediately marched up to the front, and made them both leave the church with him, no slight proof of his influence over them, older than himself. in fact, while they felt great pride in his talents, his sisters had come still more to respect and lean upon his sound judgment and firm will. he lavished upon them all the great tenderness and affection of his strong and earnest nature. during his boyhood he was affected with excessive diffidence, or bashfulness. with characteristic resolution and good sense, he set himself to overcome this weakness. he made it a point always to address any one whose presence inspired this awkward feeling, but, he said, it was years before he overcame it. after a year and four months of this severe application, isaac completed his course at phillips academy. he wished to study law with mr. hazen, but that gentleman discouraged the idea. at this juncture his uncle, william stevens, suggested west point, and wrote to mr. gayton p. osgood, the member of congress for the north essex district, in which andover was situated, inquiring if there was an appointment in his gift, and suggesting isaac's name. mr. osgood replied that there was no vacancy. but uncle william was not satisfied; he wrote to william c. phillips, the member representing the south essex district, by whom he was informed that no cadet had been appointed from mr. osgood's district. accordingly he formally made application in behalf of his nephew. a lawyer by profession, and cashier of the andover bank, he was a man of some influence. mr. hazen and other friends joined their recommendations. mr. phillips exerted a favorable influence, and although there were other candidates with more influential backing, mr. osgood bestowed upon isaac the desired appointment. both uncle william and mr. hazen declared that the recommendations had little weight, and that mr. osgood selected him on account of his reputation for ability and scholarship. chapter iii west point the following letter to his uncle william, written immediately after his arrival at west point, vividly portrays the mingled emotions that stirred the heart of the raw but ambitious country youth on reaching the goal of his boyish hopes,--his ardent patriotism, awakened by the historic scenes about him; his ambition and determination to be first in his class, "by unflinching resolution, indomitable perseverance, fixing his whole soul upon the object he wishes to attain with concentrated and undivided attention;" his gratitude to his uncle and friends for his appointment, and his affectionate regard for his family. it is also significant of his self-reliant character that he expresses no fears in regard to the impending examination for admission, but remarks, with well-grounded confidence, that "there can be no difficulty in sustaining myself with honor and respectability." west point, june 13, 1835. dear uncle,--i now enjoy the long-anticipated happiness of addressing you from west point. and perhaps you may ask, does it meet my expectations? i am not prepared to answer this question fully at present, but will say that i like my situation, although subject to very strict regulations, and fully believe there can be no difficulty in obeying every regulation and sustaining myself with honor and respectability. and be assured that i always shall consider myself greatly indebted to you for your kind exertions in my behalf, and it shall be my determination to demean myself in such a manner as to convince you and all my friends that their exertions have not been thrown away. here i am surrounded by young men from every state in the union, who are eagerly endeavoring to arrive at distinction, many of whom have determined, and, what is better still, will make every exertion to carry their resolve into effect, to be first in their class. every one must buckle on his armor for the conflict: let him be girded with unflinching resolution, indomitable perseverance, decision and firmness of mind, singleness of purpose, integrity of heart, let him fix his _whole_ soul upon the object he wishes to attain with concentrated and undivided attention, and he will undoubtedly, with scarcely the possibility of a doubt, obtain the post of honor. the first class graduated yesterday. the whole number attached to this class was 54, which is the greatest number that ever graduated at any one time from this institution. there were splendid fireworks last evening, which lasted until nine o'clock. all the cadets were permitted to partake of the sport. it is said that the cadets who leave here are so affected that they even shed tears. is it to be wondered at? is there a spot in the whole united states which is associated with so many hallowed and pleasing recollections of the patriotism, of the struggles, and of the victories of our revolutionary fathers? we are as it were in the cradle of liberty, in the stronghold of freedom, and may we be scions worthy of the tears and of the blood of our revolutionary sires: may i not disgrace my country, my state, and that character of proud disdain and patriotic valor which inspired the heroes of andover on the morn of bunker's fight; and above all may i cherish that love of freedom and sympathy for the sufferings of mankind which characterized the life of washington, of kosciusko, and the other worthies of the revolution; and in fine may i cherish a heart full of gratitude for those kind friends who by their exertions have assisted me to procure my present situation. i shall be examined monday, and the encampment will be pitched on tuesday. we shall have no uniforms until the 4th of july, at which time the new cadets mount guard. as soon as i have entered upon the active duties of the station, i shall again write to andover. give my love to father, mother, brother and sisters, to your own family, and all inquiring friends, remembering me especially to grandmother. i remain your grateful nephew, isaac i. stevens. wm. stevens, esq. he entered the academy resolved to place himself at the head of his class, not in presumptuous or ignorant self-confidence, but fully recognizing the arduous struggle before him. a boy of seventeen, with scanty advantages of education, but inured to hard work and hard study, he did not hesitate to contest the palm with youths older and far better prepared than himself, of whom two at least had received a collegiate education, and had publicly avowed their determination to attain the first place. these were henry w. halleck, of new york, distinguished as major-general, and at one time commanding the army in the war of the rebellion, and henry j. biddle, of philadelphia, both of whom were older in years, of assured social position and wealthy connections, accomplished french scholars, and well up in mathematics; and one may fancy the derision with which they regarded the rivalry of the undersized farmer's boy from andover. "one evening," says general e.d. townsend, late adjutant-general of the army, "a classmate of mine, who was very fond of mathematics, general israel vogdes, came to my room, and told me there was a 'plebe' just entered from my state, who was a fine mathematician already, and would stand 'head of his class in math.' this interested me, and i went around to offer to assist my fellow-statesman in entering on his career. this was previous to his first encampment. i found mr. stevens a modest, straightforward young man, who, in reply to my offer of any assistance i could give him, informed me he wanted to stand head of his class,--that he was not afraid of mathematics, but knew nothing whatever of french. i at once suggested to him to do what was sometimes but not often done, to apply for permission to take lessons during the encampment of one of the professors, for which a small compensation would be allowed to be deducted from mr. stevens's pay. he caught at this idea, and subsequently carried it out. the result was he stood fourteenth in french in the first january examination, and first in mathematics. this did not satisfy him, as i found on congratulating him on what i deemed a most creditable standing. the next june examination, by his untiring application, he stood head both in mathematics and french. there were some four young men in his class who were ripe scholars when they entered west point, and who were by no means wanting in studious habits. "the following year, drawing was added to the course. mr. stevens came to me for more advice, saying he had not the slightest notion of drawing. i suggested to him, first, great care in his outlines to get them accurate, and then, if he found on trial that he had no talent for shading, that by using a very fine-pointed crayon, and making with patience and care light, smooth marks, he might succeed in producing a well-finished and pretty picture. he came to me shortly after to say that he had improved upon my hint, for he first filled in the outline with a fine pencil, and then traced over this with a coarse one the prominent lines of the picture. well, he stood head in drawing, and this although at least one of his competitors was quite expert with his pencil before he entered the academy. as might be expected from the beginning, mr. stevens graduated at the head of his class in every branch throughout the course." among his classmates, who afterwards rose to be generals in the army, will be recognized henry w. halleck; henry j. hunt, the distinguished chief of artillery of the army of the potomac; george thom; edward o.c. ord; edward r. s. canby, who commanded the army against mobile in 1865, and was massacred by the modocs in 1873, when in command of the department of the columbia; and james b. ricketts; and in the confederate army, jeremy f. gilmer. among those in the three classes above him, distinguished as generals in the army, were montgomery c. meiggs, quartermaster-general during the war, daniel p. woodbury, james lowry donaldson, thomas w. sherman, henry h. lockwood, john w. phelps, robert allen, of the class of '36. henry w. benham, alexander b. dyer, s. parker scammon, israel vogdes, edward d. townsend, william h. french, john sedgwick, the soldierly and steadfast commander of the sixth corps, beloved of his troops, joseph hooker, john b.s. todd, of the class of '37; and on the confederate side, braxton bragg, jubal a. early, edmond bradford, and john c. pemberton. william f. barry, irvin c. mcdowell, robert s. granger, justus mckinstry, charles f. ruff, and andrew j. smith, of the class of '38, and p.g. t. beauregard, the distinguished confederate leader, as also william j. hardee, edward johnson, and alexander w. reynolds. in the class of '40 were the distinguished w.t. sherman, george h. thomas, george w. getty, stewart van vleit, and william hays; and on the southern side, john p. mccawn, richard s. ewell, and bushrod r. johnson. in the class of '41 were zealous b. tower, horatio g. wright, amiel w. whipple, albion w. howe, nathaniel lyon, john m. brannon, and schuyler hamilton. in the class of '42 were henry l. eustis, john newton, william s. rosecrans, barton s. alexander, john pope, seth williams, abner doubleday, napoleon j.t. dana, ralph w. kirkham, and george sykes; among the confederates, james longstreet, d.h. hill, gustavus w. smith, mansfield lovell, lafayette mclaws, and earl van dorn. now fairly entered upon the life and duties of a cadet, his intense and ardent nature found full occupation. his ambition was aroused. hard study agreed with him. the days sped rapidly and pleasantly away. he fell into companionship with the most talented and high-spirited young men. nor, time and attention all absorbed by severe application, did he sink into a mere bookworm. every morning before breakfast, rain or shine, he walked around the post for exercise, a distance of two miles. he shared, too, in the escapades natural to a free and spirited youth, and did not always come off scot-free from these scrapes, for his name stands forty-third on the conduct roll for the first year. "i have never been homesick for a single minute since i have been here," he writes his sisters hannah and elizabeth, september 8, 1835; "i never passed three months more pleasantly in my life, and since i commenced my studies time never seemed more fleeting. we are obliged to stand guard once a week, drill every day, have a dress parade, with roll calls, etc. we study ten and a half hours a day, two and a half of which are spent in the recitation room. i have recited four lessons in algebra and three in french, and i think i can get my maximum unless sick, or otherwise disabled, that is, miss no questions in any of my studies the coming year. i can get both of my lessons in half an hour, and i shall have much leisure time. if i had some greek books i think i could pass my time to better advantage. "i like the military life very much. there is as fine a set of fellows here as ever breathed the air. we study hard, eat hearty, sleep sound, and play little. in camp every one was wide awake for a scrape, or for any kind of fun. but in barracks we are as sober and steady as quakers. we go to the section room with long and solemn faces. i assure you we know that by study and severe application alone we can keep our places. i admire the spirit which pervades the whole class. the common remark is, 'i intend to bone it with all my might.' _to bone it_ means _to study hard_. every one seems determined to rise, or keep his present standing at any rate. we are divided in four sections in mathematics, and seven in french, arranged in alphabetical order. consequently i stand in the last section in each. a transfer will be made in the course of the week, those who do best being put in the higher sections, and those who do worst into the lower sections. i hope to rise in both. that i may do so, i intend to get my lessons in the best possible manner. it shall be my aim not only to understand my lessons, but to convince my instructors that i understand them. to do this i must accustom myself to collect my ideas readily, to be free from embarrassment and trepidation, and always to be perfectly calm and self-possessed." to hannah. november 28. i am doing pretty well. my health is strong and vigorous. i am not only contented with my situation, but like it very much indeed. we are kept tremendously strict, i assure you. i was visiting last wednesday evening, and they arrested me for it, and did not release me until this evening, and in addition to that they obliged me to perform an extra tour of sunday guard duty, which is very tough, i assure you, this cold weather. uncle william, it seems, was disappointed at his early standing in the class, and wrote him rather a reproachful letter of exhortation and advice, winding up with the wish that he should stand first in mathematics by the end of the year. in reply he explains that his first rating was low because his name came near the end of the alphabet. west point, december 5, 1835. dear uncle,--your letter was received yesterday, and read with much pleasure. i feel gratified that i still retain your confidence, and that you expect me to sustain an honorable stand. it is also rather flattering than otherwise to know that you feel disappointed because i have nothing more than a respectable standing in my class, for it shows that your estimate of my abilities is as high as, perhaps higher than, it should be. i assure you that your wish shall be gratified not only within the close of the first year, but within the first six months, if it is within my power. should my stand be no higher than at present, you must not feel disappointed. for such a stand is not only "_very respectable_," but very high in a class like ours. i beg of you, however, to think no more of the communication, because my stand even then was much higher than 19. the sections since then have been rearranged, and i have risen very much. you must also recollect that at first i was within seven of the foot both in m. and f. in two weeks i rose 25 men in m. and 80 in f. i then remained in the second section in mathematics till the middle of november, when i was transferred to the first section. there are only two in our class who have got the maximum at every recitation both in m. and f. since the commencement of our studies; these are cadet biddle from penn. and a fellow from mass., whose birthplace, i believe, is andover. i am now at the head of my section in french. my present standing in m. _is_ as _high_ as the _highest_, and it is considered so by every member of my class. there are four of us in m. who have done equally well, that is, we have each of us got the maximum, done all the extras, and demonstrate equally as well. their names are h.j. biddle, of penn., i. butler, of va., h. w. halleck, of n.y., and ----, of mass. i have often thought of the advice you gave me, and i hope i have profited by it. i have spent two hours in studying other authors, and in learning to demonstrate eloquently and with perspicuity, to every hour devoted to the text-book. in french i have risen more than any other man in the class. my stand at first was 67th, now it is 22d. when i came, i had scarcely looked into a french book for five years, and could not pronounce a single syllable. and, believe me, it is not egotism which prompts me to say this, but it is in order to put to rest all your apprehensions on my account. i also wish to assure you that i associate with none whom i ought not to respect. west point, december 20, 1835. dear father,--you have probably received a communication from the war department giving my stand for the month of november, which i hope will give you better satisfaction than the last return. i think my general standing in january will be still better. i shall be examined one fortnight from to-morrow, and i intend to do my best. my standing will greatly depend upon it. at the examination, each one has a demonstration to perform, besides some 20 or 30 questions to answer. if my demonstration is good, and the answers to all my questions are correct, my stand will remain in mathematics at least as good as it was in november, which, i presume, is fourth. in french i think i shall rise considerably, because my mark is as good as any one's, and i think i have gained the good-will of my teacher. very much depends upon this. we can always secure their esteem by being attentive and respectful, and, last though not least, by paying considerable attention to our personal appearance. lieutenant church, my professor in mathematics, and mr. molinard, my professor in french, are both very fine men and accomplished teachers. the latter is a frenchman. i am acquainted with many westerners, who generally are very fine fellows. they are generally very generous and open-hearted, and it is very easy to get acquainted with them. there have been two duels fought between cadets since i have been here, though no ill consequences followed. in each case the combatants were westerners. if they had been found out, they, together with the seconds, would have been dismissed. our state does the best of any in the fourth class. there are three in the first section in mathematics, and two in the first section in french. penn. has two in each. henry j. biddle, of penn., will probably be head in mathematics in january. his name comes before those who have an equal mark with him; he is a splendid mathematician, and has graduated at a college, and was undoubtedly better prepared than any other member of the class. he will also be head in french. we have a splendid collection of philosophical, mathematical, and historical works in our library. there is no difficulty in getting books, and i intend to avail myself of its many advantages. there is a universal history of modern times, consisting of 42 volumes. i am now reading rollin's ancient history. our evenings are very busy. we study from half past five till ten. it is noticeable in his letters that he finds the regular course of studies very easy, owing undoubtedly not less to the remarkable native powers of his mind than to his habits of study and faculty of intense application. yet, as in boyhood, not content with the prescribed curriculum, and spurred on by his ambition to achieve the headship of his class, he takes extra french lessons, spends "two hours in studying other authors, and in learning to demonstrate eloquently and with perspicuity, to every hour devoted to the text-book," and reads rollin's ancient history. such indomitable resolution and energy combined with great ability could not fail. in six months he had gained a high place in the first section, and had become the competitor with three others for the leadership. he writes uncle william, who has congratulated him on his standing, and now thinks it best to caution him against studying too hard:- west point, february 1, 1836. dear uncle,--it was very gratifying to learn that my standing was so satisfactory to my friends. since it has been attained by no extra exertion, it is incumbent on me to _deserve_ to sustain it for the future by strict and unwearied attention to all my academic studies. your caution respecting hard study shall be observed, for the very good reason that it is impossible to do otherwise. the regulations in this respect are very good, and are such as to secure to each one the privilege of studying as much as is necessary, while it restrains all from over-exertion. we retire at ten and rise at six. of the remaining sixteen, four hours are devoted to recreation, meals, etc., and twelve to study. of these twelve hours, two and one half are spent in the section room. the intercourse between the cadets is so free and uninterrupted that it is impossible to study except during study hours. surely twelve hours' study per day ought to injure no one of a sound constitution. our class will have a society next fall. every class, except the fourth, has one or more societies, which meet every saturday evening. we have some very fine speakers in the corps, and many take great pains to improve themselves. you wish to know our uniforms, rations, etc. our uniform is gray. our pantaloons are made as usual, except a stripe of black velvet on each leg. cousin charles can describe our coats, which are the same both winter and summer. in summer we wear white pants made of russia drilling. remember me to all inquiring friends, especially to grandmother and your own family. your nephew, isaac i. stevens. n.b. tell our folks to write soon. to his sister susan:- west point, february 23, 1836. dear sister,--be assured that advice from _you_, and advice from _all those_ whom i _know_ to be my _friends_, will afford me the greatest pleasure, and will always be received with the most respectful attention. the disgusting habits of chewing, smoking, etc., i abominate, and therefore shall never indulge in them. as for drinks, either distilled or fermented, i do not use them, because in the first place they cannot be obtained, and, in the second place, i have no desire for them. the fact of the case is, that in barracks there are no temptations offered us but what every one who has any mind could easily resist. in camp it is not the case; then many temptations are offered us, to which we are in great danger of yielding, since we have much leisure. when a person has his whole time employed, there is little danger of falling into bad habits. last fall, when i commenced the algebra, i had very little to do, and came very near contracting some very bad habits, as sleeping in the morning, etc., which at first required some little difficulty in breaking; but now i do not think of such a thing, not even sunday mornings, and i often rise at four or five o'clock. this is owing to having hard lessons to get. you mention that you are studying latin and like it very much. i have but one caution to give you on this subject, which is, get your grammar perfectly. everything depends upon this. you can never make a good latin scholar unless you know everything about the grammar. since you are studying french, i intend next encampment to write you a letter in french, which you must answer, and we will correct each other. we use levisac's grammar, and at every lesson get about half a page of exercises, and are obliged to get them so that we can write any sentence our prof. gives us upon the blackboard without referring to the books. we are now writing sentences upon the pronomial verbs. we get for our translation eight pages in charles xii. per day. our teacher, mr. bevard (the author of the french lessons), is a very good linguist, and the most thorough teacher i ever was under. he is very particular about our pronunciation, and corrects us very frequently. i think by june i shall be able to pronounce french pretty well and read it fluently, and shall endeavor to rise considerably. you must write whenever you can find it convenient, and your letters shall always be punctually answered. i observe that you pay the postage. i wish that you would allow me to pay it, as i think i am better able to do it than you. remember me to all inquiring friends. your brother, isaac i. stevens. miss s.b. stevens. his letters show the maturity of the mind and judgment of the youth of seventeen, and exhibit a slight formality and precision that indicates that he was taking pains in the composition. his correspondence must have taken no little time. his great, warm heart went out towards all his relations, and he was frequently writing to his uncle william, and his cousins in andover and salem, mass., in albany, maine, and in nashville, tenn. he wrote constantly to his father and sisters, keenly alive to their welfare and happiness. the latter were beginning to scatter widely from the paternal roof-tree. hannah, the eldest, was at haverhill, earning her livelihood. susan was attending the female seminary at the south parish (andover); mary was at methuen, at mr. stephen barker's; and only sarah and elizabeth remained at home. deeply sympathizing with them, he comforts them, urges them to treat their stepmother with respect, and touchingly alludes to their father's unfortunate condition, his growing infirmities, and his sincere affection for and devotion to his children. the first academic year rolled rapidly away. one day, as the examination drew near, halleck and biddle were comparing notes as to the prospects. "that little stevens," said the former, "is driving ahead like the devil, and he is sure to be first in mathematics. i don't think he can beat me in french, at any rate." "and i am sure," rejoined biddle, "that he cannot touch me in drawing next year. one thing i have made up my mind to,--if he gains the head of the class over me, i shall resign." this dialogue was overheard, and repeated to "little stevens," who related it in after years with some amusement. he had pursued his object with unflagging zeal, energy, and determination during the year, but, reflecting how heavily he was handicapped in the race by men like biddle, butler, and halleck, so much older and farther advanced in their studies at the beginning, he might well feel anxious. he entered the examination room, as he describes it, cool and collected, with nerves high-strung yet under perfect control, and fully determined to come out ahead. he was not disappointed. he rose to the first place,--a place, once achieved, which no competitor was to wrest from him. camp jones, july 6, 1836. dear uncle,--i received your letter by mr. johnson, and although short it was very acceptable.... we had a fine time on the fourth of july, an oration, dinner, etc. i had a great desire to spend the fourth at new york city. i applied and obtained a leave of two days, commencing on sunday noon and ending on tuesday; had a very fine time,--went to the navy yard, brooklyn, got introduced to about half a dozen midshipmen, etc. the military were out, as well as several societies. in the evening i went to the theatre, where celeste danced _as usual_. since we have been in camp we have had a very easy time, nothing to do but go on guard two or three times per week, attend roll calls and dress parades. next week we will be drilled three times per day as well as recite in infantry tactics, and attend the dancing-school. i have come to the determination to study french this encampment: shall commence next week. i cannot reasonably expect to keep my present standing in that branch unless i exert myself. i can translate quite readily, but i write quite indifferently, and can speak it but very little, whereas there are three immediately below me who can read, write, and speak the language very well. why the board placed me above them is more than i can conceive. two of them have told me they _would rise me_, and i have told them they _should not do it_. if they _do_ rise me, i shall not complain; and if they do not, so much the better. as to mathematics, i have no cause for fear,--both biddle and halleck admit i ought to stand head, and my professor had no doubts about who should be placed there. as soon as we reã«nter barracks, we commence drawing. success in this branch depends as much (and perhaps even more) upon persevering application as on a natural taste. i intend to do my very best, otherwise i shall fall very much in general merit, even should i keep my standing in other branches. biddle will stand head, or near the head, in d., as he now draws very well. if he was third in d. and i was twelfth, he would rise me in general merit. our merit rolls will be published in about two weeks. i am entitled to five, and shall send one home. in this roll the standing of every cadet, the class to which he belongs, and the number of his demerits are published. mass. stands better in my class than any other state. greene and grafton, both from boston, stand ninth and tenth. but there was one from salem found deficient in french, although he passed well in m. i think he is a smart fellow, and will stand high next year. his name is humber. he had been a sailor for six years, and french came very hard to him by reason of the very limited knowledge he had of language. i suppose that the farmers must have begun haying in good earnest. i should much prefer working on a farm for two or three months to the life i now lead. it is now thirteen months since i have done any work to which i have hitherto been accustomed, and i shall probably _soon get my hand out_. many of the cadets, chiefly those who come from the slavery states, have a great contempt for our yankee farmers, and even pretend to compare them with their slaves. they have the greatest contempt for all those who gain a subsistence by the sweat of their brows. for my own part i shall always respect every man who is honest and industrious, and more particularly those who live in the manner that has been ordained by god himself; and whenever any man, in conversation with me or in my hearing, compares that class, of which i am proud to be one, with slaves, i shall always consider it as an insult offered to myself, and shall act accordingly. remember me to all inquiring friends. write when convenient. your nephew, isaac i. stevens. wm. stevens, esq. camp jones, west point, august 16, 1836. dear uncle,--you probably have seen most of my letters that i have written home this encampment; you will see that i have taken things fair and easy, and have had quite a pleasant time. i can always get a permission to walk into the country whenever i ask for it, so that, between attending my military duties, dancing, rambling about in the country, and reading novels, i could not do otherwise than pass my time pleasantly. i cut rather a sorry figure dancing, as might be expected, but there is a chance for improvement, which i intend to make the best of. there is a standing society in the corps called the dialectic society. ten or fifteen persons are selected from each class except the fourth class, so that it consists of forty or fifty members. the society is continued by selecting the above number from every new class after it has been here one year. i intend to get elected into it, if possible. they have a fine collection of books to the amount of several hundred volumes. there are also many fine speakers in it, and many of them take great pains to improve themselves, even to the neglect of their studies. this is unquestionably bad policy. it is losing a dollar for the sake of saving a sixpence; but there is no kind of difficulty in paying proper attention to our studies, and improving ourselves in writing and speaking: by writing, i of course mean composing. if you will examine our merit rolls, you will see that jennings and halbert, of the second class, are among the deficients. these men were decidedly the best writers in the class, and the former was the orator on the fourth of july. as it is always better to _act_ than to _talk_, so they have missed it in neglecting their studies in order to become good speakers. as i stand head in french, you may possibly suppose i can speak the language. such is not the case; but one thing _is_ certain, i am determined to be able to speak it one year from this time. but how i shall do it is another thing. i can write it some, but it will require great pains to be able to write it correctly and speak it fluently. neither time nor patience shall be wanting on my part in order to accomplish both the above objects. as soon as we commence studying, i intend to have a talk with mr. bevard, the head teacher in french, and a most estimable man, about it, and do as he directs me. in return for this i shall expect a good long letter, telling me all the news and giving me good advice. remember me to all inquiring friends, to aunt eliza, and cousins eliza, william, susan, and george. i remain your nephew, isaac i. stevens. wm. stevens, esq. west point, september 1, 1836. dear father,--in my letters you often have me write about my leave next year. i look forward to this with a great deal of pleasure. as you may well suppose, i want to see my friends very much. how long a leave had i better get? i can have ten weeks if i choose, or a shorter time. i am now a corporal, and shall probably be made a sergeant next june. if i get a leave of ten weeks, i cannot keep my office. but if i retain it, my leave will not exceed four or five weeks; but to make up for this i could get as long a leave the year after; whereas, if i resigned my office and took the ten weeks' leave, i could get no leave the next encampment. the office now is not worth much, but it is very well to have it when i am in the first class, for then i shall be made a lieutenant, if my conduct is good. what had i best do? if i continue to be head in mathematics, there is a chance of my being made an assistant professor in m. next year. two of the cadet professors will then graduate, and their places will have to be filled. i do not think, however, it is best to place any dependence upon it. if there was an even chance of my being made such, i would not hesitate about resigning my office, if you should think it best to obtain a leave of ten weeks. your son, isaac i. stevens. mr. isaac stevens. west point, september 2, 1836. dear father,--yesterday we commenced our studies. we entered the barracks the 30th of august. the ball on the 29th was a most splendid one, and the hall was very full. we made use of the mess-hall, which was decorated in fine style. our band was present, and their performances served to increase their reputation. the ball was continued until after three o'clock, but i did not remain after half past one. it was estimated that nearly six hundred visitors were present. as this is the only thing of the kind we have during the year, the corps take unusual pains to have everything done in the best manner, and great care was taken that the whole should present quite a military appearance. many of the lamps were encircled by brightly burnished bayonets, which served as reflectors. directly in front of the hall was a battery of cannon, in rear of which sentinels were stationed to keep off those who had no right to be present. i enjoyed myself very much, and took part in several cotillions. we marched into barracks the day after the ball, and were allowed a day or two to arrange things. my situation is much different now from what it was one year since. now i have attained a situation which then i scarcely hoped for. now i am surrounded with my classmates and friends, when one year since i had no friends; for we were strangers to each other, and consequently displayed that cold civility, and uttered those unmeaning compliments, which distinguish the intercourse of strangers. one year since i was unknown to the officers of the institution; now i trust i have secured the confidence and esteem of those with whom i have come in contact. then i was a _poor plebe_, who had not passed his january examination; now i no longer bear that title, but possess the privileges and the name of an _old cadet_. the fourth class is a very large one, upwards of a hundred. next june i do not believe upwards of sixty will be left, and it is doubtful whether upwards of forty-five graduate, so many are found deficient and discharged. my room-mates are the same as last year, with the exception of mr. bacon. i think we shall always room together, at least i hope so. both carpenter and callender are hard students and steady fellows. the former is a very smart man. the latter you will find, by reference to some of my old letters, roomed with me before january, resigned, and was reappointed this year. i do not expect to stand first next january, but think my standing will not be below second. drawing will come hard to me, and i shall stand quite low the first three or four months. no efforts of my own shall be wanting to secure a good standing in this branch. we spend six hours per week in the drawing academy, but i intend to practice twelve hours per week in my own room. your son, isaac a. stevens. mr. isaac stevens. from early boyhood general stevens made a strong impression upon every one he met. undersized, and at first glance insignificant in appearance, his intense individuality and intellect were always deeply felt. at once he commanded the respect of the professors at the academy; and their recollections of him, and of his characteristics, were still vivid after the lapse of forty years, and the continual passing of an army of youth before their eyes. said professor w.h.c. bartlett, july 16, 1877, who was professor of natural and experimental philosophy:- "general stevens was a small, undersized, young man when he entered west point, very modest in demeanor. he had the habit of speaking carefully and distinctly, and of clearly and precisely expressing the exact idea he wished to convey. his mind was comprehensive, given to generalizations; he had the faculty of generalizing, of always thinking out first principles. in solving a mathematical problem, he would apply the principles which governed the class of problems, and not simply seek a solution of the single one before him. he was very early regarded by the faculty as a man of great talent and promise, sure to take a high stand in his class and in the world. he was popular with his class, but his popularity arose more from their opinion of his abilities than from social qualities. the professors soon felt that whatever he said was worthy of attention. i recollect that he took an active part in the dialectic society, and recollect his moving the books and busying himself in the room. biddle was his competitor for the headship of the class, and after he left there was practically no one to contest the honors with him. "halleck's was an entirely different mind from stevens's,--less comprehensive, less devoted to original research, to principles. halleck was strong in history, in precedents. "i recollect stevens's answer when a witness before a court of inquiry,--how he knew that a party had done so and so,--if he had said so. 'no,' replied he, 'he did not say so, but what he said and his manner combined convinced me of the fact; and the manner is a great part of any conversation.' when he graduated, he stood not only at the head of his class, but among the highest that ever graduated from the academy." professor a.e. church (of mathematics) writes july 27, 1877:- "my recollection of your father as a cadet at west point is very vivid. i remember him as an earnest, industrious student, strictly attentive to every duty. he possessed mathematical talents of the highest order, standing in this branch, as in every other, at the head of his class, notwithstanding rival classmates of great abilities. a distinguishing trait which he possessed in a remarkable degree, and, from what i know of his after life, continued ever prominent, was an unhesitating readiness to apply and carry on strictly and systematically every principle he had learned, never failing to come to the right result. "while others were pondering over the intricacies of a mathematical proposition, often in vain seeking some shorter way or more curious result, he seemed at once to grasp the most practicable rule, and straight onward to pursue it to an end which admitted of no doubt. "though admirably adapted for a military commander and great engineer, had he selected the profession of the law he would have been prominent among the most distinguished lawyers of the age. his early death was a serious loss to the army and country, and with his many friends was sincerely mourned by myself." the grasp and thoroughness of his mind, his power of generalization, of seeking and mastering first principles, which mr. hazen remarked in the boy, impressed the west point professors, too, as the prominent mental characteristic of the youth. says general zealous b. tower:- "i roomed with cadet stevens for four months in one of the small rooms in the south barracks. stephen d. carpenter was the other occupant of that limited living and bed room. each cadet was provided with a small mattress, to be spread upon the floor when needed, and when unoccupied to be rolled up in its canvas, well strapped, and put into a corner of the room. later, iron bedsteads were introduced, but the mattresses were never unrolled and spread until the hour for retiring. a cadet inspector visited the rooms half an hour after reveille; the officer of the day also inspected them, and the company officers also went the rounds. tattoo at 9.30 p.m. was the signal for retiring, and taps at ten p.m. for putting out all lights, when one of the officers again inspected each 'stoup,' or floor, of the barracks. "stevens's duties as assistant professor of mathematics occupied an hour and a half each day, taking that portion of time from his study hours; but it did not interfere with his studies, for he possessed quick intelligence, and great concentration of his mental powers. this faculty was very pronounced, and would have given him distinction in any profession that he might have undertaken, and the more so that it was allied to industrious habits and an enthusiastic nature. he never plodded over his lessons, but often finished them in half the time allotted to their acquisition. stevens was a pleasant room-mate, being very genial, kind, and considerate to others. he never failed in his friendships, or in anything that appeared a duty to his fellows. he was popular among those of his associates who valued sterling, manly qualities, and among the most prominent members of his corps. he spoke rapidly when a matter of interest engaged his attention, for he thought rapidly. though, rather short in stature, his large head and very expressive, intelligent eyes made him noticeable and attractive in conversation, engaging the marked attention of his auditors. his enthusiasm and strong convictions gave an energy to his manner of discussing favorite topics that lent the charm of eloquence to his speech." west point, march 11, 1836. dear father,--last week we commenced calculus. this is considered the most difficult branch of mathematics. our text-book is a compilation from the most distinguished french mathematicians by professor davies. we have about ten pages per lesson, and will be about five weeks going through it. we next study surveying, which ends our course in mathematics. since the examination i have attended the drawing academy every day, the regular attendance being every other day. were i two files higher in this branch, it would put me head in general merit. i am now drawing our saviour, represented as a child. i have been at work on it for about four weeks. it will probably take me eight weeks more to finish it. it is very slow work, i assure you, but as our standing depends entirely upon the excellence and not upon the number of pieces, i consider the time is not lost, provided what i do is done well. it seems there is a very great excitement in congress respecting the slavery question. it must afford pleasure to every friend of free discussion to learn that the south did not succeed in the resolutions censuring mr. adams. at the same time, i think he is unnecessarily agitating this dangerous question, and that his zeal will tend to awaken only feelings and desires which should never be cherished. is not the dissolution of the union a subject of fearful foreboding? ought then the sages of our land like mr. adams at this time to agitate a question which in the opinion of the south infringes upon their rights, and which, inflexible as we know them to be in their maintenance, will cause them to look upon a secession from the union as the only means of preserving them? the south are sensible of the evils of slavery. they deplore the existence of this curse, entailed upon them against their consent by the arbitrary decrees of england, and i believe that (if left to themselves) they will adopt some measures to rid themselves of it. your son, isaac i. stevens. [illustration: infant jesus _crayon drawing at west point_] west point, march 5, 1836. dear sister,--i received your letter this morning informing me of aunt eliza's death. she was certainly the finest woman i ever knew, and the remembrance of her engaging qualities will long be cherished. uncle william is very much to be pitied. have you any school in view now for next summer? you also appear to be very much interested in latin. i detested latin when i first commenced to study it, but i soon brought myself to like it. so it is with drawing. i take more pleasure in drawing than in anything else. i like it full as well as reading novels. in my last you will recollect that i wrote of the piece i was then drawing. i have now got it most half done. i was all last week (two hours per day) drawing one eye, a part of another one, and one curl of hair. you can see by this that i draw very slowly, much slower than any one in my class. the time spent in the drawing academy seems shorter than any other part of the day, and i have not yet felt any impatience at my slowness in drawing since i have commenced my last piece, a sure sign that i like it very much. your brother, isaac i. stevens. miss susan b. stevens. dear sister elizabeth,--you spoke of mr. maynard thinking i ought to be content with my present standing, and ought not to expect to stand higher. be that as it may, one thing _is_ certain, that i will _never_ cease to try for number one till i have got it again, and were i convinced that it was almost an impossibility, i would still _try_. i like the reply of general miller to his superior officer in the last war, when, being directed to attack and carry a battery of cannon on an almost inaccessible eminence, the silencing of which was indispensable, made this answer only, 'i will try,' and with the most determined courage carried it in an almost incredibly short space of time. i don't like _backing out_; it is contemptible. i shall, however, be contented with whatever standing is given me, and since i have been here i have always endeavored to prepare myself for any contingency. this is absolutely necessary. it is the only way to guard against envy, jealousy, and all those mean and degrading passions to which the human heart is prone. harry biddle and myself are now the only members of our class who are contending for head, yet i don't believe there are two men in the class on better terms. he is one of the finest young men i ever knew; and although he was very much disappointed last june, he never uttered a word showing he harbored the least ill-will against me. when the result of the june examination was known, he came and congratulated me, but told me he meant to rise me. in january it appeared he had redeemed his word, and so i went and congratulated him, and balanced the account. this is the only way to get along, for if we allow those passions i have mentioned to obtain the least ascendency over us, it will render us disagreeable and unhappy. there are eleven of us in four rooms, which are contiguous to each other, who are all good friends, and we enjoy ourselves as much as any other eleven men in the corps. at the end of the second academic year he again stood head of his class, and had the pleasure of announcing his success to his father. he stood seventeen on the conduct roll, having eleven demerits. west point, june 18, 1836. dear father,--i received a letter from oliver a few days since. he says he is "going a-gunning" on his birthday, and wishes me to be at home to keep him company. i wish this could be the case, but under present circumstances i shall not come home until the last of july, and my leave will last but four weeks only. i did not know this till about a week ago, and i have deferred writing to be able to give you my standing. the examination was closed yesterday. my standing is first in mathematics, first in french, and fourth in drawing, which puts me head in general merit. mr. biddle is second in m., third in f., and first in d. i presume you will be satisfied with this. you recollect that mr. biddle rose me in french last january, and i suppose that rising him again this june will make it all right again. i had very good luck indeed, and my recitation in mathematics was much better than at any previous examination. we march into camp on tuesday. it is to be called camp poinsett, as a compliment to the secretary of war. in july he returned home, after an absence of two years, to spend the brief leave of a month. he had foregone one the previous year, partly on the score of economy, at his father's suggestion, and it was with a heart full of joy and glad anticipations that he hastened to visit the loved ones at home, and the dear and familiar scenes of his childhood. isaac must have keenly enjoyed this visit. his sisters were proud of him, and overjoyed at his return. he had surpassed the most sanguine hopes of his friends, and on every hand met with a warm welcome. his success at the academy, his cadet uniform, and his erect, soldierly bearing invested him in the eyes of the community with the new-found respect and importance accorded to rising and promising young manhood. his cousin henry, writing after his return to the point, says: "if you look as dignified as you did when you were here, i do not wonder that you are beyond suspicion. i should like very much to see one hundred cadets playing at football. do you run as erect as you walk?" west point drill and discipline, however, had not abated his adventurous spirit, or love of the sports natural to his age. sailing on the great pond with a number of companions, and the wind having died out, for pastime he climbed to the top of the mast, which suddenly broke and let him fall headlong into the lake. on another occasion he was poling a boat with his little brother up the cochichewick towards the "hatch," as the point where the stream flowed out of the great pond was called, when the oar stuck fast in the tenacious mud of the bottom, and, grasping it too firmly, isaac lost his foothold, and was dragged over the stern into the mingled mud and water, to the sad defilement of his speckless white cadet trousers. exasperated at this ridiculous accident, he swore lustily, calling upon oliver in no gentle tones to bring back the boat. chapter iv west point.--last two years returning to the point after this brief respite, the young cadet resumed his studies with his accustomed vigor. he was appointed assistant professor of mathematics, a position of additional labor as well as honor, which he retained to the end of his course. moreover, he took an active part in the dialectic society, which as a "plebe" he looked forward to joining. in a letter to mr. hazen he recounts his early efforts in debate:- "you are probably aware that we have a debating society here, of which i have the honor to be a member. last evening (we hold our meetings on saturday evenings) we had an animated debate on the expediency of studying the _dead languages_. it was the only tolerable one we have had this fall. some pretty good speeches were made. one was particularly fine. mr. jennings, the person to whom i allude, in my opinion was made for an orator. he is undoubtedly a man of a large mind, and expresses himself admirably. his delivery is very good, and his diction is choice and effective. declamation is one of the regular exercises; and as my turn came round, i had the pleasure of unburdening myself of a short piece, and of being most woefully used up by the critical, who are regularly appointed for such performance. this is not very encouraging, to be sure. i must, however, acquit myself better next time. "you are probably aware of the great defects in our course of study. it is not calculated generally to strengthen and improve the mind as much as a four years' course of study should. some of the faculties are developed in a high degree, whilst others are almost entirely neglected; its effect is--if the expression can be used--to cast the mind in a rough, strong mould, without embellishing or polishing it. its effect is also (perhaps no more than any other regular course of study) to confine our attention to particular pursuits, and make us neglect all that general information which is essential to a man of liberal education, and in fact absolutely indispensable for any one who engages in the actual pursuits of life. don't you believe it is of greater advantage to a person to have a good idea of political economy, or a knowledge of the elementary principles of composition, than to be able to solve some abstruse problem in mathematics? "i almost wish i could content myself with standing about fifth in my class. i could then spend three or four hours a day in reading and getting valuable information, and could improve myself in composition. i might also cultivate a taste for the higher branches of literature, my taste for all which at present, except novels, is about at the zero point. as it is, i am obliged to work hard to get an hour a day to devote to reading; and as i consider history and solid works of that nature most valuable, i have been able to read but one novel within the last three months. i have been reading some of the speeches in 'british eloquence' of late; also in the 'eloquence of the united states.' do you think the characters of pitt, fox, and burke, as described by the author in the former work, are correct? my former ideas of chatham were somewhat different. the author makes him out a more selfish man than i supposed him to be. a few days since i picked up a volume of phillips's speeches, and read most of them. is not his speech in the case of blake v. wilkins admirable? what do you think of them generally? it seems to me there is more of the pomp of words than real, effective oratory in them. he has too much pathos in some of his speeches. a little of it, and sometimes much of it, produces a very good effect; but where it is nothing but a pathetic appeal to the feelings, the effect is destroyed, at least with people of sense." this letter shows that the youth was beginning to think for himself, and to weigh things according to his own ideas. the arduous course of study he was pursuing did not wholly engross his attention. he soon became the leading member of the dialectic, active in getting up lectures and other literary exercises. nor was he simply a bookworm. "the eleven of us, in contiguous rooms, who are all good friends, and enjoy ourselves as much as any other eleven men in the class," derived some of their enjoyment from breaking the rigid rules of the institution, and in hairbreadth escapes from detection. they used to run over to benny's without leave. they would bring pies and other edibles into barracks buttoned up under their coats, and, after the post was wrapped in slumber, would indulge in these forbidden sweets. his companions ofttimes complained that stevens would learn his lessons in a minute, and then come about, making a racket, and disturbing them in their studies. he used to take long walks and excursions about the neighboring country. naturally active and fearless, he became a fine horseman, and always appeared to best advantage when mounted, where his erect figure and soldierly bearing gave him the effect of higher stature than when on foot. in winter the cadets were in the habit of skating on the river. isaac, light, active, and fearless, and exceedingly adventurous, delighted to skim full speed over the thinnest ice he could find, which bent and crackled under his skates. his companions kept remonstrating with and forewarning him of a catastrophe, which in his case never occurred. one extremely cold day, however, one of his associates broke through the ice and fell into the river. they rescued him with some difficulty, and bore him dripping wet to the barracks in all haste, but the unlucky youth was nearly frozen when they carried him into his room. his mates at once set to work making a hot fire, and bringing blankets, etc. but isaac now took the lead, as the commanding spirit always does in a real emergency. he caused them to put out the fire, throw open all the windows, and to vigorously rub the insensible youth with snow brought from the outside until his circulation was restored, and the frost taken out of his benumbed extremities, when he suffered them to rebuild the fire and renew the warm comforts, both solid and liquid. his uncle moses, a distinguished teacher, settled in nashville, tenn., visited west point this fall; and his father writes, "your uncle moses speaks of your acquirements in rather extravagant terms." during the winter his father's health was poor, and he suffered much from his injured leg. oliver alone remained at home. hannah was in haverhill, attending school, and supporting herself by her needle; sarah was in lowell, working in a factory; elizabeth was at belfast, maine, visiting an aunt, and attending school; mary was at methuen; and susan was attending school at the south parish. the latter, a girl of warm heart and lively sensibilities, had not been satisfied with the sober unitarianism of her family, and had become attached to the "orthodox," or ancient puritan faith, a sincere and somewhat enthusiastic convert. the letters of these motherless girls, thus scattered about, reveal a touching picture of their earnest desire and efforts for study and self-improvement, their tender affection for their father, and their endeavor to treat their stepmother with respect and affection. it was to their brother isaac that they resorted for comfort and guidance. they confided to his warm and sympathetic heart all their troubles, aspirations, and plans, and constantly sought his advice. the noble old man at the farm, too, had come to rely upon the manly character and sound judgment of the youth of nineteen at west point. he writes of the difficulty of making both ends meet, of his earnest desire to give more schooling to his three younger daughters, and of preserving intact for his children the little property he had accumulated so laboriously. he asks isaac to write and advise susan, who he thinks lacks stability, and hannah. he entreats his son to come home every summer vacation. west point, december 17, 1836. dear father,--it was with much concern i heard of your lameness, and i am very much afraid it will prove more serious than you seem to be aware of. you ought not to think yourself obliged to work, when it is of manifest injury to you. you are now getting to be along in years, and you have done hard work enough. you ought now to think of making yourself comfortable. i _do_ hope you will be careful about exposing yourself, and will endeavor to enjoy the little property which you have accumulated with so much toil. your children, you may be assured, had much rather that it should all be consumed in making your declining years pleasant and happy, than receive a single cent of it themselves. i think you will do wrong to feel the least anxiety about leaving property to your children. you have evinced the greatest affection for us, and the utmost disinterestedness in consulting the welfare of your children, and it is our duty to make every return in our power. believe me, we will endeavor to exert our utmost in order to secure the happiness of the remaining period of your life, and we ask of you, as a favor, no longer to undergo the toil and exposure to which you have hitherto been accustomed. i wish i could have been at home thanksgiving time. three successive thanksgivings have seen my absence from home, and it is very probable that three more will pass away without allowing me the opportunity of spending them at home. as it is, i hope i shall be enabled to pass two or three weeks at home next summer, but it is very uncertain. the superintendent has come to the conclusion no longer to permit the members of the first class to be absent on leave during the encampment, and it will be very difficult to obtain a leave unless the application is _backed_ by very urgent reasons. at last susan decided to go to missouri, encouraged by the favorable reports of relatives who had moved thither, and hoping to find a more promising field as a teacher. in may, 1838, her father accompanied her to port labadie, situated on the missouri river, some miles above st. louis. here she found kind friends, and met with tolerable success in her chosen vocation. at the june examination of 1838 isaac again stood at the head of his class. on the conduct roll he was number twenty-three, with twenty demerits. he spent part of the summer leave at home. returning to the point, he made a pedestrian trip to philadelphia with a classmate, in the course of which they were thoroughly drenched in a rainstorm. the following letter exhibits his patriotic indignation at the british aggressions on the maine frontier, a precursor of the spirit with which he resisted and defeated similar aggressions on the extreme northwest in after years:- west point, august 21, 1838. dear father,--you must have seen from the papers that the executive of the state of maine is making preparations to carry into effect the resolutions of its legislature, and that the commissioners will be supported in the running of the boundary line by the whole military force of the state. kent has pursued a course alike honorable to himself and the state which he represents. if the national government shows itself so regardless of the honor and interests of a state as has been evinced by the cold indifference with which negotiations for the last fifty years have been carried on, it becomes the solemn duty of the sovereignty thus trampled upon to rise and maintain its own rights. this fawning subserviency to expediency in a matter of principle i despise. so does every honorable man; better die in a just cause than live by an abandonment of it. i have sufficient confidence in the virtue and patriotism of the people of maine to believe that they will triumphantly sustain their executive in his energetic and honorable measures. should there be actual resistance and the difficulty resolve itself into an open conflict, the government _dare_ not withhold its prompt assistance. the whole senate, without a single dissentient voice, have borne witness to the fallacy and gross injustice of the claim made by the british crown upon the lands in question. was this meant to vanish into thin air? the 4th regiment of artillery are now in new york city. why not send them to the east? they are certainly wanted on the boundary. he had frequently remonstrated with his father for treating oliver with too exacting strictness, and he now urged him to send the boy to college as soon as he became old enough. in reply the father declares:- "as to oliver's going to college, it is out of the question. a great many boys are ruined by going to college that would have made useful men if they had been put to some trade, or compelled to be industrious. by the most rigid economy i can adopt, the income of the farm will not pay my expenses. i am willing to rise early, work late, live on simple fare, but dunning letters i detest; rather live on two meals a day. i would advise every young man, who means to be punctual, and honest, to keep out of debt." oliver, however, in due time entered bowdoin college, maine, with the consent and aid of his father; graduated well, and became a successful lawyer in boston, where he has held the position of district attorney for nearly thirty years. he urges oliver to cultivate a taste for solid reading, and assures him that a taste for any subject can be acquired when the determination is fixed upon it. "let me advise you to get plutarch's lives, and read them. plutarch, you know, is a celebrated roman author. his lives of the distinguished men of greece and rome has justly immortalized his name, and it will live as long as the men whose actions he has related are admired. the style is simple and unaffected. he has seized upon the principal events in the life of each; relates to us many, anecdotes of their efforts, of their disappointments and failures; then he describes in bold and feeling language that untiring industry, that patient and ceaseless thought, which overcame every difficulty. read the lives of cicero and demosthenes, nicias and phocion. when you next write, tell me what you think of them. another work i want you to read; it is sparks's 'american biography.' we should certainly be intimately acquainted with the deeds and characters of our own great men. have you ever read any volumes of the 'spectator'? there are, i think, ten volumes of them, consisting of essays of four or five pages each upon all subjects. the style is flowing and graceful, exceedingly interesting; a vein of wit and sprightliness pervades them all. "for myself, things have gone smoothly on since i was at home. my daily duties are all sources of pleasure. this renders me satisfied with myself and with all around me. i am never afflicted with low spirits, or with feelings of discontent,--all this for the simple reason that all my time is interestingly employed. "have you finished harvesting? did you gather many walnuts? we have a large number of chestnut-trees at west point. i have gathered quite an abundance of them." to his father. november 17. dear father,--i have just come from the meeting of our society. our proceedings are quite good; and there is an evident improvement every evening. it is indeed much better to employ saturday evening in listening to, and participating in, a debate on some interesting subject than staying in one's room reading novels, or perhaps doing nothing. we had quite an animated discussion the other evening on the justice of lynch law. we got very warm; indeed, the debate came very near merging into the discussion of abolition. this, you are aware, is a very tender subject, and, for our society, a very improper one. for my own part i got very much excited, and my free avowal of abolition principles did not tend to allay the feeling which existed among the members. you can well suppose that i am looking forward to graduating with much interest. my entering this institution i consider my first important step in life. i have succeeded better than i have ever had any right to anticipate. i have endeavored to make it my rule never to relinquish any undertaking, but always to _try_ till success crowned my efforts. i have thus got along pretty well. i have not the slightest doubt that i shall succeed well enough as long as my efforts are carried on in a proper spirit, which is never to rely too confidently on success, and to bear every disappointment with a good grace. i feel much anxiety to see oliver improve. these long winter evenings should not be trifled away. oliver might study, read to the family, or otherwise improve his time, till half past nine o'clock. if he should be disposed to read any longer, let him have a good warm fire, and his reading will not be thrown away. you are, i know, a great admirer of franklin. he used to study until twelve at night when obliged to work hard all day. how could oliver and the girls, if any are at home, pass the time better than reading or studying till perhaps ten in the evening? to hannah. january 27, 1839. dear sister,--it may be said that scott and addison are elegant writers. johnson, that intellectual giant, said that whoever wished to become a perfect writer must give up his days and nights to addison. the style of addison is peculiarly easy and harmonious, the very music of composition; and although not so deep and original a thinker as many whose styles are less attractive, his works will always be admired for their sound views on moral and religious subjects. scott, you know, has been called the _magician_, and excelled all his contemporaries in the ease, rapidity, and finish of his performances. the last volume of his "waverley" was written in one week, and his novels were ushered into the reading community with so rapid a succession as astonished every one. some think that scott excelled as a poet, and, wonderful as he was as a writer of romance, he was still more successful in verse. some of his poetry and a few of his novels are well worth reading. his "lady of the lake" and "ivanhoe" are much admired. the "tales of my landlord" and "guy mannering" also are very fine. there is a little volume of poetry, called "the book of pleasures," which i intend to read, the first opportunity. it contains the pleasures of memory, of hope, and of the imagination, all three beautiful poems. you had better read them, if they are to be obtained. our examinations are finished, and we are again under full sail for the next, and, for myself, last examination. the result of the present is, head in three branches and second in the fourth. the last five months i spend at west point should be employed to better advantage than any other five months before. i have marked out for myself a pretty severe course of study, by which i shall endeavor to abide. when i graduate, it will be a satisfaction to look back upon my four years' course, and feel a consciousness that i have improved my opportunities. after graduating, where i shall be stationed is uncertain. but i shall endeavor to get ordered to boston under colonel thayer. there are extensive fortifications now erecting in boston harbor on george's island. it would be a capital chance to be employed upon them, particularly when the superintendent of the works is so distinguished a man as colonel thayer. there are reasons, which you can well imagine, why i wish to be near home. he must have been an omnivorous and rapid reader to have mastered franklin, plutarch, addison, scott, rollin's ancient history, besides poetry, speeches, and novels; one wonders where he could have found the time, but he was ever working at high pressure. in addition to the hard work necessary to retain the headship of the class, and to discharge the duties of assistant professor, he took the most active and leading part in the dialectic, and delivered the valedictory address at the graduation of the class. he also founded "the talisman," a journal for the practice and improvement of the cadets in composition. in the introductory address, which he wrote as editor, he presents his views of the need for, and objects of, the paper in glowing language, concluding:- "we have thus announced our intention of establishing a paper. its character will be readily understood from the preceding exposition of our views. we shall hoist the white flag, emblematic of our motives and intentions. on it shall be inscribed in golden letters _the talisman_. this flag will we defend with our life's blood; and when expiring nature is about to give up her last hold upon us, we will wave it aloft in triumph and die beneath its shadow." in a letter to his uncle william he gives an amusing account of anonymously criticising his own effusions:- "several of us have amused ourselves in writing a paper, which we have called 'the talisman,' and having it read at the meetings of the dialectic. our motto is, the human intellect the universal talisman. the best of the joke is, no one can divine who are concerned in it. indeed, once i wrote a most famous blowing up of one of my own performances, and was extremely amused to have several of my friends console me; in fact, one told me he would not give a fig for these criticisms, to which i assented, asking him if he had any idea who were the editors of the paper, to which he replied in the negative. when we graduate next june, we wish to have an address delivered before the society by some able man. do you think we could get governor everett?" as already stated, cadet stevens was put forward by his classmates to deliver this address himself. he contributed to "the talisman" a series of articles, written in a simple, direct, and forcible style, and marked by an earnest tone and elevated sentiments, among which were "agency of steam in mechanical operations;" "in jury trials, ought the twelve jurors to be required to be unanimous?" "has man a conscience?" "the importance of a good style of writing to an officer of the army;" "history;" "the proper study of mankind is man." his most intimate friends at the point were henry l. smith, jeremy f. gilmer, zealous b. tower, henry w. halleck, stephen d. carpenter, bryant p. tilden, william b. greene, franklin d. callender, john d. bacon, paul o. hebert. among these high-spirited and intellectual young men he was an acknowledged leader; and even after leaving the academy, they were continually calling on him for advice in their own affairs, and for aid in efforts to benefit the service, to secure increased rank and pay, etc. thus the last term sped rapidly away. at the examination he was first, as usual. he stood thirty on the conduct roll, having sixteen demerits. it will be observed that in "conduct" during the course he stood but little above the average. evidently, with his spirited and vigorous nature, he did not mind infringing the rules at times. when the academic board reviewed the standing of the members of the class to award to each his proper grade, it was found that cadet stevens stood at the head, not only generally, but in every one of the studies. moreover, his standing, as compared with all who had ever graduated from the institution, was among the first. this remarkable achievement, together with his strong personality, deeply impressed the officers of the academy. they were proud of their pupil, they felt that he reflected honor upon the institution, and they vied with each other in encomiums and attentions which they deemed his due. he invited his father and stepmother to attend the graduation exercises, and they came. when they arrived they were astonished to see the honors heaped upon their son, and the high estimation in which he was held. they, too, were overwhelmed with attentions on his account. prominent seats were found for them, and the professors came up to pay their respects to the parents of the first graduate, and to congratulate them upon his remarkable talents and promise. chapter v newport crowned with these well-earned honors, and promoted to be second lieutenant of engineers, july 1, 1839, he accompanied his parents home, expecting to enjoy a long and delightful vacation; but his anticipations were speedily cut short by orders to proceed to newport, r.i., to take part in the building of fort adams, so that he was permitted to spend only the fourth of july in andover. phrenology was in vogue then, and the young man, on his way through boston, had his head examined by a professor of the new science, who, much to his amusement, pronounced him a poet. he reached his station early in july, and took quarters with miss castoff, who kept a boarding-house on the corner of spring and ann streets. lieutenant james l. mason, also of the engineer corps, boarded at the same place. the two young men became warm friends and companions. daily they rode over to the fort together in the morning, and returned in the afternoon. lieutenant p.g. t. beauregard, afterwards the well-known confederate general, was also on duty there as an engineer officer, and remained several months after stevens's arrival. fort adams was garrisoned by a detachment of the 2d artillery, officered by lieutenants lewis g. arnold, arthur b. lansing, and henry j. hunt. fort adams, commenced twenty years previously, and now nearly completed under the able superintendence of general joseph g. totten, was the largest defensive work in the country, fortress monroe only excepted, and, as general cullum declares in his biographical sketch of general totten, "the first in its combination of the principles and details of the art of fortification." it must have afforded a most gratifying field for the energies of the ardent and accomplished young officer, fresh from the military academy, and eager to test his acquirements and abilities in real work. the redoubt, the inner and separate stronghold in rear of the main work, was mostly built under his superintendence, 1839-42. entering upon this duty with his accustomed zeal, his sound judgment in laying out the work for the workmen, and energy and diligence in pushing it, soon attracted attention. he took control with the self-reliance and habit of command of a natural leader. he was strict and exacting with the employees, but at the same time just and considerate, and took a real interest in them. he soon won their respect and goodwill. even the man who groomed his horse, john a.c. stacy, long years afterwards, when he had himself become a wealthy contractor, spoke of lieutenant stevens with the greatest admiration. his unconscious success in this direction nearly led to a breach with mason. the latter became cold and distant in manner, and openly avoided him. stevens demanded an explanation, whereupon mason burst forth indignantly with the charge, "you are destroying all my influence with the men on the work. when you appear, they hang upon every word you utter, and cannot do enough for you, while they scarcely notice me, although i am the senior, and have been longer on the work." but mason was soon satisfied by his friend's remonstrances, and his own good sense, that stevens was not to blame for that result. mason was a man of remarkable talents, brilliant in conversation, and fascinating in social intercourse. newport at this time contained many old families, among which the traditions of colonial grandeur, when the port was the largest and most flourishing city in the colonies, mingled with the fresher recollections of the revolution, the british occupation, the battle of rhode island, the romantic capture of general prescott, the english commander, the brilliant though brief sojourn of the french allies under rochambeau, and the visit of washington. the town was celebrated for beautiful and charming girls. it was the resort in summer of the cultivated, wealthy, and fashionable from other parts of the country, especially from the south. the hazards, lymans, randolphs, vernons, lawtons, hunters, kings, turners, gardiners, fowlers, gibbs, tottens, perrys, and others, all more or less related, afforded a cultivated and high-toned, yet simple and cordial society, free from the ostentation of wealth and the absurd pride of caste. the army and naval officers stationed there, and the families of commodore oliver hazard perry, the hero of lake erie, of general totten, and of others who had served their country, added a patriotic and military element. into this charming society the young officer entered with keen enjoyment, and his modest demeanor and sensible conversation, not less than his reputation for ability and scholarship, soon made him welcome. one of these newport belles thus described him:- "the first time i saw mr. stevens was in church. he sat in the pew behind ours. he was very young, of small, alight figure, had a very large head, with fine carriage,--a noble head, thick, bushy, black hair, and dark complexion. he was considered very homely, but he had a large, dark hazel eye, which looked one through and through, and compelled one's attention." notwithstanding that "he was considered very homely," young stevens took an active part in the social life and festivities of the town, calling upon the old families, escorting with other young men bevies of young ladies on delightful long walks to the beach, along the cliffs, the blue rocks, tammany hill, and other resorts, and attending the numerous parties. it was at one of these rather informal, but enjoyable gatherings that he first met the young girl who was soon to become his wife. mason had warned him to "beware of margaret hazard," as the two young men were setting out to attend a tea party at the vernons' hospitable mansion, two miles out of town. the young lady was a daughter of benjamin hazard, for years recognized as the ablest lawyer and statesman in the state, who had represented the town in the state legislature for thirty-one years without a break, having been elected sixty-two times in succession. although very young, she possessed many attractions of person and character, had many admirers, and was one of the acknowledged belles. notwithstanding the friendly or jocose warning, mr. stevens was duly presented to miss hazard, and had the pleasure of escorting her home, and improved the opportunity by inviting her to ride on horseback the following afternoon. miss margaret lacked a suitable habit, it seems; but an old cloak skillfully adapted served for the long sweeping skirt then in vogue, a cousin furnished his new beaver for a riding-hat, and another admirer contributed a handsome silver-mounted riding-whip, so that when the cavalier presented himself on his gray charger with a groom leading the "indian queen," the young lady was ready. the "indian queen" was the name of a noted saddle-horse from the stable of nicholas hassard, who for many years kept the livery stable on spring, or back street, corner of touro. when asked if the "indian queen" was a safe horse for the young lady, mr. hassard replied, "miss margaret hazard can ride any horse in my stable." this ride led to others, and it was not long before the two rode over the beaches together nearly every pleasant afternoon. mr. stevens would come with the horses about five o'clock, and the usual ride was over the three beaches and around by the green end road; and a more romantic, beautiful, and pleasant course it would be hard to find. a fearless horseman, he was fond of horses and of riding. he owned and delighted to ride a fiery gray, which ofttimes taxed all his strength, skill, and daring to master, and which occasionally ran away despite all efforts. once the steed, with the bit in his teeth, dashed headlong for the stable. "stevens is done for!" exclaimed mason; "the stable door is too low to ride under, and his brains will be knocked out." but the rider threw himself along the side and neck of the furious animal just in time to avoid this danger. mason's warning was indeed in vain. writes his intimate friend, h.l. smith, as early as april:- "not in love, stevens; why, your description fired me. by heavens! it is a glorious thing to see a girl with a large soul. would there were more such. 'dark blue eyes;' 'rides fearlessly;' 'loves channing, carlyle, milton;' 'a sweet smile,' etc." he became a frequent caller upon, and intimate in the family of, benjamin hazard. the latter was slowly sinking under the lingering disease, consumption, which carried him off in 1841. the gifted and sympathetic young man would have long talks and discussions with the intellectual, learned, and experienced senior, and would read to him from his favorite authors, swift and shakespeare. "i think our young lieutenant is very handsome," remarked mr. hazard, doubtless alluding to his fine head and sound, bright mind, and perhaps quietly rebuking the disparaging term "homely." it was not long before he became an acknowledged suitor for the hand of miss margaret, and they were betrothed in the summer of 1840. the mansion occupied by this family, situated on broad street, on the southern corner of stone street, and near the state house, is one of the oldest in newport, the timbers of which, according to tradition, were cut and hewn in the woods between the harbor and the beach. by a curious coincidence it has descended in the female line for three generations. before and during the revolution it was the home of john g. wanton, a wealthy colonial merchant and the son of the colonial governor, gideon wanton. it was a favorite resort of the brilliant french officers who landed in newport to aid the struggling patriots, one of whom cut with a diamond upon a small, old-fashioned window-pane in the great parlor, "charming polly wanton, oct. 17, 1780." but an american officer, colonel daniel lyman, afterwards chief justice of rhode island and president of the society of the cincinnati in rhode island, married "charming polly" away from her french admirers. mary wanton was an only daughter, and inherited the old mansion, where she reared a family of thirteen children, and dispensed the gracious hospitality to which she was accustomed. one of her daughters, harriet lyman, married benjamin hazard, and upon the removal of colonel lyman and his family to providence, succeeded to the old newport homestead, which thus for generations was the scene of family happiness, worth, refinement, and hospitality. it is now owned and occupied by two of benjamin hazard's daughters, misses emily lyman and mary wanton hazard, who maintain the traditions of the old mansion with charming grace. now time speeds away rapidly and pleasantly with the young officer. he has long talks and discussions with mason, noted for his brilliant mind and conversation. his official duties are congenial. he heartily enjoys the social pleasures in which he takes part, and moreover he lays out a stiff course of study for the winter. he writes uncle william, october 31, 1839:- "my brother officer, lieutenant mason, is quite familiar with politics. he is a nullifier. i am a loco-foco abolitionist. though we agree on many points, yet we have at times quite warm though very friendly debates upon these points upon which we differ. i shall be glad to spend most of the winter in study, and i think of giving about half my time to my profession and its kindred branches of physics and mathematics, and of the remaining portion a moiety to politics and the political history of our country (which will necessitate the careful reading and study of the federalist and madison papers, and other documents illustrative of the peculiar glories of our institutions), and the remainder to general reading." to hannah. my situation at newport continues to please me as much as ever. we are still pretty busy throughout the day, but are able to secure considerable time for reading and study. i have been reading byron's poems of late. although his verse is far inferior (in my opinion) to shakespeare and milton, still it has many and peculiar merits. many of his productions are overflowing with lofty and correct ideas. no sycophantic awe, or respect for place and title, restrains his caustic and withering pen. he soars upon his own pinions, and looks down upon them all. [illustration: old wanton mansion in newport] thus his time was well occupied, yet he was also an indefatigable correspondent, writing frequently to his west point classmates and friends, now beginning to scatter, and to his father, sisters, brother, and cousins, but especially to his sisters, whose welfare and happiness he had so much at heart. he is constantly sending them books and papers, and advising them in regard to their studies and plans. susan was still in missouri, doing well as a teacher. during the fall hannah was teaching school, or in boston earning her livelihood in a store. elizabeth and sarah were at school, and only mary and oliver remained at home. the father, working too hard, had serious trouble with his injured leg, and was unwell. but it was a joyous reunion when the elder brother came home at thanksgiving, and the scattered family were all assembled, except susan, in the great roomy kitchen in the old farmhouse, around the well-filled board, loaded with the roast turkey and cranberry sauce, snowy biscuits, mince, pumpkin, and apple pies, cake, preserves, and all the good things of that generous and kindly season. returning to newport, lieutenant stevens made one of a class for the study of german, although one may suspect that the language was not the only attraction. charles t. brooks, the gifted poet, preacher, and writer, and who has since translated so many poems and works from the german, was then settled over the unitarian church in newport, and a few years previously had married harriet lyman hazard, an elder sister of margaret. an accomplished and enthusiastic german scholar, mr. brooks organized the class, and acted as their instructor. mrs. brooks, mrs. shroder, miss margaret l. hazard, miss julia randolph, stevens, and mason met regularly once a week at mr. brooks's house on barney street. an incident is related showing the facility with which mr. stevens acquired any subject which he undertook. mr. brooks one day asked him a difficult question in grammar, which he answered promptly. another question was put with the same result. the teacher then plied him with question upon question, all of which he answered without hesitation. "why," exclaimed mr. brooks, "you seem to know the whole grammar." "oh, yes," replied stevens, "i've run it over." a long and affectionate letter from susan informed him of her marriage to david h. bishop, a man of fine character, and engaged in the profession of an educator, on december 26, 1839. mr. stevens at once wrote to his new relative welcoming him in his hearty and warm-hearted manner, and a friendly correspondence ensued between them, which developed into a long and well-maintained political discussion, for mr. bishop was a whig, while stevens was an uncompromising democrat, of free-soil convictions,--"loco-foco abolitionist," as he defines himself. in april the fostering and indulgent grandmother, the widow of the revolutionary soldier, jonathan, died at an advanced age, attended during her last illness by sarah. mary, early in the year, visited aunt mcfarland in belfast, maine. elizabeth was in lowell, and later also went to aunt mcfarland, and only sarah and oliver remained at home this year. his father's letters reveal how much he was coming to lean upon the self-reliant young man, and to feel the need of his support and affection. "i was glad to hear you say in your last letter that in matters relating to yourself you should be guided by your own judgment," he writes. in every letter he urges him to come home, if only for a short visit. dear son,--in your letter to oliver you mention not coming home until thanksgiving. i hope it will be convenient for you to come home and spend a few days in the summer. your visit in march was very short, but short as it was, it was better than none. i learn from you that you are far from being satisfied with your present attainments. why should young men talk of having finished their education when in fact they have only commenced it, considering how much more they might learn if they would only press forward! may all you learn be sound and durable; one rotten piece of timber may wreck a ship. do not study too hard. my days of anticipating worldly happiness are over (not so fast), i do anticipate seeing my children useful and happy. your father, isaac stevens. lieutenant stevens was promoted first lieutenant, corps of engineers, july 1, 1840. his active and thoroughgoing mind, looking beyond the duties assigned him, saw the necessity of other works to complete the defenses at newport. he wrote urgent letters to the engineer department in washington, representing the need of a thorough survey of the harbor and the surrounding ground, and especially of the fortifying of rose island, which, situated in mid-channel between rhode island and conanicut, and three miles north of, or inside fort adams, would supplement and support that work, and render the main entrance of narragansett bay impregnable to a hostile fleet. he was ambitious to plan and carry out the fortification of this point, but his recommendations were disregarded, and he was informed that his views, though sound, were premature. of late years the importance of fortifying rose island has been recognized, and the government has erected a powerful battery there. during the spring and summer his long-cherished idea of becoming a lawyer took more definite shape in his mind, as will be seen from the following letter to his uncle william, august 5, 1840:- my dear uncle,--you recollect that when last in andover i was revolving in my mind the expediency of studying law, with a view of making it my permanent profession. entering the west point academy with no idea of remaining in the army, my present occupation cannot be regarded as one that i have voluntarily and after mature reflection selected, but as one which circumstances and good luck have forced upon me. therefore, in balancing the advantages and disadvantages of the army and the law in order to a decision of the question, which shall i select as my occupation? i think i have nothing to do with certain objections that many would advance, that it would be changing my business,--it would betray a want of fixedness of purpose,--it would be an act of inconsistency. to be sure, some of the studies at west point throw no light upon the law, but most of them contribute, and contribute in an eminent degree, to induce the habits and call out the faculties essential to the able lawyer. something more is wanted,--as a knowledge of the classics, of ethics, of history. three years' rigorous, systematic devotion of my leisure moments to these pursuits would more than place me on a level with the graduates of our colleges; by economy enough of my pay could be laid up to defray my expenses, should i then resign and go through a three years' study of the law. as the thing, therefore, can be accomplished, as the law for many reasons would suit me better than the army, as i have no false notions of delicacy on the ground of consistency, etc., i have at length concluded to give up the army for the law. as soon as i decided, i began to act. on that very day, about three weeks since, i commenced latin and a course of reading in history. greek i shall commence next november. as i do not wish justly to render myself liable to the charge of hastiness or obstinacy, i have determined to consult my friends. if they can adduce reasons against my course, i should be very much obliged if they would let me know them. the thought that one's course is approved by his friends is consolatory,--it serves to strengthen his confidence in his own judgment. it removes many cross currents that would impede his course. _you_ it was that first suggested my application to enter the military academy. though the military academy was not intended to make lawyers, yet in my case i hope it may be an example that "the longest way round is the shortest way home." i have been very fortunate in making the acquaintance of mr. benjamin hazard, whom (by report) you must know. he has the reputation of being the first lawyer in the state, and is unquestionably _au fait_ with his profession. he has been so kind as to give me a great deal of information both with regard to law and lawyers in this country, and the best method of studying law. mr. hazard lent me some time since warner's law studies. i read it through twice very carefully, but much of what he said i thought totally inapplicable to the profession in this country, much that was contradictory, and some opinions i was confident were wrong. i wish you would write me soon and give me your opinion of my course, which is to remain in the army till the 1st of august, 1843, then to resign and enter some office in boston or newport for three years. from all i can learn, i think that jeremiah mason, of boston, would be the man for me. whether he takes students i know not. webster, mr. hazard tells me, contends that mason is the first lawyer in the country,--superior to himself. remember me to your own family, and my friends generally. your nephew, i.i. stevens. he also wrote on this subject to his father, mr. hazen, and h.l. smith. all whom he consulted discouraged the project except his classmate, smith. mr. hazen judiciously advises:- "it seems to me to be premature to determine quite so much at this time. it occurs to me that you might enter upon a course of legal reading, which would be useful to you in any station, uniting it with attention to military duties, which would consist with promotion in the army, and leave a little to the future to determine between the professions." although his increasing military duties, with his marriage and the mexican war, compelled him to defer carrying out this plan, it was never definitely given up. the career open to him in the army did not satisfy his ambition, and at last in 1852 he resigned, seeking a wider field. meantime he was keeping up his correspondence with his classmates and friends. halleck writes:- united states military academy, west point, february 9, 1840. dear stevens,--it is now sunday morning, and i know not that i can better employ the time that will elapse before old jasper commences his oppression, than by writing an answer to your very kind letter of last sabbath. i am happy to renew with you our old friendly intercourse. we have passed together four long years in mutual goodwill and then parted, i believe, as warm friends, and why should we now float away from each other towards the great ocean of eternity without ever exchanging a friendly hail? my old associates are still dear to me, and my lone heart sometimes softens when i think of the past spent in their society. indeed, i have here become so disgusted with humbugs, toadeaters, and punsters, that my heart gladdens at the receipt of a letter from an old friend whom i know to be a reality and no sham. we have been co-workers in at least one thing, the dialectic, and i believe that to us as much or more than to any others, the society owes its present prosperity. sincerely yours, h.w. halleck. tilden, having become involved in a controversy with the authorities at the point, comes to newport to consult with stevens, who takes up his case, advises him what to do, and writes halleck, smith, and others in his behalf. "my visit to newport," writes tilden, "was of essential service to me, and has served to strengthen the good resolutions suggested by yourself and example." h.l. smith, too, feeling aggrieved at the action of a court-martial reflecting upon his evidence as a witness, has recourse to his friend stevens, who responds in such manner as to call forth smith's grateful and somewhat enthusiastic thanks:- "i refer in part to your reply to colonel totten at table. be assured i _did_ anticipate your reply to my request. but, stevens, there are not many who would have taken the part of a friend as you did with colonel totten. i shall never forget it as an act of friendship, never cease to admire it as an act of generous independence." oliver visits him in september, and in his next letter speaks of "our fine rides on horseback." elizabeth has decided to go to nashville, tenn., to visit her uncle moses, principal of an academy there, in hopes of finding employment as a teacher; and the father calls upon his son in newport for pecuniary assistance, and informs him that hannah has come home seriously ill. the next letter from his father contained the sad intelligence that hannah was sinking fast, and urged him to come home immediately. he spent the last few days of life with the dying girl, doing all in his power to comfort her. she died in november, 1840. on his journey back to newport, mr. stevens stopped in boston to hear a lecture by john quincy adams, an account of which he gives his father:- "his subject was the four stages of man in his progress from the savage to the civilized state,--first, as a hunter; second, as a shepherd; third, as a tiller of the soil; fourth, as a member of a community in which all trades, occupations, arts, and professions were confined to their appropriate spheres, each receiving the protection and encouragement of all. his delivery was very energetic, though uncouth. his fancy was exuberant, and his speculations were not entirely, it seemed to me, supported by the truth of history. "i wrote to susan, as you desired, and gave her a detailed account of hannah's illness, with such other matters as i thought would be interesting. since i have been back to newport, i have been reading blackstone pretty diligently. thus far, i am much pleased with him." "it was a sad thanksgiving at the homestead this year," oliver writes, "so different from the year before, when all were at home except susan, and death had not yet broken the family circle." now all the children, except sarah and oliver, were scattered far and wide,--susan at union, mo., elizabeth at nashville, tenn., mary in belfast, maine, and isaac in newport. the father was again disabled with his leg, and unable to attend the thanksgiving sermon. oliver concludes his pathetic letter with a wish to go to west point. newport, december 15, 1840. dear brother oliver,--i have been very busily engaged since your letter came to hand in preparing an address to be delivered before the newport lyceum. as it was the introductory one, i felt very desirous that it should be no discredit to myself, and that all proper expectations should be fully realized. this is my apology for not immediately answering your letter. as the address has been delivered, i will now write you briefly respecting the subject-matter of the latter part of your communication.... there is nothing new here. i am passing my time very pleasantly. we have a debating club in successful operation, consisting of about sixty members,--clergymen, lawyers, physicians, tradesmen, etc., etc. we have a talk this evening on the french revolution. i don't know whether i shall say anything or not. write as soon as you can find it convenient. remember me to father, mother, and sarah, and friends in general. i hope father will take every care of his health. is it vacation with john loring now? one of his classmates, young dunn, is at home in newport. your brother, isaac i. stevens. mr. o. stevens. newport, r.i., january 17, 1840. my dear father,--as soon as i get to washington i shall put oliver's application on file in the department of war, and will obtain an interview with mr. cushing to secure his interposition, of which i think we may entertain some expectation, as no one has yet applied for the vacancy in his district. one of my classmates, lieutenant halleck, who is on duty at washington, was kind enough to ascertain and inform me of all cadets and applicants from massachusetts, with their districts, and in his list i perceive the 3d district is put down vacant without any applications. i have never seen our representative, for which reason some might deem it advisable to procure a letter of introduction; but after some consideration i have concluded to take none, but to introduce myself. it is better, if successful, than the other mode; to be sure, the risk is greater,--i will run it, however. if i make a good impression on mr. cushing under the circumstances of a vacancy and no application, it may go far towards getting his assistance. i will try it at all events. [illustration: isaac ingalls stevens _from miniature by staigg, 1841_] i shall leave on wednesday and be absent three weeks. the armisted case comes up before the supreme court next friday, and will probably be in progress the ensuing week; this will enable me to hear mr. john quincy adams, of which i am very desirous. mr. clay's resolution respecting the repeal of the sub-treasury will soon be called up, and will probably cause that whole subject again to be discussed. should it call out the able men of the senate while i am in washington, i could not desire a better opportunity to compare them. i will write you on my arrival, and afterwards from time to time. you must take good care of your health, and take things easily. i know of no one that has a better right. we have nothing new in newport. my health is perfect both in body and mind; in other words, i have never had better health in either respect. give my love to all friends and the family. your son, isaac i. stevens. writes halleck, january 15, 1841:- i hope to soon meet you here, and enter into a friendly interchange of thoughts and feelings without the formality of paper and ink. i am anxious to give you a hearty shake by the hand and welcome you to washington. if you are left to your leisure hours, you will undoubtedly have much enjoyment both in society and in congress. you must not anticipate too much pleasure in the crowded parties of the metropolis. to me they are perfect bores. let me know when you are to come on, and if not immediately i will write you a long letter. read this if you can. yours in the true bonds of friendship, h. wager halleck. although unable to procure the cadet appointment for oliver, he greatly enjoyed his first visit to the capital, especially the debates in the senate, where he listened to both clay and webster. the former impressed him as more a leader of men and controller of measures than the latter. one would think that with his official duties, and all the studies and pursuits he was carrying on, every minute of his time must have been taken up; yet he organized a course of lectures for the winter, and himself delivered an address on oliver cromwell, whose character and achievements he greatly admired. in this lecture he presented with great force and clearness a new and original conception of the great puritan, depicting him as a true patriot and a religious, god-fearing man, obliged by the circumstances of the times to seize the helm of state in order to save his country from despotism or anarchy. this was much the view afterwards so ably set forth by carlyle. this lecture excited no little attention at the time; and when carlyle's cromwell appeared, not long afterwards, it was said that the lecture would seem to have been taken from that work, had it not been delivered before that was published. he afterwards delivered this lecture in andover and other places. in the spring of 1841 he was placed in charge of fairhaven battery in new bedford, mass., in addition to his duties in newport. this required frequent trips to the former place, which he usually made by stage, but several times he traversed the intervening country on foot. on one of these trips, in an economical mood he refrained from dinner in order to save the cost of the meal. soon afterwards a lean and friendless dog attached himself to him, and followed his footsteps so persistently, and looked so piteous and hungry, that the young man's sensibilities were touched, and he stopped at a farmhouse and purchased a good dinner for the half-starved animal, which, as he laughingly declared, cost all he had saved by his self-denial. [illustration: margaret lyman stevens _from miniature by staigg, 1841_] a letter from mr. bishop conveyed the afflicting and unlooked-for intelligence of the death of susan, april 8, 1841, from pulmonary disease, after a brief illness. thus unexpectedly passed away another loved sister, and one whose sunny, affectionate disposition, fine mind, and high principles had especially endeared her. benjamin hazard died march 10, 1841. during his lingering illness he derived much comfort and pleasure from the society and attentions of the talented and sympathetic young man. he gladly sanctioned his betrothal with his daughter margaret, and willingly intrusted the future of his beloved child to one whom he both loved and respected, and in whose character and ability he had the fullest confidence. the marriage was solemnized by mr. brooks, september 8, 1841, in the great parlor of the old mansion, the same apartment which witnessed the wedding of "charming polly" and her revolutionary hero, and of their daughter harriet and benjamin hazard, the parents of the present bride. it was a quiet and simple ceremony, so soon after the death of mr. hazard, but the ample room was well filled with beautiful young girls, the sisters and cousins of the bride, officers in full uniform, the companions of the groom, and old friends of the family. hither came from andover the groom's brother oliver, and cousin henry h. stevens, his west point friend, lieutenant jeremy f. gilmer, from washington, lieutenants james l. mason, henry j. hunt, and lewis g. arnold, from newport, and a goodly number of lymans and dunnells from providence, uncles, aunts, and cousins of the bride. chapter vi charge of works: new bedford, portsmouth, portland, bucksport the wedding journey was to new york by long island sound, and thence up the hudson to west point, where they spent several days, and were received with flattering attentions by his old friends. with great pride and pleasure mr. stevens presented them to his lovely bride, and revisited with her the romantic scenes of the point, endeared by so many pleasant associations. they returned by way of springfield and boston. new bedford, september 24, 1841. my dear father,--i was very glad to see oliver and my cousin henry at newport on the occasion of my marriage, and, though your presence would have afforded me much pleasure, yet, as i well knew that it was a busy season with you, and that something very unusual only could induce you to leave home, i was not much disappointed at your not coming. you will certainly see us as early as next thanksgiving. we had a most pleasant trip, were favored with unusually fine weather, and were disappointed in no one of our anticipations. margaret had never visited west point before, and had always lived in a country the scenery of which is very tame compared with the alpine grandeur of the highlands. i had said a great deal to her about west point, and i feared that her expectations were raised high above the reality. i was, however, agreeably surprised by her assertion that her ideas had scarcely approached the truth. the day after our arrival at west point she insisted upon climbing to the crow's nest, which you recollect is two miles from west point, and commands the plain about twelve or fourteen hundred feet. finding that my dissuasion had little effect, i took her up one of the roughest ways,--in many places we had to ascend almost perpendicular rocks. in one hour and a half we were on the very topmost height of the mountain. we came back by a rough, winding, long road, and got to the hotel four hours after leaving it. i call that a pretty good feat for a lady. from hudson to springfield the road was completed except about two miles near chester factories. it passes through a most wild and picturesque country, follows the valley of one of the rivers that empties into the connecticut for some thirty miles, crossing it frequently and constantly changing direction, and is constructed in a truly magnificent style. we got back to newport just seven days after leaving it. there i found orders had been awaiting me two days to repair to new bedford, to take charge of all the repairs of the old fort. you can judge of the urgency of the orders from my going to new bedford the next day, and leaving margaret at newport, where she has been ever since. we arrived at newport about four o'clock on thursday. i left the next day at two o'clock, made an inspection of the fort on saturday forenoon, issued a hand-bill the same day for mechanics and laborers, and on monday morning had a gang of about twenty men at work. i never was in new bedford before, and knew not a single man in the place. monday morning i fell in with a real full-blooded yankee, whom i engaged as overseer, and immediately sent around the country for stone-cutters and masons. i went on monday into a ledge of granite rock, and have already thrown out about two hundred tons of stone, and got about a hundred feet cut. the people in new bedford are disposed to criticise my plans, but they will find out i know what i am about, and that they had better save their sneers for some other object. after i had been at work three days, i dismissed three men for idleness, which had a very good effect. my plan is to be rather familiar with every man, but at the same time to make every one feel that he must do his duty. to-morrow i am going to newport after margaret. i have been so busy that i have had no time to miss her. in fact, this is the very first moment since i have been in new bedford that i have been able to write home. now my business has got into a regular course, and will require but little time to attend to it. whether i shall spend the winter in newport, or new bedford, i don't know. i have at present only orders to get in readiness platforms for nine guns. your son, isaac i. stevens. mr. isaac stevens. the young couple boarded in fairhaven, a suburb of new bedford, for several months, and then removed to the town. they entered with lively interest into the society of the place, at that time the abode of many wealthy and somewhat aristocratic families. mr. stevens had already made the favorable acquaintance of the first people before bringing his wife there; her family and personal attractions were known, and they were cordially received. mrs. hazard made them a short visit during the winter. halleck asks his assistance in starting an engineering journal for the corps. i know too well your zeal for the profession to doubt for a moment that the measure will receive your countenance, and the support of your able pen. if we succeed in the undertaking, i am quite sure that it will be of much advantage to us individually, and will contribute greatly to the reputation of the corps. if the delights of married life have not entirely driven away the recollection of old bachelor friends, i hope you will again favor me with one of your old-fashioned letters. i have heard too much of the attractions of your bride to scold you for so long neglecting me. from all accounts, my dear stevens, i must pronounce you a most fortunate and happy man, and i shall embrace the first opportunity to make the acquaintance of your lady, and most heartily welcome her into our corps. yours most truly, h. wager halleck. the young couple spent thanksgiving in andover. the stern but true-hearted father, deeply mourning the untimely loss of his two elder daughters, was gladdened by the presence of five children,--sarah, isaac, oliver, mary, and the new daughter, margaret. the latter was greatly admired, and was received with warm affection and kindness by them, and by uncles william and nathaniel and their families. she was highly interested and pleased with the thanksgiving festivities, a new experience to her; for the quakers and come-outers of rhode island, many of whom left massachusetts to escape the tyranny of the "lord brethren," never made much of that holiday, but kept christmas instead. after a delightful visit of a week, they returned to new bedford and the pleasures of domestic life, and for the young husband what he always enjoyed,--hard work. this seriously encroached upon his proposed course of study and reading, yet with mason he would run up to providence to hear ralph waldo emerson's lectures. on june 9, 1842, their first child, a boy, was born in the old newport mansion, and named hazard, after his maternal grandfather. newport, june 9, 1842. my dear father,--i came here last friday with the intention of returning to new bedford on monday, but i was seized with a very violent bilious attack that kept me in the house for a day or two. the physician that was called prescribed calomel, and i was fool enough to take it, the consequence of which is that instead of being perfectly well to-day, as i should otherwise have been, i have a pain in my bones, and not half the elasticity that generally attends my recovery. however, calomel or no calomel, i don't regret my illness, for it has been the cause of my being in newport at a most interesting moment. early this morning margaret was safely delivered of a fine, healthy boy, after an uncommonly short and easy labor. she was fortunate in the attendance of a most judicious, skillful, and experienced physician, a younger brother of her father, who has been in an extensive practice for more than forty years. now, father, you may fairly say that you have a right to your gray hairs. gray hairs and grandfathers always go together. the little fellow has been squalling most unmercifully this morning, and seems to take it for granted that no one's convenience is to be consulted but his own. if he will but show the same energy in the development of his other faculties, we may expect great things of him. your son, isaac i. stevens. during the greater part of this year oliver pursues his studies at phillips academy in south andover; sarah is teaching an unruly school in saugus, mass., where she punishes a refractory boy, maintains order, and overcomes the unreasonable anger of the boy's parents in a way that proves her gifted with much firmness, decision, and good sense. only mary remains at home. she writes: "we had a fugitive slave to spend the night with us. he was as black a person as i ever saw." so it appears that the old abolitionist is doing his part towards the "underground railroad," as harboring and forwarding fugitive slaves was termed. elizabeth, in tennessee, became engaged in the spring to mr. l.m. campbell, a promising young lawyer, and they were married september 9. after the birth of the child, mr. stevens and his wife went to keeping house in new bedford. sarah visited them in the winter, and on her return home in march, 1843, they accompanied her as far as boston, where they remained a week while mr. stevens attended to some engineering duties on one of the islands in the harbor. in april he was again in boston, while his young wife was visiting her mother in newport for election day in may, when the state government was to be inaugurated. lieutenant stevens received orders to assume charge of the fortifications at portsmouth, n.h., to which those at portland, maine, were added soon afterwards. these consisted of forts constitution and scammell at the former, and forts preble and mcclary at the latter place. breaking up housekeeping at new bedford in 1843, and leaving his wife and boy in newport, and the little stock of furniture and belongings stored in the old mansion temporarily, lieutenant stevens proceeded to portsmouth and took charge of the works. having in his ever prompt and energetic manner set everything under way, he returned to newport, and brought his little family to the new station. they boarded for a short time, then he leased a spacious house, using a portion of it as an office. they speedily found themselves among warm friends and pleasant surroundings. lieutenant tom breese, of the navy, a generous, whole-souled gentleman, who had married lucy randolph, a cousin of mrs. stevens, was stationed at the navy yard, and made them more than welcome. lieutenant a.w. whipple, of the engineers, a fellow student at west point, was conducting a survey of the harbor. he became a major-general, commanded the third division, third corps, army of the potomac, and was mortally wounded at the battle of chancellorsville. there were also colonel crane, captain stanberry, and lieutenants william h. fowler and joseph hooker, of the army, and major harris, of the marines. hooker afterwards rose to be major-general, and commanded the army of the potomac at chancellorsville. portsmouth, like newport, had its old families and cultivated and agreeable society, which cordially received the young engineer officer and his wife. among the first to call upon mrs. stevens were mrs. john l. hayes and mrs. samuel elliott coues, two beautiful young women, the daughters of mr. alexander ladd, and a warm friendship grew up between the families, which continued after all three moved to washington in after years. in portland, only a few miles distant, resided rev. asa cummings, mr. stevens's maternal uncle, the editor of the "christian mirror," and his house was always open to the young couple like a second home. during the winter mrs. stevens's sister mary visited them. there was much social visiting and many entertainments; they attended the marriage of lieutenant whipple and miss sherburne. they were on board the frigate portsmouth when she was launched at the navy yard. mr. stevens found his hands full, with the two sets of works intrusted to him, and was obliged to spend no little time in traveling between them. at fort preble he planned and built the barracks, conceded to be among the best arranged in the country. having to cross the harbor frequently in his visits to the fort, he had built at newport one of the catboats for which that town was famous, and had it brought to portland. he also brought on from new bedford a faithful retainer, named daniel murphy, and put him in charge of the boat. in addition to these onerous and responsible duties, he was placed in sole charge of the fortification of the narrows of the penobscot river, where it was decided to build a regular, bastioned, casemated work for forty guns on the right bank of the river, opposite bucksport, to be named fort knox. mr. stevens visited bucksport in july, 1843, on this new duty. the first thing to be done was to purchase the site for the fort, and for this purpose he sought the owners of the land and made arrangements with them. one of these, an old farmer, not deeming it possible that the government could be represented in so important a matter by so young, boyish-looking, and unassuming a man, refused to talk with him, and soon afterwards, meeting an acquaintance, complained to him about that young fellow, a mere boy, talking to him as to buying his farm for the government, etc. to his astonishment, his friend assured him that he had made a great mistake, that the young man was lieutenant stevens, of the engineer corps, who had entire charge of building the fort, and advised him to lose no time in seeking the young officer and explaining his mistake, which he made haste to do. this incident shows how youthful mr. stevens appeared at that time, although twenty-five years old, a husband and a father. he was always quiet and unobtrusive in manner, without a trace of self-assertion or pretentiousness; and the marked impression he made upon all with whom he came in contact was due to real superiority of mind and spirit, and not to any adventitious advantages of stature or manner. he also, in july, visited castine, and inspected and reported upon the old works there, which had been fortified and held by the british during the war of 1812. his sisters were again widely scattered from their father's house. during the summer sarah was staying with uncle asa cummings, and, being attacked by a severe cough, mary came there to wait upon her, and also to attend school. their brother isaac constantly visited them, and supplied them with books and comforts. he also freely aided oliver with funds. he was at north yarmouth fitting for college, and helping himself by teaching school. with all these calls upon him, mr. stevens was obliged to ask his father to repay- "as much, not exceeding one hundred dollars, as you can conveniently raise. my expenses in the way of traveling have been very heavy this year. three journeys to bangor already, and two more in contemplation, besides quite a number between portland and portsmouth. with this i send you the 'national anti-slavery standard,' the organ of the american anti-slavery society. i have just commenced taking the paper. i like its spirit and views much." in this letter he speaks of spending four days in portland, and finding sarah improved and mary well; gives a long account of the condition and medical treatment of the former, and suggests means for her recovery and plans for mary's education. these sisters were very dear to him, and he was very solicitous for their welfare. but sarah rapidly grew worse with quick consumption, and died february 8, 1844, only twenty-two years old. after her death, mary returned home. one day at portsmouth, as mr. stevens was at work in his office and his young wife was at the window, her attention was attracted by a unique vehicle coming down the street, followed by a tail of small boys in high glee. this was a rude sleigh fashioned out of poles, and drawn by a rough-looking nag, whose coat was innocent of currycomb and brush. seated on a box in the bottom of the sleigh, and driving the horse with entire unconcern at the attention he was attracting, was a large, tall man, with light hair and fair, florid complexion, clad in homespun garb, the very type of an independent backwoods farmer. stopping at the door, he inquired for _leftenant_ stevens, who ran down, and was surprised and pleased to find in the rustic caller one of his mother's brothers, john cummings, from albany, on his way to andover. how uncle john received a warm welcome, how he was brought in and given a hearty supper, while his team was sent around to the nearest stable, and how he was loaded with viands and supplies enough to last the remainder of his journey when he resumed it, may be imagined. such an opportunity to dispense hospitality to one of his relatives was a source of unalloyed pleasure to the young officer. the laying out and starting the fort at bucksport engrossed most of his attention in the spring of 1844. the care of important works at three different places necessitated incessant traveling, besides which he had to visit boston periodically to obtain and bring down the public funds required. with all these duties and cares he was more than fully occupied, and was obliged to lay aside, for the present at least, his projected law studies. he also sent abroad and purchased a number of french works on fortifications and military history. he became deeply interested in the forts under his charge, and was indefatigable in urging upon the engineer bureau in washington improvements and measures which his active mind was quick to observe. indeed, in his zeal he overworked himself, and was prostrated with severe sickness in consequence. "you work too hard," writes his sister mary; "you will not live five years unless you take business easier." during the summer he was able to give oliver employment on fort preble, and writes his father that "oliver has acquitted himself with credit; had to manage a gang of twenty-five men." mrs. stevens spent part of the summer at her mother's house in newport, where, on june 27, their second child was born, a daughter, named julia virginia. early in august mr. stevens went to newport to escort his little family to bucksport. they spent several days in andover, accompanied by mrs. stevens's sister nancy, where they met elizabeth and her husband, just arrived from tennessee on a visit. mary was at home, and there was a pleasant family reunion. after this agreeable little visit they went to boston and took the steamboat for bucksport, miss nancy hazard returning to newport. in the fall elizabeth and mr. campbell returned to tennessee, after a round of visits to her relatives in massachusetts and maine. mary accompanied them. arriving at bucksport the last of august, they found quarters at an old-fashioned country tavern, the only hotel in the place, where they had comfortable though rustic accommodations. the principal people, with the cordial hospitality characteristic of maine, welcomed them to the town. at first many, like the old farmer, were disposed to sneer at the young stripling, but the energetic, thorough-going, and effective way in which he organized and drove on the works, his decided, self-reliant character, sound, sensible conversation, and simple, direct manners, soon won their approval and admiration, and he became a great favorite, and much respected and looked up to as well as liked. after a short sojourn at the tavern, he leased a large, roomy house of judge pond, half of which he set apart as an office, and made his residence in the other half. kidder randolph, a cousin of mrs. stevens, was employed as chief clerk, and with his wife, _nã©e_ isabella updike, came on from newport. he also employed in the office mr. isaac osgood, a fellow-townsman from andover, and on the works, as assistant, mr. abiel w. tinkham. the penobscot at this point is some half a mile wide, with a strong tidal current. for crossing the river he provided a four-oared barge, over which daniel murphy was installed as coxswain. every morning the young engineer officer would cross the river to supervise the works, and return to the town late in the afternoon or in the evening. a large force was set to work. soon deep excavations, great banks of earth, and vast piles of granite and other materials attested the vigor with which the construction was pushed. he visited many quarries far and near, and examined and tested the granite. as this material was landed in great, heavy blocks and masses on the river-bank, and had to be hauled thence to the works up a considerable ascent, he bought many oxen for the purpose, scouring the country for the largest and finest to be had. in these teams he took great pride, and especially enjoyed taking friends and visitors to see them. he was also quite proud of his ability to select good workmen from their appearance. a well-shaped head, with a full, high forehead, he used to say, denoted a good man, reliable, intelligent, and industrious. the lonely old man in andover writes a pathetic letter to isaac in december, urging him to make him a visit. of his seven children, not one was at home at thanksgiving. three daughters had died; the remaining two were far distant in tennessee; isaac was in bucksport, and oliver in north yarmouth. with deep feeling the aged and lonely father writes: "my children,--you may well suppose i thought of them." mr. stevens again had a severe sickness in the winter, the result probably of overwork, although he used to say that the cold winter climate of maine did not agree with him, that it rendered his faculties torpid or benumbed. in february, however, he visited washington, and was present at polk's inauguration as president. he embraced this opportunity to urge upon colonel totten, chief of engineers, the need of increased appropriations for the works under his charge, and with such success that the other engineer officers complained that stevens had left no funds for their works. during 1845 mr. stevens was vigorously pushing the building of fort knox, as well as attending to the works at portland and portsmouth. in may he received a confidential letter from colonel totten, asking if he desired transfer to and promotion in one of the new regiments about to be raised, which, with his characteristic reply, is given:- [confidential.] engineer department, washington, 28th may, 1845. lieutenant isaac i. stevens, _corps of engineers_, _bucksport, maine_: _sir_,--in case of an increase of the military establishment at the next session of congress, i shall probably be called upon to know if any officers of engineers desire a transfer to the new forces, with promotion. would you desire such a transfer? what is the lowest grade that you would be willing to accept? and in what arm of the service? very respectfully, your obt. svt., joseph g. totten, _col. and ch. eng._ i have already been spoken to on this subject by one high in authority. bucksport, maine, june 24, 1845. colonel joseph g. totten, _chief engineer_, _washington_: _sir_,--in answer to the confidential circular of the department of the 28th ultimo, asking if i should desire a transfer with promotion to the new forces, in case of an increase of the military establishment at the next session of congress, i beg to say generally and comprehensively that i hold myself in readiness to discharge to the best of my ability the duties of any position which shall enlarge my sphere of action and of usefulness, and with which, in the judgment of those intrusted with the administration of public affairs, i may be deemed worthy to be invested; promotion or no promotion, in my own corps or in any other corps or department of the public service, and whether the field of duty be in oregon, california, or at the north pole. i am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, isaac i. stevens, _lieut. of eng'rs._ this reply evinces a certain impatience, or disapproval, at the idea of consulting the personal wishes and preferences of an officer as to his assignment to duty. mr. stevens always held high ideals of public duty,--many would deem them quixotic and overstrained. he ever deemed it the duty of appointing officers to select the ablest and best-fitted man for any post or service that could be found, and that it was the duty of every public officer to serve with complete self-abnegation and patriotic zeal. his whole career proved the sincerity of his convictions on this point. in consequence of the hostile attitude assumed by mexico upon the admission of texas into the union against her protests, colonel totten, on june 8, writes the following confidential order:- "in all the forts under your charge (including the narrows of the penobscot) you should, as soon as it can be done advantageously, place all your batteries in a state of perfect readiness for guns, leaving nothing to be done but the mounting of the guns when they shall arrive. it is of infinite importance, should any exigency arise, that the preparation of the country shall not be found deficient in any manner depending on the engineer department." general taylor with a small force was thrown into texas to protect the newly acquired state, and the increasing probabilities of war with mexico were eagerly discussed by the ambitious young army officers. in september mr. stevens accompanied colonel totten on a tour of inspection of all the works under his charge, and entertained him and mrs. totten for several days at his house in bucksport. mr. stevens was never so well pleased as when dispensing hospitality in his own house. he was continually bringing friends home to dinner, often on short notice, and always liked to have some of his relatives visiting him. his wife's sister nancy spent the summer with them. brother oliver, uncle william's daughter eliza and son william, mrs. hazard and her son thomas, and sister, miss eliza b. lyman, and uncle nathaniel, also visited them, and, after much urging, his father, from andover, was induced to make a brief visit. he employed oliver again this summer on fort preble. always ready and glad to serve any relative or friend, he saw to the purchasing and shipping of several cargoes of hay for uncle nathaniel, declining to accept any recompense for his services. on december 7 the little girl, julia virginia, died of water on the brain, after a brief illness. she was a beautiful, gentle child, and a great pet of her father, who delighted to place her on his office table when he was at work, oftentimes to the sad disarrangement of his plans and drawings, and her death was a severe affliction. the following beautiful lines were written by mr. brooks, in condolence upon the sad loss:- "well with the child?" ah, yes, 't is well with that bright creature evermore, gone up, 'mid seraph bands to dwell with god on yonder starry shore. "well with the child?" ah, yes, 't is well, though marble-cold that lily brow, and though no sage nor seer can tell where soars the mind that beamed there now. "well with the child?" ah, yes, 't is well, though still in death that speaking eye; a shadow o'er the spirit fell- 't is past--a star is in the sky! "well with the child?" ah, yes, 't is well with her, that sweet and guileless one; toll not for her the gloomy knell, though gilds her grave the morning sun. "well with the child?" ah, yes, 't is well, and well with us who mourn, if we, by penitence made pure, might dwell, sweet child of god! with him and thee. during the winter mr. stevens organized a course of lectures for the bucksport lyceum, delivering one lecture himself, and writing to lecturers in different parts of the country, engaging their services, and inviting them to his house. among the lecturers and subjects were: john a. peters, on "the profession of politics;" william b. merton, on "american literature;" j.a. smith, on "the present state of english poetry;" henry giles, george shepard, and others, whose subjects are not known. he also became interested in organizing a unitarian church in bucksport, and corresponded with dr. a.p. peabody in regard to a pastor, etc., but it was found impracticable to do this. mr. stevens was never a sportsman or fisherman; indeed, he kept himself so immersed in work as never to have time for field sports, yet he was especially fond of the noble salmon which were taken in the penobscot, and delighted to send fine, handsome specimens of this noble fish to his father, mrs. hazard, and other friends. he had a fish-weir built below the fort, in which many fish were taken at times. convinced of the desirability of organizing a body of engineer troops as part of the army, for several years mr. stevens kept writing urgent memorials and letters to the engineer or war department in advocacy of the plan. in those days the rank and file were nearly all foreigners, and far inferior in character to the regular soldiers of the present day. for the engineer troops he advocated enlisting american young men of intelligence, good character and physique, putting them under a thorough course of instruction, with strict discipline, in order "to raise them to the highest state of discipline and efficiency, a fair representation of what an american army might and should be, so that every man in the company can, if he chooses to study and do his duty, become a good clerk, overseer, or practical engineer." moreover, in case of war, or an increase of the army, some of the best qualified and most deserving men might be given commissions. he was deeply impressed with and admired cromwell's policy of raising his "ironsides" among men of good family and substance, discarding "serving-men and tapsters," and was full of the idea of making the american army as honorable for the common soldier as for the officer. the soundness of these views is now becoming recognized, and within the last few years steps have been taken to raise the standard of regular soldiers by enlisting only the better class of men, and giving them more instruction, advantages, and opportunities, even to appointing officers from the ranks. at length the war department decided to allow the raising of an engineer company, and lieutenant stevens issued circulars calling for men, and personally enlisted the first soldier in the new corps, private lathrop. the company formed part of scott's army in mexico, where it rendered distinguished service under captain g.w. smith and lieutenant george b. mcclellan, the former of whom became a confederate major-general, and the latter was the well-known commander of the army of the potomac. in july, 1846, mr. stevens was in boston loading a vessel with material for fort knox. during this summer mrs. stevens's eldest sister, miss emily l. hazard, with her little nephew, charlie brooks, made them a visit, and two other sisters, mary and nancy, spent the summer and fall with them. the mexican war was now in full progress with taylor's campaign on the rio grande, and lieutenant stevens, ambitious for active service, but unwilling to urge his personal wishes, writes the chief of engineers that sedentary employment is prejudicial to his health,--needs exercise in the open air,--would respond with alacrity to any call made upon him for service in mexico, adding that he makes no personal application, but simply states facts, etc. at last, on december 25, he received his orders, and in two hours was speeding by sleigh over snow-drifted roads to bangor, reaching portland the next day, and boston the 28th. miss nancy hazard went, under his escort, as far as boston, returning home. miss mary remained in bucksport to spend the winter with her sister, who needed her society and care, for on november 20, the second daughter, sue, was born. chapter vii voyage to mexico boston, mass., december 29, 1846. my dearest wife,--we reached boston yesterday at half past twelve, after a very pleasant journey from bangor. the weather was unusually mild, and we experienced very little fatigue. nancy took the afternoon cars for providence. this afternoon the steamer perry runs to newport and will take her home. i shall not sail probably till saturday. i have determined to take out a complete equipment, even to a servant. i am causing inquiries to be made this morning, and in case i find no one to my mind, i shall send for daniel murphy. daniel would be so devoted to me. if i were sick he would take care of me. daniel, too, would feel with me perfectly secure from all harm. the quartermaster will furnish me here with a camp equipage. i shall provide myself with a saddle, india-rubber leggings, and everything complete, so that not for a single instant shall i be delayed on reaching my destination. immediately on my landing i wish to be ready for service. i may take out a horse. i wish some of my good friends would present me one. i should want a horse worth three hundred dollars. i have sent for oliver to spend the day with me to-morrow. i thought it best not to send for father. it will be hard for him to part with me, and he had better stay at home. since leaving you my mind has dwelt much upon my little family. i know you will look on the bright side. in all candor, i consider my life as safe in mexico as in maine. i hope to get a sound constitution, and to come back to you, my dear margaret, in due season, sound in body and none the worse for wear. you have a treasure in your own mother and brothers and sisters. mary is with you. i feel grateful to her for giving up so promptly her own wishes to stay with you. i hope you will have a pleasant winter. keep up your spirits, and have faith in the future and in the god of the future. i go to mexico without a single foreboding. i have faith, almost implicit faith, that i shall come back. have faith with me. so long as i remain in boston you shall hear from me every day. love to mary and the chicks. affectionately yours, isaac. boston, mass., december 30, 1846. my dear margaret,--oliver has come down to pass the day with me. we are hard at work preparing inventories and getting everything ready. we have a fine vessel, and i look forward to a pleasant passage. oliver brought me the sad intelligence of the death of elizabeth on the 10th of december. campbell wrote further a most feeling and excellent letter. elizabeth suffered but little, and everything was done for her that could be suggested by the forethought of the most devoted of husbands. her child was very well. mary, we expect, will return in the spring. i shall try and send you a little note every day. write me at brazos santiago, and write often, commencing now. write once a week, adding something to your letters each day. remember me to all. affectionately, isaac. lieutenant stevens's orders were to take charge of the pontoon and engineer trains, then being loaded on shipboard in boston, and accompany the same to the headquarters of general scott in mexico, touching first at brazos santiago, texas. notwithstanding the urgency of his orders, various delays occurred, and it was not until the 19th of january that the vessel sailed. during this period of waiting he had a visit from his father, and one from oliver, also. his cousins charles and henry also came down from andover to bid him good-by. he spent a day in new bedford, calling upon his friends there. daniel murphy, having fallen sick, had to be sent home. boston, mass., january 13, 1847. my dearest wife,--i wrote you a brief note yesterday, stating that i should not probably sail for some days. having nothing to do here, yet obliged to remain to be in readiness to obey any new orders, i shall endeavor to spend my time in some rational manner. there are military matters to be looked into and old friends to visit. i hope i shall hear from you, before i leave boston, and very much in full. i wish once more to look into the little details of your daily life, before i commit myself to the broad bosom of the great waters. january 14. yesterday i passed a portion of the day in cambridge; found mrs. breese and family all well. the children had grown much since i last saw them. mrs. breese seemed very resigned, but she has evidently been a great mourner. she was the same hospitable, noble-hearted woman as of old. she expects to get to newport about may; will go to housekeeping in their old house. i saw the forty-eight viennese dancers last evening. it was splendid. they are young girls from four years to sixteen, all handsome and perfectly trained. everybody goes to see them. last evening there was a great turn-out of the beauty and fashion of boston. you shall hear from me again before i leave. there is no probability of my sailing before saturday. love to hazard and the babe. remembrances, and yours affectionately, isaac. boston, mass., january 15, 1847. my dearest wife,--there is now every prospect of my getting off to-morrow. i may not reach the brazos till the middle of february. colonel totten left on the 12th for mexico, and i shall without doubt serve under his immediate direction. eighteen officers of engineers are either in mexico, or on their way thither. i trust i shall get a few lines from you to-morrow before i sail, as otherwise a month must pass before any tidings reach me. do not fall to write quite often to me at the brazos. i shall not object, you know, to find a dozen letters, more or less. to-day i dined at mr. eben dale's, a nephew of aunt cummings. cousin charles stevens dined there also. he designs going this evening to see the viennese dancers. i wish you could see them. everybody is charmed. whole families go, children and all, and to-morrow there is to be an afternoon exhibition for the particular benefit of the children. i will write you again before i sail. affectionately yours, isaac stevens. boston, mass., january 19, 1847. my dearest wife,--it is now ten o'clock in the morning, and i shall in an hour take my departure for mexico. we have a fine vessel--good officers and crew--and it is a charming day. i hoped to have heard from you before i left, but no letter has reached me. god bless you and the little ones. yours affectionately, isaac. my dearest wife,--it is now january 27, and the eighth day of our being at sea. i wrote you a brief note on the day i sailed, tuesday, january 19. we left the wharf at three p.m., with a strong westerly wind, which drove our bark through the water at the rate of eight knots per hour. the weather was very cold, but with my cloak around me, i remained on deck several hours. soon boston and its suburbs vanished in the distance, and we were fairly embarked on our journey's way. as i think it will interest you, i will jot down the occurrences of each day since our departure. and first of all, my ocean home is in a beautifully modeled and fast-sailing bark of about two hundred tons, called the prompt. there are twelve souls on board: captain wellman, first officer gallicer, second officer stebbins, six men before the mast, one man acting as cook and steward, my servant, a nice irish lad, owen clarke, nineteen years of age, and your humble servant. the officers of the bark are a fine set of fellows, and the crew perfectly cheerful and attentive to their duty. tuesday evening i was not much troubled with sea-sickness, and i enjoyed a good night's rest; but wednesday, january 20, was a hard day, nothing but sea-sickness. in pursuance of the advice of captain wellman, i remained on deck as much of the time as possible. the weather was somewhat cold, but the wind moderate. we drifted along the greater portion of the day, not faster than two or three knots an hour. after suffering from sea-sickness till noon, i went to my berth. there is an inexpressible lassitude accompanying sea-sickness, that is worse than anything else. it requires an effort to make the least exertion. thursday, january 21. this day we had snow all the time. i remained on deck twelve hours, and towards evening felt vigorous and well. the weather begins to grow milder. i begin to relish food and to enjoy sea fare. our steward has been sick ever since we left port, and we are in consequence obliged to do the best we can without a cook. it is now evening, the breeze freshens, the bark dances along merrily, and there are signs of a gale of wind. i remained up till eight o'clock, and then retired for the night. as i awoke from time to time, i could observe from the working of our vessel that it went hard on deck. i took things quietly and remained in my berth, and about sunrise of friday, january 22, i went on deck. the scene was wild and exciting. the ocean tossed in wild confusion, and our brave bark riding the crests of the waves like a sea-bird. the gale had been a severe one, and the captain told me that at one time he expected he should be obliged to lay to under bare poles. we pursued our way before the wind, making nine and ten knots per hour. saturday, january 23. the sea has become much smoother and the weather milder. yesterday we were in the midst of the gulf stream, and to-day we have passed it. sunday, january 24, was a beautiful day. the weather mild and lazy. i was on deck all day,--part of the time reading, and part dozing and sleeping. it is comfortable on deck without a coat. we are getting rapidly into southern latitudes. monday, tuesday, january 25, 26. head wind and slow progress. monday we saw several sail. the weather exceedingly mild and soft. i never enjoyed existence more than on these two days,--that is, mere existence. i dreamed away many hours, and built and pulled down air castles. the thought of home was uppermost. what a change in outward things in six days. in bucksport you wrap your cloaks and comforters around you; at sea we pull off our coats. my health is perfect; everything like sea-sickness has left me. wednesday, january 27. this is likewise a mild, soft, somewhat damp day. we make exceedingly slow progress; the wind is dead ahead. i fear we shall be a month reaching the brazos. shall i hear from you there, and how many letters will await me? i trust i shall be with you again in the course of the summer. i dwell much on my probable duties in mexico. in case the contest should be of short duration, i shall certainly return in the course of the year. i fear that you will take things hard in my absence. when i reach the brazos, i may be able to speak with some certainty of my duties in mexico. thursday, january 28. last evening we had a rough night. this morning the sea is very rough, and our bark is pitching about in all directions. i am fortunate in having no return of sea-sickness. my boy, owen, is not so fortunate. i observed his head over the bulwarks a few moments since in no equivocal position. he is a nice, willing lad. i picked him up in boston, the very day we sailed. he is now in the steward's hands learning to cook. on reaching the brazos, he will be quite accomplished in the culinary art. friday, january 29. to-day we are making fine progress, about nine miles per hour; shall reach the abaco island, one of the bahamas, on saturday (to-morrow night) at this rate. the weather is charming. i have most of the day read in my military works, sitting on the deck of the vessel. the weather is, indeed, rather warm. saturday, january 30. last night there was a change of wind, and to-day we are making little or no progress. the sea somewhat rough. we shall not reach the abaco this evening. sunday, january 31. last evening the wind died away, and to-day we have not moved one mile per hour. the sun has been warm; i have worn nothing about my neck to-day. several of the men are barefoot, and all of us are in our shirt-sleeves. we are in about latitude 27â°, and some one hundred miles from the bahamas. this calm weather is very tedious, but we must be patient; we have now been out twelve days. monday, february 1. this has been an exquisite day. soon after dinner our eyes were rejoiced with the sight of land, the first since leaving boston, thirteen days since. our bark glides along with scarcely any perceptible motion. towards night we approached the great abaco, and about seven saw the revolving light and the hole in the wall, caused, according to the jolly sons of neptune, by the devil's chasing a porpoise through the rock-bound shore of the great abaco. the hole is, indeed, a small arched opening through the rocks, admitting the passage of a small boat. friday, february 2. another splendid day. early in the morning we made the berry islands, inhabited by some fifty or sixty blacks under a black chief. we saw one of their boats returning from turtle-fishing. about seven we commenced crossing the bahama banks in soundings, nearly all the way of one hundred miles, from twelve to twenty-four feet. we had a clean run, and went into deep water about seven o'clock, running the one hundred miles in about twelve hours. the evening was surpassingly lovely. i remained on deck till ten, looking at the stars and thinking of home. wednesday, february 3. this day has fairly brought us into the mexican gulf. in ten days, i trust, we shall reach the brazos. to-day i have been overhauling my clothes. my boy owen has mended some rents in my garments. he says he can wash like "fun." the captain teases him a good deal about the bright irish lass he left in ann street. owen wants me, when i reach mexico, not only to buy a mule for his use, but a little cart for the things; quite an idea. to-day we are in latitude 24â° 13'. the weather very warm. i have found the heat quite oppressive. thursday, february 4. nothing of consequence has occurred to-day. we are moving on quickly with prosperous though gentle winds. friday, february 5. everything has moved on lazily to-day. we have seen several vessels. saturday, february 6. same as yesterday. a vessel is in sight, apparently bound to the north. it is now nearly three o'clock, and we have been out eighteen days. i shall seal up and send this letter by the vessel, if she prove to be bound north, and i trust it will find you well. we are now about five hundred and sixty miles from the brazos. shall i hear from you there? love to the children, to mary; remembrances to mr. osgood, kidder, mr. and mrs. tinkham. the vessel did not send her boat, and no opportunity was offered to send this letter. we passed directly under her stern. she was a brig of two hundred tons, and bound to new york. this letter must remain on my hands till i reach the brazos. sunday, february 7. a most melancholy event occurred on board today. as i was lying in my berth, about a quarter before twelve o'clock, captain wellman came into the cabin, somewhat agitated, and said to me, "our steward is not to be found." all hands were on deck in a moment, and a thorough search was made in all parts of the ship. the steward was not to be found anywhere. the appearance of the galley was conclusive as to his having thrown himself overboard. he was seen at half past eleven, and yet little or no preparation had been made for dinner. he had been observed to be moody and absent-minded in the course of the morning. we could assign no cause for the act. he had been treated well, and his duties were light. my servant had assisted him throughout the passage. his sudden disappearance whilst four men were on deck, in good smooth weather, caused us all to feel melancholy. we ate very little dinner. our thoughts were sad, and we passed much of our time through the remainder of the day in recalling every little incident of the voyage having any connection with the unfortunate steward. the only thing which gave any light was certain expressions he had made use of, showing a melancholy and restless spirit. we found out, moreover, that he was suffering very severely from the bad disorder, contracted some two months since in liverpool. this may have been the cause of his making way with himself. monday, february 8. we none of us passed a quiet night, in consequence of the distressing event of yesterday. one of the crew has been put into the galley, and things go on in the accustomed manner. this evening the effects of the steward were disposed of to the crew at auction; and so he has gone to his account, and our bark is pursuing her destined course. our vessel has gone on very quietly the last two days. tuesday, february 9. we still have quiet times, and are gradually approaching the brazos. with tolerable good luck we shall arrive there in two or three days. it is now evening and seven o'clock. there is every appearance of a norther. the captain has been somewhat anxiously pacing the deck for the last hour. it is now eight o'clock, and i will turn in for the night. wednesday, february 10. a severe norther came up about nine last evening, and is now sweeping over the gulf. our bark works admirably. occasionally she ships a sea. but her deck for the most part is dry. the weather is very cold, and i have kept my berth nearly all day. thursday, february 11. the norther did not commence to abate till noon to-day. it is now six p.m. the water is comparatively smooth. i have been somewhat unwell for two or three days, but hope to become well with smoother weather. friday, february 12. we had a quiet night, and this morning we have scarcely a breath of wind. our estimated distance from the brazos is about sixty miles. we shall not arrive till to-morrow. i fear i shall not hear from you. there is some, yes, great doubt, whether letters to the army are forwarded by mail beyond new orleans, in which event all your letters to me will remain in the new orleans office; nor can they be forwarded till i can send for them by some ship going there. saturday, february 13. it is now about two p.m., and we are in direct view of the brazos, which is some six miles distant. we are beating up against a head wind, and there is considerable doubt as to whether we shall make our anchorage to-night. the wind has gradually subsided, and it is now nearly a calm. unless a fresh breeze should spring up, we shall require another day. this is our twenty-fifth day. sunday, february 14, five p.m. i have just reached the brazos, and find general worth, colonel totten, lieutenants mason and tower, and many other officers here. an opportunity offers to send this letter. i will write again in a few days. i shall remain at the brazos a few days longer. remember me to kidder and his wife, mr. and mrs. tinkham, mr. osgood, and love of course to the children and mary. affectionately yours, isaac. brazos santiago, february 21, 1847. my dearest margaret,--it is now sunday, one week since i landed. your letter and mary's have reached me, and i have had the inexpressible pleasure of hearing from home. how happy it made me to hear from you all! my little children are doing well, your health is good, and you are passing a quiet and comfortable winter. it is the greatest joy to me to learn all this. i knew you would find mr. osgood a great addition to our little circle, and with mary as your companion, who has always sympathized with you entirely, i did not anticipate a very tiresome winter. since reaching here i have had little or nothing to do. it was fortunate i reached the brazos as early as i did. i saw and had some conversation with colonel totten. on monday, the day after my arrival, general scott and a portion of his staff departed for tampico. there were left behind four officers of engineers, of general scott's staff, with directions to follow by the first opportunity. these officers are lieutenants mason, trapier, tower, and myself. mason is in fine health, full of animation and conversation, and very popular with his brother officers. tower is the same as ever, a man of great native power, but entirely unobtrusive. trapier is an officer you have never seen, a man of fine address and considerable ability. we all like him very much indeed. the general left in excellent spirits. on taking leave of the engineer officers he made some very complimentary remarks in reference to the importance of our duties, and his expectations in regard to us. he will remain in tampico a few days and then proceed to the island of lobos, where a large expedition is to concentrate to land and attack vera cruz. it is expected that a force of fourteen thousand men will effect a landing. general worth is in command of three thousand regulars at this point, most of whom have embarked. general worth and staff are still here. he is somewhat delicate in health, but full of life and energy. he is thought to be our great man to handle troops on a battlefield. i have seen a good deal of my old friend hunt the last few days. he is attached to colonel duncan's battery, and is now in my room talking with mason. he is a man i esteem very much, and he is as worthy of it as ever. colonel duncan has just come in. he is a noble fellow, not in the least elated by the enviable position he occupied in the army and before the whole country. he is a man of extraordinary energy of character, great decision, and great sagacity. his name and his battery are a terror to the mexicans, and he is emphatically thus far the great man of the young officers. he is modest, amiable, mild, as he is far-sighted, decisive, indomitable. he is what his friends knew him to be years ago. mason and himself are great friends. captain saunders of the engineers is here on general worth's staff, and will probably be brevetted for distinguished services at monterey. i shall probably sail on wednesday next for tampico, and thence to the island of lobos. lobos is about sixty miles south of tampico, and affords an ample protection against northers. at tampico i shall probably find general scott and staff. there i hope to meet tilden, carpenter, and other old friends. everything is in the greatest confusion here; a thousand laborers and teamsters are employed to manage teams, take care of animals and stores, and load and discharge lighters. ever since my arrival, there has been the greatest hurry in embarking troops. there is great want of system. most of the men here in government employ are not business men. some of the quartermasters are inefficient. there are some good men. the best business man in the quartermaster's employ is lawton, of newport, brother-in-law of the turners (colonel robert r. lawton). he is harbor master, and in receipt of one hundred and fifty dollars per month. everybody speaks of him in the highest terms. he is energetic, intelligent, and perfectly temperate. he looks in admirable condition. he has applied for, and will probably receive, a captain's commission in one of the new regiments. i have seen and conversed with him here. he is full of hope, life, and energy. general butler has just arrived from monterey, on his return to the states, and in consequence of his wound not healing. general taylor occupies a position in advance of saltillo, with eighteen field-pieces, a small body of regular infantry, and some six thousand volunteers. my dearest girl, i know nothing certain of ulterior operations. we have great abundance of supplies and some seven thousand choice regular troops. we cannot expect the same conduct from the volunteers as from the regulars, but we hope they will gain laurels. i shall endeavor to do my duty in whatever circumstances i may be placed. i trust i shall have full strength to do my full duty. i know this will accord with all the wishes of your own heart. i know you would rather never see me than that i should return to your arms with infamy on my brow. this latter would be terrible. the former can be borne. as regards our dear children, i wish hazard to go to school this summer, and i am glad he continues to be so promising. of all things, i wish him to be obedient. not the obedience of fear, but of love and confidence. our little susan i know must be a bright, merry child. would that i could witness daily her youth, growth, and development! preserve a tranquil spirit; let hope at all times animate and strengthen you. have courage, have faith; we shall come together again, all the better for the trials of separation. i shall write a note to mary to accompany this. the mail leaves to-morrow for new orleans. write often, and continue to direct your letters to brazos santiago. remember me to all my bucksport friends, to kidder and his wife, osgood, mr. and mrs. tinkham. of course all the love in the world for hazard and sue. affectionately yours, isaac. tampico, wednesday evening, march 10, 1847. my dearest wife,--we left the brazos this evening week, and shall leave this place to-morrow morning. our passage of only two hundred and fifty miles thus occupied us seven days. we are somewhat apprehensive that we shall not reach vera cruz till general scott shall have effected a landing. mason, tower, and three other officers are with me. our ship now lies three miles outside the bar. our passage up the river tampico to this place (six miles above the bar) was a fairy scene. beautiful views met our eyes, and the picturesque country about this place perfectly enchanted us. the atmosphere is delightful. we see few but mexicans about us. every one looks friendly. news has just reached tampico that general taylor has had a hard-fought battle with santa anna. all the accounts came through mexican channels. santa anna claims a victory. he states that taylor is shut up in monterey. but he admits that he himself has not advanced. we infer and believe that santa anna has been defeated, and will soon return to san luis potosi. i feel sanguine that a decisive success on the part of general scott may terminate the war. i hope so. there is a chance to send this letter in the morning. i of course write in haste. you shall hear from me again on my arrival at vera cruz. affectionately yours, isaac. the landing took place on tuesday and wednesday last (march 9 and 10), and the investment was completed on thursday. the heavy ordnance is still on board ship. the debarkation is said to have been a most splendid affair. the first division landed in two hours. general worth was the first man to jump on shore. the city will undoubtedly fall in a few days. no opposition whatever was made by the mexicans to the landing. there was a little skirmishing during the investment. at the brazos i lost my servant owen. he found he could get much better wages than i had agreed to give him, and in consequence thereof he deserted me on the day i left, and i had not time to recover him. i shall find some difficulty in procuring a good servant here. i was very thankful that you wrote father and mary. i wish you to keep up some little correspondence with them during my absence. they will always be glad to hear from you. my father has had his full share of sorrow, and has suffered as much as most men i know. i have never had so true and so disinterested a friend as he. he is absorbed in his children, and, though he expresses little, he feels much. his daughters have left him one by one, and but one is left. i feel very sad when i think of him. i trust that mary will be spared to him for many years. we hope to get on shore to-morrow, but as a strong norther has been blowing since last evening, and is not yet entirely abated, it is possible we may not land till tuesday. i shall keep this letter open till the last moment. the mail is forwarded by vessels sailing to new orleans, and is not very regular. thursday morning, march 18. we reached the anchorage off the island of sacrificios on sunday, and did not get on shore till last evening (wednesday). we found the headquarters of general scott some half a mile from the place of landing. on our way thither we met colonel totten and captain lee going out of camp on a reconnoissance. the camp occupies a circuit of some eight or ten miles. we find every one in high spirits. the fact is considered unquestioned that general taylor has utterly defeated santa anna and driven him across the desert. i meet many friends in camp. sunday, march 21. i have now been on shore four days. we are busily employed on the works preparatory to opening our fire on the place. everything is going on finely. my duties interest me much. the climate is very fine. the colonel and his officers form one mess, and we have a pleasant time. don't believe the many idle reports in regard to losses. thus far we have lost only one man. the army is in fine spirits. love to every one of my friends, my dear children, and you, my dear margaret. i long to embrace you. i shall write again by next mail. your affectionate isaac. chapter viii vera cruz.--cerro gordo vera cruz, an old spanish walled town on the gulf of mexico, with a population of 12,000, was situated on a sandy plain, which, extending back from the town, was broken by many sand-hills and ridges, and covered in great part with dense chapparal. on the land side a strong line of masonry works encircled the city from fort conception on the beach above, or north of, to fort santiago below it; while on the sea side the castle of san juan de ulloa, seated on an island a thousand yards in advance of the town, commanded all approaches with 128 heavy guns, and made the sea front doubly secure. the american army landed unopposed on march 9, 1847, on the beach a few miles south of the town; during the next four days extended lines of investment completely around the doomed city on the land side, and, having with great labor and some interruption from northers landed the heavy siege-guns, mortars, and material for the bombardment, commenced the batteries on the 18th, the second day after the young engineer officers reached the scene of action. they were at once set to work reconnoitring the ground and the enemy's works by day, and laying out the batteries and superintending the working parties by night. lieutenant stevens threw himself into this work with even more than his accustomed zeal. on one of his daring reconnoissances the horse he rode--a powerful and headstrong animal loaned him by his friend, lieutenant tower--took the bit in his teeth and bolted directly for the enemy's lines. finding it impossible to stop or control the frantic steed, lieutenant stevens, throwing his whole strength on one rein, managed to make him swerve towards the base of a sand-hill, where he threw himself from the saddle, escaping injury on the soft ground, while the runaway continued his course to the very walls of the city. the batteries were placed midway between the lines of investment and the city, and about 900 yards from the walls. lieutenant stevens was indefatigable in searching out the best routes for the boyaux, or covered ways, to enable the troops to pass to and from the batteries without loss from the enemy's fire. the broken sand-hills and dense chapparal rendered this a difficult and laborious task; and in forcing his way through these thorny and almost impenetrable thickets his hands were so badly torn, and perhaps poisoned, that for several days he was obliged to have them bandaged with poultices of prickly pear. the route which he thus looked out was adopted, and the construction of the covered way was placed under his charge, with large working parties, for several nights, until completed. his experiences are best told in his own words. the independence, almost insubordination, of the new volunteers is simply the common experience with citizen soldiery fresh from home, but which they soon outgrow under good officers in a few months' campaigning. friday, march 18. at two a.m. lieutenants mason, stevens, and tower entered the trenches and relieved captain lee and lieutenants beauregard and mcclellan. no workers or guards present, save twelve sappers, till four o'clock. lieutenant mason at battery 2. lieutenant stevens at battery 1. lieutenant tower in communication leading to cemetery. colonel scott in command of the working party. a company of the 8th infantry, under command of lieutenants jordan and pitcher, in battery 1. about seven o'clock lieutenant foster relieved lieutenant tower, who returned to camp to supervise construction of powder magazines. at half past twelve lieutenant stevens ordered to examine the infantry communication, reconnoitred on the previous day, in order to commence the trenches at night with a working party. at two p.m. captain sanders on the naval battery. lieutenants stevens and smith on the right were on duty. the naval battery laid out during the day by captain lee. lieutenant smith took particular charge of batteries 3 and 4, and the remainder of the communication to battery 1, with a fatigue party under major graham; lieutenant stevens, of the boyau of communication from camp to batteries with a fatigue party of 400 volunteers, new yorkers and pennsylvanians. did not report at beach till nine p.m. arrived on the ground at ten p.m. two hours occupied in laying out the boyau with a cord and getting the whole force at work. whilst lieutenant stevens was absent in discharge of his duties of supervision at the batteries and trenches under the particular charge of lieutenant smith, the volunteers abandoned their work and returned to camp, excepting a small force of fifty men on the left of the large sand-hill, in rear of which the communication passed. saturday, march 19. about dark a large force of 400 men reported at the old cemetery as a fatigue party in the boyau under the charge of lieutenant stevens,--four companies of regulars, brooks and shackleford, 2d artillery; lieutenant ernst, 6th infantry; lieutenant rodgers, 2d dragoons,--the whole under the command of captain de hart,--and four companies of volunteers, pennsylvanians. the regulars employed on communication from battery 1 to battery 2, on parapet to the right of battery 2, and on the trench from the upper end of the valley to the first hollow of the natural trench leading through the long ridge in rear of the batteries, the volunteers on the remaining part of the boyaux. the regulars made their trench practicable. the volunteers could not be made to work with the most strenuous exertions on the part of the officers. some were drunk and all sleepy. they complained of being tired and hungry. some delay occurred throughout the works in consequence of a musketry fire from the trenches. lieutenant mason in charge of a working party at the batteries. monday, march 22. the boyaux of communication made practicable and safe to-day, although not sufficiently commodious; a fatigue party of 200 men reporting to lieutenant stevens, and commencing work at five a.m.; two companies regulars of 2d artillery, captain mckensie and lieutenant hardcastle, captain kendrick; and two of marines, lieutenant adams. this party worked with extraordinary vigor till three o'clock, all the men in the trenches all the time, the officers giving their whole energy to supervising the men; captain mckensie, in command of the working party, exhibiting great energy and efficiency. the day was quite warm, and an immense amount of work done. lieutenant mason at the batteries with fatigue party under the command of captain swartwout. tuesday, march 23. a fatigue party of 200 men reported to lieutenant stevens, and commenced work in the boyaux at 9-1/2 a.m., working with great vigor till dark, all the men constantly at work, and made the boyaux very safe and commodious,--two companies regulars, captain e.w. smith and lieutenant bissel, 5th infantry, two companies marines. note. more work is done by day than by night under fire. the working parties by day did at least double the work per man of the working parties by night. a severe sand-storm blowing all day and night. lieutenant stevens reported the completion of the boyaux to the chief engineer at 8-1/2 p.m., and, after an hour's rest, at his request returned to the trenches and assisted lieutenant mason till relieved at four o'clock in the morning. thursday, march 25. lieutenants mason and stevens relieved the engineer officers on the right at four a.m. great exertions were made at battery no. 4, which opened its fire at eight a.m. the fatigue party in the trenches, alabama volunteers, under the command of lieutenant-colonel earle, remarkably fearless and efficient. one sapper and two volunteers placed at each embrasure to repair it after every discharge. by their courage and exertions, the fire of the battery was not obstructed during the day. lieutenant mason made three reconnoissances of the enemy's works, accompanied twice by lieutenant stevens. two companies of the 1st artillery served the guns, captain magruder and lieutenant haskin; major l. whitney in command of the force serving the batteries. at eleven a.m. captain lee commenced establishing a new mortar battery on the left of no. 1. saturday, march 27. a severe norther raging yesterday made great ravages in the works that were repaired to-day. lieutenants mason and stevens in the trenches at four a.m. a new mortar battery commenced yesterday nearly finished to-day, under the particular direction of lieutenant stevens, with a working party of one company of the 4th infantry under the command of lieutenant lincoln. sunday, march 28. a partial survey of the trenches made by lieutenants beauregard, stevens, and tower. camp washington (three miles from vera cruz), march 27, 1847. my dearest margaret,--i have now the unspeakable satisfaction of telling you that both the city and the castle have capitulated after a bombardment of rather less than four days, and from the ninth day of opening the trenches, and with a loss on our side of less than forty in killed and wounded. i will tell you what your poor subaltern of a husband has had to do in this matter. on thursday, march 18, i made a reconnoissance with mason to determine the position of a road for wagons, and of a covered communication for infantry. on friday morning, march 19, i left camp at two in the morning, and was kept hard at work till four the next morning in constructing a battery and opening the communications thereto. during the course of this operation the enemy hurled at us some two hundred round-shot and shells. none came very near me. i had to encourage the men at their work, and had no time to attend to my fears. vera cruz, april 3. my dearest wife,--it is now saturday, and we have been in possession of the city one week. great destruction was spread throughout the city by our shells. in the portion next to our batteries a shell entered every house, and almost each room of every house, in consequence of which many inoffensive people were killed. vera cruz is a miserable, dirty place; the streets are full of filth, and there are great numbers of poor people. many families still keep their doors closed, though scarcely an outrage has been committed in the city. the people, though miserably poor, are very courteous and mild in their general deportment. ever since our entrance into the city, the poor have been fed each day from our government stores, and every exertion is made to protect the whole city in its rights. general worth is governor of the city. the weather is rather warm, and we find mosquitoes, fleas, etc., troublesome. the city, though sorry in its sunlight aspect, is remarkably picturesque by moonlight. the style of architecture is of the moorish character, abounding in domes and highly wrought work. i have several times wandered through the deserted streets of the city by night, filled with admiration of the gorgeous and oriental aspect of the scene. it surpasses anything i ever saw. my health is very fine. vera cruz, april 10. my dearest wife,--we are now preparing to march into the interior, and shall probably leave in a day or two. one half of the army are already on their way. we hope to enter the city of mexico, and to contemplate the wonders of the capital, in one month. in the reduction of the city we have had fortune on our side. the grossest supineness prevailed in the mexican ranks, though at times they awoke from their slumbers and poured into our midst well-directed fires of artillery. our loss is very little. john r. minton, a most gallant soldier, was killed on the first day of opening our fires. he was universally esteemed, and i had made his acquaintance on the first day of landing. he died for his country, before his country's gratitude for gallant services at monterey had been communicated in the shape of a brevet. the burden of the day came with great weight on the officers of engineers. it is the universal sentiment of the army that they did their duty. we see it in the individual deportment of every officer with whom we are associated on duty. we had exciting times. friends whom i had not seen since i left west point, i shook for the first time warmly by the hand under the heavy fire of the enemy's batteries. i met haskin and callender in such a conjuncture. there was not the least shrinking from duty, but each one stood up manfully to his task and did his whole duty; we all worked hard. the engineers failed in no part of their duty, and the consequence was that the loss of human life was comparatively trifling. i never worked so hard in my life. it was our first experience in the field, and i think we have fulfilled the expectations of the general and of our immediate chief (colonel totten). i have already written you in relation to the city. we all long to leave so much moonlight magnificence and sunlight squalidity, and breathe the pure mountain air of jalapa and perote. our troops are yet comparatively healthy. the sickly season will not come upon us for a month. up in the mountains it is the most salubrious and delightful climate of the new world. our troops conduct themselves with remarkable propriety. very few cases have occurred of excesses of any kind, and all such are punished with extreme severity. mason is in fine health, and is doing, as was to be expected, good service. all our officers are superior men, and we stand by each other like a band of brothers. i have secured a beautiful animal in the way of a horse, docile as a kitten and very intelligent. he has a beautiful eye and head, and will follow me wherever i go. i intend to bring him home with me. i have also a very good servant. he is an old soldier. i have just returned from a ride to our old camp. there is a fine hard beach all the way, which reminds me of the beach at newport. my little horse is very fleet, and carried me over the beach in very rapid style. how would hazard be delighted to see him stretch out! you must tell my little hazard about my horse. when i come home he shall ride him every day. they would soon be fast friends, i doubt not. have i told you that we are living in the government palace? at first we took our meals at the public house, but so much dirt and filth was to be met with everywhere that we formed a mess, and live in our own rooms. our mess is now reduced to four, major smith, captain lee, mason, and myself. there is a fine vegetable market close by, where we can provide ourselves; and as for meats, we have a barrel of hams. this morning i went to the market and observed quite a variety of tropical fruits; tomatoes, sweet potatoes, pineapples, plantains, lettuce, the mexican squash, are in great abundance. vera cruz, april 11. my dear father,--we are now in the midst of our arrangements to march into the interior, two divisions of the army (twiggs and patterson) having already marched. the greatest difficulty is on account of transportation. vera cruz is still healthy, and there is no natural reason why it should not be as salubrious as new orleans. its filth and nastiness is almost beyond belief, and is the efficient cause of its great sickliness in summer. our authorities are now making every exertion to cleanse the city. our troops behave well. some few excesses have been committed, and these are punished with exemplary severity. general scott has instituted military commissions to try a large class of offenses that, in an enemy's country, cannot be reached under the articles of war, and martial law has been proclaimed as a supplemental code. yesterday a negro was hanged outside the city walls for committing rape upon a mexican woman. we hope that peace will be established in the course of the summer. at all events, general scott will find no difficulty in entering the city of mexico. our own troops, regulars and volunteers, are in a high state of discipline, and pant for an opportunity to signalize themselves. the mexican troops have been demoralized by many successive defeats, and cannot, man to man, cope with our own. they are decidedly inferior, both in the men and the organization. in such cases numbers are of little account. all experience shows that resolution, courage, and enterprise, qualities possessed by our troops in an eminent degree, will overcome any tumultuous rabble. i verily believe that our little army of twelve thousand men is able to defeat any body of mexicans, however large. you know the papers have been full of the complaints of the sappers and miners, or engineer soldiers. these men i am on duty with every day. they are the pride of the whole army, confessedly the best soldiers in the army. i never saw so superior a company of soldiers, americans all, young men, having character, zeal, and intelligence, proud of their duties and of their position, perfectly subordinate, and cheerful in their obedience. i personally know almost every man of the sappers and miners. during the investment and siege of vera cruz they exhibited an extraordinary gallantry, and were all placed in the position of non-commissioned officers. each man had direction of a working party, and in the execution of that duty they retained their arms and gave directions to the men. [illustration: route, vera cruz to mexico] lieutenant stevens took great interest in the engineer company, so largely the result of his recommendations and exertions. his diary of the march inland commences the next day. march 29. the army made its entrance into the city this day at ten o'clock, and the general headquarters were established in the main plaza. general worth was appointed governor of the city. the engineer company, although it had preã«minently distinguished itself for gallantry and general conduct throughout the whole operation of the investment and siege, had no place assigned to it in the ceremonies of either the surrender or the entrance. colonel totten sailed on the princeton to the states as bearer of dispatches, and with the view of resuming his position at the head of the department, leaving major john l. smith in command. lieutenant stevens was this day directed to assume the duties of adjutant, and a sapper was detailed to assist him. march 30. lieutenants stevens, tower, and foster, with a detachment of twelve sappers, commenced the survey of the defenses of the city and castle. lieutenant mason was temporarily assigned to duty with general quitman on an expedition to alvarado. monday, april 12. the engineers left vera cruz with the general staff at five p.m., and reached vigara, three miles distant, where they encamped for the night. here a little stream flows into the sea, over which is an arched bridge of masonry, somewhat out of repair. i found myself exceedingly exhausted in consequence of my exertions before leaving the city in getting wagons for the baggage and train of the engineer company, and in attending to turning in the baggage of the engineer staff. tuesday, april 13. we started early, and found the road as far as santa fã© exceedingly sandy and difficult for carriages. santa fã© is situated in the midst of a prairie affording tolerable pasture for cattle, and has the honor of municipal regulation in the shape of an alcalde. there are some twenty little houses of trelliswork at this place. at the river san juan, six miles from santa fã© and twelve from vigara, over which is thrown a fine bridge of masonry with a long causeway at its western extremity, we halted and dined. before leaving, worth's advance, consisting of duncan's battery and lieutenant-colonel c.f. smith's light companies, reached the san juan, where they encamped for the night. resuming our march at three p.m., we pushed forward over at times a somewhat rough and hilly road, and at other points easy and practicable, till we reached our camping ground for the night, the talome river, having a one-arch bridge. wednesday, april 14. resuming our march early in the morning, we reached the national bridge at about ten a.m., distant eight miles from our encampment, after making a halt of an hour at paso de obejas (distant two and one half miles from talome), where we met a wagon train. there is a considerable village at this river. on leaving the village, the road winds its way to the top of a very high hill, where there is an inspiring view of the surrounding country. whilst the general was halting at the village, i rode to the top of the hill to take a view. at some distance to the south i could see a small band of rancheros watching the movements of our party. the national bridge is a model of the kind, possessing much architectural beauty, and impressing the mind of the beholder that an iron and a lofty race had done this work in the solitudes of the mountain pass. the scenery is of the most picturesque and imposing character. the road, previous to reaching the bridge, winds round a bold tongue of land, on the edge and apex of which a little fort had been built. from the first view of the pass, the road descends the side of a steep hill, constructed originally with great care, due attention having been paid to both curves and grades. on passing the bridge, on the left is a bold promontory, and the little fort and the open village at the other extremity of the bridge. on the right and downward side the river flows through a deep ravine, on either side of which perpendicular columns of rock rise hundreds of feet. the current gently flowed over a rocky bed, and was at points fordable. a thunderstorm in this mountain pass, the swollen stream rushing impetuously to the sea, must be terrific. after halting two hours at the national bridge, we pushed on to the plano del rio, the advance of the army. this was a difficult march of thirteen miles, with no water on the road for our horses. at some four miles from the bridge we reached a causeway, built with care, and which, leading over a little depression at its foot, is conducted almost to the top of a hill on the other side. on our way we met parties from camp searching the country for beef. we reached the plano del rio at about five o'clock, and after remaining about an hour with major smith and captain lee, i accompanied lieutenant tower on a reconnoissance. we proceeded on the jalapa road some three miles and a half, until we came in view of battery 4 on the left of the road. then, returning a short distance, we proceeded some distance on a path leading from the road till we came in view of the same battery, and one farther to the left, no. 3. from an examination of a sketch of lieutenant tower, exhibiting the results of all the reconnoissances since the arrival of general twiggs, there could be little doubt that the proper mode of attack was to the right, so as to turn the enemy's works and compel them to lay down their arms. the reconnoissances were not, however, complete, and the general, after informing himself of the position as far as it had been ascertained, determined that the reconnoissances should be extended. i found a bath in the river most delightful and refreshing after the severe labors of the day. thursday, april 15. the reconnoissances of the whole position were continued to-day; captain lee, with mason, beauregard, and myself, escorted by major sumner on the right, tower on the front. on reaching the point of the road before coming in view of battery 4, i was informed by bowman, a wagon-master of twiggs's division, that on the other side of the river there was a practicable trail leading to the river some eight miles above the bridge, and where would probably be found a practicable ford. after accompanying captain lee in his reconnoissance to a high hill about seven hundred yards from the cerro gordo, the key of the enemy's position, and getting a full view of it and of the ravines, valleys, etc., to the right, i returned home with a guide, and reported the statement of bowman to major smith. he was then starting with an escort to examine the enemy's works from the left bank of the river, with the view of establishing enfilading batteries against them. i also accompanied him; and after he had made his examinations, i requested permission to continue farther up, with a portion of the escort, till i could get a better view of the enemy's rear. a body of four hundred cavalry having been observed only about four miles up the river bank, major smith felt constrained to refuse my request. on returning from the reconnoissance i explained very fully my general views in reference to the proper mode of conducting the reconnoissances of the position, and that though thus far particular points had been carefully examined, and the engineer officers had been very industrious, yet the reconnoissances had been undertaken on too limited a scale, and did not cover the whole of the position. the dragoons are admirable for extensive reconnoissances, yet no attempt has been made to determine the practicability and even the existence of certain routes, on both the right and left, which are said to obtain; that branching from the jalapa road, a little this side of the national bridge, joined it again a short distance before reaching jalapa. either of these routes, pursued by worth's column, would have effectually turned the position of the cerro gordo. moreover, the reconnoissance on the right bank of the river had not been extended so as to get a view of the rear of the cerro gordo; and from the circumstance that four hundred lancers were on the right river bank, and in position about four miles above the bridge, the inference was almost conclusive that there was a practicable ford leading to the position in rear of the cerro gordo, and which the lancers were thrown out to cover. it was also suggested that a spirited reconnoissance in that direction would settle two essential questions, essential to properly combining the plan of attack,--1, whether there was not a practicable ford, by means of which the enemy could escape, and at which point a column of attack might be directed against him; 2, whether the main body, or a considerable portion thereof, might not be _en masse_ in rear of the position of the cerro gordo hill, and thus not be cut off by the flank movement to the right, unless extended to a wider circuit than was intended. this reconnoissance was pressed earnestly as essential, to get correct information in regard to the intentions and position of the enemy. friday, april 16. the reconnoissance i had recommended was ordered by general scott on the requisition of major smith, and fifty dragoons, under the command of lieutenant steele, were placed at my disposal. with bowman as guide, we started about half past eight o'clock, and, after crossing both branches of the river and ascending to the ranch on the hill, we struck into a broad trail, perfectly practicable for horses and field artillery, and after pursuing our way some two and three quarter miles, came to a trail nearly at right angles, and which bowman represented as six miles distant. leaving the escort here with steele, bowman, and a beef contractor, we continued in a direct course nearly a mile to some ranches, where we took a man and boy to get information. on our return we proceeded with the whole escort on the perpendicular trail to another ranch, about half a mile distant, and finally to the river supposed by bowman to be the main stream. we found it simply a tributary to the stream flowing under the first bridge, and the descent to the ravine through which it flowed was scarcely practicable for a mounted horseman. leaving a small escort at the ravine, the main body returning to the ranch, with bowman i pushed forward up the other side of the ravine, and proceeded about half a mile, and nearly to the foot of a spur that led obliquely to the main branch and in a direction a little beyond the cerro gordo. after examining the routes and the configuration of the country, i became satisfied that the reconnoissance could not be pushed farther in this direction to any practicable result, but that the best course would be to cross the spur at a depression and extend the reconnoissance down the other side to the river. on my return to the ranch, whilst proceeding at an easy pace, i found that an old rupture which had been cured fifteen years had broken out, and before i reached the ranch i began to suffer the most excruciating pain. the further continuance of the reconnoissance was abandoned, and i returned to camp, a distance of four miles, suffering very great pain. first dr. brown attended me, and i was soon relieved of pain by applying cold water. dr. tripler applied a very fine truss, and in the course of the evening i felt perfectly comfortable. [illustration: battle of cerro gordo] saturday, april 17. this day i remained in camp, able to move about only a little and with great care. in the movement of general twiggs to his position in order of battle, he was discovered, and a spirited combat ensued, which resulted in dislodging the enemy from a hill seven hundred yards from the cerro gordo, and upon which a battery of one 24-pounder and two 26-pounder howitzers was put in position during the night. sunday, april 18. as determined on yesterday, the position of the enemy was attacked to-day and, after a most brilliant conflict, the cerro gordo was stormed by the brigade of colonel harney, the enemy's line of retreat on the jalapa cut off by shields's brigade of volunteers and riley's brigade of regulars. a large portion of the enemy made their escape on the jalapa road, and across the river at the ford before alluded to. pillow made an attack in front, but failed in consequence of its being made prematurely, with great precipitation, without order in the assaulting columns, and before the supporting columns were in position, and at the wrong point, viz., in a ravine swept by the fire of two batteries, and with serious impediments in the way of abattis and felled trees. this attack, both as to time and as to direction, was earnestly remonstrated against by the engineer officer directing the attack, by the personal staff of the general, and by colonel campbell, second in command. had the attack been made on the enemy's extreme right, the true point of attack, and which was supposed to be the point determined upon by the general until he announced a different intention on arriving on the ground, it would have succeeded. it was fortunate the attack failed. it kept the garrisons of the batteries in their places and increased the number of prisoners. shields behaved most gallantly in his advance to the jalapa road, and was severely--supposed at the time mortally--wounded by a grapeshot that passed through his body. his advance captured santa anna's carriage. worth's division was not engaged, acting simply as a reserve. the storming of the cerro gordo was one of the most brilliant things on record. whilst it was in progress, four thousand of the enemy were put in motion to turn their flanks, but the cerro gordo falling into our hands before they became engaged, they took ignominiously to flight. so certain was harney that such would be the effect, when two thousand troops were reported to him as threatening each flank, he simply gave the order to extend to the right and left, and kept pushing up, and after a sharp conflict drove the enemy from the breastworks and down the hill. the retreat of the enemy was a perfect rout. a portion in small bodies retreated on the jalapa road. many troops fled to the chapparal, making their escape through almost impracticable paths. santa anna himself made his escape with a few attendants across the river and at the ford, whose existence was not verified till after the battle in consequence of the serious injury that occurred to me, preventing my extending the reconnoissance as i contemplated. ampudia with a few officers retreated on the jalapa road, and very nearly fell into our hands. twiggs's division was pushed forward hotly in pursuit, and encamped at encerro, fourteen miles distant, the night of the battle, and reached jalapa the next day. he was closely followed by the volunteer division, general patterson assuming command of the whole. worth returned to camp with the general and his staff. i was on my back a portion of the day, and was just able to drag about camp. camp near cerro gordo, sunday, april 15, 1847, 5 p.m. my dearest wife,--i have glorious news to tell you. this day we had a hard-fought battle at this place, the first great mountain pass on the highway from vera cruz to mexico. the result is a most decisive victory, resulting in the capture of six thousand mexicans, and the loss on our part of about three hundred killed and wounded. general twiggs is now in hot pursuit of santa anna, who was present in command, and his remnant of five or six thousand men. he will, we trust, enter jalapa to-night, fifteen miles distant. his division of somewhat less than three thousand men did the hard work, and will of course have the highest award of praise. as for your poor husband, his was the part to stay in camp. two days since i conducted a reconnoissance on the left of the enemy's line over very difficult ground, with fifty dragoons to support me. i rode hard through the morning, and about three in the afternoon an old rupture in the groin, which troubled me when a boy from ten to fourteen years of age, broke out again after a perfect cure of fifteen years. so excruciating was the pain that it required the greatest exertion to get to camp, four miles distant, on my horse. fortunately one of the best physicians in the army, dr. tripler, was able to attend upon me, and most fortunate of all he had a solitary truss of the best workmanship, which just fitted me. dr. tripler has prescribed the utmost quietude, has forbidden all excitement, and especially all riding on horseback. i had already received the appointment of adjutant of engineers, and my staff duties i can still attend to. all my friends express great sympathy for my misfortune. general scott expressed himself in terms that won my heart. he remarked, "you engineers are too daring. you require to be held back. my young friend, i almost cried when i heard of your mishap." i have made a great many friends since i joined the army. it may be well that i have received this check. ever since i joined the army, i have been too impetuous, too headstrong. i have made great physical exertion. now i am obliged to rein in the power of muscles, in which i do not excell, and have equal opportunities to develop the mental as before i became incapacitated. i shall have charge of the train of the engineers, which is carried in quite a number of wagons, and shall therefore be always able to ride in a wagon. my horse is one of the finest animals in the army, and is a most fast, easy, and beautiful walker, and he will therefore be no impediment to my riding on horseback. all my friends of the engineers did well. captain lee has won golden opinions. mason is rising rapidly in the esteem of all. he is one of the most disinterested as well as one of the most talented men in the army. if i have a perfectly devoted friend in the whole army, it is mason. he makes no professions; he is always true to himself and his views of right, but i have his friendship and he has mine. my old chum tower did splendidly. he is a man of great powers of mind and determined energy of character. he will probably be brevetted for his services at this place and at vera cruz. to-morrow the whole army resumes its onward march. in one day we shall enter jalapa. general scott is winning golden opinions. he is prodigiously popular with the volunteers, and the whole army has confidence in him. during the whole continuance of the battle to-day he was much exposed. the movement which resulted in the great victory of to-day was to the right and rear of the enemy, and the success of it hinged on the taking of a little work on the top of an almost inaccessible hill. the famous colonel harney of the dragoons led the forlorn hope in the attack of this position, and was closely followed by the 3d and 7th infantry. up rushed our troops, amidst the most deafening cheers from the whole line. steadily advanced the stars and stripes to the very mexican standard floating from the mexican work. for one moment in the most difficult point our flag disappeared; again it rose, and was immediately planted in triumph on the top of the hill. in four weeks we shall most certainly be in the city of mexico, unless previously the mexicans make overtures of peace. my dear wife, do not feel anxious for me. i have the means, and shall take care of my health. my hopes of distinction have in a measure vanished, but still i have the satisfaction that i can be highly useful. my general health is very good. remember me to mary and my dear children, to judge peabody, and all my friends. your affectionate husband, isaac. chapter ix jalapa.--puebla monday, april 19. this was a lazy day in camp, the general and his staff being occupied with the charge of the prisoners, and preparing the proper dispatches. it was determined to release all the prisoners and officers on parole. thus 2700 men (and 200 having escaped the previous day whilst coming into camp, and before they had reached the charge of general worth) were sent, with rations to subsist them on their way home, to and beyond jalapa. la vega, one of the prisoners, announced his intention not to accept his parole, but to go to the united states. the surgeons, moreover, were most actively engaged in caring for the wounded. the wounds of the men generally were slight, and all the disabled were cheerful and in high spirits. the wounds of the mexicans were bad, and many of their dead were shot in the head. general shields, to the surprise of all, still survived, was in excellent spirits, and did not doubt that he would get well. at half past one the general-in-chief and his staff, with an escort of dragoons, started for jalapa, and passed the night at encerro, the residence of santa anna. worth, who marched from the plano del rio in the morning, reached jalapa the same night. on the road i saw several dead, disfigured with horrible wounds. i was obliged to ride in a wagon, the surgeon having forbidden my riding on horseback. the country seat of santa anna is delightfully situated in the midst of a rolling country, abounding in herds of cattle, and all the fruits of both tropics. his house is of two stories, the first being appropriated to kitchens, store-rooms, etc., and the second to the family. several rooms were well furnished, and were garnished with paintings on historical subjects, for the most part mexican and spanish. we saw several of his wooden legs. tuesday, april 20. the general and staff reached jalapa about eleven a.m., after a most beautiful ride of eight miles. along the road were to be observed the mexican troops in little groups of two or three, accompanied by their women, of whom there were many at their camp at the cerro gordo. i ventured to try my horse, and found for the time being less inconvenience than in the wagon. the appearance of the country, rolling and green, was very inviting. as we approached the city, the rear of worth's wagons was in the road, the men and mules almost entirely exhausted by the long march of yesterday. major smith, in consequence of injuries resulting from riding on horseback, was obliged to ride, and accompanied major sumner (wounded in the conflict of the 17th inst.) in the carriage of santa anna. on reaching the city i had the pleasure of meeting captain lee, lieutenant beauregard, and lieutenants smith and mcclellan of the engineer company, who were in the advance with twiggs. quarters were assigned major smith and myself in the governor's house, the headquarters of general scott. the same afternoon general worth was pushed forward in the advance, captain lee, lieutenants mason and tower, and the engineer company accompanying him. it was reported that la hoya and perote had been abandoned, and that a body of three or four thousand lancers was on the route to puebla. wednesday, april 21. i was busily engaged to-day in organizing the train of the engineer company, the mules having proved very poor on the route from plano del rio, and many of the animals being entirely unserviceable. on requisition from the senior engineer, the general directed that a train of eight wagons should be furnished by the quartermaster at vera cruz to bring up the engineer train that remained, and as many of the engineer implements as practicable. lieutenant foster, in the afternoon, with the engineer train that had come up from the plano del rio, started to join his company at perote. sapper noyes went to vera cruz in the train of friday morning to point out to the quartermaster the articles that were needed. thursday to saturday, april 22-24. nothing especial occurred on these days. i have been principally engaged whilst at my leisure in going about the town, observing the people and their customs. sunday, april 25. this day i attended high mass in the cathedral. the church was decorated considerably, though with little taste. there were several figures of the virgin mary. the people seemed attentive to the various ceremonies, and were scrupulous in observing the prescribed forms. not many of the higher classes were present. some few elegant and well-dressed ladies were to be seen. monday to thursday, april 26-29. during these days i have been collecting facts in relation to the battle of cerro gordo, with the view of making a general map and digesting a connected military narrative. in consequence of all the officers, except lieutenant beauregard and myself, having gone to perote, there were no means of making an accurate survey of the positions, or of getting sketches of the various reconnoissances, to form a general plan. the only sketch forwarded from perote was one by lieutenant tower. i have met during these days several old friends, particularly tilden and haskin. canby i have seen much of. april 30. this day i was busily occupied in preparing a memoir on the proper mode of conducting the war, in case mexico shall pursue the guerrilla system, and obstinately refuse to listen to terms of accommodation. i find great difficulty in procuring information as to routes, etc. the weather in jalapa is delightful. for the past four days copious showers towards evening have exercised the most healthful and invigorating influence upon the troops here. since the arrival of headquarters on tuesday, april 20, there has been a remarkable equableness of temperature. jalapa is the very eden of mexico, and its picturesque situation in the very bosom of the mountains is nowhere surpassed. such is the perfect amenity and smiling aspect of nature at this favored spot, that all the seasons of the year meet together. all the days of the year are both seedtime and harvest. the place is singularly beautiful in its perennial bloom, and in the flowers and gardens of its people. they seem to be a happy, easy race, and many of the people are of refinement and intelligence. there are indications in the suburbs of jalapa of more populousness and wealth than now obtain, as in the wells of masonry to be seen, fifty feet and more in depth, etc. the snowy peak of orizaba, fifteen thousand feet above the sea, is to be seen far above the clouds, which at times hang over its base. jalapa, thursday, april 22, 1847. my dearest wife,--we entered this beautiful city, fragrant with flowers and shrubbery, at eleven o'clock tuesday morning. jalapa and the surrounding country is the eden of mexico. for many miles the country is in the highest state of cultivation. there is a perennial bloom. at this very moment all the fruits and every species of vegetation are to be seen in all their stages. on the same tree are seen blossoms and fruit. in the same field we observe grain and corn just springing from the seed, and we see it ready for the sickle. the market abounds in oranges, bananas, peppers, lettuce, cabbages, cauliflower, onions, lemons, peas (green), beans, tomatoes, etc. the refinement and cultivation of the people are to be seen in their taste for flowers. at all points the most beautiful flowers strike your eye. all the houses of the lower classes, as well as of the higher, have gardens of flowers in rear. as you pass through the street you every moment get glimpses of fountains and shrubbery. jalapa is more than capua of old. it is capua with all its beauty and serenity, but without its _abandon_. the people are refined, courteous, intelligent, and upright. here we shall remain for some ten days or a fortnight, to organize the campaign, and prepare for the march to mexico. jalapa will be the great base of operations. we left the plano del rio on monday. i rode on a wagon, and reached encerro, the hacienda of santa anna, a distance of fourteen miles, the same evening. the general and his staff passed the night here. it is beautifully situated on a commanding hill, with ample outbuildings, an artificial pond for bathing, etc., and a paved road branching from the main jalapa road. the hacienda of two stories was elegantly furnished on the second floor, the first floor being appropriated to kitchens, store-rooms, etc. we saw several of santa anna's wooden legs. general scott gave us in the evening a nice supper with wine. i rode on tuesday from encerro to jalapa on my horse, and found it about as comfortable as a wagon. the distance was about eight miles. the morning was beautiful and the scenery enchanting. on reaching the city we found some seven or eight thousand of our troops under arms. for the first time since cortez the hostile feet of a foreign race trod its pavements. the most perfect tranquillity prevailed. the people are well treated, receive good prices for all they wish to sell, and do not feel the weight of a foreign yoke. last evening we received intelligence that general taylor entered the city of san luis potosi on the 13th of this month. well done, indomitable old hero! it is somewhat doubtful whether i shall go on with the army. the surgeon advises me to remain here for the present. with care he thinks i may rely on a permanent cure. care, however, is required. jalapa, may 1, 1847. my dearest wife,--i am glad to be able to assure you that my health is improving. it is not yet safe for me to ride my horse, and i think that my ride from encerro, the country seat of santa anna, to jalapa put me back some days. i can walk without any inconvenience by being careful as to my gait, and avoiding all sudden steps. i am not in the least incapacitated for office duty, and am, excepting my injury, in very vigorous health. it is hard, i assure you, in this beautiful region to be detained from enjoying my fine horse. as it is, he stands in the stable doing nothing. on monday, may 3, i shall move on with general patterson's advance, in charge of the engineer train, to join the engineer corps with worth. the brilliant conflict of cerro gordo came upon the mexicans like a thunderbolt, and is the most decisive blow of the war. the road is free to the city of mexico, and i have no doubt general scott will be there in six weeks. it is said the mexicans will resort to the guerrilla mode of warfare. it will be found worse than useless. it will be found of assistance to our arms. general scott will enforce the strictest discipline, and the people of the country will remain undisturbed in their houses. a fair price will be paid for everything that is consumed. the war will be made to bear with a heavy hand upon all connected with the government, and upon the property of all disaffected persons. don't feel alarmed about the observation in the papers in reference to the terrible and atrocious character of guerrilla warfare. no one here feels the least alarm. twelve resolute men can disperse a hundred rancheros. as guerrilla troops our volunteers are infinitely superior to the mexicans. the mexicans as guerrilla troops are poor. they are generally very inferior troops. they are best behind breastworks, yet our men find no difficulty in storming them. you may be sure that this city is a most charming place. we do not find the upper classes disposed to associate with us. jalapa is said to be one of the most exclusive places in mexico, the society being broken up into cliques, and families living among themselves as in new bedford. the upper classes are indeed said to be very hostile to us. we are now about building a battery to overawe the city, where a ten-inch mortar will be mounted. the terrible destruction at vera cruz from our shells has been spread over all mexico, and with all the exaggeration of the spanish character. all the cities have the greatest fear of our shells. the last few days i have been busily occupied in preparing a narrative of the brilliant conflict of the cerro gordo, illustrated with a sketch, and for the engineer department at washington, and also in writing a memoir on the best mode of opposing the guerrilla warfare. the latter i have done chiefly for my own instruction. it is possible, if i can finish it to my mind, i may have it published. i have some thoughts of sending it to general scott at once. the general, however, is a very great talker and writer himself, and i doubt whether he could find time to read the memoir. sunday, may 2. the train does not go till to-morrow, so i can tell you something of the occurrences of this day. sunday is the great market day of jalapa, and this morning i saw the greatest profusion of vegetables, watermelons in abundance, the finest oranges, bananas, plantains, cauliflower, cabbage, lettuce, celery, beans, peas, squashes, pumpkins, sweet potatoes, irish potatoes, green corn, rare-ripe onions, tomatoes. the onions are the finest i ever saw. they are far superior to our own. many well-dressed ladies were to be seen in the market with their servants. i went to the cathedral, but remained only a short time. i consulted to-day dr. wright, the hospital surgeon of jalapa, in reference to my difficulty, and he speaks in the most encouraging manner. he says there is no objection to my riding a portion of the distance on horseback, and that with care there is not the least danger in advancing with the army. may 3. in the expectation that the march would take place to-morrow, i was busily engaged preparing for my departure. the sappers remaining in this place made all their arrangements, and the engineer train of eight wagons was put in perfect order, a wagon master and two extra men having been provided for. general patterson's advance brigade, that would serve as our escort, was the brigade of quitman. in the evening, about eight o'clock, an express came up from vera cruz. may 4. i rose early, having decided to start at half past six o'clock. some delays occurred, and when in readiness to start, at half past seven, i was informed that the order to march had been countermanded. consequently everything was put back in its place. about eleven a.m. carigan, a sick sapper, died at the hospital. he had been sick almost from the first day he came into the country. his case was not considered incurable at vera cruz, but the journey to jalapa, riding in a wagon over a rough road, proved too much for his strength. he was buried in the afternoon in a convent churchyard, his remains having been accompanied by myself and five sappers. when his body was lowered into its final resting-place, i made a few remarks on the peculiar circumstances of his case, dwelling upon the fact that his short service had not been in vain, and that he had served his country, and as much died for his country as though he had fallen at vera cruz or at cerro gordo. sergeant clark and a.m. noyes, on my calling on them, made a few very appropriate remarks in reference to his case, and bore cheerful testimony to his excellent character and the esteem in which he was held by his associates. regan, a sapper who had enlisted with him, and who had known him for a long time, was a most sincere mourner. he seemed to reproach himself as the cause of carigan's death, in consequence of his own example having been the cause of carigan's enlistment. i stated to regan that he had no cause to reproach himself, and that in writing to carigan's friends he could dwell upon the circumstances of carigan's having received every attention, and finally having been buried in one of the most beautiful regions of the earth, and in ground consecrated by the religious solemnities of his faith. may 5. there are reports that santa anna intends cutting off the large train coming from vera cruz in a few days, in consequence of which captain bainbridge with a battalion of infantry proceeded downward yesterday, to be followed by colonel riley and a portion of his brigade to-morrow, the whole to take a position at the national bridge. i now hold myself in readiness to move forward at any moment. but in the present aspect of affairs, three regiments of volunteers returning home, much sickness amongst the troops, and no certainty as to the arrival of new levies, it is not certain that it will be possible to move beyond puebla. may 7. left jalapa this morning at 7.30 in charge of the second section of the engineer train, to join the advance of general worth, and under the escort of general quitman's brigade, to whom i reported on my arrival at his encampment. he did not get under way till towards noon, and, after marching two hours through a cultivated and beautiful country, we reached the village of el soldado, about eight miles from jalapa. after halting an hour at this place the command pursued its march through a most picturesque and beautiful country, presenting at the different points a varied view of the valley, dotted all over with villages, and with fields of corn and barley, and parties of laborers by the roadside peacefully pursuing the cultivation of the soil. at la hoya, defended with some care at a pass between two high hills, with a succession of barriers in the road, two arranged with a single embrasure for guns, was to be seen the apple-tree in blossom, and also the pine-tree. we halted at las vegas for the night, the road hither ascending all the way, and the character of the trees rapidly changing to the fir, the black birch, and the mountain oak. las vegas is a somewhat straggling village of perhaps about two thousand people, situated in a depression or valley in the hills, which to the northeast expand into a most fertile and agreeable plain, highly cultivated along the west side. most inviting fields of barley and corn had remained untouched, though the horses of our troops had subsisted on the former. jalapa to el soldado, seven miles; to la hoya, three miles (large); to tank on left, nine miles; to las vegas, three miles; jalapa to las vegas, twenty-two miles. may 8. left las vegas about eight a.m. and reached perote about twelve p.m., a distance of ten miles, or about. this route for the first three miles is quite rough and uneven. at the end of the third mile is a very long and difficult descent, at the foot of which is a beautiful stream of ice-cold water, flowing directly from the coffre de perote. here the whole command were refreshed. after ascending a considerable hill we again, after a gentle descent, gained a little village at another, quite sluggish stream about a mile from the rio frio. a slight ascent brought us to the extended plain of perote, ten or twelve miles in width and extending generally in a westerly direction as far as el pinal. perote, with its castle in the middle of the plain and towards its eastern extremity, was almost depopulated, and presented a very uninviting appearance. general worth had collected here large stores of forage and flour, much rice, and some sugar and coffee. on reporting to general worth, and stating my object (to join captain lee), i was directed to attach myself to colonel clarke's brigade, the last battalion of which was to march at seven a.m. on the 9th. i found mason quite sick, and doubtful as to his ability to move on. though somewhat fatigued with my day's march, i suffered no inconvenience from my rupture, though the entire distance from jalapa was made on horseback. may 9. i left perote this morning with colonel clarke at seven a.m., and arrived at san antonio, a distance of seven miles, about eleven. a slight halt was made three miles from perote. at one o'clock, after resting the mules, i proceeded with the train to tepe ahualco, which i reached after a distance of nine miles. here i found the engineer company, and captain lee and lieutenant tower of the engineers. captain lee, unfortunately, was suffering from chills and fever. may 10. the brigade of colonel garland, with general worth and staff, left tepe ahualco (a very mean village, with bad water) at eight o'clock, and after a march of ten miles through the plain reached the hacienda of vireyes, where we encamped for the night. this hacienda, like most of the haciendas of the country, was a good substantial building on the four sides of a square, and arranged with reference to the defense of the interior space. the peons lived in mean habitations of mud and trellis-work, not equal to the dwellings of swine in new england. may 11. the march commenced at seven a.m., and after two halts,--one of about half an hour at byzantium, distant eight miles, a village having its cathedral, one or two stores with pulque for sale, and pretty good houses for the peons; one of about two hours at ojo de agua, distant ten miles, a village not so considerable as the former, but noted for its clear water gushing in quite a large stream from the roadside,--we reached the hacienda santa annaced as a violent windstorm came on. large stacks of barley straw in front of the hacienda afforded sustenance for many domestic animals. as we approached the village of byzantium, a gently ascending and somewhat considerable hill on the left, cultivated to its very top with the maguey plant, and the green grass of the flowing stream at the base relieved the dryness of the plain, and afforded a most pleasing prospect. the road on the 10th and 11th was level; and for the most part good. distance this day, about twelve miles. may 12. the march commenced at six a.m., the rear brigade of colonel clarke joining the advance brigade of colonel garland in its first movement, its encampment having been only two miles in rear. after proceeding some miles we entered nopalucan, a considerable town of three churches, several fondas, and some substantial houses. the padre furnished the general and his officers an entertainment of spirits and cakes. the best people had shut up their houses and left the place. before approaching nopalucan, the road for some two miles passes through a highly cultivated tract of country, with some dozen haciendas on the right and left. an elevation on entering this tract affords a very charming prospect. after remaining two hours at nopalucan the division moved forward, over in some portions a rough road, and encamped for the night one league this side of the pass of el pinal. may 13. at nopalucan information was given that santa anna, with some fifteen hundred or two thousand lancers, had passed through that place on the 10th for puebla, and at the camp of the 12th and 13th there were rumors that he had prepared mines in the road at el pinal. in consequence the engineer company, duncan's battery, and some other troops moved early to examine the pass. a false alarm during the night left many of the troops much harassed. el pinal is no pass whatever, and the mines, of which rumor was so big, were little excavations commenced under the road in two places, but abandoned. el pinal derives its name from the pine-trees, which are found to the very top of the mountains. at this point the road commences a rapid descent, and soon brings us to acajete, a smaller place than nopalucan, yet having its church and its fonda. here the alcalde provided a collation for the general and his officers. after halting an hour and a half, we moved forward, and reached amasoque about two o'clock. this is a village having a large public square and three fine churches. it is larger than nopalucan, and must contain nearly four thousand inhabitants. it was determined to remain at amasoque one entire day to enable general quitman's command to come up, and accordingly general worth's division was in expectation of a day's rest, but about nine o'clock. may 14, word was brought that five thousand lancers were marching down upon us. a reconnoissance by captain lee reduced the numbers to less than two thousand, and the movement seemed to look to the cutting of our communication with quitman's column. it was so illy concerted that seventy shots from duncan's battery and a few from steptoe's turned the enemy from their apparent purpose, and caused them to turn to their left and make good their retreat. a column of about six hundred, however, continued their course, veering a little to the left to keep out of the reach of quitman, who, on hearing our guns, hastened the march of his troops, and effected a junction with worth with great celerity. this column was followed by myself, lieutenant mcclellan, and three dragoons as far as the hacienda san miguel, some five miles from amasoque. on the way thither we crossed a very deep arroyo, along a very good though very steep mule-path. at the hacienda, having ascertained from the people and from their trail that the column had continued their eccentric course, we returned in a somewhat different direction, and having crossed an arroyo by an almost impracticable path, and fallen on and nearly captured a mexican officer and his servant, we came to where the arroyos met, and were obliged to retrace our steps. we reached headquarters about three o'clock. i was exceedingly exhausted by my exertions. lieutenant mcclellan was very gallant and prompt in pursuing the mexican, and lost him in consequence of the chapparal. a pony that was led by the servant was given to the men. note. the occurrences of this day show two things: 1st. troops should be quartered or encamped in reference to the attack of an enemy, and the site should always be determined by officers of engineers. 2d. on the arrival of troops at the place of encampment, an examination should be made to determine the principal circumstances in reference to the roads and the general features of the topography of the country, so that, in case of an attack or demonstration, we should have the necessary information to strike a vigorous blow at the enemy, and push him into a precipitate retreat. at amasoque nothing was known in the morning in reference to the roads of the village itself leading to the direction where the enemy was known to be, until the reconnoissance was made after the presence of the enemy was reported. still less was anything known in regard to the existence of the arroyos, which cut up the surface of the plain, and rendered it entirely impracticable for cavalry and artillery to operate, till the crossings (used by the people of the country and known by their troops) were carefully ascertained. during the whole march from tepe ahualco, these things had been entirely _neglected_. captain lee and lieutenant tower made a reconnoissance of the country towards puebla, and discovered that the main body of the enemy had retrograded to a village some eight miles from and off the main road to puebla. colonel garland's brigade was pushed forward about two miles and bivouacked for the night. the troops were ordered to march, first at nine p.m., then at three a.m., and finally at five a.m., in order to concentrate near puebla in the course of the morning. in consequence of these continual changes, the troops were exceedingly and needlessly harassed. may 15. the army moved at five a.m., and at a village three miles from amasoque, commissioners were found in waiting to treat for the occupation of the city. the assurances of the general were satisfactory to them. they were simply a recognition that puebla should be no exception to the general course our army has pursued in this country as regards the inviolability of the rights, persons, religion, and authority of the city, so far as not incompatible with its military occupation. the troops in the course of the day were all got into quarters, although it was accomplished in a very undignified manner, the general, at the head of his staff, personally superintending the breaking open of the doors of the barracks whenever they were not opened by the keys in season to satisfy his impatient spirit. may 16-22. the army continued in the peaceful occupation of puebla, and nothing occurred to disturb the general tranquillity except two or three cases of broils, occasioned by the imprudence of our own people, and one report of the march of santa anna to attack the city. some changes were made in the distribution of troops, much attention paid to the rumors of the streets, and no general system of measures adopted in relation to the defenses of the city, or to the dispositions to be made in case of the attack of an enemy. the people were decidedly hostile to santa anna, and our respect for their rights was making a decided change in our favor. on the 20th and 21st the city was rife with rumors of the approach of general taylor to san luis potosi, and at length it was said that general taylor had been taken prisoner and hanged. information came on the 21st that general scott was still at jalapa, and would not leave till the 23d. may 23, 24. affairs continue tranquil. information has come that general twiggs left jalapa saturday, may 22, and was followed by general scott on sunday. my own health is improving very rapidly, and on the 24th i reported to captain lee my readiness for duty. may 25. engaged on a reconnoissance of the road to tlascala. there are two roads, one for carriages and one for mules, which continue separate the whole distance to tlascala. this reconnoissance occupied seven hours, and was supported by twelve sappers. may 26. accompanied captain lee and lieutenants mason and tower in an examination of the hill and the adjacent parts of the city, to determine a position for our troops in case of the attack of the enemy. the occupation of the hill, the cuartel san josã©, and some buildings on the right and left, fulfilled the conditions quite well. it commanded the city, and the approaches to it in the direction of the hill afforded room for stores, wagons, and animals. this examination was suggested to general worth by captain lee on the first occupation of the city, but was deferred in consequence of press of business, and was ordered to-day in consequence of a report that a strong force of the enemy was marching upon the city from mexico. may 27. a fatigue party with some sappers, and all under the direction of lieutenant smith, were employed to-day in repairing the parapet of fort guadalupe, on the summit of the hill. the engineer officers were engaged generally in examining roads entering the city, and plotting the same. may 28. general scott and staff arrived to-day. engineers employed as yesterday. may 29. general twiggs arrived with his division to-day at three p.m., and at one o'clock the long roll beat in consequence of a report of the approach of the enemy, twenty thousand strong. this proved to be unfounded. may 30, 31. the only occurrence of interest is santa anna's solemn renunciation of power, and return to private life. he declares in his manifest that he has labored with a single eye to the good of his country, and can review with satisfaction and without reproach his whole public career. i cannot but entertain the opinion that santa anna's renouncing all authority is in consequence of a fixed determination on his part to be "aut cã¦sar aut nihil." it may be the deliberate act of a great statesman and patriot, more firmly to maintain the authority necessary to save his country. he may act from the conviction that his country, seeing that he would not continue in authority in this crisis unless he were cordially supported by all parties, would with one voice recall him to public life and invest him with full powers. so far as i am able to judge, santa anna's career, since his return to mexico, has been most glorious and remarkable. without resources, and in the midst of internal discord, he has organized two large armies, and made one of the most extraordinary marches in all history. he has been defeated, but throughout has shown an admirable constancy, and exhibited high military qualities. in strategic operations he has shown marked ability. at buena vista he came within an ace of utterly defeating general taylor, and had he succeeded (and the probabilities were in his favor), he would have been able to excite to the highest pitch of enthusiasm the whole nation. a large army might have been raised, and our advance into the interior effectually checked. on the field of battle he has not proved equal to us. but it is probably due to the nature of his troops, who in the shock of the conflict are inferior to us, three or four to one. at angostura, and at the cerro gordo, he exhibited courage and an indefatigable spirit. he did not leave the height of the cerro gordo till the very moment of its falling into our hands, and he was obliged to make his escape on one of the wheel mules of his carriage. nor were his spirits depressed by this overwhelming defeat. he immediately rallied his troops at orizaba, a strategic position in reference to the whole route of jalapa from vera cruz to puebla. here he was able to threaten our lines of communication, and, without moving a step, he compelled us to protect our trains with large escorts as they came up from vera cruz to jalapa. when nearly a whole brigade (riley's) was sent down to protect the large train supposed to be the last of five hundred wagons, and it became evident that nothing more would be gained in this direction, he anticipated our advance, and threw himself between us and the city of mexico. he has now renounced all authority. we must wait until his real object in taking this great step shall have become developed. june 3. we have rumors to-day that a reinforcement of 3000 men has landed at antigua, and is on the march to jalapa. it has been determined to break up jalapa, place the sick in hospital in perote, and bring up the whole disposable force to puebla. at perote and jalapa are 800 sick and 1700 men in garrison. leaving a garrison of 400 men in perote, the remaining 1300 men, with 900 recruits, will increase the troops now at puebla, 6000 effectives including officers (there are 700 sick), to 8200; of the 900 recruits, at least 200 will be left behind sick. so that 8000 men will be the extent of our force. we shall probably remain in puebla till about the 1st of july, and then advance to the city with our whole force. i write this evening to my wife by a train going down to-morrow. it is doubtful whether the letter will reach the states. this is corpus christi day. i attended church in the morning, and was anything but pleased with the idle ceremonies of the occasion. the catholicism of this country is a great corruption of that of the united states. it is chiefly a religion of observances, and of the most burdensome and elaborate kind. excepting human sacrifices, it is on a par with the religion of the aztecs. a bull-fight having been advertised, i attended it with many other officers, but the performance was a very tame one. the bulls were barbarously butchered after having been lassoed and thrown down. every one returned home disgusted. june 4. the news from mexico to-day is less favorable to peace. the congress, it is said, has refused to accept the resignation of santa anna, and the latter has left mexico to take command of the troops. the landing of cadwallader with three thousand troops has been confirmed. half a million of money is also on its way. everything bears a favorable aspect now. the arrival of funds is of great consequence, in order that no necessity may arise to live by forced contributions. we ought to apply to the support of the war the revenues that formerly went to the central government, but in our dealings with individuals scrupulously to pay for every supply and service. to-day i was employed on the journal of last month. the officers were generally employed on the drawings. june 6. a mail arrived to-day with cheering news from the states. the government was exerting its energies to increase both columns of invasion, and, from the success which had already attended the recruiting service, there was little doubt that in the course of the season there would be thirty thousand troops in the field. six regiments of volunteers for the war were also to be called out. june 7-21. the army has continued recruiting its strength and awaiting reinforcements. daily drills in companies, battalions, brigades, and divisions have tended to give tone and efficiency to the command, though a counteracting influence has been found in the troops not being paid. great discontent exists in consequence of this. many of the troops are quartered in damp basements, and all live on fresh provisions, prolific causes of disease. the sickness has been as high as twenty-five per cent. of the whole number present, and even at this time is not much below this. in some regiments the company officers do not attend to their men, and particularly to their food. the use of the chili, or mexican pepper, supplies the place of salt, and contributes essentially to the health of the troops. there have been occasional rumors of rising in the city, to be assisted by guerrillas. a small force is with the governor at athsio, and all the roads are infested to some extent by this description of troops. there have been several attempts to induce our men to desert, and now a german is being tried for the offense, and will probably be put to death. the engineers have been employed in drawing a map of the city and its environs, completing the drawings of the siege of vera cruz, and collecting information in relation to the roads and localities in the valley of mexico. the general-in-chief reached puebla on the 28th, and on the following day all the engineer officers and the engineer company were relieved from duty with particular divisions, and placed under the direction of the senior engineer at general headquarters. general twiggs arrived with his division on the 29th of june. information was derived from americans, residents of the city of mexico, who joined the army as it penetrated into the country, and from mexicans (robbers and contrabandists), etc. in consequence of these inquiries, captain lee was enabled to prepare a map of all the routes from puebla to the city of mexico and in its valley, and exhibiting generally the topography of the country, its hills, rivers, marshes, etc. much information was also obtained in reference to the fixed means of defense of the enemy,--particularly the position and character of field-works and batteries, and the character of the obstructions from cuts in the causeways of approach to the city, and from inundations from the lakes. in the investigation of this matter, one circumstance transpired affording convincing proof that no difficulty would be found to bribe men of rank and influence. a merchant of puebla, of some wealth, extensive connection, and large practical knowledge of localities in all parts of mexico, for the sum of five thousand dollars proposed going to the city of mexico and procuring accurate information in reference to the roads and localities in the valley of mexico, the fixed means of defense of the enemy, the force, composition, distribution, and _morale_ of the troops, the state of public feeling in the city, etc. he professed a sufficient acquaintance with military matters to furnish the information with entire fullness and accuracy. nor did he ask the least compensation for his services till the information furnished should be pronounced perfectly satisfactory. this proposition was finally declined by general scott. it having been ascertained that dominguez, the chief of the robbers from vera cruz to mexico and a resident of puebla, was willing to enter into the american service with at least a portion of the robbers, major smith proposed to the general-in-chief that they should be received, and employed as spies, guides, and couriers. this suggestion met with his approbation, and the inspector-general, colonel hitchcock, was associated with major smith in arranging a proper organization. thus far the robbers have proved useful as spies and couriers. general cadwallader is known to be on his way from perote, and will probably reach puebla with his command to-day or to-morrow. it is to be feared that the large number of sick will render it necessary to leave a garrison in puebla, reducing, if the advance to mexico obtain within ten days, the efficient fighting force to six thousand men. june 22-24. information reached general scott on the evening of the 23d that general cadwallader was at perote, and that he would leave next day and reach puebla on monday, the 29th. he met with serious resistance between jalapa and perote, particularly at the pass of la hoya. the 24th was st. john's day, and was celebrated generally throughout the city. some patriotic feeling was exhibited in the military dresses and flags of the boys. the engineer company obtained authority to change their quarters to the convent san antonio. the subject of an engineer drill was under discussion by lieutenants mason, stevens, and g.w. smith, and it was decided that the manual of the miner should be translated. on the 24th i submitted to major smith a brief memoir on a system of espionage, and involving the employment of the robbers of the country. june 25-28. during these days information has reached headquarters of the landing of general pillow at vera cruz, and of his order to general cadwallader to await his arrival in perote. the whole command, probably amounting to five thousand men, will arrive as early as the 5th of july. rumors for several days have been rife in puebla of negotiations for a treaty of peace being commenced. several messengers are known to have arrived from mexico, and the mexican president has been notified by general scott that a commissioner with powers to treat has arrived from the united states. i see no indication of the least disposition to treat on the part of the mexican nation, and nothing can stay the advance of our army to the valley of mexico. even then, in consequence of the rainy season and the smallness of our force, we shall restrict ourselves to the narrowest limits; but a small portion of the heart of the country will feel our presence, and the spirit of the people will not be subdued. they will flatter themselves with the hope of soon driving from their capital and their soil the _infamous invader_. new armies will be raised, and we again in the fall obliged to take the field. north to zacatecas let our arms extend! july 1. the mexican congress, agreeably to the proclamation of the president, assembled on the 28th of june, but, wanting five of a quorum, adjourned to the 5th of july, the special subject of their consideration being the appointing of commissioners to treat of peace. pillow reached perote yesterday (probably), and will probably be in puebla on the 7th or 8th inst. it is also supposed that pierce has arrived in vera cruz with additional troops. it is a doubtful matter whether the mexican congress will take a decided course in initiating negotiations, or whether the commissioners whom they appoint will agree upon the terms. i have every confidence that general scott, whilst showing every disposition to respond to any desire for peace which the mexican nation may express, and exerting his whole strength to accomplish that great object, will not permit it to be made a pretext to gain time, and a cover to the complete organization of the enemy's force. the enemy may treat at this time. they stickle on points of honor, and will have the greatest repugnance to the occupation of their capital. they see our force daily increasing. they have felt our prowess at the cerro gordo. they know we desire peace. our terms are not hard. if we advance and enter the city of mexico, their government will be in a measure dissolved, and the favorable moment for negotiations have gone. all these considerations must incline the candid and intelligent portion of the nation to arrange all matters in dispute before we advance from puebla. yet the castilian obstinacy and pride may overrule all these considerations, and determine them to try the issue of a protracted contest. it is possible they may consider our terms, if agreed to, as the step fatal and inevitable towards the final occupation of the whole country, and, considering the present conflict as one for national independence, they may conclude to fight as long as a man remains to bear arms. for one, i cannot but consider the issue doubtful, and am inclined to the belief that nothing will come from the present movement, and that we shall advance to and enter the city of mexico. july 4. the anniversary of our national independence has dawned upon the americans in puebla most auspiciously. news came last evening that general pierce, with two thousand men, left vera cruz on june 28, and that in a week he would be followed by six thousand more troops. if this be true, we shall be able to launch a column of fifteen thousand men against the capital. it must fall into our hands with but little resistance. the rainy season should be devoted to the disciplining and reorganization of the whole army, new levies and old troops. thus in october, based in the valley of mexico, we shall be in condition to move in any direction, and doubtless, northward, our columns will march as far as zacatecas, unless previously peace be agreed upon. a war fever has broken out afresh in the capital, and energetic measures are being taken to add to their means of defense. church bells are being cast into cannon, and field-works and fortifications put in good condition. the engineer staff called on the general officers in the morning and dined together afterwards. we passed a pleasant day. july 6. a courier came in this morning with information that el pinal was occupied by a guerrilla force of one thousand men, and that the train had been at ojo de agua two days, resting from the fatigues of the march from perote. the roads were bad, and many of the teams had given out. colonel harney, with a force of seven hundred men and a relief train of forty wagons, started at eight o'clock, july 7, to disperse the assemblage at el pinal, and meet the exposed train at nopalucan. the troops still continue sick. about noon the arrival of general pillow at amasoque was announced; about five o'clock the dragoons arrived, bringing with them the long-expected mail. july 8. the troops reached puebla about noon to-day, and as they passed general scott in review, they made a sorry appearance. in some respects composed of good material, they have come in all haste to the seat of war without a single day's drill, and after a march of one hundred and sixty-one miles it is not surprising they were much worn down. the day in the city was by all devoted to reading letters and papers. i had the extreme felicity of getting five letters from my dear wife, announcing her comfortable settlement for the season in newport. in a distant land, the pleasure of receiving intelligence from our dear friends at home is above and beyond all other pleasures. my latest dates were to the 31st of may. july 9. a general order of to-day assigned pillow to the command of the third regular division, composed of cadwallader's and pierce's brigades, general quitman continuing in command of the volunteer division till it shall become practicable to join his proper regular division with general taylor. general shields was assigned to the command of the volunteer brigade now in puebla. we learned to-day that there was a movement to the north against santa anna in which eight states joined. the prospect of peace is very small. july 10. news from mexico more unfavorable to peace. congress wants eleven of a quorum. there are now eighteen thousand troops in the valley of mexico, provided with arms and sixty pieces of cannon. four thousand troops from san luis potosi are said to be daily expected. all the causeways are armed with cannon, protected by field-works with wet ditches. important advantages will result from deferring the advance to mexico till the close of the rainy season. time will be gained to put the new levies in shape, instructing both officers and men in their duty, and making them more reliable before an enemy. the large number of sick will be much reduced, and sickness will be prevented by the march in dry weather. reinforcements will come up. the disposition of the mexicans for peace will be thoroughly tested, and ulterior operations after conquering the city and valley can be arranged. the war can be vigorously pushed in the dry season, with ample supplies of transportation. the new levies are utterly unreliable, and the main dependence is in the old troops, scarcely six thousand effective men. not the least doubt is felt at our ability at this time to enter the capital, and it is not to be disguised that every day's delay increases the strength of the enemy's force and affords the means to perfect his works. i believe, however, that our own strength will increase in a greater ratio. the dry season will give important advantages in our own counter-works, greater in proportion than in those possessed by the enemy. our victory will also be more decisive, and will have greater results. july 11, 12. the city has assumed its usual quietude, and it is to be hoped that effective measures will be at once taken to put the new levies in some state of efficiency. this morning (12th) a squadron of dragoons under the command of captain kearny set forth for mexico with a flag in reference to an exchange of prisoners. a general order has just been published announcing an early and vigorous movement, directing reviews of the several divisions, and the utmost attention to tactical instruction, etc. it is understood the movement will commence on tuesday, july 20. july 18. it has been ascertained that pierce will not reach puebla until about the first of august (he left vera cruz july 15 or 16), and consequently the advance movement has been deferred. i trust it will be deferred till the rainy season is over, and that in the mean time a train will go down and bring up additional supplies. the flag which went out on the 12th returned on the 14th. captain kearny went as far as rio frio, and made the distance, about forty miles, in ten hours. the flag is understood to have had reference to an exchange of prisoners. no answer has yet been returned. the review of the troops has been going on. general twiggs has unquestionably the best division in the service. in conformity with instructions from the general-in-chief, major smith made a report on the 13th in reference to the garrison and munitions to be left in puebla on the advance of the army to mexico, and the position to be occupied by the garrison. on the 15th authority was given by the general to enlarge the engineer train. july 25. it is now considered hopeless to negotiate with the mexican government until another blow is struck, and accordingly it has been intimated from headquarters that the advance division shall move as soon as the brigade of pierce shall be within one day's march. as it is almost certain that pierce has taken the orizaba road, he cannot reach puebla much before thursday of next week, august 4, so that the advance cannot be made till about wednesday, august 3. during the past week the conversations of the streets in reference to the probabilities of peace or war have been constantly fluctuating from one extreme to the other. taking counsel of their desires, people have eagerly caught at straws to convince themselves that peace was certain. at no time, judging from actual facts, has there been much probability that the difficulties between the two governments would be adjusted at this stage of the business. the governing class of mexico are easily elated; are characterized by remarkable tenacity of purpose and indomitable pride, which is not disposed to submit to humiliation; and they have at their head a fit representative in all respects, a man of extensive capacity both for peace and war, and who possesses in an eminent degree genius for command. in consequence of the long and necessary delay at puebla, the enemy have been able to organize quite a formidable force in the city of mexico, and to strengthen their position by batteries and artificial obstacles, till now, with the spirit of hopefulness so indigenous to the spanish character, they believe themselves in condition successfully to oppose us. august 1. last evening a courier brought notes from general pierce and colonel wyncoop of the 29th ult. the former was at la hoya with two thousand men, and no enemy on the road. general smith, july 28, with the 1st artillery, 3d infantry, rifle regiment of new york volunteers, and one squadron of dragoons, went down to meet him, and at the last accounts was at ojo de agua. it is exceedingly difficult to push couriers through to vera cruz. they are sure to be searched, and shot if papers are found on them. dispatches are made very short, on thin, small pieces of paper, and concealed in the garments of the couriers. it is believed that the enemy have relays of horses along the road from vera cruz to mexico, and that intelligence is transmitted at the rate of six miles an hour. every important transaction in puebla is known at headquarters in the city of mexico in ten to twelve hours. with our limited number of troops, it is impracticable to organize the line from puebla to vera cruz so that our couriers could travel in safety with the same rapidity. besides considerable garrisons in both perote and jalapa, there would have to be a strong force at orizaba, and garrisons with stockade defenses on both the orizaba and national roads every day's journey, say fifteen to twenty miles apart. i say it is impracticable so to organize our rear and have left a force adequate to the reduction of the city of mexico. in my judgment it would be our true military policy immediately thus to organize our rear, and remain in puebla till a well-disciplined army could be collected from the states. on thursday, july 29, a court of inquiry asked for by colonel riley commenced its sittings, pillow, quitman, and colonel clarke, members. that gallant veteran and most excellent officer, colonel riley, has demanded an inquiry into his operations at the cerro gordo, on the ground that the services of his brigade have not received justice at the hands of general twiggs and the commander-in-chief in their official reports. riley was a daring and successful officer of the last war, and has been in more battles and combats than any other officer in the army. though advanced in years, he is intrepid, decided, and of sound judgment. i doubt not the court of inquiry will make a report that will soothe the injured feelings of the gallant and good old man. puebla, mexico, july 8, 1847. my dearest wife,--i feel and know that here i can do some service for my country. so long as my services shall be needed here, i would not feel at liberty to ask to go home. i fear that peace cannot be brought about till some great blow is struck, and another signal victory won. such is the wretched misgovernment of this people, and so discordant are their public counsels, so corrupt and selfish their public men, that i sometimes fear that the strong arm of military power alone can pacificate the nation. no nation on the face of the earth is a stronger exemplification of the strong governing the weak. wherever our army has gone, the people have been benefited. you can hardly realize how conciliatory has been the deportment of our people throughout. all along the road from vera cruz to puebla, beautiful fields of corn and grain were left untouched, when our horses were suffering for food. any aggression on the property of the people is promptly punished and redressed. the mexican army ravage their own people, and leave a sad wreck behind them. we pay for everything, and protect the people in their rights. i believe the entrance of our army will give a fresh impulse to this people. they are now but half civilized, taking the whole population together. an impulse will be given to the arts of peace, and the nation will be wiser and better for our coming among them. you may be sure that i take great satisfaction in your writing frequently to father. it will be a great comfort to him. i wish you so far as you can to occupy my place as regards my own relatives. besides my father, oliver, and mary, i think many of them are much attached to me, and that they have a very high regard for you. i fear their expectations are much too high as to my prospects here. i aspire to no higher distinction than to do my entire duty. our military establishment is so wretchedly organized that it is difficult for a man of acknowledged merit to rise. in organizing the ten new regiments very few promotions were made from the existing organizations, in consequence of which some of the ablest military men in our army see placed above them men totally devoid of capacity or zeal for the public service. one of the colonels of the new regiments is a dismissed cadet from west point, and since i graduated. one of the majors of the volunteer regiments is a dismissed cadet of my own class, a very stupid and ignorant fellow. the men of capacity and of merit have this satisfaction: in difficult straits their counsels are sought and followed. the advice of lieutenants, even, is taken when that of general officers is disregarded. sunday, july 18. it is ten days since i wrote the above, nor is there much prospect that what has been written, and what i am writing now, will reach you for months. it is a great pleasure to write, and i know that whatever i write you will be glad to read. pierce will not arrive in puebla with his brigade before the 1st of august, nor can we advance to mexico till after his arrival. we shall be detained here at least three weeks, a length of time invaluable to get well our sick and put in good shape our new levies. you can hardly realize either the scenery or the climate of this place. to the west are the two snowy mountains of popocatepetl and iztaccihuatl, their crests far above the clouds, to the north, malinche, hoar with occasional frosts, and in every other direction gentle elevations, the whole inclosing one of the most beautiful and fertile valleys in the world. though in the nineteenth degree of latitude and in midsummer, the climate corresponds with newport in the month of april. this is due to the snowy mountains, our high elevation above the sea (at least 7500 feet), and the daily rains. every afternoon regularly, we have a copious shower, and frequently a deluge of rain. i find four blankets and my woolen drawers necessary to keep me warm. we need as much bedclothing as in bucksport in midwinter. i wear thick clothes all the time, and sometimes an overcoat. the gentlemen of puebla are accustomed to wear their cloaks habitually. for one i could not dispense with flannel underclothes. yet we never have frosts, and all the fruits and vegetables come to maturity at all seasons of the year. it is a very trying climate. the extreme rarity of the atmosphere is trying to all of us. it checks the insensible perspiration, and we have to be careful to keep well. at the present time my health is perfect. i was never better in my life, and this is the result of an abstemiousness in both eating and drinking which i have practiced ever since my arrival. we have an engineer mess of five officers. for breakfast and supper we scarcely ever have anything but dry toasted bread without butter and hard-boiled eggs. for dinner, meats plainly but thoroughly cooked, and a variety of vegetables without fruit or pastry. fruit is considered unhealthy. in one of your letters you inquire if my servant is not in my way. you must recollect that our servants do our washing as well as take care of our horses and attend upon us. my servant's part is to wait upon table and clean the dishes. he has to take care of my room, make up my bed, mend my clothes, see that they are washed and in good condition, and take care of my horse. he is expected to spend much time in cleaning my horse, and he has to ride him every day for exercise when i have no occasion to use him myself. my servant's name is michael cunningham, a native of new york, and a very good-hearted and attentive fellow. michael's only fault is that occasionally he indulges in an extra glass. this i hope to correct. my old soldier in vera cruz i was obliged to discharge for drunkenness. michael i found in puebla. he was a soldier whose term of enlistment had expired. i like this kind of life very much. but you need not fear that i shall look back to it with regret, when i find myself in the midst of my little family and by my own fireside. wherever we are, it is wise to be content. it makes one's duties pleasanter, and our lives more profitable. you may inquire how i spend my time. we breakfast at eight, dine at two, and sup at seven. i generally rise in season for breakfast, and go to bed about twelve at night. after breakfast i take a walk and call on my friends. from ten to five o'clock i pass in my room in attending to my official duties, which are now entirely sedentary, and consist in preparing returns, reports, making drawings, etc., or in studying my profession as found in the books which i brought out with me, and which are a perfect treasure. five to nine is spent in visiting, talking, receiving visits, etc. nine to twelve i pass generally in reading. thus my time is well filled, and i am being in some degree useful and preparing myself for future usefulness. mason spends his time very much in the same way. i am studying daily the spanish language, and hope before leaving this country to be able to speak it. captain pitman, of providence, now senior captain of the 9th infantry, i see frequently. he came up with cadwallader, and is spoken of highly by those who have had opportunities to witness his deportment as an officer. i have no doubt he will do good service, though unfortunately his company is small, some thirty odd effective men. he is determined to learn his profession, and will soon get his company in good condition. sunday, august 1. my dear wife, since i have been an observer in this country, i have been more and more convinced that the hero age has not yet gone. this country, so highly favored by nature, a land emphatically of sun and flowers, so abject in the slavishness and brutality of its people, needs a hero spirit for its regeneration. cortez and his devoted band did a great work, a work fit for heroes and prophets. his iron will and great soul planted castilian civilization and enterprise in the midst of a contracted and superstitious people; and cities of fine proportions, magnificent works of art, cathedrals to the worship of the most high, gardens in the arid plain and the dense chapparal and the wild forest field soon greeted the eyes of men in attestation of his genius. but with the decline of castilian grandeur, mexico ceased to be governed by a race of heroes, and her governors and her priests have degenerated into mere cumberers of the earth, having zeal only for their own aggrandizement. is not here a work for a moses or an alfred? is he not needed? and must he not arise? with the times must come the man. but enough of this. we are still in puebla, our army eleven thousand strong, daily improving in health, discipline, and efficiency, general pierce some five days behind with that eagerly looked-for mail that is to bring us tidings from our homes, and all eyes turned to mexico, ready for either alternative of peace or war. we all hope that this vexed question may be settled here on terms honorable to both countries. but if this is not to be, no man fears the ultimate result. every private in the ranks has a solid and well-grounded conviction that our flag is never destined to retire, that no effort of the enemy can pull it down. if we move onward, no mortal arm can prevent the valley of mexico from falling into our hands. general scott is a remarkable man. i will acknowledge that i was under wrong impressions as to his character. of a strong and comprehensive mind, he has extraordinary tenacity of purpose, great self-reliance, and a power of labor equaled by few men. he is emphatically the leader of our army, and has its confidence. none of our general officers are to be compared with him. he has his weak points, which i will not mention now. no man in this army doubts his fitness to command. august 7. since writing the above general pierce has arrived with a mail from the states, bringing to me the melancholy tidings that my sister mary was in cincinnati in the last stages of consumption, unable to proceed farther on her way home. oliver went on to bring her home, and wrote me the very day of his arrival. i wrote you yesterday by a courier employed at great expense to go down to vera cruz, but it is very uncertain whether he will get through. all the letters that have been sent to the states for months have been by couriers, who carry 80 to 100 letters, each a very small package, at two dollars per letter, and for the sake of the gain run the gauntlet of the guerrillas and robbers that infest the road. about one half get through. i trust that letter will reach you, as it would, i think, serve to remove much doubt in reference to the movement of our army upon the city of mexico. twiggs's division commenced its movement to-day. to-morrow general scott and staff will leave puebla, and reach twiggs the same evening at san martin. every one is in fine spirits, and no doubt is felt as to the result. this letter i must now bring to a close, and get ready for the march. i shall not be able to add to it till we enter the city of mexico, and go again into quarters. at that time not far distant, i trust not more than fourteen days, i trust i shall be able to inform you of a glorious victory and of my own personal safety. i for one have not the least presentiment of coming personal danger. i simply fear that my strength may not hold out to the last. but with prudence i have little apprehension as to my strength proving inadequate for my share of duty. i must now, with all hope and confidence in the future, bid you good-night and my sweet babes, commending you all to the care of that great being who does not permit a sparrow to fall to the ground without his knowledge. [illustration: the valley of mexico] chapter x advance to mexico, el peã�on, contreras, churubusco the city of mexico is situated in the centre of an irregular basin some thirty-five miles from north to south and twenty-five miles from east to west, and is separated from the great plain of puebla by the eastern branch of the great cordillera of anahuac, interposing an elevation of nineteen hundred feet at the pass of the rio frio. it was known from information collected by the engineers that the city was entirely surrounded either by an inundation or by marshy ground, and was approached by eight causeways, flanked with wet ditches, and provided with numerous cuts; that the whole city was protected by a double and in some quarters by a triple line of defensive works, well armed with cannon, and defended by an army of some thirty thousand men. the direct approach along the great national road was defended by the strong position of the peã±on, seven miles from the city. chapultepec stood boldly out on the southwest, and on the north there were said to be formidable works at guadalupe. after entering the valley along the national road, there were three general modes of approaching the city,--the direct along the national road, around lake tezcuco on the north, chalco and xochimilco on the south. all the information collected pointed to the south and west as the proper quarter from whence to attack the city; the south presented an extended front with four of the eight causeways of entrance nearly parallel to each other, and was necessarily weak. on the west the suburb of san cosme, a single street lined with houses on either side, extended well into the country, and afforded a vulnerable point. chapultepec, not deemed a very formidable obstacle, required to be swept away to be free to select the point of attack. hence tacubaya, a strong village overawing chapultepec, became the key point of the whole operation. in the particular operation against the southern front, the occupancy of the church and village of piedad was of the last importance, in view of all the southern gates, communicating directly with all the villages in rear from tacubaya to san augustine, and by a good cross road controlling the three causeways of san antonio, nino perdido, and piedad. before ultimately deciding upon the strategic line, general scott determined to enter the valley at the head of the column, and whilst the rear was closing up, to employ spies and push forward reconnoissances to get accurate information of all the material facts bearing on the plan of operations. accordingly, on the 7th of august the division of twiggs, with the engineer company at its head, led the advance, followed on successive days by quitman, worth, and pillow. general scott and staff joined the advance on the 8th. on the 11th twiggs reached ayotla, fifteen miles from mexico, quitman buena vista, worth rio frio, pillow tesmaluca, respectively 3-1/2 miles, 11-1/2 miles, and 20-1/2 miles in rear. on the 12th a reconnoissance of the peã±on was made by captains lee and mason and lieutenant stevens, the escort consisting of a squadron of the dragoons, captain thornton, a section of taylor's battery, and the 4th artillery,--the whole under the command of major gardner. the peã±on was found to be an extensive and commanding position, entirely surrounded by water,--lake tezcuco stretching miles to the north. the base of the hill, four hundred feet high, was surrounded by a continuous parallel armed with batteries, and the defenses rose in amphitheatre to the top, which was crowned by a small work. the only causeway of approach was swept by two lines of works, and the defenses of the whole position were formidable. a road branching off from the main road, two miles from the peã±on, and leading to mexicalcingo, was pursued some two miles, and found to be exceedingly good. the indians in the neighborhood reported that the road was equally good throughout its whole extent, but that the bridge at mexicalcingo was broken down. an amusing incident occurred in the progress of this reconnoissance. three officers--major gaines, of the kentucky volunteers, captain mason and lieutenant stevens, of the engineers--approached the causeway some three quarters of a mile in advance of the escort, and advanced towards a group of mexican officers, some eight or ten in number, who were flourishing their lances and curveting their horses as if to frighten the american officers away. the latter, well mounted, continued their course in a deliberate walk; and when they arrived within about three hundred yards, the valiant mexicans discharged their pistols, and, finding no effect had been produced upon the american officers, who still continued to advance, they immediately took to flight along the causeway. in the afternoon captain lee and lieutenant beauregard reconnoitred the road on the northern shore of lake chalco, as far as the causeway between lakes chalco and xochimilco. the causeway was knee-deep in water. the object of the reconnoissance (to get boats) was not effected. during the progress of the reconnoissance of the peã±on the mexican troops, in expectation of an attack, were brought out from the city in large numbers. major smith and lieutenant tower, from a hill one thousand feet high, in advance of ayotla, observed the passage of troops from the city to the peã±on during the progress of this reconnoissance. on the 3d a minute reconnoissance of the ground between the lakes was made by the engineers, supported by shields's brigade, who at nine o'clock left camp to block up the peã±on. captain mason, supported by sibley's dragoons and the rifles, and accompanied by lieutenants beauregard and mcclellan, examined the position of mexicalcingo, seven miles from the peã±on, pursuing the road that was partially examined yesterday. this bold movement, almost under the guns of the peã±on, and extremely hazardous in presence of an enterprising enemy, was accomplished in the most successful manner. after arriving at mexicalcingo the party was joined by captain lee and lieutenant tower, who, with a squadron of dragoons, had taken the route of the lakes to examine the roads. mexicalcingo was found to be a strong position, defended by seven batteries, and entirely surrounded by water and marshy ground. the peã±on was minutely examined by lieutenant stevens, who entered the inundation at several points, and succeeded in examining the whole position, excepting a very inconsiderable portion on the western slope. he entered the lake, and for a whole mile the water did not rise above the fetlocks of his horse. south of the causeway the water was carefully examined to determine the best crossing-place. two were found where water was not over two feet in depth, and the bottom very hard. the positions of the several batteries and the paths of approach were discovered. the position was even more formidable than it seemed yesterday. over thirty guns were in position. new batteries were being erected, and stockades on the hill. the whole inundation was swept by powerful batteries. lieutenant stevens was engaged seven hours in this reconnoissance, most of the time within twelve hundred yards of the enemy's guns. we all returned late, much fatigued with our day's work. the general expressed much gratification at the information furnished by the several reconnoissances. the general has not yet entirely decided upon his course. he listens to everything, weighs everything, and, when he sees his way clear, will act with promptitude. pillow arrived to-day, and immediately proceeded to chalco. august 14. little was done to-day in the way of reconnoissances. captain mason and lieutenant beauregard were assigned to duty with the division of general worth, and joined him at chalco. lieutenant tower commenced a reconnoissance of the lakes, to determine the practicability of transport by water to mexicalcingo, but did not succeed in getting into the canal of chalco. in the afternoon colonel duncan arrived at general headquarters with the information that the road south of the lakes was practicable. (he had explored ten miles of the road with a column.) accordingly, the plan of the general to attack mexicalcingo in front, sending worth's division around to attack in rear, was abandoned, and it was determined to move the whole army around the lakes. august 15. headquarters left ayotla at eleven, and proceeded to chalco, worth pushing from chalco the same evening, and quitman entering chalco. captain lee and lieutenant tower were assigned to the brigade of harney for temporary duty with the advance. the engineer company also joined the advance of worth. august 16. all the divisions in motion this morning. the road around the lakes was narrow and rough, in many cases passing through a narrow defile on the very edge of the lake, on one side abrupt acclivities, and on the other a quagmire, into which the least false step would plunge one several feet deep. headquarters, before reaching the camping-ground of worth of the previous night, had to pass quitman's and pillow's train. on arriving at chimalpa, headquarters remained some hours for authentic intelligence from twiggs, it having been reported that in marching out from ayotla, early in the morning, he had encountered a large force of the enemy under alvarez. on learning that taylor's battery, in firing seven rounds, dispersed the large body of enemy's lancers which made a demonstration against twiggs at the point where the route left the national road to wind round chalco, headquarters moved forward to tulancingo, where we passed the night. this village is remarkable for its large and ancient olive groves. the olive-trees on either side of the road, stretching out their arms, form an arch above like the elms of new england. august 17. headquarters reached xochimilco this day with pillow's and quitman's divisions, worth advancing as far as san augustin, and twiggs reaching pillow's camping-ground of last evening. the road to-day was extremely difficult, and required some working to fill up cuts, and remove stones and other obstructions placed in the road. the march was very laborious in consequence of the continual halts. early on the morning of the 18th general scott reached san augustin, called the engineers, observed, "to-day the enemy may feel us, to-morrow we must feel him," and ordered reconnoissances to determine the best mode of reaching the position of tacubaya. there were two roads,--the direct by san antonio, which was already ascertained to be occupied in strength by the enemy, and one to the west passing through contreras and san angel, known, however, for a portion of the distance to be simply a mule-path. major smith directed in person the examination of the san antonio route, assisted by captain mason, lieutenants stevens and tower, and captain lee that to the west, assisted by lieutenant beauregard. the instructions of the general as to reconnoissances had been already anticipated by general worth as regards the contreras route, who had pushed his division forward, and dispatched captain mason, escorted by thornton's dragoons, to reconnoitre the enemy's position at san antonio. whilst in the discharge of this duty two shots from a battery of the enemy were fired, killing captain thornton outright and severely wounding fitzwater, an interpreter. general worth immediately placed his division in the occupancy of the hacienda cuapa, thus affording the most ample protection to the escorts of the engineers. major smith now ordered captain mason and lieutenant tower to examine the enemy's right, and lieutenant stevens his left. captain mason first went to the steeple of a church near by to determine the best mode of conducting his reconnoissance, and then with colonel c.f. smith's light battalion he passed over a field of pedregal to our left, till he got a full view of the rear of the enemy. he traced paths leading to mexicalcingo, interrogated the peons, and came to the conclusion that the whole position might be turned and the enemy made to abandon it, by crossing an infantry force on the line he had just pursued, and falling upon the enemy at daylight with the bayonet. lieutenant stevens was twice recalled whilst pushing his reconnoissance, first, by order of colonel garland in consequence of an apprehended attack from the enemy, and second, by direction of major smith, the senior engineer. this officer did not deem it necessary to do anything further, observing to general worth that he had examined the whole vicinity from the top of the hacienda, and had also interrogated the residents, and was satisfied that the ground was firm on our right, and afforded a route to turn the enemy's position. lieutenant stevens expressed doubts as to this, and was permitted to go on with his examination. he persevered until night, and found that the ground was marshy, intersected with canals, and that operations in this direction were not practicable. in the mean time captain lee, with kearny's dragoons and graham's 11th infantry, reconnoitred the route by contreras. at about a mile and a half it became a mule-path, requiring to be worked to be practicable for artillery, and on ascending a hill a mile and a half farther on, a large intrenched camp opened to view at a mile's distance, occupied in strength by the enemy, and completely closing the contreras route, which for the intervening distance passed through a bed of pedregal, a lava rock of honeycomb projection. after passing the intrenched camp, the road was known to be good. at the hill the party had a successful skirmish with the enemy's pickets, and then returned to san augustin. in the afternoon general scott examined in person the san antonio front, and at his quarters that evening, after hearing the reports of the engineers, he decided to mask san antonio, and force the intrenched camp at contreras. captain mason alone of the engineers advocated the forcing of san antonio. on the 19th twiggs's division, on coming up from xochimilco, was pushed forward to the support of general pillow, already on his way to furnish parties to work the road. the engineer company, with its tools on the backs of mules, was ordered back from worth early that morning and assigned to captain lee, who, assisted by lieutenants beauregard and tower, located the road and superintended the working parties. major smith, assisted by lieutenant stevens, designated the positions to be occupied by the trains and the division of quitman at san augustin, now become the general depot and key of operations. captain mason continued on duty with worth in front of san antonio. general twiggs passed the division of pillow just as the tools of his working parties were being packed away, they being no longer able to work the way in consequence of having come within range of the enemy's batteries; and the engineers, now joined by major smith and lieutenant stevens from san augustin, advanced to and entered the pedregal to examine the enemy's position. as observed yesterday by captain lee, he was found to be in a strong intrenched camp on the opposite side of a deep ravine, which, with the almost impracticable bed of pedregal that intervened, completely separated the two armies. all the efforts of the engineers, who advanced close to the enemy's pickets, lieutenant mcclellan having his horse shot under him, could discover no other route than the mule-path, completely commanded by the long guns of the intrenched camp. this path wound through the rocks, and afforded at points some little cover for men and guns. the pickets of the enemy were in large force and well pushed forward. in the mean time a heavy cannonade, shells and round-shot, opened from the camp. at this juncture, with the rifles thrown forward as skirmishers, the howitzer battery of callender and the field battery of magruder were brought forward to a position indicated by captain lee to drive in the pickets and make a bold demonstration, to cover the true and very different movement, indicated by lieutenant stevens on returning from the advanced position gained by the engineers under cover of the rifles to communicate captain lee's request for the batteries, and before the order to move forward the batteries had been given. this officer (lieutenant stevens) observed to twiggs, the senior officer in front, "the true point of attack is the enemy's left. attack his left, you cut him off from his reserves and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains." major smith expressed similar opinions. riley was now sent against the enemy's left, and the whole brigade of smith to cover the demonstration in front. callender brought his battery into action with extraordinary promptness and efficiency, and pushed it rapidly forward. the heavier guns of magruder could not be so easily handled, and great delay occurred in getting them into battery; a position was found partially sheltering them, and they were brought into action. callender was soon severely, and t. preston johnston of magruder's battery mortally wounded. lieutenant mcclellan, who assisted to carry callender to the rear, now took command of his battery, lieutenant reno being at the time detached with the rockets. lieutenant foster also, at captain magruder's request, took charge of one of his pieces, and when johnston fell, carried him to the rear. both these officers distinguished themselves by their exertions in pushing forward the two batteries as well as in serving them. [illustration: battlefields in the valley of mexico _contreras, churubusco, molino del rey, chapultepec, capture of city_] riley was still struggling through the pedregal, lieutenant tower guiding his brigade, and cadwallader was sent in the same direction. smith's brigade, closely followed by pierce, now came to the front, and entered a cornfield to the left, three companies of the 3d infantry, captain craig, being detailed as a guard to the batteries, and lieutenant haskin with twenty men to make good magruder's losses. the fire from the camp--shot, shells, and small-arms--on the front was terrible, and the enemy's pickets advanced in force, threatening the batteries. the leading regiment of pierce, the 9th infantry, colonel ransom, conducted by lieutenant stevens, now gallantly dashed forward through the fire that swept the path, crossed a cleared cornfield in direct view of the enemy's battery, pressed from cover to cover, driving clouds of the enemy's skirmishers before them, crossed the rapid stream that ran in the ravine, and gained the opposite bank, within three or four hundred yards of the camp. this important position it maintained till dark, forming with the 12th infantry, the detachments of craig and haskin, and scattered bodies of the rifles, the sole force in front; the 15th infantry, colonel morgan, having been sent in the trail of cadwallader immediately on the arrival of the general-in-chief on the ground, and smith with his brigade following at a later period. riley on emerging from the pedregal came upon the village of san geronimo, through which he swept, and continued to advance in the direction of a ravine that was found to extend to the rear of the camp. in this isolated position he had two successful encounters with the enemy's lancers, killing their general, frontera, and awaited only the coming up of reinforcements to order the assault. but cadwallader, not put in motion till riley was well on his way, had barely time to reach the village and hold it against the reserves of the enemy, estimated at ten thousand men, foot and horse, which now came up from the city under santa anna in person. the village, the key to the position, was to be maintained at all hazards. cadwallader presented a bold front and kept the enemy in check. the arrival of morgan an hour later, and of smith towards night, made the position impregnable against an infantry attack. about sunset riley returned to the village, and smith, now senior in command, resolved to attack the reserves, but, dark coming on before his dispositions were made, an attack upon the intrenched camp was resorted to as an alternative. a dark and stormy night now closed in upon the scene, and the soldiers in their dreary bivouac were placed in readiness for the morrow's work. all thus far had gone on well. worth in front of san antonio maintained the front and rear. smith in the village of san geronimo held the key of the offensive movement to the enemy's left; his rear, thanks to the pedregal and pierce, still held in front of the intrenched camp, being safe against attack. the general-in-chief returned at nightfall to san augustin. many bodies of stragglers were to be seen on the field. even the two commanders of divisions, pillow and twiggs, failed in reaching the village, where their commands were in position, and within reach of an overwhelming force. as the fire of our batteries died away and they were withdrawn, cheer on cheer rose from the enemy's extended line. rain coming on, many bodies of stragglers not being able to find their commands, the principal force hemmed up in a little village within reach of the enemy's heavy batteries and within striking distance of his large force, for the first time a feeling of despondency seized upon the minds of our men. happily, general smith, the officer in command at the village, was equal to the emergency, and extricated our force from its perilous situation. he determined upon a night attack, and sent captain lee to san augustin to confer with the general-in-chief in reference to supporting it by a diversion in front. in consequence of the lateness of the hour, the general deemed it impracticable to get any portion of worth's command upon the ground in season, but gave full powers to captain lee to collect all the stragglers in front to operate as a diversion to the main attack projected by general smith. in the course of this interview general pillow and general twiggs came in, stating that, in consequence of the darkness and having no guide, they had found it impracticable to reach the village, and were obliged to retrace their steps; pillow adding that they fell upon one of the enemy's pickets while thus groping their way, or came so near as plainly to hear their voices. twiggs, a heavy man advanced in years, fell into one of the hollows of which the formation was full, and injured himself considerably. i was present during almost the entire interview, having entered the room shortly after the arrival of captain lee, and everything i witnessed increased, if it were possible, my confidence in general scott. himself on the ground till dark came on, he had grasped the whole field of operations, and had determined to adhere to his original plan. he listened with perfect composure and complacency to captain lee's statement of the field, occasionally introducing a pertinent question, and with the utmost patience weighed the various suggestions of the officers, and particularly general smith's plan of a night attack. neither general pillow nor general twiggs made any suggestions as to what should be done. captain lee, having been in all parts of the field, and having full information on almost every point, was, as it were, the only person whom it was necessary to listen to. the general listened with equal patience to what i had observed on the front attack. in the very commencement, and before the batteries had been ordered forward, i stated with much emphasis to general twiggs that the attack should be against the enemy's left. "attack his left, you cut him off from his reserves and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains." i, however, conducted the batteries forward, and with the assistance of lieutenants mcclellan and foster, placed them in position. after reconnoitring towards the right in the attempt to find a better path for our guns and troops, and without success, i returned to the batteries, which in the mean time had been considerably advanced, and were exposed to a tremendous fire of grape. the howitzer battery was being served with great effect, and had almost cleared the ground in front of the ravine of the enemy. but very great delay occurred in bringing forward magruder's battery and opening its fire. everything seemed to go wrong with him. the enemy's grape, within point-blank range, in a measure disabled the howitzer battery, wounding many of the gunners and finally disabling callender, who was wounded in both legs, and at this moment some little delay occurred in getting a supply of spherical case-shot. the supporting party was reduced to some eight rifles, and the enemy's skirmishers advanced. general smith's brigade came up, and entered the cornfield to the left of the battery. at my request, two or three companies of the 3d infantry advanced to the front and right to protect the batteries. soon the 9th infantry came up, with general orders to support the batteries, and were conducted by me over a cut and open cornfield, under a shower of the enemy's grape, to the cover of a ledge, from which, passing from cover to cover, driving the enemy's skirmishers before them, they reached the ravine, and crossing which they sheltered themselves on the opposite bluff on the edge of a cornfield. colonel ransom showed great gallantry and force in the management of his command, and to show the promptness of his command in following him, this anecdote is related. only some eight or ten men were seen lagging behind, and these an officer of the regiment was cursing most lustily to urge them forward. just as the regiment had reached its position i met general twiggs, and we both ascended to a little ridge, where we had a full view of the enemy's intrenched camp. soon a shower of grape came in our direction. general twiggs remained in his exposed position without moving a muscle, till i suggested the propriety of his stepping down to a little depression which afforded cover. he informed me that riley had been moving against the enemy's right for more than an hour. i remarked, "i will go and find him, and bring you back word of where he is," to which general twiggs assented, and i immediately started in search of riley. i was, however, much exhausted by my previous exertions, and the ground was of the difficult and almost impracticable honeycomb lava rock, and i was obliged to abandon the attempt, and returned to the advanced position of the 9th infantry. on an elevated ridge just on the edge of the ravine, and partly sheltered by a cedar-tree, i had a distinct view of the whole position. i observed the encounter of the lancers with our own troops (which i afterwards ascertained to be riley's command), and after an interval the enemy's reserves advancing in great force. they continued to advance in two lines of lancers and infantry, with clouds of skirmishers in front, and halted, their right nearly opposite the village of san geronimo. whilst these reserves were advancing, there was an evident slackening, and at length a total cessation, of our return fire in front to the almost continual fire of grape and escopettes of the enemy. this led me to suppose that a change had taken place in our dispositions, involving great exposure perhaps to the 9th, and i returned for information. on my return i met many bodies of stragglers, who could afford no information as to the state of the field, heard the triumphal shouts from the mexican lines, and finally fell upon general pillow and general twiggs. general pillow was in much perplexity, was intent upon finding the village of san geronimo, and wished me to conduct the 9th to that place. not having been to the village, and dark coming on, i confessed my inability to conduct the regiment as he desired, and after considerable hesitation he directed me to bring back the regiment to the position of magruder's battery. i accordingly went in the direction of the ravine, my chief guide being the discharge of the enemy's guns from the position of the reserve; but that failing, and the night becoming quite dark, i lost my way and wandered about, until finally i heard voices approaching in my direction, which i soon discovered to be from our own troops. calling out to them, i was answered by lieutenant foster, of my own corps, who informed me that he was retiring with a party of about thirty rifles and 9th infantry men, having just been driven out from a small building, higher up and on the same stream with the position of the 9th infantry, by a large force of the enemy. at this time i was so exhausted that i could walk only with great difficulty, and was obliged to abandon going in quest of the 9th, and returned with foster, who gave me the support of his arm till we reached sibley's troop of dragoons, near the foot of the hill from which general scott had overlooked the field. as we wended our way along the rain fell, small bodies of troops were to be seen from time to time, and everything had the appearance of a broken and dispirited army. it, was perhaps the only desponding moment our troops had seen since the opening of the campaign. after resting about half an hour, i returned with sibley, and reported what i had observed as above. during the whole of this memorable evening, not only was general scott perfectly composed and assured, but, in his intercourse with those present, neglected none of the courtesies due to guests. all those who came in tired and wet from the field he made sit down at his table and break their fast. about twelve o'clock general twiggs and captain lee set out on their way back to the field, pillow remaining in town to sleep; and on arriving on the ground of the front attack twiggs, entirely exhausted by his exertions, sought a little rest, and lee collected the 9th and 12th, with some sappers and rifles, to make a diversion in front. this note-book is not the place for a detailed account of the brilliant conflict planned by general smith. suffice it to say that, in consequence of the darkness and constant rain of the night, the attack projected to be made at three was not actually made till daylight. it was eminently successful, and without doubt was the most brilliant affair of the war. the principal charge was made by riley on their reverse and rear, led by tower, and supported by smith's and cadwallader's brigades, respectively commanded by dimick and cadwallader, ransom in front making a diversion with the troops that had been collected in that quarter. the position was carried with little loss on our part, and the whole force of the enemy either killed, wounded, taken prisoners, or driven solitary fugitives from the field. general valencia made his escape with the lancers in an eccentric direction, and was afterwards heard of at toluca. our troops pushed on in pursuit and soon entered the town of san angel, through which santa anna had passed that very morning with his reserves of fifteen thousand men. after a short halt at san angel, pillow in command ordered the column to move on coyoacan, where an unimportant skirmish took place. here general scott joined the column, and ordered a halt to reconnoitre and bring up the captured guns. captain lee went towards san antonio with a dragoon escort to communicate with worth, and i to the steeple of the church to use my glass. turning it on the san antonio road, i observed the enemy in full retreat, the whole road from san antonio for more than a mile towards the city being filled with troops, pack-mules, and wagons. on reporting this to general scott, he ordered twiggs to advance to cut off their retreat, and assigned me to duty as the senior engineer officer of his division. churubusco. on the head of the column reaching the fork of a road, whither a party of one hundred lancers had been driven by the mounted rifles, it was halted and a very rapid reconnoissance made of the roads in advance. lieutenant mcclellan taking the left-hand road and i the right, they were found to lead respectively to, and directly in front of, a church, which was observed to be occupied in strength. mcclellan observed one gun, and a prisoner taken on the ground reported there were two guns. the engineer company was advanced in front of the building to support and continue the reconnoissance. whilst on this duty it became engaged with the enemy, and the 1st artillery was ordered up in support. thus the action, on the part of twiggs's division, commenced. it having been entered on, it was determined to make a bold and quick matter of it. taylor's battery was ordered up, and took a position in the open space in front of the church. it was expected it would drive the enemy from the roof,[1] and enable the division--smith in front, riley on the left, and perhaps a regiment along the direct road--to carry the work by a _coup de main_. this course, recommended by myself to twiggs, was taken. some delay, however, occurred before riley got in position and opened his fire. meantime taylor, serving his battery with extraordinary coolness and energy, was met by a terrific return from the enemy, who poured upon him an unceasing deluge of grape, his whole battery consisting of eight guns, one a 16-pounder. taylor breasted it manfully for an hour and a half, when, two of his officers wounded and many of his men and horses killed and disabled, he was compelled most reluctantly to retire. soon after this riley got in position and opened a sharp fire, producing an immediate and evident abatement in the enemy's fire. the 1st artillery had been in position from the commencement of the attack, and was now followed by the 3d infantry. the work attacked in front and rear by our infantry, all retreat cut off by shields and pierce occupying the causeway in rear, worth in possession of the _tãªte-de-pont_, duncan opening two guns on one of the long faces of the work, and larkin smith directing a 4-pounder against the convent, the white flag was hung out at the very moment the 2d and 3d infantry from the rear and front carried the work at the point of the bayonet. immediately the flag of the 3d infantry was planted on the roof of the building; and over one thousand prisoners, including three general officers, surrendered to twiggs. the battle of contreras and the subsequent advance upon san angel and coyoacan led to the evacuation of san antonio. whilst this was in progress, clarke's brigade, conducted by captain mason, of the engineers, made a flank movement to the left, and cut the enemy's retreating column of three thousand in two, dispersing the rear portion and preventing its reaching the main body and entering into the subsequent fight. worth, with both brigades, now pushed forward with great energy upon the heels of the other portion, till the column was arrested by a fire of grape from a strong bastioned field-work of fourteen feet relief and wet ditches in front, covering the passage of a canal, and somewhat in rear of the work attacked by twiggs, and which, like the latter work, had not been noticed in the previous reconnoissances. both brigades were formed in the cornfields on the right; the charge was ordered, clarke in advance; and after a desperate but short conflict the work was carried at the point of the bayonet, the 6th infantry and 2d artillery particularly distinguishing themselves. in the mean time shields, in command of shields's and pierce's brigades, conducted by captain lee, the palmetto regiment in advance, pursued a route to the left, and finally came in contact with the enemy near the hacienda on the great san antonio causeway, a mile from the _tãªte-de-pont_. the enemy were in great force lining the causeway, and the lancers advancing towards the canal. the palmettoes advanced most gallantly, led by their gallant colonel, butler; but some hesitancy was manifested by the other commands, who retired under cover of the hacienda or crowded behind the palmettoes. notwithstanding the utmost exertions of the officers, a pause took place at good escopette range, and a considerable loss was experienced. the palmettoes lost their colonel, shot dead, their lieutenant-colonel, wounded, four successive color-bearers, shot down, and nearly half their rank and file killed and wounded. finally the movement was commenced, the enemy was charged through, and the causeway was filled with fugitives to the city. the dragoons, who thus far had continued inactive, now took the causeway in pursuit, and the most gallant feat of the war was enacted. captain kearny, in advance with a squadron, pursued the fugitives to the very garita, where he charged directly up to a battery under a fire of grape, dismounted, calling upon his men to follow him, and entered the gorge of the work to take it by assault. looking around, he found himself alone, the few men immediately following him having been shot down, and the remainder having retired in obedience to the return call from the rear, which for kearny's safety had just at this moment been inauspiciously sounded. surrounded by a crowd of fugitives, who pressed too closely upon him to use their weapons, he retreated, making a passage with his sword, mounted a jaded mexican horse, and commenced to retire. finding that the sorry speed of the brute would long time expose him to the enemy's grape, he dismounted and sought a better steed. scarcely was he mounted when his arm was carried away by a grape; but he succeeded in making good his retreat. his first lieutenant, ewell, had two horses shot under him, and his second lieutenant, graham, was wounded in the hand. this was the terrible and decisive conflict of the war, and was a case of a combined movement of all the divisions. the enemy's intrenched works were carried at the point of the bayonet. surrounded on all sides, the strong defensive building attacked by twiggs was obliged to surrender; the reserves, vigorously pushed, fled from the field; and the army, which in the morning was estimated to be 27,000 strong, scarcely presented in the evening a sorry array of 4000. we could have entered the city the same day had we chosen. but our troops had made extraordinary exertions, our casualties were great, and the general determined to operate against the city after deliberately weighing its capacity for defense. after this disastrous defeat of the enemy general scott rode through his lines, addressing with terseness, brevity, and feeling the troops as he passed them, who received him with great enthusiasm, and exhibiting all that moderation and equanimity which has eminently characterized his course throughout this campaign. towards night he returned to his quarters at san augustin. all the divisions suffered in nearly equal proportion, the casualties amounting to 1066, of which about one fourth were killed or permanently disabled. the 1st artillery suffered most severely in officers, losing in all the battles five gallant officers, captains capron and burke, lieutenants irons, johnson, and hoffman. it is probable the same and perhaps more decisive results could have been effected, and with far less loss, had twiggs and worth stopped in mid-career, and an hour been taken to reconnoitre the enemy's position. pillow and shields with garland's brigade and duncan's battery demonstrating in front, twiggs's whole division with taylor and the howitzer battery on the enemy's right, clarke's brigade on their left, both making considerable detours, clarke as a demonstration, twiggs the great attack, the causeway might have been gained; taylor's battery sent thundering on the enemy's rear, with harney's horse and riley's brigade cutting off all hope of succor, the enemy's works and the reserves inclosed by our troops must have immediately surrendered. then, the prisoners and their works left in charge of pillow, all the other divisions united could have been pushed forward in support of riley, and the city could have been stormed with little or no loss. this is expecting impossibilities. we knew nothing of the enemy's works, but we saw them in full retreat, we pushed forward to cut off their retreat, and, coming upon the enemy's intrenched position, we became engaged in the very act of reconnoitring it. the result was most glorious to our arms, and will, we trust, conclude the war. major smith, the chief engineer, was present during the battle of churubusco, and was distinguished for gallantry. he is suffering with the same disability as myself. we were both exceedingly fatigued with our exertions, and were glad to get a night's rest at our quarters at san augustin. shortly after our return captain lee and lieutenant tower came in. captain lee had made the most extraordinary exertions, having been on foot for two days and a night without a moment's rest. it was almost the only instance in this war i have seen him fatigued. his services were of the most important character, not second to those of any individual in this army. lieutenant tower, in his night reconnoissance and subsequent services in leading riley's brigade against valencia's intrenched camp, exhibited great resolution and high military qualities. it seemed to be conceded by the whole army that the engineers in these important operations had done their duty, and that every individual officer had shown a readiness to participate in the perils incident to their service. in truth, the whole army, officers and men, were gallant, and in several instances exhibited all the terrible energy of the anglo-saxon race. the night attack by smith, and the storming of the works at churubusco by worth and twiggs, are unsurpassed in war. the former was a rare combination of science and force, the latter an instance of desperate valor. i slept little that night. the picture was mingled sunshine and clouds. the mangled forms of capron, burke, johnston, and others whom i personally knew and respected, i could not keep from my mind. the experience of war is saddening. the terrible scenes of the battlefield cannot be effaced from the memory. we realize the observation of franklin, "i scarcely ever knew a good war or a bad peace." lieutenant stevens gained great reputation, both at headquarters and in the army generally, by the part he took in these brilliant operations. his reconnoissance of el peã±on was considered one of the most daring and complete of the war, and, as he modestly remarks, "general scott was very much pleased with my reconnoissance, and i got more credit for it than i deserved." general william h. french (commander of the third corps, army of the potomac, in 1863) writes of this reconnoissance, in which he participated as one of the covering party: "it brought lieutenant stevens conspicuously before the army. that night the reports of the different officers of engineers were made to the general-in-chief in person; that of lieutenant stevens was so full and clear, it in a great measure decided general scott to take the route around lake chalco, and attack the city of mexico in reverse. from this time the general-in-chief recognized his ability and talents." his exertions at el peã±on overtasked his strength, however, and in consequence he was obliged to ride for three days in an ambulance on the march around lake chalco as far as rochimilco. in the movement on the intrenched camp at contreras, lieutenant stevens, advancing with the skirmishers to reconnoitre the position, saw at once that the decisive movement would be to turn the enemy's left, and seize the road between the camp and the city, thus isolating the former and cutting it off from reinforcements. hastening to general twiggs, he urged this movement upon that officer in his earnest and forcible manner, saying, "the true point of attack is the enemy's left. attack his left, you cut him off from his reserves, and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains." the movement was at once decided upon. riley's brigade was directed to the right (enemy's left) over the pedregal, followed by cadwallader, and later by shields and smith; san geronimo was seized, and the dashing victory of contreras was the result. lieutenant stevens was the first to see and urge this decisive movement, and his advice was immediately adopted by the veteran twiggs. the terrific conflict of churubusco, which followed hard on contreras, was brought on, or perhaps it may be said precipitated, by lieutenant stevens. from the church steeple in coyoacan he discovered the enemy in full retreat down the san antonio causeway, and on his report to that effect, general scott at once ordered twiggs forward, and lieutenant stevens to accompany him as his senior engineer officer. leading the division with the engineer company, he discovered the fortified church, or convent, barring the road; the company became engaged, and, the action having thus commenced, general twiggs adopted almost implicitly the suggestions of the ardent young officer, and gave free rein to his efforts "to make a bold and quick matter of it." lieutenant stevens personally led and placed in position taylor's battery, the 1st artillery (infantry), and other troops, greatly exposing himself during the action. the position, however, proved much stronger than was expected, a strong earthwork and breastwork being screened and partially concealed by tall, waving corn, which covered the fields in front, and cost the bloody and protracted fight before it fell. lieutenant stevens did not altogether escape criticism for putting the battery where it was so badly cut up; indeed, seems to have reproached himself; but his superiors, the veteran twiggs and scott, found no fault, knowing full well that great boldness and exertion are the price of great achievements in war. general h.j. hunt relates that, after entering the city, a party of wounded officers were talking over matters, and lieutenant stevens reproached himself for having too severely criticised magruder at contreras, and remarked: "the very next day at churubusco i did worse myself, acting on my judgment and eyesight, which deceived me, for i had not a knowledge of all the facts bearing on the situation. it was therefore my fault that taylor's battery was knocked to pieces." "here, again," remarks general hunt, "is his characteristic frankness and honesty, and _sense of justice_ to others, breaking out, and carrying him further than was necessary, and into doing injustice to himself." archbishop's palace, 3-1/2 miles from the main plaza of the city of mexico, sunday, august 22, 1847. my dearest wife,--the great battle of mexico has been fought, and our arms have achieved a glorious triumph. commissions are now sitting to treat of an armistice that will terminate, as we all trust, in a permanent and honorable peace to both countries. mexico is again without an army, and the gates of the capital are open to us. terrible was the conflict, severe our loss, particularly in efficient and gallant officers; the whole army was engaged, and the whole public force of mexico struck down, large numbers of prisoners and a great amount of material of war falling into our hands. my heart is filled with gratitude to the most high that i had the strength to do my duty with the other officers of my corps, and that, although much exposed in three different reconnoissances and two hard-fought battles, i have escaped without a wound, and without any abatement of my health and strength. i cannot feel exultation. we have lost many brave officers and men, some my personal friends; streams of blood have in reality flowed over the battlefield. the hearts of the whole mexican nation are thrilling with anguish and dismay. such is war, so glittering and imposing on parade and in anticipation, so terrible in reality. puebla is about seventy-five miles from mexico. on referring to the map, you will find that the direct road passes between lakes tezcuco on the north, chalco and xochimilco on the south. at the venta de chalco, about twenty miles from mexico, the road turns off to pass southward of the lakes. el peã±on, about eight miles from mexico, is a high hill entirely surrounded with water, along the edge of which the great direct road to mexico passes, consisting of a causeway for about a mile and a half approaching it, and also of a causeway the whole distance after leaving it, till we reach the city of mexico. general twiggs with his splendid division was in the advance, followed on successive days by quitman, worth, and pillow. in five days twiggs was pushed up to ayotla, fifteen or sixteen miles from mexico, general scott continuing with him in the advance, and the other divisions five, fifteen, and twenty-five miles in rear. as they came up (it required two days), they were held in reserve at the head of lake chalco, whilst the proper reconnoissances and examinations were made to determine the general plan of attack. the first day, a reconnoissance was made of the peã±on, supported by a squadron of dragoons, a regiment of infantry, and two pieces of artillery. the peã±on was found to be fortified and occupied in force. captain mason, of the engineers (my friend mason), major gaines, of the kentucky volunteers (taken prisoner just before the great battle of buena vista, and who made his escape only one or two days before the march of the army from puebla), and myself rode some distance in the advance, and observed near the causeway some eight or ten mexican officers. we were at least three quarters of a mile from the rest of our force. we advanced upon them, they curveting their horses and advancing upon us. when within about three hundred yards they discharged their pistols, but we continuing our advance, they all turned their horses and returned full speed across the causeway, carrying with them a troop of lancers. the whole affair was very amusing and afforded much sport. it did not diminish our contempt of mexican prowess. the second day a splendid reconnoissance was made of the whole country between the lakes, including the peã±on and mexicalcingo at the head of lake xochimilco. the particular reconnoissance of the peã±on was intrusted to me. on my little horse, one of the most enduring, spirited, and beautiful animals in the service, with two dragoons, i went half way round the peã±on, and was for seven hours within almost point-blank range of its guns, examining the different batteries, determining the various approaches, and particularly the character of the inundation. frequently i was in the water up to the belly of my horse. general scott was very much pleased with my reconnoissance, and i got more credit for it than i deserved. the same day mason made an admirable reconnoissance of mexicalcingo. our spies had given information that the road around chalco was impracticable for our trains, and in consequence thereof the general almost made up his mind to force mexicalcingo, and at that point and westward, fight the great battle of the war. he, however, determined to wait one day for additional information. worth, who had now come up, was sent to chalco, and a column under the orders of colonel duncan reconnoitred the road around the lakes. our spies were found to have given wrong information, and the road, though bad, was found to be practicable. that same evening general scott, with the whole field before him, determined to move around chalco, and ordered the movement to commence on the morrow. the prompt advance of twiggs to ayotla, the brigade of dragoons of the famous colonel harney two miles farther in advance, and the brilliant reconnoissances of the two succeeding days impressed the enemy with the belief that the peã±on was to be attacked, and they lost no time in filling the place with troops, and putting in position formidable batteries of nearly forty guns. in the movement around the lakes worth was in the advance, followed by pillow, quitman, and twiggs. the road was exceedingly bad and narrow, in many places a perfect defile, obstructed by cuts, stones from the hills in some cases formed into walls, and requiring great patience, energy, and perseverance for the passage of the trains. the third day worth reached san augustin, general scott and staff resting at xochimilco with the divisions of pillow, quitman, and twiggs respectively some five and ten miles in rear; no obstruction of moment occurring either in front or rear, unless we except a demonstration of a large force of lancers on the movement of general twiggs's division from ayotla, a demonstration brought speedily to a close by the opening of taylor's battery. early the next morning, wednesday, august 18, scott joined worth; developed his general plan of attack, and ordered the engineers immediately to make vigorous reconnoissances of the position and force of the enemy. he remarked, "to-day the enemy may feel us, to-morrow we must feel him." accordingly two reconnoissances were made,--one, of the position of san antonio, three miles from san augustin, on the great southern road to mexico, conducted by major smith; the other, of the road to san angel, turning the position of san antonio, and bringing us to the next great and adjacent causeway to the west. this latter reconnoissance was conducted by captain lee. the first reconnoissance was supported by the whole of worth's division. captain mason had charge of one party, i had charge of the other. whilst the whole party of engineer officers with a portion of the escort were examining the position of san antonio within twelve hundred yards of its guns, and in the causeway itself, the enemy discharged his battery of two large brass 16-pounders, blowing to pieces the body of the gallant captain thornton, commanding the escort, and severely wounding an interpreter. the second reconnoitring party (that of captain lee) were brought into pretty close contact with a body of the enemy, whom they completely dispersed without any loss. thus, the enemy felt us the first day. pillow and quitman had now come up to san augustin (ten miles from mexico), and twiggs to xochimilco, four miles in rear. it was determined to move the main body on san angel, worth remaining in front of san antonio, and by a vigorous combined movement forcing this position and advancing upon tacubaya. accordingly, on thursday pillow and twiggs were pushed forward over a most difficult road, requiring much labor to make it practicable for field-guns, and in full view of a large force of the enemy, who, divining our intentions from the reconnoissance of wednesday, had intrenched himself in a strong position, barring our passage. as our troops approached, they were brought gallantly into action. callender's howitzer battery was advanced to a very exposed position for the temporary purpose of driving in a picket, was not withdrawn in time, and, exposed to a formidable battery of twelve guns, was entirely cut up, its gallant commander receiving severe wounds in both legs. magruder's battery of 12-pounders was in like manner advanced and cut up. these batteries were supported by smith's brigade on the left, and the 9th infantry on the right. the 9th infantry i led across an open field, exposed to the enemy's grape, without the loss of a man. they advanced to a strong position in a ravine, which they maintained till dark. riley's brigade and the greater portion of pillow's division were pushed forward against the enemy's right to cut him off from his reserves, and by a vigorous charge take him in flank and hurl him into the gorges of the mountains. the whole field of approach was a perfect honeycomb of lava projections, entirely impracticable for horse and difficult for foot. nothing was known of the ground. all the troops advanced with difficulty. that intrepid veteran, riley, with his gallant brigade, pushed forward and encountered the enemy's lancers in large force, repulsing them in successive charges. he organized his brigade to charge the battery, but felt it his duty to await orders and support. smith, somewhat late in the day withdrawn from the right, reached a village on the left of the enemy's position, to which riley had withdrawn, and was reinforced by the greater portion of shields's and a portion of pierce's brigade. an attack under the direction of smith was organized, but could not be executed in consequence of the gathering shadows of the night. at this moment, all offensive operations on our side having ceased and no impression made on the enemy's line, their reserves coming up in great force and bringing with them additional guns, cheer on cheer rose from their whole line, whilst on our part there was much gloom and despondency. our commands were much scattered, our batteries had become disabled, and every one was overcome with the fatigues of the day. during the latter part of the day i was reconnoitring in the advanced position of the 9th infantry, and, not knowing the progress of the day in other parts of the field, returned to the rear for orders. i found general pillow, who seemed somewhat perplexed with the posture of affairs, and gave me no orders till dark was coming on. i endeavored to find my way back, but could not succeed. i was so entirely exhausted that it was with the greatest difficulty that i could drag one foot after the other. finally i fell upon a small party of rifles and 9th infantry, led by lieutenant foster, of the engineers, who were making good their retreat from a house somewhat higher up on the same stream with the position of the 9th infantry, and from which they had been expelled by a whole regiment of the enemy. on hailing the party, foster recognized my voice, and i concluded to return with him, but so entirely worn down that i required his support. we made our way with great difficulty, occasionally meeting little parties of soldiers seeking their commands. it had already commenced raining. on passing near the place where i left my horse, i could not find him, and was obliged to pursue my way on foot. at length we reached some dragoons near the foot of a hill, where general scott had placed himself to observe the field, and there learned that he had left half an hour before for san augustin, three miles distant. i inquired for my horse, but could not find him. foster kindly lent me his, and after waiting some half an hour i set out on my return to san augustin in company with captain sibley's troop of dragoons. on my way back my feelings were not desponding, but i was sad. the 9th infantry, called the new england regiment, who had gallantly followed my lead, and had occupied for hours an exposed position, i had not succeeded in bringing back to the place indicated by the general. i felt deeply my physical inability to support long-continued exertion. it seemed to me that i had abandoned a body of men who were relying on me. the regiment had acted nobly, and none more so than pitman, acting as major. he was cool and intrepid throughout. on my way home the rain poured in torrents much of the time. i overtook my intrepid friend callender, whom some men of his company were carrying home on a litter. he seemed to be comfortable, and is now rapidly recovering from his wound. on reaching my quarters, getting some supper, and changing my clothes, i went to see general scott. he was surrounded by his personal staff, and was attentively listening to captain lee's account of the state of the field. soon after, general pillow and general twiggs entered the room. twiggs is a gray-haired veteran of sixty, large in person, of rather blunt address, and of little advantages of education, but possessing in an eminent degree decision of character, great sagacity as to men and events, and an aptitude for labor. he has the most splendid division in the service, the fruit in great measure of his own unwearied exertions. captain lee is an officer of engineers to whom i have before alluded, and one of my mess-mates. he is one of the most extraordinary men in the service. in the very prime of manhood, of remarkable presence and address, perhaps the most manly and striking officer in the service, of great grace of manner and great personal beauty, he has established an enduring reputation. his power of enduring fatigue is extraordinary, and his strength of judgment and perfect balance are conspicuous. for counsel, general scott relies more upon him than any other man in the service. i never shall forget that evening,--captain lee in calm, even, well-weighed words, giving a full view of the state of our force, suggesting the various methods of reã«stablishing affairs, and proffering his own services and exertions to carry out the views of the general; scott, composed, complacent, weighing every word he said, finding fault with no one's blunders, and taking in all cases the best view of things, indulging in no apprehensions, and exhibiting entire confidence in the ultimate event. at length general twiggs and captain lee returned to the battlefield with full powers to retrieve affairs as their best judgment should dictate. it had been proposed by general smith, one of twiggs's brigadiers, to make a night attack upon the enemy's position, defended by twelve guns and five thousand of their best troops. captain lee's principal object in seeing the general was to procure his sanction. it was not denied. on returning to the field, all arrangements were made to carry it into execution. my dear wife, i am spinning out a long letter, and i must be more brief. this night attack, in consequence of rain and the difficult nature of the ground, was not carried into execution till dawn of day. it was organized by general smith. the reconnoissance of the route was made in the night by my friend tower, of the engineers. the principal column of attack consisted of riley's brigade led by tower. two other columns were pushed in the same general direction, one of which was commanded by our friend major dimick. in front a column was formed of the scattered commands, mostly new levies. riley's column pursued its way over slippery and uneven ground, crossing two deep ravines, halting from time to time to keep the command together. finally it reached the brow of a hill in rear of the enemy's position, and was formed in two columns, just as the coming day disclosed them to the enemy. immediately the charge was ordered, and the gallant brigade made its terrible charge, ably supported by the other columns. the contest was brief but decisive. in fifteen minutes one thousand dead and wounded of the enemy lay on the field, nearly a thousand more were taken prisoners, and the remainder were flying in all directions. every one speaks in the most exalted terms of the conduct of tower. some say he led the brigade and did the whole work. as for myself, broken down the evening before, greatly in need of rest, i complied with the advice of major smith and captain lee and remained in town, giving directions to my servant to be called at three, in order that i might return to the field to be in season for the fight. my servant did not wake me till five. one delay after another occurred, and i was finally detained by general scott to conduct to the field a brigade of general worth's command. we started and had got half way out, when information came of the brilliant success of the night attack, and the brigade was ordered back. i continued my way, and finally came across tower very quietly eating his breakfast in company with lieutenant beauregard of our corps, who was also conspicuous in the same attack. i rode on, passed over the battlefield, reached the advance, and exchanged greetings with my friends of the 9th regiment, who had felt as anxious for me as i had for them. they informed me that they had withdrawn to a safe place about nine in the evening, and were engaged in the night attack. my friends of the 1st artillery, major dimick, captains capron, burke, etc., i also shook warmly by the hand, and finally rode up to general twiggs. i congratulated him on the brilliant victory achieved by his command. "general smith deserves the whole credit, but it was my division," was his reply. the order was soon given to advance upon the san antonio road, general twiggs in advance, the object being to cause the enemy to evacuate it and open the way for the advance of worth. i accompanied the advance. we soon reached the village of coyoacan, from which a picket of about two hundred lancers was expelled. there we halted till general scott rode up. he proposed to wait half an hour to reconnoitre, determine the position of the enemy, and the proper mode of attack. general worth had previously received orders not to attack the enemy till he heard the fire on the other line. calling for the engineer officers, captain lee was directed, after examining a prisoner, to communicate with general worth at san antonio, and i went to the steeple of the church to use my glass. i turned it upon the san antonio road, and observed the enemy in full retreat, the causeway for more than a mile being filled with troops, pack-mules, and baggage-wagons. i immediately reported the fact to general scott, who ordered twiggs to advance, and directed me to accompany his division. twiggs pushed on, and i went forward with the officers of the engineer company to reconnoitre. we came to a fork of a road. i took to the right, lieutenant mcclellan to the left. mine passed directly in front of a strong building (a church), occupied in force by the enemy; his led directly to the building. at a little distance before me i saw the enemy in retreat, and we took one prisoner, who informed us that the place was defended by two guns. my dear wife, perhaps i had not better at this time go into the details of the most terrible fight of the war, which now commenced. general twiggs has said publicly that by my reconnoissance and efforts it was brought on, as regards his division. we all felt the strongest determination to fight the enemy, and put him to a perfect rout. at all events, it so happened that i was extremely active in pushing forward columns of attack, etc. our friend major dimick's regiment i directed to its position. so with taylor's battery. general twiggs, in almost every case, agreed to my suggestions. by my efforts and those of the junior engineer officers, the troops were brought under fire and the battle commenced. the veteran division of twiggs, already engaged in two hard-fought battles, the desultory and galling conflict of the day before and the brilliant victory of the morning, exposed to the rains of the night, and the whole without the least rest from the wearisome march around lake chalco, came gallantly into action against the enemy, intrenched in a position of remarkable strength,--a bastioned field-work of high relief, wet ditches, armed with eight guns, some of large calibre, and protected by a church converted into a defensive building of great strength. taylor, whom you knew in newport, came into action in most gallant style, and opened his fire upon the enemy, driving him from the roof of the building. but so destructive was the return fire of the enemy behind his earthen breastworks that in a short time his battery was cut up, and he was obliged to withdraw, losing many men and horses, and two of his officers were wounded. lieutenant martin, formerly stationed in newport, lost his arm. riley opened his fire with great spirit and effect against the left; smith's brigade, headed by our gallant engineer company, against the right. worth, hearing our fire, hastened up his command, and attacked a strong bastioned field-work on the great san antonio causeway, and a little in rear of the work attacked by twiggs. the 6th infantry and duncan's battery were conducted directly up the causeway. a terrible fire of grape temporarily checked the advance of the 6th, and compelled duncan to put his battery under cover. an attack was directed, headed by the 2d artillery, to turn the left of the position. the whole command of worth was rushed to the attack, not in the most orderly manner, and the greatest gallantry was displayed by both officers and men. a continued blaze of fire proceeded from the extended line of the enemy, resting on the two field-works, and was returned with great spirit by both twiggs and worth. the roar of battle did not for a moment cease, and at times the stoutest hearts would quail. in the mean time the brigades of shields and pierce, conducted by the intrepid captain lee, were directed around the enemy's right to get into his rear and cut off his retreat. the enemy appeared in such great force that it was with the greatest difficulty that the command could be brought to the attack. the gallant colonel butler, leading most nobly the palmetto regiment, was shot dead, and lieutenant-colonel dickinson was wounded. after exceeding effort they were made to charge the enemy, the causeway was gained, and his retreat cut off. in this action both shields and pierce were conspicuous for their gallantry, and the latter was wounded. previous to the attack of worth, the work attacked by twiggs had been nearly silenced by the destructive fire of his two gallant brigades, the gunners were shot down, and the guns were served only at intervals. still the church held out, and the line in rear was not touched. worth, after one repulse and at heavy loss, took by assault the work on the causeway, the guns of which, together with two from duncan's battery, were opened upon the work attacked by twiggs. shields and pierce had now cut the causeway. seeing no hope of escape, the white flag was hung out, and immediately the division of twiggs occupied the work, taking over one thousand prisoners, of whom three were general officers. the panic was now universal. our troops pushed forward on the great causeway, the dragoons in hot pursuit, sabring the enemy in their path. they fled in all directions. the gallant captain kearny charged up almost to the very walls of the city, receiving a severe wound in the arm, which rendered its amputation necessary. this is a meagre account of this terrible fight, more protracted and severe than anything seen at the resaca, at monterey, or the cerro gordo. our loss is great, some forty officers in killed and wounded, and over seven hundred rank and file; nearly half the officers of the 1st artillery were killed or wounded. major dimick commanded the regiment in three battles and escaped without a wound. as i have before said, i was on duty with the division of twiggs. this veteran was greatly exposed during the whole contest, and was conspicuous for his coolness and judgment. general scott himself was wounded. the chief engineer, major smith, was also conspicuous for gallantry and good conduct. our gallant engineer company nobly sustained its reputation as the first company in the service. at the close of the action general scott rode over the whole field, speaking words of encouragement to the wounded, and addressing the several regiments as he passed them. on all sides he was received with the greatest enthusiasm. his words were the eloquence of the heart, and told with great effect. general scott and staff returned to san augustin, some five miles from the battlefield, to pass the night. we were all greatly in need of rest. to our great satisfaction, on comparing notes it was found that not a single engineer officer had been touched, and only three soldiers of the company wounded. notwithstanding the great fatigues of the day, i slept little that night. the battlefield was before me with its scenes of terror and of blood. the gallant officers who fell haunted me. the loss of human life was appalling. i reflected that with less precipitation the works could have been carried with much less loss. i was precipitate like the rest, and felt in a measure culpable. the next morning, after issuing the proper orders for the movements of the troops,--orders given verbally from his horse to his aides, and with admirable precision,--general scott proceeded to the village of coyoacan, and there met a white flag from the city. we then learned that consternation sat on that devoted place, and that her army of twenty-six thousand to thirty-two thousand men had become reduced to four thousand indifferent troops. the result of the white flag was the appointment of commissioners to treat of an armistice. this morning (monday) the articles were duly signed, and there is now every prospect that the war has come to a close. the armistice is made by authority of the supreme government, and its avowed object is to negotiate a treaty of peace. this armistice provides generally that the two parties shall remain as they are. hostilities are to cease within a circuit of twenty-eight leagues of the city, the guerrillas are to be withdrawn from the national road, and our communications are to be free with vera cruz. monday evening. i have sad news to-day. the first day of the armistice the mexicans have commenced trifling with us. the armistice provided that our army should draw supplies from the city, and in consequence we commenced drawing specie in exchange for drafts. the mexicans denied this construction of the article, and in consequence, at three o'clock, general scott gave notice of the termination of the armistice (the articles guarantee forty-eight hours' notice). the mexicans dare not again invoke the power of our arms, and will yield the point. but it looks bad. tuesday, august 24. the commissioners have met again to-day, and the articles have been modified to meet general scott's views. thursday, august 26. yesterday santa anna issued a proclamation referring to his great exertions to defend his country, and to the circumstances of the present crisis, and stating his conviction that an honorable peace would promote the best interests of his country. accordingly to-day commissioners to negotiate a treaty of peace were appointed on his part, who are to meet our commissioner, mr. trist, to-morrow. friday, august 27. this has been a white day for me. the archbishop's palace is a very good place for the general and his personal staff. it has a splendid view from its top. but since our arrival it has been crowded with the general staff and with a company of dragoons. the courtyard was filled with horses, and the whole place was becoming filthy in the extreme. the chief engineer, major smith, and myself occupied a small, dirty room, which we used for a sleeping-room, an eating-room, and an office. accordingly we determined to seek other quarters. after much inquiry, i fell to-day upon a splendid suite of apartments belonging to a judge in the city of mexico, which i have secured, and am now occupying with major smith. we have a large parlor, dining-room, two large sleeping-rooms, a spacious kitchen, stable, and flower garden. as throughout all mexico, our apartments extend to the rear, looking upon an open court, with one apartment only on the street. the house is of one story, and each window extends to the floor and opens upon the court. we feel quite comfortable in our new home. the corresponding suite of apartments on the opposite side of the court is occupied by the judge's clerks and law students. we have been much indebted in securing these apartments to the good offices of mr. jameson, a scotch merchant of wealth in the city of mexico, who resides in tacubaya. he is our next-door neighbor, and will make a most pleasant acquaintance. just opposite us, he is now building a most elegant mansion in the midst of a garden laid out in the english style. last evening mason and myself took a walk to the top of an eminence in rear of the palace, where we had a most beautiful view of the city of mexico and its neighboring lakes. we both thought of newport, and of the thousand delightful recollections that cluster around it. mason is in fine health, and has greatly distinguished himself in the recent operations. we both hope to see newport before the close of the year. saturday, august 28. to-day i have for once felt entirely recovered from the fatigues of the recent operations in the valley, and have twice mounted my horse, and to-morrow i think of going to the village of mixcoac, some two and a half miles from this place, where pillow's division is quartered. captain pitman is there with the 9th infantry. the colonel of this regiment, ransom, is a very fine officer. i saw general pierce to-day. he was not recovered from the effects of a fall from his horse on the battle-ground of the 19th instant, but was able to be about. he was not wounded, as i have before written. he is making a fine impression upon the whole service. the casualties are much higher than any one anticipated,--over one thousand killed and wounded (about 1060). general pierce's command suffered to the extent of about 160; general cadwallader's, about 100; general shields's, 200; general worth's, 336; general twiggs's, 260. footnotes: [1] the flat roof on the convent and most of the buildings in mexico afforded strong positions for defense, being surrounded by parapets, known as azoteas, formed by carrying the walls some four feet above the roofs. the convent azotea was lined with infantry. chapter xi molino del rey.--chapultepec.--capture of city of mexico.--return to united states. the diary continues as follows:- saturday, august 21. general scott and staff left san augustin at eight o'clock; on his way to coyoacan, he gave orders that worth should move on tacubaya, pillow on mixcoac, and twiggs on san angel; and at coyoacan, he was met by commissioners from the city asking for a suspension of arms. it was granted as preliminary to an armistice to be concluded for the express purpose of negotiating a peace, and commissioners were to meet and adjust the terms of the armistice. the general proceeded with his staff, and took up quarters in the bishop's palace, on the slope ascending westward from tacubaya, and about a mile and a half from chapultepec. this palace is a favorite resort of santa anna, and affords an extended view of the whole valley of mexico. sunday, august 22. generals quitman, smith, and pierce, american commissioners, met the mexican commissioners, villamil and quijano, to adjust the terms of the armistice. after sitting through the night of the 22d and 23d, the instrument was perfected, and signed by general scott and president santa anna. it provided generally that the belligerents should remain as they were; that hostilities should cease within a circuit of thirty leagues; that reinforcements to the american army should stop at puebla; that there should be no interruption to supplies coming to the army from the city; and that the american army should remain without the city. this armistice during the two or three subsequent days occasioned considerable discussion. the army generally felt a strong desire to enter the city as conquerors, and the foreigners of the city, somewhat numerous, fostered this feeling. it was generally agreed, however, by the most intelligent and reflecting, that general scott had pursued a wise course. our object was not to make a conquest, but to adjust the questions in dispute by a definite treaty of peace. we ought, therefore, to do nothing needlessly to humiliate them. moreover, our entering the city would disperse the government, and there would be danger that the country would become the prey of factions, and that no party would have sufficient power to enter into treaty with. such were the views of our commissioner, mr. trist. august 23-september 1. during these thirteen days commissioners herrera and mora, on the part of the mexican government, have met mr. trist several times to negotiate the treaty. thus far nothing has transpired to afford reasonable apprehension that hostilities will again be resumed. the appointment of the principal men of the peace party, santa anna's opponents, strengthens this belief. his own proclamation announcing the armistice strongly advocates peace. it is believed that, were santa anna firmly seated in power, the whole thing could be arranged in thirty days. unfortunately, he depends almost entirely upon his army. at this very moment clouds are overshadowing the heavens in all directions: almonte and valencia have formed a coalition to the west; paredes has returned from exile, and is now said to be in the neighborhood of puebla; alvarez is somewhere to the north; and a fourth faction is making head towards the south. the mexicans are great sticklers for forms, and, since the conclusion of the armistice, they have sent back our trains several times in consequence of some little ceremony having been omitted. the first train that entered the city was stoned by the populace, and there was some little difficulty experienced in getting the train out in safety. an apology was immediately made for the affront. but it was made the ground for suggesting that, for the safety of our people, the wagons should be loaded outside, and that our people should not enter the city. at this very moment there is no communication between the city and the residents of the villages occupied by our army. i believe that with patience and firmness on our part, and the being content with the cession of new mexico and new california, paying therefor an ample indemnity in money, we shall get peace. we may consider the relinquishment of the mexican claims to the territory east of the rio grande as the indemnity for the expenses of the war. september 6, 7. all our hopes have been doomed to disappointment. general scott, in consequence of the violation of the third and seventh articles of the armistice on the part of the mexicans, terminated the armistice to-day at twelve o'clock, and the ball is to be reopened. god grant that a similar sacrifice may not be required of us as at churubusco! molino del rey.[2] september 8. at daybreak an attack was made on the enemy's position at the foundry, and after a most terrific engagement of two hours the position was carried, but with a loss of six hundred killed and wounded in worth's division alone. in addition to his command, cadwallader's brigade was engaged. the enemy was in a position of immense strength, their left resting on chapultepec and the foundry, their right on a ravine, a continuous breastwork covering their front. the attack was opened by two 24-pounders on the walls of the foundry, upon which an assaulting column of five hundred men picked from worth's division, organized in companies of one hundred men and commanded by major wright, deployed and advanced upon the enemy's line. the right, led by lieutenant foster with ten sappers and ten pioneers carrying crowbars and axes, moved on the foundry; the left, led by captain mason, on the enemy's battery of four guns. the enemy were driven from their lines, but immediately retook them, every officer of the assaulting column being killed or wounded save two. captain mason had a flesh wound in the thigh; lieutenant foster one in the leg, breaking the bone. the right of the assaulting column having maintained its position under cover of the foundry, the reserves of garland and clarke were promptly brought up, and after a desperate conflict the enemy was driven to the rear of chapultepec, and the whole position fell into our hands. drum's battery of two 6-pounders supported garland on the right, and with two rounds of canister drove the enemy from his battery. it was then pushed forward three hundred yards beyond support, opening its fire and driving the enemy before it, but was finally recalled. duncan on the left supported clarke's brigade, and drove the enemy, who was advancing, back to and out of the right of his lines. the dragoons under major sumner turned the right flank, causing a large body of lancers to retire under cover of a village to the left. i reconnoitred the ground to our left, and estimated the lancers to be from one to two thousand. the attack had simply for its object the destruction of the foundry (which did not exist; at least, no boring apparatus or furnaces could be found), and the position was finally abandoned. the battle was entirely without results; two or three additional victories of the same kind would annihilate our army. it has filled all hearts with sadness. colonel scott, captain merrill, captain ayres, captain armstrong, and others have fallen. among those most lamented is the gallant colonel graham, who fell gallantly leading the 11th regiment to the charge. lieutenant burwell, wounded in the assault, was barbarously murdered by the enemy by a lance in the head. duncan's efficiency was diminished in consequence of the precipitate charge of clarke's brigade on the casa mata, masking his fire. a well-directed fire of round-shot from his battery would have driven the enemy from that strong position, and thus saved us many valuable lives sacrificed in taking it by the bayonet. there was great difficulty in reconnoitring the position without bringing on a general action. more guns should have been brought into action. it was more a case for artillery than for the bayonet. an attempt should have been made to reconnoitre the enemy's right, with a view of sending round a column and taking his line in flank and rear. the loss to worth's division was greater in this action than the english loss at the assault of badajos. on the 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th, in consequence of the occupation of the church of piedad by our troops, and the pushing of the reconnoissances in that direction, the enemy was exceedingly active in fortifying that front of the city from the gate of belen to that of las vegas, and even prepared cuts in the road leading to istacalco on the canal. on the 10th they had a very respectable battery in position, and were in expectation that the attack would be made in that direction. chapultepec. at a council of war at la piedad on the 11th, it was determined to establish batteries against chapultepec, and carry it by assault, then to operate against the city as circumstances should dictate. this was general scott's proposition, and was concurred in generally by the officers present at the council. accordingly, on the night of the 11th-12th batteries were commenced, one for two 18-pounders and one 8-inch howitzer on the road leading to chapultepec, and one for one 24-pounder and one 8-inch howitzer near the foundry. these batteries opened their fire about eight a.m. on the 12th, quitman's division supporting on the right, pillow's on the left. about 2.30 p.m. a third battery, one 18-pounder, one 8-inch howitzer, and one mortar, was prepared also near the foundry. the fire was returned with some spirit, and about eight a.m. on the 13th the order was given to commence the assault. chapultepec stands boldly out two miles from the city of mexico, an eminence two hundred feet high, having on its summit an irregular work with a stone scarp ten feet high, the whole defended by the strong stone building used as a military college. at the southwestern foot of the height is the venerable cypress grove of the age of montezuma, extending to within four hundred yards of the mill whence pillow was to direct the assault of his command. at its eastern base was a formidable battery sweeping the causeway of approach in the direction of quitman's command, the aqueduct and stone buildings affording cover to troops. it was known, from a daring reconnoissance made by general quitman on the afternoon of the 12th, that the enemy were in the occupancy of this base of chapultepec, five thousand strong. quitman, with a select storming party from twiggs's division two hundred and fifty strong, commanded by captain casey and supported by smith's brigade, was to attack on the right, carrying the formidable position reconnoitred by him on the 12th, and thence sweeping up the hill to enter the citadel itself. pillow, supported by worth's whole division with a select storming party from that division, headed by the gallant captain mckensie, 2d artillery, was to break through the cypress grove, charge up the hill, and pour his men into the work in conjunction with quitman. at eight o'clock the commands advanced. in pillow's attack, the voltigeurs, with callender's howitzer battery, ran forward, and, charging the wood, soon cleared it of the enemy's skirmishers. his whole command now pushed forward with such unexpected vigor that, before the storming party could pass them to take the lead, the whole brow of the hill was covered by a dense body of men, who, finding cover behind rocks and in the inequalities of the ground, steadfastly maintained its position, swaying slightly in the effort to get better cover whilst endeavoring to advance. there they hung, like a cluster of bees, whilst a tremendous fire of artillery opened upon them from the work. the storming party with their ladders now pressed forward; soon they were planted, the gallant mckensie, with his hat on his sword, pressed forward, drawing after as by strings the whole command, who in a moment overleaped the work and drove the gunners down the eastern slope, where a fierce conflict still raged on the part of quitman. quitman, at the preconcerted signal, moved forward the select storming party from twiggs's division, a light battalion under the gallant major twiggs, and a select storming party of forty marines under captain reynolds in the advance, followed by the maine battalion, the south carolina, new york, and pennsylvania volunteers. the brigade of smith was in the adjoining field on the right, and had assigned to it the duty of breaking through the aqueduct and taking the enemy in flank and rear. the command moved up the causeway, under a tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, till they reached some old buildings of adobe, where they were obliged to get a momentary shelter. from this position, a company of the rifles and portions of the storming parties being still further in advance, they opened an effective fire in return. as the volunteer regiments came up, they were turned off into the open field on the left, intersected with ditches, to the assault of chapultepec. the new yorkers and pennsylvanians made a detour to the left, and entering the cypress grove at an abandoned breastwork where some fifteen minutes previously portions of pillow's command had entered, pressed forward and became intermingled with pillow's command as it poured into the work, as did the palmettoes, who pierced the stone wall at a partial breach made by a cannon-ball without scarcely varying from their direction. smith in his advance, finding two wide and deep ditches in his front without any adequate means to cross them, and his force too small to force the passage in presence of the immense force of the enemy, veered to the left, and sheltering his troops partially by maguey plants, opened a well-directed fire upon the enemy in conjunction with the storming parties and marines on the causeway. meanwhile drum's battery, a 9-pounder and a 16-pounder, came up and opened on the enemy, as did hunt's section of drum's battery. for half an hour the contest was of unparalleled severity. our troops, however, pressed forward, and, chapultepec having fallen, the enemy fled to the city along the tacubaya causeway, and a causeway entering the san cosme causeway at the english cemetery, some six hundred yards outside the garita, yet not till some of the most resolute of their troops had maintained their posts even to the interlocking of bayonets and clubbing of rifles. quitman on the tacubaya causeway, the rifles and 1st artillery of smith's brigade in advance, worth on the san cosme causeway, pressed forward in pursuit of the enemy. aqueducts supplying the city with water extended along both these causeways, resting on arches that afforded partial shelter to troops. the causeway of tacubaya led directly into the city, and with a strong field-work midway was defended at the gate by another formidable battery, by the strong work of the citadel three hundred yards distant, and by cross-fires from a formidable battery on the paseo leading from the san cosme to the belen suburb, and on both sides were almost impassable ditches filled with water. the san cosme suburb extended even beyond the english cemetery, where there was a formidable field-work sweeping the main cosme causeway and the causeway from chapultepec. at the gate, and two hundred yards without, were two batteries for two guns each. quitman pushed forward his command with unexampled vigor. the rifles and 1st artillery in advance, closely followed by the palmettoes, marines, and the remainder of the volunteer division, were in close contact with the enemy till possession was effected of the garita at twenty minutes past one. in this contest drum's battery, assisted by captain winder's company of the 1st artillery as a fatigue party, was served with a vigor and enthusiasm unparalleled in this war. the iron men of drum pushed it into the very teeth of the enemy's fire, and made it send forth an iron hail that drove the enemy from all his positions, even the garita itself. drum paused not at the garita. with a sublime devotion, he marched boldly up to the very citadel itself, and fell mortally wounded, together with his gallant lieutenant, benjamin, two thirds of his company being disabled. in command of a battery only three weeks, he fell universally lamented, the first artillerist of the army. the temporary pause in the pursuit on the capture of the garita, considered indispensable to get the command in hand in order to proceed against the enemy, who was still in force, gave time to reassure the troops at the citadel, who were at one moment struck with a panic, and on the eve of evacuating the position. notwithstanding the heroic conduct of drum and the gallantry of the rifles and palmettoes, the terrible fire which was soon opened from that work and the battery on the paseo compelled quitman to withdraw his troops to the shelter of the garita, where they sustained the tremendous fire of the enemy till nightfall. the command of worth, on the fall of chapultepec, boldly pushed forward to the san cosme suburb, garland's brigade and magruder's battery in front. a smart encounter was had with a considerable body of the enemy's lancers, who were charging down the causeway. magruder was vigorously pushing forward his guns, ably supported by the troops, and the battery at the english cemetery was about to fall into our hands, when the whole command was halted. worth, on arriving at a cross-road leading to the tacubaya cemetery, was attracted by the tremendous contest going on there, and in consequence halted his command to be in condition to lend a hand to quitman in case of his being sorely pressed. timely assistance was rendered by duncan's battery, which contributed materially to quitman's success. meanwhile a reconnoissance by the engineers showed that the enemy had no artillery in position at the cemetery, that the infantry force there was not formidable, and the lancers hanging on the flanks were not worthy of regard. soon the order was given to charge the works. our troops pressed in, driving the enemy before them and with little loss, and pressed forward to the batteries at the garita and in advance. worth, on his arrival at the suburb about half past twelve o'clock, finding that a continuous row of stone buildings put it in our power to make a permanent lodgment, and reduce the contest to the crowbar and pickaxe without exposing the lives of the men, recalled the troops, and awaited the arrival of the ordnance and engineer trains. a reconnoissance having shown that the first battery could easily be carried and with little loss, the enemy was driven from it, and hunt's section was put in position behind it, and made to open on the enemy's battery of two guns at the garita. but he was soon compelled to put his battery under cover in consequence of the superior metal of the enemy. at four the trains arrived, and immediately the troops, armed with the proper tools, commenced making their way from house to house. one party, headed by the engineer company, reaching the top of a high building, forty yards from the garita, opened fire upon the enemy at the guns at the very moment a similar fire was opened from a party on the other side of the street led by the gallant mckensie. the enemy was driven from the garita, but took away one of their guns. at nightfall worth's whole command was lodged in the suburb, his advance within twelve hundred yards of the alameda. during the night quitman, in the erection of batteries and infantry covers, was making every preparation to renew the contest in the morning and to carry his attack into the heart of the city. the enemy, however, withdrew their troops, and at seven o'clock quitman's command entered the citadel, and, pushing forward to the main plaza, the marines cleared the palace of the leperos, or thieves, who were infesting it, and hoisted the star-spangled banner from its summit. general scott, who had been the master spirit of the whole operations, originating the plan of attacking chapultepec, giving the order when the time had come to make the assault, from the extended position of chapultepec ordering the movements upon the causeways, supporting each by an adequate force, and on a lodgment being effected in the cosme suburb ordering the resort to the crowbar and the refraining from the bayonet,--general scott at eight o'clock issued his orders from the national palace announcing his occupation of the capital of mexico. still, a desultory contest was kept up throughout the day from the houses of the city by an intermingled body of soldiers and leperos led on by officers of the army. scott took the most decided means to stop it, and ordered every house to be blown up from which a hostile shot should be fired. at night the city was tranquil and in the undisturbed possession of our troops. thus the crowning glories of chapultepec and of the gates of san cosme and belen placed us in the undisputed possession of the city and valley of mexico. the public force of the enemy, dispirited and demoralized, paused two or three days at guadalupe and divided: santa anna with a portion repairing to puebla to try his fortunes against childs, the governor of that place, and to watch his opportunity to fall upon our reinforcements coming up from vera cruz; the remainder, a disorderly rabble, repairing to queretaro, where the government was to be temporarily established. the casualties to the american arms in this valley have been immense,--2703 out of a force of 10,737, over one fourth, equal to the english loss at the siege of badajos. general scott's movement against chapultepec was masterly, and in his plans he was well seconded by his generals. the removal of the depot to mixcoac, the concentration of the troops at la piedad, and the reconnoissances in that direction, impressed the enemy with the belief that that point of the city was to be attacked; nor were they undeceived till the very last moment, fully believing that the operations against chapultepec were only a feint. in the attack upon chapultepec general quitman's arrangements are open to criticism. his select storming party intended for the assault of chapultepec, and armed with ladders to scale and implements to break through the walls, were kept on the causeway; whereas the whole volunteer force was sent in that direction, wholly unprovided in every particular, and that, too, at too late a period to be of much essential assistance, and in a direction which made it necessary to fall in with pillow's command, already supported in great strength by the whole of worth's division. the consequence was that general smith found himself too weak to break through the enemy's force at the aqueduct and take him in flank and rear. had smith been preceded by the storming party provided with plank to cross the ditches, and supported by two of the volunteer regiments, the slaughter of the enemy must have been immense, and large numbers must have been taken prisoners. the marines with their storming party, the light battalion, and one of the volunteer regiments with drum's battery would have been in place to encounter the enemy on the causeway. at the garita drum's battery and the palmettoes were pushed forward under the guns of the citadel, and large numbers were uselessly sacrificed. on the whole, however, general quitman exercised good judgment, and gave proof of extraordinary vigor, intrepidity, and firmness. and he deserves the greatest credit for his perfect mastery of his command. general pillow's dispositions were good and well executed, excepting that the storming party did not move in season, in consequence of which the supporting force, pressing onward, gained the brow of the hill in dense masses, and were there detained some little time awaiting the storming party with their ladders, who in their turn found great difficulty in pushing their way through to the front, which only a small portion succeeded perfectly in doing. general worth, in his attack upon the city, unnecessarily delayed his advance to succor quitman. quitman was to be most effectually relieved by the vigorous attack of worth on his own line. on the arrival of the trains, however, he proceeded with great judgment and efficiency, and his attack alone, in consequence of being able to work from house to house, must have of itself put the city into our hands. had it not been for worth's vigorous movement towards nightfall, bringing him well into the city, the enemy would not have abandoned the citadel to quitman without a severe struggle. twiggs's command did not have the prominence as a division that it had at contreras and churubusco in consequence of the brigades being separated. smith's brigade did good service in conjunction with quitman, and riley at la piedad kept the enemy in check during the storming of chapultepec, and, afterwards joining worth, did good service in the streets on the 14th. the engineers did good service during all their operations at molino del rey. captain mason made a most daring and successful examination of the front of the enemy's position, and in the attack on the 8th was signally gallant, but the result showed that the right of the enemy should have been more particularly examined. the character of his defenses at this point was never known till our troops, in the full tide of battle, were hurled against them, to be repulsed with the loss of nearly half their number. without shining talents, and without any remarkable decision or independence of character, captain lee has rendered signal service on this line. laborious, constant, firm, of good judgment, patient, and guarded in his conduct, of popular manners and address, he has been a safe counselor, and always efficient in the discharge of duty. distinguished at vera cruz, the cerro gordo, and in this valley, both before and subsequent to the armistice, he continued at his post to the last moment, even when oppressed with illness and great physical fatigue. after the storm of chapultepec he received a severe contusion in the thigh, which disabled him for the day. lieutenant beauregard is one of the finest soldiers in our corps. of great strength, accomplished in all manly exercises, well read in his profession, and of forcible and independent character, much self-reliance and confidence, he has established a good reputation throughout the service. on the day of the storm of chapultepec, although struck several times and twice severely, he maintained his post, and in the night supervised the erection of the batteries and infantry covers, from which quitman was to open his fires upon the citadel in case the enemy had continued the conflict on the following day. lieutenant tower, for judgment, for an assured and natural self-reliance, great force of character, and great decision and intrepidity in emergencies, has no superior in our corps. indefatigable at vera cruz and the cerro gordo, he was eminently distinguished at contreras. subsequent to the armistice he was efficient in the discharge of his duties, and the engineer officer of quitman on the day of the storm of chapultepec; he was remarkably intrepid under the fire of the enemy, and was at his post till a severe wound in the head compelled him to withdraw. lieutenant smith, in command of the engineer company, has rendered the most distinguished service. he has shown great power of command. the engineer company has rendered the most distinguished service. the engineer company devolved upon him in a state of great despondency and discontent on the part of the men. by his judicious management he breathed into it the breath of life, raised the spirits of the men, and inspired them with hope and confidence. in his hands the company has acquired a great reputation in the service. his lieutenants, mcclellan and foster, are both brave, intrepid, efficient, and devoted to duty. at molino, foster was dangerously wounded in the leg. but perhaps no officer of engineers has rendered more brilliant service than captain mason. of remarkable intellectual force, great quickness of apprehension, highly cultivated, an ambitious student, and frank and honest in his life, on the field of battle, in a reconnoissance of the enemy's position, indeed in every emergency, he has been conspicuous for force, rapid decision, and the most daring intrepidity. in my own case, delicate health has much diminished my efficiency. our long rest in puebla did something towards restoring my strength, and i entertained the hope that it would prove equal to any emergency. i rode in an ambulance to buena vista, and subsequently from ayotla to san augustin. my reconnoissance of the peã±on, in which i was employed seven hours in mud and water, and within almost point-blank range of the enemy's guns, was highly satisfactory to general scott. on the 19th, at contreras, i was too much exhausted and in too delicate health to remain on the field exposed to the rain. i in consequence returned to san augustin, and was not present in the splendid attack of general smith on valencia's intrenched camp. at churubusco i was the senior engineer officer of twiggs's division. at the close of that day i was almost wholly prostrated by my exertions, and i had not renewed the strength with which i left puebla on the termination of the armistice. at molino del rey i accompanied the reserves to the field, and on mason and foster becoming disabled from wounds, did duty during the remainder of the action. subsequently, in conjunction with beauregard and tower, i reconnoitred the southern front of the city. in consequence of physical exhaustion i was not assigned to duty in the establishing of batteries against chapultepec, but on the day of the 13th was on duty till i was wounded, in the san cosme suburb, about half past one o'clock. september 13. at half past one o'clock i was wounded in the foot, whilst posting a picket at a little work at a village some five hundred yards beyond the english cemetery. dr. de lein cut out the ball. it struck close to the little toe, and crossing over a little obliquely to the rear, was cut out just in front of the instep. the bones are fractured and the tendons lacerated. about half past three o'clock i was taken to tacubaya in an ambulance, and in the evening dr. barnes dressed my wound. september 14. i was removed to the city this day, and placed in comfortable quarters in the palace. i suffered some little pain last night and through the day. i owe many thanks to major smith for his unwearied kindness. september 15. to-day i am relieved of pain, though last night i got but indifferent rest. dr. barnes attends me, and has commenced applying poultices. september 17. dr. barnes, on examining my wound this morning, observed, in a manner that showed he was relieved of much anxiety, "i can save the foot." september 18-30. during this period my wound has done famously. i have been in no pain whatever. news has come of large reinforcements pouring in from below, and many expect them to reach mexico as early as the 10th proximo. it seems to me we cannot reasonably expect their arrival till the 20th or 30th proximo. santa anna, some few days after our entrance, abdicated the presidency in favor of the chief justice, peã±a y peã±a, and announced his intention to go to puebla, organize a force, and operate against childs and reinforcements coming up from below. no one here is much apprehensive of the result. the general has found it necessary to issue stringent orders in regard to assassinations of men, and to enforce the utmost vigilance on the part of our guards. in some of the regiments the police is bad, and the guards totally neglectful of their duty. a large city is ruinous to the _morale_ of troops. the officers in our army spend the nights at the gambling-houses (tigers), and the men indulge in women and drink as long as their money lasts. a camp of instruction alone affords the means of putting troops in a high state of discipline and efficiency. yet the occupation of cities has great advantages. the residents become familiar with our character and customs, and friendly relations grow up. october 1. this day i have sat up the first time,--a most agreeable change from the recumbent posture. we hear news from below that childs has been severely pressed. here, we are firmly of opinion that he cannot be driven from his post. it is hoped and believed that no troops will march up from below except in a strong column, four to six thousand men. a small body might tempt the enemy. he might fall upon it with a large force and gain some success. october 2-11. rumors accumulate in reference to santa anna's attack on puebla. from all accounts, his troops are of poor quality, and he is not on the best terms with his subordinates. my wound is doing exceedingly well, and i have at length found an opportunity to write to my wife and father by way of tampico. october 12-24. my wound has been doing badly, and my general health has been poor. for several days the foot became much inflamed, and poultices had to be applied. the new flesh has sloughed off, and the process of granulation has to be gone over again. at the present time my wound is doing well, and the fever or flux, which has threatened me for many days, i have nearly driven off. november 1. a train of six hundred wagons departed for vera cruz with a large number of wounded officers and men, on their return to the states; generals quitman and shields, colonels garland, andrews, and morgan, major smith, and other distinguished officers being of the number. general quitman leaves behind him the most enviable reputation. courteous in deportment, just in conduct, a man of business devoted to his duty, he is second to no commander of division in this army. as a military man he is said to be well informed, and to understand well the principles of his profession. he has extraordinary vigor, courage, and coolness, and he has exhibited great ability in the management of the volunteer division. general shields has all the dashing and enthusiastic bravery peculiar to the irish race. there is no braver man in our army. since entering the military service he has assiduously studied his profession, and is fast rising as a military man. november 2. yesterday and to-day have been festival (all saints') days. word came from colonel childs that general lane on the 29th set out from puebla with a column to meet the train, and that general patterson left vera cruz with five thousand men. there is still an impression that general patterson will assume the command, and that general scott will be recalled. but i discredit it entirely. very few cases of stabbing now occur. on the departure of major smith, with whom i have messed nearly the whole time i have been in the country, i find myself entirely alone. colonel watson (in command of shields's brigade) and staff occupied adjoining rooms, and we made a very pleasant little circle. colonel watson is a candid, sensible, and good man. i esteem him highly. lieutenant baker is a gentleman of much intelligence, considerable acuteness, and of the most friendly feelings. they are now all gone, and i am now installed in colonel watson's apartment. i am in a spacious room, with three large windows hung in damask looking on the street, and having at one extremity a raised platform, carpeted, and canopied with damask. here i have my bed, my table, and my armchair, as comfortable as all the world. indeed, i now very much feel as if i were in the halls of the montezumas. my brother officers have most kindly offered to do all they can for me. november 3. since the departure of the train the weather has been beautiful. captain naylor this morning very summarily dispelled my dreams of luxuriating in the halls of the montezumas by saying that the room i now occupied was needed for a commission, and that he must ask me to remove to my old quarters. as they were exceedingly damp and uncomfortable, and totally unfit for an invalid, captain lee referred the matter to general smith, the governor of the city, who decided that i should not be moved till a suitable room could be provided. captain naylor is an enthusiast on the subject of the regeneration of mexico through american intervention. as superintendent of the archives, he avails himself of his opportunities to understand this people. they are undoubtedly degenerating. the cities are falling into decay; the mechanic arts do not improve; misrule and anarchy have long been the every-day experience of this unfortunate people. in the city of mexico not a new house has been built for years, and many structures are crumbling into ruins. november 4. my friends, captains lee, power, and hardcastle, give glowing accounts of the scenic representations at the santa anna theatre,--more perfect in the mechanical contrivances, and more splendid in effect, than anything to be seen in our own country. i regretted to learn that captain lee's man peter was murdered in ayotla after the arrival of the train on the evening of the 1st instant. the officers are hard at work at their drawings, and hope to finish them against my going down in the next train. november 11. during the past few days i have been ill and well again,--a bad cold and the wound inflamed. the doctor, however, still confines me to my room. he considers that rest is necessary to prevent my foot's inflaming. information has come that general patterson, on the 27th ultimo, left vera cruz. he will probably require twenty days to reach puebla, and some twelve days more to make his arrangements there and his journey to mexico. i shall not, therefore, look for a mail before the 17th instant. november 14. nothing of interest has occurred in the city. anaya is said to have been elected provisional president. a piece of leather of the size of half a tlaco came from my wound to-day. it was cut out of my shoe by the ball and carried into my foot. november 15. a general order was published to-day announcing the determination of the general to bring to trial and punishment all officers who shall, contrary to regulations, furnish for publication accounts of operations in the field, and censuring in the severest terms the authors of "leonidas" and of the tampico letter in the "north american." november 16. colonel duncan, in a letter breathing defiance to the general, announced himself as the author of the tampico letter, and exonerated general worth from all knowledge even of its having been written till it was well on its way. it was not written for publication, colonel duncan avers. colonel duncan was arrested in consequence of these matters. november 18. the long-expected train arrived to-day, bringing me three letters from my dear wife, and news of my little family being in excellent health. mr. trist has been recalled, and it seems to be the determination of the government to abandon all attempts to negotiate a peace, and to prosecute the war unto the occupation of the whole country. november 20. much to my delight, i mounted my crutches to-day and moved about my room. november 21. i made a call on my friend major kirby, and met several of my acquaintances. november 22. to-day i got as far as the engineer office. general pillow is in arrest. december 4. went into the streets to-day and was much rejoiced to be relieved from confinement. called to see my friend foster, and found him doing nicely. december 5. went to the theatre, and was charmed with caã±ete. my friends had spoken of her in glowing terms, and i went prepared to find her overrated. she is remarkably natural, chaste, and graceful in all her impersonations, and i do not wonder that she is so very popular with the whole world of theatre-going people. december 9. the train finally got off to-day, and proceeded as far as venta nueva. foster and myself have a tolerable ambulance assigned to us. we got off late, the last wagons not leaving the city till towards noon. the mules were a good deal fagged, and the train will not probably get down so soon by two days in consequence of the length of this day's march. distance, main plaza to ayotla, fourteen miles. december 10. proceeded to rio frio. here i met my classmate, colonel irvin, in command of the 5th ohio regiment. the night was quite cold, and, not finding a room, we were obliged to sleep in an ambulance. december 11. this day went to san martin, where we found some excellent pulque. distance, fifteen miles. december 12. reached puebla. distance, twenty miles. 1847. the diary ends here. lieutenant stevens's wound was far more serious than he, in his cheerful way of making the best of everything, admitted. the ball ploughed across the bridge of the foot, breaking nearly all the bones. at first the surgeons were extremely doubtful of saving the foot. the wound was slow in healing, and the foot never fully recovered its strength and usefulness. three times, at intervals of one or two years, the wound opened and expelled pieces of bone. for many years he had to wear a special shoe with extra-thick sole. the chief of the robbers who served as spies for general scott, a man of striking presence and romantic though blood-stained career, known as don juan el diablo (don john the devil), formed a strong attachment to lieutenant stevens, and took care of him during a great part of his sickness, and was devoted and unwearied in his attentions to the wounded officer. st. charles, new orleans, december 28, 1847. my dearest wife,--i have just reached this city after a four days' passage from vera cruz, and a twenty days' journey in all from the city of mexico. i am in splendid health, although my wound still keeps me on crutches. we are all going up the river to-morrow, and i am full of the most blissful anticipations at the idea of seeing you, the children, and friends. you will not see me for eight or ten days after the receipt of this. i shall be obliged to stay in washington some days. love to friends, and to hazard and sue. i hope to see you soon. yours affectionately, isaac. footnotes: [2] the hill of chapultepec, famed as the ancient country-seat of the montezumas, rose some two miles outside the city, and was crowned by a strong castle. an extensive grove of huge and hoary cypresses clothed its slopes and stretched half a mile westward, the whole surrounded by a solid wall of masonry. molino del rey, the king's mill, a group of stone buildings, stood at the foot of the grove, and the mexican line of defenses extended thence to a strong work, the casa mata, and far beyond it. it was reported that the enemy had a gun foundry in molino, and general scott determined to capture it. chapter xii heroes home from the war washington, january 23, 1848. my dearest margaret,--at the strong desire of the colonel, i must remain here a few days longer. he wishes me to go with him over all the reports in order to get at all the facts in relation to the services of the engineer officers in the recent campaign of mexico. i am able to afford many explanations of the reports, presenting in a stronger light the services of our officers, which will enable the colonel to present a strong case to the secretary in matters of brevets. the colonel and his family have been very cordial to me, and nothing could be more grateful than the high appreciation they have for the services of our officers. the colonel takes great pride in the distinction which our corps has acquired. indeed, the services of the engineers have been so conspicuous that the corps has become popular. every one knows that the engineers have important functions in the field. i have paid my respects to the president and secretary, and was highly gratified with my interview. the secretary had a half hour's leisure, and i took the opportunity to express my sense of the great ability, wisdom, and patriotism of general scott. the secretary has the highest admiration for his military achievements, and is indeed a just and judicious friend to the service. i am boarding at mrs. janney's with my old friends, gilmer and woodbury. woodbury married miss childs, a very pleasant lady. her mother is also boarding at the same place, a highly intelligent person, and the wife of colonel childs, distinguished for his defense of puebla. you may be sure i am very impatient to see you and my little ones. nothing but a sense of duty to my brother officers, who are absent in the field, could have induced me to remain. i hope to reach newport within the week, certainly by next sunday morning. affectionate remembrances to friends, and love, much love, to my hazard and susan. yours most affectionately, isaac. my health is splendid, my wound improving. the enforced visit to washington was not without pleasant features. he was received with the gratifying attentions due an officer just from the seat of war, who had distinguished himself for gallantry and conduct, and enjoyed the congenial duty of explaining the military operations to his chief, and aiding in securing for his absent comrades the honors and rewards they had so well earned. a letter of february 6 from his friend, captain foster, is of interest in this connection:- "on arriving at washington i went immediately to mrs. janney's. there i heard of you. they all spoke very highly of you, particularly mr. robbins, who was very much interested in you. i dined at colonel totten's on wednesday, and mrs. t. told me all about your being here. they all paid you some very fine compliments. mrs. t. said she gained more information from mr. stevens than from _all_ the other officers who had come from mexico, your manner of speaking of men and things was so frank and just. miss kate said she was _delighted_ with mr. stevens; he was correct and reliable in all he said. the colonel seemed glad to see me, and proud of the reputation of his corps. the result of all this, i hope, will be that he will give us two brevets, make you a major in charge of a work, and send me as your assistant.... it made me right jealous to hear the flatteries that the ladies at mrs. burr's bestowed on the 'gallant mr. stevens.'" it was a joyful reunion when he reached newport, and enfolded his dearly loved wife and little ones in his arms. a fortnight later he visited andover, and one may imagine how his father, brother oliver, and cousins and fellow townsmen received the soldier, returned on crutches, with open arms, and lionized him to the full. the country had been at peace for thirty years, and the returning soldiers from mexico, especially the wounded officers, were received with mingled feelings of awe and admiration. writes a brother officer, "the boys look at me around the corner, remarking, 'i see him.' 'there he goes.' 'the man that's been to mexico.'" newport, r.i., february 28, 1848. my dear father,--we reached newport about half past eight o'clock in the evening the same day we left andover. i am now in my office, and am devoting some six hours each day to official matters. my wound is improving; i go about the house with a cane simply, and through the streets with one crutch and a cane. in one month, or at least in two months, i hope to be able to dismiss my crutches entirely. i hope in all sincerity that our difficulties with mexico are in the way of a permanent adjustment. the general opinion is that the senate will ratify the treaty. the only difficulty (and one which in my opinion is much to be apprehended) is that mexico, in consequence of a pronunciamiento, may disavow her own act. i trust, however, that such will not be the case, though i think it incumbent upon our government to continue to raise and push out troops till the thing is settled. should there be want of faith on the part of the mexicans, we should be in condition to punish it with most exemplary severity. let our war measures be all pushed through without delay, and let there be the greatest activity in raising troops. this course of procedure, whilst ratifying the treaty, will make the treaty an effective thing. remember me to friends. margaret wishes to be affectionately remembered to you. hazard has not forgotten your stories of king george and the redcoats. at this time he was being considered for the colonelcy of one of the new regiments, which, if the war continued, would have to be raised. a prominent member of congress from maine, hezekiah williams, writes him, "i think our delegation would unite in recommending you. it certainly would give me pleasure to aid in obtaining your appointment." mr. stevens writes oliver:- "my policy is to get elected to the command of a volunteer regiment, and get a leave of absence, so as to hold on to my present commission. i should like to command a massachusetts regiment and put it through some good service in mexico, should we be obliged to resort to the alternative of renewing the contest." an incident occurred one day, when a light rifle that mr. stevens had taken to mexico, but had never used in action there, stood in good stead. a mad dog ran amuck down broad street, frothing at the mouth and snapping at all he met. the people on all sides rushed into the shops and houses for refuge, with loud outcries of alarm and warning. mr. stevens, apprised of the danger, seized the light rifle, hobbled out on his crutches to the sidewalk, followed up the maddened beast, which had now dashed into the hall of a neighboring house, and shot him through the head, killing him on the spot. he might now reasonably expect a little rest until he could recover from his severe wound and injury. he writes oliver, march 15:- "i am taking things very quietly in this most quiet of all places. there is no danger from dissipation or over-excitement, and i need not, therefore, be apprehensive of anything like inflammation in my wounded part. my wound is doing exceedingly well. i can now move a little about the house with a cane." that very day he received orders to proceed to savannah, ga., with the view of taking charge of the fortifications on the savannah river. after his arrival there he writes oliver, march 27:- "i am here on temporary duty for a few days, and shall return home next week. this is to be my permanent station in the fall. the summer i shall spend in amusing myself. a portion of it will be passed in andover. "savannah is an old-looking, handsomely laid out, and pretty well-built place, the most important town in the state, and the only one having much trade. "colonel mansfield will relieve me in bucksport during the latter part of april, at which time i shall bid adieu to my friends in maine. "i am tolerably well pleased with my new station. it is healthy throughout the year, and i have no doubt the change will prove highly advantageous so far as health is concerned. "the duties are trifling. the large work, fort pulaski, is finished, and nothing remains to be done but to prepare a bridge-head of timber, and secure the island from overflow by the construction of dikes. the small work, fort jackson, will require an expenditure of something less than one hundred thousand dollars in the way of enlargement and repair. "my duties will therefore be comparatively light. nothing will be doing from june to october; so i shall be able to go north occasionally to pass the summer. "the people are very hospitable, and i shall make many acquaintances before i leave. i have an old classmate just rising at the bar here, and many officers' families reside here." his next letter to oliver, from newport, april 6, is interesting as presenting his view of cromwell:- "i am just back from savannah after an absence of twenty days, and return thither to commence operations in november next. the intermediate time will enable me to get well of my game foot, and to pass some little time among my friends. i go down to bucksport week after next to turn over the public property to colonel mansfield, and i shall probably be in portland on friday, april 21. "i am rather late to answer the principal thing in your letter of the 25th ultimo. both subjects are good. i should think that 'individuality of character' would be preferable, because its handling does not require so much reading as cromwell. with ample leisure for investigation, i should prefer the latter. i do not know of a single unprejudiced authority. foster's statesmen of the commonwealth and clarendon's history are the best i have seen. russell's biography is poor and inaccurate. hume is very superficial. catherine macaulay is a great bigot. carlyle's cromwell is good, because it consists principally of cromwell's letters and speeches. babington macaulay's essays on the various statesmen of the rebellion are good. "i like your idea of treating the subject of individuality. the greatest example of the influence of a strong, original character in moulding a great people in our own history is franklin. it was the strong, original characters of our revolution that achieved our independence. the many are always ruled by a few, frequently by one, the wise, the strong man, or men. i have found in this view many fine ideas in carlyle's heroes. "as regards cromwell: he and he alone achieved the overthrow of the stuarts. without him there would have been no glorious restoration, as burke calls the expulsion of james. the french monarchy would have still been absolute, and the french people would have still been in chains. cromwell was bold, direct, far-seeing, a great governor of men. cromwell was vastly superior in the elements of a great man to hampden, to pym, to strafford, to vane. a bold sketch of cromwell's actual part in the greatest drama of english history would be highly interesting. dwell on his great foresight, grasp, directness, sincerity; his boisterous youth, his religious fervor in after years, his unswerving advocacy of the rights of his neighbors, which caused him to be called the lord of the fens; his unshrinking avowal of his opinions in his early parliamentary career; his extraordinary sagacity in organizing his ironsides, the greatest soldiers of ancient or modern times; his self-denying ordinance, in which by a bold stroke he threw half-way, indecisive men from the army, and sent it forth to victory; his earnest efforts to settle matters with charles after the forces of the latter were dispersed, and he a prisoner; his invincible opposition to all ecclesiastical tyranny, whether presbyterian or prelatical; his part in the execution of the king; his great irish and scotch campaigns, particularly the battle of dunbar, where his famous rallying cry, as the sun shone through the morning clouds, 'let god arise, and let his enemies be scattered!' spread dismay through the ranks of his enemies, and brought a glorious victory to his arms." now he enjoyed a month of the rest he so much needed. with his wife and little ones he occupied rooms in the old family mansion, a welcome guest to mrs. benjamin hazard and her daughters, who always regarded him with the greatest affection and admiration. as spring opened, he took great pleasure in making a famous garden in the spacious yard behind the mansion, having the ground manured and cultivated in the most thorough manner, and planting the greatest profusion of vegetables. his friend mason was also in newport, recovering from his wound, and many were the accounts and discussions had with him and mr. brooks and other congenial spirits of the stirring scenes of the war. major stevens was fully convinced of the justice and necessity of the mexican war. the repeated depredations by mexico upon americans, and her long-continued refusal or evasion of all redress; her publicly declared purpose of conquering the republic of texas after its independence had been established and acknowledged for ten years; her arrogant demand that the united states should not admit texas to the union, and her still more arrogant threat that she would regard such admission as an act of war; the departure of her minister from washington; and the breaking off of all friendly relations instantly upon the passage by congress of the resolution admitting the lone star state,--left no alternative but to bring the inflated and treacherous pronunciamientos to terms by force of arms, since they were amenable neither to justice nor reason, and to "conquer a peace" which even they would have to respect. and, glorious as were her arms, not less creditable were the moderation and magnanimity of the great republic, when mexico, her armies destroyed, her capital taken, lay prostrate, in paying a large indemnity for the far-distant and almost tenantless regions of new mexico and california, which, while ready to fall from mexico's feeble grasp, were essential to the expansion of the populous and fast-growing republic of the north. in the latter part of may he visited boston and andover with his little son. the following month the savannah orders were countermanded, the engineer department deeming it best that he should continue in charge of fort knox, and the other works in maine and new hampshire. after a preliminary visit, he moved his family again to bucksport, in june, and occupied a cottage at the fort opposite the town. he gathered about him his former assistants, a.w. tinkham and john lee, and continued in charge of the works for upwards of five years. having a strong desire to own a home of his own, he purchased a house, with a generous lot of half an acre, overlooking the river. the house was of two stories, seven rooms, with a barn in the rear connected by a woodshed. the principal wharf was at the foot of the street, and here major stevens kept his boat. the house had an ill repute as being unhealthy, some of the former inmates having died from consumption. when cautioned on this score, he replied: "it is high time some one took the house who can give it a good reputation." he had the cellar and grounds thoroughly drained, sunk a well, blasting through a ledge of rock, and put the grounds and garden in fine order. he took great pains with, and pleasure in, the garden, raising all kinds of vegetables. they kept poultry also, and among them was a flock of twelve ducklings that every day solemnly waddled down to the river in single file, and as solemnly waddled up the hill again after their daily bath and paddling in the river, an unceasing source of interest and pleasure to the children. the government was contemplating the fortification of the more important points on the pacific coast, and to an inquiry as to his willingness to be sent to that distant field, he writes the following characteristic reply:- "as regards engineer duty on the pacific coast for a year or two, i should be well pleased with it did i feel certain that i was physically in condition to undertake it. if the passage thither should be an easy one, as mostly by sea, i have little doubt that on my arrival at the scene of my duties my lameness would be essentially gone. if the journey should be overland, i should hardly be able to bear the fatigues of it in less than two or three months. if ordered, i should go _without hesitation_, and do the best i could. i must leave this matter entirely with you. no officer should feel at liberty to decline a distant duty of this kind, and in this case, as in all others, let the public interests alone have weight." ambitious he was, but with a lofty ambition, not to aggrandize himself, but to serve his country, ever ready to sacrifice personal interests and feelings to the public service. in this and other letters he displays a certain impatience that personal convenience or interests should be consulted at all in matters of public duty. when the brevets were announced, lieutenant stevens was brevetted "captain, august 20, 1847, for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battles of contreras and churubusco," and "major, september 13, 1847, for gallant and meritorious conduct in the battle of chapultepec." he took great pains to secure justice to all the engineer officers in the way of brevets, conceiving that he was in a measure responsible therefor because, as adjutant of the corps in mexico, the engineer reports had been made through him; he had had charge of the records, and had been closely consulted by the chief, general totten, and spent no little time and effort in behalf of those who had been overlooked. the engineers felt themselves treated with injustice in the matter of brevet pay, for while the officers of artillery, cavalry, and infantry were allowed full pay when assigned to duty according to their brevet rank, the former were denied the same right, although frequently placed in charge of works and assigned to duties above their nominal rank. they had other grievances, too, in the allowances for rations, horses, etc. one so disinterested and indefatigable in behalf of his corps and brother officers as major stevens would be sure to be often called upon. he took great interest in these matters, and even more in the general reorganization of the army, upon which he corresponded and consulted largely with able and public-spirited young officers of other corps as well as his own. it was not until november that his friend and classmate, lieutenant j.f. gilmer, relieved him of the vouchers and papers relating to savannah forts. writing from washington, november 6, gilmer says: "captain fred. a. smith would like much to have you here this winter. it is possible you may do the corps a great service by being in washington this winter." a call for service in any direction always appealed strongly to him, and accordingly he determined to visit washington, as he writes his brother oliver, under date of bucksport, december 8, 1848. this letter displays a humorous vein not usual with him, and gives his view of the character and public policy of general taylor, then just elected president:- my dear brother,--i rejoice to learn that you are still in the land of the living, and that that severe and noble pursuit, the law, does not prevent your seeing the lions of the town. but you are very cruel to triumph over us benighted creatures in this region of frosts and snows. in truth we lead a quiet, rational, country life, perhaps as much to be envied as the more attractive life of the great city. i wish you, however, distinctly to understand that we do not suck our paws during the winter, and i feel bound to disabuse you of this misapprehension. that is done still farther down east, i believe. we do not sleep more than twelve or at most fourteen hours a day. we manage to eat three meals per day. but it is hard work; they approximate rather too closely. we drink tea nights, and eat apples mornings. we get the newspapers generally every day, and expect to read the message to-morrow. by way of diversion, we slide down hill on a moonlight evening. then there are prayer and conference meetings _ad libitum_. what a consolation these latter privileges would be to one of your serious turn of mind! i can almost see your grave countenance lighted up with heavenly radiance on such an occasion. by the bye, i hope to see you in about four weeks, as i pass on to washington. there i shall probably remain till after the inauguration. i find in the election of general taylor the great fact indicated that we poor devils in the army are citizens of the country, and eligible to civil offices of trust. i should have voted most cordially for general cass, had i a vote to throw. his election i vastly preferred. but there has been in this canvass a vast deal of nonsense about the camp not being the place to find our presidents, and i am much mistaken if general taylor, in his own person, does not prove a happy instance of the mingling of military and administrative ability. and those miserable hacks of party, who have sought to depreciate his military services and talents, have now the consolation to reflect that their efforts at detraction served to promote his election, as it did that of general harrison. "i unhesitatingly believe that general taylor will administer the government in an able, impartial, and patriotic manner, and if during his presidency an emergency arises, he will prove a hero-president as he has proved a hero-soldier. the democratic party ought not to prejudge him. let them maintain a firm attitude in congress, and keep well organized everywhere. the whigs cannot carry any of their favorite measures through congress for two years at least. we may then have a democratic congress, and, my word for it, there will be no collision between such a congress and general taylor. on that great cluster of questions, the public lands, the encouragement and protection of distant settlements, the development of the great pacific coast, the old man will be right. if the democratic party will show candor and liberality towards general taylor, he may be their nominee four years from this time." as one result of his visit to washington, major stevens took hold of the brevet pay question in his usual thoroughgoing and indefatigable manner. he first corresponded with every brevetted officer of the corps whom he had not already consulted personally. having thus learned their views, he prepared a strong memorial on the subject, which, after being submitted to, and warmly approved by, colonels thayer and mansfield and major tower, was sent to all the officers for their signatures. and in july he transmitted the memorial to general totten, signed by every brevetted officer of the corps save one, with an urgent letter asking his interposition with the war department in their behalf. it was the intention, in case the department denied the application, to appeal to congress, but the manifest justice of the cause as presented was unanswerable. the department, after some doubts, concluded that it had the necessary authority under the law regulating brevet pay, and at length the engineers were placed on an equality with the other arms in this respect. his brother officers conceded that the gratifying triumph was due to the well-directed and persistent efforts of major stevens, and showered upon him their warm thanks and applause. this success, however, was followed by more and more frequent applications from them and others for assistance and advice in their own personal matters. he never failed to expend his thought, energy, and time in every deserving case as promptly and freely as, ay, far more than, if he was working for himself, and he never shunned, nor complained of, these gratuitous tasks, which in the next few years became a great burden, but always seemed to take real pleasure and satisfaction in helping others, even many who had little or no claim upon him. in april writes captain george b. mcclellan, who was stationed at west point with the engineer company, an urgent appeal to major stevens to use his influence to have the company ordered away from the point, and to fort schuyler:- my dear stevens,--the detachment of artillery (laborers) stationed here are to be transferred to the engineer company,--at least so many as may be necessary to fill up the company. on our company then will it devolve to do all the police of the point, to make the roads, drive the carts, feed the oxen, work in the blacksmith and carpenter shops, etc., etc.,--in plain terms, the engineer company is destroyed; it has become a company of mud-diggers; it will no longer be an engineer company, for it will be impossible to do military duty, and no instruction in the duties of engineer troops can be given them. the object of the whole business is to get shover's company of light artillery ordered on here, and we are sacrificed to attain that object. this is a matter that concerns equally all the officers of our corps. we are disgraced if this order is allowed to remain in force, and i beg of you to use whatever influence you may possess in washington to have the order rescinded, and the company ordered away from here. i am in haste, truly your friend, george b. mcclellan. partly in response to this letter, but more to express his own views as to the true policy in regard to engineer troops, major stevens writes at length to general totten. it is characteristic that he does not treat the matter from mcclellan's narrow, personal standpoint, but at once elevates the whole subject to a discussion of the requirements of the service. after referring to his intimate association with the engineer company in its organization and in mexico, he continues:- "i think every one owes something to his profession. something is due to my profession, not inferior certainly in dignity to any other. i would endeavor to discharge it according to my ability. it will be in this spirit that i shall submit the following observations. in this spirit will i from time to time communicate with the department on this and other topics appertaining to the noble profession of arms, not doubting that my suggestions will be kindly received. "by law, the engineer company is restricted to one hundred men, a number entirely inadequate even to the duties of peace.... the remedy i would propose is this: let the utmost care be exercised in enlisting men. let no man be enlisted who cannot in due course of time be made a non-commissioned officer. let there be in no case transfers from other branches of the service. let the whole strength of the officers of the company be applied to discipline and instruct the men, so that in time of need we shall have a band of splendid non-commissioned officers, the peers of everett and hastings and starr,--men who have received commissions for their gallant services in mexico, and each of whom, had smith and mcclellan and foster fallen, could have gloriously led on the company to its duty. "i would propose a complete system of practical instruction six or seven months of the year, sapping, mining, and pontooneering, and the whole subject of field-works, at some suitable place, say fort schuyler, and a course of theoretical instruction the remaining five months, embracing an elementary course of mathematics (including drawing, surveying, and the use of instruments) and of engineering. there should also be a good general and military library. as regards the library, the corps could be applied to for aid, if necessary. i will for one, and i doubt not many officers would, liberally make donations. "even if the engineer arm were increased to four companies, which i trust will be done the next session of congress, i would recommend this course. the fine practical education which would thus be secured would induce men to enlist. and we shall have the satisfaction that in the next war with england, and when the question is to besiege montreal, quebec, and halifax, our four companies can be soon converted into twenty companies." ever since his return from mexico, major stevens was deeply interested in the reorganization of the army. even while so vigorously fighting for his corps in the matter of brevet pay, in discussions and correspondence with mansfield, mason, tower, g.w. smith, f.a. smith, beauregard, hunt, and others, after disposing of this particular grievance he would enlarge upon the reorganization of the whole army, giving his own ideas, and urging them as a patriotic duty, not as members of any corps, but from the standpoint of the whole army, to prepare memoirs, or letters, giving their views. he advocated an organization that would admit of fourfold extension in case of war; the keeping of at least one third of the troops in camps of drill and instruction in order to maintain the highest degree of military knowledge and discipline; and the raising of the standard of the rank and file, attracting thereby american-born young men as soldiers by increased pay, better instruction, and greater opportunities for advancement, even to conferring commissions in meritorious cases. these letters and replies, particularly a memoir by hunt (afterwards the distinguished general, henry j. hunt, chief of artillery of the army of the potomac), are full of interest and instruction. the army, with all the improvements adopted in recent years, has not yet reached the standard set by these patriotic and able young officers fifty years ago. how major stevens followed up these preliminary efforts will appear hereafter. chapter xiii coast survey during the summer professor a.d. bache, the distinguished scientist, chief of the united states coast survey, found himself obliged to obtain a new "assistant in charge of the coast survey office," the second position on the survey, in place of captain a.a. humphreys, of the topographical engineers, who under the labors of that office had become broken down in health and was obliged to relinquish it. it was no light tribute to the rising reputation of major stevens that so wise and sagacious a man as professor bache, and so excellent a judge of men, should have selected him out of the whole army as his right-hand assistant and executive officer. he tendered the position, august 7, in a letter well calculated to appeal to a patriotic and ambitious young man, dwelling upon the important character of the duties of the office, and the opportunities it afforded "to build up a name for executive ability," and "to reflect credit upon the corps," etc., and stating that the chief engineer (general totten was an intimate friend of professor bache) would look favorably upon his acceptance. at first major stevens was disposed to decline the post; but after several interviews with professor bache in cambridge and boston, he reluctantly decided to accept it, but upon condition that he should retain charge of the bucksport works in addition to the new position for a year longer, with the right then to retain either the coast survey or fort knox, as he might prefer, and relinquish the other. this unique condition, by which an officer about to undertake new and arduous duties stipulated to retain also his former ones, thus voluntarily adding to his labors instead of diminishing them, was at once accepted by professor bache and agreed to by the engineer department, a convincing proof of the esteem in which he was held by both. the concluding part of the following letter to his brother oliver shows that it was the wider field for his energies and ambition, the better opportunities for service and for putting in force his ideas of reorganizing the army, of performing his "duty to his profession," that really caused him to accept the onerous position:- my dear brother,--i am ready at once to give you a decided opinion as to the course you should pursue, and i know it will be in accordance with your own judgment. remain in cambridge a year and a half longer. then go to boston. throw yourself into the arena of the strongest men in the state. contend with strong men, the stronger the better, and rise above them all. i have watched your progress with the anxiety and tender solicitude which an older brother must feel in a younger and only brother. this is one of the turning-points of your life. i have not the slightest doubt, in one year from being admitted to the bar, you will be able to marry and have a home of your own. don't trouble yourself about the cost. if things go right with me here, i have no doubt i shall be able to let you have, from july, '50, to july, '51, all you will require. i write with the earnestness of deep conviction. i am proud of your talents, but you have a weight of character which gives to talent its force. let me hear from you soon. i beg of you not to give way to despondency, and the least as to the bold course i have indicated. you and i both do best by taking bold, self-relying courses. i never once failed in my life from the boldness of my course. you will not. i feel i have come to washington at the right time. the coast survey _needs me_ to overhaul it. i feel that the army has a representative in me which it has not had in washington in years. i know my position,--my strength,--and i swear by the eternal, to use jackson's expression, i will put it forth. in the following he gives his views on coast survey and other matters. washington, d.c., october 22, 1849. my dear brother,--to-day i enter upon my duties. i see no particular difficulty. there is no need of being a mere office drudge. all the work can be done without any one's breaking down. the coast survey is a large operation, and the charge of the office here can be made an agreeable duty. the responsibility will be considerable. but all details can be thrown upon subordinates. the fact is, the work in the world has got to be done. but it can be done by proper distribution and arrangement in an easy, quiet manner. this will be my study in my new duties. we shall have a great session of congress the coming winter. the whole subject of our communications with the pacific will be discussed, railroad and ship canal across the isthmus,--railroad through our own border. i have no doubt congress will direct the necessary explorations and surveys to determine the practicability of the various schemes. i am now boarding at a private house. but in a few days i shall occupy rooms, and take my meals at one of the public houses. this is the favorite mode with gentlemen that can afford it. a good parlor with sleeping-room adjoining, in a good situation, will cost me twenty-five dollars per month, the rooms being furnished, and provided with fuel, light, and attendance. and board simply, at the best public houses, will cost about twenty dollars more. this mode of living is free and easy. you go into retiracy when you choose, and can again at any moment mingle with the crowd. i am becoming acquainted with our maine and massachusetts congressmen. duncan, of haverhill, i find quite an agreeable gentleman. hamlin, one of the maine senators, seems to be quite a clever fellow. maine, however, has a mediocre representation in both branches. i was present last evening at a reception at the white house. the president looks hardy, and as though he would survive the attacks that are being made upon him. his nonchalance is by many mistaken for vacuity. the old man has an iron will and most inflexible resolution, and i assure my democratic friends, who say that he is in the keeping of others, that before his four years are through they will be convinced of it. take my opinion for what it is worth, brother oliver. the democrats, as regards general taylor, are pursuing the very course to reã«lect him. what did the whigs gain by representing general jackson to be in leading-strings? can't we learn from our enemies? the coast survey office was indeed "a large operation." all the maps, charts, computations, drawings, printing, engravings, instrument-making, and business administration of the survey were done here under the management and supervision of the assistant in charge. the force immediately under him comprised from sixty to seventy persons, including several army officers. the office occupied a large brick block of houses on new jersey avenue, corner of b street, the house at the northeast end being the residence of the professor. the coast survey now occupies the other end of the same square. the first step taken by the new chief was to organize the force into separate bureaus, each under a responsible head, and performing a particular branch of the work. this had not yet been done, although the difficulty, or impossibility, of the head of the office personally directing and supervising so many employees singly, and the details of such multifarious and complicated work, was daily becoming more evident, and doubtless was the prime cause of captain humphreys's breakdown. "on entering on my duties," he remarks in his first report, "i saw at once that my only hope of filling the situation, with satisfaction to the survey and to myself, was in at once applying my exertions to enlarging and adapting the organization of the office to the increasing wants of the survey. the office work would necessarily increase for two or three years without any increase of field work. but it was manifest that the field work of the survey itself must increase, and thus involve a still greater increase of office work." accordingly he established the departments of engraving, drawing, computing, publication and distribution of maps, archives and library, and correspondence. to these were soon added electro-plating, printing, and instrument-making. the best-fitted men were selected from the force, or new assistants were employed and put in charge of the departments. the arrears of work were rapidly brought up; the geographical data were collected and indexed; the registry of land work was improved; volumes of observations were bound; and the register, two years behind, was brought up to date. in his first report, the new assistant in charge announced that the drawing department would be up to the wants of the survey in one year, and made many useful recommendations for the improvement of the service. professor bache warmly acknowledged the efficiency of his young assistant in his reports. december 5, 1851, he declares:- "for the development of the plans of office work, the urging to completion the list of geographical positions, and the increased rapidity of publication, the coast survey is indebted mainly to the zeal and industry, guided by knowledge and intelligence, of brevet-major isaac i. stevens, of the corps of engineers, in acknowledging which, in connection with the remarks on the speedy completion of the results of the survey, i feel that i am doing simply an act of justice. "every department of the office has, under his able supervision, continued to improve, and has filled the full measure required by the increasing number, amount, and variety of results returned by the field work of the coast. it is due to major stevens to acknowledge the promptness which is secured in the publication of results, and the maturing of a system by which sketches and preliminary work of charts are made in every case to precede the more finished work, furnishing valuable results to the navigator as soon as obtained by the survey. "the rapid execution of the engraved charts of the western coast reconnoissance is a proof of the perfection of this organization, and of the zeal of those who administer it. three well-executed sheets of reconnoissance were engraved and ready for publication within twenty working days after the beginning of the engraving." during captain humphreys's illness the work had fallen greatly in arrears; many of the employees had become careless and idle, some of them dissipated; and great disorder and confusion prevailed. it was common report that the coast survey was the worst-conducted office in washington. major stevens set himself to correct this state of things with a vigor, at times a severity, that admitted no delay and brooked no opposition. strict punctuality, prompt compliance with orders, and complete and exact performance of duty, he required and exacted with military discipline. there was great discontent and indignation among the old officers and employees, and no little ridicule at the idea of the young major enforcing army rule in a scientific institution. even the professor feared he was carrying it too far, and rather pettishly remarked, "since major stevens took hold, there has been a continual jingling of bells all over the building, but i suppose it won't do to interfere with these army officers." it seems that major stevens had caused bells to be placed in the various offices with wires running to his own room, so that he could summon his subordinates without delay when he wished to see them. but the new assistant pursued the course he had marked out unswervingly, without fear and without favor. he summarily dismissed several of the worst offenders. others he degraded in pay or position. he made himself master of every branch and detail of that great institution. the old computers, engravers, draughtsmen, topographers, and others, who had passed years in the office, were astonished to find that the new chief fully understood their technical work, and was watching, criticising, and directing it with expert skill and judgment. as usual, he took a warm interest in the men under his charge, ever ready to encourage and reward the deserving, and to assist them in their personal affairs. he caused one of the messengers, who had lost both arms in an explosion, to learn to write with his foot, and gave him copying to do to eke out his scanty pay. one of the higher employees was addicted to periodical attacks of intemperance utterly beyond his power to resist, but otherwise was a respectable and useful man. major stevens quietly told this gentleman to come to him whenever he felt one of these attacks coming on too strong for him to withstand, and he should have a leave of absence for a few days, enough to have, and recover from, his spree, and on this footing he continued on the survey for years. under his firm, masterful, and exacting but generous treatment the outraged feelings of the office soon changed. they could not but respect a chief who, if he required good and full work, appreciated and acknowledged it; and their respect changed to admiration, and finally to affection, when they saw how he was building up the efficiency and reputation of the office, and realized that his strict rule was characterized by justice and impartiality, and tempered by the kindness of a warm-hearted and generous man. professor bache found in his new assistant not only relief from the cares of the office and of administration, but one whose ideas in most subjects agreed with his own, and whose strong, bright, and well-instructed mind could travel with his own through other fields. a warm and generous friendship grew up between them, which lasted unbroken during life. the task he had undertaken at the coast survey made this a very laborious winter for major stevens, but one that gratified his ambition for public service. he met many of his brother officers, "the men of mexico," and discussed with them the questions of army reorganization, fortifications, etc. he also made the acquaintance of members of congress, and freely impressed upon them his views of these measures. general shields was now a senator from illinois, and was always ready to adopt and advocate the ideas of the young major of engineers, and was glad of his aid in preparing his reports and bills. always and emphatically a national man, believing that the preservation of the union was essential to liberty and national existence, major stevens took great interest in the compromise measures so ably carried through by henry clay, in support of which webster delivered his noted 7th of march speech, and fully approved the measures of these great statesmen to allay sectional strife and preserve the union. the plans and hopes of the southern leaders were cruelly disappointed by the action of california, which adopted a free constitution, and knocked at the doors of congress for admission as a free state. consequently they refused her admission unless additional safeguards were thrown around the "peculiar institution," as slavery was termed; and many of the fire-eaters openly advocated disunion as the only means of preserving it against the free ideas of the north, and the preponderating increase of free states. for a time the difference seemed irreconcilable, and disunion and civil war imminent; but at length, by the wise counsels of clay, webster, and the more broad-minded men of both sides, a compromise was effected, and california entered the union a free state. the old puritan in andover, in his abhorrence of slavery, condemned all compromise, and writes the son he so much loved and admired a pathetic and reproachful letter, marked, too, by a sublime faith in the ultimate triumph of right:- dear son,--i have been confined to the house since the 22d of last november, but am now very well, excepting a weak leg. i have thought much of my daughters during my sickness, especially of the two youngest, who were ever ready to wait upon me by night or day.... i was sorry you should so much commend d. webster's speech, and thought no man could commend it who was opposed to slavery. i do think webster to be a demagogue; that he is so lost to every good principle as to court slaveholders' approbation, and vote shame on the descendants of the men of '75. i believe the great being who rules the destinies of nations has ordained that we remain united, that we extend the area of freedom, not slavery, that other nations may copy our example,--too late in the day for liberty to take a backward march in our country, however much she may swing to and fro in the old country. isaac stevens. his wife and family remained in bucksport during the winter, not wishing to break up the comfortable home until he decided to remain on the coast survey permanently. early in april he visited bucksport, where, on the 28th of that month, a daughter was born to them, named gertrude maude. this winter major stevens's wound broke out afresh, and discharged several small fragments of bone, causing considerable suffering and much inconvenience. this recurred several times during his stay in washington, and it was over four years before the wound permanently healed. sometimes, when walking, his foot would give out entirely, and he would have to hail the nearest omnibus or carriage. he used to wear a shoe with very thick soles, which best protected and served the injured member. a letter to professor bache, written from newport while on his way to bucksport, shows that he had decided at this time to relinquish the coast survey, a decision which he afterwards reconsidered:- ... "in baltimore i met colonel lee and captain foster. colonel lee was kind enough to go over my article on the mexican war. his suggestions and criticisms will very much improve the article. the colonel thinks i have made a mistake in determining not to remain on the survey. "i saw general scott in new york. he went over many of the operations in the valley, and you may be assured it was a great pleasure for me to meet my old chief. "i need not say to you how very gratifying to me was your letter in reply to mine communicating my intention to retire from the survey; and in answer to the concluding paragraph, you may rely upon me to do all in my power to respond to your wishes. i have been growing stronger every day since i left washington. i hope to return in condition to do more satisfactory service than was in my power for some weeks previous to my leaving." so it would seem that his hard work and close application were telling upon his health and strength. in the spring he moved his family to newport for the summer. in august he paid off four hundred dollars of the debt on the bucksport house. plain, simple, and even frugal in personal habits and expenses, and careful in money matters, he saved this sum from his pay. yet he never cared for money-making; and notwithstanding the straitened circumstances of early life, and the lessons of economy so diligently inculcated by his father, he was very generous, a free giver, a great provider, and inclined to spend money freely. he was obliged to spend most of the summer in washington, making occasional visits north to look after the bucksport works and see his family. he now definitely decided to stay on the coast survey. after a short visit at newport in august, he returned to washington, and spent no little time during the next month in hunting up suitable quarters. how thoroughly sick and tired he was of being separated from his wife and children; how he longed to live united with them; how lofty and noble were his ideals of woman, of marriage, of duty, of ambition; and what success he was gaining on the survey,--are graphically depicted in his letters to his wife:- washington, september 5, 1850. my dearest wife,--i began to-day seeking for a boarding-house. i find great objection is made to children coming to table. i think a great deal of our children taking their meals with us, and i think i had rather go to the second table myself than to be deprived of the pleasure.... i regret i did not remain a week longer. i found on reaching washington that there was no necessity for my hurrying back. we should all of us have enjoyed the bathing. it is mighty lonesome here, particularly from sundown till about eight in the morning. it spoils a man on some accounts to be married, particularly if he gets a good, lovable wife. he is not good for much away from her. i assure you i will never be separated from you again another winter unless it is an absolute impossibility for us to be together. we are young, and let us not renounce the comfort and support of each other's society unless the necessity is imperative. i know you will say amen to this.... washington, saturday, september 6, 1850. my dear wife,--... a devoted, loving, tender, sympathizing wife is the greatest element of my success in life. it adds to my strength in all respects. think of this, margaret. if i achieve what may be truly called success, it will be due mainly to you. i have no desire for place, or wealth, or station. but should i do something for my kind, should it be said of me when i am gone that the world owes something to my memory, that my fellow-men are happier and better for my labors, this is what i call success. it can be achieved only by constancy, by nobility of purpose, by a self-sacrificing spirit. your example and your affection for me will help me to cultivate these virtues. yesterday the house passed by ten votes the texas boundary and the new mexico territorial bill. you cannot imagine the gratulation which was shown by all persons, both in and out of congress, when the result was announced. the feeling was that all the danger which had menaced us had been averted. if necessary, a great many members would have changed their votes. on wednesday the measure was defeated by a majority of forty-six votes; on thursday by a majority of eight votes; and yesterday it passed by a majority of ten. all the other measures will be rapidly pushed through, and congress will rise early next month. in my judgment the most dangerous crisis that has occurred since the foundation of the government has been happily passed. henry clay has been throughout the master spirit of the times. his services the present session are enough to immortalize his name. it is the crowning triumph of his civic life, and he will descend to posterity as one of the heroes and benefactors of his age and generation. he has not his peer in congress. no man that combines his intrepid soul, his extended views, his large american heart, his admirable tact and presence of mind, and that quality of leadership which enables him through doubt and defection, in spite of unexpected difficulties and notwithstanding repeated defeats, to undauntedly pursue his course and finally achieve the ultimate triumph. this is henry clay in his seventy-fifth year. he has not his peer in our whole parliamentary history. sunday, september 8. yesterday the california and utah bills passed the house. last evening a salute of one hundred guns was fired, and a large multitude assembled in front of the national to listen to a serenade to henry clay. but the glorious old man had gone out to enjoy a quiet sunday in the country, and was not to be seen. little sue must, i know, miss me very much. she is a great pet of mine. i never feel as if i could be put out with her, let her be ever so whimsical. tell sue she shall see her papa in a few weeks, and then we shall keep together for many months. our long separation, dearest wife, is drawing to a close, and we shall be again united. my last visit was an oasis in the desert. i saw the doctor in relation to my sore throat. he says it has very much improved. the only precaution i must take is not to expose myself to the night air. my general health is quite good, and is still growing even better. my foot gives me very little trouble. it has not been so strong for eight months as for the last ten days. i now am not obliged to make much use of the crutches. you may be sure i feel very much encouraged about my health, and i have no fears as to its being perfectly reã«stablished. i eat well, sleep well, and am not worried by work. remember me, my dear wife, to all the friends. kiss the little sue and maude. your ever affectionate husband. washington, september 29, 1850. my dearest wife,--you must not think i have forgotten you. i have been very much occupied the last few days. our appropriations were in danger, and both professor bache and myself have been hard at work to save them. we have carried everything,--secured no less than one hundred and ninety thousand dollars for the western coast. a portion of this appropriation we carried in the house in the teeth of the committee of ways and means. they opposed it vehemently, yet we went to work on friday, worked hard all day, and carried it two to one nearly against them. the professor is in one respect a most skillful manager, but his skill consists in his perfect directness, truthfulness, disinterestedness, and good temper. he is perfectly frank and open. margaret, such men have most influence with all men of sense, whether members of congress, or men in official station, or in private life. this is the secret of his getting along so well. you know i have always insisted that such a course was the most sure and reliable. you stand on the solid rock, and nothing can move you when you cast aside all intrigue and low cunning, and pursue an open, truthful, manly course. cunning men cannot cope with you. this is my experience. my duties in the office are becoming more and more pleasant. the office is becoming systematized, the back work is all coming up, and in the spring i have no doubt everything will be in the best possible condition. every department is improving, and a very fine spirit pervades all the employees. i am bringing to bear upon the men my personal weight, and you know i rarely ever fail whenever i am brought into direct personal contact with men. all the men are beginning to know me. they know i am firm and steadfast, but that i am as true to them as i am to the work itself. every man will find that he can have entire confidence in my justice, and in my judgment of his merits. i am determined to be deserving of their confidence, and, if so, i shall most assuredly gain it. the professor's confidence in me seems to be greater every day. this makes my position pleasant. it makes me more efficient. my judgment is all the clearer for it. the truth is, i take the same general view of things that he does, and my judgment almost invariably brings me to the same conclusions. thus, in operating to secure our appropriations, we agreed perfectly in the mode of proceeding. indeed, the professor left the management entirely to me in the first instance. when things were prepared for him, i sent an express to his camp to bring him in. all my arrangements entered admirably into his plans. this was pleasant. my part was, of course, a subordinate one, but it was in harmony with all that was done. in the latter part of 1849 appeared the "history of the mexican war," by major roswell s. ripley, of the 1st artillery, who had served in scott's campaign, and who had been given a year's leave of absence to enable him to write the work. the history is fairly well written, and accurate for the most part, but marred by the constant effort to depreciate the character and services of general scott, and to extol generals worth and pillow at his expense. the former of these officers, a fine soldier, and deservedly of high standing in the army and before the people, needed no encomiums; the latter was unworthy of them. some of ripley's statements, too, were deemed erroneous by many of the ablest officers who participated in the contest, and there was a strong sentiment among them that these errors ought to be exposed, and the truth vindicated before the public. none felt this sentiment more strongly than major stevens. an admirer of scott's military talents, and a member of his staff during the famous campaign, his sense of justice and truth outraged by the attempt to disparage the general's great services, and to heap unearned honors upon pillow, he deemed it his duty, even in the midst of his arduous labors at the coast survey, to give to the world a tame and just account of these events, thus defending his former chief, and vindicating the truth of history. he labored upon this work with his usual energy and thoroughness, submitted it in manuscript to mason, mansfield, robert e. lee, and other officers, by whom it was highly approved, and early in 1851 published his "campaigns of the rio grande and of mexico." in the preface he says:- "his object in appearing before the public was to testify to the services of those heroic officers and soldiers who were in his judgment depreciated in the work of major ripley. he felt impelled to this course by a sense of duty, and he appeals to all the actors in those scenes to bear testimony in vindication of the truth." it is a strange instance of the foibles of a really great man that this work, inspired by the noblest and most disinterested motives, and the ablest defense of scott's course in mexico, was the cause of an estrangement for years between the writer and the commander he so well vindicated. immediately on the publication of the book, major stevens presented general scott with a copy with his compliments, fully expecting the warm thanks and appreciation of his former chief. to his astonishment, a few days later general scott returned the book by the hands of general totten, with the message that major stevens was to observe that the leaves were still uncut, thus implying that he disdained even to read it. this affront he offered to the officer whom for bravery and services in mexico he had highly commended and recommended for brevets, whose advice he had listened to in councils of war and followed on the battlefield, whom, hand upon his shoulder, he had presented to the shouting multitude in washington as 'my young friend, major stevens, to whose courage and ability i owe much of my success in mexico,' and who was his warmest and ablest defender against the aspersions of his enemies. whether general scott, whose overweening vanity could ill brook the least criticism, was inflamed by some remark in the work, which seems incredible, or whether his mind was poisoned by one of those parasites that ever hang upon the great, is uncertain. in truth, his movements and entire course are highly commended, and in only a few instances is he criticised. major stevens pronounced his attack of molino del rey a mistake, and also the not insisting upon the surrender of chapultepec when the armistice was granted after the battle of churubusco. major stevens was not in the least cast down by this unwarranted rebuff. he simply pitied the foibles of the man, while he retained his admiration for the general's military talents. he always made it a point to call upon him on new year's, and to show him the respect due the head of the army. but the cordial personal relations were broken forever. chapter xiv life in washington in october, 1850, major stevens moved his wife and little ones to washington, and took quarters at mrs. kelley's on eighteenth street, opposite lafayette square, in a large, spacious brick house, known as the club-house. here also lived general talcott, of the ordnance, colonel ethan allen hitchcock, senator mcwillie, of mississippi, and representative burt, of south carolina, with their families, and commodore matthew c. perry, soon to become famous for opening japan to the commerce and intercourse of the world. the latter took a great fancy to the little sue, a sprightly, graceful child, and used to keep a store of candy in his room for her especial benefit. they were all cultivated and agreeable people, who lived together harmoniously and pleasantly, and with social calls, receptions, and parties the winter passed off rapidly. they enjoyed, too, the pleasant intimacy and cordial sympathy of their portsmouth friends, mr. and mrs. hayes, and mr. and mrs. coues, who were now living in washington. during this winter major stevens took up the fourteen years' bill, a measure to promote lieutenants of engineers, topographical engineers, and ordnance to the rank of captain after fourteen years' service, with the same energy and thoroughness that characterized his efforts to procure for officers on duty according to brevet rank the full pay of such rank. he first induced the officers of these corps in washington to agree upon the proposed bill, and to unite in actively supporting it, no small task, for there was much jealousy between them, and different schemes for benefiting one or another corps. how he enlisted the coã¶peration of officers at other stations will be seen from the following letter to lieutenant m.c. meiggs, afterwards major-general and quartermaster-general of the army:- dear meiggs,--the inclosed memorial, asking that lieutenants of engineers, topographical engineers, and ordnance be promoted to the rank of captain after fourteen years' service, was introduced into the senate yesterday and referred to the military committee. we are all of us determined to do our best to get this measure through. we are all acting with great unanimity. the idea is not to touch the question of the increase of either corps, or the equalization of the third corps. it is simply a measure of relief for the old lieutenants, and we ask for it for the reasons stated in the memorial. we must urge the measure especially on the ground that there is no characteristic duty for the particular grades, but that with the proposed promotion not only will all our captains, but many of the lieutenants, have the same duties essentially as field officers. the chiefs of our three corps have been consulted and approve our course. the secretary of war is also favorable and advises us to this action. general shields will strongly support it. every man must help in this business, if he approves of it. the committee desires each officer to correspond without delay with such members of congress as he personally knows, and lay before them at length the grounds why this measure of relief should become a law. let me hear from you soon, and let us all put our shoulders to the wheel. if each officer can carry conviction to the understanding of one member of congress, the measure will prevail. his friend, general shields, then senator from illinois, presented the memorial and advocated the bill in the senate with hearty goodwill. the young major of engineers lost no suitable opportunity of impressing other members with the justice of the measure, and his earnest and forcible language, straightforward sincerity, and rising reputation for character and ability made him always listened to with attention and respect. he enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing the bill become a law in 1853, and of receiving the well-earned thanks and plaudits of his brother officers. the subject of the reorganization of the army, which ever since the mexican war held first place in his thoughts and correspondence, now engrossed his attention more than ever. his enlarged views, patriotic spirit, and generous nature abhorred the personal and corps jealousies too rife among army officers. he was emphatically an army man, not a corps man, seeking the best for the whole army and the country, and not the advancement of his corps or himself. accordingly he corresponded on this subject with officers of every branch of the service, and especially with those who had served on the frontier; for he rightly foresaw that the most important duties devolving upon the army would be the exploration of the vast regions acquired by the mexican war, and the protection of the settlers thereon. by this correspondence he sought to draw out and gather the views of the ablest and most experienced officers, in order to unite them upon, and to formulate, a sound scheme of army reorganization, and to impress it upon the country and congress. he wrote very many letters setting forth his own views, and urging other officers to treat upon one or another branch of the subject, or to pursue some line of inquiry, and called upon them freely to look up authorities and collect information. thus he induced major h.j. hunt to prepare valuable papers upon artillery and army reorganization in general. he begs captain kendrick to prepare a memoir on the new mexico military problem; lieutenant-colonel w.j. hardee, on the defense of the frontier; captain g.w. smith, on "general camp of discipline, where all the army come together to learn the military art;" captain george b. mcclellan, on engineer troops; captain g.w. cullum, subject of military instruction; and others. most of these officers responded readily and favorably to his appeals. in the following letters his ideas are clearly stated:- my dear hunt,--we must move quietly as well as firmly in this matter [army reorganization]. we must make up our minds to encounter a violent opposition. the bureaucracy of washington will probably be against us. we should first endeavor to get their aid, at least their neutrality in whole or in part. if they combine against reform, we must resolve to accomplish reform in spite of them. but time is necessary. a right direction to public opinion is necessary. many men in congress, the able men, must understand the question and be ready to act. we must first, then, enlighten public opinion, and enlighten members of congress. we must bide our time, and, when it comes, act. let it first, then, be stirred quietly in the army. let a great many officers in all good time, all discreet and sensible men, be interested, and let them write for the papers.... we must work to get public men informed. i would not have the movement partake in the slightest degree of a party character. but we must act on the known fact that the democratic party is the only party that can govern the country. the whig party is totally incompetent. we must throw our strength chiefly on democrats. douglas would be a tower of strength in the senate. would it not be a good idea to address a series of letters to him, and request _him_, if he approves of their general spirit, to publish them in the "washington union"? this he could do without pledging himself to the particular views of the letters. in the house is fuller, of maine, a new member but a rising man, a particular friend of mine. there is bissel, of illinois. there is rusk, of texas. general bayly, stanton, of tennessee, and others i might mention, are strong, reliable men. the southern _disunion_ men will look coldly on all attempts to improve the army. mr. burt will be lukewarm. i am somewhat fearful of jefferson davis. but they are both strong, good men, and we should act on the presumption that sectional views will not sway them from their duty. yours, etc., i.i. stevens. he urged the elevating of the _personnel_ of the army by- "enlisting none but intelligent, respectable men, a fair representation of our people, attracted by increase of pay, and by opportunity of promotion to the grade of commissioned officer; that by care in selecting men, by schools, by libraries, and by camps of instruction, we can actually make of the common soldier a pretty good military man, so that going into civil life he may do good service in the militia, and in time of war be an important element in rapidly organizing armies. in this way the influence of west point can be felt throughout the length and breadth of the land, in peace as well as on the breaking out of a war. it should be a settled principle to officer the infantry and mounted regiments in part from the rank and file. i know of no measure which is so calculated to elevate the service, and impart to it a greater efficiency. young men of character would enter it, and our own citizens would fill up the ranks. "commanding officers on the frontiers should have entire discretion in matters of clothing, subsistence, and transportation. officers of the administrative departments would in this case make their usual returns and reports to their chiefs in washington. but the directions from washington should be to the commander, and should be of the most general character; else there will be divided, discordant government, there will be a want of unity of purpose, there will be feebleness and delays in action. it may be said that this involves great judgment, energy, and foresight on the part of the commanding officer. undoubtedly, and none but officers of high qualities should be placed in command. this is one of the most important duties in the direction of affairs at washington. send the most competent man to take command. throw the responsibility upon him. _build him up_, or _break him down_. in the latter case, promptly supply his place by another officer." he also suggested planting military colonies:- "farmers and artisans to be enlisted, heads of families as well as young men, all intelligent, sober, moral men, at advanced rates of pay, and with their families be located at important points in the indian country, the whole to be organized in a military manner; heads of families as the stationary infantry force, and the young men as the dragoon force, always in the saddle, and making up in mobility for paucity of numbers. "i know well some of the prominent members of the military committee. my opinion is sometimes asked, and i wish to communicate sound, practical views. here i am, and in my intercourse with members of congress i intend to be, an _army_ man and not a _corps_ man. let me tell you that truthful, intelligent officers have weight with congress. the prominent members will give heed to their suggestions, and will be apt to adopt their views. there is a strong feeling in congress that things are not managed rightly. officers here must not only show what things are managed well; they must also show wherein things are _mis_managed, and they must suggest the remedy. it is time for officers having a common purpose to act together, and do something for their profession. i am at all events determined to do my duty. if we will act in concert, compare views in a fraternal and generous spirit, merging the _arm_ in the _army_, and taking views as large as our country, and occupying the whole ground of the public defense, and thus come to conclusions, we shall be right, and congress will act accordingly, i care not what opposition be made in interested quarters." in a letter to captain g.w. smith, he declares- "that the experience of our corps is too confined in time of peace, and that a portion ought to serve with troops in the west. this has always been my opinion, and the first year i entered the army i corresponded with halleck in relation to it, and was in favor of a strong effort being made by our officers to get a change in our duties.... were i not tied up on the coast survey as i am, i would make a great effort to get ordered to new mexico or texas. there is a field for such of us as will go there with a determination to carve one out, if it is not, in consequence of the stupidity of superiors, offered us." major stevens followed up this subject with great diligence, expending a vast amount of thought and work upon it for three years, and until the engrossing duties of the exploration of the northern route to the pacific in 1853, and of the governorship of washington territory, the making of indian treaties, and the conduct of the indian war in the pacific northwest occupied his whole time and energies. some of his ideas bore fruit, and have since been adopted, notably the raising of the standard of the rank and file by increasing the pay of the private soldier, improving his opportunities, and allowing him to compete for a commission. and the thoroughgoing and comprehensive plan he suggested of deciding upon the best system of national defense by the study and conferring together of the ablest military men, the appeal to patriotic and intelligent citizens, and the enlightening of public opinion, is as wise and practical now as then, and as necessary. for the dear-bought experience of our four great wars is entirely unheeded, indeed almost unknown to the mass of the people; and the army to-day, in organization as in numbers, in its influence upon the military ideas and aptitudes of the nation in peace as in its capacity for expansion in time of war, is inadequate to our needs as a great nation. upon this subject the following characteristic letter of mcclellan is of interest:- friday. my dear stevens,--the inclosed are the result of a search through the libraries of the war and eng'r dep'ts. i hardly feel satisfied that they are precisely what you need. if they do not suit you, inform me of it, and i will gladly renew the research. i had another conversation with the general this morning about the sappers. it's of no use whatever,--his mind is made up to detail fifty men on the coast survey. he says the duty i propose for them in texas is not legitimate and belongs not to them. amen! i have said my say. i've done what i could. some one of more influence than i possess must convince him,--my words are idle breath and of no avail. truly your friend, george b. mcclellan. it should be remembered that he was undertaking this great task of reorganizing the army, expending so much thought, labor, and time upon it, in addition to the incessant labors of the coast survey and the cares of the fortifications in maine. it was his lofty and patriotic ideals, his noble ambition to do his duty by his profession and his country, that spurred him on, and his untiring energy and power of concentration that enabled him to throw off work so rapidly and effectively. his great ambition was to accomplish results, and he was careless and indifferent as to claiming credit for himself, or pushing himself in any way. notwithstanding all these engrossing labors, he responded as promptly and generously as ever to the personal calls of his friends and others. he writes and interviews the war department and generals scott and totten in behalf of another brevet for captain g.w. smith, aids mcclellan in regard to the engineer company, obtains information for h.l. smith, has the accounts of sergeant lathrop, of the engineer company, passed, and is ever ready to lend a helping hand to any deserving man or cause. early in 1851 major stevens moved to mrs. janney's, an excellent and well-known boarding-house on eighth street, next the avenue. here lived several members of congress and government officials, and also the turkish ambassador, a grave, quiet man in a dark red fez, with whom major stevens occasionally played checkers in the evening. at this establishment breakfast was served at eight, dinner at four, with a lunch at noon, and at nine in the evening tea and thin sandwiches were handed around in the parlor. in june major stevens carried his family to newport for the summer, where leaving them, he visited bucksport to look after the works at fort knox, which still remained under his charge. he hastened back to washington before the month was out. passing through new york, he again sat to professor fowler for his "phrenological character," but this time was not accused of being a poet. whether informed by the bumps or other means, the phrenologist seems to have drawn his characteristics pretty accurately, with some glaring exceptions. desirous of keeping house, major stevens now leased a roomy brick house, one in a block of two, on the west side of third street, and only a block north of the avenue. this house had a large garden fronting on the street, and in the rear of it was a stable opening on an alley behind. having obtained a position on the coast survey for his cousin, george watson stevens, a son of uncle william, a young man of nineteen, major stevens invited the youth to become a member of his family. washington, july 27, 1851. my dear, good wife,--i have read your last letter over three times, and it has done me a world of good. i love to have you write so from your heart. you know that in marriage, in my wife and children, are centred all my hopes of earthly happiness. i am conscious it occupies too large a space in my youthful longings. it seems to me, with a devoted, loving, and lovely wife and lovely children, i might shut out the cares of life, and give myself up to happiness and joy. but we have duties to perform, trials to encounter, victories to achieve. life is a warfare. we must contend with evil. we must accomplish good. i feel that i have done something, but that i have just begun; that i am entering upon the great field of useful exertion. i feel that the past has simply given me the experience and the knowledge to wisely conquer the present, and thus achieve a future. i feel there is something heroic and noble in this view of life. i feel that the greatest support, next to the consciousness of well-doing, is the sympathy and support of you, my dear companion and friend, and the confiding, tender helplessness of our dear babes. i like george in the house very much, and, so far as i am concerned, i should like to have him a member of our family. i think, moreover, it would be to his advantage. charging him simply the actual outlay to us, it will diminish his expenditures. moreover, i shall be absent on inspections more or less, and you will thus have some one to call on. he is studious, attentive to his duties, is impressing every one favorably with whom he is brought in contact, and is advancing steadily and quite rapidly. i feel highly pleased with his progress. with economy his pay will, the first year, pay his expenses. i fear, if i am off in august, it will embarrass me very seriously in the fall. our reports are still coming in, and now is the time to put things in a successful train. i do not wish, by inaction or delay now, to make trouble hereafter. my health is remarkably good. i have never had a better appetite, or more ability to work, than i have now. i am surprised at my vigor. i don't care how hot the weather is. the perspiration will drop from my face and hands, and i will feel neither languor nor fatigue. the other men in the office complain and have to slacken in their exertions, whilst i seem to have, with every hot day, fresh strength and force. give my love to the bairns. i want very much to see them. yours affectionately, isaac. washington, july 28, 1851. my dearest wife,--i was very glad to learn that you were so well, and that the visit to tom's was so pleasant. the farm is the place for children. on their account i wish i could pass four months every summer in that way. hazard should go to school seven or eight months. i am delighted with his doings,--learning to swim, and do all kinds of work. maude, too, learning to walk,--yes, actually walking, little darling. she must have forgotten me, but she will soon recollect me on seeing me again. and sue learning to ride on horseback! why, verily, margaret, you have a hopeful family, one of which you may well be proud. whether i go on to tom's farm this summer is doubtful. i am glad they are doing so well. daniel is a first-rate business man, and, as he likes farming, why not make it his business? i believe he could in a few years clear from debt a large farm, going upon it without a cent in his pocket. this is my opinion, and in a pecuniary point of view it is much better than a salaried place,--far better. you may be assured my health is remarkably firm and good. i never knew it better. this warm weather does not affect me in the least. i bear labor better than any man in the office. not a man in the office can do as much as i can. well, as to the book. it is said to sell pretty well. most of the copies have been disposed of. very good notices have appeared both in the "intelligencer" and "republic." the notice of the "intelligencer" i sent you. the notice in the "republic" was short, but very good. some of my friends think it will excite a controversy. others think it will be found a very hard thing to reply to. the fact is, whilst i have endeavored to clearly discern errors, i have sought to look charitably on all that was done. this seemed to me the only true wisdom. some of my friends think i have carried this spirit too far, and that i have not censured enough. the general criticism is that i am too favorable towards ripley. i think i have simply done him justice. washington, august 8, 1851. my dearest wife,--my health is remarkably good, my duties multifarious, and i must not spend time in recreation which my health does not require. i have not had such health for years, and have enjoyed this summer. we are getting on famously with our housekeeping. the woman is a neat, respectable, honest person, who tries to do her duty, a very respectable washer and ironer as well as cook. i think you will be pleased with her. i shall send a boy whom we have had for a month away in the morning. one of the messengers comes to the house every evening to attend to the garden. so we are getting along. to-day we put six chickens into our coop, and to-morrow eight hens will be admitted. you will find us getting on swimmingly when you come on in october. friday morning. i have just received two very gratifying letters, one from general shields, which i send you. don't show it to any one, for he is very extravagant in praise of my book, and his suggestions are made in a corresponding spirit. but i value what he says very much, because he writes from his heart and in the spirit of friendship. i feel, too, there are many points of sympathy between him and me, and i value his friendship and words of encouragement. the other letter is from major pitman. his article on my book in the "providence journal" of august 6 is altogether the best that has appeared. he has presented his own views with clearness and force on certain points of difference. this is what i want. i don't want eulogies, but discriminating notices. i want to see my errors exposed, otherwise i shall not learn to correct them. taylor & maury have sold out all the copies of my book, and in consequence i loaned them half a dozen that i still had on hand. they think they will sell a great many more. i am pushed exceedingly, and can write no more to-day. love to the children. affectionately. in the latter part of september major stevens made a hasty visit north, spent a few days at andover and newport, and brought his family back to washington. his wife's youngest sister, miss nancy hazard, accompanied them and spent the winter with them. he still retained charge of the works at bucksport, although the second year of duty on the coast survey was near its close, and writes full and explicit instructions to mr. a.w. tinkham, c.e., concerning it. at a later date he obtained a good position for mr. tinkham on the coast survey, and also secured a situation in the same service for mr. john e. lee, whom he had employed in bucksport as clerk. the family this winter was increased by george w. stevens and miss nancy l. hazard. there was the colored cook, and bridget sullivan, the children's nurse, and sampson ingraham, a most faithful, capable, and respectable colored man and a free man. sampson had one cross to bear which sorely tried his devotion to the family, and that was milking the cow and taking care of it, which major stevens compelled him daily to do; for sampson, never having done any farm work, regarded this as derogatory, and was much distressed and mortified thereby. but finally major stevens, perceiving his trouble, relieved him from this duty. in the next house, on the south side, lived the family of captain simon f. blount, of the navy. nearly across the street senator william gwin, of california, and family occupied a roomy mansion, where they dispensed a generous hospitality. after breakfast, at eight, major stevens usually walked down to the coast survey office, and walked back in time for dinner at four in the afternoon. in the evening there was tea at eight o'clock. louis kossuth, the hungarian patriot, visited washington this winter, and attracted the greatest attention and admiration. he was a man of noble presence, a finished orator, speaking english with great purity and ease. the democratic jackson club gave a banquet on january 8 in honor of kossuth, which was attended by webster and many of the first men of the country. major stevens was called upon to respond to the toast of "the army and navy," and spoke as follows:- gentlemen,--in the name of the army i return my thanks for the honor of this toast. i speak in behalf of the american army,--that army which presents its breast to the enemy, which pours out its blood, which lays down its life. a weighty significance already attaches to these words, "the american army." for, first, it achieved the independence of these states against the most powerful nation of modern times; second, it waged against the same power the second war of independence to maintain the freedom of the seas, the war the culminating glories of which we this evening celebrate; and, third, when a contiguous republic interfered with the domestic concerns of one of our states, the vindication of the law of nations, thus trampled under foot, was placed in its hands, and the stars and stripes soon waved over the ancient seats of the montezumas. the american army will never forget what is due to its past renown and its future glory. we feel that, citizens alike with you, we are the army of a free people. we know, too, that our country possesses elements of military strength scarcely appreciated by the inattentive observer of events,--elements that have been nurtured by the wonderful growth, the trials and vicissitudes, of our young nation struggling into manhood. no other people so combines command and obedience, is so subordinate to law, yet is so much a law unto itself. no other people of ancient or modern times possesses such elements of military power. it is the profound conviction of my heart that in a just cause we could meet the world with a million armed men, each man a tried and true soldier, surpassing even the iron men of cromwell, those men who feared god but not man; those men stern in fight yet merciful in victory; those men who achieved the great triumph of english independence, and transmitted to us its glorious recollections. the members of both services, which you have honored to-night, see that the american people are marching forward to mighty destinies, and that upon them heavy responsibilities will rest. we mean to do our whole duty. we mean at all times to be in harness and at our posts. we know not when the time may come,--probably in our lifetime, and perhaps to-morrow. we feel no despondency, but are filled with joy and hope. when our beloved nation, "a power on earth," shall determine to measure its strength with other powers in the maintenance of right, and in vindication of violated law and outraged humanity, the army and navy will carry their country's flag in triumph over all seas and through all lands. congress was disposed then as now to starve the coast defenses, appropriating scarcely enough to maintain the works already built. major stevens, deeply interested in the proper fortification of the coast, both from his professional knowledge and experience and his enlarged and patriotic views, with his accustomed zeal and energy undertook the task of inculcating upon the country and congress sound ideas in regard to this important subject, and of obtaining the appropriations necessary to keep up and complete existing works. in this, as in everything he undertook, was evinced his prominent characteristic of going to the bottom of a subject, of basing his action upon broad principles; and so, instead of being satisfied with simply securing the needed appropriations for the time being, he treats of the whole system of fortifications required for national defense, both present and future. he had repeated conferences with general shields on this subject, who in march, as chairman of the military committee, brought into the senate a favorable report and bill. in support of this, and advocating a proper system of coast defenses, major stevens wrote a number of articles, which were published in the "national intelligencer" of washington, the "boston post," portland "eastern argus," "bangor democrat," and papers in new york, richmond, new orleans, and other places. he caused these articles, with shields's report, to be sent to many officers and influential men in different parts of the country, urging them to advocate the matter on patriotic grounds. these articles were much commended, especially by his brother officers of the engineers. he also at this time published in the "boston post" an article on the lighthouse system. in april, 1852, major stevens was appointed a member of the lighthouse board, which was considered no slight honor, and which added much to his responsibilities and his duties. his colleagues on the board were all men of talent and reputation, the association with whom was congenial and gratifying. in may he visited wilmington on this duty. the bucksport house had remained on his hands all this time, a source of more care than income; but in april a purchaser was found in mr. knox for $1350, evidently quite a sacrifice. he took his two elder children, hazard and sue, to newport for the summer; but his wife and maude, the youngest child, remained in washington. general franklin pierce, having been nominated for the presidency by the democratic party, was outrageously assailed by the unscrupulous press and partisans of the other side on account of his services in mexico, and even his personal courage was impugned. major stevens, having met pierce in mexico, and having been favorably impressed by him, was indignant at these slanders, and felt called upon to aid in refuting them. accordingly he published six letters in the "boston post" and two in the "republic," a washington paper, warmly, but in a temperate and courteous style, vindicating the unjustly assailed public man. he takes pains in these articles to eulogize the military talents of general scott, the rival candidate nominated by the whig party, quotes his favorable mention of pierce in his reports of operations in mexico, and shows that the rival candidates entertained warm feelings of esteem for each other, thus ingeniously making scott a witness to refute his own reckless partisans. he concludes the last article as follows:- "you well know, mr. editor, my exalted appreciation of the conduct and services of general scott in mexico. it has been a pleasing reflection that the standard-bearers of the two great parties were warm personal friends, each possessing in an eminent degree the respect and confidence of the other. the friends of general pierce have never claimed that he was a great military man. they concede with pride and gratification that general scott is, and that he is a judge of military qualities. they simply claim that general pierce in his service in mexico did his whole duty as a son of the republic, that he was eminently patriotic, disinterested, and gallant, and that it has added a laurel to his beautiful civic wreath: as a citizen he has been ready to make sacrifices for his country; as a soldier and commander, he has shown gallantry before the enemy, and was eminently the friend and father of his command." colonel charles g. greene, editor of the "post," writes that general pierce was much pleased with, and highly commended, these letters. major stevens always took great interest in public affairs. he was emphatically a national man. he held the union as the noblest work of our revolutionary patriots, and as indispensable to liberty and national greatness. an ardent democrat from boyhood, he regarded the democratic party as preã«minently the national party, the party of progress. he fully justified the mexican war, the great democratic measure, and believed with full faith in the future growth and destiny of the great republic. the slavery question, destined in a few brief years to wreck that party and so nearly destroy the nation, was still in abeyance, and it was almost universally believed that the compromise of 1850 had averted all danger from that quarter. not content with vindicating pierce in the papers, major stevens now concluded to support him on the stump. he wrote gayton p. osgood, and other friends in massachusetts, as to the advisability of this step, but received rather discouraging replies, one correspondent even taking him to task for speaking so highly of general scott in his articles, and recommending him to become a thoroughgoing partisan if he took the stump. but as usual he held to his own opinion, and in august addressed a large public meeting in hillsborough, n.h., in support of the democratic principles and candidate, and later, in october, spoke in andover, newport, and portsmouth. his brother officer and friend, colonel james l. mason, also addressed the meeting in newport, and hon. charles levi woodbury spoke with him in portsmouth. in his speeches major stevens took pains to do full justice to general scott as a military man, without disparaging him as a statesman or otherwise. his arguments were drawn from the ideas and objects of the two parties,--a contest of principles, not men. it appears that the course of the young army officer in stumping for pierce, and as in mason's case even stirring up other officers to do likewise, excited no little commotion in the war department, for it was a whig administration. on his return, the secretary of war, charles m. conrad, undertook to take him to task for it, and wrote major stevens a severe letter, demanding an explanation of his conduct. this was soon bruited about washington, and many of his friends and brother officers came anxiously to advise with him about it. they felt that he was in an embarrassing position, and one from which he could hardly hope to extricate himself with credit, and they were not a little troubled as to the outcome. at length major stevens prepared his answer to the secretary, and, before sending it, read it to a group of his anxious brother officers. in a direct, forcible, but courteous style, he reminded the secretary that, in becoming an officer of the army, he had not forfeited his rights as a citizen, nor become relieved from his duties as such; that, while he had never failed in the respect due his superior officers, he had the right of an american citizen to advocate such public measures as he deemed best for the country, and to vote for the public servants best fitted to carry them out; and he concluded in a somewhat sarcastic but perfectly respectful way by calling the secretary's attention to the fact that general scott himself was a candidate for the presidency, and was setting the example of that participation in politics which the secretary so severely reprobated, and suggested that his animadversions would have greater weight with the service, and be more worthy the dignity of the war department, if launched against the senior major-general of the army instead of a simple lieutenant and brevet major; that they were more applicable to the former than the latter, and might well be deemed an attempt to scourge general scott over his back. as major stevens read aloud this letter, the faces of his friends cleared up; soon they began to applaud it, and as he finished they crowded around him with cheers and laughter and exclamations,--"that's good! that covers the ground!" "you are right, stevens. you are perfectly right." "he can't answer it," etc. sure enough, the secretary did not answer it, and attempted no further action. in fact, major stevens had now become quite a leader among the able young officers. they were constantly calling at his house, and discussing with him the measures he was pushing forward for the improvement of the army, fortifications, etc. he was always ready to assist any of them, too, and it was known that his aid was frequently effective. he obtained a detail on the coast survey for his friend, captain j.c. foster, and secured for several others lighthouse inspectorships. he also had a number of the engineer company detailed on the coast survey, although his friends cullum, g.w. smith, and mcclellan strenuously opposed it. writes a young man on the survey, whose pay major stevens had tried to increase but without success:- "having been informed to-day that you did not succeed in your efforts to make my compensation $1500 per annum from october 1, 1851, and consequently was obliged to pay out of your own pocket $50 to make your word good, i believe it unbecoming a gentleman to remain a moment longer in possession of said money. the inclosed check will indemnify you for your loss sustained for my sake, and joyfully i return my heartfelt thanks for the efforts you have made in my behalf." writes cullum from west point:- "your feeling and commendatory remarks on the death of private logan were read to the company [engineer], and will doubtless produce an excellent impression." in truth, these personal demands grew to be a grievous burden upon his time and energies, yet he never refused his aid to any claim of friendship or desert. among others a lady, who had long prosecuted a claim before congress in vain, was introduced by his corps chief, general totten, to major stevens, as the only man who could win her cause. although the latter felt that this was a task altogether outside of his sphere of duty, and one which should not have been thrust upon him, he cheerfully undertook it, and succeeded in having it allowed by congress. the friendship between major stevens and professor bache grew stronger the longer they were associated together. they appreciated and admired each other. both were gifted with uncommon powers of mind, uprightness and purity of character, and disinterestedness. bache was more the philosopher, the student; stevens, the man of action. major stevens also saw much of professors henry and baird, of the smithsonian. he took pains to meet the able men in congress, and other men of talent and reputation who visited washington. occasionally of an evening he would take his little boy by the hand, and make the rounds of willard's and other hotels, meeting and chatting with old army and other friends and acquaintances. with but little intermission, major stevens was an indefatigable worker, and never so well content as when driving his work at high pressure; and his sound judgment guided his energy so well that he would throw off an enormous load with astonishing rapidity. he had the faculty of getting a great deal of work out of his subordinates. but, not realizing that others lacked equal ability and power of labor, he was at times too exacting and severe. he was also inclined to overrate both the good qualities and the ability of others, and too often had cause to regret having done so from the ingratitude of many whom he befriended. the two elder children, hazard and sue, returned to washington in october, and miss mary w. hazard, mrs. stevens's sister, also came on and spent the winter with them. the youngest daughter, kate, was born in the third street house on november 17, 1852. in september major stevens with professor bache was appointed on a commission for the improvement of the james, appomattox, and cape fear rivers, and in november visited richmond and wilmington on this duty. but all these additional duties and pursuits made no impairment of his vigorous hold upon, and improvement of, the coast survey. the character and standing of the office was steadily rising, and able young officers were glad to accept details in it under major stevens. lieutenant john g. foster became his principal assistant. professor h.e. hilgard, who afterwards rose to be chief of the coast survey, had charge of the computing; lieutenant richard c. rush, and afterwards lieutenant a. a. gibson, of drawing; and lieutenant e.b. hunt, of engraving. the field work, as fast as it came in, was given to the public in preliminary sketches, or charts, which served as a great incentive both to parties in the field, who saw at once the fruits of their labors, and to the office force in affording a better opportunity to train the younger members, and prepare them for the finished charts; and for the first time the annual report was illustrated by these sketches, giving all the field work done to date. he greatly facilitated the sale and distribution of coast survey maps, declaring that "they should be carried to every man's door having an interest in commerce, navigation, geography, or science." he took every means to encourage and reward the deserving, and opened the office to young men to learn the art of engraving, for there was a scarcity of skillful engravers, most of whom were foreigners. he reports:- "the system of teaching the art of engraving to youths of promise is succeeding admirably. by combining lessons in drawing, instructions at night schools, with engraving, the best spirit is excited, and the greatest excellence attained. there are now six lads in the office, whose terms vary from two to nineteen months. "during the past year there has been a visible improvement of the office in all its branches, and it is my pleasure and duty to bear unqualified testimony to the zeal and efficiency of the several assistants in charge of the departments, and of the numerous employees under them. each man has shown an honest purpose to do his duty, and i have been much oftener obliged to moderate exertion than to rebuke indifference and neglect." and professor bache in his reports declared:- "the office under the charge of major stevens has improved in the system and order of every one of its divisions; and the zeal and ability of the assistant in charge has been reflected in the spirit of the officers under him, and in the general diligence of the employees. the office is characterized by a very marked spirit of industry, of working to results, and of progress. every encouragement, as it should be, is afforded to those who endeavor to advance in their several occupations. "the office work has, by great diligence on the part of the persons employed, and by the excellent administrative arrangements of major stevens, been kept close to the field work. in no former year have so many preliminary sketches been promptly issued, and so much information of various kinds been published, or furnished to the officers of government or to individuals." chapter xv governor, washington territory.--exploration, northern route the triumph of the democratic party in november, 1853, and the election of general franklin pierce as the next president insured a more vigorous policy of exploration and settlement of the vast domain stretching from the mississippi to the pacific. major stevens was strongly attracted to this field. it appealed to his ambition. it afforded a greater opportunity for public service and achievement. prominent and gratifying as was the position and standing he held in washington, he realized its limitations. he knew, too, that with the army on a peace footing and filled with young officers, no promotion in his corps could be expected for years. in brief, feeling the powers and ambition of a leader, he was not content to remain longer a subordinate. in march congress formed the new territory of washington out of the northern half of what was then oregon, being the territory extending from the columbia river and the 46th parallel northward two hundred and fifty miles to the british possessions and the 49th parallel, and from the crest of the rocky mountains westward six hundred miles to the pacific, an area larger than new england and new york combined. save a handful of settlers on the lower columbia and the shores of puget sound, and a few missionary and trading posts in the interior, the whole vast region was unsettled, and much of it unexplored by civilized man. it contained many thousands of indians, some of whom had lately been at war with the whites, and regarded their approach with jealous and hostile eyes; the indian title to the land had not been extinguished; and there were troublesome questions with the hudson bay company, which still held its posts in the territory, and claimed extensive rights as guaranteed by treaty. on march 3 congress appropriated $150,000 for the exploration and survey of railroad routes from the mississippi to the pacific, to be expended by the secretary of war under the direction of the president. jefferson davis entered the new cabinet as secretary of war, and it was early determined to survey four principal routes to the pacific. early in the year major stevens applied for the governorship of the new territory, to which was attached, _ex officio_, the superintendency of indian affairs, and also for the charge of the exploration of the northern route. either of these fields was enough to fully task the most able and energetic man, but his ambition reached for both. equally characteristic was the high ground upon which he based his application. he asked the appointment, not as the reward of political services, nor for the sake of personal or political friendship, but because he was the fittest man for the place, the one who could best serve the public interests. he told general pierce that if he could find any one else better qualified for the position, who would accept it, it was his duty to appoint him. there was no question on that score. but his wife and many of his friends thought that he was making a great personal sacrifice in relinquishing the enviable position he had attained in washington for the toils, hardships, and dangers of the western exploration and governorship. professor bache was of this opinion, and deeply regretted to lose his efficient assistant and friend. one of the first acts of the new president was to send the name of isaac i. stevens to the senate as governor of washington territory; he was confirmed, and his commission was issued march 17. he was just thirty-four years old, in the prime of life and of mental and physical powers. major stevens's letter of resignation from the army and general totten's reply show the cordial and appreciative feelings of both. washington, d.c., march 21, 1853. brigadier-general joseph g. totten, _chief engineer._ _sir_,--i herewith resign my commission of lieutenant of engineers and brevet major united states army, to take effect on wednesday, the 16th instant. this resignation is tendered with a profound sense of the high honor, intelligence, and sentiment of duty which is characteristic of the officers with whom i have been associated the best years of my life, whom i have known and honored in peace and war, in sunshine and in storm, and whose equals i can scarcely expect to find in the new career upon which i have entered. i shall carry into civil life the conviction that the country owes the army a debt of gratitude, and is yet to receive signal benefits at its hands. this conviction, rest assured, will show itself both in words and deeds whenever the service has to be vindicated or maintained. to yourself, both personally and officially, as a friend and as a superior officer, permit me to acknowledge the kindness and confidence which i have received at your hands. it has had no hindrance or interruption during the period of nearly fourteen years, many of them years of weighty responsibilities and perplexing cares, during which i have served under your command. and to me, sir, not only my commanding officer, but my honored friend, it is the completest of satisfactions to be able to say that during my service in the army i have not had a serious difficulty with a brother officer, and that i am not aware that between me and any officer in or out of the service there is the slightest feeling of unkindness. very truly and respectfully, your friend and obedient servant, isaac i. stevens. writes general totten in reply:- while regretting that the corps of engineers are thus deprived of the future services of an officer whose high traits of character have, both in peace and war, so fully vindicated its position, i anticipate the more unhesitatingly that these characteristic qualities will continue to procure for you, in the new and wider scenes on which you have now entered, all the rewards which they so justly merit.... for myself, i have to make acknowledgment for great assistance rendered in every form, and under all the circumstances that your military duties admitted,--at all times fulfilling my wishes, abridging my cares, and exalting the usefulness and reputation of the corps. and in all our personal relations you have observed a kind consideration which i have fully appreciated. these things have created a warm interest in your welfare, and make me feel that, while the service is losing a most valuable officer, i am parting from a friend. i remain with high respect, j.g. totten, _bvt. brig.-gen. and col. engineers._ major stevens turned over the charge of fort knox to colonel john l. smith, and was succeeded on the coast survey by captain h.w. benham. major stevens had long since overcome the ill feelings excited by the vigorous and drastic way in which he had reformed the office, and had long since won the confidence of the force, and their admiration as well. they deeply regretted his departure, and in token of their esteem presented him with a beautiful service of plate, consisting of a large silver pitcher and salver, with two goblets, in _repoussã©_ work. presented to isaac i. stevens, governor of the territory of washington, late brevet major, corps of engineers, u.s. a., and assistant in charge of the office of the u.s. coast survey, as a token of esteem, by his friends on the survey, washington, d.c., march, 1853. in his next annual report after major stevens had left the coast survey, professor bache remarks:- "the gain to the country in his appointment, and especially to that new region to which he has been called, will no doubt be great, but our loss is proportionably great. an administrative ability of a high order was joined to unceasing activity and great force of character; varied general and professional knowledge to great clearness in discerning ends, and fixedness of purpose in pursuing them; remarkable knowledge of men, and easy control of those connected in business with him, to personal qualities which rendered official intercourse agreeable to those about him. the system with which he followed up plans, complicated as well as simple, insured success in his administration, and was felt in every department of the office, of which he had thoroughly mastered the details as well as the general working. the experience acquired by such an officer is invaluable to the work, and not soon to be replaced, whatever may be the resources of his successor." a remark of benham's, soon after he assumed charge, well illustrates his egotistic and assuming character: "major stevens grew up with the office from its infancy, but i grappled the lion when full-grown." benham did not long remain on the survey. scarcely was the ink dry on his commission, when governor stevens set to work to obtain charge of the exploration of the northern route, and the rapid and masterly way in which he effected it, and planned the survey and increased its magnitude and importance, must have astonished the red tape officials of washington. as usual, all his recommendations were based upon the highest grounds of public welfare and public service. on march 21 he writes the secretary of war, jefferson davis, a strong letter, proposing to conduct an exploration to determine the emigrant route, and the route for a railroad from the sources of the mississippi to puget sound, and submits a memoir for accomplishing it by means of three parties, with estimates of organization and cost in detail, and concludes, "should an expedition be intrusted to my charge, i pledge the devotion of all my force, energy, and judgment to its accomplishment." the following day he addresses the secretary of state, william l. marcy, submitting his project, and showing that he could best promote the interests of the new territory by exploring the route to it, obtaining a large amount of useful information in relation to the agricultural, mineral, commercial, and manufacturing resources, and publishing the information thus obtained, thereby inviting emigrants, filling up the territory, and developing its resources. he shows that this duty need not greatly delay the organization of territorial government, and calls attention to- "the great influence which this exploration will exercise over the indian tribes, the exceeding efficiency which it will give to me in discharge of my duties as superintendent of indian affairs, and the interesting information which it will enable me to collect in regard to their numbers, customs, locations, history, and traditions. this i design making the subject of a special communication to the department of the interior. should my views meet the approbation of the department, i will earnestly request that the necessary communication be had with the war department to arrange the exploration in conformity with the plan which i have thus rapidly sketched. i ask that it be done with the least possible delay, so as to insure its complete success. i think it important that my arrangements here should be brought to a close in sixteen days, that previous to that time competent men be dispatched to the mississippi river to assure the expedition, and thus we shall all be hard at work in the field the first week of may." as governor he was under the jurisdiction of the state department. on the same day he addresses a similar letter to the secretary of the interior, robert mcclelland, for, as superintendent of indian affairs, he came under that department. governor stevens enforced his views by personal interviews with the secretaries and the president; and his earnestness, zeal for the public service, sound judgment, and strong, convincing way of expressing his views, carried all before him. within four days his proposal to lead the expedition was accepted, and all his suggestions adopted. the administration were only too glad to find such a man to head the most important of the explorations and insure its success. perhaps no part of his career more clearly stamped governor stevens as a born leader of men than this. at a time when the new president and cabinet were overwhelmed with the pressing questions and personal claims ever engrossing the incoming administration, a mere subordinate, not content to simply await the instructions of his superiors, surveys the whole field of western exploration intrusted to him, and its attendant problems of white settlement, indians, etc., with comprehensive and far-sighted vision, decides upon the measures and action required by the needs of the country and the public service, and then so impresses his views upon the president and three great departments by sheer force of character, earnest patriotism, and sound, good sense, that all his recommendations are adopted without delay, and he is given _carte blanche_ to carry them out. the bare conception, if broached in march, when the new administration assumed charge, of obtaining both the governorship of washington territory and the charge of the northern pacific exploration, of inducing three secretaries to adopt his measures, of completely organizing and outfitting and starting in the field a great expedition for the survey of two thousand miles of wilderness, and all to be accomplished within two months, would have seemed not merely bold, but visionary and presumptuous, and nothing could have relieved governor stevens from such reproach but the fact that all this he actually accomplished. the following letter to jefferson davis, secretary of war, shows how energetically governor stevens was already gathering information and assistance for the exploration. the last part touches upon a delicate question, the placing army officers under the command of a civilian, as governor stevens now was, a thing repugnant to all military ideas and usages, and almost without precedent. but governor stevens held that his case was altogether exceptional, and found no difficulty in securing the voluntary services of as many able officers as he needed. it is believed that there is no similar instance in our history where twelve army officers came under the command of a civilian:- washington, march 25, 1853. hon. jefferson davis, _secretary of war_. _sir_,--i am now quite certain that a sufficient number of army officers will volunteer to go with me on the proposed exploration from the headwaters of the mississippi to puget sound, as will much reduce the force of civilians to be employed. several accomplished officers would be glad to be detailed, and would do effective service as astronomers, engineers, artists, naturalists, draughtsmen, etc. i can make arrangements both with the american fur and hudson bay company for active coã¶peration and assistance. the distinguished geologist, dr. j. evans, who has gone over the greater portion of the country between the mississippi and the pacific, has explored two of the passes in the rocky mountains north of the south pass, and has received much information of the topography of the country, has kindly given me much valuable information, and is ready to coã¶perate with all his energy in a plan whereby each shall render to the other every possible facility, and best promote the public service without an unnecessary expenditure of means. i think it exceedingly important that the whole exploration from the mississippi river to puget sound, including a thorough examination of the passes of the cascade range, should be placed under the charge of the same person, he, under general instructions from the department, giving the necessary direction to the several parties, thus securing united and energetic action, and guarding against the almost certain failure of the expedition should it be divided into two independent commands. as soon as the department shall decide upon the scale of the operations, and shall issue its orders assigning me to the duty, which i presume from the correspondence with the department of state to be definitely decided upon, i will at once submit a more detailed plan of operations, and make the necessary requisition for the detail of officers, and for the various facilities which may be extended by the administrative branches of the service. as in the coast survey, i propose no assignment of officers except by their own desire, and of officers who have especial adaptation to the particular duty. very respectfully your obedient servant, isaac i. stevens. among his first acts governor stevens, on march 31, applied for brevet captain george b. mcclellan, then in texas, to be "at once assigned to duty with me as my principal officer. i design to put him in charge of the exploration of the cascade range, and i can not only speak with confidence of his great ability for the particular duty, but as his friend can say that the duty will be in the highest degree agreeable to him." washington, april 5, 1853. my dear mcclellan,--i have succeeded in securing your detail to take charge of the western party in the northern pacific railroad survey. you will get the orders to-day, and be directed probably to repair to new orleans, and there await instructions. the route is from st. paul, minn., to puget sound by the great bend of the missouri river through a pass in the rocky mountains near the 49th parallel. a strong party will operate westward from st. paul; a second but smaller party will go up the missouri to the yellowstone, and there make arrangements, reconnoitre the country, etc., and on the junction of the main party they will push through the blackfoot country, and, reaching the rocky mountains, will keep at work there during the summer months. the third party, under your command, will be organized in the puget sound region, you and your scientific corps going over the isthmus, and will operate in the cascade range, and meet the party coming from the rocky mountains. as soon as my force is at work in these mountains, i shall push forward with a small reconnoitring force and find you, and, after conference with you, arrange the entire plan of operations. your scientific corps will consist of a physician and naturalist, an astronomer, a draughtsman and barometer man, and an officer of the artillery, johnson k. duncan, who, i am informed by foster, is a strong friend of yours, and will work under you. you will have authority to call upon the officers and troops stationed in the territories of oregon and washington, and i have no doubt you will be able to secure valuable assistance. at the same time funds will be placed in your hands to hire suitable guides, hunters, etc. a complete set of instruments and appliances will be sent with the necessary instructions. your friend, professor baird, is arranging the natural history part of the business. the expedition will be altogether the most complete that has ever set out in this country, and if we are true to it, the results will be satisfactory to the country. the amount of work in the cascade range and eastward, say to the probable junction of the parties at the great bend of the north fork of the columbia river, will be immense. recollect, the main object is a railroad survey from the headwaters of the mississippi river to puget sound. we must rely upon the ordinary astronomical observations in the field, upon the odometer and barometer and the compass, for getting the direction, length, and profiles of routes. with the sextant for determining height along the route, and with a good sketcher and draughtsman, you will be able to get good results. i may get for you a small detachment of sappers, and i shall try to get you assigned to duty according to your brevet rank. i telegraphed you some days since, asking your views, but in consequence of your great distance from washington it was essential to act at once. knowing your views so intimately in relation to such service, and venturing on our long acquaintance and mutual friendship, i have in the strongest terms pressed your case, on the ground that, could you be consulted, the duty would be sought by you. in my telegraphic message i informed you that i was put in charge of the duty in consequence of my civil position. it has been done at the joint desire of the war department, of the department of state, and of the department of the interior. officers have volunteered for the service, and i shall receive the services of several very valuable and experienced men. i have in the strongest terms taken the ground that my having left the army and standing in a civil position would not, under the circumstances of the case, be any objection on your part to acting under my direction. as your friend, and knowing the opportunity for distinction it would give you, i would not hesitate for a moment. one word more as to the railroad survey. we must not be frightened with long tunnels or enormous snows, but set ourselves to work to overcome them. when you reach new orleans you will find your instructions. truly your friend, isaac i. stevens. the warning in the last paragraph seems almost prophetic; for, as will be seen hereafter, mcclellan's fear of deep snows caused him to fail in an important part of his survey of the cascade passes, viz., the determining the depth of winter snow. governor stevens also obtained the detail for his survey of lieutenant a.j. donelson, of the engineer corps, and ten non-commissioned officers and men, of the engineer company, also known as sappers and miners, and of lieutenant beekman du barry, of the 3d artillery. he also obtained from the war department authority to call upon the several army administrative departments for transportation, subsistence, and arms, and even the pay of two civilian surgeons and naturalists, thus providing for all the expenses of the expedition except those pertaining to civilians employed as a scientific corps and their assistants, which were to be defrayed by the funds allotted to the northern route out of the civil appropriation, viz., $40,000 out of the $150,000 thus appropriated. by these arrangements he vastly increased the extent, thoroughness, and value of his exploration. on april 7 governor stevens sent lieutenant donelson to montreal armed with letters from the british minister in washington to sir george simpson, governor of the hudson bay company, to obtain all the information possible relative to the country from the great lakes to the pacific, the location of the trading-posts, the amount of supplies obtainable from them for the exploration party in case of emergency, the names of hunters and half-breeds who might serve as guides and interpreters, and to learn all possible about the geography, and examine all books and maps, making copies of the latter if necessary, etc. "the information we already have of this region," he writes donelson, "is based upon the following works: lewis and clarke's travels; irving's astoria and rocky mountains; travels by the missionary de smet, nicollet, and pope; governor simpson's journey around the world; and some information, not yet published, obtained from dr. evans on his geological survey of those regions. a book recommended by the british minister, 'hudson bay company,' by montgomery martin, i wish you to obtain. he suggested it might be obtained from governor simpson. as soon as you have finished your inquiries at montreal, which i think you can do in a week, return to washington, and report to me in person. "in reference to the detachment (sappers), it is necessary that the men be selected with great care. none should be taken who cannot assist the scientific corps as sketchers, draughtsmen, or collectors, etc. it is necessary that they should be put under special training. captain seymour, perhaps, might be willing to take charge of one, and lieutenant du barry of another, giving them instructions in the use of the barometer and astronomical instruments used in the field." this is interesting as showing how little was then known of the region to be explored, and how few and meagre were the works describing it. governor stevens had thus been driving the work of preparation and organization for a fortnight, when, on april 8, the formal order placing him in charge and giving full instructions was issued by the war department. these instructions exactly embody his own suggestions, much of them in the very language of his letters and memoir to secretary davis. in fact, he really prepared his own instructions. the following brief synopsis will give some idea of the scope and magnitude of the exploration, of the task governor stevens had set himself:-1. the exploration and survey of a route for a railroad from the sources of the mississippi river to puget sound is placed in charge of isaac i. stevens, governor of the territory of washington, to whom all officers detailed for the same will report for instructions. 2. to operate from st. paul, or some eligible point on the upper mississippi, towards the great bend of the missouri river, and thence on the table-land between the tributaries of the missouri and the saskatchewan to some eligible pass in the rocky mountains. a depot to be established at fort union, at the mouth of the yellowstone, with a subsidiary party to await the coming of the main party. a second party to proceed to puget sound and explore the passes of the cascade range, meeting the eastern party between that range and the rocky mountains, as may be arranged by governor stevens. 3. to explore the passes of the cascade range and rocky mountains from the 49th parallel to the headwaters of the missouri river, and to determine the capacity of the adjacent country to supply, and of the columbia and missouri rivers and their tributaries to transport, materials for the construction of the road, great attention to be given geography and meteorology of the whole intermediate region, to the seasons and character of freshets; the quantities and continuance of its rains and snows, especially in the mountain ranges; to its geology; in arid regions the use of artesian wells; its botany, natural history, agricultural and mineral resources; the location, numbers, history, traditions, and customs of its indian tribes; and such other facts as shall tend to develop the character of that portion of our national domain, and supply all the facts that enter into the solution of the particular problem of a railroad. 4-7. assigns to survey, in addition to those already assigned, captain john w.t. gardiner, 1st dragoons; second lieutenant johnson k. duncan, 3d artillery; second lieutenant rufus saxton, 4th artillery; second lieutenant cuvier grover, 4th artillery; and brevet second lieutenant john mullan, 1st artillery; and twenty picked men of the 1st dragoons and two officers and thirty men to captain mcclellan's party. 8. the administrative branches of the army, on requisition approved by governor stevens, to supply the officers, soldiers, and civil employees of the expedition (except the scientific corps and their assistants), with transportation, subsistence, medical stores, and arms, and to furnish funds for the same when not supplied in kind. 9-10. after completion of field work, the expedition to rendezvous at some suitable point in washington territory to be designated by governor stevens, and reports to be prepared. officers and enlisted men to be sent to their stations and employees to be discharged. 11. $40,000 set apart from the appropriation for the survey thus intrusted to governor stevens. it is difficult to realize the magnitude of the task here outlined. it was to traverse and explore a domain two thousand miles in length by two hundred and fifty in breadth, stretching from the mississippi river to the pacific ocean, across a thousand miles of arid plains and two great mountain ranges, a region almost unexplored, and infested by powerful tribes of predatory and warlike savages; to determine the navigability of the two great rivers, the missouri and the columbia, which intersect the region; to locate by reconnoissance and to survey a practicable railroad route; to examine the mountain passes and determine the depth of winter snows in them; to collect all possible information on the geology, climate, flora and fauna, as well as the topography, of the region traversed; and finally to treat with the indians on the route, cultivate their friendship, and collect information as to their languages, numbers, customs, traditions, and history; and all this, including the work of preparation and organization, to be accomplished in a single season. it was governor stevens's plan to effect this vast work by means of two parties operating simultaneously from both ends of the route, the principal one starting from st. paul at the eastern end, under his own immediate charge; and the other, starting from the western end, under mcclellan, to meet on the upper columbia plains between the two great mountain ranges; and two subsidiary parties,--one, under lieutenant donelson, to ascend the missouri to fort union with a stock of supplies, and there await the coming of the main party; and the other, under lieutenant saxton, to proceed from the lower columbia to the bitter root valley, in the heart of the rocky mountains, with an additional stock of supplies for the main party. the subsidiary parties were also to examine the country traversed by them, and collect all the information possible bearing on the various objects of the expedition. by this plan mcclellan was required simply to explore the cascade range, or about 200 miles of the route; while governor stevens allotted all the remainder, some 1800 miles, including the great plains, the rocky and bitter root mountains, to the parties under his immediate charge. during the next four weeks governor stevens drove forward the work of preparing and organizing the expedition with tremendous energy. he applied for and obtained the assignments of officers and men from the army; made requisitions upon the administrative branches for supplies and funds for the several parties; obtained $6000 from the interior department for the purchase of indian goods and for treating with them; employed a. w. tinkham, his former assistant at fort knox, and fred. w. lander, afterwards the brigadier-general lander who was wounded at ball's bluff and died of his wounds, as civil engineers; appointed george w. stevens as secretary and astronomer; placed professor baird, of the smithsonian, in charge of the zoã¶logical and botanical collections, and of preparing the outfits and instructions for field work; made isaac osgood, his former clerk at bucksport, disbursing officer; dr. john evans, geologist; drs. george suckley and j.g. cooper, surgeons and naturalists; j.m. stanley, artist, and engaged a number of other subordinates, including six young gentlemen who went as aides. early in april lieutenant saxton and lieutenant duncan started for the columbia via the isthmus and san francisco, with detailed instructions, that no time might be lost in organizing the western parties, and were followed by mcclellan as soon as he reached washington from texas and received his instructions. he was also furnished by governor stevens with letters from sir george simpson to the officers of the hudson bay company's posts, and with letters from the governor to many of the prominent american settlers in washington and oregon, and also a circular letter bespeaking their goodwill and support for captain mcclellan. governor stevens also placed under mcclellan's charge the construction of a military wagon-road from fort steilacoom, on puget sound, to fort walla walla on the columbia, for which congress had appropriated $20,000, and which the secretary of war had placed in governor stevens's hands, with authority to assign an officer or a civil engineer to its construction, as he deemed best. the governor gave very full instructions in regard to this road; furnished the names of prominent citizens and advised mcclellan to consult with them as to the best location for the road, and gave him full notes of his correspondence with them bearing on the matter. sir george simpson having proposed to forward an extra stock of supplies to his posts in the interior for the expedition, governor stevens made haste to decline the proffered assistance, not wishing to incur such an obligation to a foreign company, assuring sir george that his own government would provide ample supplies, and that he merely wished to know what the company's posts could spare from their usual stock in case of emergency. on this point he is emphatic in his instructions to saxton and mcclellan:- "i am exceedingly desirous no exertion should be spared to have means of our own for our expedition, and shall much prefer to be in condition to extend aid than to be obliged to receive aid from others. whilst we will gratefully receive aid from the company in case of necessity, let it be our determination to have within ourselves the means of the most complete efficacy. i am more and more convinced that in our operations we should be self-dependent, and whilst we exchange courtesies and hospitalities with the hudson bay company, the people and the indians of the territory should see that we have all the elements of success in our hands. the indians must look to us for protection and counsel. they must see that we are their true friends, and be taught not to look, as they have been accustomed to, to the hudson bay company. i am so impressed with this fact that i wish no indian presents to be procured from british posts. i am determined, in my intercourse with the indians, to break up the ascendency of the hudson bay company, and permit no authority or sanction to come between the indians and the officers of this government." the hudson bay company still held trading-posts in the new territory at steilacoom, vancouver, walla walla, and colville, and claimed extensive but ill-defined rights and possessions, and its officers lost no opportunity to cultivate the goodwill of governor stevens, hoping to win his favoring view, if not support, of their claims. lieutenants donelson and mullan, with part of the sappers, were sent to st. louis to prepare the supplies, etc., for ascending the missouri to fort union. governor stevens had already ascertained by correspondence the character of the river boats at st. louis and at pittsburg, and the cost of purchasing or chartering them, but was unable to find one of sufficiently light draught and power, and therefore decided to send the party by the american fur company's boat. captain gardiner was dispatched to st. paul to select the dragoon detachment, establish a camp, and make preliminary arrangements for starting the main party afield as early as possible. the civil engineers, lander and tinkham, were also sent to the same point to examine the crossings of the mississippi and their approaches. lieutenant grover, as assistant quartermaster and commissary of the expedition, was also sent to st. louis, assisted by a civilian employee, to procure supplies and forward them to st. paul. lieutenant du barry was directed to push on beyond st. paul to pembina to procure guides. the most detailed and careful instructions were furnished all these officers; requisitions and arrangements made with the officers of the army administrative branches in washington, st. louis, st. paul, san francisco, and vancouver for the outfit and supply of the different parties; all existing information in the way of maps, reports, etc., was copied and furnished, and full instructions for the making and preservation of natural history collections, and for the astronomical and meteorological observations were prepared and printed, and placed in the hands of all those having charge of those branches. the very full, carefully considered, and complete instructions given these various officers by governor stevens would fill two hundred pages. they are not only a remarkable monument of industry, but show a complete grasp and mastery of the whole field, great foresight of the conditions and difficulties to be encountered, and are remarkably clear and precise in stating the objects to be obtained, but leave much to the judgment of the officer addressed in the ways and means of attaining them. not content with omnivorously devouring all the books, reports, and maps upon the field of operations, and seeking information by correspondence with the officers of the hudson bay company and citizens of oregon and washington, governor stevens procured and studied all the available works on the steppes of russia and asia, as throwing light upon the formation and characteristics of the great plains. during these four weeks the third street house was filled with clerks and draughtsmen, hard at work on instructions, requisitions, maps, etc., with officers and civil employees conferring as to their duties and making preparations, and with many others anxious to accompany the expedition and seeking positions upon it; and was crammed from garret to cellar with books, maps, papers, instruments, arms, and other paraphernalia incident to such an undertaking. professor baird took the greatest interest in the scientific collections, preparing rules, and getting up panniers and apparatus, and made that feature so important that governor stevens was impelled to say, "i want you to understand, professor baird, that my exploration is something more than a natural-history expedition." the fitting out of the expedition attracted much attention in washington, and the parlors were filled every evening with gentlemen connected with or interested in it. among them was fred. w. lander, a tall, athletic young man, confident in bearing, frank and ready in conversation, and fond of relating the adventurous experiences and escapes, especially with horses, into which his daring not to say reckless disposition often led him. lieutenant george b. mcclellan, afterwards the well-known commander of the army of the potomac, was of charming manners and personality. on being asked how he liked being under governor stevens, he replied, "at any rate, i shall serve under a man of brains." lieutenants saxton and grover rose to be major-generals in the civil war. general joseph lane, who represented oregon in congress, was a frequent caller. he was a man of native grace and dignity of manner and fine character,--one of nature's noblemen. the energy and capacity for effective work displayed by governor stevens during this time astonished his friends. his labors with the pen alone were enough to fully occupy any man. besides this, he was incessantly engaged in consultations, conferences, and interviews with the subordinates and others, and was embracing every opportunity of talking with men who had experience on the plains or the pacific coast. george stevens declared that no human being could stand such a strain, and on another occasion exclaimed, "the major is crazy, actually crazy, or he never could work as he does!" in just a month from the date of the order placing him in charge, governor stevens had effected the whole work of organization and outfitting, and on may 9 left washington for st. paul to start the expedition. during the same month he also broke up housekeeping, disposed of his furniture, and moved his family into private lodgings. his wife was seriously ill, and was obliged to remain in washington with her young child and her sister mary until sufficiently recovered to stand the journey to newport. he also at this time selected and purchased of d. appleton & co., of new york, the territorial library,--for which $5000 had been appropriated by congress,--and had the books sent out by sea around cape horn. this was no small task, for he went over the lists of books and made the selection with great pains. he stated in his first message to the legislature that he had taken care to get the best books in each department of learning, and had applied to the executive of every state and territory and to many learned societies to donate their publications. this work is not the place to narrate the progress and results of that great exploration and survey. they are ably and fully recorded by governor stevens himself in three large volumes, comprising 1500 pages, with many views and illustrations, published by congress, being the first and twelfth volumes (the latter in two parts) of "reports of the explorations and surveys for a railroad route from the mississippi river to the pacific ocean." and it is only from these pages that one can learn and appreciate with what thoroughness and completeness governor stevens executed the vast work intrusted to him. for years these volumes were the great storehouse of information relating to the region treated by them, the source of innumerable reports and articles, and are to-day full of interest and valuable information. these reports really embody the results of three years' labors. and it will be related farther on how governor stevens, not content with having most successfully conducted his exploration across the continent in one season and fully performed his instructions, did, of his own patriotic devotion to the public interests, carry on that great work for two years longer, using the indian service and the volunteer forces under his command, and gave the full and final results of his labors in vol. xii., published in 1860. chapter xvi the party.--the start leaving washington may 9, and, after spending a day in new york to complete arrangements, going by way of detroit and chicago, governor stevens reached st. louis on the 15th. here he was disappointed in finding the outfits not so far advanced as he expected, and was even seriously alarmed at the mules furnished by the st. louis quartermaster, which were only three or four years old, and perfectly wild and unbroken. this was the more inexcusable from the fact that he had previously sent mr. charles taplin to st. louis with instructions that only well-broken and serviceable animals were to be procured. consequently he remained there a week hastening the necessary outfits, during which time he started lieutenant donelson's party up the missouri on the american fur company's steamboat with lieutenant mullan, mr. william h. graham, and six sappers, and 10,000 rations. dr. john evans and mr. alexander culbertson also accompanied them. the latter, having spent twenty years on the upper missouri as a fur-trader and married a blackfoot squaw, had great influence over that warlike tribe. he was appointed by governor stevens as special agent for these predatory and intractable savages, and sent forward to prepare the way for the expedition through their country by securing guides and hunters and arranging for a council. leaving st. louis on the 23d and proceeding up the mississippi, governor stevens, in order to repair the neglect of the quartermaster, purchased at the several landings and at galena a number of teams of strong, well-broken mules and horses, in some instances taking them off the wagons where they were at work. four days were spent on the father of waters. "leaving galena on the 25th," says the governor, "on the steamer nominee, we proceeded up the river, and were enabled to make short stops at dubuque, prairie du chien, lansing, la crosse, and other places. intervals of leisure were employed in reporting fully to the war and interior departments my proceedings thus far, and the arrangements in contemplation for the execution of my several trusts. the scenery on the mississippi is bold and at times beautiful, though but little variety is presented. bluff banks on both sides, topped with trees, line its banks, and occasionally marked views occur, among which i might mention as most prominent lake pepin, maiden rock, barn bluffs, etc. "st. paul is beautifully situated upon a high bluff on the east bank of the river, and is rapidly growing in size and importance." st. paul is said in the report to have then had a population of 1200. while on the nominee, governor stevens writes a letter of eight pages to his wife's brother, mr. daniel l. hazard, who had had much experience with mississippi boats,--but was then at newport recovering from malarial illness,--on the draught, power, and size of steamboats suitable for the navigation of the upper missouri, and suggests to him the opportunity for steamboating on puget sound, concluding with the following remarks, showing his own feelings towards the new country, and how completely he was adopting it:- "i have no doubt that it is one of the most delightful and salubrious regions in the whole country, with all the health of newport, but with a grandeur and largeness of scenery far surpassing it. it is just such a place as i have for many years proposed to myself, one of these days, to carve out a home. i am satisfied my family will all be pleased with their new home, and that we will be willing to settle down there for life." long before daylight the next morning after reaching st. paul, governor stevens was in the saddle, riding to the camp established by captain gardiner two days before, and had the pleasure of rousing the gentlemen of the expedition from their sleep. the camp was situated on the borders of lake amelia, about nine miles from st. paul and about three northwest from fort snelling, and, in honor of the president, the governor named it camp pierce. "about a quarter of a mile to the eastward lay another lake, connected with lake amelia by a creek, which was very convenient for watering our animals, and formed a fine meadow on which they grazed. these lakes furnished us with fish in abundance, consisting of bass, pickerel, and sunfish. "the mules presented a fine appearance, and were apparently strong and healthy, though young, and even more unbroken and unserviceable than i had feared. not a single full team of broken animals could be selected, and well-broken riding animals were essential, for most of the gentlemen of the scientific corps were unaccustomed to riding. i felt that time was precious and a great difficulty to be overcome, so at once resolved that the whole force should set to work to break them. fortunately, my purchase of mules along the river enabled me to break in the animals rapidly to the teams, by which they were started several days earlier than otherwise could have been done." a letter of george w. stevens gives the following amusing account of the scenes which occurred when every man, by the governor's order, set to work to break his own mule:- "of the 200 mules received, much to the chagrin and disappointment of the major, not ten of them were broken. but though the unbroken and unqualified age of our young mules presented a hindrance, the major has the more vigorously cut out his plans. in a week's time, of very hard labor on the part of the men, we were able to move. even the members of the scientific corps put their shoulders to the wheel, and each gentleman broke his own riding animal. the operation of breaking these most stubborn of creatures was highly exciting and interesting. first they were tolled into a corral by leading in the bell mare, which they follow with the most laughable devotion. then lassos were thrown over their necks, and after a long process of choking and hauling they were sufficiently exhausted to allow themselves to be led out and tied to a long picket rope stretched across stakes some four feet high. they did not at all relish the feeling of the rope about their necks, and such capers as they cut up, turning summersets 'both before and behind,' throwing themselves upon the ground, and jumping and doubling themselves with all the agility of the cat. at length nearly all of the 200 were tied to the picket rope, and, after a sufficiently elapsed interval to regain their minds and strength, the same antics were gone through with again. some leaped over the ropes, some tangled themselves with their lariats. breaking them to the saddle proved highly interesting. after breakfast each morning we all went out and saddled our own animals, and spent an hour or two in a _pleasant drive_. behold some fifteen or twenty of us mounted; off we start, and in a moment all sorts of scenes are being enacted. here one is thrown headforemost; here one is borne through the air with lightning speed, fortunate if not brushed off beneath the scrubby oaks. some of the mules lie down, and some persist in running among a number of picketed animals, and tangling themselves in the lariats; the riders--however good--are sent 'bounding through the air.' i had a truly tough job in breaking my animal. every time i mounted her i was sure to be thrown, and it was not until some weeks' march that she became well trained, but afterwards there was not a better-broken mule in the train. many were badly beaten and bruised in the breaking operation, and certainly a whole month's delay in our arrival at fort union was the result of the selection of these young, unbroken animals by the st. louis quartermaster." the next few days the rains were almost incessant; but, says the governor, june 1:- "although it rained heavily all day, every one in camp was engaged in breaking mules, causing many an amusing scene. several of the party were thrown repeatedly, but the determination they evince must overcome all obstacles; and i feel not only pleased to see their spirit, but to congratulate myself and them that no accident has occurred worthy of mention. much hilarity was produced by the efforts of different persons, and each fall occasioned a laugh. thus what i had seriously expected to prove a great difficulty was, in the midst of heavy rains and gloomy weather, a source of mirthful enjoyment." the main party here organized, including a few members who joined soon after starting, consisted of governor isaac i. stevens; lieutenant cuvier grover, 4th artillery; lieutenant beekman du barry, 3d artillery; detachment of four sappers; detachment of twenty men, 1st dragoons; fred. w. lander, a.w. tinkham, civil engineers; dr. george suckley, surgeon and naturalist; isaac f. osgood, disbursing agent; j.m. stanley, artist; john lambert, topographer; george w. stevens, secretary and astronomer; james doty, a. remenyi, astronomical and magnetic observations; joseph f. moffett, meteorologist; t.s. everett, quartermaster and commissary clerk; elwood evans, thomas adams, f.h. burr, max strobel, a. jekelfaluzy, b.f. kendall, ---evelyn, aides; c.p. higgins, wagon-master; william simpson, pack-master; pierre boutineau, le frambois, belland, henry boulieau, paul boulieau, guides; menoc, hunter; and sixty teamsters, packers, and voyageurs, numbering altogether one hundred and eleven members. captain gardiner was relieved from duty in consequence of illness, and did not accompany the expedition. the pay was certainly moderate: $125 for mr. stanley, the artist; $100 to the civil engineers, lander and tinkham; and $25 to each aide, per month. the subsidiary party, ascending the missouri to fort union, where it was to join the main party, consisted of lieutenant a.j. donelson, engineer corps; lieutenant john mullan, 1st artillery; six sappers; william m. graham, astronomer; dr. john evans, geologist; alexander culbertson, special indian agent. the other subsidiary party, which met the main party in the rocky mountains, consisted of lieutenant rufus saxton, 4th artillery; lieutenant robert macfeely, 4th infantry; lieutenant richard arnold, 3d artillery; mr. d.l. arnold; mr. d.s. hoyt; detachment of eighteen soldiers; twenty-nine packers, herders, etc.,--in all, fifty-two. the western party consisted of lieutenant george b. mcclellan; lieutenant johnson k. duncan, 3d artillery, astronomer, etc.; lieutenant henry c. hodges, 4th infantry, quartermaster and commissary; lieutenant sylvester mowry, 3d artillery, meteorologist; george gibbs, geologist and ethnologist; j.f. minter, civil engineer; dr. j.c. cooper, surgeon and naturalist; mr. lewis, interpreter; detachment of twenty-eight soldiers; thirty civil employees,--in all, sixty-six in number. the entire force under governor stevens's command for the exploration comprised eleven officers and seventy-six enlisted men of the army, thirty-three members of the scientific corps, and one hundred and twenty civilian employees, teamsters, packers, guides, herders, voyageurs, etc.,--altogether, some two hundred and forty. governor stevens's general plan was, while surveying a continuous compass and odometer line with the principal train, to keep detached parties far out on the sides of the route, examining the topography of the country, and gathering all possible information concerning it, and thus to embrace the widest possible field in the exploration. the following pages will give simply the governor's personal experiences on the expedition, and largely in his own language, referring the reader to his reports, especially the final report in vol. xii., for the details of this most interesting exploration. "as rapidly as the breaking-in of the mules and heavy rains for half the time allowed, the expedition moved seventy miles up the mississippi in detachments, crossed to the west bank, and on june 10 were again assembled on the sauk river, two miles above its mouth, in camp davis, so named in honor of the secretary of war. in this first movement of the expedition on the 31st, lander was sent ahead to explore, and tinkham to run the survey line. doty on june 3, and simpson on 4th, took the route with small trains, with such animals as were sufficiently broken in to be worked, and on the 6th camp pierce was broken up, and the remainder of the force followed in three parties, grover with the scientific men and instruments by steamboat, du barry with stanley, dr. suckley and sixteen dragoons, and everett with the train, both these by land up the east bank of the river. thus, despite the mules and the weather, the least possible time was lost in starting afield, and the young subordinates were being taught to command and operate detachments, which the governor regarded as of great importance, 'in order to infuse hope into the whole party, and avail myself of the present high spirit of the camp.'" having seen the several parties started off, and the camp broken up, the governor continues:- i remained at st. anthony until noon of june 7 to secure the services of several voyageurs, and particularly of the guide pierre boutineau and the hunter menoc, in which i was successful, and starting about noon, and taking a rapid conveyance, i pushed forward the same day forty miles, overtaking at rum river lieutenant du barry, and, some miles beyond, both doty and simpson, and reaching sauk rapids, a distance of thirty miles farther, by eleven a.m., found mr. tinkham actively engaged in the survey of that portion of the river. the crossing at st. anthony is by a rope ferry, its motive power being the action of the current, having a short rope at the bow and a longer or slack rope astern. on the west side of the mississippi, about three miles above rum river, there was a large encampment of winnebago indians, consisting of about one hundred lodges. these are constructed of oak bark, fastened by strips of buckskin over arched poles, resembling in shape the cover of a wagon; they are about eight feet high, and from ten to thirty feet long, according to the number of families to be accommodated. the chief's lodge in the centre is much larger, and distinguished by the flags upon it, two british and two american colors. the shores are lined with canoes, and the village extends an eighth of a mile along the river. the country, for the first seven miles after leaving camp and striking the st. anthony road, is a wet prairie. after leaving st. anthony the country appears to rise towards the north; the road lies on the eastern bank of the mississippi, along the plateau, which is generally timbered with the smaller varieties of oak, in some places forming beautiful groves. on the road, and at sauk rapids, several additional men were engaged, among them some canadian voyageurs. these men, being sometimes half-breeds, speak a jargon of patois french, chippewa, and other indian dialects. they are a hardy, willing, enduring class, and used to encounter all sorts of difficulties in their journey between different posts of the fur companies. they must be treated with kindness and a certain degree of familiarity, and, their confidence and affections being secured, they are the most obedient and hard-working fellows in the world. this morning i learned that lieutenant grover and his steamboat party had landed late last evening about five miles below sauk river, and had there encamped. in the afternoon, accompanied by boutineau, i crossed the mississippi to find him, and went three miles in a drenching rain without reaching his position. i dispatched henry boulieau in search of lander, and he returned with the information that lander was about eighteen miles ahead at cold spring, and that he had made there a good crossing for wagons. june 9. i went to mr. lander's camp, and examined the crossing, which i find to be practicable, and the work well done. june 10. i returned to lieutenant grover's camp, which was beautifully situated on the north bank of the osakis or sauk river, about two miles from its mouth. the grass was indifferent and backward, but, with half rations of oats, abundant for the animals; water excellent. in honor of the secretary of war, we named it camp davis. lieutenant du barry arrived this afternoon with his party, as did the small trains of doty and simpson. a very severe thunderstorm, with heavy rain for about five hours, occurred at night, amounting in the rain-gauge to 6.1 inches. my acquaintance with the voyageurs, thus far, has impressed me favorably. they are thorough woodsmen, and just the men for prairie life also, going into the water as pleasantly as a spaniel, and remaining there as long as needed; stout, able-bodied, and willing to put their shoulders to the wheel whenever necessary; no slough or bog deters them. camp davis, two miles west of the mississippi river, june 10, 1853. my dearest wife,--we are getting on finely. camp pierce was broken up on monday, and in five days we have gone up the river seventy miles, and the bulk of the party is now west of the mississippi. yesterday i rode forward twenty-six miles to the crossing of the sauk river to make arrangements for the advance of the civil engineer party. i had previously traveled rapidly from st. anthony to sauk rapids in a carriage, passing all the parties on the road. it was a beautiful ride all the way, and i had a most interesting companion in pierre boutineau, the great guide and voyageur of minnesota. he is famous as a buffalo-hunter, is a chippewa half-breed, and surpasses all of his class in truthfulness and great intelligence. not only is he experienced in all the vicissitudes of travel and frontier life, being the hero of many interesting events, but he has the broadness of view of an engineer, and i am confident he will be of the greatest service to us in finding our way. at the falls of st. anthony, where he resides, he is greatly esteemed, and is known throughout the territory. i breakfasted with him monday morning, and was delighted with the affection and respect with which he inspired his whole household. there was his old indian mother; his four children by his first wife, a half-breed; his second wife and babe; his sister; his brother and wife; and the wife of an absent brother. we all sat down to a breakfast of two roasted sucking-pigs, eggs, beefsteak, etc. he is a natural gentleman, and in his family i saw exhibited the most refined and courteous manners. he drove a pair of very spirited horses, and on the road, seeing some plover, he called them to him and shot one. he understands, as mr. sibley in washington told me, everything from shooting a bird or paddling a canoe to hunting buffalo, and conducting a large party through a long extent of difficult country. i have also secured menoc, the best hunter of the territory. he joins the party to-morrow, and will in ten days be able to supply us with deer and elk. june 12. messrs. osgood and kendall reached camp this morning with the barometers and india-rubber boats. at st. louis i was telegraphed that many of the barometers had been broken, and they could not be supplied short of new york. they were absolutely indispensable. i sent mr. kendall there immediately, and in thirty days the boats and instruments were made and brought to my camp, eighty miles on our way. mr. everett also arrived about noon to-day. i regretted to observe that many of his animals were in very bad condition. of our whole number some forty were disabled, and eight or ten so much so as to give very little hope that they could do any further service. i refused, however, to sell even these to the many applicants who expressed a willingness to take them off our hands below the cost of purchase. assembling both officers and men to-day, i caused to be read the camp regulations, which i had prepared for the government of the party, and made a short address, in which i informed them that every man would be expected to look to the safety of his comrades; that all alike, whether soldier or civilian, would be expected to stand guard, and in case of difficulties to meet them promptly. i exaggerated the difficulties which lay before us, and represented that the country through which they would pass was intersected by bogs, marshes, and deep morasses; that rivers were to be forded and bridged, mountains and valleys to be crossed; that the first one hundred and eighty miles of the journey was reported to be through a continuous marsh, barely practicable, where every man would have to go through mud and water and apply his shoulders to the wheel; that in ten days we would reach the indian country, where heavy guard duty would have to be performed to protect property and preserve lives; that still farther on we would probably be compelled to force our way through the country of the blackfoot indians, a tribe proverbially treacherous and warlike, that then the snows of the mountains would have to be overcome, and that every man would be expected to follow wherever he might be led; that no one would be sacrificed, nor would any one be subjected to any risk which i would not freely incur; and that whoever was not willing to coã¶perate with us had better at once retire. after these remarks the camp regulations were read by mr. kendall, and my views were cordially approved. i dispatched lieutenant grover with a picked party of fifteen men, with instructions to reconnoitre the country north, and in the vicinity of white bear lake. june 13. continuing the project of sending off the train in detached parties, and thus gradually breaking up the camp, much of the day was spent in preparing a party to be placed in charge of dr. suckley. all was effected by four p.m., when his party, consisting of belland the guide, menoc the hunter, a cook, corporal coster, and two dragoons, with two led horses and two led mules, two men in charge of them, belland's riding horse, and a pembina cart in charge of henry boulieau, started from camp. he was instructed to follow lieutenant grover's trail in easy marches, looking carefully to his animals, and paying particular attention to the collections in natural history. to-day i issued an order creating assimilated rank in the expedition, by which certain gentlemen of the party were appointed to the grade of lieutenant, and others to the grade of non-commissioned officer, for convenience in detailing guard. by this course the relative position of each man was fixed; and, whether in the main or detached parties, it was known whose duty it was to give orders in case of necessity. military organization is in some degree indispensable, and the idea of an escort has been entirely abandoned. all are soldiers in the performance of guard duty, and the soldiers accompanying us are on fatigue duty, and not merely to escort us by day and to stand guard at night. several of the pembina carts purchased by dr. borup arrived in camp to-day. they are made entirely of wood, having no iron at all about them, very roughly constructed, and the wheels usually wrapped with rawhide or buffalo skin in place of an iron tire, to prevent their cutting through the marshy ground so extensive between here and pembina. they are drawn by horses, oxen, or mules, one person usually driving from two to six carts, and when loaded they will carry from six to eight hundred pounds. they look as if made for only one trip, and the creaking of the wheels on the wooden axle does not give the idea of their standing much service. their first appearance, to those of the party unaccustomed to the sight, with the oxen harnessed in them, caused much merriment, and as they moved over the prairie, the singular noise produced by their wheels assured us that, with such an accompaniment, no need existed for any musical instrument or players, for these discoursed most sweetly. "there is no such thing as an escort to this expedition. each man is escorted by every other man," begins this order. it required each man habitually to go armed; arms to be inspected morning and evening; no march on sundays, on which days thorough inspection of persons and things to be made, and each man to bathe his whole person; each member of the scientific corps to take care of his own horse, and to take from and place in the wagons his own personal baggage; no firing on the march; personal baggage reduced to twenty-five pounds per man. by the strict enforcement of these stringent but salutary regulations, and the extreme care with which all were required to treat the animals, governor stevens conducted the entire expedition without the loss of a man, save one who shot himself by accident, and the animals actually improved on the march. june 14. spent the day in making the necessary arrangements to push forward the whole camp, to be organized for the present in detached parties under separate heads, and all under my general direction. lieutenant du barry was placed in general charge of the meteorological observations and of the train, as executive officer. everything now presents a favorable aspect, and all will be ready to move off to-morrow morning. procured several more pembina carts. engaged to-day paul boulieau, a half-breed chippewa of collegiate education, who has filled a seat in the territorial legislature with credit, and also been long in the service of the fur company. he was placed in charge of the pembina train, so called, which, consisting at first of five carts, each drawn by an ox, was this day increased by a very superior wagon team, drawn by two yoke of very large and serviceable oxen. it may here be observed that the pembina train, managed entirely by the voyageurs, invariably moved by itself, crossed all the streams without additional assistance, gave us the least trouble in supervision, and was altogether the most economical and effective transportation we had. a pioneer wagon containing rations for the advance party and the india-rubber boats, loaded lightly in order in case of necessity to be pushed rapidly forward to the advance parties, and a wagon of indian goods, were with the train. the arrangements thus made left me free to be either with the advance parties or with the train, or to make personal examinations of important features of the country off the lines of the trail. again sending on detached parties, under lieutenant grover, dr. suckley, lander, and tinkham, the march was resumed to pike lake, a distance of eighty-one miles. the season was unusually backward, the rains frequent and heavy, and great labor was required in crossing the swollen streams,--some by bridging, others by means of the india-rubber floats for ferrying over the goods while the animals swam across. the wagons, bogged in the miry ground, had to be frequently unloaded and loaded again; but many soft and marshy places were made passable by covering the road deep with cut grass, for which purpose the governor, with his usual foresight, had provided scythes. the country, with its beautiful prairies, groves, and lakes, and many streams and bogs to be crossed, and the incidents of the march are graphically described in governor stevens's report, with many views taken along the route. the following extracts will show the character of the country and the difficulties overcome:- june 16. three miles from camp davis we passed through a belt of woods for two miles, where the flies were excessively annoying, persecuting our animals so that it was hard to keep them in the road, as they constantly attempted to rush into the bushes. the country to cold spring has a rich alluvial soil, with scattered groves of timber. it is mostly level prairie, occasionally broken by a small stream, and is excellent for agricultural purposes. passing through lieutenant du barry's camp, i went on to dr. suckley's, on the west side of the sauk. sauk river at our ford is about one hundred and twenty feet wide, though, owing to the obliquity of the banks and rapidity of current, the ford is near three hundred feet wide and the water five feet deep. june 17. this morning i started with dr. suckley and went on to lake henry, nineteen and a half miles. the country was a rolling prairie, interspersed with small sloughs filled by the recent rains; the soil is rich and black, grass good, and occasionally gravelly hillocks. in the crossing of the sauk by the main train, the india-rubber boats were for the first time used. the larger one is about twelve feet long and four wide, weighing seventy-five pounds, the other about one fifth smaller. a rope was stretched across the stream, and the boats ferried across by means of a ring attached to their bows, and sliding along the rope. they succeeded admirably, and a birch canoe, managed by one of the voyageurs, was also used in crossing. some of the men were in the water for hours, but worked faithfully and efficiently. lieutenant du barry effected the crossing in one day, and encamped on the west side of the river, six miles from cold spring. june 18. left camp about seven o'clock, and in about three quarters of a mile crossed a bad place, requiring some grass. the water was two feet deep, and the bottom miry. our road lay through a beautiful prairie. the shores of lake henry are heavily wooded. in two and a half miles farther we found two very wet places, one hundred yards apart. in two miles farther we came to a long marsh, where the ground was very soft, and where our wagons stalled. three quarters of a mile beyond we encountered a very deep, muddy slough, to cross which we had recourse to a long rope, and all our force pulled on it. a branch of crow river is then reached in a mile, or a little more. it is about twelve feet wide and two deep; both sides are overflown marsh, making the place very difficult to cross. to avoid breaking bulk, we again used the long rope, and attaching three pairs of mules to it, all our men pulling on it at the same time, we got the wagon through. we arrived about noon at crow wing river, nine miles from camp. it was four or five feet deep and twenty feet wide, and at this time overflowing its usual banks. broke bulk here, the men packing our stuff across. passing crow river, we find a continuous grove of oak-trees on our left, and in five miles a series of small lakes on our right, not wooded but abounding in game. arrived at camp on lightning lake about half past eight p.m. distance traveled, eighteen miles and three quarters. the frequent sloughs and bad crossings in our march to-day added much to the labors of the men and animals. after the hard day's march we enjoyed our supper of game, cooked in hunter's style on sticks before the fire, although it was midnight before we could have it ready. june 19, sunday. lightning lake is a very beautiful sheet of water, so called from the fact that during captain pope's expedition, while encamped here, one of those storms so fearfully violent in this country occurred, during which one of his party was instantly killed by a stroke of lightning. its northern shore is thickly studded with timber, and the southern side, upon which we are encamped, affords an ample supply for all camping purposes. pickerel, pike, and bass fill the lake, numbers of which our parties caught; and ducks, geese, swans, plover, and prairie chicken abound in the vicinity. the day of rest was enjoyed by the whole party; some fishing, washing and mending their clothes, others trying various modes of cooking the game and fish which abounded. evans succeeded admirably in roasting a fish in the ashes, first rolling it up in brown paper dampened, which, when removed, brought off the scales with it, leaving the meat clean and well done. early after dinner mr. osgood arrived, informing me that lieutenant du barry, misconstruing my instructions, had declined to allow him to bring forward the two wagons which i had ordered for the use of the advanced parties. june 20. started at 3.30 a.m. to go back to the main train, which i met five miles west of lake henry. taking charge of the train myself, i directed boutineau to explore in advance for the most practicable route. the bad crossing referred to in the narrative of the 18th was, by great exertion and the united force of the whole party, effected without accident, and the whole train reached lightning lake by 4.30 p.m. lieutenant du barry appears to have felt affronted at the action of the governor in taking the personal charge of the train, and indeed the latter was apt to be pretty severe and decided if anything went wrong. it will be observed how summarily he weeded out and sent back inefficient men:- june 21. in compliance with his own request, i relieved lieutenant du barry from duty with the expedition, and ordered him to report in person to the adjutant-general in washington. he was desired to call upon the secretary of war and acquaint him with the whole history of the expedition up to this point; and, to enable him to reach the settlements with some degree of comfort and expedition, i dispatched mr. kendall and two of the voyageurs to accompany him as far as long prairie on his return, whence there would be no difficulty in his procuring transportation to sauk rapids. captain remenyi and his assistant, mr. jekelfaluzy, were discharged to-day, as they did not perform their duties to my satisfaction. all these matters detained us until 4.30 p.m., when i pushed forward with dr. suckley's and the scientific parties. the clouds were gathering and indicated a severe gust. we reached a beautiful lake about three miles distant, called by us lake stanley, in honor of the artist of the expedition, and had just time to get into camp to save ourselves from a very severe storm, which continued with great violence till near seven p.m. june 22. my party, leaving dr. suckley, got off about six a.m. we arrived at white bear lake, about nine and a half miles from the morning's camp, at 10.15 a.m. leaving lightning lake the country seems to change its character, and is no longer a flat, undiversified surface, with occasionally a gentle undulation scarcely attracting attention. it has gradually changed to a heavy, rolling prairie, which, before approaching white bear lake, becomes broken up into hills, valleys, and basins varying from thirty to fifty feet in depth. boulders and stones, from the size of pebbles to paving-stones, are very numerous. our route to-day appears to be gradually ascending at a probable rate of eight or ten feet per mile. white bear lake is a beautiful sheet of water, bordered with timber, about fourteen miles long and two wide, with high, swelling banks, running back a mile or so, and rising to the height of about one hundred and fifty feet. as the animals looked so fresh, and the day was cool and good for traveling, we halted only for a rest. about five miles from the lake we came to a stream, apparently running into it. other bad places occurred; soft bogs, marshes, and brooks impeded our progress so much that we did not get into camp until three p.m., making nine and one third miles from our halting-place, and eighteen and three fourths for our day's march. our camp was on a very rapid stream, with steep, high banks. we called it lambert river, in honor of our topographer, who received a sad overturn as he crossed it with lieutenant grover's command. the main train in charge of mr. osgood moved from camp on lightning lake at seven o'clock, after settling a difficulty of a very serious aspect growing out of a strike of all the teamsters, in consequence of a discharge by him of six of their number, according to my directions, because their services were not required. they threatened to shoot the first driver who moved out of camp. mr. osgood declared that he would drive out each wagon himself. finally, after some discussion, the discharged men moved off cheerfully, and the main train pushed forward to white bear lake. june 23. our first labor this morning was to cross the stream at a point half a mile from our camp, from which we moved about six. this crossing delayed our little party some two hours. grass had to be cut and placed on both sides of the stream. the banks were steep and soft, and it required the presence of a man or two at each wheel to keep the wagons in motion and prevent their being stuck in the mire. the country to-day appears admirably adapted to grazing purposes, and the bottoms, of frequent occurrence, are of a very rich character. marshes and little streams, bordered by soft places, occur frequently. in one of these places, fully one hundred feet in length, one of our wagons got mired, making it necessary to remove part of its load to get it through. about ten a.m. i left the train in charge of mr. g.w. stevens, and, pushing on, reached lieutenant grover's camp about twelve. the train arrived at half past one, crossed a marsh and a small stream, and encamped opposite the camps of messrs. grover, lander, and tinkham. lieutenant grover's camp is beautifully situated on the shores of pike lake. the main train and dr. suckley's party arrived about half past eight, and the whole expedition was again brought together. this i consider the real starting-point of the expedition, and named our camp here camp marcy, in honor of the secretary of state. we remained here a day in order to give the animals a chance to rest. they appear to be in very good condition, and the grazing is fine. received of the various scientific chiefs reports of their labors to this point. chapter xvii pike lake to fort union from pike lake the expedition pursued a general course westerly by ten degrees northerly in order to clear the great northeastern bend of the missouri, and reached fort union in thirty-eight days, traversing a distance of five hundred and fifty miles. a compass and odometer line was run with the main party. pursuing his system of exploring a wide scope of country by means of detached parties, governor stevens dispatched lieutenant grover with a picked party to survey a separate route south of that of the main body as far as fort union, and kept lander, tinkham, dr. suckley, lambert, doty, and adams, with small parties of the voyageurs, examining the country within forty miles of the route by frequent side trips. the main train crossed the red river near the town of breckenridge, the james river some distance north of jamestown, and skirted the mouse river near minot, on the great northern railroad, from which point to fort union, and for hundreds of miles beyond, that railroad follows governor stevens's route. it is characteristic of the governor that in sending officers on the detached trips he always furnished them the best men and animals of the party, frequently allowing them to select them themselves. on july 12 he overstrained himself in his exertions to prevent a herd of buffalo from stampeding the train, and the old rupture, which had given him so much trouble in mexico, broke out afresh, and obliged him to ride in an ambulance for many hundreds of miles. but his spirit and energy were no-wise quelled by this grievous physical disability. the graphic descriptions of the country, the incidents of the march, the encounter with countless herds of buffalo, and the meetings with the red river hunters and assiniboine indians are given in the final report with a fullness of detail which cannot be attempted here, but the following extracts will give a fair idea of this stage of the exploration:- june 24. i directed lieutenant grover to select a party of twenty picked men, twenty-six mules, three horses, and twenty-five days' provisions, including an ox, with which to go forward on the dead colt hillock line. in thus giving to lieutenant grover his own selection of animals and men, my purpose was to make him in the highest degree effective in the means at his disposal, and to demonstrate by the success of his undertaking the entire feasibility of operating in detached parties. messrs. lander and tinkham moved forward this afternoon to chippewa river. on counting rations, it was found that for the main party there was a supply for twenty days, while it might take forty-five to reach fort union. but with the eight oxen in the carts, and the known abundance of game, i feared no scarcity. the men showed some anxiety, and talked of a strike, but, seeing the confidence of the officers, abandoned any open demonstration. i had ordered a reducing of rations whenever the quantity of game would justify it, and henceforward i gave the most particular attention to it, so that, although we did not reach the yellowstone for thirty-eight days, there was at no time a scarcity of provisions. june 25. to-day the expedition may be considered fairly under way. lieutenant grover started at 7.30 a.m. the main party, under my own direction, moved forward at about the same time. in ten miles reached the chippewa river. the india-rubber boats did good service, carrying over each time more than half a wagon-load. the whole train was all well encamped two miles further on at a fine lake by sunset. june 26. the main party moved to-day to the camp of mr. tinkham of last night, and the whole command was over the river and in camp by six o'clock. as we were now approaching the indian country, i systematized all the arrangements of camp and guards, and the details of duty on the march. the dragoons were distributed as follows: two for the pack-train; two with a led horse each for reconnoitring duty; two to strike and pitch tents; two to catch fish; two with the howitzer; sergeant lindner and seven men with the main column. the sergeant was, moreover, charged with the duty of laying out the encampment under my direction. for the care of the camp, an officer of the guard, who also served as officer of the day, two non-commissioned officers, and six privates were detailed. cook-fires to be made at two a.m.; the cooks and teamsters called at three, and the animals to be put in good grass; reveille to be sounded at four, and all the officers to be called by name; the whole camp to breakfast about four, and the teamsters immediately to commence harnessing up; tents struck by half past four, and camp in motion by five; the sentinels instructed to fire upon any prowling indians. june 27. camp roused at four a.m. while at breakfast, lieutenant moffett gave me notice that we had but four minutes left to eat in, and, as we failed to get through, he had the tents struck over our heads. the train moved at five o'clock. about eight miles from camp passed elbow lake, fourteen miles reached rabbit river, followed the stream to where it empties into bell's lake, and, going along the beach through water eight inches deep with a pebbly bottom, we found a good crossing, though a ridge has to be ascended before getting upon the plain where our camp is placed. the grass is most excellent, and the animals, accustomed to each other, are visibly improving. tuesday, june 28. at half past ten a.m. the advance had crossed rabbit river, fifteen miles from camp, and halted until the arrival of the main train. leaving the train to rest, the advance started at two. in three miles met mr. lander, whose camp was with mr. tinkham's, and went into camp at five on the bois de sioux, and were joined by the whole party at nine o'clock, after a march of twenty-seven miles over a country that had been invariably reported the very worst of the whole route. our animals, though somewhat tired, immediately went to feeding. there were some soft places between the rabbit river and the bois de sioux, in which the animals were mired and wagons stalled; but we were agreeably disappointed in having comparatively a very comfortable day's journey. numerous large catfish were caught this afternoon, some weighing from twelve to twenty pounds. at half past eleven p.m. we sat down to a supper of ducks, catfish, and coffee, and all the men were in fine spirits. the bois de sioux had been a great point to reach,--the end of bad roads and the commencement of the buffalo country. here we may take a general review of the country since leaving st. paul. between camp pierce and sauk rapids, seventy-nine miles, the road passes through beautiful prairies and oak openings, with occasional meadows, wet at this early season, and, at some distance to the right, groves of tamarack, varying the landscape with their light and feathery foliage. from the crossing at sauk rapids to lightning lake most of the country is rolling prairie, with the wooded banks of sauk river on the south, and numerous small ponds and lakes with trees on their banks, abundant and excellent pasture, and swarms of water-fowl, supplying plenty of fresh provisions. a similar delightful country continues to the bois de sioux river, with some decrease in the amount of timber, until the banks of that river are reached. after leaving lightning lake the country seems to change its character; no longer a flat, undiversified surface, or with gentle undulations scarcely attracting notice, it has gradually changed to a heavy, rolling prairie, and at white bear lake becomes broken up into hills, valleys, and basins. boulders and smaller stones are numerous. this whole dividing ridge, then, separating the waters of the mississippi from those of the red river, which flow into hudson bay, is not the lofty range of mountains which might be supposed to separate the sources of two such great bodies of water flowing in opposite directions and to outlets so widely distant, but is a gently undulating and exceedingly rich prairie country, abundantly wooded and watered, having a width of one hundred miles, and an elevation not exceeding six hundred feet above the river and about sixteen hundred above the sea. there is a very slight rise in the general level in going westward, the bois de sioux being at the crossing only thirty-one feet higher than the mississippi at sauk rapids. undulating and level prairies, skirted by woods of various growth, and clothed everywhere with rich verdure; numerous and rapid streams, with innumerable small but limpid lakes, frequented by multitudes of wild fowl, most conspicuous among which appears the stately swan,--these, in ever-recurring succession, make up the panorama of this extensive district, which may be said to be everywhere fertile, beautiful, and inviting. the most remarkable features of this region are the intervals of level prairie, especially that near the bend of the branches of red river, where the horizon is as unbroken as that of a calm sea. nor are other points of resemblance wanting: the long grass, which in such places is unusually rank, bending gracefully to the passing breeze as it sweeps along the plain, gives the idea of waves (as indeed they are); and the solitary horseman on the horizon is so indistinctly seen as to complete the picture by the suggestion of a sail, raising the first feelings of novelty to a character of wonder and delight. the flowing outlines of the rolling prairies are broken only by the small lakes and patches of timber, which relieve them of monotony and enhance their beauty; and though marshes and sloughs occur, they are too small and infrequent to affect the generally attractive character of the country. the elevation of the rolling prairie is generally so uniform that even the summits between streams flowing in opposite directions exhibit no peculiar features to distinguish them from the ordinary valley slopes. wednesday, june 29. the advance parties crossed the river before seven o'clock, but the train was not started till eleven, so as to give the animals rest. the ford, very good for a small train, became very muddy towards the last, and though we unloaded all the wagons and carried the loads over in boats, the wagons and animals were badly stalled at the edges and on the soft and steep banks of the river. the country from the bois de sioux to the wild rice river is a broad, level prairie, covered with luxuriant grass eighteen inches high; the distance eleven miles, with occasional sloughs. the heat to-day was excessive, and the mosquitoes very annoying to men and animals. at four o'clock, profiting by our experience in crossing the bois de sioux, i sent mr. lander with a select force of axemen to cut timber to bridge the wild rice. the train came up slowly, the last wagons not reaching camp till midnight. thursday, june 30. part of the men were employed in carefully currying and washing the animals, and in catching fish; the remainder were detailed to build the bridge, which was completed by one p.m. it was made of heavy logs, filled in with cut willow-brush and mown grass. moved at two o'clock; in three miles came to a small creek, which was quite marshy, and caused delay to cross. moving a mile and a half farther we again struck the same stream, and encamped at half past four p.m. during our march we encountered a very severe storm, accompanied with thunder and lightning. boutineau brought in an elk, which furnished about two pounds of excellent fresh meat to each man, and was much enjoyed. kendall and the two boulieaus overtook us to-day, bringing supplies and five indian ponies. july 1. i determined to push forward with the engineer party to the sheyenne, and, if i found it necessary, have it bridged. smooth prairie extended all the way, road good, and the distance twenty-six and a half miles. a very severe thunderstorm occurred this morning, lasting an hour, and wetting us thoroughly. at eleven a.m. we met the train of the red river traders, and visited their camp, six miles distant. we were very hospitably received, purchased some pemmican, common moccasins, and articles of dress worked with porcupine quills. bought also some carts and oxen, being very deficient in transportation. the main train only proceeded thirteen miles, and i returned to them about three p.m., accompanied by kittson, father delacour, roulet, and cavilaer. kittson and roulet were members of the territorial legislature from pembina; cavilaer, the collector of customs; and delacour is a very clever, shrewd priest. they are on their annual trip to st. paul with robes, skins, pemmican, and dried meat of the buffalo, collected by trading with the half-breeds of the red river settlements. we found that they had bridged the sheyenne, saving us considerable trouble and delay. their company proved very agreeable, and we were glad that a heavy thunderstorm coming on obliged them to be our guests for the night. july 2. struck camp at seven o'clock and parted with our new friends, sending back with them strobel and two teamsters, who proved inefficient. the whole train crossed the sheyenne bridge safely by noon, and camped on the other side. we had apprehended that possibly the heavy rain of last night would swell the river and carry away the bridge, but hurrying up the wagons, we made the crossing just before the water had risen sufficiently to flow over the bridge. i called this camp mcclelland, intending to halt here over sunday and make up dispatches for washington. i sent lander and tinkham to reconnoitre both up and down the river. july 3, sunday. lander came back from his reconnoissance, having been as far south as dead colt hillock. he met with a singular adventure, which afforded us a great deal of amusement. riding along with his four voyageurs, whom he used to call his "men of iron," at some distance ahead they saw a skunk moving leisurely through the grass, with tail erect and defying their approach. lander leveled his glass at it, and, satisfying himself that it was an indian watching their movements and trying to hide himself, gave the order for his gallant band to "charge." they did charge, and at the same time firing their revolvers, the poor skunk fell, riddled with balls and weltering in his blood; when coming up, they discovered the extent of their bold exploit. joking in camp is one of the pastimes to relieve the annoyances of the march, and every little thing is seized upon to feed the disposition. fourth of july. the train started at six a.m. i remained behind to get off a mail. started about ten and followed the red river trail some twelve miles, when we left it altogether. crossed maple river, and camped on its banks. about dusk we raised the american flag, made of red and white shirts, contributed by the party and sewed together by boulieau. as it went up, the assembled command gave it three hearty cheers, and then indulged in some refreshments in honor of the day, ending the evening with songs and story-telling. july 5. traveled twenty miles over a high, firm, and almost level prairie, camping on a small branch of maple river without any wood near it. the pack-train requiring more attention and care of the animals than has been given by the man in charge, who does not take sufficient pains with the disabled animals, i to-day directed mr. kendall to oversee them and have them properly attended to. july 6. went twenty miles farther, making a noon halt of two hours, when mr. tinkham returned from a long and rapid reconnoissance ahead. prairie more rolling, but road good. a high butte to the left of our course enabled me to get a fine view of the surrounding country. two indians were seen by boutineau, who was out after buffalo, which he did not find; but abundance of ducks continue to supply the camp with fresh meat. july 7. about 8.30 we struck the sheyenne six miles from camp, and rested an hour. keeping the sheyenne on our left, we moved forward ten miles and camped about a mile and a half from the river on the banks of a fine lake. to-day le frambois and menoc killed an old buffalo bull, and also brought in some dozen geese. several of the messes supplied themselves with frogs, which have been most abundant on our march for the past two days. the whole command took supper off of buffalo, and the meat, though old and tough, tasted very good, and saved us an ox which had been destined for the slaughter. several antelopes and wolves were seen to-day. july 8. started this morning at 6.30, and arrived at the crossing of the sheyenne river after a march of fifteen miles. buttes in considerable number are seen ahead, among which the horse butte and the butte micheau are plainly visible. mr. tinkham, paul, and henry were out again to-day, making a reconnoissance on the sheyenne. we went into camp about one o'clock on the east and south side of the sheyenne, and a party was at once detailed to cut wood and prepare charcoal. the magnetic tent was put up, and the astronomical and meteorological parties went immediately to work. i called our camp camp guthrie, in honor of the secretary of the treasury, and determined to remain here all day to-morrow. boutineau and henry boulieau went out this afternoon, and returned with the choice pieces of a fine, fat, young buffalo bull, and we made a delightful meal, around the fire, of the ribs, marrow-bones, etc., cooked hunter's fashion. towards evening, on the coteau on the other side of the river, a herd of some twenty elks made their appearance. numerous wolves were also seen, which, during the night, kept up a constant howling. we planted flags on high hills in the vicinity as signals to lander, who may follow the sheyenne river to find our crossing-place. july 9. an accurate return was made of the provisions on hand, so as to regulate its weekly distribution. our flour is fast diminishing, and the issue was reduced to half a pound per day to each man. this state of affairs caused considerable grumbling in camp. we are fast approaching the buffalo country, and then shall be expected to do with much less. about 2.30 p.m. the main train under mr. osgood crossed the river, and moved forward to a good camping-place. the astronomical, magnetic, and meteorological parties, with the detail of three men attending to the coal-pit, and mr. evans and myself, remained at camp guthrie, intending to join them before they moved in the morning. july 10. after partaking of a cup of coffee at three o'clock, our little train, consisting of an ambulance and spring wagon with a cart loaded with charcoal, had crossed the sheyenne by sunrise. about seven o'clock we reached the main train, encamped some seven miles off. the train was preparing to move, and soon after we came up it started; at eight o'clock we followed and passed them. about five miles from camp we ascended to the top of a high hill, and for a great distance ahead every square mile seemed to have a herd of buffalo on it. their number was variously estimated by the members of the party, some as high as half a million. i do not think it is any exaggeration to set it down at 200,000. i had heard of the myriads of these animals inhabiting these plains, but i could not realize the truth of these accounts till to-day, when they surpassed anything i could have imagined from the accounts which i had received. the timber bordering on lake jessie was distinctly visible ahead, and between us and it were countless herds of buffalo, through which we were compelled to pass. the train moved on till eleven o'clock, when we all halted, drew up in line, and picketed the loose animals. six of the hunters, boutineau, menoc, le frambois, the two boulieaus, and rummell, were mounted upon the best horses in the command, some of which were specially reserved, and rode off in fine style, keeping together till ready to dash in among the herd. the immense sea of flesh remained quiet until their approach, and then, separating, they rode in among them, selected the fat cows, and, riding around until the proper time to do execution, the quick succession of shots announced the fact that our supplies of meat were fast being added to. in less than an hour a wagon was called into requisition to collect the choice pieces of nine buffalo cows. while we were resting, several small bands came within firing distance of our train. one or two dragoons on foot gave one a chase, but the buffalo, of course, distanced them. the most amusing scene was the dog zack, of the dragoon detachment, dashing into a whole herd, and following them a considerable distance. paul boulieau and rummell were both thrown by their horses stumbling in one of the numerous holes with which the prairie abounds. they were considerably, though not seriously, hurt. we arrived at lake jessie at three p.m., the bluff shore on which we encamped being sixty-four feet above the level of the lake. the water of lake jessie is considerably saline in its character; but about three quarters of a mile from camp, an excellent spring of good, fresh water was found by henry boulieau and myself while out on a reconnoitring trip. between one and two o'clock at night a herd of buffalo approached our camp, and it required all the exertions of the guard, assisted by many of the men, to prevent an entire stampede of all our animals. as it was, some got loose, though none were lost. the buffalo were followed a considerable distance, and some ten or a dozen shots were fired before the animals without were entirely driven off. july 11. having proceeded about four miles, a small band of buffalo started off ahead of us. le frambois's horse and four loose mules near the head of the column started in pursuit, the horse taking the lead. boutineau, le frambois, menoc, guy, lindner, and paul boulieau, all well mounted, gave chase in hopes of recovering them. by this time they had mixed up in the herd, and, though they were followed some twelve or fifteen miles, all efforts to secure them were unavailing. about a mile farther we encountered a very severe slough, the approach to which was marked by a very great curiosity in the form of a buffalo trail; at least 100,000 must have crossed here by the footprints and marks visible, and i determined on crossing the slough at the same point which the instinct of these animals had selected. july 12. in company with tinkham and some of the guides, i started from camp this morning at five o'clock, designing to be in advance of the train some miles, to reconnoitre and pick out a good road, our route lying over high hills. at about eight o'clock i sent off mr. tinkham, accompanied by the two boulieaus, well mounted, with instructions to go southward, determining the position of the headwaters of bald hillock creek, and thus connecting his work with mr. lander's reconnoissance; thence westward in a line nearly parallel with our route of to-day, making a reconnoissance of the tributaries of the jacques river (james), leaving it to his discretion whether to join our camp to-night or the next day. by this we would secure the reconnoissance of a belt of country forty miles wide, lying between the sheyenne and jacques (james) rivers. about eleven miles from camp we crossed a deep slough. about a mile farther on we crossed a fine little stream which i took to be beaver lodge creek. shortly afterwards boutineau killed a fine buffalo cow, not twenty feet from the compass line. the dispatch and dexterity with which these men cut up buffalo is truly astonishing. before the cart came up, the animal was entirely butchered, and had only to be thrown into the cart. we moved forward to-day some sixteen miles, and camped on the side of a small lake. we had scarcely got into camp before we were visited by a very severe storm, accompanied by thunder and lightning. our fires were put out by the rain, and during a temporary cessation were built up again; but it soon came on with increased violence, and our fires were again washed out. about six o'clock two of mr. lander's party who left us on the 4th arrived in camp, announcing that mr. lander and the rest of his men were only some three or four miles behind, with considerable difficulty bringing in the horses, which were giving out.[3] i dispatched two men with led horses to meet them, and about sundown they came up. we found great difficulty in keeping up our fires so as to get our supper cooked. the rain fell in torrents, our supply of wood was limited, and the buffalo chips were so wet as to be entirely useless. towards the close of the day's march i became disabled from my exertions in endeavoring to keep off a herd of buffalo from the train, causing an old wound to break out, which compelled me to ride many hundred miles in the ambulance. july 13. a very heavy fog this morning delayed our getting off as early as expected, and the hope of tinkham and his small party joining us made me less hurried about starting. sixteen miles from camp we struck james river, and crossed over a good ford, from which point i sent mr. lander down the river to examine it. noticing that the river ran very nearly in the course of our compass, we followed it, and again crossing it some five miles above, we encamped. i had a large amount of rushes collected, with a view of building as large a camp-fire as practicable, in order to give notice to tinkham of our position, he not having returned. july 14. the missing party not having arrived, three rounds of the howitzer were fired at sunrise, and we started later than usual. it was evident that the whole camp was in a great state of anxiety for the safety of our comrades. many believed that they had fallen in with indians, and were deprived of their horses and their lives. taking everything into consideration, i deemed it best to leave a party at this point so equipped as to combine great energy and force with promptness of movement, so as to be able to overtake the main train without difficulty. accordingly mr. lander was left in charge of the engineer wagon and the wagon belonging to the mountain howitzer, which was made light enough to be moved with ease forty miles in a single day. the howitzer was also left with him for the purpose of making signals. mr. doty, with three voyageurs and three men to manage the howitzer, together with the teamsters of the ammunition wagon, remained with mr. lander, having abundance of arms, provisions, animals, etc., to supply any emergency. this party was instructed to keep up fires, to fire three rounds with the howitzer at noon and at sunset should the party not arrive, and to communicate with us if any casualty occurred. a party of four brave and thorough woodsmen, whose knowledge of the prairie life was derived from experience in many expeditions, and who well understood the indian character, were sent out on the route traveled yesterday, and were directed, after traveling some eight or ten miles, to leave the road, and, going in different directions, to plant signals and scour the country. i felt certain that mr. tinkham would be found by these men, if found at all. the remainder of the train left about seven o'clock, pursuing the same course as yesterday. the first ten miles was over a level plateau. we encamped about 4.30 o'clock at the bank of a fine lake, having made to-day a distance of little over twenty miles. the mosquitoes were exceedingly annoying, flying against the sides of the tents with a noise like the pattering of rain, while the inside was perfectly black with them. their constant humming drove the men out into the open air, and rendered it almost impossible to sleep. july 15. at daybreak broadwell went back to lander's camp, and i dispatched osgood and kendall to a high hill to reconnoitre and look for a new camp. the guides and hunters were also sent on to the sheyenne to ascertain the distance, and if not too far we would go to it. being very unwell, i laid by all the morning, and the delay of the train was employed in shoeing the animals, equalizing loads, and arranging them in such a manner as to give about nine hundred pounds to each wagon, and so distributed in bulk that a portion of each wagon could be appropriated to the conveyance of wood and the meat killed each day. the men are much interested in the labors of dr. suckley, the naturalist. it is amusing to see each one making his contribution of snakes, reptiles, birds, bugs, etc. near noon osgood and his party returned, having been to the sheyenne, where they found no wood, poor grass, and swarms of mosquitoes. soon after the guides returned, announcing that they had seen a party of sioux of a thousand lodges, not more than nine miles in advance of us. boutineau's manner was full of fear, and his public announcement spread alarm through the whole camp. i at once gave orders to make ready, with the intention of visiting their camp; and, calling boutineau to my tent, asked him whether they were not the red river hunting party. he assured me indignantly that "he knew half-breeds from indians, and that they were certainly sioux." i suggested that they might be friendly sioux, who, being engaged in the hunt and hearing of our approach, were coming forward to meet us, to receive the usual presents and gratify their curiosity. he still insisted that they were hostile sioux, and saw in their presence the explanation of the cause of the absence of the missing party. we were, in his opinion, to be surrounded and cut off. after dinner, as the alarm was spreading throughout the command, the arms were inspected and ammunition distributed, and orders given to have the train in readiness to move at once. i sent boutineau, le frambois, and menoc to the top of a high ridge as a lookout, while a flag was prepared to be sent forward if necessary. word soon came that the country was alive with indians, who were fast surrounding us; and i sent scouts to hills on the right and left, having the lake to protect our rear. mounting my horse, i rode to the hill in front, and saw two horsemen rapidly approaching. our flag-bearers rode forward to meet them, and soon discovered that they were two of the red river hunters, and that their camp was three miles beyond the sheyenne. having discerned our party, they came to invite us to visit them, and expressed their kindly feelings for us. the train, which before this was in motion, arranged in a double line, with the pack and loose animals between, proceeded two miles, where there was better water, and encamped. the agreeable disappointment established a fine feeling throughout camp; and, half an hour after, boulieau and lindner arrived in camp with news of tinkham's safety, which was received with three cheers. the men to-day showed a good spirit, and although there was naturally some anxiety, they obeyed every order with alacrity. thus ended the apprehensions of the command concerning indians. red river hunters. july 16. awaited the coming up of the back parties, and during the morning tinkham arrived and was received with nine cheers, being followed soon after by the rest of the rear guard. about two p.m. the whole red river train came in sight, and as they approached, fired a succession of volleys of firearms as a salute, which we returned with three rounds from the howitzer. the train consisted of 824 carts, about 1200 animals, and 1300 persons, men, women, and children, the whole presenting a very fine appearance. they encamped near by, and the close yard which they formed presented quite a contrast to the open camp adopted by us. they made a circular or square yard of the carts, placed side by side, with the hubs adjoining, presenting a barrier impassable either to man or beast. the tents or lodges were arranged within at a distance of about twenty feet from the carts, and were of a conical shape, built of poles covered with skins, with an opening at the top for the passage of smoke and for ventilation. they were one hundred and four in number, being occupied generally by two families, averaging about ten persons to the lodge. skins were spread over the tops of the carts, and underneath many of the train found comfortable lodging-places. the animals were allowed to run loose during the day to feed, but were driven into the corral at dark. thirty-six of the men were posted as sentinels, remaining on guard all night. we had but twelve guards, three reliefs, not more than four men being on guard at one time. as our camps were only about two hundred yards apart, there was much visiting between them. i was struck with the good conduct and hospitable kindness of these people. a small band of prairie chippewa indians, who accompanied this party, visited our camp during the evening, and entertained us with one of their national dances. i was much pleased with governor wilkie, who is the head of the expedition. he is a man about sixty years of age, of fine appearance and pleasant manners. this party are residents of pembina and its vicinity. when at home they are engaged in agriculture, raising wheat, corn, potatoes, and barley. the land yields about twenty-five bushels of wheat to the acre, their farms averaging about fifteen acres each. they are industrious and frugal in their habits, and are mostly of the romish persuasion, leading a virtuous and pious life. they are generally accompanied by their priests, and attend strictly to their devotions, having exercises every sabbath, on which day they neither march nor hunt. their municipal government is of a parochial character, being divided into five parishes, each one presided over by an officer called the captain of the parish. on departing for the hunt, they select a man from the whole number, who is styled governor of the hunt, who takes charge of the party, regulates its movements, acts as referee in all cases where any differences arise between the members in regard to game or other matters, and takes command in case of difficulty with the indians. in the early part of the year, till the middle of june, these people work at agriculture, when they set out on their first hunt, leaving some thirty at the settlements in charge of their farms, houses, stock, etc. they start out to the southward in search after buffalo, taking with them their families, carts, and animals. these carts, when loaded, contain about eight hundred pounds, and are used in common. there were three hundred and thirty-six men in the present train, of whom three hundred were hunters. each hunt, of which there are two every year, continues about two months, the first starting in june, the second about the middle of october. their carts were already half full, and they expected to return to their homes in the latter part of august. on their first trip the buffalo are hunted for the purpose of procuring pemmican, dried meat, tongues, etc.; the skins, being useless for robes, are dressed for lodge-skins, moccasins, etc. in october the meat is still better and fatter, and they procure a like quantity of dried meat, reserving sufficient for a year's provisions, which is about one half of the whole amount procured; they dispose of the rest at the trading-posts of the hudson bay company. the meat which they carry home finds its way, through the red river traders of the fur company, to fort snelling, where it is exchanged for goods, sugar, coffee, etc., at the rate of fifteen cents a pound. the trade of this country is all in dry-goods, sugar, tea, ammunition, etc. notes are also issued by the hudson bay company, which are currency among them. several of these, of the denomination of five shillings, payable at york factory and bearing the signature of sir george simpson, were offered in change to various members of the expedition on purchasing articles. the skins collected in the summer hunt are usually retained by the hunters for their own use, while the robes collected in the fall hunt are a staple of trade with the fur company, and also with the hudson bay company, which latter company do a large business in this portion of the country, supplying the settlers with most of their clothes, groceries, etc. the red river settlements are made up of a population of half-breeds, traders of the hudson bay and fur companies, discharged employees of these companies, and indians, representatives of every nation of europe,--scotch, irish, english, canadians,--and speaking a jargon made up of these dialects, intermingled with chippewa and sioux, patois french being the prevailing tongue. these settlements, started some twenty-five years since, now number, in the vicinity of pembina mountain, some four thousand people. the men are generally much finer looking than the women. on the latter depend all the drudgery of camp duties, pitching the tents, attending to animals, cooking, etc. the men dress usually in woolens of various colors. the coat generally worn, called the hudson bay coat, has a capote attached to it. the belts are finely knit, of differently colored wool or worsted yarn, and are worn after the manner of sashes. their powder-horn and shot-bag, attached to bands finely embroidered with beads or worked with porcupine quills, are worn across each shoulder, making an x before and behind. many also have a tobacco-pouch strung to their sashes, in which is tobacco mixed with kinnickinnick (dried bark of the osier willow scraped fine), a fire-steel, punk, and several flints. add to these paraphernalia a gun, and a good idea will be formed of the costume of the red river hunter. the women are industrious, dress in gaudy calicoes, are fond of beads and finery, and are remarkably apt at making bead-work, moccasins, and sewing. we purchased from the train a supply of pemmican, dried meat, sugar, and other things, some of the men buying moccasins, whips, and other necessaries. i engaged the services of alexis le bombard, who was in company with this encampment, as guide to the yellowstone. he came from the yellowstone this season, and the impression gathered from my interview with him, as well as the representations of others, satisfied me that he will be extremely valuable as a guide. july 18. started a few minutes before seven, still following the trail of the red river train. about eight o'clock we crossed a branch of the sheyenne, flowing through a deep valley with an extended plateau, bounded on both sides by the high coteau. this stream appears to take its rise in a number of small lakes, and the branch crossed this morning is slightly brackish. many of the lakes are very salt. these appear to have no outlet, and their saline qualities are accounted for by the fact that they are never washed out, and consequently retain the salt deposits and incrustations. we often notice in this region lakes lying very close to each other, in some cases not more than twenty yards apart; one will be so saline as to be offensive, while the water of the other will be excellent to the taste. we passed to-day a narrow lake, some three miles in length, somewhat resembling a canal. it lay at the foot of a high hill, called the butte de morale. here occurred an engagement between some half-breeds and sioux, in which one of the former, by the name of morale, was killed; hence its name. the altitude of this butte, as determined by barometric measurement, is 281.8 feet above the level of the sheyenne river. our way was strewn with the carcasses of many buffaloes killed by the red river hunting party. at times the air was very much tainted. one of our men reported having ridden through a section of land, a quarter of a mile square, on which were strewn the remains of some three hundred buffaloes. in killing these animals, only the choice bits and hides are taken, and the remainder is left as a prey to wolves, or to rot on the ground. we had wood to-day, for the first time since leaving lake jessie, our fuel in the mean time consisting of greasewood and buffalo chips. the sight of a camp-fire of wood is quite a treat to us. our camp is beautifully located on a range of hills, nearly surrounded with salt lakes, called the white wood lakes. an excellent spring near by furnishes us an abundant supply of cold, fresh water. the odometer line measured to-day was twenty and a half miles. that pursued by the train was probably two miles longer. july 19. our course lay over a level country. after proceeding ten miles we crossed a branch of the sheyenne river, at this time very shallow, but the high banks on each side, together with the grass and deposits, gave evidence of its size during the freshets in the spring. after traveling sixteen and one half miles, we encamped near a small lake in sight of the maison du chien, which by bearings and calculation mr. tinkham estimated to be about twenty-one miles distant. we passed on the march several salt-marshes abounding with tadpoles, from which the effluvia was very offensive. in some places the ground was covered with deposits of salt to the depth of a quarter of an inch. i am much pleased with our new guide, le bombard, who appears to have a very accurate knowledge of the country, although his ideas of distance are not found to be very reliable, which is generally the case with voyageurs. july 20. fitted out lander's party, consisting of himself, le frambois, guy, and rummell, to make a reconnoissance of butte maison du chien and the coteau du missouri, to connect our work with lieutenant grover's survey, and join us on the mouse river in four days. we moved off about half past six, and after traveling five miles reached the first tributary of the mouse river. the crossing occupied nearly three hours, the water being shoulder deep; half the wagon-loads were removed and carried across in the india-rubber boat. the road was generally very good, passing over a level prairie intersected with lakes and sloughs. about twelve miles from camp we struck a beautiful ridge, resembling a railroad embankment, which lay directly in our compass course; on the top of this the train moved for some miles. we passed around the first coulee of the mouse river, and after a march of some seventeen miles (odometer measurement, 15.7), encamped on the bank of a small lake. july 21. left camp at six a.m. it commenced raining about nine, and lasted an hour or more. about eight miles from camp we saw the tracks of grover's train in a slough, by which we judged that he had passed some days previous. soon after this we crossed one of the coulees making into mouse river. these coulees are very severe on the animals, in some places being very steep. we traveled to-day sixteen miles. our camp is located on the top of a ridge, which descends into a coulee. we are about one hundred and fifty feet above the valley of mouse river. there is plenty of timber in the coulee which we are to cross to-morrow in starting. july 22. left camp about 6.30 o'clock, and found the crossing of the coulee, about half a mile to our left. on the other side of the coulee we have a fine level plateau ahead. the grand coteau du missouri was in sight all day. the depth of the first coulee, as indicated by the barometer, was eighty-two feet below our camp. about four miles out we crossed another severe coulee one hundred and eight feet below the level of our camp. the third coulee was a depression of fifty-four feet, the prairie level being some forty-two feet lower than the level of our last camp. while making our usual midday halt we were overtaken by two hunters of the red river train from the vicinity of the selkirk settlements, who were encamped some eight miles distant. they invited me to visit them, which i determined upon doing, and, placing the train in charge of dr. suckley, i gave him directions to move on some eight miles, find a good camping place, and await my return. july 23. during my absence this morning dr. suckley sent le bombard and sergeant lindner ahead some twelve miles to reconnoitre for a good road for the train; messrs. tinkham and burr went to the mouse river, and mr. moffett, accompanied by broadwell, went to the grand coteau. i sent guy and rummell ahead to dr. suckley's camp to apprise him of our coming. at about four o'clock, accompanied by governor de l'orme and seven of his principal men, we started towards dr. suckley's camp. the whole force of the survey, headed by dr. suckley, sergeant lindner bearing an american flag, met us about a mile out of camp, and saluted us with a volley from their guns, the mountain howitzer being fired three times. a large tent was put up for the accommodation of our guests, and governor de l'orme was invited to share my tent. the guard tent was made use of as a banqueting-room, and several of the men were detailed to collect buffalo chips. the cooks of the various messes assisted each other, and the meal was ready for us about nine o'clock. tinkham and burr got in just in time to partake of it with us, as also did moffett and broadwell. mr. moffett reported the height of the bluff or coteau range as seven hundred and two feet above the level of mouse river, and distant twenty miles from it; the height of the hill seven miles from the camp of to-day is two hundred and fifty-six feet. seated around the camp-fire, we had a very pleasant conference with our friends. i was very favorably impressed with governor de l'orme, and with his opinion in regard to their right to hunt on our territory, they being residents of the country north of our boundary line. they claim the protection of both governments, and the doubt as to the position of the boundary line makes them ignorant as to which one they have the most claim upon. during the hunting season they carry with them their families and their property, and they consider that this territory is open to them, that the right to hunt on it belongs to them, and that their children born during this transit over our soil possess the heritage of american citizens. with but little care, our government could obtain the whole of these people as citizens, thus protecting and building up our frontier, and having in this vicinity always a controlling check upon the indians. already is the salutary effect of their presence visible in the entire safety, now, with which single white men and small parties can go through this country. their virtuous mode of life, their industry and frugality, their adaptation to frontier life, all combine to render them a valuable class of people, and well worthy the attention of our government. they expressed a desire that i should represent these things to the government, and i assured them that i would do so with pleasure. governor de l'orme, before retiring to rest, attended to his devotions, and i have been struck with his piety and real goodness, manifested in his conduct and conversation. july 24. we took a late breakfast this morning, and after parting with our guests we got off at nine a.m. we halted for two hours at noon, during which time the hunters went out and drove a herd of buffalo towards us, and right on the line killed two fine cows. i sent mr. tinkham and paul boulieau out to the mouse river, which they followed some distance, as also the river of the lakes, joining us at camp at eight p.m. we made fifteen miles and a quarter to-day, and the grazing is excellent. july 25. the express started this morning at six for fort union, which i think cannot be over one hundred and fifty miles distant. it consists of mr. osgood, boutineau, henry boulieau, and gray. they are to procure additional wagons or carts at fort union, and carry letters to lieutenants grover and donelson. messrs. tinkham, lander, and paul boulieau went to-day to make an examination of the mouse river valley and the river of the lakes. we had but one coulee to cross, and that was shallow, and offered no impediment. we made to-day twenty-one miles, and found fine grass and excellent water at our camp. july 26. we started this morning about six o'clock, and, traveling eleven and one half miles, we halted on the bank of a lake. a herd of buffalo approached on the south side of this lake to drink, and crossed within gunshot on the opposite side. some of our party fired at them, and le bombard followed, and killed a fine, fat cow. about seven miles farther on i received a letter from mr. osgood by the hands of an assiniboine indian. the express party camped last night about ten miles ahead of this place at a large encampment of assiniboine indians, numbering some one hundred and fifty lodges and twelve hundred persons. the indians built for them a lodge in the centre of their camp, and treated them with great hospitality. one of them offered to act as mr. osgood's express, and he told them that on my arrival i would have a talk with them and make them some presents. by this note i also learned that lieutenant grover had passed some eight miles to the east of our line about four days ago. july 27. reaching camp a little after noon, fifteen miles from last night's camp, and about a quarter of a mile from that of the assiniboines, numbers of indians rode out to welcome us. we found them to be under the command of the chiefs blue thunder and little thunder, the latter probably thirty-six years of age. as soon as we were encamped, they informed me that they had reserved a present of skins for me, and were making preparations to have a talk. while dinner was being prepared, many seated themselves in squads around the tents, smoking with the men. one large pipe served a dozen, and the custom adopted is to smoke it a little and pass it to their neighbor, and thus go round. it is the first signal of welcome or friendship after the hand is offered, and they will have no business or other transaction previous to it. after dinner, accompanied by dr. suckley, messrs. stanley, lander, tinkham, everett, evans, adams, menoc, with paul boulieau, le bombard, and le frambois as interpreters, i went to their camp, which was irregularly arranged in a sort of corral, consisting of about one hundred and fifty lodges, averaging ten persons to each lodge. our approach was hailed by the barking of an immense number of dogs. these dogs are a prominent feature in every indian camp, being used for drawing lodges, provisions, and property from place to place,--indeed, furnishing the entire transportation of the indians in winter. a sledge drawn by four dogs will carry two hundred pounds over the snow with great ease. they appeared also to be abundantly supplied with horses, many of which were of good quality. all the women and children turned out of the lodges as we passed, curious to see us. frames of poles stood around, upon which skins and meat were drying. yet, in spite of the appearance of plenty, all had a look of poverty, judging from the meagreness of clothing and the length of time it appeared to have been worn, while all appeared very filthy and miserable. a very large lodge, about fifty feet in diameter, had been erected for our reception in the centre of the inclosure, within which we found seated two circles of chiefs, braves, warriors, and others. at the back of the lodge was arranged a long seat for us, consisting of a pile of skins, which were afterwards presented to me. there were about eighty persons present, including our own party. during the preparation for the ceremonial reception, there was a general smoking among all present, during which an old man, one of the dignitaries of the tribe, prepared the pipe of reception, only smoked on great occasions. the stem was decked with ribbons of various colors, and when it stood obliquely, feathers would drop down like the wing of a bird. at the lower end of this pipe, where it enters the bowl, was a duck's head. the pipe-stem was supported against a small stick stuck in the ground and crotched at the end. the pipe was turned towards the sun, the invariable practice in such cases. some sweet grass, platted, was then set on fire and used in the manner of incense, both to the bowl and the stem. after lighting the pipe with the scented grass, it was planted near by in a small hole and burned. during the smoking the bearer of the pipe shook hands with each member of our party, handing the pipe after this ceremony was over. then a bowl of water was handed around by a second individual, who also shook hands with each one of us before we drank of the contents of the bowl. next came the eating of soup, made of buffalo and typsina, a species of turnip, which was rich and greasy but quite palatable. soon after this ceremony, which completed the reception, an old man advanced to me and shook hands, after which he shook the hand of each member of our company. his appearance was much in his favor, carrying himself with great dignity. with considerable fluency, and at times with many gestures, he addressed me substantially as follows: "my father, you see us now as we are. we are poor. we have but few blankets and little clothing. the great father of life, who made us and gave us these lands to live upon, made the buffalo and other game to afford us subsistence; their meat is our only food; with their skins we clothe ourselves and build our lodges. they are our only means of life, food, fuel, and clothing. but i fear we shall soon be deprived of these; starvation and cold will destroy us. the buffalo are fast disappearing, and before many years will be destroyed. as the white man advances, our means of life will grow less. we will soon have to seek protection in our poverty from the great father, who can so well supply it. "my father, we hear that a great road is to be made through our country. we do not know what this is for, we do not understand it, but we think it will drive away the buffalo. we like to see our white brothers; we like to give them the hand of friendship; but we know that, as they come, our game goes back. what are we to do?" after shaking hands with all of us he sat down, and after a short interval of silence the chief, through his interpreter, signified a desire to hear me reply. i explained that the road to be made from the mississippi to the pacific would not injure the indians, nor deprive them of comforts; that whites would settle along the line, and, though they would drive off the buffalo, they would also supply other articles in place of them. they would receive from the president implements of agriculture, and learn to till the soil, so as to obtain food with less labor than now. i told them that i would go through the lands of the blackfeet and other indians beyond the yellowstone, carrying the friendly messages of the great father, and insisting on peace among all, to secure the safety of the whites. my remarks seemed to make a very favorable impression, and were received with every mark of respect. their approbation was shown, as each paragraph was interpreted, by the ejaculation "how!" a common word, answering every purpose of salutation, approval, or concurrence. the present they gave me consisted of thirty-two dressed skins and two robes. we spent about half an hour in going around among the various lodges, and then returned to our camp, being followed by the whole encampment. during the time we were engaged in inspecting their camp, they became aware of the profession of dr. suckley, and there was scarcely a lodge that did not contain some patient for his medical attention. the doctor vaccinated some eight or nine, and through le frambois explained its object. it was near dusk when the party arrived at our camp and were arranged to receive their presents. they were seated around in the form of three sides of a square, the open side being opposite the places occupied by our party, the chief, and higher order of the indians. at each of the four corners was posted a brave or chief. these men never receive a gift, considering it a degradation to receive anything but what their own prowess acquires for them. their hearts are so good and strong that they scorn to take anything, and self-denial and the power to resist temptation to luxury, or easily acquired property, is a boast with them. on these men in time of peace, when difficulties occur among themselves, the tribe relies, and in time of war they are their leaders to the scene of action. to two old men of the tribe was assigned the duty of making the distribution, and the presents were placed in the centre of the area. during the whole distribution the indians sat in perfect silence. all seemed satisfied with the articles they received, and not a grumble escaped one of them. after this was over they returned to their camp, the chiefs and braves remaining. at half past eight we had a collation of coffee and bread in our mess tent, and remained till a late hour, smoking and conversing. soon after this our friends left, myself and the interpreters escorting them outside the sentinels. i was much pleased with these indians, and they seemed to be very favorably inclined towards the whites, and sincere in their professions of friendship. nothing to-day of the slightest value has been missed, as far as i can learn. july 28. it was very late this morning before we started, being occupied in fitting out a party, consisting of mr. lander, dr. suckley, mr. burr, and corporal rummell, with instructions to strike the pierced rock on mouse river, and make a careful examination for coal and iron. they were to explore the white earth river, examine the coteau du missouri, and, reaching the 49th parallel, make a detour to the northwest, and arrive at the yellowstone in some three or four days. four days later, on august 1, after a march of eighty miles along the mouse river and the river of the lakes, they reached fort union. as the broad missouri and its beautiful bluff banks dotted with timber came into view, the whole party gave three cheers. lieutenants donelson and grover, who had already arrived at the fort, and mr. denig, the trader in charge, came out to meet them. the governor mounted his horse, for the first time since the false alarm about the sioux, and received them with a salute of a volley of small-arms, which was answered by thirteen guns from the fort. news was brought of the death of sapper white, of donelson's party, by the accidental discharge of a gun in his own hands. camp was soon pitched, and the whole party assembled at the governor's tent. "i congratulated them on the zealous performance of their duty, gave them a cordial invitation to go on, and whatever their determination, even should they leave us here, promised them an honorable discharge. all seemed desirous of going on, and not one availed himself of the opportunity to leave the expedition. "by the great vigilance exercised on the march, the animals had been constantly improving, gaining flesh and becoming cured of sores, so that, though we started from the mississippi with forty disabled animals, all but one were serviceable on our arrival at fort union. "the whole distance from st. paul to fort union is by odometer measurement 715.5 miles, and we had accomplished it in 55 days, and, excluding halts from time to time, in 48 traveling days. the rate of traveling was therefore about 15 miles a day, most of the way over a country almost unknown, without roads, and with such an imperfect knowledge of the distances to be made between camps as to cramp our movements much more than if the route had been measured and itineraries constructed for our use." footnotes: [3] lander, it seems, was an inveterate horse-killer, and almost always returned from his trips with his animal badly used up. buffalo chips are the dried dung frequently used on the plains as a substitute for fuel where there is no wood. chapter xviii fort union to fort benton "fort union is situated on the eastern bank of the missouri, about two miles and three quarters above the mouth of the yellowstone. it was built by the american fur company in 1830, and has from that time been the principal depot of that company. it is framed of pickets of hewn timber, about sixteen feet high, and has two bastions, one at the northwest and one at the southeast corner. the main or front entrance is on the side opposite the river. the fort is 250 feet square. the main buildings, comprising the residence of the superintendent and the store, are on the front or eastern side. they are two stories high, and built of wood. the shops and dwellings of the blacksmith, the gunsmith, the carpenter, the shoemaker, the tailor, and others are of adobe or of wood, and occupy the other sides. these mechanics are mostly french half-breeds, and have half-breed or indian wives and many children. there is a grassy plain around the fort, extending to the base of the rising ground, which is a full mile distant on the eastern side. the assiniboines, the gros ventres, the crows, and other migratory bands of indians trade at this fort, exchanging the skins of the buffalo, deer, and other animals for such commodities as they require. mr. culbertson, who has occupied the position of chief agent of the company during the past twenty years, has under his supervision not only fort union, but forts pierre and benton also. he is a man of great energy, intelligence, and fidelity, and possesses the entire confidence of the indians. his wife, a full-blooded indian of the blood band of the blackfoot tribe, is also deservedly held in high estimation. though she appears to have made little or no progress in our language, she has acquired the manners and adapted herself to the usages of the white race with singular facility. their children have been sent to the states to be educated in our best schools." fort union was long since abandoned. agreeably to instructions, mr. culbertson, immediately on reaching fort union, dispatched expresses to the chiefs of the blackfoot nation with presents of tobacco and goods, and governor stevens's message:- "i desire to meet you on the way, and assure you of the fatherly care and beneficence of the government. i wish to meet the blackfeet in a general council at fort benton. do not make war upon your neighbors. remain at peace, and the great father will see that you do not lose by it." the blackfeet at this time numbered 12,000, divided into four great bands,--blackfeet proper, bloods, piegans, and gros ventres. pressing down from the north over a century before, they drove back the crows, shoshones, and flatheads, and took possession of all the country about the headwaters of the missouri from above the boundary line to the yellowstone, and from the rocky mountains eastward to fort union. true ishmaelites, they waged perpetual war upon all other tribes, and cherished special and inveterate hostility against the whites ever since one of their number was slain by captain lewis, of lewis and clark's expedition, in 1807. they suffered, indeed, two rival trading-posts on the upper missouri, three hundred miles above fort union, namely, fort benton and fort campbell, for it was indispensable for them to exchange their peltries for arms, ammunition, blankets, and goods; but the traders never dared admit them within the forts. war was their sole business, the only means by which the young braves acquired influence, gained wealth, and found favor in the eyes of the maidens. their war parties invariably started out on foot, each warrior trailing a long lariat, and bearing a bundle of moccasins with rawhide soles. it was a point of honor never to return unless mounted, and war parties were sometimes absent over a year before they succeeded in capturing their steeds. penetrating thus on foot from three hundred to a thousand miles into the country of their foes, they would patiently lurk in the mountains, or some hidden resort, until an opportunity offered, when, running off the horses, and perhaps lifting a few scalps, they would retreat home at full speed, mounted and triumphant. thus they raided the crows and assiniboines on the east and south, the shoshones, snakes, and flatheads on the west, and even beset the emigrant trail of the platte and south pass, eight hundred miles distant; and many a lonely trapper and emigrant had fallen victim to their cunning and ferocity. yet the chiefs and elders plainly saw that this incessant warfare was slowly but surely cutting off their warriors in detail, and threatened the ultimate extinction of the tribe, and were not unwilling to relinquish it for a more peaceful mode of life, but ever found it impossible to restrain the young braves. with these powerful and intractable savages governor stevens undertook to make a lasting peace, not only between them and the whites, but also between them and their hereditary enemies, the other indian tribes. he early realized that the establishment of peace and the cessation of blackfoot war parties were indispensable to the exploration and settlement of the country, and the passage of emigrants through it, and characteristically set to work to effect it, without waiting for orders. he took every opportunity to meet and confer with the chiefs and parties of the blackfeet, urging them to make peace, and proposing a great council for the next year, at which they and the whites and the other indian tribes were to meet together and unite in bonds of lasting friendship. from fort benton the governor reported his views and action to the government, and in the strongest manner recommended the holding of the council. he sent mr. culbertson expressly to carry his report to washington, and impress his policy upon the government. it is remarkable how governor stevens, although eminently loyal and subordinate to authority, always impressed his own views upon the government, and caused them to be adopted, instead of waiting for instructions to be given him. with his sagacious foresight and ardent patriotism, he was quick to discern needed measures, which always appeared to him as duties to be undertaken, and moreover he had such courage and force of character that he never hesitated to take the responsibility of any action that he deemed necessary for the public welfare. thus far the expedition had met with most gratifying success. lieutenant donelson made a satisfactory examination of the missouri to a point one hundred and twenty-five miles above fort union, and an extended reconnoissance of the country north of that point. the main party surveyed two routes westward from pike lake, and ascertained the topographical features on both flanks for a wide scope, while lander, during the stay at fort union, examined the mouse river country northward to the 49th parallel. dr. evans was at work geologizing in the bad lands on the other side of the missouri. the force was now hardened to field work and in fine spirits, and the animals were toughened, thoroughly broken, and in fine condition. "from the 2d to the 9th of august we were closely occupied in preparing for the continuation of the survey. the men were engaged in making pembina carts, and additional transportation was purchased of the fur companies. our experience thus far had shown how well adapted ox-trains were to transportation, and accordingly two additional teams were added at fort union. in all these arrangements both the fur companies zealously coã¶perated, placing at my disposal not only all the animals they could spare, but guides, hunters, and their information in regard to the country. we were much pleased and benefited by the good offices of the indian women at the two posts, the wives of the officers, who fitted us out with a good assortment of moccasins, gloves, and other guards against the severity of the weather in the fall and winter. "the voyageurs belonging to the fur companies' posts thought it a good practical joke to spread bugbear stories about the immense snows to be expected early in the season, and many of the men got to believe that they would find snow knee-deep before they reached fort benton, and that it would be twenty feet deep in the passes of the rocky mountains in october, and the men became exceedingly alarmed. fortunately i had with me some books of travel in that country, particularly de smet's 'oregon missions,' and had carefully investigated the climates of the country west of the rocky mountains. mr. culbertson and the officers of the companies also gave me reliable information in reference to the lightness and lateness of the snow this side of the mountains, and therefore little difficulty was found in satisfying the men that they had been trifled with in this matter." advancing the expedition westward again in two parties under lieutenants grover and donelson on the 9th of august, the governor, to quote from his final report, started on the 10th from fort union at about twelve o'clock, followed by a war party of the blackfeet, consisting of twenty blood indians and forty piegan indians, who arrived at fort union on the 8th on a visit to my party, and with whom i had had the most friendly interchange of civilities. i desired their company for two or three days in order to impress them fully with the beneficent policy of our government towards the indians, and with the peaceable character of my own duties and objects, intending then to dispatch them on their way to their several tribes, and to make generally known to the blackfoot nation our objects in passing through their country. i camped that evening with lieutenant grover on the little muddy river, when, towards night, a serious difficulty came near happening between them and our party. mr. culbertson and myself, however, succeeded in arranging the matter, and we spent a most interesting evening with the principal men in conversing about the blackfeet and the indian policy of our government. on this occasion i presented the subject of a general council to be held at fort benton the ensuing year, to make peace between the blackfoot indians and the hunting tribes west of the mountains, and to preserve peace with the white children of the great father. on this as on previous occasions, mrs. culbertson, a native of the blood tribe of the blackfeet, was unwearied and efficient in her good offices. the next day we reached the big muddy river. the crossing was at a difficult ford, and we were all highly gratified at the zeal and efficiency of one of the blackfeet, who pulled as steadily at the rope as any man of my party. before leaving the big muddy i had a long conversation with the white man's horse, the chief of the war party of blackfeet. he had frequently visited the bitter root valley, and stolen horses from the flatheads. he observed, "i take the first flathead horse i come to; it is sure to be a good one." he and one of his men had just returned from the flathead country, and they gave a very favorable description of the route, assuring me, pointing to my wagons and pembina carts, that there would be no difficulty in taking them through the mountains. the country between fort union and this point is broken and rolling, with occasional formations of the _mauvaise terre_ and outcroppings of sandstone. on the big muddy there is quite a large and open valley of a very good soil and excellent grass, with a very heavy growth of cottonwood near its junction with the missouri. on starting from the big muddy on the 14th of august, the command was in most excellent condition and spirits. two of the mule teams were strengthened by an additional pair of mules, and the wagons were somewhat overloaded; for i determined to take nearly all my provisions along, so there should be no possibility of suffering for want of food, even though the depot of provisions in the bitter root valley had not been established by lieutenant saxton. we made eleven and a half miles, and encamped at a most beautiful point in the midst of luxuriant grass. the day was very sultry, some rain fell, and one ox died from the heat. august 15. excellent road all day. crossed poplar river and encamped on the west side, distance eighteen miles. i now felt the importance of renovating my health in order to prepare for the mountain work. it had been my custom thus far to continue at work till midnight, and to be up with the first in the morning. august, 16. the road to-day was over the level river-bottom of the missouri. timber in sight all day, the route running through timber for about a mile. reached a camp where there was excellent water, grass, and abundance of timber at five o'clock, making twenty three and two thirds miles. i issued this evening an order directing every person in the expedition, so far as it was consistent with his duties, to walk a portion of the way each day; for in approaching the mountains my effort was that the animals should be increasing rather than diminishing in flesh, and our experience had taught us that, by care in all these particulars, long marches could be made and the animals improved each day. august 17. made fifteen miles to-day, and camped on the missouri at two o'clock. the road was over the level river-bottom. much side work has been done since leaving the big muddy by lieutenant grover, mr. lander, and mr. tinkham, and the meteorological observations have been as numerous as they were on the route up to fort union. we organized to-day a day guard for the care of the animals, the object being to keep them in the best grazing without picketing as long as possible. august 18. passed through to-day villages of prairie dogs. crossed the porcupine river about five miles from camp. encamped on milk river, sixteen miles being the day's march. here we determined to remain a day to prepare charcoal for the blacksmith, and to make observations for the geographical position of its mouth, which is considered a very important point in the survey. our camp was surrounded by a large grove of cottonwood, and near it was a delightful spring of water. the valley of milk river is wide and open, with a heavy growth of cottonwood as far as the eye can reach, which is also to be found along the adjacent shores of the missouri. at this camp, which i named camp atchison, in honor of the acting vice-president, i reduced to writing, and issued in an order, the instructions for the government of the expedition and the distribution of duties, under which we had been moving by my verbal instructions from the big muddy river. i availed myself of this opportunity to express my sense of the services of the several members of my party. on the 19th there was some little alarm in camp in consequence of false reports about the vicinity of a war party of blackfeet. we left camp atchison on the 20th, and after moving fifteen miles reached a very pleasant camp, with excellent grass, wood, and water. in the evening there was a very heavy thunder-storm. my order was read to the gentlemen of the party this evening, and was the subject of general congratulation, and not a little mischievous by-play or joking. august 21. this morning was clear, cool, pleasant, and delightful for moving. engineer parties, both yesterday and to-day, have been actively at work getting in the country bordering the route of the main party. i dispatched a small party across milk river to panther hill to observe the country. game was very abundant; plenty of buffalo, antelope, and beaver. a heavy rain and thunder-storm occurred about noon. wild horses were reported as having been seen to-day by the reconnoitring parties. a fine eagle was shot and brought in to dr. buckley, our naturalist. to my exceeding regret, i found that there were points arising regarding the relations of army officers and civilians, and i concluded that the only way to overcome all difficulty was to pursue a firm, steady course, according to the terms of my written order. the distance to-day was seventeen and two thirds miles. august 22. we crossed milk river five miles from camp, and took a cut off to the south. we made our camp, after moving nineteen and a half miles, a quarter of a mile from the river, in the vicinity of a very heavy growth of cottonwood, there being a high bluff between us and the river. as usual, the evening was spent in considering the question of the proposed blackfoot council, and in examining the work of the parties, and preparing for the work ahead. we passed through large herds of buffalo to-day. august 23. we left camp late in consequence of the oxen straying, and about a mile from camp crossed milk river. the order to walk some miles each day has been carefully observed, and the effect was to be seen upon our animals. on reaching our camping-ground, we found a deputation of gros ventres, consisting of seven of their chiefs, five of whom were accompanied by their wives. among these was the eagle chief and his son, white eagle, and the little soldier. the wife of the son of eagle chief was a very pretty woman. her name was the white antelope. they welcomed us in the most cordial manner, and were dignified in their deportment, which was marked by the strictest propriety. we were invited to visit their camp, about thirty miles farther on. after smoking and talking for some time, lunch was served up about dusk, consisting of coffee, rice, etc., after which they made us presents of horses, giving one to myself and two to mr. culbertson, to whom they seemed to be much attached. there was a large tent put up for their accommodation, and supper was provided about ten o'clock. as my health had now been rapidly improving for some days, i determined to push ahead as rapidly as possible with two advance parties in order to examine the approaches to the mountains. accordingly i organized two parties, under lieutenant grover and mr. lander, for the above purpose. to mr. lander i assigned four and to lieutenant grover five members of the party. each was provided with reserve horses, and with fifty days' rations of flour, sugar, and coffee. these arrangements delayed me, so that on the following morning, august 24, i got off somewhat late, and was obliged to go into camp seven and a half miles this side of the indian camp. our indian friends were again with us to-night, and we treated them with bread and coffee. i learned to-day that a feud has lately broken out between the gros ventres and the blackfoot tribes. a gros ventre was married to a blackfoot woman. traveling along, he was attacked, killed, and a fleet horse of his stolen. his wife was with him at the time, and the assassin proposed that she should marry him, go northward, and the gros ventres would never learn of the death of one of their tribe. she assented. he gave her the slow animal, upon which he had ridden himself, mounting the fast horse, which had been taken from her murdered husband. they soon arrived at water; she went off to get some, and on her return pressed him to go, as the water was very good. he did so, leaving his horse with the squaw. after he had gone some two or three hundred yards she mounted the fast steed, and, pursuing a contrary direction, joined the tribe of her deceased husband, and gave such information as would lead to the revenge of his untimely death. i find these indians determined to revenge this outrage, and they are now fitting out war parties for the purpose of cutting off straggling blackfeet, and stealing their horses. august 25. took an early breakfast, making to-day twenty-two and a half miles, when we reached the camp of gros ventres on the bank of milk river, at half past three o'clock. this camp consisted of three hundred lodges, at least one thousand horses, and over two thousand indians. we were soon waited on by others of the tribe, dressed in their finest costumes, among whom i would name the cloudy robe, who presented me with a horse; the eagle, big top, the discoverer or ball in the nose, the man who goes on horseback, the white tail deer, the running fisher, the two elks, the wolf talker, the bear's coat, white bear, the clay pipestem carrier, the old horse, the sitting squaw, the little white calf. accompanied by the gentlemen of the party, i visited their camp and the lodges of the principal chiefs, at all of which we were treated with the utmost kindness and hospitality. they first received us in a large lodge prepared for the occasion, some twenty-five feet in diameter, within which some sixty were seated. we here smoked, drank, and ate, talked some time, and then visited the lodges. i was much struck with the prominent characteristics of this tribe. polygamy is universal; several of the chiefs above named having four, five, and even six wives, one of whom is the especial favorite and mistress of the household. the husband will appropriate any of them to purposes of prostitution when he can profit by so doing. they are filthy in the extreme in their habits, many of the women actually eating the vermin out of each other's heads, and out of the robes in which they sleep. being improvident, it is always feast or famine. returned to camp about eight o'clock, and fixed the next day for a council. august 26. the pembina train arrived shortly after breakfast, and the main train about noon. the necessary preparations were made for the feast, and about one o'clock the indians were seated around in squads of twenty or thirty to the number of two hundred. before the feast the indians seemed to be in high glee, passing the time in singing their songs, accompanying them with rattles made of the hoofs of antelopes strung very fancifully upon a piece of wood about a foot long, with which they marked time. shortly after the feast was over we had a council, at which the chiefs and many of the principal men were present. mr. culbertson acted as interpreter. when i first commenced talking with them, i found they were deeply enraged against the blackfeet for the cause alluded to in the journal of the 24th; that they were determined to wage war against that tribe. i determined to put an end to this, and at once made a proposition to them to settle with that tribe on their delivery of the offender, or making a suitable reparation. i then explained the folly of going to war; how much they would suffer from it and how little was to be gained; that it was the desire of the great father that all his children should be at peace with each other; that while war parties of both tribes were scouring the country, the road was dangerous to the whites who should go there; and it was my duty to demand that they should not so act as to endanger the life of a single man of my own party, or any white man who should hereafter travel through this region. i then proceeded to explain the objects of the expedition in passing through their country. i wished to make a treaty of peace between the gros ventres, blackfeet, piegans, and bloods, and between these and the indians west of the mountains who resort to the plains of the missouri to hunt the buffalo. i then proceeded to explain the advantages which would arise to the indians from entering into such a treaty, and receiving from the government directly what they now get from other indians. they would then obtain goods, provisions, etc., in the way of annuities; could keep their horses, instead of being obliged to go with their horses and purchase of other indians at an increased price, what the liberality and benevolence of the great father, in his fostering care over his children, would at once freely and abundantly supply them. "think well of the matter. suspend for the present your difficulty with the blackfoot indians. let some of your chiefs come with me to fort benton, and we will try to settle the difficulty between the tribes. if it cannot be settled there, let it be referred to a commissioner sent here by the great father, who will settle all your differences at a council of the tribes to be held next year, where the grievances of both parties will be fully heard. but i must insist on the safe conduct of every white man through this country." they then held a consultation with their braves and principal men. in about an hour we met again. they assented to every proposition made. some of their chiefs consented to accompany me to fort benton, and the whole tribe announced their willingness to wait until some time next year, and refer their difficulties to such a council. we continued the talk for some time, after which the indians were invited to come over to the camp of the main party and witness the firing of the howitzer, which seemed to give them much pleasure. about five o'clock we made a distribution of the presents and provisions designed for this tribe, consisting of blankets, shirts, calico, knives, beads, paint, powder, shot, tobacco, hard bread, etc. they received them with the greatest satisfaction; no grumbling or envy was manifested. they continued about our camp, loitering, smoking, and talking, all the afternoon and evening. august 27. busy this morning in the purchase and exchange of horses with the indians. we secured several very good horses in place of six very indifferent mules. several members of the expedition bought horses for clothing, guns, etc., their private property, thus relieving for the use of the expedition their present riding animals. by the distribution of presents and provisions, and consumption at camp, we lightened our loads some two thousand pounds, apart from the issue to the detached parties, and have received twelve serviceable animals in place of unserviceable ones, besides four new ones purchased by members of the party, two presented to me, and two purchased by mr. culbertson. august 28. i made to-day twenty-four and a half miles with the advance parties. i was very much pleased with the good offices of the running fisher, who brought into camp two of our missing horses. by my invitation he will accompany us to fort benton. august 29. the road to-day was not as good as usual: the river-bottom was much dried up, with deep cracks in the soil, and the numerous holes made by the prairie dogs were even, at times, a worse obstacle to our progress. made our halt about twelve miles from camp, where we dined. by an accident, the wind being high, the prairie took fire, which extended over considerable surface. our dining-place was on a branch of milk river, flowing from cypress mountain. parallel to this, and some three miles farther on, crossed a second branch, issuing also from the cypress mountain. by a bend, the two branches nearly meet, forming what is called the junction. mr. culbertson estimates the number of the gros ventres at about three hundred lodges, ten persons to the lodge, of which the proportion of men to women is one to two, the number of men being about six hundred. on his arrival in the country twenty-three years ago, they numbered four hundred lodges. in 1838-39, by a junction of the crees and assiniboines, some sixty lodges were entirely destroyed at julius mountain. a few years subsequently another attack was made at cypress mountain, in which sixty more lodges were exterminated, three men only escaping on this occasion, one of whom was the sitting squaw, father of the one already mentioned. soon after mr. culbertson's arrival in the country, he and four or five other whites, with a party of blackfoot indians, were attacked by a war party of assiniboines, numbering some seven or eight hundred. the field was contested all day, night only ending the conflict. in the morning the assiniboines did not resume the attack, and abandoned many of their dead on the field. a considerable number of the blackfeet were also killed, but none of the whites. august 30. yesterday we were in sight of the bear's paw, quite a broad and rugged mountain upheaval, stretching from milk river to the missouri. i sent off lieutenant grover, mr. lander, and mr. stanley, to make an examination of the bear's paw, so far as it could be done by ascending one of its highest peaks, estimated to be about seventeen or eighteen miles distant. i moved on myself with the remainder of the party, having determined that i would no longer ride in the ambulance, but would make the effort to push forward either on horseback or on foot. after moving seven or eight miles i suffered so exceedingly from riding that i walked some five or six miles with great difficulty, until, coming to a good camp on our second crossing of milk river, and the point where we were to leave it on our way to fort benton, i halted the party and rested for two hours. this gave me strength enough to mount my horse and ride to camp, eighteen miles farther on, on a tributary of the box elder creek. we crossed several branches of this creek, which is a tributary of milk river, that has its source very near the missouri and is on our general line to fort benton. the ascent is very gradual from milk river to our camp; the soil generally is very good. the view this afternoon was delightful. bear's paw itself presents a rugged, grotesque appearance, and it requires no great stretch of the imagination to see in it the paw of a grizzly bear, ready to spring upon the plain. the three buttes, or the sweet grass hills, some sixty miles to the northward of us, are a favorite resort of the blackfeet, who say that providence created these hills for the tribe to ascend and look out for buffalo. southward we have a view of mountains on the other side of the missouri. our distance to-day was twenty-nine and a half miles. august 31. we made an early start this morning, and in twelve miles came to the upper waters of the box elder creek, which is a clear, limpid stream, affording an unfailing supply of water. we then pushed on five miles over a fine rolling prairie to a coulee in the hills, where there was a spring, and here we halted to dine. this spring is a great resort for buffalo. considerable water flows from it, but the ordure of the buffalo was in such great quantities about it that it infected the water, and moreover they had trampled all the ground, and had stirred up the water of the spring with their feet. we however thought it would be well enough for us to make coffee, and we managed to get up a very respectable meal. after stopping three hours, we continued on over a very good road. there was a shower of rain and hail about four p.m. at five the missouri was in sight, the belt mountains looming up beyond it at a distance of not less than fifty miles. after a march of thirty-three miles from our morning camp, we came to a place called the springs; here the water was dried up, and there was no wood, but excellent grass. we pitched our camp in a coulee surrounded by high hills, and went to work to dig wells for water, in hopes to procure some for our animals. we succeeded in getting only a small quantity for each. there was a very high wind and a heavy thunder-shower until near midnight. our indian friends assisted us very much in the night in looking out for our animals. grover, stanley, and lander have not come in, which gives me a good deal of apprehension. the running fisher told me a story to-day illustrating one of the phases of indian life. the bear's paw, as one would infer from its wild and stern appearance, has been a scene of indian fight and massacre. seven years ago a fight occurred in the bear's paw between their tribe, allied with the blackfeet, and the crows, in which he killed one of the latter. the crows occupied an impregnable post, from whence they could shoot down all who approached within twenty paces. a blackfoot was shot in the head through a fissure in the rocks. the gros ventres then determined to surround and starve them out; at night the crows got off with the loss of one man, killed by running fisher. september 1. this morning we made an early start, and, crossing over a high, rolling prairie, in eleven miles and three quarters came to the marias river. the descent to this river on the trail is somewhat steep, the prairie plateau being over two hundred feet above the river-bottom. the river itself here presents a beautiful view. it is a clear, limpid stream, flowing over a pebbly and sandy bed, the bottoms lined with cottonwood of heavy growth, with thickets of the service and other berries. the belt mountains are very distinctly visible in the distance, as is also citadel hill, called so because its base rests upon the missouri, and it rises perpendicularly like a bastion some two hundred feet high. near by is square hill, so called from its supposed resemblance to that geometrical figure. at our noon halt, or near by, was the scene of a sanguinary conflict between the gros ventres and the crows in 1849, in which the latter were all killed. several of those traveling in our company figured in the action. a party of crows to the number of twenty-two were concealed in the hollow just in advance of where we dined, for the purpose of stealing horses from the gros ventres' camp, consisting of two hundred lodges. being discovered, the gros ventres surrounded them, and threw up dust in the air, which was carried by a strong wind in the faces of the crows, blinding them, when the gros ventres rushed in upon them, and killed the whole number without losing a man. none were left to carry home the news. we were off about noon; passed over the prairie, and descended in the valley of the teton, where we met mr. clarke, in charge of fort benton, who came out to meet us. we arrived at fort benton at 3.30 o'clock, where we were received with a salute of fifteen guns. fort benton stands on the eastern bank of the missouri, near the great bend, and three hundred and seventy-seven miles by the trail taken by me above fort union. the river is here perfectly transparent at most seasons of the year. the teton river empties into the missouri six miles below fort benton, the marias twelve miles below, and the milk two hundred miles below. the falls of the missouri are seventy miles above this fort. the muddy character of the missouri has its commencement at the mouth of milk river, which takes its name from the whitish muddiness of its waters. the ascent from the wide, grassy plain in which the fort is located to the high table-land is somewhat abrupt, the only passage on a level with the plain being close to the river on the south and very narrow. fort benton is smaller than fort union. its front is made of wood, and the other sides of adobe, or unburned brick. it usually contains about a dozen men, and the families of several of them. the blackfoot indians are the principal traders here. it is the custom of the several bands of this tribe to locate in sheltered and otherwise eligible places in the vicinity of wood, water, and grass in the early winter, where they remain as inert as possible until the melting of the snow. at such times the half-breeds of the fort visit them with goods upon horses and mules, and exchange their merchandise for the skins and furs captured by the indians. fort campbell is situated on the same plateau with fort benton, about half a mile above it, and is built in very much the same way as the latter place. i was agreeably relieved by the missing gentlemen coming into the fort september 3. they were in fine spirits, although they had eaten but little food since they left me on milk river, had traveled a very long distance, partly on foot, and had been a good deal annoyed at the loss of so much time. chapter xix widespread exploring parties for several days governor stevens was busily engaged in examining voyageurs and indians in regard to the mountain passes and the general character of the country. additional horses were procured, and arrangements made for sending out parties to explore in advance and both north and south of the route. lieutenant donelson with the main train reached the fort on the 6th. dr. evans arrived on the 5th, after an extended trip through the bad lands, where he made a large collection of geological specimens. the same day lieutenant grover was sent forward with a small party to the bitter root valley, crossing the main divide of the rocky mountains, for the purpose of ascertaining if lieutenant saxton had established his depot of provisions at that point. thence he was directed to forward an express to captain mcclellan and return to fort benton. lieutenant john mullan, with a party of six men, was sent southward to the muscle shell river, not only to examine the country, but also to convey to a band of flathead indians supposed to be in that region "a message of peace and goodwill, to express my desire to make a permanent peace between them and the blackfeet, and to build up anew their beautiful st. mary's village." thence he was to cross the mountains by a more southerly pass and rejoin the main party in the bitter root valley. the governor decided to send lieutenant donelson ahead with a party of twenty-five men to examine the approaches to cadotte's pass, the main train to follow more slowly in charge of mr. osgood, and to dispatch lander to examine a pass at the head of the marias river, considerably north of cadotte's. "i gave mr. lander," says the governor, "authority, with certain exceptions, to select his animals from my whole train, deeming it important that he should be exceedingly well fitted out, as he would probably have a long distance to make before he joined the main party in the valley of clark's fork." the governor was exceedingly desirous of taking his wagons across the mountains as the most striking demonstration of the practicability of the passes. the following from a letter of george w. stevens, of september 10, shows the high spirits and fine condition of the party:- "we have reached this point with our full number of scalp-locks, and now are preparing to cross the mountains. up to this point we have proceeded with wonderful success, and have done what no american expedition has done before us. we have not felt the slightest hardship, but the journey of over one thousand miles has been made with as much ease and comfort as we could possibly have experienced in traveling at home fully equipped. our train, of forty wagons and carts, over two hundred animals, and more than one hundred men, has safely arrived. not a man has died (except one who accidentally shot himself), nor has there been a single case of serious illness. not more than a dozen or fifteen animals have been lost, and as a general thing they are now in as good condition as when we left the mississippi. we are now eighty miles from the rocky mountains. on monday we leave with a train of twelve wagons, with which we hope to make a comfortable crossing of the mountains in twenty days. yesterday the fort was the scene of the greatest confusion, growing out of the preparations making to fit out four 'war parties,' as we term them. the first, under mr. lander, explores the marias pass, the most northern and nearly in the latitude of the boundary line. the second, under lieutenant mullan, goes to the muscle shell. the third war party is under the direction of lieutenant donelson, and is to survey the approaches to cadotte's pass, the one which will be taken by the main train. a fourth war party is the major's own to a camp of piegan indians. lieutenant grover is already in the mountains. the major's health is excellent, and though the labor is enormous, he is the only man who could have carried the expedition through in so glorious a manner. if he succeeds in getting the wagons through, he will have opened a good emigrant road from the mississippi to the pacific, and you may be sure the attempt will be most vigorously made. if fortune continues with us, within two months we shall reach puget sound, that looked-for garden-spot. we have met the assiniboine and gros ventre bands of indians, and by both were hospitably received. upon the sheyenne river we first came upon buffalo, and from that point until a week's journey back we have met them in the greatest abundance. buffalo meat has, therefore, been our principal article of food, and we ask nothing better." a very serious difficulty of another kind now confronted governor stevens. he found that the funds allotted to his exploration would not suffice to carry on the work so far and so thoroughly as he deemed necessary, and he was forced to the alternative of cutting it short or incurring a deficiency. he decided to continue the work, notwithstanding the great pecuniary risk to himself, and the risk, too, of incurring the serious displeasure of the government:- "i very frankly and explicitly stated that to continue the survey, and to carry out the instructions with regard to the work to be accomplished, it was absolutely necessary to incur a deficiency: believing that, if the facts as they existed were known to congress and the department, their instructions would be for me to continue the exploration, i determined to incur the deficiency and make the survey. my instructions required me to examine into the question of the snows on the route, into the freshets of the streams, and the period of time they were locked up by the ice, to do which it was indispensable that there should be winter posts established at fort benton, and in the bitter root valley; and it was desirable, in connection with these posts, to have such arrangements made, and such facilities afforded, as would enable the gentlemen in charge of them to continue the explorations of the passes and the adjacent country." in a letter to professor bache the governor gives the reasons for his incurring the deficiency, which were, briefly stated, the delay in the start, owing to the young and unbroken animals furnished by the quartermaster's department, notwithstanding that the governor had sent an agent especially to st. louis to insure the securing of seasoned and broken animals, and to the unusually late and rainy season; the distance across the continent, which turned out to be greater than the best estimates previously obtainable; the fact that in consequence of the great number of indians on the route, and the warlike and treacherous character of some of them, particularly the sioux and blackfeet, it was necessary to make the expedition strong, especially in guides, interpreters, and hunters; and that to carry out the instructions and objects of the exploration it was indispensable to make extended examinations, and to leave parties to continue the work throughout the winter, in order to determine the questions of snow and climate. it is perfectly apparent that the $40,000 allotted to the northern route, even though eked out by the details and supplies furnished by the war department, were altogether inadequate to the task intrusted to governor stevens. his management was marked by strict economy and good judgment; he was simply not given sufficient funds for the work. and it is most creditable alike to his judgment and moral courage that he shouldered the responsibility of the deficiency, and made his complete and exhaustive exploration. having completed all these arrangements, made his reports to the war and indian departments, and started off the several detached parties, the governor decided to visit personally the main camp of the blackfeet, near the cypress mountain, about one hundred miles north of fort benton, and just above the 49th parallel, in order to confer with their chiefs in regard to the contemplated council at fort benton next year, and secure guides for the survey of the marias pass. he desired, also, personally to examine the approaches to the several passes of the mountains from the boundary southward, expecting to overtake the main party before it reached the bitter root valley. says he in the final report:- i gave my instructions to lieutenant donelson on the 9th instant, inspected the train, found everything in good order, the men cheerful, satisfied, and confident as to going on, and the means of transportation ample, and set off towards night, having been preceded a few hours by mr. lander, on the way to cypress mountain. i encamped that night on the teton, fourteen miles from fort benton. besides the party of mr. lander, i was accompanied by mr. culbertson, special agent; mr. stanley, artist; augustus hammell, interpreter; and three voyageurs. september 10. we had been joined last evening by a considerable party of the blackfeet, who accompanied us to-day, the principal men being the little dog, the three bears, and the wolf that climbs. started before seven, and after traveling three hours reached a fine spring, with excellent grass, at a celebrated landmark known by the name of the rotten belly rocks. it is a formation of sandstone, and has the characteristic of _les mauvaises terres_. columns with capitals, resemblances to the human figure, etc., etc., abound. beneath, in the coulee, passes the broad indian trail leading to the piegan camp. here was killed rotten belly, the crow chief, in an encounter between one hundred of his braves and eleven well-armed gros ventres of the prairie. this celebrated chief, urged on by his people, had previously beleaguered fort mckenzie. he captured all the animals of the fort,--thirty-five horses. the place was in charge of mr. culbertson, and there were but nineteen men to defend it. for a month this little force baffled all the attempts of the crows to get possession of the fort. being, however, in a starving condition, and it being apparent that it could not hold out much longer, resort was had to stratagem. all the squaws, twenty-nine in number, were dressed in men's clothes, and with arms in their hands were distributed around the fort in sight of the crows, who, thus deceived in reference to the force defending the place, became disheartened, drew off, and separated. rotten belly, with a portion, mortified at his failure, declared that he would go north and seek death in battle. on reaching the rocks, and seeing the gros ventres, he said: "here i will die to-day; you have brought me to this!" and, rushing upon his enemies, he killed two, and then received his death wound. before his death he advised his people to be the friends of the whites, saying it was their only chance to escape defeat and utter ruin. kept on through the afternoon, passing over a rolling country, and reached the marias about half past four o'clock, where we camped. this stream at our crossing was about fifty yards wide, one foot deep, and of somewhat rapid current, and the river valley was about a mile wide. there was plenty of cottonwood, and we had a most excellent camp. spent the evening in conversing with the indians who accompanied us. september 11. we were off about seven o'clock, and after traveling until near noon halted at a spring, where we procured a small supply of water. continuing on without unsaddling, in less than an hour i was overtaken by baptiste champagne with an express from lieutenant donelson, inclosing a brief report from lieutenant grover, to the effect that he met lieutenant saxton near the dividing ridge, and that they were returning together to fort benton. lieutenant grover intimated in his brief letter that lieutenant saxton reported the route could not be traversed by wagons. this changed the aspect of affairs, and i determined to send mr. stanley to the piegan camp with the interpreter hammell, and to return immediately with mr. culbertson to fort benton. i determined, also, to defer the examination of the marias pass to another season. there was not that harmony in mr. lander's party which i deemed indispensable to making the examination which i had intrusted to him. accordingly i ordered him to return with me. stanley continued on to the piegan camp, and i started back on my way to fort benton. it made a long march for us, for to get a good camp it was necessary to reach the marias. our indian guide made his way pretty directly to the camp: one hour and a half we traveled in the dark. the descent to the river was steep and difficult. we succeeded in getting into a good camp about eight o'clock. before starting on my return, i dispatched an express to lieutenant donelson to push on with his advanced party, but to keep the main train till my arrival. september 12. started early, and, pushing rapidly, reached the fort by three o'clock. lieutenants saxton and grover also reached fort benton the same day. the former successfully led the western subsidiary party by way of pend oreille lake to the bitter root valley, from which point lieutenant r. macfeely, with twenty-six men and sixty animals, no longer needed, returned to the dalles, crossing the bitter roots by the southern nez perces trail, a more direct but vastly more difficult route than that of the lake. lieutenant richard arnold, with his brother, mr. daniel lyman arnold, and four men, remained with the supplies at fort owen in the valley; while lieutenant saxton, with seventeen men, pushed on across the mountains, and was met by lieutenant grover at the summit on september 8; and, as the governor remarks, "he felt rejoiced that the plan of our operations had been successful and the object of the expedition accomplished, as a party from the atlantic and one from the pacific, each in search of the other, had met by appointment, after traversing thousands of miles of unknown country, at the foot of the dividing ridge between the oceans." the same evening mr. tinkham arrived, after an extensive and successful trip of exploration up the milk river to the three buttes, across country to marias river, and thence to fort benton. in consequence of lieutenant saxton's positive representation that it was impracticable to take the wagons across the mountains, governor stevens reluctantly decided to leave them at fort benton, a decision he afterwards regretted, for after traversing the route he was satisfied that he could have taken them at least across the main range to the bitter root valley without difficulty. the whole train was now outfitted with pack animals, and was pushed forward on the 16th under lieutenant donelson. lieutenant saxton, with all but three of the dragoon detachment and some discharged men, and accompanied by mr. culbertson, making a party of twenty-eight all told, was sent down the missouri by keelboat with instructions to examine the river, especially as to the navigability for steamboats of its upper waters, disband his party at fort leavenworth or st. louis, thence proceed to washington, and make a full report, in which he was to urge the necessity of holding the proposed blackfoot council, and of continuing the surveys of the mountain section of the route. the governor also instructed him to advise with professor bache in relation to the continuation of the survey, and to providing for the deficiency, necessarily incurred, in the next deficiency bill; giving him letters to the professor, and to judge stephen a. douglas, hannibal hamlin, dr. gwin, h.m. rice, then delegate from minnesota, and other prominent senators and members of congress. mr. culbertson carried the governor's reports to the indian department, and was charged also to urge upon that department the importance of the council. mr. doty, with three men, was stationed at fort benton for the winter to make meteorological observations, and such examinations of the country as he could, and more especially to collect information about, and take a census of, the blackfeet, and improve every opportunity to impress upon them the benefits of the proposed council and peace with the western indians. as already stated, lieutenant grover was directed to examine the missouri for two hundred and fifty miles below the fort, and the country between it and milk river, and afterwards to cross the mountains in midwinter with dog-sledges, and study the depth of snow and winter climate. lander, with a detached party, was directed to examine along the base of the mountains from the marias pass to cadotte's pass. as already stated, the governor had countermanded the survey of the former by lander in consequence of the lack of harmony in that engineer's party. after leaving fort union, lander developed a fractious, almost insubordinate disposition. he chafed at the presence and authority of the army officers. at fort benton governor stevens had to curb his insubordinate spirit with some severity, and even told him that he would shoot him down like a dog if he disobeyed his orders. lander, realizing that governor stevens would enforce discipline at whatever cost, yielded, professing his readiness to obey instructions, but thereafter he did so according to the letter, not the spirit. yet the governor, both before and after this occurrence, gave him the best opportunities for distinction, intrusting to him the most important side explorations, and in the reports gave him full and generous commendation for all he accomplished, passing lightly over his shortcomings. a bold, energetic, high-strung man, lander could ill brook any authority. he afterwards conducted an independent government survey with credit, and but for his early death would undoubtedly have achieved distinction as a soldier. this appears to have been the only instance of lack of due subordination, or harmony, shown during the whole expedition, and certainly some of the governor's orders had been rigorous enough to cause restiveness, as, for instance, requiring the scientific gentlemen to break their own mules, to stand guard, and to walk a part of each day's march. remarks the governor:- "i was exceedingly gratified at this time by the spirit of the men. several men, who i was afraid had not strength to make the trip, and whom i had ordered to accompany lieutenant saxton down the missouri, were so anxious to go on that they brought me a certificate from the surgeon, dr. suckley, stating that in his opinion they were strong enough for the journey, and accordingly i allowed them to go on. we had now been together some three months, and there was great confidence between the several members of the exploration." on the 20th mr. stanley returned from his trip to the blackfoot camp, having traveled on horseback three hundred and twenty miles in eleven days. a thousand indians accompanied him back as far as milk river, where the main body remained to hunt, while thirty of their chiefs, with their families, came with him to fort benton to hold council with the great white chief, who remained for that purpose. "on the 21st we held our talk with the blackfeet. the chiefs and warriors were all richly caparisoned. their dresses of softly prepared skins of deer, elk, or antelope were elegantly ornamented with bead-work. these are made by their women, and some must have occupied many months in making. the other articles of their costume were leggings made of buffalo skins, and moccasins, also embroidered, and a breech-cloth of blue cloth. their arms were the northwest guns, and bows and arrows. on all solemn occasions, when i met the indians on my route, they were arrayed with the utmost care. my duties in the field did not allow the same attention on my part, and the indians sometimes complained of this, saying, 'we dress up to receive you, and why do you not wear the dress of a chief?' "the governor addressed them in the same strain as the gros ventres: 'your great father has sent me to bear a message to you and all his other children. it is that he wishes you to live at peace with each other and the whites. he desires that you should be under his protection, and partake equally with the crows and assiniboines of his bounty. live in peace with all the neighboring tribes, protect all the whites passing through your country, and the great father will be your fast friend.'" low horn, the principal piegan chief, replied favorably in behalf of the indians, but spoke of the difficulty of restraining their young men, who were wild, and ambitious in their turn to be braves and chiefs. they wanted by some act to win the favor of their young women, and bring scalps and horses to show their prowess. to this the governor rejoined:- "'why is it that you have two or three women to one man? is it not because your young men go out on war parties, and thus the flower of your tribe is cut down? and you will go on diminishing every year until your tribes are extinct. is it not better that your young men should have wives and children, and that your numbers should increase? won't your women prefer husbands to scalps and horses? the gros ventres desire to meet you in council, and have the difficulties between you arranged. will you meet them in council?' "while in the council, low horn, the principal chief and speaker, made all his replies without rising from his seat, and in a quiet, conversational tone. after the council he assembled his braves, and resumed the lofty bearing of a chief. he addressed them with great fervor and eloquence, commanded them henceforth to cease sending out war parties, and threatened them with severe punishment if they disobeyed. it will not be uninteresting here to state that low horn, the quiet spokesman of the council and the trumpet-toned chief in the presence of his men, crossed the missouri in 1855 with his whole band, moved up the judith, and camped on the muscle shell,--the first man who extended the hand of welcome and friendship to the western indians as they crossed the mountains on their way to the council, showing most conclusively that faith can be put in indians; for it must be remembered that two years intervened between my conference with the indians at fort benton in 1853 and their reassembling in 1855 at the council appointed at that time." [illustration: low horn _piegan chief_] chapter xx exploring the rocky mountains september 22. this morning we bade adieu to fort benton, and separated from the portions of the expedition who were assigned to duty east of the mountains. before sunrise we saw lieutenant saxton off in his keelboat, drawing eighteen inches of water, accompanied by mr. culbertson, who was directed by me to report to the department at washington, and to urge the importance of the blackfoot council. lieutenant grover, on a smaller craft, commenced his minute examination of the missouri. mr. doty, who had won very much upon me by his intelligence, his fidelity, his promptitude, and energy of character, parted from me with feelings of hope and pride at the idea that now a field was opening to him where he could be useful to his country, and make a reputation for himself. in order to make a long march this day, the evening before i dispatched my train to a point well up on the teton, some twelve miles from fort benton; and there mr. osgood and mr. stanley, who had remained behind with me at fort benton, and myself, breakfasted with the rest of our party. dr. suckley and messrs. evans and kendall, who had assisted me in my correspondence, were the additional members of my party. the whole party moved off at nine o'clock, continuing for some distance up the valley of the teton, when we ascended a hill to the prairie, and in twenty-one miles reached a coulee, where there were springs of water sufficient for our animals. large bands of antelopes were seen on the road. we struck the prairie lake at five p.m. our guide, the voyageur baptiste champagne, took us to the nearest point of sun river, hoping to get in before dark, but we did not reach camp till some time after. the view at almost any point of the plateau between the teton and sun rivers is exceedingly picturesque and suggestive. the various minor upheavals and swales of ground, which here and there dot the surface of the country, have connected with them some story of indian war, wrong, or suffering. this whole country was once occupied by the snakes, and in later times by some of the tribes of the flathead nation. it belongs now to the blackfeet by conquest. september 23. moved up the valley of the sun river, having made an early start this morning. the sun has a wide, open valley, grazing exceedingly good and soil excellent. we continued up in the direction of the pass between the crown butte and the rattlers, prominent landmarks west of the river, and visible at a great distance. this is a favorite resort of deer, antelope, and bighorn. they were present to-day in very large numbers. continuing on, we came in view of the bird tail rock, and immediately to the west, in a line near it, is another landmark, known as the piegan's tear. after making forty miles we found a camp a little off our route, in a most delightful valley, a spring of water gushing out near by, and the remains of an old camp of the blackfeet at hand, furnishing us with fuel already prepared to our hands. september 24. started as usual very early this morning, and in four miles came to beaver creek, a very beautiful stream of water. the stream is now full of beaver, and is much obstructed by their dams. the country is somewhat more broken to-day than it was yesterday; timber comes in view on the tops of the mountains, and the scenery becomes more grand with each mile as we proceed. three miles beyond beaver creek, a high peak, called the goose's neck, comes in view to the south of us; at the southern foot of which equally as good a road is found, though some two days longer, as the one now being traveled by us. it is a branch of the present trail, and is usually pursued by the flatheads on their way to buffalo. that is called the flathead and our own the blackfoot trail. we now crossed several mountain streams in the course of a few miles, and in sixteen miles we struck the dearborn river. at noon we moved forward to the dividing ridge, which was reached at four o'clock. to this point our road from near the dearborn lay over sideling hills and through timber. as we ascended the divide, a severe pelting hail and rain storm, accompanied with high wind, thunder, and lightning, suddenly came upon us, and did not abate until we had reached the summit. the wind blew very violently, and the mist resulting from the storm prevented our getting a very clear view of the country before us. it was with great gratification that we now left the plains of the missouri to enter upon the country watered by the columbia; and it was the more especially gratifying to me as, looking to my future duties in the territory, i felt that i could welcome to my future home and the scene of my future labors the gentlemen of the party, which i did very cordially and heartily. the scenery throughout the day's march, up to the divide, has been picturesque in the extreme; and the latter portion of it, from the entrance proper to the pass, our road passed between hills on every side covered with timber, on the sides of which we were constantly traveling; while many feet below are to be seen the small upper tributaries of the missouri, flowing from their source in a valley that is very wide for so small a channel, and lined with verdure and the foliage in yellow leaf. all this made a combination full of interest to the eye of one who could appreciate the beauties of nature. the ascent from the eastern base by the indian trail is somewhat steep, though in 1855 i gained the summit by a large, wide, open ravine north of the indian trail by a very gradual ascent, and without much increase of distance; i was a good deal surprised to find how small an obstacle this divide was to the movement of a wagon-train. had we gone on with our wagons, there would not have been the slightest interruption, up to the entrance of the pass, to making the usual journeys each day. we were twenty minutes simply descending on the western side, which was somewhat more steep than the eastern. continuing on, we followed the valley of the blackfoot river some ten miles, and camped in good grass, with excellent water and abundance of wood. shortly after getting into camp it commenced raining, and continued steadily all night, the weather being raw and cold. immediately on crossing the divide, on the summit of the rocky mountains, governor stevens issued his proclamation, declaring the civil territorial government extended and inaugurated over the new territory of washington. and then, as related in the narrative, he heartily welcomed the members of the party to his new home. it was on the summit of cadotte's pass that this dramatic and interesting scene occurred. as originally outlined, the main divide of the rocky mountains formed the eastern boundary of washington, but subsequently the mountain section was joined to idaho and montana. september 25. raining hard this morning. the animals having strayed some distance, we were detained until eight a.m. the first fourteen miles was through an open, wide, and beautiful prairie, after which much of our way was through wood, where fallen timber offered serious impediment to our rapid progress. at one o'clock stanley and myself, having gone rapidly ahead, had a big fire built to receive our party as they came up. here we lunched. by three o'clock the clouds were breaking away, and the rain had ceased. crossed several hills to-day, traveling on the sides of some of them. just before we came out on the prairie on which we found lieutenant donelson and the main train encamped, we were three hundred feet above the level of the river. on the sides of the hill below us was growing the mountain pine; in the valley beneath, right at the base of this hill, was the clear, rapid stream; beyond was the foliage of the trees growing in the bottom. the tops looked like a rich, green carpet; further on were wide prairies, all bounded by a high ridge of beautiful hills, altogether forming a scene of surpassing beauty. at five p.m. we reached lieutenant donelson's camp, and found we had traveled one hundred and forty-four miles since leaving fort benton. september 26. the gentlemen not required by my rapid trip to the westward, namely, dr. suckley, mr. evans, and mr. kendall, now joined the main party, and we pushed on over the blackfoot prairie (called, in lewis and clark's narrative, the prairie of the knobs), and after a march of thirty-odd miles came to a beautiful camp, near what is known in the country as the caã±on. to show the condition of the animals of the expedition, i will observe that as i passed by the mules of the train (for i remained somewhat late in camp this morning to confer with lieutenant donelson, the whole party being several miles on the march before i started), i observed that their rate of travel on a fast walk was from four to four and a half miles per hour, and the advance of the train moved thirty miles that day, getting into camp early, the animals being apparently not fatigued. we had hardly made up our camp-fire, when seeing a black bear and two cubs near by, we felt sure that we should have bear-meat for supper, but although all the voyageurs were on their track, they made their escape. september 27. we started about seven o'clock, and soon entered the caã±on, not, properly speaking, a caã±on, for throughout its extent, until you reach the debouch of hell gate, there is no special difficulty on the trail, nor would there be excessive work to open a good wagon-road. but a good many sharp spurs come down close to the river, throwing the trail well back, or involving a crossing of the stream to avail one's self of the prairies invariably found opposite each of these spurs. much of the country was of a very excellent description, abounding in timber, well watered, and with soil of an excellent quality. emerging from the caã±on, we came into a wide, open valley, commencing half a mile before reaching the mouth of the blackfoot, continuing down the valley of the hell gate until we enter the hell gate ronde, a large, extensive tract of many miles in circuit, and where the hell gate joins its waters to the bitter root. crossing the bitter root at a good ford, we continued up its valley and reached a most excellent camp on the west side of the bitter root, some twenty miles from fort owen.[4] september 28. keeping up the west bank of the bitter root river we crossed two streams, one being the traveler's rest creek of lewis and clark, and, passing through a grove of pine timber, in twelve and one half miles crossed the bitter root river, just before reaching which we met some indians from fort owen. lieutenant arnold, whom we met after crossing the river, on his way to victor's camp, returned with us. we reached fort owen[5] about noon, where we met the other gentlemen of lieutenant arnold's party. i found mr. lander in camp near fort owen, and learned that he arrived the day before yesterday. fort owen is situated on the scattering creek of lewis and clark. it was a matter of the greatest gratification, with their narrative in hand, to pass through this valley and realize the fidelity and graphic character of their descriptions. lieutenant arnold had been jerking beef against our arrival, and making all arrangements to enable us without delay to push on westward. i examined very carefully into the condition of the train left by lieutenant saxton, and of the provisions brought to this point, and had every reason to congratulate myself for having assigned to him this undertaking. we found there nearly two thousand rations, but the animals were very few of them serviceable, yet from their appearance it was obvious that none of them would continue unserviceable for any considerable time, and i believed they would be entirely equal to any service which lieutenant mullan's duties might require of them. september 29-october 3. during these days we were all occupied in making arrangements for the movement of the parties westward, and to establish lieutenant mullan's winter post. lieutenant donelson arrived on the 29th with the main party, and lieutenant mullan on the 30th with a delegation of chiefs from the flathead nation. it will not be attempted here to give any extended account of the explorations made by the detached parties, which is very fully done in the final report by governor stevens. no less than nine passes across the main chain, covering the range from the 49th parallel to the yellowstone, and four passes across the bitter root range, were examined. the most northerly of these, the marias pass, is now traversed by the great northern railroad, and one of the more southerly ones, the mullan pass, situated some fifty miles south of cadotte's pass, is crossed by the northern pacific railroad. mr. lander ran a line from the marias river via the teton, sun, and dearborn rivers to lewis and clark's pass, being the one crossed by captain lewis on his return trip, and situated twelve miles north of cadotte's pass, and made an examination of the pass. after traveling some distance down the valley of the blackfoot, he left it, and went across country to the hell gate river, and moved up the valley of this stream, mistaking it for the bitter root. finally, realizing his mistake, he turned from it, and, crossing over a number of divides and streams, he followed an indian trail which led him to fort owen. in consequence of this eccentric route, and his animals having been much pushed, they came in exceedingly jaded, although he started with the best train of the whole party. he made no observations bearing upon the railroad line except for seven miles of the pass, a short distance thence down the blackfoot valley, and a small portion of the hell gate valley. lieutenant mullan's trip to the muscle shell was a very extended one, four hundred and fifteen miles in length. he returned by the pass which now bears his name, accompanied by a delegation of the flathead indians. mr. tinkham, after examining the approaches to cadotte's pass from the sun river, on a more northern route than that taken by the main party, had left it at the camp of the 26th on the blackfoot to explore a route westward to the jocko and clark's fork, which it was expected might prove a cut-off, and had not yet rejoined the main party. on september 30 and october 1 governor stevens had conferences with the chiefs of the flatheads, and broached to them his great idea of a blackfoot peace council. they were very doubtful at first, having too recent and bitter experience of blackfoot depredations. what should they do, they asked, in case the blackfeet came near their camp at night? in reply the governor advised them not to attack unless it was evident they intended to do mischief. still they must not remain quiet and see their men killed or horses stolen. "i would leave lieutenant mullan with ten or fifteen men to protect you from the blackfeet, but they have promised not to disturb you, and i believe they mean to abide by it," etc. after considering the matter for a day among themselves, the indians promised to attend the council. the governor decided to establish a post in the bitter root valley for the winter, under the charge of lieutenant mullan, in order to determine the winter regimen of the mountains, the depth and duration of snow, the climate, etc. thirteen men were left with lieutenant mullan, and a large band of animals and ample supplies, and he was instructed to make careful meteorological observations during the winter, to continue the exploration of the mountain section, extending it to fort hall on the south, and as far as flathead lake or clark's fork on the north, and to keep a watchful and protective eye over the flathead indians. the governor directed lieutenant donelson to proceed with the main party by way of clark's fork and pend oreille lake, and assigned lander to duty with him for side examinations, while the governor himself took the more direct but rugged c[oe]ur d'alene route over the bitter roots. to dr. suckley was intrusted the adventurous duty of descending the bitter root river, clark's fork, pend oreille lake, and the columbia river by canoe to the dalles, then the frontier settlement. lieutenant arnold was to proceed from pend oreille lake, separating from the main party at that point, in a direct westerly course to colville, and thence to explore the plains of the great bend of the columbia, east of that river. mr. tinkham, who came in a few days later, was directed to explore the marias pass from the west side, and, crossing the mountains by it, to proceed to fort benton, confer with and take letters of instruction to lieutenant grover and mr. doty, and return to the bitter root valley by one of the southerly passes. thence he was to cross the bitter root mountains by one of the nez perces trails, and proceed to walla walla valley and olympia. thus by the establishment of the two stations at fort benton and in the bitter root valley, under mr. doty and lieutenant mullan, respectively, and by the explorations of the detached parties, governor stevens kept the whole mountain region under observation and solved the questions of climate and snows. indeed, he had the range crossed at every month in the year by one or other of these parties. continues the personal narrative:- accordingly, on the 2d mr. lander went down the valley to make some examinations of hell gate, and on the 3d lieutenant donelson was under way with the main party. i left on the 4th and overtook and camped with the main party in my old camp of the 27th and 28th of september. continuing on, on the 5th we both moved down the valley, and encamped on the bitter root, some three or four miles below the mouth of hell gate. here i ascertained that mr. lander, instead of waiting for the arrival of lieutenant donelson to receive the instructions which i had directed to be issued to him, to go down the bitter root to its mouth and join the main party at the horse plain, had preceded him on the main trail, and must be somewhere near the divide between the bitter root and the jocko. accordingly instructions were sent directing him to return in order to proceed on the duty which had been assigned to him. this same day i visited victor at his camp on the hell gate, three miles above its junction with the bitter root, and in return was visited by him at our camp, where we had much interesting conversation in regard to the indians, the character of the country, and the passes, particularly in the winter. i determined to remain here until mr. tinkham returned, who had not yet been heard from. october 6. lieutenant donelson moved off this morning on the route of the jocko river and clark's fork. mr. lander, who had returned to my camp in compliance with instructions, moved down the bitter root this afternoon. i sent up to fort owen for lieutenant mullan, and we remained in camp, passing the time as pleasantly as we could, awaiting the arrival of mr. tinkham. meanwhile a huge joint of beef was placed upon the spit, to be in readiness when the explorers should come in, and honest sergeant simpson undertook to act as cook. bending over the fire, with huge drops of perspiration rolling from his glowing red face, a picture was presented which mr. stanley thought not unworthy a trial of his pencil, while osgood jokingly told simpson he was working then for "two dollars a day and roast beef." the meat was cooked in the nicest manner, and at half past five o'clock we sat down to it, having as guests mr. tinkham and his party, the returned "lost sheep of the house of israel," also lieutenant mullan, who had arrived in season to join in our meal. having no guide, mr. tinkham had not succeeded in finding a direct route, but after a circuitous trip got through to the jocko, and, moving back on lieutenant donelson's trail, joined the governor, who now gave him the instructions to examine the marias pass, etc. the narrative continues:- it is extraordinary how easy of passage the mountains are in this latitude. a favorite time of the return of the flathead indians from the buffalo hunt is between christmas and new year's; it is only in winters of unusual severity that they are unable to cross during any month. we have to-day seen at our camp a good deal of victor, the flathead chief, celebrated in the book of de smet. he appears to be simple-minded, but rather wanting in energy, which might, however, be developed in an emergency. i secured a flathead guide to go with mr. tinkham through the marias pass, returning with him by the flathead pass. he was at first reluctant to go, but afterwards consented. in the course of the evening he came to me to decline going, and one or two of the men wished to back out. on tracing the cause to its source, i found they had been alarmed by some remarks of the guide monroe, who told them he was afraid they would fall in with parties of blackfoot young men. i will here remark that the indian agent, dr. lansdale, in 1856 went over the route from the jocko to the big blackfoot, sought by mr. tinkham in 1853. it is much used by the upper pend oreille indians in going to hunt buffalo east of the mountains. october 7. at 8.30 o'clock we were on the road, the party consisting of mr. stanley, mr. osgood, and four voyageurs, with antoine plante, the half-breed guide. mr. lander, who had preceded us, we overtook in twenty-seven miles, when continuing on eight miles over a rolling country, we came to a good camp on a small stream of water; wood and grass most excellent. the valley of the bitter root is generally a wide valley, with occasional spurs running sharp down to the banks of the stream, but having opposite to such spurs an open prairie on the other side of the river. october 8. we started at 7.30 o'clock, passing over a hilly, wooded, and at times difficult country, with several patches of prairie, one of which, two and a half miles long and containing probably 1000 acres, was covered with an excellent growth of grass. here we met a band of fifty nez perces indians going to hunt. they have from 250 to 300 horses, most of them splendid animals, in fine condition, and with perfectly sound backs. women and children helped to compose the band, and babies of fifteen months old, packed in a sitting posture, rode along without fear, grasping the reins with their tiny hands. we met them in the entrance to a narrow place, a mile in length, leading along the water's edge; and wishing to have a talk with them, but unwilling to lose time in returning to the open ground, i invited them to turn around to the first prairie, which antoine assured me was not more than a mile or two beyond. the prairie we found to be well grassed, open, and wooded. we now made our halt, and, while preparing for our talk, a band of c[oe]ur d'alenes joined us. they, too, were on their way to the hunt, and numbered about sixty, men, women, and children, and had about 200 horses. we had a long talk. i told them about the steps taken to meet in council at fort benton; dwelt particularly upon the prospect of the blackfeet making peace with all the indian tribes,--upon the promise they had given that their war parties should be stopped; and told them that at fort benton and at st. mary's i had left men who would interfere unless these war parties ceased. this intelligence was most gratefully received. they tell me that they return from the hunt in march, going home by the pend oreille route. we parted with them at two o'clock, and at six made a good camp near the ford by which we mean to cross to the left bank of the bitter root river. two miles from camp we met two pend oreilles, who turned around with us. at the camp we found a mother and daughter who had just crossed the river and pitched their lodge. they had eight pack and as many spare animals, and were on their way to join the indians we met this morning. we gave all the indians coffee, and the women in return gave us some cooked kamas root. it is of a dark color, small, between the pear and onion in shape, and of a sweet, agreeable flavor. october 9. we started at eight, and crossed the ford. the ride of to-day has been rather tedious. we left the valley to get rid of the undergrowth of bushes, and took a trail over the side-hill, which carried us up and down hill successively, and in some instances through woods, occasionally obstructed by fallen timber. at noon we halted at a creek, where we found a single indian family drying venison. for a little tobacco they gave us some fresh meat and trout, which we roasted before the fire, and which made us a substantial lunch; after which, pursuing our course, we fell upon a stream flowing from the dividing ridge, and, continuing up it six miles, made a camp where we found an abundance of grass. distance to-day nineteen miles. october 10. we continued in the valley about ten miles, the road leading through wood. larch and spruce, and inexhaustible supplies of limestone and marble, were met with, and the latter we afterwards found in large quantities all through the mountains. at this point the trail forks, one keeping to the right along the stream, and the other turning to the left, and passing over a high, overhanging mountain spur. our guide, antoine, informed us that the mountain trail was more easy for the animals, the one to the right being much obstructed by fallen timber. after commencing the ascent we heard the voices of our men driving the animals in the valley beneath us, and waited until we had turned them upon the trail we had concluded to take. we ascended the dividing ridge, and reached a camp with good grass upon a small lake, within a mile of its top. the lake, to which we were obliged to descend for water, is twelve hundred feet below the camp. c[oe]ur d'alene or stevens pass. october 11. the pass beneath us was made by two rivers flowing from the dividing ridge in opposite directions, having their sources in lakes not more than half a mile apart; the general direction of the valleys being east and west. we estimated our camp to be two thousand feet above the eastern base of the mountain, and two thousand five hundred feet above the western base. the lake upon the eastern side was about twelve hundred feet below us, and that upon the western side about seven hundred feet higher. after pitching camp last night a drizzling rain commenced falling, which we supposed would turn into snow before morning. upon awakening this morning we were surprised to greeted with one of the loveliest days imaginable. the sky was clear, and the air as soft and balmy as a morn in summer. after striking camp we ascended to the highest point of the ridge, about a mile and a half from camp. here we made a long halt, enjoying the magnificent view spread open to us, which, i venture to say, can scarcely be surpassed in any country. far distant in the east the peaks of the rocky mountains loomed up into view, stretched out to a great length, while the flathead lake and the valley thence to the blackfoot pass were plainly visible. nearly the entire range of the c[oe]ur d'alene mountains, clothed with evergreen forests, with here and there an open summit covered with grass; numerous valleys intersecting the country for miles around; courses of many streams marked by the ascending fog,--all conduced to render the view fascinating in the greatest degree to the beholder. the mountains were covered with luxuriant, coarse grass. seated on this point, mr. stanley was enabled to transfer this beautiful panorama to his sketch-book. descending the peak to the general level of the ridge, we continued on for six miles, when the descent commenced, and in less than three miles we passed down a very steep descent and gained the base of the mountains, which we estimated rose thirty-five hundred feet above us. this brought us into a valley filled with gigantic cedars. the larch, spruce, and vine-maple were found in to-day's march in large quantities, the latter giving a pleasing variety to the forest growth. about four o'clock we encamped upon the bank of a stream, which here grows much wider. a c[oe]ur d'alene accompanied us to this point from the eastern base of the dividing ridge, and at to-night's encampment we found a c[oe]ur d'alene and his wife on their way to hunt. october 12. the scarcity of grass last night caused our animals to wander, and three of them were found at the base of the mountains six miles back. it was not until half past ten o'clock that our men had them all collected, and we were prepared to move. we rode until half past three, when we halted at a beautiful camp, although the day's march had been but twelve miles. learning from antoine that the c[oe]ur d'alene mission was only eleven miles beyond, i determined on going in to-night. antoine and i accordingly mounted, and rode to the mission in an hour and three quarters. c[oe]ur d'alene mission. the mission is beautifully located upon a hill overlooking extensive prairies stretching to the east and west towards the c[oe]ur d'alene mountains and the columbia river. about a hundred acres of the eastern prairie adjoining the mission are inclosed and under cultivation, furnishing employment to thirty or forty indians, men, women, and children. i observed two ploughing, which they executed skillfully; others were sowing wheat, and others digging potatoes. pã¨re gazzoli received me with the most pleasing hospitality. associated with him are pã¨re ravalli, now absent to procure supplies, and brothers charles huet and maginn. towards evening i witnessed the burial of an indian chief. the funeral ceremonies were conducted after the catholic form, and i was struck with the harmonious voices of the indian choristers, and with their solemn observance of the ceremonies. the mission is composed of buildings inclosing a square. some of them are quite old, but the barn is large and new. the church stands a little distance from the rest, and does much credit to those who erected it. it is constructed upon a plan designed by pã¨re ravalli, and is of the roman demi-style of architecture. pulleys and ropes were the only mechanical aids in the construction. the interior is prettily arranged. the altar is supported by two massive timbers of pine which are four feet in diameter. the priests live in a self-denying manner, and the good effect of their influence over the indians around them is plainly manifest. there is quite a village of indians near the mission. they have some half dozen log-houses, but most of them live in lodges. october 13. while awaiting the arrival of the train, i was enabled more particularly to observe the manner in which the affairs of the mission are conducted. brother charles has charge of the buildings, and attends to the indoor work, cooks, makes butter and cheese, issues provisions, and pays the indians for their work, which payment is made in tickets bearing a certain value, "good for so many potatoes, or so much wheat," etc. by this arrangement the indians are able to procure their subsistence in the summer by hunting and fishing, and have tickets in store for living during the winter. they are well contented, and i was pleased to observe habits of industry growing upon them. in the barn we saw their operations of threshing: four boys rode as many mules abreast in a circle, being followed by two girls with flails, who appeared to be perfectly at home in their business. one half of the barn is reserved for their crops, while the other is arranged for cattle. their stock at present consists of twenty cows, eight pairs of oxen, and ninety pigs, which are driven to pasture upon the prairie by indian boys daily. i noticed an indian woman milking, and was surprised to see her use both hands, something rarely seen amongst the indians. we afterwards visited the field; a large fire was burning, and around it sat indians roasting and eating potatoes. there appeared to be a great scarcity of proper implements, and in digging potatoes many had nothing better than sharpened sticks. the train arrived about one o'clock, and pã¨re gazzoli allowed us to turn our animals into the inclosure. i have heard of an ingenious method of hunting deer which is practiced by the indians. when the c[oe]ur d'alenes, pend oreilles, spokanes, and nez perces meet together to fish and hunt, they form a large circle, and upon the trees, around its circumference, attach pieces of cloth made to resemble the human figure as much as possible. then the hunters enter the area and start up the deer. each cloth having the effect of a man, the deer, being afraid to pass them, are kept within the circle and easily killed. last year the pend oreilles killed eight hundred in one hunt; the c[oe]ur d'alenes, more than four hundred. when the indians returned from the field i addressed them as follows:- "i am glad to see you and find that you are under such good direction. i have come four times as far as you go to hunt buffalo, and have come with directions from the great father to see you, to talk to you, and do all i can for your welfare. i see cultivated fields, a church, houses, cattle, and the fruits of the earth, the work of your own hands. the great father will be delighted to hear this, and will certainly assist you. go on, and every family will have a house and a patch of ground, and every one will be well clothed. i have had talks with the blackfeet, who promise to make peace with all the indian tribes. listen to the good father and to the good brothers, who labor for your good." october 15. we started at eight o'clock, after having given brother charles as many lariats for raising the timbers of the church as we could spare, and made eighteen miles and a quarter, meeting on the way some forty indians, c[oe]ur d'alenes, nez perces, and spokanes, on their way to buffalo. we camped to-day in a beautiful prairie, called the wolf's lodge, with good grass. here we found nearly a hundred spokanes, with some three hundred horses, on their way to the hunt. towards sundown this evening i was greatly interested in observing the spokanes at their devotions. a bell rang, and the whole band gathered in and around a large lodge for evening prayers. there was something solemn and pathetic in the evening psalm resounding through the forests around us. this shows what good results can flow from the labors of devoted missionaries, for the spokanes have had no religious instruction for the last five years. as i went down the river and met band after band of the spokanes, i invariably found the same regard for religious services. afterwards they came around to my camp-fire, and we had a talk. garry, they say, is at his farm, four miles from the spokane house. october 16. we started at eight o'clock, our route being through an open wooded prairie. soon after leaving camp the c[oe]ur d'alene lake came in view to the south of us, and eleven miles from camp we struck it near its western extremity. it is a beautiful sheet of water, surrounded by picturesque hills, mostly covered with wood. its shape is irregular, unlike that given it upon the maps. its waters are received from the c[oe]ur d'alene river, which runs through it. below the lake the river is not easily navigable, there being many rapids, and in numerous places it widens greatly, and runs sluggishly through a shallow channel. above the lake i am informed by the missionaries that it is navigable nearly to the mission. leaving the lake, we followed the river on its northern bank, passing a camp of c[oe]ur d'alenes, occupied with their trout fisheries. here we witnessed a touching sight, a daughter administering to her dying father. still keeping through open woods on a most excellent road, in two miles farther we came to the c[oe]ur d'alene prairie, a beautiful tract of land containing several hundred square miles. after crossing the prairie, a distance of some eighteen miles, we continued on and encamped at a spring with sparse grass. had we gone two miles farther, we should have found an excellent camp on the river, and the next morning some of our animals were found in this very spot. the horses of the spokanes roam over this prairie in herds of from twelve to twenty. towards the latter portion of the march the river runs over a rocky bed of trap. october 17. leaving camp, antoine, osgood, stanley, and myself turned from the trail to visit the falls of the c[oe]ur d'alene river, while lavatte took the train ahead on the trail to the spokane house. there are two principal falls, one of twenty feet and the other of from ten to twelve feet, in the latter there being a perpendicular fall of seven or eight feet; for a quarter of a mile the descent is rapid, over a rough bed of rocks, and in this distance we estimated a fall of ninety or one hundred feet. one mile below this point we came to the ferry crossed by saxton. here there is a small indian village, and the inhabitants were engaged in catching salmon. i noticed one large woman who seemed to pride herself upon her person, which she took pains to set off in the most becoming manner by means of a blanket wrapped around her. the road to the spokane house was over a sandy prairie, interspersed with groves of pine. crossing a dividing ridge with high and steep banks, we came into the prairie in which the spokane house is situated, in which were two spokane villages. we inquired for garry, and i sent him a request that he would visit me at my camp. the train we found a mile below the junction, across the spokane. the indians indicating a good camp some distance beyond, we moved on eight and a half miles to it, which we reached half an hour before sundown. here there was good grass and plenty of water, and we soon made up a large campfire. after arranging matters in camp, i observed about nightfall a fire down the river, and, strolling down to the place, came upon a little camp of spokane indians, and found them engaged in religious services, which i was glad of an opportunity to witness. there were three or four men, the same number of women, and half a dozen children. their exercises were, 1, address; 2, lord's prayer; 3, psalms; 4, benediction, and were conducted with great solemnity. in the evening garry visited us with some of his tribe. they gave rumors of a large party having arrived opposite colville, also of a small party having gone from walla walla to colville. garry was educated by the hudson bay company at red river, where he lived four years with six other indians from this vicinity, all of whom are now dead. he speaks english and french well, and we have had a long conversation this evening; but he is not frank, and i do not understand him. he has an extensive field, where he raises a large quantity of wheat. to-morrow he is going to colville to get some of it ground. garry promises to send me to-morrow the indian who has just arrived from the yakima country, and who is posted up concerning the news of that place. october 18. a spokane breakfasted with us this morning, and we started at 8.30 o'clock. after riding till ten o'clock we were joined by the old indian referred to yesterday, and antoine's services were immediately put into requisition to obtain information. at twelve o'clock we lunched. the old man stated that a large party reached the bank of the river opposite colville yesterday, and that they would cross to-day. i was satisfied from his accounts that the party was mcclellan's, and accordingly determined on going to colville to-night. antoine has horses half way. we rested until two o'clock and then set out, antoine and myself pushing ahead of the train. we met antoine's family encamped on a fine prairie, with whom antoine remained, sending his brother-in-law with us as a guide. at 4.15 we reached the ferry, where we were detained fifteen minutes. at 4.45 we met jack (lieutenant macfeely's guide), who informed me that macfeely reached walla walla three weeks ago, being twenty-two days coming from st. mary's. he lost twenty animals, and was detained two days in an unsuccessful search for a man who had strayed from the trail. the road was bad, and they got off the trail, having struck too high up. jack told us it was twenty-eight miles to colville, and that we could not reach there to-night, but, being determined to do so, we pushed on and reached brown's at 5.45, who informed us that the distance to colville was eighteen miles. after partaking of some bread and milk, we resumed the road with the same animals, dashing off at full speed, going eight or nine miles an hour most of the way, and reached colville at nine o'clock. mr. mcdonald, the trader in charge, gave me a most hospitable reception, and addressed a note to mcclellan, who had just gone to his camp near by, informing him of my arrival. mcclellan came up immediately, and, though i was fairly worn out with the severeness of the ride, we sat up till one o'clock. at eleven we sat down to a nice supper, prepared by mrs. mcdonald, and regaled ourselves with steaks cooked in buffalo fat, giving them the flavor of buffalo meat. i retired exhausted with the fatigues of the day. captain mcclellan's explorations. it took captain mcclellan a month to fit out his train after he reached vancouver, on the lower columbia, so that he did not start on his survey until the last of july. crossing the cascade range by a pass south of mount adams, he proceeded northward over the plains on the eastern side of the range to the yakima valley, moving one hundred and eighty miles in thirty days, and remained there a month longer, during which mr. gibbs examined the lower and lieutenant duncan the upper valley. captain mcclellan himself, leaving his party in camp, made a hasty examination of the snoqualmie pass, at the head of the main yakima. then he crossed over a dividing ridge to the columbia river, and continued up its right or western bank to the okinakane (okanogan) river, a distance of ninety miles, spent several days in exploring that and neighboring streams, then ascended the okinakane (okanogan) river some fifty miles to lake osoyoos, and moved eastward from this point eighty-two miles to the columbia, opposite colville, and crossed on the 18th, the very day of governor stevens's arrival at the same point. mcclellan, as appears from his report, took a decidedly unfavorable view of the country, and of a railroad route across the cascades. he declared in substance that the columbia river pass was the only one worth considering, that there was no pass whatever north of it except the snoqualmie pass, and gave it as his firm and settled opinion that the snow in winter was from twenty to twenty-five feet deep in that pass. his examination of the pass was a very hasty and cursory one, with no other instruments than a compass and a barometer, and extended only three miles across the summit. his only information as to the depth of winter snow was the reports of indians, and the marks of snow on the trees, or what he took to be such. thus the most important point, the real problem of the field of exploration intrusted to him, namely, the existence and character of the cascade passes, he failed to determine. he failed utterly to respond to governor stevens's earnest and manly exhortation, "we must not be frightened with long tunnels, or enormous snows, but set ourselves to work to overcome them." he manifested the same dilatoriness in preparation and moving, the same timidity in action, the same magnifying of difficulties, that later marked and ruined his career as an army commander. two railroads now cross the range which he examined,--the northern pacific, by a pass just south of the snoqualmie and north of the nahchess, the very place of which mcclellan reported that "there certainly is none between this (the snoqualmie) and the nahchess pass;" and the great northern, by a pass at the head of the wenachee or pisquouse river, of which stream he declared, "it appears certain that there can be no pass at its head for a road." the snows he so much exaggerated have proved no obstacle, and in fact have actually caused less trouble and obstruction in these passes than in the columbia pass itself.[6] footnotes: [4] the town of missoula is seated at the entrance to hell gate. the bitter root river is now known as the missoula, the name bitter root being transferred to a branch of clark's fork. the bitter root or st. mary valley is likewise now known as the missoula valley. [5] fort owen occupied the site of the flathead village and catholic mission of st. mary, which had been recently abandoned in consequence of the incessant forays of the blackfeet. [6] one of the lines of the northern pacific railroad now crosses the c[oe]ur d'alene pass on governor stevens's route, to the vicinity of the mission, running thence south of the c[oe]ur d'alene lake to spokane. chapter xxi upper columbia to puget sound upon learning the results of mcclellan's explorations, governor stevens proposed to send him up the yakima again to carry the survey clear across the cascades to puget sound, and at first that officer seemed willing to undertake the duty. after spending two days at colville the governor, accompanied by mcclellan and his party, moved south in three marches to a camp six miles south of the spokane river, named camp washington, where on october 28 arrived lieutenant donelson with the main party. during these days there was a fall of snow covering the ground, which, however, soon melted and disappeared. but it was enough to dismay mcclellan. he now demurred to crossing the cascades, claiming it to be impracticable so late in the fall. it was indeed late; snow had already fallen on the plains, and presumably would be deeper in the mountains; and the cascades were mcclellan's own particular field, of which he ought to be the best judge. the governor therefore reluctantly, and rather against his better judgment, relinquished the plan of crossing the snoqualmie pass that fall, and gave orders for both parties to move by way of walla walla and the dalles to vancouver, and thence to olympia, at the head of puget sound. "had i possessed at camp washington," says the governor, "information which i gained in six days afterwards at walla walla, i should have pushed the party over the cascades in the present condition of the animals; but captain mcclellan was entitled to weight in his judgment of the route, it being upon the special field of his examination." the incidents of the march to camp washington are thus narrated:- during our stay at colville, we visited mcdonald's camp. near it there is a mission, under the charge of pã¨re lewis, whom we visited. the indians about the mission are well disposed and religious. as we returned to the fort, mr. stanley was just going into camp, having made a march of thirty-five miles. in the evening we listened to the thrilling stories and exciting legends of mcdonald, with which his memory seems to be well stored. he says intelligence had reached him through the blackfeet of the coming of my party; that the blackfeet gave most singular accounts of everything connected with us. for instance, they said that our horses had claws like the grizzly bear; they climbed up the steep rocks and held on by their claws; that their necks were like the new moon; and that their neighing was like the sound of distant thunder. mcdonald has, of course, given a free translation of the reports made by indians. we listened to his accounts of his own thrilling adventures of his mountain life, and a description of an encounter with a party of blackfeet is well worth relating. at the head of a party of three or four men he was met by a band of these indians, who showed evidences of hostility. by signs he requested the chief of the blackfeet to advance and meet him, both being unarmed. when the chief assented, and met him half way between the two parties, mcdonald caught him by the hair of the head, and, holding him firmly, exacted from the remaining indians promises to give up their arms, which they accordingly did, and passed on peaceably. he has lived here many years, and is an upright, intelligent, manly, and energetic man. october 21. we moved off. mcdonald presented us with a keg filled with cognac to cheer the hearts of the members of all the parties, and obliged us also to take a supply of port wine. we passed his gristmill on mill river, the only one in the neighborhood. a march of twelve miles brought us into camp, mcdonald accompanying us. we had a glorious supper of smoking steaks and hot cakes, and the stories added to the relish with which it was eaten. mcdonald again charmed us with a recital of his thrilling adventures. october 22. we got off early, and at brown's we stopped to purchase horses, and succeeded in obtaining two, one for mcclellan and the other for myself. mcdonald accompanied me some distance farther, when, bidding each other adieu, i pushed ahead, and, reaching a small stream, i found that mcclellan's party had taken the left bank, and that the captain had gone on to join them. we took the right, and thus avoided a bad crossing in which mcclellan's party became involved. we encamped upon the borders of the stream. our train is larger and more heavily laden than heretofore, in consequence of the increased supplies. to-day we have thirteen packs. at night we killed a cow purchased of brown, and we still have an ox in reserve, to be killed when we meet donelson. the air is cool and fresh, and our appetites keen. i may say here that two pounds of beef and half a pound of flour per man are not too much for a day's allowance. october 23. snow is falling this morning, and it has cleaned our beef admirably. we journeyed but ten miles, encamping near where we had seen antoine's family in going to colville. the snow ceased falling about noon, with five inches upon the ground. it is light, and we think it will disappear in a few days. the indians inform me that we shall not probably find it south of the c[oe]ur d'alene, and from their statements it would seem that this river is a dividing line as regards climate. october 24. we started this morning with the intention of reaching the appointed place of meeting to-night. mcclellan, minter, osgood, stanley, and myself pushed ahead, and at noon we reached the old chemakane mission, so called from a spring of that name near by. the mission was occupied by messrs. walker and eells, but in 1849, in consequence of the cuyuse difficulties, it was abandoned. these gentlemen labored ardently for the good of the indians. walker was a good farmer and taught them agriculture, and by them his name is now mentioned with great respect. the house occupied by walker is still standing, but eells's has been burned down. the site of the mission is five miles from the spokane river, in an extensive open valley, well watered and very rich. here we met garry and two hundred spokanes. garry has forwarded the letter to donelson, but has received no intelligence of his arrival in the c[oe]ur d'alene plain. we therefore concluded to encamp here, and to-morrow mcclellan and myself are to accompany garry to the spokane house. the colville or slawntebus and chemakane valleys have a productive soil, and are from one to three miles wide, and bordered by low hills, covered with larch, pine, and spruce, and having also a productive soil. in the evening the indians clustered around our fire, and manifested much pleasure in our treatment of them. i have now seen a great deal of garry, and am much pleased with him. beneath a quiet exterior he shows himself to be a man of judgment, forecast, and great reliability, and i could see in my interview with his band the ascendency he possesses over them. in the colville valley there is a line of settlements twenty-eight miles long. the settlers are persons formerly connected with the hudson bay company, and they are anxious to become naturalized, and have the lands they now occupy transferred to themselves. i informed them that i could only express my hopes that their case would be met by the passage of a special act. they are extensive farmers, and raise a great deal of wheat. october 25. having left the necessary directions for moving camp to the place of meeting with donelson, captain mcclellan and myself accompanied garry to the spokane house. the road was slippery in consequence of the melting of the snow, and we were obliged frequently to dismount. we found garry's family in a comfortable lodge, and he informed us that he always had on hand flour, sugar, and coffee, with which to make his friends comfortable. we then went to our new camp south of the spokane, which had been established whilst we were visiting garry's place. from the chemakane mission the train left the river, and, passing through a rolling country covered with open pine woods, in five miles reached the spokane, and crossing it by a good and winding ford, ascended the plain, and in six miles, the first two of which was through open pine, reached camp washington. october 26, 27, 28, and 29. during these days i was occupied at our camp (camp washington) in making the arrangements for moving westward. lieutenant donelson arrived on the 28th, and we all sat down to a fine supper prepared for the occasion. all the members of the exploration were in fine spirits; our table was spread under a canopy, and upon it a great variety of dishes appeared, roasted beef, bouillon, steaks, and abundance of hot bread, coffee, sugar, and our friend mcdonald's good cheer. but the best dish was a beef's head cooked by friend minter in texas fashion. it was placed in a hole in the ground on a layer of hot coals, with moss and leaves around it to protect it from the dirt, and then covered up. there it remained for some five or six hours, when, removing it, the skin came off without difficulty, and it presented a very tempting dish, and was enjoyed by every member of the party. having given the necessary instructions to mcclellan and donelson to proceed with their parties to the walla walla, thence to the dalles, vancouver, and olympia, making careful survey of the country on the route, the governor, with his small party, pushed on ahead, having garry and his brother as guides. starting late in the afternoon of the 29th, they journeyed thirteen miles over undulating hills and a high table-land, and encamped upon a small stream called se-cule-eel-qua, with fine grass and fertile soil. october 30. we commenced to move at sunrise, and at three p.m. encamped on a small lake twenty-two miles from our place of departure in the morning. in view of this camp were the graves of a number of spokane indians, indicated by mounds of stones, designed to protect the bodies from the wolves, and by poles supported in an upright position by the stones. it was the usage until within a few years past, for the spokanes and other northern tribes towards the pacific to slay the horses and cattle of the deceased at his grave, and also to sacrifice his other property, but they are gradually relinquishing this pernicious practice, under the influence of the counsels and example of the white man. october 31. we continued to follow the general course of the stream upon whose banks we were encamped, and after riding eight miles we crossed another small stream, rising in a chain of small lakes south of our last camp. these lakes abound in wild fowl, which at this season are very plentiful, and they are therefore much resorted to by the spokanes and other indians. we saw in one of these lakes, surrounded by ducks and geese, a pair of white swans, which remained to challenge our admiration after their companions had been frightened away by our approach. garry assures us that there is a remarkable lake called en-chush-chesh-she-luxum, or never freezing water, about thirty miles to the east of this place. it is much larger than any of the lakes just mentioned, and so completely surrounded by high and precipitous rocks that it is impossible to descend to the water. it is said never to freeze, even in the most severe winter. the indians believe that it is inhabited by buffalo, elk, deer, and all other kinds of game, which, they say, may be seen in the clear, transparent element. he also narrates the story of a superstition respecting a point of painted rock in pend oreille lake, situated near the place now occupied by michal ogden. the indians, he says, do not venture to pass this point, fearing that the great spirit may, as related in the legends, create a commotion in the water and cause them to be swallowed up in the waves. the painted rocks are very high, and bear effigies of men and beasts and other characters, made, as the indians believe, by a race of men who preceded them as inhabitants of the land. our route to-day has been through a rocky and broken country, and after a march of thirty-two miles we encamped on a small stream called en-cha-rae-nae, flowing from the lake where we last halted, near a number of natural mounds. november 1. our course lay down the valley of the en-cha-rae-nae, a rugged way, beset with deep clefts in the volcanic rocks. we crossed the pelouse river near the mouth of the former, and near the stream flowing from the never freezing lake, and twelve miles from the mouth of the pelouse. four miles from our place of crossing the pelouse runs through a deep caã±on, surrounded by isolated volcanic buttes, to its junction with snake river. at two p.m. we arrived at the mouth of the pelouse, and, crossing snake river, we encamped on its southern bank, several pelouse indians accompanying us, and among them a chief from a band but a few miles distant from our camp, wi-ti-my-hoy-she. he exhibited a medal of thomas jefferson, dated 1801, given to his grandfather, as he alleges, by lewis and clark. november 2. i have referred in an early stage of this narrative to the condition of my health, and will state that not a day was i on the road from fort benton to this point that i did not suffer much. the day i made my long ride to colville, i was so feeble and exhausted that, on making my noon halt after moving fifteen miles, i was obliged to have my bed spread in order to rest; but the idea of meeting gentlemen so soon, from whom i had been so long separated, enabled me to bear the fatigue of my afternoon fifty miles' ride to colville. although in great suffering, i determined to move with garry from snake river to fort walla walla to-day, leaving mr. stanley to come on with my party and train in two days. i desired to save a day in order to collect information at walla walla, and to visit the walla walla valley. accordingly we set off. it required me three hours to get my courage up to the sticking-point, so that i could bear the pain growing out of traveling at a gait faster than a walk; but, getting warm in the saddle, we increased our speed, and on reaching the touchet we dismounted for a slight halt. pushing on a little before two o'clock, we reached fort walla walla at sundown, moving the last twenty-five miles at the rate of about eight miles an hour, and were there hospitably received by mr. pembrum, the factor in charge, and after a little conversation i refreshed myself with reading some late papers. on the road my time was much occupied with studying the deportment of the mountain ranges in view, and all the peculiarities of the country about me, to judge something of its winter climate and the probable fall of snow; and on reaching walla walla i became satisfied from these things, and especially from a view of the highest spur of the blue mountains in sight, that the snows of the cascades could not be so formidable as they had been represented. i accordingly determined to search thoroughly into this matter at walla walla. november 3-8. i remained in the walla walla country during these days, spending two days up the valley and the remainder at the fort. mr. stanley, with the train, reached the fort on the 3d, and, november 4, we started upon the trip through the valley, riding upon our horses. arriving at the hudson bay farm, we exchanged them for fresh ones. this farm is eighteen miles from walla walla, and is a fine tract of land, well adapted to grazing or cultivation. it is naturally bounded by streams, and is equivalent to a mile square. there is the richest grass here that we have seen since leaving st. mary's. from this we went to mcbane's house, a retired factor of the company, from whence we had a fine view of the southern portion of the valley, which is watered by many tributaries from the blue mountains. thirty miles from walla walla, and near mcbane's, lives father chirouse, a missionary of the catholic order, who with two laymen exercises his influence among the surrounding tribes. november 5. we remained with mr. mcbane overnight, and returned to the fort to-day by way of the whitman mission, now occupied by bumford and brooke. they were harvesting, and i saw as fine potatoes as ever i beheld, many weighing two pounds, and one five and a half. their carrots and beets, too, were of extraordinary size. mr. whitman must have done a great deal of good for the indians. his mission was situated upon a fine tract of land, and he had erected a saw and grist mill. from bumford's to the mouth of the touchet are many farms, mostly occupied by the retired employees of the hudson bay company. on our return we met pu-pu-mox-mox, the walla walla chief, known and respected far and wide. he possesses not so much intelligence and energy as garry, but he has some gifts of which the latter is deprived. he is of dignified manner, and well qualified to manage men. he owns over two thousand horses, besides many cattle, and has a farm near that of the hudson bay company. on the occurrence of the cuyuse war, he was invited to join them, but steadily refused. after their destruction of the mission, he was asked to share the spoils, and again refused. they then taunted him with being afraid of the whites, to which he replied: "i am not afraid of the whites, nor am i afraid of the cuyuses. i defy your whole band. i will plant my three lodges on the border of my own territory at the mouth of the touchet, and there i will meet you if you dare to attack me." he accordingly moved his lodges to this point, and remained there three or four weeks. stanley was on his way from walker and eells's mission to whitman's mission, and indeed was actually within three miles of the latter, when he heard of the terrible tragedy which had been enacted there, and the information was brought to him by an indian of pu-pu-mox-mox's band. pu-pu-mox-mox has saved up a large amount of money (probably as much as $5000); still he is generous, and frequently gives an ox and other articles of value to the neighbors. some of his people having made a contract to ferry the emigrants across the river, who crossed the cascades this year, and then having refused to execute it, he compelled them to carry it out faithfully, and, mounting his horse, he thrashed them until they complied. he has the air of a substantial farmer. on the 6th lieutenant donelson and on the 7th captain mcclellan reached old fort walla walla with the main parties. governor stevens was now satisfied, both from his own observations and from information furnished by pembrum, pu-pu-mox-mox, and others, among them a voyageur who had actually crossed the cascades in the month of december, that it was not yet too late to send a party across these mountains. accordingly he directed mr. lander to proceed up the yakima and over the nahchess pass in order to run the line to the sound. the governor had a remarkable faculty for getting information from people of every kind and condition, hudson bay company men, settlers, voyageurs, and indians, and always took great pains to learn all they could impart, while his keen and sound judgment enabled him to distinguish the chaff from the wheat in their reports. having provided fresh animals for mr. lander, given him his written instructions, and in conversation urged upon him the entire feasibility of the survey intrusted to him, the governor, with mr. stanley, on november 8 started down the columbia in a canoe managed by voyageurs, and reached the dalles on the 12th. says the governor:- "we took with us two days' provisions, and were four days in reaching the dalles, having been detained nearly two days in camp by a high wind which blew up the river, but we eked out our scanty stores by the salmon generously furnished us by the indian bands near us. at the principal rapids i got out and observed the movements of the canoe through them, and, from the best examination which i was able to make, i became at once convinced that the river was probably navigable for steamers. i remained at the dalles on the 13th to make arrangements for the moving forward of the parties and for herding the animals, looking to a resumption of the survey, where i was the guest of major rains, and had a most pleasant time, meeting old acquaintances and making new ones with the gentlemen of the post. on the 14th i reached the cascades, where i passed the night. here i met several gentlemen--men who had crossed the plains, and who had made farms in several states and in oregon or washington--who had carefully examined the yakima country for new locations, and who impressed me with the importance of it as an agricultural and grazing country. november 15 we went down the river in a canoe, and on the 16th reached vancouver, where i remained the 17th, 18th, and 19th as the guest of colonel bonneville, and where i also became acquainted with the officers of the hudson bay company. "leaving vancouver on the 20th, i reached olympia on the 25th, where for the first time i saw the waters of puget sound. no special incident worthy of remark occurred on the journey, except that i was four days going up the cowlitz in drenching rains, and two nights had the pleasure of camping out. i will now advise voyageurs in the interior, when they get suddenly into the rains west of the cascades, to take off their buckskin underclothing. i neglected to do this, and among the many agreeabilities of this trip up the cowlitz was to have the underclothing of buckskin wet entirely through. i was enabled to examine the country pretty carefully all the way to olympia, and had with me a very intelligent man, who could point out localities and inform me about the country not in view of the road; and i saw that not only was it entirely practicable for a railroad line to the sound, but that the work was light, and the material for construction of all kinds entirely inexhaustible. "after considerable delays at vancouver, the gentlemen of the parties under captain mcclellan and lieutenant donelson arrived at olympia for office duty, being preceded a few days by mr. lander, who for reasons not conclusive to my mind did not persevere in the examination of the nahchess pass. one of his reasons for not continuing his examination was that it was not on the railroad line, which did not apply, because that fact was well known to him previously, having been announced to him positively in my written instructions. i did not censure mr. lander for not continuing on this duty, as i know the perplexity of mind in which one is placed by the contradictory character of the information gained; but i resolved to get my line to the sound, and accordingly dispatched an express to the walla walla, directing mr. tinkham on his arrival at that point to cross to puget sound by the snoqualmie pass, my object being twofold,--to get at some facts which would decisively settle the question of the depth of snow, in regard to which captain mcclellan and myself differed, as well as really to connect our work with the sound itself." thus lander purposely balked the task intrusted to him, and threw away another fine opportunity of achieving credit for himself. upon mcclellan's arrival at olympia, governor stevens directed him to take up from the sound the reconnoissance for a railroad line to the snoqualmie pass, connecting with his examination on the eastern side, which had extended three miles across the summit. but again mcclellan failed to accomplish the task, deterred as usual by the reports of indians, and magnified difficulties. leaving olympia december 23, with mr minter, civil engineer, and four men, he spent five days at steilacoom in a vain attempt to procure horses and guides for the snoqualmie falls, intending to proceed thence on snowshoes. then he went by canoe down the sound and up the snohomish river to the falls, and pushed forward on foot four miles to the prairie just above the falls. "i found," he reports, "the prairie to be about as represented,--in places bare, but in others with three or four inches of snow. leaving my companions at the indian bivouac to make the best preparations they could for passing the night (for we had neither tent, blanket, nor overcoat), i went forward on the trail with two indians. "as soon as we left the prairie the ground became entirely covered with snow; it soon became a foot deep in the shallowest spots, and was constantly increasing. all signs of a trail were obliterated,--the underbrush very thick and loaded with snow,--the snow unfit for snowshoes, according to the indians. i now turned back to our bivouac, and there awaited the arrival of an indian who was out hunting, and who was said to possess much information about the country. he soon arrived, and proved to be a very intelligent yakima, whom i had seen on the other side of the mountains in the summer. he had been hunting in the direction i wished to go, and stated that the snow soon increased to 'waist-deep' long before reaching the nooksai-nooksai, and that it was positively impracticable to use snowshoes. he also said that the indians did not pretend to cross over the mountains at this season, but waited till about the end of march, and then took their horses over. "next morning, after again questioning the indian, i reluctantly determined to return, being forced to the conclusion that, if the attempt to reach the pass was not wholly impracticable, it was at least inexpedient under all the circumstances in which i was placed."[7] could any man but mcclellan have seriously asserted that "it was positively impracticable to use snowshoes" on snow, and that, too, on the authority of indians, who were notoriously unreliable, and who, in their jealousy of white exploration, habitually exaggerated the difficulties of the country? this seems the very acme of imaginary obstacles. it was january 10 that mcclellan turned back. had he manfully taken to his snowshoes, he could have reached the summit in three or four days, and connected with his reconnoissance on the eastern side, and this was soon demonstrated to his deep disgust. far different was the action and spirit of tinkham. he had just arrived at walla walla from a remarkable and arduous trip, during which he crossed the rocky mountains by the marias pass, proceeded to fort benton, recrossed the mountains by a more southern pass to the bitter root valley, and thence crossed the bitter root range on snowshoes by the rugged southern nez perces trail, when he received governor stevens's instructions to push to the sound by way of the snoqualmie pass. starting from walla walla on january 7 with two indians, he proceeded up the yakima to its head on horseback, and there leaving his animals, he crossed the mountains on snowshoes, and reached seattle on january 26, seven days after leaving the eastern base of the divide, and twenty days from walla walla. he carefully measured the depth of snow and reported:- "from lake kitchelus to the summit, some five miles, and where occurs the deepest snow, the average measurement was about six feet, but frequently running as high as seven feet. passing on to the west side of the cascades, the snow rapidly disappears; fourteen miles from the summit there was but eight inches of snow, and thence it gradually faded away as approach was made to the shores of the sound: for only a few miles was the snow six feet deep; the whole breadth over twelve inches deep was somewhat less than sixty miles in extent." thus tinkham actually crossed the range and reached the sound, making the very trip that mcclellan pronounced "impracticable" and would not even try, only ten days after the latter's failure. but mcclellan's pride was hurt by this incident. he took governor stevens's opinion as to the snow question, and his action in sending tinkham across the pass, in high dudgeon as a reflection on himself, and, regardless of the true friendship shown him and benefits conferred upon him by the governor, treated him with marked coldness. in his usual generous and magnanimous way, governor stevens took no notice of this changed attitude of mcclellan, but gave him all possible credit in his reports. some years afterwards, when governor stevens was in congress, their mutual friend, captain j.g. foster, came to him, and said that mcclellan wished to meet him again and renew their old friendship. accordingly they met at willard's, and mcclellan appeared as cordial and agreeable as of old. captain mcclellan had been instructed, after completing his reconnoissance of the snoqualmie pass, to examine the harbors on the eastern shore of the sound as far as bellingham bay. but he gave up this duty also, after proceeding a single day's trip in canoes about twenty miles north of the mouth of the snohomish river to the northern extremity of mcdonough or camano island, where he encamped for the night, alleging as usual the inclemency of the weather: "during that night six inches of snow fell and a violent gale arose, so that on the next day we were unable to proceed. on the next day (14th), the wind still continuing dead ahead and very violent, i turned back," etc. yet at this very time governor stevens was making a complete tour of the sound in a small open sailboat, regardless of wind and weather. mcclellan also failed to do anything towards opening the military road across the cascades between steilacoom and fort walla walla; and lieutenant richard arnold, under the governor's general supervision, relieved him of the charge of the road, and completed it in 1854. it will be remembered how governor stevens had placed this road in mcclellan's hands, had furnished him with information and correspondence relating to it, and had advised him to consult with the prominent settlers in regard to the best location of it. of these people the governor remarks in his report:- "they have crossed the mountains, and made the long distance from the valley of the mississippi to their homes on the pacific; they have done so frequently, having to cut out roads as they went, and knowing little of the difficulties before them. they are therefore men of observation, of experience, of enterprise, and men who at home had by industry and frugality secured a competency and the respect of their neighbors; for it must be known that our emigrants travel in parties, and those go together who were acquaintances at home, because they mutually confide in each other. i was struck with the high qualities of the frontier people, and soon learned how to confide in them and gather information from them." contrast with this mcclellan's assertions in his letter to secretary of war davis, of september 18, 1853:- "but the result of my short experience in this country has been that not the slightest faith or confidence is to be placed in information derived from the employees of the hudson bay company, or from the inhabitants of the territory; in every instance, when i have acted upon information thus obtained, i have been altogether deceived and misled." but he was ready enough to adopt the reports of indians in support of obstacles which existed chiefly in his own imagination. footnotes: [7] pacific r.r. reports, vol. i. pp. 622-624. chapter xxii organizing civil government.--the indian service it was indeed a wild country, untouched by civilization, and a scanty white population sparsely sprinkled over the immense area that were awaiting the arrival of governor stevens to organize civil government, and shape the destinies of the future. a mere handful of settlers, 3965 all told, were widely scattered over western washington, between the lower columbia and the strait of fuca. a small hamlet clustered around the military post at vancouver. a few settlers were spread wide apart along the columbia, among whom were columbia lancaster on lewis river; seth catlin, dr. nathaniel ostrander, and the huntingtons about the mouth of the cowlitz; alexander s. abernethy at oak point; and judge william strong at cathlamet. some oystermen in shoalwater bay were taking shellfish for the san francisco market. at cowlitz landing, thirty miles up that river, were extensive prairies, where farms had been cultivated by the hudson bay company, under the name of the puget sound agricultural company, for fifteen years; and here were a few americans and a number of scotch and canadians, former employees of that company, and now looking forward to becoming american citizens, and settling down upon their own "claims" under the donation act, which gave 320 acres to every settler, and as much more to his wife. a score of hardy pioneers had settled upon the scattered prairies between the cowlitz farms and the sound; among them were john r. jackson, typical english yeoman, on his prairie, ten miles from the cowlitz; s.s. saunders, on saunders's bottom, where now stands the town of chehalis; george washington, a colored man, on the next prairie, the site of centralia; judge sidney s. ford on his prairie on the chehalis river, below the mouth of the skookumchuck creek; w.b. goodell, b.l. henness, and stephen hodgdon on grand mound prairie; a.b. rabbeson and w.w. plumb on mound prairie. a number of settlers had taken up the prairies about olympia, the principal of whom were w.o. bush, gabriel jones, william rutledge, and david kendrick on bush prairie; j.n. low, andrew j. chambers, nathan eaton, stephen d. ruddell, and urban e. hicks on chambers's prairie; david j. chambers on the prairie of his name. james mcalister and william packwood were on the nisqually bottom, at the mouth of the river, just north of which, on the verge of the nisqually plains, was situated the hudson bay company post, fort nisqually, a parallelogram of log buildings and stockade, under charge of dr. w.f. tolmie, a warm-hearted and true scot. great herds of spanish cattle, the property of this company, roamed over the nisqually plains, little cared for and more than half wild, and, it is to be feared, occasionally fell prey to the rifles of the hungry american emigrants. two miles below olympia, on the east side of the bay, was located a catholic mission under fathers ricard and blanchet, where were a large building, an orchard, and a garden. they had made a number of converts among the indians. towns, each as yet little more than a "claim" and a name, but each in the hope and firm belief of its founders destined to future greatness, were just started at steilacoom, by lafayette balch; at seattle, by dr. d. s. maynard, h.l. yesler, and the dennys; at port townsend, by f.w. pettygrove and l.b. hastings; and at bellingham bay, by henry roder and edward eldridge. save the muddy track from the cowlitz to olympia and thence to steilacoom, and a few local trails, roads there were none. communication was chiefly by water, almost wholly in canoes manned by indians. the monthly steamer from san francisco and a little river steamboat plying daily between vancouver and portland alone vexed with their keels the mighty columbia; while it was not until the next year that reckless, harum-scarum captain jack scranton ran the major tompkins, a small black steamer, once a week around the sound, and had no rival. here was this great wooded country without roads, the unrivaled waterways without steamers, the adventurous, vigorous white population without laws, numerous tribes of indians without treaties, and the hudson bay company's rights and possessions without settlement. to add to the difficulties and confusion of the situation, congress, by the donation acts, held out a standing invitation to the american settlers to seize and settle upon any land, surveyed or unsurveyed, without waiting to extinguish the indian title, or define the lands guaranteed by solemn treaty to the foreign company, and already the indians and the hudson bay company were growing daily more and more restless and indignant at the encroachments of the pushing settlers upon their choicest spots. truly a situation fraught with difficulties and dangers, where everything was to be done and nothing yet begun. it is a great but common mistake to suppose that the early american settlers of washington were a set of lawless, rough, and ignorant borderers. in fact they compare favorably with the early settlers of any of the states. as a rule they were men of more than average force of character, vigorous, honest, intelligent, law-abiding, and patriotic,--men who had brought their families to carve out homes in the wilderness, and many of them men of education and of standing in their former abodes. among them could be found the best blood of new england, the sturdy and kindly yeomanry of virginia and kentucky, and men from all the states of the middle west from ohio to arkansas. most of them had slowly wended their way across the great plains, overcoming every obstacle, and suffering untold privations; others had come by sea around cape horn, or across the isthmus. they were all true americans, patriotic and brave, and filled with sanguine hopes of, and firm faith in, the future growth and greatness of the new country which they had come to make blossom like the rose. governor stevens, as has been shown, at once appreciated the character of these people. after the arduous and exposed journey up the cowlitz by canoe,--where the indian crew had to gain foot by foot against the furious current of the flooded river, oftentimes pulling the frail craft along by the overhanging bushes,--and over the muddy trail by horseback, governor stevens reached olympia on november 25, 1853, just five months and nineteen days since starting from st. paul. he found here awaiting his arrival the new territorial secretary, charles m. mason, brother to his old friend colonel james mason, of the engineers, who had just come out by the isthmus route. mason was of distinguished appearance and bearing, with fine dark eyes and hair, fair, frank face, and charming but unobtrusive manner. he was highly educated, gifted with unusual ability, and a noble and amiable disposition, and was beloved by all who knew him. the other territorial officers on the ground were: edward lander, chief justice, and victor monroe, associate justice; j.v. clendenin, district attorney; j. patten anderson, marshal; and simpson p. moses, collector of customs. [illustration: charles h. mason _secretary of washington territory_] among the settlers welcoming their new governor were: edmund sylvester, the founder of olympia; colonel william cock, shirley ensign, d.r. bigelow, george a. barnes, h.a. goldsborough, john m. swan, c.h. hale, judge b.f. yantis, judge gilmore hayes, john g. parker, quincy a. brooks, dr. g.k. willard, colonel m. t. simmons, captain clanrick crosby, ira ward, james biles, joseph cushman, s.w. percival, edwin marsh, r.m. walker, levi and james offut, j.c. head, w. dobbins, isaac hawk, rev. g.f. whitworth, jared s. hurd, h.r. woodward, b.f. brown, and m. hurd. the arrival of the governor and his party was the great event for the little town, as well as for the new territory generally, and warm and hearty was his greeting by the pioneers. and when shortly afterwards, december 19, the governor delivered a lecture, giving a description of his exploration and an exposition of the northern route, their hopes and expectations were raised to the highest point, and they already saw in the mind's eye the iron horse speeding across the plains and through the mighty forests, and the full-flowing tide of immigration following its advent. without delay the governor issued his proclamation, as empowered by the organic act marking out and establishing election districts, appointing time (january 30) and places for holding the elections, for a delegate in congress and members of the legislature, and summoning that body to meet in olympia on the 28th of february. the indian service next engaged his attention. he appointed colonel m.t. simmons indian agent for the puget sound indians, with b.f. shaw and o. cushman as interpreters and assistants, and sent them to visit the different tribes and bands, to assure them of the protection and guidance of the great father in washington, to urge them to cultivate the soil and "follow the white man's road," that is, to adopt the habits of civilized life; and to impress upon them the necessity of making treaties, in order to prevent future trouble and secure them peace and safety. he also appointed a.j. bolon agent for the indians east of the cascades, and william h. tappan agent for the coast and river indians on the chehalis and columbia rivers, gray's harbor, and shoalwater bay. governor stevens deeply commiserated the condition and probable future of the indians under his charge, and felt the greatest interest and concern in their welfare and improvement. how wise, generous, and beneficent a policy he established in his treaties, with what great kindness, justice, and firmness he uniformly treated them, will be shown later in this work. it is enough to say now that the indians came to know him as their friend and protector, and to this day hold his memory in reverence; that the treaties he made and the policy he inaugurated have remained in force to the present time, and that under them the indians of washington have more fully preserved their rights and improved their condition than the aborigines of any other state. having thus started the civil government and indian service, and set the young men of the exploration hard at work preparing the reports, and, as already related, dispatched mcclellan to run the line from the sound to the snoqualmie pass, the governor took the sarah stone, a small sailboat, or "plunger," and, accompanied by mr. george gibbs, went down the sound in person, in order, as he states, "to visit and take a census of the indian tribes, learn something of the general character of the sound and its harbors, and to visit vancouver island and its principal port, victoria. "in this trip i visited steilacoom, seattle, skagit head, penn's cove, the mouths of the skagit and samish rivers, bellingham bay, passed up the channel de rosario and down the channel de haro to victoria, and on my return made port townsend and several other points on the western shore of the sound. we examined the coal mines back of seattle and bellingham bay, and saw a large body of indians of nearly all the tribes. i became greatly impressed with the important advantages of seattle, and also with the importance of the disputed islands." in a report to the secretary of war, written immediately after this trip, he remarks:- "i was agreeably impressed with elliott's bay, on which are the flourishing towns of seattle and alki, and i agree entirely in the opinion of captain mcclellan that it is the best harbor on the sound, and unless the approach to it from the pass should, on a more minute examination, prove less favorable than to some other point, which is hardly to be expected, that it is the proper terminus of the railroad." in his reports seattle is assumed as the terminus on the sound, and all the distances measured and calculations of cost, etc., are made with reference to that point as the western end of the route. the above is a provokingly brief and meagre record of this trip, which occupied the whole month of january, the same month that mcclellan, after balking the snoqualmie survey, turned back from camano island and abandoned the examination of the lower sound in consequence of the inclemency of the weather. the governor's trip could have been no holiday excursion, in an open sailboat in that stormy, rainy season, and among the swift tides and fierce gales of the lower sound. but it was fruitful in results. he grasped with the acute and discriminating eye of an engineer the whole system of waters and the several harbors and points of importance, talked with the principal men of each place and gleaned all the information they could furnish, and gained a comprehensive and correct idea of the numbers, distribution, and character of the indians. moreover, he met at victoria governor sir james douglass and the other officers there of the hudson bay company, and discussed with them their claims within our borders. he had now visited and personally examined all but one (fort okanogan) of that company's posts within his territory, colville, walla walla, vancouver, cowlitz farms, and nisqually, and had discussed their claims with the officers in charge of them, and with the chief factor, sir james douglass. as the result of this investigation he made, on his return to olympia, an exhaustive report to the secretary of state, setting forth in detail the actual holdings and improvements of the company at each point. he estimated that their value could not exceed $300,000, and recommended that a commission be appointed to adjudicate the claims, and that such sum be appropriated by congress to extinguish them. secretary marcy adopted his views and recommendations, and transmitted them to congress, and a bill appointing the commission and making the appropriation passed the senate the following session, but failed in the house. these claims remained a bone of contention between the countries for many years, until finally great britain, by means of a joint commission, and by sticking to the most extravagant demands with true bulldog tenacity, succeeded in wringing nearly a million dollars from the united states. at the election columbia lancaster was chosen delegate in congress. he was a lawyer by profession, and a man of ability and education. the legislature assembled on the appointed day, and governor stevens delivered his first message. briefly reviewing the great natural resources of the territory and its commercial advantages, with its unrivaled harbors and location to control in due time the trade of china and japan, he recommended the adoption of a code of laws, the organization of the country east of the cascades into counties, a school system with military training in the higher schools, and the organization of the militia. the latter he declared necessary in view of their remote situation, compelling them to rely upon themselves in case of war, for a time at least, and to enable them to draw arms and ammunition from the general government, which could be issued only to an organized militia force. he dwelt on the importance of extinguishing the indian title and the claims of the hudson bay and puget sound agricultural companies, and settling the boundary line on british territory, and recommended them to memorialize congress in behalf of these measures. he informed them that, under instructions from the secretary of state, he had already notified the foreign fur company that it could not be allowed to trade with indians within the territory, and would be given until july to wind up their affairs. he also urged them to ask congress for a surveyor-general and a land office, for more rapid surveys of public land, so that they might be kept in advance of settlement; to amend the land laws by facilitating the acquisition of title, and by placing single women on the same footing with married women; for a grant of lands for a university; for improved mail service; for roads to walla walla, to vancouver, and to bellingham bay along the eastern shore of the sound; and for continuing the geographical and geological surveys already begun. he boldly advocated the construction of three railroads across the continent, undoubtedly the first to foresee the necessity of more than a single line. from this time he always advocated three transcontinental roads. all these recommendations were promptly adopted by the legislature, except as regarded the militia, concerning which no action was taken; an unfortunate neglect, which left the people almost defenseless when the indian war broke out less than two years later. soon after arriving at olympia, governor stevens writes his friend halleck announcing his arrival and the successful achievement of the exploration. in this letter he expresses the opinion that the waters of san francisco bay and puget sound should both have their connections with the states by railroad. he asks halleck how lands should be donated and managed for the establishment of a university in washington territory, and his views as to a plan, etc. january 9 he writes joseph grinnell & co., of new york, a great mercantile and shipping and whaling firm, suggesting to them the establishing of a whaling and fishing depot on one of the harbors of the lower sound. halleck writes a cordial letter in reply to the governor's, and gives him a glimpse "behind the curtain" of california and southern democratic politics, which throws light on jefferson davis's action in shutting off the further exploration of the northern route. "i have by no means lost my interest in the democratic party, or the great public questions of the day. the first and most important of these is the great continental railroad. present examinations would seem almost conclusive against benton's central project. if so, this road must run from some point in new mexico to some pass near los angeles, and thence to san francisco (and san diego, perhaps). "if this southern route should be selected, it would lead to another northern route, perhaps the one explored by yourself to puget sound. even if a single road should be adopted on the central line, it must fork to san francisco and puget sound, the two great termini of the pacific coast. "the pro-slavery extension party will work very hard against the north pacific states, which must of necessity remain free. the first branch of this project was to call a new convention in california dividing it into two states, making the southern one a slave state, with san diego as the port and terminus of a railroad through texas. circulars and letters to that effect were sent to pro-slavery men in california, and the attempt made to divide the state, but it failed. the next move was to acquire lower california and part of sonora and chihuahua, making guaymas the terminus, and the newly acquired territory slave states. two separate plans were set on foot for the same object, the walker 'filibustering' expedition against lower california and sonora, and gadsden's treaty with santa anna. the former is thus far a most complete and contemptible failure, but rumor says the latter is likely to be successful, and will be undoubtedly, if backed with sufficient money. if the territory is acquired, it will be slave territory, and a most tremendous effort will be made to run _a_ railroad if not _the_ railroad from texas to guaymas, with a _branch_ to san francisco." amid all these pressing and engrossing official duties the governor found time to purchase his future homestead in olympia, block 84, and also a tract of ten acres a little farther back, where maple park is now situated. he also contracted for the purchase of the north half of the walker donation claim, a tract of three hundred and twenty acres situated a mile and a half south of the town and half way to tumwater. all these tracts were then buried in the dense and tall fir forest; but when the country was cleared, it appeared that the governor had selected them with unerring judgment, for they are the finest sites in the town or vicinity. during all this time the governor and the officers and scientific men of the exploration were hard at work on the reports of their operations, working up the observations, and classifying the collections. as mcclellan, donelson, lander, suckley, gibbs, arnold, tinkham, and grover successively reached olympia, bringing fresh contributions of information gathered in their trips, each took hold of the work. the offices of the survey were in two small, one-storied buildings on the west side of main street, between second and third, hired of father ricard, and presented a busy scene, filled with desks, tables, instruments, collections, maps, and papers, among which the young men were writing and working for dear life. lieutenant arnold and dr. suckley executed the reconnoissances intrusted to them most satisfactorily. lieutenant grover, starting from fort benton in january with his dog-train, crossed the main range to the bitter root valley, finding only eight inches of snow, and thence continued with horses down clark's fork and pend oreille lake and to the dalles. on reaching vancouver the governor dispatched an express to lieutenant mullan by spokane garry, who had accompanied him to that point, and in january he sent wagonmaster higgins with a second express to the same point. thus, by these expresses going and returning, he had the route between the bitter root valley and olympia traversed four times in addition to grover's trip. lieutenant mullan crossed the main continental divide six times that winter, extending his trips to fort hall, on the upper snake river, and traveling nearly a thousand miles. the explorations made by the young officers, including tinkham and doty, were very remarkable and valuable, and were attended at times with great exertions and privations, and full accounts of them are given in the final report. thus, by his winter posts and parties, the governor was solving, in the most complete and satisfactory manner, the questions of mountain snows and climates. from olympia he reported to secretary of war davis the results of the explorations, and particularly on these points. he urged that the posts be continued, and a closer examination made of the more favorable mountain passes, and that lines be surveyed from the northern route to great salt lake and to san francisco. at this juncture governor stevens received a curt and peremptory order from secretary davis, disapproving his arrangements, and ordering him to disband the winter parties and bring his operations to a close. acknowledging the receipt of the order, february 13, he declares that it shall be promptly obeyed, and continues:- "but i earnestly submit to the department the importance of the continuation of these surveys, and indulge the hope that congress will make liberal appropriations, both in a deficiency bill and in the general appropriation bill, in order that the field now so well entered upon may be fully occupied. "i will respectfully call the attention of the department to the peculiar circumstances of my exploration, which will, it seems to me, explain the exceeding of the appropriation, with every desire and effort on my part so to arrange the scale and conduct it as not to involve a deficiency. the field was almost totally new, rendering it impossible to form an estimate. much work of reconnoissance had to be done, which had previously been done for all the other routes, before a direction could be given to the railroad examinations and estimates proper. unforeseen expenses in the way of presents, etc., had to be incurred to conciliate the indian tribes, for our route was the only one, so far as i was informed, that at the time was deemed particularly dangerous; and the investigation of the question of snow was a vital and fundamental one, essential to making any reliable report at all, and included within the express requirements of the original instructions. i deeply regretted the deficiency which i found impending at fort benton, and i took at that place that course which i believed congress and the department would have taken under the circumstances." moreover, to provide funds indispensable for the immediate needs of the survey, the governor had drawn on corcoran and riggs, government bankers in washington, to the amount of $16,000, and these drafts all went to protest. but the secretary's order arrived too late to frustrate governor stevens's thoroughgoing measures for determining the snow question. the problem was solved before the work of the winter parties could be arrested, and this most important point was clearly and satisfactorily set forth in the report. the much-feared mountain snows were found to be greatly exaggerated, and to present no real obstacle to the operation of railroads. in this respect the report has been fully confirmed by subsequent experience, and in fact less difficulty has been encountered from snow in the mountains than on the plains of dakota. he decided, therefore, to hasten to washington the earliest moment his threefold duties of the governorship, indian service, and the exploration would admit of, filled with the fixed determination to prevent the discontinuance of the exploration, to secure the payment of the protested drafts, and to enlighten the government as to the necessity of the blackfoot council, and of extinguishing the indian title within his own territory. to justify his going without leave first obtained, the legislature passed a joint resolution that "no disadvantage would result to the territory should the governor visit washington, if, in his judgment, the interests of the northern pacific railroad survey could thereby be promoted." chapter xxiii return to washington.--report of exploration governor stevens left olympia on march 26, and, proceeding by way of the cowlitz to the columbia, and by steamer down the coast, reached san francisco early in april. here he found a group of his old friends and brother officers, including mason, halleck, and folsom, and how warmly he was received by them, and how interesting they found his accounts of the exploration, the indians, and the many wild and new scenes he had passed through, may be imagined. his arrival attracted much public attention; his exploration was deemed a very important and remarkable one, and one conducted with remarkable ability and success; and in music hall, on bush street, april 13, before a crowded audience, and introduced by mayor garrison, he gave an able address upon the northern route. in this address he boldly advocated three railroads across the continent, declaring that the subject of internal communications was too great to be treated from a sectional point of view. he demonstrated the favorable character of the route and country he had explored, the navigability of the upper columbia and missouri, and the little obstruction from snows. the impression made by this address is reflected in the editorial of the san francisco "herald:"- "of all the surveys ordered by the general government at washington with a view to the selection of a route for a railroad across the continent, that intrusted to governor stevens is by far the most satisfactory. he took the field in june last, having left the mississippi river on the 15th of that month, and, moving steadily westward,--throwing out parties on the right and left of his line, surveying every stream of any consequence, exploring every pass again and again,--he has accomplished in that time the survey of a belt extending two thousand miles from east to west, and from one hundred and fifty to two hundred miles from north to south. in the rocky mountains his explorations have extended over four hundred miles from north to south, and in the cascade mountains over two hundred and fifty miles. while the main work of reconnoissance was going on, the auxiliary departments of geology, natural history, botany, etc., were prosecuted with vigor and success. the results obtained in so short a space of time are, as far as we are aware, unparalleled. "the route thus occupied by governor stevens and his party is the route of the two great rivers across the continent, the missouri and columbia. their tributaries interlock; the whole mountain range is broken down into spurs and valleys, and no obstruction exists from snow. the whole route is eminently practicable. the highest grade will be fifty feet to the mile. the summit level of the road will be about five thousand feet above the sea. there will be but one tunnel. the snows will be less than in the new england states. the missouri river has been surveyed, and found to be navigable for steamers to the falls, about seven hundred miles from puget sound, and five hundred miles to the point where the main columbia is first reached by railroad from the east. this five hundred miles is in part along clark's fork, affording one hundred miles navigable for steamers. "the results of the survey may be summed up as follows: three lines run from the mississippi river to the rocky mountains; nine passes explored in the rocky mountains; three lines run from the rocky mountains to the columbia river and puget sound; the cascades explored from the columbia to the 49th parallel; puget sound examined with reference to a railroad depot; the fact that not the slightest obstruction will occur from snow established beyond controversy." after a short stay in san francisco, governor stevens took the steamer for the isthmus, and reached new york in may, and the next morning had a joyful reunion with his wife and little girls in newport. after his severe and long-continued labors, the sea voyage compelled him to a much-needed rest. on such voyages he threw off his wonted intense, high pressure mood of work, and, with mind relaxed, enjoyed the soothing influence of old neptune. he proceeded immediately to washington with his family, except his son, who was at school at phillips academy in andover, and who joined him later at the summer vacation, and took rooms at the national hotel on pennsylvania avenue. a great deal was still to be done to complete the report of the exploration, and with tinkham, osgood, and other assistants he drove it with his accustomed vigor. on june 30 he submitted it to the department, the first report of all the routes, although it covered the greatest field, and was by far the most comprehensive and exhaustive. secretary davis, recognizing that in his measures for prosecuting the survey governor stevens was actuated solely by zeal for the public service, submitted an estimate to cover the deficiency, which was duly appropriated, and the protested drafts were honored. general hunt gives the following incident, which shows the confidence governor stevens's old friends had in his ability to carry his points:- "i followed him in the thorough work he made of the northern pacific railway survey,--of his row with jeff davis for overrunning in his expenditures the amount assigned him, and so preventing jeff's designs of defeating that road. in 1854 i had, at fort monroe, occasion to describe your father to old major holmes, a classmate of jeff. he went to washington, and on his return told me, 'your friend stevens is ruined. davis refuses to recommend to congress to make good the expenditures as contrary to orders. it will ruin stevens.' 'wait awhile,' said i; 'i see by the last "union" that stevens has just arrived en route to washington at panama. he will leave jeff _nowhere!_' soon after he arrived in washington, was followed by an appropriation covering all his bills, and so jeff failed all round." secretary davis was in fact astonished and deeply disappointed at the results of the survey, and the very favorable picture of the northern route and country given in governor stevens's report. a leader among the southern public men, who were so soon to bring on the great rebellion, of which he was to be the official head, he had set his heart upon the southern route, and was anxious to establish its superiority to all others and secure its adoption as the national route, in order to aggrandize his own section. he could ill brook, therefore, governor stevens's clear and vivid description of the northern route, showing its great superiority in soil and climate, the easy grades, absence of snow, and accessibility by inland river navigation. he chose to consider the accounts overdrawn as the best way of sustaining his chosen route. in his report to congress, transmitting the surveys of the several routes, he took great pains to belittle the results of governor stevens's labors and disparage the northern route. in his comparison of routes, he arbitrarily increased the governor's estimate of cost from $117,121,000 to $150,871,000, or nearly $38,000,000; magnified the physical difficulties; condemned the agricultural resources; declared that "the country west of the rocky mountains to the pacific slope may likewise be described as one of general sterility," and that "the severely cold character of the climate throughout the whole route, except the portion west of the cascade mountains, is one of its unfavorable features." he ignored the governor's statements, and tinkham's reconnoissance as to the snow in the snoqualmie pass, and the practicability of the latter, and, quoting mcclellan with approval, declared that "the snow is twenty feet deep, the pass barely practicable, and the information now possessed is sufficient to decide against this route." it is significant that he pays a warm compliment to mcclellan, remarking that "his examination presents a reconnoissance of great value, and, though performed under adverse circumstances, exhibits all the information necessary to determine the practicability of this portion of the route." and this of an officer who had consumed a whole month in moving one hundred and eighty miles; lay another month in camp in the yakima valley, making only the most cursory examinations; found the passes non-existent, or "impracticable;" reported the snow twenty to twenty-five feet deep on the credit of indians; ignobly quailed at inclement weather and snows, which other men bravely faced and overcame; and generally condemned the country, and vilified the hardy pioneers. in sober truth mcclellan found credit in the eyes of the secretary, not for what he accomplished, but for what he failed to accomplish, for his unfavorable and condemnatory report on the route and the country, which was precisely the kind of testimony the secretary wanted. the country, stigmatized as one of "general sterility," and which governor stevens pronounced a fine, arable region of great fertility, is now one of the great wheat-fields of the country, yielding twenty to thirty million bushels a year. moreover, mr. davis manifested a dissatisfied and fault-finding spirit towards the governor. on one occasion, when the latter was calling on him, and asking his attention to some matter of importance connected with the survey, davis interrupted him with marked impatience, and intimated that he had no time to hear him. "i do not come here to talk with jefferson davis," exclaimed the governor with dignity, "but to confer with the secretary of war upon the public business intrusted to my charge, and i demand his attention." the secretary at once gave him full and considerate hearing until the matter was fully gone into, and as the governor took his leave, followed him to the door, and frankly apologized for his momentary rudeness. jefferson davis was not without generous and magnanimous traits, and appreciated the earnest and sincere character of his caller. but he put a stop to further work on the northern route, prevented any more appropriations for it, and kept up his fight against it. some time afterwards, in speaking of the route to a mutual friend,[8] he declared: "governor stevens is a man of great ability, and of upright and high-toned character, but he has entirely misconceived and exaggerated the agricultural resources of the northern route. the fact is, he has no knowledge of agricultural soils or conditions." when this was repeated to the governor he remarked: "indeed, perhaps mr. davis does not know that i was brought up on a farm until my seventeenth year." but governor stevens indulged in no complaints at this unworthy treatment. he knew that the information given in his report was too well founded and abundant to be refuted by mere official rancor. despite the deprivation of funds, he continued the work of exploration, survey, and observation for the next three years, making free use of the indian agents and volunteer troops under his command, and unsparing in his own personal exertions, and on february 7, 1859, submitted to the war department "my final report of the explorations made by me and under my direction in the years 1853, 1854, and 1855, to determine the practicability of the northern route for a railroad to the pacific." this report, published by order of congress in two large quarto volumes, as parts i. and ii., vol. xii., pacific railroad reports, contains over eight hundred pages, with plates, tables, and views, and most fully sustains the earlier report, besides adding an immense amount of new information. and this was governor stevens's answer to secretary davis. but the governor found the sultry summer in washington a very trying one, in cramped quarters, overburdened with the voluminous data and details of the report, and subject to many annoyances. unfortunately, the meteorological and astronomical observations, while in care of lieutenant donelson, were lost, presumably on the isthmus, by the carelessness of the express company, and could not be recovered, although that officer returned to san francisco expressly in search of them, and this loss caused serious embarrassment. the governor found, too, that some of the scientific corps were proposing to publish as their own separate work the materials gathered as members of the exploration, and had to adopt decided and severe measures to prevent the barefaced attempt. during great part of july he was seriously ill, and incapacitated from work. in addition to all these labors and cares, he obtained the sanction of the government for holding the blackfoot council he had so much at heart, for which he was appointed a commissioner, and allotted $10,000 for assembling and bringing the western indians to fort benton. his views and recommendations in regard to treating with the indians of washington territory, and purchasing their lands, were also adopted, and he was appointed the commissioner to make such treaties. as already stated, his recommendations in regard to the claims of the hudson bay company were adopted by the secretary of state. congress appropriated $30,000 for a wagon-road from fort benton to walla walla, a matter which the governor strenuously urged; and also amended the land laws, created the office of surveyor-general, and made appropriations for universal surveys and mail service. to all these matters "governor stevens addressed himself with the energy, ability, and straightforwardness which were his characteristics, supplementing the feebler efforts of lancaster, and, with lane of oregon, coming to the rescue of the most important bills for washington, and really doing the work of the delegate."[9] notwithstanding secretary davis's attitude on the northern route, governor stevens seems to have lost none of his influence with the administration. when about to return to the pacific coast, president pierce invited him to write him personally and frequently. footnotes: [8] major george t. clark. [9] bancroft's _pacific states_, vol. xxvi. p. 88. chapter xxiv crossing the isthmus governor stevens, with his family, consisting of his wife, four children, the two youngest being only two and four years old respectively, and the nurse ellen, a bonny young irish woman, sailed from new york, september 20, 1854, en route for his far western home. the vessel was packed full, with thirteen hundred passengers. the food was execrable, meats and poultry tainted and almost uneatable. ice was charged extra, twenty-five cents a pound. the second cabin table rivaled at times a scene from bedlam. the hungry passengers would often hurl the spoiled chickens overboard amid loud complaints, laughter, and the imitated crowing and cackle of cocks and hens. christy's minstrels were on board, bound to san francisco,--a reckless, noisy, drinking crew, but fine performers, both instrumental and vocal, and always ready and willing to entertain the passengers with their pleasing melodies. the best state-rooms were allotted the governor and family, with seats next the captain at table, but the younger children had to sit at the second table. the ship put in at havana for a day, where the family enjoyed a delicious repast of broiled birds on toast and guava jelly at the dominica restaurant, and viewed the cathedral and tomb of columbus. crossing the caribbean sea in hot and sultry weather, they arrived at aspinwall on the 29th. this place was squalid, dreary, and repulsive. low, flat, swampy morass, some filled-in land; great pools of dirty, green, stagnant water; a frail, rickety wharf, which the ship hardly dared touch lest it fall over; a railroad track along the shore; a hundred yards back, a number of large, cheap-built wooden houses, like overgrown tenement houses, unpainted and dilapidated; the street a bed of mud, littered with broken boards and refuse lumber and piles of rubbish; black pigs roaming and rooting about; many rascally and worthless-looking natives, in whom the negro predominated,--the whole thoroughly wet down by heavy, drenching, tropical showers,--such was aspinwall, as the disappointed passengers landed, and sought the shelter of the buildings supposed to be hotels, but where almost everything was lacking except extortionate charges. after a comfortless night and miserable breakfast, the party embarked on the cars, and proceeded about twenty miles to the "summit," which was half way to panama, and as far as the road then extended, and which was reached about noon, and learned that the rest of the way across had to be made on horse or mule back. there were no animals ready, but it was announced that the party would have to wait until the next morning, when plenty of mules would be provided. some railroad sheds, a few native huts, and a huge pavilion, consisting of an immense pyramidal thatched roof surmounting low sides mostly open, comprised the only shelters, and into them the passengers flocked. the great pavilion belonged to a huge, jet black jamaica negro, named carusi, and was not partitioned off, consisting of nothing indeed but the earthen floor and the roof above it, with the low sides. at night this rude structure was thronged with the weary passengers. delicate ladies and children, rough men, and people of every kind and condition fairly covered the floor, or rather ground, seeking rest as best they could; while in the centre of the apartment, in a big, old-fashioned, four-poster bed, lay the gigantic carusi side by side with his fat wife, their ebony faces contrasting with the white pillows and sheets. the minstrels improved the occasion with banjo and song until late at night, when some of them, becoming drunk, began disturbing the company with oaths and obscene language, but governor stevens rebuked them in such stern and minatory manner that they were cowed, and relapsed into silence. the expected mules began arriving in small bands under charge of natives about noon the next day, and with much bargaining and contention the passengers secured their mounts, and started off in groups. the governor employed two natives to carry the two youngest children, who were mere babies, on their backs in chairs, and set off followed by the rest of the family mounted each on a mule. it soon began to rain in torrents. in an hour it as suddenly ceased, and the sun came out, hot and sultry, soon to be followed by another downpour, and so deluge and sunshine alternated all day. after riding two hours over narrow, muddy trails, and up and down steep though short hills, where the mules had trodden the clay into regular steps, they reached the chagres river, and found all the passengers who had preceded them collected on the bank, gazing in dismay on the raging yellow flood, for the stream was up under the tremendous rains, and fearing to essay its passage. after viewing the river carefully, the governor forced his mule into it, and, guiding him diagonally across, safely made the opposite bank. then, returning, he led the way across again, his little daughter sue, only eight years old, close behind on her mule, then the rest of the family, and after them followed all the waiting crowd. it was dark when they reached panama, and found shelter in an old cloistered stone convent, now used as a hotel, exchanged their wet clothes for dry purchased at the nearest shop, and obtained much-needed food and rest. but nothing was seen or heard of the natives with the two babies, since they stole off on a footpath soon after starting, and late in the evening the governor mounted a fresh animal, and with a guide went back to find them, spending the greater part of the night in a vain search. at breakfast the next morning the natives brought in the children, safe and well and perfectly contented. they had taken the little ones to their huts on account of the heavy rains, where the native women fed them and put them to bed, dried their clothes, and sent them in the next morning, safe and sound. during the day the passengers were taken out in boats to the steamer golden age, which was anchored in the bay three miles from the town. she was a larger and more commodious ship than the other. the voyage up the coast began the next morning. a stop of several hours was made in the land-locked harbor of acapulco, which the governor improved by taking his family ashore, and treating them to a dinner of fried chicken at a small posada on the old and quaint paved main street. the panama fever soon made its dreaded appearance among the passengers, owing to their exposure on the isthmus; many fell sick, and a considerable number died and were buried at sea. the weather was fine, the sea calm and smooth save for the long rollers of the pacific, and the voyage would have been an enjoyable one had it not been for the fearful fever and the crowded condition of the vessel. on the fourteenth day she entered the golden gate, and rested in the welcome port of san francisco. the governor took rooms at the oriental hotel. his wife and the three little girls were all seized with the fever on the ship, and their condition was serious when they landed. doctors hitchcock and hammond, old army friends of the governor, were unremitting in their attentions, and after several weeks' care brought the sufferers past the danger point, all except the little four-year-old maude. her case they at length pronounced hopeless. but her father would not give her up. he had a hot bath administered as a last resort, and sat by her bedside hour after hour, giving liquid nourishment drop by drop, and at last she passed the crisis and began to recover. by all this sickness they were forced to remain in the city over a month; but in the society of his old friends, and amid the bright, vigorous men and bustling scenes of the new-born metropolis, the time passed rapidly and well improved. folsom, a man of wealth, placed his fine carriage and horses at mrs. stevens's disposal. halleck would have long talks with the governor. dr. gwin and his family, old friends and neighbors, met them with real southern cordiality. one incident is worth relating, because it materially affected subsequent events, as the governor believed. a number of officers and other gentlemen were conversing together at the hotel one evening, among whom was general john e. wool, then commanding the united states forces on the pacific coast. the talk turned on the battle of buena vista, and general wool loudly claimed for himself all the credit for that battle, disparaging in an offensive manner general taylor and the part he took in it. at length governor stevens, whose strong sense of justice was outraged by the boastful and unfair tirade, spoke up and said: "general wool, we all know the brilliant part you bore in the battle, but we all know and history will record that general taylor fought and won the battle of buena vista."[10] wool, although visibly offended, made no reply to this rebuke, but it rankled and caused a bitter animosity, which subsequently found vent in hostile speech and action. the voyage up the coast was made without special incident; they crossed the bar, steamed up the columbia, and landed at vancouver early in november. here they remained a fortnight, the guests of captain brent, the quartermaster, in order to enable the sick members to gain strength sufficiently to stand the hard trip to the sound. after this brief stay the governor took his family on a little steamboat to portland, where they spent the night. the town then consisted only of a string of small wooden buildings along the river-bank. the street, or road, was a perfect quagmire of mud-holes. single planks laid along irregularly, with many intervals, furnished the only sidewalks. the next morning they embarked on a steamer and went down the river to rainier, where they landed. this place consisted of a wharf and a sawmill. it was called rainier, it was said, by way of a joke, because it rained here all the time; but doubtless it was named after mount rainier, which was named by admiral vancouver after a lord of the british admiralty. the party took canoes, manned by indians, the same afternoon, crossed the columbia, and paddled a few miles up the cowlitz to monticello, where they spent the night. at daylight the next morning the governor and family embarked in one large canoe, while the trunks and baggage followed in another, and pushed upstream against a swift current. there were in the canoe the governor, his wife and four children, the nurse, and a crew of four indians, two at each end. it was a dark, drizzling day, with frequent showers. the passengers sat upon the bottom of the canoe upon plenty of indian mats, and well wrapped in blankets, and, except for the constrained and irksome position, were fairly comfortable. the indians, urged by promise of extra pay, paddled vigorously. at the rapids (and it seemed that nearly all the stream was in rapids) they laid aside their paddles, and, standing up, forced the canoe ahead with poles, which they wielded with great skill and vigor. all day long they paddled and poled with unabated energy, now paddling where they could take advantage of an eddy or stretch of back water, now forcing the canoe up swift rapids, gaining inch by inch. it was after dark when they reached cowlitz landing, thirty miles above monticello, and found shelter for the night at the hospitable inn kept by dr. and mrs. u.g. warbass. writes mrs. stevens of this trip:- "we were placed in the canoe with great care, so as to balance it evenly, as it was frail and upset easily. at first the novelty, motion, and watching our indians paddle so deftly, then seize their poles and push along over shallow places, keeping up a low, sweet singing as they glided along, was amusing. as we were sitting flat on the bottom of the canoe, the position became irksome and painful. we were all day long on this cowlitz river. at night i could not stand on my feet for some time after landing. we walked ankle-deep in the mud to a small log-house, where we had a good meal. here we found a number of rough, dirty-looking men, with pantaloons tucked inside their boots, and so much hair upon their heads and faces they all looked alike. after tea we were shown a room to sleep in, full of beds, which were for the women. i was so worn out with this novel way of traveling that i laid down on a narrow strip of bed, not undressed, all my family alongside on the same bed. the governor sat on a stool near by, and, strange to say, slept sound through the long, dismal night. he had been shown his bed up through a hole on top of the shanty. he said one look was sufficient. men were strewn as thick as possible on the floor in their blankets. the steam generated from their wet clothes, boots, and blankets was stifling. one small hole cut through the roof was the only ventilation. "as soon as breakfast was over the next morning, we mounted into a wagon without springs and proceeded on our journey. the governor took m. in his arms to keep her from being jolted. there surely were no worse roads to be found anywhere in the world than this. the horses went deep in the mud every step; the wheels sank to the hub, and often had to be pried up. we forded rivers, the water coming above our ankles in the wagon. many big, deep holes they would jump over, making the horses run quick, when the wagon would jump across, shaking us up fearfully. in one of these holes our horses fell down, and we stuck fast in the mud. we were taken from the wagon by men of our party plunging up to their knees in the mud, and carrying us out by sheer force of their strength. after seating us upon a fallen log, the horses were with difficulty extricated from the mud. after another long day's tiresome travel we stopped at a log-house for the night. upon entering from the porch we found a big room, with a wood fire filling up one side, blazing and crackling, low chairs in front; in the centre of the room was a table with a clean cloth on it, and a repast of well-cooked food, relishing and abundant, was placed upon it, to which we did ample justice. our host was an englishman, a farmer, who was getting on well, a genial, hospitable man. his wife was a superior woman. she had crossed the plains with her first husband. on the journey they were surrounded by indians. he was killed. she was taken prisoner by these savages, and after passing through untold suffering she managed to make her escape, and after walking hundreds of miles, living upon berries by the way, she came into the dalles, a forlorn, starved woman, almost destitute of clothing, with her boy ten years of age. it was here our host met her and offered shelter to her child and herself, which she gladly accepted, and finally became his wife. she was a fine-looking woman and a thorough housekeeper, but had the saddest expression on her face. at night she took us across the yard into another log-house, where we found a bright fire burning on the hearth, and nice, clean beds. i felt like staying in this comfortable shelter, hearing the rain patter on the roof, until the rainy season was over, at least." the host referred to was john r. jackson. his farm was only ten miles from cowlitz landing, but the roads were in such wretched state that a whole day was consumed in traveling this short distance. after a cheerful breakfast the next morning, the journey was resumed. george w. stevens and several other gentlemen came out to meet the governor and family, and escorted them to olympia. the governor mounted his horse charlie, which he purchased of the red river half-breeds, and which was brought out to him. this was a great, powerful gray charger, of high spirit, and able to cover twelve miles an hour in a swinging trot without distress. it was another rainy, drizzling day. the road was almost impassable. at saunders's bottom, where the town of chehalis now stands, the mud was knee-deep for two miles, terribly wearing on the animals. at length, after fording the skookumchuck at its mouth, and traversing an extensive prairie, the wet, tired, and bedraggled party reached the log-house of judge sidney s. ford, and found hospitable shelter for the night, having traveled about twenty-five miles that day. the next day the party reached olympia late in the afternoon, after a thirty miles' journey over much better and pleasanter roads, traversing prairies over half the distance, including grand mound, little mound, and bush's prairies. it was a dreary, dark, december day. it had rained considerably. the road from tumwater to olympia was ankle-deep in mud, and thridded a dense forest with a narrow track. with expectations raised at the idea of seeing the capital and chief town of the territory, the weary travelers toiled up a small hill in the edge of the timber, reached the summit, and eagerly looked to see the future metropolis. their hearts sank with bitter disappointment as they surveyed the dismal and forlorn scene before them. a low, flat neck of land, running into the bay, down it stretched the narrow, muddy track, winding among the stumps which stood thickly on either side; twenty small wooden houses bordered the road, while back of them on the left and next the shore were a number of indian lodges, with canoes drawn up on the beach, and indians and dogs lounging about. the little hill mentioned is where now stands the masonic building, opposite the olympia hotel. the site of the indian camp is now columbia street, between third and fourth. there were only one or two buildings above, or south of, sixth street. the public square was a tangle of fallen timber. main street terminated in giddings's wharf, which was left high and dry at low tide. mrs. stevens continues her account as follows:- "at night we were told, on ascending a hill, 'there is olympia.' below us, in the deep mud, were a few low, wooden houses, at the head of puget sound. my heart sank, for the first time in my life, at the prospect. after ploughing through the mud, we stopped at the principal hotel, to stay until our house was ready for us. as we went upstairs there were a number of people standing about to see the governor and his family. i was very much annoyed at their staring and their remarks, which they made audibly, and hastened to get in some private room, where i could make myself better prepared for an inspection. being out in rains for many days had not improved our appearance or clothes. but there seemed no rest for the weary. upon being ushered into the public parlor i found people from far and near had been invited to inspect us. the room was full. the sick child was cross, and took no notice of anything that was said to her. one of the women saying aloud, 'what a cross brat that is!' i could stand it no longer, but opened a door and went into a large dancing-hall, and soon after, when the governor came to look me up, i was breaking my heart over the forlorn situation i found myself in,--cold, wet, uncomfortable, no fire, shaking with chills. what a prospect! how i longed to find myself back in my childhood's home, among good friends and relatives! just then we were told we were expected across the street. the governor had his office there, and had us taken directly there. it was a happy change. we went into a large, cheerful room, with the beds on the floor, a bright fire burning, book-cases filled with books smiling upon us. we soon had a good repast, and felt comfortable at last. in a few days we were at housekeeping, very pleasant indeed, all picking up in health, and good friends around us. "many of the people called on me. i found them pleasant and agreeable people; many of them were well-educated and interesting young ladies who had come here with their husbands, government officials, and who had given up their city homes to live in this unknown land, surrounded by indians and dense forests. "i remained three years at olympia, a great part of the time living alone with the children, the governor being away in all parts of the territory, making treaties with the indians, planning and arranging the settlement of the country. there was a pleasant company of officers, with their wives, stationed at steilacoom, twenty miles from olympia, with whom i became acquainted, and had visits from and visited. naval ships came up puget sound with agreeable officers on board. i had a horse to ride on horseback across the lovely prairies. almost daily i took a ride about the picturesque, beautiful country, with the rich, dense forests and snowy mountains, green little prairies skirted by timber, lakes of deep, clear water, all of which was new to me, affording great pleasure in exploring indian trails and country, which was completely new. i also had a boat built, in which i made excursions down the sound. about two miles down there was a catholic mission, a large, dark house or monastery, surrounded by cultivated land, a fine garden in front filled with flowers, bordered on one side, next the water, with immense bushes of wall-flowers in bloom; the fragrance, resembling the sweet english violet, filling the air with its delicious odor. father ricard, the venerable head of this house, was from paris. he had lived in this place more than twenty years. he had with him father blanchet, a short, thickset man, who managed everything pertaining to the temporal comfort of the mission. under him were servants who were employed in various ways, baking, cooking, digging, and planting. their fruit was excellent and a great rarity, as there was but one more orchard in the whole country. there was a large number of flatheads settled about them, who had been taught to count their beads, say prayers, and were good catholics in all outward observances; chanted the morning and evening prayers, which they sang in their own language in a low, sweet strain, which, the first time i heard it, sitting in my boat at sunset, was impressive and solemn. we went often to visit father ricard, who was a highly educated man, who seemed to enjoy having some one to converse with in his own language. he said the canadians used such bad french." mrs. stevens was still suffering from the panama fever, and it was a year before she and little maude recovered from it. the new quarters consisted of two long, one-story wooden buildings, one room wide, little more than sheds, hired of father ricard at $900 a year. they were cheaply built, without plastering, but lined inside with cotton cloth. there was a narrow passageway between them, from which doors gave access to the different rooms. in rear was a large yard, extending to the beach, upon which a gate in the rear fence opened, and where a boat was kept. the indian camp began at the corner of the yard. the governor had secured two men servants, agnew as cook, and w.f. seely, man of all work. the latter was a lusty young irishman, strong as a bull and quick as a cat, witty, boastful, brave, and devoted to the governor and his family. he was a member of the exploring party, where he had fought and beaten all the pugilistic heroes up to the wagon-master, c.p. higgins, by whom he had been handsomely vanquished, and whom he regarded ever after with great admiration and esteem. the family soon felt at home in the new abode, amid the novel scenes and experiences, and cheered by new and old friends. george stevens, mason, and lieutenant arnold came in and out like brothers. there were evans and kendall, who came with the exploration; major h. a. goldsborough, george gibbs, colonel simmons, frank shaw, and orrington cushman, known as "old cush," with his great red beard, a great favorite with children, and liked and trusted by both whites and indians. major james tilton, the surveyor-general, arrived with his family after a voyage around the horn,--a man of soldierly bearing and aristocratic tastes, who was to render valuable service. captain j. cain also arrived, as indian agent,--a typical indiana politician, but a man of parts and integrity and public spirit, and a true friend. the second legislature met on december 4, and the governor on the 5th delivered his message in person. after acknowledging the consideration shown him as their executive, and congratulating them on the flattering prospects of the territory, he recommended them to memorialize congress for roads, mail service, steamer lines, etc., and other needs, and mentioned with regret the failure of congress to provide for objects for which he had earnestly striven, viz., the extinction of the hudson bay company's claims, the running of the northern boundary line, and a geological survey of the coal measures. he urged the organization of an effective militia, referring to the danger of indian hostilities, his recommendation to the first legislature, and to the fact that the government had refused his recent applications for arms because the militia was not organized. he summed up the results of his exploration in saying: "beautiful prairies and delightful valleys, easy passes practicable at all seasons of the year, have taken the place of savage deserts and mountain defiles impracticable half the year from snow.... the more the country is examined, the better it develops." in closing he invoked their support of his efforts in behalf of the indians:- "i will indulge the hope that the same spirit of concord and exalted patriotism, which has thus far marked our political existence, will continue to the end. particularly do i invoke that spirit in reference to our indian relations. i believe the time has now come for their final settlement. in view of the important duties which have been assigned to me, i throw myself unreservedly upon the people of the territory, not doubting that they will extend to me a hearty and generous support in my efforts to arrange on a permanent basis the future of the indians of this territory." referring to the military road across the nahchess pass, he said:- "it would be a great benefit to those traveling this road should the legislature take some step toward sowing with grass-seed the small prairie known as the bare prairie, situated a little below the mouth of green river, as also the sides of the mountain known as la tãªte. these points are intermediate in a long distance destitute of grass, and are almost necessarily stopping-places on the march. a very small sum would cover the expense of planting them, and the advantage would be incalculable." this humane and sensible suggestion was turned into ridicule and defeated by one of those wiseacres, strong in their own conceit and ignorance, that infest most assemblies, who cried out, "governor stevens needn't try to make grass grow where god almighty didn't make it grow." there was great jealousy on the part of the settlers of the far-reaching claims of the hudson bay company, and under the influence of this feeling the council requested the governor to communicate any information he had as to the manner in which congress arrived at the estimated amount of $300,000 as the value of such claims. the attentions paid him by the officers of that company, in their open efforts to gain his goodwill and support, were well known, and, with the fact that an appropriation of the above amount for extinguishing the claims had passed the senate, had excited some mistrust as to the governor's action and attitude on that important question. in reply he simply gave a synopsis of his report to the state department, which set all doubts at rest. footnotes: [10] governor stevens's own statement. see bancroft's _pacific states_, vol. xxvi. p. 117, note. chapter xxv indian policy.--treaties on puget sound governor stevens regarded his indian treaties and indian policy, and his management of the indians of the northwest, as among the most important, beneficial, and successful services he rendered the country. by ten treaties and many councils and talks, he extinguished the indian title to a domain larger than new england; and by the blackfoot council and treaty he made peace between those fierce savages and the whites and all the surrounding tribes, and permanently pacified a region equally extensive, embracing the greater part of montana and northern idaho; and during the four years, 1853-56, he treated and dealt with over thirty thousand indians, divided into very numerous and independent tribes and bands, and occupying the whole vast region from the pacific to and including the plains of the upper missouri, and now comprising the states of washington, part of oregon, northern idaho, and the greater part of montana. moreover, by gaining the wavering friendship and fidelity of doubtful tribes, and even many members of the disaffected, he frustrated the well-planned efforts of the hostile indians to bring about a universal outbreak, and saved the infant settlements from complete annihilation at the hands of the treacherous savages. his indian policy was one of great beneficence to the indians, jealously protected their interests, and provided for their improvement and eventual civilization, while at the same time it opened the country for settlement by the whites. the wisdom with which it was planned, and the ability and energy with which it was carried out, during this brief period, are attested by the remarkable success which attended it, and by the fact that many of these tribes are to-day living under those very treaties, and have made substantial progress towards civilized habits. it is believed that in their extent and magnitude, in their difficulties and dangers, and in the permanence and beneficence of their results, these operations are without parallel in the history of the country. yet for several years governor stevens's indian treaties were bitterly assailed and misrepresented both by hostile indians and by officers high in authority; their confirmation was refused by the united states senate, and he himself was made the target for virulent abuse. it was his intention to write the history of these operations, an intention which the pressure of public duties during the few remaining years of his life, and his early death, prevented. in his final report on the northern route he remarks, in words of manly fortitude and confidence:- "i trust the time will come when my treaty operations of 1855,--the most extensive operations ever undertaken and carried out in these latter days of our history,--i repeat, i trust the time will come when i shall be able to vindicate them, and show that they were wise and proper, and that they accomplished a great end. they have been very much criticised and very much abused; but i have always felt that history will do those operations justice. i have not been impatient as to time, but have been willing that my vindication should come at the end of a term of years. let short-minded men denounce and criticise ignorantly and injuriously, and let time show that the government made no mistake in the man whom it placed in the great field of duty as its commissioner to make treaties with the indian tribes." and in another place he adds:- "i intend at some future day to give a very full account of these large operations in the indian service." in his journey across the plains, amid all the cares and labors of the great exploration, governor stevens took the utmost pains, by messages, talks, and councils to and with the blackfeet and other tribes, to prepare them for the great council and peace treaty which he saw was necessary for the opening and settlement of the country, and on arriving in his own territory was equally indefatigable in impressing upon the indians there the advantages of living at peace with the white man, of adopting his better mode of livelihood, and of securing the aid and protection of the great father in washington. among his first acts was the appointment of indian agents, and sending them to urge these views upon the tribes. it was high time for judicious and prompt action; for the indians, especially the powerful and warlike tribes of the upper columbia, were becoming alarmed at the way the whites were pouring into the country, and, under the invitation of congress given by the donation acts, were taking up their choicest lands without asking their consent. on his recent visit in washington he had impressed his views upon the government, obtained its sanction and authorization for the blackfoot council, and the necessary authority and funds for treating with the indians of his own superintendency. he now planned treating first with the tribes on puget sound and west of the cascades for the cession of their lands, then with the great tribes occupying the country between the cascades and rocky mountains for their lands, and then, crossing the rockies, to proceed to fort benton, accompanied by delegations from the hunting tribes of washington and oregon, and there hold the great pre-arranged peace council with the blackfeet, crows, and assiniboines of the plains east of the mountains, and the nez perces, flatheads, pend oreilles, etc., of the western slope. immediately on his return to olympia the governor sent out the agents and messengers to assemble the sound indians at designated points for council and treaty making, and early in january dispatched mr. doty with a small party east of the cascades to make the preliminary arrangements for bringing together in council the indians of that region. the indians on the sound, including those on the strait of fuca, numbered some eight thousand five hundred, and were divided into a great many tribes and bands. they were canoe indians, and drew most of their food from the waters, chiefly salmon and shell-fish, eked out with game, roots, and berries. those about the upper sound had bands of ponies, with which they roamed the prairies in summer. they lived in large lodges, several families together, constructed of planks split from the cedar, with nearly flat roofs, and often thirty or forty feet long and twenty wide. they showed no little artistic skill in their canoes, paddles, spears, fish-hooks, basket-work impervious to water, and mats of rushes. out of a single cedar-tree, with infinite pains and labor, they hewed and burned the most graceful and beautiful and finest canoe ever seen, the very model, in lines and run, of a clipper ship. these varied in size from the little fishing-craft, holding but two persons, to a great canoe carrying thirty. they held as slaves the captives taken in war and their descendants, and, singularly enough, the heads of the slaves were left in their natural state, while the skulls of the free-born were flattened by pressure during infancy into the shape of a shovel. many of the bands were remnants of former large tribes, for they had been greatly diminished in numbers by the ravages of smallpox and venereal disease. they lacked the energy and courage of the indians of the upper country, and lived in perpetual dread of the gigantic and savage northern indians,--the hydahs and other bands of tlinkits of british columbia and alaska,--who would periodically swoop down the coast in their great war canoes and raid these feebler folk, ruthlessly slaughtering the men, and enslaving the women and children. they suffered also, but to a less degree, from incursions of bands of yakimas across the mountains, equally on trade and plunder bent, whom they designated "klikitats," or robbers, a term which has been taken as a tribal name. to these dangers were now added the fear of the all-powerful and ever-increasing whites. thus situated and thus apprehensive, the messages and exhortations of the governor promising them protection, pointing out the way of bettering their condition, and of even imitating the envied superior race, broke upon them like a lighthouse in a dark night upon the storm-tossed mariner, relieved their fears and anxieties, and gave them hope. they hastened to assemble at the appointed council grounds, eager to listen to the new white chief, and to learn what he offered from the great father for their benefit. on december 7, only two days after delivering his message to the legislature, governor stevens organized his treaty-making force by appointing james doty secretary, george gibbs surveyor, h.a. goldsborough commissary, and b.f. shaw interpreter, colonel m.t. simmons having already been appointed agent. the governor assembled these gentlemen to confer upon the projected treaties. after giving his views, and showing the necessity of speedily treating with the indians and placing them on reservations, he had mr. doty read certain treaties with the missouri and omaha tribes, which contained provisions he deemed worthy of adoption, and invited a general and thorough discussion of the whole subject. so many points were settled by this frank and free interchange of views that mr. gibbs was directed to draw up a programme, or outline of a treaty, which on the next meeting on the 10th, after discussion and some changes, was adopted as the basis of the treaties to be made with the tribes on the sound, coast, and lower columbia. no better advisers could have been found than the men with whom he thus took counsel; and one is struck by the clever and considerate way in which he secured the best fruits of their knowledge and experience, and enlisted their best efforts in carrying out the work. simmons and shaw were old frontiersmen, among the earliest settlers, and had dealt much with, and thoroughly understood, the indians, and were respected and trusted by them. simmons has been justly termed the daniel boone of washington territory. shaw was said to be the only man who could make or translate a speech in chinook jargon offhand, as fast as a man could talk in his own vernacular. the chinook jargon was a mongrel lingo, made up for trading purposes by the fur-traders from english, french, and indian words, and had become the common speech between whites and indians, and between indians of different tribes and tongues. he greatly distinguished himself afterwards in the indian war as lieutenant-colonel of volunteers. gibbs and goldsborough were men of education, and had lived in the country long enough to know the general situation and conditions, and to learn much about the indians. gibbs, indeed, made a study of the different tribes, and rendered an able report upon them as part of the northern pacific railroad exploration. doty, a son of ex-governor doty, of wisconsin, was a young man of uncommon ability and energy, who had spent the preceding winter at fort benton, and had studied and made a census of the blackfeet. the salient features of the policy outlined were as follows:-1. to concentrate the indians upon a few reservations, and encourage them to cultivate the soil and adopt settled and civilized habits. 2. to pay for their lands not in money, but in annuities of blankets, clothing, and useful articles during a long term of years. 3. to furnish them with schools, teachers, farmers and farming implements, blacksmiths, and carpenters, with shops of those trades. 4. to prohibit wars and disputes among them. 5. to abolish slavery. 6. to stop as far as possible the use of liquor. 7. as the change from savage to civilized habits must necessarily be gradual, they were to retain the right of fishing at their accustomed fishing-places, and of hunting, gathering berries and roots, and pasturing stock on unoccupied land as long as it remained vacant. 8. at some future time, when they should have become fitted for it, the lands of the reservations were to be allotted to them in severalty. "it was proposed," reported the governor, "to remove all the indians on the east side of the sound as far as the snohomish, as also the s'klallams, to hood's canal, and generally to admit as few reservations as possible, with a view of finally concentrating them in one." it was found necessary, however, in consequence of the mutual jealousies of so many independent tribes, to allow more reservations than he first intended, but some of them were established temporarily, with the right reserved in the president to remove the indians to the larger reservations in the future. the schooner r.b. potter, captain e.s. fowler, was chartered at $700 per month, manned and victualed by the owner, to transport the _personnel_ and treaty goods from point to point on the sound. orrington cushman, sidney s. ford, jr., and henry d. cock, with several assistants, were employed as quartermasters, to prepare camps and council grounds, make surveys, etc. in all his councils governor stevens took the greatest pains to make the indians understand what was said to them. to insure this he always had several interpreters, to check each other and prevent mistakes in translation, and was accustomed to consult the chiefs as to whom they wanted as interpreters. "it was my invariable custom," he states in the introduction to his final railroad report, page 18, "whenever i assembled a tribe in council, to procure from them their own rude sketches of the country, and a map was invariably prepared on a large scale and shown to them, exhibiting not only the region occupied by them, but the reservations that were proposed to be secured to them. at the blackfoot council, the map there exhibited of the blackfoot country--of the hunting-ground common to the blackfeet and the assiniboines, of the hunting-ground common to the blackfeet and the tribes of washington territory, and of the passes of the rocky mountains by which this hunting-ground was reached--was the effective agent in guaranteeing to the indians the exact facts as to what the treaty did propose, and to give them absolute and entire confidence in the government." he always urged and encouraged the indians to make known their own views, wishes, and objections, and gave them time to talk matters over among themselves and make up their minds. between the sessions of the council he would have the agents and interpreters explain the terms and point out the benefits of the proposed treaty, and would frequently summon the chiefs to his tent, and personally explain matters to them, and draw out their ideas. he also frequently invited public officers, and citizens of standing, to attend the councils, and would make use of them also to talk with and satisfy the indians. all the proceedings of these councils, the deliberations and speeches as well as the treaties, were every word carefully taken down in writing, and transmitted to the indian bureau in washington, where they are now on file. no one can read these records without being impressed with governor stevens's great benevolence towards the indians, and the absolute fairness, candor, and patience, as well as the judgment and tact, he manifested in dealing with them. one is also likely to be enlightened as to the native intelligence, ability, and shrewdness of the indians themselves. the first council was held on she-nah-nam, or medicine creek, now known as mcalister's creek, a mile above its mouth on the right bank, just below the house of hartman, on a rising and wooded spot a few acres in extent, like an island with the creek on the one side (south) and the tide-marsh on the other. this stream flows along the south side of the nisqually bottom, parallel to and half a mile from the river. the governor and his party, including mason, lieutenant w.a. slaughter, of the 4th infantry, doty, gibbs, edward giddings, and the governor's son, hazard, a boy of twelve, went down to the treaty ground by canoes on december 24, and found a large space cleared of underbrush, the tents pitched, and everything made ready for the council by simmons, shaw, cock, cushman, and others, who had been sent ahead for that purpose. seven hundred indians of the tribes dwelling upon the upper sound and as far down as the puyallup river, including the nisqually, puyallup, and squaxon tribes, were encamped near by. it rained nearly all day. in the afternoon the indians drove a large band of ponies across the creek, forcing them to swim. provisions were issued to the chiefs to distribute among their people. on the following day the indians assembled, taking seats on the ground in front of the council tent in semi-circular rows, and the objects and points of the proposed treaty were fully explained to them. the governor would utter a sentence in simple and clear language, and colonel shaw would interpret it in the chinook jargon, which nearly all the indians understood. the governor was extremely careful to make the indians comprehend every sentence. colonel simmons, gibbs, cushman, and the citizens present, all knew the chinook, and attentively followed shaw as he interpreted, so that no mistake or omission could occur. it was slow and fatiguing work, this going over the ground sentence by sentence, and after several hours the indians were dismissed for the day, told to think over what they had heard, and to assemble again the next morning. the governor wished to give them time to fully understand and reflect upon the proposed treaty, and encouraged them to talk freely to himself or any of his assistants in regard to it. on the 26th the indians assembled about nine o'clock to the number of 650, and governor stevens addressed them as follows:- "this is a great day for you and for us, a day of peace and friendship between you and the whites for all time to come. you are about to be paid for your lands, and the great father has sent me to-day to treat with you concerning the payment. the great father lives far off. he has many children. some of those children came here when he knew but little of them, or of the indians, and he sent me to inquire about these things. we went through this country this last year, learned your numbers and saw your wants. we felt much for you, and went to the great father to tell him what we had seen. the great father felt for his children. he pitied them, and he has sent me here to-day to express these feelings, and to make a treaty for your benefit. the great father has many white children who come here, some to build mills, some to make farms, and some to fish; and the great father wishes you to learn to farm, and your children to go to a good school; and he now wants me to make a bargain with you, in which you will sell your lands, and in return be provided with all these things. you will have certain lands set apart for your homes, and receive yearly payments of blankets, axes, etc. all this is written down in this paper, which will be read to you. if it is good you will sign it, and i will then send it to the great father. i think he will be pleased with it and say it is good, but if not, if he wishes it different, he will say so and send it back; and then, if you agree to it, it is a fixed bargain, and payments will be made." the treaty was then read section by section and explained to the indians, and every opportunity given them to discuss it. governor stevens then said:- "the paper has been read to you. is it good? if it is good, we will sign it; but if you dislike it in any point, say so now. after signing we have some goods to give you, and next summer will give you some more; and after that you must wait until the paper comes back from the great father. the goods now given are not in payment for your lands; they are merely a friendly present." the indians had some discussion, and governor stevens then put the question: "are you ready? if so, i will sign it." there were no objections, and the treaty was then signed by governor i.i. stevens, and the chiefs, delegates, and headmen on the part of the indians, and duly witnessed by the secretary, special agent, and seventeen citizens present. the presents and provisions were then given to the chiefs, who distributed them among their people. towards evening mr. swan arrived with twenty-nine indians of the puyallup tribe, and reported twenty more on the way. they had started three days before, but had been detained by bad weather. the governor decided to send them presents from olympia. thus it will be seen that the governor first explained the objects and terms of the treaty generally, and the next day had the text of it read to them and also explained. the idea of selling their lands and being paid for them was not new to the indians, for the settlers were in the habit of assuring them, when they objected and complained at the appropriation and fencing up of their choicest camping, root, and berry grounds, that the great father would soon pay them well for their country. the scope and policy of the treaty will best appear by the following abstract of its thirteen articles:-1. the indians cede their land to the united states, comprising the present counties of thurston, pierce, and parts of mason and king. 2. sets off and describes the reservations, viz., klah-she-min island, known as squaxon island, situated opposite the mouths of hammersley's and totten's inlets, and separated from hartstene island by pearl passage, containing about two sections of land, or 1280 acres, a square tract of two sections near and south of the mouth of mcalister's creek, and another equal tract on the south side of commencement bay, now covered by the city of tacoma. provision is made for the indians to remove to these reservations, and for roads through them and from them to the nearest public highways. 3. gives the indians the right of fishing at their accustomed grounds, except the right of taking shell-fish from beds staked out or cultivated by citizens, and the rights of hunting, gathering berries and roots, and pasturing herds on unclaimed land. 4. $32,500 to be paid in annuities of goods, clothing, and useful articles during the next twenty years. 5. and $3250 to be expended in aiding the indians to settle on their reservations. 6. empowers the president to remove the indians to other reservations, when the interests of the territory require it, by remunerating them for their improvements. 7. prohibits the use of annuities to pay the debts of individuals. 8. prohibits war or depredations, and the indians agree to submit all grievances to the government for settlement. 9. excludes ardent spirits from the reservations on penalty of withholding annuities. 10. provides at a central or general agency a free school, a blacksmith shop, and a carpenter shop, and to furnish a blacksmith, a carpenter, a farmer, and teachers, all to give instructions for twenty years. 11. frees all slaves and abolishes slavery. 12. prohibits the indians from trading outside the dominions of the united states, and forbids foreign indians to reside on the reservations without the permission of the superintendent or agent. 13. the treaty to go into effect as soon as ratified by the president and senate. the twelfth article was aimed against the liquor traffic, and also to counteract the undue influence of the hudson bay company. it carried out the idea expressed in the governor's instructions to mcclellan and saxton at the outset of the exploration, already quoted. "the indians must look to us for protection and counsel.... i am determined, in my intercourse with the indians, to break up the ascendency of the hudson bay company, and permit no authority or sanction to come between the indians and the officers of this government." sixty-two indians signed this treaty, "chiefs, headmen, and delegates of the nisqually, puyallup, steilacoom, squawksin, s'homamish, steh-chass, t'peek-sin, squiaitl, and sa-ha-wamish tribes and bands of indians, occupying the lands lying around the head of puget sound and the adjacent inlets, who, for the purpose of this treaty, are to be regarded as one nation." the indians all made their marks to their names as written out in full by the secretary. they were: qui-ee-metl, sno-ho-dum-set, lesh-high, slip-o-elm, kwi-ats, sta-hi, di-a-keh, hi-ten, squa-ta-hun, kahk-tse-min, so-nan-o-youtl, kl-tehp, sahl-ko-min, t'bet-ste-heh-bit, tcha-hoos-tan, ke-cha-hat, spee-peh, swe-yah-tum, chah-achsh, pich-kehd, s'klah-o-sum, sah-le-tatl, see-lup, e-la-kah-ka, slug-yeh, hi-nuk, ma-mo-nish, cheels, knut-ca-nu, bats-ta-ko-be, win-ne-ya, klo-out, se-uch-ka-nam, ske-mah-han, wuts-un-a-pum, quuts-a-tadm, quut-a-heh-mtsn, yah-leh-chn, to-tahl-kut, yul-lout, see-ahts-oot-soot, ye-tah-ko, we-po-it-ee, kah-sld, la'h-hom-kan, pah-how-at-ish, swe-yehm, sah-hwill, se-kwaht, kah-hum-kit, yah-kwo-bah, wut-sah-le-wun, sah-ba-hat, tel-e-kish, swe-keh-nam, sit-oo-ah, ko-quel-a-cut, jack, keh-kise-be-lo, go-yeh-hn, sah-putsh, william. lesh-high, the third signer, was the principal chief and instigator of the indian war that broke out the following year, and, after the outbreak was suppressed, was tried and executed for the murder of settlers, after an excited controversy and strenuous efforts to save him on the part of some of the regular officers. born of a yakima mother, he was a chief of unusual intelligence and energy, had much to do with the hudson bay company's people at fort nisqually, by whom he was much trusted as a guide and hunter, and was supposed to be well affected towards the whites. the first signer, qui-ee-muth, was lesh-high's brother, and met with a more tragic fate, being slain by a revengeful settler after he was captured. sta-hi, the fifth signer, was killed during the indian war. the witnesses who signed the treaty, nineteen in number, including well-known public men and pioneers, were the following: m.t. simmons, indian agent; james doty, secretary; c.h. mason, secretary of the territory; w.a. slaughter, 1st lieutenant, 4th infantry, u.s. a.; james mcalister, e. giddings, jr., george shazer, henry d. cock, orrington cushman, s.s. ford, jr., john w. mcalister, peter anderson, samuel klady, w.h. pullen, f.o. hough, e.r. tyerall, george gibbs, benjamin f. shaw, interpreter, hazard stevens. the governor became satisfied at a later date that the reservations set off for the nisquallies and puyallups were inadequate for their future needs, being of inferior soil and heavily timbered, and in 1856 caused them to be exchanged for two larger tracts of fine, fertile bottom land,--one on the nisqually, a few miles above its mouth, and the other at the mouth of the puyallup river, directly opposite the city of tacoma, which the indians still occupy. in the evening, after the council broke up, the governor had another long conference with his advisory board, and settled the points and programme for other treaties. the next morning, directing gibbs to survey the lines of the two reservations on nisqually and commencement bays, and dispatching simmons and shaw with the rest of the party in the schooner to the lower sound to assemble the indians for the remaining treaties, he returned to olympia with mason and doty. the treaty was immediately forwarded to washington, and was ratified by the senate, march 3, 1855, but little over two months after the council. the treaty of point elliott. the next council was held at mukilteo, or point elliott, where, between january 12 and 21, the indians of the east side of the sound assembled to the number of 2300. on the latter date governor stevens arrived on the major tompkins, accompanied by secretary mason, and by his friend, dr. c.m. hitchcock, of san francisco, who was visiting the country. after a long conference with his assistants in regard to the most suitable points for reservations, and the views and feelings of the indians, he appointed gibbs secretary, in place of doty, who had departed on his mission east of the mountains, and directed him to prepare the draft of a treaty embodying the points decided upon, and in terms similar to the one recently concluded. the next morning the indians all assembled; the four head chiefs--seattle, chief of the duwhamish and other bands on white river and the sound within twenty miles of seattle; pat-ka-nim, chief of the snohomish; goliah, chief of the skagits; and chow-its-hoot, chief of the bellingham bay and island indians--took seats in front on the ground; the sub-chiefs occupied a second row, and the various tribes took places behind them in separated groups. the governor then addressed them as follows, colonel shaw interpreting:- "my children, you are not my children because you are the fruit of my loins, but because you are children for whom i have the same feeling as if you were the fruit of my loins. you are my children for whom i will strenuously labor all the days of my life until i shall be taken hence. what will a man do for his own children? he will see that they are well cared for; that they have clothes to protect them against the cold and rain; that they have food to guard them against hunger; and as for thirst, you have your own glorious streams in which to quench it. i want you as my children to be fed and clothed, and made comfortable and happy. i find that many of you are christians, and i saw among you yesterday the sign of the cross, which i think the most holy of all signs. i address you therefore mainly as christians, who know that this life is a preparation for the life to come. "you understand well my purpose, and you want now to know the special things we propose to do for you. we want to place you in homes where you can cultivate the soil, raising potatoes and other articles of food, and where you may be able to pass in canoes over the waters of the sound and catch fish, and back to the mountains to get roots and berries. the great father desires this, and why am i able to say this? here are two thousand men, women, and children, who have always treated white men well. did i not come through your country one year since? were not many of you now present witnesses of the fact? [all said governor stevens came.] did i then make promises to you? [all said he did not.] i am glad to hear this, because i came through your country, not to make promises, but to know what you were, to know what you wanted, to know your grievances, and to report to the great father about you. i have been to the great father and told him your condition. here on this sound you make journeys of three and four days, but i made a journey of fifty days on your behalf. i told the great father i had traveled six moons in reaching this country, and had never found an indian who would not give me food, raiment, and animals to forward me and mine to the great country of the west. i told him that i was among ten thousand indians, and they took me to their lodges and offered me all they had, and here i will pause and ask you again if you do not know that i have been absent several months on this business? [all shout, 'yes.'] i went away, but i left a good and strong man in my place. i call upon governor mason to speak to you." mr. mason then addressed them, and then the governor called upon colonel simmons, who made them a speech in chinook, at the conclusion of which the indians cheered. the governor then resumed:- "the great father thinks you ought to have homes, and he wants you to have a school where your children can learn to read, and can be made farmers and be taught trades. he is willing you should catch fish in the waters, and get roots and berries back in the mountains. he wishes you all to be virtuous and industrious, and to become a happy and prosperous community. is this good, and do you want this? if not, we will talk further. [all answer, 'we do.'] "my children, i have simply told you the heart of the great father. but the lands are yours, and we mean to pay you for them. we thank you that you have been so kind to all the white children of the great father who have come here from the east. those white children have always told you you would be paid for your lands, and we are now here to buy them. "the white children of the great father, but no more his children than you are, have come here, some to build mills, some to till the land, and others to build and sail ships. my children, i believe that i have got your hearts. you have my heart. we will put our hearts down on paper, and then we will sign our names. i will send that paper to the great father, and if he says it is good, it will stand forever. i will now have the paper read to you, and all i ask of you two thousand indians is that you will say just what you think, and, if you find it good, that your chiefs and headmen will sign the same." before the treaty was read, the indians sung a mass, after the roman catholic form, and recited a prayer. governor stevens: "does any one object to what i have said? does my venerable friend seattle object? i want seattle to give his heart to me and to his people." seattle: "i look upon you as my father. all the indians have the same good feeling toward you, and will send it on the paper to the great father. all of them--men, old men, women, and children--rejoice that he has sent you to take care of them. my mind is like yours; i don't want to say more. my heart is very good towards dr. maynard [a physician who was present]; i want always to get medicine from him." governor stevens: "my friend seattle has put me in mind of one thing which i had forgotten. you shall have a doctor to cure your bodies. now, my friends, i want you, if seattle has spoken well, to say so by three cheers. [three cheers were given.] now we call upon pat-ka-nim to speak his mind." pat-ka-nim: "to-day i understood your heart as soon as you spoke. i understood your talk plainly. god made my heart and those of my people good and strong. it is good that we should give you our real feelings today. we want everything as you have said, the doctor and all. such is the feeling of all the indians. our hearts are with the whites. god makes them good towards the americans." [three cheers were given for pat-ka-nim.] chow-its-hoot: "i do not want to say much. my heart is good. god has made it good towards you. i work on the ground, raise potatoes, and build houses. i have some houses at home. but i will stop building if you wish, and will move to cha-chu-sa. now i have given you my opinion, and that of my friends. their feelings are all good, and they will do as you say hereafter. my mind is the same as seattle's. i love him, and send my friends to him if they are sick. i go to dr. maynard at seattle if i am sick." [cheers for chow-its-hoot.] goliah: "my mind is the same as the governor's. god has made it so. i have no wish to say much. i am happy at heart. i am happy to hear the governor talk of god. my heart is good and that of all my friends. i give it to the governor. i shall be glad to have a doctor for the indians. we are all glad to hear you, and to be taken care of by you. i do not want to say more." [cheers were given for goliah.] the treaty was then read and interpreted to them, and the governor asked them if they were satisfied with it. if they were, he would sign it first, and then they should sign it. if not, he wished them to state in what they desired it to be altered. all having signified their approbation, it was signed first by governor stevens, and afterwards by the chiefs and headmen. the hour being late when the signing was finished, the distribution of the presents was deferred to the next day. tuesday, january 23. the indians having reassembled, governor stevens informed them that he was about to distribute some presents. they were not intended as payment for their lands, but merely as a friendly token of regard. he gave them but few things at this time, but the next summer he should again give them a larger present, when the goods intended for them arrived. seattle then brought a white flag, and presented it, saying: "now, by this we make friends, and put away all bad feelings, if we ever had any. we are the friends of the americans. all the indians are of the same mind. we look upon you as our father. we will never change our minds, but, since you have been to see us, we will always be the same. now! now! do you send this paper of our hearts to the great chief. that is all i have to say." the presents were then given to the chiefs to distribute among their people, the camp was struck, and the party embarked on board the steamer, which had been chartered for the purpose of expediting the preparations for the next council, that with the s'klallams and sko-ko-mish, but, a heavy blow coming on, she lay at anchor till morning. an indian express arrived with news that the indians were collected at fort gamble, awaiting the arrival of the governor. the tribes, as enumerated in the treaty, furnish a long list of unpronounceable indian names, as follows: dwamish, suquamish, sk-tahl-mish, sa-mah-mish, smalh-ka-mish, skope-ah-mish, sno-qual-moo, skai-wha-mish, n'quentl-ma-mish, sk-tah-le-jum, sto-luck-wha-mish, sno-ho-mish, skagit, kik-i-all-us, swin-a-mish, squin-a-mish, sah-ku-me-hu, noo-wha-ha, nook-wa-chah-mish, me-see-qua-guilch, cho-bah-ah-bish, and others. the fifteen articles of this treaty contain the same general provisions as that of she-nah-nam creek. the territory ceded by article 1 extends from the summit of the cascades to the middle of the sound, and from the 49th parallel as far south as the puyallup river, very nearly, and comprises the present counties of king, part of kitsap, snohomish, skagit, whatcom, island, and san juan. the reservations, articles 2 and 3, included 1280 acres at port madison, 1280 acres on the east side of fidalgo island, and the island called chah-chu-sa in the lummi river. an entire township on the northeast side of port gardner, embracing tulalip bay, was made the principal reservation, to which the indians might be removed from the smaller ones; $150,000 in annuities in goods, etc., for twenty years, and $15,000 for improvements on the reservation were provided. the rights of fishing, hunting, gathering berries and roots, and pasturage on vacant land were secured to the indians. slavery was abolished, liquor prohibited on the reservations, wars and depredations forbidden, and trading in foreign dominions prohibited. a free school, teachers, doctor, blacksmith and carpenter with shops, and a farmer were provided for, and provision made for eventually allotting the reservations to them in severalty. the first chief to sign the treaty was seattle, after whom was named the metropolis of the sound; the next was pat-ka-nim, then chow-its-hoot, then goliah, and then follows the long list of guttural and sibillant native names, unspeakable by white lips, some of which were accompanied by an alias, as the smoke, the priest, general washington, general pierce, davy crockett, etc. the treaty was witnessed by m.t. simmons, c.h. mason, charles m. hitchcock, h.a. goldsborough, george gibbs, john h. scranton, henry d. cock, s.s. ford, jr., orrington cushman, ellis barnes, p. bailey, s.m. collins, lafayette balch, e.s. fowler, j.h. hall, robert davis, and benjamin f. shaw,--seventeen in number. the ratification of this and all governor stevens's subsequent indian treaties was delayed some four years in consequence of the indian war which broke out in the fall of 1855, and the misrepresentations made concerning them, and the charges that they were the cause of the war,--misrepresentations and charges originally started by the hostile indians, and taken up by prejudiced army officers and political and personal enemies; and it was not until he entered congress, and personally vindicated his treaties before the government and senate, that they were ratified, on march 8, 1859. treaty of hahd-skus or point-no-point. the next council was held at point-no-point, on the west side of the sound, opposite the southern end of whitby island. the weather was very stormy on the 24th and 25th, but twelve hundred indians assembled here, comprising the s'klallams or clallams, who occupied the shores from half way down the strait of fuca to the council ground; the chim-a-kums, of port townsend bay and the lower end of hood's canal; and the skokomish or too-an-hooch, from hood's canal and the country about its southern extremity. the major tompkins reached point-no-point on the 24th, and, leaving the schooner at anchor, and the men on shore to form camp, ran down to port townsend to bring up additional provisions, and returned in the afternoon. on the 25th, notwithstanding the storm, the indians gathered at the council ground, and, having seated themselves in a circular row under their chiefs, governor stevens addressed them as follows:- "my children, you call me your father. i, too, have a father, who is your great father. that great father has sent me here to-day to pay you for your lands, to provide for your children, to see that you are fed, and that you are cared for. your great father wishes you to be happy, to be friends to each other. the great father wants you and the whites to be friends; he wants you to have a house of your own, to have a school where your children can learn. he wants you to learn to farm, to learn to use tools, and also to have a doctor. now, all these things shall be written down in a paper; that paper shall be read to you. if the paper is good, you will sign it and i will sign it. i will then send the paper to the great father. if the great father finds that paper good, he will send me word, and i will let you know. the great father lives a long way off, and some time will be required to hear from him. i want you to wait patiently till you hear from him. in the mean time the great father has sent to you some presents simply as a free gift. some of these presents i will give you to-day, but i shall give you more in the course of the summer. you will also have your agent, mr. simmons, to take care of you. this you will have all the time; and, when the paper comes from the great father, then you will have your own houses and homes and schools. now, what have you to say? if good, give your assent; if not, say so. now, sit quiet a moment, and the paper will be read." after the treaty had been read and interpreted, governor stevens again asked them if they had anything to say. che-lan-teh-tat, an old skokomish, then rose and said:- "i wish to speak my mind as to selling the land. great chief, what shall we eat if we do so? our only food is berries, deer, and salmon. where, then, shall we find these? i don't want to sign away all my land. take half of it, and let us keep the rest. i am afraid that i shall become destitute and perish for want of food. i don't like the place you have chosen for us to live on. i am not ready to sign that paper." s'haie-at-seha-uk, a to-an-hooch, next spoke:- "i do not want to leave the mouth of the river. i do not want to leave my old home and my burying-ground. i am afraid i shall die if i do." dah-whil-luk, the skokomish head chief, an old man, rose and said:- "i do not want to sell my land, because it is valuable. the whites pay a great deal for a small piece, and they get money by selling the sticks [timber]. formerly the indians slept, but the whites came among them and woke them up, and we now know that the lands are worth much." hool-hole-tan or jim said:- "i want to speak. i do not like the offers you make in the treaty to us. you say you will give us land, but why should you give us the mouth of the river? i don't like to go on a reservation with the s'klallams; and, in case of trouble, there are more of them than of us, and they will charge us with it. before the whites came among us, we had no idea who made the land; but some time ago the priests told us that the great chief above made it, and also made the indians. since then the americans have told us that the great father always bought the land, and that it was not right to take it for nothing. they waked the indians up by this, and they now know their land was worth much. i don't want to sign away my right to the land. if it was myself alone i signed for, i would do it; but we have women and children. let us keep half of it, and take the rest. why should we sell all? we may become destitute. why not let us live together with you? i want you to hear what i have to say. all the indians have been afraid to talk, but i wish to speak and be listened to." chits-a-mah-han or the duke of york, the head chief of the clallams:- "my heart is good. i am happy since i have heard the paper read, and since i have understood governor stevens, particularly since i have been told i could look for food where i pleased, and not in one place only. formerly the indians were bad towards each other, but governor stevens has made them agree to be friends. before the whites came we were always poor; since then we have earned money, and got blankets and clothing. i hope the governor will tell the whites not to abuse the indians, as many are in the habit of doing, ordering them to go away, and knocking them down." other chiefs of the clallams and of the chem-a-cums followed in the same strain as the duke of york, approving the treaty. after further explaining its provisions the governor adjourned the council to the morrow at the request of the skokomish chief, in order that they might talk it over and understand it thoroughly. it will be observed that this treaty encountered considerable opposition on the part of the skokomish, who were, however, the most benefited by it, as the reservation was located in their country. they were largely influenced by the example of the other tribes, and after much discussion among themselves, and talks between sessions with the governor and his assistants, concluded to accept it. the next morning was a fine, pleasant one, and the indians came to the council bearing white flags. the governor addressed them, pointing out that the treaty gave them all those things that a father would give his children, as homes, schools, mechanics, and a doctor; the right to fish, hunt, and gather roots and berries. besides, it prohibited fire-water, and does not a father prevent his children from drinking fire-water? the great father was good to his children, and did not wish to steal their lands. it was for them to say what they thought right. if they had anything to say, say it now. the duke of york then presented a white flag, saying: "my heart is white, so are those of my people, and we will never stain it with blood." dah-kwil-luk, the skokomish chief, said:- "my heart, too, has become white, and i give it to the chief. i put away all bad feelings. i will be as a good man, not stealing or shedding blood. we have thrown away the feelings of yesterday and are now satisfied." he also presented a flag to the governor. kul-kah-han, the chem-a-cum chief, then presented his flag, saying:- "we can say nothing but what this flag tells. we give our hearts to you with it in return for what you do for us. we were once wretched, but since you came you have made us right. formerly other indians did wrong us, but since the whites came we are free and have not been killed." then all signed the treaty, and at a signal a salute was fired from the steamer in honor of the event. some hostile feelings having previously existed between the tribes, governor stevens now declared that they must drop them forever, and that their hearts towards each other should be good as well as towards the whites. accordingly the three head chiefs, in behalf of their people, then shook hands. then the presents were distributed to them. in the afternoon the party reã«mbarked, mr. mason returning to olympia on the steamer, and governor stevens with the remainder proceeding to port townsend in the schooner, on his way to cape flattery, the next point of meeting. the tribes mentioned in the treaty as parties thereto are the skokomish, to-an-hooch, chem-a-cum, and s'klallam, and the sub-bands of the last, viz., kah-tie, squah-quaihtl, tch-queen, ste-teht-lum, tsohkw, yennis, elh-wa, pishtst, hun-nint, klat-la-wash, and o-ke-ho, occupying lands on the strait of fuca and hood's canal. a reservation was set off at the mouth of the skokomish river, of 3840 acres. $60,000 in the usual annuities, and $6000 for the improvement of the reservation, were provided, and the other provisions were the same as in the tulalip and she-nah-nam creek treaties. this treaty was witnessed by the same gentlemen who witnessed the preceding. council of neah bay, and makah treaty. from port townsend the schooner sped rapidly down the strait of fuca, running one hundred and twenty miles in two days,--no holiday voyage, in a small vessel in midwinter, along that exposed and shelterless coast,--and reached neah bay on the evening of the 28th. at this point, just inside cape flattery, the makah indians had their principal village. messengers were immediately dispatched to call in the indians of the other makah villages, and of tribes farther south on the coast. the tents, goods, and men were landed on the 29th, and camp established. the following day the governor, accompanied by mr. gibbs, crossed the cape flattery peninsula to the pacific coast, and examined the country for the purpose of selecting a suitable reservation. in the evening he called a meeting of the makah chiefs on board the schooner, the other villages having come in during the day, and explained the principal features of the proposed treaty. the great father had sent him here to watch over the indians. he had talked with the other tribes on the sound, and they had promised to be good friends with their neighbors, and he had now come to talk with the makahs. when he had done here, he was going to the indians down the coast, and would make them friends to the makahs. he had treated with the other sound indians for their lands, setting aside reserves for them, giving them a school, farmer, physician, etc., etc. when he concluded, kal-chote, a makah chief, spoke: "before the big chiefs klehsitt, the white chief, yall-a-coon or flattery jack, and heh-iks died, he was not the head chief himself, he was only the small chief, but though there were many indians then, he was not the least of them. he knew the country all around, and therefore he had a right to speak. he thought he ought to have the right to fish, and take whales, and get food where he liked. he was afraid that if he could not take halibut where he wanted, he would become poor." keh-tchook, of the stone house: "what kal-chote had said was his wish. he did not want to leave the salt water." governor stevens informed them that, so far from wishing to stop their fisheries, he wished to send them oil-kettles and fishing apparatus. klah-pr-at-loo: "he was willing to sell his land. all he wanted was the right of fishing." tse-kan-wootl: "he wanted the sea. that was his country. if whales were killed and floated ashore, he wanted, for his people, the exclusive right of taking them, and if their slaves ran away, he wanted to get them back." governor stevens replied that he wanted them to fish, but the whites should fish also. whoever killed the whales was to have them if they came ashore. many white men were coming into the country, and he did not want the indians to be crowded out. kal-chote: "i want always to live on my old ground, and to die on it. i only want a small piece for a house, and will live as a friend to the whites, and they should fish together." ke-bach-sat: "my heart is not bad, but i do not wish to leave all my land. i am willing you should have half, but i want the other half myself." it-an-da-ha: "my father! my father! i now give you my heart. when any ships come and the whites injure me, i will apply to my father, and tell him of my trouble, and look to him for help, and if any indians wish to kill me, i shall still call on my father. i do not wish to leave the salt water. i want to fish in common with the whites. i don't want to sell all my land. i want a part in common with the whites to plant potatoes on. i want the place where my house is." governor stevens asked them whether, if the right of drying fish wherever they pleased was left them, they could not agree to live at one place for a winter residence and potato ground, explaining the idea of subdivision of lands, and he desired them to think the matter over during the night. they were asked to consult among themselves upon the choice of a head chief. as they declined doing this, on the ground that they were all of equal rank, the governor selected tse-kan-wootl, the osett chief, as the head, a choice in which they all acquiesced with satisfaction. temporary papers in lieu of commissions were then issued to a number of the sub-chiefs. the indians assembled in council on the morning of january 31. the number of the tribe was found to be six hundred. governor stevens explained the provisions of the treaty:- "the great father sent me to see you, and give you his mind. the whites are crowding in upon you. the great father wishes to give you your homes, to buy your land, and give a fair price for it, leaving you land enough to live on and raise potatoes. he knows what whalers you are, how far you go to sea to take whales. he will send you barrels in which to put your oil, kettles to try it out, lines and implements to fish with. the great father wants your children to go to school, to learn trades." the treaty was then read and interpreted and explained, clause by clause. governor stevens then asked them if they were satisfied. if they were, to say so. if not, to answer freely and state their objections. tse-kan-wootl brought up a white flag and presented it, saying: "look at this flag. see if there are any spots on it. there are none, and there are none on our hearts." kal-chote then presented another flag and said, "what you have said is good, and what you have written is good." the indians gave three cheers or shouts as each concluded. the governor then signed the treaty, and was followed by the indian chiefs and principal men, forty-one in number, of the neah, waatch, tsoo-yess, and osett villages, or bands of the makahs. among the names are klah-pe-an-hie or andrew jackson, tchoo-quut-lah or yes sir, and swell or jeff davis. the witnesses were m.t. simmons, indian agent; george gibbs, secretary; b.f. shaw, interpreter; c.m. hitchcock, m.d.; e.s. fowler, orrington cushman, and robert davis. the provisions of this treaty are the same as in the others. the annuities in goods, etc., amounted to $30,000, and $3000 were provided to improve the reservation, which embraced neah bay and cape flattery and their principal village. it was intended only for a place of residence, with enough cultivable land for potatoes and vegetables, and, what was more important, to prevent their being crowded off by fishing establishments. the locality is unfit for agriculture, being rocky and sterile, with an annual rainfall of 122 inches. and the reserve was all they needed, for the makahs are bold and skillful fishermen and sailors, accustomed to venture thirty to fifty miles out to sea in their large canoes, and take the whale and halibut, while inshore they hunt the seal and sea-otter, and catch the salmon. they are a more sturdy, brave, and enterprising race than the natives of the sound, more resembling the northern indians. in their remote, rocky stronghold, protected by the strong arm of the government extended over them by this treaty, but depending upon the sea and their own efforts for a livelihood, they have prospered greatly, putting up vast quantities of fish, furs, and oil for market; and there are few white communities that have so much wealth per capita, or wealth so evenly distributed, as these industrious and manly indians. immediately after the signing the presents were distributed, the camp was broken up, and in the evening the party reã«mbarked. the little vessel at once hoisted sail for port townsend, where, after a three days' trip, being delayed by head winds, she arrived february 3. the next day the governor, with some of the party, took the major tompkins for victoria, in order to confer with governor douglass upon the means of preventing the piratical incursions of the northern indians upon the sound. on the 5th he returned to port townsend, and reached olympia on the night of the 6th. this brief campaign was napoleonic, in rapidity and success. in six weeks governor stevens met and treated with five thousand indians, of numerous independent and jealous tribes and bands, and in four separate councils carefully and indefatigably made clear to them the new policy, convinced them of its benefits to them, and concluded with them four separate treaties, by which the indian title to the whole puget sound basin was extinguished forever, and the great source and danger of collision between the races was removed. for the eight thousand five hundred indians hitherto ignored by congress and treated by the settlers as mere vagrants, to be shoved aside at the whim or self-interest of any white man, he established nine reservations, containing over 60,000 acres, for their permanent homes and exclusive possessions; provided annuities of clothing, goods, and useful articles for twenty years, aggregating $300,000; abolished slavery and war among them; excluded liquor from the reservations; extended over them the protection of the government, with agents, schools, teachers, farmers, and mechanics to instruct them; and, in a word, set their feet fairly on "the white man's road." to accomplish this astonishing work in such brief time, he traveled eight hundred miles upon the sound and strait in the most inclement season of the year, half the distance, and that the most dangerous, in a small sailing-craft. he disregarded the storms and rains of that inclement season, and spared neither himself nor his assistants. it is not easy to say who had the hardest task, the agents and messengers who traveled all over the sound in canoes in the tempestuous rainy season to call the scattered bands together, or the unfortunate secretary, who had to catch and set down on paper the jaw-breaking native names. the success and rapidity with which he carried through these treaties were due to the careful and thorough manner in which he planned them, and prepared the minds of the indians by his tour among and talks to them a year previous, and by the messages and agents he had sent among them. besides, the indians realized their own feebleness and uncertain future, divided into so many bands, exposed to the depredations of the northern indians, and dreading the advent and encroachments of the whites. their minds consequently were well attuned for treating; and when they understood the wise and beneficent policy and liberal terms offered by the governor, they gladly accepted them, and put their trust in him as their friend and protector, a trust never withdrawn and never forsaken. the indian war which occurred soon after, and the delay in the ratification of the treaties, seriously militated against carrying out the beneficent policy so well inaugurated, and later the occasional appointment of inefficient and dishonest agents has proved even more detrimental; but notwithstanding all these drawbacks the indians have made substantial advances in civilization, and it is interesting to compare their present condition, as given in the last reports of the commissioner of indian affairs, and from local sources. their numbers have diminished only about one half. no one seeing their debased condition in 1850 to 1860 (except the makahs) would have deemed it possible for them to hold their own so well. makahs 750 tulalip agency, lower sound indians 1700 puyallup agency, upper sound indians 1850 --- 4300 all now wear civilized dress, and live in houses. many can read and write, and many of their children attend the reservation schools. "among the makahs, many of the younger indians are turning their attention to farming and raising stock, and many of them have fine gardens. they still catch a great many fish, sending them to market in seattle by steamer, and have caught and shipped as high as 10,000 pounds in one day. there are few places with so large a population where so little crime is committed." all the reservations on the sound have now been allotted, and the indians are living on their respective allotments. a considerable number have taken up farms under the homestead laws, or purchased lands from the whites, and are farming successfully. such indians are frequently seen driving into the towns with good wagons and teams, as well dressed as the average white rancher, and accompanied ofttimes by their wives and children. "practically all these indians dress as civilized men and women, and live in houses, some of which are good, comfortable, and roomy, fully equal to the average farm dwellings in prosperous communities of whites, and from these they grade down to the most squalid shacks imaginable. under the influence of the teachers, and the example of the more advanced indians and the better class of white neighbors, there is slow but sure improvement in this particular." during the fall hundreds of them congregate on the hop-fields, where they supply the most reliable hop-pickers, whole families--men, women, and children--diligently working together. after this harvest crowds of them flock into the towns, and lay in stores of clothing and provisions for the winter before returning home.[11] [11] commissioner of indian affairs' report for 1899, pp. 301-303, 612. the riverside press _electrotyped and printed by h.o. houghton & co._ _cambridge, mass, u.s.a._ * * * * * transcriber's note: some compound words (e.g., 'wagon-master') appeared both with and without a hyphen. they are given as printed. where a word is hyphenated on a line break, the hyphen is retained if the preponderance of other appearances indicate it was intended. illlustrations cannot be reproduced here, but the approximate position of each is indicated as: [illustration: <caption>]. footnotes are repositioned at the end of each chapter. they have been re-numbered consecutively. the following minor issues are noted and corrected. the name 'boulineau' was likely misprinted based on that of another member of steven's party, pierre boutineau. the instance on p. 330 refers to paul boulieau. p. 2 there is scar[c]ely a state in the union added 'c'. p. 28 and schuyler hamilton[.] added full stop p. 97 ponto[o]n added. p. 99 do not fa[l/i]l to corrected. p. 137 about twelve [p.] m. supplied missing 'p'. p. 141 but about nine o'clock[,/.] corrected. p. 182 at good esc[a/o]pette range corrected. p. 210 formid[id]able removed. p. 216 the cerro [c/g]ordo corrected. p. 330 bouli[n]eau removed spurious 'n'. p. 373 dress of a chief?["/'] corrected. images generously made available by the google books library project (http://books.google.com) note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see 43590-h.htm or 43590-h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43590/43590-h/43590-h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/43589/43590-h.zip) project gutenberg has the other volume of this work. volume i: see http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/43589 images of the original pages are available through the google books library project. see http://books.google.com/books?id=yfabaaaamaaj transcriber's note: text enclosed by underscores is in italics (_italics_). a carat character is used to denote superscription. a single character following the carat is superscripted (example: isaac^1). the 'oe' ligature appears only in the words 'coeur d'alene', and is rendered as 'c[oe]ur.' words printed using "small capitals" are shifted to all upper-case. please consult the note at the end of this text for details of corrections made. the life of isaac ingalls stevens by his son hazard stevens with maps and illustrations in two volumes vol. i [illustration] boston and new york houghton, mifflin and company the riverside press, cambridge 1900 copyright, 1900, by hazard stevens all rights reserved contents chapter xxvi the chehalis council graphic account by judge james g. swan--indians assemble on lower chehalis river--the camp and scenes--method of proceeding--indians object to leaving their wonted resorts--tleyuk, young chehalis chief, proves recusant and insolent--governor stevens rebukes him--tears up his commission before his face--dismisses the council--his forbearance, and desire to assist the indians--treaty made with quenaiults and quillehutes next fall as result of this council 1 chapter xxvii personal and political.--san juan controversy death of george watson stevens--governor stevens keeps indians in order--visits vancouver--confers with superintendent palmer, of oregon--firm stand against british claim to san juan archipelago--purchases taylor donation claim--democratic convention to nominate delegate in congress--governor stevens a candidate--effect of speech before convention: "if he gets into congress, we can never get him out"--j. patton anderson nominated 10 chapter xxviii indians of the upper columbia manly indians--ten great tribes--nez perces--missionary spalding--his work--abandons mission--escorted in safety by nez perces--intractable cuyuses--religious rivalry--dr. whitman--yakimas, spokanes, coeur d'alenes, flatheads, pend oreilles, koutenays--upper country free from settlers--indian jealousy--conspiracy to destroy whites discovered by major alvord--warnings disregarded--governor stevens thrown in gap--prepares for council--walla walla valley chosen by kam-i-ah-kan--journey to dalles--incidents--unfavorable outlook--escort secured--trip to walla walla--"call yourself a great chief and steal wood?"--council ground--scenes--general palmer arrives--programme for treaty--officers--lieutenant gracie, mr. lawrence kip, and escort arrive--governor stevens urges general wool to establish post there 16 chapter xxix the walla walla council nez perces arrive--savage parade--head chief hal-hal-tlos-sot or lawyer, an indian solon--cuyuses, walla wallas, umatillas arrive--pu-pu-mox-mox--feasting the chiefs--fathers chirouse and pandosy arrive--kam-i-ah-kan--four hundred mounted braves ride around nez perce camp--young chief--spokane garry--palouses fail to attend--timothy preaches in nez perce camp--yakimas arrive--commissioners visit lawyer--spotted eagle discloses cuyuse plots--council opened--treaties explained--five thousand indians present--horse and foot races--young chief asks holiday--pu-pu-mox-mox's bitter speech--lawyer discloses conspiracy of cuyuses to massacre whites--moves his lodge into camp to put it under protection of nez perces--governor stevens prepares for trouble--determines to continue council--invites indians to speak their minds--lawyer favorable--kam-i-ah-kan scornful--pathetic speech of eagle-from-the-light--steachus wants reservation in his own country--general stevens's tent flooded--lawyer accepts treaty--young chief and others refuse--governor stevens's pointed words--separate reservations for cuyuses, walla wallas, and umatillas--sudden arrival of looking glass--his indignation- orders nez perces to their lodges--night conference with yakimas--stormy council--lawyer goes to his lodge--kam-i-ah-kan, pu-pu-mox-mox sign treaties--lawyer's advice--nez perces and cuyuses counsel by themselves--lawyer's authority confirmed- last day of treaty--both tribes sign--eagle-from-the-light presents his medicine, a grizzly bear's skin, to governor stevens--satisfactory ending great relief--delegations to blackfoot council--nez perce scalp-dance--treachery of other tribes--outbreak--compelled to live under treaties--provisions of treaties--benefits of council--present prosperity 34 chapter xxx crossing the bitter roots party for blackfoot council--crossing snake river--red wolf and timothy thrifty chiefs--traverse fine country--coeur d'alene mission--council with indians--wrestling match--crossing the bitter root mountains--rafting the bitter root river--bitter root or st. mary's valley--reception by the flatheads and pend oreilles--victor complains of the blackfeet 66 chapter xxxi the flathead council chiefs unwilling to unite on one reservation--alexander dreads strictness of the white man's rule--big canoe--what need of treaty between friends?--let us live together--protracted debates--indians feast and counsel among themselves--no result--victor leaves the council--two days' intermission--governor stevens accepts victor's proposition and concludes treaty--moses refuses to sign treaty--"the blackfeet will get his hair" 81 chapter xxxii march to fort benton.--marshaling the tribes nez perces and flatheads to hunt south of missouri pending council--prairie plateau on summit of rocky mountains--elk for supper--lewis and clark's pass--management of train--traverse the plains--abundant game--bewildering buffalo trails--reach fort benton--governor stevens meets commissioner cumming on milk river--boats belated--provisions exhausted--leathery jerked meat--pemmican two years old--hunting buffalo on judith--bighorn at citadel rock--metsic, the hunter--two thousand western indians fraternizing with blackfeet--stolen horses--doty recovers them--cumming claims sole authority--forced to subside into proper place--he stigmatizes blackfeet and country--disagrees on all points--governor stevens's views--a million and a half buffalo find sustenance on these plains 92 chapter xxxiii the blackfoot council twelve thousand indians kept in hand for months--nez perces and snakes move to yellowstone for food--adams and tappan seek crows--delay of boats imperils council--indians summoned--council changed to mouth of judith river--remarkable express service--three thousand five hundred indians assemble--best feeling--treaty concluded--peace established--terms well kept by blackfeet--scenes at council ground--grand chorus of one hundred germans--homeric feasts--disgruntled commissioner 107 chapter xxxiv crossing the mountains in midwinter.--surprise of the coeur d'alenes and spokanes the start homeward--the haggard expressman brings news of indian outbreak--how pearson ran the gauntlet of hostile indians--governor stevens disregards warning dispatches--resolves to force his way back by the direct route--sends to fort benton for arms and ammunition--hastens ahead of train to bitter root valley--confers with flatheads and nez perces--alarming reports--procures fresh animals--nez perce chiefs join the party--taking the unexpected route--crossing the snowy bitter roots--ten dead horses--the surprise of the coeur d'alenes--"peace or war?"--craig and the nez perces take direct route home--surprise of the coeur d'alenes--rescue of blockaded miners--indians called to council--the stevens guards and spokane invincibles organized 120 chapter xxxv stormy council with the spokanes disaffected indians--kam-i-ah-kan's emissaries and falsehoods--governor stevens's firm front preserves friendship--looking glass's treachery discovered and frustrated--dubious speeches--indians' friendship gained--light marching order--four days' march in driving storm to the nez perce country 133 chapter xxxvi the faithful nez perces two thousand assemble in council--offer two hundred and fifty warriors to force way through hostiles--battle of oregon volunteers--the way cleared--the nez perce guard of honor--march to walla walla--capture of ume-how-lish--reception by the volunteers--governor stevens's speech--winter campaign--letter to general wool--his inaction and mistaken views--in camp, 27° below zero--the nez perces dismissed- governor stevens pushes on to the dalles in advance of train--crossing the gorged deschutes--by trail down the columbia to vancouver--the sail at night in the storm--arrival at olympia after nine months' absence--mrs. stevens and children visit whitby island--in danger from northern indians 143 chapter xxxvii prostration.--rescue country utterly prostrated--settlers take refuge in towns--abandon farms--general wool disbands volunteers, takes the defensive, and maligns the people--review of war- kam-i-ah-kan, leading spirit--treacherous chiefs, fresh from signing treaties, incite war--miners massacred--agent bolon murdered--major haller's repulse--settlers driven from walla walla--massacre on white river--volunteers raised- lieutenant slaughter killed--impenetrable forests and swamps--cascades afford hidden resorts--fruitless march of major rains to yakima--governor stevens addresses legislature--his measures of relief--calls out volunteers- visits lower sound--enlists indian auxiliaries--settlers return to farms--build blockhouses--organization of volunteers 156 chapter xxxviii waging the war on the sound volunteers form northern, central, and southern battalions--plan of campaign--cooperation sought with regulars--memoir of information sent general wool and colonel wright--campaign east of cascades suggested--wool's flying visit to sound--demands virtual disbanding of volunteers--governor stevens's caustic letter of refusal--pat-ka-nim fights hostiles--naval forces--battle of connell's prairie--scouring the forests and swamps amid rains and storms--red allies--massacre at cascades--two companies of rangers called out to reassure settlers--unremitting warfare--hostiles surrender or flee across cascades--posts and blockhouses turned over to regulars--volunteers on sound disbanded 171 chapter xxxix the war in the upper country fruitless movements of oregon volunteers--colonel wright marches to yakima valley in may--parleys instead of fighting--governor stevens proposes joint movement across cascades--colonel casey declines--colonel shaw crosses nahchess pass--marches to walla walla--governor stevens journeys to dalles--dispatches goff's and williams's companies to walla walla--seeks coöperation with colonel wright--warns him against amnesty to sound murderers--three columns reach walla walla the same day--shaw defeats hostiles in grande ronde--his victory restrains disaffected nez perces--governor stevens invites colonel wright to attend peace council in walla walla--that officer fooled by the yakimas--his abortive campaign--ow-hi's diplomacy 194 chapter xl the fruitless peace council governor stevens, assured of support by colonel wright, revokes call for additional volunteers--council with klikitats--refuses to receive indian murderers on reservation--pushes forward to walla walla--indians take pack-train--steptoe arrives with four companies--indians assemble--manifest hostility--steptoe moves off--volunteers start for dalles--steptoe refuses guard--governor stevens recalls volunteers--hostile and threatening indians--steptoe refusing support, governor stevens moves to his camp- disaffected chiefs demand that treaties be abrogated, whites leave the country--governor stevens demands submission--terminates council--starts for dalles--attacked on march--the fight--moves back to steptoe's camp--indians attack it--repulsed--blockhouse built--one company left--both commands march to dalles--steptoe's change of views--demand on colonel wright to deliver up sound murderers, who gives order--cleverly evaded--colonel wright marches to walla walla--counsels with hostile chiefs--yields to their demands--whites ordered out of the country--shameful betrayal of duty--governor stevens's indignant letters to the war and indian departments--pernicious influence of missionaries and hudson bay company--governor stevens's views finally adopted--steptoe's defeat--wright defeats hostiles--summary executions--fate of ow-hi and qualchen 206 chapter xli disbanding the volunteers entire force disbanded--their character, discipline--public property sold--so many captured animals that more were sold than purchased--transportation cost nothing--anecdote of captain henness--thirty-five forts built by volunteers, twenty-three by settlers, seven by regulars--colonel casey refuses demand for surrender of murderers--governor stevens insists--sharply rebukes colonel casey's slurs--leschi surrendered for trial--is finally hanged--qui-e-muth killed 232 chapter xlii martial law.--difficulties overcome hudson bay company's ex-employees remain in indian country--suspected of aiding enemy--governor stevens orders them to the towns--five return to farms, at instigation of trouble-makers--arrested and thrown in jail judge lander issues writ of habeas corpus--martial law proclaimed in pierce county--colonel shaw arrests judge and clerk, who are taken to olympia and released--lawyers pass condemnatory resolutions--judge lander holds court in olympia--issues writs--martial law in thurston county--judge lander arrested--held prisoner at camp montgomery until end of war--martial law abrogated--governor stevens fined fifty dollars--his action in proclaiming martial law disapproved by the president--dishonorable discharge used to maintain discipline--company a refuse to take field--pass contumacious resolutions--are dishonorably discharged--control of disaffected indians--agents in constant danger--summary dealing with whiskey-sellers--agents men of high qualities--statement of temporary reserves--indians and agents--northern indians depredate on sound--captain gansevoort severely punishes them at port gamble, and sends them north--colonel ebey falls victim to their revenge 242 chapter xliii legislative censure.--popular vindication governor stevens's habits of labor--adopts costume of the country--builds home--housewarming--fourth message to legislature--renders account of indian war--resolutions censuring governor stevens, for dismissing company a and proclaiming martial law, pooled and passed--indignation of the people--governor stevens nominated for congress- canvasses the territory--elected by two thirds vote- resigns as governor--death of james doty--turns over governorship to governor mcmullan; indian affairs, to superintendent nesmith--return journey east--incidents 260 chapter xliv in congress.--vindicating his course passing superintendent nesmith's accounts--obtaining funds for indian service--president recommends confirmation of the treaties--welcomed back by old friends--general lane a tower of strength--demands that military deliver yakima murderers to punishment--they abandon their protégés--takes house and moves family to washington--mr. james g. swan, secretary--circular letter to emigrants--appeals to indian department to establish farms promised blackfeet--has lieutenant john mullan placed in charge of building wagon-road between fort benton and walla walla--exposes memoir of captain cram--convinces senate indian committee that treaties ought to be confirmed--advocates northwestern boundary commission--speeches on indian war--pacific railroad--defends nesmith--matters engaging attention--resists exactions of hudson bay company in memoir to secretary of state--steptoe's defeat--colonel wright punishes indians--general harney placed in command of washington and oregon departments--he revokes wool's order excluding settlers from upper country--address on northwest--walter w. johnson, private secretary--treaties all confirmed march 8, 1859--dictates his final report on northern route before breakfast 271 chapter xlv saving san juan returns to puget sound--guest of general harney--close relations with--renominated for congress--the canvass--elected--death of mr. mason--san juan dispute waxes warm over a pig--general harney advised by governor stevens--sends captain pickett to occupy the island--british fleet blockade--reinforcements sent to pickett--british powerless on land--thousands of american miners in victoria and on fraser river--governor gholson guided by governor stevens--offers support of militia to general harney, who places ammunition at his disposal--general scott pacifies british lion--governor stevens's influence in saving the archipelago 288 chapter xlvi the stand against disunion governor stevens becomes chief exponent and authority on northern route--letter to vancouver railroad convention- contending for the northern route--governor stevens lives down prejudice--gains respect--great influence with president and departments--his habits--rebuke of self-seekers--political issues--governor stevens a national man--sustained constitutional rights of south, as matter of justice and to defeat disunion--patriotism of men of this view--attends charleston and baltimore democratic conventions--supports general lane--split in party--governor stevens accepts as chairman of executive committee of national democracy--writes address in a single night--labors hard--hopes of success--abraham lincoln elected president--act to pay indian war debt passed--w.w. miller appointed superintendent of indian affairs for washington territory--governor stevens's achievements in seven years--his firm union sentiments--denounces secession--strengthens the hands of the president 296 chapter xlvii the offer of sword and services governor stevens returns to washington territory--recommends supporting the government and arming the militia--elected captain of puget sound rifles of olympia--democratic convention meets--governor stevens withdraws his name as candidate for delegate--his speech--offers services--hastens to washington--meets cold reception--accepts colonelcy of 79th highlanders--governors andrew and sprague offer regiments 313 chapter xlviii the 79th highlanders.--the army of the potomac the highland guard, a new york city militia battalion, volunteer as the 79th highlanders--splendid material--severe losses at bull run--promised to be sent home to recruit--disappointed- colonel stevens takes command--breaks unworthy officers--the mutiny and its suppression--colonel stevens enforces discipline--marches through washington with band playing the dead march--removes camp guards and appeals to honor of the regiment--crossing the potomac into virginia--colonel stevens's brief speech at midnight--building fort ethan allen--digging forts and felling forests--picket alarms--the reconnoissance of lewinsville--general mcclellan meets returning column; his anxiety to avoid a general engagement- colonel stevens deprived of his brigade and given three green regiments--president lincoln reminded, directs appointment of colonel stevens as brigadier-general; says delay is owing to general mcclellan's advice--hazard stevens appointed adjutant 79th highlanders--colonel stevens appointed brigadier-general- moves forward four miles to camp of the big chestnut--the recusant wagon-master--the unexpected rebuke--mcclellan's passive-defensive--general stevens ordered to annapolis--bids farewell to the highlanders--whole line cries, "tak' us wi' ye!"--secures appointment of his son as captain and assistant adjutant-general--condemns mcclellan's management--predicts disaster--reaches annapolis--applies for highlanders--mcclellan objects, but president lincoln overrules him and sends them 321 chapter xlix the port royal expedition general thomas w. sherman--his army--general stevens's brigade--the embarkation--fleet assemble off fortress monroe--boat's crew of highlanders--lively scenes--sailing out to sea--storm scatters the fleet--opening sealed orders--sail for port royal--the rebel defenses--commodore dupont's attack--the enemy's flight--landing of the troops--demoralized by sweet-potato field--general stevens alone urges advance inland--constructs a mile of defensive works--sickness--life on hilton head 341 chapter l beaufort.--action of port royal ferry general stevens occupies beaufort, the newport of the south--abandoned by white population--sacked by negroes; their ignorance, habits, condition--faint attack on the pickets--general stevens advances across port royal island--pickets outer side, throwing enemy on the defensive--enemy close the coosaw river--general stevens's plan to dislodge them authorized--reinforcement by two regiments and gunboats--flatboats assembled in a hidden creek--troops embark at midnight, cross coosaw, and effect landing--march in echelon toward port royal ferry--the action--the enemy's hasty retreat--the ferry occupied--the forts destroyed--troops bivouac for the night--cross the ferry and march to beaufort in triumph--thanked in general orders for the victory of port royal ferry 353 chapter li beaufort.--campaign planned against charleston general stevens restores public library--it is confiscated by treasury agents against his protest--the gideonites come to elevate the freedmen--general stevens moderates their zeal; wins their gratitude--other visitors--thorough course of drill and discipline--twenty-five-mile picket line--detachment of 8th michigan defeat 13th georgia regiment on wilmington island--death of mr. caverly--governor stevens's views on military situation--general stevens's force a menace to charleston and savannah railroad--six miles trestle bridges--general robert e. lee's defensive measures--general stevens eager to cross swords with lee--plans movement to destroy railroad and hurl whole army on charleston--captain elliott's scouting trips--general sherman adopts plan--commodore dupont to coöperate--general hunter supersedes general sherman--fort pulaski taken--general hunter proclaims negroes forever free, then impresses them as soldiers--general stevens's views on the negro soldier--he is confirmed as brigadier-general 367 chapter lii james island campaign against charleston enemy abandon lower part of stono river and batteries--general benham plans movement on charleston by way of james island--general stevens lands on james island--drives back enemy in sharp action--takes three guns--cautions benham of need of a day's preparation before attacking--incompetent commanders--wright joins, a week later, with his division--organization of the army--enemy strengthening works across island--fort lamar, strong advanced work--general stevens erects counter-battery--reconnoissances 387 chapter liii battle of james island general benham's precipitate determination to assault fort lamar--protests of his generals--he orders general stevens to assault at dawn, wright and williams to support--attacking column--forms at two p.m.--drives in and follows hard on enemy's pickets--enters field in front of fort at daylight--rushes on the work in column of regiments--the fight over the parapet--deadly fire from enemy's reserves in rear of the work--troops withdrawn in good order and reformed--general williams attacks on left--general wright takes position to protect left and rear--general stevens about to assault a second time, when general benham suddenly gives up the fight and orders both columns to retreat--forces and losses--causes of the repulse--highlanders' revenge at fort saunders--benham deprived of command and sent north 399 chapter liv return to virginia the highlanders present general stevens with a sword--his response--death of daniel lyman arnold--general stevens's letters to his wife--holds benham to account--general wright succeeds to command on benham's arrest--james island evacuated--troops uselessly harassed--jean ribaut's fort--voyage to virginia--general stevens's letter to president lincoln recommending such movement--his views of military situation--lands at newport news--ninth corps formed, general stevens commanding first division--meets general cullum 416 chapter lv pope's campaign general stevens moves to fredericksburg--division in three brigades, and joined by two light batteries--stevens and reno's division, march up the rappahannock; join pope's army at culpeper court house--general stevens stops straggling and marauding--battle of cedar mountain--army of virginia--pope advances to rapidan--general stevens holds raccoon ford--lee leaves mcclellan--concentrates against pope, who withdraws behind rappahannock--general stevens's action at kelly's ford--marching up the river to head off lee--benjamin silences enemy's gun with a single shot--reinforcements arrive from army of the potomac--jackson marches around right flank and falls on rear--positions and movements, august 26, 27, 28--description of bull run battlefield--jackson withdraws from manassas and takes position there--movements of pope's forces--fiasco of mcdowell and sigel--jackson attacks--stubborn fight of general gibbon near groveton--generals king and ricketts march away from the enemy--pope reiterates order to attack 425 chapter lvi the second battle of bull run jackson resumes his position--sigel's troops move forward slowly and become engaged--reynolds, on left, advances, but falls back--troops of right wing arrive, scattered to meet sigel's cries for reinforcements--general stevens advances with small force to groveton--unexpectedly fired on by enemy's skirmishers--benjamin maintains unequal artillery combat--sigel and schenck withdraw troops from key-point--jackson forces back milroy and schurz--general porter's movement--inactive all day--pope hurls disconnected brigades on jackson's corps--attacks by grover, reno, kearny, stevens, all repulsed--king's division slaughtered--general stevens collects his scattered division--union attacks repulsed the first day--lee master of the situation--august 30, second day--pope sure the enemy had retreated--general stevens expresses contrary view--captain john more finds enemy in force--pope's fatuous order of pursuit--porter slowly forms column in centre--pope's faulty dispositions- whole army bunched in centre--wings stripped of troops- porter's attack--general stevens joins in it--the repulse- lee's opportunity--longstreet's onslaught--the battle on left and centre--the right firmly held--general stevens's remark--pope orders retreat--general stevens withdraws deliberately--checks pursuit--capture of lieutenant heffron--crosses bull run at lock's ford--bivouac for night--battle lost by incompetent commander--troops fought bravely 446 chapter lvii the battle of chantilly retreat to centreville--rear-guard--bivouac on centreville heights--counting stacks--two thousand and twelve muskets left--loss nearly one half--general stevens's last letter--sudden orders--march to intercept jackson--battle of chantilly--general stevens's charge--he falls, bearing the colors--the enemy driven from his position--sudden and furious thunderstorm bursts over the field 477 chapter lviii the battle of chantilly progress of the fight--general kearny responds to general stevens's summons with birney's brigade--his death--three of reno's regiments engaged--night ends the contest--sixteen union regiments against forty-eight confederate--respective losses and forces--general stevens averted great disaster 487 chapter lix final scene general stevens's body borne from battle to washington--president considering placing him in command at time of his death- burial in newport, r.i.--city erects monument--inscription- poem--general stevens's descendants 498 appendix--census of indians 503 index 507 illustrations page arrival of nez perce cavalcade at the council 34 feasting the chiefs 36 kam-i-ah-kan, head chief of the yakimas 38 u-u-san-male-e-can: spotted eagle, a chief of the nez perces 40 walla walla council 42 pu-pu-mox-mox: yellow serpent, head chief of the walla wallas 46 we-ah-te-na-tee-ma-ny: young chief, head chief of the cuyuses 50 she-ca-yah: five crows, a chief of the cuyuses 52 appushwa-hite: looking glass, war chief of the nez perces 54 hal-hal-tlos-sot: the lawyer, head chief of the nez perces 58 the scalp dance 60 ow-hi, a chief of the yakimas 64 the flathead council 82 the blackfoot council 112 group of blackfoot chiefs--ha-ca-tu-she-ye-hu, star robe, chief of the gros ventres; th-ke-te-pers, the rider, great war chief of the gros ventres; sak-uis-tan, heavy shield, great warrior of the blood indians; stam-yekh-sas-ci-cay, lame bull, piegan chief 114 blackfoot chiefs--tat-tu-ye, the fox, chief of the blood indians; mek-ya-py, red dye, piegan warrior 116 group: commissioner alfred cumming, alexander culbertson, william craig, delaware jim, james bird 118 crossing the bitter roots in midwinter 126 coeur d'alene mission 128 spokane garry: head chief of the spokanes 140 ume-how-lish, war chief of the cuyuses 148 homestead in olympia 260 letter offering sword and services (facsimile) 316 captain hazard stevens at the age of 19, from a photograph 340 headquarters at beaufort 372 general stevens and staff: captain b.f. porter, lieutenant william t. lusk, captain hazard stevens, lieutenant abraham cottrell, general stevens, major george s. kemble, lieutenant benjamin r. lyons 386 headquarters on james island 398 camp of general stevens's division at newport news 422 headquarters at newport news 424 the monument 502 the portraits of indian chiefs were made by gustavus sohon, a private soldier of the 4th infantry, an intelligent and well-educated german, who had great skill in making expressive likenesses. he also made the views of the councils and expedition. these portraits, with many others taken by the same artist, were intended by general stevens to be used to illustrate a complete account of his treaty operations. the views of camps and headquarters were sketched by e. henry, e company, 79th highlanders. maps and plans the interior from cascade mountains to fort benton. made on reduced scale from governor stevens's map of april 30, 1857, sent to the commissioner of indian affairs. routes traversed by governor stevens taken from maps accompanying his final report of the northern pacific railroad route. see appendix for marginal notes 16 theatre of indian war of 1855-56 on puget sound and west of cascade mountains. made on reduced scale from map sent by governor stevens to the secretary of war with report of march 21, 1856 172 reconnoissance of lewinsville, september 11, 1862 330 port royal and sea islands of south carolina 352 action at port royal ferry, january 1, 1862 358 battle of james island, june 16, 1862 402 virginia--potomac to rapidan river 426 positions of forces august 26, 1862, 9 p.m. 432 positions of forces august 27, 9 p.m. 433 positions of forces august 28, 9 p.m. 443 second battle of bull run, august 29 446 second battle of bull run, august 30 464 jackson's flank march, august 31 480 battle of chantilly, september 1 482 the life of isaac ingalls stevens chapter xxvi the chehalis council while treating with the sound indians, the governor sent william h. tappan, agent for the southwestern tribes, henry d. cock, and sidney ford to summon the chinooks, chehalis, and coast indians to meet in council on the chehalis river, just above gray's harbor, on february 25, and on returning to olympia dispatched simmons and shaw on the same duty. on the 22d he left olympia on horseback, rode to the chehalis, thirty miles, and the following day descended that stream in a canoe to the treaty ground. among other settlers who attended the council at the governor's invitation was james g. swan, then residing on shoalwater bay, and since noted for his interesting writings on the pacific northwest, and for the valuable collections of indian implements and curiosities, and monographs of their languages, customs, and history that he has made for the smithsonian institution. judge swan gives the following graphic and lively account of this council in his "three years' residence in washington territory." he describes how he and dr. j.g. cooper, accompanied by twenty canoe-loads of indians, paddled up the chehalis one cold, damp morning, without waiting for breakfast, finding it difficult to keep warm:- "but the indians did not seem to mind it at all; for, excited with the desire to outvie each other in their attempts to be first to camp, they paddled, and screamed, and shouted, and laughed, and cut up all kinds of antics, which served to keep them in a glow. as we approached the camp we all stopped at a bend in the river, about three quarters of a mile distant, when all began to wash their faces, comb their hair, and put on their best clothes. the women got out their bright shawls and dresses, and painted their faces with vermilion, or red ochre and grease, and decked themselves out with their beads and trinkets, and in about ten minutes we were a gay-looking set; and certainly the appearance of the canoes filled with indians dressed in their brightest colors was very picturesque, but i should have enjoyed it better had the weather been a little warmer. "the camp ground was situated on a bluff bank of the river, on its south side, about ten miles from gray's harbor, on the claim of mr. james pilkington. a space of two or three acres had been cleared from logs and brushwood, which had been piled up so as to form an oblong square. one great tree, which formed the southern side to the camp, served also as an immense backlog, against which our great camp-fire and sundry smaller ones were kindled, both to cook by and to warm us. in the centre of the square, and next the river, was the governor's tent; and between it and the south side of the ground were the commissary's and other tents, all ranged in proper order. rude tables, laid in open air, and a huge framework of poles, from which hung carcasses of beef, mutton, deer, elk, and salmon, with a cloud of wild geese, ducks, and smaller game, gave evidence that the austerities of lent were not to form any part of our services. "around the sides of the square were ranged the tents and wigwams of the indians, each tribe having a space allotted to it. the coast indians were placed at the lower part of the camp; first the chinooks, then the chehalis, quen-ai-ult, and quaitso, satsop, upper chehalis, and cowlitz. these different tribes had sent representatives to the council, and there were present about three hundred and fifty of them, and the best feeling prevailed among all. "the white persons present consisted of only fourteen, viz., governor stevens, george gibbs (who officiated as secretary to the commission), judge ford, with his two sons, who were assistant interpreters, lieutenant-colonel b.f. shaw, the chief interpreter, colonel simmons and mr. tappan, indian agents, dr. cooper, mr. pilkington, the owner of the claim, colonel cock, myself, and last, though by no means the least, cushman, our commissary, orderly sergeant, provost marshal, chief story-teller, factotum, and life of the party,--'long may he wave.' nor must i omit green mccafferty, the cook, whose name had become famous for his exploits in an expedition to queen charlotte's island to rescue some sailors from the indians. he was a good cook and kept us well supplied with hot biscuit and roasted potatoes. "our table was spread in the open air, and at breakfast and supper was pretty sure to be covered with frost, but the hot dishes soon cleared that off, and we found the clear, fresh breeze very conducive to a good appetite. after supper we all gathered round the fire to smoke our pipes, toast our feet, and tell stories. "the next morning the council was commenced. the indians were all drawn up in a large circle in front of the governor's tent, and around a table on which were placed the articles of treaty and other papers. the governor, general gibbs, and colonel shaw sat at the table, and the rest of the whites were honored with camp-stools, to sit around as a sort of guard, or as a small cloud of witnesses. "although we had no regimentals on, we were dressed pretty uniform. his excellency the governor was dressed in a red flannel shirt, dark frock coat and pants, and these last tucked in his boots, california fashion; a black felt hat, with, i think, a pipe stuck through the band; and a paper of fine-cut tobacco in his coat pocket. we also were dressed like the governor, not in ball-room or dress-parade uniform, but in good, warm, serviceable clothes. "after colonel mike simmons, the agent, and, as he has been termed, the daniel boone of the territory, had marshaled the savages into order, an indian interpreter was selected from each tribe to interpret the jargon of shaw into such language as their tribes could understand. the governor then made a speech, which was translated by colonel shaw into jargon, and spoken to the indians, in the same manner the good old elders of ancient times were accustomed to deacon out the hymns to the congregation. first the governor spoke a few words, then the colonel interpreted, then the indians; so that this threefold repetition made it rather a lengthy operation. after this speech the indians were dismissed till the following day, when the treaty was to be read. we were then requested by the governor to explain to those indians we were acquainted with what he had said, and they seemed very well satisfied. the governor had purchased of mr. pilkington a large pile of potatoes,--about a hundred bushels,--and he told the indians to help themselves. they made the heap grow small in a short time, each taking what he required for food; but lest any one should get an undue share, commissary cushman and colonel simmons were detailed to stand guard on the potato pile, which they did with the utmost good feeling, keeping the savages in a roar of laughter by their humorous ways. "at night we again gathered around the fire, and the governor requested that we should enliven the time by telling anecdotes, himself setting the example. governor stevens has a rich fund of interesting and amusing incidents that he has picked up in his camp life, and a very happy way of relating them. we were all called upon in turn. there were some tales told of a wild and romantic nature, and judge ford and colonel mike did their part. old frontiersmen and early settlers, they had many a legend to relate of toil, privation, fun, and frolic; but the palm was conceded to cushman, who certainly could vie with baron munchausen or sindbad the sailor in his wonderful romances. his imitative powers were great, and he would take off some speaker at a political gathering or a camp-meeting in so ludicrous a style that even the governor could not preserve his gravity, but would be obliged to join the rest in a general laughing chorus. whenever cushman began one of his harangues, he was sure to draw up a crowd of indians, who seemed to enjoy the fun as much as we, although they could not understand a word he said. he usually wound up by stirring up the fire; and this, blazing up brightly and throwing off a shower of sparks, would light the old forest, making the night look blacker in the distance, and showing out in full relief the dusky, grinning faces of the indians, with their blankets drawn around them, standing up just outside the circle where we were sitting. cushman was a most capital man for a camp expedition, always ready, always prompt and good-natured. "the second morning after our arrival the terms of the treaty were made known. this was read line by line by general gibbs, and then interpreted by colonel shaw to the indians. the provisions of the treaty were these: they were to be placed on a reservation between gray's harbor and cape flattery, and were to be paid forty thousand dollars in different installments. four thousand dollars in addition was also to be paid them, to enable them to clear and fence in land and cultivate. no spirituous liquors were to be allowed on the reservation; and any indian who should be guilty of drinking liquor would have his or her annuity withheld. "schools, carpenters' and blacksmiths' shops were to be furnished by the united states; also a sawmill, agricultural implements, teachers, and a doctor. all their slaves were to be free, and none afterwards to be bought or sold. the indians, however, were not to be restricted to the reservation, but were to be allowed to procure their food as they had always done, and were at liberty at any time to leave the reservation to trade with or work for the whites. "after this had all been interpreted to them, they were dismissed till the next day, in order that they might talk the matter over together, and have any part explained to them which they did not understand. the following morning the treaty was again read to them after a speech from the governor, but although they seemed satisfied, they did not perfectly comprehend. the difficulty was in having so many tribes to talk to at the same time, and being obliged to use the jargon, which at best is a poor medium of conveying intelligence. the governor requested any one of them that wished, to reply to him. several of the chiefs spoke, some in jargon and some in their own tribal language, which would be interpreted into jargon by one of their people who was conversant with it; so that, what with this diversity of tongues, it was difficult to have the subject properly understood. but their speeches finally resulted in one and the same thing, which was that they felt proud to have the governor talk with them; they liked his proposition to buy their land, but they did not want to go to the reservation. the speech of narkarty, one of the chinook chiefs, will convey the idea they all had. 'when you first began to speak,' said he to the governor, 'we did not understand you; it was all dark to us as the night; but now our hearts are enlightened, and what you say is clear to us as the sun. we are proud that our great father in washington thinks of us. we are poor, and can see how much better off the white men are than we are. we are willing to sell our land, but we do not want to go away from our homes. our fathers and mothers and ancestors are buried there, and by them we wish to bury our dead and be buried ourselves. we wish, therefore, each to have a place on our own land where we can live, and you may have the rest; but we can't go to the north among the other tribes. we are not friends, and if we went together we should fight, and soon we would all be killed.' this same idea was expressed by all, and repeated every day. the indians from the interior did not want to go on a reservation with the coast or canoe indians. the whole together only numbered 843 all told, as may be seen by the following census, which was taken on the ground:- lower chehalis 217 upper chehalis 216 quenaiults 158 chinooks 112 cowlitz 140 -- 843 "but though few in numbers, there were among them men possessed of shrewdness, sense, and great influence. they felt that though they were few, they were as much entitled to a separate treaty as the more powerful tribes in the interior. we all reasoned with them to show the kind intentions of the governor, and how much better off they would be if they could content themselves to live in one community; and our appeals were not altogether in vain. several of the tribes consented, and were ready to sign the treaty, and of these the quenaiults were the most prompt, evidently, however, from the fact that the proposed reservation included their land, and they would consequently remain at home. "i think the governor would have eventually succeeded in inducing them all to sign, had it not been for the son of carcowan, the old chehalis chief. this young savage, whose name is tleyuk, and who was the recognized chief of his tribe, had obtained great influence among all the coast indians. he was very willing at first to sign the treaty, provided the governor would select _his_ land for the reservation, and make him the grand _tyee_, or chief, over the whole five tribes; but when he found he could not effect his purpose, he changed his behavior, and we soon found his bad influence among the other indians, and the meeting broke up that day with marked symptoms of dissatisfaction. this ill-feeling was increased by old carcowan, who smuggled some whiskey into the camp, and made his appearance before the governor quite intoxicated. he was handed over to provost marshal cushman, with orders to keep him quiet till he got sober. the governor was very much incensed at this breach of his orders, for he had expressly forbidden either whites or indians bringing one drop of liquor into the camp. "the following day tleyuk stated that he had no faith in anything the governor said, for he had been told that it was the intention of the united states government to put them all on board steamers and send them away out of the country, and that the americans were not their friends. he gave the names of several white persons who had been industrious in circulating these reports to thwart the governor in his plans, and most all of them had been in the employ of the hudson bay company. he was assured that there was no truth in the report, and pretended to be satisfied, but in reality was doing all in his power to break up the meeting. that evening the governor called the chiefs into his tent, but to no purpose, for tleyuk made some insolent remarks, and peremptorily refused to sign the treaty, and with his people refused to have anything to do with it. that night in his camp they behaved in a very disorderly manner, firing off guns, shouting, and making a great uproar. "the next morning, when the council was called, the governor gave tleyuk a severe reprimand, and, taking from him his paper, which had been given to show that the government recognized him as chief, he tore it to pieces before the assemblage. tleyuk felt this disgrace very keenly, but said nothing. the paper was to him of great importance, for they all look on a printed or written document as possessing some wonderful charm. the governor then informed them that as all would not sign the treaty it was of no effect, and the camp was then broken up. "throughout the whole of the conference governor stevens evinced a degree of forbearance, and a desire to do everything he could for the benefit of the indians. nothing was done in a hurry. we remained in the camp a week, and ample time was given them each day to perfectly understand the views of the governor. the utmost good feeling prevailed, and every day they were induced to some games of sport to keep them good humored. some would have races on the river in their canoes, others danced, and others gambled; all was friendly till the last day, when tleyuk's bad conduct spoiled the whole." that was an intrepid and resolute act of governor stevens, thus to tear up the turbulent chief's commission before his face, surrounded by three hundred and fifty indians and supported by only fourteen whites; but it effectually cowed the insolent young savage, and preserved the respect of the indians. the council was by no means abortive, for in consequence of it the following fall colonel simmons obtained the assent and signature of the chiefs of the quenaiult and quillehute coast tribes to the treaty so carefully explained to them at the chehalis council, and it was signed by governor stevens at olympia, january 25, 1856, on his return from the blackfoot council, and duly confirmed with the other treaties on march 8, 1859. these indians were given $25,000 in annuities, and $2500 to improve the reservation, the selection of which was left to the president. a reservation of ten thousand acres was set off at the mouth of the quenaiult river, including their principal village and salmon fishery, renowned as yielding the richest and finest salmon on the coast, a fish of medium size, deep, rich color, and exquisite flavor. the other provisions were the same as those secured to the sound indians. tah-ho-lah and how-yatl, head chiefs of the two tribes, and twenty-nine other chiefs signed the treaty, and it was witnessed by m.t. simmons, general indian agent; h.a. goldsborough, surveyor; b.f. shaw, interpreter; james tilton, surveyor-general; f. kennedy, j.y. miller, and h.d. cock. these two tribes numbered four hundred and ninety-three, a number greatly in excess of the census given in swan's account. in their distrust the indians invariably reported less than their actual numbers, and nearly every tribe was found to be larger than the first estimate. the numbers of the chinook, chehalis, and cowlitz indians were reported by governor stevens in 1857 as one thousand one hundred and fifteen. including the quenaiults and the cowlitz, and other indians not on reservations, they now number some seven hundred, and are in about the same condition as the sound indians.[1] footnotes: [1] a census of all the tribes in the territory, returned with governor stevens's report and map of april 30, 1857, is given in the appendix. chapter xxvii personal and political.--san juan controversy just before going to the chehalis council, governor stevens and his family suffered a sad and severe affliction in the death of his young kinsman, george watson stevens, who was drowned on february 16 at the debouch of the skookumchuck creek into the chehalis river, as he was returning from portland, whither he had gone to cash some government drafts. he was accompanied on the journey by a.b. stuart, the mail and express carrier, who, as they approached the stream, had occasion to stop at a settler's house, while george stevens kept on, and, although cautioned by stuart, lost his life in the attempt to cross by the usual ford. the skookumchuck empties into the chehalis at right angles, and although ordinarily a stream of moderate size, becomes, when swollen by rains, a mighty and furious flood, which, encountering the rapid current of the chehalis, forms a dangerous whirlpool in the centre of that river. not realizing the danger, and anxious to reach his journey's end that day, he forced his horse into the raging torrent, and was swept, man and steed, into the whirlpool below, where, although a fine swimmer and a strong, vigorous man, he met his death. stuart reached the ford soon afterwards, and finding it impassable and his companion nowhere visible, rightly concluded that he was lost, and hastened to olympia with the sad tidings. governor stevens with a party hastened to the scene, and diligently searched for the missing one. the governor caused a band of horses to be driven into the stream to test its power, but all were instantly swept down into the larger river, several of them clear to the whirlpool, although the water had fallen considerably. the unfortunate youth's horse swam ashore, and was found with the saddle and saddle-bags soaked with water, and a few days later his remains were found in the river a mile below the whirlpool. this sad event cast a deep gloom upon the family, and indeed all the community, for he was a young man of great promise, noble traits, and only twenty-two years of age. the governor said of him:- "his whole character was an admirable blending of strength and gentleness. he was essentially a man of great resolution, daring, enterprise, and purpose, who adhered with great inflexibility to his determinations; yet he was so gentle, so kindly, so courteous, and so disinterested that his strength did not fully appear in ordinary intercourse. to his friends his death is a sad bereavement, which time only can obliterate. his memory will be precious, his life an example, his bright and pure spirit is now in the heavenly mansion." "he was a brother in the house," wrote mrs. stevens to her mother; "evenings he always spent at home, and took an interest in everything about the house, played with the children, seemed to be happy just staying in our society. here is my garden he made, and the flowers he set out, and marks of him all about us." it was a sad time when his remains were brought in, and the little toys and candy he had thoughtfully purchased for the children were found in his pockets and saddle-bags. he was buried on the beautiful green bush prairie, amid the scenes of mountain, prairie, and forest he loved so well. his intimate friends, mason and doty, were soon to be laid at rest by his side. in a letter to a sister mrs. stevens relates another instance of the governor's firmness and fearlessness in dealing with the indians:- "there are three different tribes of indians in olympia now, all different,--the nisquallies, chissouks, and northern fort simpson indians. a curious sight it is to see them. they are all gambling, their mats spread on the ground; and you will see groups of fifty seated on the ground, and playing all day and night. the town is full of them. mr. stevens has them right under his thumb. they are as afraid as death of him, and do just what he tells them. he told the chiefs of the tribes he would not let them disturb the whites. that night they kept up an awful howling and singing, making night hideous like a pack of wolves. mr. stevens got up, took a big club, and went right in among them, and talked to them, and told them that the first man that opened his lips he would knock down. the chief said, 'close' (all right), and not another sound came from them that night. when he came back, he said the biggest lodge was full of men sitting in a circle around a big fire, smoking and singing." returning from the chehalis council, governor stevens remained the next two months in olympia, hard at work with his multifarious duties, reviewing legislative acts, preparing reports of the councils and treaties, instructing the indian agents, and attending to the unceasing cares and questions arising from the indians, and preparing for the trip east of the mountains. in april he made the arduous horseback and river trip to vancouver, and there met superintendent joel palmer, of oregon, by appointment, having previously invited him, in order to arrange with him in regard to the proposed council with the indians of the upper country, some of whom were within general palmer's superintendency. this spring began the san juan island controversy with great britain, which came near involving the two countries in war, and lasted with various phases for eighteen years, until it was finally decided in favor of the united states by emperor william i., of germany. by the treaty of 1846 the main ship-channel which separates the continent from vancouver island was fixed as the boundary from the point where the 49th parallel intersects the gulf of georgia, in order to give the whole of that island to great britain, for the parallel intersects it. it happens, however, that there are two channels, with a valuable group of islands between them, answering this description. the americans claimed the western-most, the canal de haro, which runs next to vancouver island, and is the shorter, broader, and deeper, in every respect the main ship-channel, while the english insisted that the eastern channel, rosario straits, was the proper boundary. the shrewd and aggressive officers of the hudson bay company at victoria, sir james douglass at their head, originated the british claim, which otherwise had never arisen, so little merit had it, and in order to gain a foothold on, and claim possession of, these valuable islands, placed a flock of sheep on san juan, and stationed there a petty official of the company. the island was included in whatcom county by act of the washington legislature, the property thereon became subject to taxation, and the sheriff of the county levied upon and seized a number of the sheep in default of payment of taxes. sir james douglass thereupon addressed governor stevens, complaining of the seizure, and demanding to know if the sheriff's proceedings were authorized or sanctioned in any manner by the executive officer of washington territory. the governor promptly replied, may 12, 1855, and firmly and uncompromisingly asserted the american right, and justified the sheriff. after reciting the acts of oregon and washington assuming jurisdiction over the islands, he continued:- "the sheriff, in proceeding to collect taxes, acts under a law directing him to do so. should he be resisted in such an attempt, it would become the duty of the governor to sustain him to the full force of the authority vested in him. "the ownership remains now as it did at the execution of the treaty of june 11, 1846, and can in no wise be affected by the alleged 'possession of british subjects.'" the correspondence was communicated to the secretary of state, who in reply deprecated any action by the territorial authorities pending a settlement of the question by the respective governments, and the dispute remained in abeyance until excited some years afterwards by another british act of aggression. had our government firmly asserted its undoubted right at this time, the matter would have been settled. to the resolute and patriotic stand of governor stevens on this occasion, and his subsequent course in defense of this american territory, as will be seen hereafter, were due the ultimate defeat of the persistent and hard-fought british demands. at this time the governor purchased of william taylor for $2000 his donation claim, a fine tract of half a section, 320 acres, six miles southwest of olympia, and in the northwestern corner of bush prairie. it comprised a few acres of prairie, over a hundred acres of heavy meadow, and the remainder in heavy fir timber. a small house and a field fenced off the prairie were the only improvements. the governor always took great interest and pleasure in the soil, in gardening and farming. he soon put a man on the place, and laid out extensive plans of improving it. in april the democratic convention met in olympia to nominate a candidate for delegate in congress, to succeed judge lancaster. the delegates assembled in a large store building on the southwest corner of main and first streets, belonging to george a. barnes. governor stevens was a candidate for the nomination. he was desirous, after completing his treaty operations and returning from the blackfoot council, to represent the territory in congress, and there push forward his plans for the public service, further railroad surveys, wagon roads, mail routes, steamer service, indian treaties and policy, and, above all, the northern pacific railroad. many of the first settlers were strong in his support, recognizing how much such a man in congress could accomplish for the territory. there were two other candidates, judge columbia lancaster, very anxious to succeed himself, and j. patton anderson, united states marshal, who had traveled all over the territory in taking the census the previous year, and, it was said, had diligently improved his opportunities as census-taker by paying court to all the women, kissing all the babies, and pledging all the men to support him for delegate. he was a man of good appearance, cordial, pleasant southern manners, and well calculated to make friends. the convention divided between the three candidates, and balloted an entire day without result. in the evening the candidates were invited to address the convention. colonel shaw, who was one of the governor's supporters, although not a member of the convention, says that he advised the governor not to accept the invitation, lest the friends of the other candidates, hearing him speak, should become alarmed at his ability and power, and combine against him. such advice was the very last that the governor, with his straightforward and positive character, would relish. he went before the convention, and in a forcible and patriotic speech, without reference to himself, set forth the needs of the territory, and the public measures required for its advancement, so ably and clearly that his friends were delighted, and felt sure that he would be chosen on the next ballot. but it turned out as shaw feared. although he gained votes, his opponents combined on anderson, and nominated him, some of them exclaiming, "it won't do to nominate the governor, for if he once gets into congress, we can never get him out again." chapter xxviii indians of the upper columbia the indians of the upper columbia, with whom governor stevens was next to treat, presented a far more pressing and difficult problem than the reduced tribes of the sound. they numbered fourteen thousand souls, comprised in ten powerful tribes, viz., nez perces, cuyuses, umatillas, walla wallas, yakimas, spokanes, coeur d'alenes, flatheads, pend oreilles, and kootenais.[2] they were a manly, athletic race, still uncontaminated by the vices and diseases which so often result from contact with the whites, and far superior in courage and enterprise, as well as in form and feature, to the canoe indians of the sound and coast. each tribe possessed its own country, clearly defined by well-known natural boundaries, within whose limits their wanderings were restrained, save when they "went to buffalo," or attended some grand council or horse-race with a neighboring tribe. the chase, the salmon fishery, the root ground, the numerous bands of horses and cattle, furnished easy and ample sustenance. it was estimated that the nez perces owned twenty thousand head of these animals, and the cuyuses, umatillas, and walla wallas not less than fifteen thousand. the yakimas and spokanes also possessed great numbers. [illustration: the interior from cascade mountains to fort benton] of all these tribes, the nez perces or sahaptin were the most numerous and progressive. they numbered 3300, and occupied the country along the western base of the bitter root mountains for over two hundred miles, and a hundred miles in width, including both banks of the snake and its tributaries, the kooskooskia or clearwater, salmon, grande ronde, tucañon, etc. yearly, in the spring or fall, their war chief would lead a strong party across the rocky mountains to hunt the buffalo on the plains of the missouri, and many were the bloody encounters they had with the dreaded blackfeet, the arabs of the plains. they owned great numbers of horses, and the advent of the horse among them, about the middle of the eighteenth century, obtained from the spaniards of new mexico or california, of which they preserved the tradition, was the chief cause of their prosperous condition. from the days of lewis and clark, the first of the white race to meet their astonished gaze, they were famed as the firm friends of the white man. during all the fur-hunting and trading epoch the "mountain men," as the trappers and voyageurs delighted to call themselves, were welcome in the lodges of the nez perces. together they wintered in safety on the banks of the kooskooskia, and together they hunted the buffalo on the plains of the missouri, and made common cause against the blackfeet. among the most noted of the numerous encounters in which they were allied against their common foe was the stubborn fight of pierre's hole in 1832, so graphically described by washington irving in his "bonneville adventures." it was in this fight that lawyer, then a promising young brave, and afterwards for many years the powerful head chief of the sahaptin, received a severe wound in the hip, which never entirely healed, and doubtless hastened his death. in 1836 rev. h.h. spalding with his wife was sent out by the presbyterians, and settled as a missionary on the lapwai, a branch on the southern side of the kooskooskia, twelve miles above its confluence with the snake. here he was preceded by william craig, a virginian, one of the best type of mountain men, who had married a nez perce maiden and made his home among her people. aided by craig's knowledge of the nez perce tongue and character, and of the indians themselves, mr. spalding taught the whole tribe a simple christian faith, made a dictionary of their language, and translated and had printed in the native tongue a hymn-book, catechism, and new testament, taught a number of the young men to read and write their own language, built a saw and grist mill, and labored to induce them, not without success, to till the soil. yet, after all this achievement, he was in the end led to abandon his mission. in an unhappy hour he opened a store and went to trading with the indians. in their experience a trader was the personification of greed and falsehood. to them the union of the trader, all selfishness and fraud, and the preacher of morality and truth was monstrous, nay, impossible. mr. spalding, too, was hard and exacting in his dealings, and offended in that way. with all his zeal and energy, he evidently lacked knowledge of indian nature, perhaps of human nature. what wonder that some of the nez perces, seeing that the trading-post was a fact, concluded that his preaching was a fraud, and warned him out of their country! the massacre of the devoted missionary, dr. marcus whitman, and his family, by the cuyuses, in 1847, had just occurred, and mr. spalding, fearing a like fate if he remained after the warning, abandoned the mission where he had done so much. the majority of the nez perces, however, desired him to remain; and when he decided upon going, they formed a strong party of warriors, and escorted him with his family and effects unharmed through the hostile indians to the frontier settlement. they magnanimously refused the large reward offered them, saying, "we will not sell mr. spalding; he left our country of his own free will, and we escorted him as his friends." in the war which ensued they remained the firm friends of the whites, and the officers of the oregon volunteers engaged in it presented them with a fine, large american flag, in which they took great pride. it was their boast that "we are the friends of the white man. the white man is our brother. his blood has never stained our hands." craig remained among them in perfect safety, and was treated with undiminished kindness. although abandoned by mr. spalding, they by no means discarded the good he had taught them. they maintained, unaided, their simple religious worship, and held services regularly every sabbath, with preaching, singing of hymns, and reading of the bible, all in their own language, with the books translated and printed for them by the devoted missionary. they prided themselves upon their superior intelligence, upon having young men who could read and write, and upon their ancient and fast friendship with the whites. this friendship indeed was not merely a matter of sentiment. they were shrewd enough to turn it to good account. large emigrations crossed the plains to oregon during the period from 1843 to 1855; and the nez perces used to go down to the emigrant road on the grande ronde or umatilla, with bands of fat, sleek, handsome ponies, and exchange them with the emigrants for their worn-out horses, oxen, and sometimes a cow, clothing, groceries, ammunition, etc. the pikes, as the missourians who comprised the majority of the emigrants were called, "allowed that the nez perces could beat a yankee on a trade." by these means they were beginning to obtain cattle as well as horses, were learning to wear blankets and shirts instead of skins, and individuals were even beginning to set out fruit trees, and plant corn and potatoes, and in a word the nez perces were making rapid strides toward civilization. there is no more interesting and instructive example of the amelioration of a savage tribe by the introduction of domestic animals, and its steady growth from abject barbarism, than that afforded by the nez perces. but little more than a century ago they were a tribe of naked savages, engaged in a perpetual struggle against starvation. their country afforded but little game, and they subsisted almost exclusively on salmon, berries, and roots. the introduction of the horse enabled them to make long journeys to the buffalo plains east of the rocky mountains, where they could lay in great abundance of meat and furs; furnished them with a valuable animal for trading with other less favored tribes; soon raised them to comparative affluence, and developed in their hunting and trading expeditions a manly, enterprising, shrewd, and intelligent character. they had improved and profited still more from their intercourse with the whites, until there seemed every prospect that, with the introduction of cattle, they might lay aside their nomadic habits, and become a pastoral and then an agricultural people. the cuyuses were the most disaffected and intractable of all the tribes. but little is known of their early history. they are said to have come from the east many years ago. no tribe could resist their prowess, and when they settled on the umatilla and walla walla rivers, having driven out the original inhabitants, none dared molest them; since which, wars and pestilence had reduced their numbers to but five hundred, and continual intermarriages with the neighboring tribes had caused their own language to fall into disuse. but they still maintained their separate independence, and were as haughty and arrogant as ever. the jesuits established a mission on the umatilla and made some progress in their conversion, and then dr. whitman came among them, establishing his mission in the walla walla valley, and for several years possessed their confidence and accomplished much good. the rivalry between jesuit and protestant missionary was carried to a high pitch. pictorial cards were issued by each party, representing its opponents descending into the fiery depths of the infernal regions, where satan and his imps, with red-hot pitchforks, were impatiently waiting to receive their prey, while the converts to the true faith were ascending to heaven up a broad flight of stairs with winged angels on either side. this hostile and bigoted attitude of the missionaries towards each other must have weakened the respect and confidence of the indians, and contributed not a little to the troubles that followed. dr. whitman was accustomed to attend the indians when sick, and these labors, undertaken in the purest benevolence, were ultimately the cause of his death; for, the measles having broken out among them, and great numbers, especially of the children, dying, their suspicions were directed towards this devoted and able missionary. in the war which ensued the cuyuses suffered severely, were deprived of great numbers of horses, compelled to relinquish their white captives, and to surrender to well-deserved death some of the most active in the massacre. their head chief was known as the young chief, and next in rank and influence was the five crows. the walla wallas and umatillas numbered upwards of one thousand, and inhabited the banks of the rivers which bear their names, and those of the columbia. their head chief was pu-pu-mox-mox or the yellow serpent, a man of great intelligence and force of character, but well stricken in years. the yakimas, including outlying bands,[3] were over 3900 strong, and occupied the large region between the columbia and the cascades, with their principal abodes in the yakima valley. one band, the palouses, lived on the palouse river, on the north side of the snake and east of the columbia, next the nez perce country. large bands of the yakimas had crossed the cascades and were pressing on the feebler races on the west, by whom they were appropriately termed "klik-i-tats" or robbers. the jesuits had a mission on the ah-ti-nam creek, on the yakima, but do not seem to have acquired much influence over them. the spokanes numbered 2200, including the colvilles, 500, and okinakanes, 600, and held the country north of snake river to pend oreille lake and the 49th parallel, and extending west from the nez perce country, and that occupied by the coeur d'alenes at the base of the bitter root mountains, to the columbia river. a presbyterian mission was also established among them under rev. e. walker and g.c. eells, and abandoned about the same time as that of mr. spalding. immediately east of the spokanes, under the western slope of the bitter roots, lived the coeur d'alenes, a tribe of about five hundred. there was a catholic mission among them presided over by father ravalli, and they had been converted to the ancient faith, and their material condition greatly improved by the good fathers. the flatheads, pend oreilles, and koutenays lived in the mountain valleys between the main range of the rockies and the bitter roots, upon the tributaries of clark's fork chiefly, and depended largely upon the buffalo for their subsistence. they, too, like the nez perces, were distinguished as the constant friends of the whites, and were exposed to the unceasing forays of the blackfeet. they numbered 2250. they termed themselves the salish, and the spokanes and coeur d'alenes were of the same stock. there were also some small independent bands along the columbia, who subsisted chiefly on salmon. five sixths of the indians lived within the washington superintendency,--all, indeed, except the cuyuses, umatillas, walla wallas, and a small number of the nez perces, who dwelt or roamed in both territories, and the small bands about the dalles and on the columbia, des chutes, and john day's rivers, who lived wholly in oregon. the whole vast region occupied by these numerous, brave, and manly indians was still free from the intrusion of white settlers, save a handful in the walla walla valley and about colville. but year after year they saw the long trains of emigrants pass through their country and settle, like swarming bees, upon the fertile plains of the wallamet. they saw the indians there dispossessed of their hunting grounds, and rapidly dying off the face of the earth. the tale of every indian wronged or aggrieved, or who thought himself wronged or aggrieved, was borne with startling rapidity to their ears. thus far their intercourse with the whites had been of immense benefit to them. the fur traders supplied them with superior weapons, blankets, and many articles of comfort, and had greatly improved their condition. devoted missionaries had labored among them for years, and with marked success. by trade with the emigrants they were growing rich in cattle. but the actual occupation of the soil by the settlers filled them with alarm. amid all these benefits, the fear was fast growing into conviction that the fate of the chinooks and the wallamets was the presage of their fate, and that the whites would sooner or later pour with increasing numbers into their country, and appropriate it for themselves. the flatheads, pend oreilles, and koutenays, remote from the settlements, retained their ancient friendship for the whites. but among the other tribes the desperate resolution was extending and deepening itself to rise and wipe out the dreaded invaders ere it was too late. for several years the bold and turbulent spirits among them had been enlisting the disaffected indians far and wide in a great combination designed to crush the unsuspecting whites simultaneously at all points by one sudden and mighty blow. in 1853 the wild rumors of impending outbreaks, the forerunners of every indian war, but which have been invariably unheeded by the over-confident whites, were flying about the land. yet outwardly all was serene. the great tribes of the upper country, from whom alone danger was to be feared, were as yet unmolested by settlers, had reaped only benefits from the whites, and were as friendly as ever to all appearance. both authorities and people were lulled into a sense of complete security, and disregarded with contempt the warnings of the few who foresaw the danger. in truth, a similar state of affairs has preceded nearly all our great indian wars. they have not been caused by petty acts of aggression, stinging whole tribes to frenzied revenge. indians who undergo such treatment are usually too degraded and helpless to resist. but powerful tribes, unbroken by too long contact with the whites, fired and led by their master spirits, have from time to time risen in arms, and vainly striven to arrest and drive back the white race ere it overwhelmed them, as it had overwhelmed their kindred. many chiefs have shown profound sagacity in foreseeing the danger menacing their race, and the highest talents and bravery in their bloody struggles to avert it. the nez perces saw the danger, but they alone realized the hopelessness of averting it by war. the nez perces alone discerned that their only safety was to "follow the white man's road," and that his mode of life was better than their own. under the wise guidance of lawyer, they had become imbued with these convictions, by which their traditional friendship to the whites was strengthened and confirmed, and the time was fast approaching when their fidelity was to save many a valuable life, and preserve the settlements from destruction. in the spring of 1853 general benjamin alvord, then a major and commanding the military post at the dalles, heralded among the indians the approach of governor stevens with the exploring parties, and in reply was visited by a delegation of chiefs of the yakimas, cuyuses, and walla wallas, who said that "they always liked to have gentlemen, hudson bay company men, or officers of the army, or engineers, pass through their country, to whom they would extend every token of hospitality. they did not object to persons merely hunting, or those wearing swords, but they dreaded the approach of the whites with ploughs, axes, and shovels in their hands." major alvord had largely dealt with and studied these indians, and moreover he had confidential sources of information from the catholic priests of the yakima mission. he became so impressed with the danger of an outbreak that he reported the facts and rumors to his superior, general hitchcock, commanding the pacific department, by whom they were discredited, and major alvord was soon afterwards relieved from the dalles. events were soon to prove that the magnitude and imminence of the danger were even greater than he apprehended. says general alvord:[4]- "i informed governor stevens of these threatened indian difficulties, and of the gigantic scale of their proposed insurrection. what should he do? was he to remain idle and let the storm come? no, he set to work to provide for the inevitable. as the whites would come as five or six, or ten thousand would come every summer, he did his best to get the indians to sell their indian titles." it was on reaching the dalles on his overland exploration that the governor first learned of this smouldering fire. quick to grasp the situation, to see the breach into which, as governor and superintendent of indian affairs, it was his duty to throw himself, he lost no time, by his earnest and forcible reports, and by his visit in washington, in obtaining the necessary authority for treating with these indians. five years had elapsed since congress, by the donation acts, had invited settlers to take possession of the lands of these brave and numerous indians, utterly disregarding their rights, and now, when the volcano was ready to burst forth, the effort was to be made for the first time to treat with them, and the herculean task was devolved upon governor stevens of buying their country, allaying their well-founded fears, adjusting their jealousies and disputes with the whites and with each other, and inducing them to relinquish their savage and nomadic mode of life for agriculture and civilization. many of the best informed settlers and army officers thought that any attempt to treat with these indians for their lands was a useless and dangerous enterprise, and would surely lead to collision and bloodshed. during the spring mr. doty and agents a.j. bolen and r.h. lansdale were visiting the powerful tribes of the upper country, and preparing them for treating. the walla walla valley was chosen for the council ground at the instance of kam-i-ah-kan, the head chief of the yakimas, who said, "there is the place where in ancient times we held our councils with the neighboring tribes, and we will hold it there now." a large quantity of goods was taken up the columbia to walla walla in keel-boats. a party of twenty-five men was organized at the dalles, outfitted with a complete pack-train, mules, riding animals, and provisions, and sent to the council ground to make ready for the reception of the indians, and afterwards to accompany the governor to the blackfoot council. the walla walla council, like the blackfoot, was conceived and planned exclusively by governor stevens. he alone impressed the necessity of them upon the government, and obtained the requisite authority. the work of collecting the indians was done chiefly by his agents, and it was not until he learned from doty that the indians had agreed to attend, and that the council was assured, that he invited superintendent palmer to take part in it as joint commissioner with himself for such tribes as lived partly in both territories. this fact he caused to be entered on the joint record of the council. leaving the gubernatorial office in the hands of mr. mason, and the indian service, now well organized, in charge of colonel simmons and other agents, governor stevens early in may left olympia on his treaty-making expedition east of the mountains, calculating to be absent from five to six months. he was accompanied by lieutenant richard arnold, en route to san francisco; captain a.j. cain, indian agent for the lower columbia; r.h. crosby; his son hazard, whom he decided to take as far as the dalles and then send home; and some other gentlemen. the little cavalcade trotted rapidly across the prairies amidst severe and drenching showers, and after a brisk ride of thirty miles reached the hospitable log-house of judge ford for supper and shelter. it rained heavily during the night, and on continuing the journey the next morning, and fording the skookumchuck, where poor george stevens was so recently lost, and which was then barely passable, a terribly swift, turbulent, and dangerous-looking torrent, the whole country seemed to be under water. the prairie upon which the town of newarkum is built was flooded, and the horses laboriously waded across the plain in single file, belly-deep in water. the narrow track through the timber beyond the prairie was like a canal. dick arnold, who led the party, a tall, erect, athletic, soldierly figure, suddenly sunk down into the water with a plunge until only his head and his horse's ears were visible. he had ridden into a deep slough, which here crossed the road, indistinguishable in the general flood, but his steed swam and struggled across it and climbed out on the other side, the water dripping from man and horse, but the rider remaining firm in his seat through it all. after some delay the rest of the party effected a crossing on foot by a fallen tree, and drove the horses across by the road, swimming. without further mishap, save the toils and discomforts of muddy roads and rains, they reached cowlitz landing that afternoon, descended the cowlitz in canoes the next day, and proceeded by steamboat to vancouver. after a day's stay here the governor continued his journey up the river by steamboat to the lower cascades, where he spent the night, crossed the cascades portage on horseback early the next morning, proceeded by steamboat to the dalles, and found hospitable quarters with major granville o. haller at the military post, where were stationed two companies of the 4th infantry, under major g.j. rains. superintendent palmer was found at the dalles, awaiting the governor's arrival. the outlook for effecting a treaty was deemed unfavorable by all. governor stevens was warned by father ricard, of the yakima mission, that the indians were plotting to cut off the white chiefs who might attempt to hold a council.[5] the snake indians had attacked and massacred parties of emigrants recently, and major rains was under orders to send a force on the emigrant road to protect them. general palmer and his indian agents were reluctant to attempt to treat with the indians at that time. the governor relates in his diary how he induced major rains to send from his small force a detachment of forty soldiers, under lieutenant archibald gracie, to the council as a guard. mr. lawrence kip, afterwards a colonel of the united states army, accompanied mr. gracie on the trip, and published an interesting account of the council:- "after supper, went with major haller to see major rains. it was about midnight, but the major got up, and we talked for two hours on indian matters. i dwelt particularly on the necessity of a small force on the treaty ground to maintain order. he saw the necessity, but had no suitable force at his disposal, etc. the bearing of the proposed council on the snakes was then alluded to by me, and i remarked that the services of a small force in checking insolence would be as good as two hundred men subsequently. we deemed it necessary to maintain our dignity and that of our government at the council, and we would seize any person, whether white man or indian, who behaved in an improper manner. there were unquestionably a great many malcontents in each tribe. a few determined spirits, if not controlled, might embolden all not well disposed, and defeat the negotiations. should this spirit be shown, they must be seized; the well affected would then govern in the deliberations, and i anticipated little or no difficulty in negotiating. i then alluded to my determination to call out the militia of the territory should i find, on reaching the council ground, that any plan of hostilities was being matured, or should a feeling of hostility be manifested, in case a small force was not sent from the garrison. "so doubtful did general palmer consider the whole matter of the council, that it was only the circumstance of a military force being dispatched which determined him to send to the treaty ground presents to the indians. he stated to me that he had concluded to send up no goods; but, the escort having been ordered, he would send up his goods. at this time the oregon officers expected little from the council, and evidently believed that the whole thing was premature and ill-advised." stopping at the dalles only long enough to obtain this detachment and outfit his own small party with riding animals, seven pack-mules, two packers, and a cook, the governor again took the saddle, and traveling rapidly overland two hundred miles to the walla walla valley in four days, camping the first night on the des chutes river, the second on john day's river, the third on the umatilla, reached the council ground on may 21 towards evening, the party thoroughly drenched by the soaking rain in which they had traveled all day. an amusing incident occurred at the camp on john day's river, which the governor was fond of relating as a good joke on himself. there was no wood to be found in that vicinity, except some drift sticks, which were claimed by an old indian who had pitched his lodge on the river's bank. after many fruitless attempts to purchase some of his wood, the men took advantage of the temporary absence of the old fellow to purloin a small quantity of it. this was nearly all consumed, and a hot and savory supper was smoking before our travelers, when the old indian returned and discovered his loss. dismounting from his pony, he approached the governor, and, in a tone of indignation and scorn, exclaimed, "do you call yourself a great chief and steal wood?" a liberal present mollified him considerably, and after partaking of the supper, he departed in great good humor. the council ground was situated on the right bank of mill creek, a tributary of the walla walla river, and about six miles above the site of the unfortunate whitman mission, in the midst of a wide and fertile valley, bounded in the distance on either hand by high, bare, rolling hills, and extending, fan-shaped, far eastward to the blue mountains, whose lofty and wooded heights bounded and overlooked the plain. the valley was almost a perfect level, covered with the greatest profusion of waving bunch grass and flowers, amidst which grazed numerous bands of beautiful, sleek mustangs, and herds of long-horned spanish cattle belonging to the indians, and was intersected every half mile by a clear, rapid, sparkling stream, whose course could be easily traced in the distance by its fringe of willows and tall cottonwoods. now every foot of this rich valley is under cultivation, a dozen gristmills run their wheels by these streams, and the very treaty ground is the centre of the thriving town of walla walla, with a population of six thousand souls. under the energetic hands of doty and c.p. higgins, the packmaster,--a position corresponding to the chief mate on shipboard, or the orderly sergeant of a company of troops,--the camp was found pitched, and everything in readiness for the council. a wall tent, with a large arbor of poles and boughs in front, stood on level, open ground a short distance from the creek, and facing the blue mountains, all ready for the governor. this was also to serve as the council chamber, and ample clear space was left for the indians to assemble and seat themselves on the ground in front of the arbor. a little farther in front, and nearer the creek, were ranged the tents of the rest of the party, a stout log-house to safely hold the supplies and indian goods, and a large arbor to serve as a banqueting-hall for distinguished chiefs, so that, as in civilized lands, gastronomy might aid diplomacy. a large herd of beef cattle and a pile of potatoes, purchased of messrs. lloyd brooke, bumford & noble, traders and stock-raisers, who were occupying the site of the whitman mission, and ample stores of sugar, coffee, bacon, and flour furnished the materials for the feasts. general palmer arrived the same day with r.r. thompson and r.b. metcalfe, indian agents for oregon tribes, who had visited the cuyuses and umatillas and small bands living wholly in oregon, and summoned them to attend the council. fatigued and uncomfortable as they must have been after the day's journey and drenching, the commissioners had a long conference in the evening, listened to doty's report of his visits to the tribes and the talk and dispositions of the chiefs, and discussed the location of reservations and other points. the following programme was agreed upon:-1. governor stevens to preside at the council. 2. each superintendent to be sole commissioner for the indians within his jurisdiction. 3. both to act jointly for tribes common to both territories, each to appoint an agent and commissary for them, and goods and provisions to be distributed to them in proportion to the number under the respective jurisdictions. 4. to keep separate records, to be carefully compared and certified jointly as far as related to tribes common to both territories. 5. to keep a public table for the chiefs. the following officers were appointed for the joint treaties, in each case the first named for washington, the second for oregon: governor isaac i. stevens and superintendent joel palmer, commissioners; james doty and william c. mckay, secretaries; r.h. crosby and n. olney, commissaries; r. h. lansdale and r.r. thompson, agents; william craig, n. raymond, matthew danpher, and john flette, interpreters. the governor also appointed as interpreters a.d. pambrun, john whitford, james coxie, and patrick mckensie. lieutenant gracie, with his little detachment, arrived on the 23d. a tent, furnished by the governor, was pitched for the officer and his guest, mr. kip, while the soldiers built huts of boughs, and spread over them canvas pack-covers. the two gentlemen dined with the governor under the arbor near his tent, "off a table constructed from split pine logs, smoothed off, but not very smooth," says mr. kip. the scanty treating party of whites were now all assembled, and awaited the arrival of the indians with interest, not unmixed with apprehension; for it seemed a bold and perilous step to meet so many brave and warlike indians, many of whom were known to be disaffected and ready to provoke an outbreak, in the heart of the indian country, two hundred miles from the nearest settlement or military post, with such a mere handful. they numbered barely a hundred men,--the governor's party of thirty-five, twelve with general palmer, the military guard of forty-seven, two catholic missionaries, and a few settlers. the second day after reaching the valley governor stevens, learning that general wool had just arrived at vancouver, wrote him a letter urging the importance of occupying the walla walla valley with a strong military force, preferably of cavalry, pointing out the central location of the point, and its strategic advantages for protecting the emigrant road, the trails to the missouri on the east, the puget sound on the west, and for controlling the disaffected indians, particularly the cuyuses and snakes. this, like other sound and indeed necessary measures recommended by the governor, was ignored by the self-sufficient wool and his officers, until they were obliged to adopt them from necessity. footnotes: [2] numbers and names of all these tribes as given in tabular statement or census, in governor stevens's map and report of april 30, 1857, to the commissioner of indian affairs, now on file in indian bureau. see appendix. [3] pisquouse or wenatchee, 600; yakimas, 700; ps-hawn-appan, 500; columbia river bands, 1000; palouses, 600; klikitats, 500. [4] letter to author; report of j. ross browne, h. doc., p. 38, 1st session, 35th congress; swan's three years, washington territory, pp. 324-425; speech of governor stevens, 1st session, 35th congress, congressional globe, vol. 37, pp. 490-494. [5] speech of governor stevens, 1st session, 35th congress, congressional globe, vol. 37, p. 490. chapter xxix the walla walla council the nez perces, the first to arrive, came the next day, may 24, 2500 strong. hearing of their approach, the commissioners drew up their little party on a knoll commanding a fine view of the unbroken level of the valley. the standard of the nez perces, the large american flag given them by the officers engaged in the cuyuse war, was sent forward and planted on the knoll. soon their cavalcade came in sight, a thousand warriors mounted on fine horses and riding at a gallop, two abreast, naked to the breech-clout, their faces covered with white, red, and yellow paint in fanciful designs, and decked with plumes and feathers and trinkets fluttering in the sunshine. the ponies were even more gaudily arrayed, many of them selected for their singular color and markings, and many painted in vivid colors contrasting with their natural skins,--crimson slashed in broad stripes across white, yellow or white against black or bay; and with their free and wild action, the thin buffalo line tied around the lower jaw,--the only bridle, almost invisible,--the naked riders, seated as though grown to their backs, presented the very picture of the fabled centaurs. halting and forming a long line across the prairie, they again advanced at a gallop still nearer, then halted, while the head chief, lawyer, and two other chiefs rode slowly forward to the knoll, dismounted and shook hands with the commissioners, and then took post in rear of them. the other chiefs, twenty-five in number, then rode forward, and went through the same ceremony. then came charging on at full gallop in single file the cavalcade of braves, breaking successively from one flank of the line, firing their guns, brandishing their shields, beating their drums, and yelling their war-whoops, and dashed in a wide circle around the little party on the knoll, now charging up as though to overwhelm it, now wheeling back, redoubling their wild action and fierce yells in frenzied excitement. at length they also dismounted, and took their stations in rear of the chiefs. then a number of young braves, forming a ring, while others beat their drums, entertained the commissioners with their dances, after which the indians remounted and filed off to the place designated for their camp. this was on a small stream, flowing parallel to mill creek, on the same side with and over half a mile from the council camp. the chiefs accompanied the governor to his tent and arbor, smoked the pipe of peace, and had an informal talk. [illustration: the arrival of the nez perces] hal-hal-tlos-sot or the lawyer, the head chief of the nez perces, was an indian solon in his efforts to improve the condition of his people. without any advantages of birth or wealth, he made himself the first in his tribe, while yet in middle life, by his unrivaled wisdom and force of character. his first acts were directed against gambling, which was indulged in to great excess, and against polygamy. finding, however, that his influence as head chief was insufficient to carry out his plans for the improvement of his people, he reorganized the government of the tribe, appointed an additional number of chiefs from the young men, and, having thus increased and strengthened his influence, was enabled to accomplish his reforms. he early perceived that the growing power of the whites, which threatened to swallow up all before it, could not be resisted by force, and in consequence all his efforts were directed to inducing the indians to adopt the customs and civilization of the whites, and to preserving the unbroken friendship between the two races. from the effects of the wound received at the battle of pierre's hole he was still suffering, and his right arm had been twice broken in a fight with a grizzly bear. wise, enlightened, and magnanimous, the head chief, yet one of the poorest of his tribe, he stood head and shoulders above the other chiefs, whether in intellect, nobility of soul, or influence. provisions were issued to the nez perces, and some petty tribes which had come in, at the rate of one and a half pounds of beef, two pounds of potatoes, and one half a pound of corn to each person. the cuyuses, walla wallas, and umatillas next arrived, and went into camp without any parade or salutations on a stream on the other side of mill creek, and over a mile distant from the camp of the whites, from which the intervening fringes of trees completely hid them. the head chief of the walla wallas and umatillas was pu-pu-mox-mox or the yellow serpent, who held despotic sway over his own people, and great influence with neighboring tribes. he owned thousands of horses and cattle, and had amassed a large sum in specie, from trade with settlers and emigrants. some years before one of his sons, a youth of promise, was murdered by a miner in california, and although he had always been on friendly terms with the whites, not even allowing his people to take part in the cuyuse war, it was believed that the outrage rankled in his heart. he was well advanced in years, and somewhat childish and capricious in small things, but his form was as erect, his mind as firm, and his authority as unimpaired as ever. [illustration: feasting the chiefs] the day after their arrival many of the nez perce chiefs came to see the commissioners, and after much friendly conversation were invited to dine. governor stevens and general palmer presided at opposite ends of the long table, at which were seated some thirty chiefs, and, having heard of the enormous appetites of the indians, piled the tin plates, as they were presented, to the brim. again and again were the plates passed up for a fresh supply; the chiefs feasted and gorged like famished wolves; and the arms of the hosts became so wearied from carving and dispensing the food that they were glad to resign the posts of honor to a couple of stalwart packers. the table for the chiefs was kept up during the council, and every day was well attended, but it was not again graced by the presence of the commissioners. during the morning an express was received from the yellow serpent. he sent word that the cuyuses, walla wallas, and yakimas would accept no provisions from the commissioners, but would bring their own, and proposed that the young chief, lawyer, kam-i-ah-kan, and himself, the head chiefs of the cuyuses, nez perces, yakimas, and walla wallas respectively, should do all the talking for the indians at the council. the messenger would accept no tobacco for the chief, a very unfriendly sign, and muttered as he rode off, loud enough to be overheard by the interpreter, "you will find out by and by why we won't take provisions." every effort was made by the other indians to induce the nez perces to refuse provisions, but without avail. the latter took great pride in their unwavering friendship to the whites, and were fond of contrasting their course with that of the cuyuses. considerable jealousy sprung up between them in consequence. two of the priests, fathers chirouse, of the walla walla, and pandosy, of the yakima mission, arrived for the purpose of attending the council. they reported that these indians were generally well disposed towards the whites, with the exception of kam-i-ah-kan. the latter said, referring to the proposed council: "if the governor speaks hard, i will speak hard, too." other indians had said, "kam-i-ah-kan will come with his young men with powder and ball." they were opposed to selling their lands; and when secretary doty visited and invited them to attend the council, kam-i-ah-kan refused the presents offered him, saying that he "had never accepted anything from the whites, not even to the value of a grain of wheat, without paying for it, and that he did not wish to purchase the presents." he was a man of fine presence and bearing, over six feet in height, well built and athletic. governor stevens said of him: "he is a peculiar man, reminding me of the panther and the grizzly bear. his countenance has an extraordinary play, one moment in frowns, the next in smiles, flashing with light and black as erebus the same instant. his pantomime is great, and his gesticulation much and characteristic. he talks mostly in his face, and with his hands and arms." reports were flying about that these tribes had combined to resist a treaty, and fears were expressed that an attempt to open the council would be the signal for an outbreak. the following day a body of four hundred mounted indians, supposed to be cuyuses and walla wallas, were observed approaching, armed and in full gala dress, and uttering their war-whoops like so many demons, and, after riding three times around the nez perce camp, they departed. soon after the young chief, accompanied by his principal chiefs, rode into camp, and, being invited to dismount, did so with evident reluctance, and shook hands in a very cold manner. they refused to smoke, and remained but a short time. "the haughty carriage of these chiefs," remarks governor stevens in his journal, "and their manly character have, for the first time in my indian experience, realized the descriptions of the writers of fiction." [illustration: kam-i-ah-kan _head chief of the yakimas_] garry, the head chief of the spokanes, came, not to take part in the council, but as a spectator. when a boy he had been sent to the red river settlements in manitoba by sir george simpson, then governor of the hudson bay company, where he acquired a common-school, english education. it being impracticable to assemble so distant and widely scattered a tribe as the spokanes in time for this council, governor stevens designed making a separate treaty with them later in the season on his return from the missouri. father menetrey, from the catholic mission among the pend oreilles, also arrived to attend the council,--a cultivated man, who spoke english fluently. a messenger sent to invite the palouses returned accompanied by only one of the chiefs, who reported that his people were indifferent to the matter, and would not come. a number of scattered and insignificant bands, who lived at different points on the columbia, also arrived. the following is from governor stevens's journal:- may 27, sunday. there was service in the nez perce camp and in the nez perce language, timothy being the preacher. the commissioners attended. the sermon was on the ten commandments. timothy has a natural and graceful delivery, and his words were repeated by a prompter. the nez perces have evidently profited much from the labor of mr. spalding, who was with them ten years, and their whole deportment throughout the service was devout. the next day agent bolon, with an interpreter, was sent to meet the yakimas, who were thought to be near at hand. he soon returned, having met kam-i-ah-kan and also the yellow serpent. the latter said to mr. bolon that he was very sorry to hear that the chiefs and others in the commissioners' camp had said that he was unfriendly to the whites,--that his heart was with the cuyuses, whose hearts were bad. he had always been friendly to the whites, and was so now, and he would go to-day to see the commissioners, and ask why such things had been said of him. accordingly, soon after bolon's return, pu-pu-mox-mox, kam-i-ah-kan, ow-hi, and skloom, the two latter being chiefs of the yakimas, accompanied by a number of their braves, rode into camp. dismounting, they shook hands in the most friendly manner, and seating themselves under the arbor indulged in a smoke, using their own tobacco exclusively, although other was offered them. governor stevens addressed them, saying that he had important business to lay before them, and proposed to open the council the next day at noon. the yellow serpent replied that he wanted more than one interpreter at the council, that they might know they translated truly. being assured on this point, and invited to designate an interpreter in whom he had confidence, he said, in a scornful manner, "i do not wish my boys running around the camp of the whites like these young men," alluding to some young nez perces present and feeling quite at home. he added that he had only ridden over to-day to see the commissioners, and soon withdrew with his party. in the morning the commissioners and secretary doty visited the lawyer at his lodge, as, his wound having broken out afresh, he was unable to walk without great pain and difficulty. he exhibited and explained a map of his country, which he had drawn at governor stevens's request. during the conference several chiefs came in, and suddenly one of them, u-u-san-male-e-can or spotted eagle, said:- [illustration: spotted eagle _a chief of the nez perces_] "the cuyuses want us to go to their camp and hold a council with them and pu-pu-mox-mox. what are their hearts to us? did we propose to hold a council with them, or ask them for advice? our hearts are nez perce hearts, and we know them. we came here to hold a great council with the great chiefs of the americans, and we know the straightforward path to pursue, and are alone responsible for our actions. three cuyuses came last night and spoke to me and two other chiefs, urging us to come to a council at the cuyuse camp to meet pu-pu-mox-mox and kam-i-ah-kan. we did not wish to go. they insisted. then i said to them, 'you had best say no more. my mind is made up. why do you come here and ask three chiefs to come to a council, while to the head chief and the rest you say nothing? have we not told your messenger yesterday that our hearts are not cuyuse hearts? go home! our chiefs will not go. we have our own people to take care of; they give us trouble enough, and we will not have the cuyuse troubles on our hands.'" the lawyer then opened a book containing in their own language the advice left them by their former head chief, ellis, and read as follows:- "whenever the great chief of the americans shall come into your country to give you laws, accept them. a walla walla heart is a walla walla, a cuyuse heart is a cuyuse, so is a yakima heart a yakima, but a nez perce heart is a nez perce heart. while the nez perces are going straight, why should they turn aside to follow others? ellis's advice is to accept the white law. i have read it to you to show my heart." the speech of u-u-san-male-e-can afforded new evidence that the cuyuses were plotting underhand, although but little could be learned as to the nature of their designs. at two p.m., on may 29, 1855, the council was formally opened by governor stevens. under the roomy arbor in front of the tent were seated the commissioners, secretaries who kept the records, interpreters, and indian agents, while the indians were seated on the ground in front in semicircular rows forty deep, one behind another. timothy, the chief and preacher, concerning whom governor stevens said, "he and others are very devout, and seem to form a theocracy in the tribe, and, like the old new england fathers, to require every one to worship god in some visible way,"--this timothy, assisted by several of the young men, who were very tolerable penmen, kept the records of the council for the nez perces. they were accommodated with a table under the arbor, where everything could be seen and heard. some two thousand indians were present, fully half of whom were nez perces. the pipe having been smoked with due solemnity, two interpreters were appointed and sworn for each tribe, some preliminary remarks were made, and the council was adjourned until ten o'clock the next morning. before adjourning governor stevens renewed the offer of provisions to the recusant indians, proposing that each tribe should take two oxen to its own camp and slaughter for themselves. young chief: "we have plenty of cattle. they are close to our camp. we have already killed three, and have plenty of provisions." general palmer to the interpreter: "say to the yakimas, 'you have come a long way. you may not have provisions. if you want any, we have them, and you are welcome.'" young chief: "kam-i-ah-kan is supplied at our camp." the yellow serpent and kam-i-ah-kan dined with the commissioners, and remained in their tent for a long time, smoking in a friendly manner, but the young chief declined the invitation to dine. [illustration: walla walla council] the two following days governor stevens explained the proposed treaties at length, item by item. there were to be two reservations,--one in the nez perce country of three million acres, on the north side of snake river, embracing both the kooskooskia and salmon rivers, including a large extent of good arable land, with fine fisheries, root grounds, timber and mill-sites, and was for the accommodation of the cuyuses, walla wallas, umatillas, and spokanes, as well as the nez perces. the other embraced a large and fertile tract on the upper waters of the yakima, and was for the yakimas, klikitats, palouses, and kindred bands. the reservations were to belong to the indians, and no white man should come upon them without their consent. an agent, with school-teachers, mechanics, and farmers, would take charge of each reservation, and instruct them in agriculture, trades, etc.; grist and saw mills were to be built; the head chiefs were to receive an annuity of five hundred dollars each, in order that they might devote their whole time to their people; and annuities in clothing, tools, and useful articles were to be given for twenty years, after which they were to be self-supporting. at first the reservations were to be used in common, but provision was made for the survey and subdivision of the land, and its allotment to the indians in severalty as soon as they should be prepared to receive and utilize it. as it was evidently impracticable to make so radical a change in their habits suddenly, the indians were to have the privilege of hunting, root-gathering, and pasturing stock on vacant land until appropriated by settlers, and the right of fishing. the advantages of the reservations were dwelt upon. they embraced some of the best land in the country, and were large enough to afford each family a farm to itself, besides grazing for all their stock; they contained good fisheries, abundance of roots and berries, and considerable game. they were near enough to the great roads for trade with the emigrants, yet far enough from them to be undisturbed by travelers. by having so many tribes on the same reservation, the agent could better look after them, and could accomplish more with the means at his disposal. the staple argument held out was the superior advantages of civilization, and the absolute necessity of their adopting the habits and mode of life of the white man in order to escape extinction. governor stevens also exhorted them to treat, for the sake of the example upon their inveterate enemies, the blackfeet, that thereby they would prove themselves firm friends of the whites, and that he would then take delegations from each tribe with his party and proceed to the blackfoot country, and make a lasting treaty of peace, so that they could ever after hunt the buffalo in safety, and trade horses with the indians east of the rocky mountains. the indians listened gravely and in silence, as these matters were slowly unfolded to them, sentence by sentence through the interpreters, for five or six hours each day, and upon the adjournment of the council, quietly dispersed to their lodges. the third day the young chief for the first time dined at governor stevens's table with the other head chiefs, and general palmer and the gentlemen of the party; and in the evening he sent word that his young men were tired of such close confinement as they had undergone at the council, and desired to have a feast and holiday to-morrow, and he requested that no council be held until the day after (saturday). the commissioners cheerfully acceded to his request, well pleased at these signs of mollifying the opposition of the haughty savage. there were now assembled on the ground between five and six thousand indians. says colonel kip: "about five thousand indians, including squaws and children. their encampment and lodges are scattered over the valley for more than a mile, presenting a wild and fantastic appearance." every afternoon, after the council adjourned for the day, horse-races and foot-races were held at the nez perce camp, attended by the sporting bloods of the other tribes, and witnessed by many of the whites. the usual course was a long one,--some two miles out and back, making four miles. oftentimes thirty horses would start together in a grand sweepstakes; the riders and betters would throw into one common pile the articles put up as stakes,--blankets, leggings, horse equipments, and whatever was bet, and the winner would take the whole pile. the foot-races were equally long, and the runners would be escorted in their course by a crowd of mounted indians, galloping behind and beside them so closely that the exhausted ones could hardly stop without being run down. the riders and runners were invariably stripped to the breech-cloth, and presented many fine, manly forms, perfect apollos in bronze. everything was very quiet about the council ground the day begged for a holiday by the young chief, the indians remaining at their own camps. but the next day, saturday, june 2, they reassembled as usual; and after several hours had been spent in further explaining the provisions of the treaties, governor stevens called them to speak freely, saying, "we want you to open your hearts to us," etc. hitherto the indians had listened in grave silence, but now the opponents of the treaties took the lead in the discussion. the yellow serpent, in a speech marked by strength and sarcasm, uttered the prevailing reluctance to part with their lands, and their dread and distrust of the whites:- "we have listened to all you have to say, and we desire you to listen when any indian speaks. it appears that craig knows the heart of his people; that the whole has been prearranged in the hearts of the indians; that he wants an answer immediately, without giving them time to think; that the indians have had nothing to say, so that it would appear that we have no chief. i know the value of your speech from having experienced the same in california, having seen treaties there. we have not seen in a true light the object of your speeches, as if there was a post set between us, as if my heart wept for what you have said. look at yourselves: your flesh is white; mine is different, mine looks poor; our languages are different. if you would speak straight, then i would think that you spoke well. "should i speak to you of things that happened long ago, as you have done? the whites made me do what they pleased. they told me to do this, and i did it. they used to make our women to smoke. i supposed then they did what was right. when they told me to dance with all these nations that are here, then i danced. from that time, all the indians became proud and called themselves chiefs. "now, how are we here as at a post? from what you have said, i think that you intend to win our country, or how is it to be? in one day the americans become as numerous as the grass. this i learned in california. i know it is not right; you have spoken in a roundabout way. speak straight. i have ears to hear you, and here is my heart. suppose you show me goods, shall i run up and take them? that is the way with all us indians as you know us. goods and the earth are not equal. goods are for using on the earth. i do not know where they have given lands for goods. "we require time to think quietly, slowly. you have spoken in a manner partly tending to evil. speak plain to us. i am a poor indian. show me charity. if there was a chief among the nez perces or cuyuses, if they saw evil done they would put a stop to it, and all would be quiet. such chiefs i hope governor stevens and general palmer have. i should feel very much ashamed if the americans did anything wrong. i had but a little to say, that is all. i do not wish a reply to-day. think over what i have said." after a stinging rebuke administered by camospelo, a cuyuse chief, to some of his young men who had behaved in a surly manner, talking and walking about during the proceedings, the council was adjourned until monday. [illustration: pu-pu-mox-mox: yellow serpent _head chief of the walla wallas_] this speech of the yellow serpent is marked in every sentence by his bitter distrust of the whites. he intimates, almost asserts, that the commissioners are trying to deceive and overreach the indians, and with biting irony declares that he would feel very much ashamed if the americans did anything wrong. late that evening the lawyer came unattended to see governor stevens. he disclosed a conspiracy on the part of the cuyuses to suddenly rise upon and massacre all the whites on the council ground,--that this measure, deliberated in nightly conferences for some time, had at length been determined upon in full council of the tribe the day before, which the young chief had requested for a holiday; they were now only awaiting the assent of the yakimas and walla wallas to strike the blow; and that these latter had actually joined, or were on the point of joining, the cuyuses in a war of extermination against the whites, for which the massacre of the governor and his party was to be the signal. they had conducted these plottings with the greatest secrecy, not trusting the nez perces; and the lawyer, suspecting that all was not right, had discovered the plot by means of a spy with the greatest difficulty, and only just in time to avert the catastrophe. the lawyer concluded by saying: "i will come with my family and pitch my lodge in the midst of your camp, that those cuyuses may see that you and your party are under the protection of the head chief of the nez perces." he did so immediately, although it was now after midnight, and, without awakening the suspicions of any one, he caused it to be reported among the other indians that the commissioners were under the protection of the nez perces. governor stevens on his part imparted his knowledge of the conspiracy to secretary doty and packmaster higgins, and to them alone, for he feared that, should the party generally learn of it, a stampede would ensue. having through these efficient officers quietly caused the men to put their arms in readiness, and posting night guards, he determined to continue the council as usual, hoping that the cuyuses, foiled in their design, would finally conclude to treat. on monday the governor opened the council by inviting the indians to speak their minds freely, and, no one responding, finally called on the lawyer. he expressed himself in terms favorable to the treaty, and was followed by several of his chiefs in a similar strain. kam-i-ah-kan, on the other hand, avowed his distrust of the whites, and alluded in a contemptuous manner to the speeches of the lawyer and the others:- "i have something different to say from what the others have said. they are young men who have spoken as they have spoken. i have been afraid of the white man. his doings are different from ours. perhaps you have spoken straight that your children will do what is right. let them do as they have promised." the yellow serpent said with bitter irony, "i do not wish to speak. i leave it to the old men." steachus, the only chief of the cuyuses reported to be well disposed, commended the speech of the lawyer, and exhorted all present to speak their minds freely. but the most impressive speech by far was that of tip-pee-il-lan-oh-cow-pook, the eagle-from-the-light, a pathetic and touching speech:- "you are now come to join together the white man and the red man. and why should i hide anything? i am going now to tell you a tale. i like the president's talk. i am glad of it when i hear it here, and for that reason i am going to tell you a tale. "the time the whites first passed through this country, although the people of this country were blind, it was their heart to be friendly to them. although they did not know what the white people said to them, they answered yes, as if they were blind. they traveled about with the white people as if they had been lost. "i have been talked to by the french [hudson bay company men] and by the americans, and one says to me go this way, and the other says go another way, and that is the reason i am lost between them. "a long time ago they hung my brother for no offense, and this i say to my brother here, that he may think of it. afterwards came spalding and whitman. they advised us well, and taught us well,--very well. it was from the same source,--the light [the east]. they had pity on us, and we were pitied, and spalding sent my father to the east,--the states,--and he went. his body has never returned. he was sent to learn good counsel, and friendship and many things. this is another thing to think of. at the time, in this place here, when there was blood spilled on the ground, we were friends to the whites and they to us. at that time they found it out that we were friends to them. my chief, my own chief, said, 'i will try to settle all the bad matters with the whites,' and he started to look for counsel to straighten up matters, and there his body lies beyond here. he has never returned. "at the time the indians held a grand council at fort laramie, i was with the flatheads, and i heard there would be a grand council this side next year. we were asked to go and find counsel, friendship, and good advice. many of my people started, and died in the country,--died hunting what was right. there were a good many started; on green river the smallpox killed all but one. they were going to find good counsel in the east, and here am i looking still for counsel, and to be taught what is best to be done. "and now look at my people's bodies scattered everywhere, hunting for knowledge,--hunting for some one to teach them to go straight. and now i show it to you, and i want you to think of it. i am of a poor people. a preacher came to us, mr. spalding. he talked to us to learn, and from that he turned to be a trader, as though there were two in one, one a preacher and the other a trader. he made a farm and raised grain and bought our stock, as though there were two in one, one a preacher, the other a trader. and now one from the east has spoken, and i have heard it, and i do not wish another preacher to come, and be both trader and preacher in one. a piece of ground for a preacher big enough for his own use is all that is necessary for him. "look at that; it is the tale i had to tell you, and now i am going to hunt friendship and good advice. we will come straight here,--slowly perhaps, but we will come straight." the next two days governor stevens continued, explaining the treaties still further. a large map was brought forth, and the boundaries of the reservations accurately marked out and shown. the indians took great interest in this map, asking many questions about the mountains and streams they saw represented upon it, and in some instances adding streams which were not laid down. superintendent palmer spoke for some time, going over the same ground as governor stevens. after he had concluded, steachus, the friendly cuyuse, arose and said:- "my friends, i wish to show you my heart. if your mother were in this country, gave you birth and suckled you, and, while you were suckling, some person came and took away your mother and left you alone and sold your mother, how would you feel then? this is our mother,--this country,--as if we drew our living from her. my friends, all of this you have taken. had i two rivers, i would leave the one, and be content to live on the other. i name the place for myself, the grande ronde, the touchet towards the mountains, and the tucañon." thus even steachus, the most friendly of the cuyuses, was the first to express his dissatisfaction with a treaty which left him none of his own country, and to request a reservation within its borders. the indians were slow to speak; they required time to make up their minds, and the council was therefore adjourned. [illustration: we-ah-te-na-tee-ma-ny: young chief _head chief of the cuyuses_] about midnight the governor and his little son were awakened by lawyer, who shook the tent and said, in a low, soft voice, without a trace of hurry or excitement, "water come now." on springing out of bed, they splashed knee-deep in water flooding the tent, and were forced to make a hasty flight to higher ground. the creek had risen suddenly without warning, probably from a waterspout or heavy rains in the mountains. the following day it subsided again as rapidly as it rose. when the council met the next day, lawyer spoke first, and expressed the assent of himself and his people to the treaty. a great part of his speech was addressed to the indians. he traced the increase of the whites from the discovery of the new world by columbus; alluded in a touching manner to the way in which the indians had passed and were passing away; and urged his auditors, as their only refuge, to place themselves under the protection of the great father in washington. when lawyer concluded, the young chief, the haughty cuyuse, was the first to break the silence:- "he would not sell his country. he heard what the earth said. the earth said, 'god has placed me here to take care of the indian, to produce roots for him, and grass for his horses and cattle.' the water spoke the same way. god has forbidden the indian to sell his country except for a fair price, and he did not understand the treaty." five crows, the yellow serpent, ow-hi, and several other chiefs followed in similar strain. the yellow serpent proposed that another council should be held at some future time. he insisted that the whites should not be allowed to come into his country to settle. he complained that the indians were treated like children, were not consulted in drawing up the terms of the treaties, etc. kam-i-ah-kan refused to speak, although several times urged to do so. his invariable reply was, "i have nothing to say." the commissioners replied, explaining those parts of the treaties which the indians did not understand, and answering their objections. the discussion on the part of the indians was captious, stormy, and unsatisfactory. governor stevens in pointed words, well calculated to touch their pride, urged the recusant and evasive chiefs to speak plainly:- "my brother and myself have talked straight. have all of you talked straight? lawyer has, and his people here, and their business will be done to-morrow. "the young chief says he is blind, and does not understand. what is it that he wants? steachus says that his heart is in one of three places, the grande ronde, the touchet, and the tucañon. where is the heart of young chief? "pu-pu-mox-mox (the yellow serpent) cannot be wafted off like a feather. does he prefer the yakima reservation to that of the nez perces? we have asked him before. we ask him now. where is his heart? "and kam-i-ah-kan, the great chief of the yakimas, he has not spoken at all. his people have had no voice here to-day. he is not ashamed to speak. he is not afraid to speak. then speak out! "but ow-hi is afraid lest god be angry at his selling his land. ow-hi, my brother, i do not think that god will be angry if you do your best for yourself and your children. ask yourself this question to-night: 'will not god be angry with me if i neglect this opportunity to do them good?' ow-hi says his people are not here. why did he promise to come here, then, to hear our talk? i do not want to be ashamed of ow-hi. we expect him to speak straight out. we expect to hear from kam-i-ah-kan, from skloom." [illustration: she-ca-yah: five crows _cuyuse chief_] at length five crows proposed an adjournment. "listen to me, you chiefs. we have been as one people with the nez perces hitherto. this day we are divided. we, the cuyuses, the walla wallas, and kam-i-ah-kan's people and others will think over the matter to-night, and give you an answer to-morrow." the feature of the treaties which met with the greatest opposition was the provision that the cuyuses, walla wallas, and umatillas should relinquish the whole of their own lands, and remove to a reservation in the nez perce country. the commissioners therefore decided to establish a separate reservation for these three tribes on the headwaters of the umatilla, at the base of the blue mountains. conferences were had with the recusant chiefs separately, the proposition of a reservation in their own country was broached, and the whole ground of the treaties again gone over and fully discussed. steachus expressed himself as highly pleased with the new arrangement, and, although the others gave less encouragement, the commissioners were hopeful that a successful result would soon be reached. the change of reservations was brought forward in council the next day. the annuities of five hundred dollars for ten years to each of the head chiefs were extended to twenty years. the yellow serpent was given the privilege of establishing a trading-post for trade with the settlers and emigrants, and an annuity of one hundred dollars a year for twenty years was given his son. young chief and yellow serpent were the principal speakers, and in lengthy and rambling speeches gave their assent to the treaties. the latter, on declaring his acceptance, exclaimed, "now you may send me provisions!" kam-i-ah-kan was sullen, and refused his assent. some commotion was now observed among the indians, and suddenly a small party of warriors were seen approaching, painted and armed, singing a war-song, and flourishing on the top of a pole a freshly taken scalp. it proved to be a party of nez perces, headed by looking glass, the war chief, just from the blackfoot country, where they had been for three years hunting the buffalo. looking glass was old, irascible, and treacherous, yet second only to lawyer in influence. while hunting the buffalo he had several fights with the blackfeet. at one time seventy of his horses were stolen by them; but the vigorous old chief hotly pursued the depredators, killed two, put the rest to flight, and recovered his horses. he had reached the bitter root valley on his return home, when he heard that the nez perces were at a great council, and concluding a treaty without his presence. leaving his party to follow more slowly, he pushed on with a few chosen braves, crossed the bitter root mountains, where for some distance the snow was shoulder-deep on their horses, and, having ridden three hundred miles in seven days at the age of seventy, reached the council ground while governor stevens was urging kam-i-ah-kan to give his assent to the treaty, for the governor, hearing the arrival of looking glass announced, seized the occasion to call upon the yakima chief to sign the treaty in the name of looking glass, there being great friendship between these two. scarcely had he concluded when looking glass, surrounded by his knot of warriors with the scalps tossing above them, rode up, excited and agitated, received his friends coldly, and finally broke forth into a most angry philippic against his tribe and the treaty:- "my people, what have you done? while i was gone, you have sold my country. i have come home, and there is not left me a place on which to pitch my lodge. go home to your lodges. i will talk to you." [illustration: looking glass _war chief of the nez perces_] the council was immediately adjourned. governor stevens consulted lawyer, who was of opinion that looking glass would calm down in a day or two and accept the treaty. he said, however, that the latter's return would make it impossible to reduce the nez perce reservation, which, originally intended for the cuyuses, walla wallas, and umatillas, in addition to the nez perces, was larger than they alone required, and it was determined to make it a general reservation for other tribes, not exceeding in numbers those for whom it was at first designed. in the evening governor stevens assembled the yakima chiefs in his tent, and discussed the treaties with them until one o'clock in the morning. kam-i-ah-kan was not present, but skloom acted as the principal spokesman. the governor remarks in his journal, "skloom was desirous that his land should first be surveyed." the council of the following day, however, soon made it evident that looking glass had not yet calmed down. he declared himself the head chief of the tribes present; that the boys had spoken yesterday, but that he would speak to-day. he made many inquiries, raised many objections, and finally marked another line for the reservation, including nearly the whole of the nez perce territory. the cuyuses seized the occasion to retract their assent to their treaty, and the young chief strenuously supported looking glass in his objections, and omitted no opportunity to assert his supremacy as head chief of the nez perces. at length lawyer abruptly left the council in the midst of one of looking glass's philippics, and retired to his lodge. governor stevens refused to submit to the demands of the angry and grasping old chief, and adjourned the council until the following monday. after the adjournment the yellow serpent and kam-i-ah-kan, who had at length yielded to the advice of the other chiefs, with all the chiefs and prominent men of the two tribes, came forward and signed their respective treaties. the former had remarked in the morning that his word was pledged, and that he should sign the treaty no matter what looking glass and the nez perces did. it was thought that his example had great weight with kam-i-ah-kan. late in the evening governor stevens had an interview with lawyer, who said:- "governor stevens, you are my chief. you come from the president. he has spoken kind words to us, a poor people. we have listened to them, and have agreed to a treaty. we are bound by the agreement. when looking glass asked you, 'how long will the agent live with us?' you might have replied by asking the question, 'how long have you been head chief of the nez perces?' when he said, 'i, the head chief, have just got back; i will talk; the boys talked yesterday,' you might have replied, 'the lawyer, and not you, is the head chief. the whole nez perce tribe have said in council lawyer was the head chief. your faith is pledged. you have agreed to the treaty. i call upon you to sign it.' had this course been taken, the treaty would have been signed." "in reply," says the governor, "i told the lawyer that we considered all the talk of looking glass as the outpourings of an angry and excited old man, whose heart would become all right if left to himself for a time; that the lawyer had left the council whilst in session, and without speaking. it was his business to have interfered in this way, had it been necessary. we considered the lawyer's leaving as saying, 'nothing more can be done to-day; it must be finished to-morrow.' your authority will be sustained, and your people will be called upon to keep their word. you will be sustained. the looking glass will not be allowed to speak as head chief. you, and you alone, will be recognized. should looking glass persist, the appeal will be made to your people. they must sign the treaty agreed to by them through you as head chief, or the council will be broken up and you will return home, your faith broken, your hopes of the future gone." the council being adjourned, the cuyuses and nez perces retired to their respective camps to hold councils by themselves, which lasted all night. the position of looking glass was determined by the latter to be second to lawyer, who was reaffirmed head chief. the council was stormy, but the chiefs at length all agreed on a paper sent in by lawyer, and read in council, which declared the faith of the tribe pledged to governor stevens, and that the treaty must be signed. "those who would advise breaking their word were no better than the cuyuses. let them share the lot of the cuyuses." the morning after this council being sunday, timothy preached a sermon for the times, and held up to the indignation of the tribe, and the retribution of the almighty, those who would coalesce with the cuyuses, and break the faith of the nez perces. the governor had a conversation with kam-i-ah-kan, who said:- "looking glass, if left alone, will sign the treaty. don't ask me to accept presents. i have never taken one from a white man. when the payments are made, i will take my share." steachus, the friendly cuyuse chief, expressed his earnest desire that his tribe should sign the treaty, and both pu-pu-mox-mox and kam-i-ah-kan used their influence to induce them to accept it. early monday morning governor stevens saw lawyer, and said to him: "we are now ready to go into council. i shall call upon your people to keep their word, and upon you as head chief to sign first. we want no speeches. this will be the last day of the council. call your people together as soon as possible." the lawyer replied, "this is the right course," and immediately summoned his tribe. the closing scene of the council is best given in governor stevens's own words:- "the looking glass took his seat in council in the very best humor. the cuyuses and nez perces were all present. kam-i-ah-kan sat down near the young chief. the council was opened by me in a brief speech: 'we meet for the last time. your words are pledged to sign the treaty. the tribes have spoken through their head chiefs, joseph, red wolf, the eagle, ip-se-male-e-con, all declaring lawyer was the head chief. i call upon lawyer to sign first.' lawyer then signed the treaty. 'i now call upon joseph and the looking glass.' looking glass signed, then joseph. then every chief and man of note, both nez perces and cuyuses, signed their respective treaties. "after the treaties were signed, i spoke briefly of the blackfoot council, and asked each tribe to send delegations, the nez perces a hundred chiefs and braves, the whole under the head chief, or some chief of acknowledged authority, as looking glass. there was much talk on the subject on the part of the indians. looking glass said he would have a talk with me alone some other time." the council being completed, presents were made to all the assembled tribes, who began packing up and moving off. eagle-from-the-light, the nez perce chief, who was at first opposed to the treaty and refused to accept provisions, now presented a magnificent grizzly bear's skin, with the teeth and claws intact, to governor stevens with the following speech: "this skin is my medicine. it came with me every day to council. it tells me everything. it says what has been done is right. had anything been done wrong, it would have spoken out. i have now no use for it. i give it to you that you may know my heart is right." every day eagle-from-the-light had brought this skin to the council, and, placing it with the teeth and claws turned towards the commissioners, had used it as a seat, declining the roll of blankets offered him. [illustration: hal-hal-tlos-sot: the lawyer _head chief of the nez perces_] "thus ended," says the journal, "in the most satisfactory manner, this great council, prolonged through so many days,--a council which--in the number of indians assembled and the different tribes, old difficulties and troubles between them and the whites, a deep-seated dislike to and determination against giving up their lands, and the great importance, nay, absolute necessity, of opening this land by treaty to occupation by the whites, that bloodshed and the enormous expense of indian wars might be avoided, and in its general influence and difficulty--has never been equaled by any council held with the indian tribes of the united states. "it was so considered by all present, and a final relief from the intense anxiety and vexation of the last month was especially grateful to all concerned." the following day the nez perces celebrated the happy conclusion of the treaty, and the return of looking glass and his braves from the buffalo country, by a scalp-dance. the chiefs and braves, in full war-paint and adorned with all their savage finery, formed a large circle, standing several ranks deep. within this arena a chosen body of warriors performed the war-dance, while the densely massed ranks of braves circled around them, keeping time in measured tread, and accompanying it with their wild and barbaric war-song. the ferocious and often hideous mien of these stalwart savages, their frenzied attitudes and shrill and startling yells, formed a subject worthy the pen of dante and the pencil of doré. the missionary still had work to do. presently an old hag, the very picture of squalor and woe, burst into the circle, bearing aloft upon a pole one of the fresh scalps so recently taken by looking glass, and, dancing and jumping about with wild and extravagant action, heaped upon the poor relic of a fallen foe every mark of indignity and contempt. shaking it aloft, she vociferously abused it; she beat it, she spat upon it, she bestrode the pole and rushed around the ring, trailing it in the dust, again and again; while the warriors, with grim satisfaction, kept up their measured tread, chanted their war-songs, and uttered if possible yet more ear-piercing yells. a softer and more pleasing scene succeeded. the old hag retired with her bedraggled trophy, and a long line of indian maidens stepped within the circle, and, forming an inner rank, moved slowly round and round, chanting a mild and plaintive air. a number of the stylish young braves, real indian beaux in the height of paint and feathers, next took post within the circle, near the rank of moving maidens, and each one, as the object of his adoration passed him, placed a gayly decorated token upon her shoulder. if she allowed it to remain, his affection was returned and he was accepted, but if she shook it off, he knew that he was a rejected suitor. coquetry evidently is not confined to the civilized fair, for, without exception, the maidens, as if indignant at such public wooing, threw off the token with disdain, while every new victim of delusive hopes was greeted with shouts of laughter from the spectators. the turning-point in the council was undoubtedly the discovery of the cuyuse conspiracy by lawyer, and his act of moving his lodge into governor stevens's camp, thereby placing the whites under the protection of the nez perces. this was all that prevented the hostile chiefs and braves from striking the blow. they refrained because they knew that if lawyer was killed in an attack on the camp, which was to be expected in the mêlée, the whole nez perce nation would avenge his slaughter in their blood. the real extent and imminence of the danger was known to but few, but the fact of the plot was soon generally bruited about. [illustration: the scalp dance] "their design," says colonel kip, "was first to massacre the escort, which _could have been easily_ done. fifty soldiers against three thousand indian warriors, out on the open plains, made rather too great odds. we should have had time, like lieutenant grattan at fort laramie last season, to deliver one fire, and then the contest would have been over. their next move was to surprise the post at the dalles, as they could also have easily done, as most of the troops were withdrawn, and the indians in the neighborhood had recently united with them. this would have been the beginning of their war of extermination against the settlers." foiled in their plot, why did they then so quickly agree to the treaties, which up to that time they had so bitterly spurned? all the circumstances and evidence go to show that, with the exception of steachus, the friendly cuyuse, they all--young chief, five crows, pu-pu-mox-mox, kam-i-ah-kan, and their sub-chiefs--all signed the treaties as a deliberate act of treachery, in order to lull the whites into fancied security, give time for governor stevens to depart to the distant blackfoot country, where he would probably be "wiped out" by those truculent savages, and for the nez perces to return home, and also for completing their preparations for a widespread and simultaneous onslaught on all the settlements. scarcely had they reached home from the council when they resumed such preparations, buying extra stores of ammunition, and sending emissaries to the spokanes, coeur d'alenes, and even to some of the nez perces and to other tribes, to incite them to war, actually held a council of the disaffected at a point in the palouse country the following month, and, within three months of accepting ostensibly the protection of the great father, precipitated the conflict. agent bolon and many white miners and settlers in the upper country were massacred, and settlements as widespread as puget sound and southern oregon, six hundred miles apart, were attacked on the same day. in this conspiracy and contest kam-i-ah-kan was the moving spirit, the organizer, the instigator, whose crafty wiles never slept, and whose stubborn resolution no disaster could break. but in the end, after protracted and stubborn resistance, they were defeated and compelled to move on their reservations, and live under the very treaties they so treacherously agreed to, and under which they still live and have greatly prospered. whether or not the walla walla council precipitated the outbreak, as has been claimed, it is certain that it confirmed the nez perces in their friendship, neutralized the spokanes for two years, kept even some of the cuyuses friendly all through the war, namely, steachus and his band, extinguished the indian title, and permanently settled the status of the indian and his relation with the white man, without which peace was an impossibility. the outbreak itself could have been suppressed in a single season, had governor stevens's firm policy and sagacious views been sustained. over sixty thousand square miles were ceded by these treaties. the nez perce reservation contained five thousand square miles, including mountain and forest as well as good land, and provision was made for moving other tribes upon it. the payment for the nez perce lands comprised $200,000 in the usual annuities, and $60,000 for improving the reservation, saw and grist mills, schools, shops, teachers, farmers, mechanics, etc. ardent spirits were excluded; the right to hunt, fish, gather roots and berries, and pasture stock on vacant land was secured, and provision was made for ultimately allotting the land in severalty. an annuity of $500 for twenty years was given the head chief, and a house was to be built for him, and ten acres of land fenced and broken up the first year. at the special request of the indians, the claim and homestead of william craig was confirmed to him, and was not to be considered part of the reservation, although within its boundaries. besides lawyer and looking glass, fifty-six chiefs signed this treaty, and among them were joseph (the father of the chief joseph, who in 1877 fought the brilliant campaign against generals howard, gibbon, and miles, the only conflict that has ever occurred between the nez perces and the whites), james, red wolf, timothy, spotted eagle, and eagle-from-the-light. the umatilla reservation contained eight hundred square miles. $100,000 to be given for annuities in goods, etc., for twenty years; $50,000 for improving the reservation; $10,000 for moving the emigrant road, which passed through it, around its borders; a sawmill, a flour-mill; two schoolhouses; a blacksmith's shop, a wagon and plough making shop, a carpenter and joiner shop; tools and equipments; and teachers, farmers, and mechanics to instruct them for twenty years,--were the very liberal payments for their lands. moreover, the head chief of each tribe was to have his annuity of $500 for twenty years, a house built, and ten acres fenced and ploughed. pu-pu-mox-mox, in addition, was to be allowed to maintain a trading-post at the mouth of the yakima; his first year's salary was to be paid him on signing the treaty; he was also to receive three yoke of oxen, three yokes and four chains, a wagon, two ploughs, twelve axes, two shovels, twelve hoes, one saddle and bridle, a set of wagon harness and one of plough harness; and his son was to have an annuity of $100 for twenty years, and have a house built, and five acres of land ploughed and fenced. the wily old chief had certainly gotten all he could. the other provisions were similar to those of the nez perce treaty. it was signed by the three head chiefs and thirty-two sub-chiefs. the yakima treaty contained the same general provisions. a large reservation on the simcoe, a southern branch of the yakima, and a smaller one on the wenatchee, including the fishery there, were set apart for them. the payments include $200,000 in annuities, $60,000 for improving the reservations, the annuity, house and field for the chief, etc. in all the treaties provision is made for finally dividing the land among the indians in severalty. kam-i-ah-kan, ow-hi, skloom, and eleven other chiefs signed the treaty. the first three were able and persistent inciters of, and leaders in, the indian war. ow-hi is mentioned in "the canoe and saddle," by theodore winthrop, and met a tragic end, being slain while a prisoner trying to escape from the troops under colonel george wright. after their exemplary punishment the yakimas settled down on their reservation, and for many years were prosperous and contented under the charge of the faithful agent wilbur. they number 2556, showing little diminution; have taken their lands in severalty; most of them wear civilized dress in whole or part; have 17,000 acres under cultivation; raise 50,000 bushels of grain, 9600 of vegetables, and 25,000 tons of hay. the spokanes number 3000. while some of the bands are backward, others have made encouraging progress, "are thrifty and industrious, have splendid farms, and raise large crops of grain and hay, ... are self-supporting, and, but for the intemperance of some of them, are making rapid strides towards civilization." the agent says of one band: "they accept no issues from the government, and are independent and self-supporting. they are peaceable in their own social relations, and courteous to their white brethren. they have made material progress, having good farms, fine horses, and many of them small herds of cattle." [illustration: ow-hi _a chief of the yakimas_] the coeur d'alenes, numbering 506, are further advanced in civilization, and in better condition financially than any other tribe. they are well supplied with all kinds of farming implements, from a plough to a threshing-machine, of which latter they now have thirteen in operation, purchased by themselves with their own money. the nez perces, the most progressive and deserving of all, seem to have fared the worst. their reservation was early overrun by thousands of miners, and they were outrageously swindled by dishonest agents. they number only 1795, having diminished one half. but they have taken their lands in severalty; have 10,000 acres under cultivation, 100,000 acres under fence; raise 55,000 bushels of grain, 15,000 bushels of vegetables; own 30,000 horses, 15,000 cattle, 3000 swine, and 20,000 fowls. "very enthusiastic revival meetings were conducted here last winter by the native elders, which resulted in quite a number of converts being made."[6] [6] report of the commissioner of indian affairs, 1899, pp. 147, 148, 297, 298, 304, 612, 618, 626, 628. chapter xxx crossing the bitter roots on the close of the council the indians homeward-bound filled all the trails leading out of the valley with their wild and picturesque cavalcades,--the braves resplendent with scarlet blankets and leggings; the squaws and pappooses decked with bright calico shirts and kerchiefs. lieutenant gracie marched away to join major haller in an expedition against the predatory snakes. the secretaries and other treaty officers toiled early and late making up the records and reports for washington, which, with letters and instructions for olympia, were dispatched on the 14th by w.h. pearson, the express rider. it will be noted how carefully and fully the proceedings of all governor stevens's councils were recorded; not merely a statement of what was done, but a complete verbatim report of the deliberations, the speeches, every word uttered by both whites and indians in council, and many of the talks out of council, was reduced to writing and made part of the official record,--a record which now affords the most convincing evidence of the wisdom, foresight, and benevolence of the treaties, as well as the difficulties and dangers attending them, and presents a most interesting and historically valuable picture of the characters, dispositions, and feelings of the indians. general palmer had been appointed one of the commissioners to treat with the blackfeet, governor stevens and alfred cumming, superintendent of indian affairs for nebraska, being the others, but he declined the arduous and dangerous duty, and, with the oregon indian officers, started for home. a.j. bolon, the yakima indian agent, with a small party, was sent to old fort walla walla with a quantity of indian goods intended for the spokanes, there to be stored for safe-keeping. he was instructed to visit and inspect the yakima reservation, thence proceed to the dalles and bring the nez perce indian goods to walla walla, deposit them, and, loading up with the spokane goods, take them to antoine plante's ranch on the spokane river, in readiness for the council on the governor's return from the blackfoot country. mr. henry r. crosby was dispatched to colville to notify the indians, the hudson bay company officers, and the missionaries of the proposed council. agent w.h. tappan was sent with craig to lapwai to organize a delegation of the nez perces to go to the blackfoot council, and was to accompany them himself. all the officers were charged to examine the regions traversed by them, and report on the topographical and agricultural features, etc. the governor had procured from new york a supply of barometers and other instruments, and was determined to continue and complete his railroad explorations, so summarily arrested by jefferson davis, as far as possible on this expedition, although it was one primarily on the indian service. in his final railroad report he gives a daily journal of this trip, and a graphic description of the country passed over, together with an immense amount of new information, the fruits of his own indefatigable personal exertions and those of his subordinates, amplifying and triumphantly vindicating his first report. it was a beautiful, sunny june morning, the 16th, when the little train drew out from the deserted council ground, and took its way in single file across the level valley prairie, covered with luxuriant bunch grass and vivid-hued flowers. a large, fine-looking coeur d'alene indian, named joseph, led the way as guide; then rode the governor with his son, secretary doty, agent lansdale, and gustave sohon the artist, barometer-carrier, and observer; then came packmaster higgins, followed by the train of eleven packers and two cooks, and forty-one sleek, long-eared pack-mules, each bearing a burden of two hundred pounds, the men interspersed with the mules to keep them moving on the trail; while seventeen loose animals, in a disorderly bunch, driven by a couple of herders, brought up the rear. it was a picked force, both men and animals, and made up in efficiency for scanty numbers. the artist, gustave sohon, a soldier of the 4th infantry, detailed for the trip, was an intelligent german, a clever sketcher, and competent to take instrumental observations. higgins, ex-orderly sergeant of dragoons, a tall, broad-shouldered, spare, sinewy man, a fine swordsman and drill-master, a scientific boxer, was a man of unusual firmness, intelligence, and good judgment, and quiet, gentlemanly manners, and held the implicit respect, obedience, and goodwill of his subordinates. he afterwards became the founder, banker, and first citizen of the flourishing town of missoula, at hell gate, in the bitter root valley. a.h. robie worked up from the ranks, married a daughter of craig, and settled at boisé city, idaho, where he achieved a highly prosperous and respected career. sidney ford, a son of judge ford, already mentioned, was a handsome, stalwart young saxon in appearance, broad-shouldered, sensible, capable, and kindly. the others were all men of experience on the plains and mountains, brave and true; several had been members of the exploring expedition; others had served the fur companies, or voyageured and trapped on their own account. by all odds the most skillful and picturesque of these mountain men, and having the most varied and romantic history, was delaware jim, whose father was a delaware chief and his mother a white woman, and who had spent a lifetime--for he was now past middle age--in hunting and traveling over all parts of the country, from the mississippi to the pacific, meeting with many thrilling adventures and hair-breadth escapes. he had a tall, slender form, a keen eye, an intelligent face, and reserved manners. he was reticent in speech, although he spoke english well; but when he was induced to relate his varied experiences and adventures, his simple and modest narrative impressed every auditor with its truth. many of the men were clad in buckskin moccasins, breeches, and fringed hunting-shirts; others in rough, serviceable woolen garb, stout boots, and wide slouch hats. all carried navy revolvers and keen bowie-knives, and many in addition bore the long, heavy, small-bored kentucky rifle, which they fired with great deliberation and unerring skill. one of the most remarkable men connected with the expedition was the express rider, w.h. pearson. a native of philadelphia, of small but well-knit frame, with muscles of steel, and spirit and endurance that no exertion apparently could break down, waving, chestnut hair, a fair, high forehead, a refined, intelligent, and pleasant face, the manners and bearing of a gentleman,--such was pearson. he was destined that year to render services invaluable in character and incredible in extent. of him the governor remarks in his final report, p. 210: "hardy, bold, intelligent, and resolute, having a great diversity of experience, which had made him acquainted with all the relations between indians and white men from the borders of texas to the 49th parallel, and which enabled him to know best how to move, whether under the southern tropics or the winter snows of the north, i suppose there has scarcely ever been any man in the service of the government who excelled pearson as an expressman." he was still young, about thirty-five, but, as a texan ranger, a scout, indian fighter, and express rider, knew the frontiers from the rio grande to the columbia and missouri like an open book. the party thus starting on the protracted and perilous expedition was composed of only twenty-two persons, as follows: governor isaac i. stevens; james doty, secretary; r.h. lansdale, indian agent; gustave sohon, artist; hazard stevens; c.p. higgins, packmaster; sidney s. ford, jr., a.h. robie, joseph lemere, frank genette, h. palmer, william simpson, john canning, frank hale, louis oson, louis fourcier, c. hughes, john johnson, william s. de parris, william prudhomme, packers, the last two cooks; joseph, the c[oe]ur d'alene guide; and delaware jim, who deserves a place by himself. the party followed the nez perce trail, and, after a short march of eight miles, made camp on dry creek. two messes were formed,--the gentlemen of the party, with the guide joseph, delaware jim, ford, genette, and de parris as cook, comprising the governor's mess, and the remainder of the party higgins's mess. continuing on the nez perce trail, the party in the next three days and fifty-four miles traversed a beautiful rolling prairie country of fertile soil, luxuriant bunch grass, and wild flowers, crossing the touchet and tucañon rivers, and ascending the pa-ta-ha branch of the latter, and, descending the al-pa-wha creek, reached its confluence with snake river at red wolf's ground. here was found a village of thirteen lodges of nez perces, under the chiefs red wolf and timothy, with a fenced field of thirty acres, well watered by irrigation from the al-pa-wha, and containing a fine crop of corn and a promising orchard. "i observed with great pleasure that men as well as women and children were at work in this field, ploughing and taking care of their crops," observes the governor. after some bargaining, for the chiefs were keen traders and exacted a stiff toll for the service, the party, with packs and baggage, were ferried across the snake, a notably swift and dangerous river, by the indians in their canoes, and went into camp, while the animals crossed by swimming. by appointment lawyer met the governor here, and with the other two chiefs took supper with him, the three devouring the lion's share of a fine salmon, which timothy had just sold at an exorbitant price,--clearly the nez perces were fast learning the ways of civilization,--and completed the arrangements for sending their delegation to the blackfoot council. lawyer also gave much information about his people and country. climbing out of the deep cañon of the river next morning by an easy grade up a lateral creek, the party took a general n.n.e. course across the high, rolling plains stretching away to the mountains, for five days traversing a fine fertile and diversified country, clothed with waving grass and bright flowers, well wooded with groves of pine, and abundantly watered. they passed on the second day 600 nez perces gathering the kamas root, and having with them 2000 horses, and crossed the palouse river, with its broad valley extending far eastward into the heart of the mountains. says the governor: "we have been astonished at the luxuriance of the grass and the fertility of the soil. the whole view presents to the eye a vast bed of flowers in all their varied beauty." the governor continually remarks the fertility and agricultural capabilities of the country traversed. it now forms the most productive part of the wheat belt of eastern washington, and is all settled up by a prosperous farming community. the third day's camp was made at the kamas prairie of the coeur d'alenes, where were found 29 lodges and 250 indians of that tribe, gathering and drying kamas. this esculent is about the size and shape of a large tulip bulb, and when dried and smoked for use has a dark color and sweet taste, and was highly esteemed by the indians and mountain men. the governor had a talk with stellam, the head chief, and a number of other chiefs, and requested them to meet him at the mission in order to learn about the treaty the great father desired to make with them. they promised to attend. in the evening came the palouse chief, slah-yot-see, with 30 braves, and complained that no goods were given him at the recent council. the governor replied:- "slah-yot-see, you went away before the council was ended. koh-lat-toose remained and signed the treaty. he was recognized as the head chief of the palouses, and to him the goods were given to be distributed among his tribe as he and the principal men should determine. i have brought no goods to give you. go to koh-lat-toose. he is the chief, and it is from him you must obtain your share of the presents. had you remained until the council terminated, you would have had a voice in the distribution of the goods. kam-i-ah-kan, your head chief, signed the treaty, and said that he should bring the palouses into the yakima country, where they properly belonged." the chief said but little in reply except acknowledging kam-i-ah-kan as his head chief. the palouses had a bad name, and were regarded as sullen, insolent, and disaffected. the last day, putting the party in camp on the coeur d'alene river, the governor with doty and sohon rode on nine miles farther to the mission, where he was received with the utmost hospitality by good father ravalli, and where he found crosby, just arrived from colville. the mission was situated on a sightly eminence in the midst of a little prairie on the right bank of the river. on this beautiful and commanding site stood a well-proportioned church, solidly built of squared timbers as smoothly hewn and closely fitted as though done by skillful white artisans, yet all the work of the indians, under the direction of the priests. a long wooden building, plain but comfortable, afforded quarters for the fathers and two or three lay brothers and the transient guests. at the foot of the knoll, near the river, were the lodges of the indians, constituting their principal village. at the camp of the party this evening an incident occurred of quite unusual character,--a wrestling match between indian and white. a large number of the coeur d'alenes had come down with their canoes, and assisted the party in crossing the rivers, and had taken the packs by water a long distance, thus relieving the animals over a stretch of muddy trail, and at night camped near the whites. after supper they came over to camp, and, with much talk in chinook and many signs, at length conveyed the idea of a challenge at wrestling between an immense, powerfully formed indian, whom they brought forward as their champion, and any "skookum man" of the whites. the latter were rather taken back. none liked the looks of the big and muscular savage, but all agreed that it would never do to decline the challenge, and back down before a parcel of indians. at last sidney ford stepped forward, declaring that he would try a fall with him, if he broke his back in the effort. in the struggle which ensued, it was soon apparent that the indian was the superior in weight and strength, and ford had to put forth all his skill and agility to prevent being forced to the ground. at last, while all the spectators, both red and white, were breathlessly watching the straining, panting wrestlers, the whites especially with great anxiety and apprehension, ford gave a sudden and mighty heave, the huge indian's bare legs and moccasined feet whirled in the air, and the next instant he struck the ground with a heavy and sickening thud, and lay senseless as the dead. ford had thrown him completely over his shoulder by some skillful wrestling stroke. the indian soon recovered, and departed with his companions, well satisfied that the white man was "hi-u skookum" (mighty strong). this rencounter led to much discussion around the camp-fire that evening as to the relative prowess of indian and white. all agreed that the latter was far superior, not only in courage and physical strength, but even in endurance and woodland and savage arts and skill. the next day the party moved and encamped near the village, and on the following morning the principal chiefs to the number of thirty assembled in front of the governor's tent, and listened attentively as he explained to them the benefits they would gain by learning to "follow the white man's road," and referred to the treaties made with the other tribes at the recent council, at which some of them were present, and asked them to meet him in council with the spokanes on his return. finally he invited them to send with him a delegation to the blackfoot council, and make peace with those fierce and feared marauders. the chiefs received the talk favorably, but declined to send the delegation, saying that only a few of their people went to buffalo, and besides they were afraid to go to the council. the blackfeet would kill them. at noon, after this conference, the train set out in charge of higgins, while the governor, with doty and crosby, remained a few hours longer. the oath of allegiance to the united states was administered by crosby to the fathers and lay brothers, who subscribed the naturalization papers, and seemed much pleased with the idea of becoming american citizens. towards evening they bade the hospitable missionaries farewell, and, riding rapidly eleven miles, found the train snugly encamped in a large prairie with fine grass, where the governor encamped, october 12, 1853. the next two days the party were kept in camp by a pelting summer rain. friday, june 29, on a cool and delightful morning after the storm, the march was continued up the coeur d'alene river, retracing the governor's route of 1853 across the bitter root mountains; the summit was passed on july 1, and, descending the st. regis de borgia, crossing and recrossing the stream no less than thirty-five times, the bitter root river was reached on the 3d, eighty-six miles distant from the mission. the father superior of the catholic missions, with two companions returning from an inspection of the pend oreille mission, was met the first day, and on the summit a coeur d'alene indian, whom the governor had previously sent to the bitter root valley[7] with dispatches to mr. adams, special agent for the flatheads, in regard to holding a council with them, brought the gratifying intelligence that the indians were all ready to assemble, all full of the blackfoot council, and that everything was quiet in the indian country. the governor took great pains in examining the route and the topography of the country, and in determining the altitude by the barometer. the fourth of july was spent in crossing the bitter root, which was at this point one hundred and fifty yards wide, with a swift, strong current, and fordable only at the lowest stage of water in fall and winter. it was now swollen from recent rains and melting snows in the mountains. all hands set to work felling trees and building rafts, with which to effect a crossing. while thus laboriously engaged, a large band of flathead indians, who were encamped here, took down their lodges, and ferried themselves over the swift and broad river, with all their women, children, horses, dogs, lodges, and effects, in less than an hour's time, and in a simple and ingenious manner, which put the whites quite to the blush. the buffalo-skin lodge was spread out on a smooth, flat place at the water's edge, all the blankets, robes, clothing, bundles of provisions, saddles, packs, everything in short in the way of goods and chattels were piled in a broad, circular pile upon it, and the ends and edges of the skin were stretched up and tied together on top, as one would tie up a bundle of clothes in a handkerchief. this being completed, a brave rode his horse into the river until almost swimming, holding by his teeth the end of a line; the bundle was then pushed and lifted into the river; the squaws climbed on top of it with the children and babies around them, one of them took and held the other end of the line, and the brave started his pony swimming across the stream, holding by the mane or tail with one hand, and swimming with the other, and soon reached the opposite bank in safety. it was a curious and exciting spectacle to see ten or twelve of these bundles, the size of large haycocks, surmounted by groups of squaws and pappooses, rapidly floating down the stream, while being slowly towed across, nothing visible of the ponies and braves except their heads, while the loud, labored breathing of the swimming horses and the shouts and splashings of the indians echoed across the water. the flatheads were accustomed to train and exercise their horses in swimming, and were very skillful in crossing streams in this manner. the buffalo-skin lodges were impervious to water for only a short time, and would become leaky and useless by a prolonged soaking. the party built three large rafts, loaded all the goods upon them, and poled them across the river with long poles. the animals were compelled to swim. the last, bearing the governor, was the largest and least manageable, and came near escaping down the river on a voyage of its own choosing. it was carried farther down than the others, and on nearing the other bank got into a swifter current, where the poles were quite useless, and was swept along at break-neck speed, flying past the rocks and trees of the bank only forty feet away. at this juncture higgins seized the end of a pack rope and plunged headfirst into the raging current, gained the shore in a few powerful strokes, raced along it at top speed to keep the rope from being jerked out of his hands by the flying raft until he came to a tree, threw a turn of the rope around it, and checked the raft, which then swung inshore under the pressure of the current. in these few minutes the unwieldy craft was carried down two miles. but everything was gotten together and a comfortable camp pitched before night. the tired men smoked their pipes around the camp-fire after supper and recounted the adventures of the day, with great satisfaction that the river was behind them. after a late start the next morning the party moved eighteen miles up the right bank of the beautiful river, traversing tracts of open woods and prairies, alternating in pleasing variety with the dark, rugged range just surmounted, frowning on the right. large schools of salmon or trout were seen in the clear, pellucid water, motionless over the spawning-beds, fairly covering and hiding the river's bed, in such numbers were they. the next day's march was thirty-seven miles. on the 7th, soon after leaving camp, they were met and received by three hundred chiefs and braves of the flathead, pend oreille, and koo-te-nay tribes, in the most cordial manner, with a salute of musketry, and escorted to their camp near hell gate river. after spending some hours with them, learning their condition, and establishing pleasant relations between them and his own party, the governor moved to the main river, a mile distant, and established his camp and council ground. in the afternoon the three head chiefs, victor of the flatheads, alexander of the pend oreilles, and michelle of the koo-te-nays, accompanied by a number of other chiefs, visited governor stevens, and after the pipe had passed around,--the indispensable introduction to every indian conference,--the latter spoke to them in his usual vein, proposing a treaty, referring to the great council just held with so many indians in the walla walla valley, and appointing the next monday for opening the council with them. he also spoke of his efforts to make peace with the blackfeet, and urged them to send a delegation to the proposed council with these, their inveterate and bloody foes. this was a sore subject with the flatheads, for the blackfeet had but faithlessly kept their promises of amity and good conduct towards their neighbors. many of their young braves, despite the efforts of the chiefs and elders to restrain them, had continued their predatory raids, saying, "let us steal all the horses we can before the great white chief returns and makes peace with all the tribes, and stops horse-stealing forever," and had inflicted severe losses upon the flatheads since the governor passed through their country nearly two years before, notwithstanding, and that was what made it all the harder to bear; the flatheads had scrupulously heeded the governor's admonitions, and refrained from retaliation. on one occasion, when some young pend oreilles ran off a number of blackfoot horses, the chiefs sent them back, at the risk of the lives of the party returning them. when the governor finished, victor said:- "the blackfeet have troubled us very much. i am going to tell what has happened since you were here. twelve men have been killed when out hunting, not on war-parties. i fear the whites and keep quiet. i cannot tell how many horses have been stolen since. now i listen, and hear what you wish me to do. were it not for you, i would have had my revenge ere this. they have stolen horses seven times this spring." the chiefs then returned to their camp, promising to attend the council the following monday. the flatheads or salish, including the pend oreilles and koo-te-nays, were among those who had been driven westward by the blackfeet, and now occupied the pleasant valleys of the mountains. they were noted for their intelligence, honesty, and bravery, and although of medium stature and inferior in physique to the brawny blackfeet, never hesitated to attack them if the odds were not greater than five to one. having been supplied by the early fur traders with firearms, which enabled them to make a stand against their outnumbering foe, they had always been the firm friends of the whites, and, like the nez perces, often hunted with the mountain men, and entertained them in their lodges. a number of iroquois hunters and half-breeds had joined and intermarried with them. the bitter root valley was the seat of the flatheads proper. the pend oreilles lived lower down the river, or northward, in two bands, the upper pend oreilles on the horse plains and jocko prairies, and the lower pend oreilles on clark's fork, below the lake of their name, and were canoe indians, owning few horses. the koo-te-nays lived about the flathead river and lake. all these, except the lower pend oreilles, went to buffalo, and their hunting-trips were spiced with the constant peril and excitement of frequent skirmishes with their hereditary enemies. the jesuits, in 1843, established a mission among the lower pend oreilles, but in 1854 moved to the flathead river, near the mouth of the jocko. they also started a mission among the flatheads in the bitter root valley, forty miles above hell gate, where they founded the beautiful village of st. mary, amid charming scenery; but the incessant raids of the blackfeet were slowly but surely "wiping out" these brave and interesting indians, and the mission was abandoned in 1850 as too much exposed. the owen brothers then started a trading-post at this point, which they named fort owen; and fourteen miles above it lieutenant mullan built his winter camp in 1853, known as cantonment stevens, which has been succeeded by the town of stevensville. the term "flathead" was a misnomer, as none of them practiced the custom of flattening the head. footnotes: [7] now known as the missoula valley and river. chapter xxxi the flathead council after a quiet and restful sunday in both camps the indians assembled at the appointed time, and the council was opened on monday, july 9, at half past one p.m., by the governor, in a long speech, explaining, as at the other councils, the terms and advantages proffered by the government. although the indians were extremely friendly, and very desirous of "following the white man's road" and coming under the protection of the great father, their only apparent refuge from the fierce blackfeet, whose incessant raids threatened them with speedy extinction, the council proved unexpectedly difficult and protracted, lasting eight days, and the treaty was only saved by governor stevens's persistence and astuteness in accepting an alternative proposition offered by victor at the last moment. the chronic objection of every tribe to leaving its own country and going on a reservation in the territory of another was the stumbling-block. the governor required the three tribes, as they were really one people, being all salish, speaking a common language, and closely intermarried and allied, and also reduced in numbers, to unite upon one reservation. he offered to set apart a tract for them either in the upper bitter root valley in victor's country, or the horse plains and jocko river in the pend oreille territory, as they might prefer, and urged them to decide and agree among themselves upon one of these locations; but neither tribe was willing to abandon its wonted region, where they were accustomed to pitch their lodges, and where their dead were buried. the following brief extracts from the proceedings give an idea of the course of the difficult and at times stormy and vexatious negotiations. when the governor finished victor said:- "i am very tired now, and my people. you [the governor] are the only man who has offered to help us.... i have two places, here is mine [pointing out bitter root valley on the map], and this is mine [pointing out flathead river and clark's fork]. i will think of it, and tell you which is best. i believe you wish to assist me to help my children here so that they may have plenty to eat, and so that they may save their souls." alexander: "you are talking to me now, my big father. you have told me you have to make your own laws to punish your children. i love my children. i think i could not head them off to make them go straight. i think it is with you to do so. if i take your own way, your law, my people then will be frightened. these growing people [young people] are all the same. perhaps those who come after them may see it well before them. i do not know your laws. perhaps, if we see a rope, if we see how it punishes, we will be frightened. when the priest talked to them, tried to teach them, they all left him. my children, maybe when the whites teach you, you may see it before you. now this is my ground. we are poor, we indians. the priest is settled over there [pointing across the mountains towards the north, the direction of his country]. there, where he is, i am very well satisfied. i will talk hereafter about the ground. i am done for to-day." in this speech alexander expresses the difficulty he has to manage his unruly young people, and his fear that the white rule might prove too strict for them. [illustration: the flathead council] red wing, a flathead chief: "we gathered up yesterday the three peoples you see here. they think they are three nations. i thought these nations were going to talk each about its own land. now i hear the governor: my land is all cut up in pieces. i thought we had two places. this ground is the flatheads', that across the mountains is the pend oreilles'; perhaps not, perhaps we are all one. we made up another mind yesterday, to-day it is different. we will go back and have another council." the governor adjourned the council to the next day, urging them to talk and agree among themselves as to the reservation. the following day the governor called on the chiefs to speak their minds freely. big canoe, a pend oreille chief, made a long and sententious speech, in which he deprecated making any treaty, or parting with any of his country, and thought the whites and indians could live together in the same land:- "talk about treaty, when did i kill you? when did you kill me? what is the reason we are talking about treaties? we are friends. we never spilt the blood of one of you. i never saw your blood. i want my country. i thought no one would ever want to talk about my country. now you talk, you white men. now i have heard, i wish the whites to stop coming. perhaps you will put me in a trap if i do not listen to you, white chiefs. it is our land, both of us. if you make a farm, i would not go there and pull up your crops. i would not drive you away from it. if i were to go to your country and say, 'give me a little piece,' i wonder would you say, 'here, take it.' i expect that is the same way you want me to do here. this country you want to settle here, me with you.... you tell us, 'give us your land.' i am very poor. this is all the small piece i have got. i am not going to let it go. i did not come to make trouble; therefore i would say, i am very poor.... "it is two winters since you passed here. every year since, my horses have gone to the blackfeet. here this spring the blackfeet put my daughter on foot. she packed her goods on her back. it made me feel bad. i was going on a war-party as your express passed along. then i think of what i heard from you, my father, and take my heart back and keep quiet. if i had not listened to your express, i should have gone on war-parties over yonder. we drove one band of horses from the blackfeet. i talked about it to my indians. i said, 'give the horses back, my children.' my chief took them back. you talked about it strong, my father. my chief took them back. that is the way we act. when i found my children were going on war-parties, i would tell them to stop, be quiet; tell them i expect now we will see the chief; i expect he will talk to the blackfeet again." governor stevens: "i will ask you, my children, if you fully understand all that was said yesterday? i ask you now, can you all agree to live on one reservation? i ask victor, are you willing to go on the same reservation with the pend oreilles and koo-te-nays? i ask alexander, are you willing to go on the same reservation with the flatheads and koo-te-nays? i ask michelle, are you willing to go on the same reservation with the flatheads and pend oreilles? what do you, victor, alexander, and michelle, think? you are the head chiefs. i want you to speak." victor: "i am willing to go on one reservation, but i do not want to go over yonder" [pend oreille country]. alexander: "it is good for us all to stop in one place." michelle: "i am with alexander." governor stevens: "the pend oreilles and koo-te-nays think it well to have all these tribes together. perhaps victor might think so by and by, if the place suits. alexander and michelle wish to live together, their people on one place,--they have a thousand people, the land ought to be good. each man wants his field. the climate ought to be mild.... "i ask victor, alexander, and michelle to think it over. will they go to the valley with victor, or to the mission with alexander and michelle? i do not care which. you will have your priests with you, whether you go to the mission or fort owen. those who want the priest can have him. the great father means that every one shall do as he pleases in regard to receiving the instructions of the priests." but the council next day showed no change in the situation. victor was unwilling to move to the mission, and alexander to the valley. neither would object to the other coming to his place. it being evident, after protracted discussion, that no progress would be made by continuing the council that day, and it appearing that an influence was being exerted by the priests of the mission which might be adverse to the views of the government, a messenger was dispatched directing the presence of father hoecken for the purpose of investigating it, the council was adjourned over to friday, and the indians were recommended to have a feast and a council among themselves on the morrow. accordingly they had a grand feast on the 12th, the means for which--two beeves, coffee, sugar, flour, etc.--were furnished them, after which the day was spent in discussing the question of the reservation among themselves. but in council next day they appeared no nearer an agreement, and, after much and fruitless talk, ambrose, a flathead chief, said:- "yesterday victor spoke to alexander. he said: 'i am not headstrong. the whites picked out a place for us, the best place, and that is the reason i do not want to go. two years since they passed us. now the white man has his foot on your ground. the white man will stay with you.' yesterday, when we had the feast, then alexander spoke; he said, 'now i will go over to your side. i will let them take my place, and come to your place.' but victor did not speak, and the council broke up." governor stevens: "alexander, did you agree yesterday to give up your country and join victor?" alexander: "yes, yesterday i did give up. i listened and he did not give me an answer; then i said, 'i will not give up my land.'" governor stevens: "i speak now to the pend oreilles and koo-te-nays. do you agree to this treaty?--the treaty placing the pend oreilles and koo-te-nays on this reservation? [at the mission]. i ask victor if he declines to treat?" victor: "talk! i have nothing to say now." governor stevens: "does victor want to treat? why did he not say to alexander yesterday, 'come to my place'? or is not victor a chief? is he, as one of his people has called him, an old woman? dumb as a dog? if victor is a chief, let him speak now." victor: "i thought, my people, perhaps you would listen. i said, 'this [at the mission] is my country, and all over here is my country. some of my people want to be above me. i sit quiet, and before me you give my land away. if i thought so, i would tell the whites to take the land there [the mission]. it is my country. i am listening, and my people say, "take my country."'" governor stevens: "alexander said yesterday that he would come up here. why did you not answer and say 'come'?" victor: "yesterday i did talk." governor stevens: "alexander said yesterday he offered to give up his land and go to you. alexander says you made no answer. why did you not say, 'yes, come to my place'?" victor: "i did not understand it so." governor stevens: "ambrose says he understood alexander to say so. alexander says he said so. you did not speak and say, 'come to my place,' but you were dumb. does victor mean to say that he will neither let alexander come to his place nor go to alexander's?" ambrose, til-coos-tay, red wolf, and bear tracks, flathead chiefs, took up the discussion, pouring oil on the troubled waters, and excusing victor for not speaking in answer to alexander at their own council. at length the governor said:- "my children, i find that things are nearer to an agreement than when we began talking this morning. ambrose says the people are not quite prepared, but will be ready by and by. ambrose says, 'be patient and listen.' i am patient, and have been patient and listened to them. others of you have said they they were hiding their minds and did not speak; hence i reproved you and said, 'speak out, let us have your hearts.' it seems many of the flatheads are ready to go to the mission. if their chief says so, they will go. victor says, 'i am ready to go, but my people will not;' but the people say they are ready to go. we want all parties to speak straight, to let us have their hearts, then we can agree. if victor's people will go, we want victor as a chief to say, 'i will go.'" victor here arose and left the council. after a pause of some minutes governor stevens said:- "i will ask ambrose where is victor?" ambrose: "he is gone home." governor stevens: "ambrose, speaking of victor, said he wanted time. victor is now thinking and studying over this matter. we don't wish to drive or hurry you in this business. think over this matter to-night, and meet here to-morrow. i ask ambrose to speak to victor and tell him what i say. ambrose loves his chief, let him take my words to him." he then adjourned the council to meet in the morning. but the following day word was sent by victor to the governor that he had not yet made up his mind, and the council was postponed to monday morning. when the council opened at eleven monday morning, victor said:- "i am now going to talk. i was not content. you gave me a very small place. then i thought, here they are giving away my land. that is my country over there at the mission, this also. plenty of you say victor is the chief of the flatheads. the place you pointed out above is too small. from lo lo fork above should belong to me. my stock will have room, and if the blackfeet will let my horses alone, they will increase. i believe that you wish to help me, and that my people will do well there. we will send this word to the great father. come and look at our country. when you look at alexander's place, and say the land is good, and say, come, victor, i will go. if you think this above is good land, then victor will say, come here, alexander. then our children will be well content. that is the way we will make the treaty, my father." governor stevens: "victor has spoken. do alexander and michelle speak in the same way? i will ask alexander if he agrees." alexander: "maybe we cannot all come together. here is michelle, i know his mind. he told me, you go this way, i won't go. here are the lower pend oreilles. maybe they are the same way. they have no horses; they have only canoes. i am very heavy, as though they tied me there." michelle: "i am just following alexander's mind. if he goes this way, i will not go. i have come a long way to see you; when you leave i go back." the governor again asked them if they would agree to victor's proposition, and go to the reservation which was found best adapted to their needs after survey and examination, but both chiefs positively refused. the governor then cut the knot by accepting victor's proposition as far as it concerned him, and giving the others the reservation at the mission:- "my children, victor has made his proposition. alexander and michelle have made theirs. we will make a treaty for them. both tracts shall be surveyed. if the mission is the best land, victor shall live there. if the valley is the best land, victor shall stay here. alexander and michelle may stay at the mission.... "i ask victor to come up and sign the treaty. [he came up and signed.] now i ask alexander and michelle." [they also then signed.] moses, a flathead chief, on being called on to sign, refused. he stepped forward, and said:- "my brother is buried here. i did not think you would take the only piece of ground i had. here are three fellows [the head chiefs]; they say, 'get on your horses and go.' ... last year, when you were talking about the blackfeet, you were joking." governor stevens: "how can moses say i am not going to the blackfoot country? i have gone all the way to the great father to arrange about the blackfoot council. what more can i do? a man is coming from the great father to meet me. does he not know that mr. burr and another man went to fort benton the other day?" moses: "you have pulled all my wings off, and then let me down." governor stevens: "all that we have done is for your benefit. i have said that the flatheads were brave and honest, and should be protected. be patient. everything will come right." moses: "i do not know how it will be straight. a few days ago the blackfeet stole horses at salmon river." governor stevens: "ask him if he sees the nez perce chief, eagle-from-the-light; he is going to the blackfoot council with me." moses: "yes, i see him. they will get his hair. the blackfeet are not like these people. they are all drunk." all the principal men came forward and signed the treaty. governor stevens then said:- "here are three papers which you have signed, copies of the same treaty. one goes to the president, one i place in the hands of the head chief, and one i keep myself. everything that has been said here goes to the president. i have now a few presents for you. they are simply a gift, no part of the payments. the payments cannot be made until we hear from the president next year." the presents were then distributed. the chiefs were then requested to assemble on the morrow with regard to the blackfoot council. thus successfully and happily terminated this protracted council, "every man pleased and every man satisfied," says the governor. twelve hundred indians were present on the treaty ground. the jealousy and pride of the chiefs, victor and alexander, greatly increased the difficulty of coming to an agreement. the former repeatedly asserted his chieftainship over both tribes by claiming that the countries of both were his, a claim that alexander offered to recognize if victor would move to the horse plains (mission) reservation. alexander claimed to be chief of the lower pend oreilles, a claim the governor summarily rejected. the influence and advice of the former hudson bay company employees and half-breeds, to this and to the other treaties, was prejudicial, instigating the indians to make unreasonable demands, and often opposing and misrepresenting the treaties themselves. father hoecken arrived before the end of the council, in response to the governor's summons. it did not appear that he was exerting any adverse influence. on the contrary, he highly approved the treaty, and signed it as one of the witnesses. it seems, however, as the governor reported, that the dislike of the flatheads to the mission establishment was one cause of their unwillingness to move to the reservation in the pend oreille country. it is probable that the missionaries at st. mary's had been too strict and exacting for their independent natures. moreover, it was the fact, as the governor had cause to realize later, that the missionaries feared and dreaded the approach of the settlers, and sympathized wholly with the indians as between the two. this treaty, like all made by governor stevens, was remarkably liberal in its terms to the indians. the reservation on the flathead river comprises a million and a quarter acres. $84,000 in annuity goods; $36,000 to improve the reservation; salaries of $500 a year for twenty years, with a house and ten acres fenced and ploughed, to the three head chiefs; schools, mills, hospitals, shops; teachers and mechanics for twenty years; the right to fish, hunt, gather roots and berries, and pasture stock on vacant land; and the provision for ultimately dividing the reservation among them in severalty,--were all embraced. it was agreed that the three tribes were to constitute one nation under victor as head chief, to be known as the flathead nation, in which, and on the same reservation, were to be included other friendly tribes, as the lower pend oreilles and coeur d'alenes. besides father hoecken, r.h. lansdale, w.h. tappan, r.h. crosby, gustavus sohon, and william craig witnessed the treaty. some 25,000 square miles were ceded. all three tribes now occupy the reservation on the jocko (mission), together with the lower pend oreilles and a few spokanes. they number 2000, showing little diminution since the treaty, and have made fair progress. nearly all have houses with some land inclosed. many raise small crops of wheat and have good gardens. they have 20,000 acres under fence, over ten miles of irrigation ditches, and raised last year 25,000 bushels of grain, 10,000 bushels of vegetables, and 7000 tons of hay. their lands have not yet been allotted in severalty. the agent complains that worthless employees are frequently foisted upon the agency, "many incompetent men hold positions who take no interest in their work,"[8] etc.,--a state of things equally unfair to the indians and disgraceful to the government. footnotes: [8] report of the commissioner of indian affairs, 1899, pp. 192-194, 620. chapter xxxii march to fort benton.--marshaling the tribes before the close of the council, agents tappan and craig arrived with the proposed delegation of nez perces under looking glass, spotted eagle, eagle-from-the-light, and other chiefs. it was agreed that they and the flatheads and pend oreilles, under their chiefs victor and alexander, and accompanied by agent thomas adams and interpreter ben kiser, should cross the mountains to the buffalo country, and hunt on the plains south of the missouri, until the time came for holding the great peace council at fort benton, of which they would be notified. their agents were instructed to keep the governor informed of their whereabouts by frequent expresses, and to guard against collisions with the blackfoot war-parties, and also to communicate with the crow indians and induce them to attend the council. dr. lansdale, agent for the flathead nation, remained, and during the summer made extensive examinations of the reservation on the flathead river and the surrounding country. these arrangements completed, on wednesday, july 18, the second day after the close of the council, the governor dispatched pearson, who had just returned to the party after his rapid trip to olympia from the walla walla council, with full reports of the council just held, and letters to the indian and territorial officers in olympia, and resumed the march to fort benton, crossing for six miles the broad level valley here known as the hell gate ronde, and passing the deep, dark portal of that name,[9] and, six miles beyond it, encamped on the hell gate river. during the next five days and one hundred miles the party traversed the broad plateau of the great mountain chain over a beautiful rolling country of wide grassy valleys and gently rolling prairies, interspersed with low wooded hills and spurs, and well watered by clear, cold, rapid mountain streams. it was hard to realize that this beautiful and diversified prairie country was the top of the rocky mountains, the backbone of the continent. at the second day's camp the indian hunter and guide, a pend oreille furnished by alexander, brought in a fine string of mountain trout, and, not content with this, started out again, and soon returned with an elk, and after this the messes were rarely out of game,--elk, deer, antelope, and mountain trout. the trail followed up the hell gate and its chief tributary, the big blackfoot, the route of 1853, and crossed the divide by lewis and clark's pass. from the summit the governor obtained a magnificent and beautiful view of the country about an hour before sunset, the main chain stretching far to the north, and the broad plains, broken by many streams and coulees, extending eastward as far as the eye could reach, like an illimitable sea. he spent the whole day, with doty and sohon, examining the approaches to the summit pass, and those to cadotte's pass, ten miles farther south, and determining altitudes and grades, and reached camp long after dark, well fatigued with the day's work. throughout the expedition the governor was constantly examining the topographical features of the country. he would frequently ride ahead of the train, and, sitting on a log or on the ground, would write up his notes or journal until it came up. he was accustomed to start the train rather late in the morning, about eight o'clock, move at a steady, brisk walk, without stopping for noon rest or meal, and make camp early in the afternoon, and by this management plenty of time was afforded the animals to feed mornings and evenings. twenty miles was the average day's journey, but thirty or forty miles were made with ease whenever expedient, as often happened. no better equipped or manned train ever traversed the plains and mountains. it always moved in fine order, without delays, confusion, or friction. a worn-down or sore-backed mule or horse was a rarity. at the first symptom of need of rest, a fresh animal from the loose herd relieved the distressed one. the packers worked in couples, each two packing and caring for ten pack-mules. the riding animals were picked indian horses. the mules were of large american stock, mostly those of the exploration of 1853. thorough discipline and the best feeling prevailed among the party. there was scarcely a quarrel during the whole nine months the expedition lasted. this judicious care of the animals was characteristic of the governor, and it is noticeable that on his arduous expeditions, though hard-worked and only grass-fed, they actually improved in condition,--a unique experience on the plains. leaving behind the prairies, groves, and sparkling, rippling streams of the mountain plateau, the party entered upon the vast rolling plains, gray and arid, and, traveling over them one hundred and thirty miles, camping one night on the dearborn river, one on the sun, and three on the teton, reached the vicinity of fort benton on the fifth day, and went into camp on the last-named river four miles from the fort. the governor, riding ahead, reached it a day sooner, on the 26th, and was disappointed in not finding or hearing from his co-commissioner, superintendent alfred cumming. during this march the party were rarely out of sight of game. large herds of graceful, fleet antelopes would come scouring across the plains, and circle around the slowly moving train, now abruptly halting to gaze with erect heads and distended eyes at the strange procession, and now dashing on again in full career, and presently, their curiosity satisfied, turning away and scampering out of sight. deer and elk were constantly seen by the river banks and under the cottonwood groves. buffalo trails crossed the country in every direction, and their skulls and bones were frequent. thus far the party followed well-marked trails, but on entering the plains the guide directed his course by some distant butte or landmark, or by the sun, for there was no trail leading in a given course, and the buffalo trails lacing the plains in every direction were very misleading. the plains were covered with the short, fine, curly buffalo grass, very different from the luxuriant, waving bunch grass of the columbia, but equally nutritious. learning of mr. cumming's approach, the governor, accompanied by doty and sohon and a small party, made a three days' trip to milk river, august 11-13, a distance of eighty miles, where the commissioners met and formally organized the commission, appointing mr. doty secretary, and mr. h. kennedy, who came with mr. cumming, assistant secretary, and returned together to fort benton. the governor was seriously concerned to learn that the treaty goods and supplies were greatly delayed. commissioner cumming had been specially charged with the duty of transporting them to fort benton; but under his dilatory management the steamboat, which carried them with himself up the missouri, did not reach fort union until late in the season, and, instead of continuing up the river as far as possible, discharged her cargo and returned to st. louis. the goods were then loaded into boats, which were now slowly proceeding up the river by cordeling, or towing by a force of men walking along the bank and pulling on a long tow-rope. this unexpected and inexcusable delay seriously imperiled the holding of the council. governor stevens had brought with him only sufficient supplies to carry his small party to fort benton, expecting to find there ample stores sent up by the government under charge of cumming. the western indians, who at his invitation had come so far to attend the council, could not find subsistence for a long wait; and it was necessary for them, as well as for the governor and party, to start home before winter set in and blocked the return journey. the great numbers of the blackfeet made it difficult to keep them in hand and assemble them late in the season, for they were accustomed, and indeed were obliged, to spread over a wide territory in order to hunt buffalo, and lay in their winter robes, lodge-skins, and food. while in washington the preceding summer governor stevens had urged upon the indian department the importance of the early arrival of the goods at fort benton, and on reaching olympia in december, repeated his recommendations in writing. moreover, he wrote a personal letter to the president urging the necessity of having a steamer start with them at the earliest moment in the spring, and push up the missouri above fort union as far as possible, and especially recommended that a boat be chartered expressly for the trip. he added a prophetic caution, or warning, against relying upon the american fur company to transport the goods, as they could not be depended upon to make the necessary early start and vigorous push up the river, which would entail some extra expense and risk, but would surely pursue their usual methods, and in the end sacrifice the public interests to their own. notwithstanding these wise and urgent recommendations, the whole matter was left to cumming, who late in the spring wrote the commissioner, proposing that the council be postponed to another year. being thereupon informed that governor stevens was probably already on his way with the western indians too far to be recalled, and instructed to proceed, he contracted with the fur company to transport the goods, with the predicted result. in this and other ways he manifested a perfect willingness to play into the hands of the fur company, a willingness which, whatever the motive, affords the only rational explanation of this transaction, of his entire indifference to the success of the council, and of his opposition to making adequate provision in the way of farms and annuities for civilizing the indians. of course, the american fur company, like the hudson bay company, was averse to having its trade impaired and eventually destroyed by the government's giving goods to, and civilizing, the indians. at the governor's instance, messengers were immediately dispatched to the boats to ascertain how long before they would probably arrive, and to the different bands of indians to advise them that they must wait longer than was expected, and to ascertain and regulate their movements, so that they might readily reach the council ground when notified, and meantime find sufficient buffalo and other game to support them. provisions for his own party, now nearly out, were sought at the fort, but the traders were also destitute, not having yet received their annual supply from below, and could furnish nothing but a few hundred pounds of old jerked buffalo meat, exactly like worn-out boot-leather in appearance,--so black, dry, tough, and dirty was it. it seems that all the jerked meat, when first obtained, was piled up loose in one of the store-rooms, and free access to it given the cooks and indian wives of the employees. they naturally picked out the best first, so that, after the winter's use, only the dryest and toughest pieces and scraps remained. however, two parfleches of pemmican of one hundred pounds each were found among the goods left by the exploring party two years before. this pemmican was put up by the red river half-breeds, and consisted of jerked buffalo meat pounded fine and mixed with buffalo fat and dried berries, and then packed in large bags of rawhide called parfleches. it had become so hardened by age that it had to be chopped out of the parfleches with an axe, but it was perfectly sweet and good, and afforded a very palatable and nourishing hash. the governor now fitted out a hunting party under hugh robie, with a pack-train, and sent them with a party of gros ventre indians to the judith river, some eighty miles south of the fort, after buffalo. these noble game animals were found there in great numbers and very fat. the hunters, white and red, killed hundreds of them, stripping off the hides and flesh, which they brought into camp, where the squaws jerked the meat by cutting it into thin slices and strips and drying it on scaffolds in the sun, and dressed the skins for lodges. in three weeks robie and his party returned with his pack-mules and riding animals loaded down with fat, juicy buffalo meat,--a two months' supply for the whole party. metsic, an indian hunter, was kept busy hunting in the vicinity of the fort, and brought in many deer and antelope, and small parties were from time to time sent to the citadel rock, a noted landmark twenty miles down the river, after bighorn, which were so abundant there that the hunters would load their animals in a day's hunt. the governor was desirous that his son should see and experience all the aspects of the trip, and believed in throwing a boy on his own resources, without too close supervision, as the proper way of developing his judgment and capacity; so hazard, who was now well hardened to riding and the fatigues of the field, and sufficiently adventurous, accompanied the buffalo and big-horn hunting parties. there was no danger of starving, but the governor remarks:- "as we had very little bread, sugar, or coffee, the bighorn of citadel rock were exceedingly delightful as an article of food, and are generally preferred by the mountain men to any other game except buffalo; so between buffalo, bighorn, and the smaller game we fared very well. the parties who extended our information of the country in conveying messages to the indians, etc., invariably lived either on the dried meat they took with them, or on the game which they killed from day to day. they had no flour, no sugar, no coffee, and yet there was not a word of complaint from one of them; but we made it the subject of a good deal of merriment when we were able to reach the boats and have a sufficiency of those articles which in civilized life are deemed indispensable to comfort." meanwhile the indians were all well in hand, ready and anxious for the council, which nothing delayed but the unfortunate backwardness of the boats. the blackfeet were mostly north of the missouri, the western indians south of it, and the governor by his expresses kept himself informed of and guided their movements. the reports from the agents with the latter were especially encouraging. the nez perces, 108 lodges; flatheads and pend oreilles, 68 lodges; and 40 lodges of the snakes, numbering all told 216 lodges, or over 2000 souls,--were in one camp on the muscle shell river, awaiting the call to the council. the whole camp of the gros ventres, and low horn's band of the piegans of 54 lodges, were in the vicinity. the hereditary enemies were visiting and hunting together on most friendly terms, their minds all attuned to peace and friendship, and all anxious for the council. an incident now occurred well calculated to test the good faith of the blackfeet. when making arrangements in the bitter root valley for the western indians to attend the council, and they had objected that the blackfeet would steal their horses, governor stevens assured them of his belief that the blackfeet would receive them with kindness and hospitality, using this expression: "i guarantee that when you pull in your lariat in the morning, you will find a horse at the end of it." relying on his assurance, four young pend oreille braves visited the governor at fort benton, and on his invitation turned their horses into his band, which grazed two miles above the fort. next morning they were gone. two young warriors of the northern blackfeet had picked them out from over a hundred animals, and made off with them. the governor immediately put little dog, a prominent chief of the bloods, to search for the trail of the raiders, and at the same time dispatched doty with one attendant and a guide to the northern camps, judging that the thieves would seek refuge in that quarter. little dog returned unsuccessful, not finding a hoof-print of the missing horses in one hundred miles and thirty hours' hard riding, and was sent north to follow doty. the latter pushed on fifty miles a day for two hundred and thirty miles to bow river in british territory, a tributary of the saskatchewan, where he struck a large blackfoot camp only two hours after the arrival there of the stolen horses. he immediately called together the chiefs, and demanded the surrender of the animals. the head chief, lame bull, returned three of them, but stated that one of the scamps had gotten off with the fourth. he expressed great regret at the theft, and offered two of his own horses in place of the one not recovered. doty placed the rescued animals in charge of little dog, who had overtaken him, and resuming the pursuit of the remaining one, rode seventy miles to elk river, another branch of the saskatchewan, where he found another large camp of blackfeet, and where the chief, bull's head, delivered to him the last horse with expressions of regret at the misconduct of his young men, and the offer of another horse by way of amends. on the sixteenth day after the horses were taken they were returned to the pend oreille braves at the fort. this was the first and last instance of horse-stealing by the blackfeet pending the council, and afforded most gratifying proof of their good faith. thus a depredation which might have led to disastrous results was made the means of demonstrating the sincerity and strengthening the friendship of the indians. all these indians professed great willingness to make friends with the western tribes and the crows, and agreed to meet them at the council and conclude a treaty. they arranged with mr. doty to so direct their movements as to bring them within reach of fort benton at the proper time. he also secured james bird as interpreter, an intelligent half-breed, said to be the best interpreter in the country, who was then visiting low horn's band. on august 27 pearson arrived with letters from olympia, and reported that everything was quiet and favorable west of the mountains, and that many miners and settlers were going into the upper country, gold having recently been discovered on the columbia, near colville. "pearson rode seventeen hundred and fifty miles by the route he took from the bitter root valley to olympia, and back to benton, in twenty-eight days, during some of which he did not travel. he was less than three days going from fort owen to fort benton, a distance, by the route he pursued, of some two hundred and sixty miles, which he traveled without a change of animals, having no food but the berries of the country, except a little fish, which he killed on travelers' rest creek of lewis and clark on the morning of starting from fort owen, which served him for a single meal," as the governor says in his final report. on his trips pearson usually drove two extra horses ahead of him, and, when the one he was riding became tired, changed his saddle to a fresh one. he could "ride anything that wore hair," and was equally expert with the lariat which he carried at the horn of his saddle. he always contrived, too, to procure fresh horses at certain points on his long trips, as at walla walla, lapwai, and the bitter root valley, sometimes having previously left them, and sometimes by trading with the indians. imagine this little man of steel, insensible to cold, hunger, and fatigue, galloping like a centaur, day after day, across the vast, lonely plains, driving before him his two loose horses! the messenger dispatched to the boats returned with the report that they would probably reach the mouth of the judith in twenty days, and fort benton in thirty or thirty-five, or on the 5th to the 10th of october. the governor proposed that one of the boats be loaded with the most necessary goods and forced up faster by an extra crew, in order to hasten the opening of the council, leaving the others to follow; but commissioner cumming refused to consent to this expedient. he was a large, portly man, pompous, and full of his own importance, and having been named first as commissioner, and charged with bringing up the goods and the disbursements for the council, now attempted to arrogate to himself practically sole and exclusive authority. he even attempted to dismiss doty as secretary, and claimed the right to appoint all the officers for the council; and this was the more unreasonable because he had not brought with him a single efficient man, and the whole work of holding and collecting the indians, furnishing interpreters, and in short carrying the council through successfully, had to be done, and was done, by governor stevens and the trained force he had provided for the purpose. but the governor firmly insisted that nothing could be done except by the act of the commission; sternly informed his colleague that he would not permit him to repudiate his own action in organizing it, appointing the secretary, etc.; submitted a series of rules regulating its proceedings, and required all official communications between them to be in writing and made a matter of record. under this firm and decided treatment cumming was forced to abate his pretensions and subside into his proper place; but he opposed most of the governor's suggestions, disagreed with him on all points, and exhibited a degree of arrogance, ignorance, and childish petulance hard to be believed, were they not so plainly shown by the official record. in framing the treaty the governor proposed that farms be opened for the blackfeet on the upper waters of the sun river, and that $50,000 a year be allowed the indians for twenty years, the greater part to be expended in carrying on the farms, instructing the indians, etc. this amount was authorized by their instructions, and did not seem very extravagant for teaching twelve thousand indians the ways of civilization, and leading them to abandon their life-long hostilities and predatory raids, being only about four dollars per capita. but cumming flatly refused to agree to more than $35,000, and objected to the farms as "affording opportunities for speculating under the guise of philanthropy." as the blackfeet were within his superintendency, this was really a reflection upon himself and his agents not intended by the self-sufficient official. the commissioners were instructed to report generally on the indians and the country. cumming stigmatized the blackfeet as utter savages, bloodthirsty and depraved, and declared that they would use goods that might be furnished them as the means of buying rum at the british trading-posts, and, therefore, that annuities of goods, etc., would only aid in demoralizing them. as to the country, he adopted, _con amore_, the jefferson davis theory, asserting that "it is a vast and sterile region, which could not sustain the animals required for even a limited emigration, and altogether unfitted for cultivation. every part of this barren region must forever be closed against all modern improvements in the way of transportation, with the exception of the missouri river." he was as unable to appreciate the philanthropic views of governor stevens, and his earnest desire to improve the indians, as he was ignorant of them and of the country. the governor's views are given at length, and have been remarkably sustained by the subsequent settlement of the country. the following extracts will be found interesting, particularly his calculation that a million and a half buffalo grazed over the region:- "it is in the main an exceedingly fine grazing country, of great salubrity of climate, much arable land of good quality, with abundant cottonwood on the streams, and many localities abound in pine of the finest quality. a portion of the country is scantily watered, but not seriously to affect its capabilities as a grazing country, or to interfere with emigration. at the base of the mountains, throughout nearly the whole length of the blackfoot country, the soil is good, in many places exceedingly rich, and the grasses abundant and of the finest quality. at the heads of milk and marias rivers, and at the heads of all the southern tributaries of the south branch of the saskatchewan, between latitudes 48° 30´ and 49°, there are abundant forests of pine, large tracts of arable land, and lakes well stocked with fish. on the highwood alone, there are at least fifteen thousand acres of arable land. "so far from this country not being able to supply the wants of even a limited emigration, an emigration could not possibly take place which would exhaust its capabilities. "the quantities of buffalo which these plains subsist, not to take into account the vast herds of elk, deer, bighorn, antelope, and other game, will alone carry conviction that the territory inhabited by the blackfeet is a good grazing country. "the blackfeet live almost exclusively on the buffalo. they number above ten thousand souls. they make twenty thousand robes a year. they require nearly twenty thousand skins for their renewal of lodges annually and other purposes. all these are the skins of cows. for several months they live entirely on bulls, and many bulls are killed at all seasons of the year. making the proper allowance for animals that die of disease, are killed by wolves, or other causes, and for the known improvidence of indians, it is believed that one hundred and fifty thousand buffalo of three years old and upward are required each year to subsist, clothe, and house these indians. this number must be added each year to the herds of grown animals to prevent a decrease. estimating that three quarters of the cows bear young, and that one half of these come to maturity, eight hundred thousand buffalo of and above three years, and one million and a half buffalo of all ages must be roaming on these plains to enable the indians to live. yet, on a large portion of this region the grass is hardly touched from one year's end to another. "the whole of the gros ventres and nearly three fourths of the piegans, bloods, and blackfeet winter on the milk, marias, and teton, finding subsistence for their animals in the bottoms, and food from the buffalo which frequent the groves of cottonwood. "the character of the blackfeet. "they are called savages, yet their four tribes have lived together many years on terms of amity, making war only on the neighboring tribes. the chiefs, who promised the undersigned two years' since to use their influence to prevent their people from warring on the neighboring tribes, have been true to their word, and have in some cases incurred the displeasure of their wild young men for their persistency. these chiefs, and all the blackfoot chiefs, have sent word to their hereditary enemies, the flatheads, the nez perces, and the crows: 'come to the council without fear. your persons and your horses shall be under our protection, and if a horse be taken by some of our wild young men, his place shall at once be made good.' the undersigned looks forward to no disturbance at the council, for he believes the blackfeet will keep their word. "the blackfeet have expressed a strong desire for farms, schools, mills, and shops. they are quick to learn, have a great curiosity to handle tools and implements, and are excellent herders of animals. the women are proverbially industrious, many of them expert in the use of the needle, and persons of both sexes seem to fall readily into the ways of the whites." footnotes: [9] now occupied by the thriving town, missoula. chapter xxxiii the blackfoot council by his careful preparation for two years, and masterly handling of them, governor stevens brought and kept these various tribes of indians within easy distance of fort benton, all ready and anxious for the council, and in the most friendly and favorable state of feeling, during the whole month of august and half of september, fully six weeks. had the goods arrived at any time during this waiting period, not less than 12,000 indians would have attended the council, comprising 10,000 blackfeet, 1100 nez perces, 700 flatheads and pend oreilles, and 400 snakes, the western indians numbering 2200. but it now became impossible for the latter to remain longer on the muscle shell and judith, for lack of game. the buffalo had disappeared. the grass was drying up. no day could yet be fixed for the council in the uncertainty of the arrival of the boats. on september 8 the nez perce camp of one hundred and three lodges, in charge of agent tappan, was obliged to start southward for the yellowstone, hoping to find buffalo. tappan wrote that, unless the council was held within three weeks, not twelve nez perces would be able to attend it. eagle-from-the-light and other chiefs, with several lodges, joined the flathead camp in order not to miss the council. but on september 10 agent adams reported that the flatheads might in twelve or fourteen days be obliged, also, to go to the yellowstone for food. the snake camp also moved to the same region for the same cause. in compliance with his instructions, adams made a trip to the yellowstone in search of the crows, and descended it to a point below the big horn river, where he met tappan with some nez perces on the same quest. but these indians could not be found. it was reported that, in consequence of the measles having broken out among them and many having died, they had scattered, a part going down the river and part taking to the mountains. to prevent, if possible, the failure of the whole council undertaking, now imminent, the governor dispatched packmaster higgins with a few picked men to visit both camps, and notify them that october 3, or a few days later, was fixed for holding the council, and directing them to move to the vicinity of fort benton, and to find camps on the shantier and highwood creeks. mr. tappan was also instructed to secure, if possible, the attendance of the principal crow chiefs. on the fourth day out higgins met adams and tappan returning to fort benton, despairing of the council, but the former hastened back to the flatheads with the new orders, while tappan joined higgins, and, with craig, delaware jim, and the voyageur legare, pushed across the country and struck the nez perce camp high up on the yellowstone. although none of the party had ever passed over this part of the country before, delaware jim was so thoroughly conversant with the yellowstone country and the upper missouri, and certain mountain heights flanking the route, that he actually guided them on an air-line, and struck the looked-for camp without making a detour of a mile on the course, and that, too, traveling fifty miles a day. as the result of this prompt and decided action, adams reached fort benton october 3, and reported that victor's whole camp would soon be on the judith, and that victor himself, leaving his camp there, would come with his chiefs and principal men to fort benton to attend the council. on the 5th higgins and tappan arrived, and at noon next day a large delegation of nez perce chiefs, under charge of craig, also came in, but did not bring the large numbers in their camp, for fear they could not find sufficient game to feed them. tappan was unable to learn anything of the crows except the report already mentioned. the snakes, too, had gone beyond reach, and could not be summoned. in the mean time the northern bands of the blackfeet, in accordance with the programme arranged by mr. doty, had been moving down, and were now all on the teton and marias rivers. the gros ventres were on milk river. low horn's and little gray head's bands of the piegans were on the honkee. alexander, the pend oreille chief's camp, was established on the highwood. the buffalo were in great numbers between the marias and milk, and herds of them were coming within twenty miles of fort benton. "the arrival of the nez perces," says the governor, "brought all the indians within the direct purview of the commission, and the most remote camps, those of the flatheads and gros ventres, could be reached in a single day." these two camps were some seventy-five miles distant each, in different directions, and the area within which the indians were now brought was little less than the state of massachusetts, not counting the large nez perce camp on the yellowstone. even yet the boats had not reached the judith, could not reach it probably before the 8th, thirty-seven days from the muscle shell, instead of twenty as promised. it would require twenty-five days longer to drag them up the river another hundred miles to fort benton. the blackfeet and the western indians had now been freely mingling together for several days, and it was important that their present favorable disposition should be availed of. accordingly governor stevens proposed to hold the council on the mouth of the judith, and upon his urgency and arguments it was so decided on the evening of the 5th, the day the nez perce chiefs arrived, and the 13th was fixed as the time. the necessary measures to assemble the indians at that point were devolved upon the governor as usual, and also to notify the boats to stop and unload there. by the 7th all the camps were notified, the flatheads being already on the appointed ground, and most of the chiefs conferred with the governor in person, who, during these days, held a constant levee in his camp at the fort. the northern camps, however, were unwilling to move seventy miles farther than they expected, with their large supplies of meat recently taken, and it was decided that the chiefs, with a portion of their people, should attend, leaving the main camps undisturbed. the governor relates the following incident:- "my son hazard, thirteen years of age, had accompanied me from olympia to the waters of the missouri. like all youths of that age, he was always ready for the saddle, and had spent some days with one of my hunting parties on the judith, where he had become well acquainted with the gros ventres. when we determined to change the council from fort benton to the mouth of the judith, i undertook the duty of seeing the necessary messages sent to the various bands and tribes, and to bring them all to the mouth of the judith at the proper moment. these indians were scattered from milk river, near hammell's houses, along the marias, along the teton, to a considerable distance south of the missouri, the flatheads being on the judith, and the pend oreilles on smith's fork of the missouri, with two bands of the blackfeet lying somewhat intermediate, but in the vicinity of the girdle mountain. i succeeded in securing the services of a fit and reliable man for each one of these bands and tribes, except the gros ventres, camped on milk river. there were several men, who had considerable experience among indians and in voyageuring, who desired to go, but i had not confidence in them, and accordingly, at ten o'clock on sunday morning, i started my little son as a messenger to the gros ventres. accompanied by the interpreter, legare, he made that gros ventre camp before dark, a distance of seventy-five miles, and gave his message the same evening to the chiefs, and without changing horses they were in the saddle early in the morning, and reached my camp at half past three o'clock. thus a youth of thirteen traveled one hundred and fifty measured miles from ten o'clock of one day to half past three o'clock in the afternoon of the next. the gros ventres made their marches exactly as i had desired, and reached the new council ground at the mouth of the judith the very morning which had been appointed. "i doubt whether such an express service as we were obliged to employ at fort benton to keep the indians in hand was ever employed in this country with the same means. many of our animals, which had done service all the way from the dalles, traveled at express rates more than a thousand miles before we started on our return from fort benton. many of our mules traveled from seven to eight hundred miles with packs in going to the boats for provisions and to the hunting grounds for meat; and yet, after our treaty was concluded and we were ready to move home, we were able to make very good rates with these same animals, although the season was so late as november." to realize the remarkable extent and efficiency of this express service, bear in mind doty's trip to bow river, three hundred miles north of fort benton; tappan's and adams's and higgins's to the yellowstone, two hundred miles southeast; and the expresses down the river to the boats, one hundred and fifty miles; not to speak of pearson's trip to olympia, one thousand miles. it was as though one in new york, without telegraphs, railroads, or mails, had to regulate by pony express the movements of bands of indians at boston, portland, montreal, buffalo, and washington. after spending four days in conferences with the chiefs, explaining the reasons for changing the council ground, etc., the governor broke camp on the 10th, and on the next day, thursday, reached the point where the boats were unloading, a mile below the mouth of the judith, selected and prepared the council ground, and received and assigned to their camps the indians as they arrived. his colleague descended the river in a skiff, and did not arrive until the following saturday. by monday all the indians had assembled, and numbered thirty-five hundred. on tuesday governor stevens formally opened the council. the indians, as usual on such occasions, "reposed on the bosom of their mother," that is, sat on the ground in semicircular rows, twenty-six principal chiefs in the first row, lesser chiefs in succeeding rows, and the rank and file in the rear. the governor administered the oath to the interpreters to translate truly, having first inquired of the indians if they were satisfied with them and received an affirmative reply. [illustration: the blackfoot council] governor stevens said:- "my children, my heart is glad to-day. i see indians east of the mountains and indians west of the mountains sitting here as friends, bloods, blackfeet, piegans, gros ventres, and nez perces, koo-te-nays, pend oreilles, flatheads; and we have the cree chief sitting down here from the north and east, and snakes farther from the west. there is peace now between you all here present. we want peace also with absent tribes, with the crees and assiniboines, with the snakes, and, yes, even with the crows. you have all sent your message to the crows, telling them you would meet them in friendship here. the crows were far, and could not be present, but we expect you to promise to be friends with the crows. "it was low horn who, two years since, said to me, 'peace with the flatheads and nez perces.' the little dog, little gray head, and all the blackfoot chiefs said, 'peace with them; come and meet us in council,' and here they are. here you see them face to face. i met them the same year. i told them your words. they said, 'peace also with the blackfeet.' and the great father has said, 'peace with the crees and assiniboines, the crows, and all neighboring tribes.' "i shall say nothing about peace with the white man. no white man enters a blackfoot or a western indian's lodge without being treated to the very best. peace already prevails. we trust such will continue to be the case forever. we have been traveling over your whole country, both to the east and west of the mountains, in small parties, ranging away north to bow river, and south to the yellowstone. we have kept no guard. we have not tied up our horses. all has been safe. therefore i say peace has been, is now, and will continue, between these indians and the white man." the treaty was then read to them, after which the governor went over its provisions, explaining them, etc. the council lasted three days. the best feeling prevailed, all the chiefs making earnest and sincere speeches in favor of peace, contrasting the advantages of hunting in safety and trading between the tribes with the continual losses of their young braves and the steady decline in numbers from perpetual war, although some of them expressed doubts as to restraining the ambitious young warriors. only one passing shadow was cast over the assemblage, and that but for a moment. the treaty made all the country south of the missouri a common hunting ground for all the tribes, while the country north of the river was to be reserved to the blackfeet for hunting purposes, although open to the western indians for trading and visiting. to this restriction alexander, the pend oreille chief, demurred. said he:- "a long time ago this country belonged to our ancestors, and the blackfeet lived far north. we indians were all well pleased when we came together here in friendship. now you point us out a little piece of land to hunt our game in. when we were enemies i always crossed over there, and why should i not now when we are friends? now i have two hearts about it. what is the reason? which of these chiefs [pointing to the blackfeet] says we are not to go there? which is the one?" the little dog, a piegan chief: "it is i, and not because we have anything against you. we are friendly, but the north blackfeet might make a quarrel if you hunted near them. do not put yourself in their way." on alexander's insisting, the little dog said:- "since he speaks so much of it, we will give him liberty to come out in the north." alexander's contention will be better understood by considering the fact that his country, on the flathead river and clark's fork, lies directly opposite the region of the upper marias, and that by going directly east across the mountains through the marias pass he could reach buffalo in a short trip, while the journey to the plains south of the missouri was a much longer one. on the last day the commissioners and the chiefs and headmen of all the tribes present signed the treaty amid the greatest satisfaction and good feeling. during the next three days, october 18-20, the presents were distributed, and coats and medals were presented to the chiefs, with speeches by the commissioners, exhorting them to keep their promises to their great father, and control their young braves. the several tribes fraternized most amicably throughout all these proceedings, particularly the flatheads and gros ventres,--who had hunted together and exchanged friendly visits for many weeks on the muscle shell,--the nez perces and piegans, and the bloods and pend oreilles. though the crows were not present, the indians pledged themselves not to war upon them, nor upon any of the neighboring tribes. the officers of this council were: isaac i. stevens and alfred cumming, commissioners; james doty, secretary; thomas adams and a.j. vaughan, reporters. the interpreters were: james bird, a. culbertson, and m. roche, for the blackfeet; benjamin kiser, g. sohon, for the flatheads; william craig, delaware jim, for the nez perces. [illustration: star robe the rider heavy shield lame bull blackfoot chiefs] the treaty was much more than a treaty of peace as far as the blackfeet were concerned, for it gave them schools, farms, agricultural implements, etc., and an agent, and annuities of $35,000 for ten years, of which $15,000 was devoted to educating them in agriculture and to teaching the children. at the last moment the governor induced cumming to agree to a clause empowering the president and senate to increase the annuities $15,000 more, if the amount fixed in the treaty was deemed insufficient. it contained the usual provision prohibiting intoxicating liquor. the extensive region between the missouri and yellowstone was made the common hunting ground of all the tribes. all agreed to maintain peace with each other, including those tribes that were unable to be present, the crows, crees, assiniboines, and snakes. the treaty was made obligatory on the indians from their signing it, and on the united states from its ratification, which occurred the next spring, and it was duly proclaimed by the president on april 25, 1856. the tribes actually parties to this treaty numbered, by the commissioners' calculation, blackfeet, 11,500; nez perces, 2500; flathead nation, 2000; total 16,000. nearly all of their chiefs and principal men attended the council and signed the treaty. the peace made at this council was observed with gratifying fidelity in the main. the blackfeet ceased their incessant and bloody raids, and met their former enemies on friendly terms upon the common hunting grounds. within a few years, in 1862-63, large white settlements sprang up on the headwaters of the missouri, but they were spared the horrors and sufferings of indian warfare with so powerful a tribe largely in consequence of this treaty. the council, which governor stevens planned and carried out with such foresight, sagacity, and indefatigable exertions during two years, bore fruit at last in the perpetual peace he hoped for and predicted. few treaties with indians have been so well observed by them as this by the "bloodthirsty" blackfeet. they took no part in the great sioux wars, nor in the outbreak of joseph. they were afterwards gathered together on a large reservation, including the country about the sun river, where the governor proposed to establish their farms. the council ground was a wide, level plain covered with a noble grove of huge cottonwoods. it was on the left bank of the missouri, nearly opposite but below the mouth of the judith. this stream was also bordered by broad bottoms, which were covered with large sage-brush, and fairly swarming with deer. the governor's camp was pitched under the lofty cottonwoods, and lower down was the camp of the crew of men who had dragged the boats up the river. they were a hundred strong, mostly germans, having many fine voices among them, and were fond of spending the evenings in singing. the effect of their grand choruses, pealing forth over the river and resounding among the lofty trees, was magnificent. in the governor's camp an unusually large indian lodge--a great cone of poles covered with dressed and smoke-stained buffalo skins--was erected and used as an office tent, where the records were copied and smaller conferences held. every night between eleven and twelve, when the work of the day was concluded, the governor would call in the gentlemen of the party, a few chiefs, and some of the interpreters, and have a real homeric feast of buffalo ribs, flapjacks with melted sugar, and hot coffee. whole sides of ribs would be brought in, smoking-hot from the fire, and passed around, and each guest would cut off a rib for himself with his hunting knife, and sit there holding the huge dainty, three feet long, and tearing off the juicy and delicious meat with teeth and knife, principally the former. no description can convey an idea of the hearty zest and relish and enjoyment, or the keen appetites, with which they met at these hospitable repasts, and recounted the varied adventures and experiences of their recent trips, or listened as craig, delaware jim, or ben kiser related some thrilling tale of trapper days, or desperate fight with indian or grizzly bear. [illustration: tat-tu-ye, the fox _chief of the blood indians_] [illustration: mek-ya-py, red dye _piegan warrior_] the other commissioner did not grace these reunions with his presence. chafing at the constraint put upon him, and the secondary part which he could not help taking, despite all his pretensions, he kept his quarters on one of the boats, and relieved his mind by refusing to recommend the allowance of the governor's accounts for the extra expenses necessarily incurred by the two months' delay, the result of his own inefficiency; refused to allow mr. doty more than five dollars a day for his services as secretary, which pitiful stipend he took pains to call "wages;" and among other grievances complained that governor stevens had insinuated that he, cumming, had shown a disposition to repudiate his own acts done in commission,--all this gravely set forth in official communications addressed to the secretary, and made part of the record. this was too much for the governor's patience, and he replied:- "the undersigned has made no such intimation. on the contrary, in his communications to the commission he has demonstrated that commissioner cumming had repudiated his own act, and used every exertion to usurp the rights and powers of the commission, and reduce the undersigned to the position of a subordinate. fortunately for the dignity of the commission and the success of the treaty, this attempt was most successfully resisted, and commissioner cumming was compelled to surrender his claims. commissioner stevens has no grievance for which he asks redress from the department of the interior. he has protected his own rights here." in the joint report forwarding the treaty, prepared like all the official papers by governor stevens, he states the disagreements between the commissioners on nearly every point, and adds:- "so utterly at variance have been their views that it has only been with great difficulty that a concert of action has been effected at all." the governor's last official communication to the secretary of the commission fitly expressed his indignation at the action of the department in naming cumming first on the commission:-"the undersigned solemnly protests against the instructions of the commissioner of indian affairs placing the name of commissioner cumming first on the commission, and he appeals from said instructions to the president of the united states. "the undersigned was, in his opinion, entitled to be placed first, and for the following reasons:- "1. he originated the blackfoot council, prepared the indians on both sides of the mountains for it, and, for all practical purposes, has been the superintendent of all these tribes since he explored the country in 1853. he has appointed special agents for the blackfeet, distributed goods and provisions among them, and in other ways has by authority of the interior department had the administrative charge of these tribes. "2. he was the senior officer by date of priority of commission. "3. he was better fitted, by experience and adaptation to the duties, to take a prominent part in the negotiations, and he fearlessly refers to the official record to show that the success of the treaty is mainly due to his previous labors, his forecast in bringing the necessary force to the theatre of the principal operations, and to the vigilance, energy, and force of character which he has exhibited throughout, and that thus was redressed the wrong which otherwise would have been done to the public service, and injury to the reputation and services of the undersigned, by placing his name second on the commission." [illustration: james bird delaware jim colonel alfred cumming william craig alexander culbertson commissioner cumming and interpreters] with this parting shot the governor bade a heartfelt farewell to the pretentious incapable, who had so nearly wrecked the council, and added so much to his labors and perplexities. cumming started down the river on one of the boats on the 23d. chapter xxxiv crossing the mountains in midwinter.--surprise of the c[oe]ur d'alenes and spokanes having made a good riddance of his troublesome colleague, and seen the indians depart their several ways with much hand-shaking and many expressions of goodwill and satisfaction, the governor and his little party packed up and started on the 24th, and reached fort benton the following day. two days were spent here preparing for the long return journey across the mountains; for the animals were well worn by the hard express service of the summer, and it was necessary to lighten loads as much as possible. on october 28 the homeward start was made; the party moved over to and up the teton, continued up that stream the 29th, and went into camp thirty-five miles from the fort. supper was just over, and the men were gathering around the camp-fires, for the evening was frosty, when a lone horseman was discerned in the twilight slowly making his way over the plains towards the camp, and soon pearson rode in, or rather staggered in, for his horse was utterly exhausted, and tottered as it walked. the eager men crowded around, and helped the wiry expressman from the saddle and supported him to a seat, for he was unable to stand, and his emaciated, wild, and haggard appearance bore witness to the hardships he had undergone. he delivered his dispatches, and, after being revived with food and warmth, was able to make his report, and surely one more fraught with astonishment and consternation for that little party on the lonely plains, a thousand miles from home, could not be imagined. the great tribes of the upper columbia country, the cuyuses, yakimas, walla wallas, umatillas, palouses, and all the oregon bands down to the dalles, the very ones who had signed the treaties at the walla walla council and professed such friendship, had all broken out in open war. they had swept the upper country clean of whites, killing all the settlers and miners found there, and murdered agent bolon under circumstances of peculiar atrocity. major haller, sent into the yakima country with a hundred regulars and a howitzer, had been defeated and forced to retreat by kam-i-ah-kan's warriors, with the loss of a third of his force and his cannon. the indians west of the cascades had also risen simultaneously, and laid waste the settlements on puget sound and in oregon, showing that a widespread conspiracy prevailed. the spokanes and coeur d'alenes were hostile, or soon would become hostile under the spur and taunts of the young cuyuse and yakima warriors sent among them to stir them up, and even some of the nez perces were disaffected. a thousand well-armed and brave hostile warriors under kam-i-ah-kan, pu-pu-mox-mox, young chief, and five crows were gathered in the walla walla valley, waiting to "wipe out" the party on its return; squads of young braves were visiting the nez perces, spokanes, and coeur d'alenes, vaunting their victories, displaying fresh gory scalps, and using every effort to cajole or force them into hostility to the whites. the daring expressman's story of how he ran the gauntlet of the hostile tribes with the dispatches and information upon which depended the lives of the party heightened the impression made by his wretched appearance and doleful tidings. he left the dalles on his return trip, fresh and well mounted, and, riding all day and night, reached billy mckay's ranch on the umatilla river at daylight, and stopped to get breakfast. the place was deserted. after eating he lassoed a fine powerful horse among a large band grazing near by, and after a hard struggle managed to saddle, bridle, and mount it. the steed was wild, and started off jumping stiff-legged. as pearson rode from under the trees surrounding the house into the road, he saw a party of indians racing down the hill into the valley, evidently on his trail, and heard their yells as they caught sight of him,--"whup si-ah si-ah-poo! whup si-ah!" "kill the white man! kill the white!"--and redoubled their speed in pursuit. his new mount proved of speed and bottom, and under whip and spur gave over his jumping for swift running. as he climbed the hill leading out of the valley on to the high plains and looked back, he again saw the red devils and heard their yells; and for mile after mile, from the top of every ridge and roll of the plains crossed by the trail, he would look back and see his pursuers, or the dust rising under the hoofs of their horses. but they could not lessen the distance between them; gradually they fell behind farther and farther, and at length were lost to sight. pearson pushed his horse on all day as rapidly as it could stand without breaking down, and, when night fell, turned off the trail at right angles for several miles, then struck a course parallel to it, traveled all night, crossed the walla walla river and valley above the usual ford and crossings, and, having found a secluded depression in the plains beyond, stopped to rest and let his horse feed a couple of hours. pushing on without further adventure, and exchanging his worn-out steed for a fresh one at red wolf's ground, he reached lapwai the next day. here he obtained a day's rest. thus refreshed, and securing fresh horses and a young nez perce brave as guide, he started across the bitter root mountains by the direct nez perce trail, the shortest but also the most rugged and elevated route, and at dark made camp high up in the mountains. that night a furious snowstorm set in. a tree fell and crushed his indian companion. pearson dragged his insensible body from beneath the tree, and said to himself, "now the nez perces, too, will break out. they never will believe this buck's death was accidental. they will deem me his murderer, and always hunt my scalp after this." but to his great joy the young indian came to his senses, and proved not to be seriously hurt. the storm raged three days; several feet of snow fell, too deep for horses to travel. when it ceased, pearson sent the indian back with the horses, and, packing his dispatches, blankets, and some dried meat on his back, continued across on snowshoes, which he had made during the storm, cutting the bows with his knife, and unraveling his lariat for the webs. the trail was hidden under the snow, but he guided his course largely by the marks of packs against the trees made by indians who had crossed in winter. struggling on in this manner for four days, he emerged upon the bitter root valley near fort owen, almost dead with fatigue and privation. stopping only a few hours for rest, and procuring a good horse and equipments from the ever friendly flatheads, he again took the saddle, and on the third day staggered into the governor's camp on the teton. the dispatches fully corroborated pearson's information. among them were letters from acting-governor mason, colonel simmons, major tilton, and others, warning the governor on no account to attempt to return home by the direct route across the mountains, and urging him to descend the missouri and return by way of the isthmus. he was assured that there were scarcely any troops in the country, that it was impossible to succor him, and equally impossible for him to get through so many hostile indians, and that his only way of safety lay down the missouri river. governor stevens's decision was instant and unwavering. it was to force his way back to his territory by the direct route through all opposition and obstacles. he fully appreciated the perils and difficulties of the attempt, but his determination was unalterably fixed sternly to confront them all, and by a bold, decided course and rapid movements to force a passage through the hostile country and hostile savages. doty was sent back to the fort the next morning for additional arms and ammunition. at noon the following day, october 31, leaving orders for doty to follow with the train on his return from the fort, the governor, with delaware jim and hugh robie, his only companions, started for the bitter root valley, and reached fort owen in four and a half days, a distance of two hundred and thirty miles. says the governor of this trip:- "the first night we camped on sun river, having made a distance of some twenty-nine miles from about noon to sundown. on the 1st of november we were in the saddle at early dawn, pushed towards cadotte's pass, between the crown butte and rattlers, passed by the bird tail rock, crossed the dearborn, and went into camp four miles before reaching the divide, at a point which was the camp of lieutenant grover and mr. robie in their winter trip of 1854. this evening a snow came on about an hour before sundown, or we should have crossed the divide that night. the weather in the morning was clear and beautiful, but as we had no tent, we built up a large fire in order to dry ourselves, and got breakfast before leaving camp, and at half past eight we were on the road. there were some six or seven inches of snow on the ground, but the weather was extremely mild, and the snow was rapidly passing away. i went up the divide on the ravine north of the usual trail, and was able to find a very good route for our animals. there was little or no snow on the western slope of the divide; continuing down the blackfoot valley five and one half miles, the snow was only an inch or two deep, and entirely passed away before we reached lander's fork. we halted on lander's fork for a few minutes to rest our animals; then, moving very rapidly through the belly prairie and cañon, we came out on the large prairie of the blackfoot at a little after dark, camping where i had camped with lieutenant donelson in 1853. the next day we were in the saddle early, and, moving over this prairie at a very rapid rate, ate breakfast at a point some eighteen miles from our morning's camp, and made our evening camp within about ten miles of the hell gate crossing to fort owen. the next day we reached fort owen, meeting at the crossing some indians, by whom i was able to communicate with dr. lansdale. on our way to fort owen we met a nez perce delegation on their way home, and made arrangements to meet them at the crossing of hell gate, in order to confer about difficulties ahead. after waiting a day at fort owen, i moved down to and established my camp at hell gate, to await the arrival of mr. doty. just before reaching the dearborn river, delaware jim shot a deer, but on going up to it they were surprised to find a well-grown fawn lying dead beside it, killed by the same ballet as it stood beside and concealed by its mother." many of the flatheads came with dr. lansdale in response to the governor's summons to confer with him at this camp, and the conference with them and also with the nez perce chiefs was most satisfactory. in response to the governor's request to the latter that some of their number would accompany him, the whole delegation, fourteen in number, offered to do so, and declared their willingness to share any danger that might be encountered, and accordingly joined the party. says the governor:- "i was here able to gain no additional information of the condition of the indian tribes between the cascade mountains and the bitter root, but the reports were that all were in arms except the nez perces, a large portion of whom were said to be disaffected, and some of them even hostile. i now purchased every good mule and horse i could get in this valley, for it was my determination to have my whole command in a position so that they could move rapidly and act promptly. the question was, what should be our route home? it was important, it seemed to me, to our success that we should be able to cross the mountains and throw ourselves into the nearest tribes without their having the slightest notice of our coming. i felt a strong assurance that, if i could bring this about, i could handle enough tribes, and conciliate the friendship of enough indians, to be sufficiently strong to defy the rest. there would certainly be no difficulty from the snow down clark's fork; but it was known that the upper and lower pend oreille indians were along the road, and no party could travel over it without its approach being communicated to the indians; whereas indian report had it that the coeur d'alene pass was blocked up with snow at this season of the year, and i felt satisfied that they would not expect us on this route, and therefore i determined to move over it. it was the shorter route of the two; it was a route where i wished to make additional examinations; it was a route which enabled me to creep up, as it were, to the first indian tribe, and then, moving rapidly, to jump upon them without their having time for preparation. i knew that kam-i-ah-kan and pu-pu-mox-mox had sent a body of warriors to cut off my party, and that we had to guard against falling into an ambush; but an indian has not patience to wait many days for such a purpose, and i thought, looking to all these things, that the line of safety was to move over the coeur d'alene pass." mr. doty arrived with the train on the 11th. at the camp on the teton occurred the only death that befell the party during the expedition, that of h. palmer, who died of a lingering and incurable malady, and was laid at rest on the lonely prairie by his warm-hearted and sorrowing companions. three days more were spent after the arrival of the train in making necessary arrangements with dr. lansdale, who was placed in charge of the flatheads as their agent, with mr. owen and the missionaries. [illustration: crossing the bitter roots in midwinter] keeping his decision as to the route to himself, the governor allowed the report to become current that he would pursue the way by pend oreille lake, and this was universally believed, because both indians and mountain men pronounced the coeur d'alene impassable from snow so late in the season. still further to throw any hostile spies or runners, who might be lurking about, off the scent, and prevent their carrying word ahead of him, the governor, on the first day's march, november 14, on reaching the forks, where the trails divided, took that by the lake route, moved down it two miles, and went into camp. at earliest daylight the next morning the train was on the march, retraced its steps to the forks, and struck rapidly down the coeur d'alene trail a long distance, camping at the governor's camp ground of october 7, 8, two years before. pushing on by forced marches, the bitter root river was crossed on the ice november 17, and the summit of the mountains on the 20th, where, for lack of grass, the half-famished animals had to be tied to trees all night. the snow was from three to six feet deep for a long distance, and would have proved a serious obstacle, had not a large party of coeur d'alene indians crossed a fortnight before and beaten down a passable trail; but ten dead horses lying stiff and stark within a distance of eight miles showed how severely their animals had suffered in the passage. on this trip the governor adopted the plan of starting at daylight, moving rapidly for the day's march, and encamping early in the afternoon, thinking thus to give the animals the best opportunities for finding grass, now dry and scanty, but their only feed. the precision and rapidity with which the train packed up, started, and moved was astonishing. an hour before daylight the cooks were up and preparing breakfast; half an hour later the mules were driven up and the pack-saddles placed upon them, and the riding animals were also saddled; then breakfast, taking about twenty minutes; then the governor, watch in hand, would give the command to load, and in five minutes from the word every mule would be packed and the train moving out. the governor took great pride in this feat every morning, and the men entered into the spirit of it, strove to outdo themselves at every camp, and made the gain of half a minute in packing and starting the subject of talk and congratulation. the mules, by their perverse and vexatious conduct, arising from their invincible repugnance to water and cold, gave rise to many comical and diverting incidents. dreading the icy water, they would hold back from plunging into the fords, and would seek a dryer way by going out on the skirt or points of ice which fringed the streams, only to have it give way and drop them into deeper water. they were continually getting off the narrow, beaten path in the snow, and floundering helpless in the fleecy material, and then half a dozen sturdy packers would unsling the packs, seize the unlucky mule by tail and ears, neck-rope and saddle, and haul him back on the trail by main strength. [illustration: c[oe]ur d'alene mission] the party reached good grass the day after crossing the divide, and rested another day to allow the exhausted animals to fill up and recuperate. on the 23d a long march was made, and the party encamped twenty-six miles from the coeur d'alene mission. from the appearance of everything around, the governor was satisfied that no indian spies had yet observed his march. he deemed it impracticable to move the train to the mission in one day without breaking down the animals, yet he counted on taking the indians there by surprise, thus giving them no opportunity to waylay his party if they were hostile, and relying upon his sudden and unexpected appearance to retrieve their wavering friendship, if they were not too far committed to hostility. at daylight the next morning, with craig, pearson, and the four nez perce chiefs, looking glass, spotted eagle, three feathers, and captain john, the governor pushed on, leaving directions for the train to follow and come in next day. the evening sun was just sinking behind the mountains when the seven well-armed horsemen dashed up in front of the coeur d'alene village, rifles in hand and presented ready to fire, and in peremptory tones demanded of the astonished indians, as they poured out of their lodges, "are you friends or enemies? do you want peace or war?" the governor's orders, impressed upon his followers, were, that at the first hostile act or word they were to fire upon the indians, disabling as many of them as possible, and then to fall back upon and occupy the solidly built church on the knoll overlooking the village, and hold this stronghold against all attacks until the main party should arrive the next day. the coeur d'alenes, thus taken by surprise, in response to this formidable summons declared that they were friends and preferred peace, and gathered around with apparently friendly greetings. in fact, however, as became more apparent at the council next day, "they were much excited, on a balance for peace or war, and a chance word might turn them either way," as says the official journal. some of their young men had joined the hostiles; and the rumor was current that the son of the chief, stellam, had recently been slain by the whites. the chiefs and elders were inclined to be friendly, and wished to avoid war. on the way to the village the governor charged the four nez perce chiefs:- "when you reach the coeur d'alenes, talk to them blackfoot; tell them about our great council and treaty at fort benton; tell them that they can hunt buffalo without being disturbed by their hereditary enemies, the blackfeet; tell them the lion and the lamb have laid down together; get their minds off their troubles here, and turn them to other subjects in which they take an interest." the train arrived the next day. a council was held with the indians, and they were exhorted to continue their friendly attitude, and keep their young men from war. the emissaries of the yakimas had left the mission only five days before the arrival of the party, having despaired of its crossing the mountains. all sorts of rumors were rife, but nothing certain except that the tribes below were in arms, blocking up the road, and that they had threatened to cut off the party, pu-pu-mox-mox especially having made his boast that he would take governor stevens's scalp. it was learned, however, that four men, who had brought up the goods for the proposed spokane council, with the unfortunate agent bolon, were at antoine plante's, and that fifteen miners were also at that point, fearing to go below on account of the hostiles, and virtually blockaded by the spokanes. governor stevens at once determined to proceed to the spokane to rescue these men, and if possible to restrain the spokanes from hostilities. he dispatched craig with all but three of the nez perce chiefs to lapwai, there to confer with lawyer, assemble the nation, and prepare them for the governor's arrival. he was also instructed to send an express to the spokane with information of his success, and the disposition of the nez perces. the chiefs retained with the party were looking glass, spotted eagle, and three feathers. as at hell gate, the governor's determination rested in his own breast, and it was currently reported and believed that the party would move directly south along the base of the mountains to the nez perce country, the shortest and safest route to the refuge of that friendly tribe. to move away from it and adventure sixty miles farther among the supposedly hostile, and certainly disaffected, spokanes seemed little short of madness. in the evening some of the men, in discussing the matter, declared that if the governor started for the spokane, they would not follow him, but would take the nez perce trail; but higgins swore that no man should desert the governor if he started for hell, and the incipient mutiny went no farther. the next day, november 27, the party marched down the coeur d'alene river to wolf's lodge, nineteen miles, and, starting at daylight the following morning and making a rapid, forced march of forty miles, reached the spokane village, just below antoine plante's, before sunset. the last four miles across the prairie was made at a round trot, and within thirty minutes after first sighting the rapidly approaching column, the astonished indians beheld thirty well-armed men gallop boldly up, range themselves in front of their lodges ready to open fire, and heard the peremptory summons to decide instantly for peace or war. needless to say that they, too, were friendly and for peace. they were taken completely by surprise, and had no alternative but to choose the olive branch. only three hours before they had heard that governor stevens had gone down the missouri. the indian employees and goods and the miners were safe. they had built a blockhouse, and were on terms of armed truce with the indians rather than actual hostility. before midnight indian messengers were dispatched to colville and the various camps, summoning the head chief garry and the other chiefs, the hudson bay company's factor, mcdonald, and the jesuit missionaries to meet the governor in council at plante's. it is noteworthy that during all these troubles the hudson bay company people and the catholic missionaries were not molested by the hostile indians. the governor now gave his party, augmented by the four rescued employees, a military organization and the name of stevens guards, the name being the choice of the men, and appointed as officers c.p. higgins, captain; w.h. pearson, first lieutenant; a.h. robie, second lieutenant; and s.s. ford, third lieutenant. he also appointed doty lieutenant-colonel, aide-de-camp, and adjutant, and tappan captain and quartermaster. the miners were also formed into a military company, and adopted the name of spokane invincibles, with judge b.f. yantis as captain. the governor ordered guards regularly mounted at night. a half-breed, who had been captured by pu-pu-mox-mox and set free by him on condition that he would take a message to the governor to the effect that he, pu-pu-mox-mox, intended to take the governor's scalp, came and delivered his message. chapter xxxv stormy council with the spokanes during the next few days the indians were gathering for the council. garry and a party of coeur d'alenes came on the 29th, and mcdonald with the colville chiefs, the missionaries, and four white miners on december 2. the council lasted three days, december 3, 4, 5, and was marked by disaffected and at times openly hostile views and expressions and uncertain purposes, on the part of the indians, and steadfast determination to hold their friendship and restrain them from war, on the part of the governor. the spokanes openly sympathized with the hostiles. many of their young braves had joined them. they insisted that no white troops should enter their country, and urged the governor to make peace with the yakimas, for the rumor was current that the troops had driven them across the columbia and into the region claimed by the spokanes. they objected to the whites taking up their land before they had made treaties and sold it, and were much stirred up because a number of hudson bay company ex-employees at colville had staked out claims, and filed with judge yantis the declaratory statements claiming them under the donation act. kam-i-ah-kan's emissaries had imbued them with all kinds of falsehoods concerning the war and its causes, and the purposes of the whites, particularly of governor stevens, and what he did and said at the walla walla council. they were to be driven by soldiers from their own country, and forced to go on the nez perce reservation without any treaty or compensation. they were to be deported west of the cascades, and shipped across seas to an unknown and dreadful doom. highly colored but imaginary stories of wrong and outrage inflicted by whites upon indians were industriously circulated, and equally mythical tales of indian victories and exploits. governor stevens met their excited and hostile talk with a firm and unruffled front. he appealed to the well-known facts,--to the policy he had uniformly and consistently urged upon them and upon all the tribes since first coming to the country, the policy of peace and friendship with the whites, and of adopting the civilization of the whites, and which had been proclaimed as from the housetops, and established by treaty at the walla walla council, in the presence and hearing of their own head chief, garry, and others of their number. he showed them how this policy was for their own benefit and protection, and referred to the blackfoot council, and the peace he had there established, of which the nez perce chiefs present could give them full particulars. he declared he was ready to make a treaty with them on the spot, if they desired one, but in the troubled state of affairs would not himself urge it. by this firm and conciliatory treatment he at length brought them to a more reasonable state of mind, and induced them to lay aside all thoughts of war and preserve their friendship with the whites. the results of this remarkable conference are graphically stated in his own words:- "we remained on the spokane nine days, and i had there one of the most stormy councils for three days that ever occurred in my whole indian experience; yet, having gone there with the most earnest desire to prevent their entering into the war, but with a firm determination to tell them plainly and candidly the truth, i succeeded both in convincing them of the facts and in gaining their entire confidence. at this council were all the chiefs and people of the coeur d'alenes and of the spokanes,--the very tribes who defeated steptoe the past season, the very tribes who have met our troops since in two pitched battles; and i feel that i can without impropriety refer to the success of my labors among these indians, backed up simply with a little party of twenty-four men. when the council was adjourned, the indians gave the best test of their friendship by each coming to lay before me his little wrongs, and ask redress. they came in a body, and offered me a force to help me through the hostilities of walla walla valley and on the banks of the columbia, which i declined, saying that i came not among the spokanes for their aid, but to protect them as their father." the spokanes preserved the friendship thus gained and confirmed, and abstained from all acts of hostility for two years after this council, and until colonel e.j. steptoe, against their warning and protest, entered their country with a force of two hundred dragoons. then they flew to arms, attacked, defeated, and drove him in precipitate retreat eighty miles to the bank of snake river, where his men were only saved from massacre by the friendly nez perces, who ferried them across the river in their canoes, and boldly interposed between them and the victorious spokanes. soon after reaching the spokane the governor was led to distrust looking glass from his changed demeanor and countenance, and set a faithful half-breed interpreter to keep watch of him. the spy saw him enter garry's lodge late at night, and, stealing up to and lying prone beside it, overheard the talk between the chiefs, in which looking glass disclosed a plot on his part to entrap the governor and his party when they went among the nez perces, and compel him to enlarge their reservation to the bounds first proposed by looking glass at the walla walla council, and to exact such other payments and advantages as amounted to a swingeing ransom. looking glass strongly advised garry to adopt a similar course, and both chiefs seemed bent upon using their advantages to the utmost. on receiving this alarming report the governor instantly, but secretly, dispatched a messenger to lapwai, informing craig of the plot, and instructing him how best to forestall and frustrate it by advising with lawyer, and committing the other chiefs to a firm adherence to the treaty and active support of the governor. thus forewarned, he was enabled to frustrate the designs of the treacherous chief without his suspecting that they had been discovered. the following extracts from the speeches show the excited and disaffected mood in which they entered the council. observe in garry's second speech his artful advice in aid of his friend looking glass's design to enlarge the reservation:- garry: "when i heard of the war, i had two hearts, and have had two hearts ever since. the bad heart was a little larger than the good. now i am thinking that if you do not make peace with the yakimas, war will come into this country like the waters of the sea. from the time of my first recollection, no blood has ever been on the hands of my people. now that i am grown up, i am afraid that we may have the blood of the whites on our hands.... "i hope that you will make peace on the other side of the columbia, and keep the soldiers from coming here. the americans and the yakimas are fighting. i think they are both equally guilty. if there were many frenchmen here, my heart would be like fighting. [meaning canadians, ex-employees of the hudson bay company.] these french people here have talked too much. i went to the walla walla council, and when i returned i found that all the frenchmen had gotten their land written down on a paper. [alluding to notifications under the donation act.] i ask them, why are you in such a hurry to have writings for your lands now? why don't you wait until a treaty is made? "governor, these troubles are on my mind all the time, and i will not hide them. when i was at the walla walla council my mind was divided. when you first commenced to speak, you said the walla wallas, cuyuses, and umatillas were to move on to the nez perce reservation, and the spokanes were to move there also. then i thought you spoke bad. then i thought, when you said that, that you would strike the indians to the heart. after you had spoken of these nine different things, as schools, and shops, and farms, if you had then asked the chiefs to mark out a piece of land--a pretty large piece--to give you, it would not have struck the indians so to the heart. your thought was good. you see far. but the indians, being dull-headed, cannot see far. now your children have fallen. they [the indians] have spilled their blood, because they have not sense enough to understand you. those who killed pu-pu-mox-mox's son in california, they were americans. why are those americans alive now? why are they not hanged? this is what the indians think, that it will be indians only who are hanged for murder. now, governor, here are these young people,--my people. i do not know their minds, but if they will listen to you, i shall be very glad. when you talk to your soldiers and tell them not to cross snake river into our country, i shall be glad." a principal chief of the lower spokanes said: "why is the country in difficulty again? that comes on account of the smallpox brought into the country, and is all the time on the indians' heart. they would keep thinking the whites brought sickness into the country to kill them. that is what has hurt the hearts of the yakimas. that is what we think has brought about this difficulty between the indians and the whites. i think, governor, you have talked a little too hard. it is as if you had thrown away all the indians. i heard you said at the walla walla council that we were children, and that our women and children and cattle should be for you, and then we thought we would never raise camp and move where you wished us to. we had in our hearts that if you tried to move us off we would die on our land." stellam, coeur d'alene head chief: "we have not yet made friends. all the indians are not yet your children. when i heard that war had commenced in the yakima country, i did not believe they had done well to commence. i wish you would speak and dry the blood on that land now. if you would do that, then i would take you for a friend. you have many soldiers, and i would not like to have them mix among my people." schlat-eal: "now the yakimas have crossed the columbia. i would not like to have the whites cross to this side. if the whites do not cross the river, the indians will all be pleased. we have not made friendship yet. we have not shaken hands yet. when we see that the soldiers don't cross the columbia, we shall believe you take us for your friends. when you stop that difficulty, the fighting now going on, we shall believe you intend to adopt us for your children. then i will believe that you have taken us for your friends, and will take you for my friend." peter john colville, chief: "my heart is very poor, very bad. my heart is of all nations. i never hide it. my heart is fearful. there are some who have talked bad. i am always thinking that all would be well. i wish all the whites and indians to be friendly; but even if my people should take up arms against the americans, i myself would not. i know we cannot stop the river from running, nor the wind from blowing, and i have heard that you whites are the same. we could not stop you. i only speak to show my heart. i am done." sno-ho-mish, a chief of the lower spokanes, near the columbia: "when you went away to the blackfoot country, and the yakimas commenced fighting, my heart was broken. ever since my heart is very small. ever since i have been thinking, how will the governor speak to us? and yesterday he did speak, and said to the indians, 'you must keep peace;' and i have been thinking what god would say if we should spill blood on our land. i never loved bad indians, nor war; i never believed in making war against americans. i wish they would stop all the whites and indians from fighting. now i will stop. i have shown my heart." big star, spokane chief: "the reason that i am talking now is that all the indians did not like what you said at the walla walla council. they put all the blame on you for the trouble since. the indians say you are the cause of the war. my heart is very small towards you. my heart is the same as the others for you. ever since i heard there was war, i was afraid for you. i am afraid you will be killed. you have not yet made a treaty, and you passed by us, and your people have commenced coming,--the miners,--and they will upset my land. this spring, when my people commenced talking about the ammunition, i said, 'my children, do not listen to my children who wish to do wrong.' i said to the sun chief, 'what is the reason you are getting into trouble? your father was good. now he is killed by the blackfeet.' and this summer when the governor passed here, i spoke to him again, and he would not listen. that is why my heart is small,--that young man would not listen. i left home and went to the nez perces, and there met mr. mcdonald. after crossing the columbia river those two young fellows overtook me. i spoke to mr. mcdonald to give me good advice to help my children. he did speak, and i thought he gave me good help. i was glad. we had not yet arrived at the fort when that young man [a young spokane] rushed on the whites and choked them. after mcdonald and myself had talked to them, i thought they would listen. if i had not tried to make them do right, it would not have hurt my feelings so much. since that, i am crying all the time." quin-quim-moe-so, spokane chief, living at eells's old mission: "when i heard, governor, what you had said at the walla walla ground, i thought you had done well. but one thing you said was not right. you alone arranged the indian's land. the indians did not speak. then you struck the indians to the heart. you thought they were only indians. that is why you did it. i am not a big chief, but i will not hide my mind. i will not talk low. i wish you to hear what i am saying. that is the reason, governor; it is all your fault the indians are at war. it is your fault, because you have said that the cuyuses and walla wallas will be moved to the yakima land. they who owned the land did not speak, and yet you divided the land." garry: "when you look at those red men, you think you have more heart, more sense, than these poor indians. i think the difference between us and you americans is in the clothing,--the blood and body are the same. do you think, because your mother was white and theirs black, that you are higher or better? we are black, yet if we cut ourselves the blood will be red, and so with the whites it is the same, though their skin is white. i do not think we are poor because we belong to another nation. if you take those indians for men, treat them so now. if you talk to the indians to make a peace, the indians will do the same to you. you see now the indians are proud. on account of one of your remarks, some of your people have already fallen to the ground. the indians are not satisfied with the land you gave them. what commenced the trouble was the murder of pu-pu-mox-mox's son and dr. whitman, and _now_ they find their reservations too small. if all those indians had marked out their own reservations, the trouble would not have happened. if you could get their reservations made a little larger, they would be pleased. if i had the business to do, i could fix it by giving them a little more land. talking about land, i am only speaking my mind. what i was saying yesterday about not crossing the soldiers to this side of the columbia is my business. those indians have gone to war, and i don't know myself how to fix it up. that is your business. since, governor, the beginning of the world, there has been war. why cannot you manage to keep peace? maybe there will be no peace ever. even if you should hang all the bad people, war would begin again, and would never stop." in these speeches can be seen the reflection of the tales spread by the yakima emissaries. it was afterwards learned that some of the yakimas had really crossed the columbia to avoid an expedition into the yakima valley, under major rains with a force of regulars, and colonel j.w. nesmith with a detachment of oregon volunteers, which proved abortive, except in the loss of many of the horses and mules belonging to the regulars, which were run off by the hostile yakimas. [illustration: spokane garry _head chief of the spokanes_] after the council the indians were so friendly and well disposed that they readily exchanged their fine, fresh horses for the jaded and tired animals of the party and the indian goods, which had been brought up for the now deferred treaty, and even sold several rifles, which were used to arm the spokane invincibles. on the afternoon of the 6th, with transportation reduced to twelve days' supplies, packs to eighty pounds, the best train of the season, and the party, with the recent accessions, forty-eight strong, the governor struck out for the nez perce country, "in condition," he says, "that if the nez perces were really hostile, and i was not strong enough to fight, i could make a good run!" he moved three miles to the spokane river, crossed it just above the falls, and encamped on the site of the present city of that name. the march thence to the clearwater and lapwai, a distance of one hundred and eight miles, occupied four days, and was made in the midst of a driving and continuous storm of cold rain, sleet, and snow, wetting and chilling every one to the bone. the trail was excessively muddy and slippery, and for half a day's travel the snow was ten inches deep. on the second day an express from craig brought the cheering news that the nez perces were faithful, and the whole tribe ready to support the governor to the death. and on reaching camp the same day two frenchmen or canadians were met making their way from walla walla to the spokane, who reported the valley overrun with hostile indians, the settlers killed or driven below, and their stock swept off by the savages. fifty miles from the spokane they struck the same trail passed over in june on the way to the coeur d'alene, and pursued it for twenty miles, crossing the palouse, where an enemy was most likely to be encountered, but no indians were seen. the clearwater, or kooskooskia, was crossed just above the mouth of the lapwai. the river was barely fordable, with a powerful current and rocky bottom, and two riding horses were swept off their feet into deep water and drowned, making no effort to swim, benumbed in the icy water, and their riders barely escaped a similar fate. moving seven miles up the lapwai, craig's hospitable house, and the end of this severe march, the most comfortless and trying of the whole trip, was reached, and camp gladly made on the 11th. chapter xxxvi the faithful nez perces although it was now in the midst of winter, and the ground was covered with snow, lawyer had assembled two hundred and eight lodges, containing over two thousand indians, and able to muster eight hundred warriors. an animated council was at once held. the council lodge was a hundred feet in length, built of poles, mats, and skins, and in this assembled two hundred chiefs and principal men, lawyer presiding. an ox had been killed, and young men, who officiated for the occasion, roasted or boiled the meat at fires in the lodge, and handed it around in large pans, from which each person selected such choice pieces as suited his fancy. the scheme of looking glass found no adherent, indeed was not broached, and the unanimous resolve was not only to maintain their friendship to the whites and stand by their treaty, but to escort governor stevens with two hundred and fifty of their bravest and best-armed warriors, stark buffalo hunters and blackfoot fighters every one, and force their way through the masses of hostile indians gathered in the walla walla valley. looking glass, too, was among the first in his professions of friendship. jealousy of lawyer, and the hope of increasing his own influence among his people by obtaining great and exceptional advantages for them, were probably the causes of his unworthy plot, rather than actual enmity to the whites. said looking glass: "i told the governor that the walla walla country was blocked up by bad indians, and that i would go ahead and he behind, and that's my heart now. now that he says he will go, i will get up and go with him. now let none of you turn your face from what has been said. your old men have spoken, and where is the man will turn his back on it?" three feathers: "why don't you get up and say you are all going with governor stevens? we said before coming here they should go over our dead bodies before coming to him. that is our hearts now." and chief after chief spoke in similar vein. red wolf in his speech said: "i was on the spokane at the council held there by the indians last summer, when runners sent by kam-i-ah-kan came there to get all the people to go to war." scotum declared: "the chief pu-pu-mox-mox sent us word, and so did the cuyuses; they sent us word many times, but we have always turned our faces from them and kept the laws." here was evidence that the treacherous chiefs were inciting hostilities immediately after signing the treaties. at this juncture an indian runner was announced from the walla walla valley with the important news that a force of five hundred oregon volunteers, under colonel kelly (late united states senator), after a severe battle of four days' duration, had defeated the hostiles, and driven them from the valley. the absence of the palouse indians during the forced march through their country was now explained. they were fighting the volunteers at that very time. the way being thus opened, governor stevens was enabled to dispense with the proffered aid of the nez perces; but in order to confirm their fidelity and good feeling, he invited a hundred warriors to accompany his party as a guard of honor as far as the walla walla valley. it was a clear, bright, frosty december morning that the mingled cavalcade of white and indian left behind the hospitable lodges of the nez perces, and filed along the banks of the lapwai and kooskooskia. rarely has the clearwater reflected a more picturesque or jovial crew. here were the gentlemen of the party, with their black felt hats and heavy cloth overcoats; rough-clad miners and packers; the mountain men, with buckskin shirts and leggings and fur caps; the long-eared pack-mules, with their bulky loads; and the blanketed young braves, with painted visage, and hair adorned with eagle feathers, mounted on sleek and spirited mustangs, and dashing hither and thither in the greatest excitement and glee. each of the warriors had three fine, spirited horses, which he rode in turn as the fancy moved him. they used buckskin pads, or wooden saddles covered with buffalo, bear, or mountain-goat skin. the bridle was a simple line of buffalo hair tied around the lower jaw of the steed, which yielded implicit obedience to this scanty headgear. at a halt the long end of the line is flung loosely on the ground, and the horse is trained to stand without other fastening. the whole party were ferried across snake river by the indians in their canoes, the animals swimming. proceeding down the left bank some distance as the trail to walla walla ran, it was found that the nez perces had wholly vacated that side of the river, and removed with their bands of horses, goods, and lodges, and especially their canoes, to the other side, in order to cut off intercourse with the hostile indians. the demeanor of the young braves on this march was in marked contrast to the traditional gravity and stoicism of their race. they shouted, laughed, told stories, cracked jokes, and gave free vent to their native gayety and high spirits. craig, who accompanied the party, translated these good things as they occurred, to the great amusement of the whites. crossing a wide, flat plain, covered with tall rye grass, he related an anecdote of lawyer, with the reminiscence of which the young braves seemed particularly tickled. when yet an obscure young warrior, lawyer was traveling over this ground with a party of the tribe, including several of the principal chiefs. it was a cold winter day, and a biting gale swept up the river, penetrating their clothing and chilling them to the bone. the chiefs sat down in the shelter of the tall rye grass, and were indulging in a cosy smoke, when lawyer fired the prairie far to windward, and in an instant the fiery element, in a long, crackling, blazing line, came sweeping down on the wings of the wind upon the comfort-taking chiefs, and drove them to rush helter-skelter into the river for safety, dropping robes, pipes, and everything that might impede their flight. for this audacious prank lawyer barely escaped a public whipping. at the governor's request, the indians undertook to guard the horses while the whites guarded the camp at night, and as the country was still infested with bands of hostiles, who had burned off nearly all the grass, and the animals were with difficulty prevented from straying far and wide in search of feed, it will be readily seen that they had chosen the more arduous task. every evening, as the young men would linger around the camp-fires, reluctant to start out upon the cold and dreary night work, one or more of the chiefs would exhort them to their duty, bemoan the degeneracy of the present race, and relate instances of the superior bravery and fortitude of young men in former times. the young fellows were not slow to retort to these harangues with many a sarcastic gibe and jest, but finally they would go forth to spend the cold winter night upon the exposed prairie on horseback, posted around the band of animals. so faithfully did they perform this duty that not one was lost during the march. it was a gala day for the nez perces when the party reached the valley, and were received by the oregon volunteers with a military parade and a salute of musketry; and when governor stevens dismissed them with presents and thanks and words of encouragement, they returned home the most devoted and enthusiastic auxiliaries that ever marched in behalf of the whites. on this march the nez perce escort captured a strange indian on al-pa-wha creek, who proved to be the son of ume-how-lish, the war chief of the cuyuses, and who said that the chief, with one follower and a number of women, was in hiding farther up the creek, having fled from the valley the last day of the recent fight. the governor sent the young man to his father with the summons to surrender himself a prisoner. the next day ume-how-lish delivered himself up, saying that he had done nothing bad, and was not afraid to be tried by the white man's law, and thereafter traveled along with the party to his uncertain fate with true indian stoicism. he accompanied the governor to the dalles, where he was turned over to the oregon authorities. he was afterwards released by colonel wright. there was no evidence that he had taken part in the murder of settlers, although he had undoubtedly fought in the recent battle. the valley was reached on the 20th. major chinn, commanding the volunteers, and other officers rode out to meet the governor, and, on reaching the volunteer camp, the troops, four hundred in number, paraded, and fired a volley in salute as the picturesque column marched past, the fifty sturdy, travel-stained whites in advance, followed by the hundred proud and flaunting braves, curveting their horses and uttering their war-whoops. the volunteers then formed in hollow square, and the governor addressed them in a brief speech, complimenting them on their energy in pushing forward at that inclement season, and gallantry in engaging and routing a superior force of the enemy, and tendering the thanks of his party for opening the road. he seized the occasion also to dwell upon the advantages--the necessity--of a winter campaign to bring the war to a speedy end. the governor was the first to grasp this idea of a winter campaign as the most effective method of reducing hostile indians to subjection. as will be seen hereafter, he urged this course upon general wool and the military authorities, but only to have his views denounced and ridiculed as "impracticable;" but finally, under the stern lessons of experience, they had to be adopted. it was only by winter campaigns that general crook succeeded in subduing the snakes of idaho and eastern oregon in 1868-69. over a hundred of the cuyuses and walla wallas refused to join their kindred in the war, and remained friendly, including steachus, tin-tim-meet-see, and how-lish-wam-poo, and were now encamped on mill creek under the protection of a guard, needed unhappily not less against a few of the unruly volunteers, who had already killed some of their cattle, than against apprehended raids by the hostiles. the little flock of indians under the ministrations of father chirouse of the catholic mission also remained friendly, thanks to the good influence of the fathers. [illustration: ume-how-lish _war chief of the cuyuses_] colonel frank shaw was found with the volunteers, and from him and the oregon officers the governor learned the latest news and the condition of affairs. the fight had been a severe one. the indians resisted stoutly for four days, and only gave way at last because they mistook a large pack-train, seen descending into the valley, for reinforcements to the whites. pu-pu-mox-mox had been captured, and slain attempting to escape. general wool had arrived at vancouver, but had refused to take active measures against the enemy, assuming that the indians were not at fault, but that the war had been gotten up by white speculators. he had even disbanded two companies of washington volunteers at vancouver after they had been actually mustered into the united states service. and a company that had been raised under the direction of shaw, for the express purpose of going to the assistance of the governor, was dismissed by wool in spite of the remonstrances of its officers and of major rains. the first act of the governor after grasping the situation was to indite a letter to wool announcing his safe return, and suggesting the energetic and aggressive military measures by which the outbreak could be speedily quelled. some of the fruits of the delay in holding the blackfoot council, caused by the mulish and incapable cumming, were now apparent. had it been held early in august, as it might and should have been, the governor would have gotten back early in september, in time to cope with the first outbreak, to infuse the military authorities with a little of his own sound judgment and energy, to induce harmony and concert of action between the regular and volunteer forces, possibly to remove even wool's prejudiced and utterly wrong views, certainly in time to prevent the volunteers of his own territory from being paralyzed in action, and rendered worse than useless. but he was delayed, and in his absence bitter prejudice and divided councils ruled the hour, and the war, which should have been brought to an end in a single season by a few quick, strong blows, was suffered to drag on for years. after the reception by the volunteers the train moved up the walla walla to a point opposite the mission and went into camp, where it remained the next three days. the weather grew intensely cold, the glass ranging 27° below zero; nevertheless, the governor kept the officers at work gathering information concerning trails, crossings of rivers, etc., with a view to military operations, and had a conference with major chinn as to pushing against the indians beyond snake river; but it appeared that the lack of rations and transportation rendered an advance impracticable, and of course no move could be made while the severe weather continued. on the 24th the camp was moved four miles farther upstream to a more sheltered spot, with plenty of wood, and where there was a deserted house, which the governor and the officers occupied. the cold weather continued unabated for fourteen days. the men had all they could do to keep the fires going and avoid freezing, and many of the horses in the volunteer camp were frozen to death. although the ground was covered with snow, the animals found grass enough projecting above it, or by pawing it off, to avoid starvation. herds of cattle, abandoned by the indians in their flight, grazed within sight of camp, and were driven in and slaughtered as needed, and great flocks of prairie-chickens roosted in the trees about camp, so there was no lack of food. on the 29th the governor dismissed the nez perce escort, who were to return home under craig as soon as the cold abated, thanking them for their fidelity and services, and charging them to stay on their own side of snake river, and shun intercourse with the hostiles. the friendly cuyuse, steachus, attended this conference, very desirous of joining the nez perces and moving into their country, and asking permission to do so. "i am really afraid of those whites, those volunteers," said he. the nez perce chiefs strongly supported him in his request. said spotted eagle: "i am glad to hear those indians ask to go with us. it looks as if they wished to live and do right when they talk of joining the nez perces." but the governor, after considering the matter for a day, denied the request, for the reason that he feared that the disaffected and hostile kindred of these friendly cuyuses would be constantly visiting them, and would exert a bad influence upon the nez perces, whom he wished to keep entirely aloof from the hostiles. on the last day of the year, the cold weather continuing with unmitigated severity, the governor decided to hasten below in advance of the train, deeming his presence imperatively required within the settlements on puget sound, and issued general orders directing colonel doty to move the train to the dalles as soon as the weather permitted, and there muster out the stevens guards and spokane invincibles, constituting the walla walla battalion, appointing craig lieutenant and aide-de-camp, and instructing him as to marching home and disbanding the nez perce allies, and taking measures for protecting that tribe against hostile raids or attempts, and assigning colonel shaw of the territorial militia to take charge of matters in the valley, organize the settlers and friendly indians as a military force, to act as their own guards at least, and appointing sidney s. ford and green mccafferty captain and lieutenant of volunteers respectively as his assistants, and finally returning thanks to the battalion "for the alacrity with which they have obeyed his orders and discharged their duty, for their constancy and manliness in the rapid movement which they made from the spokane to this valley in bad weather and in an inclement season, a movement begun and half accomplished with the certain knowledge that a large force of hostile indians were to be met in this valley, and no expectation that aid was near at hand and would be extended in season. "but aid was at hand, and the commander-in-chief would do injustice to his own feelings, and those of the men of his immediate command, if in the general order he did not acknowledge the services of the gallant volunteers of oregon, who successfully met in arms in this valley the combined forces of the hostile indians at the time he was moving from the spokane to the nez perce country." on new year's day, 1856, governor stevens started for the dalles, accompanied only by his son, pearson, robie, the nez perce chief, captain john, and the captive ume-how-lish, and reached that point in three days and a half. the intense cold continued unabated. every morning the little party saddled in the darkness and started at daylight without breakfast, pushed their horses at a speed of ten miles an hour for about six hours, making about sixty miles, and made camp early in the afternoon, giving the horses several hours to graze before dark, and themselves plenty of time to gather wood, build up a rousing fire, and cook and eat a tremendous meal, breakfast, dinner, and supper in one; then early to bed, sound slumbers, and off again at daylight. all the streams were crossed on the ice until the des chutes river was reached. here was found a great gorge of broken ice twenty feet deep, through the centre of which the rapid and powerful stream had torn its way, a hundred yards wide, bordered by perpendicular walls of ice. carefully leading their horses over the broken ice masses, they reached the usual fording-place, only to find the dark, swirling river sweeping past twenty feet below them at the foot of this perpendicular and impassable icy cliff, while a similar obstacle stared at them from the other side of the river, and barred exit from the stream even should its passage be accomplished. but, nothing daunted, all set to work with stakes and knives, and at length broke down a barely passable path to the ford. captain john now led the way across, the water coming to the saddle-skirts; a practicable passage out was found, and all felt much relieved as they again spurred on. resting one day at the dalles, and accompanied only by his son and a guide, the governor continued his journey by the trail down the oregon side of the columbia. it was a little-used track, barely passable, or indeed visible, in many places, jammed between the river and the foot of the great mountain masses and precipices which overhang that mighty and sublime gorge. although the severe cold had abated, considerable snow had fallen, greatly increasing the dangers of the way; but he reached the lower cascades without mishap, and crossed to the washington side late in the evening of the second day, spending the intermediate night at hood river, at the house of mr. coe. the next day he continued by land, passing in rear of cape horn, and reached a landing on the columbia, six miles above vancouver, soon after dark. here a ship's long-boat, a stout, staunch craft, with a good sail, was obtained, with a crew of three sturdy fellows. on getting well out in the river away from land, a terrific gale came tearing downstream, struck the boat, and drove her on at great speed. the sail was quickly reefed, but the little craft careened to the gunwale; the waves broke over her; only incessant bailing kept her afloat. the dark night, the tumultuous waves, the howling gale, the open boat tearing along with the helmsman braced against the tiller, the bailer dipping the water overboard with furious haste, and the rest of the party clinging to the upper rail with clenched grasp and tense faces, can never be forgotten by one who witnessed the scene. vancouver was reached in twenty-six minutes from starting, and all landed with a strong feeling of relief at having escaped a watery grave. the governor again endeavored to communicate with general wool, and hastened to portland to see him, but he had left on the steamer for san francisco only the day before. the journey up the cowlitz in canoe and across the muddy road to olympia was made in three days, without special incident to vary the monotony of toil and discomfort ever attending it at that season, and on january 19, after an absence of nearly nine months, the governor reached olympia, and found himself once more at home with his family. during the governor's absence mrs. stevens, with her little girls and the nurse ellen, spent several weeks on whitby island, at the home of a family named crockett, in hopes that the stronger sea air of that locality would overcome the panama fever, from which they were still suffering. the crocketts were hearty and kindly kentucky farmer folks of the best type, and received the sick lady and her children with warm-hearted hospitality and kindness. mrs. stevens with the children used frequently to bathe in the sound, and on one occasion, as they were in the water, a band of northern indians was observed approaching in their great war-canoes at rapid speed. mr. crockett hastened to the beach in great apprehension and hurried the bathers to the house, declaring that the predatory savages would be sure to seize and carry them off, if they were given an opportunity. under the invigorating open-air life on the island and the excellent fare, with abundance of venison and other game, the family rapidly regained health, and after their visit returned in canoes to olympia. mrs. stevens afterward visited the military post at steilacoom, and the wives of the officers there visited her in olympia, and it was at her house that mrs. slaughter received news of the death of her husband, lieutenant w.a. slaughter, who was killed by the indians, december 5. several times, after the war broke out, circumstantial and apparently trustworthy reports were brought of the massacre of the governor and his party by the indians, all of which mrs. stevens utterly disbelieved. she scouted even more decidedly the idea that he would return by way of the missouri and isthmus of panama, which his friends were so strongly urging him to do, and declared to them that he would certainly come back by the direct route, no matter what obstacles might intervene. chapter xxxvii prostration.--the rescue when governor stevens, after his midwinter forced march across the mountains, reached olympia, he found the whole country utterly prostrated, overwhelmed. the settlers in dismay had abandoned their farms and fled for refuge to the few small villages. they were all poor, having no reserves of money, food, or supplies, and starvation stared them in the face if prevented from planting and raising a crop. the only military post on puget sound, fort steilacoom, could muster less than a hundred soldiers, and was so far from protecting the settlers that it had called for and received the reinforcement of a company of volunteers for its own protection. the post at vancouver was also but a handful in strength, and had also been reinforced by two companies of volunteers. but even this pitiful force was not to be used against the savage enemy; for wool had just gone back to san francisco after a flying visit to the columbia river, during which he had disbanded the volunteer companies, refused to take any active measures to protect the people, and loudly proclaimed, both in official reports and through the press, that the war had been forced upon the indians by the greed and brutality of the whites, and that the former would be peaceful if only let alone and not treated with injustice. there was a deficiency of arms, and still more of ammunition, in the country. six weeks were required to send a letter to washington city, and three months before an answer to the most urgent demand or entreaty could be received. it was no wonder that the pioneers were universally discouraged, and that nothing kept many of them from abandoning the country but their absolute inability to get away.[10] a brief review of the outbreak and course of the war will make clearer the situation at this juncture. scarcely was the ink dry upon his signature to the walla walla treaty, when kam-i-ah-kan, the leading and most potent spirit, and his yakimas were hard at work inciting an outbreak against the whites. they with the cuyuse and walla walla chiefs assembled the disaffected indians, and many of the others, at a council north of snake river in the summer, and made every effort to gain over the spokanes, coeur d'alenes, and even some of the nez perces, who had intermarried with the cuyuses, and not without success among the young braves. their emissaries stirred up the tribes on the eastern shore of the sound, too, the nisquallies, puyallups, and duwhamish, who had intermarried to some extent with the yakimas, and penetrated even to gray's harbor and shoalwater bay on the coast, and to southern oregon. every falsehood that indian ingenuity could invent, or credulity swallow, was employed to fire the indian heart. the conspiracy was in full train, but not yet ripe, when the outbreak was prematurely begun by the murder of the miners in the yakima valley in september, by kam-i-ah-kan's warriors, who could no longer be held back; and when agent bolon visited the tribe to investigate the matter, he was treacherously shot in the back, seized and his throat cut, and with his horse burned to ashes, september 23. qualchen, the son of ou-hi and nephew of kam-i-ah-kan, was the chief actor in this tragedy. major haller marched with a hundred men from the dalles into the yakima valley to demand the surrender of or to punish the murderers; and lieutenant w.a. slaughter, with a small force of forty men, moved from steilacoom across the nahchess pass to the yakima to coöperate with haller. but the yakimas attacked the latter october 6, and compelled him to retreat with the loss of twenty-two killed and wounded, his howitzer, and baggage. pu-pu-mox-mox then seized and plundered old fort walla walla, which had no garrison, and distributed the goods found there, including a considerable supply of indian goods, among his followers, who danced the war-dance in front of his lodge around a fresh white scalp. these indians, with the cuyuses and umatillas, then drove the settlers out of the walla walla valley, destroyed their houses and improvements, and killed or ran off the stock. lieutenant slaughter, after crossing the summit of the cascades, being unable to learn anything of haller, hastily but wisely fell back to the western side. here captain m. maloney joined him with seventy regulars and a company of volunteers, under captain gilmore hays, and again advanced across the mountains, but in turn retreated, fearing to leave the settlements on puget sound wholly unprotected; but his messengers were waylaid and slain by the sound indians, and the settlers on white or duwhamish river, near seattle, were massacred with unspeakable atrocity, the bodies of the women and children being thrown into the wells. these settlers had taken refuge in seattle, but were induced to go back to their farms by the friendly professions and assurances of the very savages who fell upon and butchered them the night after their return. and settlers on the nisqually and at other points met a similar fate. at major rains's request, acting-governor mason called out two companies of volunteers, which were mustered into the united states service, one being used to reinforce fort steilacoom, and one the vancouver post. a company was also raised at vancouver for the express purpose of going to the assistance of governor stevens, in case he attempted to force his way through the hostiles. in november an engagement took place on white river, in which some loss was inflicted upon the indians, but they soon reappeared in undiminished strength, surrounded the troops at night, and captured a number of baggage animals, and on december 5 killed lieutenant slaughter and two men, and wounded six others. several more companies of volunteers were raised for home defense, and efforts were made to separate the friendly indians from the hostiles. acting-governor mason did all that was possible to meet the crisis, and he was ably seconded by major tilton, whom he appointed adjutant-general, and by colonel simmons, but the storm was too great for their efforts. moreover, they depended upon the regular officers to conduct the war, which made wool's action doubly paralyzing. the whole region about the sound, with the exception of the prairies scattered about the head of it, was covered with the primeval evergreen forest and a dense and tangled undergrowth, so thick and matted, and obstructed by immense fallen giants and downfalls of every kind, that the most energetic hunter or woodsman could traverse through it only five or six miles a day. there were also numerous river-bottoms and swamps, even more impenetrable. only seventy miles back to the eastward stretched north and south the great cascade range, affording innumerable safe and hidden retreats; and many trails across it, well known to the indians, but unknown to the whites, gave access to the yakima emissaries and reinforcements to join the hostiles on the sound, and furnished the latter the ready means of retreat to the yakima country when hard pressed. in the dense forests and swamps the savages lurked at the very doors of the settlements, and no man ventured out, for fear of ambush by the wily and omnipresent foe. after haller's defeat major g.j. rains led an expedition from the dalles to the yakima valley with three hundred and fifty regulars and two companies of washington volunteers, under captains william strong and robert newell, and was supported by four companies of oregon volunteers, under colonel j.w. nesmith. he reached the catholic mission on the ah-tah-nam branch of the yakima, which was found deserted, and destroyed it, and then returned to the dalles, having accomplished nothing except the breaking down of his animals. the yakimas, avoiding battle with so large a force, managed to run off fifty-four of his mules and horses, and immediately their young braves rode post-haste to the neighboring tribes, proclaiming victory over the troops, and proudly showing the captured animals with the united states brand on their shoulders in proof of their success. another force of about five hundred oregon volunteers, under colonel james k. kelly, marched to the walla walla valley and defeated the hostiles there congregated, which opened the road to governor stevens, as already related. but the indians, although punished, simply fled across snake river, and were free to continue their efforts to stir up the friendly tribes, for the volunteers, from lack of supplies and transportation, were unable to pursue them. the oregon volunteers were not mustered into the united states service, because both they and governor curry were anxious to strike the indians, and justly feared that if placed under the orders of regular officers, they would be held back or placed in garrison. in december general wool came up from san francisco to vancouver, mustered out the washington volunteers, placed the regulars at the dalles, vancouver, and steilacoom strictly on the defensive, and denounced in unmeasured terms the brave oregon volunteers, who had struck the only real blow inflicted upon the enemy. he disbanded even the company specially raised for governor stevens's relief, notwithstanding the remonstrances of its captain, of major rains, and of his own aide-de-camp, lieutenant richard arnold. thus, at the beginning of the year 1856, the indians of the upper country held the whole region, except the point occupied in the walla walla valley by the oregon volunteers; the yakimas were more hostile, active, and triumphant than ever; the cuyuses, walla wallas, and umatillas were made more embittered and defiant by the punishment they had received; and all were free to instigate more hostility among the other tribes, which they were industriously doing. the regulars were on the defensive by wool's orders, while the volunteers in the valley were unable to take the aggressive for lack of supplies. west of the cascades the indians infested and held the whole country except a few points. the whites were virtually in a state of siege, deserted and maligned by a veteran officer, whose duty it was to protect them; not knowing where to find succor, or even food, completely discouraged and dismayed. the great majority of indians on the sound had not yet taken to the war-path, although much disaffected. even among the most hostile, the nisquallies, puyallups, and duwhamish, it is doubtful if a majority of any tribe took active part in the outbreak; but the war faction comprised the chiefs and the vigorous young warriors, and they were constantly stimulated and encouraged, and at times largely reinforced, by their yakima kinsmen. the hostile warriors on the sound probably varied in numbers from two hundred and fifty to five hundred, but the swamps and forests, with their knowledge of the country, gave them every advantage. the great danger was that the other indians, already disaffected, and many of whose restless young braves were aiding the hostiles to an extent which cannot be certainly determined, would openly join in the outbreak, and this danger was aggravated by every day's delay on the part of the whites in attacking and striking the enemy. a defensive policy was sure to throw the whole indian population into the arms of the hostiles. an additional and imminent danger was found in the northern indians, gangs of whom were prowling about the sound, ever ripe for murder and plunder. the first day after his arrival governor stevens delivered in person and orally a special message to the legislature, then in session. he pointed out how the donation act and the advent of settlers had made it absolutely necessary to treat with the indian tribes and extinguish their title to the soil. he showed how this had been accomplished by the treaties he had made, and described the care taken to deal with the indians justly and understandingly, especially at the walla walla council:- "the greatest care was taken to explain the treaties, and the objects of them, and to secure the most faithful interpreters. three interpreters were provided for each language. the record of that council was made up by intelligent and dispassionate men, and the speeches of all there made are recorded verbatim. the dignity, humanity, and justice of the national government are there signally exhibited, and none of the actors therein need fear the criticism of an intelligent community, nor the supervision of intelligent superiors. by these treaties, had the indians been faithful to them, the question as to whether the indian tribes of this territory can become civilized and christianized would have been determined practically. the written record will show that the authorities and the people of this territory have nothing to blush for, nothing to fear in the judgment of impartial men now living, nor the rebuke of posterity. it was a pleasant feeling that actuated me, on my mission in making these treaties, to think i was doing something to civilize and to render the condition of the indian happier.... "the war has been plotting for two or three years,--a war entered into by these indians without a cause; a war having not its origin in these treaties, nor in the bad conduct of the whites. it originated in the native intelligence of restless indians, who, foreseeing destiny against them,--that the white man was moving upon them,--determined that it must be met and resisted by arms. we may sympathize with such a manly feeling, but in view of it we have high duties. "the war must be vigorously prosecuted now. seedtime is coming, and the farmer should be at his plough in the field. in my judgment, it would be expedient forthwith to raise a force of three hundred men from the sound to push into the indian country, build a depot, and vigorously operate against the indians in this quarter, and nearly the same force should be raised on the columbia river to prosecute the war east of the cascade mountains. it would prevent reinforcements from either side joining the bands of the other side, and would effectually crush both. but what is more important would be the influence upon the numerous tribes not yet broken out into hostility. there is a surprising feeling of uneasiness among all the tribes who have not broken out, except alone the nez perces. these tribes may be led into war, if delay attends our operations. the indians must be struck now. but if we delay, in a few months the roots and fish will abound, supplying the indians with food; the snows will melt; and the mountain passes will allow them hiding-places. it is my opinion that if operations are deferred till summer, they must be deferred till winter again. "what effect would it have on the sound should nothing be done until may or june? the whole industrial community would be ruined, the sound paralyzed; the husbandman would be kept in a state of suspense by rumors of wars, and could not adhere to his pursuits; fields would not be tilled; and the territory would starve out." while approving as a general rule the mustering into the united states service of volunteers, and disclaiming any impugning of wool's motives, he advised against mustering them into that service, in consequence of that officer's "disbanding troops in violation of a positive understanding," and boldly declared:- "i am ready to take the responsibility of raising them independent of that service, and it is due to the territory and myself that the reasons for assuming it should go to the president and the department at washington. "the spirit of prosecuting this war should be to accomplish a lasting peace,--not to make treaties, but to punish their violation. while justice and mercy should characterize the acts of our government, there should be no weakness, no imbecility. the tribes now at war must submit unconditionally to the justice, mercy, and leniency of our government. the guilty ones should suffer, and the remainder be placed on reservations under the eye of the military. by such a decisive, energetic, and firm course the difficulty may be grappled with, and peace restored. "let not our hearts be discouraged. i have an abiding confidence in the future destiny of our territory. gloom must give way to sunlight. let us never lose sight of the resources, capacities, and natural advantages of the territory of washington. gather heart, then, fellow citizens. do not now talk of leaving us in our hour of adversity, but stay till the shade of gloom is lifted, and await that destiny to be fulfilled. let us all put hands together and rescue the territory from its present difficulties, so that we may all feel that we have done our whole duty in the present exigency." to this manly and clear-sighted appeal the legislature made haste to respond with the alacrity and heartfelt sense of relief, and renewal of hope and courage, with which men in the extremity of danger ever turn to a natural leader, and, so far as lay in its power, gave him unlimited authority to take measures necessary to save the settlements from extinction. forthwith governor stevens adopted and put in force, with all the energy of his determined and vigorous nature, the following measures:-1. he called upon the people by proclamation, dated january 22, to raise a thousand volunteers for six months for offensive operations against the enemy, wherever they might be ordered. he refused to enlist any troops for local or home defense or short terms, and summarily disbanded all the companies which were under arms, they having been raised for such restricted service. 2. he called upon the settlers, wherever three or four families could join together, to return to their abandoned farms, build blockhouses, and hold and cultivate the soil. 3. he required all indians on the eastern side of the sound to move to, and remain upon, reservations selected on islands, or on points on the western shore, under the care and oversight of agents, there to be fed and protected by the government while the war lasted. any indian found on the eastern side without permission of his agent was to be deemed hostile. 4. he sent secretary mason to washington to lay the pressing need of funds to meet the expenses of feeding and caring for the non-hostile indians before the government, and to enlighten it as to the war and general situation. 5. he made effective use of the friendly indians in scouting operations against the hostiles, hunting them down in their retreats, and confirming the fidelity of the doubtful tribes. 6. he sent agents to portland, san francisco, and victoria, b.c., with urgent appeals for arms, ammunition, and supplies, and published his appeal in the san francisco papers. 7. he issued territorial scrip, or certificates of indebtedness, to defray the pay of volunteers and cost of munitions and supplies. 8. he freely resorted to impressment or seizure of supplies, teams, etc., whenever necessary. 9. he appealed to the patriotism and good feeling of the volunteers, but enforced discipline, and punished misconduct by summary and dishonorable dismissal of the guilty from the service. it is only by bearing in mind the facts that the entire white population numbered only four thousand souls, of whom the males fit to bear arms barely equaled the number of volunteers called for; that they were destitute of arms, ammunition, supplies, money, and credit; discouraged and wholly on the defensive; denied protection by the regular troops, who indeed were too few to afford it; and all hope of support and sympathy from the government, or from outside, blasted by the denunciations of wool,--that one can really appreciate the courage and self-reliance of governor stevens in undertaking the task before him. the ability and self-devotion with which he successfully accomplished it, and the remarkable spirit and patriotism of the people, who sustained their leader, and loyally and patiently submitted to these stringent measures, furnish one of the brightest pages in the history of the republic. the day after delivering his message, the second after arriving home, the governor hastened down the sound to inspect the reservations and agents, and perfect measures to enforce the removal of the indians from the theatre of war. he visited every point of importance on the eastern side, informed himself thoroughly of the needs and conditions at each, and returned to olympia on the 28th. on this trip he secured the aid of pat-ka-nim, head chief of the snohomish, and a force of his warriors, the first indian auxiliaries to take the field. the indians attacked seattle on january 26 in force, destroyed the larger part of the town, driving the whites to one corner of it, and were only repulsed in the end by the fire of the united states man-of-war decatur, captain g. gansevoort. the people responded instantly to the governor's manly appeal, with true american spirit and patriotism. they made haste to enlist _en masse_ in the volunteer companies, eager to be led against the savage foe. the refugee settlers banded together in small squads, returned to the country, erected blockhouses at or near their farms, and held them with old men and boys. the merchants of san francisco refused to be misled by the libels of wool, and furnished supplies and munitions. inside of three weeks eleven companies were raised, equipped, and taking the field, besides two bodies of indian auxiliaries. a regular and efficient express service was organized throughout the territory. an assistant quartermaster and commissary, the two usual supply departments being united, was stationed in each town and principal settlement on purpose to collect provisions, transportation, etc., as well as to provide for the troops. by these skillful measures the governor so successfully overcame the two great difficulties attending the prosecution of the war, viz., the vast extent of the region and the lack of supplies, that the volunteers never had to wait for orders, nor were they ever put to unnecessary or fruitless marches or labors; and during all their campaigns on both sides of the cascade mountains, and expeditions of hundreds of miles, they never suffered, nor lost a day, for lack of supplies. the military organization is given below, not only as necessary to a clear presentation of this part of governor stevens's life, but as a tribute to those patriotic men who so gallantly and faithfully served and saved the territory of washington in her hour of extreme need:- james tilton, adjutant-general. james doty, william craig, b.f. shaw, e.c. fitzhugh, h. r. crosby, jared s. hurd, s.s. ford, edward gibson, lieutenant-colonels and aides. w.w. de lacy, captain of engineers. rudolph m. walker, ordnance officer. dr. gallio k. willard, surgeon and medical purveyor. drs. u.g. warbass and albert eggers, assistant surgeons. w.w. miller, quartermaster and commissary-general. james k. hurd, assistant quartermaster and commissary-general, in charge on columbia river. frank matthias, assistant quartermaster and commissary, seattle. warren gove, steilacoom. charles e. weed, olympia. r.s. robinson, port townsend. m.r. hathaway, succeeded by m.b. millard, vancouver. a.h. robie, dalles and in the field. s.w. percival was sent as agent to san francisco. second regiment, raised for six months. lieutenant-colonel b.f. shaw, commanding the right wing, consisting of central and southern battalions. major j.j.h. van bokkelen, commanding northern battalion. major gilmore hays, succeeded by major george blankenship, central battalion. major h.j.g. maxon, southern battalion. lieutenant eustis huger, adjutant; lieutenants humphrey hill, b.f. ruth, w.w. de lacy, adjutants of northern, central, and southern battalions respectively. captain c.h. armstrong, regimental quartermaster and commissary in field with right wing. r.m. bigelow, justin millard, m.p. burns, surgeons, northern, southern, and central battalions respectively. mounted men. company. strength. captain. c 67 b.l. henness d 44 {achilles {jephtha s. powell i 40 bluford miller k 101 francis m.p. goff m 53 henry m. chase n 74 {richards {james williams washington mounted rifles 95 h.j.g. maxon clark county rangers 81 william kelly walla walla company 29 sidney s. ford --- 584 infantry. a 53 edward lander {gilmore hays b 52 {a.b. rabbeson {david e. burntrager e 21 c.w. riley f 40 c.w. swindal g 55 {j.j.h. van bokkelen {daniel smalley h 42 r.v. peabody i 35 {samuel d. howe {george w. beam l 91 edward d. warbass train guard 47 oliver shead pioneer company 40 {joseph white {urban e. hicks nisqually ferry guard 9 sergeant william packwood --- 485 stevens guards 25 c.p. higgins spokane invincibles 23 b.f. yantis indian auxiliaries. nez perces, volunteers 70 chief spotted eagle snohomish 82 chiefs pat-ka-nim and john taylor squaxon 15 lieutenant wesley gosnell chehalis 17 sidney s. ford cowlitz 9 pierre charles --- total 1310 the horses used for mounted men were furnished partly by the government and partly by the volunteers. company m was composed of ten white men and forty-three nez perces, indians furnishing their own horses. company n was first commanded by captain richards, and second by captain williams. a portion of the pioneer company, after colonel shaw's march across the cascades, served as mounted men in the puget sound country. company b was commanded first by captain gilmore hays, second by captain a.b. rabbeson, and lastly by captain david e. burntrager. company e was first commanded by captain riley, and second by lieutenant cole. company g was first commanded by captain van bokkelen, and second by captain smalley. company i was first commanded by captain howe, and second by captain beam. volunteers called out by acting-governor mason:- first regiment, raised for three months or less. mounted men. company. strength. captain. a 61 william strong b 91 gilmore hays e 40 isaac hays f 63 benjamin l. henness k 26 john r. jackson cowlitz rangers 39 henry a. peers lewis river rangers 44 william bratton puget sound rangers 36 charles h. eaton --- 408 infantry. company. strength. captain. c 70 george b. goudy d 55 william h. wallace g 22 w.a.l. mccorkle m 75 c.c. hewett i 84 isaac n. ebey j 29 alfred a. plummer nisqually ferry guard 10 sergeant william packwood --- 345 newell's company, mounted captain robert newell mckay's company " captain william c. mckay captain strong's and hays's companies were mustered into the regular service. the mounted men furnished their own horses. footnotes: [10] bancroft, vol. xxvi. p. 143. chapter xxxviii waging the war on the sound the force thus speedily raised was organized into three battalions, designated the northern, southern, and central, each of which elected its major, and the two latter were subsequently formed into a single command by the election of shaw as lieutenant-colonel. the northern battalion, under the command of major j.j.h. van bokkelen, consisted of companies c, captain daniel smalley; h, captain r.v. peabody; and i, captain samuel d. howe. the central battalion, under major gilmore hays, comprised companies b, captain a.b. rabbeson; c, captain b.l. henness; e, captain c.w. riley; f, captain c.w. swindal; the pioneer company, captain white; and the train guard, captain oliver shead. the southern battalion included the washington mounted rifles, major h.j.g. maxon; company d, captain achilles; j, captain bluford miller; and k, captain francis m.p. goff, all under the command of major maxon. the southern battalion and captain henness's company c were mounted, most of the volunteers furnishing their own horses. the others served as infantry. besides these, company a, of forty-two men, captain edward lander (chief justice of the territory), was raised at seattle, and garrisoned that place. the plan of campaign was to guard the line of the snohomish river with the whole available force of the northern battalion, to move with the central battalion at once into the heart of the enemy's country with one hundred days' supplies, to operate with the southern battalion east of the cascades, and to combine all the operations by a movement from the sound to the interior, or from the interior to the sound, according to circumstances. the most favorable and commonly used passes across the cascades were at the head of the snohomish and its southern branch, the snoqualmie; about and opposite the mouth of the river were a good part of the sound indians; it was here that the council of mukilteo was held, at which twenty-three hundred indians were present, and across the sound, nearly opposite, was collected the greatest number of non-hostiles. the occupation of the line of the snohomish, therefore, was a move of the first strategic importance as shutting the door against the incursions of the yakimas, and cutting off the tribes on the sound from access to the back country and intercourse with them and other hostiles. it was determined to occupy the country permanently by roads and blockhouses, by which, together with the stockades and blockhouses which the encouraged settlers were building and holding at many points, to circumscribe the hostile resorts and coverts, and open up the trackless back country. indian auxiliaries were to be used as the best means of preserving their doubtful fidelity, and of using their knowledge of the country to search out and hunt down the hostiles. [illustration: theatre of indian war of 1855-56 on puget sound and west of cascade mountains] this plan the governor early communicated to lieutenant-colonel silas casey (major-general in the civil war), then commanding at steilacoom, and invited and secured his coöperation therewith. so desirous was he to insure coöperation between the regular and volunteer forces that, waiving etiquette, he twice visited casey in person; and early in february he again made the arduous journey to vancouver, and by personal conference with colonel george wright, who commanded the regular troops both on the river and the sound, sought to arrange harmonious and combined action between their respective forces, returning to olympia by the 17th. during the war the governor spared no pains to consult with the regular officers and secure their concert of action with him, and this end he brought about quite fully with casey, and partially with wright, notwithstanding both officers were under the strictest injunctions from wool not to recognize the volunteer forces in any way. the letter which governor stevens wrote to general wool on reaching walla walla gave very fully the results of his knowledge of the country and the indians, and his views and suggestions in regard to prosecuting the war, which, if adopted or heeded by the prejudiced commander, would have brought the contest to an end in a few months. after announcing his safe arrival, and giving a brief account of the numbers and dispositions of the indian tribes, he describes the features of the walla walla, palouse, spokane, and yakima countries which a military mail should know for planning the movement of troops, namely, roads, river crossings, grass, wood, depth of snow, etc., sending also a map. the governor recommended wool to occupy the walla walla valley with all his available force in january, establishing a depot camp there, and a line of barges on the columbia between the mouth of the des chutes and old fort walla walla, to bring up supplies; in february to cross snake river with 500 men and strike the indians on the palouse, where the hostiles driven out of the valley were congregated; to follow up this blow by sending a column of 300 men up the left bank of the columbia towards the okinakane river (okanogan), while 200 remained to guard the line of the snake, and keep the indians from doubling back. the effect of these movements would be to drive these hostiles across the columbia into the yakima country, when the troops north of the snake were to follow them, and all the troops south of that stream, who had been holding the river crossings and depot camps, were to unite, cross the columbia at the mouth of the snake, and move up the yakima valley, and with the other column put the indians to their last battle, for the effect of these movements would be to drive the enemy into a corner from which he could not easily escape. moreover, and this was of the first importance, this plan would interpose the troops between the hostile and friendly tribes. simultaneous movements against the yakimas and north of snake river would throw the hostiles upon the spokanes, and might cause them to take up arms. about 800 effective troops would be required. there were already 500 mounted oregon volunteers in the walla walla valley, and wool had, or would soon have, 500 to 600 regulars available. in the last paragraph of this letter the governor stated:- "in conclusion, it is due to frankness that i should state that i have determined to submit to the department the course taken by the military authorities in disbanding the troops raised in the territory of washington for my relief. no effort was made, although the facts were presented both to major-general wool and major rains, to send me assistance. the regular troops were all withdrawn into garrison, and i was left to make my way the best i could, through tribes known to be hostile. it remains to be seen whether the commissioner selected by the president to make treaties with the indians in the interior of the continent is to be ignored, and his safety left to chance." on finding that general wool had left so hastily for san francisco the governor sent a copy of this memoir to colonel wright, with a letter, dated february 6, urging him to send at least two companies of the troops at vancouver to the sound, and to push his troops against the indians east of the mountains. but instead of profiting by the valuable information and sound views given him by governor stevens, wool sarcastically replied that he had neither the resources of a territory nor the treasury of the united states at his command. instead of making use of, or coöperating with, the oregon volunteers already in the walla walla valley, he denounced them as making war upon friendly indians, and declared that, with the additional force recently arrived at the dalles and vancouver, he could bring the war to a close in a few months, provided the extermination of the indians was not determined upon, and the volunteers were withdrawn from the walla walla valley. he filled the greater part of a long letter with denunciations of outrages by whites upon indians in southern oregon, and of the oregon volunteers and of governor curry. he declared that two companies he had just sent to the sound, with three already there, making five in all, under lieutenant-colonel casey, would be a sufficient force to suppress the outbreak in that region. he concluded by saying:- "in your frankness and determination to represent me to the department, i trust you will be governed by truth, and by truth only. i disbanded no troops raised for your relief; and your communication gave me the first intelligence that any were raised for such a purpose." the bad blood and duplicity of this communication was the more inexcusable from the facts that it was on the requisition of his own officers that the washington volunteers had been raised and mustered into the united states service, that he made no complaint whatever against them or the people of that territory, and that his last assertion was a downright falsehood. even after receiving the full and valuable memoir which governor stevens sent him, he declared in official communications: "i have been kept wholly ignorant of the state of the country, except through the regular officers of the army." on march 15 wool made another flying visit to vancouver, thence by steamer to steilacoom, where he tarried but a single day, conferred with and instructed colonel casey, rebuked him for coöperating with the volunteers, and hurried away without deigning to notify the governor of his presence. the latter, on hearing that he had left vancouver for the sound, immediately dispatched adjutant-general tilton to steilacoom with a letter to wool, stating:- "he is instructed to advise you of the plan of operations which i have adopted, the force in the field, and the condition of the country. i have to acquaint you of my desire to coöperate with you in any plans you may think proper to adopt, and i shall be pleased to hear from you in reference to the prosecution of the campaign." but wool had left before tilton could reach him. the first and only result of wool's flying visit was manifested next day in a formal demand by colonel casey on governor stevens for two companies of volunteers to be mustered into the united states service, and placed under his orders. he stated in conclusion:- "i received yesterday an accession of two companies of the 9th infantry. with this accession of force and the two companies of volunteers called for, i am of the opinion that i shall have a sufficient number of troops to protect this frontier without the aid of those now in the service of the territory." this demand was made just after the volunteers had defeated the hostiles, as will soon be narrated. thus, instead of the coöperation which he so earnestly sought with the regular service, he was coolly required by the commanding general to disband thirteen companies of white troops and four bodies of indian auxiliaries, abandon his posts and blockhouses defending the settlements and in the enemy's country, leave the door of the snohomish open for the yakima emissaries to strike the reservations and the settlements,--in a word, give up his whole campaign at the moment when he had inflicted a severe defeat upon the enemy, and, fully prepared, was on the eve of following it up with his whole force, all posted in the very positions, and furnished with the needed supplies, which he had secured by so much labor and foresight, and to leave the defense of this extended and exposed frontier to an officer whose force would consist of only five companies of regulars and two of volunteers,--seven in all,--and whose most extended operations thus far had never gone beyond fifteen miles from his headquarters at fort steilacoom. this artful and impudent request of wool--for colonel casey made it by his instructions--was instantly rejected by the governor with the scorn it deserved; and in a letter to wool, dated march 20, he administered a well-deserved castigation to that ill-disposed officer:- executive office, washington territory, olympia, march 20, 1856. major-general john e. wool, _commanding pacific division_. _sir_,--i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 12th of february, and to state generally in answer thereto that the events of the past four weeks, in connection with your own official course, afford satisfactory evidence that the most objectionable positions of your letter have been abandoned, and that you have finally been awakened to the true condition of the indian war, and are seeking to make some amends for the unfortunate blunders of the past. you have probably learned how much you have been misled in your views of the operations of the oregon volunteers, and how much unnecessary sympathy you have wasted on the infamous pu-pu-mox-mox. for your own reputation i have felt pain at the statement made in your letter to me, for i am an authoritative witness in the case; and in the letter which submitted your own action in refusing to send me succor, i have presented briefly the facts, showing the unmitigated hostility of that chief. i assert that i can prove by incontrovertible evidence that pu-pu-mox-mox had been hostile for months; that he exerted his influence to effect a general combination of the tribes; that he plundered walla walla and the settlers of the valley, distributing the spoils to his own and the neighboring tribes as war trophies; that he rejected the intercession of the friendly nez perces to continue peaceful; that he had sworn to take my life and cut off my party; that he and the adjoining tribes of oregon and washington had taken up their military position as warriors at the proper points of the walla walla valley,--and all this before the volunteers of oregon moved upon him.... that some turbulent men of the oregon volunteers have done injury to the friendly cuyuses is unquestionable, and it is reprobated by the authorities and citizens of both territories. it has, however, been grossly exaggerated. had, sir, the regulars moved up to the walla walla valley, as i most earnestly urged both major rains and colonel wright both by letter and in person, these indians would have been protected. the presence of a single company would have been sufficient. the responsibility, if evil follows, will attach, sir, to you, as well as to the volunteers. in your letter of the 12th of february you state: "i have recently sent to puget sound two companies of the 9th infantry. these, with the three companies there, will give a force of nearly or quite four hundred regulars, commanded by lieutenant-colonel casey. this force, with several ships of war on the sound, to which will be added in a few days the united states steamer massachusetts, it seems to me, if rightly directed, ought to be sufficient to bring to terms two hundred indian warriors. captain keyes, in his last report, says there are not quite two hundred in arms in that region." here you have expressed a very confident opinion. you thought proper to quote captain keyes as to the number of indians, but you found it did not suit your purpose to refer to the requisitions he had made upon you for six additional companies, two of which only had been sent forward; nor could you find time to refer to the fact that colonel casey had recommended that, after the war was over, eight companies should be permanently stationed there for the protection of the sound. you think volunteers entirely unnecessary, although after having received from the executive information as to the condition of the country. it is now march, a month later, and you send two companies of regulars, and direct colonel casey to call upon me for two additional companies of volunteers. thus you have practically acknowledged that you were wrong, and that i was right; and thus i have your testimony as against yourself in vindication of the necessity of my calling out volunteers. as regards this call for volunteers, it is presumed that colonel casey informed you that the whole available force of the sound country was bearing arms, and that the great proportion of them were actively engaging the enemy; that, organized in two battalions, the northern battalion occupied the line of the snohomish, where they were establishing blockhouses and closing the passes of the snoqualmie. that the central battalion was occupying the military road over the nahchess, in relation to which road and its military bearing your aide-de-camp, lieutenant arnold, will be able to give you full information; and that on both lines decisive blows had been struck; and also that it was beyond the ability of our citizens to raise an additional company of even fifty men to honor your requisition. i have a right to hold you to a full knowledge of our condition here. if you say you were misinformed, then you are not fit for your position, and should give place to a better man. if you were informed, then your measures as a military man manifest an incapacity beyond example. therefore the call on me for two companies of volunteers is a call upon me to withdraw the troops now in the field with sixty to eighty days' provisions, after decisive blows have been struck, and when everything is ready to strike a, and perhaps _the_, decisive blow to end the war. i am, sir, too old a soldier ever to abandon a well-considered plan of campaign, or to do otherwise than to press forward with all my energies in the path marked out, promising, as it does, the speedy termination of the war; and, sir, i am too wary a man not to detect the snare that has been laid for me. you never expected, sir, that the requisition would be complied with. you knew that it was a practical impossibility; but, not having the courage to acknowledge your errors, it was resorted to in the hope that my refusing your requisition might enable you to occupy my vantage-ground, and throw me on the defensive. i hold you, sir, to the facts and necessity of the case, clearly demonstrating by your own confession the propriety of my course, and the necessity on my part of a steady adherence to it. you have referred to the atrocities committed upon the friendly indians by the whites. i know nothing of what has occurred in southern oregon; but i have to state that no man, to my knowledge, in the territory of washington advocates the extermination of the indians. the authorities here have not only used every exertion to protect them, but their exertions have been completely successful. did you learn, sir, in your brief visit to the sound, that nearly four thousand indians--friendly indians--had been moved from the war ground on the eastern shore of the sound and its vicinity to the adjacent islands, and have for nearly five months been living in charge of local agents? that not an indian in the whole course of the war has been killed by the whites except in battle? that where a military commission, composed of a majority of volunteer officers, tried some months since eight indians, only one was convicted, and that the sentence of death passed upon him has not yet been executed? it is the good conduct of our people, sir, that has so strengthened the hands of the authorities as to enable them to control these friendly indians, and to prevent any considerable accessions to the ranks of the hostiles. i have recently heard from the nez perces, the coeur d'alenes, and the spokanes. the former are firm in their allegiance; but the spokanes urge me to have a military force on the great prairie between them and the hostile indians, so these latter may not be driven to their country, and thus incite their young men to war. the letter of garry, chief of the spokanes, is a most earnest and plaintive call for help, so his hands may be strengthened in keeping his people to their plighted faith; and the coincidence is remarkable, that this indian chief, a white man in education and views in life, should have asked me to do the very thing i have urged upon you; for you will remember, in my memoir i urge that the troops, in operating against the indians, should be interposed between the friendly and hostile tribes to prevent those now friendly from joining in the war. i have, sir, studied the character of these indians, and my views as to the influence upon the friendly indians of the mode of carrying on the war against the hostiles are confirmed by the only educated indian of either oregon or washington, and the head chief of the tribe in reference to which i made the recommendation and felt the most solicitude. it seems to me that the present condition of things imposes upon you the necessity of recognizing the services of the volunteers of the two territories now in the field, and of your doing everything to facilitate their operations. but if you waste your exertions in the fruitless effort to induce either the authorities to withdraw their troops, to abandon their plan of campaign in order to comply with your requisition, or to meet your peculiar notions, i warn you now, sir, that i, as the governor of washington, will cast upon you the whole responsibility of any difficulties which may arise in consequence, and that by my firm, steady, and energetic course, and by my determination to coöperate with the regular service, whatever may be the provocation to the contrary, i will vindicate the justice of my course, and maintain my reputation as a faithful public servant. i warn you, sir, that, unless your course is changed, you will have difficulties in relation to which your only salvation will be the firm and decided policy of the two territories whose services you have ignored, whose people you have calumniated, and whose respect you have long since ceased to possess. can you presume, sir, to be able to correct your opinions by a hasty visit to the sound for a few days? and do you expect, after having taken my deliberate course, that i shall change my plans on a simple intimation from you, without even a conference between us? were you desirous, sir, to harmonize the elements of strength on the sound, you would have seen that it was your duty at least to have informed me of your presence, and to have invited me to a conference. whilst in the country, in the fall and winter, you complained that the authorities of the two territories did not communicate with you. why did you not inform me of your presence in the sound on your arrival at steilacoom? i learned of your probable arrival by simply learning on saturday morning by my express of your having left vancouver, and i immediately dispatched the chief of my staff to wait upon you with a letter. but you were gone; and whether you did not know the courtesy due the civil authorities of the territory, who had taken the proper course to place themselves in relations with you, or whether you were unwilling to meet a man whose safety you had criminally neglected, and whose general views you have been compelled to adopt, is a matter entirely immaterial to me. what, sir, would have been the effect if governor curry had not made the movement which you condemn, and my party with the friendly nez perces had been cut off? sir, there would have been a hurricane of war between the cascades and bitter root, and three thousand warriors would now be in arms. every tribe would have joined, including the snakes, and the spirit of hostility would have spread east of the bitter root to the upper pend oreilles. i believe, sir, i would have forced my way through the five or six hundred hostiles in the walla walla valley with fifty-odd white men and one hundred and fifty nez perces. would you have expected it? could the country expect it? and what was the duty of those having forces at their command? governor curry sent his volunteers and defeated the enemy. you disbanded the company of washington territory volunteers raised expressly to be sent to my relief. i have reported your refusal to send me succor to the department of war, and have given some of the circumstances attending that refusal. the company was under the command of captain william mckay. before your arrival there was a pledge that it should be mustered into the regular service and sent to my assistance. major rains informs me that he did everything in his power to induce you to send it on. william mckay informs me that he called on you personally, and that you would do nothing. i am informed that your aide-de-camp, lieutenant arnold, endeavored to get you to change your determination. what was your reply? "governor stevens can take care of himself. governor stevens will go down the missouri. governor stevens will get aid from general harney. if governor stevens wants aid, he will send for it." these were your answers, according to the changing humor of the moment. and now, sir, in view of your assertion that you disbanded no troops raised for my relief, and that my communication gave you the first intelligence that any were raised for that purpose, i would commend the chalice to your own lips, "that i trust you will be governed" hereafter "by the truth, and the truth only." i am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, isaac i. stevens, _governor, washington territory_. unable to answer this letter, which so clearly exposed and justly rebuked his reprehensible course and conduct, wool returned it, with a note from his aide stating that it was done by his order. in response the governor, in a final letter to wool, remarks of this act:- "it can only be construed as evincing a determination on your part to have no further official communication with the executive of the territory of washington, at the very time when, from the circumstances of the case and the nature of their respective duties, there should, and must often be, such communications. "it is a matter which is not to be decided by personal feeling, but by consideration of public duty, which alone should govern public acts. i shall therefore continue in my official capacity to communicate with the major-general commanding the department of the pacific whenever, in my judgment, duty and the paramount interests of the territory shall demand such communication to be made, casting upon that officer whatever responsibility before the country and his superiors may attach to his refusal to receive such communications. my duty shall be done. let others do their duty." the governor was always of the opinion, the result undoubtedly of what he was told by other officers, that, in disbanding the troops raised for his relief, wool was actuated by resentment at his, the governor's, manly declaration in san francisco, when, disgusted at wool's self-laudation and disparagement of a greater commander, he said that "every officer knew, and history would record, that general taylor won the battle of buena vista." however that may be, after the caustic letter given above, wool's malice knew no bounds. he redoubled his accusations of making war upon friendly indians, gathered up and sent on to the war department in his official reports newspaper slanders against the governor, and even declared that he was crazy. he reiterated his orders to his subordinates to have nothing to do with the territorial volunteers or authorities, and finally went to the length of directing his officers to disarm the volunteers, if practicable. no attempt was ever made in that direction. early in february pat-ka-nim, with eighty snohomish braves, accompanied by colonel simmons, pushed up the snohomish and against the hostiles on green river under leschi, the nisqually chief, and defeated them in a sharp fight, inflicting a loss of five killed and six wounded, besides two taken and executed. as fast as organized, the northern battalion was advanced on the line of the snohomish, where it built blockhouses and a camp known as fort tilton below the snoqualmie falls, and fort alden above them, and scouted the surrounding country. this battalion also established a blockhouse, with a garrison of fifteen men, at bellingham bay, and with blockhouses on whitby island and at point wilson, near port townsend, and a service of small vessels and canoes, kept watch over the lower sound. the central battalion, having been assembled on yelm prairie, twenty miles east of olympia, and constructed there fort stevens, moved to and built camp montgomery, twelve miles back of steilacoom, february 19 to 23; the post and ferry at the emigrant crossing of the puyallup, 25th to 29th; and the post and blockhouses, named fort hays, on connell's prairie, on white river, by march 2; and later two blockhouses at the crossing of that river, named forts pike and posey. small garrisons held this line of blockhouses; roads were cut and opened through the forest; and a train of thirty ox-teams, three yoke each, bought, hired, or impressed from the settlers, hauled out a hundred days' supplies. captain henness's mounted rangers cheerfully dismounted, and, leaving their horses at yelm prairie, advanced on foot. the governor visited camp montgomery on the 28th, pressing forward the movement. captain sidney s. ford, with a force of friendly chehalis indians, scouted the lower puyallup. lieutenant-colonel casey advanced a detachment of regulars to the muckleshoot prairie, eight miles below connell's prairie, where they built a blockhouse named fort slaughter. the government vessels on the sound were the war steamer massachusetts, captain samuel swartwout, which remained mostly in seattle harbor, where she relieved the decatur; the coast survey steamer active, captain james alden; and the revenue cutter jefferson davis, a sailing vessel, captain william c. pease. these officers were ever ready to aid in the defense of the settlements by every means in their power. they furnished ammunition, transported volunteers and supplies, and cruised the sound to overawe the northern indians. on march 2 two white men were killed by indians within a few miles of olympia; indians were seen and stock was driven off at other points; a band of savages under qui-e-muth were discovered in the nisqually bottom; and it appeared that, while the troops were pushing out, the indians were coming in behind them to raid the settlements. unwilling to arrest the forward movement, the governor immediately ordered maxon's company, of the southern battalion, over to the sound from vancouver, and soon after brought over the rest of the battalion. by a special war notice he also called a hundred more men from the already denuded settlements, and, with the few that were able to respond, strengthened the exposed points. on march 6 colonel casey's troops on muckleshoot prairie had a sharp fight with the enemy. on the 10th major hays, with 110 men of his central battalion, fought the principal and decisive battle of the war on the sound, known as the battle of connell's prairie. it was brought on by the indians, who, emboldened by their previous successes, fought for five hours with a confidence and stubbornness that enabled the volunteers to inflict severe losses upon them. they were finally routed by a charge on their left flank by captains swindal and rabbeson, and a simultaneous attack in front by captains henness and white, with a loss of twenty-five or thirty killed and many wounded. they even abandoned their war-drum in their flight. major hays, who handled his command with skill and judgment as well as courage, reported that they numbered at least two hundred warriors. it afterwards appeared that their numbers were much larger, and that they were aided in the fight by a hundred yakima warriors. the fruits of governor stevens's thorough preparations were now manifested by incessant blows and untiring, unsparing warfare. the indians were allowed no respite from attack, and could find no refuge, even in the densest swamps and thickets. the central battalion sent out strong parties to beat up the country of the white, green, cedar, and puyallup rivers to the base of the mountains. major van bokkelen, with captain smalley's company g, forty-six men, and seventy-six of pat-ka-nim's braves, swept the forests from the snohomish to connell's prairie, thence up the mountain to the nahchess pass, thence northward along the foot of the range to his own northern line, and thence into and over the snoqualmie passes. captain sidney ford with his chehalis indians, and agent wesley gosnell with a party of friendly, or pretended friendly, indians from the squaxon reservation--own brothers to the hostiles these--scoured the swamps and bottoms of the puyallup and nisqually; lieutenant pierre charles, with a force of cowlitz and chehalis indians, scouted up the cowlitz and newarkum rivers, and captured a number of the enemy. the ladies of olympia, under the lead of mrs. stevens, made blue caps with red facings, with which these red allies were equipped, to distinguish them from their hostile kindred. another company was called out and organized among the settlers of the cowlitz plains under captain e.d. warbass, which built a blockhouse on klikitat prairie, twelve miles higher up the cowlitz, and also kept scouting parties constantly on the move. major maxon and his company scouted and searched the whole length of the nisqually valley far into the range, leaving their horses and plunging into the tangled forests on foot, and on one of their scouts killed eight and brought in fourteen captives of the enemy. miller's and achilles's companies joined in the work, while goff was sent back to the river to increase his strength to a hundred, and, with another company to be raised there,--n, captain richards,--to rendezvous at the dalles in readiness for operations in the upper country. the governor urged captain swartwout to unite with captain lander's company, by furnishing a detachment and boats from the massachusetts, in routing out the indians who infested the shores of lake washington; and when the naval officer declined, captains howe and peabody led detachments of the northern battalion from the snohomish down through the unknown and trackless forest, and beat up the shores of the lake. lander's company a was posted on the duwhamish river, a few miles from seattle, where it built a blockhouse, and from which point lieutenant neely led a party in a canoe expedition up black river into the lake, and fell upon a camp of the hostiles just after it had been abandoned, which was found filled with remains of cattle, stores, and goods recently plundered from seattle and the settlers. colonel casey, after being reinforced by the two companies brought over from vancouver, established a post higher up on white river, from which, and from his post on muckleshoot prairie, parties scouted the surrounding forest. every blockhouse with its little garrison, every armed train and express and canoe, as well as the numerous scouting parties, was constantly watching and searching for hostile indians, and, worse than all, their own kindred, of whom shaw declared "blankets will turn any indian on the side of the whites," now joined in the hunt, and, stimulated by rewards offered for the heads of the hostile chiefs and warriors, showed the way to all their secret haunts and trails. the tide had, indeed, turned, after two months of this unrelenting warfare, and nearly every tribe on the sound now freely proffered its assistance. the northern indians, also, tendered their services, which were declined, excepting eight men, who joined the northern battalion, and proved themselves uncommonly brave, strong, and hardy soldiers. thus the whole tangled region, with its dense forests and almost impenetrable swamps, from the snohomish to the cowlitz, nearly two hundred miles, was beaten up, the indian resorts and hiding-places searched out, and their trails discovered and explored, especially those across the mountain passes, many of which were now for the first time made known to the whites. the whole policy and plan of campaign were governor stevens's, and the execution almost entirely the work of his brave and patriotic volunteers. the governor had, indeed, brought about a real concert of action with colonel casey by his frank and considerate treatment of that officer, but the regular forces kept within a very short tether of fort steilacoom. it was in the midst of the rainy season that this aggressive campaign was waged. so impracticable and unwise was it deemed by the brave and excellent major hays that he remonstrated with the governor against exposing the volunteers to such hardships, and, finding him inexorable, resigned rather than undertake it, as also did two officers of his former company. amid constant rains and swollen streams the volunteers thridded the dripping forests, where every shaken bough drenched the toiling soldiers with another shower-bath, following some dim trail, or oftener cutting or forcing their way through the trackless woods,--heavy packs of blankets and rations on their backs, the axe in one hand and the rifle in the other. scarcely would they return from one scout when they would be ordered out again. to every demand the volunteers responded with the greatest alacrity, spirit, and fortitude. the mounted men without a murmur left their horses and took to the woods as foot scouts. the southern battalion, enlisting with the expectation of campaigning on the plains of the upper country, instantly and without a murmur obeyed the order summoning them to the sound, to the discomforts and hardships of the rains and forests and swamps. the settlers freely turned out with their teams of oxen, and the storekeepers furnished blankets, clothing, shoes, and provisions to the extent of their ability. on march 26, just as the campaign was well under way, the yakimas and klikitats swooped down upon the cascades portage on the columbia, which was left insufficiently guarded by colonel wright with a force of only nine regular soldiers in a blockhouse, and massacred nineteen settlers, and killed one soldier and wounded two others. colonel wright, who was at the dalles preparing an expedition for the yakima country, immediately proceeded to the cascades with a strong force of regular troops, and the indians disappeared. satisfied that the friendly indians in that vicinity were implicated in the attack, he caused ten of them, including the chief, to be summarily tried by military commission and hanged, an act which, if committed by the territorial authorities or volunteers, would have caused redoubled denunciations on the part of wool and his parasites, but which, done by this regular officer, excited no comment. this affair at the cascades is also of interest as being general p.h. sheridan's début in the art of war. the massacre at the cascades excited new alarm among the settlers about vancouver and along the columbia. to reassure them, and keep them from abandoning their farms, the governor called out another company of volunteers under captain william kelly, known as the clark county rangers, caused several new blockhouses to be built, and had the rangers constantly patrol the settlements. it was at this time, and largely in consequence of the cascades massacre, that he called out captain warbass's company, for he deemed it essential that the settlers should not again abandon their farms. he also wrote colonel wright proposing a "thorough understanding between the regular and volunteer service, so their joint efforts may be applied to the protection of the settlements and the prosecution of the war," in order that no force need be wasted, and inviting his suggestions to that end. but colonel wright, although personally ready to coöperate like colonel casey, was under the strictest orders from wool in no way to recognize the volunteers. in his reply to the governor he simply stated what he was doing, and proposing to do, without venturing any suggestions. in truth, between the governor and his volunteers, who were so efficiently protecting the settlements and attacking the common foe, on the one hand, and his irate commanding general, who had positively ordered him to ignore the territorial authorities and forces, on the other, colonel wright was in something of a quandary, and it must be confessed that he conducted himself with no little diplomatic skill. for two months after the fight of connell's prairie, governor stevens kept his whole force thus incessantly searching the forests and hunting down the hostiles with unrelenting vigor. the indians, thrown completely on the defensive, did not commit another depredation after the cascades disaster on all that long line of exposed and scattered settlements. they were driven and chased from resort to resort; their most hidden camps and caches of provisions were discovered and destroyed; many were killed or captured; and by the middle of may over five hundred came in and gave themselves up, while the guilty chiefs and warriors fled across the cascades and sought refuge among their yakima kindred. the surrendered were placed on the reservations with the friendly indians, except a number of suspected murderers, who were tried by military commissions; but very few were found guilty for lack of evidence, and they were also sent to join their people on the reservations. it was not the governor's policy to punish them for taking part in the war, or fights only, but he deemed it essential to the future peace of the country that the murderers of settlers and chief instigators of the outbreak should be punished, and believed that if they were allowed to escape scot free they would stir up trouble again. thus the war west of the cascades was ended by the complete surrender or flight of the hostiles. in june the posts and blockhouses built by the volunteers on puyallup and white rivers, connell's prairie, and camp montgomery were turned over to the regulars, and the volunteers who were not required for an expedition east of the cascades were disbanded in july. after the suppression of hostilities on the sound, becoming satisfied that the reservations set apart at the treaty of medicine creek were inadequate for the nisquallies and puyallups, governor stevens held a council with these indians on fox island on august 4, and arranged with them to give them, in place of those established by the treaty, a larger reservation for the former tribe on the nisqually river, a few miles above its mouth, embracing some excellent bottom land, and for the latter twenty-one thousand acres of the finest alluvial land at the mouth of the puyallup river. at the same time a smaller reservation was given the duwhamish indians on the muckleshoot prairie. the puyallup reservation included thirteen donation claims taken by white settlers, but the governor had these appraised by a commission which he appointed for the purpose, and its awards, amounting to some five thousand dollars, were paid by congress. on his recommendation the president, by executive order, promptly established the new reservations, in pursuance of the sixth article of the treaty, which empowered him to take such action. the indians have remained in undisturbed possession of them ever since. when the northern pacific railroad company fixed its terminus at tacoma in 1874, it cast covetous eyes upon this noble tract of land situated across the bay, right opposite the proposed city, and the author, then its attorney in washington territory, was instructed to examine and report upon the validity of the indian title to it. his report satisfied the officers of the company that the right of the indians to their reservation was indisputable. much of the success attending governor stevens's prosecution of the indian war was due to the able and energetic men he called to his aid as staff officers. he especially commended general w.w. miller as having imparted "extraordinary efficiency to the quartermaster's and commissary department, the most difficult of all,--which, generally kept distinct, was a single department in our service,--reflecting the highest capacity and devotion to the public service upon its chief and subordinate officers." it was general miller who collected, largely by impressment, organized, and led out into the indian country the large ox-train which hauled out three months' supplies for the volunteers in the beginning of the campaign, without which it could not have been waged. he was distinguished by remarkable sound sense and judgment, and the governor counseled with and relied upon him more than any other. and after the indian war general miller was his closest friend in the territory. the governor also took occasion to make special acknowledgment to general tilton for his services as adjutant-general, where his military experience was of great value. it is much to be regretted that the limits of this work preclude the detailed mention of their services, which they so well merit; but the remarkable success of their departments is their best encomium. chapter xxxix the war in the upper country while the war of the sound was thus vigorously and successfully prosecuted, operations east of the cascades were marked by lack of vigor and purpose, and no impression was made upon the hostile tribes, except to encourage them to continue on the war-path. the oregon volunteers, who wintered in the walla walla valley, crossed snake river in march, advanced a short distance up the palouse, then traversed the country over to the columbia below priest's rapids, from which point they returned to walla walla, and in may moved back to the dalles and were disbanded. thus it will be seen how easy it would have been for the regular forces, supporting and supplementing this movement of the oregon volunteers across snake river, to have made the effective campaign that governor stevens outlined to wool. with a little reinforcement, the volunteers could have pushed beyond priest's rapids up the left bank of the columbia, driving the hostiles across the river into the yakima country, when the main columns of regulars, entering that country from the dalles and up the yakima river, could have "put the hostiles to their last battle." but it was not until may that colonel wright marched from the dalles into the yakima country with five companies of regulars. he found the hostiles in strong force on the nahchess river, one of the upper tributaries of the yakima. instead of fighting, he stopped to parley with them; but after a week of talking to no purpose, he sent back for reinforcements. at this juncture, the hostile indians on the sound having been thoroughly subdued, and those of the upper country being still in unbroken strength and confidence, governor stevens, on may 28, proposed to lieutenant-colonel casey a joint movement of their respective forces across the cascades:- "i would suggest your sending three companies to the nahchess, retaining one at or near the pass, and advancing the others into the yakima country. "at the same time i will put my whole mounted force through the snoqualmie pass and down the main yakima. the northern battalion shall occupy posts on the line of the snoqualmie from the falls to the eastern slope. a depot shall be established on the eastern slope; all the horsemen will then be available to strike and pursue the enemy." but casey, strictly forbidden by wool to recognize the volunteers, sent two companies under major garnett to reinforce wright by the circuitous cowlitz and columbia route, declining to "send him across the nahchess pass, for the reason, first, i consider there would be too much delay in getting across. in the next place, i have not sufficient transportation to spare for that purpose." from steilacoom to wright's camp on the nahchess was barely a hundred miles by the direct route across the pass; by the cowlitz-columbia route it was three hundred and fifteen miles, for a hundred and fifteen of which the troops could be transported by water, leaving two hundred to march. by these facts, and by the ease and celerity of shaw's march a few days later over the rejected route, the validity and candor of casey's "reason" may be judged. such a combined movement would have given wright ample reinforcements, and in the mounted volunteers the very arm he most needed; for infantry could never reach the indians on those plains in summer unless the latter chose to fight. and for the second time he was given the opportunity, by availing himself of the coöperation of the volunteers, to inflict a severe punishment upon the enemy. unhappily wool's orders tied his hands, and wright himself was imbued with wool's delusion that the indians of the upper country--the great hostile tribes that had plotted and brought on the war fresh from treacherously signing the treaties at walla walla, had murdered the miners and agent bolon, and had plundered fort walla walla, and laid themselves in wait to cut off governor stevens and his party--were innocent and peaceably disposed indians, who had been forced to war by the aggressions of the whites. upon casey's rejection or evasion of the joint operation he proposed, governor stevens determined to push his mounted men across the mountains, and throw upon that officer the burden of protecting the settlements upon the sound against hostile incursions. accordingly he offered to turn over to him his posts on the puyallup, and on connell's and south prairies, and the colonel received and occupied them, for which he was censured and rebuked by wool as soon as the latter was informed of it. the governor was convinced that the war could be brought to a close only by subduing the hostile tribes of the upper country; that until this was done the sound country was liable to their raids and stirring up of fresh outbreaks among the sound indians; and that every day's delay in striking them was helping kam-i-ah-kan and his emissaries in winning over the spokanes, coeur d'alenes, and disaffected nez perces to their side. he also deemed it necessary to send supplies and indian goods to craig and lawyer, and strengthen their hands in keeping the nez perces loyal, now left more exposed by the withdrawal of the oregon volunteers from the walla walla valley. he proceeded, therefore, to carry out his plans, cherished from the beginning, of striking a blow in the upper country. on june 12 lieutenant-colonel shaw marched from camp montgomery with one hundred and seventy-five mounted men of the central and southern battalions, under their respective majors, blankenship and maxon, comprising captain henness's company c, maxon's washington mounted rifles, company d, under lieutenant powell, captain miller's company j, and a pack-train of twenty-seven packers and one hundred and seven pack animals, under captain c.h. armstrong, the regimental quartermaster and commissary. on the 20th he reached the wenass branch of the yakima, with the loss of only one animal, finding the road good for a mountain road. colonel wright was still parleying with the yakimas, trying to patch up a peace, and not only with them, but also with leschi, kitsap, stahi, nelson, and qui-e-muth, the hostile chiefs who had fled from the sound country, and would vouchsafe no information or suggestion to the volunteer colonel, except the statement that the regular troops were amply sufficient for the yakima. shaw therefore continued his march, crossed the columbia at old fort walla walla, and reached and made camp on mill creek, in the valley, on the 9th of july. having seen the necessary arrangements made, and orders given for shaw's march, the governor hastened in person to the dalles, arriving there june 12, where he had already assembled captains goff's and richards's companies, in anticipation of operating in the upper country. he had previously, on april 27, inquired of colonel wright if he intended to occupy the walla walla valley, and if, in case it were not occupied, and the oregon volunteers there were withdrawn, he could furnish an escort of one company to guard the train to the nez perce country. to this wright replied that it was no part of his plan of campaign to occupy the walla walla country, "as we are assured that the indians in that district are peacefully inclined," and that the matter of an escort was referred to general wool, which, of course, was equivalent to refusal. the governor, on receiving this reply, at once wrote wright:- "my information in regard to the indians in the walla walla, and on the snake river, is that they are determined to prosecute the war. this was the declaration made by the prominent chiefs of the cuyuses to the express of mr. mcdonald some weeks since. this is the opinion of my agent in the nez perce country and of the nez perce chiefs, and it would seem to be indicated by the recent attack by the indians on the volunteers at the umatilla. "i have therefore thought it my duty to communicate these views, and i will suggest that you receive with great caution any information of their peaceful intention, to the end that you may not be thrown off your guard." thus wright was fixed in the opinion that these indians were peaceably disposed, all evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. he ignored the information and views given him by governor stevens, who, as superintendent of indian affairs, was especially charged with the care and management of them; the information furnished by the hudson bay company's officer at colville; the opinions of the nez perce chiefs and agent craig; and even a recent attack actually made upon a post of oregon volunteers on the umatilla. the governor now notified wright of shaw's march and orders to coöperate with him:- "his orders are to coöperate with you in removing the seat of war from the base of the mountains to the interior, and for reasons affecting the close of the war on the sound obvious to all persons. "he will then push to the walla walla valley, crossing the columbia at fort walla walla. "the supplies and escort for the walla walla will move from the dalles on friday morning. "the walla walla valley must be occupied immediately, to prevent the extension of the war into the interior. "kam-i-ah-kan has, since your arrival on the nahchess, made every exertion to induce the tribes thus far friendly to join in the war. he has flattered the spokanes, where he was on the 25th of may, and has endeavored to browbeat the nez perces. the spokanes have answered in the negative, and the nez perces will, i am satisfied, continue friendly. "i am ready, as the superintendent of indian affairs, to take charge of any indians that may be reported by yourself as having changed their condition from hostility to peace. "from all i can gather, i presume your views and my own do not differ as to the terms which should be allowed the indians, viz., unconditional submission, and the rendering up of murderers and instigators of the war to punishment. "i will, however, respectfully put you on your guard in reference to leschi, nelson, kitsap, and qui-e-muth, from the sound, and suggest that no arrangement be made which shall save their necks from the executioner." but the governor's wise and patriotic efforts to secure coöperation, and this fine opportunity to strike the enemy a crushing blow, were frustrated by wright's pacific attitude and the cold shoulder he turned to shaw. it was indeed hard to induce concert of action, especially aggressive action, between authorities who knew the indians as hostile and murderous, and to be subdued only by defeat and punishment, and officers who regarded them as wronged, and deserving to be made peace with and protected. thus wool's pernicious and inexcusable views and orders paralyzed the campaign of his subordinate, who shared his delusion. the governor remained at the dalles some two weeks, combining and expediting the movements of his two columns to the walla walla valley, and gaining the latest information from the indian country, and returned to olympia june 30. on this trip the governor summarily dismissed a quartermaster at vancouver for dishonest conduct, and the incident was made the subject of a caricature by john phoenix, the _nom de plume_ of that inveterate wit and joker, lieutenant george h. derby, who was then stationed at vancouver.[11] it will be recollected that the governor left captain sidney s. ford in the walla walla to organize a company for home defense of the few settlers who had returned with the oregon volunteers. he succeeded in raising twenty-five men, but was soon succeeded by a company under captain henry m. chase, composed of ten whites and forty-three nez perces. on the withdrawal of the volunteers, they, too, had to be disbanded, and the valley was wholly abandoned. on the 22d the two companies under captains goff and williams, who succeeded richards, mustering one hundred and seventy-five men, with a train of forty-five wagons and thirty-five pack-animals, in charge of quartermaster robie, marched from the dalles, and on july 9 joined shaw on mill creek, except a detachment of seventy-five men under captain goff, which left the train on the umatilla to go to the assistance of major lupton, of the oregon volunteers, who was in the presence of a force of the enemy in the blue mountains. goff and lupton followed the hostiles across the mountains, and on the 15th and 16th inflicted a sharp blow upon them on burnt river. lieutenant-colonel craig, with a force of seventy-five nez perce volunteers under spotted eagle, marched from lapwai and joined shaw's command, also on the 9th, so that the three columns, starting from points as widely divergent as puget sound, the dalles, and lapwai, all met in the valley on the same day. the nez perces gave assurances of the continued friendship of the tribe, and robie proceeded with the train of indian goods to their country under their escort alone. thus far shaw had encountered no enemy in his march, the yakimas being virtually protected by colonel wright and his parleyings, and the cuyuses and walla wallas having left the valley; but learning that the hostiles were in the grande ronde valley in force, he determined to strike them. moving by night by an unused trail across the blue mountains, guided by the faithful nez perce chief, captain john, he encountered the enemy on the third day, july 17, in the open valley. although taken by surprise, they received him in a defiant attitude; large numbers of braves, mounted and armed, and with a white scalp borne on a pole among them, confronted him, while the squaws were fleeing across the valley to seek refuge, and, on captain john's approaching them to parley, cried out to shoot him. upon this, throwing off his hat, and with a shout, the tall, rawboned leader of the volunteers instantly charged at the head of his men, his long red hair and beard streaming in the wind, broke and scattered the indians, chased them fifteen miles clear across the valley, killed forty, and captured a hundred pounds of ammunition, all their provisions, and over two hundred horses and mules, many of which bore the united states brand, and had been evidently run off from wright's and rains's commands. shaw's loss was only three killed and four wounded. having driven the hostiles beyond the grande ronde, and not having sufficient supplies to warrant pursuing them farther, shaw returned to his camp in the walla walla. meanwhile robie had been threatened and ordered out of the nez perce country by the disaffected portion of that tribe, and had returned by forced marches to the valley, but on learning of shaw's victory, and in answer to his message that "if they beat their drums for war, he would parade his men for battle," the recusant chiefs again made professions of friendship. lawyer and the majority of the tribe were unwavering in their friendship, but there were a considerable number who sympathized with their cuyuse kindred, and repented having made the treaty, among whom looking glass, red wolf, joseph, and eagle-from-the-light were leaders. one of the first acts of colonel wright at the dalles had been to release the cuyuse war chief, um-how-lish, whom the governor had captured and brought to that point, and to allow him to return to his people, accepting all his professions at par. under this encouragement some of the friendly cuyuses and the families of some of the hostiles had taken refuge among the nez perces, despite the governor's refusal to permit them to go there. the very thing he apprehended occurred, viz., the disaffected and hostile cuyuses, visiting their kindred with, and mingling among, the nez perces, had stirred up considerable disaffection in this hitherto faithful tribe. moreover, the yakima emissaries had assured the nez perces that the spokanes were about to break out against the whites, and threatened them with the same treatment accorded the whites, unless they, too, would make common cause against the encroaching race. lawyer and craig, therefore, were sorely troubled to hold firm the wavering friendship of the disaffected part of the tribe, and had written the most urgent messages to the governor for assistance. hence his great anxiety to have the walla walla valley held in force, and to get through to the nez perce country a train bearing supplies and encouragement to the faithful chiefs. shaw's victory occurred most opportunely to restrain the disaffected, and both he and craig represented that the moral effect of it was great and salutary upon them. the governor therefore decided to proceed in person to walla walla, and there hold a council with the indians, in order to confirm the friendship of the nez perces and restrain the doubtful and wavering from active hostility. he directed craig and shaw to summon the hitherto friendly indians, the nez perces, spokanes, coeur d'alenes, and friendly cuyuses, to the council; and also to send messengers to the hostiles, inviting them to attend it also, under the sole condition of submission to the government, requiring them to come unarmed, and assuring them of safe conduct to, at, and from the council. he took this course in order to give the hostiles every opportunity to give up the conflict and accept peace, if their minds were ripe for it, and also to refute the infamous charges of wool and satisfy the doubts or scruples of other regular officers, by demonstrating his earnest wish to end the war and treat the hostiles with all possible leniency. to this end, on august 3 he wrote a pressing invitation to colonel wright to attend the council, recommended him to establish a permanent garrison in the walla walla valley, and requested a conference at the dalles on the 14th of september. the governor called out two hundred more volunteers to maintain the strength of shaw's command, whose term of enlistment was about to expire, for he deemed it indispensable to hold the walla walla valley. colonel wright, acting on wool's theory of wronged and innocent indians, had suffered himself to be completely deceived by the wily yakimas, and had given open ear to their lying tales and treacherous professions, and, without striking a blow, or seizing a single murderer, or exacting any guaranty for future good behavior,--not even a promise to observe their treaty and allow whites to come into their country,--had concluded a quasi-peace with them. this was as great a victory for their diplomacy as haller's defeat was for their arms. it rendered wright's campaign utterly abortive, saved them from losses and punishment, recognized as valid their objections to the treaty and the presence of white settlers, and left kam-i-ah-kan and his followers free to continue their machinations among the doubtful tribes, which they were actively carrying on. while these wily indians were thus beguiling wright, they also tried their diplomacy on the authorities on the west side of the cascades. in may indian messengers from ow-hi and te-i-as--two of the most cunning and treacherous of the yakima chiefs, the former second only to kam-i-ah-kan, as well as foremost in bringing on the war--approached colonel simmons through friendly indians, pretending a desire to make peace, and were sent to olympia to the governor. after conversing with them, the latter was satisfied that they came only as spies and trouble-instigators, but directed them to return to the chiefs who sent them, bearing his invitation to all who wished to resume friendly relations to come with their women and children to the prairie above snoqualmie falls, and submit to the justice and mercy of the government; that only those guilty of murder and instigating the war would be punished, and all others would be pardoned and kindly treated, like the indians on the reservations. at the same time he charged colonel fitzhugh, in connection with colonel simmons, with the mission of bringing about the surrender of the indians in question in case they were acting in good faith. three weeks later, june 20, fitzhugh reported that his mission had turned out a perfect failure, that the governor was correct in his opinion, that the messengers only wanted to gain time and information, and added:- "the indians expected to make better terms with colonel wright, who had been entertaining them and making them presents on the other side of the mountains, and had told them that he was the 'big dog' in this part of the world, and had come a long distance to treat with them, and if they would only stop fighting all would be well. as things now are, they will have to be well thrashed before they will treat. from the beginning of the difficulty to the present time, the regulars, from their commander-in-chief down, have stultified themselves. they have done no fighting, and now they wish to patch up a treaty, so as to get the credit for putting an end to the war." little did the cunning ow-hi foresee the tragic fate that awaited him and his son, only two years later, at the hands of colonel wright. thus ingloriously was the war carried on, or rather paralyzed, by the regular forces in the upper country. the only blow inflicted upon the hostiles of that region during the year was struck by shaw in the grande ronde, and the effect of that was dissipated by the subsequent behavior of wool's officers. footnotes: [11] in this cartoon two settlers in roughest costumes, slouch hats, woolen shirts, huge muddy boots with trousers tucked into them, and long, unkempt hair and beard, are represented standing in front of a log-hut in the woods, while in the distance appears a building, having over the door the sign "quartermaster's office," from which a man is being kicked into the street. "_first pike._ that's pretty rough, bill, yanking a man out of office like that, without giving him ary show or trial. "_second pike._ well, the governor's generally about right, and he's dead right this time, you bet." chapter xl the fruitless peace council it will be remembered that colonel wright, hugging his delusion and shutting his eyes to obvious facts, in april expressed the opinion that the hostile cuyuses and walla wallas were "peaceably disposed" when declining to occupy the valley or furnish an escort for the nez perce train. the governor, by bringing him to attend the council and see and judge for himself, hoped to open his eyes to the real situation, and to induce him to take a more manly and aggressive course in case the indians persisted in the war. accordingly, leaving olympia august 11, governor stevens reached vancouver on the 13th, and there met colonel wright, who informed him that he was unable to attend the council from pressure of other duties, but that he was dispatching a force of four companies of regulars under lieutenant-colonel steptoe in season to be present, and that the governor could rely upon that officer for support in case of need, an assurance not made good, and which involved him in no little personal peril. as it was no longer necessary to maintain shaw's force in the valley, since the regulars were to occupy it, the governor now revoked his call for two hundred more volunteers. traveling together to the dalles, the governor and colonel wright had repeated conferences en route, and at that point also met and conferred with lieutenant-colonel steptoe, major lugenbeel, and captain jordan, with the result, as the governor supposed and reported to the indian bureau, of establishing "the most cordial and effective coöperation in all the measures taken to maintain the friendly relations of the tribes east of the mountains." it is evident that governor stevens, by his personal ascendency over men, and the manifest wisdom and necessity of his measures, actually compelled these officers, like lieutenant-colonel casey, to a degree of coöperation incompatible with wool's orders, and probably repugnant to their own prejudices. it is impossible, however, to acquit wright and steptoe of a lack of candor in concealing from the governor the real character of wool's instructions, and in leading him to expect their faithful coöperation and support. for not only had wool positively forbidden anything of the kind, but had ordered them to disarm the volunteers, if they had sufficient force to do so, and expel them from the indian country, as appeared from wool's orders when subsequently published by the government. he also ordered them to exclude american settlers from the entire upper country, but not to interfere with the hudson bay company people, it being his intention to make the cascade range a scientific frontier to the settlements. it is noteworthy that the officers of the 4th infantry, who garrisoned the country at and before the outbreak of the war,--alvord, rains, haller, maloney, slaughter, and nugen,--agreed perfectly with the territorial authorities and the people as to the causes of the outbreak, and were always ready to coöperate with them. it was major alvord who first detected and reported the existence of the indian conspiracy, and major rains who called for the volunteers. but the officers of the 9th infantry, like wright and casey, were new-comers in the country, bound by wool's orders, and prejudiced by his infamous slanders, and undoubtedly affected by professional jealousy. they were ready to ignore the territorial authorities, and to make peace by restraining the whites instead of punishing the hostile indian aggressors. they prolonged the war east of the mountains and kept back the settlement of the country for two years, but at last the scales were torn from their eyes by stern experience; they realized how mistaken had been their views and fruitless their policy, and found themselves obliged to adopt the views of governor stevens and make war in earnest. then, under the severe blows of wright, the hostile tribes were finally punished and subdued, and permanent peace assured. on the day after reaching vancouver the governor held a council with a band of klikitat indians, at which colonel wright was present, and made arrangements for removing them temporarily to their original home east of the cascades on the klikitat river, with the view of placing them ultimately on the yakima reservation. he informed colonel wright that he would receive and care for, as superintendent of indian affairs, any surrendered indians, except the sound murderers,--leschi, qui-e-muth, nelson, sta-hi, etc.,--to whom he had already cautioned him against granting amnesty. he now made formal requisition upon colonel wright for the surrender of these chiefs to be tried for their crimes, and notified him that he had forbidden the indian agents to receive them on any reservation either east or west of the cascades. he gave full and careful instructions on all these matters to the agents on the river,--captain j. cain, who had general charge of the indians on the columbia, mr. field at vancouver, mr. lear at the cascades, and the agent near the dalles,--and made the necessary arrangements to meet all exigencies. this trip affords one of many examples of the governor's untiring zeal and energy in the public service. in a single week he travels sixty miles on horseback, thirty in canoe, and forty by steamboat to vancouver; holds a council with the klikitats, and arranges for removing them from the settlements; instructs five indian agents; revokes his call for volunteers; confers with colonel wright; demands of him the surrender of indian murderers for punishment; travels eighty miles farther to the dalles; and, by repeated conferences with wright and his officers, secures their coöperation, as he has reason to believe. moreover, he finds time to write the most clear and detailed reports to the indian bureau and to the secretary of war. leaving the dalles on the 19th, and pushing forward in advance of steptoe with a train of thirty wagons drawn by eighty oxen, and two hundred loose animals, attended only by pearson, and without escort except the employees, governor stevens reached shaw's camp in the valley on the 23d. on the evening of the 28th a small pack-train was captured by the indians within a few miles of camp, the packers escaping on their horses without loss, after firing away all their ammunition. the governor was much chagrined at this, the only loss of animals or supplies suffered by his volunteers during the whole war, and in orders rebuked the parties whose negligence was responsible for the mishap, and concluded: "he desires to impress upon the troops the fact established by experience, especially in the present indian war, that bold and repeated charges upon the enemy, even when the disparity of numbers is great, will alone lead to results. in this way only can the superiority of our race be established. in all mere defensive contests with indians, whether behind breast-works or in the brush, an indian is as good as a white man; few laurels can thus be won, and the result may be discreditable." craig and dr. lansdale, the latter the agent for the flatheads, just down from the bitter root valley, arrived on the 30th with some of the nez perce chiefs. the next day agent montour and antoine plante came in from the spokanes and reported that, although the tribe professed a friendly disposition, they would not attend the council. captain d.a. russell (later major-general commanding 1st division, 6th corps, army of the potomac) with three companies marched from the yakima to the columbia, opposite old fort walla walla, and, being without means of crossing, the governor sent him a wagon boat guarded by twenty volunteers, by means of which he ferried his command over the river. on the 5th steptoe reached the valley, and went into camp four miles below the governor's camp, his force, including russell's, consisting of four companies. the volunteers were therefore all started for the dalles, their term of service expiring on the 8th, except captain goff's company, which cheerfully consented to remain as a guard at the camp until relieved by the regulars. lawyer and the bulk of the nez perces arrived on the 6th, and encamped four miles above. a train of indian goods under robie reached the camp the next day. on the 8th the governor received the nez perce chiefs and headmen to the number of three hundred, after which he held a conference with the chiefs, and entertained them at dinner. father a. ravalli, of the coeur d'alene mission, arrived in the evening, bringing important information. reports the governor:- "the father reports having seen and conversed with kam-i-ah-kan, skloom, ow-hi, and his son, and that they will not attend the council. the spokanes also declined coming. he also saw looking glass, who was not well disposed, and said he would not come to the council. from father ravalli's report, it became evident to me that all the indians in the upper country, if not openly hostile, were yet far from entertaining a disposition for friendship to be relied upon. kam-i-ah-kan had taken advantage of the cessation of hostilities against him in the yakima to circulate the grossest falsehoods as to the objects of the government in making treaties, against the volunteers, the miners, the settlers, and americans in general, and he declares that no settler shall live in the country. these falsehoods are universally credited by the indians, and thus kam-i-ah-kan, who personally visited most of the tribes, has by his intrigues been enabled to excite to a point verging upon open hostility all the tribes in the upper country, withdrawing from their allegiance one half of the nez perce nation. as yet, however, the spokanes, coeur d'alenes, and colvilles have not molested the settlers or miners passing through their country." on the 9th provisions were issued to the nez perces. in the evening it was reported that a party of volunteers on their way to the dalles were being attacked by the hostile indians, and colonel shaw was dispatched to their assistance with all the volunteers in camp and a detachment of nez perces. this left the governor with only ten men, and as he expected to open the council the next day, and had a large quantity of indian goods on the ground, he requested steptoe to send a company of dragoons to the council ground as early as practicable. in notes to and conversation with him the governor had repeatedly requested him to camp at or near the council ground, in order "to show the indians the strength of our people and the unity of our councils." in sending the wagon boat to captain russell he made a similar request. he well knew that the pacific and parleying attitude of the regular officers had imbued the indians with the idea that the regular troops were a different people from the settlers and volunteers. he wished to disabuse the indians, and moreover a guard would be indispensable for the protection of his camp and supplies as soon as the last of the volunteers moved away. wright's assurances, and the cordial conferences with that officer and steptoe, fully justified him in relying upon their support. the next morning colonel steptoe moved his camp farther up the valley, and on his way called at the governor's camp with a company of dragoons. the latter, supposing that, after his repeated request and the manifest necessity of the case, steptoe would of course encamp near by, did not reiterate his request, and the regular officer continued his march and established his camp eight miles above the council ground, leaving it wholly unprotected. fortunately shaw, with his small force, returned in the afternoon, the rumored attack proving a false alarm, and reported having seen stock whitley, chief of the des chutes indians, who said his people and the cuyuses would come to the council that day. the opening of the council was postponed to the morrow. later in the afternoon these indians, with the umatillas in large force, advanced mounted to within a short distance of camp, then, without any salutation or shaking hands, wheeled and moved off to the nez perce camp, where they partook of a feast prepared for them, after which they encamped just above their hosts. this demeanor, with the facts that they fired the prairie when coming in, and treated some members of the party with great insolence, was indicative of anything but a friendly spirit. the governor now ordered the company of volunteers to march for the dalles the next morning, and made a requisition on colonel steptoe for the presence of two companies of troops on the council ground, stating that the cuyuses had all come in, and, as the volunteers were about to leave, it was essential to have a force on the ground to control the indians. incredible as it may seem, steptoe refused, giving several lame excuses, and his real reason in the following pregnant sentence: "and permit me to say that my instructions from general wool do not authorize me to make any arrangements whatever of the kind you wish." as the governor requested no arrangements except that a regular force should camp near him to protect his council ground and show the indians "the unity of our councils," as he bore the president's commission, and was charged by the government with the care of the indians, this act shows to what length the malignity of wool and the prejudices of a somewhat weak though well-meaning officer could extend. the fact was that these regular officers had idealized the indians, accepting as true the falsehood of kam-i-ah-kan, sympathized with the savages, and were "down" on the settlers and volunteers. the governor learned for the first time from this note that steptoe had moved his camp so far away, for he had taken it for granted that that officer had encamped near by. therefore he retained goff's company of only sixty-nine men for the protection of the council, countermanding the order for it to march below in the morning. a portion of it was already one day's march on their way down, but was immediately brought back. the council was duly opened the next day, september 11, the chiefs of the nez perce, cuyuse, umatilla, john day, and des chutes indians being present. the governor expressed his sorrow at the state of hostilities,--reviewed the course of kam-i-ah-kan, pu-pu-mox-mox, and the hostiles in accepting their treaties, professing the utmost satisfaction with them, and then murdering whites traveling through their country and their agent, bolon, plundering fort walla walla, burning the houses of settlers, and threatening the lives of himself and party returning from the blackfoot council. he had labored only for their good as their friend, and could they wonder that he was grieved at this state of affairs? the provisions of the treaties relating to punishments for offenses committed by indians upon whites, or by whites upon indians, were fully explained, and the fact stated that under the treaties they had bound themselves to deliver up the murderers. it was the law, and to that they must submit. men were killed on both sides in battle, but that was not murder. but the indians who killed their agent, bolon, and others must be given up to be tried and punished by the law. he invited all indians who desired peace to submit unconditionally to the justice and mercy of the government; the lives of all except the murderers should be safe. he spoke of the indians of the sound who had surrendered and been placed on reservations, fed, clothed, and protected, and treated not harshly, but with kindness. few of the hostiles were present. many conflicting rumors were current as to the whereabouts of kam-i-ah-kan and other hostile chiefs. the council continued the next day. the governor said that he had given his views in regard to the war and how it could be ended, that his words were intended for all the indians of the country, and called upon them to express their minds. the indians manifested a reluctance to speak, each seeming to wait for another. several chiefs expressed sorrow that war existed, and hoped a peace might be made. peeps, a hostile cuyuse chief, said there was no haste, as kam-i-ah-kan was coming, and they waited for him. wee-lap-to-leek, a hostile chief of the tigh indians, a band near the dalles, said that the indians were determined to have their country; they would bet it on a fight with the whites, and the winners should take it. he was indorsed by camas-pello, former war chief of the cuyuses. eagle-from-the-light, the prominent nez perce chief, complained bitterly because a nez perce brave had been hanged in the valley last winter by the oregon volunteers, and asserted that the man was guiltless. he was followed by others in the same strain. the governor explained the laws of the whites in regard to spies, and that the executed nez perce was punished as one, and that he would speak further of the case the next day, after he had learned all the facts. he then adjourned the council, expressing the hope that kam-i-ah-kan and garry would be present the next day. the indians held councils in their camps all night. so hostile were the cuyuses, umatillas, walla wallas, and others, and so much did more than half of the nez perces sympathize with them, that the friendly nez perces danced the war-dance during the whole night. the lives of the friendly chiefs were threatened, and the great bulk of the indians seemed simply to be waiting for the coming of kam-i-ah-kan to fall upon the governor and his party. some of the indians were detected attending the council with arms under their blankets, and posting themselves near the governor and other members of the party; but although no open notice was taken of them, the redoubled vigilance of the volunteer guards gave no chance for their premeditated treachery. early the following morning the governor sent the following letter to steptoe:- council grounds, walla walla valley, w.t., september 13, 1856. lieutenant-colonel e.j. steptoe. _my dear sir_,--the council did not adjourn yesterday till near sundown. i understand the feelings of the indians from what was developed yesterday. the want of a military force on the ground seriously embarrassed me (i have retained for a day some fifty of goff's company), but having called the council in good faith as the indian superintendent, and also as the commissioner to treat with the indian tribes by the appointment of the president, i shall go through with the duty i have undertaken. one half of the nez perces and all the other tribes, except a very few persons, are unmistakably hostile in feeling. the cuyuses, the walla wallas, and other hostiles were so when they came in. hence the requisition i made upon you for troops. i particularly desire you to be present to-day, if your duties will permit, and i will also state that i think a company of your troops is essential to the security of my camp. i shall, as i said, go through with this business whatever be the consequences as regards my own personal safety, but i regard it to be my duty to the public, to the indians, and to my own character. this communication is marked confidential, but is intended as an official communication, and will go on my files as such, only i do not think it prudent that my judgment as to the aspect of affairs should, at this time, be disclosed to any other person than yourself. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, isaac i. stevens, _governor and superintendent_. while this letter was being dispatched the council reopened, and the governor took up the case of the nez perce spy, showed that he had joined kam-i-ah-kan, taken presents from him, participated in burning settlers' houses and in stirring up hostilities, and pointed out that kam-i-ah-kan and his people were to blame for the death of this man, for they had caused the war, and but for them he would still have been living. he had visited and been arrested in the volunteer camp in time of war, and duly tried, convicted, and executed. finally red wolf, to whose band the spy belonged, admitted that he committed the offense for which he was punished, and this ended all complaint. speaking owl, a nez perce chief and the mouthpiece of looking glass, now spoke up and said, "will you give us back our lands? that is what we all want to hear about; that is what troubles us. i ask plainly to have a plain answer." the governor, in his report to the indian bureau, comments on this demand as follows:- "now thus far there had not been the slightest allusion to the land of the nez perces in council, and this rapid change of front was most extraordinary. the case of the nez perce who was hanged was simply a device by means of which they hoped to get the desired concession from me by way of propitiation. when they were obliged to abandon the case, they had no alternative but to show their hand, which they did very promptly. i called upon lawyer, the head chief, to speak. he produced his commission and a copy of the nez perce treaty, remarking that he knew that, if he cast away the laws, he should be brought to justice. he pointed out to them the boundaries of the country sold, and of the reservation, and spoke of other provisions of the treaty, and concluded by saying that fifty-eight great chiefs of the nez perces had signed the treaty made at the council of last year, when all fully understood it, and it was his determination to abide by it, and he trusted his people would do the same." timothy and james expressed a similar determination, but joseph, speaking owl, eagle-from-the-light, and red wolf denied that they understood the treaty, or ever intended to give their land away, and declared that lawyer had sold it unfairly. it appeared almost certain that no satisfactory peace could be made with the hostiles, and that one half of the nez perces, through the intrigues of kam-i-ah-kan and the cuyuses, had become disaffected and desirous of annulling their treaty. in the afternoon a company of dragoons came with steptoe's answer to the governor's dispatch of the morning:- "if the indians," he wrote, "are really meditating an outbreak, it will be difficult for me to provide for the safety of my own camp, _impossible_ to defend _both_ camps. under these circumstances, if you are resolved to go on with your council, does it not seem more reasonable that you shall move your camp to the vicinity of mine? i send down the company of dragoons to bring you up to this place, if you desire to come. my force is so small that to be efficient against the large number of savages in the neighborhood it must be concentrated; nor can i detach any portion of it, in execution of certain instructions received from general wool, while the indian host remains so near to me." in view of the threatening attitude of the hostiles, and the approach of kam-i-ah-kan, who was reported as encamped that day on the touchet, only a few miles distant, as well as for the protection of the large quantity of indian goods brought up for the friendly nez perces, and such of the hostiles as might surrender, the governor the next day moved his whole party and train to steptoe's camp, and established a new camp and council ground within a quarter of a mile of his encampment. they were met on the march by kam-i-ah-kan and ow-hi, with a party of one hundred warriors under the lead of ow-hi's son, qualchen, who clearly meant mischief; but the coolness with which they were received, and the manifest readiness of the volunteers and dragoons for battle, checked them, and they made no disturbance save attempting to provoke a quarrel with the friendly nez perces in rear of the train. the indians, having been notified in the morning of the change of council grounds, moved up to the new location the same day and the following. kam-i-ah-kan and his followers encamped a quarter of a mile from the council ground, separated therefrom only by mill creek and its wooded bottom. the council continued the next two days, the 16th and 17th. the lawyer and half the nez perces were determined in their adherence to their treaty and ancient friendship to the whites, and approved of all the governor said. the other half of the tribe wished the treaty done away with. the hostiles all said, "do away with all treaties, give us back our lands, let no white man come into our country, and there will be peace; if not, then we will fight." the governor advised the nez perces to stand by their treaty. it was now in the hands of the president, and could only be set aside by him. to the hostiles he repeated the terms of peace alone possible: they must throw aside their guns and submit to the justice and mercy of the government; but as they were invited under safe conduct, they were safe in coming, safe in council, and safe in going. the council was then declared at an end. many of the friendly nez perces departed at once to their camp, but a large number of hostiles, most of whom it was observed had arms concealed beneath their blankets, remained loitering around the council ground. noting the vigilance and readiness of the volunteers, they made no disturbance, and by nightfall all retired to their camps. on every day except the first, known braves of the hostiles came to the council armed to the teeth, and took positions evincing designs upon the life of the governor; but picked men watched them closely, ready to strike down any assailant at the first overt act, so no attempt was made. during the night of the 16th there was great excitement among the indians. the friendly nez perces were much alarmed, and brought frequent reports that the hostiles were bent upon attacking the camp, and wiping out the governor and his party. these faithful allies beat the drum all night, and kept guard around his camp. the governor called attention especially to the speech of spotted eagle on the last day,- "which for feeling, courage, and truth, i have never seen surpassed in an indian council. the spotted eagle is the great war chief of the nez perces, and the right arm of lawyer. both the words and manner of the spotted eagle showed that his object in speaking was to set himself and the friendly indians right, and that he had no expectation of changing the hearts of those who were bent on war. his words, however, 'i will not follow you into the war,' were significant." the day after the conclusion of the council the governor made preparations for returning to the settlements. he decided to withdraw craig temporarily from the nez perce country on the advice of the friendly chiefs, who feared he might be killed by kam-i-ah-kan's warriors as a means of embroiling the nez perces in war against the whites. said the spotted eagle:- "if you [craig] do not return with me, we shall go back as if our eyes were shut. i think my people will not go straight if craig gets up from that place. but, my friend craig, on account of the talking i have heard at this place, i am afraid for you." that afternoon steptoe had a conference with the indians, in which he declared: "my mission is pacific. i have come not to fight you, but to live among you. come into my camp when you please. i trust we shall live together as friends," and he appointed the next day for a fuller conference with the chiefs. by this action steptoe intentionally repelled the governor's wise recommendation and endeavor to "show the indians the strength of our people and the unity of our councils." reports the governor:- "indeed, the indians looked upon the indian superintendent and the military officer as not representing a common cause. the former in the morning parts from them, having signally failed in making any arrangement to end the war; the latter speaks to the indians as though there was no war, and therefore no necessity of making any arrangement at all. "the indians, sharp-sighted and constantly on the alert from the merest trifles to draw conclusions as to character and policy, saw there did not exist between the indian department and the military the proper coöperation." what next occurred is graphically related by the governor, in his report to secretary of war davis, as follows:- i was occupied the remainder of the day and the next morning in establishing craig's agency in the neighborhood of steptoe's camp, and a little before noon, with some fifty friendly nez perces in charge of sub-agent craig, i started with the train and goff's company for the dalles. the indians did not, however, come to see steptoe at the time appointed. they previously set fire to his grass, and, following me as i set out about eleven o'clock on my way to the dalles, they attacked me within three miles of steptoe's camp at about one o'clock in the afternoon. so satisfied was i that the indians would carry into effect the determination avowed in their councils in their own camps for several nights previously to attack me, that in starting i formed my whole party, and moved in order of battle. i moved on under fire one mile to water, when, forming a corral of the wagons, and holding the adjacent hills and the brush on the stream by pickets, i made my arrangements to defend my position and fight the indians. our position in a low, open basin some five hundred or six hundred yards across was good, and with the aid of our corral we could defend ourselves against a vastly superior force of the enemy. the fight continued till late in the night. two charges were made to disperse the indians, the last led by lieutenant-colonel shaw in person with twenty-four men, but whilst driving before him some one hundred and fifty indians, an equal number pushed into his rear, and he was compelled to cut his way through them towards camp, when, drawing up his men, and aided by the teamsters and pickets, who gallantly sprang forward, he drove the indians back when in full charge upon the corral. just before the charge the friendly nez perces, fifty in number, who had been assigned to holding the ridge on the south side of the corral, were told by the enemy, "we came not to fight the nez perces, but the whites; go to your camp, or we wipe it out." their camp, with their women and children, was on a stream about a mile distant, upon which i directed the nez perces to retire, as i did not require their assistance, and i was fearful that my men might not be able to distinguish them from the hostiles, and thus friendly indians might be killed. towards night i notified lieutenant-colonel steptoe that i was fighting the indians, that i should move the next morning, and expressed the opinion that a company of his troops would be of service. in his reply he stated that the indians had burnt up his grass, and suggested that i should return to his camp, and place at his disposal my wagons, in order that he might move his whole command and his supplies to the umatilla, or some other point, where sustenance could be found for his animals. to this arrangement i assented, and lieutenant-colonel steptoe sent to my camp lieutenant davidson with detachments from the companies of dragoons and artillery with a mountain howitzer. they reached my camp about two o'clock in the morning, where everything was in good order, and most of the men at the corral asleep. a picket had been driven in an hour and a half before by the enemy,--that on the hill south of the corral, but the enemy was immediately dislodged, and all the points were held, and ground-pits being dug. the howitzer having been fired on the way out, it was believed nothing would be gained by waiting till morning, and the whole force immediately returned to lieutenant-colonel steptoe's camp. soon after sunrise the enemy attacked his camp, but were soon dislodged by the howitzer, and a charge by a detachment from steptoe's command. on my arrival at the camp i urged lieutenant-colonel steptoe to build a blockhouse immediately, to leave one company to defend it with all his supplies, _then_ to march below and return with an additional force and additional supplies, and by a vigorous winter campaign to whip the indians into submission. i placed at his disposal for the building my teams and indian employees. the blockhouse and stockade were built in a little more than two days. my indian store-room was rebuilt at one corner of the stockade. in the action my whole force consisted of goff's company of sixty-nine men, the teamsters, herders, and indian employees, numbering about fifty men, and the fifty nez perces. our train consisted of about five hundred animals, not one of which was captured by the enemy. we fought four hundred and fifty indians, and had one man mortally, one dangerously, and two slightly wounded. we killed and wounded thirteen indians. one half the nez perces, one hundred and twenty warriors, all of the yakimas and palouses, two hundred warriors, the great bulk of the yakimas, walla wallas, and umatillas were in the fight. the principal war chiefs were the son of ow-hi and the isle de père chief, quil-to-mee, the latter of whom had two horses shot under him, and who at the council showed me a letter from colonel wright acknowledging his valuable services in bringing about the peace of the yakima. in his report to the indian bureau the governor adds: "the indians were greatly surprised at steptoe's sending a force to my assistance, and kam-i-ah-kan said on learning it, 'i will let these men [referring to the regular troops] know who kam-i-ah-kan is.'" on the 23d the combined force, accompanied by craig and the fifty nez perce auxiliaries, started for the dalles, where they arrived on october 2 without incident of moment. thus, as the governor remarks:- "circumstances had brought about the coöperation between the military and the indian service which had not previously existed, and the words of steptoe to the hostiles and mine to the friendly indians corresponded. i had sent messengers to the nez perce country directing the friendly nez perces to separate from the hostile nez perces, and to keep the latter out of their portion of the country. steptoe sent word that good indians he would protect, and bad indians he would punish." in truth, a great change had come over steptoe's views. the burning of his grass and the attack on his camp were too strong even for the orders of wool and his own prejudices. he writes to colonel wright from his camp on the umatilla, september 27:- "in general terms i may say that in my judgment we are reduced to the necessity of waging a vigorous war, striking the cuyuses at the grande ronde, and kam-i-ah-kan wherever he may be found." the day before the attack on the governor, he wrote the same officer:- "as it is, he [governor stevens] complains that i have, by not aiding him, or by not coöperating heartily with him, actually opposed him. this may be so, but i certainly have done for him all, and more than, my instructions warranted." the governor warmly commends- "the admirable conduct of the volunteers and the indian employees not only during the council, but in all the operations east of the cascade mountains.... there was not a single case of injury either to the person or the property of a friendly indian, or of injury to the persons or property of the hostiles, during the council. the kindness and forbearance of officers and men, agents and employees, even when treated with rudeness by the hostiles, was extraordinary. the strayed cattle and horses of the indians were restored to them. the volunteers were well supplied, and were not tempted to plunder for subsistence. i have the permission of colonel steptoe to refer to him and his officers as witnesses of what i have stated, and have the assurance from lieutenant-colonel steptoe that he has reported it to colonel wright, and of colonel wright that he has forwarded the report to general wool." but wool's malignant animosity was not to be abated by the testimony of his own officers. he augmented his charges by declaring that governor stevens had called the council on purpose to force war upon the friendly indians. immediately on reaching the dalles, governor stevens renewed his demand upon colonel wright for the delivery of the sound murderers for trial. writes wright in reply:- "you know the circumstances under which the indians referred to were permitted to come in and remain with the friendly yakimas. although i have made no promises that they should not be held to account for their former acts, yet in the present unsettled state of our indian relations i think it would be unwise to seize them and transport them for trial. i would therefore respectfully suggest that the delivery of the indians be suspended for the present." but the governor firmly reiterated his demand, declaring:- "if the condition of things is so unsettled in the yakima that the seizing of these men will lead to war, the sooner the war commences the better. nothing in my judgment will be gained by a temporizing policy." the result was that colonel wright gave an order on major garnett, who commanded the post in the yakima, to deliver up to the governor, for trial before the courts, leschi, nelson, qui-e-muth, and stahi. but any embarrassment that might be caused to the peace on the yakima by the execution of this order was very cleverly obviated by sending these indians, or permitting them to go, back to the sound country, and placing them under the protection of colonel casey, as will more fully appear hereafter. on the 5th wright and steptoe started for the walla walla, their force being increased one company. one of colonel wright's first acts on arriving there was to hold councils with the disaffected and hostile chiefs, the same who had so recently attacked the governor and the camp of his own officer, steptoe, at which he assured them that "the bloody cloth should be washed, past differences thrown behind us, and perpetual friendship must exist between us." he gave ready ear to their complaints and demands, adopted their views in regard to the walla walla treaties, and actually recommended that they never be confirmed. lieutenant-colonel steptoe put forth a proclamation, by order of general wool, forbidding all white settlers to return to the country except the missionaries and hudson bay company people. wool instructs wright under date of october 19: "warned by what has occurred, the general trusts you will be on your guard against the whites, ... and prevent further trouble by keeping the whites out of the indian country." a month later steptoe, who seems to have had doubts of the good faith of the indians, and to apprehend that they might resume active hostilities in the spring, ventured to recommend that "a good industrious colony" be permitted to settle the walla walla valley, but wool promptly negatived this suggestion, declaring that "the cascade range formed, if not an impassable barrier, an excellent line of defense, a most valuable wall of separation between two races always at war when in contact. to permit settlers to pass the dalles and occupy the natural reserve is to give up this advantage, throw down this wall, and advance the frontier hundreds of miles to the east, and add to the protective labors of the army." he charged steptoe to carry out his orders strictly. thus he joined hands with the indian enemy to keep out american settlers from the region to which they had been especially invited by congress by the donation acts, and strove to frustrate the policy of his own government of extinguishing the indian title and settling up the country. seldom has our history shown a more shameful betrayal of duty than this veteran officer and his subordinates making a quasi-peace by surrendering to the demands of the hostile indians for the abrogation of the treaties they had accepted, and the exclusion of white settlers from their country, and seeking to lighten "the protective duties of the army" by abandoning the defense and protection of their own race. governor stevens remained at the dalles until the 6th, settling up the business of the expedition and the indian service, when he proceeded down the river, and, after spending some days at vancouver and portland in discharge of his multifarious duties, reached olympia on the 15th. in his reports, both to the indian bureau and to secretary of war davis, governor stevens condemned with just severity this craven policy. on learning of colonel wright's pacific and sympathetic talks with the disaffected and hostile chiefs in the valley, he again protested to secretary davis in the following indignant strain:- "it would seem that, to get the consent of colonel wright to take the ground that a treaty should not be insisted upon, it was simply necessary for the malcontents to attack the superintendent of indian affairs and his party. now, one half of the nez perce nation, including the head chief, lawyer, wish the treaty to be carried out. they have suffered much from their steadfast adherence to it. are their wishes to be disregarded? "it seems to me that we have in this territory fallen upon evil times. i hope and trust some energetic action may be taken to stop this trifling with great public interests, and to make our flag respected by the indians of the interior." the following, from his report of october 22 to the indian department, sums up the mistaken policy of the regular officers and its deplorable results, and gives his opinion of those neutrals in the war, the hudson bay company and the missionaries:- the department is aware that for many months i have been of opinion that a large portion of the nez perces were on the verge of hostilities, and that i deplored the mistaken course of colonel wright in the yakima as tending directly to inflame the whole interior and prepare it for war. the war commenced, on our part, in the yakima, in consequence of the attempt to arrest the murderers of bolon, mattice, and others, killed without provocation and under circumstances of unsurpassed atrocity. two expeditions were made to effect this object and to punish the tribe. after the massacre of the cascades, the third expedition, under colonel wright, went to the yakima with the avowed object of pacifying the indians, and a quasi-peace is made, and murderers are allowed to come into camp with impunity. no effort is made to strike the indians when within reach, and they breathe nothing but war, and the result of the campaign is that, after the chiefs had refused to come into council as they had promised, and weeks are fruitlessly expended in the attempt to negotiate, certain indians with their families come in, and the master spirits of these tribes, with the flower of the young men, go east of the columbia to prepare for continuing the war. i state boldly and plainly to the authorities that this mode of managing affairs is disgraceful to the government, and will bring with it in the future the most bitter consequences to the character and prosperity of the people of this most remote portion of our country. the demand for the murderers should have been inflexibly insisted upon; the indians should have been struck in battle and severely chastised. then there would have been peace in the yakima. there would not have been war in the interior. but feeble and procrastinating measures having been pursued, even to the extent of impressing the indians with the belief that the regular troops were a distinct people from the americans, and were even allies of the indians, kam-i-ah-kan and looking glass have effected that combination in the interior which i apprehended and predicted. the brilliant victory of the grande ronde, which caused for a time the lower nez perces to break from the war party, has proved unavailing. i have therefore determined to have no agent on the spokane, believing, in view of certain influences there, to which i will briefly allude, his presence would not be beneficial. in times of peace the influence of the catholic missionaries is good in that quarter, and their good offices are desirable till some outrage is committed, or war breaks out. but since the war has broken out, whilst they have made every exertion to protect individuals, and to prevent other tribes joining in the war, they have occupied a position which cannot be filled on earth,--a position between the hostiles and the americans. so great has been their desire for peace that they have overlooked all right, propriety, justice, necessity, siding with the indians, siding with the americans, but advising the latter particularly to agree to all the demands of the former,--murderers to go free, treaties to be abrogated, whites to retire to the settlements. and the indians, seeing that the missionaries are on their side, are fortified in the belief that they are fighting in a holy cause. i state on my official responsibility that the influence of the catholic missionaries in the upper country has latterly been most baneful and pernicious. again, what is the interest of the hudson bay company? there are unquestionably large deposits of gold, both north and south of the 49th parallel, east of the cascade mountains. a road has been made connecting fraser river with the british interior, and the hudson bay company have established a post in connection therewith on the main columbia, north of the 49th parallel. this post and fort colville were supplied over this road the present year. i ask again, what is the interest of the hudson bay company? most unquestionably to develop the british interior and its mines of gold, and to keep the americans out, which will be most effectually accomplished by yielding to the demands of the indians east of the cascades, and making peace by an abandonment of the country. i charge no man of that company with collusion with the indians, but i know what human nature is; it will look out sharply for its own interests, and the interest of the hudson bay company is the same as the indian conceives to be his interest in that quarter. it will be impossible for dr. lansdale to return to the flathead agency this year; both the hostility of the indians through whose country he would have to pass and the lateness of the season forbid it. i regret this, as the flathead nation have stood firmly by the blackfoot treaty, and take a proper view of the acts of the hostiles between the cascades and the bitter root. thus, sir, east of the main columbia the result of the operations of the regular troops has been that i am compelled to withdraw all my agents, except that it is barely possible that craig, when he reaches the walla walla valley on his return, may be able to go to the nez perce country. what is the remedy for this state of things? i answer, vigorous military operations,--the whipping of hostile indians into absolute submission, the hanging of murderers on conviction, and the planting of these indians on reserves established by congress. agent craig did return to lapwai at the request of the lawyer. the soundness of governor stevens's views and the accuracy of his foresight were abundantly vindicated within two years. during the following year, 1857, the settlers were excluded, the regulars lay inactive in their posts, and the quasi-peace continued. but in 1858 the yakimas waxed too insolent and predatory for even wright's patience. he sent major garnett through their country with a large force, who summarily seized and hanged a number of the chiefs and warriors, shot seven hundred of their ponies, and these severe acts humbled the haughty savages and reduced them to good behavior at last. colonel wright also ordered steptoe, with two hundred dragoons, to advance from walla walla across snake river towards spokane. the spokanes had warned the troops not to invade their country, alleging that they were neutral, and would permit neither the yakima braves nor the white soldiers to enter their limits. disregarding this warning, steptoe marched some eighty miles north of the snake, when he was assailed by the whole force of the spokanes and coeur d'alenes, badly defeated, and driven in precipitate retreat the whole distance back to snake river, hotly pursued by the victorious indians, and his force was only saved from massacre by the friendly nez perces, who ferried the fugitive troops over the river in their canoes, and boldly interposed between them and the pursuing savages. as soon as he could organize a powerful force, colonel wright in september, two months later, marched to the spokane in person, encountered and defeated the indians near the scene of steptoe's defeat, and reduced them to submission, hanging a number of them offhand without trial, and killing many of their horses. on his return to walla walla he seized and executed in like manner several of the more turbulent cuyuse and walla walla warriors. and this was the end of wool's theory of peaceable and injured indians, and the prejudiced officers, who clung to it so long and so obstinately, were at length obliged to adopt the very policy that governor stevens urged upon them in the beginning. the yakima chief, ow-hi, most active next to kam-i-ah-kan in bringing on the war and inciting the other tribes to hostility, and cunning and treacherous in his diplomacy, boldly entered wright's camp on the spokane soon after the fight, and was forthwith arrested and held a prisoner by that commander. the next day ow-hi's son, qualchen,--the murderer of agent bolon,--rode into camp, putting on a bold face and fully expecting to be treated with the consideration formerly shown the yakima chiefs. far different was his fate. wright sternly ordered him to immediate execution, and the wretched brave was forthwith hanged by the guard, despite his frantic pleadings and protestations. his father, the chief ow-hi, was killed a few days later while attempting to escape. but wool and his parasites, so vociferous in denouncing the slaying of pu-pu-mox-mox under like circumstances, raised no voice in rebuke of the merciless severity of wright. chapter xli disbanding the volunteers on returning to olympia the governor issued the order disbanding the entire volunteer organization, and took the necessary steps for disposing at public auction of the animals, equipments, and supplies on hand, and settling the accounts. the animals captured by shaw in the grande ronde were sold at vancouver, and brought enough to defray the entire cost of the expedition. in fact, owing to the large number taken, there were more animals actually sold at the several auctions than the whole number purchased for the volunteer service, notwithstanding the many worn out during the months of hard service. the sales of property realized some $150,000, and the articles sold generally brought more than the original cost. "i trust," remarked the governor, "that in view of the fact that our transportation has cost us nothing, that our people have let their animals go into the service from three to nine months, and have taken them back at a premium, the enemies of the territory will be more guarded in their speech." as all the expenses of the volunteer organization had been defrayed by scrip, the sales were made for scrip, and many of the settler-volunteers were glad to purchase stock, wagons, or supplies to take home with them, instead of paper promises to pay, yet at that time the scrip was but little depreciated. an incident showing the scrupulous regard for orders and public property maintained among the volunteers is related of captain henness. he captured a mule at the battle of the grande ronde and rode it home to olympia, a distance of some five hundred miles. desirous of owning the animal, he bid for it when put up at the public auction, but it was struck off to another for $475; and this brave officer, who had served in the field as captain of a company for ten months, was unable to secure his own riding mule, and one, too, captured by himself. when the accounts were finally adjusted, the scrip issued amounted to- equipments, supplies, etc., $961,882.39 pay-rolls of the troops 519,593.06 ------------ total $1,481,475.45 the aggregate number of volunteers was 1896. about one thousand were in service at one time. they were about equally divided between mounted and infantry troops. oregon furnished 215,--the companies of miller, goff, and richards (afterwards williams). as the whites capable of bearing arms in the entire territory did not exceed 1700, it is evident that this aid from oregon was of great value. thirty-five stockades, forts, and blockhouses were built by the volunteers, some of them being quite large works, twenty-three by the settlers, and seven by the regular troops. besides which, the roads and trails cut by the volunteers involved an immense amount of labor. the strict discipline, high _morale_ and good conduct of the volunteers were remarkable, and very creditable to them, and to the firm and sagacious mind that organized and commanded them. all captured property was turned over to the quartermasters, and properly accounted for. there was no case of murder, or unauthorized killing of indians, by the volunteers. there was no plundering or serious offenses of any kind charged upon them. they obeyed their orders with alacrity and zeal, no matter how arduous or how dangerous the duty required of them. they were the best type of american settlers, brave, intelligent, patriotic, self-respecting. they went into the war in self-defense, and were determined to put it through as soon as possible. study the maps of their marches and scouts; count the blockhouses they built, the roads and trails they opened; consider the unknown and almost impenetrable forest region the theatre of war; the rains; the hardships, the labors they underwent; and reflect how uniformly successful they were, not only in engagements, but in throwing the savage enemy wholly on the defensive, in completely putting an end to his attacks and depredations, and hunting him down so vigorously that only flight or submission could save him from death,--and one cannot but realize how necessary were their patriotic services and achievements, and how well they justified the wisdom and ability of governor stevens in calling them to the defense of the country, and carrying on an aggressive war. forts and blockhouses built by volunteers. stockade, cowlitz landing blockhouse, cowlitz farms blockhouse, skookumchuck blockhouse, chehalis river, at ford's fort miller, tanalquot plains fort stevens, yelm prairie blockhouse at lowe's, chambers' prairie blockhouse, olympia stockade, olympia fort hicks, camp montgomery blockhouse, camp montgomery fort white, puyallup crossing fort hays, connell's prairie blockhouse, connell's prairie fort white, white river crossing fort posey, white river crossing fort mcallister, south prairie blockhouse, lone tree point fort ebey, snohomish river fort tilton, below snoqualmie falls fort alden, ranger's prairie blockhouse, port townsend " point wilson " bellingham bay " on skookumchuck " vancouver " fourth prairie " washougal river " lewis river fort mason, walla walla valley fort preston, michel fork of nisqually blockhouse, klikitat prairie fort kitsap, port madison fort lander, duwhamish river stockade, seattle by settlers for mutual protection. blockhouse at davis's, claquato stockade at cochran's, skookumchuck stockade, fort henness, grand mound prairie stockade at goodell's, grand mound prairie blockhouse, tanalquot plains blockhouse, nathan eaton's, chambers' prairie two blockhouses, chambers' prairie blockhouse at ruddell's, chambers' prairie stockade at bush's, bush prairie blockhouse at rutledge's, bush prairie two blockhouses at tumwater blockhouse, dofflemyer's point blockhouse, whitby island " port gamble fort arkansas, on cowlitz blockhouse, on miami prairie blockhouse, port ludlow " port madison two blockhouses, boisfort two blockhouses, cascades by regular troops. fort slaughter, muckleshoot prairie fort maloney, puyallup river fort thomas, green river blockhouse, black river fort, walla walla valley fort, yakima valley blockhouse, cascades a few days after his return governor stevens was requested by colonel casey to take charge of a band of about a hundred lately hostile sound indians who had recently returned, or been sent back, from the yakima. the colonel complained that he had already sent them to the reservation, but the agent had refused to receive them, and, in order to prevent any disturbance that might arise from the "strange conduct of your agent," he had again received and was feeding them. the governor, having learned that stahi and other known murderers were with this band, and that leschi had been recently seen near fort nisqually, the hudson bay company post, at once replied, positively refusing to receive them until the murderers among them were arrested for trial, and formally demanded colonel casey's aid to that end:- "i have therefore to request your aid in apprehending leschi, qui-e-muth, kitsap, stahi, and nelson, and other murderers, and to keep them in custody awaiting a warrant from the nearest magistrate, which being accomplished, i will receive the remainder. "in conclusion, i have to state that i do not believe any country or any age has afforded an example of the kindness and justice which has been shown towards the indians by the suffering inhabitants of the sound during the recent troubles. they have, in spite of the few cases of murder which have occurred, shown themselves eminently a law-abiding, a just, and a forbearing people. they desire the murderers of indians to be punished, but they complain, and they have a right to complain, if indians, whose hands are steeped in the blood of the innocent, go unwhipped of justice." in response to this colonel casey declared that these indians "delivered themselves up to colonel wright when in the yakima country, made their peace with him, and were promised protection. colonel wright informed me of these facts." he declined, therefore, to assist in arresting the murderers, on the ground that it would be bad policy, if not bad faith, to do so, and added that he would refer the matter to general wool. he also remarked: "the indians on the sound, there is no doubt, can, by neglect and ill-usage, be driven to desperation." the governor controverted the position assumed by colonel casey that protection had been promised these indians by colonel wright, and renewed his demand:- "i have the statement to me by colonel wright that he had made no terms with them, and had guaranteed to them no immunity from trial and punishment. this statement was made to me repeatedly by colonel wright, and in the presence of witnesses, one of whom is mr. secretary mason. on the contrary, i have twice in writing made requisition on colonel wright for the delivery to me, in order that they might be brought within reach of the civil authorities, of leschi, qui-e-muth, kitsap, stahi, and nelson,--a requisition which he has not pretended to disregard, but which he simply asked my consent to have suspended for the present in view of the circumstances under which they came in. i renew my requisition upon you, as i did upon colonel wright, and i inclose for your information the correspondence with colonel wright in relation to the subject. "granted that it was a case of legitimate warfare, the men for whom i make requisition committed the murders in a time of profound peace, wider circumstances of unsurpassed treachery and barbarity, when their victims were entirely unsuspicious of danger, and this, too, in violation of the faith of treaties, which expressly stipulated for the giving up of men guilty of such offenses. "nor is there any analogy between the cases of known indians who have murdered white men and certain unknown white men who have murdered indians. your soldiers killed an indian. where are they? the citizens have killed indians. where are they? two are in your own garrison in confinement awaiting trial; and the others,--proof has not yet been found, after every exertion has been made to insure a bill from a grand jury in regard to the persons suspected. "i do not understand, in view of the known humanity and energy of the indian service on the sound, aided as it has been by the body of the citizens, the necessity, in communications to me, of this constant reference to the ill-treatment of the indians, for it must be borne in mind that we have managed some four thousand five hundred indians on temporary reservations on the sound during the war. indians taken from the war ground, by unwearied vigilance and care, have been seen to pass from a state of uncertainty as to whether they would join the war party, to one of contentment and satisfaction, with no assistance from the military whatever." the governor also sent colonel casey a copy of colonel wright's order on major garnett to deliver up the murderers. this correspondence seems to raise an ugly question of veracity between the two regular officers in regard to whether protection had or had not been promised the sound murderers, but the strenuous efforts to shield them from punishment for their crimes made by these officers is passing strange. colonel casey persisted in his refusal, saying: "this is a case in which the rights and usages of war are somewhat involved, and in consequence i consider myself and military superiors the proper persons to judge in the matter," and he referred it to general wool. that officer, of course, swiftly directed him to protect leschi, and all other indians professing friendship, against the whites. a few days later colonel casey again referred to the case of the indians, suggested that the reports which his agents and others carried to the governor should be received with great caution, and remarked:- "the one which i had the honor to receive from you a few days since, that more than one hundred indians had left the reservation for the purpose of joining leschi, proves to have been, what i believed at the time, a baseless fabrication. with a sincere desire to do justice to all, i will say that it is my firm belief, after weighing i trust with due consideration all the circumstances connected with the matter, that if, in dealing with the indians on the sound, a spirit of justice is exercised, and those who have charge of them are actuated by an eye single to their duties and the peace of the country, there need be no further difficulty." this unwarrantable slur called forth the following pungent reply from the governor. he had made no such report as casey attributed to him:- lieutenant-colonel silas casey. _sir_,--my reasons for declining to receive the indians at your post have been already stated, and remain in full force. when the murderers, and those accused of murder, are, in compliance with my requisition, placed by you in the hands of the civil authority, the indians will be received. the agents have positive orders to receive none of these indians except by my written instructions. the indians have been or will be indicted by the grand jury of the several counties. as you have proclaimed that hostilities have ceased, they are in your military possession. in regard to your observations about the reports which my "agents and others carry to me," as well as the reiterations of former observations in reference to the exercise of a spirit of justice, and the efforts of persons in charge of indians being "actuated by an eye single to those duties and the peace of the country," i have simply to state that the tone of them is offensive, and comes with an ill grace from the authority which has done little to that which has done much. it is not my disposition to retaliate, but the occasion makes it proper for me to state that the greatest difficulty i have had to encounter in stopping the whiskey traffic with the indians at steilacoom and bellingham bay has been the conduct of your own command. it would seem to be more appropriate that you should first control and reform the conduct of your own people, before going out of your way to instruct and rebuke another branch of the public service,--a service, too, which, both from its experience and the success which has attended its labors, is entitled to the presumption that it is as much interested in, and as much devoted to, the peace of the country as yourself, and as well qualified, to say the least, to consider dispassionately and to judge wisely of affairs at the present juncture. i have also been informed of your thanking god, in the presence of mr. wells, who informed you how the muckleshoot reservation was laid off, that the iniquity of it was not upon your hands,--a remark highly presumptuous and insulting, as well from the fact that the business did not concern you, as from the fact that the reservation was laid off both in the way i arranged with the indians at the council on fox island and to their entire satisfaction on the ground. very respectfully your obedient servant, isaac i. stevens, _governor and supt. indian affairs_. n.b. i will respectfully ask you to send me a copy of my letter notifying you that one hundred indians had left to join leschi. it is perhaps creditable to colonel casey's discretion that he attempted no reply to this letter, but simply acknowledged its receipt, and admitted that, in attributing the report about leschi to the governor, "it was an error on my part, and i cheerfully correct it." a thoroughly well-meaning man, he was evidently affected by wool's orders and influence; and, moreover, he suffered himself to give ear to, and was consequently misled by, the clique of lawyers and politicians who had instigated the martial law trouble in order to embarrass the governor, and were now hounding him with unabated rancor. notwithstanding casey's scruples and wool's orders, leschi and other accused murderers were duly indicted, arrested, and delivered to and received by colonel casey for custody at fort steilacoom, and thereupon the governor relieved him of his unwelcome protégés by sending them to the reservation. leschi was tried in due time, but the jury disagreed. he was convicted at a subsequent trial, and expiated his crimes on the gallows. the regular officers at fort steilacoom, with certain lawyers and indian sympathizers, made desperate efforts to save him from punishment, but in vain. the well-meaning casey was even hanged in effigy by the people, indignant at his course. leschi's brother, qui-e-muth, was captured near yelm prairie, november 18, and brought to the governor's office in olympia at midnight. the governor gave strict orders for guarding and protecting him there until morning, when he was to be taken to steilacoom. just before daylight, as he was sleeping on the floor, surrounded by his guards, who were also asleep, a man rushed into the room, the door being unlocked, shot qui-e-muth in the arm with a pistol, and, as he rose to his feet, drove a bowie knife into his heart, and rushed out as suddenly as he had entered. the deed was done, the assassin vanished, the victim sank lifeless to the floor, all in an instant, ere the startled and astonished guards could raise a hand to protect their charge. the governor, who had retired to rest in his quarters in the next building, aroused by the shot and the trampling of feet, came immediately to the scene, and was horror-struck and filled with indignation at the crime, and denounced it in unmeasured terms as a disgrace to the good name of the people and of the territory. he made every effort to identify and punish the murderer, but without avail. none of the guards could identify him, and no testimony could be found against any one. yet it was currently whispered that vengeance for the murder of mcalister, a settler on the nisqually and one of the earliest victims of savage treachery, had nerved the arm of his son-in-law, joseph bunting, to strike the blow. nothing that occurred during the whole war excited greater indignation in the mind of the governor than this act, or caused him more regret and chagrin. he had been unremitting in his efforts to protect the indians from lawless violence, and with such remarkable success that the volunteers were wholly free from reproach; only six cases had occurred among the exasperated settlers, and several of these he had brought to trial. and now this dastardly deed brought reproach to his very door. chapter xlii martial law.--difficulties overcome during all the indian outbreak and hostilities a number of hudson bay company ex-employees, scotchmen and canadians, were living in the indian country back of steilacoom in safety, when every american settler was murdered, or had fled to the towns. they had indian wives and half-breed children, and claimed to be neutral. they were in frequent communication with the hostile indians, and were not molested by them. captain maxon and other officers reported that they were undoubtedly giving information, aid, and comfort to the enemy, and that their scouting expeditions were fruitless in consequence. the indians who killed white and northcraft in march so near olympia were tracked straight to the houses of two of these neutrals, who acknowledged having been visited by the savages, but disclaimed any knowledge of their deeds. the volunteer officers, however, believed that they were not only sympathizers with, but active allies of, the hostiles, and were ready at the least intimation from the governor to treat them as hostiles. colonel casey declared that they ought not to be suffered to remain on their farms, where they could aid the enemy, if so disposed. the governor therefore ordered them to leave the indian country and remove to olympia, fort nisqually, or steilacoom, and there remain until further orders, in order to place them where they would be unable to give information or aid to the enemy, and also for their own safety, for the indignation of the volunteers was at white heat against them. accordingly they moved in as ordered, twelve of them. most of them had already taken out their first naturalization papers, and filed on their claims under the donation acts, and were entitled to all the rights of american citizens. a few lawyers at steilacoom, political or personal opponents of the governor, most active of whom was frank clark, saw here a chance to embarrass him,--in their own vernacular, "to get him down." they went to these ignorant men, exhorted them in regard to their rights as citizens, assured them that the governor had no authority to order them to abandon their claims, which congress had bestowed upon them, and that they could return to their homes with safety, because the law and the courts would protect them in so doing. thus persuaded, five of these misguided men, charles wren, sandy smith, john mcleod, henry smith, and john mcfield, went back to their farms. as soon as informed of their return, the governor caused them to be seized by a party of volunteers, taken to fort steilacoom, and turned over to colonel casey for safe custody, there being no jails in the territory. clark and his coadjutors lost no time in suing out a writ of habeas corpus. they represented matters to colonel casey in such a light that he notified the governor to relieve him of the prisoners. but the governor was not the man to suffer a few political tricksters to frustrate his necessary military measures. he well knew that if he surrendered in this case, he would have to abandon the practice, indispensable for carrying on the war, of impressing teams and supplies, and that his hold upon and discipline of the volunteers would be seriously impaired. on april 3 he proclaimed _martial law_ over the county of pierce, and suspended the functions of all civil officers therein. he caused the prisoners to be taken from the custody of colonel casey, brought to olympia, and incarcerated in a blockhouse. as the regular may term of the united states court for pierce county drew near, the mischief-makers were urgent for judge f.a. chenoweth, of whose district that county formed part, to hold court and enforce the writ of habeas corpus; but he, being sick, or else, as was currently believed at the time, fearing trouble and feigning sickness, requested chief justice edward lander to hold the term in his stead. judge lander at the time was captain of company a, and with his company was garrisoning the post on the duwhamish, near seattle; but without a word of notice to his military superiors he forsook his post, hastened to steilacoom, and opened court on may 7. the governor previously urged him to adjourn his court for one month, by which time there was every prospect that the indians would be subdued, and the exigency necessitating the restraint of the prisoners would have passed. but lander refused this way of avoiding a conflict, and persisted in what he doubtless deemed his duty. the governor resolutely met the issue thus raised. the court was duly opened on the appointed day, the lawyers were ready with their motions, when a detachment of volunteers under lieutenant-colonel shaw marched into the court-room, arrested the chief justice on the bench and the clerk at his table, and carried them under guard to olympia, where they were released. as soon as the detachment had departed with the prisoner judge and clerk, the clique, which had so cunningly engineered this conflict between the federal governor and the federal judge, both commissioned by the same president, made haste to hold a meeting of the "bar," vociferously to denounce the "flagrant usurpation and high-handed outrage" of the governor, and to pass a long string of condemnatory resolutions, which were signed by all the members participating in the meeting, nine in number. immediately afterwards the same parties held a "citizens' meeting" with a few others in the same room, and gave vent to more vituperative oratory, and passed more denunciatory resolutions. the whole proceedings were then published in a circular and in the newspapers. undoubtedly some who took part in these demonstrations were sincere in believing the governor's action to be wrong and uncalled for, but the real motives and animus of the prime movers were abundantly shown by the false, bitter, and scandalous statements and affidavits they made against him, and dispatched to the president, committees of congress, and the eastern press. they vehemently accused him not only of high-handed tyranny and usurpation, but of getting up the war by his indian treaties, which he had made in obedience to the instructions of the government; of vindictively oppressing and persecuting the indians, when he was feeding five thousand of them on the reservations, and standing like a rock to protect them from abuse; and even of drunkenness and embezzlement of public funds. these charges, from their very excess and bitterness, largely defeated themselves with the government, and with all by whom governor stevens was personally known; but they excited a deep prejudice against him in the minds of many, as he afterwards found in his congressional career. wool, too, welcomed with avidity these reinforcements to his crusade, and immediately forwarded copies of the resolutions, together with anonymous articles reflecting on the governor, to the war department. the signers of the resolutions were: w.h. wallace, george gibbs, elwood evans, c.c. hewitt, frank clark, b.f. kendall, william c. peas, e.o. murden, h.a. goldsborough. wallace and gibbs were the principal speakers at the citizens' meeting; thomas m. chambers, chairman; e. schrotter and e.m. meeker, secretaries; s. mccaw, r. s. moore, hugh patteson, william m. kincaid, william r. downey, committee on resolutions. evans and kendall came among the aides whom governor stevens brought to the country with the northern exploration, and who settled in olympia. the former became distinguished as an eloquent speaker and writer and historian of the pacific northwest, and, in after-years, paid the most warm, heartfelt, and appreciative eulogies to governor stevens's character and public services. gibbs and goldsborough, whom it will be remembered the governor had employed in the indian service and treated with great kindness and consideration, were unsuccessful and disappointed men. the former nursed a grievance, in that the governor had rejected an extensive and ambitious policy of indian treaties and indian management which gibbs had elaborately set forth in his report on the indians, and which, if accepted, would probably have furnished a good position for himself. the circular contained many misstatements, and was highly colored to give a wrong impression of the actual condition of affairs. to correct this, the governor published his vindication for proclaiming and enforcing martial law in pierce county. in this he clearly and forcibly states the facts and conditions rendering it necessary, for the success of military operations, that the suspected men be removed from the indian country, and sums up:- "it is simply a question as to whether the executive has the power, in carrying on the war, to take a summary course with a dangerous band of emissaries who have been the confederates of the indians throughout, and by their exertions and sympathy can render to a great extent the military operations abortive. "it is a question as to whether the military power, or public committees of the citizens, without law, as in california, shall see that justice is done in the case. "and he solemnly appeals to the same tribunals, before which he has been arraigned in the circular, in vindication of his course, being assured that it ought to be, and will be, sustained as an imperious necessity, growing out of an almost unexampled condition of things." judge lander's own district included thurston county and olympia, and the term of his court was to be held in a few days after his release from arrest. the governor's opponents and the judge determined to call him to account for contempt of court in proclaiming martial law and arresting the judge; and a strong-room was quietly prepared by the united states marshal for his incarceration in case of sentence to imprisonment. the governor issued his proclamation declaring martial law in thurston county on may 13, and sent two of the prisoners, charles wren and john mcleod, to cape montgomery for trial before a military commission. the others were released and permitted to go to steilacoom, on giving their parole to remain there. judge lander opened his court on the 14th, and issued notice, and then a writ, summoning the governor to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. no notice being taken of these missives, on the 15th a writ of attachment was issued to be served _instanter_, and united states marshal george w. corliss, with a strong posse, armed with this document, proceeded to the executive office for the purpose of arresting the governor and bringing him before the court. the governor received them, when they announced their business, with a quiet, cool dignity, which completely nonplussed them, and remarked, "gentlemen, why don't you execute your office?" as they still hung back, and looked at each other, as though at a loss to know what to do, the clerks, aided by some gentlemen present, ejected the posse from the office, to which they offered no resistance. major tilton, captain a.j. cain, james doty, quincy a. brooks, r.m. walker, a.j. baldwin, lewis ensign, charles e. weed, and joseph l. mitchell were they who expelled the posse; but it is evident that the latter made only a formal show of executing the writ. this farcical attempt had scarcely ended when a force of mounted volunteers rode rapidly into town. judge lander, hearing of their approach, hastily adjourned court, and took refuge in the office of elwood evans, the acting clerk of court, a wooden building of two rooms, situated on the east side of main street, between fourth and fifth streets. to this, a few minutes later, came captain bluford miller with a file of men, and demanded admittance. finding the door locked, he remarked, "i'll add a new letter to the alphabet: let her rip," and kicked in the door with his heavy boots. entering, he found the judge and evans in the rear room, and arrested them. mr. evans was immediately released, and judge lander was taken to camp montgomery, where he was held in honorable custody until the war on the sound was practically over, when he was set at liberty. immediately on the departure of the volunteers with their judicial prisoner, an attempt was made to hold a public meeting to protest against the governor's action. evans and kendall were the chief movers and speakers, and harangued a small crowd on main street, in front of the governor's dwelling and office. mrs. stevens, with her little girls, happened to be sitting in the front doorway as they approached, and refused to withdraw; but her presence did not deter nor mollify the speeches. despite the would-be indignation of the promoters, the whole proceeding fell flat, for nearly every one approved the governor's course, and only a mere handful took part in the demonstration. at length, having emptied the vials of their wrath, one of the speakers moved to adjourn in order to spare the feelings of mrs. stevens, who had sat apparently unmoved through it all, and the assemblage dispersed. a mass meeting, one of the largest ever convened in olympia, was held at the blockhouse on the public square, judge b.f. yantis presiding, and j.w. goodell, secretary, and the course of governor stevens in the matter of martial law was emphatically indorsed, with but twelve dissenting votes. memorials strongly defending his action were almost unanimously signed by the volunteers, and sent to the oregon and washington delegates in congress. both judge lander and judge chenoweth, in their reports to the secretary of state, complaining of the governor for enforcing martial law, admit that the people indorsed his course, and that the marshals or sheriffs were powerless to resist his orders. the two prisoners, wren and mcleod, were tried by military commission on the charge of giving aid and comfort to the enemy; but owing to lack of evidence and the end of the war, they were not convicted, and were finally set at liberty. martial law was revoked by proclamation on may 24. judge lander held his court at its next regular term in july. in response to notice the governor appeared by counsel, disclaimed any intentional disrespect to the court, but justified his action in proclaiming and enforcing martial law on the ground of imperious public necessity. a fine of fifty dollars for contempt was imposed, which he paid. anticipating a heavy fine, his friends and admirers were preparing a popular subscription to defray it, but they were not called upon. the judge's action in imposing a merely nominal fine was taken to be an acknowledgment, in accordance with the opinion of nine tenths of the community, that the governor's course, if technically illegal, was necessary and right. no action was taken against the volunteers who broke up the courts, or the citizens who turned the marshal and his posse into the street. in his communications to the government in defense of his course in proclaiming martial law, governor stevens advanced almost identically the same reasons and arguments that were afterwards adduced by president lincoln to justify his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. by a letter of the secretary of state, dated september 12, governor stevens was informed that the president, while having no doubt of the purity of his motives, disapproved his action in proclaiming martial law. the case of company a. the chief punishment by which the governor maintained such excellent discipline among the volunteers was that of dishonorable dismissal from the service, which carried with it the loss of pay. this was inflexibly enforced in flagrant cases of disobedience or misconduct, and, being regarded as a disgraceful stigma, was found sufficient. the good conduct and discipline of the volunteers was doubtless promoted by the incessant activity and labor to which they were put; but they were due still more to the superior intelligence and character of the settlers who turned out _en masse_ in defense of their hearthstones, and carried on the war with such patriotic zeal. in one case, however, the governor felt constrained to dismiss a whole company, an act afterwards made the pretext for much political denunciation and censure. it will be remembered that almost the first act of the governor, in the prosecution of the war, was to disband all local and home guards, and to enlist volunteers for general defense, to serve wherever and whenever ordered. on february 1 he directed judge lander to disband a company he had raised in seattle for home defense, and to enlist there a company for six months, subject to the orders of the executive, in conformity with the proclamation calling out volunteers. "every man," wrote the governor to lander, "who enlists, must do so with the understanding that he enlists for the general defense of the territory, and that he must move to any point where his services, in the opinion of his commanding officer, are most needed." under these instructions lander disbanded his first company and raised another, company a, which garrisoned seattle for a time, and then built and occupied a post on the duwhamish river, a few miles above seattle, and rendered good service in scouting that vicinity and lake washington. it was this post and command that lander abandoned in order to hold judge chenoweth's court, with such mortifying results to himself. on june 9 lieutenant a.a. denny, who succeeded to the command of company a on lander's abandonment of it, was ordered to detail an officer and eight men to hold the post, and to move with his company to fort hays, on connell's prairie, thence to assist in cutting a road to snoqualmie falls. on his representation that a greater force was needed for the protection of the citizens in his vicinity than was designated, he was directed to leave twenty men at the post, and to send the remainder of his company by canoe to steilacoom, thence to march to camp montgomery, where he would receive supplies. he was informed that- "the representation of captain lander that forty men could be spared, the fact of parties of from three to five having traveled in safety the route from the falls of the snoqualmie to porter's prairie, and the reports of mr. yesler that but six or eight indians are still out east of seattle, are sufficient to warrant the leaving of the town of seattle to the protection of the naval forces and the regulars at fort thomas;" and that fifteen days would probably be occupied in cutting the road. the massachusetts lay in the harbor of seattle, and fifteen of her men were on shore garrisoning the town. lieutenant denny, in a long and argumentative letter dated june 19, reiterated his opinion that it would not be safe to withdraw the company from its post. he wrote:- "i am extremely surprised at the opinion represented as expressed by judge lander. during the period of his command it was often publicly stated by him that this company was expressly organized (by private understanding with the governor and commander-in-chief) for the protection of this immediate neighborhood." it is hard to reconcile this with the governor's explicit orders and letter to judge lander. for such failure to obey orders lieutenant denny was directed to turn over his command to the next officer in rank, and was relieved from duty in the volunteer service until further orders. lieutenant d.a. neely, the next in rank, was ordered to assume command of the company, and detail twenty men to proceed to camp montgomery for work on the road. but lieutenant neely and the whole company proved equally recusant, and signed and transmitted to the governor resolutions fully indorsing the course of lieutenant denny, and declaring that they considered the course of the commander-in-chief in suspending lieutenant denny from his command an act of injustice and an insult to the company, wholly unjustifiable and uncalled for. with great forbearance, regarding the company not as willfully disobedient, but as led astray by feeling and bad advice, the governor sent his aide, colonel fitzhugh, to endeavor to bring them to reason and due sense of duty, and gave him the following instructions:- "you will show these resolutions to the company, and request the signers to either repudiate or modify them in such a manner as to relieve themselves from the position of disobedience to the orders which these resolutions condemn. "you will represent to the company that the resolution disapproving of the course of the commander-in-chief, and considering it 'an act of injustice and wholly uncalled for,' places the company in an attitude of insubordination which will necessarily preclude the possibility of their being honorably discharged from the service until they, by their own acts, occupy different ground from that of justifying disobedience to orders. "there is nothing improper or objectionable in company a requesting the reinstatement of lieutenant denny, and a request to that effect would be properly considered, but by indorsing and sustaining that officer in his refusal to obey orders they participate in a state of indiscipline and insubordination which is destructive to efficiency, and injurious to the reputation of the volunteer service of washington territory. "in the hope that the intelligent and gallant men of company a will see the matter in the true light, and by their act in rescinding these unmilitary and insubordinate resolutions will place themselves upon the same footing as the rest of the regiment, and so enable the commander-in-chief to report as efficient and useful the whole body of troops raised from the citizen soldiery of washington territory, i have the honor to be," etc. but colonel fitzhugh was unable to induce the company to rescind the resolutions, and reported that a false sense of shame restrained them. he was then sent back to formally disband the company, which he did july 28, and they were dishonorably discharged. the governor, however, did not allow this discharge to deprive them of full pay, but in this respect presented their claims on the same footing as the other volunteers. all were finally paid by congress. control of disaffected indians. governor stevens's responsibilities and labors were vastly increased by the great number of indians on the sound who did not actively join in the outbreak, but who caused constant care and anxiety on the one hand to prevent their aiding their kindred who had taken the war-path, and on the other to protect them from retaliatory violence at the hands of infuriated settlers, whose nearest and dearest had been sacrificed in savage massacre, and from the destructive whiskey traffic with vicious and debased white men. five thousand of such indians were placed upon the insular reservations and supported, in large part, under the charge of reliable agents; while three thousand more remained on the strait of fuca and the western shore of the sound in less strict custody, as they were more remote from the scene of hostilities. for a time these reservation indians were in a very excited and disaffected state. it was impossible to prevent hostile emissaries from mingling among them, or some of the young braves from slipping away to help their brethren against the hated whites. the agents lived among them in constant and imminent danger of massacre; they carried their lives in their hands. the governor's plan of enlisting them as auxiliaries, and sending them out under white officers to hunt down the enemy, although attended at first with great risk of treachery, was the most effective means of confirming their fidelity, and when the tide turned against the enemy, all were eager in their professions of friendship and offers of services. the first of these expeditions, that of pat-ka-nim and his snohomish warriors under colonel simmons, was considered a very doubtful and dangerous experiment; but heavy rewards were offered the chief for the heads of the hostiles he might slay, and one that he sent in was said to have been that of his own brother. well might shaw exclaim, "blankets will turn any indian on the side of the whites." after this, pat-ka-nim's allegiance was well secured. when sidney ford led a party of chehalis indians on a scout against the enemy, he lay one night pretending slumber, while he listened to a long discussion between his _friendly_ indian followers as to the expediency of killing him and joining the hostiles. agent wesley gosnell had a somewhat similar experience. what iron nerves, what devoted patriotism, thus to venture into the trackless forests at the head of these uncertain and treacherous savages! there is not the slightest doubt that a few weeks of wool's pacific and defensive policy would have united all these disaffected indians in the outbreak, and swept the whole country with a whirlwind of savage war. nothing but governor stevens's prompt, aggressive, and masterly measures prevented the catastrophe. by many of the settlers the governor's treatment of the indians was deemed too lenient and generous. they declared that indians who received and concealed the visits of hostile warriors, and allowed their young men to join in the raids and fights, ought themselves to be treated as hostile, and warred down without mercy. on one occasion a worthy and intelligent clergyman pleaded long and earnestly with the governor, urging him to attack and put to the sword the indians on the squaxon reservation, many of whom were nisquallies, the tribe that had taken the lead in the outbreak. but the governor disregarded all such appeals, and remained as firm in protecting the friendly or merely disaffected indians as inflexible in requiring the punishment of the murderers who first instigated the war by the wanton massacre of inoffensive settlers. summary measures were taken with whiskey-sellers, when caught about the reservations. the agent would arm his employees, and when necessary a few stout and trustworthy indians, descend on the culprit, stave, smash, and destroy his poisonous stores, and drive him to instant flight. there was no fooling with legal proceedings or courts. the means were effective, if somewhat high-handed, and the only ones that could be made so. it was more difficult to prevent the indians from obtaining liquor away from the reservations, especially about the towns, and the governor complained that the regular soldiers were among the worst offenders in this respect. in a private letter to colonel nesmith, who succeeded him as superintendent of indian affairs, the governor says of his indian agents:- "i have never known a more faithful and efficient body of men than the officers and employees connected with me in the indian service. i have never known, all things considered, a body of men at all to be compared to them in the high qualities which fit men for duty in times of emergency. they literally for months went with their lives in their hands, and moreover in the economy of the service they were vigilant and faithful. i look upon it as the duty of all officers, without waiting for instructions, to guard the treasury. i have had some difficulties to contend with in the past, growing out of political antipathies. i have from the beginning set my face sternly against all cliques, combinations, and sinister influences in the discharge of my duty." on these temporary insular reservations were collected some 5000 indians. the snohomish and other tribes, numbering 1700, were placed on skagit head, the southern point of whitby island, under colonel m.t. simmons; the lummi, nooksahk, and samish, 1050, at penn's cove, whitby island, under r.c. fay; the duwhamish, etc., 1000, on port madison bay, dr. d.t. maynard, h. l. yesler, and g.a. paige taking charge of them; the puyallaps, and nisquallies, 806, on fox island, under sidney s. ford; the quaks-na-mish, 400, on klah-shemin or squaxon island, under wesley gosnell; the chehalis, 400, on the chehalis river, near judge s.s. ford's, and under his charge; the cowlitz, 300, near cowlitz, under pierre charles. on the columbia river, under general charge of agent j. cain, 200 chinooks were collected at vancouver; 200 klikitats on the white salmon, under a. townsend; and 300 yakimas, opposite the dalles, under a.h. robie. the indian department, in response to governor stevens's urgent letters taken to washington by secretary mason, and the latter's clear statement of the emergency, promptly remitted $27,000 to feed these indians, and followed it with large sums for that purpose. the northern indians, gangs of whom persisted in visiting the sound in their great war canoes in spite of the prohibition and warnings of both american and british authorities, caused great anxiety and apprehension. the governor urged the naval officers to keep a vessel constantly cruising the lower sound to overawe and restrain them. on february 17 he wrote captain gansevoort that, from information received, he was apprehensive of a descent on the settlements by fourteen war canoes of these savages, and urged that the active be kept cruising the whole time between port townsend, bellingham bay, and seattle, saying:- "these northern indians, in daring, force, and intelligence, greatly surpass the indians of the sound. their war canoes, carrying seventy-five men, can be moved through stormy seas, and with great rapidity. i deem it essential to the safety of the lower portion of the sound that a steamer should be constantly in motion there." apparently reliable reports were brought to the governor from time to time that these desperadoes were seeking to join the hostiles. some of them actually offered their services to fight for the whites. they were attracted to the scene of war like vultures to the carrion, and were equally ready to fight and spoil either party to the conflict, or both. in july one of these unwelcome visitors was killed in a drunken brawl by a regular soldier at steilacoom. from their well-known vindictive character, it was certain that they would avenge the death sooner or later by some act of atrocity. the governor therefore reinforced whitby island with fifteen men from the line of the snohomish, and the massachusetts and hancock were kept diligently cruising. when, in november, another party appeared near steilacoom, committing depredations, and had a fight with the indians on the reservation, in which two of their number were killed, captain gansevoort hastened to the scene in the massachusetts, determined to compel them to leave the sound. they had already started down it, but he pursued and overtook them at port gamble, where he found them encamped on an island. after exhausting all efforts at conciliation, offering to pardon all their depredations, and even to tow their canoes to victoria if they would only depart from the sound, and all friendly overtures being treated with the utmost contempt and ridicule by the indians, captain gansevoort opened fire upon them from his guns, and, throwing a party ashore, attacked them on land also. their canoes were destroyed, and they were driven back into the woods, but they fought with desperate courage and determination, and continued the contest the entire day. to a message sent by a captured squaw, inviting them to surrender with the sole condition of leaving the sound, they returned the defiant answer that they would fight as long as there was a man left alive. but being on a small island, and all their canoes and supplies destroyed, they were forced by hunger to surrender, which they did after holding out for forty-eight hours. the party consisted of one hundred and seventeen men, besides squaws and boys, and lost twenty-seven killed and twenty-one wounded. captain gansevoort took the survivors in his vessel to victoria, where he purchased canoes for them and started them northward, exacting their promises never to return to the sound. even this severe punishment did not deter them from seeking revenge. the following year a party of them landed on whitby island, murdered colonel isaac n. ebey, the united states collector of customs, cut off his head, plundered his house, and departed northward with their booty and ghastly trophy. chapter xliii legislative censure.--popular vindication the family remained in olympia during this year of indian troubles. the children attended the public school, and found kind and judicious teachers in the rev. george f. whitworth and his estimable wife. mrs. stevens, escorted by her son, frequently rode on horseback over the neighboring prairies, heedlessly running a greater peril than they knew of, for the indians murdered two men and committed depredations quite near the town. there was not much social gayety at such an anxious time, but the little community were drawn closer together by the dangers surrounding it. when not absent on his trips, the governor usually worked in his office till long after midnight, and his assistants and clerks were kept hard at it to dispose of the multifarious orders, reports, accounts, and other details of the war and the indian service. he kept both the war and indian departments in washington constantly informed of the progress of the war and the condition of affairs by frequent detailed and graphic reports, and these, with his correspondence, made a volume of four hundred pages as published with his message of 1857. his physical labors were also extreme, involving journeys to the columbia river, the dalles, walla walla, and down the sound, aggregating over two thousand miles. and it should be borne in mind that he was not assisted by any regularly long established and tried services, but had in a measure to create the organizations, and to make use of hastily selected and inexperienced officers. he had by this time fully adopted the rough, serviceable costume of the country,--slouch hat, woolen shirt, and heavy riding-boots,--and, indeed, no other garb was practicable for one so constantly engaged on long and arduous journeys by horseback and canoe, frequently in stormy weather. [illustration: homestead in olympia] in the summer and fall the governor caused his block of land no. 84, which he purchased on his first arrival, to be cleared, and the late benjamin harned built for him a plain, square dwelling, with a wide hall in the centre and rooms on either side, a story and a half high. a smaller building, for an office, on the northeast corner of the block, and a stable in the rear on the southwest corner were also built. the family moved into the new home in december, and found the spacious rooms, with the magnificent view of the sound and the coast range, a most agreeable change from the former contracted quarters and noisy surroundings. the governor gave a house-warming, to which he invited the members of the legislature, a number of naval officers, who happened to be in the harbor, and about all the townspeople, including elwood evans and others who had been unmeasured in their denunciation of his course. the site of the residence had been covered with immense fir-trees, and all within reach of the dwelling had to be felled to avoid danger of their falling and crushing the house during some storm, which involved the felling of the trees over an area of ten acres. but notwithstanding all this care, one of these forest monarchs was left standing some distance in front of the office, and the following winter fell directly across it, cutting the building clear to the ground. the labor of digging out the immense stumps was very great and expensive, and when the governor, late in the winter, assured colonel cock and mr. george a. barnes that he meant to have the finest garden in town the next spring, and would send them the earliest vegetables, these old settlers laughed in confident incredulity. the governor was unable to follow up the improvement of the taylor claim this year, but john dunn, the hired man, and hazard, now an active lad of fourteen, rode out there from time to time and planted and raised quite a crop of potatoes, celery, cabbages, etc., on the beaver meadow, which also afforded several tons of hay. the legislature met in december, and governor stevens, in a strong message, accompanied by the correspondence with the war department and military officers, rendered a clear and graphic account of his successful prosecution of the war. in view of his herculean labors and entire self-devotion, and the outrageous abuse heaped upon him, the concluding paragraph is touching in its manly simplicity and confidence:- "i have endeavored faithfully to do my whole duty, and have nothing to reproach myself with as regards intention. i could have wished some things had been done more wisely, and that my whole course had been guided by my present experience. i claim at your hands simply the merit of patient and long labor, and of having been animated with the fixed determination of suffering and enduring all things in your behalf. whether in the wilderness contending with the hostile elements, managing and controlling the more hostile aborigines, or exploring the country, or at the capitol struggling with disaffection, the subject of obloquy and abuse, i have had no end but my duty, no reward in view but my country's good. it is for you to judge how i have done my part, and for the almighty ruler to allot each man his desert." it was generally believed that the legislature, like the people, would gladly recognize the great services of the governor, and do all in their power to sustain him. but his political and personal enemies had been very active, and had covertly secured a number of members, some of them elected in the guise of pretended friends. from whitby island was chosen an able but corrupt man, j.s. smith, commonly known as "carving fork smith," from the current report that his too pressing advances towards a married woman in oregon had been repulsed with such an implement by the insulted matron. this worthy called upon governor stevens at the beginning of the session and proposed some deal, with the result that the governor indignantly ordered him out of the office. angered at this repulse, he made common cause with the governor's enemies, and eagerly sought means to attack and injure him. his general course in the prosecution of the war, and even in the martial-law difficulty, was so universally approved that it would be useless to assail him on that score, but finally they concluded to make a handle of the dismissal of company a. their object was to obtain some sort of legislative censure of the governor in aid of the untiring and unscrupulous efforts they were making for his removal. a resolution pronouncing the charge of insubordination against company a to be without sufficient foundation and also a resolution condemning martial law were introduced, and by the combination of the supporters of the two, and the strenuous efforts of the governor's enemies, were passed by a bare majority. a committee was appointed to present them to him in person, in order to make the censure more emphatic and offensive. the governor received the committee with his wonted dignity and equanimity. one of the members was colonel william cock, whom the governor had always treated with consideration, whose son he had befriended and employed in the indian service, and who had always professed a warm friendship for the governor, and approval of his course. but colonel cock had been won over by the conspirators by appeals to his vanity, and had allowed himself to be placed on the committee. when it had delivered its message, the governor, genuinely grieved at the defection of a friend, addressed colonel cock in a quiet and friendly manner, pointing out how he had stultified himself, repudiating his own sentiments and declarations, endeavored to strike down the man who had done so much to defend the country, and his own professed friend, and finally, against his better feelings and judgment, had allowed himself to be made a tool of as a member of the committee. colonel cock, realizing at last the ignoble part he was playing, was thoroughly ashamed and took his leave, expressing his regret and sorrow at his course. the remainder of the committee sneaked out, feeling small and crestfallen. but the conspirators were jubilant, making sure that this legislative censure, coming on top of general wool's attacks, the martial-law resolutions, and the numerous secret affidavits sent on, would certainly cause the governor's removal, and went about exclaiming, "governor stevens is a dead lion at last." after this deliverance, the legislature passed all the measures and memorials that the governor recommended. some of the members who voted for the resolutions of censure regretted their action like colonel cock, and all were soon compelled to cower and apologize before the indignation which their action excited all over the territory. everywhere the real people, the stalwart settlers, the men of worth and character, were denouncing this underhanded and cowardly attempt to misrepresent their sentiments, and strike down the man who had saved the territory in her peril and defended her fair fame against the slanders of high officials, whose patriotic self-devotion and herculean labors they had witnessed, whose courage, force of character, and ability they admired, and whose leadership they were proud to follow. the people were eager to manifest their approval and support of governor stevens, and in response to this sentiment the democratic convention, meeting at cowlitz landing, unanimously nominated him for delegate in congress. meantime the governor, least disturbed of all at the unjust but impotent censure, enjoyed a little respite after four years of incessant and overwhelming responsibilities and labors. he was comfortably established in his new home, and hugely enjoyed his garden and farming. he employed two excellent men about the place, joel risden and william van ogle, and fully redeemed his promise of the finest garden and earliest vegetables in olympia. he purchased a yoke of oxen, had a cart built, and commenced clearing the walker claim, situated half way to tumwater. the malignant charges and attacks upon him failed to cause his removal. the governor, however, felt that he had not been properly supported at washington. his indian treaties were left unconfirmed, and wool's course in excluding settlers from the upper country and vilifying the people was not rebuked. he declared with great feeling that he would never accept another appointive civil office. on january 26, 1857, at the instance of the governor, the legislature passed an act incorporating the northern pacific railroad company, with a capital of fifteen millions, which might be increased to thirty millions, and authority to build a railroad from one of the passes in the rocky mountains, on the border of nebraska, westwardly across washington by the bitter root valley, crossing the coeur d'alene mountains, and traversing the plain of the columbia, with two branches, one down the columbia, the other over the cascade mountains to the sound, with a line from the river to the sound. among the incorporators were governor isaac i. stevens, senator ramsay, and general james shields, of minnesota, judge william strong, colonel william cock, elwood evans, a.a. denny, and w.s. ladd. the governor expected a rapid development of the territory, and evidently thought that an organized company with a charter was a practical step towards starting the great railroad enterprise. early in the year 1857 general wool was relieved of the command of the pacific department by general n. g. clarke, colonel 6th infantry, and went to new york, where he continued his malignant warfare upon the authorities, volunteers, and people of oregon and washington, by whose governors and legislatures he was denounced, "and whose respect he had long since ceased to possess." after his nomination the governor determined to make a canvass of the territory, and invited alexander s. abernethy, who was nominated by the whig convention, to accompany and meet him in joint discussion. the newly appointed receiver of the land office, just arrived from the east, selucious garfielde, a man of fine, showy presence and great oratorical gifts, offered to assist in the canvass by discussing national politics. a small steam-tug, the traveler, w.h. horton owner and captain, was chartered to take the party around the sound. mr. abernethy declined the invitation, but colonel william h. wallace went in his stead, and the governor, accompanied by garfielde, wallace, his son hazard, and a few friends, started from olympia in may, and visited steilacoom, seattle, ports madison, gamble, ludlow, and townsend, thence up hood's canal to sebec, thence whitby island, thence bellingham bay, and thence returned to olympia. at each point the governor spoke at length, defending his course, but devoting more time to pointing out the needs of the territory and the measures necessary for its benefit, such as the confirmation of the treaties, payment of the war debt, additional roads and mail service, and especially the northern pacific railroad and its relation to the trade of asia. with much feeling he indignantly denied the personal charges against himself, denounced the traducers, and defied them to meet him face to face and repeat them. though not a fluent speaker, he was clear, strong, earnest, and convincing, and was everywhere received with the greatest attention and respect. a plot was formed at steilacoom to get up a row at the meeting to be held there, and under cover of it to assassinate the governor; and in consequence of the earnest entreaties of his friends there, who had discovered the plot at the last moment and were wholly unprepared for it, he made but a short stop at that point. in july he again visited steilacoom, and held a meeting and joint discussion, but no attempt at disturbance was made, his friends being ready for it. as the little traveler slowly churned her way into bellingham bay, a great war canoe, manned by the northern indians,--those dreaded sea wolves,--went speeding across the entrance to the bay twice as fast as the traveler could possibly go, and the little party felt rejoiced to have escaped meeting them. it was only a few weeks later that the unfortunate colonel ebey met his tragic fate at the hands of a crew of these savages. they were forbidden to enter the sound, and the appearance of one of their war canoes betokened only violence and robbery. after returning to olympia the governor spoke at meetings of the settlers there, at tumwater, and yelm, chambers', and grand mound prairies. then he proceeded down the chehalis river and traveled along the coast, crossing gray's harbor and shoalwater bay, to the mouth of the columbia, holding meetings on miami prairie, and each of these points; thence, continuing the canvass, he went up the river, speaking at cathlamet, monticello, lewis river, vancouver, and the cascades, and then, returning home by way of the cowlitz, he spoke at cowlitz landing and judge ford's. in this canvass, in five weeks governor stevens traveled by steamer, canoe, and on horseback fourteen hundred and sixty miles, and spoke at forty meetings. his friends supported him with great enthusiasm, and one of the features of the contest was the "stevens hat," adopted as a badge by his more enthusiastic supporters,--a black slouch hat, the rougher and shabbier the better. the election took place july 13, and he was chosen by a vote of 986 against 549 for his opponent. during the governor's absence on the canvass occurred the untimely death of james doty, his faithful secretary and assistant in so many difficult and dangerous indian councils and expeditions. "i have never been connected with a more intelligent and upright man," declared the governor. he was buried on bush prairie beside his friend, george w. stevens. after his election as delegate governor stevens resigned as governor, august 11, 1857, and lafayette mcmullan, of virginia, was appointed his successor. the governor turned over the gubernatorial office to the new appointee on his arrival, and the indian superintendency to colonel nesmith, who was appointed superintendent for both oregon and washington, the two superintendencies having been united by the last congress, in may. at his invitation colonel nesmith visited him at olympia, and the governor took the greatest pains to impart to him all the information and assistance in regard to his new duties in his power. it was on a beautiful morning in the early fall that governor stevens with his family started from olympia on the return journey to the east. he rode his noble gray charger charlie, and his son was also mounted, while mrs. stevens and the three little girls rode in an easy spring wagon. the roads were dry, the weather of the finest, the country in its most beautiful garb, and all the family were in high health and spirits; and the governor, buoyant with courage, hope, and vigor, having accomplished the tremendous tasks laid upon him by the government, carried the territory through the indian hostilities, overcome all obstacles, and put down his enemies, now looked forward with renewed confidence to vindicating his course in washington, and compelling a deceived and misguided congress and administration to do justice to his people and himself. the return journey to the cowlitz, and down that stream in canoes, and up the columbia to portland by steamboat was uneventful but pleasant, in strong contrast to the discomforts of the trip on entering the country three years previously. san francisco was reached after a short voyage down the coast, where the governor was again welcomed by his old friends, and everywhere received with the attention and deference considered due his remarkable achievements in face of unprecedented obstacles. on the voyage to panama, the steamer golden gate broke her shaft the second day out, and had to creep back to port with one wheel, like a bird with a broken wing, losing an entire week. the golden age, which took her place, came near meeting a worse disaster; for one stormy and misty afternoon, as the captain and cabin passengers were at dinner, a steerage passenger on the forward upper deck espied a rock-bound island directly in front of the steamship, upon which she was rushing at full speed, and gave the alarm. the great paddle-wheels were instantly reversed, and the vessel just managed to back off before striking. colonel john c. fremont, the pathfinder, the republican candidate for the presidency, was one of the passengers,--a slender, alert man,--as was also one of the californian senators, john broderick, who fell in a duel with judge terry soon afterwards. the passage across the isthmus was made safely and easily all the way by rail; and the voyage from aspinwall to new york was unmarked, save by a severe storm, with mountainous billows for three days, off cape hatteras. they arrived in new york in time to make a short visit in newport, and to spend thanksgiving at andover with the puritan father. chapter xliv in congress.--vindicating his course governor stevens lost no time in hastening to washington, and the very next day after his arrival called upon the commissioner of indian affairs in regard to the funds for, and accounts of, superintendent nesmith. the large numbers of indians, chiefly in oregon, still being restricted to reservations and partially supported by the government, necessitated heavy expenditures, some of which were made without previous authorization, and it was essential for the peace of the country that they should be approved and nesmith sustained. following the matter up with his accustomed energy and thoroughness, he calls upon the commissioner and secretary of the interior again and again; he has all the suspended accounts, estimates, and papers brought together, and, having mastered them, he sits down with the chief clerk,--"an old friend of mine," he writes nesmith,--posts him up and satisfies him on all points, and secures his favorable report, and then convinces the commissioner and secretary. by the very next steamer the funds for washington territory liabilities are sent to nesmith, and during the next few months, by unremitting and painstaking efforts, his deficiency payments are allowed, his estimates approved, and ample funds remitted. this was an extremely difficult and laborious task, for the expenditures for the indian service in the two territories were unexpectedly large, the department was naturally reluctant to authorize them, and the difficulties were largely increased by the rasping and peppery, if not insubordinate, letters which nesmith, indignant at the neglect of his recommendations, addressed to the commissioner, and which the governor ingeniously neutralized by personally vouching for colonel nesmith, and submitting extracts of nesmith's letters to himself evincing the superintendent's devotion to duty. the still more important duty of vindicating his indian treaties and procuring their ratification engaged his closest attention. in one short fortnight, by his clear exposition of their wise and beneficent provisions, and by his graphic portrayal of the conditions in the pacific northwest, he satisfies commissioner mix, secretary thompson, and president buchanan that the treaties ought to be confirmed, and secures their urgent recommendations to the senate in favor of confirming them without delay. he seemed to take his former attitude of personal influence with the highest officers of the government at a bound, despite the serious charges that had been made against him. on december 2 he writes nesmith:- "we have had many conferences with the commissioner, and two with the president and secretary of war, in regard to indian affairs. i am working very hard with the department in order to have everything completely in train against the meeting of congress. "i have been most cordially received in all quarters since my arrival, and i hope i shall be useful to our territories." and again, on december 17:- "lane and myself will canvass the indian committees. have seen senator sebastian, chairman senate committee. pushing armed steamer for the sound. indian and war departments and president all concur. i have had a most attentive and courteous hearing from all these gentlemen. years since, i learned brevity and directness in the transaction of business here, and i find no difficulty whatever in effecting a good deal in very brief interviews." his old friends in washington--professors bache, henry, and baird, general totten, mr. john l. hayes, former brother officers, and others--welcomed him back, and were glad and proud to observe that he was unchanged except in increased maturity and strength of character, and that his very presence, with his simple, earnest, and dignified demeanor, refuted the infamous slanders that had been circulated against him. general joseph lane, the delegate from oregon, received him with open arms, delighted to have so able a coadjutor to fight the battles of the far-distant and neglected northwestern territories. general lane was highly esteemed by all parties, and had much influence with the democratic leaders. the governor said he was a tower of strength. a devoted friendship grew up between the two whole-souled and patriotic men. it will be remembered how inflexibly governor stevens insisted upon the trial and punishment of the indian murderers who so treacherously massacred unoffending settlers, deeming the example absolutely necessary, to deter the commission of outrages by the indians in the future. having brought leschi and the sound murderers to condign punishment, in spite of the efforts of the regular officers to shield them, he now urged the indian department to make requisition upon the war department for the arrest and delivery to the civil courts, for trial, of the yakima murderers, whose atrocious slaying of their agent, bolon, and the miners, precipitated the war, but who thus far had been virtually safeguarded by the pacific and temporizing policy of the regular officers. after a number of interviews with the indian commissioner and the two secretaries, the demand was about to be complied with, for all agreed that the murderers ought to be punished, when the objection was raised by the military authorities on the pacific that an attempt to seize the offenders would lead to further hostilities, and it was intimated that the indians regarded the quasi-peace operations of colonel wright in 1856 as promising them immunity for the murders. the secretary of the interior, doubtful how far the good faith of the government might be involved, was consequently reluctant to make the necessary requisition on the war department. the governor thereupon addressed an able letter to the commissioner, in which he pointed out that an inflexible adherence to the policy of punishing perpetrators of unprovoked murders was the only course to impress savage tribes with respect, and deter them from the commission of similar outrages; that, while such a course in this case might be attended with the renewal of hostilities on a small scale with the recalcitrant faction of the yakimas, it would do more than all else to strengthen the hands of peaceful and friendly indians in other tribes. he declared that he had always understood, from repeated interviews with colonel wright, that that officer had given no immunity to murderers. moreover, the very manner in which the military objected showed conclusively that no such immunity was ever granted; for, if it had been granted, they would have avowed it positively as their own act, and not merely have referred to it hypothetically, as it were, and as subordinate to the question of expediency. for if the faith of the government had been pledged, questions of expediency were subordinate. he concluded:- "i must therefore urge the requisition, unless the military will take the responsibility of saying, 'we did make a pacification on the ground of immunity to the murderers,' in which case i shall press the matter no further, except to suggest that measures be taken to prevent such pacifications hereafter." thus ably and ingeniously the governor forced upon the military the onus of acknowledging having patched up a fictitious peace by granting immunity to murderous savages, whom it was their duty to punish. this they could not bring themselves to do; they were obliged to abandon their protégés to their fate, and the requisition was made. one cannot but think, after a careful study of all the evidence, that the indian murderers were led to believe in the promise of immunity, if it was not explicitly promised them. at the end of december he broke away from these engrossing cares and labors for a few days, and went north for his family, having leased a commodious brick house, no. 510, on the north side of twelfth street, between e and f, at $200 a month; but on january 4 he is again at his post in the house. he installed mr. james g. swan as his secretary, set apart the upper rooms in the house as an office, and plunged with redoubled energy into the important and multifarious duties and objects he had undertaken, chief of which was the confirmation of the indian treaties; payment of the indian war debt; advocacy of the northern route, separate indian superintendency for washington territory, armed steamer for puget sound, mail route, military roads, appropriations for indian service, and for other needs of the territory; and pressing before the departments many private claims growing out of the indian war. besides all these, he published, february 1, a circular letter to emigrants, giving useful information for those wishing to move to the territory. in this month he also wrote a strong appeal to the indian department, urging that the farms promised the blackfeet by the treaty of the blackfoot council be established without further delay, and suggesting that the commissioner confer with alexander culbertson, who was then visiting washington,--an appeal which bore fruit, for the commissioner immediately sent for mr. culbertson, and took steps to start the farms. the governor also gave effective aid to mr. culbertson in collecting an account due him from the government. the appropriation of $30,000 for a wagon-road between fort benton and walla walla--made in 1855--had never been used, in consequence of the indian hostilities, and the governor now induced the secretary of war to authorize the commencement of the road, and to place lieutenant mullan in charge of it. the topographical engineers of the army were not a little put out at the governor's action in mullan's behalf, claiming that the duty rightfully belonged to one of their corps, and that he was disregarding the rights of the engineers in bestowing it upon a line officer; but he had found mullan one of the most zealous and efficient officers of the exploration, and one, moreover, especially conversant with the country. his recommendation had great weight with the war department, thus to overcome the influence of the corps and the almost invariable usage. another incident which occurred at this time afforded further evidence of his influence. an officer of general wool's staff, captain t.j. cram, in 1857 made a report to him upon the upper columbia country, much of which was taken from governor stevens's exploration reports without acknowledgment. moreover, the navigability of the great river was pronounced utterly impracticable, and the country itself stigmatized as essentially barren and worthless; and the report was made the vehicle for reiterating all wool's exploded charges against the territorial authorities, people, and volunteers, and collecting and retailing all the stories of outrage upon indians by whites that could be trumped up. this precious "topographical memoir" was widely published in the newspapers, and was submitted by general wool to the war department, with the evident design of defeating the confirmation of the treaties and the payment of the war debt. when the report arrived, the governor filed a statement in the department exposing its character; and at his instance captain a.a. humphreys, who had charge of all the pacific railroad reports, also filed a similar statement, pointing out cram's unreliability and plagiarisms, so thoroughly discrediting the report that the department would never give it out, and it failed of its intended effect. it was a hard fight over the treaties before the senate committee. wool's charges, widely spread in the newspapers, had excited much prejudice against them, and they were strenuously opposed by most of the regular officers on the pacific. but by the middle of march the governor was equally successful in convincing that committee that they ought to be confirmed, and was able to write nesmith that the committee would report favorably, and that there was every prospect of confirmation. the northwestern boundary, with the disputed question of the san juan archipelago, also claimed his attention. his resolute letter of may, 1855, to sir james douglass, declaring that he would sustain the american right to the islands to the full force of his authority, having been submitted to both governments with sir james's protests, had brought home to them the risk of armed collision unless the boundary question were speedily settled. accordingly commissioners were appointed on both sides to determine and delimit the boundary as drawn by the treaty of 1846. but as the controversy turned on the construction of the treaty itself, it could not be settled by any survey, and in this, the most important part of their task, the commissioners soon became clever disputants, each advocating his own side of the question. jefferson davis, now a senator of great influence, writes governor stevens, march 18, requesting him "to call on the president and secretary of state, and give them your views as to the importance and necessity of marking the boundary," etc. the american commissioner was mr. archibald campbell, and captain j. g. parke, of the engineers, was the chief surveyor, both old friends of governor stevens. with his thorough knowledge of the islands in dispute, and of the astute, grasping, and persistent character of the hudson bay company and british officials, the governor strove to stiffen the backbone of the administration, and to expedite the boundary survey. governor stevens's first speech in the house occurred may 12, on his bill to create additional land districts in his territory, and was a brief one. the next day a bill came up to reimburse governor douglass for the supplies he had furnished in the indian war, and the governor seized the opportunity to deliver a powerful speech in behalf of the war debt. he referred to sir james's emphatic testimony that his, the governor's, course was the only one which could have protected the settlements, or prevented their depopulation, and vigorously defended the people and volunteers:- "during the whole course of that war, not a friendly indian, nor an indian prisoner, was ever maltreated in the camp of the volunteers of washington. for six months the people of washington had to live in blockhouses; and yet so obedient were the people to law, so proud of their country, doing such high homage to the spirit of humanity and justice, that during all that time the life of the indian was safe in the camp of the volunteers. why, sir, there were nearly five thousand disaffected indians during all this time on the reservations lying along the waters of the sound, and not a man ever went there to do them harm. "i trust that the same measure of justice, which the committee propose to deal out to governor douglass, will be dealt out to the people of the territories of oregon and washington. the debt in all the cases rests upon the same foundation. our people furnished supplies and animals and shipping, and rendered their own services, on the faith of the government." on the 31st he delivered a long and exhaustive speech on the same subject, giving the history of the war, vindicating his own course, and the patriotism and conduct of the volunteers and people. on may 25 he delivered a speech of an hour upon the pacific railroad, the subject of all others in which he took the greatest interest and expended the greatest exertions. he took the broad national view, embracing the whole country, and advocated three routes, and then pointed out the superior advantages of the northern route, and dwelt upon its value for gaining the trade of asia:- "therefore i would not carve our way to the pacific by a single route. it would not satisfy the country. it is not for its peace and harmony politically. it could not do the business of the country. it is not up to the exigencies of the occasion. but carve your way to the western ocean with at least three roads. "considering, therefore, the greater shortness of the northern route, and its nearer connections with both asia and europe, it must become the great route of freight and passengers from asia to europe, and even of freight from asia to the whole valley of the mississippi." these views have become established facts for so many years that it is hard to realize how far in advance of his contemporaries governor stevens was in holding them. he was one of the first, if not the very first, to discern the necessity for three transcontinental railroads, and the opportunity for securing the trade of asia offered by the northern route. a few days later he sprang to his feet in defense of his friend nesmith, who was bitterly assailed by m.r.h. garnett, of virginia, and answered him in a manner so complete and satisfactory as to defeat an amendment offered by him. on the 27th he spoke in support of an appropriation for a military survey of the upper columbia, and in a sharp and breezy debate had the satisfaction of exposing cram's report. congress adjourned on june 9. the treaties were not reached, but the governor writes nesmith that a test vote showed that the senate was strongly in favor of them, and that they would all be confirmed next session. during the session governor stevens introduced nineteen bills and resolutions, and offered four amendments. he spoke nine times, making five considerable speeches, including two on the war debt, one on the pacific railroad, one on the survey of the columbia, and the defense of nesmith. the following synopsis gives the matters which claimed his attention in congress:- indian war debt. military roads. additional land districts. settlement of accounts of clerks of courts. erection of public buildings. survey of columbia river. geological survey. military road, columbia to missouri. increased pay for land surveys. relief of c.h. mason. additional post and mail routes. pacific railroad. port of entry at vancouver. marine hospital. land for lunatic asylum. port of delivery at whatcom. enrolling clerk for legislature. as to false reports of wool. bringing on indian chiefs. payment territorial deficiency. extending certain acts to washington territory. the above summary gives but a faint idea of the amount of work and attention involved in the several matters enumerated. with characteristic thoroughness, the governor always paved the way for his measures by first obtaining the support and recommendation of the department to which each pertained, and was equally indefatigable in following them up before the committees. but nothing engrossed so much of his time and attention as the numerous claims for losses and services growing out of the indian war, sent to him by his constituents, almost all poor men, all of which he presented and pressed with the greatest pains and assiduity. so intent had he become upon all these important measures that, as he writes nesmith, he determined to remain in washington during the recess of congress, and prepare for success the next session. on july 21 governor stevens submitted an able and exhaustive memoir to lewis cass, secretary of state, on the unjust and exorbitant exactions imposed upon americans, who were then flocking to the newly discovered gold fields of new caledonia,--now british columbia,--on fraser and thompson rivers, having previously, on may 18 and june 29, informed him of this emigration, and the impositions placed upon it by governor douglass. the chief of these were, a license tax of five dollars a month for the privilege of mining, and the prohibition of all navigation and trading except by license from the hudson bay company, and the requirement that all supplies must be purchased from that company. he showed that with forty thousand miners, nearly all of them american citizens, entering the gold fields, as was the estimate of the most intelligent gentlemen of the pacific coast, the license tax would amount to $2,400,000 per annum; while the hudson bay company, from the exclusive right of furnishing supplies, would reap the enormous harvest of $14,000,000 per annum. moreover, as the bulk of these supplies could not be furnished from the present resources of that company, they would have to be drawn by it from california, oregon, and washington, so that in fact those states were compelled to make that company their factor for the sale of their products, and allow it all the profits from the sale of their own products to their own citizens. the governor declared that this state of things could not be submitted to by american citizens unless imposed by positive and imperative law, and that the exactions in question had been imposed without any legal authority which should be respected by the citizens or government of the united states. he held that, the british government having passed no law levying a mining tax, governor douglass, as governor of vancouver island, was not given authority by his commission or instructions to impose such tax; that he was governor of vancouver island only, and his political jurisdiction did not extend to the mainland, where, in fact, he had always declined to exercise authority over the indians as governor, while he had dealt with them as chief factor of the hudson bay company. that the company, a mere indian trading company, had no authority under its charter to set up a monopoly of selling supplies to white men, whether american citizens or british subjects, such monopoly, moreover, being expressly prohibited by british law. and he concluded by asking, in behalf of the citizens of our whole pacific coast, that the government would interpose with the british authorities for the removal of the restrictions, and would demand the repayment of all mining taxes collected, and of the value of all vessels and cargoes confiscated. in the last paragraph he takes pains to acknowledge the assistance of his friend, john l. hays, esq., in the investigation of the legal questions involved. the memorial was widely published in the papers, and produced an excellent effect on the pacific coast. the hudson bay company relinquished its attempt to compel the miners to purchase supplies from it exclusively, and the monthly mining tax was reduced to a moderate yearly one. the memorial was a timely and much-needed warning to the buchanan administration to stand up against the ever greedy and bull-dog demands of the british upon the pacific northwest. the news of steptoe's defeat reached washington in june, and created a great sensation. it was looked upon as a complete vindication of governor stevens's views and policy in regard to the management of the indians, and a convincing proof of the folly and failure of the wool military peace policy. the very officers who had condemned and denounced the governor's plan of punishing and subduing the hostiles in order to preserve the fidelity and peace of the friendly and doubtful tribes, now that their weak temporizing had drawn the latter into hostilities, breathed nothing but war. writes colonel nesmith with glee, natural enough considering how his request for two howitzers had been brusquely refused, and himself treated with contumely, by wool:- "general clarke and the whole military are now fully answered, and they believe there _is a war_. the military now find themselves in something like your position when the indians, in violation of all pledges, attacked your camp in the walla walla. i say again, 'hands off;' they have a fair field, and i hope they will have a _free fight_!" the war department took energetic measures in consequence of steptoe's defeat. colonel wright was largely reinforced, and in september led a thousand troops into the spokane country, defeated the indians in two engagements, and summarily hanged sixteen of them without trial. the same month oregon and washington were constituted a separate military department, and the veteran general, william s. harney, was sent out in command. this appointment was highly satisfactory to governor stevens, for general harney adopted all his views in regard to the military problem, the indians, the opening of the country to settlement, and later, as will be seen, in regard to defending our right to the san juan archipelago. the governor writes colonel nesmith and governor curry requesting them to call on the veteran commander on his arrival, and extend to him their good will and support. general harney's first act on reaching his new command was to throw open to settlement the whole upper country, revoking wool's orders excluding settlers therefrom. this was a notable victory for governor stevens, and wiped out the last of wool's reactionary measures. the governor spent the whole recess in washington, except for a flying visit north in july (when, in passing through new york, he had his phrenological chart again drawn by fowler) and a visit of three weeks in the fall to newport and andover. in the evening of december 2 he delivered before the american geographical and statistical society, in new york, an elaborate address on the northwest, comprising fifty-six printed pages. mr. e.v. smalley, the historian of the northern pacific railroad, says of this address that "he presented the whole argument in behalf of the northern route. some of his statements were received with a great deal of skepticism, but time has shown that they were strictly and conscientiously accurate." mr. swan returned to the pacific coast in the fall, and a very capable, faithful, and agreeable young man, mr. walter w. johnson, succeeded him as secretary. the adjacent house on the south side was occupied by mr. johnson's aunts, mrs. w.r. johnson and miss donelson, most estimable, cultivated, and attractive ladies, and the two families contracted the warmest friendship for each other. congress reassembled december 6. during the session governor stevens offered seven bills and five resolutions, and moved four amendments. his longest and most important speech was on the payment of the war debt, delivered february 21, 1859. he also spoke on bringing indian chiefs to washington, twice on the northwest boundary, and on the military road between fort benton and walla walla. in january he had two hearings before the senate indian committee. the treaties were all confirmed in the senate on march 8 without serious opposition, for by this time their wisdom and merit were recognized on all hands. j. ross browne, special agent sent out by the interior department to investigate matters, strongly urged their confirmation. judge g. mott, another special agent, who had been dispatched to examine nesmith's superintendency, did the same. colonel mansfield, the inspector-general of the army, after visiting the upper country and studying the conditions there, strongly recommended the treaties. and even general clarke and colonel wright, nobly acknowledging their mistake in opposing them, joined in the recommendation. at last governor stevens's great work was vindicated by the test of experience, and approved by its former opponents. it has already been related how jefferson davis, as secretary of war, summarily rejected governor stevens's plans for continuing the surveys on the northern route, throwing the whole influence of the government in favor of the southern route, and strove to discredit his report of the superior advantages of the former; and how the governor, on his expedition to the blackfoot council, notwithstanding this rebuff, indefatigably continued his surveys, taking barometrical observations, and making careful examinations of different passes and routes, using the officers and parties of the indian service for the purpose. throughout all the labors and responsibilities of the indian war he kept up the determination of important points, and the collection of data concerning the climate, snows, navigability of the great rivers, passes, etc., making use in like manner of the volunteer parties. during this fall and winter he made his final report on the northern pacific railroad route, giving the results of his labors since the first report, made some three years before. this final report was published in two large quarto volumes, containing 797 pages. the first volume contains the narrative, 225 pages; geographical memoir, 81 pages; meteorology, 25 pages; estimate, 27 pages; and, with the exception of the meteorological tables and a paper on the hydrography of washington territory, comprising 28 pages, was entirely the governor's own composition, and equal to about 700 ordinary printed pages. the second volume contains the botany, zoölogy, ichthyology, etc., with numerous plates. the governor expected, on returning from fort benton, to devote a year to the preparation of his final report, but this was interrupted by the indian war, and then, with largely increased data, he found himself absorbed in these congressional duties and labors, which completely engrossed all his time and attention. it was a physical impossibility for any man to write out with his own hand in a few months such a report, even if it lay all composed and arranged in his mind. the way in which governor stevens overcame the difficulty was original, and showed his remarkable mental grasp and powers of memory. he dictated the whole report. every morning an expert stenographer came at six, and the governor, walking up and down in the dining-room, dictated to him for one or two hours before breakfast. the reporter then took his notes, wrote them out, and had the manuscript ready for the governor's revision at the next sitting. walter w. johnson, dr. j.g. cooper, and other assistants were kept hard at work on the report, and on february 7, 1859, the governor had the satisfaction of submitting it to the secretary of war, john b. floyd, jefferson davis's successor. the report is written in a clear and graphic style. the facts presented in it fully sustained and confirmed the conclusions of the first report, and made a crushing answer to jefferson davis's doubts and criticisms. and governor stevens's views set forth therein have been fully and strikingly borne out in the subsequent development of the country. ten thousand copies of the report were ordered to be printed by the senate march 3, and afterwards the house ordered ten thousand extra copies march 25, and the senate as many more may 9, 1860. those first printed were not satisfactory to the governor in execution, paper, or binding, and he was at no little pains to have the twenty thousand extra copies ordered. being disappointed in a certain senator whom he expected to pass the desired order in the senate, the governor frankly applied to jefferson davis to secure the order, and davis was manly and magnanimous enough to do so at once. it was characteristic of governor stevens, as has already been pointed out, to base all his action and objects upon the high ground of public needs and welfare, and therefore, ignoring any personal considerations, he demanded davis's aid, on the ground that the valuable data in his final report ought to be published for the benefit of the country. the governor was inclined to attribute good motives to his opponents, or those who differed from him; was quick to see and admit their points of view; and never assailed their motives, nor descended to personal attacks. indeed, he was inclined to think too well of men, and to expect too much of them. chapter xlv saving san juan six weeks after the final adjournment of congress, governor stevens left new york in april, on the steamer northerner, on the long journey to puget sound, via the isthmus and san francisco. he was accompanied by his family, except his son, who remained at school in boston, and by his brother-in-law, mr. daniel l. hazard, who was going to the pacific coast to seek his fortune, which he found after six years' devotion to business. the journey out was a pleasant one, and they reached vancouver on the columbia, and repaired to the hotel of the town. general harney immediately called, and insisted on taking the governor and family to his house, where they remained several days. the incident is significant as showing the close relations between the veteran commander and governor stevens, and helps explain the prompt and decisive action of the former on the san juan controversy a few weeks later. this dispute was in the acute stage; the boundary commissioners were as busy with arguments and contentions as a whole bar of lawyers, and as far from agreement. undoubtedly the governor, in his earnest and convincing manner, fully imbued the general with his views of the american right, and the duty of the authorities to defend it. the journey from vancouver to olympia was made in the manner usual in those days,--down the columbia in river steamboat, up the cowlitz in canoes paddled and poled by indians, and across country in wagons to olympia. the governor was everywhere received with demonstrations of popular confidence and goodwill. the democratic convention unanimously renominated him as delegate to the next congress. colonel william h. wallace was nominated by the republican convention. selucious garfielde, having been removed from his office of receiver of the land office for misconduct, now vehemently opposed the governor, and came out in support of wallace. governor stevens at once entered upon a systematic and thorough canvass of the territory, inviting his competitor to accompany him, which he did. but garfielde and judge chenoweth started around the sound ahead of the candidates, hoping to capture the vote of the people for wallace beforehand. mr. daniel l. hazard accompanied the canvassing party. the governor, as was too much his habit, crowded into a short space of time a greater amount of speaking and traveling than most men could stand. colonel wallace broke down on the columbia river under the strain, and had to return home, whereat the governor seemed rather pleased, not at his opponent's misfortune, but at his own superior endurance. the election took place july 11, and he was chosen by a vote of 1684 against 1094. mr. charles h. mason, the secretary of the territory and at times the acting governor, died on july 23, rather unexpectedly. he was beloved by every one, and the whole town was plunged in mourning. the governor felt his loss as that of a brother, and was very much affected. two days later the funeral services were held in the capitol building. governor stevens delivered an eloquent and heartfelt eulogy, moving all present to tears, after which a procession was formed, and almost the entire population followed the remains to the grave. he was laid at rest on bush prairie, beside his friend, george w. stevens. a row over a pig precipitated a crisis in the san juan dispute. an american settler shot a hudson bay company's porker found rooting in his garden, whereupon governor douglass promptly dispatched a steamer to the scene, bearing his son-in-law, who was a high official of the company and also of the colony, and two members of the colonial council. landing, they loudly claimed the island as british soil, and ordered the settler to pay one hundred dollars for the slain pig, on penalty of being taken to victoria for trial if he refused. but the settler, who had already offered to pay the reasonable value of the pig, did refuse, and boldly defied arrest, revolver in hand. the british officials retired, baffled for the time, but declaring that the settler was a trespasser on british soil, and must submit to trial by a british court for his offense. a few days after this episode general harney, returning from a visit to governor douglass, stopped at san juan, and the american settlers there invoked his protection against british aggression, relating the story of the pig. they also begged protection against the raids of the northern indians, who had committed many depredations on americans, while they never molested the english or hudson bay company people, whom they regarded as friends. the old soldier realized the defenseless condition of the settlers. his blood was stirred at the attempted outrage. on his way back to vancouver he stopped at olympia and dined with governor stevens, and discussed with him what action the emergency required. immediately on reaching his headquarters at vancouver, general harney ordered captain george e. pickett,--the same who, a confederate general, led the famous charge at gettysburg,--to proceed with his company of the 9th infantry from bellingham bay to san juan island, occupy it, and afford protection to american settlers. pickett landed on the island july 27, and at once issued a proclamation declaring that, in compliance with the orders of the commanding general (harney), he came to establish a military post on the island, notifying the inhabitants to call on him for protection against northern indians, and stating that "this being united states territory, no laws other than those of the united states, nor courts except such as are held by virtue of said laws, will be recognized or allowed on this island." this was throwing down the gauntlet at the feet of the british lion with a vengeance; and governor douglass, a bold, haughty, and determined man, hurried three warships to the island, with positive orders to prevent the landing of any more united states troops; but pickett took up a position on high ground, threw up intrenchments, and notified the british that he would fire upon them if they attempted to land. governor douglass now issued his proclamation, protesting against the "invasion," and reasserting that the island was british soil; and, armed with this document, his three naval commanders waited on pickett, and formally demanded his withdrawal. on his refusal, they proposed a joint occupation. but the daredevil american officer was equally obdurate in rejecting this compromise, and repeated his warning to them not to land. nothing remained for them but to report their mortifying failure to governor douglass. it happened that admiral baynes, commanding the british pacific fleet, had just put into esquimault harbor, the british naval station on vancouver island, four miles from victoria, with a strong naval force. sir james, his indignation at white-heat, and fiercely determined to expel the yankees from the coveted island, now ordered the admiral to take his whole force and drive them from it. as governor of a british colony, sir james was authorized to give the order, and it was the admiral's duty to obey it. but admiral baynes took the responsibility of not obeying it. it would be ridiculous, he declared, to involve the two great nations in war over a squabble about a pig. but he reinforced the ships blockading san juan, and renewed the orders to prevent the landing of any more american troops. five british ships of war, carrying 167 guns and 2140 men, closely beset the southeastern end of the island, charged with the execution of these orders. governor stevens visited san juan soon after pickett landed, and on august 4 left it in the steamer julia. captain jack scranton, with dispatches from captain pickett to general harney, reached olympia the next day, and at once forwarded the dispatches by special messenger to general harney at vancouver. in return, harney's orders reached olympia on the 8th, were forwarded immediately by the julia to steilacoom, and in pursuance of them colonel casey embarked on the steamer with three companies, hastened down the sound, silently stole through the blockading fleet in a dense fog, and effected a landing on san juan on the 10th. the sight of the empty steamer anchored close to the shore in the gray of the morning, and the cheers of the reinforcements as they marched into pickett's fort on the hill above, first apprised the british navy of the successful landing. soon afterwards admiral baynes withdrew his ships and relinquished the blockade, leaving the american forces in undisputed possession. while the british were omnipotent on the water, they were ill prepared to sustain a contest on land, and undoubtedly the knowledge of this fact influenced admiral baynes, and governor douglass, too, after his first indignation, in their forbearing attitude. victoria and all the points on fraser and thompson rivers and other places on the mainland were thronged with american miners, attracted by the recently discovered gold fields. the british were but a handful. the brave and adventurous pioneers of washington and oregon, the indian war volunteers, were close at hand. the first clash of arms on san juan would have signaled the downfall of every vestige of british authority in northwest america, except on the decks of their warships. there is no doubt that governor stevens and the american commander intended to press their advantage to the utmost in case of conflict. the governor of the territory was then r.d. gholson, a well-meaning and respectable kentuckian, who had recently succeeded mcmullan, and who reposed wholly on governor stevens for advice and guidance, constantly consulting him. this governor now tendered to general harney the support of the territorial militia in case of need, sending him a return showing the number of stands of arms the territory possessed, with the statement that there was a lack of ammunition. in response general harney immediately dispatched a large quantity of ammunition to fort steilacoom and placed it at the governor's disposal. truly the times were changed since general wool refused ammunition to the settlers battling for their homes against the savage foe, and maligned their patriotic efforts. the directing hand of governor stevens is manifest in this resolute assertion of american rights. it was his determined stand, when governor, against the persistent encroachments of the british, which first put our government on its guard. he it was who instructed general harney as to the merits of the controversy, encouraged him to take decisive action, visited san juan and noted the conditions there at the critical time, and saw to hurrying reinforcements to pickett. it is not too much to say that he was the master spirit whose bold and decided action repelled the foreign aggression, aroused public opinion, deterred a weak and timid administration from surrendering our rights, and saved the archipelago to the united states. judge james g. swan, who was acting as the governor's secretary at this time, quotes from his diary how general harney and governor gholson consulted governor stevens, and declares that the stand he took and his influence were the great means of saving san juan to the united states; that, without his clear and decided counsel, general harney would hardly have felt justified in taking such vigorous action as he did; that there was a deal of doubt felt and expressed among officers of the army, and it needed the strong, outspoken action of such a man as governor stevens at that crisis to turn the scale. alarmed at the risk of war, and the scarcely veiled threats of the british minister, the government hastened to send general scott to the seat of war, big with compromise. he withdrew captain pickett and all the troops save one company from the island. admiral baynes established a post of an equal number of marines on the opposite or western end, and the joint occupation was maintained thirteen years, and until terminated by the emperor william's award in favor of the united states. scott then endeavored to perform a still more ungracious task, laid upon him by the administration, to wit, to remove harney in deference to great britain, without arousing the indignation of the people at such a rebuke for his spirited and patriotic action; to cringe to the lion without exciting the eagle. he gave harney an order to relinquish his command on the pacific and take the department of the west, with headquarters at st. louis, with permission to accept or decline the order as he saw fit. but harney was not disposed to assist in his own rebuke, or smooth the way of truckling to england, and kept his post. hardly had scott turned his back, when harney ordered pickett back to san juan, an order in turn countermanded by the general-in-chief.[12] the people of the pacific coast were enthusiastic over harney, the legislatures of oregon and washington applauded his course by public resolutions, and the public opinion thus aroused put a needed check to the compromising spirit of the administration. governor stevens spent the remainder of august and part of september in olympia. he enjoyed visiting his farms and planning their improvement, for his early and hereditary love of the soil was always strong. in september he started eastward by the isthmus route with his family, and reached washington the following month. footnotes: [12] major granville o. haller, in an article on the san juan affair, states that immediately on receipt of news of the action of the british he was sent with his company by colonel casey from steilacoom to san juan, ostensibly as a guard against northern indians, but with instructions to confer with pickett, and if he needed aid, to land and assume command. on reaching the scene of action he was closely questioned by the british officers as to the latest news from the east,--the american mail had just brought news of the battle of solferino,--for their mails were delayed, and they were somewhat restrained by the reflection that their government might have already relinquished the archipelago, and advices of it not yet arrived. major haller remained on his vessel a few days, probably not wishing to precipitate a conflict by forcing a landing, but did land soon afterwards. chapter xlvi the stand against disunion the indian treaties confirmed, governor stevens was more determined than ever to secure the payment of the indian war debt. this had been thoroughly examined and audited by a commission appointed by the secretary of war, consisting of captains rufus ingalls and a.j. smith, of the army, and mr. lafayette grover, the brother of lieutenant grover and afterwards governor of oregon, and their report had been referred by the last congress to the third auditor. it was a long time before he reported, and his report, when made, was a very unjust and condemnatory one, manifestly tinged with the prejudice so widely spread by wool's slanders. the friends of the debt for some time were unable to get it before the house, and had to content themselves with enlightening individual members and the public. the governor followed up the various matters in behalf of the pacific northwest with his usual energy this session. he spoke on the pacific railroad, on steam vessels for puget sound, on indian appropriations, military post on red river, appropriations for surveys, separate indian superintendency for washington territory, etc. he succeeded in obtaining an appropriation of $100,000 for the military road between fort benton and walla walla, which lieutenant mullan was now building, $10,000 for a military road between steilacoom and vancouver, $4500 for the boundary survey between oregon and washington, $95,500 for the indian service, and secured a new land office and district for the southern part of the territory. during the session he offered thirteen bills, eight resolutions, and two memorials. his chief interest and labors, however, were on the northern railroad route. he was indefatigable in making known its great national advantages. on april 3 he addressed an elaborate letter on the subject to the railroad convention of the pacific coast, held at vancouver. in this he again advocated three routes; showed the national importance of the northern route, its advantages for securing the trade of asia, and the danger, if that route were neglected, that the british-canadians would build a line to the pacific within their own borders, and thereby forestall this country in developing its pacific ports and securing the asiatic commerce. he declared that the explorations thus far made were simply reconnoissances; that two years would be required to complete the surveys, and probably ten years to build the road. he urged the convention to reject absolutely the compromise in the shape of a branch line from some point on the central route to the columbia river and puget sound, which had been urged in congress and elsewhere, and firmly to insist on the northern route as a great national work. as published, this letter makes twenty-four printed pages, and mr. smalley, the historian of the northern pacific railroad, already quoted, says of it that- "he gave so clear and condensed an account of the northern route, its distances and grades, as compared with the line then projected to benicia, california, its advantageous situation in relation to the china and japan trade, and the adaptability of the country it would traverse for continuous settlement, that the document, printed in pamphlet form, became a cyclopedia in miniature, from which facts and arguments have ever since been drawn by the friends of that route." governor stevens had now become the recognized authority on the northern route, and the acknowledged leader of its advocates in congress. he was ably supported by general lane, and by the minnesota senators, rice and ramsay, and was indefatigable in furnishing them with data and points for use in debate. at a dinner party on one occasion, senator gwin openly taxed the governor with writing the speech which a certain senator had just delivered in behalf of that route, and which made some stir, declaring that no one could mistake the governor's style and ideas; and the charge was well founded. during governor stevens's first term in congress great efforts were made by the friends of the central route to pass a bill granting a subsidy in lands and bonds to that route, and the bait of a branch from the vicinity of salt lake to the columbia river and puget sound was held out to placate the adherents of the northern route. governor stevens strenuously fought this scheme of a branch instead of the through northern route. the proposed bill failed. in the next congress the adherents of the central and southern routes joined forces. the extreme secessionists, on the eve of withdrawing from congress in order to break up the union, were ready enough to vote subsidies to the united routes, and the union sentiment was invoked by the argument that the aid extended to the southern route would help satisfy the south and strengthen the union. by this combination the house, on december 20, 1860, passed a bill for a land grant and subsidy to both the central and southern routes. the northern route was completely ignored. an amendment offered by governor stevens, granting ten sections of land per mile for a road from red river to puget sound, was rejected. but when the bill came before the senate, an amendment was offered by senator wilkinson, of minnesota, and adopted, the new england senators aiding those from minnesota, wisconsin, and oregon, giving a subsidy of twenty-five millions for a railroad from lake superior to puget sound, and a land grant of six alternate sections per mile on each side of the track in minnesota, and ten alternate sections for the rest of the way. the amendment created the northern pacific railroad company, and empowered charles d. gilfillan, of minnesota, nathaniel p. banks, of wisconsin, and isaac i. stevens, of washington territory, to act as a board of commissioners to organize the company. the bill thus amended went back to the house for concurrence, but the session was almost at an end, and repeated efforts to take the bill from the speaker's table, to get it before the house for consideration, failed for lack of a two thirds vote. governor stevens rapidly overcame--lived down--the prejudice excited by the charges and reports against him, and won the respect of his fellow members. several of them expressed to him their surprise at finding him so different a man from what they had been led to believe. said one gentleman, "i expected to find you a loud-voiced, tobacco-chewing, drinking, swearing, violent man, and instead i find a gentleman of quiet manners, education, ability, and high aims and ideals." the governor used to regard this change of opinion, which he personally made upon members, with a good deal of satisfaction. he usually rose early, and spent the two hours before breakfast at work in his office. after breakfast and until noon, when congress met, he would spend in visiting the departments. he kept a light carriage with one horse for this purpose, and for going to and from the capitol, having the colored servant bob drive it, or driving himself. he had unbounded influence in all the departments. the clear, lucid way in which he presented his cases; his brief, prompt, business-like methods; the fact that he never asked anything that he did not believe to be right, and called for by public interests, and that he would not submit to delay or neglect, but would follow up his matters until they received due attention, even to the president himself if necessary,--made him respected and somewhat feared, while his uniform courtesy and consideration for the clerks and subordinates won their goodwill. he acquired great influence with president buchanan. his son hazard was desirous of entering west point, and he took the youth to call on the president and ask an appointment for him. mr. buchanan very naturally asked the governor why he did not give his son the appointment within his own gift as a member of congress. the latter declared he could not do this with propriety, and pointedly requested the desired appointment, which the president seemed reluctant to make, pleading the many claims upon him for the few cadetships at his disposal. but finding the governor still firm in his request, he promised unequivocally and positively to appoint his son. the governor carefully refrained from advising or influencing the latter in the choice of a profession, telling him that he had better decide the matter for himself. an uncle, however, very strenuously urged him not to go to west point. at last the young man besought the advice of his father, who simply said that he would not advise him to enter west point, or adopt the army as a profession, but told him to decide according to his own judgment and inclination. under these circumstances he concluded to give up west point. within a year the rebellion broke out, and he was carrying a musket in the ranks of the union volunteers. how little can we foresee the future! the governor appointed robert catlin as cadet to west point from washington territory. he dined at six, and spent the evening in social intercourse. sometimes he would make the rounds of the hotels, meeting old friends and acquaintances, and frequently would work late in the night on some matter that engaged his attention. like all rising and influential men, he was more and more sought after in behalf of all sorts of people and schemes. mrs. stevens relates that on one occasion, when she was reading in the rear end of the large double parlors and the governor was receiving two gentlemen in the front room, she was startled to see him suddenly spring from his chair, face his visitors with upright, soldierly bearing and head erect, exclaiming in a stern and indignant voice, "look at me, gentlemen, and tell me what you see about me that you dare intimate such a proposition! leave my house!" they slunk off without a word. the governor delighted in hospitality, and was never happier than when entertaining his friends. while in washington he was visited by many of his own and mrs. stevens's relatives. governor stevens was preëminently a national man in all his ideas and sympathies. his revolutionary ancestry, his west point training, his participation in large national interests,--as the mexican war, the coast survey, the exploration of the continent and upbuilding of the pacific northwest, together with the natural bent of his patriotic nature and comprehensive, far-sighted mind,--strengthened his love for and pride in the great republic, and made sectionalism or disunion utterly abhorrent to him. like webster, he regarded the union as the palladium of national liberty, life, and power, and its preservation the highest patriotic duty. there was an aggressive disunion faction, in the southern tier of slave states, seeking to disrupt the union by magnifying northern encroachments against the southern institution of negro slavery; but the great bulk of the southern people still held fast to their ancient moorings. governor stevens firmly believed that to maintain unimpaired the compromises of the constitution in regard to slavery was not only the highest statesmanship looking to the preservation of the union, but a matter of justice and good faith to the southern unionists. he believed that as long as the northern democracy stood by the constitutional rights of the south, they would continue to hold fast to the union, and defeat the secessionists, and that thus, by the league of broad-minded national men both north and south, the extremists could be kept down and the union maintained. the political issues of the day sprang up over the question of slavery in the territories. the republican party held that congress had the right, and it was its duty, to prohibit slavery within them; and its more progressive leaders openly expressed the belief that the institution, if debarred from extension and confined to the existing slave states, would ultimately become extinct. the democratic party was divided between two doctrines on the question. the majority of northern democrats upheld the "squatter sovereignty" doctrine of stephen a. douglas, to wit, that the people of each territory had the right to decide for or against slavery; while the southern democrats and a large part of those in the north, including many of the oldest and ablest leaders and public men, held that, as the territories had been acquired by the blood and treasure of all the states, neither congress nor the citizens of a territory could lawfully prohibit slavery therein as long as they remained territories; but when they assumed statehood, the people could prohibit or establish slavery, as they saw fit. the latter doctrine had the support of a dictum of the supreme court. moreover, well-informed men knew that, as a practical matter, there was no probability that negro slavery could be extended into any of the existing territories, for both natural conditions and the great preponderance of northern emigration to the west were adverse to it. a few brief years would settle the question in the territories, and remove it from national politics; and meantime, if the southern people, the great majority of whom were union-loving and patriotic, could be reassured that their constitutional rights as to slavery would be respected, the disunionists would become powerless, the dangerous controversies over slavery would die out, and the union would be saved, stronger and more glorious than ever. such were the views of stevens and many of the ablest democratic leaders, the same views that actuated clay and webster and their compatriots when they allayed the storm of an earlier strife over the same subject. no spirit of subserviency to the south actuated them, but a strong sense of justice to the weaker section, of fidelity to the constitution, of loyalty to the southern unionists, and, above all, a broad-minded national patriotism. thus it was that the men of whom governor stevens was a type, after striving to the utmost to safeguard the southern constitutional rights, when sacrilegious hands assailed the nation's life, and the southern people, frenzied with the madness of the hour, were swept into the maelstrom of the great rebellion, were foremost in defense of the country, in self-devotion and self-sacrifice for her sake. in this school of patriots are numbered two members of lincoln's cabinet, edwin m. stanton, the great war secretary, and joseph holt, the attorney-general; general john a. dix and daniel l. dickinson, of new york; generals grant, sherman, halleck, sheridan; benjamin f. butler, of massachusetts; john a. logan, of illinois; and many others, all of whom supported breckinridge and lane. although deeply immersed in the important practical measures for the advancement of the northern route and the pacific northwest, governor stevens was as earnest and decided in his political views as in everything else he undertook. he attended the democratic national convention, which was held in charleston, s.c., april 23, as a delegate representing oregon, the territories having no representation. he ardently advocated the nomination of general lane, his friend and co-worker in behalf of the pacific territories. general lane had achieved much distinction in the mexican war, was a man of broad, statesman-like views, sound judgment, upright, high-toned, generous, and considerate of others, and universally esteemed. he was just the man for a compromise candidate, and his chances were good for the nomination after the more prominent candidates should defeat each other. but the convention split upon the platform, the northern delegates insisting upon the squatter sovereignty doctrine; whereupon the representatives of nine extreme southern states seceded from the convention, which, without making any nominations, adjourned to meet at baltimore on june 18. in the few ballots taken, general lane received six votes; but the opportune moment for which his friend hoped never arrived, owing to the disruption of the convention. the baltimore convention served but to emphasize the irreconcilable difference between the two doctrines and wings dividing the democracy. douglas's doctrine was adopted, and himself nominated, by a reduced convention; while the delegations of eight more states, withdrawing from it, met in separate convention on june 28, in the same city, and nominated john c. breckinridge, of kentucky, for president, and joseph lane, of oregon, for vice-president, on a platform declaring the other doctrine, and assuming the name of the national democratic party. president buchanan and the entire influence of the administration supported the latter, and, as the election showed, not only the majority of the foremost public men of the northern democracy, but one third of its voters. abraham lincoln and hannibal hamlin were nominated by the republican party on a platform opposing the extension of slavery in the territories; and a convention representing the old whigs, and many moderate men and unionists in both sections, nominated john bell, of tennessee, and edward everett, of massachusetts, on the bare declaration of "the union, the constitution, and the enforcement of the laws." the national democratic party, thus launched into the struggle, was destitute of any national organization, so essential for carrying on a presidential contest. the leaders, including the nominees and members of the cabinet, after full consultation, besought governor stevens to accept the position of chairman of the national executive committee, organize it, and carry on the canvass. ever ready to devote himself to any cause in which he was enlisted, the governor undertook the herculean task. in a single night he wrote the party address to the country,--an address covering a whole page of a large metropolitan newspaper, a feat for which general lane years afterwards expressed unbounded admiration and astonishment, both for its ability and for the ease and rapidity with which it was dashed off. during the next four months governor stevens drove on the canvass with his accustomed energy and ability. headquarters were opened in new york, contributions collected, meetings organized, and large numbers of speeches and documents circulated all over the country. on september 5 he entertained at dinner, in washington, general lane, secretaries howell cobb and jacob thompson, of the cabinet, and a delegation from new york. the situation seemed by no means hopeless to the adherents of breckinridge and lane. the republican vote at the last presidential election was far in the minority, even in the north; and now, with four candidates in the field, it seemed probable that there would be no popular election. in such case the choice of president would devolve upon the house of representatives, voting by states, and the democratic members controlled a majority of the states, and could therefore choose one of the democratic candidates. in the event that the house failed to elect, owing either to dissensions among the democratic members, or the abstention of enough members to break a quorum, which the republican members could bring about, as they had the numerical majority, then the senate had the election of vice-president, who would act as president, and that insured the choice of general lane, because the majority of the states were represented in the senate by senators who supported breckinridge and lane.[13] the election of lincoln in november overset all these hopes and calculations, and the drama of the great rebellion, which was to humble the arrogant fire-eaters of the south, free the land from the curse of slavery, and vindicate the union by the sword, the last argument of kings and nations, was ushered in. at the last session of this, the 36th congress, the bill to pay the indian war debt was passed, notwithstanding the most strenuous and bitter opposition, led by a member from new york, general wool's state, and inspired by him. the report of the third auditor, which greatly and very unfairly cut down the award of the ingalls commission, was made the basis of the bill. governor stevens, in his speeches in congress, severely criticised and exposed the mistakes and unfair findings of the auditor, without impugning his honesty. he was a well-meaning but narrow man, who had allowed himself to be prejudiced against the volunteers. other advocates of the bill were less considerate towards him. on one occasion he thanked the governor with great warmth and sincerity for always treating him, and referring to him, as an honest man and well-meaning public servant, much to the governor's surprise. he also succeeded in having his territory made a separate indian superintendency, and his friend w.w. miller appointed superintendent. he also increased the mail service on the sound from weekly to semi-weekly, and secured appropriations of $59,700 for the indian service, $61,000 for general expenses, and had lieutenant mullan's report on building the military road across the mountains printed. he offered five bills, six resolutions, and four amendments, and spoke on the northern pacific railroad, in defense of the coast survey, indian war debt, increased mail service on puget sound, military post on red river, etc. during his congressional tour the governor was particularly indefatigable and successful in establishing new post-roads, and increasing mail facilities in all parts of the territory. years afterwards general miller declared that the government had done nothing since his death but to cut down the mail service, and abolish the post-offices and routes he had caused to be established. the military road between fort benton and walla walla, which the governor caused to be opened, and in charge of which he had placed lieutenant mullan, known as the mullan road popularly, was for a number of years the highway across the bitter root and rocky mountains, traversed by thousands of trains, and the great artery for communication with and supply of thousands of settlers and miners in montana, until superseded by the railroads. the payment of the indian war debt was a great triumph for governor stevens, and completed the vindication of his course, as the confirmation of his treaties vindicated his indian policy. during the last seven years, what severe and unremitting labors he had undergone, what great results he had achieved, and what tremendous obstacles and opposition he had overcome! he had made the exploration of the northern route the most complete and exhaustive of all; had demonstrated its superiority, not simply as a transcontinental line, but as a world route for the world's commerce, and had made himself the authority and exponent of that route. by his indian service he had treated with over thirty thousand indians, extinguished the indian title to a hundred and fifty million acres, established peace among hereditary enemies over an area larger than new england and the middle states, and instituted over thousands of savages a beneficent policy of instruction and civilization. by calling out volunteers and waging an aggressive war against the savage foe, when all was gloom and terror, and the settlers were not only forsaken but vilified by the military authority, whose duty it was to protect them, he saved the settlements of his territory from extinction, and the progress of the northwest from being set back for years. and his firm and patriotic stand against british aggression saved the san juan group to the united states. entering congress vilified by high and low, with the censure of his territorial legislature and the disapproval of the president recorded against him, he had so ably demonstrated the wisdom and rightfulness of his course that he secured the ratification of his indian treaties, the payment of the indian war debt, the reversal of the reactionary policy of wool, the opening of the interior to settlement, and the punishment of indian murderers. during his brief career up to this time he disbursed over three quarters of a million dollars for the government, as follows:[14]- as an officer of engineers, the larger part on fort knox $278,108.29 as governor and superintendent of indian affairs 386,642.66 in the northern route exploration 114,103.56 ---------- $778,854.51 events followed fast that winter in the great national drama. the ultra-secessionists in the cotton states had it all their own way; and the democratic leaders throughout the south, regardless of their northern allies, who had stood by them so bravely and against such odds, were only too ready to follow in the same treasonable path, some accepting seward's doctrine of an irrepressible conflict between slavery and freedom, and believing that separation and an independent government were the only means by which slavery could be maintained; while others, furious at the loss of political power, like lucifer, would rather reign in hell than serve in heaven,--would ruin where they could no longer rule. great efforts were made by the moderate men, especially of the border states, to heal the breach; the republican leaders, frightened at the storm, displayed a conciliatory spirit; and it seemed for a time that the differences might be compromised, the fears of the south allayed, and the union peacefully preserved. governor stevens clung to this hope to the last. he thought that if a constitutional convention could be held, the breach could be healed; that the strong union sentiment in most of the southern states would cause them to adhere to the union; and that the few seceding states, isolated and helpless, would soon be glad to resume their places. it is altogether probable that this view was correct, but one essential condition of such a plan was that no overt act of hostility should be committed. the secessionists, by violently seizing the national forts and property, and beginning hostilities, rendered peaceful adjustment hopeless. governor stevens was firm and decided in his opinion that it was the duty of the president to protect the national property and forts and enforce the laws. the following sentences culled from his correspondence show his views and feelings at this trying and momentous crisis:- december 10. should carolina attack the forts, or seize the revenue, there must be collision. the government must protect its property and execute its laws. let all men agree to a convention of all the states. when the delegates meet, i am sure it will be found easier to unite than to separate. if union seems to be accompanied by occasional discord, separation will threaten perpetual war. if in union there is not always harmony, in separation there will never be peace. december 17. that the president will protect the public property and execute the laws, no one can doubt. that he has troops in readiness to embark at a moment's warning to succor the forts in the event of their attack by south carolina cannot be doubted. i do not believe that the authorities of south carolina will make any attack of the kind, or resist the collecting of the revenue, at least until ample notice has been given. when the case arises will be the time for the president to act. that he will act decisively i do not doubt. but the great problem to be solved is to vindicate the laws without collision. the only hope of reconciliation is in avoiding collision. never were wanted more the qualities of forbearance and moderation in connection with those of decision and of action. january 3. the blow of the secessionists in seizing the arsenal and forts at charleston has been followed up by the seizure of the arsenal at augusta, and of the forts on the savannah river. there is no doubt that the secessionists here sent word south some time ago to seize all the forts on the gulf, and most if not all are probably now in their hands. the mad, headlong, and unjustifiable course of the southern states is tending to unite the north as one man. the firm course which the president is taking will rally around him all true, union-loving, conservative men. when secession raised its treasonable head among his political associates, governor stevens denounced it, and broke with them at once and forever. he took an active part in urging president buchanan to withdraw his confidence from the southern members of his cabinet, and take a positive stand in defense of the government and country. he called on mr. buchanan repeatedly, and strongly urged this course. his recent position as chairman of the national democratic executive committee added strength to the personal influence he already had, and aided much in bringing the president to the firmer attitude which distinguished the last days of his administration. the governor respected mr. buchanan, while he pitied his lack of firmness and moral courage. he said that for a time mr. buchanan presented a pitiable spectacle of indecision and lack of firmness and courage. he even feared personal violence, and had been threatened with it by some of the southerners. during the winter washington was filled with alarming rumors that the secessionists were plotting to seize the capital, to assassinate the president-elect, to prevent his inauguration, and there was considerable foundation for them. to guard against such dangers, governor stevens aided in the organization of a regiment of district of columbia militia, and was one of the chief advisers and supporters of colonel c.p. stone, who raised and commanded it, assisting him in procuring arms and equipments. colonel stone was the general stone who was so unjustly persecuted for the disaster at ball's bluff. the governor personally urged mr. buchanan to sustain major anderson in his bold move of occupying fort sumter, to give his entire confidence to general scott, and approved and defended his bringing regular troops to washington. in these matters governor stevens was intimately associated and acted with holt, stanton, dix, and other democrats, most of whom had been supporting breckinridge and lane, and who rescued mr. buchanan from the hands of his secessionist cabinet, and inspired him to assert the national authority. footnotes: [13] alexander h. stephens, _the war between the states_, vol. ii. p. 276. [14] the accounts for this vast sum were all found correct, and were all passed by the accounting officers of the treasury, except some of the expenditures on the exploration, and it is instructive to note these items as an example of how great injustice the rigid rules, or notions of accounting officials, ofttimes inflict upon the most scrupulous and careful officers. governor stevens was charged with a balance of $8856.14, the largest item in which ($2626) consisted of the payment to ten regular officers on the exploration of one dollar per diem each, while engaged in topographical duty, according to an established regulation. other items were for payments for subsistence and transportation; for compensation paid civil employees; for interest on the protested drafts, which were necessary to continue the survey, and for which congress made appropriation; for articles and animals necessarily lost or worn out in so widespread and extended a service; and even for recompense paid certain of the party who had to abandon their clothing and effects in the mountains in a snowstorm. no compensation was ever allowed governor stevens for his services in conducting the exploration and preparing his final report. although the disallowed items were referred to captain a.a. humphreys (general humphreys) for examination, and he reported in favor of governor stevens, and recommended the allowance of nearly every item, no action was taken before the latter fell at the battle of chantilly, the following year. since then application has been made to congress, resulting in one bill passing the house and another the senate at different times, but neither passed both branches. and general stevens, after serving his country so faithfully, and accomplishing so much in her behalf, is accounted a _debtor_ to the government. chapter xlvii the offer of sword and services immediately after the inauguration of president lincoln, governor stevens hastened to return to the territory. general miller wrote:- "i believe that the national democracy can easily keep possession of the territory. as to your own prospects, they seem as good to me as ever they were. now that you have won a national fame, you will always be looked upon as the leading man of the northwest. should you be thrown out of the delegateship at the next election, in two years you would be the strongest man on the coast. but you cannot be beaten even at the next election." general lane, however, had just been defeated in oregon by a coalition of the republicans and douglas democrats, and colonel j.w. nesmith was chosen his successor. breaking up the twelfth street establishment, and leaving mrs. stevens and the three girls in newport and his son at harvard, governor stevens sailed from new york on the steamer northern light, march 12, by the isthmus route, and arrived in olympia the last of april. there he denounced secession, took strong ground in favor of supporting the government, and recommended organizing and arming the territorial militia. accordingly a company was raised in olympia, known as the puget sound rifles; he was elected captain, accepted the command without hesitation, and was duly commissioned and sworn in. this was before the news of the attack on fort sumter and the grand uprising of the nation had reached the pacific slope, and the minds of many were still in doubt. the democratic convention was held at vancouver in may. untiring efforts had been made by the faction opposed to governor stevens to defeat his renomination, and the showy and oratorical garfielde headed the opposition. the governor's friends felt too secure in his well-earned and undiminished popularity, and the prestige of his successful career in congress, just crowned by the payment of the war debt, and neglected the active work and support the occasion called for. notwithstanding this, a clear majority of the delegates were elected as stevens men; but when the convention met, the opposition were found well organized, active, and bitter; they won over a number of delegates, several of them by bribery, as was publicly charged, and rendered the governor's nomination doubtful, and only to be made at the cost of a protracted contest. indignant at such unworthy treatment at the hands of the party he had served so faithfully and well, and disdaining such a contest at such a time, for the news of the firing on sumter had just been received, and he had resolved to tender his service to the country, governor stevens at once withdrew his name as a candidate before the convention. garfielde was then nominated, and the governor accepted the situation in the following manly and magnanimous speech:- mr. president, gentlemen of the convention, and fellow citizens of the territory of washington,--i congratulate you on the harmonious termination of your labors. notwithstanding great differences of judgment as to the admission of delegates and the fairness of the organization of this convention, you have at length, with almost entire unanimity, agreed upon a platform and a candidate. by your action i shall abide. the choice of this convention is my choice, and shall receive my cordial and unwavering support. for one, i shall not look mournfully into the past. this, the hour of agony of our country's life, is no time for recrimination and the indulgence of selfish feeling. it appeals to whatever is noble and patriotic in behalf of that country's cause. our beloved union is in most imminent peril. the sad spectacle of civil and fratricidal strife is being exhibited to the world, and doubt has arisen as to the capacity of man for self-government. no longer devotion to our whole country, no longer an enlarged view of the liberties and progress of mankind, shapes the policies of parties and prevails in the councils of the government, but the strife of jarring sections and an insane grasp after ascendency has precipitated upon the country a cruel, internecine war. it is the duty of the democracy to unite for the sake of the union of these states. the sundered democracy of the states has already come together. let not our hitherto united democracy now separate. i most heartily indorse the platform of the convention that secession is revolution. there is no such thing, indeed, as peaceable secession. from the beginning of this controversy, not only have i deprecated, but i have denounced secession. i have deemed it the worst possible remedy for the redress of the grievances of the south. i have considered it an aggravation ten-thousand-fold of all their wrongs. i feel that, as the representative of the most northwest territory, i have been true and unfaltering to my constituency and my country. for during the entire winter past i have used every exertion of my nature in behalf of the union of these states and against secession. gentlemen, it is our duty as patriots, and as true lovers of liberty, to stand by our government and our country in this its great emergency. the aggressions of the south upon the property and the forces of the general government must be sternly repelled. the government must be maintained as well against domestic as foreign foes. let these states become the prey of revolutionary schemes, let the doctrine be admitted that one of the parties can alter or break up the compact without the consent of the others, and anarchy will reign throughout the land and all hopes of regulated liberty will come to an end. we must, i repeat, stand steadfastly by the constituted authorities in their efforts to sustain the government. fellow citizens and fellow democrats, i am profoundly grateful for the confidence which, during eight long years of labor, you have placed in me. i am especially grateful for the marks of confidence which i have received in this hour of uncertainty and doubt. my own views and opinions are known to you. i have nothing to explain, to retract, or to apologize for. i have sought faithfully, under all circumstances, to do my duty. i feel that at my hands the honor of the territory has been sustained, and i can look every man in the face, knowing, as i do, that i have done no man intentional injustice. but many of his friends were so indignant at the rascally methods employed to compass his defeat that they refused to support garfielde, and he was badly defeated in the election. the day the convention adjourned, governor stevens tendered his services to the government in the following letter:- portland, oregon, may 22, 1861. hon. simon cameron, _secretary of war_. _sir_,--i have the honor to offer my services in the great contest now taking place for the maintenance of the union in whatever military position the government may see fit to employ them. for my services in the war with mexico i will respectfully refer you to general scott, on whose staff i served as an officer of engineers during that war. for my services in the subsequent indian wars of the country, i will refer you to the hon. j.w. nesmith, one of the senators from oregon. i need not add that, throughout this unhappy secession controversy, i have been an unwavering and steadfast union man. i am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, isaac i. stevens. [illustration: _facsimile of letter offering services_] the same day, from vancouver the governor wrote senator nesmith, requesting him to see the secretary and- "let him know that the offer is made from the earnest purpose and desire to do my duty in this great emergency of our country's history.... i am afraid there is to be a protracted contest. i want to see the rebellion crushed out. the policy of conciliation, to which i adhered as long as it presented the least hope, has not only been exhausted, but it has been contemptuously rejected by the south. the war ought to be prosecuted with the utmost vigor. let us see if we have a government. nothing can be worse than anarchy." the governor was anxious to reach washington at the earliest possible moment in order to renew in person his tender of services, but was detained in portland over the sailing of one steamer by a severe though brief fit of sickness. at this time he was obliged to borrow $600 of judge seth catlin,--a warm personal and political friend,--for his expenses in washington had been heavy and he had nothing laid up. he was always too much engrossed in public affairs to give due attention to his private interests, but he was always careful to meet his bills and expenses. he was able to take the next steamer down the coast, the cortez, and on board of her he wrote general totten as follows:- steamer cortez, june 19, 1861. my dear general,--i am on my way to the states to offer my services in a military capacity to the government, and for the war.[15] i feel and know that i can do good service. educated at the public expense, my country has a right to my services. this secession movement must be put down with an iron hand. anarchy and interminable civil wars will be the inevitable, logical consequence of yielding to it. i do not propose a permanent return to the service, but simply service for the war. whilst i shall accept any military position the government may tender me, i take it for granted proper regard will be had to my somewhat large military experience since i left the army, and my position before the public. i want, therefore, the confidence of those in authority. you can render good offices in the matter. i want the confidence of general scott. i have ever been his discriminating friend. last winter i sustained his entire course. i personally urged the president to give his entire confidence to general scott. i approved and defended the bringing of regular troops to the city, the organizing, arming, and promptly officering the district militia, of which, except the late president and secretary of war, the inspector-general, colonel stone, is more cognizant than any one else. i had frequent conferences with him about the district militia, and was able to be of some service to him in consequence of my relations with mr. buchanan and mr. holt. it has been most fortunate that, notwithstanding my intimate relations with most of the secession leaders, in consequence of the part i took in the presidential campaign, i never wavered for a moment in resolutely fighting secession. i was actively at work the moment it arose. i gave it no quarter. my position was well known in congress. general totten forwarded this letter with the following indorsement:- "with a high order of talent, his great characteristics of promptness, boldness, and energy cannot fail to mark prominently any career that may be opened to him as a soldier, and i trust the government will at once avail itself of his high qualifications by assigning him a position that will give full play to powers so well suited to the present wants of the country." governor stevens also wrote professor bache, colonel stone, and others to present his merits to the new administration; for, confident in his own powers, he was most anxious to secure such a position as would enable him to render his best service to his country. he reached new york early in july, and went straight to washington, not even stopping to visit his family in newport. his reception there was cold and discouraging. the very active part he had taken in the recent presidential campaign, and his intimate association during it with men who were now foremost in striving to destroy the country, prejudiced many against him, and douglas democrats even more than republicans. senator nesmith rather turned the cold shoulder, alleging that he felt bound to reserve all his influence for the benefit of men from his own state. governor stevens called upon the new president, and made a good and lasting impression upon him, but no response was made to his tender; and while the whole country was aroused, and troops were flocking to washington, and the great needs of the hour were military ability and experience, it seemed as though the services of one of her best qualified and most patriotic sons would be rejected, and he be denied the opportunity of serving his country in her extremity. he offered his services to general mcdowell as aide, or in any capacity, for the movement which culminated in the defeat of bull run, but they were declined. the only bright spot in this time of disappointment and mortification was his meeting general scott, and regaining the esteem and confidence of his old chief. meantime his friends and patriotic men of all parties, who were anxious that his services should not be lost to the country, were sending on recommendations in his behalf. governor sprague and the legislature of rhode island, governor andrew, senator wilson, representatives rice, train, and others, of massachusetts, senator john p. hale, of new hampshire, nesmith, of oregon, rice, of minnesota, and many other members of congress urged his appointment as brigadier-general. the "springfield republican" strongly set forth his qualifications, and urged the government to employ his services. as, contrary to expectations, it was not made, governor andrew offered him the colonelcy of a massachusetts regiment, and governor sprague that of a rhode island regiment, both explaining that they would have made the offer before, had they not supposed he would be given the position of general. but just before these offers were received, the secretary of war tendered him the colonelcy of the 79th highlanders, a new york regiment, which had been badly cut up at bull run, and he had accepted it. a few days later a paragraph appeared in the papers to the effect that he had declined this position, and immediately governor andrew telegraphed, "can you now accept regiment temporarily while we try for brigade?" and governor sprague telegraphed, "i hear you decline position in 79th. will you accept my offer?" but having tendered his services to the government without qualification, governor stevens felt in duty bound to accept any position to which he might be assigned, and therefore was obliged to decline both offers. before entering upon the new duty he made a hasty visit of two days to his family in newport, where he addressed a union meeting with general burnside. at this time he was still reduced in health and strength from the overwork of the last year, and mortified and depressed in spirit, almost the only occasion his buoyant and self-reliant character was thus affected. to a personal friend he exclaimed, "i will show those men in washington that i am worthy of something better than a regiment, or i will lay my bones on the battlefield." footnotes: [15] governor alexander s. abernethy writes the following anecdote of governor stevens. meeting him just before starting east, the governor said that he had told the southern gentlemen, with whom he had been associated in the democratic executive committee and in the convention, that, if a war should result from the action they had taken, he would be found supporting the government against them. "and," said he, "i am going to washington at once, and shall offer the president my sword and my services as long as this war shall last." chapter xlviii the 79th highlanders.--the army of the potomac for many years the highland guard was a crack new york city militia battalion, composed of scots, or men of scottish lineage. they wore the kilt as their uniform, and, for fatigue or undress, a blue jacket with red facings, and trousers of cameronian tartan. at the breaking out of the rebellion, the battalion was raised to a full regiment by the addition of two companies and filling up the ranks, and on may 13, 1861, entered the united states service for three years as the 79th highlanders, new york volunteers. few regiments even in those patriotic days contained a finer, braver, or more intelligent body of men. nearly every walk of life was represented among them except common laborers; but business men, clerks, and mechanics, with some sailors and even a few veteran british soldiers, filled the ranks. one company contained so many bookkeepers and clerks that it was known as the clerks' company. if a skilled man was wanted at headquarters for any purpose, from clerk to mule-driver, from manning a light battery to rowing a boat, the highlanders were always called upon to furnish the detail, and their successive commanders had all they could do to prevent the regiment from being depleted by such calls. at the battle of bull run the highlanders were terribly cut up, losing one hundred and ninety-eight killed, wounded, and missing, including eleven officers. the colonel, james cameron, brother to the secretary of war, was killed gallantly leading his regiment, which was considerably scattered after the battle. it was collected together in a few days, and moved to a camp on meridian hill, at the head of tenth street, north of washington, named camp ewen. the officers and non-commissioned officers now petitioned the secretary to order the regiment home to recruit and recuperate. the secretary, visiting the camps, repeatedly expressed great regard for the regiment, and promised to do anything in his power for it. when the petition reached him, he indorsed it as follows:- the secretary of war believes that in consideration of the gallant services of the 79th regiment, new york volunteers, and of their losses in battle, they are entitled to the special consideration of their country; and he also orders that the regiment be sent to some one of the forts in the bay of new york to fill up the regiment by recruits, as soon as colonel stevens returns to the command. simon cameron, _secretary of war_. the men were informed of the secretary's order, and notified to prepare for the homeward trip, to which they looked forward with eager anticipations and longing. but the military authorities remonstrated so strenuously against the order, on the ground of the bad effect on other troops of allowing one regiment to go home, that the secretary allowed it to be set aside, yet no notice of the revocation was given the highlanders. as day by day went by without the much-desired homeward orders, they became more and more dissatisfied; the officers, as much in the dark as the men, could not satisfy their doubts and misgivings, and the spirit of insubordination grew daily. on august 7 lieutenant-colonel samuel m. elliott was directed from headquarters first division, new york state militia, to convene the commissioned officers, after five days' notice, for the purpose of electing a colonel, and accordingly notified them to meet on the 13th at four p.m. for such purpose. apparently the state authorities ignored the action of the war department in appointing a new colonel, and it does not appear that the appointment of colonel stevens was announced to the regiment, except by his own order assuming command. on august 10 colonel stevens arrived at the camp, and at dress parade that evening the following order was read:- the undersigned, in pursuance of orders from the war department, hereby assumes command of the 79th regiment, new york state militia. he will devote himself earnestly to the regiment, and trusts that its high reputation, gained by honorable service in the face of the enemy, will not suffer at his hands. he doubts not that zeal, fidelity, and soldierly bearing will continue to characterize every member of the regiment. isaac i. stevens, _colonel_. the new colonel spent the next day in simply observing the officers and men and inspecting the camp, taking no active steps. on the following day, however, he summoned the major and several other officers to his tent, and demanded and exacted their resignations. on the 13th, the third day of his command, he issued an order at dress parade that the regiment should move camp on the morrow. this brought matters to a climax. the men plainly saw that they were not to go to new york, and felt that they had been trifled with and deceived. they gathered in knots like angry bees to discuss their wrongs. many of them went into the city that night and returned late, more or less intoxicated. whiskey was smuggled into the camp, and some of the forced-to-resign officers had a hand in this, and by the eventful morning of the 14th the regiment was ripe for mutiny. when, after an early breakfast, the order was given to strike tents, all flatly refused except two companies,--i and k,--which remained faithful and obedient during the trouble. these were the new companies recently organized, and probably were less infected with militia notions than the others. colonel stevens visited the refractory companies in turn, but the men, deaf to orders and expostulations, stubbornly refused obedience, and told how they had been deceived and disappointed. lieutenant-colonel elliott attempted to explain his action, but without satisfying the colonel, who gave him half an hour in which to resign, on penalty of court-martial. elliott resigned. colonel stevens continued going freely and fearlessly among the men, remonstrating with them and urging them not to bring disgrace upon the regiment, but in vain. when the officers attempted to strike the tents themselves, they were forcibly prevented, and several of them roughly handled. colonel stevens, coming to a group where some officers had just been thus repulsed, the armed and angry mutineers threatening to shoot any one who touched a tent, at once exclaimed, "then i will take it down myself," and, disregarding threatening words and looks, laid hold of the tent to strike it. at this the men, struck with admiration at his intrepidity, exclaimed, "dinna mind, colonel; we'll take it doon for ye this ance." at length, finding all efforts to restore obedience fruitless, colonel stevens felt obliged to report the mutiny, and ask for troops to suppress it. in response the camp was surrounded late in the afternoon by an overpowering force of regular infantry, artillery, and cavalry, which, in presence of the refractory regiment, ostentatiously loaded muskets, drew sabres, and charged the guns with canister and trained them on the camp. colonel stevens then addressed them, standing in the midst of the camp:- "i know you have been deceived. you have been told you were to go to your homes, when no such orders had been given. but you are soldiers, and your duty is to obey. i am your colonel, and your obedience is due to me. i am a soldier of the regular army. i have spent many years on the frontier fighting the indians. i have been surrounded by the red devils, fighting for my scalp. i have been a soldier in the war with mexico, and bear honorable wounds received in battle, and have been in far greater danger than that surrounding me now. all the morning i have begged you to do your duty. now i shall order you; and if you hesitate to obey instantly, my next order will be to those troops to fire upon you. soldiers of the 79th highlanders, fall in!" his voice rang out like a trumpet. the men, thoroughly cowed, made haste to fall into the ranks. the regiment, guarded on both flanks by the regulars, was then marched into fourteenth street, the colors were taken away by order of general mcclellan, and thirty-five men, reported by the officer of the guard as active in the disturbance, were marched off to prison. the regiment resumed its march for the eastern branch, crossed that stream, and bivouacked for the night near the maryland insane asylum,--a suggestive coincidence, remarks the historian of the regiment. soon after daylight the next morning the new camp was reached, named camp causten, after a resident of washington, who had shown the highlanders many kind attentions after bull run, tents were pitched, and the routine of camp life established. fourteen of the so-called ringleaders were soon afterwards released and returned to the regiment, and the remainder were sent to the dry tortugas on the florida coast, where they were kept on fatigue duty until the 16th of the following february, when they were also released, and rejoined the regiment at beaufort, s.c. colonel stevens commanded his regiment with a firm and severe hand. he enforced early roll-calls, hard drilling, and strict cleanliness in person and camp. there were some men so demoralized, by homesickness or otherwise, that they could not be induced to keep themselves decent, or attend to their duties, and he made the guard take them daily to the river, and strip and scrub them with soap and brooms. under such drastic treatment they speedily recovered their tone. he promptly and severely punished every neglect of duty. he selected a number of bright, efficient young sergeants, and promoted them to be officers of the companies. he daily sent out detachments on scouting expeditions, or marches of ten or twelve miles, and had sketches and measurements made for a topographical map. by these means he varied the monotony of camp life, and infused hope and spirit into the command. he obtained furloughs for a limited number of men, those with families having the preference, and thus assisted some forty to visit their homes for fifteen days each. he was especially strict with the officers, taught them to assert their authority, and broke up the time-honored habit, the curse of militia organizations, of deferring to, and hobnobbing with, the rank and file. on the 26th the regiment broke camp, marched through washington, the band playing the dead march, by order of the colonel, in token of their disgraced condition and loss of the colors, and went into camp on kalorama hill, beyond georgetown, a mile from the chain bridge. colonel stevens named the new location camp hope, and in a brief address to the regiment bade them hope, and declared that together they would win back the colors and achieve a glorious career. with all his matter-of-fact judgment, he had a pronounced vein of enthusiasm and poetic feeling, and had a singular power of arousing them in others, and of appealing to the higher motives. it was napoleon who declared that in war the moral is to the physical as three to one. at this camp colonel stevens dispensed entirely with camp guards, which in all the new regiments were deemed indispensable, and appealed to the sense of honor and discipline of the highlanders to refrain from wandering from camp, and from annoying, or pilfering from, the country people. the men responded nobly to this appeal, and took great pride in scrupulously obeying these orders, and in the confidence reposed in them. the inhabitants felt safe when they saw the uniform of the highlanders, and frequently spoke of the difference between them and other troops. the highlanders still wore the blue jacket with red facings, but the regulation uniform as to the remainder. later, when the jackets were worn out, they were uniformed like other troops. on the evening of the 6th of september a large force, including the highlanders, crossed chain bridge to the southern side of the potomac, and took up positions in front and extending to the left, connecting with troops from arlington. at midnight, as the regiment was drawn up in line, colonel stevens addressed them as follows:- "'soldiers of the 79th! you have been censured, and i have been censured with you. you are now going to fight the battles of your country without your colors. i pray god you may soon have an opportunity of meeting the enemy, that you may return victorious with your colors gloriously won.' "as cheering was prohibited," says the historian, "the men listened in silence, but with a determination to do all in our power to recover our lost honors." it was an impressive scene,--the long line of silent soldiers dimly seen in the gloom of night, as they gained new courage and determination from the brief, brave, and soldierly words of their leader. the troops in front of chain bridge constituted a division under general w.f. smith (baldy smith), of the army of the potomac, forming under general george b. mcclellan, and colonel stevens was placed in charge of the first brigade, consisting of the 2d and 3d vermont, the 6th maine, and his own regiment, and was intrusted with building fort ethan allen, a strong and extensive earthwork on the left of the leesburg turnpike, and of felling the woods in the vicinity. the maine men, all expert woodsmen, armed with axes and deployed in a long line at the foot of a wooded slope, worked upwards, chopping every tree nearly through, so that it stood by only a narrow chip, until they reached the top of the slope; then at the signal of the bugle the last few quick strokes of the axe resounded against the top row of trees, which fell crashing on those below, and they on the next lower, and so on, until the whole forest crashed down together in thundering ruin. the troops were kept hard at work, thus felling forests and digging forts, and also in outpost duty, for a strong picket line to cover the front, posted nearly a mile in advance, had to be maintained. alarms from this line were frequent, and on one occasion the enemy were reported as advancing in heavy force, and the troops were hastily gotten under arms. every one expected to take post in the fort, but colonel stevens led his brigade out nearly to the picket line, deployed them on a commanding position on both sides of the road, and coolly awaited the attack. this movement, so promptly but deliberately made, visibly raised the confidence and _morale_ of the troops; and when, the alarm proving unfounded, they marched back to camp, they felt able and eager to encounter the enemy on equal ground. on the 11th, under orders from general smith, but with strictest injunction not to bring on a general engagement under any circumstances, colonel stevens, with two thousand troops, made a reconnoissance in force of lewinsville, a hamlet six miles in advance of chain bridge. his force comprised the highlanders; the 3d vermont, under colonel breed n. hyde; two companies of the 2d vermont, under lieutenant-colonel george j. stannard; four companies of the 1st chasseurs or 65th new york, under lieutenant-colonel alexander shaler; five companies of the 19th indiana, under colonel solomon meredith; four guns of griffin's battery, 5th united states artillery, captain charles griffin; a detachment of fifty of the 5th regular cavalry, under lieutenant william mclean; and one of forty volunteer cavalry, under captain robinson. with skirmishers in advance, and exploring the ground on both flanks to the distance of a mile, the command advanced steadily to lewinsville, the enemy's cavalry pickets falling back without resistance, and occupied the village at ten a.m. cavalry pickets were thrown out on all the roads; three guns and some five hundred skirmishers were posted well out to command the approaches on all sides; and the position was held for five hours, during which lieutenant orlando m. poe, of the engineers (afterwards general poe), and mr. west, of the coast survey, made a topographical map and sketch of the place and vicinity. colonel stevens, with captain griffin and lieutenant poe, thoroughly examined the whole position of lewinsville, of which he reported, "it has great natural advantages, is easily defensible, and should be occupied without delay." during this time small bodies of the enemy were seen observing the union force at a safe distance, and a cavalry picket, or reconnoitring party of fifty men, was driven off by lieutenant mclean. the accompanying sketch shows the roads and dispositions of the force to cover the reconnoissance. colonel meredith, with three companies of his regiment and one gun, held the road leading north to the leesburg pike. the same road, running south of the village to falls church, was guarded by one company of the same regiment with one gun. colonel hyde, with the 3d vermont and one gun, held the road leading westward to vienna, and also the new road to vienna, which fell into the falls church road half a mile south of the hamlet. the remaining gun, with the two companies of the 2d vermont, was kept in reserve at the cross-roads; while the highlanders and chasseurs were held in reserve a third of a mile back from the village, and two companies of the former were thrown out as skirmishers to cover the left flank and rear, and connected with the indiana skirmishers on the falls church road. about three in the afternoon the skirmishers were called in, and the column formed for the return march. just as the bugle sounded "forward!" a section of artillery, which the enemy, stealing up under cover of the woods as the highlanders' skirmishers retired, had adroitly planted on the left rear, opened a brisk fire of shells over the head of the column as it marched back; and simultaneously a considerable force of their skirmishers from the vienna and falls church roads advanced on the village and commenced firing on the withdrawing troops, but were directly repulsed, and gave no further trouble. for a few minutes there was some flurry in the column under the shell fire at a turn in the road where it was most exposed. some of the officers and men threw themselves flat on the ground at every missile that burst or hurtled overhead, and once twenty men ranged themselves in line behind a tree barely a foot in diameter. but this confusion was over in a few minutes; the excitable ones, under the jeers and laughter of their comrades, resumed their places in the ranks, and the column was not broken or delayed. [illustration: reconnoissance of lewinsville, september 11, 1862] colonel stevens posted griffin's battery in a good position on the right, or north of the road, which opened a rapid and well-sustained fire on the enemy's guns, and in half an hour silenced them. the column continued its march meantime in admirable order, and lieutenant mclean brought up the rear unmolested. colonel stevens, having thus withdrawn his column from the village and well past the annoying battery, selected other positions for the guns, a section on each side of the road, and disposed his troops to meet the enemy's attack, or to attack him if opportunity offered. the troops were in fine spirits, and obeyed every order with alacrity. but the enemy having ceased his artillery fire, and making no demonstration, showing glimpses only of cavalry and infantry at a distance, the return march was continued, and the troops reached their camps without further incident. the union loss in this affair was two killed and thirteen wounded, besides three captured, the latter having, in their eagerness to get a shot at the enemy, ventured too far in front of the skirmish line of the 19th indiana, to which they belonged. the enemy's force consisted of the 13th virginia, a section of rosser's battery of the washington artillery, and a detachment of the 1st virginia cavalry, all under command of colonel j.e.b. stuart, of the latter. colonel stuart made a most exaggerated and magniloquent report of the action, and was actually promoted to brigadier-general for it. the action was over, and the union troops were calmly marching down the road, when general baldy smith came galloping up it in hot haste, followed by his staff and a section of mott's battery, and manifesting considerable anxiety, for the artillery firing had been brisk and noisy while it lasted, and his orders from mcclellan--the same he had impressed on colonel stevens--charged him not to bring on a general engagement. but perceiving the fine order and undaunted bearing of the troops, and learning how well they had all behaved, and that the enemy was keeping his distance, he resumed his wonted coolness, and heartily congratulated colonel stevens and his command on the well-conducted and successful reconnoissance. half an hour later general mcclellan, with a large following of staff and escort, came tearing up the road to the returning column, showing even greater excitement and anxiety. he, too, calmed down on learning that the affair was all over, congratulated general smith, ostentatiously visited and commiserated the wounded, and returned to washington without noticing colonel stevens. a few days later the colors were restored to the highlanders by general mcclellan in person, in recognition of their soldierly conduct since recrossing the potomac, especially in the affair at lewinsville. colonel stevens took great pains in disciplining and training the regiments under his command, one of which, the 6th maine, was raised at bucksport and vicinity, and some of whose officers he knew when building fort knox, and he looked forward with confidence and pride to forming and commanding in them a fine body of soldiers. they, too, were responding to and appreciating his efforts, and strong feelings of mutual esteem and devotion were fast growing up between the commander and command. before moving from camp hope, president lincoln had assured him of his appointment as brigadier-general within a week, and he was daily expecting it. he never doubted that the troops he was so carefully instructing would form his brigade when he became a general, nor did they. his surprise and chagrin, therefore, were great when the maine and vermont regiments were summarily taken from him to make up a brigade for general w.s. hancock, who, a new brigadier, had just reported to smith, and three newer and greener regiments were sent to replace them. they were the 33d and 49th new york and 47th pennsylvania. colonel stevens was deeply hurt and disappointed at this action. with the unexplained delay in his promised appointment, and mcclellan's significant and averted demeanor, it seemed to indicate a fixed intention on the part of the authorities to deny him promotion, and to keep him down to his colonelcy indefinitely. but he uttered no word of remonstrance or repining at this unworthy treatment, and took the new regiments in hand with unabated care and vigor. he declared to his son, in strict confidence, that, if his appointment as general was not soon made, he would relinquish the command of a brigade and devote himself to the highlanders; that he would make them the best-disciplined and the best-drilled regiment in the army, and would so infuse them with the spirit of devotion to the country and the cause that, like cromwell's ironsides, nothing could resist their onset. he dwelt much at this time on cromwell, and how he had formed and trained his invincible soldiers. before embracing the contemplated course, however, colonel stevens sent his son to see the president and deliver a brief message to the effect that, although several weeks had elapsed since the assurance was given of his appointment as a general officer within a week, he had heard nothing of it, and feared that the president, under the great weight of care and responsibilities, might have forgotten it. the young man accordingly rode into the city and presented himself at the white house. his card was taken; the ante-rooms were crowded with anxious applicants and callers, and among them he waited for hours, unable to get access to the president, or secure any attention. at last he accosted a colored messenger, who from time to time entered the president's room with cards, and begged his assistance in obtaining an interview, stating that he had a message of great importance from his father, colonel isaac i. stevens, who had sent him expressly to deliver it to the president. the messenger would scarcely listen, indeed, had to be almost forcibly detained, until the name struck his ear, when his whole manner changed. "do you mean governor stevens?" he exclaimed. "is governor stevens your father? i used to see him here often in mr. buchanan's time, and i am glad to do anything in the world i can for him. i'll take your name in the next time, and you shall see the president, if i can fix it." he was as good as his word, and soon ushered the youth into the inner office. mr. lincoln received him in a kindly and fatherly manner that at once placed him at ease, listened to the message, and said: "tell your father that i have not forgotten my promise, nor him; that i should have had his appointment made before this, if it had not been for general mcclellan; that general mcclellan said colonel stevens had better remain in command of the highlanders some time longer; that they were not yet reduced to proper discipline, and it would be unsafe to take away their colonel at present. but tell your father," he added, "that it shall be no longer delayed." he then took a small blank card and wrote a line upon it, directing that colonel stevens's appointment as brigadier-general be made out, and handed it to his visitor, bidding him take it over to the war department and deliver it to the adjutant-general. this was soon done, and the young man, plying the spur, joyfully galloped back to camp with the gratifying news. any military man knows perfectly well that as brigadier-general he could have as much oversight and control over a regiment in his brigade as though he remained its colonel. in fact, general stevens retained personal and immediate command of the highlanders, although he commanded a brigade, and long after he became a general. on the 25th general smith advanced to lewinsville with five thousand troops on a foraging expedition. colonel stevens, with the highlanders and the 2d vermont, led the advance, and the skirmishers of the former captured an officer of stuart's regiment with his horse. the enemy made no resistance, and after loading ninety wagons with corn and grain, the expedition returned. camp advance, september 27, 1861. my dear wife,--i appointed hazard adjutant of the highlanders yesterday. he has been with the regiment under fire three times, acting as my aide on two occasions, and the aide of captain ireland on the third. the appointment is very acceptable to the regiment. hazard will make an excellent adjutant. it will be easy for him to learn the technical part. his general experience will make everything easy. i am looking somewhat for my brigadier's commission this week. the young man joined the regiment immediately after it crossed the potomac, and had borne a musket in some of its skirmishes, and was appointed adjutant on the advancement of the former adjutant, david ireland, to a captaincy in the regular army. general stevens's appointment as brigadier was made on the 28th, and on the following day he was formally assigned to the command of the third brigade of smith's division, consisting of the four regiments already under his charge, viz., the highlanders, 33d and 49th new york, and 47th pennsylvania. he retained the immediate command of the highlanders in addition to that of the brigade. a few days afterwards smith's division and other troops of the right wing were advanced some four miles permanently, without encountering the enemy. about noon, soon after the troops had come to a halt, general mcclellan, escorted as usual by a numerous staff, appeared on the scene, and, after visiting different points, dismounted, and sat down to a lunch which his attendants spread for him. he invited general smith and some other officers to partake of the repast, but ignored the presence of general stevens, who was quite near. the latter may have been unduly sensitive, but he regarded the omission as an intentional slight, and remarked that he actually pitied mcclellan. general stevens named the new position occupied by his brigade, which was not far from falls church, the camp of the big chestnut, from a huge sylvan monarch near by. a train of one hundred and forty-four wagons came over from washington to move the tents and baggage of the command,--what a contrast to later campaign days, when four wagons only, or even less, were allowed to a brigade!--but even this number proved inadequate to bring everything at one trip. the new adjutant of the highlanders directed the wagon-master to send some wagons back for what was left behind, but that functionary flatly refused, alleging that he was under orders to make but one trip, and then return to the city. the adjutant thereupon applied to the general for instructions in the premises, but his reception was hotter than he bargained for. "have you a thousand men at your disposal, and suffer yourself to be set at defiance by a wagon-master? if you are not man enough to make your authority respected, you are not fit to be an officer. go back to your regiment and attend to your duty." smarting under this unexpected rebuke, the young officer again summoned the wagon-master and reiterated the order, and, on his second refusal to obey it, had him lashed fast to a neighboring tree. four of his wagoners, equally contumacious, shared the same fate; and a sergeant and four soldiers of the ever ready and capable highlanders were soon driving the teams back to the old camp, and in a few hours safely returned with the left-behind goods. the bound wagon-master and teamsters were then set free and ordered to mount their wagons and drive off instantly, an order which they obeyed with alacrity, and returned to washington doubtless madder if not wiser men. although at times a severe and exacting man, general stevens always encouraged his subordinates to self-reliance, to do things, "to take the responsibility," in jackson's phrase, and was sure to back them up if they acted in this spirit. drilling, picketing, and tree-felling fully employed the troops, at camp of the big chestnut. by mcclellan's orders the woods, which covered a good part of the country, were slashed, the roads blocked, and the whole front obstructed by felled trees. the troops were ordered to get under arms and stand in line for half an hour before daylight every morning in anticipation of an attack which never came. this was an especially disagreeable and unhealthy task, for the potomac fog shrouded the country at that hour, the autumnal mornings were damp and chilly, and the men would stand coughing all along the line. many a poor fellow owed his death or disablement to this useless exposure. strict orders were issued to avoid any movement which might lead to a collision with the enemy, and especially to shun everything which might bring on a general engagement. the orders frequently repeated these cautions, and seemed to be filled with a nervous apprehension of fighting. general stevens thought this passive-defensive attitude all wrong. he took great pains to inculcate and develop a bold and enterprising spirit in his own brigade, especially charging his pickets to hold their ground in case of attack, and was delighted when a detachment of the 49th new york stood firm, and handsomely repulsed a dash of the enemy. at breakfast on october 16 general stevens unexpectedly received orders to turn over the command of his brigade to the senior colonel, and report in person to general thomas w. sherman at annapolis, md., by daylight the next morning. by eleven o'clock a.m. he had written farewell orders to the brigade and to the highlanders, devolved the command upon colonel taylor, of the 33d new york, had all his belongings packed up, and mounted his horse to ride to washington. to avoid anything like a scene, the general was about to ride away without visiting the regiment and bidding them farewell, but captain david morrison, the senior officer, came and begged him to say good-by in person, saying that the regiment was formed and was most anxious to see him. he rode in front of the line, and in a few feeling words expressed his regards and hopes for them and bade them farewell. as he wheeled and rode off, a spontaneous and universal cry of "tak' us wi' ye! tak' us wi' ye!" burst from end to end of the line, and tears stood in many a manly eye. stopping only two hours in washington, during which he called at the war department and secured the appointment of his son as captain and assistant adjutant-general of united states volunteers, and to make necessary purchases, he took the cars in the afternoon for annapolis. as they rolled along through the pleasant rural scenery of maryland, general stevens threw off all traces of care and became as cheerful and light-hearted as a boy. he fell to talking about the recent experiences in the army of the potomac in a most interesting and instructive way, exposing and condemning the mistakes and evil effects of mcclellan's passive-defensive management, and pointing out what he deemed to be the right course. instead of obstructing the entire front with blocked roads and tracts of slashed woods, which would impede the enemy's attack indeed, but would also confine the union troops to the strict defensive, making it impossible to manoeuvre them offensively outside the works, the front should have been kept clear and unobstructed, and the ground carefully studied and understood by subordinate commanders, with the view of throwing a heavy force upon the enemy's flank, or any weak point he might offer, in case he attacked. instead of restraining the natural enterprise and ardor of the troops, prohibiting and deprecating all hostile contact with the enemy, as if they were no match for the rebels, thus keeping them under the cowing of bull run, and aggravating the awe of the enemy's prowess inspired by that defeat, they should have been continually brought face to face with the foe, scouts and reconnoissances kept afoot and boldly pushed, and parties of picked men under picked officers sent to fall upon the enemy's pickets and exposed detachments at every favorable opportunity. such a course, he declared, would most speedily give the troops confidence and restore their _morale_, would foster and develop their natural enterprise and bravery, and would most effectively and quickly make them reliable soldiers. he had none of that distrust of volunteers often felt by regular officers, and which undoubtedly influenced mcclellan, for he knew how quickly such splendid material as the brave young volunteers then flocking to the country's defense would become soldiers, if well officered and under a bold and skillful commander. he discussed, also, mcclellan's character without the least trace of animosity, admitting his ability and patriotism, but lamenting his fatal lack of boldness and decision, which, he said, rendered his failure inevitable, and finally he exclaimed, with great feeling and conviction, "i am glad to leave mcclellan's army. i am rejoiced to get out of that army. i tell you that army under mcclellan is doomed to disaster." they reached annapolis that evening, and were most cordially received by general sherman, and by colonel daniel leasure, of the 100th pennsylvania, known as the "roundheads," which was to form part of general stevens's new brigade. his first act on reaching annapolis was to apply by telegraph to the secretary of war, in conjunction with general sherman, for the highlanders. he also personally telegraphed the president to that effect. colonel leasure, too, telegraphed the secretary that his regiment was largely composed of the descendants of scotch covenanters and cromwell's soldiers, and were anxious to be joined by the highlanders. both the president and secretary were desirous of granting the request, but it was first referred to general mcclellan, and properly, as the regiment was in his army. he strenuously objected to it, protesting that he could not possibly spare one of his best veteran regiments. but mr. lincoln again overruled the "young napoleon," and ordered the highlanders to annapolis to rejoin their beloved commander. [illustration: hazard stevens, capt. & asst. adj. gen'l.] chapter xlix the port royal expedition the force which general sherman was fitting out at annapolis was destined, in conjunction with the navy, to secure a harbor on the southern coast to serve as a base for the blockading fleets. general sherman was a veteran regular officer of artillery, who had greatly distinguished himself at the battle of buena vista, a thorough soldier, a strict disciplinarian, devoted to his profession, and moreover a man of ability, sound judgment, and true patriotism, but perhaps somewhat deficient in enterprise. he personally applied for general stevens, for whom he entertained great esteem, as one of his brigade commanders. his force numbered some twelve thousand, all new, raw volunteers, except two regular batteries and the highlanders, who, having fought at bull run, were looked up to as veterans by the other troops, and was divided into three brigades, commanded by brigadier-generals egbert l. viele the first, isaac i. stevens the second, and horatio g. wright the third. general stevens's brigade consisted of the highlanders, the 100th pennsylvania or roundheads, colonel daniel leasure; the 50th pennsylvania, colonel b. c. christ; and the 8th michigan, colonel william m. fenton. they were all brave, patriotic, and intelligent men, the best types of american volunteers, and destined to render great and glorious service to the very end of the war, participating in many battles and engagements, and preserving their colors without a stain. the michiganders, as they were familiarly called, were largely of new england stock, many of them farmers' boys, and had all the grit, intelligence, and enterprise of their lineage. the 50th pennsylvania were pennsylvania dutch, descendants of the germans who settled the central part of the state before the revolution, and were slower, more heavily moulded than the others, but always steadfast and reliable. the roundheads came from the western, more mountainous part of the keystone state, and were of the vigorous scotch-irish stock, with many tall, rawboned men. the regiments were quartered in the naval academy buildings and grounds. on colonel leasure's recommendation, general stevens took a large brick building as headquarters, but soon after moving into it an ambulance was driven up to the front door, and a soldier in an advanced stage of the smallpox, his face perfectly black and festering, was taken out of the vehicle on a stretcher and borne into the house, which, it seems, had been selected as a smallpox hospital. needless to say that headquarters fled before this visitation. general stevens, indignant at leasure's carelessness in the matter, summarily ordered him out of his own spacious quarters and took them for himself, greatly to the colonel's disgust, who was heard to exclaim that there were too many roundheads about for him to submit to such an indignity; but the incident had a good effect in showing that the new commander would stand no trifling. the highlanders arrived on the 18th, and the next day the troops were taken off in small bay steamboats to the large ocean steamships anchored two miles out, and embarked upon them. the largest of these vessels, and second only to the great eastern, was the vanderbilt, a noble side-wheel ship of three thousand tonnage, which had recently been given the government by cornelius vanderbilt, the old commodore, and was named after him. his favorite captain, le favre, a skillful navigator and accomplished gentleman, commanded her. on this fine steamer were crowded general stevens and staff, the highlanders, the 8th michigan, and a hundred quartermaster's employees, all together over two thousand men. a large number of surf-boats and quantities of tents and baggage were piled in confusion on her decks, leaving scarce standing-room for the troops. the roundheads and one battalion of the 50th embarked on the ocean queen, while colonel christ with the remainder of his regiment were loaded on the winfield scott. captain and assistant quartermaster william lilly here joined the command as brigade quartermaster. he had met general stevens during the presidential campaign and won his confidence, of which he proved unworthy, and owed his appointment to the general's recommendation. general stevens was also joined by colonel william h. nobles, who had seen much service on the frontier, and whom he appointed lieutenant-colonel of the highlanders, but he was unequal to the position and soon afterwards resigned. the general appointed as his first aide-de-camp lieutenant william t. lusk, of the highlanders, an educated and high-toned gentleman, who had abandoned his studies in germany to fight for his country, and who proved a brave and excellent officer, and has since achieved distinction in his profession as a physician. the remaining members of the staff were dr. george s. kemble, brigade surgeon; captain l.a. warfield, brigade commissary; and lieutenants henry s. taft and william s. cogswell, signal officers. the transports sailed on the 20th and reached fortress monroe the next day. here were awaiting them a fleet of thirty warships, under commodore samuel f. dupont, and a large number of sailing vessels laden with munitions and stores. the expedition lay here at anchor for a week, completing the necessary preparations. commodore dupont held many conferences on his flagship, the wabash, with general sherman and the brigade commanders, at which the objective point was decided upon. the weather was fine, the sea smooth, and the blue road-stead, covered with the great fleet, comprising every variety of vessel,--the great, grim, black warships, with their frowning batteries; the transports, swarming with blue-clad soldiers; the deep-laden sailing ships, with their tall spars,--presented an impressive and animated scene, enlivened by the numerous launches and cutters darting from ship to ship with officers bearing dispatches or exchanging calls. one of the swiftest and nattiest of these small craft was the captain's gig of the vanderbilt, manned by a crew of fine oarsmen from the highlanders, which attracted much attention from the army and navy alike, was the envy of other headquarters, and was kept busy conveying general stevens and staff over the waters blue. it was a fine, bracing autumn afternoon, october 29, when the great fleet sailed out of the chesapeake in two parallel columns a mile apart. the giant warship wabash led the right column, followed in single file by the war vessels, thirty in number, a black and formidable array. the left column was composed of the transport steamers, crowded with troops, each towing one of the sailing-vessels, and also contained some thirty ships. the vanderbilt towed the great republic, a four-masted, full-rigged ship of four thousand tons, the largest sailing-ship then afloat. besides a vast cargo of stores, she carried on her main and upper decks a great number of artillery horses. thus the mighty armada steadily ploughed its way out to sea, with flags waving and bands playing, a glorious and awe-inspiring sight; while the troops, exhilarated by the novel and stirring scene and the excitement of sailing to an unknown destination, their hearts swelling with the hope and determination of soon dealing the rebel lion a mighty and perhaps fatal blow, cheered and cheered again until they could cheer no more. the third day a furious storm struck the combined fleet and scattered it far and wide. at midnight, in the height of the tempest, the great hawsers by which the vanderbilt was towing her consort threatened to tear off her quarters under the terrific strain of the mountain billows, and had to be cut asunder with axes, and the great republic was abandoned to her fate in the raging storm, furious sea, and black night. when day broke no other sail was visible amid the driving and tossing billows. later in the day general stevens opened the sealed orders with which every ship was provided, to be opened in case of separation from the fleet, in presence of captains le favre, stevens, and lilly, and announced that the destination and point of rendezvous was off port royal, one of the finest harbors on the southern coast, situated midway between charleston and savannah. the vanderbilt, the swiftest of the fleet, arrived off the entrance on november 3, among the first. the other ships came straggling in, and by the 6th were nearly all assembled and anchored just outside the bar, save four, the governor and peerless, that foundered in the storm, and the osceola and union, that were driven ashore. the loss of life, however, was small under the circumstances, being seven drowned and ninety-three captured. the 50th pennsylvania, on the winfield scott, came near going to the bottom, and were only saved by incessant pumping and bailing, and throwing overboard the entire cargo. port royal was defended by earthworks on each side of the entrance, fort walker on hilton head, the south side, and fort beauregard on bay point, on the north. these were strong and well-constructed forts, with heavy parapets, traverses, and bomb-proofs, mounted forty-one guns of large calibre, and were garrisoned and defended by three thousand troops, under general thomas f. drayton, whose brother, captain percival drayton, commanded the gunboat pocahontas in dupont's fleet. the enemy had also three small gunboats in the bay, under commodore tatnall, formerly an officer of the united states navy. after reconnoissance by his gunboats, commodore dupont decided to attack the forts with his fleet, and arranged with general sherman that the troops were to land in small boats on the open beach during the naval bombardment and carry the works by assault, in case the navy failed to shell the enemy out. accordingly, on the morning of november 7 the surf-boats, of which there were a large number, and all the boats belonging to the vessels, were launched, and brought up alongside or astern of the transports, and the troops of stevens's and wright's brigades were provided with ammunition and one day's cooked rations, and held in readiness to land and attack. while they awaited this movement in high-wrought expectation, the following order was written by general stevens and read to them, and had a marked effect to increase their determination and ardor:- headquarters second brigade, expeditionary corps, s.s. vanderbilt, november 7, 1861. general orders no. 5. the brigadier-general commanding the second brigade trustfully appeals to each man of his command this day to strike a signal blow for his country. she has been stabbed by traitorous hands, and by her most favored sons. show by your acts that the hero age has not passed away, and that patriotism still lives. better to fall nobly in the forlorn hope in vindication of home and nationality than to live witnesses of the triumph of a sacrilegious cause. the lord god of battles will direct us; to him let us humbly appeal this day to vouchsafe to us his crowning mercy; and may those of us who survive, when the evening sun goes down, ascribe to him, and not to ourselves, the glorious victory. by order of brigadier-general stevens. hazard stevens, _capt. and ass't adj't-gen_. at nine o'clock on the bright, clear morning, with a smooth sea, the great war fleet crossed the bar, and deliberately advanced to attack the forts in a long column of single ships, while the transports lay at anchor just outside with their decks, masts, and shrouds covered with the troops, eagerly watching the scene. commodore dupont in the wabash led the long string of warships slowly up the middle of the bay, receiving and replying to the fire of both forts until two miles beyond them, then turned to the left in a wide circle and led back past fort walker, at a thousand yards distance, opening upon it broadside after broadside. at the same time a flanking column of five gunboats steamed up the bay nearer to bay point and poured its broadsides into fort beauregard, and, steering towards the other side, advanced against tatnall's fleet, driving it into skull creek, which cuts off hilton head on the inside, and then, taking position near the shore and flanking the fort, opened upon it a destructive fire. meantime the main column, led by the wabash, was majestically and slowly passing the work, each succeeding vessel opening its batteries upon it in turn as it came within range, and maintaining a rapid fire as it drew past. the naval gun fire was terrific, rising at times to a continuous roar; dense clouds of smoke belched forth and hung about the ships, while the white puff-balls showed where the great 11 and 9-inch shells were bursting over and about the work. the enemy replied with a brisk and well-maintained fire, and many of his missiles could be traced by the great columns of water dashed up as they ricochetted across the bay beyond the vessels. after passing down the bay as far as the depth of water permitted, dupont turned and again led the fleet in front of fort walker, at much closer range than before, pouring upon the devoted work a still more terrific fire. as the admiral repeated this manoeuvre for the third time, one of the light-draught gunboats, pushing closely in at six p.m., discovered that the enemy had fled, and sent a boat with a small party ashore, who pulled down the rebel flag and hoisted over it the glorious stars and stripes. what cheers then burst forth from ship to ship of the crowded transports, what joy and relief from suspense were felt by the officers who had so anxiously watched the bombardment for hours, momentarily looking for orders to land and assault the works, which were so stubbornly resisting the navy, can never be realized by those not actors in the scene. the flight of the enemy was panic. they left their flags flying, their tents standing, and all their supplies. tatnall's mosquito fleet hastened up skull creek, and, with the aid of some large flatboats, ferried the fugitives across that stream. the fact that the enemy's retreat might have been cut off and his entire force captured, by sending gunboats up the inner channels separating hilton head and bay point from adjacent islands, lent wings to his flight. the opportunity was not improved. fort beauregard was abandoned in equal haste, although not subjected to nearly so severe a battering as fort walker. the navy lost only thirty-one killed and wounded; that of the enemy was sixty-six. the morning after the bombardment the highlanders went ashore on bay point, and occupied fort beauregard and the deserted camp, and the rest of the troops were landed on hilton head. the beach shoals very gradually, and the men and impedimenta had to be loaded from the ocean steamers into small boats, which took them in until they grounded, a hundred yards or more from the beach, when the troops had to jump overboard and wade ashore. all the camp equipage and supplies had to be taken ashore in the arms of men detailed for the purpose, so that the landing was a very laborious and tedious process. the enemy's camp bore witness to his panic flight; clothing, bedding, half-cooked provisions, even a rebel flag over one tent and a sword inside, and in another an excellent repast, with jelly, cake, and wine, were found abandoned. general drayton's headquarters, in a large building near fort walker, was abandoned in such haste that the horses in the stable were left behind, and general drayton's own charger, a fine, handsome bay horse of medium size, but compactly built and of great spirit and endurance, was captured here and became the favorite horse of general stevens. back of the fort was a large field in sweet potatoes, and it presented a singular appearance after the soldiers landed and discovered it, covered with thousands of men, all digging the tubers for dear life. general sherman facetiously remarked that general drayton planted that potato-field on purpose to demoralize his army. immediately after landing, general sherman held a conference with his general officers as to undertaking an offensive movement. the enemy was evidently demoralized, and either charleston or savannah might fall before a sudden dash, and offered a tempting prize. but the general opinion was that a movement upon either involved too great risks, and that the first duty was to fortify and render absolutely secure the point already gained. general stevens alone dissented from this view. he strenuously urged an aggressive movement inland to the mainland, then, turning to right or left, against one of the cities. in answer to objections, he declared that the overpowering naval force rendered hilton head already secure, and it could be fortified at leisure. the navy, too, could support an advance, and cover a withdrawal in case of need. the country was full of flatboats used by the planters for the transportation of cotton. hundreds of these could be collected among the islands by the negroes, and would furnish means of transporting the troops up, or ferrying them across the inland waters, which, instead of an obstacle, could thus be made an aid to the movement. but the cautious counsel prevailed, and general sherman reaped the reward of his lack of enterprise by being superseded a few months later, after rendering faithful service. certainly he lost a great opportunity. with such subordinates as generals stevens and wright, and the navy to assist, he might have taken savannah, and could not have been badly damaged, even if repulsed. general stevens had visited savannah as an engineer officer shortly after the mexican war, and his habit of acquiring information about every subject that interested him entitled his views to more attention. but, after all, the general, like the poet, is born, not made, and sherman may have been wisely governed by his own limitations. as will be seen hereafter, this idea of a movement inland, and making use of flatboats, took a deep hold of general stevens's mind. he placed his brigade in camp a mile back from the beach, and was given charge of an extensive line of works, laid out by captain q.a. gilmore, the chief engineer officer. he pushed this work with his accustomed vigor, detailing daily the greater part of his force as working parties. he had a full quota of officers turn out with the men, the details verified every morning, and kept some of his staff always on the work. the troops, seeing that no shirking was tolerated, gave diligent labor, and within a month the line, over a mile in length, was completed. the highlanders, however, continued to occupy bay point, and made many scouting expeditions on neighboring islands. considerable sickness broke out among the troops on hilton head,--smallpox, measles, and typhoid,--and there were many deaths, so that the practice of playing the dead march at funerals was forbidden, notwithstanding which the troops were generally in fine condition and spirits. general stevens himself had a severe attack of bilious fever, from which he but slowly recovered. the following letters give a pleasant sketch of life at hilton head:- headquarters second brigade, e.c., hilton head, november 28, 1861. my dearest wife,--we are getting on in the most quiet manner possible. as i wrote you a day or two since, my brigade is almost exclusively occupied in throwing up intrenchments. it has been hard at work the last ten days, working even the last sunday. i have to-day nearly thirteen hundred men in the trenches. we are living at my headquarters quite comfortably. for instance, to-day is considered a sort of thanksgiving day, being the day set apart for thanksgiving in some of the states. i have for dinner, at half past five o'clock, roast turkey, boiled turkey, and a fine boiled ham. this ought to be pretty satisfactory. in our stores we have two dozen fine turkeys, growing in better condition every day. these turkeys we buy from the negroes. we have plenty of beef and mutton and sweet potatoes, also oysters and fish. headquarters second brigade, e.c., hilton head, december 5, 1861. my dear wife,--we are enjoying fine weather, and the health of the troops is daily improving. my brigade is still at work on the intrenchments. they have done an immense amount of work, much to the satisfaction of general sherman. hazard takes great interest in everything. we are living quite comfortably; have an old house with a fireplace, which answers for my office and hazard's office and our quarters. hazard has three and sometimes four clerks, two messengers, and, when needed, an officer to assist him. our mess consists of the brigade quartermaster, captain lilly; the brigade surgeon, dr. kemble; my aide-de-camp, lieutenant lusk; hazard, and myself. we have a most excellent cook, brought from new york, and a good dining-room servant picked up here. we have our breakfast at seven o'clock, lunch at twelve, and dinner between half past five and six. how long we shall remain here, i cannot form an idea,--probably some months. we are most wanting in books. i must also get some more military books, and now regret i left so many behind me. hazard is in the trenches to-day. i keep a large force out, and all my staff that can be spared. [illustration: port royal and sea islands of south carolina] chapter l beaufort.--action of port royal ferry scarcely were the works at hilton head completed when general stevens was ordered, early in december, to occupy beaufort, as an advanced post threatening the mainland, and affording protection to the negroes on the islands. this was a town of five thousand souls, delightfully situated on port royal island on the banks of beaufort river, some fifteen miles above hilton head. it was a place of fine mansions and houses, almost wholly exempt from the poorer class, the seat of wealth and refinement, and often styled the newport of the south. it was the headquarters of the sea islands, upon which alone was grown the fine, long stapled sea island cotton, worth a dollar a pound during the war. with unbounded confidence in the strength of the forts at the harbor entrance, and in the prowess of their defenders, the most chivalric blood of carolina, the people of beaufort listened to the thunder of dupont's guns on the eventful 7th of november, and from the steeples and roofs watched the moving masts and clouds of smoke of his fleet as he attacked the works; and when the appalling news reached them of his victory, the whole white population fled in terror, only one white person, and he a native of new england, remaining in the town. from all the islands the flight of the planters was equally hasty and complete. negroes, live-stock, large quantities of cotton, household goods and furniture, and even wearing apparel, were all abandoned in the panic exodus. since the bombardment, raiding parties of the enemy were venturing over with increasing boldness, burning the cotton and terrorizing the negroes. these numbered at least ten thousand, thus abandoned by their masters, and were scattered over the extensive archipelago, but chiefly upon port royal, ladies', and st. helena islands. the more intelligent house servants having gone with their owners, nearly all the negroes left on the islands were in the densest ignorance, some of them the blackest human beings ever seen, and others the most bestial in appearance, and there were even some native africans, brought over by slavers in recent years. they were not put to hard labor, judging by northern standards, and were set so light a daily task in the cotton-field that they would usually finish it in the forenoon, and have the rest of the day to themselves. the only food furnished them was a peck of shelled indian corn a week apiece, which the black women had to grind into meal upon rude stones turned by hand; but this ration was eked out by fish and oysters, with which the waters abounded, by the poultry which they were allowed to keep, and also by the vegetables from their little garden patches. at christmas they were given a liberal dole of fresh beef for a grand feast. the turkeys, of which great numbers were kept on every plantation, were deemed a kind of royal fowl, reserved for the whites like the cattle, and tabooed to the blacks, who were not allowed to raise them as they did the common barnyard fowl. but upon the flight of their masters the negroes were prompt enough to take them for their own, and used to sell them to the troops at generous prices. these ignorant and benighted creatures flocked into beaufort on the hegira of the whites, and held high carnival in the deserted mansions, smashing doors, mirrors, and furniture, and appropriating all that took their fancy. after this loot, a common sight was a black wench dressed in silks, or white lace curtains, or a stalwart black field-hand resplendent in a complete suit of gaudy carpeting just torn from the floor. after this sack, they remained at home upon the plantations, and reveled in unwonted idleness and luxury, feasting upon the corn, cattle, and turkeys of their fugitive masters. embarking his brigade and a section of battery e, 3d united states artillery, under lieutenant dunbar r. ransom, on steamers at hilton head, general stevens on the ocean queen, with the 50th pennsylvania, reached beaufort at seven in the evening of december 11, landed, and threw out a strong picket on the main road across the island, known as the shell-road. the negroes stated that a party of rebel cavalry had visited the town that afternoon, and threatened to return at night and lay it in ashes. at midnight they came riding down the shell-road; but being fired upon by the picket, the whole party, with the exception of the "colonel" and his son, took to their heels, and never drew rein until they reached the mainland, ten miles distant, according to the report of the doughty commander. the next morning the remainder of the troops landed, and general stevens advanced across the island on the shell-road to port royal ferry on the coosaw river, with two regiments and ransom's guns. the rebel cavalry, falling back without resistance, crossed the ferry, taking to the farther side the ferry-boat and ropes and all other boats. the coosaw is a large and deep tidal river, separating the island from the mainland. it is bordered by wide, impassable marshes, across which at the ferry long causeways extended on each side from the firm land to the main river. a small, square ferry-house stood at the end of each causeway, and the one on the farther side had been strengthened and converted into a blockhouse, and from it the enemy fired on the union advance. but the first shell from the 3-inch rifled gun went crashing through the extempore blockhouse, and sent its brave defenders scampering up the long causeway. two adventurous soldiers then swam the river and brought back a boat, in which a party crossed over, demolished the blockhouse, and returned with the ferry scow and paraphernalia. a strong picket-line was posted along the river, a good force left in support at a cross-roads some miles back on the shell-road, and the general with the remainder of the party returned to beaufort. general stevens at once cleared the blacks out of town, and established a camp in the suburbs for the temporary reception of refugees and vagrant negroes. he placed the troops under canvas in the outskirts, and prohibited their entering the town without a permit, and strictly forbade all plundering, or even entering the empty houses. guards were posted over a fine public library, the pride of the town, which, however, had been thrown about in utter disorder; patrols were kept scouring the streets, and the strictest order and discipline were enforced. in order to protect the negroes and keep the enemy within his own lines, general stevens strongly picketed the western or exposed side of port royal and ladies' islands, guarding all the landing-places, and watching the coosaw and broad rivers for twenty-five miles. knowing the difficulty of maintaining so long and exposed a line of outposts against an enterprising enemy, he threw him on the defensive by the boldness of his advanced line, and by a succession of well-planned and daring raids upon his pickets on the opposite shore. thus lieutenant benjamin f. porter, of the 8th michigan, on the night of december 17 captured a picket of six men on chisholm's island, and on several occasions small parties were thrown across the coosaw in boats, the enemy's pickets were driven off, and the buildings from which they fired upon the union pickets were destroyed. so successfully was this policy carried out that the enemy made but one counter attack during the six months that general stevens occupied the islands, viz., an attempt on the picket on barnwell island, february 11, 1862, and that was repulsed without loss on our side. the first and, as it turned out, only serious operation undertaken by general sherman was the siege of fort pulaski at the mouth of the savannah river. a large force of troops, under general viele, and heavy guns and mortars were dispatched to this quarter, and captain q. a. gilmore, the chief engineer officer, was given charge of the siege works. general wright was sent down the coast with a considerable force, and in march occupied fernandina and jacksonville, fla., which had been abandoned by the enemy. by the end of december the enemy erected a strong field-work on the mainland, opposite and commanding port royal ferry, and repulsed the efforts of the gunboats to dislodge him. the naval authorities pronounced it impracticable to reduce the work, or to keep the river open with the light wooden gunboats which alone could operate in those waters. negro refugees reported a large force of the enemy at garden's corners, only four miles from the ferry. they were endeavoring to obstruct the channel by driving piles in it. opposite seabrook, at a point a mile and a half above the ferry, they were throwing up a formidable-looking battery. their increased activity and boldness, as well as their success in closing the river to the navy, indicated aggressive action; for with the river closed they could throw a force upon port royal island without fear of its being cut off, could raid the plantation and negroes, and could compel the union commander to maintain a large force on the island, or run the risk of losing a small one. impressed with the importance of dislodging the enemy and keeping the river open, general stevens laid before general sherman a plan to that end, which the latter promptly approved. it was simply to throw a sufficient force across the river several miles below the ferry, advance up the left bank, beat any force that might be found covering the work, and take it in the rear. three light-draught gunboats were to coöperate in the movement. at the same time, two gunboats entering the coosaw from broad river through whale branch and small bodies of troops from seabrook landing and opposite the ferry were to threaten the enemy on the upper side, and distract his attention from the real attack. it was decided to reinforce general stevens with two regiments from hilton head for the movement,--the 47th and 48th new york. nearly every plantation on these islands was supplied with large flatboats, used chiefly for the transportation of cotton. ever since his occupation general stevens had been quietly collecting these scows at beaufort, with a view to using them in future operations. during the night of december 30 over one hundred of these flats, with a crew of negro oarsmen and a guard of two soldiers in each boat, were sent up beaufort river, brickyard creek, and an inlet or creek which branches from the coosaw near the northeast corner of the island and extends inland southwesterly several miles. there was an excellent landing-place two and a half miles up this creek, and only eight miles from beaufort, with good roads between. at this landing, screened from sight of the enemy by well-wooded banks, the fleet of flatboats lay during the day. every precaution was taken to prevent any negro from leaving the party and giving information of the movement. [illustration: action at port royal ferry, january 1, 1862] commodore dupont furnished the desired gunboats, placing them under the command of captain c.p.r. rodgers. about noon on the 31st that officer reached beaufort with the ottawa and pembina, followed by the hale, and the details of the joint movement, and particularly the signals to enable the troops and ships to act in concert, were arranged between him and general stevens. about dark the 47th and 48th new york, under lieutenant-colonel james l. fraser and colonel james h. perry respectively, arrived on the transport steamer boston. two companies of the roundheads were left to guard the town and depot of beaufort. another company of that regiment took post three miles out at the cross-roads. two companies of the highlanders and two of the roundheads, under captain william st. george elliott of the former, were posted at seabrook, with orders, when the gunboats came through whale branch and opened on the enemy's battery, to cross over and take it if practicable. colonel leasure, with the remainder of his roundheads and one company of the highlanders, was stationed at the ferry to observe the enemy, make a demonstration against him, and cross over if circumstances permitted. flatboats were collected at both points in readiness for the crossing. lieutenant ransom, with his guns, was also posted near the ferry. four companies of the 50th pennsylvania were left in beaufort with orders to embark on flats at midnight and proceed upstream to the mouth of the creek already mentioned. after dark the remainder of the brigade, viz., the 8th michigan and six companies of the 50th pennsylvania from beaufort, and seven companies of the highlanders from seabrook and other advanced posts, from which they had been relieved by the roundheads during the day, marched to the well-hidden landing-place on the creek, where the flats lay awaiting them. at one a.m. new year's morning the embarkation commenced. the landing-place was narrow, and only two or three flats at a time could be loaded, which made the embarkation slow, tedious, and confused. each boat was ordered to push off into the stream as soon as loaded, and proceed far enough down it to give plenty of room for others. but the creek became almost blocked with flats crowded with men, laden to the gunwale, and apparently floating about without aim or order. the night was dark, a pale mist rose on the water, the sickly beams of a half moon struggled through the gloom, the fires and lanterns flared at the landing, the smothered orders, oaths and calls of officers from flat to flat, striving to avoid becoming separated from their regiments, made a babel of voices, and all added to and heightened the appearance of hopeless confusion. the scene to the painter or poet was weird and picturesque in the extreme, but to a soldier most exasperating. when half the troops were afloat, and the embarkation of the remainder, proceeding steadily though slowly, was assured, general stevens entered his barge and, rowing rapidly downstream, placed himself at the head of the flotilla. each boat as passed was ordered to follow. their progress, deeply laden as they were, was necessarily slow, but as they took up the movement, the dense and confused mass very soon lengthened out into an orderly column, and the perplexities and misgivings of many an officer gave place to the alacrity and confidence which aggressive action ever inspires. the first faint pencilings of dawn were streaking the eastern sky as the flotilla slowly drew out of the mouth of the creek and entered the river. the fog lay low upon the water, and completely shrouded the farther shore. here joined captain rodgers with four launches, each armed with a 12-pounder boat howitzer, and the four companies of the 50th pennsylvania, which embarked at beaufort. then hove in sight the gunboat ottawa. noiselessly the stalwart blacks strained at the muffled oars, the long ashen blades steadily rose and dipped; the blue-coated masses sat in silence, muskets in hand, straining their eyes ahead; while the flotilla, like a huge black cloud, slowly crept over the face of the broad sound, here a mile and a half wide. after an age of cramped waiting and suspense, the dim, spectral trees lining the low shore opposite comes in sight; the launches and swiftest boats now shoot rapidly ahead, the rowers straining every nerve, and the soldiers anxiously scanning the hostile shore; a score of gray forms are discerned among the trees; a straggling volley spatters harmlessly over the water, and the next instant the boats drive upon the bank, and the landing is effected. general stevens's barge outstripped the other boats, and he leaped ashore the first man, closely followed by captain john more and ten picked men of the highlanders, and the enemy's pickets took to their heels. it was now found that the 8th michigan, through some strange mistake, had remained near the mouth of the creek, notwithstanding the explicit orders, repeated, too, by general stevens in person when passing down the creek. orders were immediately dispatched to colonel fenton to proceed across and up the river and land at the adams house, some three miles above, where there was an excellent landing-place. colonel perry had received orders the night before to follow the gunboats, and debark his two regiments at the same point as soon as it was in the possession of the landing party. thither were also sent the empty flats. skirmishers and scouts were thrown out while the troops were landing, and several negroes were picked up who proved useful as guides. with the highlanders in the advance, preceded by two companies deployed as skirmishers, and followed by two boat howitzers under lieutenant irwin, of the navy, and the 50th pennsylvania bringing up the rear, the little column pushed rapidly on, taking a course parallel to the river, and traversing woods and swampy and difficult ground, without any road for most of the way, and at eleven a.m., after a hot and fatiguing march, reached a position abreast of the adams house. small parties of the enemy, who fired a few shots, were observed at several points on the march, but a few shells from the howitzers and the highlanders' skirmishers easily brushed them aside. the column now rested for two and a half hours while the remainder of the troops were debarking, for the landing-place was contracted, and the regiments on the boston had to be put ashore in small boats. at 1.30 p.m. general stevens formed his order of march, and moved forward for the fort, marching parallel to the river. the highlanders, with two companies skirmishing in advance, led the way; the two naval howitzers followed; colonel christ's 50th pennsylvania and colonel fenton's michiganders formed the support, and the 47th and 48th new york the reserve. the column advanced in echelon, the highlanders nearest the river, and each succeeding regiment battalion distance in rear of and to the right of the one preceding it. this formation was equally well adapted to meet an attack in front or on the right flank. the river protected the left. a broad belt of cotton-fields stretched along the river to and beyond the ferry, some three miles distant. back of the open fields a body of woods presented an irregular front, from a mile to half a mile distant from the river. over these fields the skirmishers advanced steadily, followed by the entire command in the order by echelon described, each regiment moving in line, or occasionally by the flank, or by column of companies, according to the ground, with the regularity of parade. the signal officer, lieutenant henry s. tafft, kept with the skirmishers, signaling constantly with his colleague, lieutenant cogswell, on the ottawa, thus directing her fire, and establishing perfect concert of action afloat and ashore. the shells from the gunboat tore the wood just in front of the skirmishers as they advanced. as the troops advanced in this order the scene from the gunboats was most inspiriting,--the wide strip of open country, the dark, frowning forest beyond it, the broad, silver-hued river with the black gunboats, and line after line of dark-blue infantry, tipped with steel, moving onward over the fields with the steady, rapid, irresistible flow of billows rolling across the sea. the column had advanced a mile in this order when a puff of smoke and the roar of a gun burst from the edge of the woods, followed by others in rapid succession, and a battery, well screened in the timber, opened a rapid fire of shells over and among the leading regiments. but, without pause, general stevens continued his movement, regardless of the noisy shelling, until the third regiment, the michiganders, was fully abreast with the battery. then halting, he brought his three leading regiments into line, facing the woods, wheeling them to the right, and advancing the highlanders and 50th on a line with the michiganders, and threw out four companies of the latter upon the battery to develop the enemy's force. he left the reserve regiments as they stood when halted, being already considerably to the right and in advance of the newly formed line. the michigan skirmishers had scarcely disappeared within the bushes which masked the battery, when a rolling volley of musketry rattled among the trees, and out they came, falling back. at the same time a large regiment of the enemy appeared from behind a point of the woods which partially screened its advance, bearing directly down upon the 50th pennsylvania. colonel christ was directed to meet and not to await the attack. at the command his regiment deliberately fixed bayonets and moved forward, presenting a long and imposing line. the charging rebel regiment first ceased its shouts and yells, then fired a scattering and ineffective volley, and broke and fled to the cover of the woods so precipitantly that the 50th had scarcely time to fire a round after them. general stevens now threw one wing of the 50th upon the flank of the enemy's position, and colonel perry's regiment upon the other flank. but the hostile battery ceased its fire, and the troops, on reaching its position, found the enemy gone, with every sign of a precipitate retreat. meantime the highlanders' skirmishers, never halting, had reached the fort, and entered it simultaneously with the force under colonel leasure which crossed at the ferry. a single gun, a 12-pounder, was found in the work; the others had been removed by the enemy. the troops were recalled, the wounded cared for, and the march was resumed to the ferry without further opposition. colonel leasure and captain elliott were found at the fort, and reported the complete success of the movements intrusted to them. two gunboats--the seneca, captain daniel ammen, and ellen, captain budd--entered whale branch as prearranged, and opened fire on the battery opposite seabrook. captain elliott immediately crossed over with his party, found the battery ready for guns, but none there, and, after destroying the work, returned to seabrook. thence hastening to the ferry, he joined colonel leasure, and crossed at that point just as the skirmishers from the main column appeared. the troops bivouacked that night at the ferry, with pickets well out, and two naval howitzers, under lieutenant j.h. upshur, in position commanding the main road, while at short intervals the gunboats fired big 11-inch shells as far into rebeldom as heavy charges could throw them. it was afterwards reported by the refugee negroes that one of these "rotten shot," as they termed the bursting shells, fell at garden's corners, four miles away. during the night the ferry was completely restored. the captured gun and wagons, with the wounded, crossed early in the morning. the captured work was leveled, and at nine a.m. the troops commenced crossing, using both the ferryboat and flats. by noon the entire force of three thousand men was over. the enemy remained quiet back in the woods. the troops marched into beaufort that afternoon in fine spirits, and with confidence in themselves heightened by the brush with the enemy and the success of the expedition. both officers and men had shown themselves steady, prompt, and ready to march, manoeuvre, and fight, and it was not their fault if the enemy would not give them a harder tussle. excepting the highlanders, all were green troops, never having even seen an enemy before, except as distant witnesses of the naval bombardment of hilton head. the 47th and 48th new york embarked on their transport at beaufort, and returned to hilton head the next morning. the enemy's forces in the action, as reported by him, comprised the 14th and four companies of the 12th south carolina, a section of leake's virginia battery, and a detachment of cavalry, forty-two in number, who are commended as participating with their double-barreled shotguns and navy revolvers. colonel james jones, of the 14th, commanded. besides these troops general pemberton hurried forward from pocotaligo a large part of a tennessee brigade, under general donelson, which met the retreating troops after the action was over. the union losses consisted of three men of the 8th michigan killed, and one officer, major watson, and eight men of the same regiment, three men of the 48th new york, and two of the 50th pennsylvania, wounded,--in all, seventeen. the enemy acknowledged, in official reports, the loss of an officer and seven men killed, and an officer and twenty-three men wounded,--in all, thirty-two. general stevens warmly commended the conduct of his troops and the services of his staff, captain hazard stevens, assistant adjutant-general; lieutenants william t. lusk and benjamin r. lyons, aides; andrew j. holbrook, volunteer aide; henry s. tafft and william s. cogswell, signal officers; and captain charles a. fuller, quartermaster. this action was almost the first union success achieved by the army since the disaster of bull run, and the thanks of the government were extended in general orders to general stevens and his command for their victory, styled the battle of port royal ferry. chapter li beaufort.--campaign planned against charleston after the action of port royal ferry, general stevens continued to hold beaufort and the neighboring islands for five months, without the occurrence of any military event of importance, chiefly occupied in thoroughly drilling and disciplining his troops. lieutenant abraham cottrell, of the 8th michigan, was added to the staff as aide. a battalion of the 1st massachusetts cavalry, under lieutenant-colonel h.b. sargent, was added to his command; also another section of battery e of the 3d artillery, captain a.p. rockwell's connecticut light battery, and a company of serrell's new york engineers, under captain alfred f. sears, with a pontoon bridge equipment. his attention, moreover, was largely taken up with other matters, not military, but growing out of the peculiar conditions there. he caused the public library, which has already been mentioned, with several fine private libraries added to it, to be put in order, restored to the shelves and catalogued, and thrown open for the use of the troops. corporal joseph matthews, joseph hall, and george lispenard, of company e of the highlanders, were busy at this work for several months. he intended that the library, thus preserved, should be cared for and kept in the town where it belonged, and restored to the inhabitants when they resumed their allegiance and returned to their homes. but one day the treasury agent, colonel william h. reynolds, presented himself, and demanded the books as captured rebel property, to be sold for the benefit of the government,--a demand which general stevens indignantly and peremptorily rejected. a month later the agent again appeared with a formal demand from the secretary of the treasury for the library, indorsed by general sherman with an order to give them up. even then general stevens suspended the order, and wrote a strong protest to general sherman, setting forth the vandal character of the proposed action, and urging him to represent the matter in its true light to the government, and secure the revocation of the order. but general sherman was unwilling to take such a responsibility, and there was no alternative but to give up the books. general stevens disapproved the action of the government in sending such treasury agents into the field, with independent authority to gather up cotton and other property, as meddling with military operations, encroaching on the authority of military commanders, and opening the door for dishonest or over-zealous agents to plunder private property. such work, he declared, should be done by the army through the quartermaster's department, and the captured property then turned over to the treasury department. apprehensive that the numerous negroes within his lines might become vagrant and burdensome unless brought under control and made self-supporting, general sherman issued an elaborate order, providing for teaching them the elementary branches, and inducing them to plant crops. the latter requirement general stevens heartily approved, but he seriously doubted the propriety of the former, and wrote general sherman, pointing out that to educate the blacks and raise hopes of freedom in their breast would make their condition doubly hard in case, on the suppression of the rebellion, they had to return to their masters, and that the order, manifestly looking to freeing the slaves, might alienate the support of the border states from the union cause. this view now seems reactionary, but it should be borne in mind that the great mass of union soldiers sprang to arms, not to free the slaves, but to preserve the union. lincoln himself guided his course by the same view of not alienating the border states, withholding his emancipation proclamation until the progress of public opinion made it expedient. writes general sherman in reply:- "after all, my dear general, the government will do as it sees best in this matter. my order can be reversed at its pleasure. but, of myself, it would be doing some violence to my own views of duty to make the change you desire in the system therein indicated. but allow me to express to you my warmest thanks for the thoughtful and considerate manner in which you have done me the honor to write. although we may differ in our views in one or two points,--both admitted to be delicate ones,--it will not permit any change of my exalted opinion of your talents and your personal character." but the generals were only wasting time in discussing the negro problem, for by the next steamer, early in march, there descended on the department of the south, like the locusts on egypt, a swarm of treasury agents and humanitarians, male and female, all zealously bent on educating and elevating the "freedmen," as they immediately dubbed the blacks. the irreverent young officers styled these good people the "gideonites," and were disposed to make all manner of fun of them; but among the number were persons of the highest respectability and purest motives, and they undoubtedly accomplished some good. they met with a cold and ungracious reception from general sherman, who declared that their coming was uncalled for and entirely premature, and incontinently packed them off to beaufort to the care of general stevens, thus washing his hands of them. the latter treated them with the utmost courtesy and kindness, assigned them good quarters in town, and detailed a capable and gentlemanly young officer, lieutenant h.g. belcher, of the 8th michigan, to see to their comfort and needs. he not only gave them every facility and assistance in his power in their care of the blacks, but took a real interest in their mission, talked and advised with the chiefs, and exerted a decided and salutary influence in modifying some of their crude and extravagant ideas, and bringing them down to judicious and practicable measures. it is a curious fact that in several instances he had to curb the attempts of some of the more zealous, who strove to work the blacks harder than their old masters did. always frank and outspoken in his opinions, and differing widely from many of the views of these visitors, general stevens impressed them with his sincere and earnest sense of duty, and won their gratitude and goodwill. hon. edward l. pierce, the biographer of sumner, who was the chief agent, thus acknowledged their feelings and obligations toward general stevens:- "general stevens was an officer with whom subordination was a controlling duty. the order for sending able-bodied negroes to hilton head to be armed imposed on him an uncongenial service, but he performed it faithfully and with dispatch, and even aided in the selection of the officers to drill them. his preconceived opinions, although he desired them humane treatment, were understood to be unfavorable to an effort at the present time to raise them to intelligent citizenship; but to the industrial and educational movement to that end he offered no opposition, but gave to it in good faith his official protection and aid, and the special agent of the treasury department, who was charged with its direction, never asked facilities which he denied, often more being granted than was requested. the better part of the territory to which that movement applied was under his command, and its friends will gratefully remember him for his personal courtesies and honorable coöperation." mrs. stevens also arrived on the same steamer to visit her husband, with her youngest daughter, kate, a beautiful and engaging little girl of ten, and remained nearly a month. their visit was a great solace to general stevens, and the last time he was to see them. the washington ladies, mrs. johnson and miss donelson, their neighbors and warm friends for four years, came with the gideonites, actuated by benevolence. other visitors were mr. caverly, whom general stevens had met in washington, and his beautiful young wife. he was in the last stages of consumption, and the general had him taken into his own quarters and carefully nursed and cared for until his death. hon. john m. forbes, of milton, mass., and his wife, whose son, william h. forbes, was an officer of the 1st massachusetts cavalry, then at beaufort, also visited there that winter; and hon. w.j.a. fuller, of new york, an eminent lawyer, and brother to captain charles a. fuller, was another visitor. during all this time general stevens was chiefly engaged in training and disciplining his command. besides company and battalion drills in the forenoon, brigade drills were had four afternoons a week, usually in some extensive cotton-field below the town, and occasionally these drills were varied by movements through timber, bridging and crossing streams, or overcoming other obstacles, the three arms being exercised to act in concert. there was no other brigade in the armies on either side that was put through such a complete and thorough course of brigade drill as general stevens gave his command at beaufort. schools of instruction for officers and for non-commissioned officers were also vigorously kept up. the picketing of the widely extended and exposed points on the islands involved a line twenty-five miles in extent, and was a severe task on the troops. an entire regiment was required for this duty, and was changed every ten days. to insure the vigilance of the pickets, general stevens organized a system of nightly inspections by members of his staff and other officers specially sent out from beaufort, in addition to the grand rounds and inspections by their own officers. besides the staff officers already mentioned, lieutenant benjamin r. lyons, of the 50th pennsylvania, and lieutenant a. cottrell, of the 8th michigan, were detailed as aides, and captain charles a. fuller took the place of captain lilly as quartermaster, the latter being court-martialed and cashiered. a fine mansion in the edge of town, in the midst of a luxuriant semi-tropical garden, with the negro quarters and kitchens in detached buildings, served as headquarters. on the open space on one side, brigade guard-mounting was held every morning to the martial and inspiring music of the highlanders' band. this was one of the finest bands in the service, or, indeed, in the country. it had been long established in new york, and was maintained with indefatigable zeal and industry by lieutenant william robertson, the band-master. thus well occupied with drills, dress parades, guard-mountings, picketing, and study, in that beautiful region and delightful winter climate, profusely supplied with fresh beef, poultry, and sweet potatoes, in addition to the ample regular ration, the troops greatly enjoyed their sojourn at beaufort, while they rapidly gained soldierly discipline and efficiency. in april a detachment of two hundred and fifty of the 8th michigan escorted lieutenant james h. wilson on a reconnoissance to wilmington island, on the savannah river, and in a very creditable action defeated and drove an entire rebel regiment, the 13th georgia, suffering, however, a loss of forty-two killed and wounded. the following letters from general stevens to his wife give interesting sketches of this period:- [illustration: headquarters at beaufort] beaufort, s.c., february 16, 1861. my dear wife,--i am devoting my energies to perfecting the discipline of my brigade. all the regiments are now in very respectable drill,--one in very superior drill. for five weeks i have had brigade drills, an average of four per week. in this week they will have been instructed in all the evolutions of the line. hazard is very expert both at battalion and brigade drill, and he can drill a brigade much better than any of my colonels. then i have a regiment doing picket duty on the island. i relieve it every ten days, so each regiment has been thoroughly instructed in picket and outpost duty. i have here the second battalion of the 1st massachusetts cavalry, commanded by lieutenant-colonel sargent. it is finely officered, and is a splendid body of men. i have also a connecticut light battery of six guns. it will, however, take months to make this battery efficient. for the last three weeks i have had regimental schools for officers and non-commissioned officers. they are doing well, and both officers and non-commissioned officers take great interest in them. hazard's health is excellent. he takes very great interest in everything, is full of life and energy, very industrious, studies carefully his tactics, regulations, etc. he is making a very superior officer indeed; is a very efficient adjutant-general. my aides, captain lusk and lieutenant cottrell, are good men. april 17.... i have endeavored to do all i could with propriety to facilitate everything which tended to the improvement of the condition of the negroes. many of the people here, both men and women, understand pretty well the circumstances of the case, and are getting to take practical views of the subject. april 21.... mrs. johnson and miss donelson leave day after to-morrow on the atlantic. we shall send for them and see that they are comfortably taken on the ship. two officers of my brigade return at the same time on leave of absence, in whose special charge i will place them. the 8th michigan regiment had a very brilliant affair last wednesday. whilst about two hundred and sixty of the regiment under their colonel (fenton) were reconnoitring wilmington island, they were attacked by a full regiment (the georgia 13th), eight hundred strong. after a desperate conflict of nearly two hours our men whipped them, drove them off the ground, pursued them for a mile, and then carefully and leisurely held the field for five hours. all our dead and wounded and every particle of baggage were brought off. we lost two officers and ten men killed, and thirty men wounded,--a very heavy loss, being one fifth of the entire command. on friday and saturday we buried the dead. the services were very affecting. the regiment returned on saturday afternoon, and the whole brigade turned out to receive them. we had invited the ladies from the pope plantation to come to beaufort on friday to attend a concert given by the highlanders on friday evening. mrs. johnson, miss donelson, and miss ward came over. they returned on saturday evening. we had the burial of the dead, the concert, and the reception while they were here. we entertained them at the house, and they really enjoyed their visit. indeed, mrs. j. and miss d. have found it rather lonely on ladies' island, and i thought, in view of old acquaintance' sake and their kind and excellent natures, that we ought to do something to give them a little change. may 24. we have had a sad household the last few days. mr. caverly has been sinking gradually since wednesday morning, and died this morning at one o'clock. he was exceedingly patient and resigned, and very grateful for the attentions he had received here. i am very thankful i did not hesitate, in his enfeebled condition, insisting upon his coming to my house. his wife has borne herself with great fortitude and courage throughout. lieutenant pratt, of the massachusetts cavalry, is going home on leave of absence, and will take charge of mrs. caverly. may 18. above is a view of the steamer planter, a dispatch boat of general ripley in charleston harbor, which was run off by the pilot robert and the black crew last week. it is a very remarkable affair, and makes quite a hero of robert. she was tied up at the wharf close to ripley's office. yet he slipped out of the harbor unobserved, and gave the steamer up to our blockading fleet. the planter lay at beaufort from thursday morning to this morning. she was run off on tuesday, may 13. the following to mr. fuller gives general stevens's views on the proper war policy, and the severity of the contest yet to be fought. it was at this time that the government, rendered over-confident by western successes, stopped recruiting. it will be seen how exactly he read the military situation:- beaufort, s.c., march 15, 1862. my dear sir,-... at this moment every effort should be made to keep our ranks full by enlistments. we are only at the beginning of the hard fights. our men will fall in battle, and die in the hospitals. the best troops rapidly melt away in aggressive movements. we must take nothing for granted except the determination on the part of the south to make a stern and protracted resistance. the great point is to open the mississippi down to the gulf, and this can be done by driving our forces southward in tennessee, and farther south into alabama and mississippi. this should be combined with a great movement from the gulf. the mississippi river in our control, everything westward will fall by vigorous, rapid, comparatively short movements. we must husband our men and resources. we, if we don't look out, will find our victorious march stayed in mid-course by the melting away of our attacking columns, not kept full in consequence of a too great dissemination of our force. at this time general stevens wrote professor bache a memoir, to be laid before the president, giving his views of the military policy and operations to be undertaken. dr. lusk, who, as his aide, copied the letter from the rough draft, declares that he urged the very movements that were afterwards adopted, and was greatly impressed with the ability and prophetic foresight of the memoir. unfortunately, no copy of it has been found. headquarters second brigade, e.c., beaufort, s.c., february 25, 1862. w.j.a. fuller, esq., _my dear sir_,--i hope not the least suggestion will be made in any quarter in relation to placing me in command of the expeditionary corps of general sherman. i am induced to write you in relation to it, because i have learned from a reliable source that it is being spoken of in some influential quarters in massachusetts. general sherman has treated me with marked kindness and consideration, and i feel that i would be acting badly towards him if i did not express decidedly my views and feelings in regard to the matter. it would be, however, sheer affectation on my part to say that i did not desire a separate command. i of course most earnestly desire one, but not at the expense of a friend, or with injustice to any one. the advanced position of general stevens's command was a constant threat to the charleston and savannah railroad, justly regarded by the enemy as the vital line of communication between the two cities. the railroad crossed the many rivers which empty along this part of the coast by long pile or trestle bridges of hard southern pine, full of pitch, and exceedingly combustible. in thirty miles it thus crossed, going north from savannah, the coosawhatchie, tulifiny, broad, pocotaligo, combahee, and ashepoo rivers, with six miles of bridges in the aggregate, and at pocotaligo, the centre of this stretch, was only eight miles distant from port royal ferry and the union lines. so important was the preservation of this railroad regarded by general robert e. lee, the confederate commander, and so probable did he deem our advance in this direction, that he made his headquarters at coosawhatchie, posted strong detachments with guns and intrenchments at the bridges, and supported them with considerable bodies of troops at central points, all under general j.c. pemberton, with headquarters at pocotaligo. and that officer, on succeeding lee in command of south carolina and georgia in march, remained at the same place, and continued the same attitude of watchful defense. general stevens early fixed his eye upon these bridges as affording the most feasible way of breaking up the railroad. he was eager to cross swords with lee and confident, more than once remarking that he could beat "bob lee,"--that he felt himself more than a match for him. from negro refugees he learned that the enemy held them in force, but nothing sufficiently definite and reliable to be of much value. anxious to gain exact and full information of the bridges, the enemy, and his dispositions, and of the roads and nature of the country, he offered the task to captain elliott, of the highlanders, who undertook it with alacrity. during january, february, and march, this intrepid officer made trip after trip within the enemy's lines, explored the whole region, and examined every bridge between the coosawhatchie and the ashepoo, located the enemy's posts, ascertained their forces, intrenchments, guns, etc., and gleaned much information in regard to the roads, approaches, and country. on these scouts captain elliott went in uniform. he would start at night in a small canoe with a trusty negro guide, paddle noiselessly up one of the rivers until within the enemy's lines, then land and pursue his explorations on foot. by day he usually lay hid in the swamps or pine woods. the service was not only fraught with danger, but extremely arduous, involving every hardship of cold, hunger, and exposure. it was so well performed that it is doubtful if the confederate commander himself was much better informed as to the state of things within his lines than was his opponent. no whisper of suspicion of captain elliott's scouts was suffered to get out; and although his long and frequent absences on special duty excited comment, all knowledge of them was confined to himself, general stevens, and the assistant adjutant-general of the brigade. in the latter part of february general stevens sent captain ralph ely, of the 8th michigan, with four officers and twenty-two men, in boats on a reconnoissance up the combahee river. captain ely performed this duty with skill and success, was gone three days, and went entirely around some of the enemy's posts without revealing his presence to them. with the thorough knowledge of the enemy's defenses he had so carefully gained, general stevens conceived the plan of moving suddenly by land and water upon the railroad, breaking it up irremediably by destroying every bridge for thirty miles, thus cutting the communication between the cities and threatening both, and then rapidly to countermarch the whole force to the ferry, beaufort, or broad river, embark on transports, and, reinforced by every available man of sherman's command, to strike for charleston by the inner waterways of the north edisto, wadmalaw, and stono, thus completely turning the heavy harbor and sea defenses which protected the city against a front attack. he worked out the details of this movement against the railroad with great pains, knowing that he would have it to execute. he counted largely upon the flotilla of launches and flatboats, by means of which he would be enabled to throw strong forces up the rivers, and cut off and isolate every position and bridge in turn. port royal ferry had demonstrated the practicability of thus moving troops by water, and had given them the idea. he had plenty of flats, great numbers of negroes trained to the oar, and there was no lack of good boatmen among the soldiers. the largest part of the attacking force was to be thrown directly on the railroad, moving simultaneously in two columns, one overland from port royal ferry via garden's corners, the other ascending broad and pocotaligo rivers in flatboats, supported by naval launches and light-draught gunboats. strong detachments were boldly to press the enemy's posts on the coosawhatchie and tulifiny, and be ready to join in the attack upon them later by the main force. a picked detachment was to ascend the combahee in boats, carry the enemy's posts on that river and on the ashepoo, and destroy the railroad bridges, and then, proceeding along the railroad, join and coöperate with the main column in destroying the bridge over the pocotaligo, when the united force were to press southward down the railroad towards savannah, sweeping everything clear beyond the coosawhatchie, and leaving the railroad in smoking ruins for thirty miles. in connection with the siege of pulaski, general sherman desired to operate against savannah. he complained that a combined movement in force upon that city planned by him in january was balked by the refusal of the navy to coöperate. later, he was ordered by mcclellan to abandon the design. naturally impatient of delay, and anxious to achieve some success, he was ripe for new undertakings. as the fall of pulaski was evidently impending, general stevens unfolded his plan to general sherman, and the two officers, in several long and confidential conferences, discussed it fully. general sherman decided to adopt and carry it out as soon as the fall of pulaski should free his whole force for the operation. commodore dupont also heartily entered into the plan, and was ready to give it all requisite naval support. moreover, he proposed making a strong naval demonstration on bull bay, north of charleston, in order still further to distract the enemy at the critical time. the objective point to be seized as the key to charleston--the turning-point of the campaign--was known as church flats, situated on the stream extending from the wadmalaw to the stono river. from this point a good road led to charleston, fourteen miles distant. the gunboats could approach within two miles of it. the movement of sherman's entire force was to be so combined and timed that every effective man--wright from florida, viele from pulaski, williams from hilton head, and stevens's flying column fresh from their attack on the railroad, leaving ruined bridges and a beaten, disconcerted enemy behind it--was to be transported by water and thrown upon church flats. true, the point was fortified and garrisoned, but the navy would cover the landing, and afford support in case of repulse. a successful dash might take charleston at a blow. or, if a foothold only were gained, the army could force its way by the stono, turn all the defenses on james island and the harbor, and reduce or destroy the city from the banks of the ashley. this movement was taking the enemy by the throat. the subsequent attacks on the sea front were taking the bull by the horns, and met the usual fate of that performance. fort pulaski fell april 11. with due allowance for preparation and delays, the railroad should have been destroyed and our army in possession of church flats by may 1. what means of defense had the enemy at this juncture? lee had been sent to virginia, and during the six weeks succeeding his departure pemberton was stripped of regiment after regiment, dispatched to richmond or to corinth. about april 20 he withdrew all troops except the cavalry between the ashepoo and oketie for the defense of the two cities. "this," he reports, "will leave the line of the charleston and savannah railroad with no other protection than what the cavalry companies can afford, which is altogether insufficient." at this time also he moved his headquarters from pocotaligo to charleston, and abandoned the defenses of georgetown north of charleston, removing the guns therefrom for the protection of the latter. only four thousand men, under colonel p.h. colquitt, 46th georgia, guarded the long and exposed line south of the ashepoo clear to savannah. colquitt's headquarters, with his own regiment and two field batteries, were at pocotaligo; the remainder of his force was scattered along the road. there were no obstructions yet planted in the stono, except possibly at church flats, where, as late as april 29, pemberton orders evans, "sink the obstructions at church flats immediately." the line of defenses across james island was not commenced. the guns with which it was afterwards armed were in the exposed, advanced batteries on cole and battery islands, and must have been abandoned there. the returns of pemberton's forces for may 11, 1862, give the effective force in his department:- georgia 9,172 south carolina 18,514 ----- total 27,686 the south carolina troops were disposed as follows:- charleston defenses, brigadier-general ripley 9750 james island to the ashepoo, brigadier-general evans 4883 ashepoo to savannah, colonel colquitt 3881 general stevens's movement on the railroad, if successful, would effectually break up colquitt's command, and prevent succor reaching the threatened point at charleston from the troops at and about savannah for at least a week, most probably two weeks; for they would have to be sent around by way of augusta, ga., and by this route the rail was not continuous, there being a gap of over forty miles. consequently pemberton's available force to resist the proposed movement would be reduced to ripley's and evans's commands, which mustered,- infantry 10,477 artillery 3,032 cavalry 1,133 ----- total 14,642 counting out the garrisons of the forts and batteries about the city and harbor, and on james, cole, and battery islands, it is clear that pemberton could not possibly have concentrated over six or seven thousand troops to meet sherman's advance on the stono. in all probability he would not have had half that number at the critical point in time; for the vigor of the attack on the railroad, sweeping southward, would surely have impressed him that savannah was in danger, causing him perhaps to hurry part of his troops to the relief of that city via augusta, while dupont's demonstration on bull bay would have still further distracted his attention from the real point of attack until too late. returns of the union forces for april 30 show present for duty some 17,000, as follows:- brigadier-general viele, daufuskie, bird and jones islands 3077 brigadier-general stevens, beaufort 3881 brigadier-general wright, edisto and otter islands 3623 brigadier-general q.a. gilmore, fort pulaski, tybee, and cockspur 2139 colonel robert williams, hilton head 2987 fernandina and st. augustine, florida 1194 fort seward, south carolina, 92, and department commander and staff, 16 108 ----- total 16,988 an effective force of 10,000 could have been formed from these troops and thrown upon the stono. sherman was a good and resolute soldier; his troops were in fine condition, and full of pluck and confidence. with stevens and wright to lead them, and the navy at his back, he would almost certainly have achieved success.[16] but this promising movement was nipped in the bud by the untimely and unexpected arrival of major-general david hunter to supersede sherman. brigadier-general h.w. benham accompanied hunter as a kind of second in command. in fact, both officers were _enfants terribles_, whom the administration exiled to south carolina to get rid of. hunter had just been relieved from commanding in missouri for an act of insubordination in issuing an emancipation proclamation in defiance of orders; and benham, fresh from skirmishes in west virginia, was in washington, claiming everything in the way of credit, and loudly importuning the government for high command, when they were ordered to south carolina. sherman turned over the command of the department, and sailed north on the 8th of april. three days later pulaski fell after a day and a half's bombardment, and benham made haste to claim the credit of the achievement due to sherman and gilmore. general hunter divided his department into the northern and southern districts, and gave benham the command of the former, comprising south carolina, georgia, and part of florida, and nearly all the troops. about the middle of april general wright returned from florida with the greater part of his brigade, and took post on edisto island. hunter, a sincere, earnest, and patriotic man, was absorbed in the political and humanitarian aspects of the great struggle. he lost no time in issuing another emancipation proclamation. "martial law and slavery," so ran this unique document, "in a free country are altogether incompatible; the persons heretofore held as slaves are therefore declared forever free." the same day he issued the following order to the commanding officers of the several posts and islands: "sir, you will send immediately to these headquarters, under guard, all able-bodied negroes capable of bearing arms within your lines." the six hundred forlorn and frightened darkeys, who next day were loaded on a steamer at beaufort and shipped to hilton head, must have been sadly puzzled over their new-found forever freedom. but hunter soon solved all doubts by throwing them into camp with uniforms on their backs, arms in their hands, white officers to drill them, black preachers to exhort them, and a cordon of white soldiers sentineling their camp to make sure they did not run away. thus was raised the first negro regiment. hunter, having proclaimed them free, felt no scruples in making them fight for freedom. general stevens, after obeying the order with a promptness altogether unexpected by general hunter, and for which he was totally unprepared, remonstrated against it in a letter to general benham, his immediate commander:- "1. there is very little material for soldiers in the able-bodied men of color in this department. i have not yet been able to find a single man who would venture alone inside the enemy's lines, although i have diligently sought to find such a man. occasionally a negro has been used to accompany white men. they have great fear of the prowess of their masters, and of white men generally. they have the strongest local and domestic attachments, which make them very reluctant to leave their homes. "2: they can be used to very great advantage in connection with and for the menial duties of the military service, and also as adjuncts of existing organizations; thus, as quartermasters' employees, doing all kinds of labor, from mechanical to the merest drudgery work. as boatmen, also, and as laborers on the defensive works, as guides and scouts, they can render most effective service, and should be employed _as adjuncts of existing organizations_. in fixed batteries they could do the heavy work, moving the guns, and carrying the shot and shell. in engineering operations they could do the heavy labor, even some of the hard lifting and carrying in managing the pontoon equipage. thus i conceive a great use can be made of the blacks in our military operations in devolving upon them the menial duties, and as strictly subordinate to existing organizations." these were precisely the views as to raising negro troops expressed not long afterwards by the distinguished general, w.t. sherman. the remonstrance seems to have had some effect, for general hunter telegraphed, and afterwards wrote, general stevens to say to the negroes that they were sent for to receive their free papers, and would have a chance to volunteer, if they wished, and that those who did not wish to remain would be sent back to their homes. in fact, the regiment was disbanded not long afterwards. another cause of anxiety to general stevens was the delay of the senate in confirming his appointment as brigadier-general. the confirmation was held up by senator wilson, of massachusetts, chairman of the military committee, in consequence of numerous anonymous letters to him and other senators, written from the department of the south, charging that general stevens was unsound on the slavery question. but when general sherman reached washington and indignantly refuted these slanders, described the able handling of his troops at port royal ferry, and the fine condition to which he had brought his brigade; and messrs. pierce, french, and suydam, the treasury agents, abolitionists themselves, bore willing witness to his patriotic spirit and the ungrudging assistance he had given them,--wilson assented to the confirmation. senators fessenden, john p. hale, rice, nesmith, and others strongly stood up for him, and on april 12 it was made without further delay. note.--admiral dupont's fleet-captain, charles henry davis, in a letter written soon after the naval victory at port royal, declares that the true way of attacking charleston is "by lines of water communication from st. helena sound; and, if you will observe, south edisto, north edisto, and stono rivers and inlets afford the means of lateral support to an army moving towards charleston by vessels of the navy," etc. _life of charles henry davis, rear admiral_, p. 174. on the arrival of the new commanders, the admiral, waiving rank in order to expedite matters, consented to put himself in official communication with general benham; but he soon had occasion to call general hunter's attention to the tone and character of one of benham's letters, and to withdraw the concession. in a subsequent letter to hunter the admiral remarks: "i have, however, to take exception to the attempt of general benham to attribute his inability to meet his own arrangements to any shortcomings on my part." _official dispatches of admiral dupont_, pp. 172-183. [illustration: lieut. wm. t. lusk, lieut. abraham cottrell, -------, major george s. kemble, capt. b.f. porter, capt. hazard stevens, general stevens, lieut. benj. r. lyons general stevens and staff] footnotes: [16] the author was general stevens's chief of staff, and was confidentially informed and employed by him in all the details of this plan of campaign against charleston, and of the scouts by captain elliott and others. since the war he has gone over the whole matter with general thomas w. sherman, who expressed the utmost confidence in the proposed movement, and his lasting regret that he was deprived of the opportunity of carrying it out. chapter lii james island campaign against charleston general hunter, busy in proclaiming martial law and freedom, and in raising a black army by conscription, with which he hoped to strike a blow into the vitals of the confederacy in the future, decided for the present simply to maintain a defensive attitude. but benham was greedy to signalize himself. his dense egotism and self-sufficiency rendered him almost incapable of listening to any suggestions, or even information, that did not originate with himself. the movement planned by general stevens with so much care was rejected offhand by benham. yet he was extremely anxious to employ the troops in some offensive operation, and gave hunter no peace on that point. early in may pemberton abandoned his works at the mouth of the stono, dismantling them and removing the guns for the purpose of arming an inner line across james island, which he was commencing, and which ran from fort johnson in the harbor to fort pemberton on the stono, ten miles above its mouth, and the naval gunboats entered and took possession of the lower four miles of the river. here benham saw his chance. hunter at length yielded to his importunity, and consented to a demonstration in force upon charleston by way of james island. benham made the plan. one division of troops, under general stevens, embarking on transports, were to go around by sea, enter the stono, and debark on james island. another division, under general wright, who was already on edisto island with four thousand troops, was to make a combined land and water movement over edisto and john's islands, crossing the intervening bays and streams, and reach james island simultaneously with stevens. a prompt and successful attack upon the incomplete line of intrenchments across that island would place charleston in our power. the plan was entirely practicable, but marred from the start by benham's unfortunate talent for blundering. when he communicated the details of the movement to general stevens, that officer pointed out to him that he was not allowing time enough for wright to make the movement required of him, and reach james island simultaneously with the other division, and that he would necessarily be a week later in arriving unless his orders were changed. benham took this friendly advice in dudgeon. the orders were not changed, and wright was just one week behind the appointed time, as predicted. as soon as he was informed of the intended movement, general stevens earnestly urged benham to inaugurate it by sending him to break up the railroad, as he had so long and so well planned, or, if not with the heavy force and thoroughness approved by general sherman, at least to permit him to throw his own brigade upon it. in a personal interview he presented his views with such clearness and force that he actually obtained a reluctant consent from benham to make the attack, but at the last moment he peremptorily countermanded the movement. finally, to general stevens's last earnest request by telegraph he would only consent that a demonstration might be made by the single regiment that was to be left to garrison beaufort, the 50th pennsylvania, stipulating, moreover, that it was to be back the same day it started on the raid. accordingly the 50th, under colonel christ, supported by a company of the highlanders and another of the michiganders, a detachment of eighty men of the 1st massachusetts cavalry under major henry l. higginson, and a section of rockwell's battery, advanced on may 29 to pocotaligo, had a brisk skirmish with the enemy, driving him from his position, with a loss of two killed, six wounded, and two captured, and returned. the union loss was two killed and nine wounded. how different this mere demonstration from the bold and crushing onslaught planned by general stevens! general rufus saxton arrived at beaufort to take charge of affairs there on general stevens's departure. he was one of the army officers who took part in the northern pacific railroad exploration under the latter, and had been warmly recommended by him, as an able and experienced officer, for appointment as brigadier-general, a recommendation which general saxton declares was finally the cause of his obtaining the appointment; for, taking advanced views in favor of emancipating and elevating the slaves, he was chiefly supported by the abolitionists, and was considered a representative of that element. he brought with him a provost-marshal, who, when the troops were embarking, came on the wharf with a considerable guard, and summarily took from the hostler two horses belonging to captain stevens, claiming that, having been captured from the enemy, they were improperly held by that officer. they were, in fact, captured animals, but had been regularly appraised by a board of survey, and the value of them paid into the quartermaster's department. the troops on the vessel witnessed this seizure with no goodwill, for they all knew the horses, and one of the soldiers made haste to acquaint the owner with what was taking place. he, finding remonstrance useless and the captor determined to hold on to his prey, quietly stepped across the wharf to the steamboat alongside, crowded with troops, all interested spectators, and directed an officer of the 8th michigan to take his company ashore, seize the horses, and put them on board. the order had scarcely left his lips when a hundred brawny fellows, musket in hand, leaped over the ship's rail and on the wharf, rescued the animals with no gentle hand, and drove the astonished and crestfallen provost-marshal and his myrmidons off the wharf. of course he rushed to general saxton, big with complaint, and the latter at once sought redress of general stevens for the forcing of his provost-guard. but the latter in most emphatic terms rebuked the high-handed act of the over-zealous provost, and fully upheld his staff officer. embarking the other three regiments of his brigade and rockwell's battery, reduced to four guns, on june 1 general stevens proceeded to hilton head, where he was joined by the 28th massachusetts and 46th new york in transports, and on the 2d steamed by sea around to, and entered, the stono, which was held by several gunboats, to a point above grimball's plantation, which was six miles above the mouth. the transports anchored two miles below this point, and opposite a hamlet on john's island known as legareville. a strong picket was thrown ashore on james island for the night, it being too late to land the troops. on the 3d they were put on shore in small boats, which were insufficient in number, and made the landing slow and laborious. as soon as a few companies were ashore, general stevens advanced with them, drove back the enemy, who were in considerable force, after a sharp action, captured three guns, which they were moving back to their inner line, and established his permanent picket line two and a half miles from the river, running diagonally across the island from big folly creek to the stono near grimball's. the action perhaps merits a fuller account. a farm road led back from the river about two and a half miles to the bank of big folly creek, where it passed along a row of negro quarters. here, turning to the left or westward, it crossed a wide cotton-field, then traversed a strip of woods, then crossed a marsh and slough by a causeway and continued on across the island in a generally westward direction. driving back the enemy, general stevens occupied the negro quarters with six companies, two of the 28th massachusetts on the right, then two of the roundheads and two of the highlanders on the left. two more companies of the latter, as they came up, were posted farther to the left and front. the enemy held the woods in front, and both sides opened a brisk musketry fire across the broad intervening cotton-field. some of their skirmishers got across the field far to the right of our position, and, under cover of the bushes which fringed the bank of the creek there, threatened the flank. to meet this danger, captain stevens stationed a platoon of the roundheads a short distance to the right of the quarters, where they, too, had the cover of the bushes. soon afterwards a column of the enemy, apparently a regiment, and which was in fact the charleston battalion, the crack corps of the city, emerged from the woods, and advanced by the flank in column of fours, headed by a mounted officer. in this order they charged down the road across the field at the double-quick, and, notwithstanding the fire of the companies stationed at the negro quarters, which proved singularly ineffective, actually penetrated to the buildings; the 28th companies gave way, and for a moment they had the position. but the roundheads held their ground, while the highlanders charged them with the bayonet and drove them in confusion to the right, whence they escaped across the field to the woods. in the rush, however, they swept off and captured captain cline and part of his platoon, which was posted to protect the right flank. the highlanders wounded and captured lieutenant henry walker, adjutant of the battalion, in the mêlée. general stevens immediately followed up this repulse by advancing his troops upon and through the woods, and to the other side of the marsh and causeway, forcing the enemy to abandon three pieces of artillery in his hasty retreat. the guns were hauled to camp in triumph. the enemy acknowledged a loss of seventeen wounded, one mortally, and one captured. his force consisted of the marion rifles, pee dee rifles, evans guard, sumter guard, beauregard light infantry, charleston riflemen, irish volunteers, calhoun guard, and union light infantry, in all apparently nine companies. yet all this array of chivalry did not save the guns they were sent to bring in. the picket line was posted along the front side of the woods, and on the edge of the marsh. the enemy's pickets held the other side of the marsh. there were several picket skirmishes during the next few days. the troops were kept well employed in landing stores, making camps, and on picket duty, awaiting the arrival of wright's division. benham was eager for general stevens to make a dash upon the enemy's lines without waiting for the balance of his army, but hesitated to give the order. the latter, fearing most his commander's blundering precipitancy, in the following confidential note urged him to come to a speedy decision, representing that a day's preparation was absolutely essential:- james island, june 6, 1862. dear general,--i understand your wish to be to make an armed reconnoissance of the enemy's position, and if the result be favorable, to follow it up by a dash, in order to seize james island below james river and newton cut. we shall probably be as well able to make it day after to-morrow (daylight) as at any other time. should you decide to make it day after to-morrow, it is of the first consequence to make that decision without delay. it will require all day to-morrow to prepare for it. i would suggest that not more than three companies be left at legareville; that everything else be brought over to-morrow, including the six guns of hamilton's battery; that arrangements be made with the gunboats to open cross-fires. the system of signals will require careful arrangement. i desire that the dash be successful, and therefore i want to see every man thrown in. but i desire particularly to express my judgment that, in the present position of our troops, twenty-four hours of vigorous work is absolutely essential in the way of preparation. very truly yours, isaac i. stevens. brigadier-general benham. how completely this judicious caution as to the necessity of due preparation was thrown away upon the opinionated benham was proved ten days later, but for the present he gave up the idea of a dash. in a letter to his wife, dated june 11, general stevens gives expression to his disgust at the incompetents set over him:- "i am not in very good spirits to-night, for the reason that i have two commanders, hunter and benham, who are imbecile, vacillating, and utterly unfit to command. why it has been my fortune to be placed in positions where i was of little account, and to be subjected to such extreme mortification and annoyance, is beyond my imagining. it may not even teach me patience. i shall, however, do the best i can. if the authorities would send some man not altogether incompetent, i should be better satisfied. why can't mansfield be sent here, and both hunter and benham relieved? as for myself, i am tabooed. no proper use is intended to be made of me, and as everybody is in the humor to speak highly of my abilities, i shall be held in part responsible for the follies of others. benham is an ass,--a dreadful man, of no earthly use except as a nuisance and obstruction." a few days later he writes:- "we are now attempting an enterprise for which our force is entirely inadequate. the want of a proper commander is fearful. we shall try to prevent any disaster occurring. this is all i can say at present." on the 8th wright's division reached legareville, and was occupied the next two days in crossing the river, and taking a position at grimball's, a mile and a half above general stevens's camp. colonel robert williams went into camp with his 1st massachusetts cavalry just below wright. the 7th connecticut, which came with the overland column, joined general stevens's division. wright's delay was caused by the inadequacy of the water transportation, especially boats, furnished him. it was found an exceedingly slow and laborious operation to transfer troops, guns, and horses from shore to ship, and from ship to shore, in a few small boats. there were no wharves, and the landing-places were narrow and swampy. it was only by the greatest exertions, working his command night and day, that he was able to accomplish in a week the movement which benham expected made in a day. yet benham, blind to the energetic and loyal character of wright and the strenuous exertions of his troops on this march, never forgave that officer for the delay. utterly unaccustomed to the command and handling of troops, and swollen with new-found authority, he ever deemed his loud and peremptory "those are my orders, sir," an equivalent to that painstaking attention to details and to means which napoleon and wellington and all great soldiers have found indispensable. the army now assembled numbered about twelve thousand, and was organized in two divisions and an independent brigade, as follows:- first division, brigadier-general h.g. wright. first brigade, colonel j.l. chatfield. 6th connecticut, colonel j.l. chatfield. 47th new york, colonel p.c. kane. 97th pennsylvania, colonel h.r. guss. second brigade, colonel thomas welsh. 45th pennsylvania, colonel thomas welsh. 76th pennsylvania, colonel j.m. power. battery e, 3d u.s. artillery, captain john hamilton. second division, brigadier-general isaac i. stevens. first brigade, colonel william m. fenton. 8th michigan, lieutenant-colonel frank graves. 28th massachusetts, lieutenant-colonel m. moore. 7th connecticut, lieutenant-colonel joseph r. hawley. second brigade, colonel daniel leasure. 79th highlanders, lieutenant-colonel david morrison. 100th pennsylvania, major david a. lecky. 46th new york, colonel rudolph rosa. 1st connecticut battery, captain a.p. rockwell. independent brigade, colonel robert williams. 1st massachusetts cavalry, lieut.-col. h.b. sargent. 3d r.i. heavy artillery (infantry), major e. metcalf. 3d new hampshire, colonel j.h. jackson. 1st new york engineers, colonel e.w. serrell. all this time the enemy were concentrating and working like beavers on their new line of works across the island. in advance of the left of the line, at the narrowest neck of a peninsula formed by two inlets extending from big folly creek, they had previously erected a strong work, known as battery or fort lamar. it was a hundred yards long in front, and completely blocked the neck from shore to shore, so that it was impossible to turn or flank it. it had a wide and deep ditch, and a heavy parapet sixteen feet in height above the general level of the grounds and twenty-four feet above the bottom of the ditch, and extended back on both flanks along the inlets. it mounted eight heavy guns, viz., an 8-inch columbiad, two rifled 24-pounders, four 18-pounders, and a 15-inch mortar, and protected the whole left of their line with a flank fire. the front was well covered by abattis, except at the left angle, where a cart road ran along the left flank a hundred yards, then passing inside and to the rear.[17] in front of the fort the peninsula rapidly widened out. the ground was in old cotton-fields, open and level, except for the high ridges and deep furrows resulting from that crop. about five hundred yards in front of the fort a hedge and ditch extended across the peninsula, separating field from field; and five hundred yards farther another hedge-row and ditch separated the second field from the road already mentioned. both sides of the neck were skirted with bushes along the banks of the inlets, a light fringe on the eastward or left, a thicker fringe, affording some cover, on the west side. the ground rose immediately behind the work, overlooking it, and was covered with a growth of pine timber, above which uprose a tall, skeleton signal tower. the peninsula was known as secessionville neck, from the landing-place of that name on its extremity. half a mile to the right of battery lamar, on the main line, was battery reed, mounting two 24-pounders, and commanding the ground in front of the former with a searching cross-fire. there was also a floating battery, mounting two guns, moored in the inlet to the left rear of the fort. these works were continually shelling our pickets. the camps were beyond their range. in order to answer them general stevens was allowed by benham to erect a battery of three 24-pounder siege-guns on the point nearest the enemy's fort, and half a mile to the right of the negro quarters already mentioned. the battery was situated some two hundred yards from the extreme point, and on the bank of big folly creek, and partially screened by the bushes there. it was well built, with heavy parapet and traverse, and the detachment of roundheads who manned the guns soon felt quite secure. when it opened on the fort, it evidently caused some perturbation among the enemy. for some time a lively interchange of missiles was kept up. our shells set fire to the floating battery, and the next night it was moved farther down the inlet. the union battery could be approached on foot under cover of the bushes which lined the bank of the creek, but to reach it on horseback it was necessary to ride down the field in open view of the hostile work, and a group of horsemen was pretty sure to draw their fire. a few days after the battery was completed, general benham, accompanied by general stevens and quite a cavalcade of their respective staffs, rode out to inspect the picket line. as they were returning by the road towards the negro quarters, benham expressed a wish to visit the battery, and turned his horse to ride towards it. general stevens suggested that it would be better to approach the battery on foot under cover of the bushes, as the enemy would probably fire on so large a party in the open field. benham repelled the suggestion with a rude exclamation, and continued to ride towards the battery. general stevens, of course, kept his place by his side without further comment, and the staffs and orderlies followed as in duty bound. as soon as the cavalcade emerged beyond the shelter of the woods, and came in view of the fort, a puff of smoke dashed from its side, and one of those shrieking shells hurtled just overhead and struck with a splash in the creek. benham instantly pulled up, stared around bewildered a moment, and, wheeling his horse short about, hastily rode back behind the friendly screen and shelter of the woods, followed by his staff. general stevens, ignoring this manoeuvre, kept quietly on at a moderate trot, followed by his staff, and all soon reached the welcome battery unharmed, although several more shells were fired at them. on the 8th the 46th new york and one company of the 1st massachusetts cavalry, under colonel j.h. morrow, of hunter's staff, made a reconnoissance to the enemy's right through the woods above grimball's, but, meeting a heavy force of skirmishers, retired without seeing the works. that same afternoon general stevens sent captain stevens of his staff, accompanied by lieutenant p.h. o'rourke of the engineers, with a company of the 3d new hampshire, under captain m.t. donohoe (afterwards general donohoe), to reconnoitre the fort at secessionville. the enemy's pickets were driven in, four of them captured; half the company, in skirmish order, approached the fort to within six or seven hundred yards, while the other half moved down the road to the left. though subjected to a brisk shell-fire, and the fire of the pickets, not a man was touched. the character of the ground in front of the fort was ascertained, and the little party withdrew deliberately. on the 10th the 13th georgia, under cover of the woods, the pickets not being sufficiently advanced, got close to wright's camp, and opened a sudden and furious attack upon it. they were repulsed in short order, with severe loss, by wright's troops, aided by the fire of the gunboats. [illustration: headquarters, james island] footnotes: [17] the confederate major, pressley, who went over the ground just after the assault to be related in the next chapter, thus describes fort lamar, in _southern historical society papers_, vol. xvi.: "the work across the neck of the secessionville peninsula was about fifty yards in length, and was a very well-constructed line of intrenchments. the ramparts were about fifteen feet from the level of the ground. there was a ditch in front about ten to fifteen feet in width. the exterior slope was so nearly perpendicular that it was impossible to get up in front without scaling-ladders. the enemy were not provided with these." chapter liii battle of james island meantime benham was chafing at the helpless and ignominious position in which he found himself. at the head of twelve thousand fine troops, within six miles of charleston, he was confronted by a formidable line of works, and had received positive orders from hunter not to fight a battle. for several days he contemplated a movement towards the enemy's right, and issued some preliminary orders to that end. general stevens thought an attempt should have been made in that direction as soon as wright's division arrived. general wright agreed that, if any part of the line was to be attempted, it should be the right. both judged the left impracticable, resting as it did on the water, and covered by the advanced flanking fort at secessionville. general hunter returned to hilton head for a short visit. in his absence, in an evil hour general benham took it into his head that he might take the secessionville fort. its guns were shelling our pickets, and even the commanding general himself, when he ventured within range. they could almost reach wright's camp. he resolved upon this attempt as precipitantly, and as regardless of the difficulties, as was his wont. on the evening of the 15th be summoned his subordinate commanders on board his headquarters steamer. there assembled generals stevens, wright, and williams. captain percival drayton, commanding the naval force, was also present. to them benham announced his decision: general stevens to assault the fort before daylight with his division, wright and williams to support, the navy to coöperate. this announcement, coming at nine o'clock at night, for such an attack before daylight the next morning, without any previous notice or chance for preparation, must have taken them aback. general wright couched an emphatic protest in the diplomatic form of questions to general stevens:- "have you impaired the strength of the enemy's works at secessionville by the firing of your battery?" "not in the least," replied general stevens; "i have driven the enemy from his guns by my fire, and i can do it again, but as soon as the fire ceases he returns. i have not dismounted a gun, and we shall find him in the morning as strong as ever." "do you know of any instance where volunteer troops have successfully stormed works as strong as those which defend the approach to secessionville?" "i know of no such instance." "have you any reason to believe that the result in the present case will be different in its character from what it has invariably been heretofore?" "i have no reason to expect a different result. it is simply a bare possibility to take the work." "there, general," said general wright, turning to benham, "you have my opinion." in this general williams concurred. general stevens states in a letter to general hunter, written on july 8, soon after the battle:- "i then proceeded to state with all possible emphasis my objections to this morning attack. i urged that it should be deferred to a much later period in the day; that we should first shake the _morale_ of the garrison, and endeavor to weaken its defenses by a continuous fire of the battery and of our gunboats; that in the mean time we should carefully survey the ground and prepare our troops, and make the attack when the battery and gunboats had had the desired effect. i closed by saying that under such circumstances i could do more with two thousand men than i could with three thousand men in the way he proposed. general wright, moreover, warned general benham that his orders were in fact orders to fight a battle. in this general williams and myself in express terms concurred. general benham, however, overruled all our objections, and premptorily ordered the attack to be made. "i assured him, as did the other gentlemen, that he should rely upon my promptitude and activity in obeying his orders, but i considered myself as obeying orders to which i had expressed the strongest possible objections, and i therefore determined there should not be the least want of energy or promptitude on my part." with this the conference broke up, and the officers hastened ashore to their respective commands to prepare for the arduous task of the morrow. general stevens at once ordered his troops to be in readiness at the advanced camps, two miles from the river, at two a.m., with sixty rounds of ammunition and twenty-four hours' cooked rations. captain strahan's company, i, 3d rhode island, was detailed from wright's division to relieve the detachment of roundheads in the three-gun battery. over three hundred of that regiment were out on the widely extended picket line. ordered to assemble and join their regiment, only one hundred and thirty of the number succeeded in reaching it in time to take part in the action, and then only after it had come under fire, so scanty and inadequate was the time allowed for preparation. two companies of the 28th massachusetts were on fatigue duty and had to be left behind. the 7th connecticut, moreover, had been on severe fatigue duty the three previous nights, and were much jaded. at the hour fixed, the troops were at the appointed place. before 3.30 a.m. the column was advanced two miles farther to the outer pickets, and was arranged in the following order:-lieutenant benjamin r. lyons, aide-de-camp, with a negro guide, led the storming party, which consisted of two companies of the 8th michigan, commanded respectively by captains ralph ely and richard n. doyle, followed by captain alfred f. sears's company, e, serrell's new york engineers. then followed fenton's first brigade, comprising the 8th michigan, lieutenant-colonel frank graves; the 7th connecticut, lieutenant-colonel joseph r. hawley; and the 28th massachusetts, lieutenant-colonel mcclellan moore. then rockwell's battery of four guns. then colonel leasure's second brigade, consisting of the highlanders, lieutenant-colonel david morrison; the roundheads, major david a. lecky; and the 46th new york, colonel rudolph rosa. captain l.m. sargent, with his company h, 1st massachusetts cavalry, twenty-eight men, brought up the rear. the attacking column numbered not exceeding 2900 officers and men, as shown by the following return:- officers. men. total. general and staff 9 6 15 first brigade:- 8th michigan 25 509 534 7th connecticut 25 573 598 28th massachusetts 20 416 436 second brigade:- 79th highlanders 24 460 484 100th pennsylvania 21 230 251 46th new york 22 452 474 rockwell's battery, four guns 4 73 77 sears's company, e, 1st new york engineers 2 59 61 sargent's company, h, 1st mass. cavalry 2 28 30 -- --- --- aggregate 154 2806 2960 [illustration: battle of james island, june 16, 1862] general stevens gave the most explicit orders, reiterated in person to the several commanders, that the troops were to preserve strict silence, no stop to be made after passing the enemy's pickets; to form forward into line on reaching the fields in front of the fort; regiment to follow regiment and storm the work; not to fire a shot but rely exclusively on the bayonet, the muskets to be loaded but not capped. the idea impressed upon all was simply to assault the work in column of regiments, without an instant's pause after alarming the enemy's pickets, and take it with the bayonet. just before four a.m. the column moved forward on the road already described, and crossed the marsh by the causeway. here a section of rockwell's guns dropped out, and fell in again behind the second brigade. no opposition was encountered until the first house beyond our lines was reached, when the enemy's pickets fired, wounding five men of the storming party, and fled; but an officer and three men of their number were captured. the road was found blocked with felled timber, but the column without any delay advanced through the fields alongside the road until past the obstruction, and reached the open fields in front of the fort at 4.15 a.m., just as day was breaking. the storming party and the 8th michigan filed into the field through an opening in the hedge and ditch which bordered the road, formed forward into line without a pause, and advanced steadily in excellent order over the uneven, deeply furrowed ground, soon surmounted the second ditch and hedge, and swept onward across the field next the work. the enemy were seen hastily forming on the parapet; their commander, colonel lamar, rushing to the gun half dressed, fired the great columbiad, heavily charged with grape, which tore a great gap through the advancing line, and they immediately opened with a storm of grape and canister from the guns, and a rapid and deadly fire of musketry along the whole front. closing their ranks without break or pause, the gallant michiganders pushed on, the storming party forty yards in advance, strewing the ground at every step with their dead and wounded. as they reached the ditch, lieutenant lyons dashed forward crying, "come on, boys!" was the first man across the ditch, and fell half way up the parapet with a shattered arm. many of the brave fellows who survived the murderous fire resolutely pressed on, gained the parapet, and poured their fire into the defenders behind it, who visibly gave back. captain reed, of the 1st south carolina artillery, was killed at the gun he was serving by a union captain, who was in turn immediately shot down. but the enemy rallied, the supports in the grove of pines in rear of the work poured in a deadly fire, and the brave stormers on the parapet, too few in number, soon melted away. the few survivors were forced to give back, and, throwing themselves on the ground, sheltered themselves as best they could behind the cotton ridges, from which they opened a fire on the fort with their muskets. meantime the 7th connecticut and 28th massachusetts, following close upon the 8th michigan, turned into the field, deployed in like manner, and moved forward. unfortunately they inclined a little to the left, and after crossing the second hedge the heavy grape and canister and musketry of the fort cut them up severely, and drove them still farther to the left, where they became disordered, and entangled in the bushes and broken ground bordering the marsh on that side. lieutenant-colonel hawley tried to straighten out his regiment, setting up his colors in the field, and moved it to the rear and to the right, when he was ordered by colonel fenton to move still farther to the right, and advance again on the fort. the 28th massachusetts, although considerably scattered, moved forward under cover of the bushes until they encountered an inlet of the marsh and the abattis of slashed trees, when they fell back under cover. by this time leasure's brigade was up, and, directed by general stevens in person, advanced straight on the fort, regiment after regiment, deploying as they advanced. the highlanders moved forward in fine order, followed by the roundheads, taking ground a little more to the left. crossing the second hedge, they came under the terrible fire of canister which struck the left of the highlanders and the centre of the roundheads, literally cutting the latter in two. the highlanders pushed steadily forward, supported by the right wing of the roundheads, passing the 7th connecticut as hawley was endeavoring to lead it to the right as directed by fenton, struck the work at the angle on its left (our right), and, led by the gallant morrison, plunged across the ditch, and clambered up the steep parapet; many of the defenders ran back, and again the fort seemed won. but again the musketry from the sharpshooters on the flanks and rear cut down the brave scotsmen; a bullet grazed morrison's temple, inflicting a serious wound, and he and the half score survivors of the brave band that so gallantly gained the parapet were forced to leap down again. but they did not return empty handed. morrison brought out a prisoner at the muzzle of his revolver. the capture of another was even more daring. a rebel soldier sprang upon the parapet in his eagerness, and aimed his musket at one of the assailants, scrambling up the steep and lofty bank, but the highlander, making a tremendous leap, dashed aside the weapon, seized his antagonist in his arms, and rolled with him to the bottom of the ditch, where he was forced to surrender. while the highlanders were thus storming the work, the left wing of the roundheads, with some of the highlanders, cut off and driven to the left by the terrible hail which smote them, yet pushed determinedly on. they ran over or through the 7th connecticut as that regiment was moving out into the field, as already narrated, throwing it into some confusion, and dashed themselves against the fort. but here the front was well protected by abattis, and afforded no opening. the reed battery raked them terribly. the men fell by scores, the line lost its impetus, and the survivors threw themselves on the ground behind the cotton-ridges for shelter. the 46th new york was double-quicked the last half mile of the road, conducted across the first field and through the farther hedge, and ordered forward. its course, like that of the 7th connecticut and 28th massachusetts, bore too much to the left, and like them it became entangled in the bushes on that side. here portions of the 7th connecticut and 28th massachusetts, retreating, broke through the 46th, carrying back fifty men of that regiment. there they stayed, suffering considerably from grape, until the advanced regiments moved back, when they also withdrew to the hedge. while the attack was making, rockwell planted three guns of his battery well forward and to the left in the first field, and maintained as constant a fire of shells upon the fort as the movement of our troops admitted. his fourth gun was posted on the road to guard the left rear. captain sears aided rockwell's guns across the hedge and ditch and high ridges, and later cleared out the felled trees from the road in rear. general stevens, from his position in the first field, had a clear view of every movement. lieutenant lyons and other wounded officers brought discouraging reports. seeing plainly that the assailants were all driven from the parapet, and that the attacking force was completely scattered and had in a manner disappeared, he was satisfied the attack had failed. with instant decision he ordered the troops to fall back, and reform behind the hedges. captain stevens was sent with the order. on reaching the front of the fort not a line, or semblance of one, could be seen, except about forty men standing in the field within a hundred yards of the work. besides the dead and wounded, the ground was covered with blue-clad men, crouching down between the ridges, many of whom were firing on the work. a heavy hail of musketry came from it, or from the pine grove and cover behind it. the guns fired only at intervals. captain stevens did not see a mounted officer, nor a single color, except perhaps one with the scanty line referred to, nor a single man running away. riding to this line, he found lieutenant-colonel hawley and two officers on the right of it, endeavoring to cheer on the men. the line had stopped. the men were dropping fast, some stricken down, others voluntarily for shelter in the deep furrows; two were knocked over within arm's length as he delivered the order. hawley at once about-faced his line and moved back. then a most remarkable sight was observed. the men of his regiment, lying between the ridges, rose to their feet, and hastened to form on either flank of the line, which rapidly grew and lengthened out as it withdrew. then another and another and another line rose out of the ground in like manner, and in a few minutes the four regiments, which had so gallantly dashed themselves against the fort, were moving back in four well-formed lines with colors flying, and men rising from all parts of the field and running to form on their respective regiments; but, alas, how reduced and scanty were they as compared with the strong, brave regiments which so proudly entered that fatal field barely a half hour before, where six hundred brave men now lay weltering in their blood! the withdrawn regiments were halted behind the second hedge and straightened out. as soon as the troops could be seen moving back, captain strahan opened on the fort. two of his guns were soon disabled, and he lost a sergeant killed, but with the remaining gun he kept up a well-directed and regular fire until the close of the battle. the gunboats ellen and hale, moving up big folly creek, now began throwing shells at the long range of over two miles, some of which fell in the fields, greatly endangering our own men; but, guided by the signal officers, lieutenant henry s. tafft on shore and lieutenant o.h. howard on the ellen, the subsequent fire was more accurately directed upon the fort. the distance, however, was too great, and the shells too few, to produce much effect. according to the plan, while general stevens's division was assaulting the fort, wright and williams, moving together from grimball's, were to act as a support to the former, protecting his left and rear from an attack by the enemy from his main line. williams's brigade comprised five companies of the 3d rhode island, the 3d new hampshire, six companies of the 97th pennsylvania, and a section of battery e, 3d united states artillery. wright had of his own division, of chatfield's brigade, two companies of the 6th connecticut and eight companies of the 47th new york; and of walsh's brigade, six companies of the 45th pennsylvania, three companies of serrell's new york engineers, and besides these the other two sections of hamilton's battery, e, and two squadrons of the 1st massachusetts cavalry. these organizations were mere skeletons, and numbered about two thousand seven hundred effective. the remaining troops were left on picket, and to guard the camps. wright moved soon after three a.m. to, and formed under cover of, the woods one mile in front of his camp. hearing a few shots on his right front, he rightly judged that stevens's column was advancing, and at once moved forward. by this time daylight was upon him. now he was joined by general benham, who assumed command, leaving wright responsible for only his own skeleton division. moving rapidly to the front, wright soon placed his troops in position fronting the enemy's main line, and maintained substantially this position until ordered to withdraw, throwing the 47th new york to the left, and advancing a section of hamilton's battery, which opened a sharp fire. before reaching this position general benham received a message from general stevens asking immediate support, and ordered williams to move forward and report to him. reaching the field just as the assaulting column was falling back and reforming behind the hedges, and ordered by general stevens to push in on his left, and do the best in concert with him that the ground would admit of, williams threw the 3d new hampshire forward beyond, or on our left of the marsh and inlet which covered the flank of the fort on that side, with the view of taking it in flank, and supported it with the battalion of the 3d rhode island. the 97th pennsylvania he posted on the left of general stevens's reforming regiments. the two former advanced with great bravery and steadiness, so far that they actually poured a telling fire into the flank of the fort, and the garrison was manifestly shaken. for half an hour they maintained the contest, sustaining unflinchingly a severe fire from the fort and the 4th louisiana battalion, which hastened to reinforce it, raked by the reed battery on the left and smitten in the rear by boyce's field battery. the 3d rhode island was thrown to the left against the latter. it encountered three companies of the 24th south carolina, drove them back, and struck the 25th and 1st south carolina, which supported boyce's guns, and were protected by a patch of felled timber, and maintained an unequal contest with them until ordered to withdraw. meantime general stevens, with the greatest possible rapidity, was advancing his regiments as fast as reorganized to the farther hedge, the one nearest the fort, where they found cover in the ditch. the sun had cleared away the morning clouds, and now shone bright and clear. it was a beautiful and inspiriting sight to see each regiment move forward across the wide field in well-dressed line with colors flying, unheeding the shell and grape which hurtled past or overhead. rockwell dashed his guns up to the same line nearly, and in the open field maintained a rapid and steady fire on the fort, only five hundred yards distant. strahan plied his single gun, and the occasional heavy shells from the gunboats burst over the work with a deeper roar. sharpshooters, as well as the advanced men who still clung close up to the fort, kept the parapet tolerably clear, but the fort was no whit silenced. the grape fell in frequent showers. notwithstanding the severe losses the men were not discouraged, but were as determined and confident as before. stimulated by the volleys and cheers of williams's troops, they were ready, nay eager, to be led to the assault the second time. general stevens sent word to benham that his whole division was in the advanced position, reformed and ready, and that he would attack again as soon as williams's movement produced its effect. just as he was about to give the order to advance, the firing on the left slackened and ceased, and williams's troops were seen moving back. benham, as hasty and ill judged in abandoning the field as he was precipitate and obstinate in ordering the assault, had ordered them to retreat. on the left were heard the rebel cheers. in front the fort redoubled its fire. soon afterwards general benham ordered general stevens to withdraw his column to camp. wright and williams had already fallen back. the former is particular to state in his report that "the withdrawal from the field of both columns was ordered by general benham." general stevens withdrew his forces without loss and unopposed. even the advanced men were all brought off. lieutenant h.g. belcher, of the 8th michigan, took them the order, and, working over singly to the left, they got under cover of the bushes on that side and thus withdrew. the enemy attempted no pursuit, and by ten a.m. the entire force was back in camp. thus ended the battle of james island or secessionville, the culmination of crass obstinacy and folly. benham, who, deaf to the orders of his commander, deaf to the warnings of wright, deaf to stevens's earnest entreaties to be allowed to attack later in the day and after due preparation, had so rashly and obstinately forced the fight,--this very benham shrank from the shock of battle, and ordered the retreat when victory was within his grasp. the enemy's forces upon james island were commanded by general n.g. evans, and numbered certainly not less than 9000 effective. colonel t.g. lamar commanded the fort and was severely wounded. he had two companies, b and i, of his own regiment, the 1st south carolina artillery, the 1st south carolina or charleston and 9th south carolina or pee dee battalions, four officers and one hundred picked men of the 22d south carolina, and three officers and presumably the crew of the floating battery, which had been withdrawn from the fire of the three-gun battery a few days before. all these commands must have numbered at least 800, although colonel lamar reports that his force did not exceed 500 until reinforced. he was soon reinforced by the 4th louisiana battalion, numbering 250, and later by the balance of the 22d south carolina, so that he must have had at least 1500 men before the action closed. the losses in these commands amounted to 172, of which the original garrison suffered 144, an unusually heavy loss behind strong works, viz.: charleston battalion, 42; 1st south carolina artillery, 55; pee dee battalion, 29; detachment 22d south carolina, 18; total, 144. the loss of the 1st south carolina artillery, 55, would indicate that more than two companies were in the fort. colonel lamar reports that he was expecting an attack, having a detachment at each gun, and the alarm was given when the pickets were driven in; yet the assaulting column advanced so rapidly that it was within seven hundred yards when he reached the battery, and much nearer when in person he fired the 8-inch columbiad heavily charged with grape, which he says broke the leading regiment, cutting it completely in two. the other confederate troops engaged were the 1st, 24th, and 25th south carolina, boyce's field battery, and company h, 1st south carolina artillery, which manned the reed battery. general evans ordered up the 47th and 51st georgia to support his right. his force, engaged and on the field, numbered 4500 effective, besides which were plenty of other troops available on the main works. the confederate loss all told was 204. the union loss aggregated 685, of which stevens's column suffered 529; williams's brigade, 152; wright's division, four. the 8th michigan lost 185 out of 534, or thirty per cent.; 13 out of 22 officers who went into the fight, including every officer of the storming party, were killed or wounded. the highlanders lost 110 out of 484, notwithstanding which they withdrew in good order, and brought off 60 of their wounded, some of their dead, and their two prisoners. these losses would have been much greater had it not been for the partial shelter afforded by the cotton-ridges, and the fire of the men behind them, which kept down that of the fort. but the loss of the garrison is unparalleled behind such works, and shows the desperate nature of the fighting. the nearest parallel to this assault afforded by the war was that on fort saunders at knoxville, where the highlanders had their revenge. they manned the exposed salient of the fort when longstreet tried to carry it by storm, november 29, 1863. this work was not so strong either in profile or position as fort lamar. it was subjected to a severe shelling and fire of sharpshooters, and then three veteran brigades, fifteen regiments, rushed upon both faces of the salient angle. the highlanders and benjamin's battery e, of the 2d artillery, repulsed every attack. no enemy raised his head above the parapet and lived. and in the midst of the fight, amid the noise and fury of battle, as the highlanders plied their muskets and rolled by hand 20-pounder shells with fuses cut short and lighted into the ditch, filled with the struggling mass of men, the highlanders grimly passed the word along the line, "remember james island! remember james island!" the highlanders here lost four killed and five wounded. the entire loss in the fort was inconsiderable. the enemy lost 813 men, three flags, and 600 small-arms. this would seem almost incredible, were it not attested by the official reports, both union and confederate. why the assault failed, it is not far to seek. the principal cause was the strength of the work, manned as it was by a resolute garrison, and the destructive fire of its heavy guns. although the alarm was given by the outposts nearly a mile from the work, the column reached it upon the heels of the fleeing picket, and was actually within five hundred yards before the first gun could be fired. but this gun, an 8-inch columbiad charged with grape, shattered the centre of the leading regiment, cutting it completely in two. then the canister from the big howitzer and other guns doubly decimated them, yet the brave fellows gained the parapet. had the next two regiments, the 7th connecticut and 28th massachusetts, following close upon the michiganders as ordered, joined them at this instant, the work would undoubtedly have been taken. but they were green troops, never having been under fire; the 28th, indeed, was fresh from home, and under the terrible storm of grape and canister they were beaten to the left, and entangled in the bushes and broken bank there. although lieutenant-colonel hawley lost no time in disentangling his regiment and moving it out into the field and again forward, it is significant, and well shows the difficulty of handling green troops under fire, that the highlanders rushed past the right of the 7th connecticut, and the roundheads broke through or ran over its centre, and both assaulted the fort and were repulsed--nearly all who reached the parapet being killed, and the remainder forced to give back--by the time the connecticut regiment had advanced to within a hundred yards of the work, where hawley received the order to withdraw. certainly the rapid advance and onset of the michiganders, highlanders, and roundheads were all that men could do. their loss was so great and the parapet so difficult that not enough men could surmount it to be able to hold it; but the chief reason for the failure was the deadly fire from the woods and cover behind the fort. the work was fairly stormed, but the stormers, too few to hold it, were destroyed by the deadly fire from its rear. these three regiments had already smelt powder, and had been well drilled and disciplined by general stevens. the others, new and inexperienced, could not be expected to equal them, yet they evinced no lack of bravery. general stevens says in his report:- "i must confess that the coolness and mobility of all the troops engaged on the 16th surprised me, and i cannot but believe, had proper use been made of the artillery, guns from the navy, and our own batteries, fixed and field; had the position been gradually approached and carefully examined, and the attack made much later in the day, when our batteries had had their full effect, all of which, you will recollect, was strongly urged by me upon general benham the evening of the conference,--the result might have been very different."[18] general stevens commends the gallantry of his troops in strong terms, and the brave and efficient service of his staff, already mentioned, of lieutenant orrin m. dearborn, of the 3d new hampshire, aide in place of lieutenant cottrell, who, having been promoted captain, had command of his company, and of lieutenant jefferson justice, of the roundheads, acting division quartermaster, who served upon the field as his aide. lieutenant lyons, who so bravely led the stormers, died of his wound in hospital at hilton head soon afterwards. for his wrong-headed and disobedient conduct benham was placed under arrest by general hunter and sent north. his appointment as brigadier-general was revoked by the president. later, by unwearied importunity and the pressure of influence, he managed to get himself reinstated, but never again was he trusted with the lives of brave men. footnotes: [18] see _rebellion records_, vol. xiv.; _history of the 79th highlanders_, by william todd; major pressley, in _southern historical society papers_, vol. xvi., major john johnson's _defense of charleston harbor_. chapter liv return to virginia a few days after their bloody repulse from fort lamar the highlanders paraded in front of general stevens's headquarters and presented him with a beautiful sword, together with a sash, belt, and spurs, in the following feeling address. the address was inscribed upon a large sheet of parchment by one of the skillful penmen in the regiment, in characters as clear and distinct as copperplate engraving, and in the middle of the sheet was an excellent photograph of the general in uniform. the sword was the gift of the non-commissioned officers and privates exclusively, for they had refused to permit the officers to contribute a cent towards or bear any part in the testimonial, although the latter were anxious to do their share. it was common talk among the men that the officers never amounted to anything until general stevens took them in hand; that he had saved and redeemed the regiment after they had well-nigh ruined it; and that they should not have any part in the sword, which was the tribute of the rank and file. the presentation was a great surprise to general stevens, and was the more gratifying as showing the undiminished regard of the regiment immediately after the recent severe battle and loss:- brigadier-general isaac i. stevens. _sir_,--a unanimous feeling of gratitude and respect pervading the non-commissioned officers and privates of the seventy ninth regiment (highland guard) new york state militia, and wishing to give that feeling a humble and appropriate expression, we have determined to-day to present for your acceptance this sword, feeling assured that by you it will be worthily worn, and never drawn but in defense of human rights and their political guaranties. your recent connection with us as our colonel, our friend, and our counselor has fitted us in a peculiar manner to judge of and appreciate your virtues in each of these capacities. coming amongst us at a critical period in our history as a regiment, when our fair fame was eclipsed, and demoralization was fast hurrying us to the vortex of anarchy, you listened to the story of our wrongs, tempered your decisions against the erring ones with the high attribute of mercy, and bade us hope. we did hope, and ere long we found ourselves recuperated and in camp advance. there our confidence in you was perfected, and our esteem became affection. when it was announced that your distinguished military services had brought you higher and greener laurels, we were glad and proud; but sorrow, deep and profound, pervaded our ranks when it was made known that your services were demanded in another sphere, and that we must separate. the exclamation of "tak' us wi' ye!" which greeted you upon that day's parade was heartfelt and sincere, and your intervention in our behalf has enabled us to preserve our connection, if not as close, not the less fondly. that your valuable and beneficent life may long be spared to the service and to mankind, and that the blessing of god may rest upon you and upon your family, is the sincere prayer of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the seventy-ninth, highland guard. general stevens's response. fellow-soldiers of the highland guard,--i have no words to express my gratitude for this unexpected and unmerited mark of your confidence and affection. we came together not only at a critical period of your own history as a regiment, but at a critical period of our beloved country's history, when its armies had been stricken down, and dismay and discouragement spread over the length and breadth of the land. it was the time for the true and the strong to come to the work, and by a firm stand in our country's cause again to cause hope and faith to spring up in the hearts of men. you recollect we moved from our camp of "hope" on the beautiful heights in the rear of washington to the camp of the "advance" across the potomac. then i spoke to you words of encouragement, and together, in the glorious light of day, we won back our colors. we had soon become acquainted. as your colonel, i ever found you brave and true. the pathos of your address, its living expressions, touch me. when i was ordered south, and rode through your ranks to say farewell, and saw the tear glisten in every manly eye, and heard the words, "tak' us wi' ye!" from every lip, i thought we could not part; so, on reaching annapolis, i said to our late able and respected commander, general sherman, "send for the highlanders; they want to come, and you can depend upon them." here you have come, and here you are to-day. have you not always done well? who ever finds the highlanders behind? i know not which feeling of my heart is stronger in regard to you,--my pride or my affection. your firm step, your manly countenances, cold steel for your enemies, and the open hand and heart for your friend,--such are you, beloved comrades. in the late sad, glorious fight where were you? laggards, or seeking the front on the double-quick to succor your friends, the 8th michigan, led on by your gallant lieutenant-colonel there, david morrison? you gained that front and parapet, and some of your noblest and your best there found a soldier's grave. it was indeed a sad but glorious field. not a laggard, not a fugitive,--all the regiment in line,--all by their colors and in order of battle, but many dead and wounded men. i am profoundly affected by the circumstance that you have seized such an occasion to show your regard for me. yes, beloved comrades, we are ready to expose and, if need be, to lay down our lives for our country. we will keep steadfastly to the work till this sad, terrible war is ended, and peace smiles again upon the land. my friends, i shall endeavor to be deserving of your magnificent testimonial of respect and affection. i accept it, not as my right, but as your free gift. i accept it most gratefully. god willing, that sword shall ever be borne by me in defense of my country's rights, and in the cause of god and humanity. the spurs, too, from my friends of the drum corps,--the boys who scour the battlefield and bring off the dead and wounded men,--i will wear in memory of your mission, and perhaps some day they may urge the fleet steed to your relief and assistance. friends, the thistle of your native land has stung our enemies, and been an omen of hope to our friends. it has been planted here, and glorious properties has it shown in this palmetto soil. in conclusion, permit me again to express my deep gratitude for these marks of your affection and esteem. the sword was an exceedingly handsome one. the blade was richly inlaid with gold, representing a highlander bearing the american flag, an ancient scottish soldier, and many scottish and patriotic devices and mottoes. the hilt represented the goddess of liberty; the guard was formed of the thistle, the emblem of scotland, and was studded with a large topaz surrounded by thirteen diamonds. the hilt and scabbard were heavily gilded, and the latter terminated in a tiger's head. there was also a plain steel scabbard bronzed, a general's yellow sash, and a red-and-gold belt. the spurs were also richly gilded, the shank and rowel representing the thistle, and were the gift of the drummer-boys. james island, june 26, 1862. my dearest wife,--general wright called down at my quarters last evening and took a look at my sword. he thought it a very splendid thing, and advises me to send it home as soon as possible. i hope those beautiful testimonials will reach you speedily and safely. i want my friends to see them. the sword is the most beautiful i ever saw. i have already sent you my reply to the address. it is thought here to be very appropriate. it was wholly unstudied, as i had not the least idea of what the address would be. hazard has worked very hard of late. did i write you that his conduct on the battlefield was witnessed by the rebels with great admiration? so say the rebel officers whom my officers met under a recent flag of truce. these officers say a great many shots were fired directly at him. every one in the division knows the officer they refer to, from the description of the officer and his horse, to be hazard. the boy did most nobly, and every one speaks in the highest terms of his conduct on the field of battle. was not his life wonderfully preserved? my own staff is considered a very excellent one. cottrell was not killed, but was wounded, and a prisoner in the hands of the enemy. lyons is getting on well with his wound. lyman arnold is dead. i particularly interested his brigade commander, colonel williams, and the surgeon, in his case, and i cannot doubt that every attention was paid to him. daniel lyman arnold, who has already been mentioned as a member of the northern pacific railroad exploration, with his brother, general richard arnold, was a cousin of mrs. stevens. he was a private in the 3d rhode island, and was mortally wounded in the battle, where he had shown great bravery. general stevens, with his son, visited the dying man soon after the battle, and did all in his power to make him comfortable. june 30. i wrote you three days ago that general hunter had given orders to evacuate this place. it is a large operation. the cavalry were got on board yesterday and last night, and started this morning for hilton head. we expect the transports back to-morrow, when general williams's division will be embarked. my own division will be embarked last. raymond rodgers came here to-day from the squadron at hilton head. he talked considerably about the 16th. he assured me that my conduct and management on that day is universally commended. indeed, i have good reason to believe that here in this department, both with the army and navy, it has very much increased my military reputation. no one but benham calls in question my perfect fidelity to my orders, and that the course i actually pursued alone gave, under his orders, the least promise of success. i moved with exceeding rapidity, without stopping to fire, and pushed in everything without reserve. the statement of the enemy shows how near the work came to falling into our hands. i know i could have seized that work with but little loss of life, and on that very day, had the entire management been mine. my own course with him after the battle was stern and determined. i _compelled_ him to modify his report so as to do my division full justice. i warned him that the entire responsibility of bringing on that fight was his, that i had opposed it, and that i should take no part of the responsibility. he wilted and quailed under my eye and speech. he made a second attempt to falsify the truth with me, and i made him quail again, and this was in the presence of witnesses. there has been a real comfort and satisfaction in serving under wright, which i have not had for a long time. he has shown very sound judgment in all his arrangements since he has been in command. williams, who commands the second division, is a very agreeable and sensible man, and is highly esteemed throughout the command. on benham's arrest general wright succeeded to the command as next in rank, and field-works to protect the camps were commenced, and considerable work done upon them, when general hunter wisely decided to withdraw from james island. general stevens brought off the last of the troops on july 4. he was first ordered to beaufort with his division, except the 7th connecticut and rockwell's battery, which were detached and landed at hilton head; but scarcely had they reached beaufort when--including the 50th pennsylvania, which rejoined the command--they were brought back to hilton head and debarked july 5, then reëmbarked july 9, and sent back to beaufort; then, without leaving the transports, they were dropped four miles down the beaufort river, and landed on smith's plantation, where the whole division was to be encamped. in the absence of wharves, all the baggage had to be put ashore in small boats. by great exertions this was accomplished, and the tents were up before dark, when orders were received to reëmbark immediately and proceed to hilton head, there to take ocean steamers for virginia. after a brief rest the harassed and wornout soldiers toiled the balance of the night, reëmbarking the camp equipage, baggage, and supplies. the troops were transferred to ocean steamers at hilton head on july 10 and 11, and on the 12th were borne away northward, rejoiced to leave a command marked by incompetence and disaster, and to rest after the useless toil to which they had been subjected. the point on beaufort river where general stevens's division landed is of especial interest as the site of the first european settlement in the united states, made by jean ribaut and a party of french huguenots in 1562, just three centuries before; and the walls of a small fort, constructed by him of coquina, a very hard and durable concrete of oyster-shells, were visible on the shore of and partly in the river, which had considerably undermined them. steamer vanderbilt, july 14, 1862. my dear wife,--we left hilton head at eight o'clock, yesterday morning. i was utterly worn out, and was very glad to go to bed. i slept twenty hours the first twenty-four i was on board, and to-day i have been very well rested. it is supposed our destination will be mcclellan's army. mcclellan has unquestionably met with a very serious check. indeed, it is nothing less than a disaster. his loss in men and material of war must have been immense. the plan of campaign of the potomac (army) has been a monstrous folly, and disaster is its legitimate fruit. the army should never have been divided, and the route should not have been by fortress monroe. i doubt whether any adequate plan will be hit upon to make the most of the present condition of things. i am afraid the confederates will by a rapid countermarch fall upon pope with overwhelming force. i think, so far as i can gather the facts, that pope should be largely reinforced, and that he should wage the campaign. it has also occurred to me that the wisest plan would be to withdraw mcclellan from his present position, send him to the potomac, unite him with pope, and commence anew. but it is useless to speculate. we shall reach fortress monroe to-morrow, where we will receive additional orders. [illustration: camp of general stevens's division at newport news] the transfer to virginia was the very movement that general stevens recommended to the president in a letter dated july 8, in which he wrote:- "in the district formerly commanded by sherman are some twenty-three regiments. eleven of these regiments are ample for the purpose i have mentioned. this will leave a full division of twelve regiments to reinforce our columns at points where the enemy is fighting with the energy of despair, and where its timely aid may bring to our arms the crowning victory of the war. "i earnestly desire this war to be prosecuted to a signal and speedy success. this department can well afford to wait. it is not the proper base for operations. we are, moreover, much too small for an advance, and much too large for simply holding the points we now occupy. let us simply hold these points. the crisis of the war is in virginia. there throw your troops. there signally defeat and destroy the enemy. you strike charleston and savannah by striking richmond. "send us, therefore, and send twelve of our regiments to virginia. let us have the satisfaction of sharing there the dangers, the privations, and the sacrifices of our companions in arms. let us feel that we are doing good service for our country, that we are really helping in the gravest contest of the war." after a smooth and pleasant voyage the command reached fortress monroe on the 16th, debarked at newport news, and went into camp on the level plain overlooking the broad expanse of water where james river enters hampton roads. general burnside had just arrived here with eight thousand troops from north carolina, and the ninth corps was organized from the two commands, general stevens's division forming the first and the north carolina troops the second and third divisions under generals jesse l. reno and john g. parke respectively, general burnside commanding the corps. general cullum, halleck's chief of staff, was at fortress monroe when general stevens arrived there, and had a long and confidential talk with his former brother officer and old friend in regard to the military situation. it is noteworthy that the very movements he mentioned as best in his letter to his wife were precisely the ones adopted immediately afterwards, viz., the withdrawal of mcclellan and reinforcement of pope. halleck, whose voice was then controlling in military councils in washington, was undoubtedly led to adopt, or strengthened in his own ideas by, the views of his former classmate and rival, whose ability and sound military judgment he fully appreciated. newport news, august 2, 1862. my dear wife,--i send by this mail sketches with brief letters to each of the girls. we go on board ship to-morrow. i am now satisfied there will be marked improvement in the general management of army matters. probably the moves now being made will take the country somewhat by surprise, but they are wise and absolutely necessary. before this reaches you our destination will be known, but i am not at liberty to speak of it. reno sets off about sundown this evening, parke will be off to-morrow, and myself the next day. [illustration: headquarters, newport news] chapter lv pope's campaign the military authorities having decided to throw burnside's troops up the rappahannock to reinforce pope, general stevens sailed from newport news on august 4, debarked at acquia creek on the 6th, and reached fredericksburg the same day. here two light batteries were added to the division, e, of the 2d united states artillery, under lieutenant s.n. benjamin, with four 20-pounder rifled parrotts and the 8th massachusetts battery, a new organization recently from home, enlisted for six months only. the division was divided into three brigades, the 8th michigan and 50th pennsylvania, under colonel b. c. christ, constituting the first brigade; the roundheads and 46th new york, under colonel leasure, the second; and the highlanders and 28th massachusetts, under colonel addison farnsworth, the third. colonel farnsworth was appointed colonel of the highlanders by the governor of new york, and joined his regiment at beaufort, but was absent on leave during the james island campaign, at the close of which he returned to it. lieutenant h.g. heffron was appointed aide in place of lieutenant lyons. starting from fredericksburg on the 13th, generals stevens's and reno's divisions, eight thousand strong, the latter as ranking officer in command, stripped of all baggage except shelter tents, marched up the north bank of the rappahannock, passing bealton station on the alexandria and orange court house railroad, crossed the river at rappahannock station, and joined pope at culpeper court house on the 15th. general stevens bivouacked three miles in front of that point, and on the following day was thrown forward to guard raccoon ford, on the rapidan river, which he held with a strong detachment, placing his division a mile and a half back in support. pope's bombastic orders, and his invitation to forage on the enemy, greatly increased straggling and relaxed discipline among his troops. general stevens ordered roll-calls at every halt, and at the end of every day's march; reports of stragglers made daily, and prompt and severe punishment inflicted upon such delinquents and upon plunderers, and sternly stopped the evil in its inception. the 46th new york, a german regiment, where even the commands at drill were given in german, loaded some of its supply-wagons with lager beer on leaving fredericksburg, leaving behind a good part of their rations, having some vague notion of living off the country. general stevens at once had all the lager thrown into the road, and the wagons sent back for the abandoned rations. the indignation of colonel rosa and his officers rose to such a pitch over this summary loss of their beloved beverage that they tendered their resignations in a body, with a grandiloquent letter from the colonel. but general stevens emphatically assured them that they must remain and do their duty as soldiers during the campaign, and took no further notice of their insubordinate and unsoldierly action. [illustration: virginia--potomac to rapidan river] on the 9th, only a week before the arrival of the two divisions of the ninth corps, the severe fight of cedar mountain occurred between banks's corps and jackson. the latter, although victor on the field by force of numbers, was so badly crippled that he withdrew behind the rapidan the second day after the battle. pope, on receiving these reinforcements, advanced to the line of that river, and general stevens held his extreme left, a cavalry picket only watching germanna ford, the next below raccoon. the army, officially known as the army of virginia, consisted of the corps of mcdowell, banks, and sigel, and numbered forty thousand effective. the ninth corps troops added eight thousand more, and heavy reinforcements from the army of the potomac were on their way, so that, if pope could only hold his ground a few days, both armies would be united in his advanced position. but lee, safely leaving mcclellan, with his great army, on the peninsula to his inaction, swiftly gathered his army opposite pope, and, crossing the river, advanced one wing under jackson to strike him on the left and rear, and the other, under longstreet, to attack him in front. pope gained timely notice of this move by a lucky cavalry reconnoissance, and withdrew to the rappahannock just in time to escape it. during the 17th, 18th, and 19th general stevens kept his officers busily engaged in what he termed "looking up the country," that is, in tracing out all the roads and by-roads, and studying the topography, defensive positions, and approaches. he always attached great importance to a thorough knowledge of the ground, and seized every opportunity to gain it. ordered, on the afternoon of the 19th, to move back his train immediately, and his troops at two in the morning, by way of stevensburg and barnett's ford on the rappahannock, general stevens started off the train at once, and at nine in the evening drew out his division three miles on the designated road, which runs parallel to the river for a considerable distance, and halted. by this movement he placed his whole force in position to defend the ford till the last moment, and all danger of being cut off by the sudden advance of the enemy was obviated. the column resumed the march in retreat at two a.m., reached stevensburg at daylight, where it was detained an hour by general reno's train, that officer with his division having already fallen back, and after a march of twenty-six miles crossed the rappahannock at barnett's ford, and went into bivouac at four p.m. that day the whole of pope's army fell back and took up the line of the rappahannock, the ninth corps on the left. at dusk on the evening of the 21st, leaving four companies of infantry and four light guns of the 8th massachusetts battery at the ford, and two companies at another ford a few miles higher up, general stevens marched eight miles up the river to kelly's ford, arriving at midnight, and a day after general reno. the next day he recrossed the river with two brigades in support of a cavalry reconnoissance by general buford. deploying the third brigade,--the highlanders and 28th massachusetts,--he drove back a considerable force of the enemy for more than a mile in a sharp action, and, after accomplishing all that was expected or desired, withdrew to the left bank. on the 2d both divisions continued moving up the river ten miles to rappahannock station, two regiments from each being left to guard kelly's ford. here were found the troops of mcdowell and banks. sigel was farther up the river, and his artillery was heard thundering in the distance all day. banks moved after him late in the afternoon. both armies were now moving up the rappahannock, but on opposite sides. lee, foiled in his bold onslaught by the timely retreat of his antagonist, and finding him strongly posted behind the river, was now pushing his columns up the right bank, seeking to cross it or to outflank and turn pope's right, and pope was carefully following his movement to head him off. on the 23d general stevens continued the march up the river, followed by reno's division. banks's troops and sigel's train were soon overtaken, blocking up the road; the march was continually interrupted and delayed by them, and after struggling forward over the muddy and slippery roads, pelted by a heavy, drenching rainstorm, until after midnight, having marched only four miles in eighteen hours, the tired and bedraggled troops were allowed to rest, or rather halt, by the roadside until morning. during the day the troops left at the lower fords rejoined the division, having been relieved by general reynolds's division, the first to arrive from the army of the potomac. on overtaking banks's corps, general stevens had a talk with that officer, who was quite lame from a recent fall, and looked thin and careworn. his troops had been sadly cut up at cedar mountain, and his regiments, with their scanty numbers, seemed reduced almost to the size of companies. all day sigel's guns were thundering up the river as though a pitched battle were raging, but, as afterwards appeared, he was wasting ammunition on skirmishers and single horsemen beyond the stream, while his enormous and ill-regulated wagon-train was keeping back the rest of the army. the march was resumed on the 24th, and sulphur springs reached late in the afternoon. general stevens, riding at the head of his column, was here met by general sigel, who requested him to take one of his (general stevens's) brigades and a battery, and destroy the bridge across the river at this point, which the enemy's sharpshooters were making very hot. astonished at such a request, a virtual acknowledgment of his own and his troops' inefficiency, general stevens nevertheless promptly set to work to comply with it, when the bridge was found to be in flames, having been fired by some of sigel's men. on this day's march, as the division was halting for a noon rest, and the soldiers were reclining on the ground in groups, or making their cups of coffee over little fires of fence rails, a party of rebel cavalry with a section of artillery appeared on a cross-road a mile distant and near the river, and a lively shower of shells suddenly fell over and among the resting troops. at this lieutenant benjamin very coolly and deliberately unlimbered and sighted one of his 20-pounders; the shell flew straight to the mark, fairly striking the annoying piece, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat at this single shot. the following morning, the 25th, general stevens continued marching up the river, and, on reaching waterloo bridge, was ordered to countermarch and proceed to warrenton. arrived here, passing mcdowell's corps bivouacked along the road, the division rested some hours, then marched for warrenton junction, and halted at midnight at a place known as eastern view, several miles from the junction, to which it moved the next day, the 26th. meantime the reinforcements were arriving from the army of the potomac. reynolds's division, 6000 strong, coming by way of acquia creek and the rappahannock, joined on the 23d and was attached to mcdowell's corps. by the same route two divisions of the fifth corps, under general fitz john porter, reached bealton on the 26th and the junction the next day. they numbered 9000 effective, and were commanded by generals george w. morell and george sykes respectively. on the 25th generals kearny's and hooker's divisions of the third corps, under general samuel p. heintzelman, numbering 10,000 effective, were brought out on the railroad from alexandria to the same place, warrenton junction. with these reinforcements, deducting losses and straggling, pope's strength was raised to 60,000. lee's army numbered,--longstreet, 30,000; jackson, 22,000; stuart's cavalry, 3000; total, 55,000.[19] on the 22d lee attempted a crossing near sulphur springs, and threw a heavy force of jackson's troops across the river; but the storm, and the sudden rise of the stream making the fords impassable, induced him to withdraw. thus baffled in his design of crossing at sulphur springs, and finding that point and waterloo bridge, four miles above, held in force by the union troops, and well knowing that pope's strength was increasing daily by reinforcements from the army of the potomac, lee now determined to push jackson completely around the right of the union army, turning it by a circuitous but rapid march, and throw him on the railroad in its rear, its sole line of supply, and to follow up the movement with the other wing under longstreet. accordingly, on the 24th jackson moved back from the river to jefferson, his troops being relieved by longstreet's; on the 25th marched by amissville and orleans to salem; and on the 26th continued his march through thoroughfare gap and gainesville to bristoe station, on the ill-fated line of communications, which he struck at dark, capturing some prisoners and two trains loaded with supplies. bristoe is only eight miles north of warrenton junction, about which so many union troops were grouped; and jackson, by his bold move, had thrown himself fairly upon the back of pope's army. without delay he dispatched a small force that night to manassas junction, five miles down the railroad, and eight guns, three hundred prisoners, and an immense quantity of stores fell into his hands. next morning, leaving ewell to hold back the union forces, he moved the other divisions to manassas, where they spent the day outfitting themselves from the captured stores. [illustration: positions, nine p.m., august 26, 1862.] when this blow fell, pope had his troops well in hand: mcdowell and sigel's corps grouped about warrenton; the four divisions of stevens, reno, kearny and hooker near warrenton junction; while porter at bealton and banks at fayetteville were within an easy march of the junction. pope, having made up his mind that the enemy would fall upon his right, was loath to believe that he had gotten into his rear in heavy force, but he embarked a regiment on a train of cars and sent it down the road towards bristoe that night to find out. this reconnoissance reported the enemy in force; but even yet pope was not convinced, still clinging to his opinion that his right, the line from warrenton to gainesville, was most exposed to lee's attack. therefore, instead of throwing upon bristoe, at daylight the next morning, the overwhelming force he had at hand near the junction, he sent only hooker's division down the railroad to brush away the supposed raiding party, moved the other three (stevens, reno, and kearny) to greenwich, and ordered mcdowell and sigel to gainesville; the former to take command of both corps, for he was not satisfied with sigel's dilatoriness in marching and obeying orders. [illustration: positions of troops, sunset, august 27, 1862.] hooker encountered ewell in front of bristoe, and, in a sharp action in the afternoon, pushed him across broad run, from which, after destroying the bridge, he retreated unmolested to manassas. as the result of hooker's fight, pope now knew that jackson with his whole corps was at bristoe that very morning, and had just marched--his rear division was even then marching--down the railroad to manassas. he supposed that longstreet was far to the westward, beyond supporting distance to jackson. confident that the great flanker was at last within his power, he issued vigorous orders for the morrow's movements, designed to throw his whole army upon him at manassas and crush him. to this end he ordered hooker to push down the railroad towards manassas; porter to hasten from warrenton junction to support hooker, starting at one in the morning; kearny to bristoe; and stevens and reno directly on manassas,--the three to move at daylight; mcdowell to advance his whole force from gainesville also on manassas, with sigel resting his right on the manassas gap railroad, and mcdowell's divisions following in echelon extended on his left, so that this great force would sweep a wide scope of country,--practically the whole region between the manassas gap railroad and the warrenton pike,--and would intercept jackson's retreat by that thoroughfare. this plan was well plotted to overwhelm the wolf at manassas, if the wolf would only wait there until the toils closed around him. a day, or even half a day, would suffice. but jackson was not the man to wait anywhere long enough to give his adversary the initiative. that night and early the next morning he moved to the field of bull run, and took up a position admirable for defense, and from which with equal facility he could attack any force moving along the pike, or fall back westward by good roads to meet longstreet, now rapidly approaching. it is a high, undulating country west of bull run upon which on june 21, 1861, and august 28, 29, and 30, 1862, were fought the battles of bull run, gainesville, and second bull run, or, as known to the confederates, bull run, groveton, and manassas. long, broad ridges stretch across the country, sloping down in successive rolls of ground to wide hollows. open fields cover two thirds of the surface of hill and dale, alternating with tracts of woods, which clothe the remaining third. these are of oak and other deciduous trees, and are tolerably open and free from underbrush. the alexandria and warrenton pike, running nearly west (west 15° south), bisects the field, and was the most important line of communication upon it. crossing bull run by a stone bridge, the pike follows up the valley of a tributary, young's branch, gently and gradually ascending for two miles, and then passes over several ridges and high ground on to gainesville, five miles farther. young's branch has worn a deep and narrow valley through the first ridge, a mile from the stone bridge, and to the traveler passing up the pike the abutting ends of the ridge present the appearance of quite steep and high hills. the first hill on the left, separated from the next by a hollow down which a dirt road descends, is the henry hill, the scene of the fiercest fighting of the first battle, where bee and bartow, the southern generals, fell, and where ricketts and his gallant battery were all but destroyed and were captured. the next hill is the chinn house, termed in some of the reports the bald hill. opposite these, and on the right or north side of the road, are buck hill and rosefield or dogan house. the tops of these hills are not peaked but flat, being simply the general level of the plateau or ridge. another road scarcely less important crosses the field at right angles to the pike, nearly on the line of this first ridge, passing between the henry and chinn hills, and buck hill and rosefield. this is the manassas and sudley road. from manassas junction, six miles to the south on the alexandria and orange court house railroad, it runs in a northerly direction to and over the plateau on the south part of the field, descends by the lateral hollow to young's branch, where it crosses the pike, and, climbing up the end of the ridge on the north, continues in the same general direction over two miles to sudley ford across bull run. another road from the south crosses the pike at a point two and a half miles beyond the stone bridge, known as groveton, and marked by two houses and some outbuildings. this road, running north, descends down a hollow from the plateau on the south, crosses the pike at groveton, passes across low or flat ground for half a mile, enters a tract of woods, and extends through them to sudley ford. one of the most important features of the second battle was a section of railroad grade about two miles in length, which extended from the run near sudley church nearly parallel to the groveton road for a mile and a half, traversing thickly wooded but level ground with shallow cuts and low embankments; then, curving westward away from the road and emerging from the woods into the open, it crossed a hollow on an embankment, which at one place was ten feet high, and bore away on its course to gainesville. standing at rosefield, the eye of the observer sweeps westward or frontward over a broad expanse of open country, descending to the lower ground crossed by the groveton road, and beyond it, over the rising slopes and summit of a bare, high ridge two miles and a half distant, a ridge much higher than the one on which he stands, and the dominating feature of the landscape. to the right, or northward, open fields extend nearly a mile, but to the right front is seen the extensive tract of woods in which is concealed the railroad grade, and which covers the broad flat between the two ridges. to the left or southward, across the narrow valley of young's branch, appear the steep henry and bald hills, really the verge of the plateau. they are bare of trees. but farther to the west, the left front, a tract of woods, from two to three hundred yards back from the pike, clothes the plateau. on the south side the ground slopes up sharply from the branch and extends southward in a broad, high plateau, while on the north side of the pike the ground is much lower, extending, as already described, to the groveton road. bull run bounds the field on the east and northeast, and can be readily crossed by several fords as well as by the stone bridge. among them are sudley ford, over three miles above the bridge; lock's or red house ford, half way between these points; blackburn's ford, four miles below; one a short distance above, and another alongside the bridge. it was thursday, august 28, 1862, that the first rays of the rising sun, falling athwart the cloudless skies and warm but balmy air of a southern summer morning, revealed an animated scene,--throngs of gray-coated, slouch-hatted men, yet with many a blue-coated one intermingled, clustering thickly along the sudley road near the pike, some of them resting outspread upon the grass, others boiling tin cups of coffee and roasting ears of field-corn over tiny fires of fence rails; long lines of stacked muskets with bayonets glittering in the sun; guns and wagons blocking the roads, while their teams of horses and mules were drinking from the little rivulet, or munching their feed from the wagon-boxes. travel-stained, gaunt, and unkempt were these men, but their alert bearing, and ready joke and laugh, told of unbroken strength and confidence. they were jackson's old division, now commanded by general william b. taliaferro. among them was the brigade that a twelvemonth before won on yonder hill the proud sobriquet of "stonewall." in high glee and spirits, they recounted and gloated over the incidents of the previous day, how, marching swiftly clear around the flank of the union army, they struck the railroad in rear and almost in midst of its extended columns, capturing guns, men, and immense stores of military supplies at manassas junction; how, after loading themselves with all they could carry and burning the rest, they left the junction at midnight, and after a short march were now regaling themselves with captured yankee rations upon the scene of the first yankee defeat. soon the command, "fall in," is passed along, and, resuming the arms and packs, the dusty column continues its march. one brigade, under colonel bradley t. johnson, moves up the pike to groveton, where it takes post with pickets well out towards gainesville and the road leading southward; while the remainder of the division streams along the sudley road nearly to sudley church, where, turning to the left and crossing the railroad grade, it again comes to a halt in the woods beyond it. scarcely had these troops cleared the road when another motley column came crossing bull run by the pike and swinging up it at a rapid gait, and they, too, followed the others down the sudley road and into the woods across the railroad. these were general richard s. ewell's division of jackson's corps, which left the junction at daylight, crossed bull run by blackburn's ford, marched up the left or east bank across the fields, and recrossed by the stone bridge. and still another column, general a.p. hill's light division of the same corps, came marching up from centreville an hour later, following ewell up the pike and along the sudley road, and also disappeared in the woods beyond the railroad. thus, soon after noon, jackson had his whole corps of 20,000 effective men united, and hidden in the woods behind the railroad with his train parked at sudley, one brigade advanced to groveton watching the roads west and south, and general j. e.b. stuart with his cavalry guarding bull run bridge and fords and the sudley road half way to manassas. now, leaving jackson's "foot-cavalry," as his men delighted to call themselves, resting under the oaks, the narration of the movements of the union army is continued, in order clearly to understand the bloody and fruitless battles then impending. pope's right wing, as it may be termed, moved on the 28th as ordered; reached manassas about noon, only to find the smoking ruins of jackson's destructive visit; continued towards centreville, and bivouacked for the night,--kearny at that point, stevens, reno, and hooker near blackburn's ford. porter came up to bristoe. truly a sluggish advance, but pope was placing his chief reliance upon his left wing, under mcdowell, which he expected to sweep up from gainesville and head off jackson on the west and north, while he assailed him on the south with his right. the complete and ignominious fiasco which mcdowell and sigel contrived to make of this movement is one of the strangest and most discreditable episodes of this unhappy campaign. the previous day (27th) sigel had not moved his whole corps to gainesville as ordered, but only the head of his column, the main body of which was stretched back along the pike towards warrenton. the divisions of reynolds, king, and ricketts, of mcdowell's corps, in the order named, extended the column in rear of sigel still farther. moreover, the road was incumbered by sigel's train of two hundred wagons, which he kept with the troops, although ordered to send them to catlett's station, on the alexandria and orange court house railroad, where all the trains were to assemble under guard of banks. although ordered to move at daylight on manassas, resting his right on the manassas gap railroad, and to be supported by mcdowell's corps in echelon on his left, sigel made a late start, and at 7.30 was halting at gainesville, his troops building fires to cook breakfast and blocking up the road, and finally, claiming that his orders were to rest his right flank on the alexandria and orange court house railroad, sheered off to the right after passing gainesville, keeping on the right of the manassas gap railroad, upon the left of which his orders explicitly directed him to advance, and in the afternoon reached the vicinity of the junction. from this point, after a start for centreville and countermarch, he moved down the sudley road to the pike, which the head of his column reached at dark. but he still held on to his train. reynolds, although greatly impeded by sigel's troops and wagons, forced his way past them, passed gainesville, and moved down the pike towards groveton, in order to gain his required position upon sigel's left. approaching groveton about ten a.m., he flushed jackson's advanced brigade,--bradley johnson's,--and deployed and pushed forward his leading brigade, under general george g. meade. but johnson drew back into the woods on the west, concealing his troops; and reynolds supposed that the enemy was a mere scouting party, and sheered off in turn from the pike to the right in order to follow sigel as ordered. after a laborious march across country on the left of the manassas gap railroad, he came out in sight of manassas, and thence, moving by the sudley road, he reached the vicinity of the pike and bivouacked near the chinn house, still on the left of sigel. thus these commands spent the whole day in laboriously marching clear around the circle from a point just west of groveton to a point on the same pike a mile east of it, marching fifteen miles to gain two! general buford, with his cavalry, by a bold reconnoissance developed longstreet's column at salem on the 27th. mcdowell, therefore, wisely modified the order to move his whole force on manassas by directing his rear division under ricketts, starting at one a.m., to move across from new baltimore to haymarket, thence to thoroughfare gap, and hold longstreet in check. ricketts was greatly delayed by the wagons and troops blocking the road ahead of him, but reached the vicinity of the gap at three p.m. to find the enemy already in possession of it. but deploying in position, and opening with artillery, he maintained a resolute stand, holding him in check until dark, when he retreated to gainesville. king, next to reynolds in the column, was so long delayed that he was five hours later in reaching the point near groveton, where the former caught a glimpse of bradley johnson's brigade. he was ordered to march down the pike to centreville. the leading brigade under hatch had passed this point, and the next brigade under gibbon had just reached it, when his column was subjected to artillery fire from batteries which suddenly appeared north of the road. deploying and advancing to drive them off, gibbon came face to face with extended lines of infantry advancing upon him in battle order, and one of the most stubborn fights of the war took place. it was jackson who, after lurking in his wooded lair all the afternoon, watching the heavy masses of union troops passing down the pike, and successively sheering off near groveton and marching away in the direction of manassas, now pushed forward the divisions of ewell and taliaferro and attacked king's column. the field was a high, level, open plain, without any cover except a small patch of woods and an orchard and some farm buildings. reports taliaferro:- "here one of the most terrific conflicts that can be conceived of occurred. our troops held the farmhouse and one edge of the orchard, while the enemy held the orchard and inclosure next the turnpike. for two hours and a half, without an instant's cessation of the most deadly discharges of musketry, roundshot, and shell, both lines stood unmoved, neither advancing and neither broken or yielding, until at last, about nine o'clock at night, the enemy slowly and sullenly fell back, and yielded the field to our victorious troops." this fierce conflict was sustained by gibbon's brigade of four regiments, two regiments of doubleday's brigade, and campbell's battery, alone and without help from the remainder of king's division. general gibbon, after an hour and a half of this terrible struggle, finding himself far outnumbered and outflanked on the left, ordered his line to fall back, which was done in good order. his pickets occupied the ground and collected the wounded. the enemy seems to have also drawn back to care for the wounded and reorganize, for jackson's report contains this significant statement: "the next morning (29th) i found he had abandoned the ground occupied as the battlefield the evening before." it is incontestable that gibbon's small force--six regiments and one battery--thus gloriously sustained the attack of five brigades of infantry and three batteries of artillery under jackson's own direction. the loss was about eight hundred on each side. ewell and taliaferro were both severely wounded, the former losing a leg. during the battle general reynolds rode to the field from his bivouac, and aided gibbon in calling for support. general ricketts reached gainesville with his division just as the fight was over, having retreated from holding longstreet in check. thus at nine o'clock that night, thursday, august 28, ricketts and king held the pike from gainesville to groveton. reynolds was in touch with king, being a short distance east of groveton, sigel next to him; while pope's right wing was in the positions already stated, the ninth and heintzelman's corps between blackburn's ford and centreville, porter east of, banks at bristoe. thus pope's army was well positioned for a determined attack upon jackson the first thing the next morning by mcdowell and sigel, with the right coming up early to support. such an attack should have beaten jackson, if he accepted battle, but he could readily decline an unequal struggle by drawing back to haymarket and uniting with longstreet's columns. and it is clear that pope's only chance of "bagging" or beating jackson was lost on the 28th by the dilatory, disconnected, and purposeless marches of mcdowell's wing. [illustration: conclusion of gibbon's fight. positions, nine p.m., august 28, 1862; excepting jackson's, which is that occupied by him during the 28th, 29th, and 30th.] but whatever advantage might have been gained from gibbon's stanch fight was speedily thrown away by king's decision to abandon the ground, and that, too, after assuring general ricketts, as that officer states, that he would hold on. at midnight he retreated to manassas, and general ricketts retreated to bristoe. both marched away from the enemy, and by daylight their troops, exhausted and discouraged by being marched day and night and made to shun the enemy, were strung out along the dusty roads ten miles from where they were needed, while lee's right wing was swiftly marching to join jackson, which nothing could now prevent. something may be said in palliation of this retreat. the enemy held the ground in front of king, and might be expected to renew the battle in the morning. the advance of longstreet was through the gap and in contact with ricketts, and only five miles distant, the afternoon before. it was to be expected that the confederate leader would lose no time in pushing on to join jackson, and he might move up during the night, and fall upon the two union divisions with his whole force--thirty thousand men--at daylight. "no superior general officer was in the vicinity with the requisite knowledge and authority to order up troops," etc., says gibbon. but why they did not retreat down the pike, where were reynolds and sigel close at hand, and by which king was ordered to move, is indeed incomprehensible. the chief responsibility for the series of blunders which rendered abortive the movements of the left wing clearly rests upon mcdowell, its commander. his was the nerveless command that failed to make sigel march when and whither ordered; his the sluggish movements that left his troops strung along the pike nearly to warrenton, instead of concentrating them about gainesville on the 27th; his the mistaken judgment that kept him from hastening in person that night to gainesville, the key-point to his whole movement, and, worse yet, that led him to gallop off to consult with pope the next day instead of remaining with his command, keeping his divisions in hand, and pushing them vigorously eastward along the railroad and the pike until he developed jackson's position. but mcdowell was constantly conferred with and depended upon by pope, and had too much upon his mind the task of manoeuvring the whole army. during the day (28th) pope was in a state of great uncertainty as to jackson's movements, but late at night, learning of gibbon's battle, he concluded that jackson, while retreating up the pike, had been headed off and stopped by mcdowell's troops, and his hopes revived. he issued his orders accordingly,--kearny to move at one o'clock at night, even if he carries no more than two thousand men, and to advance up the turnpike; hooker to march at three a.m., even if he shall have to do so with only half his men; the ninth corps, also, all up the pike; sigel and reynolds are to attack at earliest dawn; porter to hasten forward to centreville. footnotes: [19] john c. ropes, _army under pope_, pp. 193-199, gives pope 71,000; lee, 54,268. general longstreet, _manassas to appomattox_, gives pope 54,500; lee, 53,000. colonel william allen, _army of northern virginia_, puts "lee's strength at 47,000 to 55,000; say over 50,000." chapter lvi the second battle of bull run early in the morning of friday, the 28th, jackson moved back behind the railroad grade, extended his lines, and took up his defensive position, extending from near sudley church along and in rear of the railroad to the high ground north of the pike, opposite to, or just north of, the battle-ground of the previous evening, curving his right to present a somewhat convex front towards the pike. ewell's division, now under general a.r. lawton, held the right, hill's the left, and jackson's, under general william e. starke, the centre; hill and starke were in the woods. a battery was placed on the high ground in front of the right, and between it and the pike, and two regiments of infantry, 13th and 35th virginia, were thrown across the pike into the woods on the south side of it. other batteries were planted on the high "stony ridge" in rear of the main line. secure in this position he calmly awaits events, knowing that a few hours will bring longstreet on his right. [illustration: second battle of bull run, august 29, 1862, at noon except attacks on right, 4 to 5.30 p.m., as indicated] sigel's troops are now pushing forward from the vicinity of henry and chinn hills. schurz's division, with milroy's independent brigade on its left, advances to the right across the pike, and, wheeling to the left, crosses the sudley road and enters the woods which cover and screen jackson's left and centre, with sharp fighting pushes back his skirmishers, seizes part of the railroad, and develops the enemy's position there. on the left of the pike schenck's division advances, with its right on the pike and reynolds's division on its left. schenck's batteries take position on the ridges on each side of the pike near groveton, and keep up a long-range cannonade with the enemy's guns on the high ridge in front; while the infantry slowly works forward, unopposed except by artillery fire, to that point. reynolds also moves forward, swinging to the right, and driving back the two virginia regiments, until he reaches the pike half a mile or more beyond groveton, where gibbon's battle began, and there finds the union dead and wounded abandoned when king fell back the previous night. his line is formed along the road, facing north, and a short advance over the high ground will throw him on jackson's extreme right. one of schenck's brigades, stahel's, is on his right; the other, mclean's, is in rear, or south of stahel, and in the woods. it is now about ten a.m. it has taken four hours for schurz to develop the enemy's left and centre, and for schenck and reynolds to advance a mile and a half over an easy country and push back a handful of skirmishers; and they have not yet located jackson's right, although they have gained a good position from which to attack it. their movement diverged from that of schurz, and opened an interval in the line between milroy and stahel. the ground between them, indeed, was the open country on the right of the pike, commanded by their batteries, and the forward movement northward of the troops of reynolds would soon have closed the gap. but milroy was calling on sigel for support, and for troops to fill the gap on his left. schurz was also asking aid, and to meet their calls stahel was hastily moved by the right flank across the fields towards milroy. reynolds was not informed of this movement, but, discovering that the troops on his right had disappeared, and supposing that the whole of schenck's division had moved away, and observing a force of the enemy approaching his left, which was entirely in air, he immediately swung his division back, recrossed the groveton road, and, finding mclean's brigade in the woods, took position on its left with his line refused somewhat. it was longstreet's leading division under hood just reaching the field that reynolds observed, and it was probably well for him that he moved back so promptly. now the troops of the right wing are reaching the field. first kearny, who moves across country north of the pike with poe's brigade pushing back the enemy's cavalry and skirmishers along bull run, and comes up against jackson's extreme left, and on the right of schurz. then stevens's division marches up the pike to the crossing of the sudley road, where sigel is receiving schurz's and milroy's cries for aid, and listening to the thunder of his guns shelling the batteries of the enemy, with the fervid imagination of a war correspondent. sigel, with the consent of reno, as he claims, immediately scatters this fine division, sending one brigade to schurz, another to milroy, and the third, with benjamin's battery, e, of the 2d artillery, up the pike to schenck. reno's division, which next arrived, was dissipated in like manner, nagle's brigade being sent to support schurz, while the other with the artillery was placed in reserve on the ridge in rear of the sudley road. hooker's division on its arrival was also divided, grover's brigade being sent to support schurz; and afterwards carr's brigade was put on the front line, relieving part of schurz's force, and was in turn relieved by hooker's remaining brigade, under general nelson taylor. it was not an uncommon thing during the war, as many an officer knows from dear-bought experience, for commanders of troops in action to beseech support, usually claiming that they were out of ammunition, or their flanks were being turned, and, when the reinforcements reached them, to put the new-comers into the front line and withdraw their own troops to the rear. this was what sigel did with the divisions of the right wing as they reached the field. thus these fine troops, second to none in condition, discipline, and _morale_, which, led by their own generals and thrown in mass upon the enemy, would have struck a mighty blow, were frittered away over the field, simply relieving other troops, and adding but little to the extent or strength of the battle line. schurz, ever mightier with the pen than the sword, evinced a marvelous capacity to absorb reinforcements. and sigel, having demonstrated his talents as a strategist and a marcher the previous day, now proved his ability on the battlefield by so scattering the seventeen thousand troops of the right wing as to deprive them of their own able and tried commanders, and reduce them to the least possible weight upon the fighting line. his division being thus scattered, general stevens led up the pike the brigade which was to reinforce schenck. this consisted of only a regiment and a half,--the 100th pennsylvania and five companies of the 46th new york, the other five companies being detached to guard trains,--and benjamin's battery of four 20-pounder rifled parrotts. approaching groveton, two batteries on the right of the road, on the low ridge overlooking the hamlet, were exchanging shell-fire at long range with the enemy's batteries on the high ridge a mile in front. save this, no enemy was visible in that vicinity. the little column was moving without skirmishers in front, for it was said that our troops held the ground beyond groveton, the battery first, followed by the infantry in marching column of fours. the general and staff had reached the cross-road, the battery was descending the slope in the road, which here ran in quite a cut gullied out by rains and wear, when an extended line of gray-coated skirmishers emerged over the crest of the opposite ridge, two hundred yards distant, and, catching sight of the group of horsemen and the battery, quickly began firing upon them. it was impossible to turn the guns either to right or left out of the sunken road in which they were imprisoned; but benjamin coolly led his battery thirty yards forward to where the banks were lower, the skirmishers coming nearer and their fire sharper every minute, then turned the leading team short to the left; the drivers plied the whip, the horses leaped up the steep bank, and with a sudden pull jerked the gun out of the cut. and piece after piece followed to the same point, and was extricated in like manner, and then, remounting the ridge, whirled into battery on the left of the road and opened fire. while benjamin was thus extricating his guns, five companies of the 100th pennsylvania dashed forward at double-quick, deploying as skirmishers across the cross-road, drove the enemy's skirmishers back behind their ridge, and held their ground until withdrawn four hours later. the two half regiments were placed in line on the reverse slope of the ridge in rear and to the left of the guns. a short distance on the left were the woods, and in the edge rested the right of mclean's brigade. it was the skirmishers of hood's division that so nearly caught benjamin's guns. they were pushed out to feel and locate the union position promptly after reynolds drew back. longstreet's wing was fast arriving, and by noon four of his divisions were in position,--hood across the pike, kemper on his right, jones still farther on their right, extending to the manassas gap railroad, evans's independent brigade in support of hood, and wilcox's division also supporting him on his left and rear. two batteries of the washington artillery took post on the high ridge with jackson's guns and added their fire. with these additional batteries the artillery firing waxed heavier, and soon twenty hostile guns were hurling a storm of missiles upon the union artillery at groveton. after an hour's firing schenck's batteries on the right of the road, dilger and wiedrich, went to the rear, out of ammunition, and for three long hours benjamin was left to sustain unaided this storm of shot and shell. but benjamin could plant his heavy, long-range shells with wonderful accuracy. he concentrated his fire on one battery, and ere long a caisson was seen to blow up on the distant ridge, and it ceased firing. again and again he would concentrate on a battery and silence it, but only to have the others redouble their fire, and when he turned on them the first would reopen. at length two of his guns were disabled, and nearly half his men were killed or wounded. now, at two p.m., schenck concluded that he "was too far out," because reynolds had refused his line on the left, and he could get no fresh artillery to continue the duel on the pike. sigel says that he sent him an order to retire, but that schenck anticipated it, so the discredit of the move belongs to both of them. by order of general schenck, general stevens drew in his skirmishers and moved back down the pike, placing benjamin's two guns on an eminence of the chinn hill, and his two regiments on the right of the road in advance of the rosefield house. schenck and reynolds moved back abreast to the western slope of the chinn hill. thus, in this sequence of withdrawals, it will be seen that after schenck and reynolds had gotten in position to strike jackson's right, although too late to do so without danger of longstreet's advance falling upon their flank, schenck sent off stahel's brigade at milroy's calls. reynolds then moved back, because schenck had retired and left him unsupported, as he supposed, and also because his left was threatened by longstreet's advance; and schenck in turn moved back because reynolds had withdrawn, although the latter had only refused his line, which, situated in open ground with the enemy in force in his front, was the right thing for him to do. our guns at groveton could see along and flank the front of the union line on the right as far as the railroad, and their thunder encouraged the troops on that wing, and deterred the enemy from aggressive movements which would subject them to an enfilade fire of artillery. the position was in truth a key-point, not only commanding the lower ground to the right, but also affording good ground upon which to receive an attack, or from which to advance, and, moreover, it covered the roads southward, by which porter's troops, as will be seen presently, were expected to join the army. the drawing back of our guns and troops from groveton was the signal for jackson's lines to push forward more aggressively. milroy was roughly handled and forced back. it was general stevens's third brigade, under colonel addison farnsworth, that was sent to support schurz, and was posted on the front line along the railroad, next to schimmelfennig's brigade. part of this brigade, on farnsworth's left, broke at the advance of the enemy, and fell back through the woods, but the highlanders and faugh-a-ballaghs stood firm and repulsed the attack. soon afterwards the fugitives, having reformed, moved up in line from the rear, and began firing into the backs of the troops who had stood their ground, mistaking them for the enemy; but this was speedily stopped, and they were again placed on the line. the experience of the first brigade was equally unsatisfactory. placed in the first line, they were left to bear the brunt of the fighting on milroy's front, and were finally obliged to fall back by the giving way of troops on their flanks. general pope arrived on the field about noon, and made his headquarters in rear of the sudley road, near buck hill. although he declares in his report that he refused sigel's demands for reinforcements, it is clear beyond doubt that he neither put a stop to the wasteful scattering of his best troops, nor attempted to unite and bring them together as a disposable force of weight for offensive movements. all the afternoon he was expecting porter's and mcdowell's column to fall upon jackson's right and rear, for he had worked himself up to the belief that longstreet would not be up for another day, and nothing short of disastrous defeat could shake his dogged belief. on receiving news of king's and ricketts's retreat from gainesville and groveton, which he did about daylight, general pope ordered porter to march upon gainesville with his own corps and king's division. "i am following the enemy down the warrenton turnpike," he adds. "be expeditious, or we will lose much." and later he dispatched a joint order to mcdowell and porter to the same effect:- "you will please move forward with your joint commands toward gainesville.... heintzelman, sigel, and reno are moving on the warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from gainesville. i desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your own, the whole command shall halt.... one thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach bull run to-night or by daylight." porter had already passed manassas on his way to centreville when he received the first order, but immediately countermarched to the junction and towards gainesville as ordered, with morell's division leading, sykes's next, then piatt's brigade, and king following in rear. about eleven o'clock the head of the column reached dawkins branch, an insignificant brook four and a half miles from gainesville, and two and a half miles south of groveton. here the enemy was perceived, and skirmishers were thrown across the creek, supported by butterfield's brigade; and porter was forming to advance on the enemy, when general mcdowell joined him, and showed a dispatch from buford as follows:- "headquarters cavalry brigade, 9.30 a.m. seventeen regiments, one battery, and five hundred cavalry passed through gainesville three quarters of an hour ago on the centreville road." the presence of the enemy in front, and clouds of dust rising along the roads in his rear, corroborated this dispatch. so, too, did the noise of the artillery combat at groveton. the two generals rode together through the woods to the right as far as the manassas gap railroad, but decided that it was "impracticable" to move northward a mile and a half across country to effect a junction with the right wing. mcdowell then left porter, telling him that he would take king's division around by the sudley road and put it in between porter and the right wing. except for some slight changes in position of the head of his column, porter remained inactive the rest of the day, with his rear stretching back two and a half miles along the road. what befell king's division, under mcdowell's guidance, will be seen later. unquestionably, longstreet was up and in position in time to resist the attack of mcdowell and porter, had they made one. and a board of three officers of great reputation and experience,--generals schofield, terry, and getty,--after a thorough examination, has declared that such an attack would have been ill advised, has applauded porter's conduct, and pronounced the opinion that his presence there that day saved the army from disaster. nevertheless, the fact remains that this great column of over twenty thousand troops was kept out of the ring completely. the orders given and objects to be gained were perfectly plain and simple. they were, first, to fall upon the enemy, supposed to be jackson, and, second, to effect a junction with the right wing. mcdowell and porter did neither. granting that an attack was ill judged, why was not a brigade brought up and deployed athwart the railroad, and a regiment pushed through the woods northward to locate and connect with the force on the pike, whose artillery was distinctly heard? traversing only three quarters of a mile of intervening woods, such a column would have reached open fields, and come in sight of reynolds's troops. but, more surprising still, why was no one sent up the roads which fork both from the road and railroad only half a mile back of the head of porter's column, traverse the woods in a northerly direction, and lead to groveton? a staff officer sent up this road would have come in sight of reynolds's skirmishers in a ride of only a mile. unable longer to control his impatience, general pope began about four p.m. sending peremptory orders to attack, first to one command, then to another, as he could get hold of them, accompanying the orders with assurances that the enemy was being driven by some other command, and that porter was about to fall, or was falling, on his flank and rear, and using him up. the first victim of this plan of beating a corps in strong position by attacking it with a brigade at a time was general cuvier grover's brigade, first of hooker's division, comprising five regiments,--1st, 11th, and 16th massachusetts, 2d new hampshire, and 26th pennsylvania,--which was already supporting schurz. with muskets loaded and bayonets fixed, ordered to close on the enemy, fire one volley, and charge with the bayonet, they struck him where the railroad emerged from the woods and crossed the hollow on an embankment, broke the first line, carried the embankment, swept eighty yards beyond it and broke a second line, only to be forced back by overpowering numbers, with a loss of four hundred and eighty-six, for this gallant charge was entirely unsupported. reports general grover:- "we rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a short, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed muskets. many of the enemy were bayoneted in their tracks, others struck down with the butts of pieces, and onward pressed our line. in a few yards more it met a terrible fire from a second line, which in its turn broke. the enemy's third line now bore down upon our thinned ranks in close order, and swept back the right centre and a portion of the left. with the gallant 16th massachusetts on our left i tried to turn his flank, but the breaking of our right and centre and the weight of the enemy's lines caused the necessity of falling back, first to the embankment and then to our first position, behind which we rallied to our colors." one is not surprised to find the following in the report of colonel william blaisdell, 11th massachusetts:- "i was greatly amazed to find that the regiment had been sent to engage a force of more than five times its numbers, strongly posted in thick woods and behind heavy embankments, and not a soldier to support it in case of disaster." hooker's third brigade, under colonel joseph b. carr, earlier in the day had relieved part of schurz's troops, and after, as he reports, fighting two hours and expending most of his ammunition, was in turn relieved by the second brigade, under general nelson taylor. when grover was driven back, taylor's left regiment was broken by the rush of fugitives; the enemy poured through the gap, giving an enfilade and reverse fire, and taking many prisoners, among them general taylor's aides, lieutenants tremain and dwight. "finding my line," says taylor, "completely flanked and turned, and in danger of being entirely cut off, i gave the order to fall back, which was done in as good order as could be, situated as we were. the loss on this occasion was not as large as i had reason to apprehend, yet it was considerable." scarce had these broken troops emerged from the woods and reformed in the open ground in rear, when general reno led up his first brigade, under colonel james nagle, to a second attack on the same position from which grover had been repulsed. this consisted of only three regiments,--48th pennsylvania, 6th new hampshire, and 2d maryland. this also was a gallant and determined assault. again the enemy was forced back from the railroad, but again his rear lines rushed forward, flanked nagle on the left, and drove him back with a loss of five hundred and thirty-one. kearny was holding the right with robinson's brigade, while poe's brigade was guarding his right flank, with his skirmishers extending to and across bull run, and birney's brigade was supporting both. now, after the crash of musketry of reno's attack had all died away, and his troops were all out of the woods, kearny makes his attack. reinforcing robinson with one of poe's and four of birney's regiments, and throwing forward his right, wheeling to the left until his lines are nearly athwart the railroad, he charges along it to the left, driving the enemy in great disorder. but his attacking force lacks weight; the charge comes to a stand. they are assailed by two brigades from ewell, those of lawton and early, outflanked, overpowered, and are forced back to the position from which they started; many of them, however, in broken and disordered crowds, run out of the woods farther to the left, near the same place where appeared hooker's and reno's fugitives so recently. eight regiments only out of kearny's fifteen make this attack. his loss was about six hundred. nothing but the timely counter-charge of lawton and early saved hill. the rattle of musketry is still echoing in the forest, and kearny's fugitives are pouring out upon the open, when an officer in hot haste conveys pope's order to general stevens to advance into the woods and attack. the only troops left him are the regiment and a half withdrawn from groveton, only seven hundred strong. without an instant's delay, the troops take their muskets from the stacks, double-quick across the open ground, and form line at the edge of the woods. kearny himself rides over to the little force just forming, and, at his request, captain stevens stops a moment to write an order or message for him, for he has but one arm. the scanty line enters and sweeps through the woods, encounters the enemy now holding the railroad, delivers and receives for fifteen minutes, which seem hours, a heavy musketry fire, and then, with the enemy swarming past both flanks, is forced back through the woods to the open ground, where the men at once halt and reform. both the regimental commanders and colonel leasure, commanding the brigade, were severely wounded, and the loss was about two hundred. general stevens's horse was shot under him, and also that of his orderly. it was remarked that when his troops emerged out of the woods, almost the last one was a short man in a general's uniform, followed by a tall orderly bearing a saddle on his shoulder. with this attack the fighting on the right came to an end for the day. the possession of the woods along the railroad was relinquished to the enemy. a strong skirmish line held the edge of, and to the right a good part of, the timber. the troops were posted in rear in good positions for the night, the scattered commands being collected. general stevens's brigades were gotten together after some search, and the division was posted in the woods a quarter of a mile to the right and a little to the rear of the place where leasure's brigade formed for the attack. the following incident, which illustrates the evil effects of scattering commands, is related in the history of the 79th highlanders by captain william t. lusk, one of the general's aides:- "i was directed to find farnsworth; was sent by sigel to schurz, and by schurz to schimmelfennig. the gallant german, when at last found, exclaimed, 'mein gott! de troops, dey all runned avay, and i guess your men runned avay, too!' general stevens was indignant, and used some pretty strong language, when i carried back this report, and ordered me to find the missing regiments, and not to return until i brought them with me. i started, therefore, for the old railroad embankment. luckily, i found farnsworth just on the edge of the woods. he said he was waiting for orders, but had none since i left him in the morning." but the day was not to close without one more useless slaughter of brave troops. mcdowell brought king's division along the sudley road nearly to the pike, by half past four, passing without notice, at newmarket, the old warrenton turnpike, which here forked from the sudley road and led to the unoccupied gap between porter and reynolds, to the very position where he told porter he would put king. pope first directed the division over to the right, where his attacks by detachments were being so disastrously repulsed, and finally, just as it reached the pike, ordered mcdowell to push it up the road in pursuit of the enemy, declaring that he was in full retreat. mcdowell gave the order and the encouragement. gibbon's brigade, which had suffered so severely in the fight the previous night, was placed in support of batteries on the rosefield ridge. the other three brigades, under hatch (king being sick), fired by the lying promises of success, which were strengthened by the tremendous outbursts of musketry and roar of guns on the right wing, where they were told jackson was being driven, hastened up the road with high hopes. near groveton, about dusk, they deployed,--hatch's brigade on the right of the road, doubleday on the left, patrick in reserve,--and pushed on with great confidence. but longstreet, who all the afternoon had held his hand, notwithstanding lee's wish to attack, was at that very moment advancing hood's division, supported by evans's brigade and wilcox's division, with hunton's brigade of kemper's division on hood's right. the opposing forces encountered a short distance in front of groveton, but the disparity in numbers was too great for the union troops. the fight was furious but brief. their left was outflanked and broken, and both brigades were driven back with heavy loss, including one gun. patrick in some degree checked the enemy, who pursued considerably to the rear of groveton. night put a stop to the unequal struggle. this ended the fighting of the 29th. the union arms were outnumbered and repulsed in every encounter, and lost ground on both wings. sigel's dilatory and timid advance consumed the morning hours until, with longstreet's arrival, the chance of attacking jackson's right was lost. sigel, too, may be censured for his importunate and unsoldierly demands for aid which so frittered away the weight of the right wing. but pope on his arrival could have rectified this. pope, and pope alone, ordered the hasty and disconnected attacks of the afternoon, wasting the blood and impairing the _morale_ of his best troops. the four divisions of stevens, reno, kearny, and hooker numbered forty-three regiments, 17,000 effective, as fine troops as ever marched under the stars and stripes, and as well commanded. had pope, disregarding the clamors of sigel and schurz, arrayed these splendid troops in battle order on his right, and hurled them in one combined attack upon the enemy, pushing into the fight also schurz and milroy and twenty of the guns that were idling in the centre upon the ridge, jackson would surely have been driven back upon longstreet. the battle would then have raged on the heights beyond groveton, the scene of gibbon's fight; and here longstreet, with the advantages of position and greatly superior numbers, might have retrieved the day, or at least stayed farther union advance, even though schenck and reynolds attacked his right with their utmost vigor. in such a battle porter might possibly have turned the scale; but his troops, only partly deployed and stretching back along the road for three miles, were not in hand for prompt aggressive movement. all that afternoon lee was master of the situation. his army was united. pope's was divided; over twenty thousand of his troops out of reach and beyond his control. if lee had struck with his right wing, schenck and reynolds, who alone confronted it, could not long have resisted the overpowering numbers, and pope would have been driven across bull run. porter could never have prevented the disaster. he could not have thrown his troops into the fight in time, unready as they were, and especially if the ground on his right was broken, difficult, and impenetrable, as he claimed, but mistakenly. it was longstreet's slow-paced caution that saved pope that afternoon. on mcdowell's arrival on the field pope learned of porter's inaction, and immediately sent him a positive order to attack, which reached him at too late an hour to be executed. pope thereupon sent him an order to march to the battlefield. early in the morning of the next day, the 30th, general stevens went over to pope's headquarters, which were a short distance in the rear, and there found assembled pope, mcdowell, heintzelman, reno, and other general officers. pope was confident that the enemy had retreated during the night, and, greatly to general stevens's astonishment, some of the others coincided in that opinion. he, however, strongly expressed the contrary view, whereupon pope directed him to push a strong skirmish line into the woods in his front and try the enemy. accordingly captain john more, of the 79th highlanders, one of the best and bravest officers in the division, with one hundred men of his regiment, skirmished into the woods and attacked the enemy with great spirit; but after half an hour's sharp firing captain more was brought out shot through the body, and a third of his men were killed or wounded. no impression was made on the enemy. general early, who commanded a brigade in ewell's division, says in his report: "during the course of the morning the skirmishers from my brigade repulsed a column of the enemy which commenced to advance." the highlanders were withdrawn, and the result of their effort immediately reported to general pope, but it had no effect upon his opinionated mind. by his positive assertions of driving the enemy and of his having retreated, he had imbued mcdowell and heintzelman largely with his own views. thus filled with pope's ideas, and having little personal observation of the previous day's battle, they hastily rode along the right wing, and came back and corroborated the mistaken views of the infatuated commander. one circumstance there was which lent color to them, and that was that during the night both jackson and longstreet drew back to their main line those troops that, in the eagerness of combat, had pushed beyond it. yet there was scarcely a man in all the union army, except the army and two corps commanders, who did not bitterly realize that they had been worsted the day before, and who did not feel sure that the enemy was still in front, stronger and readier than ever to renew the battle. ricketts's division reached the field the previous evening. in the morning two brigades were placed on the extreme right, relieving some of kearny's troops, and the other two brigades were left in reserve near the centre. apparently no opportunity of dividing and scattering commands was to be lost. about nine a.m. porter arrived with his troops, except griffin's brigade of morell's division and martin's battery, which by some error had retired to centreville. the forenoon wore away without demonstration beyond considerable artillery firing. no reconnoissance in force was attempted. at length at noon pope issued an order, the most astonishing in its fatuity ever given on a battlefield:- headquarters near groveton, august 30, 1862, 12 m. special orders, no. --. the following forces will be immediately thrown forward and in pursuit of the enemy, and press him vigorously during the whole day. major-general mcdowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit. major-general porter's corps will push forward on the warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of brigadier-generals king and reynolds. the division of brigadier-general ricketts will pursue the haymarket road, followed by the corps of major general heintzelman. the necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by major-general mcdowell, to whom regular and frequent reports will be made. the general headquarters will be somewhere on the warrenton turnpike. by command of major-general pope, george d. ruggles, _colonel and chief of staff_. the enemy he thus ordered pursued were at that moment, as they had been since noon the previous day, all up, posted in strong position, flushed with success, confident in themselves, well rested, and not inferior in numbers. and their skillful leader was only waiting the opportune moment to launch the mighty thunderbolt of war he so ably wielded. such was the situation. but nothing had any effect upon the mind of the infatuated commander; the bloody repulses of the previous day, the loss of ground on both wings, the information thrust upon him by mcdowell, porter, ricketts, and reynolds that longstreet's advance had passed gainesville before nine o'clock the previous morning, over twenty-four hours before, and that his forces had confronted porter and reynolds all the afternoon before,--all, all was disregarded, and pope, impervious alike to reason and to facts, without a reconnoissance save the spirited push of the hundred highlanders, gave the fatal order fraught with disaster to his army, and the acme of his own fatuity and incompetence. but the officers charged with the execution of the order never attempted to carry it out according to its terms. with the exception perhaps of mcdowell, they knew too well that it was an order impossible to execute. ricketts, already in contact with the hostile line, reported that the enemy had no intention of retreating, and was ordered to hold his position. porter made no effort to "push up the warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of king and reynolds." the pursuit feature of the order was ignored by all, and instead of it a strong column of attack was organized against jackson's centre. this was composed of porter's troops and king's division, under porter's command, and was slowly formed behind the screen of woods in advance of the right centre of the union lines. stevens's division, two brigades of ricketts's division, and kearny held the lines on the right. in rear of porter and king, and in rear of the centre, were placed hooker's, reno's, and two brigades of ricketts's division, and all of sigel's corps except mclean's brigade, which held the left, south of the pike, in front of the chinn hill. reynolds with his small division extended the line on mclean's left. extending from rosefield for a long distance toward the right, on the crest of the ridge, was planted a long row of artillery,--forty guns at least,--as near together as they could be handled, while other batteries were in rear, unable to find a place in the line. a few batteries occupied positions in advance of this ridge, and exchanged incessant fire with the enemy's guns across the wide, open ground. thus pope bunched nearly his whole army in the centre, leaving his right weak, and his left wing a mere handful. [illustration: second battle of bull run, second day, august 30, 1862 positions at 4 p.m., and successive positions on left] while porter was slowly forming his column, his skirmishers pushed forward over the open ground nearly to groveton. reynolds, too, advanced his skirmishers on the left through the skirt of woods near groveton, south of the pike, and discovered the enemy's skirmishers extending far to his left and rear, "evidently masking a column of the enemy formed for attack on my left flank, when our line should be sufficiently advanced." so important was this discovery deemed by reynolds that he galloped instantly to pope and reported it. how the information was received is graphically told by general ruggles, pope's chief of staff, in a letter to general porter, which the author is permitted to use:- "at two p.m. or thereabouts, reynolds came dashing up, his horse covered with foam, threw himself out of the saddle, and said, 'general pope, the enemy is turning our left.' general pope replied, 'oh, i guess not!' reynolds rejoined, 'i have considered this information of sufficient importance to run the gauntlet of three rebel battalions to bring it to you in person. i had thought you would believe _me_.' thereupon general pope turned to general john buford and said, 'general buford, take your brigade of cavalry and go out and see if the enemy _is_ turning our left flank.' reynolds then said, 'i go back to my command.'" how clearly this incident reveals the infatuated, dogged state of mind that possessed pope! it is after four p.m. when porter gives the order to advance. the first and third brigades of morell's division in columns, under butterfield, are in front, sykes's regulars are in support. king's division, under hatch, advances on the right of butterfield in a column seven lines deep, with intervals of fifty yards between the lines. sweeping through the woods, they come in sight of the railroad embankment and the wooded hill beyond it. instantly the whole side of the hill and edges of the woods swarm with men before unseen. says general warren in his report: "the effect was not unlike flushing a covey of quails." a terrific musketry is poured upon the advancing column, while a storm of shell and shrapnel smite its flank with most deadly fire from the batteries on the ridge to the left front. with hearty cheers, the advancing troops desperately charge the embankment and railroad cut on the right of it, and when repulsed, charge again, and then cling to their ground and open steady musketry. all in vain. longstreet throws two more batteries forward on the ridge, and fatally enfilades the struggling troops. "butterfield's troops are torn to pieces," says sykes. in half an hour all is over, the repulse is complete, and the shattered troops move sullenly back, bearing out many wounded. in that short time they have lost 700 men. general stevens, having formed his divisions in three lines, each a brigade, moves forward through the woods on the right of porter's column, and, without waiting for orders, attacks simultaneously with him, at once becomes furiously engaged, and suffers heavy loss, including colonel farnsworth, who is severely wounded. general stevens maintains this contest until porter's column is repulsed, when he withdraws his command to the first ridge in rear of the woods, posting his lines just behind the crest, with skirmishers holding the edge of the woods. porter's attack, made nearly at the same point as grover's, did not penetrate the enemy's position so deeply. with only 2500 men, the latter broke two lines and swept eighty yards beyond the embankment, while porter with 12,000 men did not carry the embankment. but how different the conditions under which he attacked,--the enemy in stronger force, better prepared, and longstreet's terrible artillery tearing to pieces the flank of the columns! and is not something due the _morale_ of his troops, which was almost systematically broken by the blunders and disasters of this unhappy campaign? with what confidence could king's division be expected to charge, which, after marching all day thursday, sustained the fierce and stubborn fight near groveton with jackson's two divisions, then moved away at midnight, abandoning their wounded and the field they had so bravely won; then marching all the next day, with occasional halts, until at dusk they were brought upon the field, and, deceived with false hopes of success, were dashed against overpowering masses of the enemy almost on the scene of their recent battle, and only twelve hours after it, and were broken and driven back with disaster; and the third day--saturday--were exposed to shell fire for several hours, while slowly taking place in the attacking column, knowing full well that they were about to be hurled against the very centre and strongest part of the enemy's position, from which every attack of the previous day had been met with bloody repulse,--"where even privates realized," says colonel charles w. roberts, commanding morell's first brigade, "that they were going into the jaws of death itself"? clearly, this was not such an attack as these troops would have made if in their normal condition, and with any hopes of success. and their able commander did not drive it home with the full weight and vigor of one who, confident of success, puts in the last man and the last effort. sykes's division was not brought up to renew the charge upon the railroad, for porter, seeing that success was hopeless, wisely used it to cover the falling back of butterfield and hatch. the enemy's reports bear abundant witness to the gallantry and severity of porter's charge, which shook jackson so that even he called aloud for assistance. in his report he says:- "the federal infantry, about four o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover in the woods and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to the centre and left. in a few minutes our entire line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle. as one line was repulsed, another took its place and pressed forward, as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. so impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send to the commanding general for reinforcements." says colonel bradley t. johnson, who commanded the second brigade of ewell's division:- "before the railroad cut, the fight was most obstinate. i saw a federal flag hold its position for half an hour within ten yards of the flag of one of the regiments in the cut, and go down six or eight times; and after the fight one hundred dead were lying within twenty yards from the cut, some of them within two feet of it. the men fought until their ammunition was exhausted, and then threw stones. lieutenant lewis randolph killed one with a stone, and i saw him after the fight with his skull fractured." with porter's repulse comes lee's opportunity, the opening for which he has so coolly waited the better part of two days. longstreet, anticipating the order to advance, throws forward his whole wing in one of those overwhelming attacks for which he became famous. at first there seems to be almost nothing to oppose the avalanche. pope has just ordered reynolds's division to the right of the pike to aid in protecting porter's withdrawal, although more than half the army was bunched together there in the centre, and meade's and seymour's brigades and ransom's battery have taken the new position. colonel g.k. warren, of sykes's division, without waiting for orders, seeing hazlett's battery, which was well advanced on the pike, uncovered by reynolds's movement, has just hurried his little brigade of two regiments, 5th and 10th new york, over to the left of the road to support the battery, when the storm bursts upon him. furiously assailed in front, masses of the enemy come swarming through the woods on his left and rear, and it is only by breaking to the rear that any escape capture. his loss is four hundred and thirty-one, but the few minutes he holds back the enemy saves the guns. reynolds's remaining brigade, under anderson, with three batteries, in the act of moving to the right as ordered, is suddenly assailed with fury and forced to turn and fight where it stands, and now bears the brunt of the onslaught. under cover of the woods, the enemy has completely turned the flank of all the union positions, as reynolds had told pope only an hour before, and now strikes them with heavy masses of infantry on both front and left. after a gallant resistance anderson is forced back, with the loss of four guns of kerns's battery and the caissons of cooper's. mclean, who sees with amazement reynolds's division move away, leaving him to hold the hill alone, at once deploys his brigade, facing westward, and receives the attack. he now changes front to the left, and in a magnificent charge drives back the flanking forces of the enemy, but has to offer his right in the movement to the deadly enfilade fire from his former front, and he, too, bravely struggling, is borne back over the chinn hill. meantime the generals in the centre are making frantic efforts to hurry troops over to the left. general zealous b. tower, distinguished for his gallantry in the mexican war, one of the ablest officers of the army, leads the two reserve brigades of ricketts across the pike and up the chinn hill, where mclean is being overborne; but, before he can reach a good position, his men are falling by scores, he is stricken down with a severe wound,--disabled for life and his career in the field closed,--and ere long his brigades are driven back. colonel koltes, of sigel's corps, leading his brigade to the same position, is killed, and his troops, too, are forced back. general schenck, leading reinforcements to mclean, is wounded. the enemy have driven the last defenders from the chinn hill and plateau, and their exultant lines go sweeping on to complete the victory. but reynolds, with meade's and seymour's brigades, and milroy with his brigade, are now formed in line upon the slope of the henry hill, along or near the sudley road, and throw back the charging confederates with deadly fire, and soon sykes's regulars, buchanan's and chapman's brigades, and weed's battery reinforce the hard-pressed and struggling line, extending it farther to the left and rear. the enemy cannot break it, but his fire fast thins its ranks, and his flanking movement and deadly enfilade still continue. at last night is at hand, and the fury of his attack abates. the defenders, spent with heavy loss and the hard struggle, now fall back; but general reno has just led his second brigade and graham's battery up the hill, and forms his three regiments, 21st massachusetts, 51st pennsylvania, and 51st new york, around its crest in a thin line facing both the chinn hill and the woods on the left, with the guns in the intervals between the regiments. in this position he repulses after dark two attacks of wilcox's troops, the last efforts of longstreet's mighty onslaught. after nine o'clock, after the fighting had ceased, he quietly retires from the hill and marches to centreville. in the centre jackson's right followed up porter's retreating troops sharply; but the fire of the numerous guns searching all the open ground there, and the firm attitude of our troops, kept them at bay. but when the chinn hill was lost, and the enemy's fire from there smote the troops of sigel holding the centre near the pike, they were forced to fall back to the ridge, where they took up a new position behind the sudley road. as soon as longstreet's attack was well in progress, all the rebel guns upon the high ridge were turned upon our right, for they dared not continue firing upon the left and centre for fear of injuring their own troops now swarming onward against the union positions, and the concentric fire of forty guns now pounded with a perfect hail of shot and shell the union troops and batteries on that wing. the men there lay hugging the ground in rear of the guns, partially sheltered by the low ridges, while the artillery fired with its utmost rapidity upon the rebel lines of battle emerging over the distant ridge and advancing down the slope until lost to view in the woods, or beneath the smoke which now hung over the lower ground. they swept onward in splendid order, not in one or two long lines, but regiment after regiment, separately, with blood-red colors proudly borne aloft and pointed forward, like wave after wave of ocean after a storm, rolling onward with resistless majesty and power. from the great battery in our centre belched a mighty and continuous roar and volume of thunder, and dense clouds of dusky, sulphurous smoke rolled over the landscape in front; while beyond it, on the left, but apparently beneath its folds, rose the incessant clatter and crackle of musketry, with now and again the heavier, sharper noise of great volleys, telling of the dreadful struggle raging there. surely there are no sights and sounds more terrible than those of a great battle. when this scene of pandemonium was at its height, general stevens quietly remarked to general ricketts, as they stood near one of our batteries watching the fight on the left front: "if we can hold the right here, the enemy must be repulsed, for general pope has nearly all his troops over there, and can certainly repel any attack on his left." soon after this general reno was standing with general stevens near the same point. the battery had ceased firing, for the enemy's infantry were no longer visible. suddenly a tall young fellow, in a union sergeant's uniform, came running up the slope from the woods two hundred yards in front, and cried out, "don't fire on that regiment; it is the 26th new york. it has been in the woods, and is just coming out. don't fire! don't fire!" all looked, and there, at the edge of the woods, was a line of troops in blue uniforms just forming. general reno turned to general stevens, as if in doubt; but captain stevens, knowing that the enemy's skirmishers held the edge of the woods ever since ours were drawn in, impulsively called out to the battery, "fire! they are rebels! fire!" the guns instantly fired upon them, and as quickly they disappeared, melted, into the woods. the sergeant, too, had disappeared, when we turned to find him, having made good use of his long legs to rejoin his companions when his bold ruse failed. a little later, when the great struggle on the left was still raging, a mounted officer came galloping at high speed down to the line and delivered an order from general pope to retreat. "general pope orders the right wing to fall back at once. the enemy has turned the left, and if it remains half an hour longer, it will be cut off and captured." with this, back he raced, faster, if possible, than he came. very deliberately and quietly general stevens gave the necessary orders, cautioning his colonels against haste or flurry. one by one the guns ceased firing, and were limbered up and taken to the rear. when the last one had gone, the infantry rose to their feet, and marched back in usual marching column. out of the woods in front the enemy were swarming like angry bees in clouds of skirmishers, and beginning to push up the slope. by the time our troops had moved two hundred yards back from the little ridge or roll of ground they had just left, the enemy came pouring over it in considerable numbers. but general stevens had thrown his two rear regiments in line, and they opened with a well-aimed volley, which instantly cleared the ridge of the pursuers. the regiments promptly resumed the retreat, and four hundred yards farther back filed past two more of general stevens's regiments, which in like manner stood in line ready to repel too hot a pursuit. at this moment general kearny came from the right at the head of a small force, apparently a regiment, passing along the rear side of a point of woods which extended to near where general stevens's line stood. just then the enemy began firing out of this cover. instantly kearny fronted his scanty force into line and dashed it into the woods; but quickly a sharp volley resounded in the timber, and his men came running out, and continued to the rear, pursued by the enemy's skirmishers in equal disorder. upon these the waiting line poured a deliberate volley, and back they went running into the woods. the troops, after administering this sharp rebuff, filed off to the rear unmolested, and moved over a prominent ridge a thousand yards back, along the crest of which was drawn up in line a part of ricketts's division, apparently a brigade. it was now fast growing dark. general stevens, knowing that the pike would be crowded with retreating troops, wished to cross bull run somewhere above the bridge, and sent for major elliott, of the highlanders, who was at the first battle of bull run, and might know of some practicable ford. this proved to be the case; and after some little delay the division, guided by major elliott, crossed at locke's or red house ford, and moved by a cross-road to the pike, where, finding the main road jammed full of troops and artillery flowing past in a dense column, general stevens bivouacked till morning, when he moved to centreville. while the division was waiting on the ridge behind ricketts's troops, they opened with a sudden volley, as startling as unexpected, in the darkness. the enemy, pursuing, were advancing up the hill when this volley stopped them, and, falling back to the foot of the ridge, they lay there all night. ricketts's brigade immediately moved off to the left by a farm road to a ford a short distance above the bridge, where they crossed. soon after these troops had filed away in the darkness, general stevens sent lieutenant heffron, one of his aides, to the crest which they had just left, telling him to observe, try if he could see or hear the enemy, and come back and report. after sufficient time had elapsed for heffron to have performed the duty, he sent captain stevens on a similar errand, for his column was not quite ready to move; owing to delay in finding out about the ford, and there was nothing between it and the enemy. he, too, rode back to the crest, gazed into the darkness, listened intently, without catching sight or sound, and started to ride down the front of the ridge to make sure of the enemy's position, when the reflection that heffron had probably done that very thing and had not returned caused him to turn back and rejoin his command, the rear of which was just moving off. heffron had ridden down the slope and into the enemy's line at its foot, and was captured. at this time two brigades of kearny's division, which, being more in rear than ricketts's, had moved back before him, were on or in front of the ridge, only a musket-shot to the left of the enemy lying at its foot, each force ignorant of the other's presence, and remained there until ten p.m., when they retreated by the same route as ricketts. poe's brigade, on the extreme right, fell back, and recrossed the run by the same ford as general stevens's division, and before it. thus the troops of the right wing made good their retreat in perfect order and without loss, except that of some guns of ricketts.[20] general pope in his report, after claiming that he repulsed the enemy at all points, states that he gave the order to withdraw to centreville after eight o'clock at night. no doubt he did give such an order at that time, but he suppresses all mention of the orders he gave to retreat and fall back long before that time, when he saw his left being turned and overpowered, and, his presumptuous confidence knocked out of him, thought more of saving part of his army than of repelling the enemy. and then it was, about six p.m., that so many troops were hurried off the field in retreat to centreville, among them nagle's brigade, of reno's division, two brigades of hooker's, king's division, and some of sigel's troops in the centre, and the whole of the right wing; and then, too, it was that he dispatched the order to general banks at bristoe station to destroy the public property and retreat to centreville. at that time the head of franklin's corps of the army of the potomac was up to the stone bridge on its march to reinforce pope, and might have been used to maintain his battle. but that commander already had more men on the field than he was capable of using. under the leadership of a sheridan, a grant, a meade, or a thomas, his gallant army would never have retreated from the field, and might have inflicted a deadly blow upon its antagonist. how bravely and even desperately the union troops fought is best attested by the confederate reports, and the nine thousand confederate losses in killed and wounded. the union loss, including that of the 28th, amounted to fourteen thousand. that at the end of the battle there was disorder and demoralization among some commands it were idle to deny, but it has been grossly exaggerated. note.--general pope's reports are very erroneous and misleading; the histories of the battle, following his statements, scarce less so. he and they habitually speak of corps when only brigades were engaged, and give all his dispositions and movements an aspect of forethought and order the reverse of the fact. it is only by careful study of the reports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders, and of the dispatches on the field, that the shifting struggle can be traced out. _war records_, vol. xii., report and testimony in review of fitz-john porter case. footnotes: [20] the reports of jackson and his subordinates indulge in much exaggeration as to driving the union forces in their front, but longstreet, with more truth, states in his book, p. 189, that "jackson failed to pull up even on the left." chapter lvii the battle of chantilly having safely withdrawn his division from the disastrous field, crossing bull run by red house ford, general stevens conducted it to the main turnpike, now brimful with retreating troops. it was night, too, and quite dark. unwilling to plunge his command into the crowded throng, he halted and allowed them to sleep on their arms by the roadside, while the dense, dark tide of troops, trains, and artillery flowed past all night. after daylight he resumed the march by the pike, now clear, and halted for breakfast in the fields a mile from centreville. the men were ravenously hungry, having long since emptied their haversacks; the supply trains were in the rear, no one knew where, so that a drink of water and a tightened belt seemed destined to be the only breakfast. but general stevens, having observed a small herd of cattle near by belonging to some commissary, had them driven up and slaughtered; some wagons loaded with hard bread were also seized, and soon the entire command were cooking and enjoying a hearty repast of beefsteak and hard tack. general stevens now received orders from general pope to act as rear-guard. reno's division (that officer being ill and off duty), a brigade of cavalry, and two batteries were added to his command for that duty, the most important and responsible in the army at this juncture. he moved out and took position on cub run, two and a half miles in front of centreville, throwing out a strong skirmish line beyond the creek, and disposing his batteries and troops to resist an attack. contrary to expectation, the enemy did not press on after his victory, although he appeared in force, advanced his skirmish line in plain view, and opened briskly with his artillery, to which ours as briskly replied. the day was wet, drizzling, and dreary, but at last wore away with nothing more serious. at night general reynolds and his division relieved general stevens. he criticised some of the latter's dispositions, which called out a sharp rejoinder. he declared that the enemy's skirmishers were too close, and deployed a regiment to drive them back, but his men, to his intense chagrin, hung back. then he said the enemy might attack at any moment. but general stevens did not share his apprehensions, and remarked to him, "i think it most probable that the enemy will move around and strike us under the ribs." after being relieved, the division moved to centreville, and bivouacked on the heights half a mile south of the hamlet. the following morning, monday, september 1, the officers straightened out their commands and took account of their losses; rations and ammunition were brought up and issued; and all hoped for at least one day of much needed rest. captain stevens, by direction of the general, counted the stacks of muskets, and found the latter to number 2012. half of the division had fallen in battle, or on the march, since leaving fredericksburg a fortnight before. lieutenant s.n. benjamin, a very brave and intelligent young officer, whom general stevens treated with great kindness and consideration during the campaign, relates that about noon the general came to his battery,- "and came where i was sitting. (my crutches had been broken, and i could not rise without help.) i soon saw that he felt very blue,--that he felt the defeat very keenly, and feared its effect on the men. i tried to assure him that his own command felt more devoted to him than ever, and if possible more faith in his skill than before. and this was god's truth,--_they did_, and he had earned it. "still he felt very blue. i asked him if he would write to his wife. 'yes; but there is no way to send a letter in. i am anxious to send word.' 'well, general, you write, and i will send it by some christian or sanitary man. we have just sent letters, and i will have a man watch the turnpike until some one will take it.' "he seemed much pleased with this. i brought him the envelope, etc., and he wrote on a book, sitting on the ground. before he had finished, the order came to move. he closed it hastily, after giving some orders, gave it to me, and went to his headquarters. the letter was given to a gentleman going to washington with a wounded man." it was general stevens's last letter. while the beaten and distracted union commander was trying to straighten out his forces huddled about centreville, uncertain whether to risk further conflict or to fall back to the defenses of washington, lee was moving his whole army in one column, to fall upon his enemy's line of retreat and rear. the very day after the battle he advanced jackson's wing across bull run by sudley ford to the little river turnpike, which runs straight to fairfax court house, and there intersects the alexandria and warrenton pike, eight miles behind centreville. on this monday morning jackson was marching down the turnpike with longstreet and his whole wing following closely in support, thus turning the union army at centreville, and moving to fall upon its only line of retreat; "to strike it under the ribs," as general stevens so clearly foresaw. pope had taken no steps to anticipate or guard against this fatal flank movement. he was groping in the dark, utterly at a loss what course to pursue, and consequently he did nothing until noon, when startling news forced him to decision and to action. [illustration: jackson's flank march to turn centreville.] such was the situation,--the bulk of the union forces grouped about centreville with their distraught commander, the victorious rebel army, in one strong column, jackson at its head, turning their flank and striking far in their rear,--when, at one p.m., two cavalrymen dashed up to general stevens's headquarters. they bore orders to him from general pope to march immediately across country, guided by the two troopers, to the little river pike, and there take position and hold in check a column of the enemy reported advancing down that road. general stevens soon had his division under arms, moved across the fields, and entered the alexandria pike a short distance east of centreville. here ferrero's brigade of reno's division, the other brigade after its heavy loss on the 29th not being again called upon, fell in behind and followed. the scanty column moved down the road a mile and a half, then turned off to the left, and followed a farm road in a northeasterly direction between the two pikes. as general stevens and staff were riding at the head of the column the cavalrymen told how they had been out foraging that morning to the little river pike, and had run into a heavy column of the enemy advancing down it, and had made all haste to gallop to pope's headquarters with the news. thence they were at once dispatched to general stevens with the orders already related, and directed to guide his column to the endangered road. this startling news brought him about noon by these cavalrymen was unquestionably the first intelligence that pope received of lee's thrust. his own orders prove this, for he not only immediately dispatched general stevens to seize and hold the little river pike, but detached hooker from his division and sent him to germantown, a point just in front of fairfax court house, where the two pikes meet, to take charge of some troops there and post them to resist the threatening movement, ordered mcdowell- "immediately to march rapidly back to fairfax court house with your whole division (corps) and assume command of the two brigades there, and occupy germantown with your whole force, so as to cover the turnpike from this place to alexandria. jackson is reported advancing on fairfax with 20,000 men,"-and soon afterwards hurried heintzelman's two divisions down the pike toward fairfax. and it was while thus moving that general kearny received general stevens's urgent summons, and opportunely hastened to the stricken field, as will soon be related. after proceeding across country several miles in rather a winding or crooked course, the column was marching over an elevated tract of open country, which sloped down in front to a marshy hollow clothed with small growth, and partially timbered. beyond the hollow, open fields appeared again, and beyond them dense pine woods. to the rear the high ground extended to the main turnpike, half a mile distant, down which were seen the white covers of the crowded wagons moving in retreat. at this moment the little cavalcade at the head of the column was suddenly surprised by the sight of a rebel skirmish line deployed across the fields in front and cautiously advancing toward it, and the more because the little river pike, as the cavalrymen said, was still some distance away. the skirmishers were already across the hollow and close at hand when first seen. at the first glance general stevens realized what that rebel skirmish line portended. it portended an attack in force upon the turnpike, the only line of retreat. full well he knew that the movement must be arrested, or the line of retreat would be broken, the army cut in two while widely extended along the road, and a great disaster inflicted. instantly he threw forward two companies of the highlanders, under captains w.t. lusk and robert ives, to drive back the enemy's advance and uncover his movement. deploying in skirmish order, they ran forward, exchanging a sharp fire with the opposing line and driving it back, crossed the hollow, surmounted a graded railroad embankment which traversed it, and pushed on after the rebel skirmishers into the farther fields. the embankment was the grade of the same manassas gap railroad over which, beyond bull run, jackson made his fierce fight. [illustration: battle of chantilly, september 1, 1862] captain stevens, directing the skirmishers, had just ridden on top of the embankment, when a rebel soldier half way across the field in front, who was helping off a wounded comrade, withdrew his arm from his comrade's support, deliberately aimed at the mounted officer, and fired, and the bullet passed through his hat, inflicting a sharp rap upon his head. twenty muskets were instantly fired at the bold rebel in return, but without effect, and coolly and deliberately he shifted his piece to his left hand, replaced his right arm around his comrade's waist, and helped him slowly off in safety. while the highlanders were thus pushing back the enemy, general stevens, without halting or retarding the march of his troops an instant, was forming them as fast as they came up in a column of brigades on the hither side of the fields beyond the hollow. while thus forming, a regiment of the enemy advanced in line of battle from the woods more than half way across the fields, and the union skirmishers fell back before it. but benjamin's guns, having just taken position on the right of the forming column, opened upon the regiment, and it immediately fell back and disappeared in the woods. lusk's company now rejoined its regiment, but ives's fell back to the railroad grade, and remained there during the battle. the column was formed in the edge of quite a large open tract, the farther side of which was closed by the woods. woods also extended on the right side all along the open ground. near the centre of the open tract, and to the left and front of the column, was a farmhouse, with outbuildings and orchard, and just beyond it a large field of tall, waving corn extended to the woods in front, and to woods on the left. the estate was known as fruitvale, and belonged to the family of reid, but was occupied at this time by a family named heath. a road coming from the main turnpike in rear ran in a northerly course past the right of the forming column, extended along the right edge of the open ground, traversed the farther woods, and crossed the little river pike at right angles. this has been known since colonial days as the ox road, and the eminence over which it runs, just north of the crossing, is ox hill, from which the confederates have named the coming engagement the battle of ox hill. in union reports and histories it is known as the battle of chantilly, from the hamlet of that name six miles westward on the little river pike. the column was soon formed in the following order:- 28th mass., 79th highlanders, col. david morrison. 50th penn., 8th michigan, col. benjamin c. christ. 100th penn., 46th new york, lieut.-col. david a. lecky. the formation was nearly completed when general reno appeared. he had been sick and off duty the day before. the conference between him and general stevens was brief. the latter pointed out the supposed position of the enemy, in a few strong words showed the necessity of hurling back his threatened advance, and declared his intention of attack as soon as his column was formed. general reno seemed undecided and hesitating. he seemed not to approve the movement, but he certainly did not disapprove it in words, nor did he give any orders, nor take command in any way, and soon turned and rode back. general stevens now dismounted, and directed his staff to dismount, and sent one of them to each of the leading regiments, with orders to go forward with it and make every exertion to force the charge home. he sent captain stevens to the highlanders, and lieutenant dearborn, his aide, to the 28th massachusetts. the column now advanced, benjamin's guns firing shells into the woods in front. it descended a long, gentle slope, crossed a slight hollow, and swept steadily up the easy ascent in three firm, regular lines with the fixed bayonets glistening above them. not a sight nor sound betrayed the presence of the enemy. there was nothing to be seen but the open field, extending two hundred yards in front and closed by the wall of woods, with an old zigzag rail fence at its edge. "there is no enemy there," exclaimed captain lusk to captain stevens, as they were marching side by side; "they have fallen back; we shall find nothing there." even as he spoke, the enemy poured a terrific volley from behind the rail fence. captain stevens struck the ground with great force and suddenness, shot in the arm and hip, and as he struggled to his feet saw the even battle line of the highlanders pressing firmly and steadily on. a few minutes later general stevens came up on foot, stopped a moment to ask his son if he was badly hurt, and to order a soldier to help him off the field, and, unheeding his remonstrances, moved on after the first line. the enemy was smiting the column with a terrible and deadly musketry. the men were falling fast. general stevens now ordered captain lusk to hasten to the 50th pennsylvania, which was hesitating at entering the cornfield, and to push them forward, for, as the column advanced, the left struck and extended into this cornfield. the troops, under the withering hail of bullets, were now wavering and almost at a standstill. five color-bearers of the highlanders had fallen in succession, and the colors again fell to the ground. at this crisis general stevens pushed to the front, seized the falling colors from the hands of the wounded bearer, unheeding his cry, "for god's sake, don't take the colors, general; they'll shoot you if you do!" and calling aloud upon his old regiment, "highlanders, my highlanders, follow your general!" rushed forward with the uplifted flag. the regiment responded nobly. they rushed forward, reached the edge of the woods, hurled themselves with fury upon the fence and the rebel line behind it, and the enemy broke and fled in disorder. the 28th massachusetts joined gallantly in the charge, and the other brigades as gallantly supported the first. at this moment a sudden and severe thunderstorm, with a furious gale, burst over the field and the rain fell in torrents, while the flash of lightning and peals of thunder seemed to rebuke man's bloody, fratricidal strife. general stevens fell dead in the moment of victory. a bullet entered at the temple and pierced his brain. he still firmly grasped the flagstaff, and the colors lay fallen upon his head and shoulders. his noble, brave, and ardent spirit, freed at last from the petty jealousies of earth, had flown to its creator. chapter lviii the battle of chantilly the enemy's troops thus struck and hurled back were ewell's division of jackson's corps. hays's and trimble's brigades were behind the fence, and were supported by early's and lawton's brigades in the woods in their rear. this was the centre division in jackson's column. the leading one, under starke, had already crossed the ox road, and the rear division, under a.p. hill, was closed up on ewell's. jackson, judging from the fury of the attack and the numbers of his men running in disorder out of the woods that he was assailed by a heavy force, and fearing for his artillery, which had taken position on ox hill, on the north side of the pike, when ewell's division advanced into the woods on the south side, at once moved his batteries half a mile back up the pike to a long ridge, and planted them in position to rally his troops upon in case of need, while at the same time he hurried hill's infantry division forward to maintain the battle. that officer advanced the brigades of branch and brockenbrough (field's), and successively threw into the fight those of gregg, pander, thomas, and archer, all of which, except the last, became heavily engaged and suffered severely. general stevens's division withstood the attack of these fresh troops stoutly. it had driven back everything in its immediate front, but the contest now raged over the cornfield on the left. it was impossible for its scanty numbers long to resist the pressure of hill's brigades, successively rushing into the conflict. but aid was at hand. at the moment of ordering the fatal charge, general stevens sent lieutenant h.g. belcher, of the 8th michigan, back to the main turnpike with instructions to ask support, and to go from commander to commander until he secured it. belcher applied to several generals, who declined to go without orders, until finally he met general kearny. scarcely had he made known his mission to him, and its urgency was startlingly emphasized by the rapid and fierce musketry of the battle, when kearny exclaimed, "by god, i will support stevens anywhere!" and at once broke the head of his column off the pike, and struck across the fields to the sound of the battle. it was birney's brigade that kearny so promptly brought to the rescue. they arrived just in time. the 4th maine, colonel elijah walker, formed line in rear of the cornfield, considerably to the left of the farmhouse, and opened on the enemy swarming in the farther edge of the field. the remaining regiments as they came up, the 101st new york, 3d maine, 4th new york, and 1st new york, extended the line to the right as far as the house, or the right border of the cornfield, and, as general birney reports, "held the enemy and sustained unflinchingly the most murderous fire from a superior force." from this position they made a gallant advance well into the cornfield, driving back the enemy to the woods, and then withdrew to their former ground. captain george e. randolph planted his battery of four guns immediately in rear of the line, and fired over it into the farther side of the cornfield and into the woods. the 18th new york and 57th pennsylvania were put in later, and helped sustain the contest. general stevens's troops maintained their unequal battle until after birney's line opened. jackson reports, "so severe was the fire in front and flank of branch's brigade as to produce in it some disorder and falling back," and other confederate officers mention the severe flank fire, showing conclusively that both stevens's and birney's smote this brigade, one in flank, the other in front, under which double fire it was broken and driven back. "this engagement is regarded by this brigade as one of our severest," says its commander in his report. after holding their ground for an hour in the unequal contest, and expending all their ammunition, general stevens's troops fell back to the reid house from the position they had so gallantly won. the enemy did not advance into the open ground on the right of the cornfield, and birney's fight was continued over it until night ended the contest. ferrero's brigade, of only three regiments, reached the field immediately after stevens's division, and was ordered by general reno to cover his right. the 51st new york, the leading regiment, moved forward into the woods some distance on the right of stevens's column until it encountered the line of starke's division, became somewhat engaged, and retired with a loss of thirteen. the next regiment, the 21st massachusetts, was not to escape so easily. thrown forward on the left of the 51st new york, and disconnected from it, it advanced for a long distance in the woods, somewhat disordered by fallen trees, struck the enemy's line, and unexpectedly received a deadly volley, and nearly one hundred brave fellows, dead and wounded, lay prostrate at the blow. the gallant regiment returned the fire as well as it could, but in the drenching rain many guns became unserviceable, and it fell back from the woods, the enemy not pursuing. the third regiment, the 51st pennsylvania, entered the woods on the right of the 51st new york, but were not engaged. meantime starke withdrew his whole division from the woods back to the little river pike, and moved to the rear. whether his line, struck by an unaccountable panic, fell into disorder, or whether jackson drew back the troops for the support of hill, all of whose brigades were then going into the fight, is uncertain, but probably the latter. early moved to the left and covered the front vacated by starke, but with a contracted line, while trimble's and lawton's brigades were content to hold their ground in the woods considerably to the rear of the fence from which hays and trimble had been so roughly driven. longstreet deployed toombs's and anderson's brigades of his leading division (jones's), and advanced them into the woods in support of jackson's troops, but they were not called upon, as night soon closed the contest. "as i rode up and met general jackson," says longstreet in his "manassas to appomattox," "i remarked upon the number of his men going to the rear. "'general, your men don't appear to work well to-day?' "'no,' he replied, 'but i hope it will prove a victory in the morning.'" as the stricken 21st massachusetts emerged from the woods, near where general stevens formed his column, it was met by general kearny, who was searching for troops to cover the right flank of birney's line. "in fierce haste," says general c.f. walcott, the historian of the regiment, in a paper on this battle before the massachusetts military historical society, "he ordered the regiment to move on the run to take post on birney's right, the position of whose line was indicated only by the flashes of their muskets. luckily two of our companies, which had been detached in the woods to cover our flanks, had escaped the ambuscade into which the others had fallen, and now joined us with serviceable guns, and the regiment, about two hundred strong, moved across the open ground towards the cornfield and the front of birney's right, deploying a thin skirmish line to cover our right and front as we advanced. "as our skirmishers came up to the rail fence of the cornfield they were fired on by thomas's skirmishers, whose brigade, with two of pender's regiments, was in the cornfield, and coming from the woods well on birney's right. crossing the line of the fence we soon halted in the corn, under a dropping fire from the enemy. general kearny was following us up closely, and as we came to a halt fiercely tried to force us forward, saying that we were firing on our own men, and that there were no rebels near us. we had the proof in two prisoners--an officer and private of a georgia regiment--brought in by our skirmishers, besides the warning cries of 'surrender,' coming both from our right and front; but, unfortunately, kearny's judgment seemed unable to appreciate the existence of the peril which his military instinct had caused him to guard against. lieutenant walcott, of the brigade staff, took our prisoners to him, saying, 'general, if you don't believe there are rebels in the corn, here are two prisoners from the 49th georgia, just taken in our front.' crying out fiercely, '------you and your prisoners!' the general, entirely alone, apparently in ungovernable rage at our disregard of his peremptory orders to advance, forced his horse through the deep, sticky mud of the cornfield past the left of the regiment, passing within a few feet of where i was standing. i watched him moving in the murky twilight through the corn, and, when less than twenty yards away, saw his horse suddenly rear and turn, and half a dozen muskets flash around him: so died the intrepid soldier, general philip kearny! "diverted by our movement from their design upon birney's brigade, the enemy surged up against our front and right flank, took what fire we could give them at a few paces distance (which they returned with interest), and in the dark, ignorant of our weakness, allowed us to withdraw from their front without pursuit, and in a few minutes also drew back themselves from the cornfield to the woods behind it. except a few scattering shots on birney's front, which soon ceased, the battle of chantilly was now over." supposing from the non-return of general kearny that he had fallen or been captured, general birney assumed command of his division, and after the battle was over relieved his hard-fought troops with general poe's brigade. robinson's brigade was posted during the battle on the high ground near the main turnpike, and was not engaged. the union troops held the ground upon which they fought until half past two in the morning, brought off their wounded, and then retreated to fairfax court house after the last of the troops from centreville had passed. only sixteen union regiments, viz., six of stevens's division, three of ferrero's brigade, and seven of birney's brigade, with six guns, benjamin's two 20-pounder rifles, and randolph's four 12-pounders, fought this battle against jackson's whole corps of seventy regiments, of which at least forty-eight were in the fight. the union force numbered 5500 effective, the confederate at least twice as many. in this brief and fierce battle the losses on each side were from 800 to 1000. the following statement is made up from confederate official reports and, on the union side, from regimental histories, for there are no official reports of union losses, except four in poe's brigade, and from estimates based on all available data, but undoubtedly falls short of the actual losses. how exactly general stevens grasped the military situation when he caught sight of the rebel skirmish line, and instantly decided to stay jackson's impending advance by an attack that would throw even him on the defensive, is clearly shown by the confederate leader's objective, and the dispositions he had made of his troops to accomplish it. jackson had moved down the pike from chantilly slowly and carefully, to give time for longstreet to close up in support. his troops were well in hand, the infantry of one division, and probably of all three, marching in two columns, one on each side of the road, and the artillery on the road between them. already he had thrown this solid column, prepared for battle rather than for the march, athwart the ox road, which led straight across to the coveted line of retreat. already his skirmishers, supported by a regiment, had pushed southward half a mile, and were advancing across country to the other pike, and in another half mile--in ten minutes more--would come in plain sight of the wagons moving back upon it. his whole corps was in position,--ewell's division (under lawton) in the centre, starke on the left, hill on the right. it lay wholly in jackson's will and power, advancing but little over a mile, to hurl this mighty mass, seventy regiments strong, upon pope's only road and his retreating troops and trains. who that knows jackson's career can doubt his will and power to seize the golden opportunity? at the very instant of launching the thunderbolt, jackson learns that the enemy is advancing upon him, his skirmishers are driven in, his centre division is hurled headlong from its position, the fugitives pour out of the woods, he hurries his artillery to the rear, is forced to throw the whole of his right division into the fight, brigade after brigade, and to withdraw his left division for his last reserve. the possibility of striking his enemy is gone. he can only say, "i hope it will prove a victory to-morrow." and the troops that general stevens led to this desperate and victorious charge were the same who, but ten weeks since, suffered the slaughter on james island, and had just lost half of their number in the bloody encounters on the plains of bull run. can more be said for the gallantry and devotion of the soldiers, or the hold upon them of their heroic leader? had general stevens remained on the defensive and given time--and time counted by minutes--for jackson to advance, disaster were inevitable. how long could his scanty force of nine regiments, outflanked and overborne, have resisted the avalanche? true, kearny was on the pike, and perhaps others would have joined in the defense, but where was the army or corps commander to put them in, and order and control battle against jackson's onslaught, backed by longstreet? pope was at centreville; sumner, with his second corps, north of it; sigel's, mcdowell's, franklin's troops scattered from fairfax to alexandria and washington; banks retreating down braddock road,--all scattered and out of reach. the closest study of the situation strengthens the conviction that general stevens that day saved the army and the country from an appalling disaster. general mcdowell, hurrying to fairfax court house as directed by general pope, met patrick's brigade near that point and posted it behind difficult run, just in front of germantown,[21] where it was supported by ricketts's division. general stuart, who with his cavalry preceded jackson's column down the pike, after passing the ox road some two miles found his advance arrested by these troops, and, after some skirmishing, moved off northward toward flint hill in a fruitless effort to flank the union line. patrick's brigade lost twenty wounded. neither force took any part in the battle of chantilly. union losses. stevens's division: staff 2 first brigade: {100th pennsylvania 36 colonel daniel leasure {46th new york 50[a] second brigade: {79th highlanders 40 colonel david morrison {28th massachusetts 99 third brigade: {8th michigan (7 killed) 50[a] colonel b.c. christ {50th pennsylvania (7 killed) 50[a] -- 327 reno's division: ferrero's brigade 21st massachusetts 130 51st new york 13 51st pennsylvania (none) -- 143 kearny's division: staff 1 birney's brigade 3d maine 50 4th maine 64 40th new york 163 1st new york 40[a] 38th new york 25[a] 101st new york 40[a] 57th pennsylvania 25[a] poe's brigade: pickets 4 -- total: 16 regiments 412 -- 882 [a] estimated. no report in war records or histories. confederate losses. jackson's corps: stark's division 20 regiments 71[b] ewell's division: lawton's brigade 6 regiments 12 early's brigade 7 regiments 32 trimble's brigade 5 regiments 21 hays's brigade 5 regiments 135 - -- 43 200 hill's division: branch's brigade 5 regiments 108 pender's brigade 4 regiments 58 gregg's brigade 5 regiments 104 archer's brigade 5 regiments (not engaged) field's (or brockenbrough's) 4 regiments (no report) 75[b] thomas's brigade 4 regiments (loss not reported) 75[b] - -- 27 420 longstreet's corps: jones's division 1 total: 70 regiments--48 in action 692 [b] estimated. general hill reports his loss as 306. it is impossible to reconcile these small losses with the confederate reports of the severity of the fighting. note.--the confederate reports of the battle of chantilly, or ox hill, show with tolerable clearness their troops engaged, and the positions and parts taken by them. early's report definitely locates hays's and trimble's brigades "in line of battle on the right of jackson's division, and occupying positions in the edge of a field beyond a piece of woods through which the ox road here runs." this is unmistakably the very position from which general stevens's charge drove the enemy. the loss in hays's brigade (135) was greater than that of any other. early acknowledges that hays's brigade "fell back in confusion, passing through these regiments (second line), followed by the enemy;" that the commander of trimble's brigade was killed, and one or two regiments of it were thrown into some confusion. there are no reports from any officer of jackson's (starke's) division, except the bare mention by one brigade commander that they met the enemy at ox hill, september 1, and repulsed him; none from hays's, trimble's, or lawton's brigades of ewell's division; and none from field's (brockenbrough's) brigade of hill's division. general longstreet, in his book _manassas to appomattox_, pp. 193-195, says of this battle: "two of hill's brigades were thrown out to find the enemy, and were soon met by his advance in search of jackson, which made a furious attack, driving back the confederate brigades in some disorder. stevens, appreciating the crisis as momentous, thought it necessary to follow the opportunity by aggressive battle in order to hold jackson away from the warrenton turnpike. kearny, always ready to second any courageous move, joined in the daring battle. at the critical moment the rain and thunder storm burst with great violence upon the combatants, the high wind beating the storm in the faces of the confederates. so firm was the unexpected battle that part of jackson's line yielded to the onslaught. at one moment his artillery seemed in danger.... as i rode up and met general jackson, i remarked upon the number of his men going to the rear:- "'general, your men don't appear to work well to-day.' "'no,' he replied, 'but i hope it will prove a victory in the morning.' "as both federal division commanders fell, the accounts fail to do justice to their fight. stevens, in his short career, gave evidence of courage, judgment, skill, and genius not far below his illustrious antagonist." immediately after the close of the civil war, in june, 1865, the author visited the battlefield of chantilly. the ground and its incidents agreed precisely with his recollections. the remains of the fence at the edge of the woods from which general stevens hurled the enemy were plainly visible, many of the rails as well as the trees showing marks of bullets. from a point near the corner of the cornfield, extending nearly perpendicularly into the woods for fifty yards, and facing to the left, were the vestiges of a hastily thrown up breastwork, or cover, of earth, rails, logs, and branches, which the union troops had scraped together after driving back the enemy in order to meet the attack of hill's troops on their left. in may, 1883, the author, accompanied by the late general charles f. walcott, again visited the field, and by the hospitality of lieutenant john n. ballard, the present owner of the estate, himself a confederate soldier, spent the night at the reid house. mr. ballard exhibited a plan of the estate, made in 1858, accompanying a former deed, which comprised almost exactly the battlefield, and kindly permitted a tracing of it to be made. the distance between the fence where general stevens fell and the little river pike was found by pacing to be about four hundred yards. by this data a fairly accurate map of the battlefield was obtained. mr. charles stewart, a very intelligent gentleman, whose house is on the little river pike half a mile west of the field, who was at home at the time of the battle and an eye-witness of the movements of the confederate troops, and who went over the field the third day after the engagement, pointed out to the visitors the localities of interest in connection with the fight near his house, and graphically narrated how jackson hurried his artillery to the rear at the opening of the battle, and threw it into position half a mile back on a bare, commanding ridge near the stewart house. this account was fully corroborated by mr. ballard. a full and interesting account of this visit, and also an account of the battle, by general walcott, is given in volume ii., military historical society of massachusetts. the author has been aided in preparing his account of the battle by written statements from colonel david morrison, captain william t. lusk, and captain robert armour, of the 79th highlanders; lieutenant samuel n. benjamin and captain george e. randolph, who commanded the two batteries engaged; colonel elijah walker, of the 4th maine, and colonel moses b. lakeman, of the 3d maine; and by personal interviews with these officers and many others, including lieutenant h.g. belcher, who participated in the engagement. _war records_, series 1, vol. xii., "history of 79th highlanders," by william todd; _the one hundredth regiment pennsylvania volunteers, roundheads_; james c. stevenson, _michigan in the war_, _maine in the war_; bates's _history of pennsylvania volunteers_. the only reports of the battle of chantilly by union officers who took part in it are those of general birney and captain randolph, and they are very brief. there are actually no reports from any officers of general stevens's or general reno's division, owing to the death of the commanders--reno fell at south mountain a few days later--and the rapid changes in, and movements of, the troops in the maryland campaign, which immediately followed. footnotes: [21] statement of colonel charles mcclure, of patrick's staff. chapter lix final scene after the successful charge colonel morrison sent an officer to report that general stevens had fallen, and that the enemy had been driven back. general reno, to whom the report was made, returned orders to bury general stevens on the field, and to fall back. the highlanders reverently and tenderly bore away the body of their beloved commander and placed it in an ambulance, from which one of their number, although wounded, willingly alighted to give room. the remains were taken to washington to the house of his dear friend, john l. hayes, and thence to newport, r.i. general reno's apparently unfeeling order excited great indignation among the highlanders. at the very moment of his heroic death general stevens was being considered by the president and his advisers as commander of the armies in virginia. mr. hayes was assured of the fact by a member of the cabinet, and it was currently stated in the press. certain it is that ignoble personal rivalries and jealousies could not have kept him down much longer. he was appointed and confirmed a major-general, to rank from july 4, 1862. he was only forty-four years, five months, and seven days of age when he fell. the stern old puritan abolitionist, his aged father, died august 22, only ten days previous. he frequently declared that he should never see isaac again, that he knew his spirit too well, that he would surely be killed in battle, and it was thought that brooding over this idea hastened his own death. general stevens was buried in the island cemetery in newport. the obsequies were attended by governor sprague, of rhode island, and governor andrew, of massachusetts, professor bache and officers of the coast survey, the mayor and council of newport and other dignitaries, and a large military escort. the city of newport erected beside his grave a massive granite obelisk, bearing the following simple and appropriate inscription, composed by his brother-in-law, the rev. charles t. brooks: in memory of major-general isaac ingalls stevens, born in andover, mass., march 25, 1818, who gave to the service of his country a quick and comprehensive mind, a warm and generous heart, a firm will and a strong arm, and who fell while rallying his command with the flag of the republic in his dying grasp, at the battle of chantilly, va., september 1, 1862. this monument is erected as a token of admiring gratitude by the city of newport. when the highlanders were mustered out of service, the flag under whose folds general stevens fell was sent to his widow, with the following letter from the brave colonel morrison:- new york, september 22, 1864. mrs. isaac i. stevens. _dear madam_,--i have the honor to transmit to you the colors of the 79th highlanders, the same that were in the hand of your late lamented husband when he received his wound. since i knew that you wished to have them in your possession i have watched them with a jealous eye through many stormy fields. although but a rag, many a brave man would have sacrificed his life rather than anything dishonorable should happen them. from chantilly to blue springs, wherever they were unfurled, victory has perched upon them, and when, torn and tattered, we exchanged them for a new set, i have carried them about with me, and i assure you it gives me great pleasure in sending them to you, so that you may preserve them as an heirloom in your family. serving immediately under general stevens, no one had a better opportunity of knowing him than myself. well may you feel proud of him! his nobleness of heart, his firm devotion to his country, his untiring energy, his unflinching bravery, have endeared him to all those who have served under him. his memory is engraven on the hearts of every one of his highlanders, and the few of us that are left often speak of the many acts of kindness bestowed on us by "our general." i am, madam, your obedient servant, d. morrison, _late colonel 79th highlanders_. the legislature of rhode island passed resolutions upon the death of general stevens, and offered to provide a fit resting-place for his ashes. the city of newport, the officers of the coast survey, and many other public bodies paid fitting tribute by resolutions. "when the intelligence of his death reached washington territory, the grief of all classes was sincere and profound. nothing could any one recall that was base or dishonorable, but much that was lofty and manly in the dead hero. the legislature passed resolutions in his honor, and ordered crape to be worn."[22] for many years the successive governors and legislatures regularly paid tribute to his memory. he fell--that glowing eye in sudden night was quenched; but still the flag he lifted high, and onward bore to victory, in his dead hand was clenched. he sank--but o'er his head the drooping ensign fell, as if its folds it fondly spread above the forehead, pale and dead, of him who loved it well. he sleeps--unlock that clasp! the hero's work is done! another hand that staff shall grasp, and, if need be, till life's last gasp, like him shall bear it on. he rests--the true and brave! and where his relics lie, in holier beauty long shall wave, fit canopy for freeman's grave, god's starry flag on high. he lives--his deeds inspire new strength for duty's strife: now myriads burn with nobler fire onward to press--to mount up higher and win the eternal life.[23] footnotes: [22] h.h. bancroft's _history of washington_. [23] anonymous, from _boston commonwealth_. general stevens's descendants. 1. hazard, born in newport, r.i., june 9, 1842. 2. julia virginia, born in newport, june 27, 1844, died in bucksport, me., december 7, 1845. 3. susan, born in bucksport, november 20, 1846; married richard isaac eskridge, united states army, in portland, oregon, october 27, 1870. 4. gertrude maude, born in bucksport, april 29, 1850. 5. kate, born in washington, d.c., november 17, 1852; married edward wingard bingham, in boston, mass., february 18, 1886. grandchildren, children of richard isaac eskridge and susan stevens eskridge. 1. maud, born at fort vancouver, washington territory, august 21, 1871; married edward pennington pearson, united states army, at fort reno, oklahoma territory, april 16, 1898. 2. richard stevens, born at yuma depot, arizona territory, october 24, 1872. 3. hazard stevens, born at yuma depot, february 24, 1874; died at fort d.a. russell, wyoming territory, october 12, 1874. 4. virginia, born at fort d.a. russell, march 2, 1875. 5. oliver stevens, born in boston, mass., october 12, 1876. 6. mary peyton, born at fort leavenworth, kansas, march 28, 1878; married charles mckinley saltzman, united states army, in boston, may 9, 1899. [illustration: the monument] appendix following are the marginal notes on the map of the indian nations and tribes of the territory of washington, and of the territory of nebraska west of the mouth of the yellowstone. sent to the hon. george w. manypenny, commissioner of indian affairs, with letter of this date. isaac i. stevens, _governor and supt. indian affairs_. olympia, washington territory, april 30, 1857. _tabular statement of the indians east of the cascade mountains, etc._ ------------------+-----------+-------+-----------------+---------------- name and date of |names of |popula-|reservations. |temporary treaties. |tribes. |tion. | |encampments. ------------------+-----------+-------+----------------+----------------- treaty with the |pisquouse. | 600 |simcoe and the |about 1500 yakima nation |yakimas. | 700 |adjoining | of these concluded at |pshawm | |country and | tribes are walla walla, | wappam. | 500 |forks of the | encamped in june, 1855. | | |we-nat-scha-pan,| the vicinity | | |or pisquouse | of simcoe | | |river. | river. |bands on | | |opposite the | columbia.| 1000 | | dalles, oregon. |klikitats. | 500 | |white salmon | | | | river. |palouses. | 600 | | | |-------| | | | 3900 | | | |-------| | | | | | walla walla |nez perces.| 3300 |on the snake | treaty, | | | and clearwater | concluded june, | | | rivers. | 1855. | | | | | | | | treaty with the |flatheads. | 500 |flathead river. | flathead nation |upper pend | | | concluded | oreilles.| 700 | | june, 1855. |kootenays. | 500 | | | |-------| | | | 1700 | | | |-------| | | | | | tribes with whom |coeur | 450 | | no treaties | d'alenes.| | | have been |lower pend | | | made. | oreilles.| 450 | | |colvilles. | 500 | | |okinakanes.| 600 | | |spokanes. | 1100 | | | |-------| | | | 3100 | | ------------------+-----------+-------+----------------+--------------- total number of indians east of the cascade mountains 12,000 treaties have been made with 8,900 number with whom treaties have not been made 3,100 largest number held on temporary reservations 3,000 written on upper central margin in governor stevens's handwriting:- total number of indians west of the cascade mountains 9,712 total number of indians east of the cascade mountains 12,000 total number of indians, territory of washington 21,712 treaties have been made with 17,497 treaties remain to be made with 4,215 _tabular statement of the indians west of the cascade mountains, showing tribes, population, parties to the several treaties, reservations provided for in the treaties, and temporary encampments._ ------------------+---------------+-------+------------------+--------------- name and date of |names of |popula-|reservations. |temporary treaties. |tribes. |tion. | |encampments. ------------------+---------------+-------+------------------+--------------- | | | | treaty of medicine|quaks-na-mish, | } |klah-che-min |klah-che-min creek, december |nisqually, | }1200 | island, | island. 26, 1854. |puy-all-up. | } |near mouth of | } | | | nisqually river. | } fox island. | | |near mouth of | } | | | puy-all-up river.| } | | | | treaty of |duwamish, | } |noo-soh-te-um, |dunginess point. point elliott, |suquamish, | } | near port | fort kitsap. january 22, 1855.|and allied | } 942 | madison, and | | tribes. | } | at muckleshoot. | | | | | |sno-qual-moo, | } |te-wilt-sch-da, |skagit head, on |sno-ho-mish, | } | north side | whitby island. |and allied | }1700 | sno-ho-mish | | tribes. | } | river. | | | | | |skagits and | } |s.e. end perry | | allied | }1300 | (or fidalgo) | | tribes. | } | island. | | | | | |lummi, | } |chah-choo-sa |penn's cove, on |nook-sahk, | }1050 | island, at mouth | whitby island. |sa-mish. | } | of lummi river. | | |-------| | | | 4992 | | | |-------| | | | | | treaty of |clallams, | 926 | } head of hood's | point-no-point, |skokomish, | 290 | } canal. | january 25, 1855.|chem-a-kum. | 100 | } | | |-------| | | | 1316 | | | |-------| | | | | | treaty of |ma-kahs. | 596 |cape flattery. | neah bay, | | | | january 31, 1855.| | | | | | | | | | |reservation to be | treaty of olympia.|quinaiult, | } | selected by the | |kwilleyute. | } 493 | president. | | | |quinaiult river | | | | and land set | | | | apart. | | | | | tribes with whom |lower | | | treaties have not| chehalis. | 217 | | been made. |upper | | |s.s. ford's on | chehalis. | 216 | | the chehalis | | | | river. | | | | |cowlitz and | | |near cowlitz | tia-tin-a-pan.| 240 | | landing. |lower | | |removed to | chinooks. | 112 | | white salmon. |upper | | |vancouver and | chinooks. | 330 | | cascades. | |-------| | | | 1115 | | ------------------+---------------+-------+------------------+-------------- total number of indians west of cascade mountains 9712 number with whom treaties have been made 8597 number with whom treaties have yet to be made 1115 largest number held on temporary reservations 5686 all have been assisted during the war. the parties to the treaties of neah bay and olympia, the lower chehalis and lower chinooks, have required but little assistance at the hands of the department. notes of the indians of the territory of nebraska between the rocky mountains and mouth of the yellowstone. the blackfoot nation are in four tribes, viz., piegans, bloods, blackfeet, gros ventres, and number 11,500 souls. the map shows the hunting-grounds, secured exclusively to the blackfeet in the treaty, at the mouth of the judith, concluded october 17, 1855; the hunting-ground common to the blackfeet and western indians, the blackfeet and assiniboines; the western and southern boundaries of the assiniboine country; and the western boundary of the crow country. the western indians, flatheads, pend oreilles, and a portion of the kootenays, generally make two hunts a year east of the rocky mountains, and they depend for their lodges, parfleches, apechinos, and much of their meat upon these hunts. they get some of their supplies by trade with the blackfeet. the indians of the western tribes, as the spokanes and coeur d'alenes, "go to buffalo," but not in as large numbers or with as much regularity as the preceding. the nez perces generally have a large camp--over one hundred lodges--either on the common hunting-grounds or in the crow country. their hunters always pass one winter, and sometimes two winters, in succession, east of the mountains before they return to their own country. census of the blackfoot nation. tribes. number of lodges. population. piegans. 340 3,150 bloods. 290 2,690 blackfeet. 290 2,690 gros ventres. 360 2,970 --- ----- 1280 11,500 index a company, dismissed for disobedience, ii. 250-253, 263. abaco island, bahamas, i. 101, 102. abernethy, alexander s., ii. 265, 317. academic board, west point, awards first place to cadet stevens, i. 59. acajete, i. 140. acapulco, i. 436. achilles, captain, ii. 169-171, 187. acquia creek, ii. 425, 430. active, coast survey steamer, ii. 185. adams, fort, at newport, i. 60, 61. adams, john quincy, i. 44, 73. adams, lieutenant, i. 113. adams, mount, i. 394. adams, thomas, i. 306; ii. 75, 92, 107, 108, 114. agnew, i. 444. ah-tah-nam, branch of yakima river, ii. 22, 160. alabama volunteers, i. 114. albany, me., i. 35, 86. alden, fort, ii. 184, 234. alden, james, captain, ii. 185. alexander, barton s., general, i. 28. alexander, head chief of pend oreilles, ii. 77; at flathead council, 82-89, 113, 114. alexandria and orange court house railroad, ii. 425. alexandria and warrenton turnpike, ii. 433, 435. allen, robert, general, i. 28. allen, william, colonel, ii. 481. almonte, mexican general, i. 203. al-pa-wha creek, ii. 70, 147. alvarado, mexico, i. 119. alvarez, mexican general, i. 168, 203. alvord, benjamin, general, ii. 25, 26, 207. amasoque, i. 141, 153. ambrose, flathead chief, ii. 85-87. amelia, lake, i. 304. american fur co., i. 287, 298, 302, 347; ii. 96, 97. american geographical and statistical society of new york, address before, by governor stevens, ii. 284. amissville, va., ii. 431. amman, daniel, captain, ii. 364. ampudia, mexican general, i. 126. anderson, george t., colonel, ii. 490. anderson, j. patten, i. 414; ii. 15. anderson, peter, i. 462. anderson, robert, colonel, ii. 469. andover, mass., i. 1, 2, 19, 35, 86, 227, 274; ii. 270. andover, me., i. 5, 6. andrew, john a., governor, offers regiment to governor stevens, ii. 319, 320, 499. andrews, colonel, i. 220. annapolis, ii. 340-342. anti-slavery society, isaac stevens bequeaths it $500, i. 10. appleton, d., & co., i. 300. archer, j.j. general, ii. 487. armour, robert, captain, ii. 497. armstrong, c.h., captain, ii. 168, 197. armstrong, captain, killed at molino del rey, i. 206. army, reorganization of, efforts to promote, i. 240, 259-263. army of virginia, ii. 427. arnold, daniel lyman, i. 307, 370; death of, ii. 420. arnold, lewis g., lieutenant, i. 60, 77. arnold, richard, lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 307, 370, 379, 380, 382; takes charge of wagon-road, 409, 422; ii. 27, 28. ashepoo river ii. 374, 379-381. ashley river, ii. 380. aspinwall, description of, i. 433, 434; ii. 270. assiniboine indians, meeting and talk with, i. 342-345, 347; ii. 115. atchison, camp, on milk river, i. 354. athsio, mexican village, i. 148. augusta, ga., ii. 381. ayotla, village in valley of mexico, i. 164, 166, 168, 224. ayres, captain, killed, i. 206. azotea, parapeted roof, i. 181. bache, alexander dallas; professor, i. 241, 242, 245-247, 250, 253, 254, 276-279, 281; remarks on major stevens, 284, 367; ii. 273, 319; letter to, giving views on military operation, 375, 499. bacon, john d., room-mate, i. 40, 58. bad lands, i. 350. bahama banks, i. 102. bahama islands, i. 101, 102. bailey, p., i. 468. bainbridge, captain, i. 137. baird, spencer f., professor, i. 276, 295, 299; ii. 273. baker, lieutenant, i. 221. balch, lafayette, i. 412, 468. bald hillock creek, i. 330. bald hill, ii. 435. baldwin, a.j., ii. 248. ball-in-the-nose, gros ventre chief, i. 356. ballard, john n., lieutenant, ii. 496, 497. baltimore, i. 250. baltimore democratic convention, ii. 304, 305. bangor, me., i. 95. banks, nathaniel p., ii. 299, 426-429, 432, 475, 494. barker, stephen, i. 35. barnes, dr., i. 219. barnes, ellis, i. 468. barnes, george a., i. 415; ii. 15, 224. barnett's ford, ii. 427, 428. barnwell island, ii. 357. barry, william f., general, i. 28. bartlett, w.h.c., professor, gives characteristics of general stevens, i. 41. bartow, general, ii. 435. battery island, ii. 381, 382. bay point, ii. 345, 347. bayly, george, i. 260. baynes, admiral, ii. 291, 292. bealton, va., ii. 426, 432. beam, george w., captain, ii. 169, 170. bear tracks, flathead chief, ii. 86. bear's coat, gros ventre chief, i. 356. bear's paw mountains, i. 359-361. beaufort, s.c., ii. 353; occupied by general stevens, 355. beaufort river, ii. 355, 358. beauregard, p.g.t., i. 28, 60, 111, 114, 122, 130, 165, 166, 169, 171; sketch of, 216. beauregard, fort, ii. 345. beauregard light infantry, ii. 392. beaver creek, i. 376. beaver lodge creek, i. 330. bee, general, ii. 435. belcher, h.g., lieutenant, ii. 370, 411, 488, 497. belen, gate to mexico, i. 207, 210. belfast, me., i. 68. belland, i. 306, 312. bell, john, ii. 305. bell's lake, i. 322. bellingham bay, i. 412; ii. 184, 267. belt mountains, i. 361. benham, henry w., captain, i. 28, 283, 284; general, ii. 383, 384, 386, 387, 392; general stevens's opinion of, 393, 394, 397, 399, 400, 409-411; sent north in arrest, i. 415, 420, 421. benjamin, lieutenant, wounded, i. 211. benjamin, samuel n., lieutenant, ii. 413, 425, 430, 449, 451, 478, 479, 483, 484, 492, 497. benny haven's restaurant, adjacent to west point, i. 50. benton, fort, i. 348; description of, 362, 375; ii. 94, 95, 120. berry islands, bahamas, i. 102. bevard, professor, french teacher at west point, i. 34, 39. biddle, henry j., rival classmate, i. 25, 31, 32, 35-37, 46. big blackfoot river, i. 385; ii. 93. big canoe, pend oreille chief, ii. 83, 84. big chestnut, camp of the, ii. 336-338. big folly creek, ii. 390, 391. big horn river, ii. 108. big muddy river, i. 352. big star, spokane chief, speech, ii. 138, 139. big top, gros ventre chief, i. 356. bigelow, d.r., i. 415; ii. 168. biles, james, i. 415. bird, james, ii. 101, 114. bird island, ii. 382. bird tail rock, i. 376; ii. 124. birney, david b., general, ii. 457, 488, 492, 497. bishop, david h., marries susan b. stevens, i. 68; announces her death, 77. bissel, lieutenant, i. 113. bissel, of illinois, i. 260. bitter root mountains, i. 380-382; ii. 75, 127. bitter root river, i. 379, 382, 386; ii. 75, 127. bitter root valley, i. 352, 364-382, 385. blackburn's ford, ii. 437, 439. blackfeet, description of, i. 348, 351, 352, 368, 370; talk with, 373, 374; ii. 99; governor stevens's opinion of, 105, 106; council and treaty, 112-119, 275. blackfoot council, i. 431; ii. 27, 58, 89, 112-119. blackfoot river, i. 377, 379. blackfoot trail, i. 376. black river, ii. 188. blaisdell, william, colonel, ii. 456. blanchet, father, i. 412, 443. blankenship, george, major, ii. 168, 170, 197. blue mountains, i. 402, 403; ii. 31. blood indians, i. 348, 351, 352; ii. 114, 505. blunt, simon f., captain, i. 269. bois de sioux river, i. 322-325. bolon, a.j., i. 416; ii. 26, 61, 67; murdered by indians, 121, 157. bonneville, colonel, i. 405. borup, dr., i. 313. boston, i. 1, 78, 82, 94-96. boston, steamship, ii. 359, 362. boston post, i. 271-273. boulieau, henry, i. 306, 312, 325, 329, 330, 341. boulieau, paul, i. 306, 314, 325, 329, 330. boutineau, pierre, i. 306, 310, 325, 329, 341. bowman, wagonmaster, i. 122-124. bow river, ii. 100. box elder creek, i. 360. boyce's field battery, ii. 409. braddock road, ii. 494. bradford, edward, i. 28. bragg, braxton, i. 28. branch, l.o.b., general, ii. 487-489, 495, 496. brannon, john m., general, i. 28. bratton, william, captain, ii. 170. breckinridge, john c. ii. 304. breckinridge, town, i. 320. brickyard creek, ii. 358. brent, captain, i. 438. bridges, i. 7. bristoe station, ii. 431, 433, 439. broad river, ii. 356, 374, 378. broad run, ii. 438. broadwell, i. 382. brockenbrough, j.m., colonel, ii. 487, 495, 496. broderick, john, ii. 270. brooke, lloyd, i. 403; ii. 32. brooklyn, visits navy yard, i. 36. brooks, charles m., i. 94. brooks, charles t., rev., i. 67; solemnizes marriage, i. 77; poem on death of julia, 92; ii. 499. brooks, lieutenant, i. 112. brooks, quincy a., i. 415; ii. 248. brown, i. 398. brown, b.f., i. 415. browne, j. ross, ii. 25, 28. buchanan, james, president, ii. 272, 300, 305, 312. buchanan, robert c., lieutenant-colonel, ii. 470. buck hill, ii. 435. bucksport, me., i. 84, 87-100; returns to, 233, 249, 265. budd, captain, ii. 364. buena vista, village of, valley of mexico, i. 164. buffalo, countless herds of, i. 328, 329; ii. 105. buffalo chips, i. 331. buford, john, general, ii. 428, 440, 454, 465. bull bay, ii. 379. bull run, ii. 434, 437. bull's head, blackfoot chief, ii. 101. bumford, i. 403; ii. 32. bunker hill, battle, i. 4, 5. bunting, joseph, ii. 241. burke, captain, killed, i. 184. burns, m.p., dr., ii. 168. burnside, ambrose e., general, ii. 320, 423, 424. burr, f.h., i. 306, 339, 340, 345. burntrager, david e., captain, ii. 169, 170. burt, representative, i. 257, 261. burwell, lieutenant, killed, i. 206. bush prairie, i. 412. bush, w.o., i. 412. butler, benjamin f., ii. 303. butler, colonel, killed, i. 182. butler, general, i. 107. butler, j.h., classmate, i. 31, 36. butte de morale, i. 337. butte micheau, i. 327. butterfield, daniel, general, ii. 454, 466, 468. byzantium, i. 139. cadotte's pass, i. 365, 378; ii. 93, 124. cadwallader, general, i. 150, 172, 173, 179, 205. cain, j., captain, i. 445; ii. 27, 208, 248, 257. calhoun guard, ii. 392. california, i. 233, 248, 252. callender, franklin d., i. 40, 41, 58, 116, 171, 172; wounded, 176, 209. cambridge, mass., i. 98. cameron, james, colonel, killed at bull run, ii. 321. cameron, simon, secretary of war, governor stevens tenders sword and services to, ii. 316, 322. camospelo, cuyuse chief, ii. 46, 214. campaigns of the rio grande and of mexico, i. 255, 256, 267, 268. campbell, archibald, ii. 277. campbell, colonel, i. 125. campbell, fort, i. 348, 363. campbell, l.m., marries elizabeth b. stevens, i. 82, 87; announces death of wife, 97. campbell's battery, ii. 442. canby, e.r.s., general, classmate, i. 27, 132. cañete, actress, i. 224. canning, john, ii. 70. cape fear river, i. 277. capron, captain, killed, i. 184. carcowan, chehalis chief, ii. 7. caribbean sea, i. 433. carpenter, stephen d., i. 40, 41, 58. carigan, sapper, burial of, remarks, i. 136. carr, joseph b., colonel, ii. 448, 456. carusi, jamaica negro innkeeper, i. 434, 435. casa mata, fort at molino del rey, i. 205. cascade range, i. 288, 394-396; snow, 408, 409; ii. 159. cascades of the columbia, 405; massacre, ii. 190. casey, silas, lieutenant-colonel, i. 208; ii. 172, 176, 185, 186, 188; governor stevens proposes joint movement across cascades, declined, 195; seeks to protect indian murderers, correspondence with governor stevens, 236-240, 243, 244, 292. cass, lewis, i. 236; secretary of state, governor stevens submits memoir to, against british exactions, ii. 281-283. castine, me., visits, i. 85. castoff, miss, boards with, in newport, i. 60. cathlamet, i. 411. catholic missionaries, not disturbed by hostiles, ii. 132, 255; governor stevens's opinion of, as neutrals, 228, 229. catlett's station, ii. 439. catlin, robert, ii. 301. catlin, seth, i. 411; ii. 317. causten, camp, ii. 325. caverly, mr. and mrs., ii. 371, 374. caversham, england, whence came john stevens in 1638, i. 2. cavilaer, i. 325. cedar mountain, battle of, ii. 426. cedar river, ii. 187. celeste, danced as usual, i. 36. centralia, i. 412. centreville, ii. 439, 445, 474, 477-480. cerro gordo, i. 122, 123; battle of, 124-128. cha-chu-sa island, i. 466, 468. chagres river, i. 335. chain bridge, ii. 327. chalco, lake, i. 163, 165; village, 167. chambers, andrew j., i. 412. chambers, david j., i. 412. chambers prairie, i. 412. chambers, thomas m., ii. 246. champagne, baptiste, i. 369, 375. chancellorsville, battle of, i. 83. chantilly, battle of, ii. 482-497. chapman, william, lieutenant-colonel, ii. 470. chapultepec, i. 163, 204, 205; battle of, 207-210. charles, pierre, ii. 169, 187, 257. charleston, campaign planned against, ii. 378-382; james island campaign against, 387-394; battalion, 381, 411, 412; riflemen, 392. charleston, democratic convention at, ii. 304. charlie, governor stevens's gray charger, i. 440; ii. 269. chase, henry m., ii. 169, 200. chasseurs, or 65th new york, ii. 329. chatfield, j.a., colonel, ii. 395. chehalis indians, i. 334; ii. 1-9, 187, 257; council, ii. 1-9; river, i. 412; ii. 1, 2, 10, 257; town, i. 441. chemakane mission, valley, i. 398, 399. chenoweth, f.a., judge, ii. 244, 249, 289. chicago, i. 302. childs, colonel, i. 214, 219, 221, 226. chim-a-kum indians, i. 469-473. chimalpa, i. 168. chinn hill and house, ii. 435, 470. chinn, major, ii. 147, 150. chinook indians, ii. 1-9, 23, 257. chinook jargon, i. 453; ii. 5. chippewa indians, i. 334; river, 321. chirouse, father, i. 403; ii. 37, 148. chisholm's island, ii. 356. chow-its-hoots, indian chief, i. 463, 466-468. christian mirror, newspaper, i. 84. christ, b.c., colonel, ii. 341, 343, 364, 388, 425, 484. christy's minstrels, i. 433, 435. church, a.e., professor, describes traits of general stevens, i. 41. church flats, ii. 379-381. churubusco, battle of, i. 180-186, 196-199; brought on by lieutenant stevens, 187, 188. cincinnati, i. 162. citadel hill or rock, i. 361; ii. 98. clallam or sklallam indians, i. 469. clark county rangers, ii. 169, 190. clark, frank, stirs up trouble leading to martial law, i. 242-245. clark, george t., major, i. 16, 430. clark, in charge of fort benton, i. 361. clark, owen, servant, i. 100, 101; deserts, 108. clark, sergeant of sappers, i. 136. clarke, colonel, i. 157, 182, 205, 206. clarke, nathan g., colonel, relieves general wool, ii. 266; recommends treaties, 285. clark's fork, ii. 79. clay, henry, i. 75, 248; view of, 252. clay-pipe-stem-carrier, gros ventre chief, i. 356. clendenin, j.v., i. 414. cline, captain, ii. 391. cloudy robe, gros ventre chief, i. 356. coast survey, accepts charge of office, i. 241; views of, 243, 244; reforms, 245-248, 250, 254; officers present silver service, 284. cobb, howell, ii. 306. cochichewick, stream in andover, i. 1; meadows, 5, 8; woolen mills, 16, 47. cock, henry d., i. 455-461. cock, william, colonel, i. 415; ii. 262-264. cockspur island, ii. 382. coe, ii. 153. coeur d'alene indians, i. 386-388, 390; ii. 16-23; present conditions, 64-72; wrestling match, 73, 74, 121, 127, 129, 130, 230, 231. coeur d'alene lake, i. 391. coeur d'alene mission, i. 389-391; ii. 72, 73, 129. coeur d'alene mountains, i. 387. coeur d'alene pass, i. 382, 387; ii. 127. coeur d'alene prairie, i. 391. coeur d'alene river, i. 391, 392; ii. 72, 75, 131. cogswell, william s., lieutenant, ii. 343, 363, 366. cold springs, i. 315. cole island, ii. 381. cole, lieutenant, ii. 170. collins, s.m., i. 468. colquitt, p.h., colonel, ii. 380. columbia river, i. 394, 405, 411, 438; ii. 153, 157, 269. columbus, tomb of, visited, i. 433. colville, i. 297, 393, 394, 396, 397. colville indians, ii. 22. colville valley settlements, i. 399. combahee river, ii. 376, 378, 379. commencement bay, i. 459, 462. conception, fort, at vera cruz, i. 110. confidence, ship of john stevens, i. 2. connecticut volunteers, 6th, i. 395. see 7th connecticut, rockwell's battery. connell's prairie, ii. 155; battle of, 186. conrad, charles m., secretary of war, rebukes political action, answered, i. 274, 275. constitution, fort, at portsmouth, n.h., i. 83. contreras, i. 169, 170; battle of, 171-179, 181, 192-195. cooper, j.g., dr., i. 296, 307; ii. 3. cooper's battery, ii. 469. coosaw river, ii. 355, 360, 361. coosawhatchie river, ii. 376, 379. corinth, ii. 380. corliss, george w., ii. 247. cortez, i. 161. cortez, steamship, ii. 317. coster, corporal, i. 312. coteau de missouri, i. 338-340, 345. cottrell, abraham, lieutenant, ii. 367, 372, 420. coues, samuel elliott, i. 83, 257. cowlitz indians, ii. 1-9, 187, 257, 269. cowlitz landing, i. 411, 439; ii. 28. cowlitz river, i. 405, 411, 412; canoeing up, 438; 439; ii. 28, 154, 187, 257. coxie, patrick, ii. 33. coyoacan, i. 180, 181, 202. cram, a.j., captain, ii. 276, 277. crane, colonel, i. 83. craig, captain, i. 173. craig, william, ii. 18, 33, 62, 67, 91, 92, 108, 109, 115, 117, 129, 130, 145-150, 168, 201, 203, 209, 220, 223, 230. crees, ii. 215. crockett, ii. 154. cromwell, oliver, lecture on, i. 76; view of, 230-232; ii. 333. crook, george, general, ii. 148. crosby, clanrick, i. 415. crosby, r.h., ii. 27, 32, 67, 72, 168. crow wing river, i. 316. crown butte, i. 376; ii. 124. crows, i. 347, 361, 362; ii. 108, 109, 115. cuapa, hacienda of, i. 169. cub run, ii. 477. culbertson, alexander, i, 302, 307, 347, 348, 359, 368, 370; ii. 114, 275, 276. cullum, g.w., general, i. 61, 260, 274, 275; ii. 424. culpeper court house, ii. 426. cumming, alfred, ii. 66, 94-96; arrogates authority, rebuked, 102, 103; stigmatizes country and indians, 103, 104, 114, 117-119, 149. cummings, asa, uncle, i. 12, 84, 85. cummings genealogy, isaac^1, john^2, abraham^3, joseph^4, thomas^5, asa^6, hannah (mother)^7, i. 12. cummings, hannah, wife of isaac, stevens (mother), i. 7-9; death, 15. cummings, john, uncle, warm welcome to, i. 86. cunningham, michael, servant, i. 160. curry, governor, ii. 284. cushman, joseph, i. 415. cushman, orrington, i. 415, 445, 455; ii. 3-5. cuyuses, ii. 16, 20, 21; at walla walla council, 36-64, 121, 144, 148, 150; take war path, 157, 158, 212; attack governor stevens, 221-223; turbulent warriors hanged by colonel wright, 231. cypress mountain, i. 359, 368. dale, eben, i. 99. dalles, i. 400, 405; ii. 28, 30, 151, 153, 197, 199, 206, 208, 257. dana, n.t.j., general, i. 28. danpher, matthew, ii. 32. daufuskie island, ii. 382. davidson, lieutenant, ii. 222. davies, professor, i. 44. davis, camp, i. 308, 310. davis, jefferson, i. 261, 281, 285; reports to, 287, 288, 422; order from, to stop survey, 423; disparages northern route, 427-430; answer to, 431; fault-finding, apologizes, 430; governor stevens reports to, ii. 209, 221-223, 227, 277, 287. davis, jefferson, revenue cutter, ii. 185. davis, robert, i. 468. dawkins branch, ii. 454. dead colt hillock line, i. 321. dearborn, orrin m., lieutenant, ii. 415, 484. dearborn river, i. 376; ii. 94, 124. decatur, u.s. man of war, ii. 107, 185. deficiency in funds, i. 366, 367, 423. de hart, lieutenant, i. 112. delacour, father, i. 325. de lacy, w.w., ii. 168. delaware jim, ii. 69, 70, 108, 115, 117, 124. de lein, dr., i. 218. democratic party, i. 260, 280; nominates governor stevens for delegate in congress, ii. 265; unanimously renominates him, 289; doctrines, 302. democratic convention at vancouver, governor stevens withdraws, his speech, i. 314-316. denig, mr., i. 345. denny, i. 412. denny, a.a., ii. 251-253, 265. de parris, william s., ii. 70. derby, george h., lieutenant, ii. 200. des chutes river, ii. 30, 152. detroit, i. 302. dialectic society, i. 38, 48, 49, 55, 57. dickinson, daniel l., ii. 303. difficult run, ii. 494. dilger, hubert, captain, ii. 451. dimick, i. 179. discover, gros ventre chief, i. 356. dix, john a., ii. 303, 312. dobbins, w., i. 415. dogan house, ii. 435. dominguez, chief of robbers, i. 149. donaldson, j.l., general, i. 27. donation act, i. 413; ii. 26, 162. donelson, a.j., lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 291, 297, 302, 307, 345, 350, 351, 364, 368, 370, 371, 378, 379, 382, 384, 400, 404, 406, 431. donelson, general, ii. 366. donelson, miss., ii. 284, 371, 373, 374. donohoe, michael t., captain, ii. 398. doty, james, i. 306, 308, 331, 371, 375, 422, 452, 458; ii. 26, 31, 47, 68, 70, 93, 95; recovers stolen horses, 100, 101, 114, 124, 126, 132, 151, 168, 248; death of, 268. doubleday, abner w., general, i. 27. douglass, james, sir, i. 418, 477; ii. 13, 14, 277, 290-293. douglass, stephen a., i. 260; ii. 302. downey, william r., ii. 246. doyle, richard n., ii. 402. drayton, percival, captain, ii. 346, 399. drayton, thomas f., general, ii. 346, 349. drum, i. 210; killed, 211. dry creek, ii. 70. dry tortugas, ii. 325. du berry, beekman, lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 291, 298, 306, 308, 314; leaves exploration, 217. duncan, colonel, i. 106, 120, 140, 141, 167, 181, 206, 212, 223. duncan, johnson k., lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 293, 296, 307, 394. duncan, of haverhill, i. 243. dunn, john, ii. 262. dunnells, i. 77. dupont, samuel f., commodore, ii. 343; capture of port royal, 346-348, 358, 379, 382. duwhamish indians, i. 463-469; ii. 161-192, 256. duwhamish river. see white river. dwight, lieutenant, ii. 457. dyer, alexander b., i. 27. eagle-from-the-light, nez perce chief, speech at walla walla council, ii. 48-50; presents his medicine bear-skin to governor stevens, 58; signs treaty, 63, 92, 107, 202, 214. eagle, gros ventre chief, i. 355, 356. earl, lieutenant-colonel, i. 114. early, jubal a., i. 27; ii. 457, 458, 462, 487, 490, 495, 496. eastern view, ii. 430. eaton, charles h., ii. 170. eaton, nathan, i. 412. ebey, isaac n., ii. 170; murdered by northern indians, 259. edisto island, ii. 382, 383. eggers, albert, ii. 168. eighth infantry, i. 172. eighth massachusetts battery, ii. 425. eighth michigan volunteers, ii. 341-343, 359-366, 372, 374, 389; battle of james island, 402-415, 425; battle of chantilly, 484, 495. elbow lake, i. 322. eldredge, edward, i. 412. eells, c., missionary among spokanes, i. 398; ii. 22. eleventh infantry, i. 170. elk river, ii. 100. ellen, gunboat, ii. 364, 408. ellen, nurse, i. 433. elliott, point, treaty of, i. 462-469. elliott, samuel m., lieutenant-colonel, ii. 322, 324. elliott, william st. george, major, ii. 359, 364, 377, 474. el pinal, i. 138, 140, 153. el soldado, mexican village, i. 137. ely, ralph, captain, ii. 377, 378. emerson, ralph waldo, lectures, i. 81. emigrants, circular letter to, ii. 274. encerro, santa anna's hacienda, i. 126, 129. en-cha-rae-nae creek, i. 401. en-chush-chesh-she-luxum, lake, i. 401. endicott, william, i. 16. engineer company, advocates, i. 93; enlists first man, private lothrop, 94, 118, 119, 139, 140, 164, 167, 171. english cemetery, city of mexico, i. 210. ensign, lewis, ii. 248. ensign, shirley, i. 415. ernst, lieutenant, i. 112. eskridge, richard i., colonel, u.s.a., married susan stevens; their children, maud, richard stevens, hazard stevens, virginia, oliver, mary peyton, ii. 502. esquimault harbor, ii. 291. ethan allen, fort, ii. 328. eustis, henry l., general, i. 27. evans guards, ii. 392. evans, elwood, i. 306, 328, 375; ii. 245, 246, 248, 261, 266. evans, john, dr., i. 287, 296, 302, 307, 351, 364. evans, n.g., general, ii. 381, 411, 412, 450, 460. evelyn, mr., i. 306. everett, edward, ii. 302. everett, t.s., i. 106, 308, 311. ewell, richard s., general, i. 27, 183; ii. 431, 433, 438, 441, 442, 446, 457, 487. ewen, camp, ii. 322. fairhaven, mass., takes charge of battery, i. 76, 80. falls church, ii. 330. farnsworth, addison, colonel, ii. 425, 452, 459, 466. faugh-a-ballagh, "clear the way," designation of 28th massachusetts, ii. 452. fay, r.c., ii. 256. fayetteville, va., ii. 432. fenton, william, colonel, ii. 341, 361, 395, 402, 403. fernandina, fla., ii. 357, 382. ferrero, edward, general, ii. 489. fessenden, w.p., senator, ii. 386. field, charles w., general, brigade, ii. 487, 495, 496. field, h., ii. 208. fifteenth infantry, i. 173. fiftieth pennsylvania volunteers, ii. 341, 359-366, 388, 389, 421, 425; battle of chantilly, 484, 485, 495. first artillery, i. 114, 156, 180, 181, 184, 210, 211. fitzhugh, e.c., ii. 158, 205, 253. fitzwater, killed, i. 169. five crows, cuyuse chief, ii. 51, 52, 61, 121. flathead indians, i. 348; talk with, 381, 382, 384; ii. 16, 22, 23; manner of ferrying across rivers, 77, 79, 80; council and treaty, 80-91; present condition, 91, 92, 99, 107, 114, 115, 125. flathead lake, i. 382. flathead river, ii. 80, 90. flathead trail, i. 376. flattery, cape, i. 473, 474, 477. flette, john, ii. 33. flint hill, va., ii. 494. floyd, john b., secretary of war, ii. 287. folsom, captain, i. 425, 437. forbes, john m., ii. 371. forbes, william h., ii 371. ford, sidney s., judge, i. 412, 441-443; ii. 168, 257. ford, sidney s., jr., ii. 1, 3, 68, 70, 73, 132, 151, 169, 185, 187, 200, 255, 256. forts, stockades, and blockhouses built: thirty-five by volunteers, ii. 234; twenty-three by settlers, 235; seven by regulars, 235. forty-sixth new york, ii. 390; battle of james island, 402-415, 425, 426, 449, 450, 484, 495. foster, john g., general, i. 112, 119, 131, 172, 178; wounded, 205, 224; letter from, 227, 250; on coast survey, 275, 277, 409. foster, susan, i. 15. fourcier, louis, ii. 70. fourteen years' bill, carried, i. 257-259. fourth infantry, i. 114, 164. fowler, e.s., i. 454, 468. fowler, professor, phrenologist, i. 60, 265. fowler, william h., lieutenant, i. 83. fox island, council at, ii. 192; reservation, 256. franklin academy, i. 15. franklin, william b., general, corps, ii. 476, 494. fraser river, ii. 293. fraser, james l., colonel, ii. 359. fredericksburg, ii. 425. fremont, john c., ii. 270. french, mr., ii. 385. french, william h., general, i. 27; remarks on general stevens's reconnoissance of the peñon, i. 186. frontera, mexican general, killed, i. 173. fruitvale farm, battlefield of chantilly, ii. 483. fry, dorothy, wife of captain james, i. 3. fuca, strait of, i. 473, 477. fuller, charles a., captain, ii. 366, 372. fuller, of maine, i. 260. fuller, w.j.a., ii. 371, 375, 376. gaines, major, i. 165. gainesville, va., ii. 431, 433, 439-441. galena, i. 303. gallicer, first mate bark prompt, i. 99. gansevoort, g., captain, ii. 167; punishes northern indians, 258, 259. garden's corners, ii. 357, 365. gardiner, j.w.t., captain, detailed on exploration, i. 293, 298, 306. gardner, major, i. 164. gardner, port, i. 468. garfielde, selucious, ii. 265, 280, 314, 316. garland, colonel, i. 139, 140, 142, 169, 205, 206, 211. garnett, major, ii. 195, 225, 230. garnett, m.r.h., ii. 280. garrison, mayor of san francisco, i. 425. garry. see spokane garry. gazzoli, père, i. 388. genette, frank, ii. 70. george's island, boston harbor, i. 57. georgia, gulf of, ii. 13. georgia volunteers, 13th, ii. 372, 374, 398; 47th and 51st, i. 412. germanna ford, ii. 427. germantown, ii. 481. getty, george w., general, i. 28; ii. 454. gholson, r.d., governor, ii. 293, 294. gibbon, john, general, ii. 63, 441, 442, 459. gibbs, george, i. 307, 394, 416, 445, 453-457; ii. 3, 5, 245, 246. gibson, a.a., lieutenant, i. 277. gibson, edward, ii. 158. giddings, edward, i. 456. gideonites, ii. 369, 370. giles, henry, lecturer, i. 93. gilfillan, charles d., ii. 299. gilmer, jeremy f., classmate, i. 27, 58, 77, 226, 235. gilmore, q.a., general, ii. 350, 357, 382. goff, francis m.p., ii. 169, 171, 187, 197, 200, 201, 210, 214, 222. golden age, steamship, i. 436; ii. 269. golden gate, steamship, ii. 269. goldsborough, h.a., i. 415, 445, 453; ii. 245, 246. goliah, chief, i. 463, 466. goodell, j.w., ii. 249. goodell, w.b., i. 412. goose's neck, i. 376. gosnell, wesley, ii. 169, 187, 255, 257. goudy, george b., ii. 170. gove, warren, ii. 168. governor, the, steamship, ii. 345. gracie, archibald, lieutenant, ii. 29, 33, 66. grafton, i. 37. graham, lieutenant, wounded, i. 183. graham, major, i. 112, 170. graham, william m., i. 302, 307. graham, william m., captain, ii. 470. grainger, robert s., general, i. 28. grand mound prairie, i. 412. grande ronde, battle at, ii. 201, 202. grant, u.s., general, ii. 303. graves, frank, lieutenant-colonel, ii. 395, 402. gray, i. 341. gray's harbor, ii. 1. great britain, ii. 12, 13. great northern railroad, i. 320, 380, 395. great pond, north andover, i. 5, 8; ducking in, 47. great republic, ship, ii. 344, 345. great salt lake, i. 422. green river, ii. 184, 187. greene, charles g., i. 273. greene, william b., i. 37, 58. greenwich, ii. 433. gregg, maxcy, general, ii. 487, 495, 496. griffin, charles, captain, ii. 329-331, 463. grimball's plantation, ii. 390. grinnell, joseph & co., i. 420. gros ventres, i. 347, 348, 355; council with, 356-358, 362; ii. 99, 109, 114. grover, cuvier, lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 293, 298, 306, 308, 312, 314, 319-321, 345, 351, 355, 359, 364, 370, 372; winter trip, fort benton to olympia, 422; ii. 448, 455, 456. grover, lafayette, ii. 296. groveton, ii. 436, 438, 440, 441, 449, 450, 452. guadalupe, fort, in puebla, i. 144. guadalupe, mexico, i. 163, 214. gulf stream, i. 100. guthrie, camp, i. 327, 328. guy, i. 329, 338. gwin, william, senator, i. 269, 437; ii. 298. hahd-skus, treaty of, on point-no-point, i. 469-473. halbert, i. 38. hale, c.h., i. 415. hale, frank, ii. 70. hale, gunboat, ii. 408. hale, john p., senator, ii. 320, 386. hal-hal-tlos-sot. see lawyer. hall, fort, i. 422. hall, joseph, ii. 367. hall, j.h., i. 468. halleck, henry w., general, classmate, rival, i. 26, 27, 31, 35-37, 58, 71, 72, 75, 80; letter to, 420; letter from, 420, 425; ii. 303, 424. haller, granville o., major, ii. 28, 29, 121, 157, 158, 207, 294. hamilton, john, captain, ii. 395, 409. hamilton, schuyler, general, i. 28. hamlin, i. 243. hammell, augustus, i. 368, 369. hammond, dr., i. 436. hampshire, england, i. 1. hampton roads, ii. 423. hancock, united states warship, ii. 258. hancock, w.s., general, ii. 333. hardcastle, lieutenant, i. 113. hardee, william j., i. 28, 260. harned, benjamin, ii. 261. harney, william s., colonel, i. 125, 126, 153, 167; general harney placed in command in oregon and washington, ii. 283, 284, 288; orders captain pickett to san juan, 290; reinforces him, 291-295. haro, canal de, ii. 13. harris, major, i. 83. haskin, joseph p., lieutenant, i. 114, 116, 132, 173. hassard, nicholas, i. 63. hastings, l.b., i. 412. hatch, rufus, general, ii. 441, 460, 466, 468. hathaway, m.r., ii. 168, 200. hatteras, cape, storm off, ii. 270. havana, i. 433. haverhill, mass., i. 1, 35. hawk, isaac, i. 415. hawley, joseph r., lieutenant-colonel, ii. 395, 402, 405, 407, 414. hayes, john l., i. 83, 257; ii. 273, 282, 498. hayes, william, general, i. 28. hays, fort, i. 185, 234. hays, gilmore, i. 414; ii. 158, 168-171, 186; resigns, 189. hays, harry t., general, ii. 487, 490, 495, 496. hays, isaac, ii. 170. haymarket, va., ii. 440. hazard, benjamin, i. 63-65, 70, 71; death, 77. hazard, daniel l., i. 303; ii. 288, 289. hazard, emily l., i. 65, 94. hazard, harriet (_née_ lyman), i. 65, 91. hazard, harriet l., i. 67. hazard, margaret l., i. 63, 64, 67, 79, 81, 87, 96. hazard, mary w., i. 65, 94, 95, 276. hazard, mrs., i. 232. hazard, nancy, i. 87, 91, 95, 96, 268, 269. hazard, thomas g., i. 91, 266, 267. hazen, nathan w., i. 19, 20, 22, 48, 71. hazlett, charles e., captain, ii. 469. head, j.c., i. 415. heath family, ii. 483. hebert, paul o., i. 58. heffron, h.g., lieutenant, ii. 425, 474, 475. heintzelman, samuel p., general, ii. 430, 462, 463, 481. hell gate, i. 379; ii. 93, 125. hell gate river, ii. 93. hell gate ronde, i. 379; ii. 92. henness, b.l., captain, ii. 169, 170, 186, 197. henry hill, ii. 435, 470. henry, joseph, professor, i. 276; ii. 273. henry, lake, i. 315. herrera, mexican peace commissioner, i. 203. hewett, c.c., captain, ii. 170, 245. hicks, urban e., i. 412. higgins, c.p., i. 306, 422, 444; ii. 31, 48, 68, 70, 77, 108, 109, 131, 132, 169. higginson, henry l., major, ii. 389. hilgard, h.e., professor, i. 277. hill, a.p., general, ii. 438, 446, 458, 487, 493, 495, 496. hill, d.h., i. 27. hill, humphrey, ii. 168. hillsborough, n.c., i. 274. hilton head, ii. 345, 350-352, 382. hitchcock, c.m., dr., i. 436, 463. hitchcock, e.a., colonel, i. 150, 257. hodges, henry c., lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 307. hodgdon, stephen, i. 412. hoecken, father, ii. 85, 90. hoffman, lieutenant, killed, i. 184. holbrook, andrew j., lieutenant, ii. 366. holt, abiel, i. 13. holt, joseph, ii. 303, 312, 318. hood, john b., general, ii. 448, 450, 460. hood river, ii. 153. hooker, joseph, general, i. 27, 83; ii. 430, 432-434, 439, 445, 448, 460, 464, 481. hope, camp, ii. 325. horn, cape, i. 300; ii. 153. horse butte, i. 327. horse plains, ii. 79. horton, w.h., ii. 266. hough, f.o., i. 462. howard, o.h., lieutenant, ii. 408. howard, o.o., general, ii. 63. howe, a.w., general, i. 28. howe, samuel d., captain, ii. 169, 171, 188. how-lish-wam-poo, cuyuse chief, ii. 148. hoyt, o.s., i. 307. huger, eustis, ii. 168. hughes, c., ii. 70. hudson bay company, i. 281, 285, 297; governor stevens reports on claims, 297; ii. 13; people not molested by hostile indians, 132, 225; governor stevens's opinion of, as neutrals, 229; ex-employees ordered to settlements, imprisoned, tried, 242-249; claim san juan, 289; exactions of, 281, 282. huet, charles, i. 389. humber, i. 37. humphreys, a.a., captain, i. 241, 244, 246; ii. 277, 309. hunt, e.b., lieutenant, i. 277. hunt, h.j., general, classmate, i. 27, 60, 77, 106; general stevens's sense of justice, 188, 210, 212; army reforms, 240, 259; letter to, 260; jefferson davis and governor stevens, 427, 428. hunter, david, general, ii. 383-386, 393, 399, 420, 421. huntington family, i. 412. hunton, eppa, general, ii. 460. hurd, james k., ii. 168. hurd, jared s., i. 415; ii. 168. hurd, m., i. 415. hydah indians, i. 452. hyde, breed n., colonel, ii. 329. indian affairs, commissioner of, reports to, ii. 91, 227-230, 271-273. indian councils and treaties: she-nah-nam, i. 456-462; point elliott, 463-468; point-no-point, 469-473; neah bay, 473-477; chehalis, quinaiult, ii. 1-9; walla walla, 34-65; flathead, 81-91; blackfoot, 107-119; spokane, 133-140; nez perce, 143, 144; fox island, 192; klikitat, 208; second walla walla, 210-220; treaties confirmed, 285. indian policy, governor stevens's, i. 448-450, 454, 455. indian tribes. see map, ii. 16; appendix, 503-505, and following:- east of rocky mountains, assiniboines, in four bands of blackfeet, bloods, piegans, and gros ventres; chippewas, crees, crows, sioux, winnebagoes. tribes of rocky mountains, flatheads, pend oreilles, kootenays. tribes of upper columbia, nez perces, cuyuses, umatillas, walla wallas, coeur d'alenes, spokanes, yakimas, palouses, klikitats, snakes. tribes of puget sound, nisquallies, puyallups, duwhamish, snohomish, clallams, chimakums, skokomish, makahs. tribes of coast, quinaiults, quillehutes, chehalis, chinooks, cowlitz. northern indians, hydahs. indian war, causes of, ii. 25, 26, 163. indian war debt, ii. 296; paid by congress, 306-308. indiana, 19th regiment volunteers, ii. 329, 330. ingalls, mary, wife of joseph, i. 3. ingalls, rufus, captain, ii. 296. ingraham, sampson, i. 269. ip-se-male-e-con or spotted eagle, nez perce chief, i. 58. see spotted eagle. ireland, david, captain, ii. 335. irish volunteers, ii. 392. irons, lieutenant, killed, i. 184. irvin, colonel, i. 224. irwin, lieutenant, ii. 362. istacalco, i. 207. ives, robert, captain, ii. 482, 483. iztaccihuatl, mountain in mexico, i. 159. jack, i. 393. jackson club, i. 269. jackson, fort, near savannah, i. 230. jackson, j.h., colonel, ii. 395. jackson, john r., i. 411, 440; ii. 170. jackson, thomas j., general, ii. 426, 427, 431, 434, 438, 441, 446, 452, 462, 468, 471, 475, 479, 480; battle of chantilly, 487-496. jacksonville, fla., ii. 357. jacques river, i. 330. jalapa, i. 123, 126, 129, 130; description of, 132, 133. james island, ii. 380-388; campaign, 390-399; battle of, 399-415. james, nez perce chief, ii. 63, 217. james or jacques river, i. 277, 320, 330, 331. james river, va., ii. 423. jameson, mr., i. 201. jamestown, i. 320. janney, mrs., i. 226, 264, 265. jefferson, va., ii. 431. jekelfaluzy, a., i. 306, 317. jennings, i. 38, 48. jessie, lake, i. 328, 329. jesuit missionaries, ii. 21, 22. juan el diablo, don, i. 225. judith river, ii. 98; blackfoot council at mouth of, 110-116. julia, steamer, ii. 292. justice, jefferson, lieutenant, ii. 415. jocko river, i. 381, 384, 385; ii. 79. john, captain, nez perce chief, ii. 129, 152, 201. john day's river, ii. 30. john taylor, snohomish chief, ii. 169. johnson bradley, t., general, ii. 438, 440, 468. johnson, bushrod, i. 27. johnson, edward, i. 27. johnson, fort, ii. 387. johnson, john, ii. 70. johnson, mr., i. 36. johnson, t. preston, lieutenant, killed, i. 172, 184. johnson, walter w., ii. 284. johnson, w.r., mrs., ii. 284, 371, 373, 374. jones, camp at west point, i. 36. jones, david r., general, ii. 450, 490. jones, gabriel, i. 412. jones island, ii. 382. jones, james, colonel, ii. 365. jordan, captain, ii. 206. jordan, lieutenant, i. 112. joseph, coeur d'alene guide, ii. 67. joseph, nez perce chief, ii. 58, 63, 202, 217 kalorama hill, near georgetown, d.c., ii. 325. kam-i-ah-kan, head chief of yakimas, ii. 27, 38; at walla walla council, 40; speech, 48, 51-53; signs treaty, 55-57; chief instigator to war, 61, 64, 121, 157, 211, 218, 223. kane, p.c., colonel, ii. 395. kearny, philip, general, i. 155, 170, 183; ii. 430, 434, 439, 445, 448, 457, 458, 462, 464, 473, 475; at battle of chantilly, 488; death, 490, 491. kelley, mrs., i. 257. kelly, james k., colonel, ii. 144, 160. kelly, william, captain, ii. 169, 190. kemble, george s., dr., ii. 343. kemper, james l., general, ii. 450, 460. kendall, b.f., i. 306, 311, 312, 317, 325, 332; 375; ii. 245, 246, 248. kendrick, captain, i. 113, 259. kendrick, david, i. 412. kennedy, h., ii. 95. kerns's battery, ii. 469. kincaid, william m., ii. 246. king, rufus, general, ii. 439, 441-443, 453, 454, 459, 460, 463, 464. kip, lawrence, ii. 29, 33, 60, 61. kirby, major, i. 224. kirkham, ralph w., general, i. 28. kiser, benjamin, ii. 92, 115, 117. kitchelus, lake, i. 408. kittson, i. 325. klady, samuel, i. 462. klah-she-min or squaxon island, i. 458. klikitat prairie, ii. 187. klikitat river, i. 208. klikitats, i. 452; ii. 22, 190, 208, 257. knox, fort, opposite bucksport, me., buys land for, i. 84; constructs, 85-100, 265; resumes charge of, 283; relinquishes, 283; ii. 309. knox, mr., buys house, i. 272. knoxville, tenn., i. 35; ii. 413. koh-lat-toose, palouse chief, ii. 72. koltes, john a., colonel, ii. 470. koos-koos-kin, or clearwater river, ii. 18, 141, 145. kootenay indians, ii. 17, 22, 77, 79, 80. kossuth, louis, i. 269. la frambois, i. 306, 329, 338. la hoya, mexico, i. 137, 156. la vega, mexican general, i. 129. las vegas, mexican village, i. 137, 138, 207. lakeman, moses b., colonel, ii. 497. lamar, fort or battery, ii. 396; assault on, 400-416. lamar, t.g., colonel, ii. 403, 411, 412. ladies' island, ii. 354. ladd, alexander, i. 83. ladd, w.s., ii. 266. lambert, john, i. 306. lambert river, i. 318. lancaster, columbia, i. 411; elected delegate in congress, 418, 432; ii. 15. lander, edward, judge, i. 414; ii. 169, 171, 188; arrested and taken off bench, 244; holds court in olympia, issues writs, again arrested, held prisoner to end of war, 247, 248; fines governor stevens $50, 249, 251-253. lander, frederick w., i. 295, 298, 299, 306, 308, 314, 319, 321, 325, 326, 330-332, 338, 345, 350, 355, 359, 365, 368-370, 372, 380, 381, 383, 384; ordered to examine nahchess pass; fails, 405, 406. lander's fork, ii. 125. lake george, n.y., i. 3, 4. lame bull, blackfoot chief, ii. 100. lane, joseph, general, i. 221, 300, 432; ii. 273, 298; nominated for vice-president, 304; his chances, 306, 313. lansdale, r.h., dr., i. 385; ii. 26, 33, 68, 70, 92, 125, 127, 209. lansing, arthur b., lieutenant, i. 60. lapwai, ii. 18, 142, 145. lathrop, i. 100, 264. lawrence, mass., i. 1. lawton, a.r., general, ii. 446, 457, 458, 487, 495, 496. lawton, robert r., colonel, i. 106. lawyer, hal-hal-tlos-sot, head chief of nez perces, ii. 18; at walla walla council, 35-64; moves lodge in governor stevens's camp, 47; speech, 51, 54; advises governor stevens, 56-58, 71, 146, 202, 210, 217, 218. le bombard, alexis, guide, i. 337, 338. le favre, captain, ii. 343. leake's virginia battery, ii. 365. lear, mr., ii. 208. leasure, daniel, colonel, ii. 340-342, 359, 364, 395, 402, 406, 425, 458. lecky, david a., major, ii. 395, 402, 484. lee, john e., i. 233, 269. lee, robert e., general, i. 109, 111, 114, 117, 121, 122, 130, 139, 141, 142, 144, 149; reconnoitres the peñon, 164-166, 169, 170; at contreras, 171, 172, 174, 175, 179, 180; important services, 185; sketch of, 194 216, 250, 255; ii. 376, 377, 380, 427, 431, 460, 479. legareville, ii. 390, 393, 394. lemere, joseph, ii. 70. leschi, i. 461; ii. 184, 208, 225, 236, 238; hanged, 240. lewinsville, va., reconnoissance, ii. 329-332. lewis and clark, i. 348, 378, 379. lewis and clark's pass, ii. 93. lewis, mr., i. 307. lewis, père, i. 397. lewis river, i. 411. lighthouse board, i. 271. lightning lake, i. 316, 318. lilly, william, captain, ii. 343, 372. lincoln, abraham, president, nominated, ii. 305; elected, 306; governor stevens calls upon, 319, 332, 334, 340. lincoln, lieutenant, i. 114. lindner, sergeant, i. 322, 330. lispenard, george, ii. 367. little dog, blackfoot chief, i. 368; ii. 100, 114. little muddy river, i. 351. little river turnpike, ii. 479, 481, 497. little soldier, gros ventre chief, i. 355. little white calf, gros ventre chief, i. 356. lobos island, mexico, i. 105, 106. lock's ford, ii. 437, 475. logan, john a., general, ii. 304. logan, private, remarks on death of, i. 276. long island sound, i. 78. longstreet, james, i. 27; ii. 413, 427, 431, 434, 440, 448, 450-452, 454, 460, 462, 466; his attack, ii. 469-471, 475, 479, 490, 496. looking glass, war chief of nez perces, ii. 54-58, 92, 129, 130; treachery discovered, 133, 143, 144, 202. loring, george b., i. 16. l'orme, de, governor, red river hunters, i. 340, 341. louisburg, i. 3. louisiana volunteers, 4th, ii. 409, 411. lovell, mansfield, i. 28. low, j.m., i. 412. lowell, mass., i. 68. low horn, piegan chief, i. 374; ii. 99. lugenbeel, major, ii. 206. lummi indians, ii. 256. lummi river, i. 468. lupton, major, ii. 200, 201. lusk, william t., ii. 343, 368, 459, 482, 483, 485, 497. lyman, daniel, colonel, i. 65. lyman, harriet, i. 65. lymans, i. 77. lyon, nathaniel, general, i. 28. lyons, benjamin r., lieutenant, ii. 366, 372, 402, 405, 406; death of, 415. maryland volunteers, 2d, ii. 457. macfeely, robert, lieutenant, i. 307, 370, 393. madison, port, i. 468; ii. 256. maginn, i. 389. magruder, john b., captain, i. 114, 171, 172, 176, 211. maine, i. 3, 5. maine volunteers, i. 209; 6th regiment, ii. 332; 3d and 4th, 488, 495. maison du chien, i. 338. makah indians, treaty with, i. 473-477. major tompkins's steamer, i. 413, 462. malinche, mountain in mexico, i. 159. maloney, maurice, captain, ii. 158, 207. manassas gap railroad, ii. 434. manassas junction, ii. 431, 434, 435, 439. mansfield joseph, k.f., colonel, i. 230, 237, 255; ii. 285. man-who-goes-on-horseback, gros ventre chief, i. 356. maple river, i. 326. marble ridge farm, stratagem against indians, i. 7. marcy, camp, i. 319. marcy, william l., secretary of state, i. 285; ii. 250. marias pass, i. 380, 381, 384. marias river, i. 361, 362, 369, 370. marion rifles, ii. 392. marsh, edwin, i. 415. martial law, ii. 240-250, 263. martin, augustus p., captain ii. 463. mason, charles h., i, 414, 456, 461, 462, 464; ii. 123, 158, 159, 165, 257, 258; death of, 289. mason, james l., i. 60-64, 66, 67, 77, 81, 105, 106, 108, 111, 113, 114, 117, 119, 122, 130, 138, 144; reconnoitres the peñon, 164-167, 169-171, 182, 201; wounded, 205, 216; sketch of, 217, 232, 255, 274, 425. mason, jeremiah, i. 71. massachusetts, u.s. war-ship, ii. 185, 252, 258. massachusetts volunteers, 1st cavalry, ii. 367, 389; 28th regiment, 390; 1st, 11th, and 16th, 455, 456; 21st, 470, 489-491, 495. matthews, joseph, ii. 367. matthias, frank, ii. 168. maxon, h.j.g., major, ii. 168, 171, 186, 187, 197, 242. maynard, d.s., dr., i. 412, 465, 466; ii. 256. maynard, mr., i. 45. mcalister, james, i. 412, 462. mcalister, john w., i. 462. mcbane, i. 403. mccafferty, green, ii. 3, 151. mccaw, s., ii. 246. mcclary, fort, at portland, me., i. 83. mcclellan, george b., general, i. 111, 130, 141, 142, 166, 171, 172, 180; asks aid, 238, 260, 263, 264; governor stevens applies for, 288; letter to, 289, 293, 295-297, 299, 307, 394; his exploration of cascade passes, 394-400, 404, 406; ordered to run line to snoqualmie pass, 406; his failure, 407-409; disparages settlers, 410; commended by secretary jefferson davis, 429; ii. 325, 328, 332; keeps back general stevens's appointment as brigadier-general, 334, 336; general stevens condemns mcclellan's management, and foretells disaster, 339, 340, 427. mcclelland, camp, i. 326. mcclelland, robert, secretary of the interior, i. 286. mcclure, charles, colonel, ii. 494. mccorkle, w.a.l., captain, ii. 170. mccown, john p., i. 28. mcdonald, in charge of fort colville, i. 393, 394, 397, 398; ii. 133. mcdonough or caamano island, i. 409. mcdowell, irvin c., general, i. 28; ii. 319, 427, 430, 432-434, 439, 440, 444, 453-455, 459, 462-464, 481, 494. mcfarland, aunt, i. 68. mcfield, john, ii. 243. mckay, william c., ii. 32, 170. mckensie, captain, i. 113, 208, 213. mckensie, patrick, ii. 33. mckenzie, fort, i. 370. mckinstry, justus, general, i. 28. mclaws, lafayette, i. 28. mclean, nathaniel c., general, ii. 447, 448, 465, 469, 470. mclean, william, lieutenant, ii. 329, 331. mcleod, john, ii. 243, 247, 249. mcmullin, fayette, governor, ii. 268. mcwillie senator, i. 257. meade, george g., general, ii. 440, 469, 470. meeker, e.m., ii. 246. meiggs, montgomery c., general, i. 27, 258. menetrey, father, ii. 89. menoc, i. 306, 311, 312, 329. meredith, solomon, colonel, ii. 329. merrill, captain, killed, i. 206. merrimac river, mass. i. 1. merton, w.b., lectures in bucksport, i. 93. metcalf, e., major, ii. 395. metsic, indian hunter, i. 98. mexicalcingo, town in valley of mexico, i. 165, 166. mexican congress, i. 151. mexican gulf, i. 102; norther in, 104. mexican war justified, i. 232, 273; work on 250, 255, 256; ripley's history, 254. mexico, i. 91. mexico, city of, defenses of, i. 154, 163; capture, 213-215; condition of, 222. micheau, butte, i. 327. michelle, head chief of koo-te-nays, ii. 77; at flathead council, 84, 88. michigan. see 8th regiment volunteers. miles, general, ii. 63. milk creek, scene of walla walla council, ii. 31, 218. milk river, i. 353-355, 361, 362. millard, justin, ii. 168. millard, m.b., ii. 168. miller, bluford, captain, ii. 169, 171, 187, 197; arrests judge lander, 248. miller, general, i. 45. miller, w.w., general, ii. 168, 193; appointed superintendent of indian affairs, 307, 313. milroy, robert h., general, ii. 446, 447, 451, 452, 470. minot, i. 320. minter, j.f., i. 307, 398-400, 406. minton, john r., i. 116. missionaries, catholic, not disturbed by hostiles, ii. 132, 225; governor stevens's opinion of, as neutrals, 228, 229. mississippi river, i. 288, 302, 303, 308-310, 353. missoula, town, river, valley, i. 379; ii. 93. missouri, coteau du, i. 338-340, 345. missouri river, i. 297, 302, 345, 362. mitchell, joseph l., ii. 248. mix, commissioner of indian affairs, ii. 271-275. mixcoac, i. 201, 202. moffett, joseph f., i. 306, 322. molinard, professor at west point, i. 32. molino del rey, battle of, i. 204-207. monroe, fortress, i. 60; ii. 343, 423, 424. monroe, guide, i. 385. monroe, victor, i. 414. monterey, mexico, i. 107. montezumas, i. 207, 222. montgomery, camp, ii. 185, 197, 234. monticello, i. 438. montour, indian agent, ii. 210. mooar, george, cousin, i. 11. moore, mcclellan, lieutenant-colonel, ii. 395, 402. moore, r.s., ii. 246. mora, i. 203. morale, butte de, i. 337. more, john, captain, ii. 361, 462. morell, george w. general, ii. 430, 453, 466. morgan, colonel, i. 173, 220. morrison, david, colonel, ii. 338, 395, 402, 406, 484, 497, 498; transmits colors to mrs. stevens, 499, 500. morrow, j.h., colonel, ii. 398. moses, flathead chief, ii. 88, 89. moses, simpson p., i. 414. mott, g., ii. 285. mouse river, i. 320, 338, 339, 341, 345, 351. mowry, sylvester, lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 307. muckleshoot prairie, ii. 186, 192. mukilteo, i. 462. mullan, john, lieutenant, detailed on exploration, i. 293, 297, 302, 364, 380-382, 384; remarkable trips, 422; ii. 275, 296. mullan pass, i. 380. mullan road, fort benton to walla walla, i. 431; ii. 276, 285, 296, 307, 308. murden, e.o., ii. 245. murphy, daniel, i. 84, 88, 96, 98. muscle shell river, i. 364, 381; ii. 99. nagle, james, colonel, ii. 448, 457. nahchess pass, i. 395, 446; ii. 158, 187, 195, 197. nahchess river, i. 395, 405, 406. narkarty, chinook chief, ii. 6. national bridge, mexico, i. 120, 121. national democratic party, governor stevens chairman of executive committee, ii. 305, 306. national palace, occupied by general scott, i. 213. naylor, captain, i. 222. neah bay, i. 473, 477. neely, d.a., lieutenant, ii. 188, 252. nelson, duwhamish chief, ii. 208, 225. nesmith, james w., colonel, ii. 140, 160, 256, 267, 271, 272, 279, 288; elected senator, 313, 317-320, 386. newarkum, ii. 28, 187. new baltimore, ii. 440. new bedford, mass., i. 76, 79, 82, 83, 98. newell, robert, ii. 160, 170. new hampshire volunteers, 3d regiment, ii. 395-409; 2d regiment, 455; 6th regiment, 457. newmarket, ii. 459. new mexico, i. 233, 252. new orleans, i. 104. newport, r.i., stay at, i. 60, 79, 82, 83, 87, 226, 232, 250, 265, 274; arrives at, 427; ii. 320; monument erected to general stevens by, 499, 502. newport news, va., i. 423, 425. newton cut, ii. 392. newton, john, general, i. 27. new york city, i. 36, 78, 427; ii. 270, 319. new york volunteers, i. 112, 156, 209. see 79th highlanders, 65th, ii. 329, 330; 33d and 49th, 333, 336; 47th and 48th at action, port royal ferry, 358-366; serrell's engineers, 367, 395; 46th, 390, 393; 47th, 393-409; 5th and 10th, 469; 1st, 4th, 18th, 101st, 488, 495; 51st, 470, 489, 495. ninth infantry, i. 173, 176-179. nez perce indians, i. 385, 390; ii. 16-21; at walla walla council, 34-64; sign treaty, 62, 63; present condition, 65, 99-107, 109, 114, 115, 121, 125, 141; council with, 143, 144; furnish escort, 145, 147, 150; at peace council, 210-220; aid in fighting hostiles, 221-223; save steptoe's defeated force, 230. nez perce reservation, ii. 62. ninth corps, ii. 423, 424, 427, 445. nisqually, fort, hudson bay company's, i. 412. nisqually indians, i. 456-462; ii. 12, 161; new reservation given, 192, 256. nisqually plains, i. 412. nisqually river, i. 412, 456; ii. 186, 187. noble, mr., ii. 32. nobles, william h., ii. 341, 343. nooksahk, ii. 256. nopalucan, i. 140, 153. north andover, i. 1, 2, 47, 53, 60, 81. north yarmouth, me., i. 85. north edisto river, ii. 378. northern indians, i. 452; ii. 12, 154, 161, 188, 257-259, 289, 294. northern light, steamship, ii. 313. northern pacific railroad, i. 381, 395; governor stevens's speeches on, ii. 279; letter to vancouver railroad convention, 297-299; company incorporated, 265. northern pacific railroad route exploration, i. 285-380; preparing reports in olympia, 421, 422; address on, in san francisco, 426, 427; makes first report, 427, 428; final report, 431; ii. 286-309. northerner, steamship, ii. 288. noyes, a.m., sapper, i. 130, 136. oak point, i. 411. ocean queen, steamship, ii. 343, 355. offut, levi and james, i. 415. ogden, michael, i. 401. ohio regiment, i. 224. oho de agua, i. 139, 153, 156. oketie, ii. 380. okinakane or okanogan river, i. 394. old horse, gros ventre chief, i. 356. olney, nathan, ii. 33. olympia, i. 400, 405-412, 414, 415; appearance of, 441, 442; ii. 154, 259, 261, 313. ord, e.o.c., classmate, i. 26. oregon volunteers, ii. 140; defeat hostiles in walla walla, 144, 147, 160; operations, 194. orizaba, peak of, i. 132. orleans, va., ii. 431. o'rourke, p.h., lieutenant, ii. 398. osgood, gayton p., appoints to west point, i. 22, 273. osgood, isaac, i. 88, 295, 306, 311, 318, 328, 332, 341, 365, 375, 384, 385, 392, 427. oson, louis, ii. 70. osoyoos, lake, i. 394. ostrander, n., dr., i. 411. ottawa, gunboat, ii. 358, 361. otter island, ii. 382. owen, fort, i. 370, 379, 380; ii. 80, 124, 125. owen, john, ii. 127. ow-hi, yakima chief, ii. 40, 51, 52; signs treaty, 64, 204; death of, 205, 218, 231. ox hill, va., ii. 484, 487. ox road, ii. 483, 487. packwood, william, i. 412; ii. 169, 170. palmer, h., ii. 70; death of, 126. palmer, joel, ii. 12, 27, 29, 66. palmetto regiment, i. 182, 209, 211. palouse indians, ii. 22, 39, 121. palouse river, i. 401, 402; ii. 71, 141. pambrun, a.d., i. 402; ii. 33. panama, city, i. 435, 436. panama fever, i. 436. panama, isthmus of, i. 427, 431, 433-436; ii. 270. pandosy, father, ii. 37. panther hill, i. 354. paredes, mexican general, i. 203. parke, john g., general, ii. 277, 424. parker, john g., i. 415. paso de obejas, i. 120. pataha creek, ii. 70. patterson, general, i. 126, 221. pat-kanim, snohomish chief, i. 462-465; ii. 156, 169, 184, 187, 254. patrick, marsena r., general, ii. 460, 494. pay, brevet, i. 237. peabody, a.p., i. 93. peabody, r.v., captain, ii. 169, 171, 188. peabody, sarah, wife of lieutenant james stevens, i. 3. pearson, edward pennington, colonel u.s.a., ii. 502. pearson, w.h., express rider, ii. 66, 69, 70, 92, 101, 102; runs gauntlet of hostile tribes with news of outbreak, 120-123, 129, 132, 152, 209. pease, william c., captain, ii. 185, 245. pedregal, lava rock, i. 170, 192. pee dee battalion, ii. 411-412. pee dee rifles, ii. 392. peeps, cuyuse chief, ii. 214. peerless, steamer, ii. 345. peers, henry a., captain, ii. 170. pemberton, john c., i. 28; ii. 365, 376, 380-382, 387. pembina, i. 298, 335. pembina carts, train, i. 313, 314. pembina, gunboat, ii. 358. peña y peña, mexican statesman, i. 219. pend oreille indians, i. 386, 390; ii. 22-77, 79, 80, 92, 99, 109, 114. pend oreille, lake, i. 370, 401; ii. 17. pender, w.d., general, ii. 487, 495, 496. penn's cove, ii. 256. pennsylvania volunteers, i. 112, 209; 47th, ii. 333. see 50th, 100th or roundheads; 45th, 50th, 76th, 97th, 100th, 395-409; 26th, 455; 48th, 457; 51st, 470, 489, 495; 57th, 488, 495. penobscot river, me., i. 84, 88. peñon, i. 163-165; lieutenant stevens's close reconnoissance of, 166, 167, 190. percival, s.w., i. 415; ii. 169. perote, mexico, i. 138, 153. perry, james h., colonel, ii. 358, 361, 364. perry, matthew c., commodore, i. 257. perry, oliver hazard, commodore, i. 62. peter, captain lee's man, murdered, i. 222. peter, john colville, spokane chief, speech, ii. 138. peters, john a., lectures in bucksport, i. 93. pettygrove, f.w., i. 412. phelps, john w., general i. 28. philadelphia, trip to, i. 53. phillips academy, enters, i. 19. phillips, wendell, lectures in north andover, i. 10. piatt, a. sanders, general, ii. 453. pickett, george e. captain, occupies san juan island, ii. 290-295. piedad, church, village, causeway, mexico, i. 164, 207. piegan indians, i. 348, 351; talk with, 373, 374; ii. 99, 109, 114. piegan's tear, i. 376. pierce, edward l., ii. 370, 385. pierce, franklin, general, i. 156; arrives at puebla, 162, 172, 174; at churubusco, 181, 182, 202; advocates election of, 272-274; elected president, 280, 281; invites correspondence, 432. pierre's hole, fight at, ii. 18. pike, fort, ii. 185, 234. pike lake, i. 314. pilkington, james, ii. 2. pillow, gideon, general, i. 125, 150, 153, 157, 164, 167; battle of contreras, 171, 174, 175, 178, 179, 201, 202; of chapultepec, 207-210, 224. pioneer company, ii. 169. pisquouse or wenatche river, i. 395. pitman, captain, i. 161, 201, 268. plano del rio, mexico, i. 121. plante antoine, i. 385, 392, 393; ii. 131, 210. planter, rebel dispatch boat, ii. 374. plebe, member of youngest class, west point, i. 48. plumb, w.w., i. 412. plummer, alfred a., captain, ii. 170. pocotaligo, ii. 365, 376, 379, 389. pocotaligo river, ii. 376, 378. poe, orlando m., lieutenant, ii. 329; general, 448, 457, 475, 492. poinsett, camp, at west point, i. 46. point-no-point, treaty of, i. 469-473. pond, judge, i. 88. poor, ann, second wife to isaac stevens, i. 9, 15. pope, john, general, i. 28; ii. 427, 428, 431-433, 439, 445, 453, 455, 459-465, 469, 473, 475, 476, 479-481, 494. poplar river, i. 352. popocatepetl, mountain in mexico, i. 159. porcupine river, i. 353. porter, benjamin f., ii. 356. porter, fitz john, general, ii. 430, 432, 434, 439, 445, 453-455, 461, 462-468. port labadie, mo. i. 53. portland, me., takes charge of works at, i. 83, 84, 95. portland, ore., i. 438; ii. 153, 269. port royal, ii. 345. port royal ferry, ii. 355, 357; action of, 358-366. port royal island, ii. 353. portsmouth, frigate, launch, i. 84. portsmouth, n.h., takes charge of works, i. 83, 86; speaks for general pierce, 274. port townsend, i. 412. posey, fort, ii. 185, 234. potter, r.b., schooner, i. 454. powell, jephtha s., captain, ii. 169, 170, 197. power, j.m., colonel, ii. 395. prairie of the knobs, or blackfoot prairie, i. 378. pratt, lieutenant, ii. 374. preble, fort, at portland, me., builds barracks at, i. 84, 87. prescott, general, capture of, i. 62. pressley, major, ii. 396. prompt, bark, sailing to mexico, i. 99. providence, r.i., i. 65, 81. prudhomme, william, ii. 70. puebla, occupied, i. 143-162, 214, 224. puget sound, i. 280, 288; tour of, i. 416, 417; description of country, ii. 159, 160. puget sound agricultural company, i. 411. puget sound rifles, governor stevens commissioned captain of, ii. 313. pulaski, fort, i. 230; ii. 357, 379, 380, 383. pullen, w.h., i. 462. pu-pu-mox-mox, head chief of walla wallas, i. 403, 404; ii. 21, 36, 37; sarcastic speech at council, 45, 46; signs treaty, 53, 55-63, 121, 130; threats to take governor stevens's scalp, 132; treachery of, 144; death of, 148, 158. putnam, at bunker hill, i. 5. putnam, simon, schoolmaster, franklin academy, i. 16. puyallup indians, i. 456-462; ii. 161, 187, 192. puyallup river, i. 456; ii. 185, 256. quaitso indians, ii. 1-9. quaks-na-mish indians, ii. 256. qualchen, yakima chief, murders agent bolon, ii. 157, 218, 223; hanged by colonel wright, 231. queretaro, i. 214. qui-e-muth, i. 461; ii. 186, 208, 225; killing of, 240, 241. quijano, mexican commissioner, i. 202. quillehute indians, ii. 8. quil-to-mee, yakima chief, ii. 222. quinaiult indians, ii. 1-9. quin-quim-moe-so, spokane chief, speech, ii. 139. quitman, john a., general, i. 119, 136, 137, 141, 153, 157; advances from puebla, 164, 167, 168, 202; chapultepec, 207-213, 220. rabbeson, a.b., i. 412; ii. 169, 171, 187. rabbit river, i. 322. raccoon ford, ii. 426. rainier, i. 438. rains, g.j., major, i. 405; ii. 28, 29, 140, 158; expedition to yakima valley, 160, 207. ramsay, senator, ii. 266, 298. randolph, george e., captain, ii. 488, 492, 497. randolph, julia, i. 67. randolph, kidder, i. 88. randolph, lewis, lieutenant, ii. 468. randolph, lucy, i. 83. ransom, dunbar r., lieutenant, ii. 355, 359, 469. ransom, trueman b., colonel, i. 173, 176. rapidan river, ii. 426, 427. rappahannock river, ii. 425, 427, 428, 430. rappahannock station, ii. 427. rattlers, i. 376; ii. 124. ravalli, père, i. 389; ii. 22, 72, 210. raymond, n., ii. 33. red house ford, ii. 437, 474. red river, i. 320. red river hunters from pembina, i. 333-337. red river hunters from selkirk settlements, i. 339-341. red river traders, i. 325, 326. red wolf, nez perce chief, ii. 58, 63, 70, 144, 202, 216, 217. red wolf's ground, ii. 70. red wolf, flathead chief, ii. 82, 86. reed, captain, ii. 404. reed, battery, ii. 396, 406, 409. regan, a sapper, i. 136. reid family, ii. 483. remenyi, a. i. 306, 317. reno, jesse l., general, i. 172; ii. 424, 425, 427, 428, 433, 434, 439, 448, 457, 462, 464, 470, 472, 477, 484, 489, 497, 498. republic, the, newspaper, i. 272. republican party, doctrine, ii. 302. revolution, i. 62. reynolds, captain, i. 209. reynolds, john f., general, ii. 430, 439, 440, 442, 445, 447, 448, 451, 452, 455, 463, 465, 466, 469, 470, 478. reynolds, william h., ii. 367. rhode island, battle of, i. 62; legislature, ii. 319; resolutions on death of general stevens, 500. rhode island volunteers, 3d h.a., ii. 395, 409. rhoeder, henry, i. 413. ribaut, jean, ii. 422. ricard, father, i. 412, 443; his warning, ii. 29. rice, alexander h., ii. 320. rice, henry m., senator, ii. 298, 321, 386. richards, captain, ii. 169, 170, 187, 197, 200. richmond, ii. 380. ricketts, james b., general, classmate, i. 26; ii. 435, 439, 442, 443, 463, 464, 472, 474. rifles, i. 210. riley, colonel, i. 125, 137, 157; battle of contreras, 172-174, 179, 181. riley, c.w., captain, ii. 169, 171. rio del plano, mexico, i. 123, 124. rio frio, mexico, i. 138, 155, 164, 224. ripley, roswell s., major, history of mexican war, i. 254, 255; general, ii. 381. risden, joel, ii. 265. river of the lakes, i. 341, 345. roberts, charles w., ii. 467. robertson, william, ii. 372. robie, a.h., ii. 68, 70, 98, 124, 132, 152, 168, 200, 202, 210, 257. robinson, captain, ii. 329. robinson, john c., general, ii. 457, 492. robinson, r.s., ii. 168. rochambeau, i. 62. roche, m., ii. 114. rockwell, alfred p., captain, ii. 367, 389, 395, 406, 410, 421. rocky mountains, i. 364; proclamation on crossing the summit, 377, 378; a broad plateau, ii. 93. rodgers, c.p.r., captain, ii. 358, 360, 420. ropes, john c., ii. 437. rosa, rudolph, colonel, ii. 395, 402, 426. rosario strait, ii. 13. rose island, recommends fortifying, i. 69. rosecrans, william s., general, i. 27. rosefield, ii. 435. rotten belly, crow chief, i. 368, 369. rotten belly rocks, i. 369. roulet, i. 325. roundheads, or 100th penn. volunteers, ii. 341, 343, 359-366, 391; battle of james island, 402-415, 425, 449, 450; battle of chantilly, 484, 495. ruddell, stephen d., i. 412. ruggles, george d., colonel, ii. 463, 465. ruff, charles f., general, i. 27. rum river, i. 309. rummell, corporal, i. 329, 338, 345. running fisher, gros ventre chief, i. 356, 359, 361. rush, richard c., i. 277. rusk of texas, i. 260. russell, david a., captain, ii. 210. ruth, b.f., ii. 168. rutledge, william, i. 412. sacrificio, island, mexico, i. 109. sahaptin. see nez perce indians. salem, mass., i. 35. salem, va., ii. 431, 440. salisbury, i. 1. salish or selish, race of indians, ii. 23, 79. saltillo, mexico, i. 107. saltzman, charles mckinley, u.s.a., ii. 502. st. anthony, i. 308. st. augustine, florida, ii. 382. st. helena island, ii. 354. st. louis, i. 297, 302. st. mary, village, ii. 80. st. paul, i. 298, 303, 304, 346. st. regis de borgia river, ii. 75. samish indians, ii. 256. san angel, i. 169, 179-181, 202. san antonio, i. 138, 169, 170, 174, 180, 182. san augustin, i. 168-171, 174, 185, 202. san cosme, causeway, garita (gate), i. 164, 210, 211; lieutenant stevens wounded, 218, 219. san francisco, i. 422; visits, 425, 436; ii. 269. san geronimo, i. 173, 174. san juan de ulloa, castle at vera cruz, i. 110. san juan island controversy begins, ii. 12, 277, 285; threatens war, 290-295. san juan river, i. 120. san luis potosi, i. 108. san miguel, hacienda, i. 141. san martin, i. 162, 224. sanders, captain, i. 106, 112. santa anna, i. 108, 126; renounces authority, his career, 145, 146, 173, 179, 202, 203, 214, 219. santa annaced, hacienda, i. 139. sante fé, i. 119. santiago, fort at vera cruz, i. 110. sargent, horace binney, lieutenant-colonel, ii. 367, 395. sargent, l.m., captain, ii. 402. saskatchewan river, ii. 100. satsop, ii. 1-9. saugus, mass., i. 82. sauk or osakis river, i. 308-310, 315. sauk rapids, i. 309. saunders bottom, i. 441. saunders, daniel, i. 16. saunders, fort, at knoxville, ii. 413. saunders, s.s., i. 412. savage, new england genealogies, i. 1. savannah, ga., ordered to, i. 229, 230, 233; ii. 379, 381, 382. savannah river, ii. 357. saviour, drawing of, i. 44. saxton, rufus, lieutenant, detailed on survey, i. 293, 296, 297, 307, 369-371; ii. 389, 390. scalp dance, view and description, i. 59, 60. scammell, fort, at portsmouth, n.h., i. 83. scammon, s. parker, general, i. 28. scattering creek, i. 380. schenck, robert c., general, ii. 446, 447, 451, 452, 470. schimmelfennig, general, ii. 452, 459. schlat-lal, spokane chief, speech, ii. 138. schofield, john m., general, ii. 454. schrotter, e., ii. 246. schurz, carl, general, ii. 446-449, 452. schuyler, fort, i. 238, 239. scott, martin, colonel, i. 111; killed, 206. scott, winfield, general, i. 105, 108, 109, 118, 127, 128; arrives at puebla, 144, 156; estimate of, 162; advances from puebla, 164, 168, 170; battle of contreras, 174; able, confident bearing, 175, 179, 180, 194; addresses troops, 184, 202-204; chapultepec, 207, 213, 214, 219, 221, 250; takes offense, 255, 256, 272-275; compromises san juan trouble, 194, 295, 319. scotum, nez perce chief, ii. 144. scranton, john h., captain, i. 413, 468; ii. 292. scull creek, ii. 347. seabrook, ii. 357-359, 364. sea islands of south carolina, ii. 353. sears, alfred f., captain, ii. 367, 402, 406. seattle, i. 412; proper railroad terminus, 417; indians attack, ii. 166, 167. seattle, chief, ii. 463-468. sebastian, senator, ii. 272. secessionville, ii. 396. second artillery, i. 112, 113, 182. second infantry, ii. 173, 181. second vermont, ii. 329. se-cule-eel-qua creek, i. 400. sedgewick, john, general, i. 28. seely, f.w., i. 444. seneca, gunboat, ii. 364. serrell, e.w., colonel, ii. 395. serrell's engineer regiment, ii. 367, 395. settlers, american pioneers, character of, i. 410, 413, 414; murdered by indians, ii. 158. seventh connecticut, ii. 394; battle of james island, 403-415, 421. seventy-ninth highlanders, new york volunteers, ii. 320; character of the men, 321; heavy losses at bull run, mutiny, 322-327, 329, 330; colors returned 332, 335, 336; scene when general stevens bade farewell, 338, 340, 342, 343, 348; action at port royal ferry, 358-366, 388, 389, 391; battle of james island, 402-415; present sword to general stevens 416-419, 425, 428, 452, 459; battle of chantilly, 482, 485, 495. seward, fort, ii. 382. seymour, truman, general, ii 469, 470. shackleford, lieutenant, i. 112. shaler, alexander, lieutenant-colonel, ii. 329. shaw, b.f., colonel, i. 415, 453; ii. 1, 3, 5, 148, 151, 168, 171; marches across cascades to walla walla, i. 197; battle of grande ronde 201-203, 211, 212, 221; arrests judge lander, 244. shazer, george i. 462. shead, oliver, captain, ii. 169, 171. she-nah-nam or medicine creek, i. 456. shepard, george, lectures in bucksport, i. 93. sherburne, miss, marriage to lieutenant whipple, i. 84. sheridan, p.h., general, ii. 190, 303. sherman, thomas w., general, i. 28; ii. 338, 340, 341, 346, 349, 350, 357, 358, 368, 369, 376, 383. sherman, william t., general, i. 28; ii. 303, 385. sheyenne river, i. 315, 327, 332. shields, james, general, i. 125, 129, 154, 166, 181, 182, 220, 221; senator, 248, 258; gratifying letter from, 268, 271; ii. 266. shoalwater bay, i. 411. shoshone or snake indians, i. 346. shroder, mrs., i. 67. sibley, i. 166, 178, 176. sigel, franz, general, ii. 427-429, 432-434, 439, 440, 442, 445-449, 465, 494. simcoe river, branch of yakima, ii. 63. simmons, m.t., colonel, i. 415, 445, 453, 464; ii. 1, 3, 4, 123, 159, 184, 204, 256. simpson, george, sir, governor hudson bay company, i. 291, 296. simpson, william, i. 306, 308, 384; ii. 70. sioux indians, i. 333. sitting squaw, gros ventre chief, i. 356, 359. sixth infantry, i. 182. skagit head, ii. 256. skloom, yakima chief, ii. 40, 55, 64. sko-ko-mish indians, i. 469-473. sko-ko-mish river, i. 473. skookumchuck creek, i. 412, 441; ii. 10, 11, 28. slah-yot-see, palouse chief, ii. 72. slaughter, w.a., lieutenant, i. 456, 462; ii. 154, 158; killed by indians, 159, 207. slaughter, fort, i. 185, 235. slawntehus or chimakane creek and valley, i. 399. small, robert, ii. 374. smalley, daniel, captain, ii. 169-171, 187. smalley, e.v., ii. 284, 297. smith, alexander (sandy), ii. 243. smith, andrew j., general, i. 28; ii. 296. smith, c.f., lieutenant-colonel, i. 120, 169. smith, e.w., captain, i. 113. smith, frederick a., captain, i. 235. smith, general, i. 156; battle of contreras, 172-175, 179, 202; chapultepec, 208-210. smith, gustavus w., i. 28, 94, 112, 130, 144; sketch of, 217, 260, 262, 264. smith, henry, ii. 243. smith, henry l., i. 58, 64, 71, 72, 264. smith, j.a., lectures in bucksport, i. 93. smith, john l., major, i. 117, 119, 121-123, 149, 150, 155, 166, 169-171, 185, 220, 221, 283. smith, j.s., ii. 263. smith, larkin, i. 181. smith, william f., general, ii. 328, 329, 332, 335. smith's plantation, ii. 421. snake indians, ii. 29, 99, 107, 115, 148. snake river, i. 402; ii. 71. snelling, fort, i. 304. snohomish, spokane chief, speech, ii. 138. snohomish indians, i. 463-468; ii. 156, 169, 256. snohomish river, i. 407, 409; ii. 171, 172, 184, 187. snoqualmie pass, i. 394, 396, 406; ii. 187. snoqualmie river, ii. 172. snow, in mountains, i. 408; question solved, 422. sohon gustave, ii. 68, 70, 93, 95, 115. southampton, england, i. 2. south carolina volunteers, i. 209; 12th and 14th regiments, ii. 365; 1st, 24th, and 25th regiments, 409; 1st artillery, 1st, 9th, and 22d regiments, 411. spalding, h.h., ii. 17-19. speaking owl, ii. 218, 217. spokane, garry, i. 391-393, 399, 400, 422; ii. 39, 133, 135; speeches, 136, 139, 140. spokane house, i. 391, 392, 399. spokane indians, i. 390-392, 399; ii. 16-22; present condition, 64, 121, 131; council with, 133-140; defeat steptoe, 230; defeated by wright, 231. spokane invincibles, ii. 132, 141, 151, 169. spokane river, i. 399; ii. 141. spotted eagle, nez perce chief, ii. 40, 41, 58, 68, 92, 129, 130, 150, 151, 169, 201, 219, 220. sprague, william, governor, offers regiment to governor stevens, ii. 319, 320, 499. springfield, mass., i. 78. springfield republican, ii. 320. square hill, i. 361. squaxon indians, i. 456; ii. 187, 257. squaxon island or klah-she-min, i. 456; ii. 257. stacy, john a.c., i. 61. stahel, general, ii. 447. stahi, nisqually chief, ii. 208, 225. stanberry, captain, i. 83. stanley, j.m., i. 296, 306, 308, 359, 368, 370, 373, 375, 378, 385, 392, 397, 403, 405. stanley, lake, i. 318. stannard, george j., lieutenant-colonel, ii. 329. stanton, edwin m., ii. 303, 312. stanton, of tennessee, i. 260. starke, william e., general, ii. 446, 487, 489, 490, 495, 496. steachus, cuyuse chief, ii. 50, 53, 57, 148, 150. stebbins, second mate bark prompt, i. 99. steele, richard, lieutenant, i. 123, 124. steilacoom, fort, i. 296, 297, 412; ii. 156, 159, 267. stellam, head chief coeur d'alenes, ii. 129; speech, 137, 138. stephens, alexander h., ii. 306. steptoe, e.j., battery, i. 141. steptoe, e.j. colonel, defeat by spokanes, ii. 185, 206; at peace council, 210-221; indians attack his camp, 222; marches back to dalles, 223, 225, 226; defeated by spokanes, 230, 283. stevensburg, ii. 427, 428. stevens cantonment, ii. 80. stevens guards, ii. 132, 151, 169. stevens hat, ii. 268. stevens, abiel, captured by indians, i. 3. stevens, asa, captain, died in lake george campaign, i. 3. stevens, benjamin, jr., i. 2. stevens, charles a., cousin, i. 33, 98, 99. stevens, dolly, i. 4. stevens, eliza, aunt, death of, i. 45. stevens, eliza, cousin, i. 91. stevens, elizabeth barker, sister, i. 11; letters to, 35, 45; visits belfast, 51, 67, 68; goes to nashville, 73; marries l.m. campbell, 82-87; death, 97. stevens, ephraim, recompensed for loss by indians, i. 3. stevens, fort, ii. 185, 235. stevens, george watson, i. 265, 266, 269, 295; breaking mules, 304-306, 319; scenes at fort benton, 365, 366, 441; death of, ii. 10, 11. stevens, gertrude maude, i. 249; lost on isthmus, 436; panama fever, 437; ii. 502. stevens, hannah, i. 4. stevens, hannah peabody, sister, i. 11, 22, 29, 30, 35, 51, 56, 66, 67; death, 73. stevens, hazard, i. 81, 82, 456-462; ii. 27, 56, 70, 98, 99, 110, 152, 153, 193, 260, 262, 266, 300, 313; calls on president lincoln, 334; appointed adjutant, 79th highlanders, 335, 337; appointed captain and assistant adjutant-general, 338, 352, 366, 383, 389-391, 398; at battle of james island, 407, 419, 420, 458, 472, 474, 478, 482-485, 502. stevens, henry h., cousin, i. 47, 77, 98. stevens, isaac, father, i. 4; settles in maine, crippled by falling tree, 6; marries hannah cummings, i. 7; settles in andover, 8; characteristics, 9, 10; children, 11; wife's ancestry, 12; letters to, 31, 39, 40, 44, 46, 52-56; visits west point at son's graduation, 59; letters, 69, 74, 78-81, 85, 89, 92, 117, 228, 249; ii. 270; death of, 498, 499. stevens, isaac ingalls. see table of contents; descendants, ii. 502. stevens, james, captain in louisburg expedition, i. 3. stevens, james, lieutenant, died in lake george campaign, i. 3. stevens, james, revolutionary soldier, diary of siege of boston, i. 5, 6. stevens, james, settles in maine, i. 5, 6. stevens, jeremy, i. 4. stevens, john, died in louisburg expedition, i. 5. stevens, john, founder of andover, i. 1, 2. stevens, jonathan, grandfather, fights at bunker hill, i. 4; characteristics, 5, 8, 15. stevens, jonathan, settles in maine, i. 5, 6. stevens, joseph, deacon, i. 3. stevens, julia virginia, daughter, born, i. 87; died, mr. brooks's tribute, 92; ii. 502. stevens, kate, daughter, born, i. 277; lost on isthmus, 436; ii. 371, 502. stevens, margaret l. (_née_ hazard), wife, i. 63, 64, 67, 79, 81, 87; letters to, 97-99; voyage to mexico, 109-115; vera cruz, 115-117; battle of cerro gordo, i. 127, 128; jalapa, description of, 132-135; puebla, description of, 158-162; account of campaign in valley, including churubusco, 189-202; arrives at new orleans, 225; washington, 226; views and ideals, 251-254, 265-267; canoeing up cowlitz, 439, 440; impressions of olympia, 442-444; visits whitby island, ii. 154, 155, 187, 248, 249, 260, 313, 371; letters to, 373, 374, 479, 500. stevens, mary jane, sister, i. 11, 35, 51, 67, 68, 81, 82, 85-87; death, 162. stevens, moses, uncle, i. 4, 51. stevens, nathan, councillor, first male child born in andover, i. 2. stevens, nathaniel, uncle, i. 4, 16, 81, 92. stevens, oliver, brother, i. 11, 46, 47, 51, 54-56, 67, 73, 74, 77, 81, 82, 85, 87, 92, 97, 229, 230, 236, 242, 243. stevens, oliver, uncle, i. 4. stevens, primus, faithful servant to benjamin, jr., i. 2. stevens, sarah, i. 4. stevens, sarah ann, sister, i. 11, 22, 35, 51, 67, 81, 85; death, 86. stevens, susan, daughter, i. 95, 257; ii. 502. stevens, susan bragg, sister, i. 11; letters to, 34, 35, 45; attending school, andover, 51; goes to missouri, 52, 67; marries david h. bishop, 68; death, 77. stevens, susanna (_née_ bragg), wife of jonathan, grandmother, i. 4, 13; death, 68. stevens, william, uncle, i. 4; suggests west point, 22; letter to, emotions on entering west point, 24, 29, 33, 35-39, 58, 66, 69, 81. stevens, william o., cousin, i. 91. stevensville, ii. 80. stewart, charles, ii. 497. stock, whitley, des chutes chief, ii. 212. stone, c.p., general, ii. 312, 319. stono river, ii. 378, 387, 390. strahan, captain, ii. 401, 408, 410. strobel, max, i. 306, 326. strong, william, judge, i. 411; ii. 160, 170. stuart, a.b., ii. 10. stuart, j.e.b., general, ii. 331, 431, 438, 494. suckley, george, dr., i. 296, 306, 308, 312, 314, 315, 317-319, 345, 375, 382, 422. sudley church, ii. 438. sudley ford, ii. 435. sullivan, bridget, nurse, i. 269. sulphur springs, ii. 429, 431. sumner, edwin v., general, i. 122; ii. 494. sumter guards, ii. 392. sun river, i. 375, 376; ii. 94, 124. suydam, mr., ii. 385. swan, james g., account of chehalis council, ii. 1-9, 25; governor stevens's secretary, 275, 284, 294. swan, john m., i. 415. swan, mr., i. 458. swartwout, captain, i. 113, 206. swartwout, samuel, captain, ii. 185, 187. sweet grass hill, i. 360. swindal, c.w., captain, ii. 169, 171, 186. sykes, george, general, i. 27; ii. 430, 453, 466, 468, 470. sylvester, edmund, i. 414. tacoma, i. 459. tacubaya, village near city of mexico, i. 164; occupied, 200, 202, 210, 219. tafft, henry s., lieutenant, ii. 343, 363, 366, 408. talcott, general, i. 257. taliaferro, william b., general, ii. 437, 441, 442. talisman, paper, edits, i. 57, 58. talome river, mexico, i. 120. tampico, mexico, i. 105, 106, 108. taplin, charles, i. 302. tappan, william h., i. 416; ii. 1, 3, 67, 91, 92, 107-109, 132. tatnall, commodore, ii. 346. taylor, battery, i. 164, 180, 181. taylor claim, ii. 262. taylor, colonel, ii. 338. taylor, nelson, general, ii. 448, 456, 457. taylor, william, ii. 14, 15. taylor, zachary, general, i. 91, 107, 108; view of, 236, 244. tepe ahualco, mexico, i. 139. terry, alfred h., general, ii. 454. teton river, i. 362, 368, 375; ii. 94, 120. texas, i. 91; bill, 252. texcuco, lake in valley of mexico, i. 164. texmaluca, village in valley of mexico, i. 169. thayer, colonel, i. 57, 237. third artillery, battery e., ii. 395. third infantry, i. 156, 176, 181. third vermont, ii. 329, 330. thom, george, general, classmate, i. 27. thomas, edward l., general, ii. 487, 495, 496. thomas, george h., general, i. 28. thompson, jacob, secretary of interior, ii. 272, 274, 306. thompson, r.r., ii. 32, 33. thompson river, ii. 293. thornton, captain, i. 164; killed, 169. thoroughfare gap, ii. 431, 440. three bears, blackfoot chief, i. 368. three buttes or sweet grass hills, i. 360. three feathers, nez perce chief, ii. 129, 130, 144. til-coos-tay, flathead chief, ii. 86. tilden, bryant p., i. 58, 72, 132. tilton, fort, i. 184. tilton, james, major, i. 445; ii. 123, 159, 168, 176, 193, 248. timothy, nez perce chief, ii. 39, 57, 63, 70, 217. tinkham, abiel w., assistant at fort knox, i. 88, 233, 268, 295, 298, 306, 308, 314, 319, 321, 322, 326, 330-334, 341, 342, 370, 381, 383-385; ordered to examine snoqualmie pass, 406; his successful trip, 408, 422, 427. tin-tin-meet-see, ii. 148. tlascala, i. 144. tleyuk, chehalis chief, ii. 7, 8. tlinkits, northern indians, i. 452. todd, john b.s., general, i. 28. tolmie, william frazer, dr., i. 412. toombs, r., general, ii. 494. totten, joseph g., general, i. 60-62, 89-91, 94, 98, 105, 109, 114, 119, 226, 227, 235, 237, 239, 256; letter to, resigning, 282; reply, 283; ii. 273, 317, 318. touchet river, i. 402; ii. 218. tower, zealous b., general, i. 28; draws character of general stevens, 43, 58, 105, 108, 111, 119, 121, 122, 130, 139, 142, 144, 166, 167, 169, 170, 179, 185; sketch of, 217, 237; ii. 470. townsend, a., ii. 257. townsend, e.d., general, his advice, i. 26, 28. townsend, port, i. 473, 477. train, charles r., ii. 320. train guard, ii. 169. trapier, lieutenant, i. 105. traveler, steam tug, ii. 266. traveler's rest creek, i. 379. tremain, lieutenant, ii. 457. trimble, isaac r., general, ii. 487, 495, 496. tripler, dr. i. 124. trist, nicholas, i. 200, 208. tulalip reservation, i. 468. tulancingo, i. 168. tulifiny river, ii. 376. tumwater, i. 441. twelfth infantry, i. 173, 179. twenty-eighth massachusetts, ii. 390, 391; battle of james island, 402-415, 425, 428, 452, 484, 485, 495. twiggs, general, i. 12; battle of cerro gordo, 125, 126; reaches puebla, 144, 155; advances, 162, 164; battle of contreras, 170-172, 175-182, 202; chapultepec, 208-210. twiggs, major, i. 209. tybee island, ii. 382. tyerall, e.r., i. 462. umatilla indians, ii. 16, 21; at walla walla council, 36-64, 121, 158, 212. umatilla river, ii. 30. umatilla treaty, ii. 63. ume-how-lish, war chief of cuyuses, captured, ii. 147, 152, 262. union, fort, i. 295, 297, 320, 345, 346; description of, 347, 351. union, preservation of, ii. 301, 302. union, steamship, ii. 345. union light infantry, ii. 392. updyke, isabella, i. 88. upshur, j.h., lieutenant, ii. 365. utah bill, i. 252. valencia, mexican general, i. 179, 203. van bokkelen, j.j.h., ii. 168-171, 187. vancouver, fort and town on columbia river, i. 297, 394, 400, 405, 406, 411; ii. 12, 153, 156, 159, 206, 208, 288. vancouver island, i. 417, 418; ii. 13. vanderbilt, cornelius, ii. 343. vanderbilt, steamship, ii. 342, 344, 345. van dorn, earl, i. 27. van ogle, william, ii. 265. van vliet, stewart, general, i. 27. vaughan, a.j., ii. 114. venta nueva, i. 224. vera cruz, mexico, i. 106-108, 110; siege of, 111-115; leaves, 119-221. vermont, 2d and 3d volunteers, ii. 329-331. vernon, i. 63. victor, flathead chief, i. 383-385; ii. 77-80; at flathead council, i. 80-92. victoria, b.c., i. 417, 418, 477; ii. 292. viele, egbert l., general, ii. 341, 357, 382. vienna, ii. 330. vigara, mexico, i. 119. villamil, mexican commissioner, i. 202. vireyes, i. 139. virginia, army of, ii. 427. virginia, 13th regiment, ii. 331; 1st cavalry, 332; 13th and 35th, 446, 447. vogdes, israel, general, i. 25, 27. voltigeurs, i. 208. wabash, commodore dupont's flagship, ii. 344. wadmalaw river, ii. 378. walcott, charles f., general, ii. 490, 496, 497. walcott, lieutenant, ii. 491. walker, elijah, colonel, ii. 488, 497. walker, e., missionary among spokanes, i. 398; ii. 22. walker, fort, ii. 345. walker, henry, ii. 392. walker, r.m., i. 315; ii. 168, 248. walker donation claim purchased, i. 421; ii. 265. walla walla, old fort, i. 296, 297, 402, 403; plundered by indians, ii. 158. walla walla river and valley, i. 393, 400, 403; ii. 31, 147, 149, 209. walla walla indians, ii. 16, 21; at walla walla council, 35-64, 121, 157, 158. walla walla council, ii. 27, 31-65. wallace, william h., ii. 170, 245, 266, 289. wallamet indians, ii. 23. wanton, gideon, governor, i. 65. wanton, john g., i. 65. wanton, mary, "charming polly," i. 65. warbass, edward d., ii. 169, 187. warbass, n.g., dr., i. 439; ii. 168. ward, ira, i. 415. warfield, l.a., captain, ii. 343. warren, dr., treats rupture, i. 18. warren, g.k., colonel, ii. 466, 469. warrenton, ii. 430, 432. warrenton junction, ii. 430-432. washington, camp, near vera cruz, i. 115. washington, camp, south of spokane river, 399, 400. washington, george, general, i. 62. washington, george, i. 412. washington, territory of, formed, i. 280; appointed governor of, 282; sparse settlements in, 411-414; governor stevens's messages to legislature, 418, 419, 445, 447; ii. 162-164, 262; resolution that governor visit washington, i. 424; of censure, ii. 263-264. washington artillery, ii. 450. washington city, visits, i. 75, 89, 226, 237; life in, 242-292, 302; spends summer of 1854 at, 427-434; ii. 271, 295, 319. washington lake, ii. 188. washington mounted rifles, ii. 169, 197. washington territorial library, purchased, i. 300. washington volunteers, called out by governor mason, disbanded by wool, ii. 149, 158, 160, 168-171, 189; mustered out on sound, 192; all disbanded, character and services, 232-235. waterloo bridge, ii. 430. watson, colonel, i. 221. watson, major, ii. 366. webster, daniel, i. 75, 248, 249. weed, stephen h., captain, ii. 470. weed, charles e., ii. 168, 248. wee-lap-to-leek, chief of tigh indians, ii. 214. wellman, captain, bark prompt, i. 99, 108. welsh, thomas, colonel, ii. 395. wenass river, ii. 197. wenatche river, i. 395; ii. 64. west, mr., ii. 329. west point, i. 22, 83; course at, 24-59; revisits, 78. whig party, i. 260. whipple, a.w., general, i. 27, 83, 84. whitby island, ii. 154, 184, 258. white, sapper, death of, i. 346. white, william, captain, ii. 169, 171, 187. white antelope, gros ventre squaw, ii. 355. white bear, gros ventre chief, i. 356. white bear lake, i. 312, 318. white eagle, gros ventre chief, i. 355. white earth river, i. 345. white man's horse, blackfoot chief, i. 352. white river or duwhamish, ii. 159, 187, 188. white salmon river, ii. 257. white tail deer, gros ventre chief, i. 356. white wood lakes, i. 338. whitman, marcus, missionary among cuyuses, i. 403; ii. 21. whitney, l., major, i. 114. whitworth, george f., rev., i. 415; ii. 260. wiedrich, captain, ii. 451. wilbur, agent of yakimas, ii. 64. wilcox, c.m., general, ii. 450, 460, 471. wild rice river, i. 324. wilkie, governor, red river hunters, i. 334, 335. wilkinson, morton s., senator, ii. 299. willard, g.k., dr., i. 415; ii. 168. william i., emperor of germany, awards san juan archipelago to united states, ii. 294. williams, hezekiah, i. 229. williams, james, captain, ii. 169, 170, 200. williams, robert, general, ii. 382, 394, 395, 399, 400; at battle of james island, 408-411. williams, seth, general, i. 27. wilmington island, ii. 372. wilmington, n.c., i. 272, 277. wilson, henry, senator, ii. 319, 385. wilson, james h., lieutenant, ii. 372. wilson point, ii. 184. winders, captain, i. 211. winfield scott, steamship, ii. 313. winnebago indians, i. 309. winthrop, theodore, ii. 64. wi-ti-my-hoy-she, palouse indian chief, i. 402. wolf's lodge prairie, i. 390; ii. 131. wolf talker, gros ventre chief, i. 356. wolf that climbs, blackfoot chief, i. 368. woodbury, charles levi, i. 274. woodbury, d.p., general, i. 27, 226. woodward, h.r., i. 415. wool, john e., general, rebuked, i. 437; ii. 33, 148, 149, 153, 156, 160, 161; memoir sent to, 173, 174; reply, 175, 176; demand to disband volunteers, 177; governor stevens's caustic reply, 177-184, 196, 207, 224; orders settlers kept out of upper country, 225, 226; relieved by general clark, 266, 276. worth, william s., general, i. 105-107, 115, 119, 120, 126, 129, 130, 138, 139, 141; occupies puebla, 143; advance from puebla, 164, 167-169, 171, 174, 175, 180; at churubusco, 181, 202; battle of molino del rey, 205, 206; battle of chapultepec, 208, 213. wren charles, ii. 243, 247, 249. wright, george, major, i. 205; colonel, ii. 64, 147, 173, 190, 191; abortive campaign against yakima, 194-199; governor stevens's letter to, 199, 202, 203; quasi-peace with yakimas, 204; puts ow-hi and quelchen to death, 205-208; gives order to give up indian murderers, its evasion, 224, 225; punishes the yakimas and spokanes, 230, 231, 274, 283; recommends treaties, 285. wright, h.g., general, i. 27; ii. 341, 357, 380, 382, 383, 387, 388, 394, 395, 399, 400, 408-411, 421. wyncoop, colonel, i. 156. xochimilco, lake in valley of mexico, i. 163, 165. xochimilco, village, i. 168, 171. yale college, solves problem from, i. 20. yantis, benjamin f., judge, ii. 132, 169, 249. yellowstone, i. 337, 345, 347; ii. 107, 108. yelm prairie, ii. 185. yakima indians, ii. 16, 22; at walla walla council, 40-64; present condition, 64, 121, 140; begin war, 157; defeat major haller, 158, 160, 186; massacre at cascades, 190, 197, 221-223, 257, 273, 274. yakima river, ii. 63, 197. yakima treaty, ii. 63, 64. yakima valley, i. 394. yesler, h.l., i. 412; ii. 251, 256. young's branch, ii. 435. young chief, head chief of cuyuses at walla walla council, ii. 38, 42, 44, 51; assents to treaty, 53, 61, 121. zacatecas, mexico, i. 151. the riverside press _electrotyped and printed by h.o. houghton & co._ _cambridge, mass, u.s.a._ * * * * * transcriber's note: some compound words (e.g., 'wagon-master') appeared both with and without a hyphen. they are given as printed. where a word is hyphenated on a line break, the hyphen is retained if the preponderance of other appearances indicate it was intended. index entries tend not to hyphenate words that are unhyphenated in the text. all variants were retained. illlustrations cannot be reproduced here, but the approximate position of each is indicated as: [illustration: <caption>]. footnotes are repositioned at the end of each chapter. they have been re-numbered consecutively. the word 'coöperate' is consistently printed with the diaeresis on the second syllable's opening 'o'. on p. 181, the word fell on a line break, and was hyphenated without the diaeresis. the 'ö' has been restored for consistency. the total for the second table on p. 381 appears incorrectly as 16,988. the figures, as printed, add to 17,009. on p. 401, the word 'premptorily', apparently an error for 'peremptorily' appears in a quoted passage, and is merely noted here. neither of the versions of 'quinault' in the table on p. 504 agrees with the modern spelling. to be consistent, the second instance was changed to agree with the first, 'quinaiult'. index there were several errors discovered in the index, which refers to both volumes. on occasion, the volume numbers 'i' or 'ii' are missing or incorrect. these errata are included in the table below. while these errors are corrected, no systematic attempt was made to check all entries. the entry for 'daufuskie island' was misprinted as 'danfuskie', and attributed to the wrong page (p. 282 rather than p. 382). it should have followed the entry for 'danpher', just below it. minor punctuation lapses were silently corrected. the following minor issues, most likely printer's errors, are noted, and were corrected. p. 85 governor stevens[;/:] corrected. p. 94 vicin[i]ty added. p. 95 luxur[i]ant added. p. 181 co[-o]/ö]perate corrected. p. 268 meeting[s] added. p. 318 well known in congress.["] removed. p. 349 stren[u]ously removed. p. 368 serr[i/e]ll's corrected. p. 371 discipl[in]ing added. p. 381 brigad[i]er-general ripley added. p. 401 premptorily _sic._ p. 432 junct[i]on added. p. 450 b[r]ack removed. p. 504 quin[ia/ai]ult transposed. p. 507 anderson, george t., colonel, i[i]. 490. added. p. 510 river, [i.] 412; added. p. 512 da[n/u]fuskie corrected and repositioned. p. 513 flattery, cape, [i.] 473, 474, 477. added. p. 514 gosnell, wesley, ii. 169, 187, 255, 2[2/5]7 corrected. p. 516 james river, va., [ii.] 423. added. p. 525 seventy-ninth highlanders, new york volunteers, [i]i. 320, added. action at port royal ferry, 3[6/5]8-366 corrected. p. 526 stevens, eliza, cousin, [i]. 91. added. stevens, george watson, [i.] 265, 266, 269, 295; added. p. 528 townsend, e.d., general, his advice, [i.] 26, 28. added. p. 529 virginia, 13th regiment, ii. 3[2/3]1; corrected. 1st cavalry, [3]32; added. washington, camp, south of spokane river, [i.] 399, 400. added. wellman, captain, bark prompt, [i.] 99, 108. added. p. 530 xochimilco, village, [i.] 168, 171. added. personal memoirs of u. s. grant, complete by u. s. grant preface. "man proposes and god disposes." there are but few important events in the affairs of men brought about by their own choice. although frequently urged by friends to write my memoirs i had determined never to do so, nor to write anything for publication. at the age of nearly sixty-two i received an injury from a fall, which confined me closely to the house while it did not apparently affect my general health. this made study a pleasant pastime. shortly after, the rascality of a business partner developed itself by the announcement of a failure. this was followed soon after by universal depression of all securities, which seemed to threaten the extinction of a good part of the income still retained, and for which i am indebted to the kindly act of friends. at this juncture the editor of the century magazine asked me to write a few articles for him. i consented for the money it gave me; for at that moment i was living upon borrowed money. the work i found congenial, and i determined to continue it. the event is an important one for me, for good or evil; i hope for the former. in preparing these volumes for the public, i have entered upon the task with the sincere desire to avoid doing injustice to any one, whether on the national or confederate side, other than the unavoidable injustice of not making mention often where special mention is due. there must be many errors of omission in this work, because the subject is too large to be treated of in two volumes in such way as to do justice to all the officers and men engaged. there were thousands of instances, during the rebellion, of individual, company, regimental and brigade deeds of heroism which deserve special mention and are not here alluded to. the troops engaged in them will have to look to the detailed reports of their individual commanders for the full history of those deeds. the first volume, as well as a portion of the second, was written before i had reason to suppose i was in a critical condition of health. later i was reduced almost to the point of death, and it became impossible for me to attend to anything for weeks. i have, however, somewhat regained my strength, and am able, often, to devote as many hours a day as a person should devote to such work. i would have more hope of satisfying the expectation of the public if i could have allowed myself more time. i have used my best efforts, with the aid of my eldest son, f. d. grant, assisted by his brothers, to verify from the records every statement of fact given. the comments are my own, and show how i saw the matters treated of whether others saw them in the same light or not. with these remarks i present these volumes to the public, asking no favor but hoping they will meet the approval of the reader. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, july 1, 1885. contents volume i. chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. chapter ii. west point--graduation. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico --supplying transportation. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second-lieutenant--army of occupation. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz --siege and capture of vera cruz. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey --storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army--mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast --crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast--promoted captain--flush times in california. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting --mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment--general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo. --jefferson city--cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah --headquarters at cairo. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont--a narrow escape--after the battle. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy--assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight--retreat and defeat of the confederates. chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates--intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston --remarks on shiloh. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth--occupation of corinth--the army separated. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis --escaping jackson--complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen --occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs --collecting forage and food. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general mcclernand in command--assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence--operations at yazoo pass. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press--running the batteries--loss of the indianola --disposition of the troops. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf--movement up the big black--battle of raymond. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy--battle of champion's hill. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black --investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. chapter xxxvii. siege of vicksburg. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines's bluff --explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. volume one begins: chapter i. ancestry--birth--boyhood. my family is american, and has been for generations, in all its branches, direct and collateral. mathew grant, the founder of the branch in america, of which i am a descendant, reached dorchester, massachusetts, in may, 1630. in 1635 he moved to what is now windsor, connecticut, and was the surveyor for that colony for more than forty years. he was also, for many years of the time, town clerk. he was a married man when he arrived at dorchester, but his children were all born in this country. his eldest son, samuel, took lands on the east side of the connecticut river, opposite windsor, which have been held and occupied by descendants of his to this day. i am of the eighth generation from mathew grant, and seventh from samuel. mathew grant's first wife died a few years after their settlement in windsor, and he soon after married the widow rockwell, who, with her first husband, had been fellow-passengers with him and his first wife, on the ship mary and john, from dorchester, england, in 1630. mrs. rockwell had several children by her first marriage, and others by her second. by intermarriage, two or three generations later, i am descended from both the wives of mathew grant. in the fifth descending generation my great grandfather, noah grant, and his younger brother, solomon, held commissions in the english army, in 1756, in the war against the french and indians. both were killed that year. my grandfather, also named noah, was then but nine years old. at the breaking out of the war of the revolution, after the battles of concord and lexington, he went with a connecticut company to join the continental army, and was present at the battle of bunker hill. he served until the fall of yorktown, or through the entire revolutionary war. he must, however, have been on furlough part of the time--as i believe most of the soldiers of that period were--for he married in connecticut during the war, had two children, and was a widower at the close. soon after this he emigrated to westmoreland county, pennsylvania, and settled near the town of greensburg in that county. he took with him the younger of his two children, peter grant. the elder, solomon, remained with his relatives in connecticut until old enough to do for himself, when he emigrated to the british west indies. not long after his settlement in pennsylvania, my grandfather, captain noah grant, married a miss kelly, and in 1799 he emigrated again, this time to ohio, and settled where the town of deerfield now stands. he had now five children, including peter, a son by his first marriage. my father, jesse r. grant, was the second child--oldest son, by the second marriage. peter grant went early to maysville, kentucky, where he was very prosperous, married, had a family of nine children, and was drowned at the mouth of the kanawha river, virginia, in 1825, being at the time one of the wealthy men of the west. my grandmother grant died in 1805, leaving seven children. this broke up the family. captain noah grant was not thrifty in the way of "laying up stores on earth," and, after the death of his second wife, he went, with the two youngest children, to live with his son peter, in maysville. the rest of the family found homes in the neighborhood of deerfield, my father in the family of judge tod, the father of the late governor tod, of ohio. his industry and independence of character were such, that i imagine his labor compensated fully for the expense of his maintenance. there must have been a cordiality in his welcome into the tod family, for to the day of his death he looked upon judge tod and his wife, with all the reverence he could have felt if they had been parents instead of benefactors. i have often heard him speak of mrs. tod as the most admirable woman he had ever known. he remained with the tod family only a few years, until old enough to learn a trade. he went first, i believe, with his half-brother, peter grant, who, though not a tanner himself, owned a tannery in maysville, kentucky. here he learned his trade, and in a few years returned to deerfield and worked for, and lived in the family of a mr. brown, the father of john brown--"whose body lies mouldering in the grave, while his soul goes marching on." i have often heard my father speak of john brown, particularly since the events at harper's ferry. brown was a boy when they lived in the same house, but he knew him afterwards, and regarded him as a man of great purity of character, of high moral and physical courage, but a fanatic and extremist in whatever he advocated. it was certainly the act of an insane man to attempt the invasion of the south, and the overthrow of slavery, with less than twenty men. my father set up for himself in business, establishing a tannery at ravenna, the county seat of portage county. in a few years he removed from ravenna, and set up the same business at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. during the minority of my father, the west afforded but poor facilities for the most opulent of the youth to acquire an education, and the majority were dependent, almost exclusively, upon their own exertions for whatever learning they obtained. i have often heard him say that his time at school was limited to six months, when he was very young, too young, indeed, to learn much, or to appreciate the advantages of an education, and to a "quarter's schooling" afterwards, probably while living with judge tod. but his thirst for education was intense. he learned rapidly, and was a constant reader up to the day of his death in his eightieth year. books were scarce in the western reserve during his youth, but he read every book he could borrow in the neighborhood where he lived. this scarcity gave him the early habit of studying everything he read, so that when he got through with a book, he knew everything in it. the habit continued through life. even after reading the daily papers--which he never neglected--he could give all the important information they contained. he made himself an excellent english scholar, and before he was twenty years of age was a constant contributor to western newspapers, and was also, from that time until he was fifty years old, an able debater in the societies for this purpose, which were common in the west at that time. he always took an active part in politics, but was never a candidate for office, except, i believe, that he was the first mayor of georgetown. he supported jackson for the presidency; but he was a whig, a great admirer of henry clay, and never voted for any other democrat for high office after jackson. my mother's family lived in montgomery county, pennsylvania, for several generations. i have little information about her ancestors. her family took no interest in genealogy, so that my grandfather, who died when i was sixteen years old, knew only back to his grandfather. on the other side, my father took a great interest in the subject, and in his researches, he found that there was an entailed estate in windsor, connecticut, belonging to the family, to which his nephew, lawson grant --still living--was the heir. he was so much interested in the subject that he got his nephew to empower him to act in the matter, and in 1832 or 1833, when i was a boy ten or eleven years old, he went to windsor, proved the title beyond dispute, and perfected the claim of the owners for a consideration--three thousand dollars, i think. i remember the circumstance well, and remember, too, hearing him say on his return that he found some widows living on the property, who had little or nothing beyond their homes. from these he refused to receive any recompense. my mother's father, john simpson, moved from montgomery county, pennsylvania, to clermont county, ohio, about the year 1819, taking with him his four children, three daughters and one son. my mother, hannah simpson, was the third of these children, and was then over twenty years of age. her oldest sister was at that time married, and had several children. she still lives in clermont county at this writing, october 5th, 1884, and is over ninety ears of age. until her memory failed her, a few years ago, she thought the country ruined beyond recovery when the democratic party lost control in 1860. her family, which was large, inherited her views, with the exception of one son who settled in kentucky before the war. he was the only one of the children who entered the volunteer service to suppress the rebellion. her brother, next of age and now past eighty-eight, is also still living in clermont county, within a few miles of the old homestead, and is as active in mind as ever. he was a supporter of the government during the war, and remains a firm believer, that national success by the democratic party means irretrievable ruin. in june, 1821, my father, jesse r. grant, married hannah simpson. i was born on the 27th of april, 1822, at point pleasant, clermont county, ohio. in the fall of 1823 we moved to georgetown, the county seat of brown, the adjoining county east. this place remained my home, until at the age of seventeen, in 1839, i went to west point. the schools, at the time of which i write, were very indifferent. there were no free schools, and none in which the scholars were classified. they were all supported by subscription, and a single teacher--who was often a man or a woman incapable of teaching much, even if they imparted all they knew--would have thirty or forty scholars, male and female, from the infant learning the a b c's up to the young lady of eighteen and the boy of twenty, studying the highest branches taught--the three r's, "reading, 'riting, 'rithmetic." i never saw an algebra, or other mathematical work higher than the arithmetic, in georgetown, until after i was appointed to west point. i then bought a work on algebra in cincinnati; but having no teacher it was greek to me. my life in georgetown was uneventful. from the age of five or six until seventeen, i attended the subscription schools of the village, except during the winters of 1836-7 and 1838-9. the former period was spent in maysville, kentucky, attending the school of richardson and rand; the latter in ripley, ohio, at a private school. i was not studious in habit, and probably did not make progress enough to compensate for the outlay for board and tuition. at all events both winters were spent in going over the same old arithmetic which i knew every word of before, and repeating: "a noun is the name of a thing," which i had also heard my georgetown teachers repeat, until i had come to believe it--but i cast no reflections upon my old teacher, richardson. he turned out bright scholars from his school, many of whom have filled conspicuous places in the service of their states. two of my contemporaries there --who, i believe, never attended any other institution of learning--have held seats in congress, and one, if not both, other high offices; these are wadsworth and brewster. my father was, from my earliest recollection, in comfortable circumstances, considering the times, his place of residence, and the community in which he lived. mindful of his own lack of facilities for acquiring an education, his greatest desire in maturer years was for the education of his children. consequently, as stated before, i never missed a quarter from school from the time i was old enough to attend till the time of leaving home. this did not exempt me from labor. in my early days, every one labored more or less, in the region where my youth was spent, and more in proportion to their private means. it was only the very poor who were exempt. while my father carried on the manufacture of leather and worked at the trade himself, he owned and tilled considerable land. i detested the trade, preferring almost any other labor; but i was fond of agriculture, and of all employment in which horses were used. we had, among other lands, fifty acres of forest within a mile of the village. in the fall of the year choppers were employed to cut enough wood to last a twelve-month. when i was seven or eight years of age, i began hauling all the wood used in the house and shops. i could not load it on the wagons, of course, at that time, but i could drive, and the choppers would load, and some one at the house unload. when about eleven years old, i was strong enough to hold a plough. from that age until seventeen i did all the work done with horses, such as breaking up the land, furrowing, ploughing corn and potatoes, bringing in the crops when harvested, hauling all the wood, besides tending two or three horses, a cow or two, and sawing wood for stoves, etc., while still attending school. for this i was compensated by the fact that there was never any scolding or punishing by my parents; no objection to rational enjoyments, such as fishing, going to the creek a mile away to swim in summer, taking a horse and visiting my grandparents in the adjoining county, fifteen miles off, skating on the ice in winter, or taking a horse and sleigh when there was snow on the ground. while still quite young i had visited cincinnati, forty-five miles away, several times, alone; also maysville, kentucky, often, and once louisville. the journey to louisville was a big one for a boy of that day. i had also gone once with a two-horse carriage to chilicothe, about seventy miles, with a neighbor's family, who were removing to toledo, ohio, and returned alone; and had gone once, in like manner, to flat rock, kentucky, about seventy miles away. on this latter occasion i was fifteen years of age. while at flat rock, at the house of a mr. payne, whom i was visiting with his brother, a neighbor of ours in georgetown, i saw a very fine saddle horse, which i rather coveted, and proposed to mr. payne, the owner, to trade him for one of the two i was driving. payne hesitated to trade with a boy, but asking his brother about it, the latter told him that it would be all right, that i was allowed to do as i pleased with the horses. i was seventy miles from home, with a carriage to take back, and mr. payne said he did not know that his horse had ever had a collar on. i asked to have him hitched to a farm wagon and we would soon see whether he would work. it was soon evident that the horse had never worn harness before; but he showed no viciousness, and i expressed a confidence that i could manage him. a trade was at once struck, i receiving ten dollars difference. the next day mr. payne, of georgetown, and i started on our return. we got along very well for a few miles, when we encountered a ferocious dog that frightened the horses and made them run. the new animal kicked at every jump he made. i got the horses stopped, however, before any damage was done, and without running into anything. after giving them a little rest, to quiet their fears, we started again. that instant the new horse kicked, and started to run once more. the road we were on, struck the turnpike within half a mile of the point where the second runaway commenced, and there there was an embankment twenty or more feet deep on the opposite side of the pike. i got the horses stopped on the very brink of the precipice. my new horse was terribly frightened and trembled like an aspen; but he was not half so badly frightened as my companion, mr. payne, who deserted me after this last experience, and took passage on a freight wagon for maysville. every time i attempted to start, my new horse would commence to kick. i was in quite a dilemma for a time. once in maysville i could borrow a horse from an uncle who lived there; but i was more than a day's travel from that point. finally i took out my bandanna--the style of handkerchief in universal use then--and with this blindfolded my horse. in this way i reached maysville safely the next day, no doubt much to the surprise of my friend. here i borrowed a horse from my uncle, and the following day we proceeded on our journey. about half my school-days in georgetown were spent at the school of john d. white, a north carolinian, and the father of chilton white who represented the district in congress for one term during the rebellion. mr. white was always a democrat in politics, and chilton followed his father. he had two older brothers--all three being school-mates of mine at their father's school--who did not go the same way. the second brother died before the rebellion began; he was a whig, and afterwards a republican. his oldest brother was a republican and brave soldier during the rebellion. chilton is reported as having told of an earlier horse-trade of mine. as he told the story, there was a mr. ralston living within a few miles of the village, who owned a colt which i very much wanted. my father had offered twenty dollars for it, but ralston wanted twenty-five. i was so anxious to have the colt, that after the owner left, i begged to be allowed to take him at the price demanded. my father yielded, but said twenty dollars was all the horse was worth, and told me to offer that price; if it was not accepted i was to offer twenty-two and a half, and if that would not get him, to give the twenty-five. i at once mounted a horse and went for the colt. when i got to mr. ralston's house, i said to him: "papa says i may offer you twenty dollars for the colt, but if you won't take that, i am to offer twenty-two and a half, and if you won't take that, to give you twenty-five." it would not require a connecticut man to guess the price finally agreed upon. this story is nearly true. i certainly showed very plainly that i had come for the colt and meant to have him. i could not have been over eight years old at the time. this transaction caused me great heart-burning. the story got out among the boys of the village, and it was a long time before i heard the last of it. boys enjoy the misery of their companions, at least village boys in that day did, and in later life i have found that all adults are not free from the peculiarity. i kept the horse until he was four years old, when he went blind, and i sold him for twenty dollars. when i went to maysville to school, in 1836, at the age of fourteen, i recognized my colt as one of the blind horses working on the tread-wheel of the ferry-boat. i have describes enough of my early life to give an impression of the whole. i did not like to work; but i did as much of it, while young, as grown men can be hired to do in these days, and attended school at the same time. i had as many privileges as any boy in the village, and probably more than most of them. i have no recollection of ever having been punished at home, either by scolding or by the rod. but at school the case was different. the rod was freely used there, and i was not exempt from its influence. i can see john d. white--the school teacher --now, with his long beech switch always in his hand. it was not always the same one, either. switches were brought in bundles, from a beech wood near the school house, by the boys for whose benefit they were intended. often a whole bundle would be used up in a single day. i never had any hard feelings against my teacher, either while attending the school, or in later years when reflecting upon my experience. mr. white was a kindhearted man, and was much respected by the community in which he lived. he only followed the universal custom of the period, and that under which he had received his own education. chapter ii. west point--graduation. in the winter of 1838-9 i was attending school at ripley, only ten miles distant from georgetown, but spent the christmas holidays at home. during this vacation my father received a letter from the honorable thomas morris, then united states senator from ohio. when he read it he said to me, "ulysses, i believe you are going to receive the appointment." "what appointment?" i inquired. "to west point; i have applied for it." "but i won't go," i said. he said he thought i would, and i thought so too, if he did. i really had no objection to going to west point, except that i had a very exalted idea of the acquirements necessary to get through. i did not believe i possessed them, and could not bear the idea of failing. there had been four boys from our village, or its immediate neighborhood, who had been graduated from west point, and never a failure of any one appointed from georgetown, except in the case of the one whose place i was to take. he was the son of dr. bailey, our nearest and most intimate neighbor. young bailey had been appointed in 1837. finding before the january examination following, that he could not pass, he resigned and went to a private school, and remained there until the following year, when he was reappointed. before the next examination he was dismissed. dr. bailey was a proud and sensitive man, and felt the failure of his son so keenly that he forbade his return home. there were no telegraphs in those days to disseminate news rapidly, no railroads west of the alleghanies, and but few east; and above all, there were no reporters prying into other people's private affairs. consequently it did not become generally known that there was a vacancy at west point from our district until i was appointed. i presume mrs. bailey confided to my mother the fact that bartlett had been dismissed, and that the doctor had forbidden his son's return home. the honorable thomas l. hamer, one of the ablest men ohio ever produced, was our member of congress at the time, and had the right of nomination. he and my father had been members of the same debating society (where they were generally pitted on opposite sides), and intimate personal friends from their early manhood up to a few years before. in politics they differed. hamer was a life-long democrat, while my father was a whig. they had a warm discussion, which finally became angry--over some act of president jackson, the removal of the deposit of public moneys, i think--after which they never spoke until after my appointment. i know both of them felt badly over this estrangement, and would have been glad at any time to come to a reconciliation; but neither would make the advance. under these circumstances my father would not write to hamer for the appointment, but he wrote to thomas morris, united states senator from ohio, informing him that there was a vacancy at west point from our district, and that he would be glad if i could be appointed to fill it. this letter, i presume, was turned over to mr. hamer, and, as there was no other applicant, he cheerfully appointed me. this healed the breach between the two, never after reopened. besides the argument used by my father in favor of my going to west point--that "he thought i would go"--there was another very strong inducement. i had always a great desire to travel. i was already the best travelled boy in georgetown, except the sons of one man, john walker, who had emigrated to texas with his family, and immigrated back as soon as he could get the means to do so. in his short stay in texas he acquired a very different opinion of the country from what one would form going there now. i had been east to wheeling, virginia, and north to the western reserve, in ohio, west to louisville, and south to bourbon county, kentucky, besides having driven or ridden pretty much over the whole country within fifty miles of home. going to west point would give me the opportunity of visiting the two great cities of the continent, philadelphia and new york. this was enough. when these places were visited i would have been glad to have had a steamboat or railroad collision, or any other accident happen, by which i might have received a temporary injury sufficient to make me ineligible, for a time, to enter the academy. nothing of the kind occurred, and i had to face the music. georgetown has a remarkable record for a western village. it is, and has been from its earliest existence, a democratic town. there was probably no time during the rebellion when, if the opportunity could have been afforded, it would not have voted for jefferson davis for president of the united states, over mr. lincoln, or any other representative of his party; unless it was immediately after some of john morgan's men, in his celebrated raid through ohio, spent a few hours in the village. the rebels helped themselves to whatever they could find, horses, boots and shoes, especially horses, and many ordered meals to be prepared for them by the families. this was no doubt a far pleasanter duty for some families than it would have been to render a like service for union soldiers. the line between the rebel and union element in georgetown was so marked that it led to divisions even in the churches. there were churches in that part of ohio where treason was preached regularly, and where, to secure membership, hostility to the government, to the war and to the liberation of the slaves, was far more essential than a belief in the authenticity or credibility of the bible. there were men in georgetown who filled all the requirements for membership in these churches. yet this far-off western village, with a population, including old and young, male and female, of about one thousand--about enough for the organization of a single regiment if all had been men capable of bearing arms--furnished the union army four general officers and one colonel, west point graduates, and nine generals and field officers of volunteers, that i can think of. of the graduates from west point, all had citizenship elsewhere at the breaking out of the rebellion, except possibly general a. v. kautz, who had remained in the army from his graduation. two of the colonels also entered the service from other localities. the other seven, general mcgroierty, colonels white, fyffe, loudon and marshall, majors king and bailey, were all residents of georgetown when the war broke out, and all of them, who were alive at the close, returned there. major bailey was the cadet who had preceded me at west point. he was killed in west virginia, in his first engagement. as far as i know, every boy who has entered west point from that village since my time has been graduated. i took passage on a steamer at ripley, ohio, for pittsburg, about the middle of may, 1839. western boats at that day did not make regular trips at stated times, but would stop anywhere, and for any length of time, for passengers or freight. i have myself been detained two or three days at a place after steam was up, the gang planks, all but one, drawn in, and after the time advertised for starting had expired. on this occasion we had no vexatious delays, and in about three days pittsburg was reached. from pittsburg i chose passage by the canal to harrisburg, rather than by the more expeditious stage. this gave a better opportunity of enjoying the fine scenery of western pennsylvania, and i had rather a dread of reaching my destination at all. at that time the canal was much patronized by travellers, and, with the comfortable packets of the period, no mode of conveyance could be more pleasant, when time was not an object. from harrisburg to philadelphia there was a railroad, the first i had ever seen, except the one on which i had just crossed the summit of the alleghany mountains, and over which canal boats were transported. in travelling by the road from harrisburg, i thought the perfection of rapid transit had been reached. we travelled at least eighteen miles an hour, when at full speed, and made the whole distance averaging probably as much as twelve miles an hour. this seemed like annihilating space. i stopped five days in philadelphia, saw about every street in the city, attended the theatre, visited girard college (which was then in course of construction), and got reprimanded from home afterwards, for dallying by the way so long. my sojourn in new york was shorter, but long enough to enable me to see the city very well. i reported at west point on the 30th or 31st of may, and about two weeks later passed my examination for admission, without difficulty, very much to my surprise. a military life had no charms for me, and i had not the faintest idea of staying in the army even if i should be graduated, which i did not expect. the encampment which preceded the commencement of academic studies was very wearisome and uninteresting. when the 28th of august came--the date for breaking up camp and going into barracks--i felt as though i had been at west point always, and that if i staid to graduation, i would have to remain always. i did not take hold of my studies with avidity, in fact i rarely ever read over a lesson the second time during my entire cadetship. i could not sit in my room doing nothing. there is a fine library connected with the academy from which cadets can get books to read in their quarters. i devoted more time to these, than to books relating to the course of studies. much of the time, i am sorry to say, was devoted to novels, but not those of a trashy sort. i read all of bulwer's then published, cooper's, marryat's, scott's, washington irving's works, lever's, and many others that i do not now remember. mathematics was very easy to me, so that when january came, i passed the examination, taking a good standing in that branch. in french, the only other study at that time in the first year's course, my standing was very low. in fact, if the class had been turned the other end foremost i should have been near head. i never succeeded in getting squarely at either end of my class, in any one study, during the four years. i came near it in french, artillery, infantry and cavalry tactics, and conduct. early in the session of the congress which met in december, 1839, a bill was discussed abolishing the military academy. i saw in this an honorable way to obtain a discharge, and read the debates with much interest, but with impatience at the delay in taking action, for i was selfish enough to favor the bill. it never passed, and a year later, although the time hung drearily with me, i would have been sorry to have seen it succeed. my idea then was to get through the course, secure a detail for a few years as assistant professor of mathematics at the academy, and afterwards obtain a permanent position as professor in some respectable college; but circumstances always did shape my course different from my plans. at the end of two years the class received the usual furlough, extending from the close of the june examination to the 28th of august. this i enjoyed beyond any other period of my life. my father had sold out his business in georgetown--where my youth had been spent, and to which my day-dreams carried me back as my future home, if i should ever be able to retire on a competency. he had moved to bethel, only twelve miles away, in the adjoining county of clermont, and had bought a young horse that had never been in harness, for my special use under the saddle during my furlough. most of my time was spent among my old school-mates--these ten weeks were shorter than one week at west point. persons acquainted with the academy know that the corps of cadets is divided into four companies for the purpose of military exercises. these companies are officered from the cadets, the superintendent and commandant selecting the officers for their military bearing and qualifications. the adjutant, quartermaster, four captains and twelve lieutenants are taken from the first, or senior class; the sergeants from the second, or junior class; and the corporals from the third, or sophomore class. i had not been "called out" as a corporal, but when i returned from furlough i found myself the last but one--about my standing in all the tactics--of eighteen sergeants. the promotion was too much for me. that year my standing in the class--as shown by the number of demerits of the year--was about the same as it was among the sergeants, and i was dropped, and served the fourth year as a private. during my first year's encampment general scott visited west point, and reviewed the cadets. with his commanding figure, his quite colossal size and showy uniform, i thought him the finest specimen of manhood my eyes had ever beheld, and the most to be envied. i could never resemble him in appearance, but i believe i did have a presentiment for a moment that some day i should occupy his place on review--although i had no intention then of remaining in the army. my experience in a horse-trade ten years before, and the ridicule it caused me, were too fresh in my mind for me to communicate this presentiment to even my most intimate chum. the next summer martin van buren, then president of the united states, visited west point and reviewed the cadets; he did not impress me with the awe which scott had inspired. in fact i regarded general scott and captain c. f. smith, the commandant of cadets, as the two men most to be envied in the nation. i retained a high regard for both up to the day of their death. the last two years wore away more rapidly than the first two, but they still seemed about five times as long as ohio years, to me. at last all the examinations were passed, and the members of the class were called upon to record their choice of arms of service and regiments. i was anxious to enter the cavalry, or dragoons as they were then called, but there was only one regiment of dragoons in the army at that time, and attached to that, besides the full complement of officers, there were at least four brevet second lieutenants. i recorded therefore my first choice, dragoons; second, 4th infantry; and got the latter. again there was a furlough--or, more properly speaking, leave of absence for the class were now commissioned officers--this time to the end of september. again i went to ohio to spend my vacation among my old school-mates; and again i found a fine saddle horse purchased for my special use, besides a horse and buggy that i could drive--but i was not in a physical condition to enjoy myself quite as well as on the former occasion. for six months before graduation i had had a desperate cough ("tyler's grip" it was called), and i was very much reduced, weighing but one hundred and seventeen pounds, just my weight at entrance, though i had grown six inches in stature in the mean time. there was consumption in my father's family, two of his brothers having died of that disease, which made my symptoms more alarming. the brother and sister next younger than myself died, during the rebellion, of the same disease, and i seemed the most promising subject for it of the three in 1843. having made alternate choice of two different arms of service with different uniforms, i could not get a uniform suit until notified of my assignment. i left my measurement with a tailor, with directions not to make the uniform until i notified him whether it was to be for infantry or dragoons. notice did not reach me for several weeks, and then it took at least a week to get the letter of instructions to the tailor and two more to make the clothes and have them sent to me. this was a time of great suspense. i was impatient to get on my uniform and see how it looked, and probably wanted my old school-mates, particularly the girls, to see me in it. the conceit was knocked out of me by two little circumstances that happened soon after the arrival of the clothes, which gave me a distaste for military uniform that i never recovered from. soon after the arrival of the suit i donned it, and put off for cincinnati on horseback. while i was riding along a street of that city, imagining that every one was looking at me, with a feeling akin to mine when i first saw general scott, a little urchin, bareheaded, footed, with dirty and ragged pants held up by bare a single gallows--that's what suspenders were called then--and a shirt that had not seen a wash-tub for weeks, turned to me and cried: "soldier! will you work? no, sir--ee; i'll sell my shirt first!!" the horse trade and its dire consequences were recalled to mind. the other circumstance occurred at home. opposite our house in bethel stood the old stage tavern where "man and beast" found accommodation, the stable-man was rather dissipated, but possessed of some humor. on my return i found him parading the streets, and attending in the stable, barefooted, but in a pair of sky-blue nankeen pantaloons--just the color of my uniform trousers--with a strip of white cotton sheeting sewed down the outside seams in imitation of mine. the joke was a huge one in the mind of many of the people, and was much enjoyed by them; but i did not appreciate it so highly. during the remainder of my leave of absence, my time was spent in visiting friends in georgetown and cincinnati, and occasionally other towns in that part of the state. chapter iii. army life--causes of the mexican war--camp salubrity. on the 30th of september i reported for duty at jefferson barracks, st. louis, with the 4th united states infantry. it was the largest military post in the country at that time, being garrisoned by sixteen companies of infantry, eight of the 3d regiment, the remainder of the 4th. colonel steven kearney, one of the ablest officers of the day, commanded the post, and under him discipline was kept at a high standard, but without vexatious rules or regulations. every drill and roll-call had to be attended, but in the intervals officers were permitted to enjoy themselves, leaving the garrison, and going where they pleased, without making written application to state where they were going for how long, etc., so that they were back for their next duty. it did seem to me, in my early army days, that too many of the older officers, when they came to command posts, made it a study to think what orders they could publish to annoy their subordinates and render them uncomfortable. i noticed, however, a few years later, when the mexican war broke out, that most of this class of officers discovered they were possessed of disabilities which entirely incapacitated them for active field service. they had the moral courage to proclaim it, too. they were right; but they did not always give their disease the right name. at west point i had a class-mate--in the last year of our studies he was room-mate also--f. t. dent, whose family resided some five miles west of jefferson barracks. two of his unmarried brothers were living at home at that time, and as i had taken with me from ohio, my horse, saddle and bridle, i soon found my way out to white haven, the name of the dent estate. as i found the family congenial my visits became frequent. there were at home, besides the young men, two daughters, one a school miss of fifteen, the other a girl of eight or nine. there was still an older daughter of seventeen, who had been spending several years at boarding-school in st. louis, but who, though through school, had not yet returned home. she was spending the winter in the city with connections, the family of colonel john o'fallon, well known in st. louis. in february she returned to her country home. after that i do not know but my visits became more frequent; they certainly did become more enjoyable. we would often take walks, or go on horseback to visit the neighbors, until i became quite well acquainted in that vicinity. sometimes one of the brothers would accompany us, sometimes one of the younger sisters. if the 4th infantry had remained at jefferson barracks it is possible, even probable, that this life might have continued for some years without my finding out that there was anything serious the matter with me; but in the following may a circumstance occurred which developed my sentiment so palpably that there was no mistaking it. the annexation of texas was at this time the subject of violent discussion in congress, in the press, and by individuals. the administration of president tyler, then in power, was making the most strenuous efforts to effect the annexation, which was, indeed, the great and absorbing question of the day. during these discussions the greater part of the single rifle regiment in the army--the 2d dragoons, which had been dismounted a year or two before, and designated "dismounted rifles"--was stationed at fort jessup, louisiana, some twenty-five miles east of the texas line, to observe the frontier. about the 1st of may the 3d infantry was ordered from jefferson barracks to louisiana, to go into camp in the neighborhood of fort jessup, and there await further orders. the troops were embarked on steamers and were on their way down the mississippi within a few days after the receipt of this order. about the time they started i obtained a leave of absence for twenty days to go to ohio to visit my parents. i was obliged to go to st. louis to take a steamer for louisville or cincinnati, or the first steamer going up the ohio river to any point. before i left st. louis orders were received at jefferson barracks for the 4th infantry to follow the 3d. a messenger was sent after me to stop my leaving; but before he could reach me i was off, totally ignorant of these events. a day or two after my arrival at bethel i received a letter from a classmate and fellow lieutenant in the 4th, informing me of the circumstances related above, and advising me not to open any letter post marked st. louis or jefferson barracks, until the expiration of my leave, and saying that he would pack up my things and take them along for me. his advice was not necessary, for no other letter was sent to me. i now discovered that i was exceedingly anxious to get back to jefferson barracks, and i understood the reason without explanation from any one. my leave of absence required me to report for duty, at jefferson barracks, at the end of twenty days. i knew my regiment had gone up the red river, but i was not disposed to break the letter of my leave; besides, if i had proceeded to louisiana direct, i could not have reached there until after the expiration of my leave. accordingly, at the end of the twenty days, i reported for duty to lieutenant ewell, commanding at jefferson barracks, handing him at the same time my leave of absence. after noticing the phraseology of the order--leaves of absence were generally worded, "at the end of which time he will report for duty with his proper command"--he said he would give me an order to join my regiment in louisiana. i then asked for a few days' leave before starting, which he readily granted. this was the same ewell who acquired considerable reputation as a confederate general during the rebellion. he was a man much esteemed, and deservedly so, in the old army, and proved himself a gallant and efficient officer in two wars --both in my estimation unholy. i immediately procured a horse and started for the country, taking no baggage with me, of course. there is an insignificant creek--the gravois--between jefferson barracks and the place to which i was going, and at that day there was not a bridge over it from its source to its mouth. there is not water enough in the creek at ordinary stages to run a coffee mill, and at low water there is none running whatever. on this occasion it had been raining heavily, and, when the creek was reached, i found the banks full to overflowing, and the current rapid. i looked at it a moment to consider what to do. one of my superstitions had always been when i started to go any where, or to do anything, not to turn back, or stop until the thing intended was accomplished. i have frequently started to go to places where i had never been and to which i did not know the way, depending upon making inquiries on the road, and if i got past the place without knowing it, instead of turning back, i would go on until a road was found turning in the right direction, take that, and come in by the other side. so i struck into the stream, and in an instant the horse was swimming and i being carried down by the current. i headed the horse towards the other bank and soon reached it, wet through and without other clothes on that side of the stream. i went on, however, to my destination and borrowed a dry suit from my --future--brother-in-law. we were not of the same size, but the clothes answered every purpose until i got more of my own. before i returned i mustered up courage to make known, in the most awkward manner imaginable, the discovery i had made on learning that the 4th infantry had been ordered away from jefferson barracks. the young lady afterwards admitted that she too, although until then she had never looked upon me other than as a visitor whose company was agreeable to her, had experienced a depression of spirits she could not account for when the regiment left. before separating it was definitely understood that at a convenient time we would join our fortunes, and not let the removal of a regiment trouble us. this was in may, 1844. it was the 22d of august, 1848, before the fulfilment of this agreement. my duties kept me on the frontier of louisiana with the army of observation during the pendency of annexation; and afterwards i was absent through the war with mexico, provoked by the action of the army, if not by the annexation itself. during that time there was a constant correspondence between miss dent and myself, but we only met once in the period of four years and three months. in may, 1845, i procured a leave for twenty days, visited st. louis, and obtained the consent of the parents for the union, which had not been asked for before. as already stated, it was never my intention to remain in the army long, but to prepare myself for a professorship in some college. accordingly, soon after i was settled at jefferson barracks, i wrote a letter to professor church--professor of mathematics at west point--requesting him to ask my designation as his assistant, when next a detail had to be made. assistant professors at west point are all officers of the army, supposed to be selected for their special fitness for the particular branch of study they are assigned to teach. the answer from professor church was entirely satisfactory, and no doubt i should have been detailed a year or two later but for the mexican war coming on. accordingly i laid out for myself a course of studies to be pursued in garrison, with regularity, if not persistency. i reviewed my west point course of mathematics during the seven months at jefferson barracks, and read many valuable historical works, besides an occasional novel. to help my memory i kept a book in which i would write up, from time to time, my recollections of all i had read since last posting it. when the regiment was ordered away, i being absent at the time, my effects were packed up by lieutenant haslett, of the 4th infantry, and taken along. i never saw my journal after, nor did i ever keep another, except for a portion of the time while travelling abroad. often since a fear has crossed my mind lest that book might turn up yet, and fall into the hands of some malicious person who would publish it. i know its appearance would cause me as much heart-burning as my youthful horse-trade, or the later rebuke for wearing uniform clothes. the 3d infantry had selected camping grounds on the reservation at fort jessup, about midway between the red river and the sabine. our orders required us to go into camp in the same neighborhood, and await further instructions. those authorized to do so selected a place in the pine woods, between the old town of natchitoches and grand ecore, about three miles from each, and on high ground back from the river. the place was given the name of camp salubrity, and proved entitled to it. the camp was on a high, sandy, pine ridge, with spring branches in the valley, in front and rear. the springs furnished an abundance of cool, pure water, and the ridge was above the flight of mosquitoes, which abound in that region in great multitudes and of great voracity. in the valley they swarmed in myriads, but never came to the summit of the ridge. the regiment occupied this camp six months before the first death occurred, and that was caused by an accident. there was no intimation given that the removal of the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry to the western border of louisiana was occasioned in any way by the prospective annexation of texas, but it was generally understood that such was the case. ostensibly we were intended to prevent filibustering into texas, but really as a menace to mexico in case she appeared to contemplate war. generally the officers of the army were indifferent whether the annexation was consummated or not; but not so all of them. for myself, i was bitterly opposed to the measure, and to this day regard the war, which resulted, as one of the most unjust ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. it was an instance of a republic following the bad example of european monarchies, in not considering justice in their desire to acquire additional territory. texas was originally a state belonging to the republic of mexico. it extended from the sabine river on the east to the rio grande on the west, and from the gulf of mexico on the south and east to the territory of the united states and new mexico--another mexican state at that time--on the north and west. an empire in territory, it had but a very sparse population, until settled by americans who had received authority from mexico to colonize. these colonists paid very little attention to the supreme government, and introduced slavery into the state almost from the start, though the constitution of mexico did not, nor does it now, sanction that institution. soon they set up an independent government of their own, and war existed, between texas and mexico, in name from that time until 1836, when active hostilities very nearly ceased upon the capture of santa anna, the mexican president. before long, however, the same people--who with permission of mexico had colonized texas, and afterwards set up slavery there, and then seceded as soon as they felt strong enough to do so--offered themselves and the state to the united states, and in 1845 their offer was accepted. the occupation, separation and annexation were, from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave states might be formed for the american union. even if the annexation itself could be justified, the manner in which the subsequent war was forced upon mexico cannot. the fact is, annexationists wanted more territory than they could possibly lay any claim to, as part of the new acquisition. texas, as an independent state, never had exercised jurisdiction over the territory between the nueces river and the rio grande. mexico had never recognized the independence of texas, and maintained that, even if independent, the state had no claim south of the nueces. i am aware that a treaty, made by the texans with santa anna while he was under duress, ceded all the territory between the nueces and the rio grande--, but he was a prisoner of war when the treaty was made, and his life was in jeopardy. he knew, too, that he deserved execution at the hands of the texans, if they should ever capture him. the texans, if they had taken his life, would have only followed the example set by santa anna himself a few years before, when he executed the entire garrison of the alamo and the villagers of goliad. in taking military possession of texas after annexation, the army of occupation, under general taylor, was directed to occupy the disputed territory. the army did not stop at the nueces and offer to negotiate for a settlement of the boundary question, but went beyond, apparently in order to force mexico to initiate war. it is to the credit of the american nation, however, that after conquering mexico, and while practically holding the country in our possession, so that we could have retained the whole of it, or made any terms we chose, we paid a round sum for the additional territory taken; more than it was worth, or was likely to be, to mexico. to us it was an empire and of incalculable value; but it might have been obtained by other means. the southern rebellion was largely the outgrowth of the mexican war. nations, like individuals, are punished for their transgressions. we got our punishment in the most sanguinary and expensive war of modern times. the 4th infantry went into camp at salubrity in the month of may, 1844, with instructions, as i have said, to await further orders. at first, officers and men occupied ordinary tents. as the summer heat increased these were covered by sheds to break the rays of the sun. the summer was whiled away in social enjoyments among the officers, in visiting those stationed at, and near, fort jessup, twenty-five miles away, visiting the planters on the red river, and the citizens of natchitoches and grand ecore. there was much pleasant intercourse between the inhabitants and the officers of the army. i retain very agreeable recollections of my stay at camp salubrity, and of the acquaintances made there, and no doubt my feeling is shared by the few officers living who were there at the time. i can call to mind only two officers of the 4th infantry, besides myself, who were at camp salubrity with the regiment, who are now alive. with a war in prospect, and belonging to a regiment that had an unusual number of officers detailed on special duty away from the regiment, my hopes of being ordered to west point as instructor vanished. at the time of which i now write, officers in the quartermaster's, commissary's and adjutant--general's departments were appointed from the line of the army, and did not vacate their regimental commissions until their regimental and staff commissions were for the same grades. generally lieutenants were appointed to captaincies to fill vacancies in the staff corps. if they should reach a captaincy in the line before they arrived at a majority in the staff, they would elect which commission they would retain. in the 4th infantry, in 1844, at least six line officers were on duty in the staff, and therefore permanently detached from the regiment. under these circumstances i gave up everything like a special course of reading, and only read thereafter for my own amusement, and not very much for that, until the war was over. i kept a horse and rode, and staid out of doors most of the time by day, and entirely recovered from the cough which i had carried from west point, and from all indications of consumption. i have often thought that my life was saved, and my health restored, by exercise and exposure, enforced by an administrative act, and a war, both of which i disapproved. as summer wore away, and cool days and colder nights came upon us, the tents. we were occupying ceased to afford comfortable quarters; and "further orders" not reaching us, we began to look about to remedy the hardship. men were put to work getting out timber to build huts, and in a very short time all were comfortably housed--privates as well as officers. the outlay by the government in accomplishing this was nothing, or nearly nothing. the winter was spent more agreeably than the summer had been. there were occasional parties given by the planters along the "coast"--as the bottom lands on the red river were called. the climate was delightful. near the close of the short session of congress of 1844-5, the bill for the annexation of texas to the united states was passed. it reached president tyler on the 1st of march, 1845, and promptly received his approval. when the news reached us we began to look again for "further orders." they did not arrive promptly, and on the 1st of may following i asked and obtained a leave of absence for twenty days, for the purpose of visiting--st. louis. the object of this visit has been before stated. early in july the long expected orders were received, but they only took the regiment to new orleans barracks. we reached there before the middle of the month, and again waited weeks for still further orders. the yellow fever was raging in new orleans during the time we remained there, and the streets of the city had the appearance of a continuous well-observed sunday. i recollect but one occasion when this observance seemed to be broken by the inhabitants. one morning about daylight i happened to be awake, and, hearing the discharge of a rifle not far off, i looked out to ascertain where the sound came from. i observed a couple of clusters of men near by, and learned afterwards that "it was nothing; only a couple of gentlemen deciding a difference of opinion with rifles, at twenty paces." i do not remember if either was killed, or even hurt, but no doubt the question of difference was settled satisfactorily, and "honorably," in the estimation of the parties engaged. i do not believe i ever would have the courage to fight a duel. if any man should wrong me to the extent of my being willing to kill him, i would not be willing to give him the choice of weapons with which it should be done, and of the time, place and distance separating us, when i executed him. if i should do another such a wrong as to justify him in killing me, i would make any reasonable atonement within my power, if convinced of the wrong done. i place my opposition to duelling on higher grounds than here stated. no doubt a majority of the duels fought have been for want of moral courage on the part of those engaged to decline. at camp salubrity, and when we went to new orleans barracks, the 4th infantry was commanded by colonel vose, then an old gentleman who had not commanded on drill for a number of years. he was not a man to discover infirmity in the presence of danger. it now appeared that war was imminent, and he felt that it was his duty to brush up his tactics. accordingly, when we got settled down at our new post, he took command of the regiment at a battalion drill. only two or three evolutions had been gone through when he dismissed the battalion, and, turning to go to his own quarters, dropped dead. he had not been complaining of ill health, but no doubt died of heart disease. he was a most estimable man, of exemplary habits, and by no means the author of his own disease. chapter iv. corpus christi--mexican smuggling--spanish rule in mexico--supplying transportation. early in september the regiment left new orleans for corpus christi, now in texas. ocean steamers were not then common, and the passage was made in sailing vessels. at that time there was not more than three feet of water in the channel at the outlet of corpus christi bay; the debarkation, therefore, had to take place by small steamers, and at an island in the channel called shell island, the ships anchoring some miles out from shore. this made the work slow, and as the army was only supplied with one or two steamers, it took a number of days to effect the landing of a single regiment with its stores, camp and garrison equipage, etc. there happened to be pleasant weather while this was going on, but the land-swell was so great that when the ship and steamer were on opposite sides of the same wave they would be at considerable distance apart. the men and baggage were let down to a point higher than the lower deck of the steamer, and when ship and steamer got into the trough between the waves, and were close together, the load would be drawn over the steamer and rapidly run down until it rested on the deck. after i had gone ashore, and had been on guard several days at shell island, quite six miles from the ship, i had occasion for some reason or other to return on board. while on the suviah--i think that was the name of our vessel--i heard a tremendous racket at the other end of the ship, and much and excited sailor language, such as "damn your eyes," etc. in a moment or two the captain, who was an excitable little man, dying with consumption, and not weighing much over a hundred pounds, came running out, carrying a sabre nearly as large and as heavy as he was, and crying, that his men had mutinied. it was necessary to sustain the captain without question, and in a few minutes all the sailors charged with mutiny were in irons. i rather felt for a time a wish that i had not gone aboard just then. as the men charged with mutiny submitted to being placed in irons without resistance, i always doubted if they knew that they had mutinied until they were told. by the time i was ready to leave the ship again i thought i had learned enough of the working of the double and single pulley, by which passengers were let down from the upper deck of the ship to the steamer below, and determined to let myself down without assistance. without saying anything of my intentions to any one, i mounted the railing, and taking hold of the centre rope, just below the upper block, i put one foot on the hook below the lower block, and stepped off just as i did so some one called out "hold on." it was too late. i tried to "hold on" with all my might, but my heels went up, and my head went down so rapidly that my hold broke, and i plunged head foremost into the water, some twenty-five feet below, with such velocity that it seemed to me i never would stop. when i came to the surface again, being a fair swimmer, and not having lost my presence of mind, i swam around until a bucket was let down for me, and i was drawn up without a scratch or injury. i do not believe there was a man on board who sympathized with me in the least when they found me uninjured. i rather enjoyed the joke myself. the captain of the suviah died of his disease a few months later, and i believe before the mutineers were tried. i hope they got clear, because, as before stated, i always thought the mutiny was all in the brain of a very weak and sick man. after reaching shore, or shell island, the labor of getting to corpus christi was slow and tedious. there was, if my memory serves me, but one small steamer to transport troops and baggage when the 4th infantry arrived. others were procured later. the distance from shell island to corpus christi was some sixteen or eighteen miles. the channel to the bay was so shallow that the steamer, small as it was, had to be dragged over the bottom when loaded. not more than one trip a day could be effected. later this was remedied, by deepening the channel and increasing the number of vessels suitable to its navigation. corpus christi is near the head of the bay of the same name, formed by the entrance of the nueces river into tide-water, and is on the west bank of that bay. at the time of its first occupancy by united states troops there was a small mexican hamlet there, containing probably less than one hundred souls. there was, in addition, a small american trading post, at which goods were sold to mexican smugglers. all goods were put up in compact packages of about one hundred pounds each, suitable for loading on pack mules. two of these packages made a load for an ordinary mexican mule, and three for the larger ones. the bulk of the trade was in leaf tobacco, and domestic cotton-cloths and calicoes. the mexicans had, before the arrival of the army, but little to offer in exchange except silver. the trade in tobacco was enormous, considering the population to be supplied. almost every mexican above the age of ten years, and many much younger, smoked the cigarette. nearly every mexican carried a pouch of leaf tobacco, powdered by rolling in the hands, and a roll of corn husks to make wrappers. the cigarettes were made by the smokers as they used them. up to the time of which i write, and for years afterwards--i think until the administration of president juarez--the cultivation, manufacture and sale of tobacco constituted a government monopoly, and paid the bulk of the revenue collected from internal sources. the price was enormously high, and made successful smuggling very profitable. the difficulty of obtaining tobacco is probably the reason why everybody, male and female, used it at that time. i know from my own experience that when i was at west point, the fact that tobacco, in every form, was prohibited, and the mere possession of the weed severely punished, made the majority of the cadets, myself included, try to acquire the habit of using it. i failed utterly at the time and for many years afterward; but the majority accomplished the object of their youthful ambition. under spanish rule mexico was prohibited from producing anything that the mother-country could supply. this rule excluded the cultivation of the grape, olive and many other articles to which the soil and climate were well adapted. the country was governed for "revenue only;" and tobacco, which cannot be raised in spain, but is indigenous to mexico, offered a fine instrumentality for securing this prime object of government. the native population had been in the habit of using "the weed" from a period, back of any recorded history of this continent. bad habits--if not restrained by law or public opinion--spread more rapidly and universally than good ones, and the spanish colonists adopted the use of tobacco almost as generally as the natives. spain, therefore, in order to secure the largest revenue from this source, prohibited the cultivation, except in specified localities--and in these places farmed out the privilege at a very high price. the tobacco when raised could only be sold to the government, and the price to the consumer was limited only by the avarice of the authorities, and the capacity of the people to pay. all laws for the government of the country were enacted in spain, and the officers for their execution were appointed by the crown, and sent out to the new el dorado. the mexicans had been brought up ignorant of how to legislate or how to rule. when they gained their independence, after many years of war, it was the most natural thing in the world that they should adopt as their own the laws then in existence. the only change was, that mexico became her own executor of the laws and the recipient of the revenues. the tobacco tax, yielding so large a revenue under the law as it stood, was one of the last, if not the very last, of the obnoxious imposts to be repealed. now, the citizens are allowed to cultivate any crops the soil will yield. tobacco is cheap, and every quality can be produced. its use is by no means so general as when i first visited the country. gradually the "army of occupation" assembled at corpus christi. when it was all together it consisted of seven companies of the 2d regiment of dragoons, four companies of light artillery, five regiments of infantry --the 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th and 8th--and one regiment of artillery acting as infantry--not more than three thousand men in all. general zachary taylor commanded the whole. there were troops enough in one body to establish a drill and discipline sufficient to fit men and officers for all they were capable of in case of battle. the rank and file were composed of men who had enlisted in time of peace, to serve for seven dollars a month, and were necessarily inferior as material to the average volunteers enlisted later in the war expressly to fight, and also to the volunteers in the war for the preservation of the union. the men engaged in the mexican war were brave, and the officers of the regular army, from highest to lowest, were educated in their profession. a more efficient army for its number and armament, i do not believe ever fought a battle than the one commanded by general taylor in his first two engagements on mexican--or texan soil. the presence of united states troops on the edge of the disputed territory furthest from the mexican settlements, was not sufficient to provoke hostilities. we were sent to provoke a fight, but it was essential that mexico should commence it. it was very doubtful whether congress would declare war; but if mexico should attack our troops, the executive could announce, "whereas, war exists by the acts of, etc.," and prosecute the contest with vigor. once initiated there were but few public men who would have the courage to oppose it. experience proves that the man who obstructs a war in which his nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. better for him, individually, to advocate "war, pestilence, and famine," than to act as obstructionist to a war already begun. the history of the defeated rebel will be honorable hereafter, compared with that of the northern man who aided him by conspiring against his government while protected by it. the most favorable posthumous history the stay-at-home traitor can hope for is--oblivion. mexico showing no willingness to come to the nueces to drive the invaders from her soil, it became necessary for the "invaders" to approach to within a convenient distance to be struck. accordingly, preparations were begun for moving the army to the rio grande, to a point near matamoras. it was desirable to occupy a position near the largest centre of population possible to reach, without absolutely invading territory to which we set up no claim whatever. the distance from corpus christi to matamoras is about one hundred and fifty miles. the country does not abound in fresh water, and the length of the marches had to be regulated by the distance between water supplies. besides the streams, there were occasional pools, filled during the rainy season, some probably made by the traders, who travelled constantly between corpus christi and the rio grande, and some by the buffalo. there was not at that time a single habitation, cultivated field, or herd of domestic animals, between corpus christi and matamoras. it was necessary, therefore, to have a wagon train sufficiently large to transport the camp and garrison equipage, officers' baggage, rations for the army, and part rations of grain for the artillery horses and all the animals taken from the north, where they had been accustomed to having their forage furnished them. the army was but indifferently supplied with transportation. wagons and harness could easily be supplied from the north but mules and horses could not so readily be brought. the american traders and mexican smugglers came to the relief. contracts were made for mules at from eight to eleven dollars each. the smugglers furnished the animals, and took their pay in goods of the description before mentioned. i doubt whether the mexicans received in value from the traders five dollars per head for the animals they furnished, and still more, whether they paid anything but their own time in procuring them. such is trade; such is war. the government paid in hard cash to the contractor the stipulated price. between the rio grande and the nueces there was at that time a large band of wild horses feeding; as numerous, probably, as the band of buffalo roaming further north was before its rapid extermination commenced. the mexicans used to capture these in large numbers and bring them into the american settlements and sell them. a picked animal could be purchased at from eight to twelve dollars, but taken at wholesale, they could be bought for thirty-six dollars a dozen. some of these were purchased for the army, and answered a most useful purpose. the horses were generally very strong, formed much like the norman horse, and with very heavy manes and tails. a number of officers supplied themselves with these, and they generally rendered as useful service as the northern animal in fact they were much better when grazing was the only means of supplying forage. there was no need for haste, and some months were consumed in the necessary preparations for a move. in the meantime the army was engaged in all the duties pertaining to the officer and the soldier. twice, that i remember, small trains were sent from corpus christi, with cavalry escorts, to san antonio and austin, with paymasters and funds to pay off small detachments of troops stationed at those places. general taylor encouraged officers to accompany these expeditions. i accompanied one of them in december, 1845. the distance from corpus christi to san antonio was then computed at one hundred and fifty miles. now that roads exist it is probably less. from san antonio to austin we computed the distance at one hundred and ten miles, and from the latter place back to corpus christi at over two hundred miles. i know the distance now from san antonio to austin is but little over eighty miles, so that our computation was probably too high. there was not at the time an individual living between corpus christi and san antonio until within about thirty miles of the latter point, where there were a few scattering mexican settlements along the san antonio river. the people in at least one of these hamlets lived underground for protection against the indians. the country abounded in game, such as deer and antelope, with abundance of wild turkeys along the streams and where there were nut-bearing woods. on the nueces, about twenty-five miles up from corpus christi, were a few log cabins, the remains of a town called san patricio, but the inhabitants had all been massacred by the indians, or driven away. san antonio was about equally divided in population between americans and mexicans. from there to austin there was not a single residence except at new braunfels, on the guadalupe river. at that point was a settlement of germans who had only that year come into the state. at all events they were living in small huts, about such as soldiers would hastily construct for temporary occupation. from austin to corpus christi there was only a small settlement at bastrop, with a few farms along the colorado river; but after leaving that, there were no settlements except the home of one man, with one female slave, at the old town of goliad. some of the houses were still standing. goliad had been quite a village for the period and region, but some years before there had been a mexican massacre, in which every inhabitant had been killed or driven away. this, with the massacre of the prisoners in the alamo, san antonio, about the same time, more than three hundred men in all, furnished the strongest justification the texans had for carrying on the war with so much cruelty. in fact, from that time until the mexican war, the hostilities between texans and mexicans was so great that neither was safe in the neighborhood of the other who might be in superior numbers or possessed of superior arms. the man we found living there seemed like an old friend; he had come from near fort jessup, louisiana, where the officers of the 3d and 4th infantry and the 2d dragoons had known him and his family. he had emigrated in advance of his family to build up a home for them. chapter v. trip to austin--promotion to full second lieutenant--army of occupation. when our party left corpus christi it was quite large, including the cavalry escort, paymaster, major dix, his clerk and the officers who, like myself, were simply on leave; but all the officers on leave, except lieutenant benjamin--afterwards killed in the valley of mexico --lieutenant, now general, augur, and myself, concluded to spend their allotted time at san antonio and return from there. we were all to be back at corpus christi by the end of the month. the paymaster was detained in austin so long that, if we had waited for him, we would have exceeded our leave. we concluded, therefore, to start back at once with the animals we had, and having to rely principally on grass for their food, it was a good six days' journey. we had to sleep on the prairie every night, except at goliad, and possibly one night on the colorado, without shelter and with only such food as we carried with us, and prepared ourselves. the journey was hazardous on account of indians, and there were white men in texas whom i would not have cared to meet in a secluded place. lieutenant augur was taken seriously sick before we reached goliad and at a distance from any habitation. to add to the complication, his horse--a mustang that had probably been captured from the band of wild horses before alluded to, and of undoubted longevity at his capture--gave out. it was absolutely necessary to get for ward to goliad to find a shelter for our sick companion. by dint of patience and exceedingly slow movements, goliad was at last reached, and a shelter and bed secured for our patient. we remained over a day, hoping that augur might recover sufficiently to resume his travels. he did not, however, and knowing that major dix would be along in a few days, with his wagon-train, now empty, and escort, we arranged with our louisiana friend to take the best of care of the sick lieutenant until thus relieved, and went on. i had never been a sportsman in my life; had scarcely ever gone in search of game, and rarely seen any when looking for it. on this trip there was no minute of time while travelling between san patricio and the settlements on the san antonio river, from san antonio to austin, and again from the colorado river back to san patricio, when deer or antelope could not be seen in great numbers. each officer carried a shot-gun, and every evening, after going into camp, some would go out and soon return with venison and wild turkeys enough for the entire camp. i, however, never went out, and had no occasion to fire my gun; except, being detained over a day at goliad, benjamin and i concluded to go down to the creek--which was fringed with timber, much of it the pecan--and bring back a few turkeys. we had scarcely reached the edge of the timber when i heard the flutter of wings overhead, and in an instant i saw two or three turkeys flying away. these were soon followed by more, then more, and more, until a flock of twenty or thirty had left from just over my head. all this time i stood watching the turkeys to see where they flew--with my gun on my shoulder, and never once thought of levelling it at the birds. when i had time to reflect upon the matter, i came to the conclusion that as a sportsman i was a failure, and went back to the house. benjamin remained out, and got as many turkeys as he wanted to carry back. after the second night at goliad, benjamin and i started to make the remainder of the journey alone. we reached corpus christi just in time to avoid "absence without leave." we met no one not even an indian --during the remainder of our journey, except at san patricio. a new settlement had been started there in our absence of three weeks, induced possibly by the fact that there were houses already built, while the proximity of troops gave protection against the indians. on the evening of the first day out from goliad we heard the most unearthly howling of wolves, directly in our front. the prairie grass was tall and we could not see the beasts, but the sound indicated that they were near. to my ear it appeared that there must have been enough of them to devour our party, horses and all, at a single meal. the part of ohio that i hailed from was not thickly settled, but wolves had been driven out long before i left. benjamin was from indiana, still less populated, where the wolf yet roamed over the prairies. he understood the nature of the animal and the capacity of a few to make believe there was an unlimited number of them. he kept on towards the noise, unmoved. i followed in his trail, lacking moral courage to turn back and join our sick companion. i have no doubt that if benjamin had proposed returning to goliad, i would not only have "seconded the motion" but have suggested that it was very hard-hearted in us to leave augur sick there in the first place; but benjamin did not propose turning back. when he did speak it was to ask: "grant, how many wolves do you think there are in that pack?" knowing where he was from, and suspecting that he thought i would over-estimate the number, i determined to show my acquaintance with the animal by putting the estimate below what possibly could be correct, and answered: "oh, about twenty," very indifferently. he smiled and rode on. in a minute we were close upon them, and before they saw us. there were just two of them. seated upon their haunches, with their mouths close together, they had made all the noise we had been hearing for the past ten minutes. i have often thought of this incident since when i have heard the noise of a few disappointed politicians who had deserted their associates. there are always more of them before they are counted. a week or two before leaving corpus christi on this trip, i had been promoted from brevet second-lieutenant, 4th infantry, to full second-lieutenant, 7th infantry. frank gardner,(*1) of the 7th, was promoted to the 4th in the same orders. we immediately made application to be transferred, so as to get back to our old regiments. on my return, i found that our application had been approved at washington. while in the 7th infantry i was in the company of captain holmes, afterwards a lieutenant-general in the confederate army. i never came in contact with him in the war of the rebellion, nor did he render any very conspicuous service in his high rank. my transfer carried me to the company of captain mccall, who resigned from the army after the mexican war and settled in philadelphia. he was prompt, however, to volunteer when the rebellion broke out, and soon rose to the rank of major-general in the union army. i was not fortunate enough to meet him after he resigned. in the old army he was esteemed very highly as a soldier and gentleman. our relations were always most pleasant. the preparations at corpus christi for an advance progressed as rapidly in the absence of some twenty or more lieutenants as if we had been there. the principal business consisted in securing mules, and getting them broken to harness. the process was slow but amusing. the animals sold to the government were all young and unbroken, even to the saddle, and were quite as wild as the wild horses of the prairie. usually a number would be brought in by a company of mexicans, partners in the delivery. the mules were first driven into a stockade, called a corral, inclosing an acre or more of ground. the mexicans,--who were all experienced in throwing the lasso,--would go into the corral on horseback, with their lassos attached to the pommels of their saddles. soldiers detailed as teamsters and black smiths would also enter the corral, the former with ropes to serve as halters, the latter with branding irons and a fire to keep the irons heated. a lasso was then thrown over the neck of a mule, when he would immediately go to the length of his tether, first one end, then the other in the air. while he was thus plunging and gyrating, another lasso would be thrown by another mexican, catching the animal by a fore-foot. this would bring the mule to the ground, when he was seized and held by the teamsters while the blacksmith put upon him, with hot irons, the initials "u. s." ropes were then put about the neck, with a slipnoose which would tighten around the throat if pulled. with a man on each side holding these ropes, the mule was released from his other bindings and allowed to rise. with more or less difficulty he would be conducted to a picket rope outside and fastened there. the delivery of that mule was then complete. this process was gone through with every mule and wild horse with the army of occupation. the method of breaking them was less cruel and much more amusing. it is a well-known fact that where domestic animals are used for specific purposes from generation to generation, the descendants are easily, as a rule, subdued to the same uses. at that time in northern mexico the mule, or his ancestors, the horse and the ass, was seldom used except for the saddle or pack. at all events the corpus christi mule resisted the new use to which he was being put. the treatment he was subjected to in order to overcome his prejudices was summary and effective. the soldiers were principally foreigners who had enlisted in our large cities, and, with the exception of a chance drayman among them, it is not probable that any of the men who reported themselves as competent teamsters had ever driven a mule-team in their lives, or indeed that many had had any previous experience in driving any animal whatever to harness. numbers together can accomplish what twice their number acting individually could not perform. five mules were allotted to each wagon. a teamster would select at the picket rope five animals of nearly the same color and general appearance for his team. with a full corps of assistants, other teamsters, he would then proceed to get his mules together. in two's the men would approach each animal selected, avoiding as far as possible its heels. two ropes would be put about the neck of each animal, with a slip noose, so that he could be choked if too unruly. they were then led out, harnessed by force and hitched to the wagon in the position they had to keep ever after. two men remained on either side of the leader, with the lassos about its neck, and one man retained the same restraining influence over each of the others. all being ready, the hold would be slackened and the team started. the first motion was generally five mules in the air at one time, backs bowed, hind feet extended to the rear. after repeating this movement a few times the leaders would start to run. this would bring the breeching tight against the mules at the wheels, which these last seemed to regard as a most unwarrantable attempt at coercion and would resist by taking a seat, sometimes going so far as to lie down. in time all were broken in to do their duty submissively if not cheerfully, but there never was a time during the war when it was safe to let a mexican mule get entirely loose. their drivers were all teamsters by the time they got through. i recollect one case of a mule that had worked in a team under the saddle, not only for some time at corpus christi, where he was broken, but all the way to the point opposite matamoras, then to camargo, where he got loose from his fastenings during the night. he did not run away at first, but staid in the neighborhood for a day or two, coming up sometimes to the feed trough even; but on the approach of the teamster he always got out of the way. at last, growing tired of the constant effort to catch him, he disappeared altogether. nothing short of a mexican with his lasso could have caught him. regulations would not have warranted the expenditure of a dollar in hiring a man with a lasso to catch that mule; but they did allow the expenditure "of the mule," on a certificate that he had run away without any fault of the quartermaster on whose returns he was borne, and also the purchase of another to take his place. i am a competent witness, for i was regimental quartermaster at the time. while at corpus christi all the officers who had a fancy for riding kept horses. the animals cost but little in the first instance, and when picketed they would get their living without any cost. i had three not long before the army moved, but a sad accident bereft me of them all at one time. a colored boy who gave them all the attention they got --besides looking after my tent and that of a class-mate and fellow-lieutenant and cooking for us, all for about eight dollars per month, was riding one to water and leading the other two. the led horses pulled him from his seat and all three ran away. they never were heard of afterwards. shortly after that some one told captain bliss, general taylor's adjutant-general, of my misfortune. "yes; i heard grant lost five or six dollars' worth of horses the other day," he replied. that was a slander; they were broken to the saddle when i got them and cost nearly twenty dollars. i never suspected the colored boy of malicious intent in letting them get away, because, if they had not escaped, he could have had one of them to ride on the long march then in prospect. chapter vi. advance of the army--crossing the colorado--the rio grande. at last the preparations were complete and orders were issued for the advance to begin on the 8th of march. general taylor had an army of not more than three thousand men. one battery, the siege guns and all the convalescent troops were sent on by water to brazos santiago, at the mouth of the rio grande. a guard was left back at corpus christi to look after public property and to take care of those who were too sick to be removed. the remainder of the army, probably not more than twenty five hundred men, was divided into three brigades, with the cavalry independent. colonel twiggs, with seven companies of dragoons and a battery of light artillery, moved on the 8th. he was followed by the three infantry brigades, with a day's interval between the commands. thus the rear brigade did not move from corpus christi until the 11th of march. in view of the immense bodies of men moved on the same day over narrow roads, through dense forests and across large streams, in our late war, it seems strange now that a body of less than three thousand men should have been broken into four columns, separated by a day's march. general taylor was opposed to anything like plundering by the troops, and in this instance, i doubt not, he looked upon the enemy as the aggrieved party and was not willing to injure them further than his instructions from washington demanded. his orders to the troops enjoined scrupulous regard for the rights of all peaceable persons and the payment of the highest price for all supplies taken for the use of the army. all officers of foot regiments who had horses were permitted to ride them on the march when it did not interfere with their military duties. as already related, having lost my "five or six dollars' worth of horses" but a short time before i determined not to get another, but to make the journey on foot. my company commander, captain mccall, had two good american horses, of considerably more value in that country, where native horses were cheap, than they were in the states. he used one himself and wanted the other for his servant. he was quite anxious to know whether i did not intend to get me another horse before the march began. i told him no; i belonged to a foot regiment. i did not understand the object of his solicitude at the time, but, when we were about to start, he said: "there, grant, is a horse for you." i found that he could not bear the idea of his servant riding on a long march while his lieutenant went a-foot. he had found a mustang, a three-year old colt only recently captured, which had been purchased by one of the colored servants with the regiment for the sum of three dollars. it was probably the only horse at corpus christi that could have been purchased just then for any reasonable price. five dollars, sixty-six and two-thirds per cent. advance, induced the owner to part with the mustang. i was sorry to take him, because i really felt that, belonging to a foot regiment, it was my duty to march with the men. but i saw the captain's earnestness in the matter, and accepted the horse for the trip. the day we started was the first time the horse had ever been under saddle. i had, however, but little difficulty in breaking him, though for the first day there were frequent disagreements between us as to which way we should go, and sometimes whether we should go at all. at no time during the day could i choose exactly the part of the column i would march with; but after that, i had as tractable a horse as any with the army, and there was none that stood the trip better. he never ate a mouthful of food on the journey except the grass he could pick within the length of his picket rope. a few days out from corpus christi, the immense herd of wild horses that ranged at that time between the nueces and the rio grande was seen directly in advance of the head of the column and but a few miles off. it was the very band from which the horse i was riding had been captured but a few weeks before. the column was halted for a rest, and a number of officers, myself among them, rode out two or three miles to the right to see the extent of the herd. the country was a rolling prairie, and, from the higher ground, the vision was obstructed only by the earth's curvature. as far as the eye could reach to our right, the herd extended. to the left, it extended equally. there was no estimating the number of animals in it; i have no idea that they could all have been corralled in the state of rhode island, or delaware, at one time. if they had been, they would have been so thick that the pasturage would have given out the first day. people who saw the southern herd of buffalo, fifteen or twenty years ago, can appreciate the size of the texas band of wild horses in 1846. at the point where the army struck the little colorado river, the stream was quite wide and of sufficient depth for navigation. the water was brackish and the banks were fringed with timber. here the whole army concentrated before attempting to cross. the army was not accompanied by a pontoon train, and at that time the troops were not instructed in bridge building. to add to the embarrassment of the situation, the army was here, for the first time, threatened with opposition. buglers, concealed from our view by the brush on the opposite side, sounded the "assembly," and other military calls. like the wolves before spoken of, they gave the impression that there was a large number of them and that, if the troops were in proportion to the noise, they were sufficient to devour general taylor and his army. there were probably but few troops, and those engaged principally in watching the movements of the "invader." a few of our cavalry dashed in, and forded and swam the stream, and all opposition was soon dispersed. i do not remember that a single shot was fired. the troops waded the stream, which was up to their necks in the deepest part. teams were crossed by attaching a long rope to the end of the wagon tongue passing it between the two swing mules and by the side of the leader, hitching his bridle as well as the bridle of the mules in rear to it, and carrying the end to men on the opposite shore. the bank down to the water was steep on both sides. a rope long enough to cross the river, therefore, was attached to the back axle of the wagon, and men behind would hold the rope to prevent the wagon "beating" the mules into the water. this latter rope also served the purpose of bringing the end of the forward one back, to be used over again. the water was deep enough for a short distance to swim the little mexican mules which the army was then using, but they, and the wagons, were pulled through so fast by the men at the end of the rope ahead, that no time was left them to show their obstinacy. in this manner the artillery and transportation of the "army of occupation" crossed the colorado river. about the middle of the month of march the advance of the army reached the rio grande and went into camp near the banks of the river, opposite the city of matamoras and almost under the guns of a small fort at the lower end of the town. there was not at that time a single habitation from corpus christi until the rio grande was reached. the work of fortifying was commenced at once. the fort was laid out by the engineers, but the work was done by the soldiers under the supervision of their officers, the chief engineer retaining general directions. the mexicans now became so incensed at our near approach that some of their troops crossed the river above us, and made it unsafe for small bodies of men to go far beyond the limits of camp. they captured two companies of dragoons, commanded by captains thornton and hardee. the latter figured as a general in the late war, on the confederate side, and was author of the tactics first used by both armies. lieutenant theodric porter, of the 4th infantry, was killed while out with a small detachment; and major cross, the assistant quartermaster-general, had also been killed not far from camp. there was no base of supplies nearer than point isabel, on the coast, north of the mouth of the rio grande and twenty-five miles away. the enemy, if the mexicans could be called such at this time when no war had been declared, hovered about in such numbers that it was not safe to send a wagon train after supplies with any escort that could be spared. i have already said that general taylor's whole command on the rio grande numbered less than three thousand men. he had, however, a few more troops at point isabel or brazos santiago. the supplies brought from corpus christi in wagons were running short. work was therefore pushed with great vigor on the defences, to enable the minimum number of troops to hold the fort. all the men who could be employed, were kept at work from early dawn until darkness closed the labors of the day. with all this the fort was not completed until the supplies grew so short that further delay in obtaining more could not be thought of. by the latter part of april the work was in a partially defensible condition, and the 7th infantry, major jacob brown commanding, was marched in to garrison it, with some few pieces of artillery. all the supplies on hand, with the exception of enough to carry the rest of the army to point isabel, were left with the garrison, and the march was commenced with the remainder of the command, every wagon being taken with the army. early on the second day after starting the force reached its destination, without opposition from the mexicans. there was some delay in getting supplies ashore from vessels at anchor in the open roadstead. chapter vii. the mexican war--the battle of palo alto--the battle of resaca de la palma--army of invasion--general taylor--movement on camargo. while general taylor was away with the bulk of his army, the little garrison up the river was besieged. as we lay in our tents upon the sea-shore, the artillery at the fort on the rio grande could be distinctly heard. the war had begun. there were no possible means of obtaining news from the garrison, and information from outside could not be otherwise than unfavorable. what general taylor's feelings were during this suspense i do not know; but for myself, a young second-lieutenant who had never heard a hostile gun before, i felt sorry that i had enlisted. a great many men, when they smell battle afar off, chafe to get into the fray. when they say so themselves they generally fail to convince their hearers that they are as anxious as they would like to make believe, and as they approach danger they become more subdued. this rule is not universal, for i have known a few men who were always aching for a fight when there was no enemy near, who were as good as their word when the battle did come. but the number of such men is small. on the 7th of may the wagons were all loaded and general taylor started on his return, with his army reinforced at point isabel, but still less than three thousand strong, to relieve the garrison on the rio grande. the road from point isabel to matamoras is over an open, rolling, treeless prairie, until the timber that borders the bank of the rio grande is reached. this river, like the mississippi, flows through a rich alluvial valley in the most meandering manner, running towards all points of the compass at times within a few miles. formerly the river ran by resaca de la palma, some four or five miles east of the present channel. the old bed of the river at resaca had become filled at places, leaving a succession of little lakes. the timber that had formerly grown upon both banks, and for a considerable distance out, was still standing. this timber was struck six or eight miles out from the besieged garrison, at a point known as palo alto--"tall trees" or "woods." early in the forenoon of the 8th of may as palo alto was approached, an army, certainly outnumbering our little force, was seen, drawn up in line of battle just in front of the timber. their bayonets and spearheads glistened in the sunlight formidably. the force was composed largely of cavalry armed with lances. where we were the grass was tall, reaching nearly to the shoulders of the men, very stiff, and each stock was pointed at the top, and hard and almost as sharp as a darning-needle. general taylor halted his army before the head of column came in range of the artillery of the mexicans. he then formed a line of battle, facing the enemy. his artillery, two batteries and two eighteen-pounder iron guns, drawn by oxen, were placed in position at intervals along the line. a battalion was thrown to the rear, commanded by lieutenant-colonel childs, of the artillery, as reserves. these preparations completed, orders were given for a platoon of each company to stack arms and go to a stream off to the right of the command, to fill their canteens and also those of the rest of their respective companies. when the men were all back in their places in line, the command to advance was given. as i looked down that long line of about three thousand armed men, advancing towards a larger force also armed, i thought what a fearful responsibility general taylor must feel, commanding such a host and so far away from friends. the mexicans immediately opened fire upon us, first with artillery and then with infantry. at first their shots did not reach us, and the advance was continued. as we got nearer, the cannon balls commenced going through the ranks. they hurt no one, however, during this advance, because they would strike the ground long before they reached our line, and ricochetted through the tall grass so slowly that the men would see them and open ranks and let them pass. when we got to a point where the artillery could be used with effect, a halt was called, and the battle opened on both sides. the infantry under general taylor was armed with flint-lock muskets, and paper cartridges charged with powder, buck-shot and ball. at the distance of a few hundred yards a man might fire at you all day without your finding it out. the artillery was generally six-pounder brass guns throwing only solid shot; but general taylor had with him three or four twelve-pounder howitzers throwing shell, besides his eighteen-pounders before spoken of, that had a long range. this made a powerful armament. the mexicans were armed about as we were so far as their infantry was concerned, but their artillery only fired solid shot. we had greatly the advantage in this arm. the artillery was advanced a rod or two in front of the line, and opened fire. the infantry stood at order arms as spectators, watching the effect of our shots upon the enemy, and watching his shots so as to step out of their way. it could be seen that the eighteen-pounders and the howitzers did a great deal of execution. on our side there was little or no loss while we occupied this position. during the battle major ringgold, an accomplished and brave artillery officer, was mortally wounded, and lieutenant luther, also of the artillery, was struck. during the day several advances were made, and just at dusk it became evident that the mexicans were falling back. we again advanced, and occupied at the close of the battle substantially the ground held by the enemy at the beginning. in this last move there was a brisk fire upon our troops, and some execution was done. one cannon-ball passed through our ranks, not far from me. it took off the head of an enlisted man, and the under jaw of captain page of my regiment, while the splinters from the musket of the killed soldier, and his brains and bones, knocked down two or three others, including one officer, lieutenant wallen, --hurting them more or less. our casualties for the day were nine killed and forty-seven wounded. at the break of day on the 9th, the army under taylor was ready to renew the battle; but an advance showed that the enemy had entirely left our front during the night. the chaparral before us was impenetrable except where there were roads or trails, with occasionally clear or bare spots of small dimensions. a body of men penetrating it might easily be ambushed. it was better to have a few men caught in this way than the whole army, yet it was necessary that the garrison at the river should be relieved. to get to them the chaparral had to be passed. thus i assume general taylor reasoned. he halted the army not far in advance of the ground occupied by the mexicans the day before, and selected captain c. f. smith, of the artillery, and captain mccall, of my company, to take one hundred and fifty picked men each and find where the enemy had gone. this left me in command of the company, an honor and responsibility i thought very great. smith and mccall found no obstruction in the way of their advance until they came up to the succession of ponds, before described, at resaca. the mexicans had passed them and formed their lines on the opposite bank. this position they had strengthened a little by throwing up dead trees and brush in their front, and by placing artillery to cover the approaches and open places. smith and mccall deployed on each side of the road as well as they could, and engaged the enemy at long range. word was sent back, and the advance of the whole army was at once commenced. as we came up we were deployed in like manner. i was with the right wing, and led my company through the thicket wherever a penetrable place could be found, taking advantage of any clear spot that would carry me towards the enemy. at last i got pretty close up without knowing it. the balls commenced to whistle very thick overhead, cutting the limbs of the chaparral right and left. we could not see the enemy, so i ordered my men to lie down, an order that did not have to be enforced. we kept our position until it became evident that the enemy were not firing at us, and then withdrew to find better ground to advance upon. by this time some progress had been made on our left. a section of artillery had been captured by the cavalry, and some prisoners had been taken. the mexicans were giving way all along the line, and many of them had, no doubt, left early. i at last found a clear space separating two ponds. there seemed to be a few men in front and i charged upon them with my company. there was no resistance, and we captured a mexican colonel, who had been wounded, and a few men. just as i was sending them to the rear with a guard of two or three men, a private came from the front bringing back one of our officers, who had been badly wounded in advance of where i was. the ground had been charged over before. my exploit was equal to that of the soldier who boasted that he had cut off the leg of one of the enemy. when asked why he did not cut off his head, he replied: "some one had done that before." this left no doubt in my mind but that the battle of resaca de la palma would have been won, just as it was, if i had not been there. there was no further resistance. the evening of the 9th the army was encamped on its old ground near the fort, and the garrison was relieved. the siege had lasted a number of days, but the casualties were few in number. major jacob brown, of the 7th infantry, the commanding officer, had been killed, and in his honor the fort was named. since then a town of considerable importance has sprung up on the ground occupied by the fort and troops, which has also taken his name. the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma seemed to us engaged, as pretty important affairs; but we had only a faint conception of their magnitude until they were fought over in the north by the press and the reports came back to us. at the same time, or about the same time, we learned that war existed between the united states and mexico, by the acts of the latter country. on learning this fact general taylor transferred our camps to the south or west bank of the river, and matamoras was occupied. we then became the "army of invasion." up to this time taylor had none but regular troops in his command; but now that invasion had already taken place, volunteers for one year commenced arriving. the army remained at matamoras until sufficiently reinforced to warrant a movement into the interior. general taylor was not an officer to trouble the administration much with his demands, but was inclined to do the best he could with the means given him. he felt his responsibility as going no further. if he had thought that he was sent to perform an impossibility with the means given him, he would probably have informed the authorities of his opinion and left them to determine what should be done. if the judgment was against him he would have gone on and done the best he could with the means at hand without parading his grievance before the public. no soldier could face either danger or responsibility more calmly than he. these are qualities more rarely found than genius or physical courage. general taylor never made any great show or parade, either of uniform or retinue. in dress he was possibly too plain, rarely wearing anything in the field to indicate his rank, or even that he was an officer; but he was known to every soldier in his army, and was respected by all. i can call to mind only one instance when i saw him in uniform, and one other when i heard of his wearing it, on both occasions he was unfortunate. the first was at corpus christi. he had concluded to review his army before starting on the march and gave orders accordingly. colonel twiggs was then second in rank with the army, and to him was given the command of the review. colonel and brevet brigadier-general worth, a far different soldier from taylor in the use of the uniform, was next to twiggs in rank, and claimed superiority by virtue of his brevet rank when the accidents of service threw them where one or the other had to command. worth declined to attend the review as subordinate to twiggs until the question was settled by the highest authority. this broke up the review, and the question was referred to washington for final decision. general taylor was himself only a colonel, in real rank, at that time, and a brigadier-general by brevet. he was assigned to duty, however, by the president, with the rank which his brevet gave him. worth was not so assigned, but by virtue of commanding a division he must, under the army regulations of that day, have drawn the pay of his brevet rank. the question was submitted to washington, and no response was received until after the army had reached the rio grande. it was decided against general worth, who at once tendered his resignation and left the army, going north, no doubt, by the same vessel that carried it. this kept him out of the battles of palo alto and resaca de la palma. either the resignation was not accepted, or general worth withdrew it before action had been taken. at all events he returned to the army in time to command his division in the battle of monterey, and served with it to the end of the war. the second occasion on which general taylor was said to have donned his uniform, was in order to receive a visit from the flag officer of the naval squadron off the mouth of the rio grande. while the army was on that river the flag officer sent word that he would call on the general to pay his respects on a certain day. general taylor, knowing that naval officers habitually wore all the uniform the "law allowed" on all occasions of ceremony, thought it would be only civil to receive his guest in the same style. his uniform was therefore got out, brushed up, and put on, in advance of the visit. the flag officer, knowing general taylor's aversion to the wearing of the uniform, and feeling that it would be regarded as a compliment should he meet him in civilian's dress, left off his uniform for this occasion. the meeting was said to have been embarrassing to both, and the conversation was principally apologetic. the time was whiled away pleasantly enough at matamoras, while we were waiting for volunteers. it is probable that all the most important people of the territory occupied by our army left their homes before we got there, but with those remaining the best of relations apparently existed. it was the policy of the commanding general to allow no pillaging, no taking of private property for public or individual use without satisfactory compensation, so that a better market was afforded than the people had ever known before. among the troops that joined us at matamoras was an ohio regiment, of which thomas l. hamer, the member of congress who had given me my appointment to west point, was major. he told me then that he could have had the colonelcy, but that as he knew he was to be appointed a brigadier-general, he preferred at first to take the lower grade. i have said before that hamer was one of the ablest men ohio ever produced. at that time he was in the prime of life, being less than fifty years of age, and possessed an admirable physique, promising long life. but he was taken sick before monterey, and died within a few days. i have always believed that had his life been spared, he would have been president of the united states during the term filled by president pierce. had hamer filled that office his partiality for me was such, there is but little doubt i should have been appointed to one of the staff corps of the army--the pay department probably--and would therefore now be preparing to retire. neither of these speculations is unreasonable, and they are mentioned to show how little men control their own destiny. reinforcements having arrived, in the month of august the movement commenced from matamoras to camargo, the head of navigation on the rio grande. the line of the rio grande was all that was necessary to hold, unless it was intended to invade mexico from the north. in that case the most natural route to take was the one which general taylor selected. it entered a pass in the sierra madre mountains, at monterey, through which the main road runs to the city of mexico. monterey itself was a good point to hold, even if the line of the rio grande covered all the territory we desired to occupy at that time. it is built on a plain two thousand feet above tide water, where the air is bracing and the situation healthy. on the 19th of august the army started for monterey, leaving a small garrison at matamoras. the troops, with the exception of the artillery, cavalry, and the brigade to which i belonged, were moved up the river to camargo on steamers. as there were but two or three of these, the boats had to make a number of trips before the last of the troops were up. those who marched did so by the south side of the river. lieutenant-colonel garland, of the 4th infantry, was the brigade commander, and on this occasion commanded the entire marching force. one day out convinced him that marching by day in that latitude, in the month of august, was not a beneficial sanitary measure, particularly for northern men. the order of marching was changed and night marches were substituted with the best results. when camargo was reached, we found a city of tents outside the mexican hamlet. i was detailed to act as quartermaster and commissary to the regiment. the teams that had proven abundantly sufficient to transport all supplies from corpus christi to the rio grande over the level prairies of texas, were entirely inadequate to the needs of the reinforced army in a mountainous country. to obviate the deficiency, pack mules were hired, with mexicans to pack and drive them. i had charge of the few wagons allotted to the 4th infantry and of the pack train to supplement them. there were not men enough in the army to manage that train without the help of mexicans who had learned how. as it was the difficulty was great enough. the troops would take up their march at an early hour each day. after they had started, the tents and cooking utensils had to be made into packages, so that they could be lashed to the backs of the mules. sheet-iron kettles, tent-poles and mess chests were inconvenient articles to transport in that way. it took several hours to get ready to start each morning, and by the time we were ready some of the mules first loaded would be tired of standing so long with their loads on their backs. sometimes one would start to run, bowing his back and kicking up until he scattered his load; others would lie down and try to disarrange their loads by attempting to get on the top of them by rolling on them; others with tent-poles for part of their loads would manage to run a tent-pole on one side of a sapling while they would take the other. i am not aware of ever having used a profane expletive in my life; but i would have the charity to excuse those who may have done so, if they were in charge of a train of mexican pack mules at the time. chapter viii. advance on monterey--the black fort--the battle of monterey--surrender of the city. the advance from camargo was commenced on the 5th of september. the army was divided into four columns, separated from each other by one day's march. the advance reached cerralvo in four days and halted for the remainder of the troops to come up. by the 13th the rear-guard had arrived, and the same day the advance resumed its march, followed as before, a day separating the divisions. the forward division halted again at marin, twenty-four miles from monterey. both this place and cerralvo were nearly deserted, and men, women and children were seen running and scattered over the hills as we approached; but when the people returned they found all their abandoned property safe, which must have given them a favorable opinion of los grengos--"the yankees." from marin the movement was in mass. on the 19th general taylor, with his army, was encamped at walnut springs, within three miles of monterey. the town is on a small stream coming out of the mountain-pass, and is backed by a range of hills of moderate elevation. to the north, between the city and walnut springs, stretches an extensive plain. on this plain, and entirely outside of the last houses of the city, stood a strong fort, enclosed on all sides, to which our army gave the name of "black fort." its guns commanded the approaches to the city to the full extent of their range. there were two detached spurs of hills or mountains to the north and northwest of the city, which were also fortified. on one of these stood the bishop's palace. the road to saltillo leaves the upper or western end of the city under the fire of the guns from these heights. the lower or eastern end was defended by two or three small detached works, armed with artillery and infantry. to the south was the mountain stream before mentioned, and back of that the range of foot-hills. the plaza in the centre of the city was the citadel, properly speaking. all the streets leading from it were swept by artillery, cannon being intrenched behind temporary parapets. the house-tops near the plaza were converted into infantry fortifications by the use of sand-bags for parapets. such were the defences of monterey in september, 1847. general ampudia, with a force of certainly ten thousand men, was in command. general taylor's force was about six thousand five hundred strong, in three divisions, under generals butler, twiggs and worth. the troops went into camp at walnut springs, while the engineer officers, under major mansfield--a general in the late war--commenced their reconnoissance. major mansfield found that it would be practicable to get troops around, out of range of the black fort and the works on the detached hills to the north-west of the city, to the saltillo road. with this road in our possession, the enemy would be cut off from receiving further supplies, if not from all communication with the interior. general worth, with his division somewhat reinforced, was given the task of gaining possession of the saltillo road, and of carrying the detached works outside the city, in that quarter. he started on his march early in the afternoon of the 20th. the divisions under generals butler and twiggs were drawn up to threaten the east and north sides of the city and the works on those fronts, in support of the movement under general worth. worth's was regarded as the main attack on monterey, and all other operations were in support of it. his march this day was uninterrupted; but the enemy was seen to reinforce heavily about the bishop's palace and the other outside fortifications on their left. general worth reached a defensible position just out of range of the enemy's guns on the heights north-west of the city, and bivouacked for the night. the engineer officers with him--captain sanders and lieutenant george g. meade, afterwards the commander of the victorious national army at the battle of gettysburg--made a reconnoissance to the saltillo road under cover of night. during the night of the 20th general taylor had established a battery, consisting of two twenty-four-pounder howitzers and a ten inch mortar, at a point from which they could play upon black fort. a natural depression in the plain, sufficiently deep to protect men standing in it from the fire from the fort, was selected and the battery established on the crest nearest the enemy. the 4th infantry, then consisting of but six reduced companies, was ordered to support the artillerists while they were intrenching themselves and their guns. i was regimental quartermaster at the time and was ordered to remain in charge of camp and the public property at walnut springs. it was supposed that the regiment would return to its camp in the morning. the point for establishing the siege battery was reached and the work performed without attracting the attention of the enemy. at daylight the next morning fire was opened on both sides and continued with, what seemed to me at that day, great fury. my curiosity got the better of my judgment, and i mounted a horse and rode to the front to see what was going on. i had been there but a short time when an order to charge was given, and lacking the moral courage to return to camp--where i had been ordered to stay--i charged with the regiment as soon as the troops were out of the depression they came under the fire of black fort. as they advanced they got under fire from batteries guarding the east, or lower, end of the city, and of musketry. about one-third of the men engaged in the charge were killed or wounded in the space of a few minutes. we retreated to get out of fire, not backward, but eastward and perpendicular to the direct road running into the city from walnut springs. i was, i believe, the only person in the 4th infantry in the charge who was on horseback. when we got to a lace of safety the regiment halted and drew itself together--what was left of it. the adjutant of the regiment, lieutenant hoskins, who was not in robust health, found himself very much fatigued from running on foot in the charge and retreat, and, seeing me on horseback, expressed a wish that he could be mounted also. i offered him my horse and he accepted the offer. a few minutes later i saw a soldier, a quartermaster's man, mounted, not far away. i ran to him, took his horse and was back with the regiment in a few minutes. in a short time we were off again; and the next place of safety from the shots of the enemy that i recollect of being in, was a field of cane or corn to the north-east of the lower batteries. the adjutant to whom i had loaned my horse was killed, and i was designated to act in his place. this charge was ill-conceived, or badly executed. we belonged to the brigade commanded by lieutenant-colonel garland, and he had received orders to charge the lower batteries of the city, and carry them if he could without too much loss, for the purpose of creating a diversion in favor of worth, who was conducting the movement which it was intended should be decisive. by a movement by the left flank garland could have led his men beyond the range of the fire from black fort and advanced towards the northeast angle of the city, as well covered from fire as could be expected. there was no undue loss of life in reaching the lower end of monterey, except that sustained by garland's command. meanwhile quitman's brigade, conducted by an officer of engineers, had reached the eastern end of the city, and was placed under cover of the houses without much loss. colonel garland's brigade also arrived at the suburbs, and, by the assistance of some of our troops that had reached house-tops from which they could fire into a little battery covering the approaches to the lower end of the city, the battery was speedily captured and its guns were turned upon another work of the enemy. an entrance into the east end of the city was now secured, and the houses protected our troops so long as they were inactive. on the west general worth had reached the saltillo road after some fighting but without heavy loss. he turned from his new position and captured the forts on both heights in that quarter. this gave him possession of the upper or west end of monterey. troops from both twiggs's and butler's divisions were in possession of the east end of the town, but the black fort to the north of the town and the plaza in the centre were still in the possession of the enemy. our camps at walnut springs, three miles away, were guarded by a company from each regiment. a regiment of kentucky volunteers guarded the mortars and howitzers engaged against black fort. practically monterey was invested. there was nothing done on the 22d by the united states troops; but the enemy kept up a harmless fire upon us from black fort and the batteries still in their possession at the east end of the city. during the night they evacuated these; so that on the morning of the 23d we held undisputed possession of the east end of monterey. twiggs's division was at the lower end of the city, and well covered from the fire of the enemy. but the streets leading to the plaza--all spanish or spanish-american towns have near their centres a square called a plaza--were commanded from all directions by artillery. the houses were flat-roofed and but one or two stories high, and about the plaza the roofs were manned with infantry, the troops being protected from our fire by parapets made of sand-bags. all advances into the city were thus attended with much danger. while moving along streets which did not lead to the plaza, our men were protected from the fire, and from the view, of the enemy except at the crossings; but at these a volley of musketry and a discharge of grape-shot were invariably encountered. the 3d and 4th regiments of infantry made an advance nearly to the plaza in this way and with heavy loss. the loss of the 3d infantry in commissioned officers was especially severe. there were only five companies of the regiment and not over twelve officers present, and five of these officers were killed. when within a square of the plaza this small command, ten companies in all, was brought to a halt. placing themselves under cover from the shots of the enemy, the men would watch to detect a head above the sand-bags on the neighboring houses. the exposure of a single head would bring a volley from our soldiers. we had not occupied this position long when it was discovered that our ammunition was growing low. i volunteered to go back (*2) to the point we had started from, report our position to general twiggs, and ask for ammunition to be forwarded. we were at this time occupying ground off from the street, in rear of the houses. my ride back was an exposed one. before starting i adjusted myself on the side of my horse furthest from the enemy, and with only one foot holding to the cantle of the saddle, and an arm over the neck of the horse exposed, i started at full run. it was only at street crossings that my horse was under fire, but these i crossed at such a flying rate that generally i was past and under cover of the next block of houses before the enemy fired. i got out safely without a scratch. at one place on my ride, i saw a sentry walking in front of a house, and stopped to inquire what he was doing there. finding that the house was full of wounded american officers and soldiers, i dismounted and went in. i found there captain williams, of the engineer corps, wounded in the head, probably fatally, and lieutenant territt, also badly wounded his bowels protruding from his wound. there were quite a number of soldiers also. promising them to report their situation, i left, readjusted myself to my horse, recommenced the run, and was soon with the troops at the east end. before ammunition could be collected, the two regiments i had been with were seen returning, running the same gauntlet in getting out that they had passed in going in, but with comparatively little loss. the movement was countermanded and the troops were withdrawn. the poor wounded officers and men i had found, fell into the hands of the enemy during the night, and died. while this was going on at the east, general worth, with a small division of troops, was advancing towards the plaza from the opposite end of the city. he resorted to a better expedient for getting to the plaza--the citadel--than we did on the east. instead of moving by the open streets, he advanced through the houses, cutting passageways from one to another. without much loss of life, he got so near the plaza during the night that before morning, ampudia, the mexican commander, made overtures for the surrender of the city and garrison. this stopped all further hostilities. the terms of surrender were soon agreed upon. the prisoners were paroled and permitted to take their horses and personal property with them. my pity was aroused by the sight of the mexican garrison of monterey marching out of town as prisoners, and no doubt the same feeling was experienced by most of our army who witnessed it. many of the prisoners were cavalry, armed with lances, and mounted on miserable little half-starved horses that did not look as if they could carry their riders out of town. the men looked in but little better condition. i thought how little interest the men before me had in the results of the war, and how little knowledge they had of "what it was all about." after the surrender of the garrison of monterey a quiet camp life was led until midwinter. as had been the case on the rio grande, the people who remained at their homes fraternized with the "yankees" in the pleasantest manner. in fact, under the humane policy of our commander, i question whether the great majority of the mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming. property and person were thoroughly protected, and a market was afforded for all the products of the country such as the people had never enjoyed before. the educated and wealthy portion of the population here, as elsewhere, abandoned their homes and remained away from them as long as they were in the possession of the invaders; but this class formed a very small percentage of the whole population. chapter ix. political intrigue--buena vista--movement against vera cruz--siege and capture of vera cruz. the mexican war was a political war, and the administration conducting it desired to make party capital out of it. general scott was at the head of the army, and, being a soldier of acknowledged professional capacity, his claim to the command of the forces in the field was almost indisputable and does not seem to have been denied by president polk, or marcy, his secretary of war. scott was a whig and the administration was democratic. general scott was also known to have political aspirations, and nothing so popularizes a candidate for high civil positions as military victories. it would not do therefore to give him command of the "army of conquest." the plans submitted by scott for a campaign in mexico were disapproved by the administration, and he replied, in a tone possibly a little disrespectful, to the effect that, if a soldier's plans were not to be supported by the administration, success could not be expected. this was on the 27th of may, 1846. four days later general scott was notified that he need not go to mexico. general gaines was next in rank, but he was too old and feeble to take the field. colonel zachary taylor--a brigadier-general by brevet--was therefore left in command. he, too, was a whig, but was not supposed to entertain any political ambitions; nor did he; but after the fall of monterey, his third battle and third complete victory, the whig papers at home began to speak of him as the candidate of their party for the presidency. something had to be done to neutralize his growing popularity. he could not be relieved from duty in the field where all his battles had been victories: the design would have been too transparent. it was finally decided to send general scott to mexico in chief command, and to authorize him to carry out his own original plan: that is, capture vera cruz and march upon the capital of the country. it was no doubt supposed that scott's ambition would lead him to slaughter taylor or destroy his chances for the presidency, and yet it was hoped that he would not make sufficient capital himself to secure the prize. the administration had indeed a most embarrassing problem to solve. it was engaged in a war of conquest which must be carried to a successful issue, or the political object would be unattained. yet all the capable officers of the requisite rank belonged to the opposition, and the man selected for his lack of political ambition had himself become a prominent candidate for the presidency. it was necessary to destroy his chances promptly. the problem was to do this without the loss of conquest and without permitting another general of the same political party to acquire like popularity. the fact is, the administration of mr. polk made every preparation to disgrace scott, or, to speak more correctly, to drive him to such desperation that he would disgrace himself. general scott had opposed conquest by the way of the rio grande, matamoras and saltillo from the first. now that he was in command of all the forces in mexico, he withdrew from taylor most of his regular troops and left him only enough volunteers, as he thought, to hold the line then in possession of the invading army. indeed scott did not deem it important to hold anything beyond the rio grande, and authorized taylor to fall back to that line if he chose. general taylor protested against the depletion of his army, and his subsequent movement upon buena vista would indicate that he did not share the views of his chief in regard to the unimportance of conquest beyond the rio grande. scott had estimated the men and material that would be required to capture vera cruz and to march on the capital of the country, two hundred and sixty miles in the interior. he was promised all he asked and seemed to have not only the confidence of the president, but his sincere good wishes. the promises were all broken. only about half the troops were furnished that had been pledged, other war material was withheld and scott had scarcely started for mexico before the president undertook to supersede him by the appointment of senator thomas h. benton as lieutenant-general. this being refused by congress, the president asked legislative authority to place a junior over a senior of the same grade, with the view of appointing benton to the rank of major-general and then placing him in command of the army, but congress failed to accede to this proposition as well, and scott remained in command: but every general appointed to serve under him was politically opposed to the chief, and several were personally hostile. general scott reached brazos santiago or point isabel, at the mouth of the rio grande, late in december, 1846, and proceeded at once up the river to camargo, where he had written general taylor to meet him. taylor, however, had gone to, or towards tampico, for the purpose of establishing a post there. he had started on this march before he was aware of general scott being in the country. under these circumstances scott had to issue his orders designating the troops to be withdrawn from taylor, without the personal consultation he had expected to hold with his subordinate. general taylor's victory at buena vista, february 22d, 23d, and 24th, 1847, with an army composed almost entirely of volunteers who had not been in battle before, and over a vastly superior force numerically, made his nomination for the presidency by the whigs a foregone conclusion. he was nominated and elected in 1848. i believe that he sincerely regretted this turn in his fortunes, preferring the peace afforded by a quiet life free from abuse to the honor of filling the highest office in the gift of any people, the presidency of the united states. when general scott assumed command of the army of invasion, i was in the division of general david twiggs, in taylor's command; but under the new orders my regiment was transferred to the division of general william worth, in which i served to the close of the war. the troops withdrawn from taylor to form part of the forces to operate against vera cruz, were assembled at the mouth of the rio grande preparatory to embarkation for their destination. i found general worth a different man from any i had before served directly under. he was nervous, impatient and restless on the march, or when important or responsible duty confronted him. there was not the least reason for haste on the march, for it was known that it would take weeks to assemble shipping enough at the point of our embarkation to carry the army, but general worth moved his division with a rapidity that would have been commendable had he been going to the relief of a beleaguered garrison. the length of the marches was regulated by the distances between places affording a supply of water for the troops, and these distances were sometimes long and sometimes short. general worth on one occasion at least, after having made the full distance intended for the day, and after the troops were in camp and preparing their food, ordered tents struck and made the march that night which had been intended for the next day. some commanders can move troops so as to get the maximum distance out of them without fatigue, while others can wear them out in a few days without accomplishing so much. general worth belonged to this latter class. he enjoyed, however, a fine reputation for his fighting qualities, and thus attached his officers and men to him. the army lay in camp upon the sand-beach in the neighborhood of the mouth of the rio grande for several weeks, awaiting the arrival of transports to carry it to its new field of operations. the transports were all sailing vessels. the passage was a tedious one, and many of the troops were on shipboard over thirty days from the embarkation at the mouth of the rio grande to the time of debarkation south of vera cruz. the trip was a comfortless one for officers and men. the transports used were built for carrying freight and possessed but limited accommodations for passengers, and the climate added to the discomfort of all. the transports with troops were assembled in the harbor of anton lizardo, some sixteen miles south of vera cruz, as they arrived, and there awaited the remainder of the fleet, bringing artillery, ammunition and supplies of all kinds from the north. with the fleet there was a little steam propeller dispatch-boat--the first vessel of the kind i had ever seen, and probably the first of its kind ever seen by any one then with the army. at that day ocean steamers were rare, and what there were were sidewheelers. this little vessel, going through the fleet so fast, so noiselessly and with its propeller under water out of view, attracted a great deal of attention. i recollect that lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, by whom i happened to be standing on the deck of a vessel when this propeller was passing, exclaimed, "why, the thing looks as if it was propelled by the force of circumstances." finally on the 7th of march, 1847, the little army of ten or twelve thousand men, given scott to invade a country with a population of seven or eight millions, a mountainous country affording the greatest possible natural advantages for defence, was all assembled and ready to commence the perilous task of landing from vessels lying in the open sea. the debarkation took place inside of the little island of sacrificios, some three miles south of vera cruz. the vessels could not get anywhere near shore, so that everything had to be landed in lighters or surf-boats; general scott had provided these before leaving the north. the breakers were sometimes high, so that the landing was tedious. the men were got ashore rapidly, because they could wade when they came to shallow water; but the camp and garrison equipage, provisions, ammunition and all stores had to be protected from the salt water, and therefore their landing took several days. the mexicans were very kind to us, however, and threw no obstacles in the way of our landing except an occasional shot from their nearest fort. during the debarkation one shot took off the head of major albertis. no other, i believe, reached anywhere near the same distance. on the 9th of march the troops were landed and the investment of vera cruz, from the gulf of mexico south of the city to the gulf again on the north, was soon and easily effected. the landing of stores was continued until everything was got ashore. vera cruz, at the time of which i write and up to 1880, was a walled city. the wall extended from the water's edge south of the town to the water again on the north. there were fortifications at intervals along the line and at the angles. in front of the city, and on an island half a mile out in the gulf, stands san juan de ulloa, an enclosed fortification of large dimensions and great strength for that period. against artillery of the present day the land forts and walls would prove elements of weakness rather than strength. after the invading army had established their camps out of range of the fire from the city, batteries were established, under cover of night, far to the front of the line where the troops lay. these batteries were intrenched and the approaches sufficiently protected. if a sortie had been made at any time by the mexicans, the men serving the batteries could have been quickly reinforced without great exposure to the fire from the enemy's main line. no serious attempt was made to capture the batteries or to drive our troops away. the siege continued with brisk firing on our side till the 27th of march, by which time a considerable breach had been made in the wall surrounding the city. upon this general morales, who was governor of both the city and of san juan de ulloa, commenced a correspondence with general scott looking to the surrender of the town, forts and garrison. on the 29th vera cruz and san juan de ulloa were occupied by scott's army. about five thousand prisoners and four hundred pieces of artillery, besides large amounts of small arms and ammunition, fell into the hands of the victorious force. the casualties on our side during the siege amounted to sixty-four officers and men, killed and wounded. chapter x. march to jalapa--battle of cerro gordo--perote--puebla--scott and taylor. general scott had less than twelve thousand men at vera cruz. he had been promised by the administration a very much larger force, or claimed that he had, and he was a man of veracity. twelve thousand was a very small army with which to penetrate two hundred and sixty miles into an enemy's country, and to besiege the capital; a city, at that time, of largely over one hundred thousand inhabitants. then, too, any line of march that could be selected led through mountain passes easily defended. in fact, there were at that time but two roads from vera cruz to the city of mexico that could be taken by an army; one by jalapa and perote, the other by cordova and orizaba, the two coming together on the great plain which extends to the city of mexico after the range of mountains is passed. it was very important to get the army away from vera cruz as soon as possible, in order to avoid the yellow fever, or vomito, which usually visits that city early in the year, and is very fatal to persons not acclimated; but transportation, which was expected from the north, was arriving very slowly. it was absolutely necessary to have enough to supply the army to jalapa, sixty-five miles in the interior and above the fevers of the coast. at that point the country is fertile, and an army of the size of general scott's could subsist there for an indefinite period. not counting the sick, the weak and the garrisons for the captured city and fort, the moving column was now less than ten thousand strong. this force was composed of three divisions, under generals twiggs, patterson, and worth. the importance of escaping the vomito was so great that as soon as transportation enough could be got together to move a division the advance was commenced. on the 8th of april, twiggs's division started for jalapa. he was followed very soon by patterson, with his division. general worth was to bring up the rear with his command as soon as transportation enough was assembled to carry six days' rations for his troops with the necessary ammunition and camp and garrison equipage. it was the 13th of april before this division left vera cruz. the leading division ran against the enemy at cerro gordo, some fifty miles west, on the road to jalapa, and went into camp at plan del rio, about three miles from the fortifications. general patterson reached plan del rio with his division soon after twiggs arrived. the two were then secure against an attack from santa anna, who commanded the mexican forces. at all events they confronted the enemy without reinforcements and without molestation, until the 18th of april. general scott had remained at vera cruz to hasten preparations for the field; but on the 12th, learning the situation at the front, he hastened on to take personal supervision. he at once commenced his preparations for the capture of the position held by santa anna and of the troops holding it. cerro gordo is one of the higher spurs of the mountains some twelve to fifteen miles east of jalapa, and santa anna had selected this point as the easiest to defend against an invading army. the road, said to have been built by cortez, zigzags around the mountain-side and was defended at every turn by artillery. on either side were deep chasms or mountain walls. a direct attack along the road was an impossibility. a flank movement seemed equally impossible. after the arrival of the commanding-general upon the scene, reconnoissances were sent out to find, or to make, a road by which the rear of the enemy's works might be reached without a front attack. these reconnoissances were made under the supervision of captain robert e. lee, assisted by lieutenants p. g. t. beauregard, isaac i. stevens, z. b. tower, g. w. smith, george b. mcclellan, and j. g. foster, of the corps of engineers, all officers who attained rank and fame, on one side or the other, in the great conflict for the preservation of the unity of the nation. the reconnoissance was completed, and the labor of cutting out and making roads by the flank of the enemy was effected by the 17th of the month. this was accomplished without the knowledge of santa anna or his army, and over ground where he supposed it impossible. on the same day general scott issued his order for the attack on the 18th. the attack was made as ordered, and perhaps there was not a battle of the mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place. under the supervision of the engineers, roadways had been opened over chasms to the right where the walls were so steep that men could barely climb them. animals could not. these had been opened under cover of night, without attracting the notice of the enemy. the engineers, who had directed the opening, led the way and the troops followed. artillery was let down the steep slopes by hand, the men engaged attaching a strong rope to the rear axle and letting the guns down, a piece at a time, while the men at the ropes kept their ground on top, paying out gradually, while a few at the front directed the course of the piece. in like manner the guns were drawn by hand up the opposite slopes. in this way scott's troops reached their assigned position in rear of most of the intrenchments of the enemy, unobserved. the attack was made, the mexican reserves behind the works beat a hasty retreat, and those occupying them surrendered. on the left general pillow's command made a formidable demonstration, which doubtless held a part of the enemy in his front and contributed to the victory. i am not pretending to give full details of all the battles fought, but of the portion that i saw. there were troops engaged on both sides at other points in which both sustained losses; but the battle was won as here narrated. the surprise of the enemy was complete, the victory overwhelming; some three thousand prisoners fell into scott's hands, also a large amount of ordnance and ordnance stores. the prisoners were paroled, the artillery parked and the small arms and ammunition destroyed. the battle of buena vista was probably very important to the success of general scott at cerro gordo and in his entire campaign from vera cruz to the great plains reaching to the city of mexico. the only army santa anna had to protect his capital and the mountain passes west of vera cruz, was the one he had with him confronting general taylor. it is not likely that he would have gone as far north as monterey to attack the united states troops when he knew his country was threatened with invasion further south. when taylor moved to saltillo and then advanced on to buena vista, santa anna crossed the desert confronting the invading army, hoping no doubt to crush it and get back in time to meet general scott in the mountain passes west of vera cruz. his attack on taylor was disastrous to the mexican army, but, notwithstanding this, he marched his army to cerro gordo, a distance not much short of one thousand miles by the line he had to travel, in time to intrench himself well before scott got there. if he had been successful at buena vista his troops would no doubt have made a more stubborn resistance at cerro gordo. had the battle of buena vista not been fought santa anna would have had time to move leisurely to meet the invader further south and with an army not demoralized nor depleted by defeat. after the battle the victorious army moved on to jalapa, where it was in a beautiful, productive and healthy country, far above the fevers of the coast. jalapa, however, is still in the mountains, and between there and the great plain the whole line of the road is easy of defence. it was important, therefore, to get possession of the great highway between the sea-coast and the capital up to the point where it leaves the mountains, before the enemy could have time to re-organize and fortify in our front. worth's division was selected to go forward to secure this result. the division marched to perote on the great plain, not far from where the road debouches from the mountains. there is a low, strong fort on the plain in front of the town, known as the castle of perote. this, however, offered no resistance and fell into our hands, with its armament. general scott having now only nine or ten thousand men west of vera cruz, and the time of some four thousand of them being about to expire, a long delay was the consequence. the troops were in a healthy climate, and where they could subsist for an indefinite period even if their line back to vera cruz should be cut off. it being ascertained that the men whose time would expire before the city of mexico could possibly fall into the hands of the american army, would not remain beyond the term for which they had volunteered, the commanding-general determined to discharge them at once, for a delay until the expiration of their time would have compelled them to pass through vera cruz during the season of the vomito. this reduced scott's force in the field to about five thousand men. early in may, worth, with his division, left perote and marched on to puebla. the roads were wide and the country open except through one pass in a spur of mountains coming up from the south, through which the road runs. notwithstanding this the small column was divided into two bodies, moving a day apart. nothing occurred on the march of special note, except that while lying at the town of amozoque--an easy day's march east of puebla--a body of the enemy's cavalry, two or three thousand strong, was seen to our right, not more than a mile away. a battery or two, with two or three infantry regiments, was sent against them and they soon disappeared. on the 15th of may we entered the city of puebla. general worth was in command at puebla until the latter end of may, when general scott arrived. here, as well as on the march up, his restlessness, particularly under responsibilities, showed itself. during his brief command he had the enemy hovering around near the city, in vastly superior numbers to his own. the brigade to which i was attached changed quarters three different times in about a week, occupying at first quarters near the plaza, in the heart of the city; then at the western entrance; then at the extreme east. on one occasion general worth had the troops in line, under arms, all day, with three days' cooked rations in their haversacks. he galloped from one command to another proclaiming the near proximity of santa anna with an army vastly superior to his own. general scott arrived upon the scene the latter part of the month, and nothing more was heard of santa anna and his myriads. there were, of course, bodies of mounted mexicans hovering around to watch our movements and to pick up stragglers, or small bodies of troops, if they ventured too far out. these always withdrew on the approach of any considerable number of our soldiers. after the arrival of general scott i was sent, as quartermaster, with a large train of wagons, back two days' march at least, to procure forage. we had less than a thousand men as escort, and never thought of danger. we procured full loads for our entire train at two plantations, which could easily have furnished as much more. there had been great delay in obtaining the authority of congress for the raising of the troops asked for by the administration. a bill was before the national legislature from early in the session of 1846-7, authorizing the creation of ten additional regiments for the war to be attached to the regular army, but it was the middle of february before it became a law. appointments of commissioned officers had then to be made; men had to be enlisted, the regiments equipped and the whole transported to mexico. it was august before general scott received reinforcement sufficient to warrant an advance. his moving column, not even now more than ten thousand strong, was in four divisions, commanded by generals twiggs, worth, pillow and quitman. there was also a cavalry corps under general harney, composed of detachments of the 1st, 2d, and 3d dragoons. the advance commenced on the 7th of august with twiggs's division in front. the remaining three divisions followed, with an interval of a day between. the marches were short, to make concentration easier in case of attack. i had now been in battle with the two leading commanders conducting armies in a foreign land. the contrast between the two was very marked. general taylor never wore uniform, but dressed himself entirely for comfort. he moved about the field in which he was operating to see through his own eyes the situation. often he would be without staff officers, and when he was accompanied by them there was no prescribed order in which they followed. he was very much given to sit his horse side-ways--with both feet on one side--particularly on the battlefield. general scott was the reverse in all these particulars. he always wore all the uniform prescribed or allowed by law when he inspected his lines; word would be sent to all division and brigade commanders in advance, notifying them of the hour when the commanding general might be expected. this was done so that all the army might be under arms to salute their chief as he passed. on these occasions he wore his dress uniform, cocked hat, aiguillettes, sabre and spurs. his staff proper, besides all officers constructively on his staff--engineers, inspectors, quartermasters, etc., that could be spared--followed, also in uniform and in prescribed order. orders were prepared with great care and evidently with the view that they should be a history of what followed. in their modes of expressing thought, these two generals contrasted quite as strongly as in their other characteristics. general scott was precise in language, cultivated a style peculiarly his own; was proud of his rhetoric; not averse to speaking of himself, often in the third person, and he could bestow praise upon the person he was talking about without the least embarrassment. taylor was not a conversationalist, but on paper he could put his meaning so plainly that there could be no mistaking it. he knew how to express what he wanted to say in the fewest well-chosen words, but would not sacrifice meaning to the construction of high-sounding sentences. but with their opposite characteristics both were great and successful soldiers; both were true, patriotic and upright in all their dealings. both were pleasant to serve under--taylor was pleasant to serve with. scott saw more through the eyes of his staff officers than through his own. his plans were deliberately prepared, and fully expressed in orders. taylor saw for himself, and gave orders to meet the emergency without reference to how they would read in history. chapter xi. advance on the city of mexico--battle of contreras--assault at churubusco--negotiations for peace--battle of molino del rey--storming of chapultepec--san cosme--evacuation of the city--halls of the montezumas. the route followed by the army from puebla to the city of mexico was over rio frio mountain, the road leading over which, at the highest point, is about eleven thousand feet above tide water. the pass through this mountain might have been easily defended, but it was not; and the advanced division reached the summit in three days after leaving puebla. the city of mexico lies west of rio frio mountain, on a plain backed by another mountain six miles farther west, with others still nearer on the north and south. between the western base of rio frio and the city of mexico there are three lakes, chalco and xochimilco on the left and texcoco on the right, extending to the east end of the city of mexico. chalco and texcoco are divided by a narrow strip of land over which the direct road to the city runs. xochimilco is also to the left of the road, but at a considerable distance south of it, and is connected with lake chalco by a narrow channel. there is a high rocky mound, called el penon, on the right of the road, springing up from the low flat ground dividing the lakes. this mound was strengthened by intrenchments at its base and summit, and rendered a direct attack impracticable. scott's army was rapidly concentrated about ayotla and other points near the eastern end of lake chalco. reconnoissances were made up to within gun-shot of el penon, while engineers were seeking a route by the south side of lake chalco to flank the city, and come upon it from the south and south-west. a way was found around the lake, and by the 18th of august troops were in st. augustin tlalpam, a town about eleven miles due south from the plaza of the capital. between st. augustin tlalpam and the city lie the hacienda of san antonio and the village of churubusco, and south-west of them is contreras. all these points, except st. augustin tlalpam, were intrenched and strongly garrisoned. contreras is situated on the side of a mountain, near its base, where volcanic rocks are piled in great confusion, reaching nearly to san antonio. this made the approach to the city from the south very difficult. the brigade to which i was attached--garland's, of worth's division--was sent to confront san antonio, two or three miles from st. augustin tlalpam, on the road to churubusco and the city of mexico. the ground on which san antonio stands is completely in the valley, and the surface of the land is only a little above the level of the lakes, and, except to the south-west, it was cut up by deep ditches filled with water. to the south-west is the pedregal--the volcanic rock before spoken of--over which cavalry or artillery could not be passed, and infantry would make but poor progress if confronted by an enemy. from the position occupied by garland's brigade, therefore, no movement could be made against the defences of san antonio except to the front, and by a narrow causeway, over perfectly level ground, every inch of which was commanded by the enemy's artillery and infantry. if contreras, some three miles west and south, should fall into our hands, troops from there could move to the right flank of all the positions held by the enemy between us and the city. under these circumstances general scott directed the holding of the front of the enemy without making an attack until further orders. on the 18th of august, the day of reaching san augustin tlalpam, garland's brigade secured a position within easy range of the advanced intrenchments of san antonio, but where his troops were protected by an artificial embankment that had been thrown up for some other purpose than defense. general scott at once set his engineers reconnoitring the works about contreras, and on the 19th movements were commenced to get troops into positions from which an assault could be made upon the force occupying that place. the pedregal on the north and north-east, and the mountain on the south, made the passage by either flank of the enemy's defences difficult, for their work stood exactly between those natural bulwarks; but a road was completed during the day and night of the 19th, and troops were got to the north and west of the enemy. this affair, like that of cerro gordo, was an engagement in which the officers of the engineer corps won special distinction. in fact, in both cases, tasks which seemed difficult at first sight were made easier for the troops that had to execute them than they would have been on an ordinary field. the very strength of each of these positions was, by the skill of the engineers, converted into a defence for the assaulting parties while securing their positions for final attack. all the troops with general scott in the valley of mexico, except a part of the division of general quitman at san augustin tlalpam and the brigade of garland (worth's division) at san antonio, were engaged at the battle of contreras, or were on their way, in obedience to the orders of their chief, to reinforce those who were engaged. the assault was made on the morning of the 20th, and in less than half an hour from the sound of the advance the position was in our hands, with many prisoners and large quantities of ordnance and other stores. the brigade commanded by general riley was from its position the most conspicuous in the final assault, but all did well, volunteers and regulars. from the point occupied by garland's brigade we could see the progress made at contreras and the movement of troops toward the flank and rear of the enemy opposing us. the mexicans all the way back to the city could see the same thing, and their conduct showed plainly that they did not enjoy the sight. we moved out at once, and found them gone from our immediate front. clarke's brigade of worth's division now moved west over the point of the pedregal, and after having passed to the north sufficiently to clear san antonio, turned east and got on the causeway leading to churubusco and the city of mexico. when he approached churubusco his left, under colonel hoffman, attacked a tete-de-pont at that place and brought on an engagement. about an hour after, garland was ordered to advance directly along the causeway, and got up in time to take part in the engagement. san antonio was found evacuated, the evacuation having probably taken place immediately upon the enemy seeing the stars and stripes waving over contreras. the troops that had been engaged at contreras, and even then on their way to that battle-field, were moved by a causeway west of, and parallel to the one by way of san antonio and churubusco. it was expected by the commanding general that these troops would move north sufficiently far to flank the enemy out of his position at churubusco, before turning east to reach the san antonio road, but they did not succeed in this, and churubusco proved to be about the severest battle fought in the valley of mexico. general scott coming upon the battle-field about this juncture, ordered two brigades, under shields, to move north and turn the right of the enemy. this shields did, but not without hard fighting and heavy loss. the enemy finally gave way, leaving in our hands prisoners, artillery and small arms. the balance of the causeway held by the enemy, up to the very gates of the city, fell in like manner. i recollect at this place that some of the gunners who had stood their ground, were deserters from general taylor's army on the rio grande. both the strategy and tactics displayed by general scott in these various engagements of the 20th of august, 1847, were faultless as i look upon them now, after the lapse of so many years. as before stated, the work of the engineer officers who made the reconnoissances and led the different commands to their destinations, was so perfect that the chief was able to give his orders to his various subordinates with all the precision he could use on an ordinary march. i mean, up to the points from which the attack was to commence. after that point is reached the enemy often induces a change of orders not before contemplated. the enemy outside the city outnumbered our soldiery quite three to one, but they had become so demoralized by the succession of defeats this day, that the city of mexico could have been entered without much further bloodshed. in fact, captain philip kearney --afterwards a general in the war of the rebellion--rode with a squadron of cavalry to the very gates of the city, and would no doubt have entered with his little force, only at that point he was badly wounded, as were several of his officers. he had not heard the call for a halt. general franklin pierce had joined the army in mexico, at puebla, a short time before the advance upon the capital commenced. he had consequently not been in any of the engagements of the war up to the battle of contreras. by an unfortunate fall of his horse on the afternoon of the 19th he was painfully injured. the next day, when his brigade, with the other troops engaged on the same field, was ordered against the flank and rear of the enemy guarding the different points of the road from san augustin tlalpam to the city, general pierce attempted to accompany them. he was not sufficiently recovered to do so, and fainted. this circumstance gave rise to exceedingly unfair and unjust criticisms of him when he became a candidate for the presidency. whatever general pierce's qualifications may have been for the presidency, he was a gentleman and a man of courage. i was not a supporter of him politically, but i knew him more intimately than i did any other of the volunteer generals. general scott abstained from entering the city at this time, because mr. nicholas p. trist, the commissioner on the part of the united states to negotiate a treaty of peace with mexico, was with the army, and either he or general scott thought--probably both of them--that a treaty would be more possible while the mexican government was in possession of the capital than if it was scattered and the capital in the hands of an invader. be this as it may, we did not enter at that time. the army took up positions along the slopes of the mountains south of the city, as far west as tacubaya. negotiations were at once entered into with santa anna, who was then practically the government and the immediate commander of all the troops engaged in defence of the country. a truce was signed which denied to either party the right to strengthen its position, or to receive reinforcements during the continuance of the armistices, but authorized general scott to draw supplies for his army from the city in the meantime. negotiations were commenced at once and were kept up vigorously between mr. trist and the commissioners appointed on the part of mexico, until the 2d of september. at that time mr. trist handed in his ultimatum. texas was to be given up absolutely by mexico, and new mexico and california ceded to the united states for a stipulated sum to be afterwards determined. i do not suppose mr. trist had any discretion whatever in regard to boundaries. the war was one of conquest, in the interest of an institution, and the probabilities are that private instructions were for the acquisition of territory out of which new states might be carved. at all events the mexicans felt so outraged at the terms proposed that they commenced preparations for defence, without giving notice of the termination of the armistice. the terms of the truce had been violated before, when teams had been sent into the city to bring out supplies for the army. the first train entering the city was very severely threatened by a mob. this, however, was apologized for by the authorities and all responsibility for it denied; and thereafter, to avoid exciting the mexican people and soldiery, our teams with their escorts were sent in at night, when the troops were in barracks and the citizens in bed. the circumstance was overlooked and negotiations continued. as soon as the news reached general scott of the second violation of the armistice, about the 4th of september, he wrote a vigorous note to president santa anna, calling his attention to it, and, receiving an unsatisfactory reply, declared the armistice at an end. general scott, with worth's division, was now occupying tacubaya, a village some four miles south-west of the city of mexico, and extending from the base up the mountain-side for the distance of half a mile. more than a mile west, and also a little above the plain, stands molino del rey. the mill is a long stone structure, one story high and several hundred feet in length. at the period of which i speak general scott supposed a portion of the mill to be used as a foundry for the casting of guns. this, however, proved to be a mistake. it was valuable to the mexicans because of the quantity of grain it contained. the building is flat roofed, and a line of sand-bags over the outer walls rendered the top quite a formidable defence for infantry. chapultepec is a mound springing up from the plain to the height of probably three hundred feet, and almost in a direct line between molino del rey and the western part of the city. it was fortified both on the top and on the rocky and precipitous sides. the city of mexico is supplied with water by two aqueducts, resting on strong stone arches. one of these aqueducts draws its supply of water from a mountain stream coming into it at or near molino del rey, and runs north close to the west base of chapultepec; thence along the centre of a wide road, until it reaches the road running east into the city by the garita san cosme; from which point the aqueduct and road both run east to the city. the second aqueduct starts from the east base of chapultepec, where it is fed by a spring, and runs north-east to the city. this aqueduct, like the other, runs in the middle of a broad road-way, thus leaving a space on each side. the arches supporting the aqueduct afforded protection for advancing troops as well as to those engaged defensively. at points on the san cosme road parapets were thrown across, with an embrasure for a single piece of artillery in each. at the point where both road and aqueduct turn at right angles from north to east, there was not only one of these parapets supplied by one gun and infantry supports, but the houses to the north of the san cosme road, facing south and commanding a view of the road back to chapultepec, were covered with infantry, protected by parapets made of sandbags. the roads leading to garitas (the gates) san cosme and belen, by which these aqueducts enter the city, were strongly intrenched. deep, wide ditches, filled with water, lined the sides of both roads. such were the defences of the city of mexico in september, 1847, on the routes over which general scott entered. prior to the mexican war general scott had been very partial to general worth--indeed he continued so up to the close of hostilities--but, for some reason, worth had become estranged from his chief. scott evidently took this coldness somewhat to heart. he did not retaliate, however, but on the contrary showed every disposition to appease his subordinate. it was understood at the time that he gave worth authority to plan and execute the battle of molino del rey without dictation or interference from any one, for the very purpose of restoring their former relations. the effort failed, and the two generals remained ever after cold and indifferent towards each other, if not actually hostile. the battle of molino del rey was fought on the 8th of september. the night of the 7th, worth sent for his brigade and regimental commanders, with their staffs, to come to his quarters to receive instructions for the morrow. these orders contemplated a movement up to within striking distance of the mills before daylight. the engineers had reconnoitred the ground as well as possible, and had acquired all the information necessary to base proper orders both for approach and attack. by daylight on the morning of the 8th, the troops to be engaged at molino were all at the places designated. the ground in front of the mills, to the south, was commanded by the artillery from the summit of chapultepec as well as by the lighter batteries at hand; but a charge was made, and soon all was over. worth's troops entered the mills by every door, and the enemy beat a hasty retreat back to chapultepec. had this victory been followed up promptly, no doubt americans and mexicans would have gone over the defences of chapultepec so near together that the place would have fallen into our hands without further loss. the defenders of the works could not have fired upon us without endangering their own men. this was not done, and five days later more valuable lives were sacrificed to carry works which had been so nearly in our possession on the 8th. i do not criticise the failure to capture chapultepec at this time. the result that followed the first assault could not possibly have been foreseen, and to profit by the unexpected advantage, the commanding general must have been on the spot and given the necessary instructions at the moment, or the troops must have kept on without orders. it is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed. the loss on our side at molino del rey was severe for the numbers engaged. it was especially so among commissioned officers. i was with the earliest of the troops to enter the mills. in passing through to the north side, looking towards chapultepec, i happened to notice that there were armed mexicans still on top of the building, only a few feet from many of our men. not seeing any stairway or ladder reaching to the top of the building, i took a few soldiers, and had a cart that happened to be standing near brought up, and, placing the shafts against the wall and chocking the wheels so that the cart could not back, used the shafts as a sort of ladder extending to within three or four feet of the top. by this i climbed to the roof of the building, followed by a few men, but found a private soldier had preceded me by some other way. there were still quite a number of mexicans on the roof, among them a major and five or six officers of lower grades, who had not succeeded in getting away before our troops occupied the building. they still had their arms, while the soldier before mentioned was walking as sentry, guarding the prisoners he had surrounded, all by himself. i halted the sentinel, received the swords from the commissioned officers, and proceeded, with the assistance of the soldiers now with me, to disable the muskets by striking them against the edge of the wall, and throw them to the ground below. molino del rey was now captured, and the troops engaged, with the exception of an appropriate guard over the captured position and property, were marched back to their quarters in tacubaya. the engagement did not last many minutes, but the killed and wounded were numerous for the number of troops engaged. during the night of the 11th batteries were established which could play upon the fortifications of chapultepec. the bombardment commenced early on the morning of the 12th, but there was no further engagement during this day than that of the artillery. general scott assigned the capture of chapultepec to general pillow, but did not leave the details to his judgment. two assaulting columns, two hundred and fifty men each, composed of volunteers for the occasion, were formed. they were commanded by captains mckinzie and casey respectively. the assault was successful, but bloody. in later years, if not at the time, the battles of molino del rey and chapultepec have seemed to me to have been wholly unnecessary. when the assaults upon the garitas of san cosme and belen were determined upon, the road running east to the former gate could have been reached easily, without an engagement, by moving along south of the mills until west of them sufficiently far to be out of range, thence north to the road above mentioned; or, if desirable to keep the two attacking columns nearer together, the troops could have been turned east so as to come on the aqueduct road out of range of the guns from chapultepec. in like manner, the troops designated to act against belen could have kept east of chapultepec, out of range, and come on to the aqueduct, also out of range of chapultepec. molino del rey and chapultepec would both have been necessarily evacuated if this course had been pursued, for they would have been turned. general quitman, a volunteer from the state of mississippi, who stood well with the army both as a soldier and as a man, commanded the column acting against belen. general worth commanded the column against san cosme. when chapultepec fell the advance commenced along the two aqueduct roads. i was on the road to san cosme, and witnessed most that took place on that route. when opposition was encountered our troops sheltered themselves by keeping under the arches supporting the aqueduct, advancing an arch at a time. we encountered no serious obstruction until within gun-shot of the point where the road we were on intersects that running east to the city, the point where the aqueduct turns at a right angle. i have described the defences of this position before. there were but three commissioned officers besides myself, that i can now call to mind, with the advance when the above position was reached. one of these officers was a lieutenant semmes, of the marine corps. i think captain gore, and lieutenant judah, of the 4th infantry, were the others. our progress was stopped for the time by the single piece of artillery at the angle of the roads and the infantry occupying the house-tops back from it. west of the road from where we were, stood a house occupying the south-west angle made by the san cosme road and the road we were moving upon. a stone wall ran from the house along each of these roads for a considerable distance and thence back until it joined, enclosing quite a yard about the house. i watched my opportunity and skipped across the road and behind the south wall. proceeding cautiously to the west corner of the enclosure, i peeped around and seeing nobody, continued, still cautiously, until the road running east and west was reached. i then returned to the troops, and called for volunteers. all that were close to me, or that heard me, about a dozen, offered their services. commanding them to carry their arms at a trail, i watched our opportunity and got them across the road and under cover of the wall beyond, before the enemy had a shot at us. our men under cover of the arches kept a close watch on the intrenchments that crossed our path and the house-tops beyond, and whenever a head showed itself above the parapets they would fire at it. our crossing was thus made practicable without loss. when we reached a safe position i instructed my little command again to carry their arms at a trail, not to fire at the enemy until they were ordered, and to move very cautiously following me until the san cosme road was reached; we would then be on the flank of the men serving the gun on the road, and with no obstruction between us and them. when we reached the south-west corner of the enclosure before described, i saw some united states troops pushing north through a shallow ditch near by, who had come up since my reconnaissance. this was the company of captain horace brooks, of the artillery, acting as infantry. i explained to brooks briefly what i had discovered and what i was about to do. he said, as i knew the ground and he did not, i might go on and he would follow. as soon as we got on the road leading to the city the troops serving the gun on the parapet retreated, and those on the house-tops near by followed; our men went after them in such close pursuit--the troops we had left under the arches joining--that a second line across the road, about half-way between the first and the garita, was carried. no reinforcements had yet come up except brooks's company, and the position we had taken was too advanced to be held by so small a force. it was given up, but retaken later in the day, with some loss. worth's command gradually advanced to the front now open to it. later in the day in reconnoitring i found a church off to the south of the road, which looked to me as if the belfry would command the ground back of the garita san cosme. i got an officer of the voltigeurs, with a mountain howitzer and men to work it, to go with me. the road being in possession of the enemy, we had to take the field to the south to reach the church. this took us over several ditches breast deep in water and grown up with water plants. these ditches, however, were not over eight or ten feet in width. the howitzer was taken to pieces and carried by the men to its destination. when i knocked for admission a priest came to the door who, while extremely polite, declined to admit us. with the little spanish then at my command, i explained to him that he might save property by opening the door, and he certainly would save himself from becoming a prisoner, for a time at least; and besides, i intended to go in whether he consented or not. he began to see his duty in the same light that i did, and opened the door, though he did not look as if it gave him special pleasure to do so. the gun was carried to the belfry and put together. we were not more than two or three hundred yards from san cosme. the shots from our little gun dropped in upon the enemy and created great confusion. why they did not send out a small party and capture us, i do not know. we had no infantry or other defences besides our one gun. the effect of this gun upon the troops about the gate of the city was so marked that general worth saw it from his position. (*3) he was so pleased that he sent a staff officer, lieutenant pemberton--later lieutenant-general commanding the defences of vicksburg--to bring me to him. he expressed his gratification at the services the howitzer in the church steeple was doing, saying that every shot was effective, and ordered a captain of voltigeurs to report to me with another howitzer to be placed along with the one already rendering so much service. i could not tell the general that there was not room enough in the steeple for another gun, because he probably would have looked upon such a statement as a contradiction from a second lieutenant. i took the captain with me, but did not use his gun. the night of the 13th of september was spent by the troops under general worth in the houses near san cosme, and in line confronting the general line of the enemy across to belen. the troops that i was with were in the houses north of the road leading into the city, and were engaged during the night in cutting passage-ways from one house to another towards the town. during the night santa anna, with his army--except the deserters--left the city. he liberated all the convicts confined in the town, hoping, no doubt, that they would inflict upon us some injury before daylight; but several hours after santa anna was out of the way, the city authorities sent a delegation to general scott to ask--if not demand--an armistice, respecting church property, the rights of citizens and the supremacy of the city government in the management of municipal affairs. general scott declined to trammel himself with conditions, but gave assurances that those who chose to remain within our lines would be protected so long as they behaved themselves properly. general quitman had advanced along his line very successfully on the 13th, so that at night his command occupied nearly the same position at belen that worth's troops did about san cosme. after the interview above related between general scott and the city council, orders were issued for the cautious entry of both columns in the morning. the troops under worth were to stop at the alameda, a park near the west end of the city. quitman was to go directly to the plaza, and take possession of the palace--a mass of buildings on the east side in which congress has its sessions, the national courts are held, the public offices are all located, the president resides, and much room is left for museums, receptions, etc. this is the building generally designated as the "halls of the montezumas." chapter xii. promotion to first lieutenant--capture of the city of mexico--the army --mexican soldiers--peace negotiations. on entering the city the troops were fired upon by the released convicts, and possibly by deserters and hostile citizens. the streets were deserted, and the place presented the appearance of a "city of the dead," except for this firing by unseen persons from house-tops, windows, and around corners. in this firing the lieutenant-colonel of my regiment, garland, was badly wounded, lieutenant sidney smith, of the 4th infantry, was also wounded mortally. he died a few days after, and by his death i was promoted to the grade of first lieutenant.(*4) i had gone into the battle of palo alto in may, 1846, a second lieutenant, and i entered the city of mexico sixteen months later with the same rank, after having been in all the engagements possible for any one man and in a regiment that lost more officers during the war than it ever had present at any one engagement. my regiment lost four commissioned officers, all senior to me, by steamboat explosions during the mexican war. the mexicans were not so discriminating. they sometimes picked off my juniors. general scott soon followed the troops into the city, in state. i wonder that he was not fired upon, but i believe he was not; at all events he was not hurt. he took quarters at first in the "halls of the montezumas," and from there issued his wise and discreet orders for the government of a conquered city, and for suppressing the hostile acts of liberated convicts already spoken of--orders which challenge the respect of all who study them. lawlessness was soon suppressed, and the city of mexico settled down into a quiet, law-abiding place. the people began to make their appearance upon the streets without fear of the invaders. shortly afterwards the bulk of the troops were sent from the city to the villages at the foot of the mountains, four or five miles to the south and south-west. whether general scott approved of the mexican war and the manner in which it was brought about, i have no means of knowing. his orders to troops indicate only a soldierly spirit, with probably a little regard for the perpetuation of his own fame. on the other hand, general taylor's, i think, indicate that he considered the administration accountable for the war, and felt no responsibility resting on himself further than for the faithful performance of his duties. both generals deserve the commendations of their countrymen and to live in the grateful memory of this people to the latest generation. earlier in this narrative i have stated that the plain, reached after passing the mountains east of perote, extends to the cities of puebla and mexico. the route travelled by the army before reaching puebla, goes over a pass in a spur of mountain coming up from the south. this pass is very susceptible of defence by a smaller against a larger force. again, the highest point of the road-bed between vera cruz and the city of mexico is over rio frio mountain, which also might have been successfully defended by an inferior against a superior force. but by moving north of the mountains, and about thirty miles north of puebla, both of these passes would have been avoided. the road from perote to the city of mexico, by this latter route, is as level as the prairies in our west. arriving due north from puebla, troops could have been detached to take possession of that place, and then proceeding west with the rest of the army no mountain would have been encountered before reaching the city of mexico. it is true this road would have brought troops in by guadalupe--a town, church and detached spur of mountain about two miles north of the capital, all bearing the same general name --and at this point lake texcoco comes near to the mountain, which was fortified both at the base and on the sides: but troops could have passed north of the mountain and come in only a few miles to the north-west, and so flanked the position, as they actually did on the south. it has always seemed to me that this northern route to the city of mexico, would have been the better one to have taken. but my later experience has taught me two lessons: first, that things are seen plainer after the events have occurred; second, that the most confident critics are generally those who know the least about the matter criticised. i know just enough about the mexican war to approve heartily of most of the generalship, but to differ with a little of it. it is natural that an important city like puebla should not have been passed with contempt; it may be natural that the direct road to it should have been taken; but it could have been passed, its evacuation insured and possession acquired without danger of encountering the enemy in intricate mountain defiles. in this same way the city of mexico could have been approached without any danger of opposition, except in the open field. but general scott's successes are an answer to all criticism. he invaded a populous country, penetrating two hundred and sixty miles into the interior, with a force at no time equal to one-half of that opposed to him; he was without a base; the enemy was always intrenched, always on the defensive; yet he won every battle, he captured the capital, and conquered the government. credit is due to the troops engaged, it is true, but the plans and the strategy were the general's. i had now made marches and been in battle under both general scott and general taylor. the former divided his force of 10,500 men into four columns, starting a day apart, in moving from puebla to the capital of the nation, when it was known that an army more than twice as large as his own stood ready to resist his coming. the road was broad and the country open except in crossing the rio frio mountain. general taylor pursued the same course in marching toward an enemy. he moved even in smaller bodies. i never thought at the time to doubt the infallibility of these two generals in all matters pertaining to their profession. i supposed they moved in small bodies because more men could not be passed over a single road on the same day with their artillery and necessary trains. later i found the fallacy of this belief. the rebellion, which followed as a sequence to the mexican war, never could have been suppressed if larger bodies of men could not have been moved at the same time than was the custom under scott and taylor. the victories in mexico were, in every instance, over vastly superior numbers. there were two reasons for this. both general scott and general taylor had such armies as are not often got together. at the battles of palo alto and resaca-de-la-palma, general taylor had a small army, but it was composed exclusively of regular troops, under the best of drill and discipline. every officer, from the highest to the lowest, was educated in his profession, not at west point necessarily, but in the camp, in garrison, and many of them in indian wars. the rank and file were probably inferior, as material out of which to make an army, to the volunteers that participated in all the later battles of the war; but they were brave men, and then drill and discipline brought out all there was in them. a better army, man for man, probably never faced an enemy than the one commanded by general taylor in the earliest two engagements of the mexican war. the volunteers who followed were of better material, but without drill or discipline at the start. they were associated with so many disciplined men and professionally educated officers, that when they went into engagements it was with a confidence they would not have felt otherwise. they became soldiers themselves almost at once. all these conditions we would enjoy again in case of war. the mexican army of that day was hardly an organization. the private soldier was picked up from the lower class of the inhabitants when wanted; his consent was not asked; he was poorly clothed, worse fed, and seldom paid. he was turned adrift when no longer wanted. the officers of the lower grades were but little superior to the men. with all this i have seen as brave stands made by some of these men as i have ever seen made by soldiers. now mexico has a standing army larger than that of the united states. they have a military school modelled after west point. their officers are educated and, no doubt, generally brave. the mexican war of 1846-8 would be an impossibility in this generation. the mexicans have shown a patriotism which it would be well if we would imitate in part, but with more regard to truth. they celebrate the anniversaries of chapultepec and molino del rey as of very great victories. the anniversaries are recognized as national holidays. at these two battles, while the united states troops were victorious, it was at very great sacrifice of life compared with what the mexicans suffered. the mexicans, as on many other occasions, stood up as well as any troops ever did. the trouble seemed to be the lack of experience among the officers, which led them after a certain time to simply quit, without being particularly whipped, but because they had fought enough. their authorities of the present day grow enthusiastic over their theme when telling of these victories, and speak with pride of the large sum of money they forced us to pay in the end. with us, now twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we have writers --who profess devotion to the nation--engaged in trying to prove that the union forces were not victorious; practically, they say, we were slashed around from donelson to vicksburg and to chattanooga; and in the east from gettysburg to appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. there is no difference in the amount of romance in the two stories. i would not have the anniversaries of our victories celebrated, nor those of our defeats made fast days and spent in humiliation and prayer; but i would like to see truthful history written. such history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the american citizen, no matter what section of the country he hailed from, or in what ranks he fought. the justice of the cause which in the end prevailed, will, i doubt not, come to be acknowledged by every citizen of the land, in time. for the present, and so long as there are living witnesses of the great war of sections, there will be people who will not be consoled for the loss of a cause which they believed to be holy. as time passes, people, even of the south, will begin to wonder how it was possible that their ancestors ever fought for or justified institutions which acknowledged the right of property in man. after the fall of the capital and the dispersal of the government of mexico, it looked very much as if military occupation of the country for a long time might be necessary. general scott at once began the preparation of orders, regulations and laws in view of this contingency. he contemplated making the country pay all the expenses of the occupation, without the army becoming a perceptible burden upon the people. his plan was to levy a direct tax upon the separate states, and collect, at the ports left open to trade, a duty on all imports. from the beginning of the war private property had not been taken, either for the use of the army or of individuals, without full compensation. this policy was to be pursued. there were not troops enough in the valley of mexico to occupy many points, but now that there was no organized army of the enemy of any size, reinforcements could be got from the rio grande, and there were also new volunteers arriving from time to time, all by way of vera cruz. military possession was taken of cuernavaca, fifty miles south of the city of mexico; of toluca, nearly as far west, and of pachuca, a mining town of great importance, some sixty miles to the north-east. vera cruz, jalapa, orizaba, and puebla were already in our possession. meanwhile the mexican government had departed in the person of santa anna, and it looked doubtful for a time whether the united states commissioner, mr. trist, would find anybody to negotiate with. a temporary government, however, was soon established at queretaro, and trist began negotiations for a conclusion of the war. before terms were finally agreed upon he was ordered back to washington, but general scott prevailed upon him to remain, as an arrangement had been so nearly reached, and the administration must approve his acts if he succeeded in making such a treaty as had been contemplated in his instructions. the treaty was finally signed the 2d of february, 1848, and accepted by the government at washington. it is that known as the "treaty of guadalupe hidalgo," and secured to the united states the rio grande as the boundary of texas, and the whole territory then included in new mexico and upper california, for the sum of $15,000,000. soon after entering the city of mexico, the opposition of generals pillow, worth and colonel duncan to general scott became very marked. scott claimed that they had demanded of the president his removal. i do not know whether this is so or not, but i do know of their unconcealed hostility to their chief. at last he placed them in arrest, and preferred charges against them of insubordination and disrespect. this act brought on a crisis in the career of the general commanding. he had asserted from the beginning that the administration was hostile to him; that it had failed in its promises of men and war material; that the president himself had shown duplicity if not treachery in the endeavor to procure the appointment of benton: and the administration now gave open evidence of its enmity. about the middle of february orders came convening a court of inquiry, composed of brevet brigadier-general towson, the paymaster-general of the army, brigadier-general cushing and colonel belknap, to inquire into the conduct of the accused and the accuser, and shortly afterwards orders were received from washington, relieving scott of the command of the army in the field and assigning major-general william o. butler of kentucky to the place. this order also released pillow, worth and duncan from arrest. if a change was to be made the selection of general butler was agreeable to every one concerned, so far as i remember to have heard expressions on the subject. there were many who regarded the treatment of general scott as harsh and unjust. it is quite possible that the vanity of the general had led him to say and do things that afforded a plausible pretext to the administration for doing just what it did and what it had wanted to do from the start. the court tried the accuser quite as much as the accused. it was adjourned before completing its labors, to meet in frederick, maryland. general scott left the country, and never after had more than the nominal command of the army until early in 1861. he certainly was not sustained in his efforts to maintain discipline in high places. the efforts to kill off politically the two successful generals, made them both candidates for the presidency. general taylor was nominated in 1848, and was elected. four years later general scott received the nomination but was badly beaten, and the party nominating him died with his defeat.(*5) chapter xiii. treaty of peace--mexican bull fights--regimental quartermaster--trip to popocatapetl--trip to the caves of mexico. the treaty of peace between the two countries was signed by the commissioners of each side early in february, 1848. it took a considerable time for it to reach washington, receive the approval of the administration, and be finally ratified by the senate. it was naturally supposed by the army that there would be no more fighting, and officers and men were of course anxious to get home, but knowing there must be delay they contented themselves as best they could. every sunday there was a bull fight for the amusement of those who would pay their fifty cents. i attended one of them--just one--not wishing to leave the country without having witnessed the national sport. the sight to me was sickening. i could not see how human beings could enjoy the sufferings of beasts, and often of men, as they seemed to do on these occasions. at these sports there are usually from four to six bulls sacrificed. the audience occupies seats around the ring in which the exhibition is given, each seat but the foremost rising higher than the one in front, so that every one can get a full view of the sport. when all is ready a bull is turned into the ring. three or four men come in, mounted on the merest skeletons of horses blind or blind-folded and so weak that they could not make a sudden turn with their riders without danger of falling down. the men are armed with spears having a point as sharp as a needle. other men enter the arena on foot, armed with red flags and explosives about the size of a musket cartridge. to each of these explosives is fastened a barbed needle which serves the purpose of attaching them to the bull by running the needle into the skin. before the animal is turned loose a lot of these explosives are attached to him. the pain from the pricking of the skin by the needles is exasperating; but when the explosions of the cartridges commence the animal becomes frantic. as he makes a lunge towards one horseman, another runs a spear into him. he turns towards his last tormentor when a man on foot holds out a red flag; the bull rushes for this and is allowed to take it on his horns. the flag drops and covers the eyes of the animal so that he is at a loss what to do; it is jerked from him and the torment is renewed. when the animal is worked into an uncontrollable frenzy, the horsemen withdraw, and the matadores --literally murderers--enter, armed with knives having blades twelve or eighteen inches long, and sharp. the trick is to dodge an attack from the animal and stab him to the heart as he passes. if these efforts fail the bull is finally lassoed, held fast and killed by driving a knife blade into the spinal column just back of the horns. he is then dragged out by horses or mules, another is let into the ring, and the same performance is renewed. on the occasion when i was present one of the bulls was not turned aside by the attacks in the rear, the presentations of the red flag, etc., etc., but kept right on, and placing his horns under the flanks of a horse threw him and his rider to the ground with great force. the horse was killed and the rider lay prostrate as if dead. the bull was then lassoed and killed in the manner above described. men came in and carried the dead man off in a litter. when the slaughtered bull and horse were dragged out, a fresh bull was turned into the ring. conspicuous among the spectators was the man who had been carried out on a litter but a few minutes before. he was only dead so far as that performance went; but the corpse was so lively that it could not forego the chance of witnessing the discomfiture of some of his brethren who might not be so fortunate. there was a feeling of disgust manifested by the audience to find that he had come to life again. i confess that i felt sorry to see the cruelty to the bull and the horse. i did not stay for the conclusion of the performance; but while i did stay, there was not a bull killed in the prescribed way. bull fights are now prohibited in the federal district--embracing a territory around the city of mexico, somewhat larger than the district of columbia--and they are not an institution in any part of the country. during one of my recent visits to mexico, bull fights were got up in my honor at puebla and at pachuca. i was not notified in advance so as to be able to decline and thus prevent the performance; but in both cases i civilly declined to attend. another amusement of the people of mexico of that day, and one which nearly all indulged in, male and female, old and young, priest and layman, was monte playing. regular feast weeks were held every year at what was then known as st. augustin tlalpam, eleven miles out of town. there were dealers to suit every class and condition of people. in many of the booths tlackos--the copper coin of the country, four of them making six and a quarter cents of our money--were piled up in great quantities, with some silver, to accommodate the people who could not bet more than a few pennies at a time. in other booths silver formed the bulk of the capital of the bank, with a few doubloons to be changed if there should be a run of luck against the bank. in some there was no coin except gold. here the rich were said to bet away their entire estates in a single day. all this is stopped now. for myself, i was kept somewhat busy during the winter of 1847-8. my regiment was stationed in tacubaya. i was regimental quartermaster and commissary. general scott had been unable to get clothing for the troops from the north. the men were becoming--well, they needed clothing. material had to be purchased, such as could be obtained, and people employed to make it up into "yankee uniforms." a quartermaster in the city was designated to attend to this special duty; but clothing was so much needed that it was seized as fast as made up. a regiment was glad to get a dozen suits at a time. i had to look after this matter for the 4th infantry. then our regimental fund had run down and some of the musicians in the band had been without their extra pay for a number of months. the regimental bands at that day were kept up partly by pay from the government, and partly by pay from the regimental fund. there was authority of law for enlisting a certain number of men as musicians. so many could receive the pay of non-commissioned officers of the various grades, and the remainder the pay of privates. this would not secure a band leader, nor good players on certain instruments. in garrison there are various ways of keeping up a regimental fund sufficient to give extra pay to musicians, establish libraries and ten-pin alleys, subscribe to magazines and furnish many extra comforts to the men. the best device for supplying the fund is to issue bread to the soldiers instead of flour. the ration used to be eighteen ounces per day of either flour or bread; and one hundred pounds of flour will make one hundred and forty pounds of bread. this saving was purchased by the commissary for the benefit of the fund. in the emergency the 4th infantry was laboring under, i rented a bakery in the city, hired bakers--mexicans--bought fuel and whatever was necessary, and i also got a contract from the chief commissary of the army for baking a large amount of hard bread. in two months i made more money for the fund than my pay amounted to during the entire war. while stationed at monterey i had relieved the post fund in the same way. there, however, was no profit except in the saving of flour by converting it into bread. in the spring of 1848 a party of officers obtained leave to visit popocatapetl, the highest volcano in america, and to take an escort. i went with the party, many of whom afterwards occupied conspicuous positions before the country. of those who "went south," and attained high rank, there was lieutenant richard anderson, who commanded a corps at spottsylvania; captain sibley, a major-general, and, after the war, for a number of years in the employ of the khedive of egypt; captain george crittenden, a rebel general; s. b. buckner, who surrendered fort donelson; and mansfield lovell, who commanded at new orleans before that city fell into the hands of the national troops. of those who remained on our side there were captain andrew porter, lieutenant c. p. stone and lieutenant z. b. tower. there were quite a number of other officers, whose names i cannot recollect. at a little village (ozumba) near the base of popocatapetl, where we purposed to commence the ascent, we procured guides and two pack mules with forage for our horses. high up on the mountain there was a deserted house of one room, called the vaqueria, which had been occupied years before by men in charge of cattle ranging on the mountain. the pasturage up there was very fine when we saw it, and there were still some cattle, descendants of the former domestic herd, which had now become wild. it was possible to go on horseback as far as the vaqueria, though the road was somewhat hazardous in places. sometimes it was very narrow with a yawning precipice on one side, hundreds of feet down to a roaring mountain torrent below, and almost perpendicular walls on the other side. at one of these places one of our mules loaded with two sacks of barley, one on each side, the two about as big as he was, struck his load against the mountain-side and was precipitated to the bottom. the descent was steep but not perpendicular. the mule rolled over and over until the bottom was reached, and we supposed of course the poor animal was dashed to pieces. what was our surprise, not long after we had gone into bivouac, to see the lost mule, cargo and owner coming up the ascent. the load had protected the animal from serious injury; and his owner had gone after him and found a way back to the path leading up to the hut where we were to stay. the night at the vaqueria was one of the most unpleasant i ever knew. it was very cold and the rain fell in torrents. a little higher up the rain ceased and snow began. the wind blew with great velocity. the log-cabin we were in had lost the roof entirely on one side, and on the other it was hardly better then a sieve. there was little or no sleep that night. as soon as it was light the next morning, we started to make the ascent to the summit. the wind continued to blow with violence and the weather was still cloudy, but there was neither rain nor snow. the clouds, however, concealed from our view the country below us, except at times a momentary glimpse could be got through a clear space between them. the wind carried the loose snow around the mountain-sides in such volumes as to make it almost impossible to stand up against it. we labored on and on, until it became evident that the top could not be reached before night, if at all in such a storm, and we concluded to return. the descent was easy and rapid, though dangerous, until we got below the snow line. at the cabin we mounted our horses, and by night were at ozumba. the fatigues of the day and the loss of sleep the night before drove us to bed early. our beds consisted of a place on the dirt-floor with a blanket under us. soon all were asleep; but long before morning first one and then another of our party began to cry out with excruciating pain in the eyes. not one escaped it. by morning the eyes of half the party were so swollen that they were entirely closed. the others suffered pain equally. the feeling was about what might be expected from the prick of a sharp needle at a white heat. we remained in quarters until the afternoon bathing our eyes in cold water. this relieved us very much, and before night the pain had entirely left. the swelling, however, continued, and about half the party still had their eyes entirely closed; but we concluded to make a start back, those who could see a little leading the horses of those who could not see at all. we moved back to the village of ameca ameca, some six miles, and stopped again for the night. the next morning all were entirely well and free from pain. the weather was clear and popocatapetl stood out in all its beauty, the top looking as if not a mile away, and inviting us to return. about half the party were anxious to try the ascent again, and concluded to do so. the remainder--i was with the remainder--concluded that we had got all the pleasure there was to be had out of mountain climbing, and that we would visit the great caves of mexico, some ninety miles from where we then were, on the road to acapulco. the party that ascended the mountain the second time succeeded in reaching the crater at the top, with but little of the labor they encountered in their first attempt. three of them--anderson, stone and buckner--wrote accounts of their journey, which were published at the time. i made no notes of this excursion, and have read nothing about it since, but it seems to me that i can see the whole of it as vividly as if it were but yesterday. i have been back at ameca ameca, and the village beyond, twice in the last five years. the scene had not changed materially from my recollection of it. the party which i was with moved south down the valley to the town of cuantla, some forty miles from ameca ameca. the latter stands on the plain at the foot of popocatapetl, at an elevation of about eight thousand feet above tide water. the slope down is gradual as the traveller moves south, but one would not judge that, in going to cuantla, descent enough had been made to occasion a material change in the climate and productions of the soil; but such is the case. in the morning we left a temperate climate where the cereals and fruits are those common to the united states, we halted in the evening in a tropical climate where the orange and banana, the coffee and the sugar-cane were flourishing. we had been travelling, apparently, on a plain all day, but in the direction of the flow of water. soon after the capture of the city of mexico an armistice had been agreed to, designating the limits beyond which troops of the respective armies were not to go during its continuance. our party knew nothing about these limits. as we approached cuantla bugles sounded the assembly, and soldiers rushed from the guard-house in the edge of the town towards us. our party halted, and i tied a white pocket handkerchief to a stick and, using it as a flag of truce, proceeded on to the town. captains sibley and porter followed a few hundred yards behind. i was detained at the guard-house until a messenger could be dispatched to the quarters of the commanding general, who authorized that i should be conducted to him. i had been with the general but a few minutes when the two officers following announced themselves. the mexican general reminded us that it was a violation of the truce for us to be there. however, as we had no special authority from our own commanding general, and as we knew nothing about the terms of the truce, we were permitted to occupy a vacant house outside the guard for the night, with the promise of a guide to put us on the road to cuernavaca the next morning. cuernavaca is a town west of guantla. the country through which we passed, between these two towns, is tropical in climate and productions and rich in scenery. at one point, about half-way between the two places, the road goes over a low pass in the mountains in which there is a very quaint old town, the inhabitants of which at that day were nearly all full-blooded indians. very few of them even spoke spanish. the houses were built of stone and generally only one story high. the streets were narrow, and had probably been paved before cortez visited the country. they had not been graded, but the paving had been done on the natural surface. we had with us one vehicle, a cart, which was probably the first wheeled vehicle that had ever passed through that town. on a hill overlooking this town stands the tomb of an ancient king; and it was understood that the inhabitants venerated this tomb very highly, as well as the memory of the ruler who was supposed to be buried in it. we ascended the mountain and surveyed the tomb; but it showed no particular marks of architectural taste, mechanical skill or advanced civilization. the next day we went into cuernavaca. after a day's rest at cuernavaca our party set out again on the journey to the great caves of mexico. we had proceeded but a few miles when we were stopped, as before, by a guard and notified that the terms of the existing armistice did not permit us to go further in that direction. upon convincing the guard that we were a mere party of pleasure seekers desirous of visiting the great natural curiosities of the country which we expected soon to leave, we were conducted to a large hacienda near by, and directed to remain there until the commanding general of that department could be communicated with and his decision obtained as to whether we should be permitted to pursue our journey. the guard promised to send a messenger at once, and expected a reply by night. at night there was no response from the commanding general, but the captain of the guard was sure he would have a reply by morning. again in the morning there was no reply. the second evening the same thing happened, and finally we learned that the guard had sent no message or messenger to the department commander. we determined therefore to go on unless stopped by a force sufficient to compel obedience. after a few hours' travel we came to a town where a scene similar to the one at cuantia occurred. the commanding officer sent a guide to conduct our party around the village and to put us upon our road again. this was the last interruption: that night we rested at a large coffee plantation, some eight miles from the cave we were on the way to visit. it must have been a saturday night; the peons had been paid off, and spent part of the night in gambling away their scanty week's earnings. their coin was principally copper, and i do not believe there was a man among them who had received as much as twenty-five cents in money. they were as much excited, however, as if they had been staking thousands. i recollect one poor fellow, who had lost his last tlacko, pulled off his shirt and, in the most excited manner, put that up on the turn of a card. monte was the game played, the place out of doors, near the window of the room occupied by the officers of our party. the next morning we were at the mouth of the cave at an early hour, provided with guides, candles and rockets. we explored to a distance of about three miles from the entrance, and found a succession of chambers of great dimensions and of great beauty when lit up with our rockets. stalactites and stalagmites of all sizes were discovered. some of the former were many feet in diameter and extended from ceiling to floor; some of the latter were but a few feet high from the floor; but the formation is going on constantly, and many centuries hence these stalagmites will extend to the ceiling and become complete columns. the stalagmites were all a little concave, and the cavities were filled with water. the water percolates through the roof, a drop at a time--often the drops several minutes apart--and more or less charged with mineral matter. evaporation goes on slowly, leaving the mineral behind. this in time makes the immense columns, many of them thousands of tons in weight, which serve to support the roofs over the vast chambers. i recollect that at one point in the cave one of these columns is of such huge proportions that there is only a narrow passage left on either side of it. some of our party became satisfied with their explorations before we had reached the point to which the guides were accustomed to take explorers, and started back without guides. coming to the large column spoken of, they followed it entirely around, and commenced retracing their steps into the bowels of the mountain, without being aware of the fact. when the rest of us had completed our explorations, we started out with our guides, but had not gone far before we saw the torches of an approaching party. we could not conceive who these could be, for all of us had come in together, and there were none but ourselves at the entrance when we started in. very soon we found it was our friends. it took them some time to conceive how they had got where they were. they were sure they had kept straight on for the mouth of the cave, and had gone about far enough to have reached it. chapter xiv. return of the army--marriage--ordered to the pacific coast--crossing the isthmus--arrival at san francisco. my experience in the mexican war was of great advantage to me afterwards. besides the many practical lessons it taught, the war brought nearly all the officers of the regular army together so as to make them personally acquainted. it also brought them in contact with volunteers, many of whom served in the war of the rebellion afterwards. then, in my particular case, i had been at west point at about the right time to meet most of the graduates who were of a suitable age at the breaking out of the rebellion to be trusted with large commands. graduating in 1843, i was at the military academy from one to four years with all cadets who graduated between 1840 and 1846--seven classes. these classes embraced more than fifty officers who afterwards became generals on one side or the other in the rebellion, many of them holding high commands. all the older officers, who became conspicuous in the rebellion, i had also served with and known in mexico: lee, j. e. johnston, a. s. johnston, holmes, hebert and a number of others on the confederate side; mccall, mansfield, phil. kearney and others on the national side. the acquaintance thus formed was of immense service to me in the war of the rebellion--i mean what i learned of the characters of those to whom i was afterwards opposed. i do not pretend to say that all movements, or even many of them, were made with special reference to the characteristics of the commander against whom they were directed. but my appreciation of my enemies was certainly affected by this knowledge. the natural disposition of most people is to clothe a commander of a large army whom they do not know, with almost superhuman abilities. a large part of the national army, for instance, and most of the press of the country, clothed general lee with just such qualities, but i had known him personally, and knew that he was mortal; and it was just as well that i felt this. the treaty of peace was at last ratified, and the evacuation of mexico by united states troops was ordered. early in june the troops in the city of mexico began to move out. many of them, including the brigade to which i belonged, were assembled at jalapa, above the vomito, to await the arrival of transports at vera cruz: but with all this precaution my regiment and others were in camp on the sand beach in a july sun, for about a week before embarking, while the fever raged with great virulence in vera cruz, not two miles away. i can call to mind only one person, an officer, who died of the disease. my regiment was sent to pascagoula, mississippi, to spend the summer. as soon as it was settled in camp i obtained a leave of absence for four months and proceeded to st. louis. on the 22d of august, 1848, i was married to miss julia dent, the lady of whom i have before spoken. we visited my parents and relations in ohio, and, at the end of my leave, proceeded to my post at sackett's harbor, new york. in april following i was ordered to detroit, michigan, where two years were spent with but few important incidents. the present constitution of the state of michigan was ratified during this time. by the terms of one of its provisions, all citizens of the united states residing within the state at the time of the ratification became citizens of michigan also. during my stay in detroit there was an election for city officers. mr. zachariah chandler was the candidate of the whigs for the office of mayor, and was elected, although the city was then reckoned democratic. all the officers stationed there at the time who offered their votes were permitted to cast them. i did not offer mine, however, as i did not wish to consider myself a citizen of michigan. this was mr. chandler's first entry into politics, a career he followed ever after with great success, and in which he died enjoying the friendship, esteem and love of his countrymen. in the spring of 1851 the garrison at detroit was transferred to sackett's harbor, and in the following spring the entire 4th infantry was ordered to the pacific coast. it was decided that mrs. grant should visit my parents at first for a few months, and then remain with her own family at their st. louis home until an opportunity offered of sending for her. in the month of april the regiment was assembled at governor's island, new york harbor, and on the 5th of july eight companies sailed for aspinwall. we numbered a little over seven hundred persons, including the families of officers and soldiers. passage was secured for us on the old steamer ohio, commanded at the time by captain schenck, of the navy. it had not been determined, until a day or two before starting, that the 4th infantry should go by the ohio; consequently, a complement of passengers had already been secured. the addition of over seven hundred to this list crowded the steamer most uncomfortably, especially for the tropics in july. in eight days aspinwall was reached. at that time the streets of the town were eight or ten inches under water, and foot passengers passed from place to place on raised foot-walks. july is at the height of the wet season, on the isthmus. at intervals the rain would pour down in streams, followed in not many minutes by a blazing, tropical summer's sun. these alternate changes, from rain to sunshine, were continuous in the afternoons. i wondered how any person could live many months in aspinwall, and wondered still more why any one tried. in the summer of 1852 the panama railroad was completed only to the point where it now crosses the chagres river. from there passengers were carried by boats to gorgona, at which place they took mules for panama, some twenty-five miles further. those who travelled over the isthmus in those days will remember that boats on the chagres river were propelled by natives not inconveniently burdened with clothing. these boats carried thirty to forty passengers each. the crews consisted of six men to a boat, armed with long poles. there were planks wide enough for a man to walk on conveniently, running along the sides of each boat from end to end. the men would start from the bow, place one end of their poles against the river bottom, brace their shoulders against the other end, and then walk to the stern as rapidly as they could. in this way from a mile to a mile and a half an hour could be made, against the current of the river. i, as regimental quartermaster, had charge of the public property and had also to look after the transportation. a contract had been entered into with the steamship company in new york for the transportation of the regiment to california, including the isthmus transit. a certain amount of baggage was allowed per man, and saddle animals were to be furnished to commissioned officers and to all disabled persons. the regiment, with the exception of one company left as guards to the public property--camp and garrison equipage principally--and the soldiers with families, took boats, propelled as above described, for gorgona. from this place they marched to panama, and were soon comfortably on the steamer anchored in the bay, some three or four miles from the town. i, with one company of troops and all the soldiers with families, all the tents, mess chests and camp kettles, was sent to cruces, a town a few miles higher up the chagres river than gorgona. there i found an impecunious american who had taken the contract to furnish transportation for the regiment at a stipulated price per hundred pounds for the freight and so much for each saddle animal. but when we reached cruces there was not a mule, either for pack or saddle, in the place. the contractor promised that the animals should be on hand in the morning. in the morning he said that they were on the way from some imaginary place, and would arrive in the course of the day. this went on until i saw that he could not procure the animals at all at the price he had promised to furnish them for. the unusual number of passengers that had come over on the steamer, and the large amount of freight to pack, had created an unprecedented demand for mules. some of the passengers paid as high as forty dollars for the use of a mule to ride twenty-five miles, when the mule would not have sold for ten dollars in that market at other times. meanwhile the cholera had broken out, and men were dying every hour. to diminish the food for the disease, i permitted the company detailed with me to proceed to panama. the captain and the doctors accompanied the men, and i was left alone with the sick and the soldiers who had families. the regiment at panama was also affected with the disease; but there were better accommodations for the well on the steamer, and a hospital, for those taken with the disease, on an old hulk anchored a mile off. there were also hospital tents on shore on the island of flamingo, which stands in the bay. i was about a week at cruces before transportation began to come in. about one-third of the people with me died, either at cruces or on the way to panama. there was no agent of the transportation company at cruces to consult, or to take the responsibility of procuring transportation at a price which would secure it. i therefore myself dismissed the contractor and made a new contract with a native, at more than double the original price. thus we finally reached panama. the steamer, however, could not proceed until the cholera abated, and the regiment was detained still longer. altogether, on the isthmus and on the pacific side, we were delayed six weeks. about one-seventh of those who left new york harbor with the 4th infantry on the 5th of july, now lie buried on the isthmus of panama or on flamingo island in panama bay. one amusing circumstance occurred while we were lying at anchor in panama bay. in the regiment there was a lieutenant slaughter who was very liable to sea-sickness. it almost made him sick to see the wave of a table-cloth when the servants were spreading it. soon after his graduation, slaughter was ordered to california and took passage by a sailing vessel going around cape horn. the vessel was seven months making the voyage, and slaughter was sick every moment of the time, never more so than while lying at anchor after reaching his place of destination. on landing in california he found orders which had come by the isthmus, notifying him of a mistake in his assignment; he should have been ordered to the northern lakes. he started back by the isthmus route and was sick all the way. but when he arrived at the east he was again ordered to california, this time definitely, and at this date was making his third trip. he was as sick as ever, and had been so for more than a month while lying at anchor in the bay. i remember him well, seated with his elbows on the table in front of him, his chin between his hands, and looking the picture of despair. at last he broke out, "i wish i had taken my father's advice; he wanted me to go into the navy; if i had done so, i should not have had to go to sea so much." poor slaughter! it was his last sea voyage. he was killed by indians in oregon. by the last of august the cholera had so abated that it was deemed safe to start. the disease did not break out again on the way to california, and we reached san francisco early in september. chapter xv. san francisco--early california experiences--life on the pacific coast --promoted captain--flush times in california. san francisco at that day was a lively place. gold, or placer digging as it was called, was at its height. steamers plied daily between san francisco and both stockton and sacramento. passengers and gold from the southern mines came by the stockton boat; from the northern mines by sacramento. in the evening when these boats arrived, long wharf--there was but one wharf in san francisco in 1852--was alive with people crowding to meet the miners as they came down to sell their "dust" and to "have a time." of these some were runners for hotels, boarding houses or restaurants; others belonged to a class of impecunious adventurers, of good manners and good presence, who were ever on the alert to make the acquaintance of people with some ready means, in the hope of being asked to take a meal at a restaurant. many were young men of good family, good education and gentlemanly instincts. their parents had been able to support them during their minority, and to give them good educations, but not to maintain them afterwards. from 1849 to 1853 there was a rush of people to the pacific coast, of the class described. all thought that fortunes were to be picked up, without effort, in the gold fields on the pacific. some realized more than their most sanguine expectations; but for one such there were hundreds disappointed, many of whom now fill unknown graves; others died wrecks of their former selves, and many, without a vicious instinct, became criminals and outcasts. many of the real scenes in early california life exceed in strangeness and interest any of the mere products of the brain of the novelist. those early days in california brought out character. it was a long way off then, and the journey was expensive. the fortunate could go by cape horn or by the isthmus of panama; but the mass of pioneers crossed the plains with their ox-teams. this took an entire summer. they were very lucky when they got through with a yoke of worn-out cattle. all other means were exhausted in procuring the outfit on the missouri river. the immigrant, on arriving, found himself a stranger, in a strange land, far from friends. time pressed, for the little means that could be realized from the sale of what was left of the outfit would not support a man long at california prices. many became discouraged. others would take off their coats and look for a job, no matter what it might be. these succeeded as a rule. there were many young men who had studied professions before they went to california, and who had never done a day's manual labor in their lives, who took in the situation at once and went to work to make a start at anything they could get to do. some supplied carpenters and masons with material--carrying plank, brick, or mortar, as the case might be; others drove stages, drays, or baggage wagons, until they could do better. more became discouraged early and spent their time looking up people who would "treat," or lounging about restaurants and gambling houses where free lunches were furnished daily. they were welcomed at these places because they often brought in miners who proved good customers. my regiment spent a few weeks at benicia barracks, and then was ordered to fort vancouver, on the columbia river, then in oregon territory. during the winter of 1852-3 the territory was divided, all north of the columbia river being taken from oregon to make washington territory. prices for all kinds of supplies were so high on the pacific coast from 1849 until at least 1853--that it would have been impossible for officers of the army to exist upon their pay, if it had not been that authority was given them to purchase from the commissary such supplies as he kept, at new orleans wholesale prices. a cook could not be hired for the pay of a captain. the cook could do better. at benicia, in 1852, flour was 25 cents per pound; potatoes were 16 cents; beets, turnips and cabbage, 6 cents; onions, 37 1/2 cents; meat and other articles in proportion. in 1853 at vancouver vegetables were a little lower. i with three other officers concluded that we would raise a crop for ourselves, and by selling the surplus realize something handsome. i bought a pair of horses that had crossed the plains that summer and were very poor. they recuperated rapidly, however, and proved a good team to break up the ground with. i performed all the labor of breaking up the ground while the other officers planted the potatoes. our crop was enormous. luckily for us the columbia river rose to a great height from the melting of the snow in the mountains in june, and overflowed and killed most of our crop. this saved digging it up, for everybody on the pacific coast seemed to have come to the conclusion at the same time that agriculture would be profitable. in 1853 more than three-quarters of the potatoes raised were permitted to rot in the ground, or had to be thrown away. the only potatoes we sold were to our own mess. while i was stationed on the pacific coast we were free from indian wars. there were quite a number of remnants of tribes in the vicinity of portland in oregon, and of fort vancouver in washington territory. they had generally acquired some of the vices of civilization, but none of the virtues, except in individual cases. the hudson's bay company had held the north-west with their trading posts for many years before the united states was represented on the pacific coast. they still retained posts along the columbia river and one at fort vancouver, when i was there. their treatment of the indians had brought out the better qualities of the savages. farming had been undertaken by the company to supply the indians with bread and vegetables; they raised some cattle and horses; and they had now taught the indians to do the labor of the farm and herd. they always compensated them for their labor, and always gave them goods of uniform quality and at uniform price. before the advent of the american, the medium of exchange between the indian and the white man was pelts. afterward it was silver coin. if an indian received in the sale of a horse a fifty dollar gold piece, not an infrequent occurrence, the first thing he did was to exchange it for american half dollars. these he could count. he would then commence his purchases, paying for each article separately, as he got it. he would not trust any one to add up the bill and pay it all at once. at that day fifty dollar gold pieces, not the issue of the government, were common on the pacific coast. they were called slugs. the indians, along the lower columbia as far as the cascades and on the lower willamette, died off very fast during the year i spent in that section; for besides acquiring the vices of the white people they had acquired also their diseases. the measles and the small-pox were both amazingly fatal. in their wild state, before the appearance of the white man among them, the principal complaints they were subject to were those produced by long involuntary fasting, violent exercise in pursuit of game, and over-eating. instinct more than reason had taught them a remedy for these ills. it was the steam bath. something like a bake-oven was built, large enough to admit a man lying down. bushes were stuck in the ground in two rows, about six feet long and some two or three feet apart; other bushes connected the rows at one end. the tops of the bushes were drawn together to interlace, and confined in that position; the whole was then plastered over with wet clay until every opening was filled. just inside the open end of the oven the floor was scooped out so as to make a hole that would hold a bucket or two of water. these ovens were always built on the banks of a stream, a big spring, or pool of water. when a patient required a bath, a fire was built near the oven and a pile of stones put upon it. the cavity at the front was then filled with water. when the stones were sufficiently heated, the patient would draw himself into the oven; a blanket would be thrown over the open end, and hot stones put into the water until the patient could stand it no longer. he was then withdrawn from his steam bath and doused into the cold stream near by. this treatment may have answered with the early ailments of the indians. with the measles or small-pox it would kill every time. during my year on the columbia river, the small-pox exterminated one small remnant of a band of indians entirely, and reduced others materially. i do not think there was a case of recovery among them, until the doctor with the hudson bay company took the matter in hand and established a hospital. nearly every case he treated recovered. i never, myself, saw the treatment described in the preceding paragraph, but have heard it described by persons who have witnessed it. the decimation among the indians i knew of personally, and the hospital, established for their benefit, was a hudson's bay building not a stone's throw from my own quarters. the death of colonel bliss, of the adjutant general's department, which occurred july 5th, 1853, promoted me to the captaincy of a company then stationed at humboldt bay, california. the notice reached me in september of the same year, and i very soon started to join my new command. there was no way of reaching humboldt at that time except to take passage on a san francisco sailing vessel going after lumber. red wood, a species of cedar, which on the pacific coast takes the place filled by white pine in the east, then abounded on the banks of humboldt bay. there were extensive saw-mills engaged in preparing this lumber for the san francisco market, and sailing vessels, used in getting it to market, furnished the only means of communication between humboldt and the balance of the world. i was obliged to remain in san francisco for several days before i found a vessel. this gave me a good opportunity of comparing the san francisco of 1852 with that of 1853. as before stated, there had been but one wharf in front of the city in 1852--long wharf. in 1853 the town had grown out into the bay beyond what was the end of this wharf when i first saw it. streets and houses had been built out on piles where the year before the largest vessels visiting the port lay at anchor or tied to the wharf. there was no filling under the streets or houses. san francisco presented the same general appearance as the year before; that is, eating, drinking and gambling houses were conspicuous for their number and publicity. they were on the first floor, with doors wide open. at all hours of the day and night in walking the streets, the eye was regaled, on every block near the water front, by the sight of players at faro. often broken places were found in the street, large enough to let a man down into the water below. i have but little doubt that many of the people who went to the pacific coast in the early days of the gold excitement, and have never been heard from since, or who were heard from for a time and then ceased to write, found watery graves beneath the houses or streets built over san francisco bay. besides the gambling in cards there was gambling on a larger scale in city lots. these were sold "on change," much as stocks are now sold on wall street. cash, at time of purchase, was always paid by the broker; but the purchaser had only to put up his margin. he was charged at the rate of two or three per cent. a month on the difference, besides commissions. the sand hills, some of them almost inaccessible to foot-passengers, were surveyed off and mapped into fifty vara lots--a vara being a spanish yard. these were sold at first at very low prices, but were sold and resold for higher prices until they went up to many thousands of dollars. the brokers did a fine business, and so did many such purchasers as were sharp enough to quit purchasing before the final crash came. as the city grew, the sand hills back of the town furnished material for filling up the bay under the houses and streets, and still further out. the temporary houses, first built over the water in the harbor, soon gave way to more solid structures. the main business part of the city now is on solid ground, made where vessels of the largest class lay at anchor in the early days. i was in san francisco again in 1854. gambling houses had disappeared from public view. the city had become staid and orderly. chapter xvi. resignation--private life--life at galena--the coming crisis. my family, all this while, was at the east. it consisted now of a wife and two children. i saw no chance of supporting them on the pacific coast out of my pay as an army officer. i concluded, therefore, to resign, and in march applied for a leave of absence until the end of the july following, tendering my resignation to take effect at the end of that time. i left the pacific coast very much attached to it, and with the full expectation of making it my future home. that expectation and that hope remained uppermost in my mind until the lieutenant-generalcy bill was introduced into congress in the winter of 1863-4. the passage of that bill, and my promotion, blasted my last hope of ever becoming a citizen of the further west. in the late summer of 1854 i rejoined my family, to find in it a son whom i had never seen, born while i was on the isthmus of panama. i was now to commence, at the age of thirty-two, a new struggle for our support. my wife had a farm near st. louis, to which we went, but i had no means to stock it. a house had to be built also. i worked very hard, never losing a day because of bad weather, and accomplished the object in a moderate way. if nothing else could be done i would load a cord of wood on a wagon and take it to the city for sale. i managed to keep along very well until 1858, when i was attacked by fever and ague. i had suffered very severely and for a long time from this disease, while a boy in ohio. it lasted now over a year, and, while it did not keep me in the house, it did interfere greatly with the amount of work i was able to perform. in the fall of 1858 i sold out my stock, crops and farming utensils at auction, and gave up farming. in the winter i established a partnership with harry boggs, a cousin of mrs. grant, in the real estate agency business. i spent that winter at st. louis myself, but did not take my family into town until the spring. our business might have become prosperous if i had been able to wait for it to grow. as it was, there was no more than one person could attend to, and not enough to support two families. while a citizen of st. louis and engaged in the real estate agency business, i was a candidate for the office of county engineer, an office of respectability and emolument which would have been very acceptable to me at that time. the incumbent was appointed by the county court, which consisted of five members. my opponent had the advantage of birth over me (he was a citizen by adoption) and carried off the prize. i now withdrew from the co-partnership with boggs, and, in may, 1860, removed to galena, illinois, and took a clerkship in my father's store. while a citizen of missouri, my first opportunity for casting a vote at a presidential election occurred. i had been in the army from before attaining my majority and had thought but little about politics, although i was a whig by education and a great admirer of mr. clay. but the whig party had ceased to exist before i had an opportunity of exercising the privilege of casting a ballot; the know-nothing party had taken its place, but was on the wane; and the republican party was in a chaotic state and had not yet received a name. it had no existence in the slave states except at points on the borders next to free states. in st. louis city and county, what afterwards became the republican party was known as the free-soil democracy, led by the honorable frank p. blair. most of my neighbors had known me as an officer of the army with whig proclivities. they had been on the same side, and, on the death of their party, many had become know-nothings, or members of the american party. there was a lodge near my new home, and i was invited to join it. i accepted the invitation; was initiated; attended a meeting just one week later, and never went to another afterwards. i have no apologies to make for having been one week a member of the american party; for i still think native-born citizens of the united states should have as much protection, as many privileges in their native country, as those who voluntarily select it for a home. but all secret, oath-bound political parties are dangerous to any nation, no matter how pure or how patriotic the motives and principles which first bring them together. no political party can or ought to exist when one of its corner-stones is opposition to freedom of thought and to the right to worship god "according to the dictate of one's own conscience," or according to the creed of any religious denomination whatever. nevertheless, if a sect sets up its laws as binding above the state laws, wherever the two come in conflict this claim must be resisted and suppressed at whatever cost. up to the mexican war there were a few out and out abolitionists, men who carried their hostility to slavery into all elections, from those for a justice of the peace up to the presidency of the united states. they were noisy but not numerous. but the great majority of people at the north, where slavery did not exist, were opposed to the institution, and looked upon its existence in any part of the country as unfortunate. they did not hold the states where slavery existed responsible for it; and believed that protection should be given to the right of property in slaves until some satisfactory way could be reached to be rid of the institution. opposition to slavery was not a creed of either political party. in some sections more anti-slavery men belonged to the democratic party, and in others to the whigs. but with the inauguration of the mexican war, in fact with the annexation of texas, "the inevitable conflict" commenced. as the time for the presidential election of 1856--the first at which i had the opportunity of voting--approached, party feeling began to run high. the republican party was regarded in the south and the border states not only as opposed to the extension of slavery, but as favoring the compulsory abolition of the institution without compensation to the owners. the most horrible visions seemed to present themselves to the minds of people who, one would suppose, ought to have known better. many educated and, otherwise, sensible persons appeared to believe that emancipation meant social equality. treason to the government was openly advocated and was not rebuked. it was evident to my mind that the election of a republican president in 1856 meant the secession of all the slave states, and rebellion. under these circumstances i preferred the success of a candidate whose election would prevent or postpone secession, to seeing the country plunged into a war the end of which no man could foretell. with a democrat elected by the unanimous vote of the slave states, there could be no pretext for secession for four years. i very much hoped that the passions of the people would subside in that time, and the catastrophe be averted altogether; if it was not, i believed the country would be better prepared to receive the shock and to resist it. i therefore voted for james buchanan for president. four years later the republican party was successful in electing its candidate to the presidency. the civilized world has learned the consequence. four millions of human beings held as chattels have been liberated; the ballot has been given to them; the free schools of the country have been opened to their children. the nation still lives, and the people are just as free to avoid social intimacy with the blacks as ever they were, or as they are with white people. while living in galena i was nominally only a clerk supporting myself and family on a stipulated salary. in reality my position was different. my father had never lived in galena himself, but had established my two brothers there, the one next younger than myself in charge of the business, assisted by the youngest. when i went there it was my father's intention to give up all connection with the business himself, and to establish his three sons in it: but the brother who had really built up the business was sinking with consumption, and it was not thought best to make any change while he was in this condition. he lived until september, 1861, when he succumbed to that insidious disease which always flatters its victims into the belief that they are growing better up to the close of life. a more honorable man never transacted business. in september, 1861, i was engaged in an employment which required all my attention elsewhere. during the eleven months that i lived in galena prior to the first call for volunteers, i had been strictly attentive to my business, and had made but few acquaintances other than customers and people engaged in the same line with myself. when the election took place in november, 1860, i had not been a resident of illinois long enough to gain citizenship and could not, therefore, vote. i was really glad of this at the time, for my pledges would have compelled me to vote for stephen a. douglas, who had no possible chance of election. the contest was really between mr. breckinridge and mr. lincoln; between minority rule and rule by the majority. i wanted, as between these candidates, to see mr. lincoln elected. excitement ran high during the canvass, and torch-light processions enlivened the scene in the generally quiet streets of galena many nights during the campaign. i did not parade with either party, but occasionally met with the "wide awakes" --republicans--in their rooms, and superintended their drill. it was evident, from the time of the chicago nomination to the close of the canvass, that the election of the republican candidate would be the signal for some of the southern states to secede. i still had hopes that the four years which had elapsed since the first nomination of a presidential candidate by a party distinctly opposed to slavery extension, had given time for the extreme pro-slavery sentiment to cool down; for the southerners to think well before they took the awful leap which they had so vehemently threatened. but i was mistaken. the republican candidate was elected, and solid substantial people of the north-west, and i presume the same order of people throughout the entire north, felt very serious, but determined, after this event. it was very much discussed whether the south would carry out its threat to secede and set up a separate government, the corner-stone of which should be, protection to the "divine" institution of slavery. for there were people who believed in the "divinity" of human slavery, as there are now people who believe mormonism and polygamy to be ordained by the most high. we forgive them for entertaining such notions, but forbid their practice. it was generally believed that there would be a flurry; that some of the extreme southern states would go so far as to pass ordinances of secession. but the common impression was that this step was so plainly suicidal for the south, that the movement would not spread over much of the territory and would not last long. doubtless the founders of our government, the majority of them at least, regarded the confederation of the colonies as an experiment. each colony considered itself a separate government; that the confederation was for mutual protection against a foreign foe, and the prevention of strife and war among themselves. if there had been a desire on the part of any single state to withdraw from the compact at any time while the number of states was limited to the original thirteen, i do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no matter how much the determination might have been regretted. the problem changed on the ratification of the constitution by all the colonies; it changed still more when amendments were added; and if the right of any one state to withdraw continued to exist at all after the ratification of the constitution, it certainly ceased on the formation of new states, at least so far as the new states themselves were concerned. it was never possessed at all by florida or the states west of the mississippi, all of which were purchased by the treasury of the entire nation. texas and the territory brought into the union in consequence of annexation, were purchased with both blood and treasure; and texas, with a domain greater than that of any european state except russia, was permitted to retain as state property all the public lands within its borders. it would have been ingratitude and injustice of the most flagrant sort for this state to withdraw from the union after all that had been spent and done to introduce her; yet, if separation had actually occurred, texas must necessarily have gone with the south, both on account of her institutions and her geographical position. secession was illogical as well as impracticable; it was revolution. now, the right of revolution is an inherent one. when people are oppressed by their government, it is a natural right they enjoy to relieve themselves of the oppression, if they are strong enough, either by withdrawal from it, or by overthrowing it and substituting a government more acceptable. but any people or part of a people who resort to this remedy, stake their lives, their property, and every claim for protection given by citizenship--on the issue. victory, or the conditions imposed by the conqueror--must be the result. in the case of the war between the states it would have been the exact truth if the south had said,--"we do not want to live with you northern people any longer; we know our institution of slavery is obnoxious to you, and, as you are growing numerically stronger than we, it may at some time in the future be endangered. so long as you permitted us to control the government, and with the aid of a few friends at the north to enact laws constituting your section a guard against the escape of our property, we were willing to live with you. you have been submissive to our rule heretofore; but it looks now as if you did not intend to continue so, and we will remain in the union no longer." instead of this the seceding states cried lustily,--"let us alone; you have no constitutional power to interfere with us." newspapers and people at the north reiterated the cry. individuals might ignore the constitution; but the nation itself must not only obey it, but must enforce the strictest construction of that instrument; the construction put upon it by the southerners themselves. the fact is the constitution did not apply to any such contingency as the one existing from 1861 to 1865. its framers never dreamed of such a contingency occurring. if they had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would have sanctioned the right of a state or states to withdraw rather than that there should be war between brothers. the framers were wise in their generation and wanted to do the very best possible to secure their own liberty and independence, and that also of their descendants to the latest days. it is preposterous to suppose that the people of one generation can lay down the best and only rules of government for all who are to come after them, and under unforeseen contingencies. at the time of the framing of our constitution the only physical forces that had been subdued and made to serve man and do his labor, were the currents in the streams and in the air we breathe. rude machinery, propelled by water power, had been invented; sails to propel ships upon the waters had been set to catch the passing breeze--but the application of stream to propel vessels against both wind and current, and machinery to do all manner of work had not been thought of. the instantaneous transmission of messages around the world by means of electricity would probably at that day have been attributed to witchcraft or a league with the devil. immaterial circumstances had changed as greatly as material ones. we could not and ought not to be rigidly bound by the rules laid down under circumstances so different for emergencies so utterly unanticipated. the fathers themselves would have been the first to declare that their prerogatives were not irrevocable. they would surely have resisted secession could they have lived to see the shape it assumed. i travelled through the northwest considerably during the winter of 1860-1. we had customers in all the little towns in south-west wisconsin, south-east minnesota and north-east iowa. these generally knew i had been a captain in the regular army and had served through the mexican war. consequently wherever i stopped at night, some of the people would come to the public-house where i was, and sit till a late hour discussing the probabilities of the future. my own views at that time were like those officially expressed by mr. seward at a later day, that "the war would be over in ninety days." i continued to entertain these views until after the battle of shiloh. i believe now that there would have been no more battles at the west after the capture of fort donelson if all the troops in that region had been under a single commander who would have followed up that victory. there is little doubt in my mind now that the prevailing sentiment of the south would have been opposed to secession in 1860 and 1861, if there had been a fair and calm expression of opinion, unbiased by threats, and if the ballot of one legal voter had counted for as much as that of any other. but there was no calm discussion of the question. demagogues who were too old to enter the army if there should be a war, others who entertained so high an opinion of their own ability that they did not believe they could be spared from the direction of the affairs of state in such an event, declaimed vehemently and unceasingly against the north; against its aggressions upon the south; its interference with southern rights, etc., etc. they denounced the northerners as cowards, poltroons, negro-worshippers; claimed that one southern man was equal to five northern men in battle; that if the south would stand up for its rights the north would back down. mr. jefferson davis said in a speech, delivered at la grange, mississippi, before the secession of that state, that he would agree to drink all the blood spilled south of mason and dixon's line if there should be a war. the young men who would have the fighting to do in case of war, believed all these statements, both in regard to the aggressiveness of the north and its cowardice. they, too, cried out for a separation from such people. the great bulk of the legal voters of the south were men who owned no slaves; their homes were generally in the hills and poor country; their facilities for educating their children, even up to the point of reading and writing, were very limited; their interest in the contest was very meagre--what there was, if they had been capable of seeing it, was with the north; they too needed emancipation. under the old regime they were looked down upon by those who controlled all the affairs in the interest of slave-owners, as poor white trash who were allowed the ballot so long as they cast it according to direction. i am aware that this last statement may be disputed and individual testimony perhaps adduced to show that in ante-bellum days the ballot was as untrammelled in the south as in any section of the country; but in the face of any such contradiction i reassert the statement. the shot-gun was not resorted to. masked men did not ride over the country at night intimidating voters; but there was a firm feeling that a class existed in every state with a sort of divine right to control public affairs. if they could not get this control by one means they must by another. the end justified the means. the coercion, if mild, was complete. there were two political parties, it is true, in all the states, both strong in numbers and respectability, but both equally loyal to the institution which stood paramount in southern eyes to all other institutions in state or nation. the slave-owners were the minority, but governed both parties. had politics ever divided the slave-holders and the non-slave-holders, the majority would have been obliged to yield, or internecine war would have been the consequence. i do not know that the southern people were to blame for this condition of affairs. there was a time when slavery was not profitable, and the discussion of the merits of the institution was confined almost exclusively to the territory where it existed. the states of virginia and kentucky came near abolishing slavery by their own acts, one state defeating the measure by a tie vote and the other only lacking one. but when the institution became profitable, all talk of its abolition ceased where it existed; and naturally, as human nature is constituted, arguments were adduced in its support. the cotton-gin probably had much to do with the justification of slavery. the winter of 1860-1 will be remembered by middle-aged people of to-day as one of great excitement. south carolina promptly seceded after the result of the presidential election was known. other southern states proposed to follow. in some of them the union sentiment was so strong that it had to be suppressed by force. maryland, delaware, kentucky and missouri, all slave states, failed to pass ordinances of secession; but they were all represented in the so-called congress of the so-called confederate states. the governor and lieutenant-governor of missouri, in 1861, jackson and reynolds, were both supporters of the rebellion and took refuge with the enemy. the governor soon died, and the lieutenant-governor assumed his office; issued proclamations as governor of the state; was recognized as such by the confederate government, and continued his pretensions until the collapse of the rebellion. the south claimed the sovereignty of states, but claimed the right to coerce into their confederation such states as they wanted, that is, all the states where slavery existed. they did not seem to think this course inconsistent. the fact is, the southern slave-owners believed that, in some way, the ownership of slaves conferred a sort of patent of nobility--a right to govern independent of the interest or wishes of those who did not hold such property. they convinced themselves, first, of the divine origin of the institution and, next, that that particular institution was not safe in the hands of any body of legislators but themselves. meanwhile the administration of president buchanan looked helplessly on and proclaimed that the general government had no power to interfere; that the nation had no power to save its own life. mr. buchanan had in his cabinet two members at least, who were as earnest--to use a mild term--in the cause of secession as mr. davis or any southern statesman. one of them, floyd, the secretary of war, scattered the army so that much of it could be captured when hostilities should commence, and distributed the cannon and small arms from northern arsenals throughout the south so as to be on hand when treason wanted them. the navy was scattered in like manner. the president did not prevent his cabinet preparing for war upon their government, either by destroying its resources or storing them in the south until a de facto government was established with jefferson davis as its president, and montgomery, alabama, as the capital. the secessionists had then to leave the cabinet. in their own estimation they were aliens in the country which had given them birth. loyal men were put into their places. treason in the executive branch of the government was estopped. but the harm had already been done. the stable door was locked after the horse had been stolen. during all of the trying winter of 1860-1, when the southerners were so defiant that they would not allow within their borders the expression of a sentiment hostile to their views, it was a brave man indeed who could stand up and proclaim his loyalty to the union. on the other hand men at the north--prominent men--proclaimed that the government had no power to coerce the south into submission to the laws of the land; that if the north undertook to raise armies to go south, these armies would have to march over the dead bodies of the speakers. a portion of the press of the north was constantly proclaiming similar views. when the time arrived for the president-elect to go to the capital of the nation to be sworn into office, it was deemed unsafe for him to travel, not only as a president-elect, but as any private citizen should be allowed to do. instead of going in a special car, receiving the good wishes of his constituents at all the stations along the road, he was obliged to stop on the way and to be smuggled into the capital. he disappeared from public view on his journey, and the next the country knew, his arrival was announced at the capital. there is little doubt that he would have been assassinated if he had attempted to travel openly throughout his journey. chapter xvii. outbreak of the rebellion--presiding at a union meeting--mustering officer of state troops--lyon at camp jackson--services tendered to the government. the 4th of march, 1861, came, and abraham lincoln was sworn to maintain the union against all its enemies. the secession of one state after another followed, until eleven had gone out. on the 11th of april fort sumter, a national fort in the harbor of charleston, south carolina, was fired upon by the southerners and a few days after was captured. the confederates proclaimed themselves aliens, and thereby debarred themselves of all right to claim protection under the constitution of the united states. we did not admit the fact that they were aliens, but all the same, they debarred themselves of the right to expect better treatment than people of any other foreign state who make war upon an independent nation. upon the firing on sumter president lincoln issued his first call for troops and soon after a proclamation convening congress in extra session. the call was for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days' service. if the shot fired at fort sumter "was heard around the world," the call of the president for 75,000 men was heard throughout the northern states. there was not a state in the north of a million of inhabitants that would not have furnished the entire number faster than arms could have been supplied to them, if it had been necessary. as soon as the news of the call for volunteers reached galena, posters were stuck up calling for a meeting of the citizens at the court-house in the evening. business ceased entirely; all was excitement; for a time there were no party distinctions; all were union men, determined to avenge the insult to the national flag. in the evening the court-house was packed. although a comparative stranger i was called upon to preside; the sole reason, possibly, was that i had been in the army and had seen service. with much embarrassment and some prompting i made out to announce the object of the meeting. speeches were in order, but it is doubtful whether it would have been safe just then to make other than patriotic ones. there was probably no one in the house, however, who felt like making any other. the two principal speeches were by b. b. howard, the post-master and a breckinridge democrat at the november election the fall before, and john a. rawlins, an elector on the douglas ticket. e. b. washburne, with whom i was not acquainted at that time, came in after the meeting had been organized, and expressed, i understood afterwards, a little surprise that galena could not furnish a presiding officer for such an occasion without taking a stranger. he came forward and was introduced, and made a speech appealing to the patriotism of the meeting. after the speaking was over volunteers were called for to form a company. the quota of illinois had been fixed at six regiments; and it was supposed that one company would be as much as would be accepted from galena. the company was raised and the officers and non-commissioned officers elected before the meeting adjourned. i declined the captaincy before the balloting, but announced that i would aid the company in every way i could and would be found in the service in some position if there should be a war. i never went into our leather store after that meeting, to put up a package or do other business. the ladies of galena were quite as patriotic as the men. they could not enlist, but they conceived the idea of sending their first company to the field uniformed. they came to me to get a description of the united states uniform for infantry; subscribed and bought the material; procured tailors to cut out the garments, and the ladies made them up. in a few days the company was in uniform and ready to report at the state capital for assignment. the men all turned out the morning after their enlistment, and i took charge, divided them into squads and superintended their drill. when they were ready to go to springfield i went with them and remained there until they were assigned to a regiment. there were so many more volunteers than had been called for that the question whom to accept was quite embarrassing to the governor, richard yates. the legislature was in session at the time, however, and came to his relief. a law was enacted authorizing the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments, one from each congressional district, for one month, to be paid by the state, but pledged to go into the service of the united states if there should be a further call during their term. even with this relief the governor was still very much embarrassed. before the war was over he was like the president when he was taken with the varioloid: "at last he had something he could give to all who wanted it." in time the galena company was mustered into the united states service, forming a part of the 11th illinois volunteer infantry. my duties, i thought, had ended at springfield, and i was prepared to start home by the evening train, leaving at nine o'clock. up to that time i do not think i had been introduced to governor yates, or had ever spoken to him. i knew him by sight, however, because he was living at the same hotel and i often saw him at table. the evening i was to quit the capital i left the supper room before the governor and was standing at the front door when he came out. he spoke to me, calling me by my old army title "captain," and said he understood that i was about leaving the city. i answered that i was. he said he would be glad if i would remain over-night and call at the executive office the next morning. i complied with his request, and was asked to go into the adjutant-general's office and render such assistance as i could, the governor saying that my army experience would be of great service there. i accepted the proposition. my old army experience i found indeed of very great service. i was no clerk, nor had i any capacity to become one. the only place i ever found in my life to put a paper so as to find it again was either a side coat-pocket or the hands of a clerk or secretary more careful than myself. but i had been quartermaster, commissary and adjutant in the field. the army forms were familiar to me and i could direct how they should be made out. there was a clerk in the office of the adjutant-general who supplied my deficiencies. the ease with which the state of illinois settled its accounts with the government at the close of the war is evidence of the efficiency of mr. loomis as an accountant on a large scale. he remained in the office until that time. as i have stated, the legislature authorized the governor to accept the services of ten additional regiments. i had charge of mustering these regiments into the state service. they were assembled at the most convenient railroad centres in their respective congressional districts. i detailed officers to muster in a portion of them, but mustered three in the southern part of the state myself. one of these was to assemble at belleville, some eighteen miles south-east of st. louis. when i got there i found that only one or two companies had arrived. there was no probability of the regiment coming together under five days. this gave me a few idle days which i concluded to spend in st. louis. there was a considerable force of state militia at camp jackson, on the outskirts of st. louis, at the time. there is but little doubt that it was the design of governor claiborn jackson to have these troops ready to seize the united states arsenal and the city of st. louis. why they did not do so i do not know. there was but a small garrison, two companies i think, under captain n. lyon at the arsenal, and but for the timely services of the hon. f. p. blair, i have little doubt that st. louis would have gone into rebel hands, and with it the arsenal with all its arms and ammunition. blair was a leader among the union men of st. louis in 1861. there was no state government in missouri at the time that would sanction the raising of troops or commissioned officers to protect united states property, but blair had probably procured some form of authority from the president to raise troops in missouri and to muster them into the service of the united states. at all events, he did raise a regiment and took command himself as colonel. with this force he reported to captain lyon and placed himself and regiment under his orders. it was whispered that lyon thus reinforced intended to break up camp jackson and capture the militia. i went down to the arsenal in the morning to see the troops start out. i had known lyon for two years at west point and in the old army afterwards. blair i knew very well by sight. i had heard him speak in the canvass of 1858, possibly several times, but i had never spoken to him. as the troops marched out of the enclosure around the arsenal, blair was on his horse outside forming them into line preparatory to their march. i introduced myself to him and had a few moments' conversation and expressed my sympathy with his purpose. this was my first personal acquaintance with the honorable--afterwards major-general f. p. blair. camp jackson surrendered without a fight and the garrison was marched down to the arsenal as prisoners of war. up to this time the enemies of the government in st. louis had been bold and defiant, while union men were quiet but determined. the enemies had their head-quarters in a central and public position on pine street, near fifth--from which the rebel flag was flaunted boldly. the union men had a place of meeting somewhere in the city, i did not know where, and i doubt whether they dared to enrage the enemies of the government by placing the national flag outside their head-quarters. as soon as the news of the capture of camp jackson reached the city the condition of affairs was changed. union men became rampant, aggressive, and, if you will, intolerant. they proclaimed their sentiments boldly, and were impatient at anything like disrespect for the union. the secessionists became quiet but were filled with suppressed rage. they had been playing the bully. the union men ordered the rebel flag taken down from the building on pine street. the command was given in tones of authority and it was taken down, never to be raised again in st. louis. i witnessed the scene. i had heard of the surrender of the camp and that the garrison was on its way to the arsenal. i had seen the troops start out in the morning and had wished them success. i now determined to go to the arsenal and await their arrival and congratulate them. i stepped on a car standing at the corner of 4th and pine streets, and saw a crowd of people standing quietly in front of the head-quarters, who were there for the purpose of hauling down the flag. there were squads of other people at intervals down the street. they too were quiet but filled with suppressed rage, and muttered their resentment at the insult to, what they called, "their" flag. before the car i was in had started, a dapper little fellow--he would be called a dude at this day --stepped in. he was in a great state of excitement and used adjectives freely to express his contempt for the union and for those who had just perpetrated such an outrage upon the rights of a free people. there was only one other passenger in the car besides myself when this young man entered. he evidently expected to find nothing but sympathy when he got away from the "mud sills" engaged in compelling a "free people" to pull down a flag they adored. he turned to me saying: "things have come to a ---pretty pass when a free people can't choose their own flag. where i came from if a man dares to say a word in favor of the union we hang him to a limb of the first tree we come to." i replied that "after all we were not so intolerant in st. louis as we might be; i had not seen a single rebel hung yet, nor heard of one; there were plenty of them who ought to be, however." the young man subsided. he was so crestfallen that i believe if i had ordered him to leave the car he would have gone quietly out, saying to himself: "more yankee oppression." by nightfall the late defenders of camp jackson were all within the walls of the st. louis arsenal, prisoners of war. the next day i left st. louis for mattoon, illinois, where i was to muster in the regiment from that congressional district. this was the 21st illinois infantry, the regiment of which i subsequently became colonel. i mustered one regiment afterwards, when my services for the state were about closed. brigadier-general john pope was stationed at springfield, as united states mustering officer, all the time i was in the state service. he was a native of illinois and well acquainted with most of the prominent men in the state. i was a carpet-bagger and knew but few of them. while i was on duty at springfield the senators, representatives in congress, ax-governors and the state legislators were nearly all at the state capital. the only acquaintance i made among them was with the governor, whom i was serving, and, by chance, with senator s. a. douglas. the only members of congress i knew were washburne and philip foulk. with the former, though he represented my district and we were citizens of the same town, i only became acquainted at the meeting when the first company of galena volunteers was raised. foulk i had known in st. louis when i was a citizen of that city. i had been three years at west point with pope and had served with him a short time during the mexican war, under general taylor. i saw a good deal of him during my service with the state. on one occasion he said to me that i ought to go into the united states service. i told him i intended to do so if there was a war. he spoke of his acquaintance with the public men of the state, and said he could get them to recommend me for a position and that he would do all he could for me. i declined to receive endorsement for permission to fight for my country. going home for a day or two soon after this conversation with general pope, i wrote from galena the following letter to the adjutant-general of the army. galena, illinois, may 24, 1861. col. l. thomas adjt. gen. u. s. a., washington, d. c. sir:--having served for fifteen years in the regular army, including four years at west point, and feeling it the duty of every one who has been educated at the government expense to offer their services for the support of that government, i have the honor, very respectfully, to tender my services, until the close of the war, in such capacity as may be offered. i would say, in view of my present age and length of service, i feel myself competent to command a regiment, if the president, in his judgment, should see fit to intrust one to me. since the first call of the president i have been serving on the staff of the governor of this state, rendering such aid as i could in the organization of our state militia, and am still engaged in that capacity. a letter addressed to me at springfield, illinois, will reach me. i am very respectfully, your obt. svt., u. s. grant. this letter failed to elicit an answer from the adjutant-general of the army. i presume it was hardly read by him, and certainly it could not have been submitted to higher authority. subsequent to the war general badeau having heard of this letter applied to the war department for a copy of it. the letter could not be found and no one recollected ever having seen it. i took no copy when it was written. long after the application of general badeau, general townsend, who had become adjutant-general of the army, while packing up papers preparatory to the removal of his office, found this letter in some out-of-the-way place. it had not been destroyed, but it had not been regularly filed away. i felt some hesitation in suggesting rank as high as the colonelcy of a regiment, feeling somewhat doubtful whether i would be equal to the position. but i had seen nearly every colonel who had been mustered in from the state of illinois, and some from indiana, and felt that if they could command a regiment properly, and with credit, i could also. having but little to do after the muster of the last of the regiments authorized by the state legislature, i asked and obtained of the governor leave of absence for a week to visit my parents in covington, kentucky, immediately opposite cincinnati. general mcclellan had been made a major-general and had his headquarters at cincinnati. in reality i wanted to see him. i had known him slightly at west point, where we served one year together, and in the mexican war. i was in hopes that when he saw me he would offer me a position on his staff. i called on two successive days at his office but failed to see him on either occasion, and returned to springfield. chapter xviii. appointed colonel of the 21st illinois--personnel of the regiment --general logan--march to missouri--movement against harris at florida, mo.--general pope in command--stationed at mexico, mo. while i was absent from the state capital on this occasion the president's second call for troops was issued. this time it was for 300,000 men, for three years or the war. this brought into the united states service all the regiments then in the state service. these had elected their officers from highest to lowest and were accepted with their organizations as they were, except in two instances. a chicago regiment, the 19th infantry, had elected a very young man to the colonelcy. when it came to taking the field the regiment asked to have another appointed colonel and the one they had previously chosen made lieutenant-colonel. the 21st regiment of infantry, mustered in by me at mattoon, refused to go into the service with the colonel of their selection in any position. while i was still absent governor yates appointed me colonel of this latter regiment. a few days after i was in charge of it and in camp on the fair grounds near springfield. my regiment was composed in large part of young men of as good social position as any in their section of the state. it embraced the sons of farmers, lawyers, physicians, politicians, merchants, bankers and ministers, and some men of maturer years who had filled such positions themselves. there were also men in it who could be led astray; and the colonel, elected by the votes of the regiment, had proved to be fully capable of developing all there was in his men of recklessness. it was said that he even went so far at times as to take the guard from their posts and go with them to the village near by and make a night of it. when there came a prospect of battle the regiment wanted to have some one else to lead them. i found it very hard work for a few days to bring all the men into anything like subordination; but the great majority favored discipline, and by the application of a little regular army punishment all were reduced to as good discipline as one could ask. the ten regiments which had volunteered in the state service for thirty days, it will be remembered, had done so with a pledge to go into the national service if called upon within that time. when they volunteered the government had only called for ninety days' enlistments. men were called now for three years or the war. they felt that this change of period released them from the obligation of re-volunteering. when i was appointed colonel, the 21st regiment was still in the state service. about the time they were to be mustered into the united states service, such of them as would go, two members of congress from the state, mcclernand and logan, appeared at the capital and i was introduced to them. i had never seen either of them before, but i had read a great deal about them, and particularly about logan, in the newspapers. both were democratic members of congress, and logan had been elected from the southern district of the state, where he had a majority of eighteen thousand over his republican competitor. his district had been settled originally by people from the southern states, and at the breaking out of secession they sympathized with the south. at the first outbreak of war some of them joined the southern army; many others were preparing to do so; others rode over the country at night denouncing the union, and made it as necessary to guard railroad bridges over which national troops had to pass in southern illinois, as it was in kentucky or any of the border slave states. logan's popularity in this district was unbounded. he knew almost enough of the people in it by their christian names, to form an ordinary congressional district. as he went in politics, so his district was sure to go. the republican papers had been demanding that he should announce where he stood on the questions which at that time engrossed the whole of public thought. some were very bitter in their denunciations of his silence. logan was not a man to be coerced into an utterance by threats. he did, however, come out in a speech before the adjournment of the special session of congress which was convened by the president soon after his inauguration, and announced his undying loyalty and devotion to the union. but i had not happened to see that speech, so that when i first met logan my impressions were those formed from reading denunciations of him. mcclernand, on the other hand, had early taken strong grounds for the maintenance of the union and had been praised accordingly by the republican papers. the gentlemen who presented these two members of congress asked me if i would have any objections to their addressing my regiment. i hesitated a little before answering. it was but a few days before the time set for mustering into the united states service such of the men as were willing to volunteer for three years or the war. i had some doubt as to the effect a speech from logan might have; but as he was with mcclernand, whose sentiments on the all-absorbing questions of the day were well known, i gave my consent. mcclernand spoke first; and logan followed in a speech which he has hardly equalled since for force and eloquence. it breathed a loyalty and devotion to the union which inspired my men to such a point that they would have volunteered to remain in the army as long as an enemy of the country continued to bear arms against it. they entered the united states service almost to a man. general logan went to his part of the state and gave his attention to raising troops. the very men who at first made it necessary to guard the roads in southern illinois became the defenders of the union. logan entered the service himself as colonel of a regiment and rapidly rose to the rank of major-general. his district, which had promised at first to give much trouble to the government, filled every call made upon it for troops, without resorting to the draft. there was no call made when there were not more volunteers than were asked for. that congressional district stands credited at the war department to-day with furnishing more men for the army than it was called on to supply. i remained in springfield with my regiment until the 3d of july, when i was ordered to quincy, illinois. by that time the regiment was in a good state of discipline and the officers and men were well up in the company drill. there was direct railroad communication between springfield and quincy, but i thought it would be good preparation for the troops to march there. we had no transportation for our camp and garrison equipage, so wagons were hired for the occasion and on the 3d of july we started. there was no hurry, but fair marches were made every day until the illinois river was crossed. there i was overtaken by a dispatch saying that the destination of the regiment had been changed to ironton, missouri, and ordering me to halt where i was and await the arrival of a steamer which had been dispatched up the illinois river to take the regiment to st. louis. the boat, when it did come, grounded on a sand-bar a few miles below where we were in camp. we remained there several days waiting to have the boat get off the bar, but before this occurred news came that an illinois regiment was surrounded by rebels at a point on the hannibal and st. joe railroad some miles west of palmyra, in missouri, and i was ordered to proceed with all dispatch to their relief. we took the cars and reached quincy in a few hours. when i left galena for the last time to take command of the 21st regiment i took with me my oldest son, frederick d. grant, then a lad of eleven years of age. on receiving the order to take rail for quincy i wrote to mrs. grant, to relieve what i supposed would be her great anxiety for one so young going into danger, that i would send fred home from quincy by river. i received a prompt letter in reply decidedly disapproving my proposition, and urging that the lad should be allowed to accompany me. it came too late. fred was already on his way up the mississippi bound for dubuque, iowa, from which place there was a railroad to galena. my sensations as we approached what i supposed might be "a field of battle" were anything but agreeable. i had been in all the engagements in mexico that it was possible for one person to be in; but not in command. if some one else had been colonel and i had been lieutenant-colonel i do not think i would have felt any trepidation. before we were prepared to cross the mississippi river at quincy my anxiety was relieved; for the men of the besieged regiment came straggling into town. i am inclined to think both sides got frightened and ran away. i took my regiment to palmyra and remained there for a few days, until relieved by the 19th illinois infantry. from palmyra i proceeded to salt river, the railroad bridge over which had been destroyed by the enemy. colonel john m. palmer at that time commanded the 13th illinois, which was acting as a guard to workmen who were engaged in rebuilding this bridge. palmer was my senior and commanded the two regiments as long as we remained together. the bridge was finished in about two weeks, and i received orders to move against colonel thomas harris, who was said to be encamped at the little town of florida, some twenty-five miles south of where we then were. at the time of which i now write we had no transportation and the country about salt river was sparsely settled, so that it took some days to collect teams and drivers enough to move the camp and garrison equipage of a regiment nearly a thousand strong, together with a week's supply of provision and some ammunition. while preparations for the move were going on i felt quite comfortable; but when we got on the road and found every house deserted i was anything but easy. in the twenty-five miles we had to march we did not see a person, old or young, male or female, except two horsemen who were on a road that crossed ours. as soon as they saw us they decamped as fast as their horses could carry them. i kept my men in the ranks and forbade their entering any of the deserted houses or taking anything from them. we halted at night on the road and proceeded the next morning at an early hour. harris had been encamped in a creek bottom for the sake of being near water. the hills on either side of the creek extend to a considerable height, possibly more than a hundred feet. as we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see harris' camp, and possibly find his men ready formed to meet us, my heart kept getting higher and higher until it felt to me as though it was in my throat. i would have given anything then to have been back in illinois, but i had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; i kept right on. when we reached a point from which the valley below was in full view i halted. the place where harris had been encamped a few days before was still there and the marks of a recent encampment were plainly visible, but the troops were gone. my heart resumed its place. it occurred to me at once that harris had been as much afraid of me as i had been of him. this was a view of the question i had never taken before; but it was one i never forgot afterwards. from that event to the close of the war, i never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though i always felt more or less anxiety. i never forgot that he had as much reason to fear my forces as i had his. the lesson was valuable. inquiries at the village of florida divulged the fact that colonel harris, learning of my intended movement, while my transportation was being collected took time by the forelock and left florida before i had started from salt river. he had increased the distance between us by forty miles. the next day i started back to my old camp at salt river bridge. the citizens living on the line of our march had returned to their houses after we passed, and finding everything in good order, nothing carried away, they were at their front doors ready to greet us now. they had evidently been led to believe that the national troops carried death and devastation with them wherever they went. in a short time after our return to salt river bridge i was ordered with my regiment to the town of mexico. general pope was then commanding the district embracing all of the state of missouri between the mississippi and missouri rivers, with his headquarters in the village of mexico. i was assigned to the command of a sub-district embracing the troops in the immediate neighborhood, some three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery. there was one regiment encamped by the side of mine. i assumed command of the whole and the first night sent the commander of the other regiment the parole and countersign. not wishing to be outdone in courtesy, he immediately sent me the countersign for his regiment for the night. when he was informed that the countersign sent to him was for use with his regiment as well as mine, it was difficult to make him understand that this was not an unwarranted interference of one colonel over another. no doubt he attributed it for the time to the presumption of a graduate of west point over a volunteer pure and simple. but the question was soon settled and we had no further trouble. my arrival in mexico had been preceded by that of two or three regiments in which proper discipline had not been maintained, and the men had been in the habit of visiting houses without invitation and helping themselves to food and drink, or demanding them from the occupants. they carried their muskets while out of camp and made every man they found take the oath of allegiance to the government. i at once published orders prohibiting the soldiers from going into private houses unless invited by the inhabitants, and from appropriating private property to their own or to government uses. the people were no longer molested or made afraid. i received the most marked courtesy from the citizens of mexico as long as i remained there. up to this time my regiment had not been carried in the school of the soldier beyond the company drill, except that it had received some training on the march from springfield to the illinois river. there was now a good opportunity of exercising it in the battalion drill. while i was at west point the tactics used in the army had been scott's and the musket the flint lock. i had never looked at a copy of tactics from the time of my graduation. my standing in that branch of studies had been near the foot of the class. in the mexican war in the summer of 1846, i had been appointed regimental quartermaster and commissary and had not been at a battalion drill since. the arms had been changed since then and hardee's tactics had been adopted. i got a copy of tactics and studied one lesson, intending to confine the exercise of the first day to the commands i had thus learned. by pursuing this course from day to day i thought i would soon get through the volume. we were encamped just outside of town on the common, among scattering suburban houses with enclosed gardens, and when i got my regiment in line and rode to the front i soon saw that if i attempted to follow the lesson i had studied i would have to clear away some of the houses and garden fences to make room. i perceived at once, however, that hardee's tactics--a mere translation from the french with hardee's name attached --was nothing more than common sense and the progress of the age applied to scott's system. the commands were abbreviated and the movement expedited. under the old tactics almost every change in the order of march was preceded by a "halt," then came the change, and then the "forward march." with the new tactics all these changes could be made while in motion. i found no trouble in giving commands that would take my regiment where i wanted it to go and carry it around all obstacles. i do not believe that the officers of the regiment ever discovered that i had never studied the tactics that i used. chapter xix. commissioned brigadier-general--command at ironton, mo.--jefferson city --cape girardeau--general prentiss--seizure of paducah--headquarters at cairo. i had not been in mexico many weeks when, reading a st. louis paper, i found the president had asked the illinois delegation in congress to recommend some citizens of the state for the position of brigadier-general, and that they had unanimously recommended me as first on a list of seven. i was very much surprised because, as i have said, my acquaintance with the congressmen was very limited and i did not know of anything i had done to inspire such confidence. the papers of the next day announced that my name, with three others, had been sent to the senate, and a few days after our confirmation was announced. when appointed brigadier-general i at once thought it proper that one of my aides should come from the regiment i had been commanding, and so selected lieutenant c. b. lagow. while living in st. louis, i had had a desk in the law office of mcclellan, moody and hillyer. difference in views between the members of the firm on the questions of the day, and general hard times in the border cities, had broken up this firm. hillyer was quite a young man, then in his twenties, and very brilliant. i asked him to accept a place on my staff. i also wanted to take one man from my new home, galena. the canvass in the presidential campaign the fall before had brought out a young lawyer by the name of john a. rawlins, who proved himself one of the ablest speakers in the state. he was also a candidate for elector on the douglas ticket. when sumter was fired upon and the integrity of the union threatened, there was no man more ready to serve his country than he. i wrote at once asking him to accept the position of assistant adjutant-general with the rank of captain, on my staff. he was about entering the service as major of a new regiment then organizing in the north-western part of the state; but he threw this up and accepted my offer. neither hillyer nor lagow proved to have any particular taste or special qualifications for the duties of the soldier, and the former resigned during the vicksburg campaign; the latter i relieved after the battle of chattanooga. rawlins remained with me as long as he lived, and rose to the rank of brigadier general and chief-of-staff to the general of the army--an office created for him--before the war closed. he was an able man, possessed of great firmness, and could say "no" so emphatically to a request which he thought should not be granted that the person he was addressing would understand at once that there was no use of pressing the matter. general rawlins was a very useful officer in other ways than this. i became very much attached to him. shortly after my promotion i was ordered to ironton, missouri, to command a district in that part of the state, and took the 21st illinois, my old regiment, with me. several other regiments were ordered to the same destination about the same time. ironton is on the iron mountain railroad, about seventy miles south of st. louis, and situated among hills rising almost to the dignity of mountains. when i reached there, about the 8th of august, colonel b. gratz brown --afterwards governor of missouri and in 1872 vice-presidential candidate --was in command. some of his troops were ninety days' men and their time had expired some time before. the men had no clothing but what they had volunteered in, and much of this was so worn that it would hardly stay on. general hardee--the author of the tactics i did not study--was at greenville some twenty-five miles further south, it was said, with five thousand confederate troops. under these circumstances colonel brown's command was very much demoralized. a squadron of cavalry could have ridden into the valley and captured the entire force. brown himself was gladder to see me on that occasion than he ever has been since. i relieved him and sent all his men home within a day or two, to be mustered out of service. within ten days after reaching ironton i was prepared to take the offensive against the enemy at greenville. i sent a column east out of the valley we were in, with orders to swing around to the south and west and come into the greenville road ten miles south of ironton. another column marched on the direct road and went into camp at the point designated for the two columns to meet. i was to ride out the next morning and take personal command of the movement. my experience against harris, in northern missouri, had inspired me with confidence. but when the evening train came in, it brought general b. m. prentiss with orders to take command of the district. his orders did not relieve me, but i knew that by law i was senior, and at that time even the president did not have the authority to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. i therefore gave general prentiss the situation of the troops and the general condition of affairs, and started for st. louis the same day. the movement against the rebels at greenville went no further. from st. louis i was ordered to jefferson city, the capital of the state, to take command. general sterling price, of the confederate army, was thought to be threatening the capital, lexington, chillicothe and other comparatively large towns in the central part of missouri. i found a good many troops in jefferson city, but in the greatest confusion, and no one person knew where they all were. colonel mulligan, a gallant man, was in command, but he had not been educated as yet to his new profession and did not know how to maintain discipline. i found that volunteers had obtained permission from the department commander, or claimed they had, to raise, some of them, regiments; some battalions; some companies--the officers to be commissioned according to the number of men they brought into the service. there were recruiting stations all over town, with notices, rudely lettered on boards over the doors, announcing the arm of service and length of time for which recruits at that station would be received. the law required all volunteers to serve for three years or the war. but in jefferson city in august, 1861, they were recruited for different periods and on different conditions; some were enlisted for six months, some for a year, some without any condition as to where they were to serve, others were not to be sent out of the state. the recruits were principally men from regiments stationed there and already in the service, bound for three years if the war lasted that long. the city was filled with union fugitives who had been driven by guerilla bands to take refuge with the national troops. they were in a deplorable condition and must have starved but for the support the government gave them. they had generally made their escape with a team or two, sometimes a yoke of oxen with a mule or a horse in the lead. a little bedding besides their clothing and some food had been thrown into the wagon. all else of their worldly goods were abandoned and appropriated by their former neighbors; for the union man in missouri who staid at home during the rebellion, if he was not immediately under the protection of the national troops, was at perpetual war with his neighbors. i stopped the recruiting service, and disposed the troops about the outskirts of the city so as to guard all approaches. order was soon restored. i had been at jefferson city but a few days when i was directed from department headquarters to fit out an expedition to lexington, booneville and chillicothe, in order to take from the banks in those cities all the funds they had and send them to st. louis. the western army had not yet been supplied with transportation. it became necessary therefore to press into the service teams belonging to sympathizers with the rebellion or to hire those of union men. this afforded an opportunity of giving employment to such of the refugees within our lines as had teams suitable for our purposes. they accepted the service with alacrity. as fast as troops could be got off they were moved west some twenty miles or more. in seven or eight days from my assuming command at jefferson city, i had all the troops, except a small garrison, at an advanced position and expected to join them myself the next day. but my campaigns had not yet begun, for while seated at my office door, with nothing further to do until it was time to start for the front, i saw an officer of rank approaching, who proved to be colonel jefferson c. davis. i had never met him before, but he introduced himself by handing me an order for him to proceed to jefferson city and relieve me of the command. the orders directed that i should report at department headquarters at st. louis without delay, to receive important special instructions. it was about an hour before the only regular train of the day would start. i therefore turned over to colonel davis my orders, and hurriedly stated to him the progress that had been made to carry out the department instructions already described. i had at that time but one staff officer, doing myself all the detail work usually performed by an adjutant-general. in an hour after being relieved from the command i was on my way to st. louis, leaving my single staff officer(*6) to follow the next day with our horses and baggage. the "important special instructions" which i received the next day, assigned me to the command of the district of south-east missouri, embracing all the territory south of st. louis, in missouri, as well as all southern illinois. at first i was to take personal command of a combined expedition that had been ordered for the capture of colonel jeff. thompson, a sort of independent or partisan commander who was disputing with us the possession of south-east missouri. troops had been ordered to move from ironton to cape girardeau, sixty or seventy miles to the south-east, on the mississippi river; while the forces at cape girardeau had been ordered to move to jacksonville, ten miles out towards ironton; and troops at cairo and bird's point, at the junction of the ohio and mississippi rivers, were to hold themselves in readiness to go down the mississippi to belmont, eighteen miles below, to be moved west from there when an officer should come to command them. i was the officer who had been selected for this purpose. cairo was to become my headquarters when the expedition terminated. in pursuance of my orders i established my temporary headquarters at cape girardeau and sent instructions to the commanding officer at jackson, to inform me of the approach of general prentiss from ironton. hired wagons were kept moving night and day to take additional rations to jackson, to supply the troops when they started from there. neither general prentiss nor colonel marsh, who commanded at jackson, knew their destination. i drew up all the instructions for the contemplated move, and kept them in my pocket until i should hear of the junction of our troops at jackson. two or three days after my arrival at cape girardeau, word came that general prentiss was approaching that place (jackson). i started at once to meet him there and to give him his orders. as i turned the first corner of a street after starting, i saw a column of cavalry passing the next street in front of me. i turned and rode around the block the other way, so as to meet the head of the column. i found there general prentiss himself, with a large escort. he had halted his troops at jackson for the night, and had come on himself to cape girardeau, leaving orders for his command to follow him in the morning. i gave the general his orders--which stopped him at jackson--but he was very much aggrieved at being placed under another brigadier-general, particularly as he believed himself to be the senior. he had been a brigadier, in command at cairo, while i was mustering officer at springfield without any rank. but we were nominated at the same time for the united states service, and both our commissions bore date may 17th, 1861. by virtue of my former army rank i was, by law, the senior. general prentiss failed to get orders to his troops to remain at jackson, and the next morning early they were reported as approaching cape girardeau. i then ordered the general very peremptorily to countermarch his command and take it back to jackson. he obeyed the order, but bade his command adieu when he got them to jackson, and went to st. louis and reported himself. this broke up the expedition. but little harm was done, as jeff. thompson moved light and had no fixed place for even nominal headquarters. he was as much at home in arkansas as he was in missouri and would keep out of the way of a superior force. prentiss was sent to another part of the state. general prentiss made a great mistake on the above occasion, one that he would not have committed later in the war. when i came to know him better, i regretted it much. in consequence of this occurrence he was off duty in the field when the principal campaign at the west was going on, and his juniors received promotion while he was where none could be obtained. he would have been next to myself in rank in the district of south-east missouri, by virtue of his services in the mexican war. he was a brave and very earnest soldier. no man in the service was more sincere in his devotion to the cause for which we were battling; none more ready to make sacrifices or risk life in it. on the 4th of september i removed my headquarters to cairo and found colonel richard oglesby in command of the post. we had never met, at least not to my knowledge. after my promotion i had ordered my brigadier-general's uniform from new york, but it had not yet arrived, so that i was in citizen's dress. the colonel had his office full of people, mostly from the neighboring states of missouri and kentucky, making complaints or asking favors. he evidently did not catch my name when i was presented, for on my taking a piece of paper from the table where he was seated and writing the order assuming command of the district of south-east missouri, colonel richard j. oglesby to command the post at bird's point, and handing it to him, he put on an expression of surprise that looked a little as if he would like to have some one identify me. but he surrendered the office without question. the day after i assumed command at cairo a man came to me who said he was a scout of general fremont. he reported that he had just come from columbus, a point on the mississippi twenty miles below on the kentucky side, and that troops had started from there, or were about to start, to seize paducah, at the mouth of the tennessee. there was no time for delay; i reported by telegraph to the department commander the information i had received, and added that i was taking steps to get off that night to be in advance of the enemy in securing that important point. there was a large number of steamers lying at cairo and a good many boatmen were staying in the town. it was the work of only a few hours to get the boats manned, with coal aboard and steam up. troops were also designated to go aboard. the distance from cairo to paducah is about forty-five miles. i did not wish to get there before daylight of the 6th, and directed therefore that the boats should lie at anchor out in the stream until the time to start. not having received an answer to my first dispatch, i again telegraphed to department headquarters that i should start for paducah that night unless i received further orders. hearing nothing, we started before midnight and arrived early the following morning, anticipating the enemy by probably not over six or eight hours. it proved very fortunate that the expedition against jeff. thompson had been broken up. had it not been, the enemy would have seized paducah and fortified it, to our very great annoyance. when the national troops entered the town the citizens were taken by surprise. i never after saw such consternation depicted on the faces of the people. men, women and children came out of their doors looking pale and frightened at the presence of the invader. they were expecting rebel troops that day. in fact, nearly four thousand men from columbus were at that time within ten or fifteen miles of paducah on their way to occupy the place. i had but two regiments and one battery with me, but the enemy did not know this and returned to columbus. i stationed my troops at the best points to guard the roads leading into the city, left gunboats to guard the river fronts and by noon was ready to start on my return to cairo. before leaving, however, i addressed a short printed proclamation to the citizens of paducah assuring them of our peaceful intentions, that we had come among them to protect them against the enemies of our country, and that all who chose could continue their usual avocations with assurance of the protection of the government. this was evidently a relief to them; but the majority would have much preferred the presence of the other army. i reinforced paducah rapidly from the troops at cape girardeau; and a day or two later general c. f. smith, a most accomplished soldier, reported at cairo and was assigned to the command of the post at the mouth of the tennessee. in a short time it was well fortified and a detachment was sent to occupy smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland. the state government of kentucky at that time was rebel in sentiment, but wanted to preserve an armed neutrality between the north and the south, and the governor really seemed to think the state had a perfect right to maintain a neutral position. the rebels already occupied two towns in the state, columbus and hickman, on the mississippi; and at the very moment the national troops were entering paducah from the ohio front, general lloyd tilghman--a confederate--with his staff and a small detachment of men, were getting out in the other direction, while, as i have already said, nearly four thousand confederate troops were on kentucky soil on their way to take possession of the town. but, in the estimation of the governor and of those who thought with him, this did not justify the national authorities in invading the soil of kentucky. i informed the legislature of the state of what i was doing, and my action was approved by the majority of that body. on my return to cairo i found authority from department headquarters for me to take paducah "if i felt strong enough," but very soon after i was reprimanded from the same quarters for my correspondence with the legislature and warned against a repetition of the offence. soon after i took command at cairo, general fremont entered into arrangements for the exchange of the prisoners captured at camp jackson in the month of may. i received orders to pass them through my lines to columbus as they presented themselves with proper credentials. quite a number of these prisoners i had been personally acquainted with before the war. such of them as i had so known were received at my headquarters as old acquaintances, and ordinary routine business was not disturbed by their presence. on one occasion when several were present in my office my intention to visit cape girardeau the next day, to inspect the troops at that point, was mentioned. something transpired which postponed my trip; but a steamer employed by the government was passing a point some twenty or more miles above cairo, the next day, when a section of rebel artillery with proper escort brought her to. a major, one of those who had been at my headquarters the day before, came at once aboard and after some search made a direct demand for my delivery. it was hard to persuade him that i was not there. this officer was major barrett, of st. louis. i had been acquainted with his family before the war. chapter xx. general fremont in command--movement against belmont--battle of belmont --a narrow escape--after the battle. from the occupation of paducah up to the early part of november nothing important occurred with the troops under my command. i was reinforced from time to time and the men were drilled and disciplined preparatory for the service which was sure to come. by the 1st of november i had not fewer than 20,000 men, most of them under good drill and ready to meet any equal body of men who, like themselves, had not yet been in an engagement. they were growing impatient at lying idle so long, almost in hearing of the guns of the enemy they had volunteered to fight against. i asked on one or two occasions to be allowed to move against columbus. it could have been taken soon after the occupation of paducah; but before november it was so strongly fortified that it would have required a large force and a long siege to capture it. in the latter part of october general fremont took the field in person and moved from jefferson city against general sterling price, who was then in the state of missouri with a considerable command. about the first of november i was directed from department headquarters to make a demonstration on both sides of the mississippi river with the view of detaining the rebels at columbus within their lines. before my troops could be got off, i was notified from the same quarter that there were some 3,000 of the enemy on the st. francis river about fifty miles west, or south-west, from cairo, and was ordered to send another force against them. i dispatched colonel oglesby at once with troops sufficient to compete with the reported number of the enemy. on the 5th word came from the same source that the rebels were about to detach a large force from columbus to be moved by boats down the mississippi and up the white river, in arkansas, in order to reinforce price, and i was directed to prevent this movement if possible. i accordingly sent a regiment from bird's point under colonel w. h. l. wallace to overtake and reinforce oglesby, with orders to march to new madrid, a point some distance below columbus, on the missouri side. at the same time i directed general c. f. smith to move all the troops he could spare from paducah directly against columbus, halting them, however, a few miles from the town to await further orders from me. then i gathered up all the troops at cairo and fort holt, except suitable guards, and moved them down the river on steamers convoyed by two gunboats, accompanying them myself. my force consisted of a little over 3,000 men and embraced five regiments of infantry, two guns and two companies of cavalry. we dropped down the river on the 6th to within about six miles of columbus, debarked a few men on the kentucky side and established pickets to connect with the troops from paducah. i had no orders which contemplated an attack by the national troops, nor did i intend anything of the kind when i started out from cairo; but after we started i saw that the officers and men were elated at the prospect of at last having the opportunity of doing what they had volunteered to do--fight the enemies of their country. i did not see how i could maintain discipline, or retain the confidence of my command, if we should return to cairo without an effort to do something. columbus, besides being strongly fortified, contained a garrison much more numerous than the force i had with me. it would not do, therefore, to attack that point. about two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, i learned that the enemy was crossing troops from columbus to the west bank to be dispatched, presumably, after oglesby. i knew there was a small camp of confederates at belmont, immediately opposite columbus, and i speedily resolved to push down the river, land on the missouri side, capture belmont, break up the camp and return. accordingly, the pickets above columbus were drawn in at once, and about daylight the boats moved out from shore. in an hour we were debarking on the west bank of the mississippi, just out of range of the batteries at columbus. the ground on the west shore of the river, opposite columbus, is low and in places marshy and cut up with sloughs. the soil is rich and the timber large and heavy. there were some small clearings between belmont and the point where we landed, but most of the country was covered with the native forests. we landed in front of a cornfield. when the debarkation commenced, i took a regiment down the river to post it as a guard against surprise. at that time i had no staff officer who could be trusted with that duty. in the woods, at a short distance below the clearing, i found a depression, dry at the time, but which at high water became a slough or bayou. i placed the men in the hollow, gave them their instructions and ordered them to remain there until they were properly relieved. these troops, with the gunboats, were to protect our transports. up to this time the enemy had evidently failed to divine our intentions. from columbus they could, of course, see our gunboats and transports loaded with troops. but the force from paducah was threatening them from the land side, and it was hardly to be expected that if columbus was our object we would separate our troops by a wide river. they doubtless thought we meant to draw a large force from the east bank, then embark ourselves, land on the east bank and make a sudden assault on columbus before their divided command could be united. about eight o'clock we started from the point of debarkation, marching by the flank. after moving in this way for a mile or a mile and a half, i halted where there was marshy ground covered with a heavy growth of timber in our front, and deployed a large part of my force as skirmishers. by this time the enemy discovered that we were moving upon belmont and sent out troops to meet us. soon after we had started in line, his skirmishers were encountered and fighting commenced. this continued, growing fiercer and fiercer, for about four hours, the enemy being forced back gradually until he was driven into his camp. early in this engagement my horse was shot under me, but i got another from one of my staff and kept well up with the advance until the river was reached. the officers and men engaged at belmont were then under fire for the first time. veterans could not have behaved better than they did up to the moment of reaching the rebel camp. at this point they became demoralized from their victory and failed to reap its full reward. the enemy had been followed so closely that when he reached the clear ground on which his camp was pitched he beat a hasty retreat over the river bank, which protected him from our shots and from view. this precipitate retreat at the last moment enabled the national forces to pick their way without hinderance through the _abatis_--the only artificial defence the enemy had. the moment the camp was reached our men laid down their arms and commenced rummaging the tents to pick up trophies. some of the higher officers were little better than the privates. they galloped about from one cluster of men to another and at every halt delivered a short eulogy upon the union cause and the achievements of the command. all this time the troops we had been engaged with for four hours, lay crouched under cover of the river bank, ready to come up and surrender if summoned to do so; but finding that they were not pursued, they worked their way up the river and came up on the bank between us and our transports. i saw at the same time two steamers coming from the columbus side towards the west shore, above us, black--or gray--with soldiers from boiler-deck to roof. some of my men were engaged in firing from captured guns at empty steamers down the river, out of range, cheering at every shot. i tried to get them to turn their guns upon the loaded steamers above and not so far away. my efforts were in vain. at last i directed my staff officers to set fire to the camps. this drew the fire of the enemy's guns located on the heights of columbus. they had abstained from firing before, probably because they were afraid of hitting their own men; or they may have supposed, until the camp was on fire, that it was still in the possession of their friends. about this time, too, the men we had driven over the bank were seen in line up the river between us and our transports. the alarm "surrounded" was given. the guns of the enemy and the report of being surrounded, brought officers and men completely under control. at first some of the officers seemed to think that to be surrounded was to be placed in a hopeless position, where there was nothing to do but surrender. but when i announced that we had cut our way in and could cut our way out just as well, it seemed a new revelation to officers and soldiers. they formed line rapidly and we started back to our boats, with the men deployed as skirmishers as they had been on entering camp. the enemy was soon encountered, but his resistance this time was feeble. again the confederates sought shelter under the river banks. we could not stop, however, to pick them up, because the troops we had seen crossing the river had debarked by this time and were nearer our transports than we were. it would be prudent to get them behind us; but we were not again molested on our way to the boats. from the beginning of the fighting our wounded had been carried to the houses at the rear, near the place of debarkation. i now set the troops to bringing their wounded to the boats. after this had gone on for some little time i rode down the road, without even a staff officer, to visit the guard i had stationed over the approach to our transports. i knew the enemy had crossed over from columbus in considerable numbers and might be expected to attack us as we were embarking. this guard would be encountered first and, as they were in a natural intrenchment, would be able to hold the enemy for a considerable time. my surprise was great to find there was not a single man in the trench. riding back to the boat i found the officer who had commanded the guard and learned that he had withdrawn his force when the main body fell back. at first i ordered the guard to return, but finding that it would take some time to get the men together and march them back to their position, i countermanded the order. then fearing that the enemy we had seen crossing the river below might be coming upon us unawares, i rode out in the field to our front, still entirely alone, to observe whether the enemy was passing. the field was grown up with corn so tall and thick as to cut off the view of even a person on horseback, except directly along the rows. even in that direction, owing to the overhanging blades of corn, the view was not extensive. i had not gone more than a few hundred yards when i saw a body of troops marching past me not fifty yards away. i looked at them for a moment and then turned my horse towards the river and started back, first in a walk, and when i thought myself concealed from the view of the enemy, as fast as my horse could carry me. when at the river bank i still had to ride a few hundred yards to the point where the nearest transport lay. the cornfield in front of our transports terminated at the edge of a dense forest. before i got back the enemy had entered this forest and had opened a brisk fire upon the boats. our men, with the exception of details that had gone to the front after the wounded, were now either aboard the transports or very near them. those who were not aboard soon got there, and the boats pushed off. i was the only man of the national army between the rebels and our transports. the captain of a boat that had just pushed out but had not started, recognized me and ordered the engineer not to start the engine; he then had a plank run out for me. my horse seemed to take in the situation. there was no path down the bank and every one acquainted with the mississippi river knows that its banks, in a natural state, do not vary at any great angle from the perpendicular. my horse put his fore feet over the bank without hesitation or urging, and with his hind feet well under him, slid down the bank and trotted aboard the boat, twelve or fifteen feet away, over a single gang plank. i dismounted and went at once to the upper deck. the mississippi river was low on the 7th of november, 1861, so that the banks were higher than the heads of men standing on the upper decks of the steamers. the rebels were some distance back from the river, so that their fire was high and did us but little harm. our smoke-stack was riddled with bullets, but there were only three men wounded on the boats, two of whom were soldiers. when i first went on deck i entered the captain's room adjoining the pilot-house, and threw myself on a sofa. i did not keep that position a moment, but rose to go out on the deck to observe what was going on. i had scarcely left when a musket ball entered the room, struck the head of the sofa, passed through it and lodged in the foot. when the enemy opened fire on the transports our gunboats returned it with vigor. they were well out in the stream and some distance down, so that they had to give but very little elevation to their guns to clear the banks of the river. their position very nearly enfiladed the line of the enemy while he was marching through the cornfield. the execution was very great, as we could see at the time and as i afterwards learned more positively. we were very soon out of range and went peacefully on our way to cairo, every man feeling that belmont was a great victory and that he had contributed his share to it. our loss at belmont was 485 in killed, wounded and missing. about 125 of our wounded fell into the hands of the enemy. we returned with 175 prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces. the loss of the enemy, as officially reported, was 642 men, killed, wounded and missing. we had engaged about 2,500 men, exclusive of the guard left with the transports. the enemy had about 7,000; but this includes the troops brought over from columbus who were not engaged in the first defence of belmont. the two objects for which the battle of belmont was fought were fully accomplished. the enemy gave up all idea of detaching troops from columbus. his losses were very heavy for that period of the war. columbus was beset by people looking for their wounded or dead kin, to take them home for medical treatment or burial. i learned later, when i had moved further south, that belmont had caused more mourning than almost any other battle up to that time. the national troops acquired a confidence in themselves at belmont that did not desert them through the war. the day after the battle i met some officers from general polk's command, arranged for permission to bury our dead at belmont and also commenced negotiations for the exchange of prisoners. when our men went to bury their dead, before they were allowed to land they were conducted below the point where the enemy had engaged our transports. some of the officers expressed a desire to see the field; but the request was refused with the statement that we had no dead there. while on the truce-boat i mentioned to an officer, whom i had known both at west point and in the mexican war, that i was in the cornfield near their troops when they passed; that i had been on horseback and had worn a soldier's overcoat at the time. this officer was on general polk's staff. he said both he and the general had seen me and that polk had said to his men, "there is a yankee; you may try your marksmanship on him if you wish," but nobody fired at me. belmont was severely criticised in the north as a wholly unnecessary battle, barren of results, or the possibility of them from the beginning. if it had not been fought, colonel oglesby would probably have been captured or destroyed with his three thousand men. then i should have been culpable indeed. chapter xxi. general halleck in command--commanding the district of cairo--movement on fort henry--capture of fort henry. while at cairo i had frequent opportunities of meeting the rebel officers of the columbus garrison. they seemed to be very fond of coming up on steamers under flags of truce. on two or three occasions i went down in like manner. when one of their boats was seen coming up carrying a white flag, a gun would be fired from the lower battery at fort holt, throwing a shot across the bow as a signal to come no farther. i would then take a steamer and, with my staff and occasionally a few other officers, go down to receive the party. there were several officers among them whom i had known before, both at west point and in mexico. seeing these officers who had been educated for the profession of arms, both at school and in actual war, which is a far more efficient training, impressed me with the great advantage the south possessed over the north at the beginning of the rebellion. they had from thirty to forty per cent. of the educated soldiers of the nation. they had no standing army and, consequently, these trained soldiers had to find employment with the troops from their own states. in this way what there was of military education and training was distributed throughout their whole army. the whole loaf was leavened. the north had a great number of educated and trained soldiers, but the bulk of them were still in the army and were retained, generally with their old commands and rank, until the war had lasted many months. in the army of the potomac there was what was known as the "regular brigade," in which, from the commanding officer down to the youngest second lieutenant, every one was educated to his profession. so, too, with many of the batteries; all the officers, generally four in number to each, were men educated for their profession. some of these went into battle at the beginning under division commanders who were entirely without military training. this state of affairs gave me an idea which i expressed while at cairo; that the government ought to disband the regular army, with the exception of the staff corps, and notify the disbanded officers that they would receive no compensation while the war lasted except as volunteers. the register should be kept up, but the names of all officers who were not in the volunteer service at the close, should be stricken from it. on the 9th of november, two days after the battle of belmont, major-general h. w. halleck superseded general fremont in command of the department of the missouri. the limits of his command took in arkansas and west kentucky east to the cumberland river. from the battle of belmont until early in february, 1862, the troops under my command did little except prepare for the long struggle which proved to be before them. the enemy at this time occupied a line running from the mississippi river at columbus to bowling green and mill springs, kentucky. each of these positions was strongly fortified, as were also points on the tennessee and cumberland rivers near the tennessee state line. the works on the tennessee were called fort heiman and fort henry, and that on the cumberland was fort donelson. at these points the two rivers approached within eleven miles of each other. the lines of rifle pits at each place extended back from the water at least two miles, so that the garrisons were in reality only seven miles apart. these positions were of immense importance to the enemy; and of course correspondingly important for us to possess ourselves of. with fort henry in our hands we had a navigable stream open to us up to muscle shoals, in alabama. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee at eastport, mississippi, and follows close to the banks of the river up to the shoals. this road, of vast importance to the enemy, would cease to be of use to them for through traffic the moment fort henry became ours. fort donelson was the gate to nashville--a place of great military and political importance--and to a rich country extending far east in kentucky. these two points in our possession the enemy would necessarily be thrown back to the memphis and charleston road, or to the boundary of the cotton states, and, as before stated, that road would be lost to them for through communication. the designation of my command had been changed after halleck's arrival, from the district of south-east missouri to the district of cairo, and the small district commanded by general c. f. smith, embracing the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland rivers, had been added to my jurisdiction. early in january, 1862, i was directed by general mcclellan, through my department commander, to make a reconnoissance in favor of brigadier-general don carlos buell, who commanded the department of the ohio, with headquarters at louisville, and who was confronting general s. b. buckner with a larger confederate force at bowling green. it was supposed that buell was about to make some move against the enemy, and my demonstration was intended to prevent the sending of troops from columbus, fort henry or donelson to buckner. i at once ordered general smith to send a force up the west bank of the tennessee to threaten forts heiman and henry; mcclernand at the same time with a force of 6,000 men was sent out into west kentucky, threatening columbus with one column and the tennessee river with another. i went with mcclernand's command. the weather was very bad; snow and rain fell; the roads, never good in that section, were intolerable. we were out more than a week splashing through the mud, snow and rain, the men suffering very much. the object of the expedition was accomplished. the enemy did not send reinforcements to bowling green, and general george h. thomas fought and won the battle of mill springs before we returned. as a result of this expedition general smith reported that he thought it practicable to capture fort heiman. this fort stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry on the opposite side of the river, and its possession by us, with the aid of our gunboats, would insure the capture of fort henry. this report of smith's confirmed views i had previously held, that the true line of operations for us was up the tennessee and cumberland rivers. with us there, the enemy would be compelled to fall back on the east and west entirely out of the state of kentucky. on the 6th of january, before receiving orders for this expedition, i had asked permission of the general commanding the department to go to see him at st. louis. my object was to lay this plan of campaign before him. now that my views had been confirmed by so able a general as smith, i renewed my request to go to st. louis on what i deemed important military business. the leave was granted, but not graciously. i had known general halleck but very slightly in the old army, not having met him either at west point or during the mexican war. i was received with so little cordiality that i perhaps stated the object of my visit with less clearness than i might have done, and i had not uttered many sentences before i was cut short as if my plan was preposterous. i returned to cairo very much crestfallen. flag-officer foote commanded the little fleet of gunboats then in the neighborhood of cairo and, though in another branch of the service, was subject to the command of general halleck. he and i consulted freely upon military matters and he agreed with me perfectly as to the feasibility of the campaign up the tennessee. notwithstanding the rebuff i had received from my immediate chief, i therefore, on the 28th of january, renewed the suggestion by telegraph that "if permitted, i could take and hold fort henry on the tennessee." this time i was backed by flag-officer foote, who sent a similar dispatch. on the 29th i wrote fully in support of the proposition. on the 1st of february i received full instructions from department headquarters to move upon fort henry. on the 2d the expedition started. in february, 1862, there were quite a good many steamers laid up at cairo for want of employment, the mississippi river being closed against navigation below that point. there were also many men in the town whose occupation had been following the river in various capacities, from captain down to deck hand but there were not enough of either boats or men to move at one time the 17,000 men i proposed to take with me up the tennessee. i loaded the boats with more than half the force, however, and sent general mcclernand in command. i followed with one of the later boats and found mcclernand had stopped, very properly, nine miles below fort henry. seven gunboats under flag-officer foote had accompanied the advance. the transports we had with us had to return to paducah to bring up a division from there, with general c. f. smith in command. before sending the boats back i wanted to get the troops as near to the enemy as i could without coming within range of their guns. there was a stream emptying into the tennessee on the east side, apparently at about long range distance below the fort. on account of the narrow water-shed separating the tennessee and cumberland rivers at that point, the stream must be insignificant at ordinary stages, but when we were there, in february, it was a torrent. it would facilitate the investment of fort henry materially if the troops could be landed south of that stream. to test whether this could be done i boarded the gunboat essex and requested captain wm. porter commanding it, to approach the fort to draw its fire. after we had gone some distance past the mouth of the stream we drew the fire of the fort, which fell much short of us. in consequence i had made up my mind to return and bring the troops to the upper side of the creek, when the enemy opened upon us with a rifled gun that sent shot far beyond us and beyond the stream. one shot passed very near where captain porter and i were standing, struck the deck near the stern, penetrated and passed through the cabin and so out into the river. we immediately turned back, and the troops were debarked below the mouth of the creek. when the landing was completed i returned with the transports to paducah to hasten up the balance of the troops. i got back on the 5th with the advance, the remainder following as rapidly as the steamers could carry them. at ten o'clock at night, on the 5th, the whole command was not yet up. being anxious to commence operations as soon as possible before the enemy could reinforce heavily, i issued my orders for an advance at 11 a.m. on the 6th. i felt sure that all the troops would be up by that time. fort henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. the camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to donelson and dover. the garrison of the fort and camp was about 2,800, with strong reinforcements from donelson halted some miles out. there were seventeen heavy guns in the fort. the river was very high, the banks being overflowed except where the bluffs come to the water's edge. a portion of the ground on which fort henry stood was two feet deep in water. below, the water extended into the woods several hundred yards back from the bank on the east side. on the west bank fort heiman stood on high ground, completely commanding fort henry. the distance from fort henry to donelson is but eleven miles. the two positions were so important to the enemy, as he saw his interest, that it was natural to suppose that reinforcements would come from every quarter from which they could be got. prompt action on our part was imperative. the plan was for the troops and gunboats to start at the same moment. the troops were to invest the garrison and the gunboats to attack the fort at close quarters. general smith was to land a brigade of his division on the west bank during the night of the 5th and get it in rear of heiman. at the hour designated the troops and gunboats started. general smith found fort heiman had been evacuated before his men arrived. the gunboats soon engaged the water batteries at very close quarters, but the troops which were to invest fort henry were delayed for want of roads, as well as by the dense forest and the high water in what would in dry weather have been unimportant beds of streams. this delay made no difference in the result. on our first appearance tilghman had sent his entire command, with the exception of about one hundred men left to man the guns in the fort, to the outworks on the road to dover and donelson, so as to have them out of range of the guns of our navy; and before any attack on the 6th he had ordered them to retreat on donelson. he stated in his subsequent report that the defence was intended solely to give his troops time to make their escape. tilghman was captured with his staff and ninety men, as well as the armament of the fort, the ammunition and whatever stores were there. our cavalry pursued the retreating column towards donelson and picked up two guns and a few stragglers; but the enemy had so much the start, that the pursuing force did not get in sight of any except the stragglers. all the gunboats engaged were hit many times. the damage, however, beyond what could be repaired by a small expenditure of money, was slight, except to the essex. a shell penetrated the boiler of that vessel and exploded it, killing and wounding forty-eight men, nineteen of whom were soldiers who had been detailed to act with the navy. on several occasions during the war such details were made when the complement of men with the navy was insufficient for the duty before them. after the fall of fort henry captain phelps, commanding the iron-clad carondelet, at my request ascended the tennessee river and thoroughly destroyed the bridge of the memphis and ohio railroad. chapter xxii. investment of fort donelson--the naval operations--attack of the enemy --assaulting the works--surrender of the fort. i informed the department commander of our success at fort henry and that on the 8th i would take fort donelson. but the rain continued to fall so heavily that the roads became impassable for artillery and wagon trains. then, too, it would not have been prudent to proceed without the gunboats. at least it would have been leaving behind a valuable part of our available force. on the 7th, the day after the fall of fort henry, i took my staff and the cavalry--a part of one regiment--and made a reconnoissance to within about a mile of the outer line of works at donelson. i had known general pillow in mexico, and judged that with any force, no matter how small, i could march up to within gunshot of any intrenchments he was given to hold. i said this to the officers of my staff at the time. i knew that floyd was in command, but he was no soldier, and i judged that he would yield to pillow's pretensions. i met, as i expected, no opposition in making the reconnoissance and, besides learning the topography of the country on the way and around fort donelson, found that there were two roads available for marching; one leading to the village of dover, the other to donelson. fort donelson is two miles north, or down the river, from dover. the fort, as it stood in 1861, embraced about one hundred acres of land. on the east it fronted the cumberland; to the north it faced hickman's creek, a small stream which at that time was deep and wide because of the back-water from the river; on the south was another small stream, or rather a ravine, opening into the cumberland. this also was filled with back-water from the river. the fort stood on high ground, some of it as much as a hundred feet above the cumberland. strong protection to the heavy guns in the water batteries had been obtained by cutting away places for them in the bluff. to the west there was a line of rifle pits some two miles back from the river at the farthest point. this line ran generally along the crest of high ground, but in one place crossed a ravine which opens into the river between the village and the fort. the ground inside and outside of this intrenched line was very broken and generally wooded. the trees outside of the rifle-pits had been cut down for a considerable way out, and had been felled so that their tops lay outwards from the intrenchments. the limbs had been trimmed and pointed, and thus formed an _abatis_ in front of the greater part of the line. outside of this intrenched line, and extending about half the entire length of it, is a ravine running north and south and opening into hickman creek at a point north of the fort. the entire side of this ravine next to the works was one long _abatis_. general halleck commenced his efforts in all quarters to get reinforcements to forward to me immediately on my departure from cairo. general hunter sent men freely from kansas, and a large division under general nelson, from buell's army, was also dispatched. orders went out from the war department to consolidate fragments of companies that were being recruited in the western states so as to make full companies, and to consolidate companies into regiments. general halleck did not approve or disapprove of my going to fort donelson. he said nothing whatever to me on the subject. he informed buell on the 7th that i would march against fort donelson the next day; but on the 10th he directed me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, saying that he forwarded me intrenching tools for that purpose. i received this dispatch in front of fort donelson. i was very impatient to get to fort donelson because i knew the importance of the place to the enemy and supposed he would reinforce it rapidly. i felt that 15,000 men on the 8th would be more effective than 50,000 a month later. i asked flag-officer foote, therefore, to order his gunboats still about cairo to proceed up the cumberland river and not to wait for those gone to eastport and florence; but the others got back in time and we started on the 12th. i had moved mcclernand out a few miles the night before so as to leave the road as free as possible. just as we were about to start the first reinforcement reached me on transports. it was a brigade composed of six full regiments commanded by colonel thayer, of nebraska. as the gunboats were going around to donelson by the tennessee, ohio and cumberland rivers, i directed thayer to turn about and go under their convoy. i started from fort henry with 15,000 men, including eight batteries and part of a regiment of cavalry, and, meeting with no obstruction to detain us, the advance arrived in front of the enemy by noon. that afternoon and the next day were spent in taking up ground to make the investment as complete as possible. general smith had been directed to leave a portion of his division behind to guard forts henry and heiman. he left general lew. wallace with 2,500 men. with the remainder of his division he occupied our left, extending to hickman creek. mcclernand was on the right and covered the roads running south and south-west from dover. his right extended to the back-water up the ravine opening into the cumberland south of the village. the troops were not intrenched, but the nature of the ground was such that they were just as well protected from the fire of the enemy as if rifle-pits had been thrown up. our line was generally along the crest of ridges. the artillery was protected by being sunk in the ground. the men who were not serving the guns were perfectly covered from fire on taking position a little back from the crest. the greatest suffering was from want of shelter. it was midwinter and during the siege we had rain and snow, thawing and freezing alternately. it would not do to allow camp-fires except far down the hill out of sight of the enemy, and it would not do to allow many of the troops to remain there at the same time. in the march over from fort henry numbers of the men had thrown away their blankets and overcoats. there was therefore much discomfort and absolute suffering. during the 12th and 13th, and until the arrival of wallace and thayer on the 14th, the national forces, composed of but 15,000 men, without intrenchments, confronted an intrenched army of 21,000, without conflict further than what was brought on by ourselves. only one gunboat had arrived. there was a little skirmishing each day, brought on by the movement of our troops in securing commanding positions; but there was no actual fighting during this time except once, on the 13th, in front of mcclernand's command. that general had undertaken to capture a battery of the enemy which was annoying his men. without orders or authority he sent three regiments to make the assault. the battery was in the main line of the enemy, which was defended by his whole army present. of course the assault was a failure, and of course the loss on our side was great for the number of men engaged. in this assault colonel william morrison fell badly wounded. up to this time the surgeons with the army had no difficulty in finding room in the houses near our line for all the sick and wounded; but now hospitals were overcrowded. owing, however, to the energy and skill of the surgeons the suffering was not so great as it might have been. the hospital arrangements at fort donelson were as complete as it was possible to make them, considering the inclemency of the weather and the lack of tents, in a sparsely settled country where the houses were generally of but one or two rooms. on the return of captain walke to fort henry on the 10th, i had requested him to take the vessels that had accompanied him on his expedition up the tennessee, and get possession of the cumberland as far up towards donelson as possible. he started without delay, taking, however, only his own gunboat, the carondelet, towed by the steamer alps. captain walke arrived a few miles below donelson on the 12th, a little after noon. about the time the advance of troops reached a point within gunshot of the fort on the land side, he engaged the water batteries at long range. on the 13th i informed him of my arrival the day before and of the establishment of most of our batteries, requesting him at the same time to attack again that day so that i might take advantage of any diversion. the attack was made and many shots fell within the fort, creating some consternation, as we now know. the investment on the land side was made as complete as the number of troops engaged would admit of. during the night of the 13th flag-officer foote arrived with the iron-clads st. louis, louisville and pittsburg and the wooden gunboats tyler and conestoga, convoying thayer's brigade. on the morning of the 14th thayer was landed. wallace, whom i had ordered over from fort henry, also arrived about the same time. up to this time he had been commanding a brigade belonging to the division of general c. f. smith. these troops were now restored to the division they belonged to, and general lew. wallace was assigned to the command of a division composed of the brigade of colonel thayer and other reinforcements that arrived the same day. this new division was assigned to the centre, giving the two flanking divisions an opportunity to close up and form a stronger line. the plan was for the troops to hold the enemy within his lines, while the gunboats should attack the water batteries at close quarters and silence his guns if possible. some of the gunboats were to run the batteries, get above the fort and above the village of dover. i had ordered a reconnoissance made with the view of getting troops to the river above dover in case they should be needed there. that position attained by the gunboats it would have been but a question of time--and a very short time, too--when the garrison would have been compelled to surrender. by three in the afternoon of the 14th flag-officer foote was ready, and advanced upon the water batteries with his entire fleet. after coming in range of the batteries of the enemy the advance was slow, but a constant fire was delivered from every gun that could be brought to bear upon the fort. i occupied a position on shore from which i could see the advancing navy. the leading boat got within a very short distance of the water battery, not further off i think than two hundred yards, and i soon saw one and then another of them dropping down the river, visibly disabled. then the whole fleet followed and the engagement closed for the day. the gunboat which flag-officer foote was on, besides having been hit about sixty times, several of the shots passing through near the waterline, had a shot enter the pilot-house which killed the pilot, carried away the wheel and wounded the flag-officer himself. the tiller-ropes of another vessel were carried away and she, too, dropped helplessly back. two others had their pilot-houses so injured that they scarcely formed a protection to the men at the wheel. the enemy had evidently been much demoralized by the assault, but they were jubilant when they saw the disabled vessels dropping down the river entirely out of the control of the men on board. of course i only witnessed the falling back of our gunboats and felt sad enough at the time over the repulse. subsequent reports, now published, show that the enemy telegraphed a great victory to richmond. the sun went down on the night of the 14th of february, 1862, leaving the army confronting fort donelson anything but comforted over the prospects. the weather had turned intensely cold; the men were without tents and could not keep up fires where most of them had to stay, and, as previously stated, many had thrown away their overcoats and blankets. two of the strongest of our gunboats had been disabled, presumably beyond the possibility of rendering any present assistance. i retired this night not knowing but that i would have to intrench my position, and bring up tents for the men or build huts under the cover of the hills. on the morning of the 15th, before it was yet broad day, a messenger from flag-officer foote handed me a note, expressing a desire to see me on the flag-ship and saying that he had been injured the day before so much that he could not come himself to me. i at once made my preparations for starting. i directed my adjutant-general to notify each of the division commanders of my absence and instruct them to do nothing to bring on an engagement until they received further orders, but to hold their positions. from the heavy rains that had fallen for days and weeks preceding and from the constant use of the roads between the troops and the landing four to seven miles below, these roads had become cut up so as to be hardly passable. the intense cold of the night of the 14th-15th had frozen the ground solid. this made travel on horseback even slower than through the mud; but i went as fast as the roads would allow. when i reached the fleet i found the flag-ship was anchored out in the stream. a small boat, however, awaited my arrival and i was soon on board with the flag-officer. he explained to me in short the condition in which he was left by the engagement of the evening before, and suggested that i should intrench while he returned to mound city with his disabled boats, expressing at the time the belief that he could have the necessary repairs made and be back in ten days. i saw the absolute necessity of his gunboats going into hospital and did not know but i should be forced to the alternative of going through a siege. but the enemy relieved me from this necessity. when i left the national line to visit flag-officer foote i had no idea that there would be any engagement on land unless i brought it on myself. the conditions for battle were much more favorable to us than they had been for the first two days of the investment. from the 12th to the 14th we had but 15,000 men of all arms and no gunboats. now we had been reinforced by a fleet of six naval vessels, a large division of troops under general l. wallace and 2,500 men brought over from fort henry belonging to the division of c. f. smith. the enemy, however, had taken the initiative. just as i landed i met captain hillyer of my staff, white with fear, not for his personal safety, but for the safety of the national troops. he said the enemy had come out of his lines in full force and attacked and scattered mcclernand's division, which was in full retreat. the roads, as i have said, were unfit for making fast time, but i got to my command as soon as possible. the attack had been made on the national right. i was some four or five miles north of our left. the line was about three miles long. in reaching the point where the disaster had occurred i had to pass the divisions of smith and wallace. i saw no sign of excitement on the portion of the line held by smith; wallace was nearer the scene of conflict and had taken part in it. he had, at an opportune time, sent thayer's brigade to the support of mcclernand and thereby contributed to hold the enemy within his lines. i saw everything favorable for us along the line of our left and centre. when i came to the right appearances were different. the enemy had come out in full force to cut his way out and make his escape. mcclernand's division had to bear the brunt of the attack from this combined force. his men had stood up gallantly until the ammunition in their cartridge-boxes gave out. there was abundance of ammunition near by lying on the ground in boxes, but at that stage of the war it was not all of our commanders of regiments, brigades, or even divisions, who had been educated up to the point of seeing that their men were constantly supplied with ammunition during an engagement. when the men found themselves without ammunition they could not stand up against troops who seemed to have plenty of it. the division broke and a portion fled, but most of the men, as they were not pursued, only fell back out of range of the fire of the enemy. it must have been about this time that thayer pushed his brigade in between the enemy and those of our troops that were without ammunition. at all events the enemy fell back within his intrenchments and was there when i got on the field. i saw the men standing in knots talking in the most excited manner. no officer seemed to be giving any directions. the soldiers had their muskets, but no ammunition, while there were tons of it close at hand. i heard some of the men say that the enemy had come out with knapsacks, and haversacks filled with rations. they seemed to think this indicated a determination on his part to stay out and fight just as long as the provisions held out. i turned to colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, who was with me, and said: "some of our men are pretty badly demoralized, but the enemy must be more so, for he has attempted to force his way out, but has fallen back: the one who attacks first now will be victorious and the enemy will have to be in a hurry if he gets ahead of me." i determined to make the assault at once on our left. it was clear to my mind that the enemy had started to march out with his entire force, except a few pickets, and if our attack could be made on the left before the enemy could redistribute his forces along the line, we would find but little opposition except from the intervening _abatis_. i directed colonel webster to ride with me and call out to the men as we passed: "fill your cartridge-boxes, quick, and get into line; the enemy is trying to escape and he must not be permitted to do so." this acted like a charm. the men only wanted some one to give them a command. we rode rapidly to smith's quarters, when i explained the situation to him and directed him to charge the enemy's works in his front with his whole division, saying at the same time that he would find nothing but a very thin line to contend with. the general was off in an incredibly short time, going in advance himself to keep his men from firing while they were working their way through the _abatis_ intervening between them and the enemy. the outer line of rifle-pits was passed, and the night of the 15th general smith, with much of his division, bivouacked within the lines of the enemy. there was now no doubt but that the confederates must surrender or be captured the next day. there seems from subsequent accounts to have been much consternation, particularly among the officers of high rank, in dover during the night of the 15th. general floyd, the commanding officer, who was a man of talent enough for any civil position, was no soldier and, possibly, did not possess the elements of one. he was further unfitted for command, for the reason that his conscience must have troubled him and made him afraid. as secretary of war he had taken a solemn oath to maintain the constitution of the united states and to uphold the same against all its enemies. he had betrayed that trust. as secretary of war he was reported through the northern press to have scattered the little army the country had so that the most of it could be picked up in detail when secession occurred. about a year before leaving the cabinet he had removed arms from northern to southern arsenals. he continued in the cabinet of president buchanan until about the 1st of january, 1861, while he was working vigilantly for the establishment of a confederacy made out of united states territory. well may he have been afraid to fall into the hands of national troops. he would no doubt have been tried for misappropriating public property, if not for treason, had he been captured. general pillow, next in command, was conceited, and prided himself much on his services in the mexican war. he telegraphed to general johnston, at nashville, after our men were within the rebel rifle-pits, and almost on the eve of his making his escape, that the southern troops had had great success all day. johnston forwarded the dispatch to richmond. while the authorities at the capital were reading it floyd and pillow were fugitives. a council of war was held by the enemy at which all agreed that it would be impossible to hold out longer. general buckner, who was third in rank in the garrison but much the most capable soldier, seems to have regarded it a duty to hold the fort until the general commanding the department, a. s. johnston, should get back to his headquarters at nashville. buckner's report shows, however, that he considered donelson lost and that any attempt to hold the place longer would be at the sacrifice of the command. being assured that johnston was already in nashville, buckner too agreed that surrender was the proper thing. floyd turned over the command to pillow, who declined it. it then devolved upon buckner, who accepted the responsibility of the position. floyd and pillow took possession of all the river transports at dover and before morning both were on their way to nashville, with the brigade formerly commanded by floyd and some other troops, in all about 3,000. some marched up the east bank of the cumberland; others went on the steamers. during the night forrest also, with his cavalry and some other troops about a thousand in all, made their way out, passing between our right and the river. they had to ford or swim over the back-water in the little creek just south of dover. before daylight general smith brought to me the following letter from general buckner: headquarters, fort donelson, february 16, 1862. sir:--in consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, i propose to the commanding officer of the federal forces the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and fort under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until 12 o'clock to-day. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. to brigadier-general u. s. grant, com'ding u. s. forces, near fort donelson. to this i responded as follows: headquarters army in the field, camp near donelson, february 16, 1862. general s. b. buckner, confederate army. sir:--yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. no terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. i propose to move immediately upon your works. i am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't se'v't, u. s. grant, brig. gen. to this i received the following reply: headquarters, dover, tennessee, february 16, 1862. to brig. gen'l u. s. grant, u. s. army. sir:--the distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose. i am, sir, your very ob't se'v't, s. b. buckner, brig. gen. c. s. a. general buckner, as soon as he had dispatched the first of the above letters, sent word to his different commanders on the line of rifle-pits, notifying them that he had made a proposition looking to the surrender of the garrison, and directing them to notify national troops in their front so that all fighting might be prevented. white flags were stuck at intervals along the line of rifle-pits, but none over the fort. as soon as the last letter from buckner was received i mounted my horse and rode to dover. general wallace, i found, had preceded me an hour or more. i presume that, seeing white flags exposed in his front, he rode up to see what they meant and, not being fired upon or halted, he kept on until he found himself at the headquarters of general buckner. i had been at west point three years with buckner and afterwards served with him in the army, so that we were quite well acquainted. in the course of our conversation, which was very friendly, he said to me that if he had been in command i would not have got up to donelson as easily as i did. i told him that if he had been in command i should not have tried in the way i did: i had invested their lines with a smaller force than they had to defend them, and at the same time had sent a brigade full 5,000 strong, around by water; i had relied very much upon their commander to allow me to come safely up to the outside of their works. i asked general buckner about what force he had to surrender. he replied that he could not tell with any degree of accuracy; that all the sick and weak had been sent to nashville while we were about fort henry; that floyd and pillow had left during the night, taking many men with them; and that forrest, and probably others, had also escaped during the preceding night: the number of casualties he could not tell; but he said i would not find fewer than 12,000, nor more than 15,000. he asked permission to send parties outside of the lines to bury his dead, who had fallen on the 15th when they tried to get out. i gave directions that his permit to pass our limits should be recognized. i have no reason to believe that this privilege was abused, but it familiarized our guards so much with the sight of confederates passing to and fro that i have no doubt many got beyond our pickets unobserved and went on. the most of the men who went in that way no doubt thought they had had war enough, and left with the intention of remaining out of the army. some came to me and asked permission to go, saying that they were tired of the war and would not be caught in the ranks again, and i bade them go. the actual number of confederates at fort donelson can never be given with entire accuracy. the largest number admitted by any writer on the southern side, is by colonel preston johnston. he gives the number at 17,000. but this must be an underestimate. the commissary general of prisoners reported having issued rations to 14,623 fort donelson prisoners at cairo, as they passed that point. general pillow reported the killed and wounded at 2,000; but he had less opportunity of knowing the actual numbers than the officers of mcclernand's division, for most of the killed and wounded fell outside their works, in front of that division, and were buried or cared for by buckner after the surrender and when pillow was a fugitive. it is known that floyd and pillow escaped during the night of the 15th, taking with them not less than 3,000 men. forrest escaped with about 1,000 and others were leaving singly and in squads all night. it is probable that the confederate force at donelson, on the 15th of february, 1862, was 21,000 in round numbers. on the day fort donelson fell i had 27,000 men to confront the confederate lines and guard the road four or five miles to the left, over which all our supplies had to be drawn on wagons. during the 16th, after the surrender, additional reinforcements arrived. during the siege general sherman had been sent to smithland, at the mouth of the cumberland river, to forward reinforcements and supplies to me. at that time he was my senior in rank and there was no authority of law to assign a junior to command a senior of the same grade. but every boat that came up with supplies or reinforcements brought a note of encouragement from sherman, asking me to call upon him for any assistance he could render and saying that if he could be of service at the front i might send for him and he would waive rank. chapter xxiii. promoted major-general of volunteers--unoccupied territory--advance upon nashville--situation of the troops--confederate retreat--relieved of the command--restored to the command--general smith. the news of the fall of fort donelson caused great delight all over the north. at the south, particularly in richmond, the effect was correspondingly depressing. i was promptly promoted to the grade of major-general of volunteers, and confirmed by the senate. all three of my division commanders were promoted to the same grade and the colonels who commanded brigades were made brigadier-generals in the volunteer service. my chief, who was in st. louis, telegraphed his congratulations to general hunter in kansas for the services he had rendered in securing the fall of fort donelson by sending reinforcements so rapidly. to washington he telegraphed that the victory was due to general c. f. smith; "promote him," he said, "and the whole country will applaud." on the 19th there was published at st. louis a formal order thanking flag-officer foote and myself, and the forces under our command, for the victories on the tennessee and the cumberland. i received no other recognition whatever from general halleck. but general cullum, his chief of staff, who was at cairo, wrote me a warm congratulatory letter on his own behalf. i approved of general smith's promotion highly, as i did all the promotions that were made. my opinion was and still is that immediately after the fall of fort donelson the way was opened to the national forces all over the south-west without much resistance. if one general who would have taken the responsibility had been in command of all the troops west of the alleghanies, he could have marched to chattanooga, corinth, memphis and vicksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the north there would soon have been force enough at all these centres to operate offensively against any body of the enemy that might be found near them. rapid movements and the acquisition of rebellious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to carry them to their destination. on the other hand there were tens of thousands of strong able-bodied young men still at their homes in the south-western states, who had not gone into the confederate army in february, 1862, and who had no particular desire to go. if our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. providence ruled differently. time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his north-western front up to the ohio river. i promptly informed the department commander of our success at fort donelson and that the way was open now to clarksville and nashville; and that unless i received orders to the contrary i should take clarksville on the 21st and nashville about the 1st of march. both these places are on the cumberland river above fort donelson. as i heard nothing from headquarters on the subject, general c. f. smith was sent to clarksville at the time designated and found the place evacuated. the capture of forts henry and donelson had broken the line the enemy had taken from columbus to bowling green, and it was known that he was falling back from the eastern point of this line and that buell was following, or at least advancing. i should have sent troops to nashville at the time i sent to clarksville, but my transportation was limited and there were many prisoners to be forwarded north. none of the reinforcements from buell's army arrived until the 24th of february. then general nelson came up, with orders to report to me with two brigades, he having sent one brigade to cairo. i knew general buell was advancing on nashville from the north, and i was advised by scouts that the rebels were leaving that place, and trying to get out all the supplies they could. nashville was, at that time, one of the best provisioned posts in the south. i had no use for reinforcements now, and thinking buell would like to have his troops again, i ordered nelson to proceed to nashville without debarking at fort donelson. i sent a gunboat also as a convoy. the cumberland river was very high at the time; the railroad bridge at nashville had been burned, and all river craft had been destroyed, or would be before the enemy left. nashville is on the west bank of the cumberland, and buell was approaching from the east. i thought the steamers carrying nelson's division would be useful in ferrying the balance of buell's forces across. i ordered nelson to put himself in communication with buell as soon as possible, and if he found him more than two days off from nashville to return below the city and await orders. buell, however, had already arrived in person at edgefield, opposite nashville, and mitchell's division of his command reached there the same day. nelson immediately took possession of the city. after nelson had gone and before i had learned of buell's arrival, i sent word to department headquarters that i should go to nashville myself on the 28th if i received no orders to the contrary. hearing nothing, i went as i had informed my superior officer i would do. on arriving at clarksville i saw a fleet of steamers at the shore--the same that had taken nelson's division--and troops going aboard. i landed and called on the commanding officer, general c. f. smith. as soon as he saw me he showed an order he had just received from buell in these words: nashville, february 25, 1862. general c. f. smith, commanding u. s. forces, clarksville. general:--the landing of a portion of our troops, contrary to my intentions, on the south side of the river has compelled me to hold this side at every hazard. if the enemy should assume the offensive, and i am assured by reliable persons that in view of my position such is his intention, my force present is altogether inadequate, consisting of only 15,000 men. i have to request you, therefore, to come forward with all the available force under your command. so important do i consider the occasion that i think it necessary to give this communication all the force of orders, and i send four boats, the diana, woodford, john rain, and autocrat, to bring you up. in five or six days my force will probably be sufficient to relieve you. very respectfully, your ob't srv't, d. c. buell, brigadier-general comd'g. p. s.--the steamers will leave here at 12 o'clock to-night. general smith said this order was nonsense. but i told him it was better to obey it. the general replied, "of course i must obey," and said his men were embarking as fast as they could. i went on up to nashville and inspected the position taken by nelson's troops. i did not see buell during the day, and wrote him a note saying that i had been in nashville since early morning and had hoped to meet him. on my return to the boat we met. his troops were still east of the river, and the steamers that had carried nelson's division up were mostly at clarksville to bring smith's division. i said to general buell my information was that the enemy was retreating as fast as possible. general buell said there was fighting going on then only ten or twelve miles away. i said: "quite probably; nashville contained valuable stores of arms, ammunition and provisions, and the enemy is probably trying to carry away all he can. the fighting is doubtless with the rear-guard who are trying to protect the trains they are getting away with." buell spoke very positively of the danger nashville was in of an attack from the enemy. i said, in the absence of positive information, i believed my information was correct. he responded that he "knew." "well," i said, "i do not know; but as i came by clarksville general smith's troops were embarking to join you." smith's troops were returned the same day. the enemy were trying to get away from nashville and not to return to it. at this time general albert sidney johnston commanded all the confederate troops west of the alleghany mountains, with the exception of those in the extreme south. on the national side the forces confronting him were divided into, at first three, then four separate departments. johnston had greatly the advantage in having supreme command over all troops that could possibly be brought to bear upon one point, while the forces similarly situated on the national side, divided into independent commands, could not be brought into harmonious action except by orders from washington. at the beginning of 1862 johnston's troops east of the mississippi occupied a line extending from columbus, on his left, to mill springs, on his right. as we have seen, columbus, both banks of the tennessee river, the west bank of the cumberland and bowling green, all were strongly fortified. mill springs was intrenched. the national troops occupied no territory south of the ohio, except three small garrisons along its bank and a force thrown out from louisville to confront that at bowling green. johnston's strength was no doubt numerically inferior to that of the national troops; but this was compensated for by the advantage of being sole commander of all the confederate forces at the west, and of operating in a country where his friends would take care of his rear without any detail of soldiers. but when general george h. thomas moved upon the enemy at mill springs and totally routed him, inflicting a loss of some 300 killed and wounded, and forts henry and heiman fell into the hands of the national forces, with their armaments and about 100 prisoners, those losses seemed to dishearten the confederate commander so much that he immediately commenced a retreat from bowling green on nashville. he reached this latter place on the 14th of february, while donelson was still besieged. buell followed with a portion of the army of the ohio, but he had to march and did not reach the east bank of the cumberland opposite nashville until the 24th of the month, and then with only one division of his army. the bridge at nashville had been destroyed and all boats removed or disabled, so that a small garrison could have held the place against any national troops that could have been brought against it within ten days after the arrival of the force from bowling green. johnston seemed to lie quietly at nashville to await the result at fort donelson, on which he had staked the possession of most of the territory embraced in the states of kentucky and tennessee. it is true, the two generals senior in rank at fort donelson were sending him encouraging dispatches, even claiming great confederate victories up to the night of the 16th when they must have been preparing for their individual escape. johnston made a fatal mistake in intrusting so important a command to floyd, who he must have known was no soldier even if he possessed the elements of one. pillow's presence as second was also a mistake. if these officers had been forced upon him and designated for that particular command, then he should have left nashville with a small garrison under a trusty officer, and with the remainder of his force gone to donelson himself. if he had been captured the result could not have been worse than it was. johnston's heart failed him upon the first advance of national troops. he wrote to richmond on the 8th of february, "i think the gunboats of the enemy will probably take fort donelson without the necessity of employing their land force in cooperation." after the fall of that place he abandoned nashville and chattanooga without an effort to save either, and fell back into northern mississippi, where, six weeks later, he was destined to end his career. from the time of leaving cairo i was singularly unfortunate in not receiving dispatches from general halleck. the order of the 10th of february directing me to fortify fort henry strongly, particularly to the land side, and saying that intrenching tools had been sent for that purpose, reached me after donelson was invested. i received nothing direct which indicated that the department commander knew we were in possession of donelson. i was reporting regularly to the chief of staff, who had been sent to cairo, soon after the troops left there, to receive all reports from the front and to telegraph the substance to the st. louis headquarters. cairo was at the southern end of the telegraph wire. another line was started at once from cairo to paducah and smithland, at the mouths of the tennessee and cumberland respectively. my dispatches were all sent to cairo by boat, but many of those addressed to me were sent to the operator at the end of the advancing wire and he failed to forward them. this operator afterwards proved to be a rebel; he deserted his post after a short time and went south taking his dispatches with him. a telegram from general mcclellan to me of february 16th, the day of the surrender, directing me to report in full the situation, was not received at my headquarters until the 3d of march. on the 2d of march i received orders dated march 1st to move my command back to fort henry, leaving only a small garrison at donelson. from fort henry expeditions were to be sent against eastport, mississippi, and paris, tennessee. we started from donelson on the 4th, and the same day i was back on the tennessee river. on march 4th i also received the following dispatch from general halleck: maj.-gen. u. s. grant, fort henry: you will place maj.-gen. c. f. smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at fort henry. why do you not obey my orders to report strength and positions of your command? h. w. halleck, major-general. i was surprised. this was the first intimation i had received that general halleck had called for information as to the strength of my command. on the 6th he wrote to me again. "your going to nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at washington, so much so that i was advised to arrest you on your return." this was the first i knew of his objecting to my going to nashville. that place was not beyond the limits of my command, which, it had been expressly declared in orders, were "not defined." nashville is west of the cumberland river, and i had sent troops that had reported to me for duty to occupy the place. i turned over the command as directed and then replied to general halleck courteously, but asked to be relieved from further duty under him. later i learned that general halleck had been calling lustily for more troops, promising that he would do something important if he could only be sufficiently reinforced. mcclellan asked him what force he then had. halleck telegraphed me to supply the information so far as my command was concerned, but i received none of his dispatches. at last halleck reported to washington that he had repeatedly ordered me to give the strength of my force, but could get nothing out of me; that i had gone to nashville, beyond the limits of my command, without his authority, and that my army was more demoralized by victory than the army at bull run had been by defeat. general mcclellan, on this information, ordered that i should be relieved from duty and that an investigation should be made into any charges against me. he even authorized my arrest. thus in less than two weeks after the victory at donelson, the two leading generals in the army were in correspondence as to what disposition should be made of me, and in less than three weeks i was virtually in arrest and without a command. on the 13th of march i was restored to command, and on the 17th halleck sent me a copy of an order from the war department which stated that accounts of my misbehavior had reached washington and directed him to investigate and report the facts. he forwarded also a copy of a detailed dispatch from himself to washington entirely exonerating me; but he did not inform me that it was his own reports that had created all the trouble. on the contrary, he wrote to me, "instead of relieving you, i wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume immediate command, and lead it to new victories." in consequence i felt very grateful to him, and supposed it was his interposition that had set me right with the government. i never knew the truth until general badeau unearthed the facts in his researches for his history of my campaigns. general halleck unquestionably deemed general c. f. smith a much fitter officer for the command of all the forces in the military district than i was, and, to render him available for such command, desired his promotion to antedate mine and those of the other division commanders. it is probable that the general opinion was that smith's long services in the army and distinguished deeds rendered him the more proper person for such command. indeed i was rather inclined to this opinion myself at that time, and would have served as faithfully under smith as he had done under me. but this did not justify the dispatches which general halleck sent to washington, or his subsequent concealment of them from me when pretending to explain the action of my superiors. on receipt of the order restoring me to command i proceeded to savannah on the tennessee, to which point my troops had advanced. general smith was delighted to see me and was unhesitating in his denunciation of the treatment i had received. he was on a sick bed at the time, from which he never came away alive. his death was a severe loss to our western army. his personal courage was unquestioned, his judgment and professional acquirements were unsurpassed, and he had the confidence of those he commanded as well as of those over him. chapter xxiv. the army at pittsburg landing--injured by a fall--the confederate attack at shiloh--the first day's fight at shiloh--general sherman--condition of the army--close of the first day's fight--the second day's fight --retreat and defeat of the confederates. when i reassumed command on the 17th of march i found the army divided, about half being on the east bank of the tennessee at savannah, while one division was at crump's landing on the west bank about four miles higher up, and the remainder at pittsburg landing, five miles above crump's. the enemy was in force at corinth, the junction of the two most important railroads in the mississippi valley--one connecting memphis and the mississippi river with the east, and the other leading south to all the cotton states. still another railroad connects corinth with jackson, in west tennessee. if we obtained possession of corinth the enemy would have no railroad for the transportation of armies or supplies until that running east from vicksburg was reached. it was the great strategic position at the west between the tennessee and the mississippi rivers and between nashville and vicksburg. i at once put all the troops at savannah in motion for pittsburg landing, knowing that the enemy was fortifying at corinth and collecting an army there under johnston. it was my expectation to march against that army as soon as buell, who had been ordered to reinforce me with the army of the ohio, should arrive; and the west bank of the river was the place to start from. pittsburg is only about twenty miles from corinth, and hamburg landing, four miles further up the river, is a mile or two nearer. i had not been in command long before i selected hamburg as the place to put the army of the ohio when it arrived. the roads from pittsburg and hamburg to corinth converge some eight miles out. this disposition of the troops would have given additional roads to march over when the advance commenced, within supporting distance of each other. before i arrived at savannah, sherman, who had joined the army of the tennessee and been placed in command of a division, had made an expedition on steamers convoyed by gunboats to the neighborhood of eastport, thirty miles south, for the purpose of destroying the railroad east of corinth. the rains had been so heavy for some time before that the low-lands had become impassable swamps. sherman debarked his troops and started out to accomplish the object of the expedition; but the river was rising so rapidly that the back-water up the small tributaries threatened to cut off the possibility of getting back to the boats, and the expedition had to return without reaching the railroad. the guns had to be hauled by hand through the water to get back to the boats. on the 17th of march the army on the tennessee river consisted of five divisions, commanded respectively by generals c. f. smith, mcclernand, l. wallace, hurlbut and sherman. general w. h. l. wallace was temporarily in command of smith's division, general smith, as i have said, being confined to his bed. reinforcements were arriving daily and as they came up they were organized, first into brigades, then into a division, and the command given to general prentiss, who had been ordered to report to me. general buell was on his way from nashville with 40,000 veterans. on the 19th of march he was at columbia, tennessee, eighty-five miles from pittsburg. when all reinforcements should have arrived i expected to take the initiative by marching on corinth, and had no expectation of needing fortifications, though this subject was taken into consideration. mcpherson, my only military engineer, was directed to lay out a line to intrench. he did so, but reported that it would have to be made in rear of the line of encampment as it then ran. the new line, while it would be nearer the river, was yet too far away from the tennessee, or even from the creeks, to be easily supplied with water, and in case of attack these creeks would be in the hands of the enemy. the fact is, i regarded the campaign we were engaged in as an offensive one and had no idea that the enemy would leave strong intrenchments to take the initiative when he knew he would be attacked where he was if he remained. this view, however, did not prevent every precaution being taken and every effort made to keep advised of all movements of the enemy. johnston's cavalry meanwhile had been well out towards our front, and occasional encounters occurred between it and our outposts. on the 1st of april this cavalry became bold and approached our lines, showing that an advance of some kind was contemplated. on the 2d johnston left corinth in force to attack my army. on the 4th his cavalry dashed down and captured a small picket guard of six or seven men, stationed some five miles out from pittsburg on the corinth road. colonel buckland sent relief to the guard at once and soon followed in person with an entire regiment, and general sherman followed buckland taking the remainder of a brigade. the pursuit was kept up for some three miles beyond the point where the picket guard had been captured, and after nightfall sherman returned to camp and reported to me by letter what had occurred. at this time a large body of the enemy was hovering to the west of us, along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad. my apprehension was much greater for the safety of crump's landing than it was for pittsburg. i had no apprehension that the enemy could really capture either place. but i feared it was possible that he might make a rapid dash upon crump's and destroy our transports and stores, most of which were kept at that point, and then retreat before wallace could be reinforced. lew. wallace's position i regarded as so well chosen that he was not removed. at this time i generally spent the day at pittsburg and returned to savannah in the evening. i was intending to remove my headquarters to pittsburg, but buell was expected daily and would come in at savannah. i remained at this point, therefore, a few days longer than i otherwise should have done, in order to meet him on his arrival. the skirmishing in our front, however, had been so continuous from about the 3d of april that i did not leave pittsburg each night until an hour when i felt there would be no further danger before the morning. on friday the 4th, the day of buckland's advance, i was very much injured by my horse falling with me, and on me, while i was trying to get to the front where firing had been heard. the night was one of impenetrable darkness, with rain pouring down in torrents; nothing was visible to the eye except as revealed by the frequent flashes of lightning. under these circumstances i had to trust to the horse, without guidance, to keep the road. i had not gone far, however, when i met general w. h. l. wallace and colonel (afterwards general) mcpherson coming from the direction of the front. they said all was quiet so far as the enemy was concerned. on the way back to the boat my horse's feet slipped from under him, and he fell with my leg under his body. the extreme softness of the ground, from the excessive rains of the few preceding days, no doubt saved me from a severe injury and protracted lameness. as it was, my ankle was very much injured, so much so that my boot had to be cut off. for two or three days after i was unable to walk except with crutches. on the 5th general nelson, with a division of buell's army, arrived at savannah and i ordered him to move up the east bank of the river, to be in a position where he could be ferried over to crump's landing or pittsburg as occasion required. i had learned that general buell himself would be at savannah the next day, and desired to meet me on his arrival. affairs at pittsburg landing had been such for several days that i did not want to be away during the day. i determined, therefore, to take a very early breakfast and ride out to meet buell, and thus save time. he had arrived on the evening of the 5th, but had not advised me of the fact and i was not aware of it until some time after. while i was at breakfast, however, heavy firing was heard in the direction of pittsburg landing, and i hastened there, sending a hurried note to buell informing him of the reason why i could not meet him at savannah. on the way up the river i directed the dispatch-boat to run in close to crump's landing, so that i could communicate with general lew. wallace. i found him waiting on a boat apparently expecting to see me, and i directed him to get his troops in line ready to execute any orders he might receive. he replied that his troops were already under arms and prepared to move. up to that time i had felt by no means certain that crump's landing might not be the point of attack. on reaching the front, however, about eight a.m., i found that the attack on pittsburg was unmistakable, and that nothing more than a small guard, to protect our transports and stores, was needed at crump's. captain baxter, a quartermaster on my staff, was accordingly directed to go back and order general wallace to march immediately to pittsburg by the road nearest the river. captain baxter made a memorandum of this order. about one p.m., not hearing from wallace and being much in need of reinforcements, i sent two more of my staff, colonel mcpherson and captain rowley, to bring him up with his division. they reported finding him marching towards purdy, bethel, or some point west from the river, and farther from pittsburg by several miles than when he started. the road from his first position to pittsburg landing was direct and near the river. between the two points a bridge had been built across snake creek by our troops, at which wallace's command had assisted, expressly to enable the troops at the two places to support each other in case of need. wallace did not arrive in time to take part in the first day's fight. general wallace has since claimed that the order delivered to him by captain baxter was simply to join the right of the army, and that the road over which he marched would have taken him to the road from pittsburg to purdy where it crosses owl creek on the right of sherman; but this is not where i had ordered him nor where i wanted him to go. i never could see and do not now see why any order was necessary further than to direct him to come to pittsburg landing, without specifying by what route. his was one of three veteran divisions that had been in battle, and its absence was severely felt. later in the war general wallace would not have made the mistake that he committed on the 6th of april, 1862. i presume his idea was that by taking the route he did he would be able to come around on the flank or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of heroism that would redound to the credit of his command, as well as to the benefit of his country. some two or three miles from pittsburg landing was a log meeting-house called shiloh. it stood on the ridge which divides the waters of snake and lick creeks, the former emptying into the tennessee just north of pittsburg landing, and the latter south. this point was the key to our position and was held by sherman. his division was at that time wholly raw, no part of it ever having been in an engagement; but i thought this deficiency was more than made up by the superiority of the commander. mcclernand was on sherman's left, with troops that had been engaged at forts henry and donelson and were therefore veterans so far as western troops had become such at that stage of the war. next to mcclernand came prentiss with a raw division, and on the extreme left, stuart with one brigade of sherman's division. hurlbut was in rear of prentiss, massed, and in reserve at the time of the onset. the division of general c. f. smith was on the right, also in reserve. general smith was still sick in bed at savannah, but within hearing of our guns. his services would no doubt have been of inestimable value had his health permitted his presence. the command of his division devolved upon brigadier-general w. h. l. wallace, a most estimable and able officer; a veteran too, for he had served a year in the mexican war and had been with his command at henry and donelson. wallace was mortally wounded in the first day's engagement, and with the change of commanders thus necessarily effected in the heat of battle the efficiency of his division was much weakened. the position of our troops made a continuous line from lick creek on the left to owl creek, a branch of snake creek, on the right, facing nearly south and possibly a little west. the water in all these streams was very high at the time and contributed to protect our flanks. the enemy was compelled, therefore, to attack directly in front. this he did with great vigor, inflicting heavy losses on the national side, but suffering much heavier on his own. the confederate assaults were made with such a disregard of losses on their own side that our line of tents soon fell into their hands. the ground on which the battle was fought was undulating, heavily timbered with scattered clearings, the woods giving some protection to the troops on both sides. there was also considerable underbrush. a number of attempts were made by the enemy to turn our right flank, where sherman was posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy loss. but the front attack was kept up so vigorously that, to prevent the success of these attempts to get on our flanks, the national troops were compelled, several times, to take positions to the rear nearer pittsburg landing. when the firing ceased at night the national line was all of a mile in rear of the position it had occupied in the morning. in one of the backward moves, on the 6th, the division commanded by general prentiss did not fall back with the others. this left his flanks exposed and enabled the enemy to capture him with about 2,200 of his officers and men. general badeau gives four o'clock of the 6th as about the time this capture took place. he may be right as to the time, but my recollection is that the hour was later. general prentiss himself gave the hour as half-past five. i was with him, as i was with each of the division commanders that day, several times, and my recollection is that the last time i was with him was about half-past four, when his division was standing up firmly and the general was as cool as if expecting victory. but no matter whether it was four or later, the story that he and his command were surprised and captured in their camps is without any foundation whatever. if it had been true, as currently reported at the time and yet believed by thousands of people, that prentiss and his division had been captured in their beds, there would not have been an all-day struggle, with the loss of thousands killed and wounded on the confederate side. with the single exception of a few minutes after the capture of prentiss, a continuous and unbroken line was maintained all day from snake creek or its tributaries on the right to lick creek or the tennessee on the left above pittsburg. there was no hour during the day when there was not heavy firing and generally hard fighting at some point on the line, but seldom at all points at the same time. it was a case of southern dash against northern pluck and endurance. three of the five divisions engaged on sunday were entirely raw, and many of the men had only received their arms on the way from their states to the field. many of them had arrived but a day or two before and were hardly able to load their muskets according to the manual. their officers were equally ignorant of their duties. under these circumstances it is not astonishing that many of the regiments broke at the first fire. in two cases, as i now remember, colonels led their regiments from the field on first hearing the whistle of the enemy's bullets. in these cases the colonels were constitutional cowards, unfit for any military position; but not so the officers and men led out of danger by them. better troops never went upon a battle-field than many of these, officers and men, afterwards proved themselves to be, who fled panic stricken at the first whistle of bullets and shell at shiloh. during the whole of sunday i was continuously engaged in passing from one part of the field to another, giving directions to division commanders. in thus moving along the line, however, i never deemed it important to stay long with sherman. although his troops were then under fire for the first time, their commander, by his constant presence with them, inspired a confidence in officers and men that enabled them to render services on that bloody battle-field worthy of the best of veterans. mcclernand was next to sherman, and the hardest fighting was in front of these two divisions. mcclernand told me on that day, the 6th, that he profited much by having so able a commander supporting him. a casualty to sherman that would have taken him from the field that day would have been a sad one for the troops engaged at shiloh. and how near we came to this! on the 6th sherman was shot twice, once in the hand, once in the shoulder, the ball cutting his coat and making a slight wound, and a third ball passed through his hat. in addition to this he had several horses shot during the day. the nature of this battle was such that cavalry could not be used in front; i therefore formed ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers--of whom there were many. when there would be enough of them to make a show, and after they had recovered from their fright, they would be sent to reinforce some part of the line which needed support, without regard to their companies, regiments or brigades. on one occasion during the day i rode back as far as the river and met general buell, who had just arrived; i do not remember the hour, but at that time there probably were as many as four or five thousand stragglers lying under cover of the river bluff, panic-stricken, most of whom would have been shot where they lay, without resistance, before they would have taken muskets and marched to the front to protect themselves. this meeting between general buell and myself was on the dispatch-boat used to run between the landing and savannah. it was brief, and related specially to his getting his troops over the river. as we left the boat together, buell's attention was attracted by the men lying under cover of the river bank. i saw him berating them and trying to shame them into joining their regiments. he even threatened them with shells from the gunboats near by. but it was all to no effect. most of these men afterward proved themselves as gallant as any of those who saved the battle from which they had deserted. i have no doubt that this sight impressed general buell with the idea that a line of retreat would be a good thing just then. if he had come in by the front instead of through the stragglers in the rear, he would have thought and felt differently. could he have come through the confederate rear, he would have witnessed there a scene similar to that at our own. the distant rear of an army engaged in battle is not the best place from which to judge correctly what is going on in front. later in the war, while occupying the country between the tennessee and the mississippi, i learned that the panic in the confederate lines had not differed much from that within our own. some of the country people estimated the stragglers from johnston's army as high as 20,000. of course this was an exaggeration. the situation at the close of sunday was as follows: along the top of the bluff just south of the log-house which stood at pittsburg landing, colonel j. d. webster, of my staff, had arranged twenty or more pieces of artillery facing south or up the river. this line of artillery was on the crest of a hill overlooking a deep ravine opening into the tennessee. hurlbut with his division intact was on the right of this artillery, extending west and possibly a little north. mcclernand came next in the general line, looking more to the west. his division was complete in its organization and ready for any duty. sherman came next, his right extending to snake creek. his command, like the other two, was complete in its organization and ready, like its chief, for any service it might be called upon to render. all three divisions were, as a matter of course, more or less shattered and depleted in numbers from the terrible battle of the day. the division of w. h. l. wallace, as much from the disorder arising from changes of division and brigade commanders, under heavy fire, as from any other cause, had lost its organization and did not occupy a place in the line as a division. prentiss' command was gone as a division, many of its members having been killed, wounded or captured, but it had rendered valiant services before its final dispersal, and had contributed a good share to the defence of shiloh. the right of my line rested near the bank of snake creek, a short distance above the bridge which had been built by the troops for the purpose of connecting crump's landing and pittsburg landing. sherman had posted some troops in a log-house and out-buildings which overlooked both the bridge over which wallace was expected and the creek above that point. in this last position sherman was frequently attacked before night, but held the point until he voluntarily abandoned it to advance in order to make room for lew. wallace, who came up after dark. there was, as i have said, a deep ravine in front of our left. the tennessee river was very high and there was water to a considerable depth in the ravine. here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn our flank, but was repelled. the gunboats tyler and lexington, gwin and shirk commanding, with the artillery under webster, aided the army and effectually checked their further progress. before any of buell's troops had reached the west bank of the tennessee, firing had almost entirely ceased; anything like an attempt on the part of the enemy to advance had absolutely ceased. there was some artillery firing from an unseen enemy, some of his shells passing beyond us; but i do not remember that there was the whistle of a single musket-ball heard. as his troops arrived in the dusk general buell marched several of his regiments part way down the face of the hill where they fired briskly for some minutes, but i do not think a single man engaged in this firing received an injury. the attack had spent its force. general lew. wallace, with 5,000 effective men, arrived after firing had ceased for the day, and was placed on the right. thus night came, wallace came, and the advance of nelson's division came; but none --unless night--in time to be of material service to the gallant men who saved shiloh on that first day against large odds. buell's loss on the 6th of april was two men killed and one wounded, all members of the 36th indiana infantry. the army of the tennessee lost on that day at least 7,000 men. the presence of two or three regiments of buell's army on the west bank before firing ceased had not the slightest effect in preventing the capture of pittsburg landing. so confident was i before firing had ceased on the 6th that the next day would bring victory to our arms if we could only take the initiative, that i visited each division commander in person before any reinforcements had reached the field. i directed them to throw out heavy lines of skirmishers in the morning as soon as they could see, and push them forward until they found the enemy, following with their entire divisions in supporting distance, and to engage the enemy as soon as found. to sherman i told the story of the assault at fort donelson, and said that the same tactics would win at shiloh. victory was assured when wallace arrived, even if there had been no other support. i was glad, however, to see the reinforcements of buell and credit them with doing all there was for them to do. during the night of the 6th the remainder of nelson's division, buell's army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming the left wing. two other divisions, crittenden's and mccook's, came up the river from savannah in the transports and were on the west bank early on the 7th. buell commanded them in person. my command was thus nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency. during the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to the storm without shelter. i made my headquarters under a tree a few hundred yards back from the river bank. my ankle was so much swollen from the fall of my horse the friday night preceding, and the bruise was so painful, that i could get no rest. the drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without this additional cause. some time after midnight, growing restive under the storm and the continuous pain, i moved back to the log-house under the bank. this had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or alleviate suffering. the sight was more unendurable than encountering the enemy's fire, and i returned to my tree in the rain. the advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back from the most advanced position of the confederates on the day before. it is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of buell's command. possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night. the position of the union troops on the morning of the 7th was as follows: general lew. wallace on the right; sherman on his left; then mcclernand and then hurlbut. nelson, of buell's army, was on our extreme left, next to the river. crittenden was next in line after nelson and on his right, mccook followed and formed the extreme right of buell's command. my old command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under buell constituted the left wing of the army. these relative positions were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from the field. in a very short time the battle became general all along the line. this day everything was favorable to the union side. we had now become the attacking party. the enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. the last point held by him was near the road leading from the landing to corinth, on the left of sherman and right of mcclernand. about three o'clock, being near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere else, i gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward, going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. at this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for charging, although exposed. i knew the enemy were ready to break and only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their friends who had started earlier. after marching to within musket-range i stopped and let the troops pass. the command, charge, was given, and was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy broke. (*7) chapter xxv. struck by a bullet--precipitate retreat of the confederates --intrenchments at shiloh--general buell--general johnston--remarks on shiloh. during this second day of the battle i had been moving from right to left and back, to see for myself the progress made. in the early part of the afternoon, while riding with colonel mcpherson and major hawkins, then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. we were moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the river above the landing. there did not appear to be an enemy to our right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. the shells and balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. i do not think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight. in the sudden start we made, major hawkins lost his hat. he did not stop to pick it up. when we arrived at a perfectly safe position we halted to take an account of damages. mcpherson's horse was panting as if ready to drop. on examination it was found that a ball had struck him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely through. in a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no sign of injury until we came to a stop. a ball had struck the metal scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off; before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. there were three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a sword-scabbard. all were thankful that it was no worse. after the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. the enemy carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made them still worse for troops following. i wanted to pursue, but had not the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days, lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and i did (*8) not feel disposed to positively order buell, or any part of his command, to pursue. although the senior in rank at the time i had been so only a few weeks. buell was, and had been for some time past, a department commander, while i commanded only a district. i did not meet buell in person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but had i seen him at the moment of the last charge i should have at least requested him to follow. i rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their loads to enable them to get off their guns. about five miles out we found their field hospital abandoned. an immediate pursuit must have resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and probably some guns. shiloh was the severest battle fought at the west during the war, and but few in the east equalled it for hard, determined fighting. i saw an open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the ground. on our side national and confederate troops were mingled together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field nearly all were confederates. on one part, which had evidently not been ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. there was not one of these left standing unpierced by bullets. the smaller ones were all cut down. contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of the army i was then commanding, we were on the defensive. we were without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill as soldiers. the officers with them, except the division commanders and possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally inexperienced in war. the result was a union victory that gave the men who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after. the enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy an army and capture a position. they failed in both, with very heavy loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and convinced that the "yankee" was not an enemy to be despised. after the battle i gave verbal instructions to division commanders to let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so buried. the latter part of these instructions was not carried out by all; but they were by those sent from sherman's division, and by some of the parties sent out by mcclernand. the heaviest loss sustained by the enemy was in front of these two divisions. the criticism has often been made that the union troops should have been intrenched at shiloh. up to that time the pick and spade had been but little resorted to at the west. i had, however, taken this subject under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. besides this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe. reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other. under all these circumstances i concluded that drill and discipline were worth more to our men than fortifications. general buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as i ever knew. i had been two years at west point with him, and had served with him afterwards, in garrison and in the mexican war, several years more. he was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate acquaintances. he was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence and respect of all who knew him. he was a strict disciplinarian, and perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who "enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. one system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character. the other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any other occupation. general buell became an object of harsh criticism later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. no one who knew him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and then betray the trust. when i came into command of the army in 1864, i requested the secretary of war to restore general buell to duty. after the war, during the summer of 1865, i travelled considerably through the north, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people. every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why. correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war or the individuals concerned in it. the opportunity frequently occurred for me to defend general buell against what i believed to be most unjust charges. on one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very charge i had so often refuted--of disloyalty. this brought from general buell a very severe retort, which i saw in the new york world some time before i received the letter itself. i could very well understand his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. i replied to him, but not through the press. i kept no copy of my letter, nor did i ever see it in print; neither did i receive an answer. general albert sidney johnston, who commanded the confederate forces at the beginning of the battle, was disabled by a wound on the afternoon of the first day. this wound, as i understood afterwards, was not necessarily fatal, or even dangerous. but he was a man who would not abandon what he deemed an important trust in the face of danger and consequently continued in the saddle, commanding, until so exhausted by the loss of blood that he had to be taken from his horse, and soon after died. the news was not long in reaching our side and i suppose was quite an encouragement to the national soldiers. i had known johnston slightly in the mexican war and later as an officer in the regular army. he was a man of high character and ability. his contemporaries at west point, and officers generally who came to know him personally later and who remained on our side, expected him to prove the most formidable man to meet that the confederacy would produce. i once wrote that nothing occurred in his brief command of an army to prove or disprove the high estimate that had been placed upon his military ability; but after studying the orders and dispatches of johnston i am compelled to materially modify my views of that officer's qualifications as a soldier. my judgment now is that he was vacillating and undecided in his actions. all the disasters in kentucky and tennessee were so discouraging to the authorities in richmond that jefferson davis wrote an unofficial letter to johnston expressing his own anxiety and that of the public, and saying that he had made such defence as was dictated by long friendship, but that in the absence of a report he needed facts. the letter was not a reprimand in direct terms, but it was evidently as much felt as though it had been one. general johnston raised another army as rapidly as he could, and fortified or strongly intrenched at corinth. he knew the national troops were preparing to attack him in his chosen position. but he had evidently become so disturbed at the results of his operations that he resolved to strike out in an offensive campaign which would restore all that was lost, and if successful accomplish still more. we have the authority of his son and biographer for saying that his plan was to attack the forces at shiloh and crush them; then to cross the tennessee and destroy the army of buell, and push the war across the ohio river. the design was a bold one; but we have the same authority for saying that in the execution johnston showed vacillation and indecision. he left corinth on the 2d of april and was not ready to attack until the 6th. the distance his army had to march was less than twenty miles. beauregard, his second in command, was opposed to the attack for two reasons: first, he thought, if let alone the national troops would attack the confederates in their intrenchments; second, we were in ground of our own choosing and would necessarily be intrenched. johnston not only listened to the objection of beauregard to an attack, but held a council of war on the subject on the morning of the 5th. on the evening of the same day he was in consultation with some of his generals on the same subject, and still again on the morning of the 6th. during this last consultation, and before a decision had been reached, the battle began by the national troops opening fire on the enemy. this seemed to settle the question as to whether there was to be any battle of shiloh. it also seems to me to settle the question as to whether there was a surprise. i do not question the personal courage of general johnston, or his ability. but he did not win the distinction predicted for him by many of his friends. he did prove that as a general he was over-estimated. general beauregard was next in rank to johnston and succeeded to the command, which he retained to the close of the battle and during the subsequent retreat on corinth, as well as in the siege of that place. his tactics have been severely criticised by confederate writers, but i do not believe his fallen chief could have done any better under the circumstances. some of these critics claim that shiloh was won when johnston fell, and that if he had not fallen the army under me would have been annihilated or captured. ifs defeated the confederates at shiloh. there is little doubt that we would have been disgracefully beaten if all the shells and bullets fired by us had passed harmlessly over the enemy and if all of theirs had taken effect. commanding generals are liable to be killed during engagements; and the fact that when he was shot johnston was leading a brigade to induce it to make a charge which had been repeatedly ordered, is evidence that there was neither the universal demoralization on our side nor the unbounded confidence on theirs which has been claimed. there was, in fact, no hour during the day when i doubted the eventual defeat of the enemy, although i was disappointed that reinforcements so near at hand did not arrive at an earlier hour. the description of the battle of shiloh given by colonel wm. preston johnston is very graphic and well told. the reader will imagine that he can see each blow struck, a demoralized and broken mob of union soldiers, each blow sending the enemy more demoralized than ever towards the tennessee river, which was a little more than two miles away at the beginning of the onset. if the reader does not stop to inquire why, with such confederate success for more than twelve hours of hard fighting, the national troops were not all killed, captured or driven into the river, he will regard the pen picture as perfect. but i witnessed the fight from the national side from eight o'clock in the morning until night closed the contest. i see but little in the description that i can recognize. the confederate troops fought well and deserve commendation enough for their bravery and endurance on the 6th of april, without detracting from their antagonists or claiming anything more than their just dues. the reports of the enemy show that their condition at the end of the first day was deplorable; their losses in killed and wounded had been very heavy, and their stragglers had been quite as numerous as on the national side, with the difference that those of the enemy left the field entirely and were not brought back to their respective commands for many days. on the union side but few of the stragglers fell back further than the landing on the river, and many of these were in line for duty on the second day. the admissions of the highest confederate officers engaged at shiloh make the claim of a victory for them absurd. the victory was not to either party until the battle was over. it was then a union victory, in which the armies of the tennessee and the ohio both participated. but the army of the tennessee fought the entire rebel army on the 6th and held it at bay until near night; and night alone closed the conflict and not the three regiments of nelson's division. the confederates fought with courage at shiloh, but the particular skill claimed i could not and still cannot see; though there is nothing to criticise except the claims put forward for it since. but the confederate claimants for superiority in strategy, superiority in generalship and superiority in dash and prowess are not so unjust to the union troops engaged at shiloh as are many northern writers. the troops on both sides were american, and united they need not fear any foreign foe. it is possible that the southern man started in with a little more dash than his northern brother; but he was correspondingly less enduring. the endeavor of the enemy on the first day was simply to hurl their men against ours--first at one point, then at another, sometimes at several points at once. this they did with daring and energy, until at night the rebel troops were worn out. our effort during the same time was to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made. the object of the confederates on the second day was to get away with as much of their army and material as possible. ours then was to drive them from our front, and to capture or destroy as great a part as possible of their men and material. we were successful in driving them back, but not so successful in captures as if farther pursuit could have been made. as it was, we captured or recaptured on the second day about as much artillery as we lost on the first; and, leaving out the one great capture of prentiss, we took more prisoners on monday than the enemy gained from us on sunday. on the 6th sherman lost seven pieces of artillery, mcclernand six, prentiss eight, and hurlbut two batteries. on the 7th sherman captured seven guns, mcclernand three and the army of the ohio twenty. at shiloh the effective strength of the union forces on the morning of the 6th was 33,000 men. lew. wallace brought 5,000 more after nightfall. beauregard reported the enemy's strength at 40,955. according to the custom of enumeration in the south, this number probably excluded every man enlisted as musician or detailed as guard or nurse, and all commissioned officers--everybody who did not carry a musket or serve a cannon. with us everybody in the field receiving pay from the government is counted. excluding the troops who fled, panic-stricken, before they had fired a shot, there was not a time during the 6th when we had more than 25,000 men in line. on the 7th buell brought 20,000 more. of his remaining two divisions, thomas's did not reach the field during the engagement; wood's arrived before firing had ceased, but not in time to be of much service. our loss in the two days' fight was 1,754 killed, 8,408 wounded and 2,885 missing. of these, 2,103 were in the army of the ohio. beauregard reported a total loss of 10,699, of whom 1,728 were killed, 8,012 wounded and 957 missing. this estimate must be incorrect. we buried, by actual count, more of the enemy's dead in front of the divisions of mcclernand and sherman alone than here reported, and 4,000 was the estimate of the burial parties of the whole field. beauregard reports the confederate force on the 6th at over 40,000, and their total loss during the two days at 10,699; and at the same time declares that he could put only 20,000 men in battle on the morning of the 7th. the navy gave a hearty support to the army at shiloh, as indeed it always did both before and subsequently when i was in command. the nature of the ground was such, however, that on this occasion it could do nothing in aid of the troops until sundown on the first day. the country was broken and heavily timbered, cutting off all view of the battle from the river, so that friends would be as much in danger from fire from the gunboats as the foe. but about sundown, when the national troops were back in their last position, the right of the enemy was near the river and exposed to the fire of the two gun-boats, which was delivered with vigor and effect. after nightfall, when firing had entirely ceased on land, the commander of the fleet informed himself, approximately, of the position of our troops and suggested the idea of dropping a shell within the lines of the enemy every fifteen minutes during the night. this was done with effect, as is proved by the confederate reports. up to the battle of shiloh i, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the government would collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained over any of its armies. donelson and henry were such victories. an army of more than 21,000 men was captured or destroyed. bowling green, columbus and hickman, kentucky, fell in consequence, and clarksville and nashville, tennessee, the last two with an immense amount of stores, also fell into our hands. the tennessee and cumberland rivers, from their mouths to the head of navigation, were secured. but when confederate armies were collected which not only attempted to hold a line farther south, from memphis to chattanooga, knoxville and on to the atlantic, but assumed the offensive and made such a gallant effort to regain what had been lost, then, indeed, i gave up all idea of saving the union except by complete conquest. up to that time it had been the policy of our army, certainly of that portion commanded by me, to protect the property of the citizens whose territory was invaded, without regard to their sentiments, whether union or secession. after this, however, i regarded it as humane to both sides to protect the persons of those found at their homes, but to consume everything that could be used to support or supply armies. protection was still continued over such supplies as were within lines held by us and which we expected to continue to hold; but such supplies within the reach of confederate armies i regarded as much contraband as arms or ordnance stores. their destruction was accomplished without bloodshed and tended to the same result as the destruction of armies. i continued this policy to the close of the war. promiscuous pillaging, however, was discouraged and punished. instructions were always given to take provisions and forage under the direction of commissioned officers who should give receipts to owners, if at home, and turn the property over to officers of the quartermaster or commissary departments to be issued as if furnished from our northern depots. but much was destroyed without receipts to owners, when it could not be brought within our lines and would otherwise have gone to the support of secession and rebellion. this policy i believe exercised a material influence in hastening the end. the battle of shiloh, or pittsburg landing, has been perhaps less understood, or, to state the case more accurately, more persistently misunderstood, than any other engagement between national and confederate troops during the entire rebellion. correct reports of the battle have been published, notably by sherman, badeau and, in a speech before a meeting of veterans, by general prentiss; but all of these appeared long subsequent to the close of the rebellion and after public opinion had been most erroneously formed. i myself made no report to general halleck, further than was contained in a letter, written immediately after the battle informing him that an engagement had been fought and announcing the result. a few days afterwards general halleck moved his headquarters to pittsburg landing and assumed command of the troops in the field. although next to him in rank, and nominally in command of my old district and army, i was ignored as much as if i had been at the most distant point of territory within my jurisdiction; and although i was in command of all the troops engaged at shiloh i was not permitted to see one of the reports of general buell or his subordinates in that battle, until they were published by the war department long after the event. for this reason i never made a full official report of this engagement. chapter xxvi. halleck assumes command in the field--the advance upon corinth --occupation of corinth--the army separated. general halleck arrived at pittsburg landing on the 11th of april and immediately assumed command in the field. on the 21st general pope arrived with an army 30,000 strong, fresh from the capture of island number ten in the mississippi river. he went into camp at hamburg landing five miles above pittsburg. halleck had now three armies: the army of the ohio, buell commanding; the army of the mississippi, pope commanding; and the army of the tennessee. his orders divided the combined force into the right wing, reserve, centre and left wing. major-general george h. thomas, who had been in buell's army, was transferred with his division to the army of the tennessee and given command of the right wing, composed of all of that army except mcclernand's and lew. wallace's divisions. mcclernand was assigned to the command of the reserve, composed of his own and lew. wallace's divisions. buell commanded the centre, the army of the ohio; and pope the left wing, the army of the mississippi. i was named second in command of the whole, and was also supposed to be in command of the right wing and reserve. orders were given to all the commanders engaged at shiloh to send in their reports without delay to department headquarters. those from officers of the army of the tennessee were sent through me; but from the army of the ohio they were sent by general buell without passing through my hands. general halleck ordered me, verbally, to send in my report, but i positively declined on the ground that he had received the reports of a part of the army engaged at shiloh without their coming through me. he admitted that my refusal was justifiable under the circumstances, but explained that he had wanted to get the reports off before moving the command, and as fast as a report had come to him he had forwarded it to washington. preparations were at once made upon the arrival of the new commander for an advance on corinth. owl creek, on our right, was bridged, and expeditions were sent to the north-west and west to ascertain if our position was being threatened from those quarters; the roads towards corinth were corduroyed and new ones made; lateral roads were also constructed, so that in case of necessity troops marching by different routes could reinforce each other. all commanders were cautioned against bringing on an engagement and informed in so many words that it would be better to retreat than to fight. by the 30th of april all preparations were complete; the country west to the mobile and ohio railroad had been reconnoitred, as well as the road to corinth as far as monterey twelve miles from pittsburg. everywhere small bodies of the enemy had been encountered, but they were observers and not in force to fight battles. corinth, mississippi, lies in a south-westerly direction from pittsburg landing and about nineteen miles away as the bird would fly, but probably twenty-two by the nearest wagon-road. it is about four miles south of the line dividing the states of tennessee and mississippi, and at the junction of the mississippi and chattanooga railroad with the mobile and ohio road which runs from columbus to mobile. from pittsburg to corinth the land is rolling, but at no point reaching an elevation that makes high hills to pass over. in 1862 the greater part of the country was covered with forest with intervening clearings and houses. underbrush was dense in the low grounds along the creeks and ravines, but generally not so thick on the high land as to prevent men passing through with ease. there are two small creeks running from north of the town and connecting some four miles south, where they form bridge creek which empties into the tuscumbia river. corinth is on the ridge between these streams and is a naturally strong defensive position. the creeks are insignificant in volume of water, but the stream to the east widens out in front of the town into a swamp impassable in the presence of an enemy. on the crest of the west bank of this stream the enemy was strongly intrenched. corinth was a valuable strategic point for the enemy to hold, and consequently a valuable one for us to possess ourselves of. we ought to have seized it immediately after the fall of donelson and nashville, when it could have been taken without a battle, but failing then it should have been taken, without delay on the concentration of troops at pittsburg landing after the battle of shiloh. in fact the arrival of pope should not have been awaited. there was no time from the battle of shiloh up to the evacuation of corinth when the enemy would not have left if pushed. the demoralization among the confederates from their defeats at henry and donelson; their long marches from bowling green, columbus, and nashville, and their failure at shiloh; in fact from having been driven out of kentucky and tennessee, was so great that a stand for the time would have been impossible. beauregard made strenuous efforts to reinforce himself and partially succeeded. he appealed to the people of the south-west for new regiments, and received a few. a. s. johnston had made efforts to reinforce in the same quarter, before the battle of shiloh, but in a different way. he had negroes sent out to him to take the place of teamsters, company cooks and laborers in every capacity, so as to put all his white men into the ranks. the people, while willing to send their sons to the field, were not willing to part with their negroes. it is only fair to state that they probably wanted their blacks to raise supplies for the army and for the families left at home. beauregard, however, was reinforced by van dorn immediately after shiloh with 17,000 men. interior points, less exposed, were also depleted to add to the strength at corinth. with these reinforcements and the new regiments, beauregard had, during the month of may, 1862, a large force on paper, but probably not much over 50,000 effective men. we estimated his strength at 70,000. our own was, in round numbers, 120,000. the defensible nature of the ground at corinth, and the fortifications, made 50,000 then enough to maintain their position against double that number for an indefinite time but for the demoralization spoken of. on the 30th of april the grand army commenced its advance from shiloh upon corinth. the movement was a siege from the start to the close. the national troops were always behind intrenchments, except of course the small reconnoitring parties sent to the front to clear the way for an advance. even the commanders of these parties were cautioned, "not to bring on an engagement." "it is better to retreat than to fight." the enemy were constantly watching our advance, but as they were simply observers there were but few engagements that even threatened to become battles. all the engagements fought ought to have served to encourage the enemy. roads were again made in our front, and again corduroyed; a line was intrenched, and the troops were advanced to the new position. cross roads were constructed to these new positions to enable the troops to concentrate in case of attack. the national armies were thoroughly intrenched all the way from the tennessee river to corinth. for myself i was little more than an observer. orders were sent direct to the right wing or reserve, ignoring me, and advances were made from one line of intrenchments to another without notifying me. my position was so embarrassing in fact that i made several applications during the siege to be relieved. general halleck kept his headquarters generally, if not all the time, with the right wing. pope being on the extreme left did not see so much of his chief, and consequently got loose as it were at times. on the 3d of may he was at seven mile creek with the main body of his command, but threw forward a division to farmington, within four miles of corinth. his troops had quite a little engagement at farmington on that day, but carried the place with considerable loss to the enemy. there would then have been no difficulty in advancing the centre and right so as to form a new line well up to the enemy, but pope was ordered back to conform with the general line. on the 8th of may he moved again, taking his whole force to farmington, and pushed out two divisions close to the rebel line. again he was ordered back. by the 4th of may the centre and right wing reached monterey, twelve miles out. their advance was slow from there, for they intrenched with every forward movement. the left wing moved up again on the 25th of may and intrenched itself close to the enemy. the creek with the marsh before described, separated the two lines. skirmishers thirty feet apart could have maintained either line at this point. our centre and right were, at this time, extended so that the right of the right wing was probably five miles from corinth and four from the works in their front. the creek, which was a formidable obstacle for either side to pass on our left, became a very slight obstacle on our right. here the enemy occupied two positions. one of them, as much as two miles out from his main line, was on a commanding elevation and defended by an intrenched battery with infantry supports. a heavy wood intervened between this work and the national forces. in rear to the south there was a clearing extending a mile or more, and south of this clearing a log-house which had been loop-holed and was occupied by infantry. sherman's division carried these two positions with some loss to himself, but with probably greater to the enemy, on the 28th of may, and on that day the investment of corinth was complete, or as complete as it was ever made. thomas' right now rested west of the mobile and ohio railroad. pope's left commanded the memphis and charleston railroad east of corinth. some days before i had suggested to the commanding general that i thought if he would move the army of the mississippi at night, by the rear of the centre and right, ready to advance at daylight, pope would find no natural obstacle in his front and, i believed, no serious artificial one. the ground, or works, occupied by our left could be held by a thin picket line, owing to the stream and swamp in front. to the right the troops would have a dry ridge to march over. i was silenced so quickly that i felt that possibly i had suggested an unmilitary movement. later, probably on the 28th of may, general logan, whose command was then on the mobile and ohio railroad, said to me that the enemy had been evacuating for several days and that if allowed he could go into corinth with his brigade. trains of cars were heard coming in and going out of corinth constantly. some of the men who had been engaged in various capacities on railroads before the war claimed that they could tell, by putting their ears to the rail, not only which way the trains were moving but which trains were loaded and which were empty. they said loaded trains had been going out for several days and empty ones coming in. subsequent events proved the correctness of their judgment. beauregard published his orders for the evacuation of corinth on the 26th of may and fixed the 29th for the departure of his troops, and on the 30th of may general halleck had his whole army drawn up prepared for battle and announced in orders that there was every indication that our left was to be attacked that morning. corinth had already been evacuated and the national troops marched on and took possession without opposition. everything had been destroyed or carried away. the confederate commander had instructed his soldiers to cheer on the arrival of every train to create the impression among the yankees that reinforcements were arriving. there was not a sick or wounded man left by the confederates, nor stores of any kind. some ammunition had been blown up--not removed--but the trophies of war were a few quaker guns, logs of about the diameter of ordinary cannon, mounted on wheels of wagons and pointed in the most threatening manner towards us. the possession of corinth by the national troops was of strategic importance, but the victory was barren in every other particular. it was nearly bloodless. it is a question whether the morale of the confederate troops engaged at corinth was not improved by the immunity with which they were permitted to remove all public property and then withdraw themselves. on our side i know officers and men of the army of the tennessee--and i presume the same is true of those of the other commands--were disappointed at the result. they could not see how the mere occupation of places was to close the war while large and effective rebel armies existed. they believed that a well-directed attack would at least have partially destroyed the army defending corinth. for myself i am satisfied that corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign commenced promptly on the arrival of reinforcements after the battle of shiloh. general halleck at once commenced erecting fortifications around corinth on a scale to indicate that this one point must be held if it took the whole national army to do it. all commanding points two or three miles to the south, south-east and south-west were strongly fortified. it was expected in case of necessity to connect these forts by rifle-pits. they were laid out on a scale that would have required 100,000 men to fully man them. it was probably thought that a final battle of the war would be fought at that point. these fortifications were never used. immediately after the occupation of corinth by the national troops, general pope was sent in pursuit of the retreating garrison and general buell soon followed. buell was the senior of the two generals and commanded the entire column. the pursuit was kept up for some thirty miles, but did not result in the capture of any material of war or prisoners, unless a few stragglers who had fallen behind and were willing captives. on the 10th of june the pursuing column was all back at corinth. the army of the tennessee was not engaged in any of these movements. the confederates were now driven out of west tennessee, and on the 6th of june, after a well-contested naval battle, the national forces took possession of memphis and held the mississippi river from its source to that point. the railroad from columbus to corinth was at once put in good condition and held by us. we had garrisons at donelson, clarksville and nashville, on the cumberland river, and held the tennessee river from its mouth to eastport. new orleans and baton rouge had fallen into the possession of the national forces, so that now the confederates at the west were narrowed down for all communication with richmond to the single line of road running east from vicksburg. to dispossess them of this, therefore, became a matter of the first importance. the possession of the mississippi by us from memphis to baton rouge was also a most important object. it would be equal to the amputation of a limb in its weakening effects upon the enemy. after the capture of corinth a movable force of 80,000 men, besides enough to hold all the territory acquired, could have been set in motion for the accomplishment of any great campaign for the suppression of the rebellion. in addition to this fresh troops were being raised to swell the effective force. but the work of depletion commenced. buell with the army of the ohio was sent east, following the line of the memphis and charleston railroad. this he was ordered to repair as he advanced --only to have it destroyed by small guerilla bands or other troops as soon as he was out of the way. if he had been sent directly to chattanooga as rapidly as he could march, leaving two or three divisions along the line of the railroad from nashville forward, he could have arrived with but little fighting, and would have saved much of the loss of life which was afterwards incurred in gaining chattanooga. bragg would then not have had time to raise an army to contest the possession of middle and east tennessee and kentucky; the battles of stone river and chickamauga would not necessarily have been fought; burnside would not have been besieged in knoxville without the power of helping himself or escaping; the battle of chattanooga would not have been fought. these are the negative advantages, if the term negative is applicable, which would probably have resulted from prompt movements after corinth fell into the possession of the national forces. the positive results might have been: a bloodless advance to atlanta, to vicksburg, or to any other desired point south of corinth in the interior of mississippi. chapter xxvii. headquarters moved to memphis--on the road to memphis--escaping jackson --complaints and requests--halleck appointed commander-in-chief--return to corinth--movements of bragg--surrender of clarksville--the advance upon chattanooga--sheridan colonel of a michigan regiment. my position at corinth, with a nominal command and yet no command, became so unbearable that i asked permission of halleck to remove my headquarters to memphis. i had repeatedly asked, between the fall of donelson and the evacuation of corinth, to be relieved from duty under halleck; but all my applications were refused until the occupation of the town. i then obtained permission to leave the department, but general sherman happened to call on me as i was about starting and urged me so strongly not to think of going, that i concluded to remain. my application to be permitted to remove my headquarters to memphis was, however, approved, and on the 21st of june i started for that point with my staff and a cavalry escort of only a part of one company. there was a detachment of two or three companies going some twenty-five miles west to be stationed as a guard to the railroad. i went under cover of this escort to the end of their march, and the next morning proceeded to la grange with no convoy but the few cavalry men i had with me. from la grange to memphis the distance is forty-seven miles. there were no troops stationed between these two points, except a small force guarding a working party which was engaged in repairing the railroad. not knowing where this party would be found i halted at la grange. general hurlbut was in command there at the time and had his headquarters tents pitched on the lawn of a very commodious country house. the proprietor was at home and, learning of my arrival, he invited general hurlbut and me to dine with him. i accepted the invitation and spent a very pleasant afternoon with my host, who was a thorough southern gentleman fully convinced of the justice of secession. after dinner, seated in the capacious porch, he entertained me with a recital of the services he was rendering the cause. he was too old to be in the ranks himself--he must have been quite seventy then--but his means enabled him to be useful in other ways. in ordinary times the homestead where he was now living produced the bread and meat to supply the slaves on his main plantation, in the low-lands of mississippi. now he raised food and forage on both places, and thought he would have that year a surplus sufficient to feed three hundred families of poor men who had gone into the war and left their families dependent upon the "patriotism" of those better off. the crops around me looked fine, and i had at the moment an idea that about the time they were ready to be gathered the "yankee" troops would be in the neighborhood and harvest them for the benefit of those engaged in the suppression of the rebellion instead of its support. i felt, however, the greatest respect for the candor of my host and for his zeal in a cause he thoroughly believed in, though our views were as wide apart as it is possible to conceive. the 23d of june, 1862, on the road from la grange to memphis was very warm, even for that latitude and season. with my staff and small escort i started at an early hour, and before noon we arrived within twenty miles of memphis. at this point i saw a very comfortable-looking white-haired gentleman seated at the front of his house, a little distance from the road. i let my staff and escort ride ahead while i halted and, for an excuse, asked for a glass of water. i was invited at once to dismount and come in. i found my host very genial and communicative, and staid longer than i had intended, until the lady of the house announced dinner and asked me to join them. the host, however, was not pressing, so that i declined the invitation and, mounting my horse, rode on. about a mile west from where i had been stopping a road comes up from the southeast, joining that from la grange to memphis. a mile west of this junction i found my staff and escort halted and enjoying the shade of forest trees on the lawn of a house located several hundred feet back from the road, their horses hitched to the fence along the line of the road. i, too, stopped and we remained there until the cool of the afternoon, and then rode into memphis. the gentleman with whom i had stopped twenty miles from memphis was a mr. de loche, a man loyal to the union. he had not pressed me to tarry longer with him because in the early part of my visit a neighbor, a dr. smith, had called and, on being presented to me, backed off the porch as if something had hit him. mr. de loche knew that the rebel general jackson was in that neighborhood with a detachment of cavalry. his neighbor was as earnest in the southern cause as was mr. de loche in that of the union. the exact location of jackson was entirely unknown to mr. de loche; but he was sure that his neighbor would know it and would give information of my presence, and this made my stay unpleasant to him after the call of dr. smith. i have stated that a detachment of troops was engaged in guarding workmen who were repairing the railroad east of memphis. on the day i entered memphis, jackson captured a small herd of beef cattle which had been sent east for the troops so engaged. the drovers were not enlisted men and he released them. a day or two after one of these drovers came to my headquarters and, relating the circumstances of his capture, said jackson was very much disappointed that he had not captured me; that he was six or seven miles south of the memphis and charleston railroad when he learned that i was stopping at the house of mr. de loche, and had ridden with his command to the junction of the road he was on with that from la grange and memphis, where he learned that i had passed three-quarters of an hour before. he thought it would be useless to pursue with jaded horses a well-mounted party with so much of a start. had he gone three-quarters of a mile farther he would have found me with my party quietly resting under the shade of trees and without even arms in our hands with which to defend ourselves. general jackson of course did not communicate his disappointment at not capturing me to a prisoner, a young drover; but from the talk among the soldiers the facts related were learned. a day or two later mr. de loche called on me in memphis to apologize for his apparent incivility in not insisting on my staying for dinner. he said that his wife accused him of marked discourtesy, but that, after the call of his neighbor, he had felt restless until i got away. i never met general jackson before the war, nor during it, but have met him since at his very comfortable summer home at manitou springs, colorado. i reminded him of the above incident, and this drew from him the response that he was thankful now he had not captured me. i certainly was very thankful too. my occupation of memphis as district headquarters did not last long. the period, however, was marked by a few incidents which were novel to me. up to that time i had not occupied any place in the south where the citizens were at home in any great numbers. dover was within the fortifications at fort donelson, and, as far as i remember, every citizen was gone. there were no people living at pittsburg landing, and but very few at corinth. memphis, however, was a populous city, and there were many of the citizens remaining there who were not only thoroughly impressed with the justice of their cause, but who thought that even the "yankee soldiery" must entertain the same views if they could only be induced to make an honest confession. it took hours of my time every day to listen to complaints and requests. the latter were generally reasonable, and if so they were granted; but the complaints were not always, or even often, well founded. two instances will mark the general character. first: the officer who commanded at memphis immediately after the city fell into the hands of the national troops had ordered one of the churches of the city to be opened to the soldiers. army chaplains were authorized to occupy the pulpit. second: at the beginning of the war the confederate congress had passed a law confiscating all property of "alien enemies" at the south, including the debts of southerners to northern men. in consequence of this law, when memphis was occupied the provost-marshal had forcibly collected all the evidences he could obtain of such debts. almost the first complaints made to me were these two outrages. the gentleman who made the complaints informed me first of his own high standing as a lawyer, a citizen and a christian. he was a deacon in the church which had been defiled by the occupation of union troops, and by a union chaplain filling the pulpit. he did not use the word "defile," but he expressed the idea very clearly. he asked that the church be restored to the former congregation. i told him that no order had been issued prohibiting the congregation attending the church. he said of course the congregation could not hear a northern clergyman who differed so radically with them on questions of government. i told him the troops would continue to occupy that church for the present, and that they would not be called upon to hear disloyal sentiments proclaimed from the pulpit. this closed the argument on the first point. then came the second. the complainant said that he wanted the papers restored to him which had been surrendered to the provost-marshal under protest; he was a lawyer, and before the establishment of the "confederate states government" had been the attorney for a number of large business houses at the north; that "his government" had confiscated all debts due "alien enemies," and appointed commissioners, or officers, to collect such debts and pay them over to the "government": but in his case, owing to his high standing, he had been permitted to hold these claims for collection, the responsible officials knowing that he would account to the "government" for every dollar received. he said that his "government," when it came in possession of all its territory, would hold him personally responsible for the claims he had surrendered to the provost-marshal. his impudence was so sublime that i was rather amused than indignant. i told him, however, that if he would remain in memphis i did not believe the confederate government would ever molest him. he left, no doubt, as much amazed at my assurance as i was at the brazenness of his request. on the 11th of july general halleck received telegraphic orders appointing him to the command of all the armies, with headquarters in washington. his instructions pressed him to proceed to his new field of duty with as little delay as was consistent with the safety and interests of his previous command. i was next in rank, and he telegraphed me the same day to report at department headquarters at corinth. i was not informed by the dispatch that my chief had been ordered to a different field and did not know whether to move my headquarters or not. i telegraphed asking if i was to take my staff with me, and received word in reply: "this place will be your headquarters. you can judge for yourself." i left memphis for my new field without delay, and reached corinth on the 15th of the month. general halleck remained until the 17th of july; but he was very uncommunicative, and gave me no information as to what i had been called to corinth for. when general halleck left to assume the duties of general-in-chief i remained in command of the district of west tennessee. practically i became a department commander, because no one was assigned to that position over me and i made my reports direct to the general-in-chief; but i was not assigned to the position of department commander until the 25th of october. general halleck while commanding the department of the mississippi had had control as far east as a line drawn from chattanooga north. my district only embraced west tennessee and kentucky west of the cumberland river. buell, with the army of the ohio, had, as previously stated, been ordered east towards chattanooga, with instructions to repair the memphis and charleston railroad as he advanced. troops had been sent north by halleck along the line of the mobile and ohio railroad to put it in repair as far as columbus. other troops were stationed on the railroad from jackson, tennessee, to grand junction, and still others on the road west to memphis. the remainder of the magnificent army of 120,000 men which entered corinth on the 30th of may had now become so scattered that i was put entirely on the defensive in a territory whose population was hostile to the union. one of the first things i had to do was to construct fortifications at corinth better suited to the garrison that could be spared to man them. the structures that had been built during the months of may and june were left as monuments to the skill of the engineer, and others were constructed in a few days, plainer in design but suited to the command available to defend them. i disposed the troops belonging to the district in conformity with the situation as rapidly as possible. the forces at donelson, clarksville and nashville, with those at corinth and along the railroad eastward, i regarded as sufficient for protection against any attack from the west. the mobile and ohio railroad was guarded from rienzi, south of corinth, to columbus; and the mississippi central railroad from jackson, tennessee, to bolivar. grand junction and la grange on the memphis railroad were abandoned. south of the army of the tennessee, and confronting it, was van dorn, with a sufficient force to organize a movable army of thirty-five to forty thousand men, after being reinforced by price from missouri. this movable force could be thrown against either corinth, bolivar or memphis; and the best that could be done in such event would be to weaken the points not threatened in order to reinforce the one that was. nothing could be gained on the national side by attacking elsewhere, because the territory already occupied was as much as the force present could guard. the most anxious period of the war, to me, was during the time the army of the tennessee was guarding the territory acquired by the fall of corinth and memphis and before i was sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive. the enemy also had cavalry operating in our rear, making it necessary to guard every point of the railroad back to columbus, on the security of which we were dependent for all our supplies. headquarters were connected by telegraph with all points of the command except memphis and the mississippi below columbus. with these points communication was had by the railroad to columbus, then down the river by boat. to reinforce memphis would take three or four days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have taken at least two days. memphis therefore was practically isolated from the balance of the command. but it was in sherman's hands. then too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable auxiliary. during the two months after the departure of general halleck there was much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. some of them, however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded, were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the mexican war which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they occurred. about the 23d of july colonel ross, commanding at bolivar, was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be reinforced from jackson and corinth. on the 27th there was skirmishing on the hatchie river, eight miles from bolivar. on the 30th i learned from colonel p. h. sheridan, who had been far to the south, that bragg in person was at rome, georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way of mobile) to chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join him at rome. price was at this time at holly springs, mississippi, with a large force, and occupied grand junction as an outpost. i proposed to the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed that, while i had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops was not to scatter them, but hold them ready to reinforce buell. the movement of bragg himself with his wagon trains to chattanooga across country, while his troops were transported over a long round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. buell was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. more men were required the farther the national troops penetrated into the enemy's country. i, with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed bragg, was purely on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far inferior to my own. on the 2d of august i was ordered from washington to live upon the country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far as practicable. i was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and from our lines. i do not recollect having arrested and confined a citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. i am aware that a great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to joliet, illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my order. i had all such released the moment i learned of their arrest; and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was said to be confined by my order. there were many citizens at home who deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was afforded to inflict an injury to the national cause. this class was not of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and i deemed it better that a few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should suffer. on the 14th of august i was ordered to send two more divisions to buell. they were sent the same day by way of decatur. on the 22d colonel rodney mason surrendered clarksville with six companies of his regiment. colonel mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at shiloh. he was by nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his action when the battle was over. he came to me with tears in his eyes and begged to be allowed to have another trial. i felt great sympathy for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison clarksville and donelson. he selected clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy. but when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his constitutional weakness overcame him. he inquired the number of men the enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender. arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered and informed his subordinate at donelson of the fact, advising him to do the same. the guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet them and drove them away. among other embarrassments, at the time of which i now write, was the fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from the south and directed me to give every facility toward that end. pay in gold was authorized, and stations on the mississippi river and on the railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be received. this opened to the enemy not only the means of converting cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and intelligent information in regard to our position and strength. it was also demoralizing to the troops. citizens obtaining permits from the treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits. men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared none of their dangers. on the 30th of august colonel m. d. leggett, near bolivar, with the 20th and 29th ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be about 4,000 strong. the enemy was driven away with a loss of more than one hundred men. on the 1st of september the bridge guard at medon was attacked by guerillas. the guard held the position until reinforced, when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen wounded. on the same day colonel dennis, with a force of less than 500 infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in strong force, a few miles west of medon, and drove them away with great loss. our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field. afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. our loss, as reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. on the 2d of september i was ordered to send more reinforcements to buell. jackson and bolivar were yet threatened, but i sent the reinforcements. on the 4th i received direct orders to send granger's division also to louisville, kentucky. general buell had left corinth about the 10th of june to march upon chattanooga; bragg, who had superseded beauregard in command, sent one division from tupelo on the 27th of june for the same place. this gave buell about seventeen days' start. if he had not been required to repair the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen days at the outside, and chattanooga must have been reached by the national forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. the road between nashville and chattanooga could easily have been put in repair by other troops, so that communication with the north would have been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the national troops. if buell had been permitted to move in the first instance, with the whole of the army of the ohio and that portion of the army of the mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and guard it. granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of september. i was at the station at corinth when the troops reached that point, and found general p. h. sheridan with them. i expressed surprise at seeing him and said that i had not expected him to go. he showed decided disappointment at the prospect of being detained. i felt a little nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him. sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which i had served eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the pacific coast when the war broke out. he was promoted to a captaincy in may, 1861, and before the close of the year managed in some way, i do not know how, to get east. he went to missouri. halleck had known him as a very successful young officer in managing campaigns against the indians on the pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west missouri. there was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the use of public transportation for private purposes. he asked to be relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and his request was granted. when general halleck took the field in april, 1862, sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. during the advance on corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d michigan cavalry. governor blair, of michigan, telegraphed general halleck asking him to suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he would appoint a good man without reference to his state. sheridan was named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when corinth was reached he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the army of the mississippi. he was in command at booneville on the 1st of july with two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times as numerous as his own. by very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of attack he completely routed the enemy. for this he was made a brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about corinth. on this account i was sorry to see him leaving me. his departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services in his new field. granger and sheridan reached louisville before buell got there, and on the night of their arrival sheridan with his command threw up works around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from the front. chapter xxviii. advance of van dorn and price--price enters iuka--battle of iuka. at this time, september 4th, i had two divisions of the army of the mississippi stationed at corinth, rienzi, jacinto and danville. there were at corinth also davies' division and two brigades of mcarthur's, besides cavalry and artillery. this force constituted my left wing, of which rosecrans was in command. general ord commanded the centre, from bethel to humboldt on the mobile and ohio railroad and from jackson to bolivar where the mississippi central is crossed by the hatchie river. general sherman commanded on the right at memphis with two of his brigades back at brownsville, at the crossing of the hatchie river by the memphis and ohio railroad. this made the most convenient arrangement i could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon any threatened point. all the troops of the command were within telegraphic communication of each other, except those under sherman. by bringing a portion of his command to brownsville, from which point there was a railroad and telegraph back to memphis, communication could be had with that part of my command within a few hours by the use of couriers. in case it became necessary to reinforce corinth, by this arrangement all the troops at bolivar, except a small guard, could be sent by rail by the way of jackson in less than twenty-four hours; while the troops from brownsville could march up to bolivar to take their place. on the 7th of september i learned of the advance of van dorn and price, apparently upon corinth. one division was brought from memphis to bolivar to meet any emergency that might arise from this move of the enemy. i was much concerned because my first duty, after holding the territory acquired within my command, was to prevent further reinforcing of bragg in middle tennessee. already the army of northern virginia had defeated the army under general pope and was invading maryland. in the centre general buell was on his way to louisville and bragg marching parallel to him with a large confederate force for the ohio river. i had been constantly called upon to reinforce buell until at this time my entire force numbered less than 50,000 men, of all arms. this included everything from cairo south within my jurisdiction. if i too should be driven back, the ohio river would become the line dividing the belligerents west of the alleghanies, while at the east the line was already farther north than when hostilities commenced at the opening of the war. it is true nashville was never given up after its first capture, but it would have been isolated and the garrison there would have been obliged to beat a hasty retreat if the troops in west tennessee had been compelled to fall back. to say at the end of the second year of the war the line dividing the contestants at the east was pushed north of maryland, a state that had not seceded, and at the west beyond kentucky, another state which had been always loyal, would have been discouraging indeed. as it was, many loyal people despaired in the fall of 1862 of ever saving the union. the administration at washington was much concerned for the safety of the cause it held so dear. but i believe there was never a day when the president did not think that, in some way or other, a cause so just as ours would come out triumphant. up to the 11th of september rosecrans still had troops on the railroad east of corinth, but they had all been ordered in. by the 12th all were in except a small force under colonel murphy of the 8th wisconsin. he had been detained to guard the remainder of the stores which had not yet been brought in to corinth. on the 13th of september general sterling price entered iuka, a town about twenty miles east of corinth on the memphis and charleston railroad. colonel murphy with a few men was guarding the place. he made no resistance, but evacuated the town on the approach of the enemy. i was apprehensive lest the object of the rebels might be to get troops into tennessee to reinforce bragg, as it was afterwards ascertained to be. the authorities at washington, including the general-in-chief of the army, were very anxious, as i have said, about affairs both in east and middle tennessee; and my anxiety was quite as great on their account as for any danger threatening my command. i had not force enough at corinth to attack price even by stripping everything; and there was danger that before troops could be got from other points he might be far on his way across the tennessee. to prevent this all spare forces at bolivar and jackson were ordered to corinth, and cars were concentrated at jackson for their transportation. within twenty-four hours from the transmission of the order the troops were at their destination, although there had been a delay of four hours resulting from the forward train getting off the track and stopping all the others. this gave a reinforcement of near 8,000 men, general ord in command. general rosecrans commanded the district of corinth with a movable force of about 9,000 independent of the garrison deemed necessary to be left behind. it was known that general van dorn was about a four days' march south of us, with a large force. it might have been part of his plan to attack at corinth, price coming from the east while he came up from the south. my desire was to attack price before van dorn could reach corinth or go to his relief. general rosecrans had previously had his headquarters at iuka, where his command was spread out along the memphis and charleston railroad eastward. while there he had a most excellent map prepared showing all the roads and streams in the surrounding country. he was also personally familiar with the ground, so that i deferred very much to him in my plans for the approach. we had cars enough to transport all of general ord's command, which was to go by rail to burnsville, a point on the road about seven miles west of iuka. from there his troops were to march by the north side of the railroad and attack price from the north-west, while rosecrans was to move eastward from his position south of corinth by way of the jacinto road. a small force was to hold the jacinto road where it turns to the north-east, while the main force moved on the fulton road which comes into iuka further east. this plan was suggested by rosecrans. bear creek, a few miles to the east of the fulton road, is a formidable obstacle to the movement of troops in the absence of bridges, all of which, in september, 1862, had been destroyed in that vicinity. the tennessee, to the north-east, not many miles away, was also a formidable obstacle for an army followed by a pursuing force. ord was on the north-west, and even if a rebel movement had been possible in that direction it could have brought only temporary relief, for it would have carried price's army to the rear of the national forces and isolated it from all support. it looked to me that, if price would remain in iuka until we could get there, his annihilation was inevitable. on the morning of the 18th of september general ord moved by rail to burnsville, and there left the cars and moved out to perform his part of the programme. he was to get as near the enemy as possible during the day and intrench himself so as to hold his position until the next morning. rosecrans was to be up by the morning of the 19th on the two roads before described, and the attack was to be from all three quarters simultaneously. troops enough were left at jacinto and rienzi to detain any cavalry that van dorn might send out to make a sudden dash into corinth until i could be notified. there was a telegraph wire along the railroad, so there would be no delay in communication. i detained cars and locomotives enough at burnsville to transport the whole of ord's command at once, and if van dorn had moved against corinth instead of iuka i could have thrown in reinforcements to the number of 7,000 or 8,000 before he could have arrived. i remained at burnsville with a detachment of about 900 men from ord's command and communicated with my two wings by courier. ord met the advance of the enemy soon after leaving burnsville. quite a sharp engagement ensued, but he drove the rebels back with considerable loss, including one general officer killed. he maintained his position and was ready to attack by daylight the next morning. i was very much disappointed at receiving a dispatch from rosecrans after midnight from jacinto, twenty-two miles from iuka, saying that some of his command had been delayed, and that the rear of his column was not yet up as far as jacinto. he said, however, that he would still be at iuka by two o'clock the next day. i did not believe this possible because of the distance and the condition of the roads, which was bad; besides, troops after a forced march of twenty miles are not in a good condition for fighting the moment they get through. it might do in marching to relieve a beleaguered garrison, but not to make an assault. i immediately sent ord a copy of rosecrans' dispatch and ordered him to be in readiness to attack the moment he heard the sound of guns to the south or south-east. he was instructed to notify his officers to be on the alert for any indications of battle. during the 19th the wind blew in the wrong direction to transmit sound either towards the point where ord was, or to burnsville where i had remained. a couple of hours before dark on the 19th rosecrans arrived with the head of his column at barnets, the point where the jacinto road to iuka leaves the road going east. he here turned north without sending any troops to the fulton road. while still moving in column up the jacinto road he met a force of the enemy and had his advance badly beaten and driven back upon the main road. in this short engagement his loss was considerable for the number engaged, and one battery was taken from him. the wind was still blowing hard and in the wrong direction to transmit sounds towards either ord or me. neither he nor i nor any one in either command heard a gun that was fired upon the battle-field. after the engagement rosecrans sent me a dispatch announcing the result. this was brought by a courier. there was no road between burnsville and the position then occupied by rosecrans and the country was impassable for a man on horseback. the courier bearing the message was compelled to move west nearly to jacinto before he found a road leading to burnsville. this made it a late hour of the night before i learned of the battle that had taken place during the afternoon. i at once notified ord of the fact and ordered him to attack early in the morning. the next morning rosecrans himself renewed the attack and went into iuka with but little resistance. ord also went in according to orders, without hearing a gun from the south of town but supposing the troops coming from the south-west must be up by that time. rosecrans, however, had put no troops upon the fulton road, and the enemy had taken advantage of this neglect and retreated by that road during the night. word was soon brought to me that our troops were in iuka. i immediately rode into town and found that the enemy was not being pursued even by the cavalry. i ordered pursuit by the whole of rosecrans' command and went on with him a few miles in person. he followed only a few miles after i left him and then went into camp, and the pursuit was continued no further. i was disappointed at the result of the battle of iuka--but i had so high an opinion of general rosecrans that i found no fault at the time. chapter xxix. van dorn's movements--battle of corinth--command of the department of the tennessee. on the 19th of september general geo. h. thomas was ordered east to reinforce buell. this threw the army at my command still more on the defensive. the memphis and charleston railroad was abandoned, except at corinth, and small forces were left at chewalla and grand junction. soon afterwards the latter of these two places was given up and bolivar became our most advanced position on the mississippi central railroad. our cavalry was kept well to the front and frequent expeditions were sent out to watch the movements of the enemy. we were in a country where nearly all the people, except the negroes, were hostile to us and friendly to the cause we were trying to suppress. it was easy, therefore, for the enemy to get early information of our every move. we, on the contrary, had to go after our information in force, and then often returned without it. on the 22d bolivar was threatened by a large force from south of grand junction, supposed to be twenty regiments of infantry with cavalry and artillery. i reinforced bolivar, and went to jackson in person to superintend the movement of troops to whatever point the attack might be made upon. the troops from corinth were brought up in time to repel the threatened movement without a battle. our cavalry followed the enemy south of davis' mills in mississippi. on the 30th i found that van dorn was apparently endeavoring to strike the mississippi river above memphis. at the same time other points within my command were so threatened that it was impossible to concentrate a force to drive him away. there was at this juncture a large union force at helena, arkansas, which, had it been within my command, i could have ordered across the river to attack and break up the mississippi central railroad far to the south. this would not only have called van dorn back, but would have compelled the retention of a large rebel force far to the south to prevent a repetition of such raids on the enemy's line of supplies. geographical lines between the commands during the rebellion were not always well chosen, or they were too rigidly adhered to. van dorn did not attempt to get upon the line above memphis, as had apparently been his intention. he was simply covering a deeper design; one much more important to his cause. by the 1st of october it was fully apparent that corinth was to be attacked with great force and determination, and that van dorn, lovell, price, villepigue and rust had joined their strength for this purpose. there was some skirmishing outside of corinth with the advance of the enemy on the 3d. the rebels massed in the north-west angle of the memphis and charleston and the mobile and ohio railroads, and were thus between the troops at corinth and all possible reinforcements. any fresh troops for us must come by a circuitous route. on the night of the 3d, accordingly, i ordered general mcpherson, who was at jackson, to join rosecrans at corinth with reinforcements picked up along the line of the railroad equal to a brigade. hurlbut had been ordered from bolivar to march for the same destination; and as van dorn was coming upon corinth from the north-west some of his men fell in with the advance of hurlbut's and some skirmishing ensued on the evening of the 3d. on the 4th van dorn made a dashing attack, hoping, no doubt, to capture rosecrans before his reinforcements could come up. in that case the enemy himself could have occupied the defences of corinth and held at bay all the union troops that arrived. in fact he could have taken the offensive against the reinforcements with three or four times their number and still left a sufficient garrison in the works about corinth to hold them. he came near success, some of his troops penetrating the national lines at least once, but the works that were built after halleck's departure enabled rosecrans to hold his position until the troops of both mcpherson and hurlbut approached towards the rebel front and rear. the enemy was finally driven back with great slaughter: all their charges, made with great gallantry, were repulsed. the loss on our side was heavy, but nothing to compare with van dorn's. mcpherson came up with the train of cars bearing his command as close to the enemy as was prudent, debarked on the rebel flank and got in to the support of rosecrans just after the repulse. his approach, as well as that of hurlbut, was known to the enemy and had a moral effect. general rosecrans, however, failed to follow up the victory, although i had given specific orders in advance of the battle for him to pursue the moment the enemy was repelled. he did not do so, and i repeated the order after the battle. in the first order he was notified that the force of 4,000 men which was going to his assistance would be in great peril if the enemy was not pursued. general ord had joined hurlbut on the 4th and being senior took command of his troops. this force encountered the head of van dorn's retreating column just as it was crossing the hatchie by a bridge some ten miles out from corinth. the bottom land here was swampy and bad for the operations of troops, making a good place to get an enemy into. ord attacked the troops that had crossed the bridge and drove them back in a panic. many were killed, and others were drowned by being pushed off the bridge in their hurried retreat. ord followed and met the main force. he was too weak in numbers to assault, but he held the bridge and compelled the enemy to resume his retreat by another bridge higher up the stream. ord was wounded in this engagement and the command devolved on hurlbut. rosecrans did not start in pursuit till the morning of the 5th and then took the wrong road. moving in the enemy's country he travelled with a wagon train to carry his provisions and munitions of war. his march was therefore slower than that of the enemy, who was moving towards his supplies. two or three hours of pursuit on the day of battle, without anything except what the men carried on their persons, would have been worth more than any pursuit commenced the next day could have possibly been. even when he did start, if rosecrans had followed the route taken by the enemy, he would have come upon van dorn in a swamp with a stream in front and ord holding the only bridge; but he took the road leading north and towards chewalla instead of west, and, after having marched as far as the enemy had moved to get to the hatchie, he was as far from battle as when he started. hurlbut had not the numbers to meet any such force as van dorn's if they had been in any mood for fighting, and he might have been in great peril. i now regarded the time to accomplish anything by pursuit as past and, after rosecrans reached jonesboro, i ordered him to return. he kept on to ripley, however, and was persistent in wanting to go farther. i thereupon ordered him to halt and submitted the matter to the general-in-chief, who allowed me to exercise my judgment in the matter, but inquired "why not pursue?" upon this i ordered rosecrans back. had he gone much farther he would have met a greater force than van dorn had at corinth and behind intrenchments or on chosen ground, and the probabilities are he would have lost his army. the battle of corinth was bloody, our loss being 315 killed, 1,812 wounded and 232 missing. the enemy lost many more. rosecrans reported 1,423 dead and 2,225 prisoners. we fought behind breastworks, which accounts in some degree for the disparity. among the killed on our side was general hackelman. general oglesby was badly, it was for some time supposed mortally, wounded. i received a congratulatory letter from the president, which expressed also his sorrow for the losses. this battle was recognized by me as being a decided victory, though not so complete as i had hoped for, nor nearly so complete as i now think was within the easy grasp of the commanding officer at corinth. since the war it is known that the result, as it was, was a crushing blow to the enemy, and felt by him much more than it was appreciated at the north. the battle relieved me from any further anxiety for the safety of the territory within my jurisdiction, and soon after receiving reinforcements i suggested to the general-in-chief a forward movement against vicksburg. on the 23d of october i learned of pemberton's being in command at holly springs and much reinforced by conscripts and troops from alabama and texas. the same day general rosecrans was relieved from duty with my command, and shortly after he succeeded buell in the command of the army in middle tennessee. i was delighted at the promotion of general rosecrans to a separate command, because i still believed that when independent of an immediate superior the qualities which i, at that time, credited him with possessing, would show themselves. as a subordinate i found that i could not make him do as i wished, and had determined to relieve him from duty that very day. at the close of the operations just described my force, in round numbers, was 48,500. of these 4,800 were in kentucky and illinois, 7,000 in memphis, 19,200 from mound city south, and 17,500 at corinth. general mcclernand had been authorized from washington to go north and organize troops to be used in opening the mississippi. these new levies with other reinforcements now began to come in. on the 25th of october i was placed in command of the department of the tennessee. reinforcements continued to come from the north and by the 2d of november i was prepared to take the initiative. this was a great relief after the two and a half months of continued defence over a large district of country, and where nearly every citizen was an enemy ready to give information of our every move. i have described very imperfectly a few of the battles and skirmishes that took place during this time. to describe all would take more space than i can allot to the purpose; to make special mention of all the officers and troops who distinguished themselves, would take a volume. (*9) chapter xxx. the campaign against vicksburg--employing the freedmen--occupation of holly springs--sherman ordered to memphis--sherman's movements down the mississippi--van dorn captures holly springs--collecting forage and food. vicksburg was important to the enemy because it occupied the first high ground coming close to the river below memphis. from there a railroad runs east, connecting with other roads leading to all points of the southern states. a railroad also starts from the opposite side of the river, extending west as far as shreveport, louisiana. vicksburg was the only channel, at the time of the events of which this chapter treats, connecting the parts of the confederacy divided by the mississippi. so long as it was held by the enemy, the free navigation of the river was prevented. hence its importance. points on the river between vicksburg and port hudson were held as dependencies; but their fall was sure to follow the capture of the former place. the campaign against vicksburg commenced on the 2d of november as indicated in a dispatch to the general-in-chief in the following words: "i have commenced a movement on grand junction, with three divisions from corinth and two from bolivar. will leave here [jackson, tennessee] to-morrow, and take command in person. if found practicable, i will go to holly springs, and, may be, grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as i go." at this time my command was holding the mobile and ohio railroad from about twenty-five miles south of corinth, north to columbus, kentucky; the mississippi central from bolivar north to its junction with the mobile and ohio; the memphis and charleston from corinth east to bear creek, and the mississippi river from cairo to memphis. my entire command was no more than was necessary to hold these lines, and hardly that if kept on the defensive. by moving against the enemy and into his unsubdued, or not yet captured, territory, driving their army before us, these lines would nearly hold themselves; thus affording a large force for field operations. my moving force at that time was about 30,000 men, and i estimated the enemy confronting me, under pemberton, at about the same number. general mcpherson commanded my left wing and general c. s. hamilton the centre, while sherman was at memphis with the right wing. pemberton was fortified at the tallahatchie, but occupied holly springs and grand junction on the mississippi central railroad. on the 8th we occupied grand junction and la grange, throwing a considerable force seven or eight miles south, along the line of the railroad. the road from bolivar forward was repaired and put in running order as the troops advanced. up to this time it had been regarded as an axiom in war that large bodies of troops must operate from a base of supplies which they always covered and guarded in all forward movements. there was delay therefore in repairing the road back, and in gathering and forwarding supplies to the front. by my orders, and in accordance with previous instructions from washington, all the forage within reach was collected under the supervision of the chief quartermaster and the provisions under the chief commissary, receipts being given when there was any one to take them; the supplies in any event to be accounted for as government stores. the stock was bountiful, but still it gave me no idea of the possibility of supplying a moving column in an enemy's country from the country itself. it was at this point, probably, where the first idea of a "freedman's bureau" took its origin. orders of the government prohibited the expulsion of the negroes from the protection of the army, when they came in voluntarily. humanity forbade allowing them to starve. with such an army of them, of all ages and both sexes, as had congregated about grand junction, amounting to many thousands, it was impossible to advance. there was no special authority for feeding them unless they were employed as teamsters, cooks and pioneers with the army; but only able-bodied young men were suitable for such work. this labor would support but a very limited percentage of them. the plantations were all deserted; the cotton and corn were ripe: men, women and children above ten years of age could be employed in saving these crops. to do this work with contrabands, or to have it done, organization under a competent chief was necessary. on inquiring for such a man chaplain eaton, now and for many years the very able united states commissioner of education, was suggested. he proved as efficient in that field as he has since done in his present one. i gave him all the assistants and guards he called for. we together fixed the prices to be paid for the negro labor, whether rendered to the government or to individuals. the cotton was to be picked from abandoned plantations, the laborers to receive the stipulated price (my recollection is twelve and a half cents per pound for picking and ginning) from the quartermaster, he shipping the cotton north to be sold for the benefit of the government. citizens remaining on their plantations were allowed the privilege of having their crops saved by freedmen on the same terms. at once the freedmen became self-sustaining. the money was not paid to them directly, but was expended judiciously and for their benefit. they gave me no trouble afterwards. later the freedmen were engaged in cutting wood along the mississippi river to supply the large number of steamers on that stream. a good price was paid for chopping wood used for the supply of government steamers (steamers chartered and which the government had to supply with fuel). those supplying their own fuel paid a much higher price. in this way a fund was created not only sufficient to feed and clothe all, old and young, male and female, but to build them comfortable cabins, hospitals for the sick, and to supply them with many comforts they had never known before. at this stage of the campaign against vicksburg i was very much disturbed by newspaper rumors that general mcclernand was to have a separate and independent command within mine, to operate against vicksburg by way of the mississippi river. two commanders on the same field are always one too many, and in this case i did not think the general selected had either the experience or the qualifications to fit him for so important a position. i feared for the safety of the troops intrusted to him, especially as he was to raise new levies, raw troops, to execute so important a trust. but on the 12th i received a dispatch from general halleck saying that i had command of all the troops sent to my department and authorizing me to fight the enemy where i pleased. the next day my cavalry was in holly springs, and the enemy fell back south of the tallahatchie. holly springs i selected for my depot of supplies and munitions of war, all of which at that time came by rail from columbus, kentucky, except the few stores collected about la grange and grand junction. this was a long line (increasing in length as we moved south) to maintain in an enemy's country. on the 15th of november, while i was still at holly springs, i sent word to sherman to meet me at columbus. we were but forty-seven miles apart, yet the most expeditious way for us to meet was for me to take the rail to columbus and sherman a steamer for the same place. at that meeting, besides talking over my general plans i gave him his orders to join me with two divisions and to march them down the mississippi central railroad if he could. sherman, who was always prompt, was up by the 29th to cottage hill, ten miles north of oxford. he brought three divisions with him, leaving a garrison of only four regiments of infantry, a couple of pieces of artillery and a small detachment of cavalry. further reinforcements he knew were on their way from the north to memphis. about this time general halleck ordered troops from helena, arkansas (territory west of the mississippi was not under my command then) to cut the road in pemberton's rear. the expedition was under generals hovey and c. c. washburn and was successful so far as reaching the railroad was concerned, but the damage done was very slight and was soon repaired. the tallahatchie, which confronted me, was very high, the railroad bridge destroyed and pemberton strongly fortified on the south side. a crossing would have been impossible in the presence of an enemy. i sent the cavalry higher up the stream and they secured a crossing. this caused the enemy to evacuate their position, which was possibly accelerated by the expedition of hovey and washburn. the enemy was followed as far south as oxford by the main body of troops, and some seventeen miles farther by mcpherson's command. here the pursuit was halted to repair the railroad from the tallahatchie northward, in order to bring up supplies. the piles on which the railroad bridge rested had been left standing. the work of constructing a roadway for the troops was but a short matter, and, later, rails were laid for cars. during the delay at oxford in repairing railroads i learned that an expedition down the mississippi now was inevitable and, desiring to have a competent commander in charge, i ordered sherman on the 8th of december back to memphis to take charge. the following were his orders: headquarters 13th army corps, department of the tennessee. oxford, mississippi, december 8,1862. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding right wing: you will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to memphis, tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. on your arrival at memphis you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of general curtis's forces at present east of the mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. as soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of vicksburg, and with the co-operation of the gunboat fleet under command of flag-officer porter proceed to the reduction of that place in such a manner as circumstances, and your own judgment, may dictate. the amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. the quartermaster at st. louis will be instructed to send you transportation for 30,000 men; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the port of memphis. on arriving in memphis, put yourself in communication with admiral porter, and arrange with him for his co-operation. inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. i will hold the forces here in readiness to co-operate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary. leave the district of memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there. u. s. grant, major-general. this idea had presented itself to my mind earlier, for on the 3d of december i asked halleck if it would not be well to hold the enemy south of the yallabusha and move a force from helena and memphis on vicksburg. on the 5th again i suggested, from oxford, to halleck that if the helena troops were at my command i though it would be possible to take them and the memphis forces south of the mouth of the yazoo river, and thus secure vicksburg and the state of mississippi. halleck on the same day, the 5th of december, directed me not to attempt to hold the country south of the tallahatchie, but to collect 25,000 troops at memphis by the 20th for the vicksburg expedition. i sent sherman with two divisions at once, informed the general-in-chief of the fact, and asked whether i should command the expedition down the river myself or send sherman. i was authorized to do as i though best for the accomplishment of the great object in view. i sent sherman and so informed general halleck. as stated, my action in sending sherman back was expedited by a desire to get him in command of the forces separated from my direct supervision. i feared that delay might bring mcclernand, who was his senior and who had authority from the president and secretary of war to exercise that particular command,--and independently. i doubted mcclernand's fitness; and i had good reason to believe that in forestalling him i was by no means giving offence to those whose authority to command was above both him and me. neither my orders to general sherman, nor the correspondence between us or between general halleck and myself, contemplated at the time my going further south than the yallabusha. pemberton's force in my front was the main part of the garrison of vicksburg, as the force with me was the defence of the territory held by us in west tennessee and kentucky. i hoped to hold pemberton in my front while sherman should get in his rear and into vicksburg. the further north the enemy could be held the better. it was understood, however, between general sherman and myself that our movements were to be co-operative; if pemberton could not be held away from vicksburg i was to follow him; but at that time it was not expected to abandon the railroad north of the yallabusha. with that point as a secondary base of supplies, the possibility of moving down the yazoo until communications could be opened with the mississippi was contemplated. it was my intention, and so understood by sherman and his command, that if the enemy should fall back i would follow him even to the gates of vicksburg. i intended in such an event to hold the road to grenada on the yallabusha and cut loose from there, expecting to establish a new base of supplies on the yazoo, or at vicksburg itself, with grenada to fall back upon in case of failure. it should be remembered that at the time i speak of it had not been demonstrated that an army could operate in an enemy's territory depending upon the country for supplies. a halt was called at oxford with the advance seventeen miles south of there, to bring up the road to the latter point and to bring supplies of food, forage and munitions to the front. on the 18th of december i received orders from washington to divide my command into four army corps, with general mcclernand to command one of them and to be assigned to that part of the army which was to operate down the mississippi. this interfered with my plans, but probably resulted in my ultimately taking the command in person. mcclernand was at that time in springfield, illinois. the order was obeyed without any delay. dispatches were sent to him the same day in conformity. on the 20th general van dorn appeared at holly springs, my secondary base of supplies, captured the garrison of 1,500 men commanded by colonel murphy, of the 8th wisconsin regiment, and destroyed all our munitions of war, food and forage. the capture was a disgraceful one to the officer commanding but not to the troops under him. at the same time forrest got on our line of railroad between jackson, tennessee, and columbus, kentucky, doing much damage to it. this cut me off from all communication with the north for more than a week, and it was more than two weeks before rations or forage could be issued from stores obtained in the regular way. this demonstrated the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of road over which to draw supplies for an army moving in an enemy's country. i determined, therefore, to abandon my campaign into the interior with columbus as a base, and returned to la grange and grand junction destroying the road to my front and repairing the road to memphis, making the mississippi river the line over which to draw supplies. pemberton was falling back at the same time. the moment i received the news of van dorn's success i sent the cavalry at the front back to drive him from the country. he had start enough to move north destroying the railroad in many places, and to attack several small garrisons intrenched as guards to the railroad. all these he found warned of his coming and prepared to receive him. van dorn did not succeed in capturing a single garrison except the one at holly springs, which was larger than all the others attacked by him put together. murphy was also warned of van dorn's approach, but made no preparations to meet him. he did not even notify his command. colonel murphy was the officer who, two months before, had evacuated iuka on the approach of the enemy. general rosecrans denounced him for the act and desired to have him tried and punished. i sustained the colonel at the time because his command was a small one compared with that of the enemy--not one-tenth as large--and i thought he had done well to get away without falling into their hands. his leaving large stores to fall into price's possession i looked upon as an oversight and excused it on the ground of inexperience in military matters. he should, however, have destroyed them. this last surrender demonstrated to my mind that rosecrans' judgment of murphy's conduct at iuka was correct. the surrender of holly springs was most reprehensible and showed either the disloyalty of colonel murphy to the cause which he professed to serve, or gross cowardice. after the war was over i read from the diary of a lady who accompanied general pemberton in his retreat from the tallahatchie, that the retreat was almost a panic. the roads were bad and it was difficult to move the artillery and trains. why there should have been a panic i do not see. no expedition had yet started down the mississippi river. had i known the demoralized condition of the enemy, or the fact that central mississippi abounded so in all army supplies, i would have been in pursuit of pemberton while his cavalry was destroying the roads in my rear. after sending cavalry to drive van dorn away, my next order was to dispatch all the wagons we had, under proper escort, to collect and bring in all supplies of forage and food from a region of fifteen miles east and west of the road from our front back to grand junction, leaving two months' supplies for the families of those whose stores were taken. i was amazed at the quantity of supplies the country afforded. it showed that we could have subsisted off the country for two months instead of two weeks without going beyond the limits designated. this taught me a lesson which was taken advantage of later in the campaign when our army lived twenty days with the issue of only five days' rations by the commissary. our loss of supplies was great at holly springs, but it was more than compensated for by those taken from the country and by the lesson taught. the news of the capture of holly springs and the destruction of our supplies caused much rejoicing among the people remaining in oxford. they came with broad smiles on their faces, indicating intense joy, to ask what i was going to do now without anything for my soldiers to eat. i told them that i was not disturbed; that i had already sent troops and wagons to collect all the food and forage they could find for fifteen miles on each side of the road. countenances soon changed, and so did the inquiry. the next was, "what are we to do?" my response was that we had endeavored to feed ourselves from our own northern resources while visiting them; but their friends in gray had been uncivil enough to destroy what we had brought along, and it could not be expected that men, with arms in their hands, would starve in the midst of plenty. i advised them to emigrate east, or west, fifteen miles and assist in eating up what we left. chapter xxxi. headquarters moved to holly springs--general m'clernand in command --assuming command at young's point--operations above vicksburg --fortifications about vicksburg--the canal--lake providence --operations at yazoo pass. this interruption in my communications north--i was really cut off from communication with a great part of my own command during this time --resulted in sherman's moving from memphis before mcclernand could arrive, for my dispatch of the 18th did not reach mcclernand. pemberton got back to vicksburg before sherman got there. the rebel positions were on a bluff on the yazoo river, some miles above its mouth. the waters were high so that the bottoms were generally overflowed, leaving only narrow causeways of dry land between points of debarkation and the high bluffs. these were fortified and defended at all points. the rebel position was impregnable against any force that could be brought against its front. sherman could not use one-fourth of his force. his efforts to capture the city, or the high ground north of it, were necessarily unavailing. sherman's attack was very unfortunate, but i had no opportunity of communicating with him after the destruction of the road and telegraph to my rear on the 20th. he did not know but what i was in the rear of the enemy and depending on him to open a new base of supplies for the troops with me. i had, before he started from memphis, directed him to take with him a few small steamers suitable for the navigation of the yazoo, not knowing but that i might want them to supply me after cutting loose from my base at grenada. on the 23d i removed my headquarters back to holly springs. the troops were drawn back gradually, but without haste or confusion, finding supplies abundant and no enemy following. the road was not damaged south of holly springs by van dorn, at least not to an extent to cause any delay. as i had resolved to move headquarters to memphis, and to repair the road to that point, i remained at holly springs until this work was completed. on the 10th of january, the work on the road from holly springs to grand junction and thence to memphis being completed, i moved my headquarters to the latter place. during the campaign here described, the losses (mostly captures) were about equal, crediting the rebels with their holly springs capture, which they could not hold. when sherman started on his expedition down the river he had 20,000 men, taken from memphis, and was reinforced by 12,000 more at helena, arkansas. the troops on the west bank of the river had previously been assigned to my command. mcclernand having received the orders for his assignment reached the mouth of the yazoo on the 2d of january, and immediately assumed command of all the troops with sherman, being a part of his own corps, the 13th, and all of sherman's, the 15th. sherman, and admiral porter with the fleet, had withdrawn from the yazoo. after consultation they decided that neither the army nor navy could render service to the cause where they were, and learning that i had withdrawn from the interior of mississippi, they determined to return to the arkansas river and to attack arkansas post, about fifty miles up that stream and garrisoned by about five or six thousand men. sherman had learned of the existence of this force through a man who had been captured by the enemy with a steamer loaded with ammunition and other supplies intended for his command. the man had made his escape. mcclernand approved this move reluctantly, as sherman says. no obstacle was encountered until the gunboats and transports were within range of the fort. after three days' bombardment by the navy an assault was made by the troops and marines, resulting in the capture of the place, and in taking 5,000 prisoners and 17 guns. i was at first disposed to disapprove of this move as an unnecessary side movement having no especial bearing upon the work before us; but when the result was understood i regarded it as very important. five thousand confederate troops left in the rear might have caused us much trouble and loss of property while navigating the mississippi. immediately after the reduction of arkansas post and the capture of the garrison, mcclernand returned with his entire force to napoleon, at the mouth of the arkansas river. from here i received messages from both sherman and admiral porter, urging me to come and take command in person, and expressing their distrust of mcclernand's ability and fitness for so important and intricate an expedition. on the 17th i visited mcclernand and his command at napoleon. it was here made evident to me that both the army and navy were so distrustful of mcclernand's fitness to command that, while they would do all they could to insure success, this distrust was an element of weakness. it would have been criminal to send troops under these circumstances into such danger. by this time i had received authority to relieve mcclernand, or to assign any person else to the command of the river expedition, or to assume command in person. i felt great embarrassment about mcclernand. he was the senior major-general after myself within the department. it would not do, with his rank and ambition, to assign a junior over him. nothing was left, therefore, but to assume the command myself. i would have been glad to put sherman in command, to give him an opportunity to accomplish what he had failed in the december before; but there seemed no other way out of the difficulty, for he was junior to mcclernand. sherman's failure needs no apology. on the 20th i ordered general mcclernand with the entire command, to young's point and milliken's bend, while i returned to memphis to make all the necessary preparation for leaving the territory behind me secure. general hurlbut with the 16th corps was left in command. the memphis and charleston railroad was held, while the mississippi central was given up. columbus was the only point between cairo and memphis, on the river, left with a garrison. all the troops and guns from the posts on the abandoned railroad and river were sent to the front. on the 29th of january i arrived at young's point and assumed command the following day. general mcclernand took exception in a most characteristic way--for him. his correspondence with me on the subject was more in the nature of a reprimand than a protest. it was highly insubordinate, but i overlooked it, as i believed, for the good of the service. general mcclernand was a politician of very considerable prominence in his state; he was a member of congress when the secession war broke out; he belonged to that political party which furnished all the opposition there was to a vigorous prosecution of the war for saving the union; there was no delay in his declaring himself for the union at all hazards, and there was no uncertain sound in his declaration of where he stood in the contest before the country. he also gave up his seat in congress to take the field in defence of the principles he had proclaimed. the real work of the campaign and siege of vicksburg now began. the problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which the troops could operate against vicksburg. the mississippi river, from cairo south, runs through a rich alluvial valley of many miles in width, bound on the east by land running from eighty up to two or more hundred feet above the river. on the west side the highest land, except in a few places, is but little above the highest water. through this valley the river meanders in the most tortuous way, varying in direction to all points of the compass. at places it runs to the very foot of the bluffs. after leaving memphis, there are no such highlands coming to the water's edge on the east shore until vicksburg is reached. the intervening land is cut up by bayous filled from the river in high water--many of them navigable for steamers. all of them would be, except for overhanging trees, narrowness and tortuous course, making it impossible to turn the bends with vessels of any considerable length. marching across this country in the face of an enemy was impossible; navigating it proved equally impracticable. the strategical way according to the rule, therefore, would have been to go back to memphis; establish that as a base of supplies; fortify it so that the storehouses could be held by a small garrison, and move from there along the line of railroad, repairing as we advanced, to the yallabusha, or to jackson, mississippi. at this time the north had become very much discouraged. many strong union men believed that the war must prove a failure. the elections of 1862 had gone against the party which was for the prosecution of the war to save the union if it took the last man and the last dollar. voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout the greater part of the north, and the draft had been resorted to to fill up our ranks. it was my judgment at the time that to make a backward movement as long as that from vicksburg to memphis, would be interpreted, by many of those yet full of hope for the preservation of the union, as a defeat, and that the draft would be resisted, desertions ensue and the power to capture and punish deserters lost. there was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory. this was in my mind from the moment i took command in person at young's point. the winter of 1862-3 was a noted one for continuous high water in the mississippi and for heavy rains along the lower river. to get dry land, or rather land above the water, to encamp the troops upon, took many miles of river front. we had to occupy the levees and the ground immediately behind. this was so limited that one corps, the 17th, under general mcpherson, was at lake providence, seventy miles above vicksburg. it was in january the troops took their position opposite vicksburg. the water was very high and the rains were incessant. there seemed no possibility of a land movement before the end of march or later, and it would not do to lie idle all this time. the effect would be demoralizing to the troops and injurious to their health. friends in the north would have grown more and more discouraged, and enemies in the same section more and more insolent in their gibes and denunciation of the cause and those engaged in it. i always admired the south, as bad as i thought their cause, for the boldness with which they silenced all opposition and all croaking, by press or by individuals, within their control. war at all times, whether a civil war between sections of a common country or between nations, ought to be avoided, if possible with honor. but, once entered into, it is too much for human nature to tolerate an enemy within their ranks to give aid and comfort to the armies of the opposing section or nation. vicksburg, as stated before, is on the first high land coming to the river's edge, below that on which memphis stands. the bluff, or high land, follows the left bank of the yazoo for some distance and continues in a southerly direction to the mississippi river, thence it runs along the mississippi to warrenton, six miles below. the yazoo river leaves the high land a short distance below haines' bluff and empties into the mississippi nine miles above vicksburg. vicksburg is built on this high land where the mississippi washes the base of the hill. haines' bluff, eleven miles from vicksburg, on the yazoo river, was strongly fortified. the whole distance from there to vicksburg and thence to warrenton was also intrenched, with batteries at suitable distances and rifle-pits connecting them. from young's point the mississippi turns in a north-easterly direction to a point just above the city, when it again turns and runs south-westerly, leaving vessels, which might attempt to run the blockade, exposed to the fire of batteries six miles below the city before they were in range of the upper batteries. since then the river has made a cut-off, leaving what was the peninsula in front of the city, an island. north of the yazoo was all a marsh, heavily timbered, cut up with bayous, and much overflowed. a front attack was therefore impossible, and was never contemplated; certainly not by me. the problem then became, how to secure a landing on high ground east of the mississippi without an apparent retreat. then commenced a series of experiments to consume time, and to divert the attention of the enemy, of my troops and of the public generally. i, myself, never felt great confidence that any of the experiments resorted to would prove successful. nevertheless i was always prepared to take advantage of them in case they did. in 1862 general thomas williams had come up from new orleans and cut a ditch ten or twelve feet wide and about as deep, straight across from young's point to the river below. the distance across was a little over a mile. it was williams' expectation that when the river rose it would cut a navigable channel through; but the canal started in an eddy from both ends, and, of course, it only filled up with water on the rise without doing any execution in the way of cutting. mr. lincoln had navigated the mississippi in his younger days and understood well its tendency to change its channel, in places, from time to time. he set much store accordingly by this canal. general mcclernand had been, therefore, directed before i went to young's point to push the work of widening and deepening this canal. after my arrival the work was diligently pushed with about 4,000 men--as many as could be used to advantage--until interrupted by a sudden rise in the river that broke a dam at the upper end, which had been put there to keep the water out until the excavation was completed. this was on the 8th of march. even if the canal had proven a success, so far as to be navigable for steamers, it could not have been of much advantage to us. it runs in a direction almost perpendicular to the line of bluffs on the opposite side, or east bank, of the river. as soon as the enemy discovered what we were doing he established a battery commanding the canal throughout its length. this battery soon drove out our dredges, two in number, which were doing the work of thousands of men. had the canal been completed it might have proven of some use in running transports through, under the cover of night, to use below; but they would yet have to run batteries, though for a much shorter distance. while this work was progressing we were busy in other directions, trying to find an available landing on high ground on the east bank of the river, or to make water-ways to get below the city, avoiding the batteries. on the 30th of january, the day after my arrival at the front, i ordered general mcpherson, stationed with his corps at lake providence, to cut the levee at that point. if successful in opening a channel for navigation by this route, it would carry us to the mississippi river through the mouth of the red river, just above port hudson and four hundred miles below vicksburg by the river. lake providence is a part of the old bed of the mississippi, about a mile from the present channel. it is six miles long and has its outlet through bayou baxter, bayou macon, and the tensas, washita and red rivers. the last three are navigable streams at all seasons. bayous baxter and macon are narrow and tortuous, and the banks are covered with dense forests overhanging the channel. they were also filled with fallen timber, the accumulation of years. the land along the mississippi river, from memphis down, is in all instances highest next to the river, except where the river washes the bluffs which form the boundary of the valley through which it winds. bayou baxter, as it reaches lower land, begins to spread out and disappears entirely in a cypress swamp before it reaches the macon. there was about two feet of water in this swamp at the time. to get through it, even with vessels of the lightest draft, it was necessary to clear off a belt of heavy timber wide enough to make a passage way. as the trees would have to be cut close to the bottom--under water--it was an undertaking of great magnitude. on the 4th of february i visited general mcpherson, and remained with him several days. the work had not progressed so far as to admit the water from the river into the lake, but the troops had succeeded in drawing a small steamer, of probably not over thirty tons' capacity, from the river into the lake. with this we were able to explore the lake and bayou as far as cleared. i saw then that there was scarcely a chance of this ever becoming a practicable route for moving troops through an enemy's country. the distance from lake providence to the point where vessels going by that route would enter the mississippi again, is about four hundred and seventy miles by the main river. the distance would probably be greater by the tortuous bayous through which this new route would carry us. the enemy held port hudson, below where the red river debouches, and all the mississippi above to vicksburg. the red river, washita and tensas were, as has been said, all navigable streams, on which the enemy could throw small bodies of men to obstruct our passage and pick off our troops with their sharpshooters. i let the work go on, believing employment was better than idleness for the men. then, too, it served as a cover for other efforts which gave a better prospect of success. this work was abandoned after the canal proved a failure. lieutenant-colonel wilson of my staff was sent to helena, arkansas, to examine and open a way through moon lake and the yazoo pass if possible. formerly there was a route by way of an inlet from the mississippi river into moon lake, a mile east of the river, thence east through yazoo pass to coldwater, along the latter to the tallahatchie, which joins the yallabusha about two hundred and fifty miles below moon lake and forms the yazoo river. these were formerly navigated by steamers trading with the rich plantations along their banks; but the state of mississippi had built a strong levee across the inlet some years before, leaving the only entrance for vessels into this rich region the one by way of the mouth of the yazoo several hundreds of miles below. on the 2d of february this dam, or levee, was cut. the river being high the rush of water through the cut was so great that in a very short time the entire obstruction was washed away. the bayous were soon filled and much of the country was overflowed. this pass leaves the mississippi river but a few miles below helena. on the 24th general ross, with his brigade of about 4,500 men on transports, moved into this new water-way. the rebels had obstructed the navigation of yazoo pass and the coldwater by felling trees into them. much of the timber in this region being of greater specific gravity than water, and being of great size, their removal was a matter of great labor; but it was finally accomplished, and on the 11th of march ross found himself, accompanied by two gunboats under the command of lieutenant-commander watson smith, confronting a fortification at greenwood, where the tallahatchie and yallabusha unite and the yazoo begins. the bends of the rivers are such at this point as to almost form an island, scarcely above water at that stage of the river. this island was fortified and manned. it was named fort pemberton after the commander at vicksburg. no land approach was accessible. the troops, therefore, could render no assistance towards an assault further than to establish a battery on a little piece of ground which was discovered above water. the gunboats, however, attacked on the 11th and again on the 13th of march. both efforts were failures and were not renewed. one gunboat was disabled and we lost six men killed and twenty-five wounded. the loss of the enemy was less. fort pemberton was so little above the water that it was thought that a rise of two feet would drive the enemy out. in hope of enlisting the elements on our side, which had been so much against us up to this time, a second cut was made in the mississippi levee, this time directly opposite helena, or six miles above the former cut. it did not accomplish the desired result, and ross, with his fleet, started back. on the 22d he met quinby with a brigade at yazoo pass. quinby was the senior of ross, and assumed command. he was not satisfied with returning to his former position without seeing for himself whether anything could be accomplished. accordingly fort pemberton was revisited by our troops; but an inspection was sufficient this time without an attack. quinby, with his command, returned with but little delay. in the meantime i was much exercised for the safety of ross, not knowing that quinby had been able to join him. reinforcements were of no use in a country covered with water, as they would have to remain on board of their transports. relief had to come from another quarter. so i determined to get into the yazoo below fort pemberton. steel's bayou empties into the yazoo river between haines' bluff and its mouth. it is narrow, very tortuous, and fringed with a very heavy growth of timber, but it is deep. it approaches to within one mile of the mississippi at eagle bend, thirty miles above young's point. steel's bayou connects with black bayou, black bayou with deer creek, deer creek with rolling fork, rolling fork with the big sunflower river, and the big sunflower with the yazoo river about ten miles above haines' bluff in a right line but probably twenty or twenty-five miles by the winding of the river. all these waterways are of about the same nature so far as navigation is concerned, until the sunflower is reached; this affords free navigation. admiral porter explored this waterway as far as deer creek on the 14th of march, and reported it navigable. on the next day he started with five gunboats and four mortar-boats. i went with him for some distance. the heavy overhanging timber retarded progress very much, as did also the short turns in so narrow a stream. the gunboats, however, ploughed their way through without other damage than to their appearance. the transports did not fare so well although they followed behind. the road was somewhat cleared for them by the gunboats. in the evening i returned to headquarters to hurry up reinforcements. sherman went in person on the 16th, taking with him stuart's division of the 15th corps. they took large river transports to eagle bend on the mississippi, where they debarked and marched across to steel's bayou, where they re-embarked on the transports. the river steamers, with their tall smokestacks and light guards extending out, were so much impeded that the gunboats got far ahead. porter, with his fleet, got within a few hundred yards of where the sailing would have been clear and free from the obstructions caused by felling trees into the water, when he encountered rebel sharp-shooters, and his progress was delayed by obstructions in his front. he could do nothing with gunboats against sharpshooters. the rebels, learning his route, had sent in about 4,000 men--many more than there were sailors in the fleet. sherman went back, at the request of the admiral, to clear out black bayou and to hurry up reinforcements, which were far behind. on the night of the 19th he received notice from the admiral that he had been attacked by sharp-shooters and was in imminent peril. sherman at once returned through black bayou in a canoe, and passed on until he met a steamer, with the last of the reinforcements he had, coming up. they tried to force their way through black bayou with their steamer, but, finding it slow and tedious work, debarked and pushed forward on foot. it was night when they landed, and intensely dark. there was but a narrow strip of land above water, and that was grown up with underbrush or cane. the troops lighted their way through this with candles carried in their hands for a mile and a half, when they came to an open plantation. here the troops rested until morning. they made twenty-one miles from this resting-place by noon the next day, and were in time to rescue the fleet. porter had fully made up his mind to blow up the gunboats rather than have them fall into the hands of the enemy. more welcome visitors he probably never met than the "boys in blue" on this occasion. the vessels were backed out and returned to their rendezvous on the mississippi; and thus ended in failure the fourth attempt to get in rear of vicksburg. chapter xxxii. the bayous west of the mississippi--criticisms of the northern press --running the batteries--loss of the indianola--disposition of the troops. the original canal scheme was also abandoned on the 27th of march. the effort to make a waterway through lake providence and the connecting bayous was abandoned as wholly impracticable about the same time. at milliken's bend, and also at young's point, bayous or channels start, which connecting with other bayous passing richmond, louisiana, enter the mississippi at carthage twenty-five or thirty miles above grand gulf. the mississippi levee cuts the supply of water off from these bayous or channels, but all the rainfall behind the levee, at these points, is carried through these same channels to the river below. in case of a crevasse in this vicinity, the water escaping would find its outlet through the same channels. the dredges and laborers from the canal having been driven out by overflow and the enemy's batteries, i determined to open these other channels, if possible. if successful the effort would afford a route, away from the enemy's batteries, for our transports. there was a good road back of the levees, along these bayous, to carry the troops, artillery and wagon trains over whenever the water receded a little, and after a few days of dry weather. accordingly, with the abandonment of all the other plans for reaching a base heretofore described, this new one was undertaken. as early as the 4th of february i had written to halleck about this route, stating that i thought it much more practicable than the other undertaking (the lake providence route), and that it would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country. the upper end of these bayous being cut off from a water supply, further than the rainfall back of the levees, was grown up with dense timber for a distance of several miles from their source. it was necessary, therefore, to clear this out before letting in the water from the river. this work was continued until the waters of the river began to recede and the road to richmond, louisiana, emerged from the water. one small steamer and some barges were got through this channel, but no further use could be made of it because of the fall in the river. beyond this it was no more successful than the other experiments with which the winter was whiled away. all these failures would have been very discouraging if i had expected much from the efforts; but i had not. from the first the most i hoped to accomplish was the passage of transports, to be used below vicksburg, without exposure to the long line of batteries defending that city. this long, dreary and, for heavy and continuous rains and high water, unprecedented winter was one of great hardship to all engaged about vicksburg. the river was higher than its natural banks from december, 1862, to the following april. the war had suspended peaceful pursuits in the south, further than the production of army supplies, and in consequence the levees were neglected and broken in many places and the whole country was covered with water. troops could scarcely find dry ground on which to pitch their tents. malarial fevers broke out among the men. measles and small-pox also attacked them. the hospital arrangements and medical attendance were so perfect, however, that the loss of life was much less than might have been expected. visitors to the camps went home with dismal stories to relate; northern papers came back to the soldiers with these stories exaggerated. because i would not divulge my ultimate plans to visitors, they pronounced me idle, incompetent and unfit to command men in an emergency, and clamored for my removal. they were not to be satisfied, many of them, with my simple removal, but named who my successor should be. mcclernand, fremont, hunter and mcclellan were all mentioned in this connection. i took no steps to answer these complaints, but continued to do my duty, as i understood it, to the best of my ability. every one has his superstitions. one of mine is that in positions of great responsibility every one should do his duty to the best of his ability where assigned by competent authority, without application or the use of influence to change his position. while at cairo i had watched with very great interest the operations of the army of the potomac, looking upon that as the main field of the war. i had no idea, myself, of ever having any large command, nor did i suppose that i was equal to one; but i had the vanity to think that as a cavalry officer i might succeed very well in the command of a brigade. on one occasion, in talking about this to my staff officers, all of whom were civilians without any military education whatever, i said that i would give anything if i were commanding a brigade of cavalry in the army of the potomac and i believed i could do some good. captain hillyer spoke up and suggested that i make application to be transferred there to command the cavalry. i then told him that i would cut my right arm off first, and mentioned this superstition. in time of war the president, being by the constitution commander-in-chief of the army and navy, is responsible for the selection of commanders. he should not be embarrassed in making his selections. i having been selected, my responsibility ended with my doing the best i knew how. if i had sought the place, or obtained it through personal or political influence, my belief is that i would have feared to undertake any plan of my own conception, and would probably have awaited direct orders from my distant superiors. persons obtaining important commands by application or political influence are apt to keep a written record of complaints and predictions of defeat, which are shown in case of disaster. somebody must be responsible for their failures. with all the pressure brought to bear upon them, both president lincoln and general halleck stood by me to the end of the campaign. i had never met mr. lincoln, but his support was constant. at last the waters began to recede; the roads crossing the peninsula behind the levees of the bayous, were emerging from the waters; the troops were all concentrated from distant points at milliken's bend preparatory to a final move which was to crown the long, tedious and discouraging labors with success. i had had in contemplation the whole winter the movement by land to a point below vicksburg from which to operate, subject only to the possible but not expected success of some one of the expedients resorted to for the purpose of giving us a different base. this could not be undertaken until the waters receded. i did not therefore communicate this plan, even to an officer of my staff, until it was necessary to make preparations for the start. my recollection is that admiral porter was the first one to whom i mentioned it. the co-operation of the navy was absolutely essential to the success (even to the contemplation) of such an enterprise. i had no more authority to command porter than he had to command me. it was necessary to have part of his fleet below vicksburg if the troops went there. steamers to use as ferries were also essential. the navy was the only escort and protection for these steamers, all of which in getting below had to run about fourteen miles of batteries. porter fell into the plan at once, and suggested that he had better superintend the preparation of the steamers selected to run the batteries, as sailors would probably understand the work better than soldiers. i was glad to accept his proposition, not only because i admitted his argument, but because it would enable me to keep from the enemy a little longer our designs. porter's fleet was on the east side of the river above the mouth of the yazoo, entirely concealed from the enemy by the dense forests that intervened. even spies could not get near him, on account of the undergrowth and overflowed lands. suspicions of some mysterious movements were aroused. our river guards discovered one day a small skiff moving quietly and mysteriously up the river near the east shore, from the direction of vicksburg, towards the fleet. on overhauling the boat they found a small white flag, not much larger than a handkerchief, set up in the stern, no doubt intended as a flag of truce in case of discovery. the boat, crew and passengers were brought ashore to me. the chief personage aboard proved to be jacob thompson, secretary of the interior under the administration of president buchanan. after a pleasant conversation of half an hour or more i allowed the boat and crew, passengers and all, to return to vicksburg, without creating a suspicion that there was a doubt in my mind as to the good faith of mr. thompson and his flag. admiral porter proceeded with the preparation of the steamers for their hazardous passage of the enemy's batteries. the great essential was to protect the boilers from the enemy's shot, and to conceal the fires under the boilers from view. this he accomplished by loading the steamers, between the guards and boilers on the boiler deck up to the deck above, with bales of hay and cotton, and the deck in front of the boilers in the same way, adding sacks of grain. the hay and grain would be wanted below, and could not be transported in sufficient quantity by the muddy roads over which we expected to march. before this i had been collecting, from st. louis and chicago, yawls and barges to be used as ferries when we got below. by the 16th of april porter was ready to start on his perilous trip. the advance, flagship benton, porter commanding, started at ten o'clock at night, followed at intervals of a few minutes by the lafayette with a captured steamer, the price, lashed to her side, the louisville, mound city, pittsburgh and carondelet--all of these being naval vessels. next came the transports --forest queen, silver wave and henry clay, each towing barges loaded with coal to be used as fuel by the naval and transport steamers when below the batteries. the gunboat tuscumbia brought up the rear. soon after the start a battery between vicksburg and warrenton opened fire across the intervening peninsula, followed by the upper batteries, and then by batteries all along the line. the gunboats ran up close under the bluffs, delivering their fire in return at short distances, probably without much effect. they were under fire for more than two hours and every vessel was struck many times, but with little damage to the gunboats. the transports did not fare so well. the henry clay was disabled and deserted by her crew. soon after a shell burst in the cotton packed about the boilers, set the vessel on fire and burned her to the water's edge. the burning mass, however, floated down to carthage before grounding, as did also one of the barges in tow. the enemy were evidently expecting our fleet, for they were ready to light up the river by means of bonfires on the east side and by firing houses on the point of land opposite the city on the louisiana side. the sight was magnificent, but terrible. i witnessed it from the deck of a river transport, run out into the middle of the river and as low down as it was prudent to go. my mind was much relieved when i learned that no one on the transports had been killed and but few, if any, wounded. during the running of the batteries men were stationed in the holds of the transports to partially stop with cotton shot-holes that might be made in the hulls. all damage was afterwards soon repaired under the direction of admiral porter. the experiment of passing batteries had been tried before this, however, during the war. admiral farragut had run the batteries at port hudson with the flagship hartford and one iron-clad and visited me from below vicksburg. the 13th of february admiral porter had sent the gunboat indianola, lieutenant-commander george brown commanding, below. she met colonel ellet of the marine brigade below natchez on a captured steamer. two of the colonel's fleet had previously run the batteries, producing the greatest consternation among the people along the mississippi from vicksburg (*10) to the red river. the indianola remained about the mouth of the red river some days, and then started up the mississippi. the confederates soon raised the queen of the west, (*11) and repaired her. with this vessel and the ram webb, which they had had for some time in the red river, and two other steamers, they followed the indianola. the latter was encumbered with barges of coal in tow, and consequently could make but little speed against the rapid current of the mississippi. the confederate fleet overtook her just above grand gulf, and attacked her after dark on the 24th of february. the indianola was superior to all the others in armament, and probably would have destroyed them or driven them away, but for her encumbrance. as it was she fought them for an hour and a half, but, in the dark, was struck seven or eight times by the ram and other vessels, and was finally disabled and reduced to a sinking condition. the armament was thrown overboard and the vessel run ashore. officers and crew then surrendered. i had started mcclernand with his corps of four divisions on the 29th of march, by way of richmond, louisiana, to new carthage, hoping that he might capture grand gulf before the balance of the troops could get there; but the roads were very bad, scarcely above water yet. some miles from new carthage the levee to bayou vidal was broken in several places, overflowing the roads for the distance of two miles. boats were collected from the surrounding bayous, and some constructed on the spot from such material as could be collected, to transport the troops across the overflowed interval. by the 6th of april mcclernand had reached new carthage with one division and its artillery, the latter ferried through the woods by these boats. on the 17th i visited new carthage in person, and saw that the process of getting troops through in the way we were doing was so tedious that a better method must be devised. the water was falling, and in a few days there would not be depth enough to use boats; nor would the land be dry enough to march over. mcclernand had already found a new route from smith's plantation where the crevasse occurred, to perkins' plantation, eight to twelve miles below new carthage. this increased the march from milliken's bend from twenty-seven to nearly forty miles. four bridges had to be built across bayous, two of them each over six hundred feet long, making about two thousand feet of bridging in all. the river falling made the current in these bayous very rapid, increasing the difficulty of building and permanently fastening these bridges; but the ingenuity of the "yankee soldier" was equal to any emergency. the bridges were soon built of such material as could be found near by, and so substantial were they that not a single mishap occurred in crossing all the army with artillery, cavalry and wagon trains, except the loss of one siege gun (a thirty-two pounder). this, if my memory serves me correctly, broke through the only pontoon bridge we had in all our march across the peninsula. these bridges were all built by mcclernand's command, under the supervision of lieutenant hains of the engineer corps. i returned to milliken's bend on the 18th or 19th, and on the 20th issued the following final order for the movement of troops: headquarters department of the tennessee, milliken's bend, louisiana, april 20, 1863. special orders, no. 110. * * * * * * * viii. the following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "army in the field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the mississippi river, from which vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads. first.--the thirteenth army corps, major-general john a. mcclernand commanding, will constitute the right wing. second.--the fifteenth army corps, major-general w. t. sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing. third.--the seventeenth army corps, major-general james b. mcpherson commanding, will constitute the centre. fourth.--the order of march to new carthage will be from right to left. fifth.--reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps; or, an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. when the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commander, unless otherwise specially ordered for a particular emergency. sixth.--troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage. seventh.--in the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters; and one wall tent for each division headquarters; corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by general orders no. 160, a. g. o., series of 1862. eighth.--all the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance and the authorized camp equipage of the army. ninth.--as fast as the thirteenth army corps advances, the seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the fifteenth army corps. tenth.--two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from richmond to new carthage. eleventh.--general hospitals will be established by the medical director between duckport and milliken's bend. all sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents as fast as they become fit for duty. each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind and take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. the force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from duckport to milliken's bend. they will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats. twelfth.--the movement of troops from milliken's bend to new carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance, required by previous orders. thirteenth.--commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. all such irregularities must be summarily punished. fourteenth.--brigadier-general j. c. sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to new carthage. his particular attention is called to general orders, no. 69, from adjutant-general's office, washington, of date march 20, 1863. by order of major-general u. s. grant. mcclernand was already below on the mississippi. two of mcpherson's divisions were put upon the march immediately. the third had not yet arrived from lake providence; it was on its way to milliken's bend and was to follow on arrival. sherman was to follow mcpherson. two of his divisions were at duckport and young's point, and the third under steele was under orders to return from greenville, mississippi, where it had been sent to expel a rebel battery that had been annoying our transports. it had now become evident that the army could not be rationed by a wagon train over the single narrow and almost impassable road between milliken's bend and perkins' plantation. accordingly six more steamers were protected as before, to run the batteries, and were loaded with supplies. they took twelve barges in tow, loaded also with rations. on the night of the 22d of april they ran the batteries, five getting through more or less disabled while one was sunk. about half the barges got through with their needed freight. when it was first proposed to run the blockade at vicksburg with river steamers there were but two captains or masters who were willing to accompany their vessels, and but one crew. volunteers were called for from the army, men who had had experience in any capacity in navigating the western rivers. captains, pilots, mates, engineers and deck-hands enough presented themselves to take five times the number of vessels we were moving through this dangerous ordeal. most of them were from logan's division, composed generally of men from the southern part of illinois and from missouri. all but two of the steamers were commanded by volunteers from the army, and all but one so manned. in this instance, as in all others during the war, i found that volunteers could be found in the ranks and among the commissioned officers to meet every call for aid whether mechanical or professional. colonel w. s. oliver was master of transportation on this occasion by special detail. chapter xxxiii. attack on grand gulf--operations below vicksburg. on the 24th my headquarters were with the advance at perkins' plantation. reconnoissances were made in boats to ascertain whether there was high land on the east shore of the river where we might land above grand gulf. there was none practicable. accordingly the troops were set in motion for hard times, twenty-two miles farther down the river and nearly opposite grand gulf. the loss of two steamers and six barges reduced our transportation so that only 10,000 men could be moved by water. some of the steamers that had got below were injured in their machinery, so that they were only useful as barges towed by those less severely injured. all the troops, therefore, except what could be transported in one trip, had to march. the road lay west of lake st. joseph. three large bayous had to be crossed. they were rapidly bridged in the same manner as those previously encountered. (*12) on the 27th mcclernand's corps was all at hard times, and mcpherson's was following closely. i had determined to make the attempt to effect a landing on the east side of the river as soon as possible. accordingly, on the morning of the 29th, mcclernand was directed to embark all the troops from his corps that our transports and barges could carry. about 10,000 men were so embarked. the plan was to have the navy silence the guns at grand gulf, and to have as many men as possible ready to debark in the shortest possible time under cover of the fire of the navy and carry the works by storm. the following order was issued: perkins plantation, la., april 27,1863. major-general j. a. mcclernand, commanding 13th a. c. commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. have put aboard the artillery and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning. all the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite grand gulf, where you see, by special orders of this date, general mcpherson is ordered to send one division. the plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. your corps will be on the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. once on shore, have each commander instructed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. the first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement. admiral porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced. it may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past grand gulf and land at rodney. in case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. in this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land and move by forced marches to below grand gulf, re-embark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. there will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at grand gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that the transports can run by with the troops on board. should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade. if not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences. u. s. grant, major-general. at 8 o'clock a.m., 29th, porter made the attack with his entire strength present, eight gunboats. for nearly five and a half hours the attack was kept up without silencing a single gun of the enemy. all this time mcclernand's 10,000 men were huddled together on the transports in the stream ready to attempt a landing if signalled. i occupied a tug from which i could see the effect of the battle on both sides, within range of the enemy's guns; but a small tug, without armament, was not calculated to attract the fire of batteries while they were being assailed themselves. about half-past one the fleet withdrew, seeing their efforts were entirely unavailing. the enemy ceased firing as soon as we withdrew. i immediately signalled the admiral and went aboard his ship. the navy lost in this engagement eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. a large proportion of these were of the crew of the flagship, and most of those from a single shell which penetrated the ship's side and exploded between decks where the men were working their guns. the sight of the mangled and dying men which met my eye as i boarded the ship was sickening. grand gulf is on a high bluff where the river runs at the very foot of it. it is as defensible upon its front as vicksburg and, at that time, would have been just as impossible to capture by a front attack. i therefore requested porter to run the batteries with his fleet that night, and to take charge of the transports, all of which would be wanted below. there is a long tongue of land from the louisiana side extending towards grand gulf, made by the river running nearly east from about three miles above and nearly in the opposite direction from that point for about the same distance below. the land was so low and wet that it would not have been practicable to march an army across but for a levee. i had had this explored before, as well as the east bank below to ascertain if there was a possible point of debarkation north of rodney. it was found that the top of the levee afforded a good road to march upon. porter, as was always the case with him, not only acquiesced in the plan, but volunteered to use his entire fleet as transports. i had intended to make this request, but he anticipated me. at dusk, when concealed from the view of the enemy at grand gulf, mcclernand landed his command on the west bank. the navy and transports ran the batteries successfully. the troops marched across the point of land under cover of night, unobserved. by the time it was light the enemy saw our whole fleet, ironclads, gunboats, river steamers and barges, quietly moving down the river three miles below them, black, or rather blue, with national troops. when the troops debarked, the evening of the 29th, it was expected that we would have to go to rodney, about nine miles below, to find a landing; but that night a colored man came in who informed me that a good landing would be found at bruinsburg, a few miles above rodney, from which point there was a good road leading to port gibson some twelve miles in the interior. the information was found correct, and our landing was effected without opposition. sherman had not left his position above vicksburg yet. on the morning of the 27th i ordered him to create a diversion by moving his corps up the yazoo and threatening an attack on haines' bluff. my object was to compel pemberton to keep as much force about vicksburg as i could, until i could secure a good footing on high land east of the river. the move was eminently successful and, as we afterwards learned, created great confusion about vicksburg and doubts about our real design. sherman moved the day of our attack on grand gulf, the 29th, with ten regiments of his command and eight gunboats which porter had left above vicksburg. he debarked his troops and apparently made every preparation to attack the enemy while the navy bombarded the main forts at haines' bluff. this move was made without a single casualty in either branch of the service. on the first of may sherman received orders from me (sent from hard times the evening of the 29th of april) to withdraw from the front of haines' bluff and follow mcpherson with two divisions as fast as he could. i had established a depot of supplies at perkins' plantation. now that all our gunboats were below grand gulf it was possible that the enemy might fit out boats in the big black with improvised armament and attempt to destroy these supplies. mcpherson was at hard times with a portion of his corps, and the depot was protected by a part of his command. the night of the 29th i directed him to arm one of the transports with artillery and send it up to perkins' plantation as a guard; and also to have the siege guns we had brought along moved there and put in position. the embarkation below grand gulf took place at de shroon's, louisiana, six miles above bruinsburg, mississippi. early on the morning of 30th of april mcclernand's corps and one division of mcpherson's corps were speedily landed. when this was effected i felt a degree of relief scarcely ever equalled since. vicksburg was not yet taken it is true, nor were its defenders demoralized by any of our previous moves. i was now in the enemy's country, with a vast river and the stronghold of vicksburg between me and my base of supplies. but i was on dry ground on the same side of the river with the enemy. all the campaigns, labors, hardships and exposures from the month of december previous to this time that had been made and endured, were for the accomplishment of this one object. i had with me the 13th corps, general mcclernand commanding, and two brigades of logan's division of the 17th corps, general mcpherson commanding--in all not more than twenty thousand men to commence the campaign with. these were soon reinforced by the remaining brigade of logan's division and crocker's division of the 17th corps. on the 7th of may i was further reinforced by sherman with two divisions of his, the 15th corps. my total force was then about thirty-three thousand men. the enemy occupied grand gulf, haines' bluff and jackson with a force of nearly sixty thousand men. jackson is fifty miles east of vicksburg and is connected with it by a railroad. my first problem was to capture grand gulf to use as a base. bruinsburg is two miles from high ground. the bottom at that point is higher than most of the low land in the valley of the mississippi, and a good road leads to the bluff. it was natural to expect the garrison from grand gulf to come out to meet us and prevent, if they could, our reaching this solid base. bayou pierre enters the mississippi just above bruinsburg and, as it is a navigable stream and was high at the time, in order to intercept us they had to go by port gibson, the nearest point where there was a bridge to cross upon. this more than doubled the distance from grand gulf to the high land back of bruinsburg. no time was to be lost in securing this foothold. our transportation was not sufficient to move all the army across the river at one trip, or even two; but the landing of the 13th corps and one division of the 17th was effected during the day, april 30th, and early evening. mcclernand was advanced as soon as ammunition and two days' rations (to last five) could be issued to his men. the bluffs were reached an hour before sunset and mcclernand was pushed on, hoping to reach port gibson and save the bridge spanning the bayou pierre before the enemy could get there; for crossing a stream in the presence of an enemy is always difficult. port gibson, too, is the starting point of roads to grand gulf, vicksburg and jackson. mcclernand's advance met the enemy about five miles west of port gibson at thompson's plantation. there was some firing during the night, but nothing rising to the dignity of a battle until daylight. the enemy had taken a strong natural position with most of the grand gulf garrison, numbering about seven or eight thousand men, under general bowen. his hope was to hold me in check until reinforcements under loring could reach him from vicksburg; but loring did not come in time to render much assistance south of port gibson. two brigades of mcpherson's corps followed mcclernand as fast as rations and ammunition could be issued, and were ready to take position upon the battlefield whenever the 13th corps could be got out of the way. the country in this part of mississippi stands on edge, as it were, the roads running along the ridges except when they occasionally pass from one ridge to another. where there are no clearings the sides of the hills are covered with a very heavy growth of timber and with undergrowth, and the ravines are filled with vines and canebrakes, almost impenetrable. this makes it easy for an inferior force to delay, if not defeat, a far superior one. near the point selected by bowen to defend, the road to port gibson divides, taking two ridges which do not diverge more than a mile or two at the widest point. these roads unite just outside the town. this made it necessary for mcclernand to divide his force. it was not only divided, but it was separated by a deep ravine of the character above described. one flank could not reinforce the other except by marching back to the junction of the roads. mcclernand put the divisions of hovey, carr and a. j. smith upon the right-hand branch and osterhaus on the left. i was on the field by ten a.m., and inspected both flanks in person. on the right the enemy, if not being pressed back, was at least not repulsing our advance. on the left, however, osterhaus was not faring so well. he had been repulsed with some loss. as soon as the road could be cleared of mcclernand's troops i ordered up mcpherson, who was close upon the rear of the 13th corps, with two brigades of logan's division. this was about noon. i ordered him to send one brigade (general john e. smith's was selected) to support osterhaus, and to move to the left and flank the enemy out of his position. this movement carried the brigade over a deep ravine to a third ridge and, when smith's troops were seen well through the ravine, osterhaus was directed to renew his front attack. it was successful and unattended by heavy loss. the enemy was sent in full retreat on their right, and their left followed before sunset. while the movement to our left was going on, mcclernand, who was with his right flank, sent me frequent requests for reinforcements, although the force with him was not being pressed. i had been upon the ground and knew it did not admit of his engaging all the men he had. we followed up our victory until night overtook us about two miles from port gibson; then the troops went into bivouac for the night. chapter xxxiv. capture of port gibson--grierson's raid--occupation of grand gulf --movement up the big black--battle of raymond. we started next morning for port gibson as soon as it was light enough to see the road. we were soon in the town, and i was delighted to find that the enemy had not stopped to contest our crossing further at the bridge, which he had burned. the troops were set to work at once to construct a bridge across the south fork of the bayou pierre. at this time the water was high and the current rapid. what might be called a raft-bridge was soon constructed from material obtained from wooden buildings, stables, fences, etc., which sufficed for carrying the whole army over safely. colonel j. h. wilson, a member of my staff, planned and superintended the construction of this bridge, going into the water and working as hard as any one engaged. officers and men generally joined in this work. when it was finished the army crossed and marched eight miles beyond to the north fork that day. one brigade of logan's division was sent down the stream to occupy the attention of a rebel battery, which had been left behind with infantry supports to prevent our repairing the burnt railroad bridge. two of his brigades were sent up the bayou to find a crossing and reach the north fork to repair the bridge there. the enemy soon left when he found we were building a bridge elsewhere. before leaving port gibson we were reinforced by crocker's division, mcpherson's corps, which had crossed the mississippi at bruinsburg and come up without stopping except to get two days' rations. mcpherson still had one division west of the mississippi river, guarding the road from milliken's bend to the river below until sherman's command should relieve it. on leaving bruinsburg for the front i left my son frederick, who had joined me a few weeks before, on board one of the gunboats asleep, and hoped to get away without him until after grand gulf should fall into our hands; but on waking up he learned that i had gone, and being guided by the sound of the battle raging at thompson's hill--called the battle of port gibson--found his way to where i was. he had no horse to ride at the time, and i had no facilities for even preparing a meal. he, therefore, foraged around the best he could until we reached grand gulf. mr. c. a. dana, then an officer of the war department, accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and through a portion of the siege. he was in the same situation as fred so far as transportation and mess arrangements were concerned. the first time i call to mind seeing either of them, after the battle, they were mounted on two enormous horses, grown white from age, each equipped with dilapidated saddles and bridles. our trains arrived a few days later, after which we were all perfectly equipped. my son accompanied me throughout the campaign and siege, and caused no anxiety either to me or to his mother, who was at home. he looked out for himself and was in every battle of the campaign. his age, then not quite thirteen, enabled him to take in all he saw, and to retain a recollection of it that would not be possible in more mature years. when the movement from bruinsburg commenced we were without a wagon train. the train still west of the mississippi was carried around with proper escort, by a circuitous route from milliken's bend to hard times seventy or more miles below, and did not get up for some days after the battle of port gibson. my own horses, headquarters' transportation, servants, mess chest, and everything except what i had on, was with this train. general a. j. smith happened to have an extra horse at bruinsburg which i borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than stirrups. i had no other for nearly a week. it was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. provisions could be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. i directed, therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. quite a train was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. in it could be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons, with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for use or pleasure. the making out of provision returns was stopped for the time. no formalities were to retard our progress until a position was secured when the time could be spared to observe them. it was at port gibson i first heard through a southern paper of the complete success of colonel grierson, who was making a raid through central mississippi. he had started from la grange april 17th with three regiments of about 1,700 men. on the 21st he had detached colonel hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between columbus and macon and then return to la grange. hatch had a sharp fight with the enemy at columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at okalona and tupelo, and arriving in la grange april 26. grierson continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the vicksburg and meridian railroad and the new orleans and jackson railroad, arriving at baton rouge may 2d. this raid was of great importance, for grierson had attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against vicksburg. during the night of the 2d of may the bridge over the north fork was repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning. before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. it was evident that the enemy was covering a retreat from grand gulf to vicksburg. every commanding position from this (grindstone) crossing to hankinson's ferry over the big black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our progress. mcpherson, however, reached hankinson's ferry before night, seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and several miles north on the road to vicksburg. when the junction of the road going to vicksburg with the road from grand gulf to raymond and jackson was reached, logan with his division was turned to the left towards grand gulf. i went with him a short distance from this junction. mcpherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the battle of port gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle; but the road logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right flank, and they soon gave way. mcpherson was ordered to hold hankinson's ferry and the road back to willow springs with one division; mcclernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to guard the line back down the bayou. i did not want to take the chances of having an enemy lurking in our rear. on the way from the junction to grand gulf, where the road comes into the one from vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, i learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on their way to vicksburg. i left logan to make the proper disposition of his troops for the night, while i rode into the town with an escort of about twenty cavalry. admiral porter had already arrived with his fleet. the enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place. when i reached grand gulf may 3d i had not been with my baggage since the 27th of april and consequently had had no change of underclothing, no meal except such as i could pick up sometimes at other headquarters, and no tent to cover me. the first thing i did was to get a bath, borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and get a good meal on the flag-ship. then i wrote letters to the general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be telegraphed from cairo, orders to general sullivan commanding above vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. about twelve o'clock at night i was through my work and started for hankinson's ferry, arriving there before daylight. while at grand gulf i heard from banks, who was on the red river, and who said that he could not be at port hudson before the 10th of may and then with only 15,000 men. up to this time my intention had been to secure grand gulf, as a base of supplies, detach mcclernand's corps to banks and co-operate with him in the reduction of port hudson. the news from banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the one intended. to wait for his co-operation would have detained me at least a month. the reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high points close to the river for over three hundred miles. the enemy would have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than banks could have brought. i therefore determined to move independently of banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of vicksburg and invest or capture the city. grand gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at washington were notified. i knew well that halleck's caution would lead him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any chance of success. the time it would take to communicate with washington and get a reply would be so great that i could not be interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was practicable. even sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four states of the confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine at this time, wrote me from hankinson's ferry, advising me of the impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. he urged me to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as life." to this i replied: "i do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from grand gulf. i know it will be impossible without constructing additional roads. what i do expect is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance." we started from bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. a delay would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify. mcclernand's and mcpherson's commands were kept substantially as they were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them three days' rations in haversacks. beef, mutton, poultry and forage were found in abundance. quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. every plantation, however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for the owners and their slaves. all these were kept running while we were stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at all plantations covered by the troops. but the product was taken by the troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to go without bread until a new base was established on the yazoo above vicksburg. while the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations i ordered reconnoissances made by mcclernand and mcpherson, with the view of leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the big black and attack the city at once. on the 6th sherman arrived at grand gulf and crossed his command that night and the next day. three days' rations had been brought up from grand gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. orders were given for a forward movement the next day. sherman was directed to order up blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from milliken's bend to hard times with two brigades. the quartermaster at young's point was ordered to send two hundred wagons with blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread, coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat. on the 3d hurlbut, who had been left at memphis, was ordered to send four regiments from his command to milliken's bend to relieve blair's division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send lauman's division in addition, the latter to join the army in the field. the four regiments were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no delay. during the night of the 6th mcpherson drew in his troops north of the big black and was off at an early hour on the road to jackson, via rocky springs, utica and raymond. that night he and mcclernand were both at rocky springs ten miles from hankinson's ferry. mcpherson remained there during the 8th, while mcclernand moved to big sandy and sherman marched from grand gulf to hankinson's ferry. the 9th, mcpherson moved to a point within a few miles west of utica; mcclernand and sherman remained where they were. on the 10th mcpherson moved to utica, sherman to big sandy; mcclernand was still at big sandy. the 11th, mcclernand was at five mile creek; sherman at auburn; mcpherson five miles advanced from utica. may 12th, mcclernand was at fourteen mile creek; sherman at fourteen mile creek; mcpherson at raymond after a battle. after mcpherson crossed the big black at hankinson's ferry vicksburg could have been approached and besieged by the south side. it is not probable, however, that pemberton would have permitted a close besiegement. the broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the big black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. it was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of vicksburg, and approach from that direction. accordingly, mcpherson's troops that had crossed the big black were withdrawn and the movement east to jackson commenced. as has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads generally confined to the tops of the hills. the troops were moved one (sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. mcclernand's corps was kept with its left flank on the big black guarding all the crossings. fourteen mile creek, a stream substantially parallel with the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by mcclernand and sherman with slight loss. mcpherson was to the right of sherman, extending to raymond. the cavalry was used in this advance in reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the most practicable routes from one command to another so they could support each other in case of an attack. in making this move i estimated pemberton's movable force at vicksburg at about eighteen thousand men, with smaller forces at haines' bluff and jackson. it would not be possible for pemberton to attack me with all his troops at one place, and i determined to throw my army between his and fight him in detail. this was done with success, but i found afterwards that i had entirely under-estimated pemberton's strength. up to this point our movements had been made without serious opposition. my line was now nearly parallel with the jackson and vicksburg railroad and about seven miles south of it. the right was at raymond eighteen miles from jackson, mcpherson commanding; sherman in the centre on fourteen mile creek, his advance thrown across; mcclernand to the left, also on fourteen mile creek, advance across, and his pickets within two miles of edward's station, where the enemy had concentrated a considerable force and where they undoubtedly expected us to attack. mcclernand's left was on the big black. in all our moves, up to this time, the left had hugged the big black closely, and all the ferries had been guarded to prevent the enemy throwing a force on our rear. mcpherson encountered the enemy, five thousand strong with two batteries under general gregg, about two miles out of raymond. this was about two p.m. logan was in advance with one of his brigades. he deployed and moved up to engage the enemy. mcpherson ordered the road in rear to be cleared of wagons, and the balance of logan's division, and crocker's, which was still farther in rear, to come forward with all dispatch. the order was obeyed with alacrity. logan got his division in position for assault before crocker could get up, and attacked with vigor, carrying the enemy's position easily, sending gregg flying from the field not to appear against our front again until we met at jackson. in this battle mcpherson lost 66 killed, 339 wounded, and 37 missing --nearly or quite all from logan's division. the enemy's loss was 100 killed, 305 wounded, besides 415 taken prisoners. i regarded logan and crocker as being as competent division commanders as could be found in or out of the army and both equal to a much higher command. crocker, however, was dying of consumption when he volunteered. his weak condition never put him on the sick report when there was a battle in prospect, as long as he could keep on his feet. he died not long after the close of the rebellion. chapter xxxv. movement against jackson--fall of jackson--intercepting the enemy --battle of champion's hill. when the news reached me of mcpherson's victory at raymond about sundown my position was with sherman. i decided at once to turn the whole column towards jackson and capture that place without delay. pemberton was now on my left, with, as i supposed, about 18,000 men; in fact, as i learned afterwards, with nearly 50,000. a force was also collecting on my right, at jackson, the point where all the railroads communicating with vicksburg connect. all the enemy's supplies of men and stores would come by that point. as i hoped in the end to besiege vicksburg i must first destroy all possibility of aid. i therefore determined to move swiftly towards jackson, destroy or drive any force in that direction and then turn upon pemberton. but by moving against jackson, i uncovered my own communication. so i finally decided to have none--to cut loose altogether from my base and move my whole force eastward. i then had no fears for my communications, and if i moved quickly enough could turn upon pemberton before he could attack me in the rear. accordingly, all previous orders given during the day for movements on the 13th were annulled by new ones. mcpherson was ordered at daylight to move on clinton, ten miles from jackson; sherman was notified of my determination to capture jackson and work from there westward. he was ordered to start at four in the morning and march to raymond. mcclernand was ordered to march with three divisions by dillon's to raymond. one was left to guard the crossing of the big black. on the 10th i had received a letter from banks, on the red river, asking reinforcements. porter had gone to his assistance with a part of his fleet on the 3d, and i now wrote to him describing my position and declining to send any troops. i looked upon side movements as long as the enemy held port hudson and vicksburg as a waste of time and material. general joseph e. johnston arrived at jackson in the night of the 13th from tennessee, and immediately assumed command of all the confederate troops in mississippi. i knew he was expecting reinforcements from the south and east. on the 6th i had written to general halleck: "information from the other side leaves me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from tullahoma." up to this time my troops had been kept in supporting distances of each other, as far as the nature of the country would admit. reconnoissances were constantly made from each corps to enable them to acquaint themselves with the most practicable routes from one to another in case a union became necessary. mcpherson reached clinton with the advance early on the 13th and immediately set to work destroying the railroad. sherman's advance reached raymond before the last of mcpherson's command had got out of the town. mcclernand withdrew from the front of the enemy, at edward's station, with much skill and without loss, and reached his position for the night in good order. on the night of the 13th, mcpherson was ordered to march at early dawn upon jackson, only fifteen miles away. sherman was given the same order; but he was to move by the direct road from raymond to jackson, which is south of the road mcpherson was on and does not approach within two miles of it at the point where it crossed the line of intrenchments which, at that time, defended the city. mcclernand was ordered to move one division of his command to clinton, one division a few miles beyond mississippi springs following sherman's line, and a third to raymond. he was also directed to send his siege guns, four in number with the troops going by mississippi springs. mcclernand's position was an advantageous one in any event. with one division at clinton he was in position to reinforce mcpherson, at jackson, rapidly if it became necessary; the division beyond mississippi springs was equally available to reinforce sherman; the one at raymond could take either road. he still had two other divisions farther back now that blair had come up, available within a day at jackson. if this last command should not be wanted at jackson, they were already one day's march from there on their way to vicksburg and on three different roads leading to the latter city. but the most important consideration in my mind was to have a force confronting pemberton if he should come out to attack my rear. this i expected him to do; as shown further on, he was directed by johnston to make this very move. i notified general halleck that i should attack the state capital on the 14th. a courier carried the dispatch to grand gulf through an unprotected country. sherman and mcpherson communicated with each other during the night and arranged to reach jackson at about the same hour. it rained in torrents during the night of the 13th and the fore part of the day of the 14th. the roads were intolerable, and in some places on sherman's line, where the land was low, they were covered more than a foot deep with water. but the troops never murmured. by nine o'clock crocker, of mcpherson's corps, who was now in advance, came upon the enemy's pickets and speedily drove them in upon the main body. they were outside of the intrenchments in a strong position, and proved to be the troops that had been driven out of raymond. johnston had been reinforced; during the night by georgia and south carolina regiments, so that his force amounted to eleven thousand men, and he was expecting still more. sherman also came upon the rebel pickets some distance out from the town, but speedily drove them in. he was now on the south and south-west of jackson confronting the confederates behind their breastworks, while mcpherson's right was nearly two miles north, occupying a line running north and south across the vicksburg railroad. artillery was brought up and reconnoissances made preparatory to an assault. mcpherson brought up logan's division while he deployed crocker's for the assault. sherman made similar dispositions on the right. by eleven a.m. both were ready to attack. crocker moved his division forward, preceded by a strong skirmish line. these troops at once encountered the enemy's advance and drove it back on the main body, when they returned to their proper regiment and the whole division charged, routing the enemy completely and driving him into this main line. this stand by the enemy was made more than two miles outside of his main fortifications. mcpherson followed up with his command until within range of the guns of the enemy from their intrenchments, when he halted to bring his troops into line and reconnoitre to determine the next move. it was now about noon. while this was going on sherman was confronting a rebel battery which enfiladed the road on which he was marching--the mississippi springs road--and commanded a bridge spanning a stream over which he had to pass. by detaching right and left the stream was forced and the enemy flanked and speedily driven within the main line. this brought our whole line in front of the enemy's line of works, which was continuous on the north, west and south sides from the pearl river north of the city to the same river south. i was with sherman. he was confronted by a force sufficient to hold us back. appearances did not justify an assault where we were. i had directed sherman to send a force to the right, and to reconnoitre as far as to the pearl river. this force, tuttle's division, not returning i rode to the right with my staff, and soon found that the enemy had left that part of the line. tuttle's movement or mcpherson's pressure had no doubt led johnston to order a retreat, leaving only the men at the guns to retard us while he was getting away. tuttle had seen this and, passing through the lines without resistance, came up in the rear of the artillerists confronting sherman and captured them with ten pieces of artillery. i rode immediately to the state house, where i was soon followed by sherman. about the same time mcpherson discovered that the enemy was leaving his front, and advanced crocker, who was so close upon the enemy that they could not move their guns or destroy them. he captured seven guns and, moving on, hoisted the national flag over the rebel capital of mississippi. stevenson's brigade was sent to cut off the rebel retreat, but was too late or not expeditious enough. our loss in this engagement was: mcpherson, 37 killed, 228 wounded; sherman, 4 killed and 21 wounded and missing. the enemy lost 845 killed, wounded and captured. seventeen guns fell into our hands, and the enemy destroyed by fire their store-houses, containing a large amount of commissary stores. on this day blair reached new auburn and joined mcclernand's 4th division. he had with him two hundred wagons loaded with rations, the only commissary supplies received during the entire campaign. i slept that night in the room that johnston was said to have occupied the night before. about four in the afternoon i sent for the corps commanders and directed the dispositions to be made of their troops. sherman was to remain in jackson until he destroyed that place as a railroad centre, and manufacturing city of military supplies. he did the work most effectually. sherman and i went together into a manufactory which had not ceased work on account of the battle nor for the entrance of yankee troops. our presence did not seem to attract the attention of either the manager or the operatives, most of whom were girls. we looked on for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the looms, with "c. s. a." woven in each bolt. there was an immense amount of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. finally i told sherman i thought they had done work enough. the operatives were told they could leave and take with them what cloth they could carry. in a few minutes cotton and factory were in a blaze. the proprietor visited washington while i was president to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was private. he asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his property had been destroyed by national troops, so that he might use it with congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. i declined. on the night of the 13th johnston sent the following dispatch to pemberton at edward's station: "i have lately arrived, and learn that major-general sherman is between us with four divisions at clinton. it is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. if practicable, come up in his rear at once. to beat such a detachment would be of immense value. all the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. time is all-important." this dispatch was sent in triplicate, by different messengers. one of the messengers happened to be a loyal man who had been expelled from memphis some months before by hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. there was a good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but hurlbut and the expelled man understood each other. he delivered his copy of johnston's dispatch to mcpherson who forwarded it to me. receiving this dispatch on the 14th i ordered mcpherson to move promptly in the morning back to bolton, the nearest point where johnston could reach the road. bolton is about twenty miles west of jackson. i also informed mcclernand of the capture of jackson and sent him the following order: "it is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the big black, and beat us into vicksburg. we must not allow them to do this. turn all your forces towards bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there. move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." and to blair i wrote: "their design is evidently to cross the big black and pass down the peninsula between the big black and yazoo rivers. we must beat them. turn your troops immediately to bolton; take all the trains with you. smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. if practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train." johnston stopped on the canton road only six miles north of jackson, the night of the 14th. he sent from there to pemberton dispatches announcing the loss of jackson, and the following order: "as soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. i am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. can grant supply himself from the mississippi? can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him." the concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of the country. mcpherson moved along the road parallel with and near the railroad. mcclernand's command was, one division (hovey's) on the road mcpherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. one (osterhaus) was at raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near champion's hill; one (carr's) had to pass over the same road with osterhaus, but being back at mississippi springs, would not be detained by it; the fourth (smith's) with blair's division, was near auburn with a different road to pass over. mcclernand faced about and moved promptly. his cavalry from raymond seized bolton by half-past nine in the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men. the night of the 15th hovey was at bolton; carr and osterhaus were about three miles south, but abreast, facing west; smith was north of raymond with blair in his rear. mcpherson's command, with logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock, and by four reached hovey and went into camp; crocker bivouacked just in hovey's rear on the clinton road. sherman with two divisions, was in jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military factories. i rode in person out to clinton. on my arrival i ordered mcclernand to move early in the morning on edward's station, cautioning him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt very certain of success. i naturally expected that pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which i have shown were to attack us at clinton. this, indeed, i knew he could not do; but i felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. it turned out, however, that he had decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from edward's station and get between me and my base. i, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. on the 15th pemberton had actually marched south from edward's station, but the rains had swollen baker's creek, which he had to cross so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. this brought him back to the jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over baker's creek. some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join johnston at clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected. about five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed on the jackson and vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. they reported that they had passed through pemberton's army in the night, and that it was still marching east. they reported him to have eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five thousand men. i had expected to leave sherman at jackson another day in order to complete his work; but getting the above information i sent him orders to move with all dispatch to bolton, and to put one division with an ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. within an hour after receiving this order steele's division was on the road. at the same time i dispatched to blair, who was near auburn, to move with all speed to edward's station. mcclernand was directed to embrace blair in his command for the present. blair's division was a part of the 15th army corps (sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. the 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. mcpherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow hovey's division as closely as possible. mcclernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at edward's station, over which to march his troops. hovey's division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the clinton) still farther north. mcclernand was directed to move blair's and a. j. smith's divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and osterhaus and carr by the middle road. orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to feel for the enemy. smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. about the same time hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from jackson to vicksburg. mcpherson was hastening up to join hovey, but was embarrassed by hovey's trains occupying the roads. i was still back at clinton. mcpherson sent me word of the situation, and expressed the wish that i was up. by half-past seven i was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. when i arrived hovey's skirmishing amounted almost to a battle. mcclernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy's position than mcpherson. i sent him word by a staff officer to push forward and attack. these orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting mcclernand's advance. champion's hill, where pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. it is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. on the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at baker's creek. it was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. the ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. the left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. the bolton and edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile; then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to baker's creek, nearly a mile away. on the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. there was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road. from raymond there is a direct road to edward's station, some three miles west of champion's hill. there is one also to bolton. from this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching bolton and leads direct to the same station. it was along these two roads that three divisions of mcclernand's corps, and blair of sherman's, temporarily under mcclernand, were moving. hovey of mcclernand's command was with mcpherson, farther north on the road from bolton direct to edward's station. the middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and descends to baker's creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches edward's station. pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east. hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left. by eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. but he was not able to hold his position and had to abandon the artillery. mcpherson brought up his troops as fast as possible, logan in front, and posted them on the right of hovey and across the flank of the enemy. logan reinforced hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reinforcements. i ordered crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. mcpherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they did good execution. from logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. he did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. up to this time i had kept my position near hovey where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon i moved with a part of my staff by our right around, until i came up with logan himself. i found him near the road leading down to baker's creek. he was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; hovey, reinforced by two brigades from mcpherson's command, confronted the enemy's left; crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; mcclernand two hours before, had been within two miles and a half of their centre with two divisions, and the two divisions, blair's and a. j. smith's, were confronting the rebel right; ransom, with a brigade of mcarthur's division of the 17th corps (mcpherson's), had crossed the river at grand gulf a few days before, and was coming up on their right flank. neither logan nor i knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. just at this juncture a messenger came from hovey, asking for more reinforcements. there were none to spare. i then gave an order to move mcpherson's command by the left flank around to hovey. this uncovered the rebel line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy. during all this time, hovey, reinforced as he was by a brigade from logan and another from crocker, and by crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. the enemy fled precipitately. this was between three and four o'clock. i rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of carr's division just coming in. osterhaus was farther south and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. hovey's division, and mcpherson's two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. i sent orders to osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to carr, whom i saw personally, i explained the situation and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the big black, and to cross it if he could; osterhaus to follow him. the pursuit was continued until after dark. the battle of champion's hill lasted about four hours, hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishing, some of which almost rose to the dignity of battle. every man of hovey's division and of mcpherson's two divisions was engaged during the battle. no other part of my command was engaged at all, except that as described before. osterhaus's and a. j. smith's divisions had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as half-past seven. their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy's line. mcclernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon and in easy hearing. i sent him repeated orders by staff officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. these traversed the wood separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward; but he did not come. it is true, in front of mcclernand there was a small force of the enemy and posted in a good position behind a ravine obstructing his advance; but if he had moved to the right by the road my staff officers had followed the enemy must either have fallen back or been cut off. instead of this he sent orders to hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. to obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as mcclernand had to advance to get into battle and substantially over the same ground. of course i did not permit hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior. we had in this battle about 15,000 men absolutely engaged. this excludes those that did not get up, all of mcclernand's command except hovey. our loss was 410 killed, 1,844 wounded and 187 missing. hovey alone lost 1,200 killed, wounded and missing--more than one-third of his division. had mcclernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had i known the ground as i did afterwards, i cannot see how pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. as it was he lost over three thousand killed and wounded and about three thousand captured in battle and in pursuit. loring's division, which was the right of pemberton's line, was cut off from the retreating army and never got back into vicksburg. pemberton himself fell back that night to the big black river. his troops did not stop before midnight and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. logan alone captured 1,300 prisoners and eleven guns. hovey captured 300 under fire and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded whom he paroled, thus making 1,200. mcpherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. the pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. the night of the 16th of may found mcpherson's command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battlefield, along the line of the road to vicksburg. carr and osterhaus were at edward's station, and blair was about three miles south-east; hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. i pushed through the advancing column with my staff and kept in advance until after night. finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. as no troops came up we moved back a mile or more until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. we had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left. while a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand, or the ten thousand, with great composure; but after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as a friend. chapter xxxvi. battle of black river bridge--crossing the big black--investment of vicksburg--assaulting the works. we were now assured of our position between johnston and pemberton, without a possibility of a junction of their forces. pemberton might have made a night march to the big black, crossed the bridge there and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us and finally returned to johnston. but this would have given us vicksburg. it would have been his proper move, however, and the one johnston would have made had he been in pemberton's place. in fact it would have been in conformity with johnston's orders to pemberton. sherman left jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th and reached bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. his rear guard did not get in until two a.m. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. he paroled his prisoners at jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded in care of surgeons and attendants. at bolton he was informed of our victory. he was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on to bridgeport on the big black river, some eleven miles above the point where we expected to find the enemy. blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible. this movement brought sherman's corps together, and at a point where i hoped a crossing of the big black might be effected and sherman's corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, thus opening a crossing for the remainder of the army. i informed him that i would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river. the advance division, carr's (mcclernand's corps), resumed the pursuit at half-past three a.m. on the 17th, followed closely by osterhaus, mcpherson bringing up the rear with his corps. as i expected, the enemy was found in position on the big black. the point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land; the east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. a bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the big black at ordinary stages. when the river is full water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. the bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. at this time there was a foot or two of water in it. the rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. the whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. at the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. carr's division was deployed on our right, lawler's brigade forming his extreme right and reaching through these woods to the river above. osterhaus' division was deployed to the left of carr and covered the enemy's entire front. mcpherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in wherever he could be of assistance. while the troops were standing as here described an officer from banks' staff came up and presented me with a letter from general halleck, dated the 11th of may. it had been sent by the way of new orleans to banks to be forwarded to me. it ordered me to return to grand gulf and to co-operate from there with banks against port hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege vicksburg. i told the officer that the order came too late, and that halleck would not give it now if he knew our position. the bearer of the dispatch insisted that i ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position when i heard great cheering to the right of our line and, looking in that direction, saw lawler in his shirt sleeves leading a charge upon the enemy. i immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch; i think not even to this day. the assault was successful. but little resistance was made. the enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind him and leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. many tried to escape by swimming the river. some succeeded and some were drowned in the attempt. eighteen guns were captured and 1,751 prisoners. our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded and 3 missing. the enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. but for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, i have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defences around vicksburg. as the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. it was but little after nine o'clock a.m. when the capture took place. as soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. one was taken charge of by lieutenant hains, of the engineer corps, one by general mcpherson himself and one by general ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. my recollection is that hains built a raft bridge; mcpherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers, for pontoons; and that ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. a bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. lumber was taken from buildings, cotton gins and wherever found, for this purpose. by eight o'clock in the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing. sherman reached bridgeport about noon of the 17th and found blair with the pontoon train already there. a few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance and soon surrendered. two divisions were crossed that night and the third the following morning. on the 18th i moved along the vicksburg road in advance of the troops and as soon as possible joined sherman. my first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the yazoo river above vicksburg. sherman's line of march led him to the very point on walnut hills occupied by the enemy the december before when he was repulsed. sherman was equally anxious with myself. our impatience led us to move in advance of the column and well up with the advanced skirmishers. there were some detached works along the crest of the hill. these were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from haines' bluff had not all got past on their way to vicksburg. at all events the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. in a few minutes sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the december before on the ground where his command had lain so helpless for offensive action. he turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. this, however, he said was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history and i ought to make a report of it at once. vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. i do not claim to quote sherman's language; but the substance only. my reason for mentioning this incident will appear further on. mcpherson, after crossing the big black, came into the jackson and vicksburg road which sherman was on, but to his rear. he arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. mcclernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to mount albans, and then turned to the left and put his troops on the road from baldwin's ferry to vicksburg. this brought him south of mcpherson. i now had my three corps up the works built for the defence of vicksburg, on three roads --one to the north, one to the east and one to the south-east of the city. by the morning of the 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. sherman was on the right, and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. mcpherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the jackson road. mcclernand took up the ground to his left and extended as far towards warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line. on the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. the enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at champion's hill and the big black, and i believed he would not make much effort to hold vicksburg. accordingly, at two o'clock i ordered an assault. it resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy. the 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position and in making roads in rear of the army, from yazoo river or chickasaw bayou. most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days' rations issued by the commissary. they had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. i remember that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that i heard him, "hard tack." in a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, "hard tack! hard tack!" i told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. the cry was instantly changed to cheers. by the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. the bread and coffee were highly appreciated. i now determined on a second assault. johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one i had with me, and i knew he was being reinforced. there was danger of his coming to the assistance of pemberton, and after all he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. the immediate capture of vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive johnston from the state. but the first consideration of all was--the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try. the attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at ten o'clock a.m. on the 22d with a furious cannonade from every battery in position. all the corps commanders set their time by mine so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. the attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy and in planting their battle flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. general mcclernand reported that he had gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, and wanted reinforcements. i occupied a position from which i believed i could see as well as he what took place in his front, and i did not see the success he reported. but his request for reinforcements being repeated i could not ignore it, and sent him quinby's division of the 17th corps. sherman and mcpherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of mcclernand. this last attack only served to increase our casualties without giving any benefit whatever. as soon as it was dark our troops that had reached the enemy's line and been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn; and thus ended the last assault upon vicksburg. chapter xxxvii siege of vicksburg. i now determined upon a regular siege--to "out-camp the enemy," as it were, and to incur no more losses. the experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will. with the navy holding the river, the investment of vicksburg was complete. as long as we could hold our position the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men and munitions of war to what they had on hand. these could not last always. the crossing of troops at bruinsburg commenced april 30th. on the 18th of may the army was in rear of vicksburg. on the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles (besides continuous skirmishing) had been fought and won by the union forces; the capital of the state had fallen and its arsenals, military manufactories and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about one hundred and eighty miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but five days' rations had been issued, and no forage; over six thousand prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one field-pieces had fallen into our hands; and four hundred miles of the river, from vicksburg to port hudson, had become ours. the union force that had crossed the mississippi river up to this time was less than forty-three thousand men. one division of these, blair's, only arrived in time to take part in the battle of champion's hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade, ransom's of mcpherson's corps, reached the field after the battle. the enemy had at vicksburg, grand gulf, jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. they were in their own country, where no rear guards were necessary. the country is admirable for defence, but difficult for the conduct of an offensive campaign. all their troops had to be met. we were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at port gibson seven or eight thousand; at raymond, five thousand; at jackson, from eight to eleven thousand; at champion's hill, twenty-five thousand; at the big black, four thousand. a part of those met at jackson were all that was left of those encountered at raymond. they were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. our loss up to this time was: killed wounded missing port gibson..... 131 719 25 south fork bayou pierre..... .. 1 .. skirmishes, may 3 ..... 1 9 .. fourteen mile creek..... 6 24 .. raymond............... 66 339 39 jackson..... 42 251 7 champion's hill..... 410 1,844 187 big black..... 39 237 3 bridgeport..... .. 1 .. total..... 695 3,425 259 of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. not half of them were disabled for any length of time. after the unsuccessful assault of the 22d the work of the regular siege began. sherman occupied the right starting from the river above vicksburg, mcpherson the centre (mcarthur's division now with him) and mcclernand the left, holding the road south to warrenton. lauman's division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line. in the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the yazoo river and chickasaw bayou, around the rear of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. the troops had been without these from the time of crossing the mississippi up to this time. all was now ready for the pick and spade. prentiss and hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the big black, and to observe johnston. i knew that johnston was receiving reinforcements from bragg, who was confronting rosecrans in tennessee. vicksburg was so important to the enemy that i believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere. my line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from haines' bluff to vicksburg, thence to warrenton. the line of the enemy was about seven. in addition to this, having an enemy at canton and jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reinforced, we required a second line of defence facing the other way. i had not troops enough under my command to man these. general halleck appreciated the situation and, without being asked, forwarded reinforcements with all possible dispatch. the ground about vicksburg is admirable for defence. on the north it is about two hundred feet above the mississippi river at the highest point and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. but here, too, it was cut up by ravines and small streams. the enemy's line of defence followed the crest of a ridge from the river north of the city eastward, then southerly around to the jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a southwesterly direction to the river. deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defences. as there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. to follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. generally therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely. the work to be done, to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. the problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. we had but four engineer officers with us. captain prime, of the engineer corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. his health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by captain comstock, also of the engineer corps. to provide assistants on such a long line i directed that all officers who had graduated at west point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should in addition to their other duties assist in the work. the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. the chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army, begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for unless he would do for a sap-roller. as soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and as we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, i let him off. the general is a large man; weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall. we had no siege guns except six thirty-two pounders, and there were none at the west to draw from. admiral porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns of large calibre, and with these, and the field artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. the first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. the enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharpshooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works. in no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. it was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. to give additional protection sand bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. on top of these, logs were put. by these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharpshooters. the enemy used in their defence explosive musket-balls, no doubt thinking that, bursting over our men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but i do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of these shells. when they were hit and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. in these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them. the enemy could not resort to our method to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon and used it freely. splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind. there were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pound shells and binding them with strong iron bands. these answered as coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy. the labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work; but details from the troops had often to be made. the work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy the batteries were advanced. by the 30th of june there were two hundred and twenty guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned and commanded by the navy. we were now as strong for defence against the garrison of vicksburg as they were against us; but i knew that johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reinforcements from the east. he had at this time a larger force than i had had at any time prior to the battle of champion's hill. as soon as the news of the arrival of the union army behind vicksburg reached the north, floods of visitors began to pour in. some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the christian and sanitary associations came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. they did not know how little the gift would be appreciated. many of the soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks and turkeys without bread during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. but the intention was good. among the earliest arrivals was the governor of illinois, with most of the state officers. i naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. in sherman's front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. i therefore took them to sherman's headquarters and presented them. before starting out to look at the lines--possibly while sherman's horse was being saddled --there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the north had been so imperfectly informed. there was a little knot around sherman and another around me, and i heard sherman repeating, in the most animated manner, what he had said to me when we first looked down from walnut hills upon the land below on the 18th of may, adding: "grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; i opposed it. i wrote him a letter about it." but for this speech it is not likely that sherman's opposition would have ever been heard of. his untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitle him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. he could not have done more if the plan had been his own. (*13) on the 26th of may i sent blair's division up the yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the big black and the yazoo. the country was rich and full of supplies of both food and forage. blair was instructed to take all of it. the cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. blair went forty-five miles and was gone almost a week. his work was effectually done. i requested porter at this time to send the marine brigade, a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command and which proved very useful, up to haines' bluff to hold it until reinforcements could be sent. on the 26th i also received a letter from banks, asking me to reinforce him with ten thousand men at port hudson. of course i could not comply with his request, nor did i think he needed them. he was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. on the 3d of june a brigade from hurlbut's command arrived, general kimball commanding. it was sent to mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of haines' bluff and about midway between the big black and the yazoo. a brigade of blair's division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on blair's return from the yazoo, been sent to the same place with instructions to watch the crossings of the big black river, to destroy the roads in his (blair's) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies. on the 7th of june our little force of colored and white troops across the mississippi, at milliken's bend, were attacked by about 3,000 men from richard taylor's trans-mississippi command. with the aid of the gunboats they were speedily repelled. i sent mower's brigade over with instructions to drive the enemy beyond the tensas bayou; and we had no further trouble in that quarter during the siege. this was the first important engagement of the war in which colored troops were under fire. these men were very raw, having all been enlisted since the beginning of the siege, but they behaved well. on the 8th of june a full division arrived from hurlbut's command, under general sooy smith. it was sent immediately to haines' bluff, and general c. c. washburn was assigned to the general command at that point. on the 11th a strong division arrived from the department of the missouri under general herron, which was placed on our left. this cut off the last possible chance of communication between pemberton and johnston, as it enabled lauman to close up on mcclernand's left while herron intrenched from lauman to the water's edge. at this point the water recedes a few hundred yards from the high land. through this opening no doubt the confederate commanders had been able to get messengers under cover of night. on the 14th general parke arrived with two divisions of burnside's corps, and was immediately dispatched to haines' bluff. these latter troops--herron's and parke's--were the reinforcements already spoken of sent by halleck in anticipation of their being needed. they arrived none too soon. i now had about seventy-one thousand men. more than half were disposed across the peninsula, between the yazoo at haines' bluff and the big black, with the division of osterhaus watching the crossings of the latter river farther south and west from the crossing of the jackson road to baldwin's ferry and below. there were eight roads leading into vicksburg, along which and their immediate sides, our work was specially pushed and batteries advanced; but no commanding point within range of the enemy was neglected. on the 17th i received a letter from general sherman and one on the 18th from general mcpherson, saying that their respective commands had complained to them of a fulsome, congratulatory order published by general mcclernand to the 13th corps, which did great injustice to the other troops engaged in the campaign. this order had been sent north and published, and now papers containing it had reached our camps. the order had not been heard of by me, and certainly not by troops outside of mcclernand's command until brought in this way. i at once wrote to mcclernand, directing him to send me a copy of this order. he did so, and i at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and ordered him back to springfield, illinois. the publication of his order in the press was in violation of war department orders and also of mine. chapter xxxviii. johnston's movements--fortifications at haines' bluff--explosion of the mine--explosion of the second mine--preparing for the assault--the flag of truce--meeting with pemberton--negotiations for surrender--accepting the terms--surrender of vicksburg. on the 22d of june positive information was received that johnston had crossed the big black river for the purpose of attacking our rear, to raise the siege and release pemberton. the correspondence between johnston and pemberton shows that all expectation of holding vicksburg had by this time passed from johnston's mind. i immediately ordered sherman to the command of all the forces from haines' bluff to the big black river. this amounted now to quite half the troops about vicksburg. besides these, herron and a. j. smith's divisions were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to reinforce sherman. haines' bluff had been strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from there to the big black at the railroad crossing batteries had been constructed. the work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them. we were now looking west, besieging pemberton, while we were also looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by johnston. but as against the garrison of vicksburg we were as substantially protected as they were against us. where we were looking east and north we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. johnston evidently took in the situation and wisely, i think, abstained from making an assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides without accomplishing any result. we were strong enough to have taken the offensive against him; but i did not feel disposed to take any risk of losing our hold upon pemberton's army, while i would have rejoiced at the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by johnston. from the 23d of may the work of fortifying and pushing forward our position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. at three points on the jackson road, in front of leggett's brigade, a sap was run up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of june we had it undermined and the mine charged. the enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in reaching our mine. at this particular point the hill on which the rebel work stands rises abruptly. our sap ran close up to the outside of the enemy's parapet. in fact this parapet was also our protection. the soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the union soldiers for the tobacco of the confederates; at other times the enemy threw over hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned them. our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it. this caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy it. on the 25th of june at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was exploded. a heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to open with the explosion. the effect was to blow the top of the hill off and make a crater where it stood. the breach was not sufficient to enable us to pass a column of attack through. in fact, the enemy having failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most of the men guarding that point were placed. there were a few men, however, left at the advance line, and others working in the countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. all that were there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side, still alive. i remember one colored man, who had been under ground at work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. he was not much hurt, but terribly frightened. some one asked him how high he had gone up. "dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his reply. general logan commanded at this point and took this colored man to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege. as soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had been placed for the express purpose. the enemy made a desperate effort to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. from here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. the compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. the enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. during the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our ranks. we found it impossible to continue this work. another mine was consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of july, destroying an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. no attempt to charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us. our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. the enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the first. we lost none in the second. from this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and i determined to explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at different points and assault immediately after. we were up now at three different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet of the enemy divided us. at this time an intercepted dispatch from johnston to pemberton informed me that johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order to relieve the garrison at vicksburg. i knew the garrison would make no formidable effort to relieve itself. the picket lines were so close to each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post pickets--that the men could converse. on the 21st of june i was informed, through this means, that pemberton was preparing to escape, by crossing to the louisiana side under cover of night; that he had employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "yankees" to cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be finished in a week to carry them all over. the rebel pickets also said that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build these boats with. afterwards this story was verified: on entering the city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats. all necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt abortive. our pickets were doubled; admiral porter was notified, so that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee crossing the peninsula on the louisiana side. had the attempt been made the garrison of vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on the louisiana side. general richard taylor was expected on the west bank to co-operate in this movement, i believe, but he did not come, nor could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. the mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth, except in the immediate front of vicksburg and of port hudson. we had nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from lake providence to opposite bruinsburg. the roads west were not of a character to draw supplies over for any considerable force. by the 1st of july our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a number of places. at ten points we could move under cover to within from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. orders were given to make all preparations for assault on the 6th of july. the debouches were ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. plank, and bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to enable the troops to cross the ditches. on the night of the 1st of july johnston was between brownsville and the big black, and wrote pemberton from there that about the 7th of the month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to cut his way out. pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached him. on july 1st pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the following letter to each of his four division commanders: "unless the siege of vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. i see no prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. you are, therefore, requested to inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation." two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically did the same. they expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate would fail. pemberton had previously got a message to johnston suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the garrison with their arms. johnston replied that it would be a confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized pemberton to use his name in making such an arrangement. on the 3d about ten o'clock a.m. white flags appeared on a portion of the rebel works. hostilities along that part of the line ceased at once. soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a white flag. they proved to be general bowen, a division commander, and colonel montgomery, aide-de-camp to pemberton, bearing the following letter to me: "i have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to arranging terms for the capitulation of vicksburg. to this end, if agreeable to you, i will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may find convenient. i make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. this communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by major-general john s. bowen." it was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the command. the troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate, exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the gibes of many northern papers that came to them saying all their suffering was in vain, that vicksburg would never be taken, were at last at an end and the union sure to be saved. bowen was received by general a. j. smith, and asked to see me. i had been a neighbor of bowen's in missouri, and knew him well and favorably before the war; but his request was refused. he then suggested that i should meet pemberton. to this i sent a verbal message saying that, if pemberton desired it, i would meet him in front of mcpherson's corps at three o'clock that afternoon. i also sent the following written reply to pemberton's letter: "your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. the useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in vicksburg, will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and i can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. i do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because i have no terms other than those indicated above." at three o'clock pemberton appeared at the point suggested in my verbal message, accompanied by the same officers who had borne his letter of the morning. generals ord, mcpherson, logan and a. j. smith, and several officers of my staff, accompanied me. our place of meeting was on a hillside within a few hundred feet of the rebel lines. near by stood a stunted oak-tree, which was made historical by the event. it was but a short time before the last vestige of its body, root and limb had disappeared, the fragments taken as trophies. since then the same tree has furnished as many cords of wood, in the shape of trophies, as "the true cross." pemberton and i had served in the same division during part of the mexican war. i knew him very well therefore, and greeted him as an old acquaintance. he soon asked what terms i proposed to give his army if it surrendered. my answer was the same as proposed in my reply to his letter. pemberton then said, rather snappishly, "the conference might as well end," and turned abruptly as if to leave. i said, "very well." general bowen, i saw, was very anxious that the surrender should be consummated. his manner and remarks while pemberton and i were talking, showed this. he now proposed that he and one of our generals should have a conference. i had no objection to this, as nothing could be made binding upon me that they might propose. smith and bowen accordingly had a conference, during which pemberton and i, moving a short distance away towards the enemy's lines were in conversation. after a while bowen suggested that the confederate army should be allowed to march out with the honors of war, carrying their small arms and field artillery. this was promptly and unceremoniously rejected. the interview here ended, i agreeing, however, to send a letter giving final terms by ten o'clock that night. word was sent to admiral porter soon after the correspondence with pemberton commenced, so that hostilities might be stopped on the part of both army and navy. it was agreed on my paging with pemberton that they should not be renewed until our correspondence ceased. when i returned to my headquarters i sent for all the corps and division commanders with the army immediately confronting vicksburg. half the army was from eight to twelve miles off, waiting for johnston. i informed them of the contents of pemberton's letters, of my reply and the substance of the interview, and that i was ready to hear any suggestion; but would hold the power of deciding entirely in my own hands. this was the nearest approach to a "council of war" i ever held. against the general, and almost unanimous judgment of the council i sent the following letter: "in conformity with agreement of this afternoon, i will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of vicksburg, public stores, etc. on your accepting the terms proposed, i will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight a.m. to-morrow. as soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles be signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff and cavalry officers one horse each. the rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. if these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. thirty wagons also, counting two two-horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. the same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. the paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers present are authorized to sign the roll of prisoners." by the terms of the cartel then in force, prisoners captured by either army were required to be forwarded as soon as possible to either aiken's landing below dutch gap on the james river, or to vicksburg, there to be exchanged, or paroled until they could be exchanged. there was a confederate commissioner at vicksburg, authorized to make the exchange. i did not propose to take him a prisoner, but to leave him free to perform the functions of his office. had i insisted upon an unconditional surrender there would have been over thirty thousand men to transport to cairo, very much to the inconvenience of the army on the mississippi. thence the prisoners would have had to be transported by rail to washington or baltimore; thence again by steamer to aiken's--all at very great expense. at aiken's they would have had to be paroled, because the confederates did not have union prisoners to give in exchange. then again pemberton's army was largely composed of men whose homes were in the south-west; i knew many of them were tired of the war and would get home just as soon as they could. a large number of them had voluntarily come into our lines during the siege, and requested to be sent north where they could get employment until the war was over and they could go to their homes. late at night i received the following reply to my last letter: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. in the main your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops manifested in the defence of vicksburg, i have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. at ten o'clock a.m. to-morrow, i propose to evacuate the works in and around vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines. after which you will take possession. officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected." this was received after midnight. my reply was as follows: "i have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d july. the amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. it will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. again, i can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. while i do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, i cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. the property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening; that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. if you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock a.m., and then return to the inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, i will make no objection to it. should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock a.m. i shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men." pemberton promptly accepted these terms. during the siege there had been a good deal of friendly sparring between the soldiers of the two armies, on picket and where the lines were close together. all rebels were known as "johnnies," all union troops as "yanks." often "johnny" would call: "well, yank, when are you coming into town?" the reply was sometimes: "we propose to celebrate the 4th of july there." sometimes it would be: "we always treat our prisoners with kindness and do not want to hurt them;" or, "we are holding you as prisoners of war while you are feeding yourselves." the garrison, from the commanding general down, undoubtedly expected an assault on the fourth. they knew from the temper of their men it would be successful when made; and that would be a greater humiliation than to surrender. besides it would be attended with severe loss to them. the vicksburg paper, which we received regularly through the courtesy of the rebel pickets, said prior to the fourth, in speaking of the "yankee" boast that they would take dinner in vicksburg that day, that the best receipt for cooking a rabbit was "first ketch your rabbit." the paper at this time and for some time previous was printed on the plain side of wall paper. the last number was issued on the fourth and announced that we had "caught our rabbit." i have no doubt that pemberton commenced his correspondence on the third with a two-fold purpose: first, to avoid an assault, which he knew would be successful, and second, to prevent the capture taking place on the great national holiday, the anniversary of the declaration of american independence. holding out for better terms as he did he defeated his aim in the latter particular. at the appointed hour the garrison of vicksburg marched out of their works and formed line in front, stacked arms and marched back in good order. our whole army present witnessed this scene without cheering. logan's division, which had approached nearest the rebel works, was the first to march in; and the flag of one of the regiments of his division was soon floating over the court-house. our soldiers were no sooner inside the lines than the two armies began to fraternize. our men had had full rations from the time the siege commenced, to the close. the enemy had been suffering, particularly towards the last. i myself saw our men taking bread from their haversacks and giving it to the enemy they had so recently been engaged in starving out. it was accepted with avidity and with thanks. pemberton says in his report: "if it should be asked why the 4th of july was selected as the day for surrender, the answer is obvious. i believed that upon that day i should obtain better terms. well aware of the vanity of our foe, i knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance on the 4th of july into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time." this does not support my view of his reasons for selecting the day he did for surrendering. but it must be recollected that his first letter asking terms was received about 10 o'clock a.m., july 3d. it then could hardly be expected that it would take twenty-four hours to effect a surrender. he knew that johnston was in our rear for the purpose of raising the siege, and he naturally would want to hold out as long as he could. he knew his men would not resist an assault, and one was expected on the fourth. in our interview he told me he had rations enough to hold out for some time--my recollection is two weeks. it was this statement that induced me to insert in the terms that he was to draw rations for his men from his own supplies. on the 4th of july general holmes, with an army of eight or nine thousand men belonging to the trans-mississippi department, made an attack upon helena, arkansas. he was totally defeated by general prentiss, who was holding helena with less than forty-two hundred soldiers. holmes reported his loss at 1,636, of which 173 were killed; but as prentiss buried 400, holmes evidently understated his losses. the union loss was 57 killed, 127 wounded, and between 30 and 40 missing. this was the last effort on the part of the confederacy to raise the siege of vicksburg. on the third, as soon as negotiations were commenced, i notified sherman and directed him to be ready to take the offensive against johnston, drive him out of the state and destroy his army if he could. steele and ord were directed at the same time to be in readiness to join sherman as soon as the surrender took place. of this sherman was notified. i rode into vicksburg with the troops, and went to the river to exchange congratulations with the navy upon our joint victory. at that time i found that many of the citizens had been living under ground. the ridges upon which vicksburg is built, and those back to the big black, are composed of a deep yellow clay of great tenacity. where roads and streets are cut through, perpendicular banks are left and stand as well as if composed of stone. the magazines of the enemy were made by running passage-ways into this clay at places where there were deep cuts. many citizens secured places of safety for their families by carving out rooms in these embankments. a door-way in these cases would be cut in a high bank, starting from the level of the road or street, and after running in a few feet a room of the size required was carved out of the clay, the dirt being removed by the door-way. in some instances i saw where two rooms were cut out, for a single family, with a door-way in the clay wall separating them. some of these were carpeted and furnished with considerable elaboration. in these the occupants were fully secure from the shells of the navy, which were dropped into the city night and dav without intermission. i returned to my old headquarters outside in the afternoon, and did not move into the town until the sixth. on the afternoon of the fourth i sent captain wm. m. dunn of my staff to cairo, the nearest point where the telegraph could be reached, with a dispatch to the general-in-chief. it was as follows: "the enemy surrendered this morning. the only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. this i regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. it saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on johnston, to drive him from the state. i will send troops to the relief of banks, and return the 9th army corps to burnside." this news, with the victory at gettysburg won the same day, lifted a great load of anxiety from the minds of the president, his cabinet and the loyal people all over the north. the fate of the confederacy was sealed when vicksburg fell. much hard fighting was to be done afterwards and many precious lives were to be sacrificed; but the morale was with the supporters of the union ever after. i at the same time wrote to general banks informing him of the fall and sending him a copy of the terms; also saying i would send him all the troops he wanted to insure the capture of the only foothold the enemy now had on the mississippi river. general banks had a number of copies of this letter printed, or at least a synopsis of it, and very soon a copy fell into the hands of general gardner, who was then in command of port hudson. gardner at once sent a letter to the commander of the national forces saying that he had been informed of the surrender of vicksburg and telling how the information reached him. he added that if this was true, it was useless for him to hold out longer. general banks gave him assurances that vicksburg had been surrendered, and general gardner surrendered unconditionally on the 9th of july. port hudson with nearly 6,000 prisoners, 51 guns, 5,000 small-arms and other stores fell into the hands of the union forces: from that day to the close of the rebellion the mississippi river, from its source to its mouth, remained in the control of the national troops. pemberton and his army were kept in vicksburg until the whole could be paroled. the paroles were in duplicate, by organization (one copy for each, federals and confederates), and signed by the commanding officers of the companies or regiments. duplicates were also made for each soldier and signed by each individually, one to be retained by the soldier signing and one to be retained by us. several hundred refused to sign their paroles, preferring to be sent to the north as prisoners to being sent back to fight again. others again kept out of the way, hoping to escape either alternative. pemberton appealed to me in person to compel these men to sign their paroles, but i declined. it also leaked out that many of the men who had signed their paroles, intended to desert and go to their homes as soon as they got out of our lines. pemberton hearing this, again appealed to me to assist him. he wanted arms for a battalion, to act as guards in keeping his men together while being marched to a camp of instruction, where he expected to keep them until exchanged. this request was also declined. it was precisely what i expected and hoped that they would do. i told him, however, that i would see that they marched beyond our lines in good order. by the eleventh, just one week after the surrender, the paroles were completed and the confederate garrison marched out. many deserted, and fewer of them were ever returned to the ranks to fight again than would have been the case had the surrender been unconditional and the prisoners sent to the james river to be paroled. as soon as our troops took possession of the city guards were established along the whole line of parapet, from the river above to the river below. the prisoners were allowed to occupy their old camps behind the intrenchments. no restraint was put upon them, except by their own commanders. they were rationed about as our own men, and from our supplies. the men of the two armies fraternized as if they had been fighting for the same cause. when they passed out of the works they had so long and so gallantly defended, between lines of their late antagonists, not a cheer went up, not a remark was made that would give pain. really, i believe there was a feeling of sadness just then in the breasts of most of the union soldiers at seeing the dejection of their late antagonists. the day before the departure the following order was issued: "paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. they will be authorized to cross at the railroad bridge, and move from there to edward's ferry, (*14) and on by way of raymond. instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed." chapter xxxix. retrospect of the campaign--sherman's movements--proposed movement upon mobile--a painful accident--ordered to report at cairo. the capture of vicksburg, with its garrison, ordnance and ordnance stores, and the successful battles fought in reaching them, gave new spirit to the loyal people of the north. new hopes for the final success of the cause of the union were inspired. the victory gained at gettysburg, upon the same day, added to their hopes. now the mississippi river was entirely in the possession of the national troops; for the fall of vicksburg gave us port hudson at once. the army of northern virginia was driven out of pennsylvania and forced back to about the same ground it occupied in 1861. the army of the tennessee united with the army of the gulf, dividing the confederate states completely. the first dispatch i received from the government after the fall of vicksburg was in these words: "i fear your paroling the prisoners at vicksburg, without actual delivery to a proper agent as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that the men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. such has been the case elsewhere. if these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will detain them until further orders." halleck did not know that they had already been delivered into the hands of major watts, confederate commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. at vicksburg 31,600 prisoners were surrendered, together with 172 cannon about 60,000 muskets and a large amount of ammunition. the small-arms of the enemy were far superior to the bulk of ours. up to this time our troops at the west had been limited to the old united states flint-lock muskets changed into percussion, or the belgian musket imported early in the war--almost as dangerous to the person firing it as to the one aimed at--and a few new and improved arms. these were of many different calibers, a fact that caused much trouble in distributing ammunition during an engagement. the enemy had generally new arms which had run the blockade and were of uniform caliber. after the surrender i authorized all colonels whose regiments were armed with inferior muskets, to place them in the stack of captured arms and replace them with the latter. a large number of arms turned in to the ordnance department as captured, were thus arms that had really been used by the union army in the capture of vicksburg. in this narrative i have not made the mention i should like of officers, dead and alive, whose services entitle them to special mention. neither have i made that mention of the navy which its services deserve. suffice it to say, the close of the siege of vicksburg found us with an army unsurpassed, in proportion to its numbers, taken as a whole of officers and men. a military education was acquired which no other school could have given. men who thought a company was quite enough for them to command properly at the beginning, would have made good regimental or brigade commanders; most of the brigade commanders were equal to the command of a division, and one, ransom, would have been equal to the command of a corps at least. logan and crocker ended the campaign fitted to command independent armies. general f. p. blair joined me at milliken's bend a full-fledged general, without having served in a lower grade. he commanded a division in the campaign. i had known blair in missouri, where i had voted against him in 1858 when he ran for congress. i knew him as a frank, positive and generous man, true to his friends even to a fault, but always a leader. i dreaded his coming; i knew from experience that it was more difficult to command two generals desiring to be leaders than it was to command one army officered intelligently and with subordination. it affords me the greatest pleasure to record now my agreeable disappointment in respect to his character. there was no man braver than he, nor was there any who obeyed all orders of his superior in rank with more unquestioning alacrity. he was one man as a soldier, another as a politician. the navy under porter was all it could be, during the entire campaign. without its assistance the campaign could not have been successfully made with twice the number of men engaged. it could not have been made at all, in the way it was, with any number of men without such assistance. the most perfect harmony reigned between the two arms of the service. there never was a request made, that i am aware of, either of the flag-officer or any of his subordinates, that was not promptly complied with. the campaign of vicksburg was suggested and developed by circumstances. the elections of 1862 had gone against the prosecution of the war. voluntary enlistments had nearly ceased and the draft had been resorted to; this was resisted, and a defeat or backward movement would have made its execution impossible. a forward movement to a decisive victory was necessary. accordingly i resolved to get below vicksburg, unite with banks against port hudson, make new orleans a base and, with that base and grand gulf as a starting point, move our combined forces against vicksburg. upon reaching grand gulf, after running its batteries and fighting a battle, i received a letter from banks informing me that he could not be at port hudson under ten days, and then with only fifteen thousand men. the time was worth more than the reinforcements; i therefore determined to push into the interior of the enemy's country. with a large river behind us, held above and below by the enemy, rapid movements were essential to success. jackson was captured the day after a new commander had arrived, and only a few days before large reinforcements were expected. a rapid movement west was made; the garrison of vicksburg was met in two engagements and badly defeated, and driven back into its stronghold and there successfully besieged. it looks now as though providence had directed the course of the campaign while the army of the tennessee executed the decree. upon the surrender of the garrison of vicksburg there were three things that required immediate attention. the first was to send a force to drive the enemy from our rear, and out of the state. the second was to send reinforcements to banks near port hudson, if necessary, to complete the triumph of opening the mississippi from its source to its mouth to the free navigation of vessels bearing the stars and stripes. the third was to inform the authorities at washington and the north of the good news, to relieve their long suspense and strengthen their confidence in the ultimate success of the cause they had so much at heart. soon after negotiations were opened with general pemberton for the surrender of the city, i notified sherman, whose troops extended from haines' bluff on the left to the crossing of the vicksburg and jackson road over the big black on the right, and directed him to hold his command in readiness to advance and drive the enemy from the state as soon as vicksburg surrendered. steele and ord were directed to be in readiness to join sherman in his move against general johnston, and sherman was advised of this also. sherman moved promptly, crossing the big black at three different points with as many columns, all concentrating at bolton, twenty miles west of jackson. johnston heard of the surrender of vicksburg almost as soon as it occurred, and immediately fell back on jackson. on the 8th of july sherman was within ten miles of jackson and on the 11th was close up to the defences of the city and shelling the town. the siege was kept up until the morning of the 17th, when it was found that the enemy had evacuated during the night. the weather was very hot, the roads dusty and the water bad. johnston destroyed the roads as he passed and had so much the start that pursuit was useless; but sherman sent one division, steele's, to brandon, fourteen miles east of jackson. the national loss in the second capture of jackson was less than one thousand men, killed, wounded and missing. the confederate loss was probably less, except in captured. more than this number fell into our hands as prisoners. medicines and food were left for the confederate wounded and sick who had to be left behind. a large amount of rations was issued to the families that remained in jackson. medicine and food were also sent to raymond for the destitute families as well as the sick and wounded, as i thought it only fair that we should return to these people some of the articles we had taken while marching through the country. i wrote to sherman: "impress upon the men the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, abstaining from taking anything not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. they should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people." provisions and forage, when called for by them, were issued to all the people, from bruinsburg to jackson and back to vicksburg, whose resources had been taken for the supply of our army. very large quantities of groceries and provisions were so issued. sherman was ordered back to vicksburg, and his troops took much the same position they had occupied before--from the big black to haines' bluff. having cleaned up about vicksburg and captured or routed all regular confederate forces for more than a hundred miles in all directions, i felt that the troops that had done so much should be allowed to do more before the enemy could recover from the blow he had received, and while important points might be captured without bloodshed. i suggested to the general-in-chief the idea of a campaign against mobile, starting from lake pontchartrain. halleck preferred another course. the possession of the trans-mississippi by the union forces seemed to possess more importance in his mind than almost any campaign east of the mississippi. i am well aware that the president was very anxious to have a foothold in texas, to stop the clamor of some of the foreign governments which seemed to be seeking a pretext to interfere in the war, at least so far as to recognize belligerent rights to the confederate states. this, however, could have been easily done without wasting troops in western louisiana and eastern texas, by sending a garrison at once to brownsville on the rio grande. halleck disapproved of my proposition to go against mobile, so that i was obliged to settle down and see myself put again on the defensive as i had been a year before in west tennessee. it would have been an easy thing to capture mobile at the time i proposed to go there. having that as a base of operations, troops could have been thrown into the interior to operate against general bragg's army. this would necessarily have compelled bragg to detach in order to meet this fire in his rear. if he had not done this the troops from mobile could have inflicted inestimable damage upon much of the country from which his army and lee's were yet receiving their supplies. i was so much impressed with this idea that i renewed my request later in july and again about the 1st of august, and proposed sending all the troops necessary, asking only the assistance of the navy to protect the debarkation of troops at or near mobile. i also asked for a leave of absence to visit new orleans, particularly if my suggestion to move against mobile should be approved. both requests were refused. so far as my experience with general halleck went it was very much easier for him to refuse a favor than to grant one. but i did not regard this as a favor. it was simply in line of duty, though out of my department. the general-in-chief having decided against me, the depletion of an army, which had won a succession of great victories, commenced, as had been the case the year before after the fall of corinth when the army was sent where it would do the least good. by orders, i sent to banks a force of 4,000 men; returned the 9th corps to kentucky and, when transportation had been collected, started a division of 5,000 men to schofield in missouri where price was raiding the state. i also detached a brigade under ransom to natchez, to garrison that place permanently. this latter move was quite fortunate as to the time when ransom arrived there. the enemy happened to have a large number, about 5,000 head, of beef cattle there on the way from texas to feed the eastern armies, and also a large amount of munitions of war which had probably come through texas from the rio grande and which were on the way to lee's and other armies in the east. the troops that were left with me around vicksburg were very busily and unpleasantly employed in making expeditions against guerilla bands and small detachments of cavalry which infested the interior, and in destroying mills, bridges and rolling stock on the railroads. the guerillas and cavalry were not there to fight but to annoy, and therefore disappeared on the first approach of our troops. the country back of vicksburg was filled with deserters from pemberton's army and, it was reported, many from johnston's also. the men determined not to fight again while the war lasted. those who lived beyond the reach of the confederate army wanted to get to their homes. those who did not, wanted to get north where they could work for their support till the war was over. besides all this there was quite a peace feeling, for the time being, among the citizens of that part of mississippi, but this feeling soon subsided. it is not probable that pemberton got off with over 4,000 of his army to the camp where he proposed taking them, and these were in a demoralized condition. on the 7th of august i further depleted my army by sending the 13th corps, general ord commanding, to banks. besides this i received orders to co-operate with the latter general in movements west of the mississippi. having received this order i went to new orleans to confer with banks about the proposed movement. all these movements came to naught. during this visit i reviewed banks' army a short distance above carrollton. the horse i rode was vicious and but little used, and on my return to new orleans ran away and, shying at a locomotive in the street, fell, probably on me. i was rendered insensible, and when i regained consciousness i found myself in a hotel near by with several doctors attending me. my leg was swollen from the knee to the thigh, and the swelling, almost to the point of bursting, extended along the body up to the arm-pit. the pain was almost beyond endurance. i lay at the hotel something over a week without being able to turn myself in bed. i had a steamer stop at the nearest point possible, and was carried to it on a litter. i was then taken to vicksburg, where i remained unable to move for some time afterwards. while i was absent general sherman declined to assume command because, he said, it would confuse the records; but he let all the orders be made in my name, and was glad to render any assistance he could. no orders were issued by my staff, certainly no important orders, except upon consultation with and approval of sherman. on the 13th of september, while i was still in new orleans, halleck telegraphed to me to send all available forces to memphis and thence to tuscumbia, to co-operate with rosecrans for the relief of chattanooga. on the 15th he telegraphed again for all available forces to go to rosecrans. this was received on the 27th. i was still confined to my bed, unable to rise from it without assistance; but i at once ordered sherman to send one division to memphis as fast as transports could be provided. the division of mcpherson's corps, which had got off and was on the way to join steele in arkansas, was recalled and sent, likewise, to report to hurlbut at memphis. hurlbut was directed to forward these two divisions with two others from his own corps at once, and also to send any other troops that might be returning there. halleck suggested that some good man, like sherman or mcpherson, should be sent to memphis to take charge of the troops going east. on this i sent sherman, as being, i thought, the most suitable person for an independent command, and besides he was entitled to it if it had to be given to any one. he was directed to take with him another division of his corps. this left one back, but having one of mcpherson's divisions he had still the equivalent. before the receipt by me of these orders the battle of chickamauga had been fought and rosecrans forced back into chattanooga. the administration as well as the general-in-chief was nearly frantic at the situation of affairs there. mr. charles a. dana, an officer of the war department, was sent to rosecrans' headquarters. i do not know what his instructions were, but he was still in chattanooga when i arrived there at a later period. it seems that halleck suggested that i should go to nashville as soon as able to move and take general direction of the troops moving from the west. i received the following dispatch dated october 3d: "it is the wish of the secretary of war that as soon as general grant is able he will come to cairo and report by telegraph." i was still very lame, but started without delay. arriving at columbus on the 16th i reported by telegraph: "your dispatch from cairo of the 3d directing me to report from cairo was received at 11.30 on the 10th. left the same day with staff and headquarters and am here en route for cairo." end of volume i. personal memoirs of u. s. grant volume ii. contents. chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans --commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address --arrival at chattanooga. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position--sherman's movements. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy--sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy--pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville --visiting knoxville--cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee --commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position--sheridan's first raid. chapter xlix. sherman s campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan--entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. chapter liii. hancock's assault--losses of the confederates--promotions recommended--discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack--reducing the artillery. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey --position of the national army. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor--correspondence with lee retrospective. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james --general lee--visit to butler--the movement on petersburg --the investment of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad--early's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg--explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg --canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas --capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners--an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg --sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line--the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac--sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville --correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south--president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman --capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis --general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes--grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton--estimate of the different corps commanders. conclusion appendix chapter xl. first meeting with secretary stanton--general rosecrans--commanding military division of mississippi--andrew johnson's address--arrival at chattanooga. the reply (to my telegram of october 16, 1863, from cairo, announcing my arrival at that point) came on the morning of the 17th, directing me to proceed immediately to the galt house, louisville, where i would meet an officer of the war department with my instructions. i left cairo within an hour or two after the receipt of this dispatch, going by rail via indianapolis. just as the train i was on was starting out of the depot at indianapolis a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the secretary of war was coming into the station and wanted to see me. i had never met mr. stanton up to that time, though we had held frequent conversations over the wires the year before, when i was in tennessee. occasionally at night he would order the wires between the war department and my headquarters to be connected, and we would hold a conversation for an hour or two. on this occasion the secretary was accompanied by governor brough of ohio, whom i had never met, though he and my father had been old acquaintances. mr. stanton dismissed the special train that had brought him to indianapolis, and accompanied me to louisville. up to this time no hint had been given me of what was wanted after i left vicksburg, except the suggestion in one of halleck's dispatches that i had better go to nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve rosecrans. soon after we started the secretary handed me two orders, saying that i might take my choice of them. the two were identical in all but one particular. both created the "military division of mississippi," (giving me the command) composed of the departments of the ohio, the cumberland, and the tennessee, and all the territory from the alleghanies to the mississippi river north of banks's command in the south-west. one order left the department commanders as they were, while the other relieved rosecrans and assigned thomas to his place. i accepted the latter. we reached louisville after night and, if i remember rightly, in a cold, drizzling rain. the secretary of war told me afterwards that he caught a cold on that occasion from which he never expected to recover. he never did. a day was spent in louisville, the secretary giving me the military news at the capital and talking about the disappointment at the results of some of the campaigns. by the evening of the day after our arrival all matters of discussion seemed exhausted, and i left the hotel to spend the evening away, both mrs. grant (who was with me) and myself having relatives living in louisville. in the course of the evening mr. stanton received a dispatch from mr. c. a. dana, then in chattanooga, informing him that unless prevented rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so. as stated before, after the fall of vicksburg i urged strongly upon the government the propriety of a movement against mobile. general rosecrans had been at murfreesboro', tennessee, with a large and well-equipped army from early in the year 1863, with bragg confronting him with a force quite equal to his own at first, considering it was on the defensive. but after the investment of vicksburg bragg's army was largely depleted to strengthen johnston, in mississippi, who was being reinforced to raise the siege. i frequently wrote general halleck suggesting that rosecrans should move against bragg. by so doing he would either detain the latter's troops where they were or lay chattanooga open to capture. general halleck strongly approved the suggestion, and finally wrote me that he had repeatedly ordered rosecrans to advance, but that the latter had constantly failed to comply with the order, and at last, after having held a council of war, had replied in effect that it was a military maxim "not to fight two decisive battles at the same time." if true, the maxim was not applicable in this case. it would be bad to be defeated in two decisive battles fought the same day, but it would not be bad to win them. i, however, was fighting no battle, and the siege of vicksburg had drawn from rosecrans' front so many of the enemy that his chances of victory were much greater than they would be if he waited until the siege was over, when these troops could be returned. rosecrans was ordered to move against the army that was detaching troops to raise the siege. finally he did move, on the 24th of june, but ten days afterwards vicksburg surrendered, and the troops sent from bragg were free to return. it was at this time that i recommended to the general-in-chief the movement against mobile. i knew the peril the army of the cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties, but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending line over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. if threatened by land and from the water at the same time the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. those troops would necessarily come from bragg. my judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service. soon it was discovered in washington that rosecrans was in trouble and required assistance. the emergency was now too immediate to allow us to give this assistance by making an attack in rear of bragg upon mobile. it was therefore necessary to reinforce directly, and troops were sent from every available point. rosecrans had very skilfully manoeuvred bragg south of the tennessee river, and through and beyond chattanooga. if he had stopped and intrenched, and made himself strong there, all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated. but he pushed on, with his forces very much scattered, until bragg's troops from mississippi began to join him. then bragg took the initiative. rosecrans had to fall back in turn, and was able to get his army together at chickamauga, some miles south-east of chattanooga, before the main battle was brought on. the battle was fought on the 19th and 20th of september, and rosecrans was badly defeated, with a heavy loss in artillery and some sixteen thousand men killed, wounded and captured. the corps under major-general george h. thomas stood its ground, while rosecrans, with crittenden and mccook, returned to chattanooga. thomas returned also, but later, and with his troops in good order. bragg followed and took possession of missionary ridge, overlooking chattanooga. he also occupied lookout mountain, west of the town, which rosecrans had abandoned, and with it his control of the river and the river road as far back as bridgeport. the national troops were now strongly intrenched in chattanooga valley, with the tennessee river behind them and the enemy occupying commanding heights to the east and west, with a strong line across the valley from mountain to mountain, and with chattanooga creek, for a large part of the way, in front of their line. on the 29th halleck telegraphed me the above results, and directed all the forces that could be spared from my department to be sent to rosecrans. long before this dispatch was received sherman was on his way, and mcpherson was moving east with most of the garrison of vicksburg. a retreat at that time would have been a terrible disaster. it would not only have been the loss of a most important strategic position to us, but it would have been attended with the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the cumberland and the annihilation of that army itself, either by capture or demoralization. all supplies for rosecrans had to be brought from nashville. the railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government up to bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the tennessee river; but bragg, holding lookout and raccoon mountains west of chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon-roads, both south and north of the tennessee, between chattanooga and bridgeport. the distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail, but owing to the position of bragg, all supplies for rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. this country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly ten thousand of which had already starved, and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery or even the ambulances to convey the sick. the men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from nashville across the country. the region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached chattanooga they were much in the condition of the few animals left alive there--"on the lift." indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on "half rations of hard bread and beef dried on the hoof." nothing could be transported but food, and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. what they had was well worn. the fuel within the federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. there were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank, where it was abundant. the only way of supplying fuel, for some time before my arrival, had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by the use of paddles or poles. it would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps. if a retreat had occurred at this time it is not probable that any of the army would have reached the railroad as an organized body, if followed by the enemy. on the receipt of mr. dana's dispatch mr. stanton sent for me. finding that i was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where i was, and bidding them find me and send me to him at once. about eleven o'clock i returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. i hastened to the room of the secretary and found him pacing the floor rapidly in his dressing-gown. saying that the retreat must be prevented, he showed me the dispatch. i immediately wrote an order assuming command of the military division of the mississippi, and telegraphed it to general rosecrans. i then telegraphed to him the order from washington assigning thomas to the command of the army of the cumberland; and to thomas that he must hold chattanooga at all hazards, informing him at the same time that i would be at the front as soon as possible. a prompt reply was received from thomas, saying, "we will hold the town till we starve." i appreciated the force of this dispatch later when i witnessed the condition of affairs which prompted it. it looked, indeed, as if but two courses were open: one to starve, the other to surrender or be captured. on the morning of the 20th of october i started, with my staff, and proceeded as far as nashville. at that time it was not prudent to travel beyond that point by night, so i remained in nashville until the next morning. here i met for the first time andrew johnson, military governor of tennessee. he delivered a speech of welcome. his composure showed that it was by no means his maiden effort. it was long, and i was in torture while he was delivering it, fearing something would be expected from me in response. i was relieved, however, the people assembled having apparently heard enough. at all events they commenced a general hand-shaking, which, although trying where there is so much of it, was a great relief to me in this emergency. from nashville i telegraphed to burnside, who was then at knoxville, that important points in his department ought to be fortified, so that they could be held with the least number of men; to admiral porter at cairo, that sherman's advance had passed eastport, mississippi, that rations were probably on their way from st. louis by boat for supplying his army, and requesting him to send a gunboat to convoy them; and to thomas, suggesting that large parties should be put at work on the wagon-road then in use back to bridgeport. on the morning of the 21st we took the train for the front, reaching stevenson alabama, after dark. rosecrans was there on his way north. he came into my car and we held a brief interview, in which he described very clearly the situation at chattanooga, and made some excellent suggestions as to what should be done. my only wonder was that he had not carried them out. we then proceeded to bridgeport, where we stopped for the night. from here we took horses and made our way by jasper and over waldron's ridge to chattanooga. there had been much rain, and the roads were almost impassable from mud, knee-deep in places, and from wash-outs on the mountain sides. i had been on crutches since the time of my fall in new orleans, and had to be carried over places where it was not safe to cross on horseback. the roads were strewn with the debris of broken wagons and the carcasses of thousands of starved mules and horses. at jasper, some ten or twelve miles from bridgeport, there was a halt. general o. o. howard had his headquarters there. from this point i telegraphed burnside to make every effort to secure five hundred rounds of ammunition for his artillery and small-arms. we stopped for the night at a little hamlet some ten or twelve miles farther on. the next day we reached chattanooga a little before dark. i went directly to general thomas's headquarters, and remaining there a few days, until i could establish my own. during the evening most of the general officers called in to pay their respects and to talk about the condition of affairs. they pointed out on the map the line, marked with a red or blue pencil, which rosecrans had contemplated falling back upon. if any of them had approved the move they did not say so to me. i found general w. f. smith occupying the position of chief engineer of the army of the cumberland. i had known smith as a cadet at west point, but had no recollection of having met him after my graduation, in 1843, up to this time. he explained the situation of the two armies and the topography of the country so plainly that i could see it without an inspection. i found that he had established a saw-mill on the banks of the river, by utilizing an old engine found in the neighborhood; and, by rafting logs from the north side of the river above, had got out the lumber and completed pontoons and roadway plank for a second bridge, one flying bridge being there already. he was also rapidly getting out the materials and constructing the boats for a third bridge. in addition to this he had far under way a steamer for plying between chattanooga and bridgeport whenever we might get possession of the river. this boat consisted of a scow, made of the plank sawed out at the mill, housed in, and a stern wheel attached which was propelled by a second engine taken from some shop or factory. i telegraphed to washington this night, notifying general halleck of my arrival, and asking to have general sherman assigned to the command of the army of the tennessee, headquarters in the field. the request was at once complied with. chapter xli. assuming the command at chattanooga--opening a line of supplies--battle of wauhatchie--on the picket line. the next day, the 24th, i started out to make a personal inspection, taking thomas and smith with me, besides most of the members of my personal staff. we crossed to the north side of the river, and, moving to the north of detached spurs of hills, reached the tennessee at brown's ferry, some three miles below lookout mountain, unobserved by the enemy. here we left our horses back from the river and approached the water on foot. there was a picket station of the enemy on the opposite side, of about twenty men, in full view, and we were within easy range. they did not fire upon us nor seem to be disturbed by our presence. they must have seen that we were all commissioned officers. but, i suppose, they looked upon the garrison of chattanooga as prisoners of war, feeding or starving themselves, and thought it would be inhuman to kill any of them except in self-defence. that night i issued orders for opening the route to bridgeport--a cracker line, as the soldiers appropriately termed it. they had been so long on short rations that my first thought was the establishment of a line over which food might reach them. chattanooga is on the south bank of the tennessee, where that river runs nearly due west. it is at the northern end of a valley five or six miles in width, through which chattanooga creek runs. to the east of the valley is missionary ridge, rising from five to eight hundred feet above the creek and terminating somewhat abruptly a half mile or more before reaching the tennessee. on the west of the valley is lookout mountain, twenty-two hundred feet above-tide water. just below the town the tennessee makes a turn to the south and runs to the base of lookout mountain, leaving no level ground between the mountain and river. the memphis and charleston railroad passes this point, where the mountain stands nearly perpendicular. east of missionary ridge flows the south chickamauga river; west of lookout mountain is lookout creek; and west of that, raccoon mountains. lookout mountain, at its northern end, rises almost perpendicularly for some distance, then breaks off in a gentle slope of cultivated fields to near the summit, where it ends in a palisade thirty or more feet in height. on the gently sloping ground, between the upper and lower palisades, there is a single farmhouse, which is reached by a wagon-road from the valley east. the intrenched line of the enemy commenced on the north end of missionary ridge and extended along the crest for some distance south, thence across chattanooga valley to lookout mountain. lookout mountain was also fortified and held by the enemy, who also kept troops in lookout valley west, and on raccoon mountain, with pickets extending down the river so as to command the road on the north bank and render it useless to us. in addition to this there was an intrenched line in chattanooga valley extending from the river east of the town to lookout mountain, to make the investment complete. besides the fortifications on mission ridge, there was a line at the base of the hill, with occasional spurs of rifle-pits half-way up the front. the enemy's pickets extended out into the valley towards the town, so far that the pickets of the two armies could converse. at one point they were separated only by the narrow creek which gives its name to the valley and town, and from which both sides drew water. the union lines were shorter than those of the enemy. thus the enemy, with a vastly superior force, was strongly fortified to the east, south, and west, and commanded the river below. practically, the army of the cumberland was besieged. the enemy had stopped with his cavalry north of the river the passing of a train loaded with ammunition and medical supplies. the union army was short of both, not having ammunition enough for a day's fighting. general halleck had, long before my coming into this new field, ordered parts of the 11th and 12th corps, commanded respectively by generals howard and slocum, hooker in command of the whole, from the army of the potomac to reinforce rosecrans. it would have been folly to send them to chattanooga to help eat up the few rations left there. they were consequently left on the railroad, where supplies could be brought to them. before my arrival, thomas ordered their concentration at bridgeport. general w. f. smith had been so instrumental in preparing for the move which i was now about to make, and so clear in his judgment about the manner of making it, that i deemed it but just to him that he should have command of the troops detailed to execute the design, although he was then acting as a staff officer and was not in command of troops. on the 24th of october, after my return to chattanooga, the following details were made: general hooker, who was now at bridgeport, was ordered to cross to the south side of the tennessee and march up by whitesides and wauhatchie to brown's ferry. general palmer, with a division of the 14th corps, army of the cumberland, was ordered to move down the river on the north side, by a back road, until opposite whitesides, then cross and hold the road in hooker's rear after he had passed. four thousand men were at the same time detailed to act under general smith directly from chattanooga. eighteen hundred of them, under general hazen, were to take sixty pontoon boats, and under cover of night float by the pickets of the enemy at the north base of lookout, down to brown's ferry, then land on the south side and capture or drive away the pickets at that point. smith was to march with the remainder of the detail, also under cover of night, by the north bank of the river to brown's ferry, taking with him all the material for laying the bridge as soon as the crossing was secured. on the 26th, hooker crossed the river at bridgeport and commenced his eastward march. at three o'clock on the morning of the 27th, hazen moved into the stream with his sixty pontoons and eighteen hundred brave and well-equipped men. smith started enough in advance to be near the river when hazen should arrive. there are a number of detached spurs of hills north of the river at chattanooga, back of which is a good road parallel to the stream, sheltered from the view from the top of lookout. it was over this road smith marched. at five o'clock hazen landed at brown's ferry, surprised the picket guard, and captured most of it. by seven o'clock the whole of smith's force was ferried over and in possession of a height commanding the ferry. this was speedily fortified, while a detail was laying the pontoon bridge. by ten o'clock the bridge was laid, and our extreme right, now in lookout valley, was fortified and connected with the rest of the army. the two bridges over the tennessee river--a flying one at chattanooga and the new one at brown's ferry--with the road north of the river, covered from both the fire and the view of the enemy, made the connection complete. hooker found but slight obstacles in his way, and on the afternoon of the 28th emerged into lookout valley at wauhatchie. howard marched on to brown's ferry, while geary, who commanded a division in the 12th corps, stopped three miles south. the pickets of the enemy on the river below were now cut off, and soon came in and surrendered. the river was now opened to us from lookout valley to bridgeport. between brown's ferry and kelly's ferry the tennessee runs through a narrow gorge in the mountains, which contracts the stream so much as to increase the current beyond the capacity of an ordinary steamer to stem it. to get up these rapids, steamers must be cordelled; that is, pulled up by ropes from the shore. but there is no difficulty in navigating the stream from bridgeport to kelly's ferry. the latter point is only eight miles from chattanooga and connected with it by a good wagon-road, which runs through a low pass in the raccoon mountains on the south side of the river to brown's ferry, thence on the north side to the river opposite chattanooga. there were several steamers at bridgeport, and abundance of forage, clothing and provisions. on the way to chattanooga i had telegraphed back to nashville for a good supply of vegetables and small rations, which the troops had been so long deprived of. hooker had brought with him from the east a full supply of land transportation. his animals had not been subjected to hard work on bad roads without forage, but were in good condition. in five days from my arrival in chattanooga the way was open to bridgeport and, with the aid of steamers and hooker's teams, in a week the troops were receiving full rations. it is hard for any one not an eye-witness to realize the relief this brought. the men were soon reclothed and also well fed, an abundance of ammunition was brought up, and a cheerfulness prevailed not before enjoyed in many weeks. neither officers nor men looked upon themselves any longer as doomed. the weak and languid appearance of the troops, so visible before, disappeared at once. i do not know what the effect was on the other side, but assume it must have been correspondingly depressing. mr. davis had visited bragg but a short time before, and must have perceived our condition to be about as bragg described it in his subsequent report. "these dispositions," he said, "faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of chattanooga for want of food and forage. possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reinforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time." but the dispositions were not "faithfully sustained," and i doubt not but thousands of men engaged in trying to "sustain" them now rejoice that they were not. there was no time during the rebellion when i did not think, and often say, that the south was more to be benefited by its defeat than the north. the latter had the people, the institutions, and the territory to make a great and prosperous nation. the former was burdened with an institution abhorrent to all civilized people not brought up under it, and one which degraded labor, kept it in ignorance, and enervated the governing class. with the outside world at war with this institution, they could not have extended their territory. the labor of the country was not skilled, nor allowed to become so. the whites could not toil without becoming degraded, and those who did were denominated "poor white trash." the system of labor would have soon exhausted the soil and left the people poor. the non-slaveholders would have left the country, and the small slaveholder must have sold out to his more fortunate neighbor. soon the slaves would have outnumbered the masters, and, not being in sympathy with them, would have risen in their might and exterminated them. the war was expensive to the south as well as to the north, both in blood and treasure, but it was worth all it cost. the enemy was surprised by the movements which secured to us a line of supplies. he appreciated its importance, and hastened to try to recover the line from us. his strength on lookout mountain was not equal to hooker's command in the valley below. from missionary ridge he had to march twice the distance we had from chattanooga, in order to reach lookout valley; but on the night of the 28th and 29th an attack was made on geary at wauhatchie by longstreet's corps. when the battle commenced, hooker ordered howard up from brown's ferry. he had three miles to march to reach geary. on his way he was fired upon by rebel troops from a foot-hill to the left of the road and from which the road was commanded. howard turned to the left, charged up the hill and captured it before the enemy had time to intrench, taking many prisoners. leaving sufficient men to hold this height, he pushed on to reinforce geary. before he got up, geary had been engaged for about three hours against a vastly superior force. the night was so dark that the men could not distinguish one from another except by the light of the flashes of their muskets. in the darkness and uproar hooker's teamsters became frightened and deserted their teams. the mules also became frightened, and breaking loose from their fastenings stampeded directly towards the enemy. the latter, no doubt, took this for a charge, and stampeded in turn. by four o'clock in the morning the battle had entirely ceased, and our "cracker line" was never afterward disturbed. in securing possession of lookout valley, smith lost one man killed and four or five wounded. the enemy lost most of his pickets at the ferry, captured. in the night engagement of the 28th-9th hooker lost 416 killed and wounded. i never knew the loss of the enemy, but our troops buried over one hundred and fifty of his dead and captured more than a hundred. after we had secured the opening of a line over which to bring our supplies to the army, i made a personal inspection to see the situation of the pickets of the two armies. as i have stated, chattanooga creek comes down the centre of the valley to within a mile or such a matter of the town of chattanooga, then bears off westerly, then north-westerly, and enters the tennessee river at the foot of lookout mountain. this creek, from its mouth up to where it bears off west, lay between the two lines of pickets, and the guards of both armies drew their water from the same stream. as i would be under short-range fire and in an open country, i took nobody with me, except, i believe, a bugler, who stayed some distance to the rear. i rode from our right around to our left. when i came to the camp of the picket guard of our side, i heard the call, "turn out the guard for the commanding general." i replied, "never mind the guard," and they were dismissed and went back to their tents. just back of these, and about equally distant from the creek, were the guards of the confederate pickets. the sentinel on their post called out in like manner, "turn out the guard for the commanding general," and, i believe, added, "general grant." their line in a moment front-faced to the north, facing me, and gave a salute, which i returned. the most friendly relations seemed to exist between the pickets of the two armies. at one place there was a tree which had fallen across the stream, and which was used by the soldiers of both armies in drawing water for their camps. general longstreet's corps was stationed there at the time, and wore blue of a little different shade from our uniform. seeing a soldier in blue on this log, i rode up to him, commenced conversing with him, and asked whose corps he belonged to. he was very polite, and, touching his hat to me, said he belonged to general longstreet's corps. i asked him a few questions--but not with a view of gaining any particular information--all of which he answered, and i rode off. chapter xlii. condition of the army--rebuilding the railroad--general burnside's situation--orders for battle--plans for the attack--hooker's position --sherman's movements. having got the army of the cumberland in a comfortable position, i now began to look after the remainder of my new command. burnside was in about as desperate a condition as the army of the cumberland had been, only he was not yet besieged. he was a hundred miles from the nearest possible base, big south fork of the cumberland river, and much farther from any railroad we had possession of. the roads back were over mountains, and all supplies along the line had long since been exhausted. his animals, too, had been starved, and their carcasses lined the road from cumberland gap, and far back towards lexington, ky. east tennessee still furnished supplies of beef, bread and forage, but it did not supply ammunition, clothing, medical supplies, or small rations, such as coffee, sugar, salt and rice. sherman had started from memphis for corinth on the 11th of october. his instructions required him to repair the road in his rear in order to bring up supplies. the distance was about three hundred and thirty miles through a hostile country. his entire command could not have maintained the road if it had been completed. the bridges had all been destroyed by the enemy, and much other damage done. a hostile community lived along the road; guerilla bands infested the country, and more or less of the cavalry of the enemy was still in the west. often sherman's work was destroyed as soon as completed, and he only a short distance away. the memphis and charleston railroad strikes the tennessee river at eastport, mississippi. knowing the difficulty sherman would have to supply himself from memphis, i had previously ordered supplies sent from st. louis on small steamers, to be convoyed by the navy, to meet him at eastport. these he got. i now ordered him to discontinue his work of repairing roads and to move on with his whole force to stevenson, alabama, without delay. this order was borne to sherman by a messenger, who paddled down the tennessee in a canoe and floated over muscle shoals; it was delivered at iuka on the 27th. in this sherman was notified that the rebels were moving a force towards cleveland, east tennessee, and might be going to nashville, in which event his troops were in the best position to beat them there. sherman, with his characteristic promptness, abandoned the work he was engaged upon and pushed on at once. on the 1st of november he crossed the tennessee at eastport, and that day was in florence, alabama, with the head of column, while his troops were still crossing at eastport, with blair bringing up the rear. sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery, and trains, all to be supplied by the single track road from nashville. all indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying burnside's command in east tennessee, twenty-five thousand more, by the same route. a single track could not do this. i gave, therefore, an order to sherman to halt general g. m. dodge's command, of about eight thousand men, at athens, and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from decatur north towards nashville, and to rebuild that road. the road from nashville to decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the road-bed. all the bridges over these had been destroyed, and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. all the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. all bridges and culverts had been destroyed between nashville and decatur, and thence to stevenson, where the memphis and charleston and the nashville and chattanooga roads unite. the rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as stevenson over which to supply the army. from bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. general dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. he had no tools to work with except those of the pioneers--axes, picks, and spades. with these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against surprises by small parties of the enemy. as he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. he had his men and teams bring in all the grain they could find, or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. when these were not near enough to the troops for protection they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them, were moved up in like manner. blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. car-builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. but rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not enough rolling stock to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. there were no rails except those in use. to supply these deficiencies i ordered eight of the ten engines general mcpherson had at vicksburg to be sent to nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. i also ordered the troops in west tennessee to points on the river and on the memphis and charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads except the memphis and charleston to nashville. the military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and, as far as he could, bridge material. general dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. the number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms; the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles. the enemy's troops, which it was thought were either moving against burnside or were going to nashville, went no farther than cleveland. their presence there, however, alarmed the authorities at washington, and, on account of our helpless condition at chattanooga, caused me much uneasiness. dispatches were constantly coming, urging me to do something for burnside's relief; calling attention to the importance of holding east tennessee; saying the president was much concerned for the protection of the loyal people in that section, etc. we had not at chattanooga animals to pull a single piece of artillery, much less a supply train. reinforcements could not help burnside, because he had neither supplies nor ammunition sufficient for them; hardly, indeed, bread and meat for the men he had. there was no relief possible for him except by expelling the enemy from missionary ridge and about chattanooga. on the 4th of november longstreet left our front with about fifteen thousand troops, besides wheeler's cavalry, five thousand more, to go against burnside. the situation seemed desperate, and was more aggravating because nothing could be done until sherman should get up. the authorities at washington were now more than ever anxious for the safety of burnside's army, and plied me with dispatches faster than ever, urging that something should be done for his relief. on the 7th, before longstreet could possibly have reached knoxville, i ordered thomas peremptorily to attack the enemy's right, so as to force the return of the troops that had gone up the valley. i directed him to take mules, officers' horses, or animals wherever he could get them to move the necessary artillery. but he persisted in the declaration that he could not move a single piece of artillery, and could not see how he could possibly comply with the order. nothing was left to be done but to answer washington dispatches as best i could; urge sherman forward, although he was making every effort to get forward, and encourage burnside to hold on, assuring him that in a short time he should be relieved. all of burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out. he even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held south and west of knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to chattanooga when the battle should begin. longstreet had a railroad as far as loudon; but from there to knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. burnside's suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. on the 14th i telegraphed him: "sherman's advance has reached bridgeport. his whole force will be ready to move from there by tuesday at farthest. if you can hold longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, i will be able to force the enemy back from here and place a force between longstreet and bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies. sherman would have been here before this but for high water in elk river driving him some thirty miles up that river to cross." and again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as follows: "your dispatch and dana's just received. being there, you can tell better how to resist longstreet's attack than i can direct. with your showing you had better give up kingston at the last moment and save the most productive part of your possessions. every arrangement is now made to throw sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth of chickamauga creek, as soon as it arrives. thomas will attack on his left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry missionary ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between cleveland and dalton. hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry lookout mountain. the enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on his left flank. this favors us. to further confirm this, sherman's advance division will march direct from whiteside to trenton. the remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from whiteside to kelly's ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and leave him to suppose the whole force is going up lookout valley. sherman's advance has only just reached bridgeport. the rear will only reach there on the 16th. this will bring it to the 19th as the earliest day for making the combined movement as desired. inform me if you think you can sustain yourself until this time. i can hardly conceive of the enemy breaking through at kingston and pushing for kentucky. if they should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. thomas has ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of sparta. i will ascertain if they have started, and inform you. it will be entirely out of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from here?" longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at loudon until the 13th. that being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. he was in a position threatening knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought back speedily to chattanooga. the day after longstreet left loudon, sherman reached bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that evening, the 14th, and reached chattanooga the next day. my orders for battle were all prepared in advance of sherman's arrival (*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be engaged were so far away. the possession of lookout mountain was of no special advantage to us now. hooker was instructed to send howard's corps to the north side of the tennessee, thence up behind the hills on the north side, and to go into camp opposite chattanooga; with the remainder of the command, hooker was, at a time to be afterwards appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower palisades, and so get into chattanooga valley. the plan of battle was for sherman to attack the enemy's right flank, form a line across it, extend our left over south chickamauga river so as to threaten or hold the railroad in bragg's rear, and thus force him either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his base at chickamauga station. hooker was to perform like service on our right. his problem was to get from lookout valley to chattanooga valley in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to rossville, south of bragg's line on missionary ridge, form line there across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to chickamauga valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. thomas, with the army of the cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks. to carry out this plan, sherman was to cross the tennessee at brown's ferry and move east of chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of mission ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of sight of the enemy on the ridge. there are two streams called chickamauga emptying into the tennessee river east of chattanooga--north chickamauga, taking its rise in tennessee, flowing south, and emptying into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the south chickamauga, which takes its rise in georgia, flows northward, and empties into the tennessee some three or four miles above the town. there were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the north chickamauga river, their presence there being unknown to the enemy. at night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each boat. a few were to land east of the mouth of the south chickamauga, capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two banks of the river. the rest were to land on the south side of the tennessee, where missionary ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side to ferry over the main body of sherman's command while those left on the south side intrenched themselves. thomas was to move out from his lines facing the ridge, leaving enough of palmer's corps to guard against an attack down the valley. lookout valley being of no present value to us, and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure missionary ridge, hooker's orders were changed. his revised orders brought him to chattanooga by the established route north of the tennessee. he was then to move out to the right to rossville. hooker's position in lookout valley was absolutely essential to us so long as chattanooga was besieged. it was the key to our line for supplying the army. but it was not essential after the enemy was dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was begun. hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past lookout mountain and chattanooga valley, and up to missionary ridge. by crossing the north face of lookout the troops would come into chattanooga valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. orders were accordingly given to march by this route. but days before the battle began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action were all considered. the passage over the mountain was a difficult one to make in the face of an enemy. it might consume so much time as to lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they were more wanted. after reaching chattanooga valley, the creek of the same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be crossed. i was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep lookout mountain until we got through with the troops on missionary ridge. by marching hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream, and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named time; when in this new position, he would have chattanooga creek behind him, and the attack on missionary ridge would unquestionably cause the evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on lookout mountain. hooker's order was changed accordingly. as explained elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood in the river rendering the bridge at brown's ferry unsafe for the passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all the troops together against missionary ridge. the next day after sherman's arrival i took him, with generals thomas and smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed them the ground over which sherman had to march, and pointed out generally what he was expected to do. i, as well as the authorities in washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for burnside's safety. burnside himself, i believe, was the only one who did not share in this anxiety. nothing could be done for him, however, until sherman's troops were up. as soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, sherman started for bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, i believe, from kelly's ferry. sherman had left bridgeport the night of the 14th, reached chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the importance of time. his march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season would admit of. by the 20th he was himself at brown's ferry with the head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division (ewing's) was at trenton, sent that way to create the impression that lookout was to be taken from the south. sherman received his orders at the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the following morning. news had been received that the battle had been commenced at knoxville. burnside had been cut off from telegraphic communications. the president, the secretary of war, and general halleck, were in an agony of suspense. my suspense was also great, but more endurable, because i was where i could soon do something to relieve the situation. it was impossible to get sherman's troops up for the next day. i then asked him if they could not be got up to make the assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered thomas to move on that date. but the elements were against us. it rained all the 20th and 21st. the river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the pontoons in place. general orlando b. willcox, a division commander under burnside, was at this time occupying a position farther up the valley than knoxville --about maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the north. a dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened from the east. the following was sent in reply: "if you can communicate with general burnside, say to him that our attack on bragg will commence in the morning. if successful, such a move will be made as i think will relieve east tennessee, if he can hold out. longstreet passing through our lines to kentucky need not cause alarm. he would find the country so bare that he would lose his transportation and artillery before reaching kentucky, and would meet such a force before he got through, that he could not return." meantime, sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as his troops could be got up. the crossing had to be effected in full view of the enemy on the top of lookout mountain. once over, however, the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side, and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on lookout mountain or missionary ridge, until they emerged between the hills to strike the bank of the river. but when sherman's advance reached a point opposite the town of chattanooga, howard, who, it will be remembered, had been concealed behind the hills on the north side, took up his line of march to join the troops on the south side. his crossing was in full view both from missionary ridge and the top of lookout, and the enemy of course supposed these troops to be sherman's. this enabled sherman to get to his assigned position without discovery. chapter xliii. preparations for battle--thomas carries the first line of the enemy --sherman carries missionary ridge--battle of lookout mountain --general hooker's fight. on the 20th, when so much was occurring to discourage--rains falling so heavily as to delay the passage of troops over the river at brown's ferry and threatening the entire breaking of the bridge; news coming of a battle raging at knoxville; of willcox being threatened by a force from the east--a letter was received from bragg which contained these words: "as there may still be some non-combatants in chattanooga, i deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." of course, i understood that this was a device intended to deceive; but i did not know what the intended deception was. on the 22d, however, a deserter came in who informed me that bragg was leaving our front, and on that day buckner's division was sent to reinforce longstreet at knoxville, and another division started to follow but was recalled. the object of bragg's letter, no doubt, was in some way to detain me until knoxville could be captured, and his troops there be returned to chattanooga. during the night of the 21st the rest of the pontoon boats, completed, one hundred and sixteen in all, were carried up to and placed in north chickamauga. the material for the roadway over these was deposited out of view of the enemy within a few hundred yards of the bank of the tennessee, where the north end of the bridge was to rest. hearing nothing from burnside, and hearing much of the distress in washington on his account, i could no longer defer operations for his relief. i determined, therefore, to do on the 23d, with the army of the cumberland, what had been intended to be done on the 24th. the position occupied by the army of the cumberland had been made very strong for defence during the months it had been besieged. the line was about a mile from the town, and extended from citico creek, a small stream running near the base of missionary ridge and emptying into the tennessee about two miles below the mouth of the south chickamauga, on the left, to chattanooga creek on the right. all commanding points on the line were well fortified and well equipped with artillery. the important elevations within the line had all been carefully fortified and supplied with a proper armament. among the elevations so fortified was one to the east of the town, named fort wood. it owed its importance chiefly to the fact that it lay between the town and missionary ridge, where most of the strength of the enemy was. fort wood had in it twenty-two pieces of artillery, most of which would reach the nearer points of the enemy's line. on the morning of the 23d thomas, according to instructions, moved granger's corps of two divisions, sheridan and t. j. wood commanding, to the foot of fort wood, and formed them into line as if going on parade, sheridan on the right, wood to the left, extending to or near citico creek. palmer, commanding the 14th corps, held that part of our line facing south and southwest. he supported sheridan with one division (baird's), while his other division under johnson remained in the trenches, under arms, ready to be moved to any point. howard's corps was moved in rear of the centre. the picket lines were within a few hundred yards of each other. at two o'clock in the afternoon all were ready to advance. by this time the clouds had lifted so that the enemy could see from his elevated position all that was going on. the signal for advance was given by a booming of cannon from fort wood and other points on the line. the rebel pickets were soon driven back upon the main guards, which occupied minor and detached heights between the main ridge and our lines. these too were carried before halting, and before the enemy had time to reinforce their advance guards. but it was not without loss on both sides. this movement secured to us a line fully a mile in advance of the one we occupied in the morning, and the one which the enemy had occupied up to this time. the fortifications were rapidly turned to face the other way. during the following night they were made strong. we lost in this preliminary action about eleven hundred killed and wounded, while the enemy probably lost quite as heavily, including the prisoners that were captured. with the exception of the firing of artillery, kept up from missionary ridge and fort wood until night closed in, this ended the fighting for the first day. the advantage was greatly on our side now, and if i could only have been assured that burnside could hold out ten days longer i should have rested more easily. but we were doing the best we could for him and the cause. by the night of the 23d sherman's command was in a position to move, though one division (osterhaus's) had not yet crossed the river at brown's ferry. the continuous rise in the tennessee had rendered it impossible to keep the bridge at that point in condition for troops to cross; but i was determined to move that night even without this division. orders were sent to osterhaus accordingly to report to hooker, if he could not cross by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th. because of the break in the bridge, hooker's orders were again changed, but this time only back to those first given to him. general w. f. smith had been assigned to duty as chief engineer of the military division. to him were given the general direction of moving troops by the boats from north chickamauga, laying the bridge after they reached their position, and generally all the duties pertaining to his office of chief engineer. during the night general morgan l. smith's division was marched to the point where the pontoons were, and the brigade of giles a. smith was selected for the delicate duty of manning the boats and surprising the enemy's pickets on the south bank of the river. during this night also general j. m. brannan, chief of artillery, moved forty pieces of artillery, belonging to the army of the cumberland, and placed them on the north side of the river so as to command the ground opposite, to aid in protecting the approach to the point where the south end of the bridge was to rest. he had to use sherman's artillery horses for this purpose, thomas having none. at two o'clock in the morning, november 24th, giles a. smith pushed out from the north chickamauga with his one hundred and sixteen boats, each loaded with thirty brave and well-armed men. the boats with their precious freight dropped down quietly with the current to avoid attracting the attention of any one who could convey information to the enemy, until arriving near the mouth of south chickamauga. here a few boats were landed, the troops debarked, and a rush was made upon the picket guard known to be at that point. the guard were surprised, and twenty of their number captured. the remainder of the troops effected a landing at the point where the bridge was to start, with equally good results. the work of ferrying over sherman's command from the north side of the tennessee was at once commenced, using the pontoons for the purpose. a steamer was also brought up from the town to assist. the rest of m. l. smith's division came first, then the division of john e. smith. the troops as they landed were put to work intrenching their position. by daylight the two entire divisions were over, and well covered by the works they had built. the work of laying the bridge, on which to cross the artillery and cavalry, was now begun. the ferrying over the infantry was continued with the steamer and the pontoons, taking the pontoons, however, as fast as they were wanted to put in their place in the bridge. by a little past noon the bridge was completed, as well as one over the south chickamauga connecting the troops left on that side with their comrades below, and all the infantry and artillery were on the south bank of the tennessee. sherman at once formed his troops for assault on missionary ridge. by one o'clock he started with m. l. smith on his left, keeping nearly the course of chickamauga river; j. e. smith next to the right and a little to the rear; and ewing still farther to the right and also a little to the rear of j. e. smith's command, in column, ready to deploy to the right if an enemy should come from that direction. a good skirmish line preceded each of these columns. soon the foot of the hill was reached; the skirmishers pushed directly up, followed closely by their supports. by half-past three sherman was in possession of the height without having sustained much loss. a brigade from each division was now brought up, and artillery was dragged to the top of the hill by hand. the enemy did not seem to be aware of this movement until the top of the hill was gained. there had been a drizzling rain during the day, and the clouds were so low that lookout mountain and the top of missionary ridge were obscured from the view of persons in the valley. but now the enemy opened fire upon their assailants, and made several attempts with their skirmishers to drive them away, but without avail. later in the day a more determined attack was made, but this, too, failed, and sherman was left to fortify what he had gained. sherman's cavalry took up its line of march soon after the bridge was completed, and by half-past three the whole of it was over both bridges and on its way to strike the enemy's communications at chickamauga station. all of sherman's command was now south of the tennessee. during the afternoon general giles a. smith was severely wounded and carried from the field. thomas having done on the 23d what was expected of him on the 24th, there was nothing for him to do this day except to strengthen his position. howard, however, effected a crossing of citico creek and a junction with sherman, and was directed to report to him. with two or three regiments of his command he moved in the morning along the banks of the tennessee, and reached the point where the bridge was being laid. he went out on the bridge as far as it was completed from the south end, and saw sherman superintending the work from the north side and moving himself south as fast as an additional boat was put in and the roadway put upon it. howard reported to his new chief across the chasm between them, which was now narrow and in a few minutes closed. while these operations were going on to the east of chattanooga, hooker was engaged on the west. he had three divisions: osterhaus's, of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; geary's, 12th corps, army of the potomac; and cruft's, 14th corps, army of the cumberland. geary was on the right at wauhatchie, cruft at the centre, and osterhaus near brown's ferry. these troops were all west of lookout creek. the enemy had the east bank of the creek strongly picketed and intrenched, and three brigades of troops in the rear to reinforce them if attacked. these brigades occupied the summit of the mountain. general carter l. stevenson was in command of the whole. why any troops, except artillery with a small infantry guard, were kept on the mountain-top, i do not see. a hundred men could have held the summit--which is a palisade for more than thirty feet down--against the assault of any number of men from the position hooker occupied. the side of lookout mountain confronting hooker's command was rugged, heavily timbered, and full of chasms, making it difficult to advance with troops, even in the absence of an opposing force. farther up, the ground becomes more even and level, and was in cultivation. on the east side the slope is much more gradual, and a good wagon road, zigzagging up it, connects the town of chattanooga with the summit. early on the morning of the 24th hooker moved geary's division, supported by a brigade of cruft's, up lookout creek, to effect a crossing. the remainder of cruft's division was to seize the bridge over the creek, near the crossing of the railroad. osterhaus was to move up to the bridge and cross it. the bridge was seized by gross's brigade after a slight skirmish with the pickets guarding it. this attracted the enemy so that geary's movement farther up was not observed. a heavy mist obscured him from the view of the troops on the top of the mountain. he crossed the creek almost unobserved, and captured the picket of over forty men on guard near by. he then commenced ascending the mountain directly in his front. by this time the enemy was seen coming down from their camps on the mountain slope, and filing into their rifle-pits to contest the crossing of the bridge. by eleven o'clock the bridge was complete. osterhaus was up, and after some sharp skirmishing the enemy was driven away with considerable loss in killed and captured. while the operations at the bridge were progressing, geary was pushing up the hill over great obstacles, resisted by the enemy directly in his front, and in face of the guns on top of the mountain. the enemy, seeing their left flank and rear menaced, gave way, and were followed by cruft and osterhaus. soon these were up abreast of geary, and the whole command pushed up the hill, driving the enemy in advance. by noon geary had gained the open ground on the north slope of the mountain, with his right close up to the base of the upper palisade, but there were strong fortifications in his front. the rest of the command coming up, a line was formed from the base of the upper palisade to the mouth of chattanooga creek. thomas and i were on the top of orchard knob. hooker's advance now made our line a continuous one. it was in full view, extending from the tennessee river, where sherman had crossed, up chickamauga river to the base of mission ridge, over the top of the north end of the ridge to chattanooga valley, then along parallel to the ridge a mile or more, across the valley to the mouth of chattanooga creek, thence up the slope of lookout mountain to the foot of the upper palisade. the day was hazy, so that hooker's operations were not visible to us except at moments when the clouds would rise. but the sound of his artillery and musketry was heard incessantly. the enemy on his front was partially fortified, but was soon driven out of his works. during the afternoon the clouds, which had so obscured the top of lookout all day as to hide whatever was going on from the view of those below, settled down and made it so dark where hooker was as to stop operations for the time. at four o'clock hooker reported his position as impregnable. by a little after five direct communication was established, and a brigade of troops was sent from chattanooga to reinforce him. these troops had to cross chattanooga creek and met with some opposition, but soon overcame it, and by night the commander, general carlin, reported to hooker and was assigned to his left. i now telegraphed to washington: "the fight to-day progressed favorably. sherman carried the end of missionary ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and his left at chickamauga creek. troops from lookout valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and a point high up. hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which a small number have fallen into our hands from missionary ridge." the next day the president replied: "your dispatches as to fighting on monday and tuesday are here. well done. many thanks to all. remember burnside." and halleck also telegraphed: "i congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. i fear that burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. i know you will do all in your power to relieve him." the division of jefferson c. davis, army of the cumberland, had been sent to the north chickamauga to guard the pontoons as they were deposited in the river, and to prevent all ingress or egress of citizens. on the night of the 24th his division, having crossed with sherman, occupied our extreme left from the upper bridge over the plain to the north base of missionary ridge. firing continued to a late hour in the night, but it was not connected with an assault at any point. chapter xliv. battle of chattanooga--a gallant charge--complete rout of the enemy --pursuit of the confederates--general bragg--remarks on chattanooga. at twelve o'clock at night, when all was quiet, i began to give orders for the next day, and sent a dispatch to willcox to encourage burnside. sherman was directed to attack at daylight. hooker was ordered to move at the same hour, and endeavor to intercept the enemy's retreat if he still remained; if he had gone, then to move directly to rossville and operate against the left and rear of the force on missionary ridge. thomas was not to move until hooker had reached missionary ridge. as i was with him on orchard knob, he would not move without further orders from me. the morning of the 25th opened clear and bright, and the whole field was in full view from the top of orchard knob. it remained so all day. bragg's headquarters were in full view, and officers--presumably staff officers--could be seen coming and going constantly. the point of ground which sherman had carried on the 24th was almost disconnected from the main ridge occupied by the enemy. a low pass, over which there is a wagon road crossing the hill, and near which there is a railroad tunnel, intervenes between the two hills. the problem now was to get to the main ridge. the enemy was fortified on the point; and back farther, where the ground was still higher, was a second fortification commanding the first. sherman was out as soon as it was light enough to see, and by sunrise his command was in motion. three brigades held the hill already gained. morgan l. smith moved along the east base of missionary ridge; loomis along the west base, supported by two brigades of john e. smith's division; and corse with his brigade was between the two, moving directly towards the hill to be captured. the ridge is steep and heavily wooded on the east side, where m. l. smith's troops were advancing, but cleared and with a more gentle slope on the west side. the troops advanced rapidly and carried the extreme end of the rebel works. morgan l. smith advanced to a point which cut the enemy off from the railroad bridge and the means of bringing up supplies by rail from chickamauga station, where the main depot was located. the enemy made brave and strenuous efforts to drive our troops from the position we had gained, but without success. the contest lasted for two hours. corse, a brave and efficient commander, was badly wounded in this assault. sherman now threatened both bragg's flank and his stores, and made it necessary for him to weaken other points of his line to strengthen his right. from the position i occupied i could see column after column of bragg's forces moving against sherman. every confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the union forces was concentrated upon him. j. e. smith, with two brigades, charged up the west side of the ridge to the support of corse's command, over open ground and in the face of a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, and reached the very parapet of the enemy. he lay here for a time, but the enemy coming with a heavy force upon his right flank, he was compelled to fall back, followed by the foe. a few hundred yards brought smith's troops into a wood, where they were speedily reformed, when they charged and drove the attacking party back to his intrenchments. seeing the advance, repulse, and second advance of j. e. smith from the position i occupied, i directed thomas to send a division to reinforce him. baird's division was accordingly sent from the right of orchard knob. it had to march a considerable distance directly under the eye of the enemy to reach its position. bragg at once commenced massing in the same direction. this was what i wanted. but it had now got to be late in the afternoon, and i had expected before this to see hooker crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of rossville and compelling bragg to mass in that direction also. the enemy had evacuated lookout mountain during the night, as i expected he would. in crossing the valley he burned the bridge over chattanooga creek, and did all he could to obstruct the roads behind him. hooker was off bright and early, with no obstructions in his front but distance and the destruction above named. he was detained four hours crossing chattanooga creek, and thus was lost the immediate advantage i expected from his forces. his reaching bragg's flank and extending across it was to be the signal for thomas's assault of the ridge. but sherman's condition was getting so critical that the assault for his relief could not be delayed any longer. sheridan's and wood's divisions had been lying under arms from early morning, ready to move the instant the signal was given. i now directed thomas to order the charge at once (*16). i watched eagerly to see the effect, and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. the centre of the line which was to make the charge was near where thomas and i stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. turning to thomas to inquire what caused the delay, i was surprised to see thomas j. wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. i spoke to general wood, asking him why he did not charge as ordered an hour before. he replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. i told him to make the charge at once. he was off in a moment, and in an incredibly short time loud cheering was heard, and he and sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards missionary ridge. the confederates were strongly intrenched on the crest of the ridge in front of us, and had a second line half-way down and another at the base. our men drove the troops in front of the lower line of rifle-pits so rapidly, and followed them so closely, that rebel and union troops went over the first line of works almost at the same time. many rebels were captured and sent to the rear under the fire of their own friends higher up the hill. those that were not captured retreated, and were pursued. the retreating hordes being between friends and pursuers caused the enemy to fire high to avoid killing their own men. in fact, on that occasion the union soldier nearest the enemy was in the safest position. without awaiting further orders or stopping to reform, on our troops went to the second line of works; over that and on for the crest--thus effectually carrying out my orders of the 18th for the battle and of the 24th (*17) for this charge. i watched their progress with intense interest. the fire along the rebel line was terrific. cannon and musket balls filled the air: but the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. the pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were seen climbing over the confederate barriers at different points in front of both sheridan's and wood's divisions. the retreat of the enemy along most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that bragg and his officers lost all control over their men. many were captured, and thousands threw away their arms in their flight. sheridan pushed forward until he reached the chickamauga river at a point above where the enemy crossed. he met some resistance from troops occupying a second hill in rear of missionary ridge, probably to cover the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. it was now getting dark, but sheridan, without halting on that account pushed his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right and left to surround the position. the enemy discovered the movement before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat, leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. to sheridan's prompt movement the army of the cumberland, and the nation, are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and small-arms that day. except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way would not have been accomplished. while the advance up mission ridge was going forward, general thomas with staff, general gordon granger, commander of the corps making the assault, and myself and staff occupied orchard knob, from which the entire field could be observed. the moment the troops were seen going over the last line of rebel defences, i ordered granger to join his command, and mounting my horse i rode to the front. general thomas left about the same time. sheridan on the extreme right was already in pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. wood, who commanded the division to the left of sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in the charge, but did not join sheridan in the pursuit. to the left, in baird's front where bragg's troops had massed against sherman, the resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. i ordered granger to follow the enemy with wood's division, but he was so much excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy had taken, that by the time i could stop the firing the enemy had got well out of the way. the enemy confronting sherman, now seeing everything to their left giving way, fled also. sherman, however, was not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning. as soon as sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he directed his reserves, davis's division of the army of the cumberland, to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the chickamauga, and to move forward to chickamauga station. he ordered howard to move up the stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during the night, and follow davis at four o'clock in the morning. morgan l. smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still held. nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies. the rest of sherman's command was directed to follow howard at daylight in the morning to get on to the railroad towards graysville. hooker, as stated, was detained at chattanooga creek by the destruction of the bridge at that point. he got his troops over, with the exception of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock. leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed, he pushed on with the remainder of his command. at rossville he came upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a retreat along the ridge. this threw them on palmer. they could make but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many of them as could do so escaped. many, however, were captured. hooker's position during the night of the 25th was near rossville, extending east of the ridge. palmer was on his left, on the road to graysville. during the night i telegraphed to willcox that bragg had been defeated, and that immediate relief would be sent to burnside if he could hold out; to halleck i sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve burnside. before the battle of chattanooga opened i had taken measures for the relief of burnside the moment the way should be clear. thomas was directed to have the little steamer that had been built at chattanooga loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. granger's corps was to move by the south bank of the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, and up that to knoxville accompanied by the boat. in addition to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in haversacks. in the battle of chattanooga, troops from the army of the potomac, from the army of the tennessee, and from the army of the cumberland participated. in fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and the sudden rise in the tennessee river so mingled the troops that the organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders, during the battle. hooker, on the right, had geary's division of the 12th corps, army of the potomac; osterhaus's division of the 15th corps, army of the tennessee; and cruft's division of the army of the cumberland. sherman had three divisions of his own army, howard's corps from the army of the potomac, and jefferson c. davis's division of the army of the cumberland. there was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. indeed, i doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of this intermingling of commands. all saw a defiant foe surrounding them, and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him, and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was accomplished. the victory at chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily than was expected by reason of bragg's making several grave mistakes: first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of his impregnable position. it was known that mr. jefferson davis had visited bragg on missionary ridge a short time before my reaching chattanooga. it was reported and believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between bragg and longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the campaign against knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. i had known both bragg and longstreet before the war, the latter very well. we had been three years at west point together, and, after my graduation, for a time in the same regiment. then we served together in the mexican war. i had known bragg in mexico, and met him occasionally subsequently. i could well understand how there might be an irreconcilable difference between them. bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally and otherwise. he was also thoroughly upright. but he was possessed of an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. a man of the highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army he was in frequent trouble. as a subordinate he was always on the lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest neglect, even of the most trivial order. i have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of bragg. on one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. he was first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other duty. as commander of the company he made a requisition upon the quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. as quartermaster he declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his reasons for so doing. as company commander he responded to this, urging that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. as quartermaster he still persisted that he was right. in this condition of affairs bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post. the latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed: "my god, mr. bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army, and now you are quarrelling with yourself!" longstreet was an entirely different man. he was brave, honest, intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he had the courage to maintain. he was never on the lookout to detect a slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given. it may be that longstreet was not sent to knoxville for the reason stated, but because mr. davis had an exalted opinion of his own military genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one stone." on several occasions during the war he came to the relief of the union army by means of his superior military genius. i speak advisedly when i saw mr. davis prided himself on his military capacity. he says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of his nomination to the confederate presidency. some of his generals have said so in their writings since the downfall of the confederacy. my recollection is that my first orders for the battle of chattanooga were as fought. sherman was to get on missionary ridge, as he did; hooker to cross the north end of lookout mountain, as he did, sweep across chattanooga valley and get across the south end of the ridge near rossville. when hooker had secured that position the army of the cumberland was to assault in the centre. before sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that hooker was directed to come to chattanooga by the north bank of the tennessee river. the waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at brown's ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. for this reason hooker's orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally.-----note.--from this point on this volume was written (with the exception of the campaign in the wilderness, which had been previously written) by general grant, after his great illness in april, and the present arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and 18th of july, 1885. chapter xlv. the relief of knoxville--headquarters moved to nashville--visiting knoxville-cipher dispatches--withholding orders. chattanooga now being secure to the national troops beyond any doubt, i immediately turned my attention to relieving knoxville, about the situation of which the president, in particular, was very anxious. prior to the battles, i had made preparations for sending troops to the relief of burnside at the very earliest moment after securing chattanooga. we had there two little steamers which had been built and fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run. general thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with rations and ammunition and move up the tennessee river to the mouth of the holston, keeping the boat all the time abreast of the troops. general granger, with the 4th corps reinforced to make twenty thousand men, was to start the moment missionary ridge was carried, and under no circumstances were the troops to return to their old camps. with the provisions carried, and the little that could be got in the country, it was supposed he could hold out until longstreet was driven away, after which event east tennessee would furnish abundance of food for burnside's army and his own also. while following the enemy on the 26th, and again on the morning of the 27th, part of the time by the road to ringgold, i directed thomas, verbally, not to start granger until he received further orders from me; advising him that i was going to the front to more fully see the situation. i was not right sure but that bragg's troops might be over their stampede by the time they reached dalton. in that case bragg might think it well to take the road back to cleveland, move thence towards knoxville, and, uniting with longstreet, make a sudden dash upon burnside. when i arrived at ringgold, however, on the 27th, i saw that the retreat was most earnest. the enemy had been throwing away guns, caissons and small-arms, abandoning provisions, and, altogether, seemed to be moving like a disorganized mob, with the exception of cleburne's division, which was acting as rear-guard to cover the retreat. when hooker moved from rossville toward ringgold palmer's division took the road to graysville, and sherman moved by the way of chickamauga station toward the same point. as soon as i saw the situation at ringgold i sent a staff officer back to chattanooga to advise thomas of the condition of affairs, and direct him by my orders to start granger at once. feeling now that the troops were already on the march for the relief of burnside i was in no hurry to get back, but stayed at ringgold through the day to prepare for the return of our troops. ringgold is in a valley in the mountains, situated between east chickamauga creek and taylor's ridge, and about twenty miles south-east from chattanooga. i arrived just as the artillery that hooker had left behind at chattanooga creek got up. his men were attacking cleburne's division, which had taken a strong position in the adjacent hills so as to cover the retreat of the confederate army through a narrow gorge which presents itself at that point. just beyond the gorge the valley is narrow, and the creek so tortuous that it has to be crossed a great many times in the course of the first mile. this attack was unfortunate, and cost us some men unnecessarily. hooker captured, however, 3 pieces of artillery and 230 prisoners, and 130 rebel dead were left upon the field. i directed general hooker to collect the flour and wheat in the neighboring mills for the use of the troops, and then to destroy the mills and all other property that could be of use to the enemy, but not to make any wanton destruction. at this point sherman came up, having reached graysville with his troops, where he found palmer had preceded him. palmer had picked up many prisoners and much abandoned property on the route. i went back in the evening to graysville with sherman, remained there over night and did not return to chattanooga until the following night, the 29th. i then found that thomas had not yet started granger, thus having lost a full day which i deemed of so much importance in determining the fate of knoxville. thomas and granger were aware that on the 23d of the month burnside had telegraphed that his supplies would last for ten or twelve days and during that time he could hold out against longstreet, but if not relieved within the time indicated he would be obliged to surrender or attempt to retreat. to effect a retreat would have been an impossibility. he was already very low in ammunition, and with an army pursuing he would not have been able to gather supplies. finding that granger had not only not started but was very reluctant to go, he having decided for himself that it was a very bad move to make, i sent word to general sherman of the situation and directed him to march to the relief of knoxville. i also gave him the problem that we had to solve--that burnside had now but four to six days supplies left, and that he must be relieved within that time. sherman, fortunately, had not started on his return from graysville, having sent out detachments on the railroad which runs from dalton to cleveland and knoxville to thoroughly destroy that road, and these troops had not yet returned to camp. i was very loath to send sherman, because his men needed rest after their long march from memphis and hard fighting at chattanooga. but i had become satisfied that burnside would not be rescued if his relief depended upon general granger's movements. sherman had left his camp on the north side of the tennessee river, near chattanooga, on the night of the 23d, the men having two days' cooked rations in their haversacks. expecting to be back in their tents by that time and to be engaged in battle while out, they took with them neither overcoats nor blankets. the weather was already cold, and at night they must have suffered more or less. the two days' rations had already lasted them five days; and they were now to go through a country which had been run over so much by confederate troops that there was but little probability of finding much food. they did, however, succeed in capturing some flour. they also found a good deal of bran in some of the mills, which the men made up into bread; and in this and other ways they eked out an existence until they could reach knoxville. i was so very anxious that burnside should get news of the steps being taken for his relief, and thus induce him to hold out a little longer if it became necessary, that i determined to send a message to him. i therefore sent a member of my staff, colonel j. h. wilson, to get into knoxville if he could report to burnside the situation fully, and give him all the encouragement possible. mr. charles a. dana was at chattanooga during the battle, and had been there even before i assumed command. mr. dana volunteered to accompany colonel wilson, and did accompany him. i put the information of what was being done for the relief of knoxville into writing, and directed that in some way or other it must be secretly managed so as to have a copy of this fall into the hands of general longstreet. they made the trip safely; general longstreet did learn of sherman's coming in advance of his reaching there, and burnside was prepared to hold out even for a longer time if it had been necessary. burnside had stretched a boom across the holston river to catch scows and flats as they floated down. on these, by previous arrangements with the loyal people of east tennessee, were placed flour and corn, with forage and provisions generally, and were thus secured for the use of the union troops. they also drove cattle into knoxville by the east side, which was not covered by the enemy; so that when relief arrived burnside had more provisions on hand than when he had last reported. our total loss (not including burnside's) in all these engagements amounted to 757 killed, 4,529 wounded and 330 missing. we captured 6,142 prisoners--about 50 per cent. more than the enemy reported for their total loss--40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons and over 7,000 stands of small-arms. the enemy's loss in arms was probably much greater than here reported, because we picked up a great many that were found abandoned. i had at chattanooga, in round numbers, about 60,000 men. bragg had about half this number, but his position was supposed to be impregnable. it was his own fault that he did not have more men present. he had sent longstreet away with his corps swelled by reinforcements up to over twenty thousand men, thus reducing his own force more than one-third and depriving himself of the presence of the ablest general of his command. he did this, too, after our troops had opened a line of communication by way of brown's and kelly's ferries with bridgeport, thus securing full rations and supplies of every kind; and also when he knew reinforcements were coming to me. knoxville was of no earthly use to him while chattanooga was in our hands. if he should capture chattanooga, knoxville with its garrison would have fallen into his hands without a struggle. i have never been able to see the wisdom of this move. then, too, after sherman had arrived, and when bragg knew that he was on the north side of the tennessee river, he sent buckner's division to reinforce longstreet. he also started another division a day later, but our attack having commenced before it reached knoxville bragg ordered it back. it had got so far, however, that it could not return to chattanooga in time to be of service there. it is possible this latter blunder may have been made by bragg having become confused as to what was going on on our side. sherman had, as already stated, crossed to the north side of the tennessee river at brown's ferry, in full view of bragg's troops from lookout mountain, a few days before the attack. they then disappeared behind foot hills, and did not come to the view of the troops on missionary ridge until they met their assault. bragg knew it was sherman's troops that had crossed, and, they being so long out of view, may have supposed that they had gone up the north bank of the tennessee river to the relief of knoxville and that longstreet was therefore in danger. but the first great blunder, detaching longstreet, cannot be accounted for in any way i know of. if he had captured chattanooga, east tennessee would have fallen without a struggle. it would have been a victory for us to have got our army away from chattanooga safely. it was a manifold greater victory to drive away the besieging army; a still greater one to defeat that army in his chosen ground and nearly annihilate it. the probabilities are that our loss in killed was the heavier, as we were the attacking party. the enemy reported his loss in killed at 361: but as he reported his missing at 4,146, while we held over 6,000 of them as prisoners, and there must have been hundreds if not thousands who deserted, but little reliance can be placed on this report. there was certainly great dissatisfaction with bragg on the part of the soldiers for his harsh treatment of them, and a disposition to get away if they could. then, too, chattanooga, following in the same half year with gettysburg in the east and vicksburg in the west, there was much the same feeling in the south at this time that there had been in the north the fall and winter before. if the same license had been allowed the people and press in the south that was allowed in the north, chattanooga would probably have been the last battle fought for the preservation of the union. general william f. smith's services in these battles had been such that i thought him eminently entitled to promotion. i was aware that he had previously been named by the president for promotion to the grade of major-general, but that the senate had rejected the nomination. i was not aware of the reasons for this course, and therefore strongly recommended him for a major-generalcy. my recommendation was heeded and the appointment made. upon the raising of the siege of knoxville i, of course, informed the authorities at washington--the president and secretary of war--of the fact, which caused great rejoicing there. the president especially was rejoiced that knoxville had been relieved (*18) without further bloodshed. the safety of burnside's army and the loyal people of east tennessee had been the subject of much anxiety to the president for several months, during which time he was doing all he could to relieve the situation; sending a new commander (*19) with a few thousand troops by the way of cumberland gap, and telegraphing me daily, almost hourly, to "remember burnside," "do something for burnside," and other appeals of like tenor. he saw no escape for east tennessee until after our victory at chattanooga. even then he was afraid that burnside might be out of ammunition, in a starving condition, or overpowered: and his anxiety was still intense until he heard that longstreet had been driven from the field. burnside followed longstreet only to strawberry plains, some twenty miles or more east, and then stopped, believing that longstreet would leave the state. the latter did not do so, however, but stopped only a short distance farther on and subsisted his army for the entire winter off east tennessee. foster now relieved burnside. sherman made disposition of his troops along the tennessee river in accordance with instructions. i left thomas in command at chattanooga, and, about the 20th of december, moved my headquarters to nashville, tennessee. nashville was the most central point from which to communicate with my entire military division, and also with the authorities at washington. while remaining at chattanooga i was liable to have my telegraphic communications cut so as to throw me out of communication with both my command and washington. nothing occurred at nashville worthy of mention during the winter, (*20) so i set myself to the task of having troops in positions from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting all necessary supplies so as to be ready to claim a due share of the enemy's attention upon the appearance of the first good weather in the spring. i expected to retain the command i then had, and prepared myself for the campaign against atlanta. i also had great hopes of having a campaign made against mobile from the gulf. i expected after atlanta fell to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off lee's army from the west by way of the road running through augusta to atlanta and thence south-west. i was preparing to hold atlanta with a small garrison, and it was my expectation to push through to mobile if that city was in our possession: if not, to savannah; and in this manner to get possession of the only east and west railroad that would then be left to the enemy. but the spring campaign against mobile was not made. the army of the ohio had been getting supplies over cumberland gap until their animals had nearly all starved. i now determined to go myself to see if there was any possible chance of using that route in the spring, and if not to abandon it. accordingly i left nashville in the latter part of december by rail for chattanooga. from chattanooga i took one of the little steamers previously spoken of as having been built there, and, putting my horses aboard, went up to the junction of the clinch with the tennessee. from that point the railroad had been repaired up to knoxville and out east to strawberry plains. i went by rail therefore to knoxville, where i remained for several days. general john g. foster was then commanding the department of the ohio. it was an intensely cold winter, the thermometer being down as low as zero every morning for more than a week while i was at knoxville and on my way from there on horseback to lexington, kentucky, the first point where i could reach rail to carry me back to my headquarters at nashville. the road over cumberland gap, and back of it, was strewn with debris of broken wagons and dead animals, much as i had found it on my first trip to chattanooga over waldron's ridge. the road had been cut up to as great a depth as clay could be by mules and wagons, and in that condition frozen; so that the ride of six days from strawberry plains to lexington over these holes and knobs in the road was a very cheerless one, and very disagreeable. i found a great many people at home along that route, both in tennessee and kentucky, and, almost universally, intensely loyal. they would collect in little places where we would stop of evenings, to see me, generally hearing of my approach before we arrived. the people naturally expected to see the commanding general the oldest person in the party. i was then forty-one years of age, while my medical director was gray-haired and probably twelve or more years my senior. the crowds would generally swarm around him, and thus give me an opportunity of quietly dismounting and getting into the house. it also gave me an opportunity of hearing passing remarks from one spectator to another about their general. those remarks were apt to be more complimentary to the cause than to the appearance of the supposed general, owing to his being muffled up, and also owing to the travel-worn condition we were all in after a hard day's ride. i was back in nashville by the 13th of january, 1864. when i started on this trip it was necessary for me to have some person along who could turn dispatches into cipher, and who could also read the cipher dispatches which i was liable to receive daily and almost hourly. under the rules of the war department at that time, mr. stanton had taken entire control of the matter of regulating the telegraph and determining how it should be used, and of saying who, and who alone, should have the ciphers. the operators possessed of the ciphers, as well as the ciphers used, were practically independent of the commanders whom they were serving immediately under, and had to report to the war department through general stager all the dispatches which they received or forwarded. i was obliged to leave the telegraphic operator back at nashville, because that was the point at which all dispatches to me would come, to be forwarded from there. as i have said, it was necessary for me also to have an operator during this inspection who had possession of this cipher to enable me to telegraph to my division and to the war department without my dispatches being read by all the operators along the line of wires over which they were transmitted. accordingly i ordered the cipher operator to turn over the key to captain cyrus b. comstock, of the corps of engineers, whom i had selected as a wise and discreet man who certainly could be trusted with the cipher if the operator at my headquarters could. the operator refused point blank to turn over the key to captain comstock as directed by me, stating that his orders from the war department were not to give it to anybody--the commanding general or any one else. i told him i would see whether he would or not. he said that if he did he would be punished. i told him if he did not he most certainly would be punished. finally, seeing that punishment was certain if he refused longer to obey my order, and being somewhat remote (even if he was not protected altogether from the consequences of his disobedience to his orders) from the war department, he yielded. when i returned from knoxville i found quite a commotion. the operator had been reprimanded very severely and ordered to be relieved. i informed the secretary of war, or his assistant secretary in charge of the telegraph, stager, that the man could not be relieved, for he had only obeyed my orders. it was absolutely necessary for me to have the cipher, and the man would most certainly have been punished if he had not delivered it; that they would have to punish me if they punished anybody, or words to that effect. this was about the only thing approaching a disagreeable difference between the secretary of war and myself that occurred until the war was over, when we had another little spat. owing to his natural disposition to assume all power and control in all matters that he had anything whatever to do with, he boldly took command of the armies, and, while issuing no orders on the subject, prohibited any order from me going out of the adjutant-general's office until he had approved it. this was done by directing the adjutant-general to hold any orders that came from me to be issued from the adjutant-general's office until he had examined them and given his approval. he never disturbed himself, either, in examining my orders until it was entirely convenient for him; so that orders which i had prepared would often lie there three or four days before he would sanction them. i remonstrated against this in writing, and the secretary apologetically restored me to my rightful position of general-in-chief of the army. but he soon lapsed again and took control much as before. after the relief of knoxville sherman had proposed to burnside that he should go with him to drive longstreet out of tennessee; but burnside assured him that with the troops which had been brought by granger, and which were to be left, he would be amply prepared to dispose of longstreet without availing himself of this offer. as before stated sherman's command had left their camps north of the tennessee, near chattanooga, with two days' rations in their haversacks, without coats or blankets, and without many wagons, expecting to return to their camps by the end of that time. the weather was now cold and they were suffering, but still they were ready to make the further sacrifice, had it been required, for the good of the cause which had brought them into service. sherman, having accomplished the object for which he was sent, marched back leisurely to his old camp on the tennessee river. chapter xlvi. operations in mississippi--longstreet in east tennessee--commissioned lieutenant-general--commanding the armies of the united states--first interview with president lincoln. soon after his return from knoxville i ordered sherman to distribute his forces from stevenson to decatur and thence north to nashville; sherman suggested that he be permitted to go back to mississippi, to the limits of his own department and where most of his army still remained, for the purpose of clearing out what confederates might still be left on the east bank of the mississippi river to impede its navigation by our boats. he expected also to have the co-operation of banks to do the same thing on the west shore. of course i approved heartily. about the 10th of january sherman was back in memphis, where hurlbut commanded, and got together his memphis men, or ordered them collected and sent to vicksburg. he then went to vicksburg and out to where mcpherson was in command, and had him organize his surplus troops so as to give him about 20,000 men in all. sherman knew that general (bishop) polk was occupying meridian with his headquarters, and had two divisions of infantry with a considerable force of cavalry scattered west of him. he determined, therefore, to move directly upon meridian. i had sent some 2,500 cavalry under general sooy smith to sherman's department, and they had mostly arrived before sherman got to memphis. hurlbut had 7,000 cavalry, and sherman ordered him to reinforce smith so as to give the latter a force of about 7,000 with which to go against forrest, who was then known to be south-east from memphis. smith was ordered to move about the 1st of february. while sherman was waiting at vicksburg for the arrival of hurlbut with his surplus men, he sent out scouts to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy and to bring back all the information they could gather. when these scouts returned it was through them that he got the information of general polk's being at meridian, and of the strength and disposition of his command. forrest had about 4,000 cavalry with him, composed of thoroughly well-disciplined men, who under so able a leader were very effective. smith's command was nearly double that of forrest, but not equal, man to man, for the lack of a successful experience such as forrest's men had had. the fact is, troops who have fought a few battles and won, and followed up their victories, improve upon what they were before to an extent that can hardly be counted by percentage. the difference in result is often decisive victory instead of inglorious defeat. this same difference, too, is often due to the way troops are officered, and for the particular kind of warfare which forrest had carried on neither army could present a more effective officer than he was. sherman got off on the 3d of february and moved out on his expedition, meeting with no opposition whatever until he crossed the big black, and with no great deal of opposition after that until he reached jackson, mississippi. this latter place he reached on the 6th or 7th, brandon on the 8th, and morton on the 9th. up to this time he moved in two columns to enable him to get a good supply of forage, etc., and expedite the march. here, however, there were indications of the concentration of confederate infantry, and he was obliged to keep his army close together. he had no serious engagement; but he met some of the enemy who destroyed a few of his wagons about decatur, mississippi, where, by the way, sherman himself came near being picked up. he entered meridian on the 14th of the month, the enemy having retreated toward demopolis, alabama. he spent several days in meridian in thoroughly destroying the railroad to the north and south, and also for the purpose of hearing from sooy smith, who he supposed had met forrest before this time and he hoped had gained a decisive victory because of a superiority of numbers. hearing nothing of him, however, he started on his return trip to vicksburg. there he learned that smith, while waiting for a few of his men who had been ice-bound in the ohio river, instead of getting off on the 1st as expected, had not left until the 11th. smith did meet forrest, but the result was decidedly in forrest's favor. sherman had written a letter to banks, proposing a co-operative movement with him against shreveport, subject to my approval. i disapproved of sherman's going himself, because i had other important work for him to do, but consented that he might send a few troops to the aid of banks, though their time to remain absent must be limited. we must have them for the spring campaign. the trans-mississippi movement proved abortive. my eldest son, who had accompanied me on the vicksburg campaign and siege, had while there contracted disease, which grew worse, until he had grown so dangerously ill that on the 24th of january i obtained permission to go to st. louis, where he was staying at the time, to see him, hardly expecting to find him alive on my arrival. while i was permitted to go, i was not permitted to turn over my command to any one else, but was directed to keep the headquarters with me and to communicate regularly with all parts of my division and with washington, just as though i had remained at nashville. when i obtained this leave i was at chattanooga, having gone there again to make preparations to have the troops of thomas in the southern part of tennessee co-operate with sherman's movement in mississippi. i directed thomas, and logan who was at scottsboro, alabama, to keep up a threatening movement to the south against j. e. johnston, who had again relieved bragg, for the purpose of making him keep as many troops as possible there. i learned through confederate sources that johnston had already sent two divisions in the direction of mobile, presumably to operate against sherman, and two more divisions to longstreet in east tennessee. seeing that johnston had depleted in this way, i directed thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides stanley's division which was already to the east, into east tennessee, and notified schofield, who was now in command in east tennessee, of this movement of troops into his department and also of the reinforcements longstreet had received. my object was to drive longstreet out of east tennessee as a part of the preparations for my spring campaign. about this time general foster, who had been in command of the department of the ohio after burnside until schofield relieved him (*21), advised me that he thought it would be a good thing to keep longstreet just where he was; that he was perfectly quiet in east tennessee, and if he was forced to leave there, his whole well-equipped army would be free to go to any place where it could effect the most for their cause. i thought the advice was good, and, adopting that view, countermanded the orders for pursuit of longstreet. on the 12th of february i ordered thomas to take dalton and hold it, if possible; and i directed him to move without delay. finding that he had not moved, on the 17th i urged him again to start, telling him how important it was, that the object of the movement was to co-operate with sherman, who was moving eastward and might be in danger. then again on the 21st, he not yet having started, i asked him if he could not start the next day. he finally got off on the 22d or 23d. the enemy fell back from his front without a battle, but took a new position quite as strong and farther to the rear. thomas reported that he could not go any farther, because it was impossible with his poor teams, nearly starved, to keep up supplies until the railroads were repaired. he soon fell back. schofield also had to return for the same reason. he could not carry supplies with him, and longstreet was between him and the supplies still left in the country. longstreet, in his retreat, would be moving towards his supplies, while our forces, following, would be receding from theirs. on the 2d of march, however, i learned of sherman's success, which eased my mind very much. the next day, the 3d, i was ordered to washington. the bill restoring the grade of lieutenant-general of the army had passed through congress and became a law on the 26th of february. my nomination had been sent to the senate on the 1st of march and confirmed the next day (the 2d). i was ordered to washington on the 3d to receive my commission, and started the day following that. the commission was handed to me on the 9th. it was delivered to me at the executive mansion by president lincoln in the presence of his cabinet, my eldest son, those of my staff who were with me and and a few other visitors. the president in presenting my commission read from a paper--stating, however, as a preliminary, and prior to the delivery of it, that he had drawn that up on paper, knowing my disinclination to speak in public, and handed me a copy in advance so that i might prepare a few lines of reply. the president said: "general grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the army of the united states. with this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. as the country herein trusts you, so, under god, it will sustain you. i scarcely need to add, that, with what i here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence." to this i replied: "mr. president, i accept the commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred. with the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. i feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and i know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that providence which leads both nations and men." on the 10th i visited the headquarters of the army of the potomac at brandy station; then returned to washington, and pushed west at once to make my arrangements for turning over the commands there and giving general directions for the preparations to be made for the spring campaign. it had been my intention before this to remain in the west, even if i was made lieutenant-general; but when i got to washington and saw the situation it was plain that here was the point for the commanding general to be. no one else could, probably, resist the pressure that would be brought to bear upon him to desist from his own plans and pursue others. i determined, therefore, before i started back to have sherman advanced to my late position, mcpherson to sherman's in command of the department, and logan to the command of mcpherson's corps. these changes were all made on my recommendation and without hesitation. my commission as lieutenant-general was given to me on the 9th of march, 1864. on the following day, as already stated, i visited general meade, commanding the army of the potomac, at his headquarters at brandy station, north of the rapidan. i had known general meade slightly in the mexican war, but had not met him since until this visit. i was a stranger to most of the army of the potomac, i might say to all except the officers of the regular army who had served in the mexican war. there had been some changes ordered in the organization of that army before my promotion. one was the consolidation of five corps into three, thus throwing some officers of rank out of important commands. meade evidently thought that i might want to make still one more change not yet ordered. he said to me that i might want an officer who had served with me in the west, mentioning sherman specially, to take his place. if so, he begged me not to hesitate about making the change. he urged that the work before us was of such vast importance to the whole nation that the feeling or wishes of no one person should stand in the way of selecting the right men for all positions. for himself, he would serve to the best of his ability wherever placed. i assured him that i had no thought of substituting any one for him. as to sherman, he could not be spared from the west. this incident gave me even a more favorable opinion of meade than did his great victory at gettysburg the july before. it is men who wait to be selected, and not those who seek, from whom we may always expect the most efficient service. meade's position afterwards proved embarrassing to me if not to him. he was commanding an army and, for nearly a year previous to my taking command of all the armies, was in supreme command of the army of the potomac--except from the authorities at washington. all other general officers occupying similar positions were independent in their commands so far as any one present with them was concerned. i tried to make general meade's position as nearly as possible what it would have been if i had been in washington or any other place away from his command. i therefore gave all orders for the movements of the army of the potomac to meade to have them executed. to avoid the necessity of having to give orders direct, i established my headquarters near his, unless there were reasons for locating them elsewhere. this sometimes happened, and i had on occasions to give orders direct to the troops affected. on the 11th i returned to washington and, on the day after, orders were published by the war department placing me in command of all the armies. i had left washington the night before to return to my old command in the west and to meet sherman whom i had telegraphed to join me in nashville. sherman assumed command of the military division of the mississippi on the 18th of march, and we left nashville together for cincinnati. i had sherman accompany me that far on my way back to washington so that we could talk over the matters about which i wanted to see him, without losing any more time from my new command than was necessary. the first point which i wished to discuss was particularly about the co-operation of his command with mine when the spring campaign should commence. there were also other and minor points, minor as compared with the great importance of the question to be decided by sanguinary war--the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved from important commands, namely mcclellan, burnside and fremont in the east, and buell, mccook, negley and crittenden in the west. some time in the winter of 1863-64 i had been invited by the general-in-chief to give my views of the campaign i thought advisable for the command under me--now sherman's. general j. e. johnston was defending atlanta and the interior of georgia with an army, the largest part of which was stationed at dalton, about 38 miles south of chattanooga. dalton is at the junction of the railroad from cleveland with the one from chattanooga to atlanta. there could have been no difference of opinion as to the first duty of the armies of the military division of the mississippi. johnston's army was the first objective, and that important railroad centre, atlanta, the second. at the time i wrote general halleck giving my views of the approaching campaign, and at the time i met general sherman, it was expected that general banks would be through with the campaign which he had been ordered upon before my appointment to the command of all the armies, and would be ready to co-operate with the armies east of the mississippi, his part in the programme being to move upon mobile by land while the navy would close the harbor and assist to the best of its ability. (*22) the plan therefore was for sherman to attack johnston and destroy his army if possible, to capture atlanta and hold it, and with his troops and those of banks to hold a line through to mobile, or at least to hold atlanta and command the railroad running east and west, and the troops from one or other of the armies to hold important points on the southern road, the only east and west road that would be left in the possession of the enemy. this would cut the confederacy in two again, as our gaining possession of the mississippi river had done before. banks was not ready in time for the part assigned to him, and circumstances that could not be foreseen determined the campaign which was afterwards made, the success and grandeur of which has resounded throughout all lands. in regard to restoring officers who had been relieved from important commands to duty again, i left sherman to look after those who had been removed in the west while i looked out for the rest. i directed, however, that he should make no assignment until i could speak to the secretary of war about the matter. i shortly after recommended to the secretary the assignment of general buell to duty. i received the assurance that duty would be offered to him; and afterwards the secretary told me that he had offered buell an assignment and that the latter had declined it, saying that it would be degradation to accept the assignment offered. i understood afterwards that he refused to serve under either sherman or canby because he had ranked them both. both graduated before him and ranked him in the old army. sherman ranked him as a brigadier-general. all of them ranked me in the old army, and sherman and buell did as brigadiers. the worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the commander he is ordered to report to. on the 23d of march i was back in washington, and on the 26th took up my headquarters at culpeper court-house, a few miles south of the headquarters of the army of the potomac. although hailing from illinois myself, the state of the president, i never met mr. lincoln until called to the capital to receive my commission as lieutenant-general. i knew him, however, very well and favorably from the accounts given by officers under me at the west who had known him all their lives. i had also read the remarkable series of debates between lincoln and douglas a few years before, when they were rival candidates for the united states senate. i was then a resident of missouri, and by no means a "lincoln man" in that contest; but i recognized then his great ability. in my first interview with mr. lincoln alone he stated to me that he had never professed to be a military man or to know how campaigns should be conducted, and never wanted to interfere in them: but that procrastination on the part of commanders, and the pressure from the people at the north and congress, which was always with him, forced him into issuing his series of "military orders"--one, two, three, etc. he did not know but they were all wrong, and did know that some of them were. all he wanted or had ever wanted was some one who would take the responsibility and act, and call on him for all the assistance needed, pledging himself to use all the power of the government in rendering such assistance. assuring him that i would do the best i could with the means at hand, and avoid as far as possible annoying him or the war department, our first interview ended. the secretary of war i had met once before only, but felt that i knew him better. while commanding in west tennessee we had occasionally held conversations over the wires, at night, when they were not being otherwise used. he and general halleck both cautioned me against giving the president my plans of campaign, saying that he was so kind-hearted, so averse to refusing anything asked of him, that some friend would be sure to get from him all he knew. i should have said that in our interview the president told me he did not want to know what i proposed to do. but he submitted a plan of campaign of his own which he wanted me to hear and then do as i pleased about. he brought out a map of virginia on which he had evidently marked every position occupied by the federal and confederate armies up to that time. he pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the potomac, and suggested that the army might be moved on boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. we would then have the potomac to bring our supplies, and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out. i listened respectfully, but did not suggest that the same streams would protect lee's flanks while he was shutting us up. i did not communicate my plans to the president, nor did i to the secretary of war or to general halleck. march the 26th my headquarters were, as stated, at culpeper, and the work of preparing for an early campaign commenced. chapter xlvii. the military situation--plans for the campaign--sheridan assigned to command of the cavalry--flank movements--forrest at fort pillow--general banks's expedition--colonel mosby--an incident of the wilderness campaign. when i assumed command of all the armies the situation was about this: the mississippi river was guarded from st. louis to its mouth; the line of the arkansas was held, thus giving us all the north-west north of that river. a few points in louisiana not remote from the river were held by the federal troops, as was also the mouth of the rio grande. east of the mississippi we held substantially all north of the memphis and charleston railroad as far east as chattanooga, thence along the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, taking in nearly all of the state of tennessee. west virginia was in our hands; and that part of old virginia north of the rapidan and east of the blue ridge we also held. on the sea-coast we had fortress monroe and norfolk in virginia; plymouth, washington and new berne in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, port royal and fort pulaski in south carolina and georgia; fernandina, st. augustine, key west and pensacola in florida. the balance of the southern territory, an empire in extent, was still in the hands of the enemy. sherman, who had succeeded me in the command of the military division of the mississippi, commanded all the troops in the territory west of the alleghanies and north of natchez, with a large movable force about chattanooga. his command was subdivided into four departments, but the commanders all reported to sherman and were subject to his orders. this arrangement, however, insured the better protection of all lines of communication through the acquired territory, for the reason that these different department commanders could act promptly in case of a sudden or unexpected raid within their respective jurisdictions without awaiting the orders of the division commander. in the east the opposing forces stood in substantially the same relations towards each other as three years before, or when the war began; they were both between the federal and confederate capitals. it is true, footholds had been secured by us on the sea-coast, in virginia and north carolina, but, beyond that, no substantial advantage had been gained by either side. battles had been fought of as great severity as had ever been known in war, over ground from the james river and chickahominy, near richmond, to gettysburg and chambersburg, in pennsylvania, with indecisive results, sometimes favorable to the national army, sometimes to the confederate army; but in every instance, i believe, claimed as victories for the south by the southern press if not by the southern generals. the northern press, as a whole, did not discourage these claims; a portion of it always magnified rebel success and belittled ours, while another portion, most sincerely earnest in their desire for the preservation of the union and the overwhelming success of the federal armies, would nevertheless generally express dissatisfaction with whatever victories were gained because they were not more complete. that portion of the army of the potomac not engaged in guarding lines of communication was on the northern bank of the rapidan. the army of northern virginia confronting it on the opposite bank of the same river, was strongly intrenched and commanded by the acknowledged ablest general in the confederate army. the country back to the james river is cut up with many streams, generally narrow, deep, and difficult to cross except where bridged. the region is heavily timbered, and the roads narrow, and very bad after the least rain. such an enemy was not, of course, unprepared with adequate fortifications at convenient intervals all the way back to richmond, so that when driven from one fortified position they would always have another farther to the rear to fall back into. to provision an army, campaigning against so formidable a foe through such a country, from wagons alone seemed almost impossible. system and discipline were both essential to its accomplishment. the union armies were now divided into nineteen departments, though four of them in the west had been concentrated into a single military division. the army of the potomac was a separate command and had no territorial limits. there were thus seventeen distinct commanders. before this time these various armies had acted separately and independently of each other, giving the enemy an opportunity often of depleting one command, not pressed, to reinforce another more actively engaged. i determined to stop this. to this end i regarded the army of the potomac as the centre, and all west to memphis along the line described as our position at the time, and north of it, the right wing; the army of the james, under general butler, as the left wing, and all the troops south, as a force in rear of the enemy. some of these latter were occupying positions from which they could not render service proportionate to their numerical strength. all such were depleted to the minimum necessary to hold their positions as a guard against blockade runners; where they could not do this their positions were abandoned altogether. in this way ten thousand men were added to the army of the james from south carolina alone, with general gillmore in command. it was not contemplated that general gillmore should leave his department; but as most of his troops were taken, presumably for active service, he asked to accompany them and was permitted to do so. officers and soldiers on furlough, of whom there were many thousands, were ordered to their proper commands; concentration was the order of the day, and to have it accomplished in time to advance at the earliest moment the roads would permit was the problem. as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or to act in support of it, the 9th army corps, over twenty thousand strong, under general burnside, had been rendezvoused at annapolis, maryland. this was an admirable position for such a reinforcement. the corps could be brought at the last moment as a reinforcement to the army of the potomac, or it could be thrown on the sea-coast, south of norfolk, in virginia or north carolina, to operate against richmond from that direction. in fact burnside and the war department both thought the 9th corps was intended for such an expedition up to the last moment. my general plan now was to concentrate all the force possible against the confederate armies in the field. there were but two such, as we have seen, east of the mississippi river and facing north. the army of northern virginia, general robert e. lee commanding, was on the south bank of the rapidan, confronting the army of the potomac; the second, under general joseph e. johnston, was at dalton, georgia, opposed to sherman who was still at chattanooga. beside these main armies the confederates had to guard the shenandoah valley, a great storehouse to feed their armies from, and their line of communications from richmond to tennessee. forrest, a brave and intrepid cavalry general, was in the west with a large force; making a larger command necessary to hold what we had gained in middle and west tennessee. we could not abandon any territory north of the line held by the enemy because it would lay the northern states open to invasion. but as the army of the potomac was the principal garrison for the protection of washington even while it was moving on lee, so all the forces to the west, and the army of the james, guarded their special trusts when advancing from them as well as when remaining at them. better indeed, for they forced the enemy to guard his own lines and resources at a greater distance from ours, and with a greater force. little expeditions could not so well be sent out to destroy a bridge or tear up a few miles of railroad track, burn a storehouse, or inflict other little annoyances. accordingly i arranged for a simultaneous movement all along the line. sherman was to move from chattanooga, johnston's army and atlanta being his objective points. (*23) crook, commanding in west virginia, was to move from the mouth of the gauley river with a cavalry force and some artillery, the virginia and tennessee railroad to be his objective. either the enemy would have to keep a large force to protect their communications, or see them destroyed and a large amount of forage and provision, which they so much needed, fall into our hands. sigel was in command in the valley of virginia. he was to advance up the valley, covering the north from an invasion through that channel as well while advancing as by remaining near harper's ferry. every mile he advanced also gave us possession of stores on which lee relied. butler was to advance by the james river, having richmond and petersburg as his objective. before the advance commenced i visited butler at fort monroe. this was the first time i had ever met him. before giving him any order as to the part he was to play in the approaching campaign i invited his views. they were very much such as i intended to direct, and as i did direct (*24), in writing, before leaving. general w. f. smith, who had been promoted to the rank of major-general shortly after the battle of chattanooga on my recommendation, had not yet been confirmed. i found a decided prejudice against his confirmation by a majority of the senate, but i insisted that his services had been such that he should be rewarded. my wishes were now reluctantly complied with, and i assigned him to the command of one of the corps under general butler. i was not long in finding out that the objections to smith's promotion were well founded. in one of my early interviews with the president i expressed my dissatisfaction with the little that had been accomplished by the cavalry so far in the war, and the belief that it was capable of accomplishing much more than it had done if under a thorough leader. i said i wanted the very best man in the army for that command. halleck was present and spoke up, saying: "how would sheridan do?" i replied: "the very man i want." the president said i could have anybody i wanted. sheridan was telegraphed for that day, and on his arrival was assigned to the command of the cavalry corps with the army of the potomac. this relieved general alfred pleasonton. it was not a reflection on that officer, however, for i did not know but that he had been as efficient as any other cavalry commander. banks in the department of the gulf was ordered to assemble all the troops he had at new orleans in time to join in the general move, mobile to be his objective. at this time i was not entirely decided as to whether i should move the army of the potomac by the right flank of the enemy, or by his left. each plan presented advantages. (*25) if by his right--my left--the potomac, chesapeake bay and tributaries would furnish us an easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison consisted of a regiment of colored troops, infantry, and a detachment of tennessee cavalry. these troops fought bravely, but were overpowered. i will leave forrest in his dispatches to tell what he did with them. "the river was dyed," he says, "with the blood of the slaughtered for two hundred yards. the approximate loss was upward of five hundred killed, but few of the officers escaping. my loss was about twenty killed. it is hoped that these facts will demonstrate to the northern people that negro soldiers cannot cope with southerners." subsequently forrest made a report in which he left out the part which shocks humanity to read. at the east, also, the rebels were busy. i had said to halleck that plymouth and washington, north carolina, were unnecessary to hold. it would be better to have the garrisons engaged there added to butler's command. if success attended our arms both places, and others too, would fall into our hands naturally. these places had been occupied by federal troops before i took command of the armies, and i knew that the executive would be reluctant to abandon them, and therefore explained my views; but before my views were carried out the rebels captured the garrison at plymouth. i then ordered the abandonment of washington, but directed the holding of new berne at all hazards. this was essential because new berne was a port into which blockade runners could enter. general banks had gone on an expedition up the red river long before my promotion to general command. i had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time. by direction of halleck i had reinforced banks with a corps of about ten thousand men from sherman's command. this reinforcement was wanted back badly before the forward movement commenced. but banks had got so far that it seemed best that he should take shreveport on the red river, and turn over the line of that river to steele, who commanded in arkansas, to hold instead of the line of the arkansas. orders were given accordingly, and with the expectation that the campaign would be ended in time for banks to return a. j. smith's command to where it belonged and get back to new orleans himself in time to execute his part in the general plan. but the expedition was a failure. banks did not get back in time to take part in the programme as laid down. nor was smith returned until long after the movements of may, 1864, had been begun. the services of forty thousand veteran troops, over and above the number required to hold all that was necessary in the department of the gulf, were thus paralyzed. it is but just to banks, however, to say that his expedition was ordered from washington and he was in no way responsible except for the conduct of it. i make no criticism on this point. he opposed the expedition. by the 27th of april spring had so far advanced as to justify me in fixing a day for the great move. on that day burnside left annapolis to occupy meade's position between bull run and the rappahannock. meade was notified and directed to bring his troops forward to his advance. on the following day butler was notified of my intended advance on the 4th of may, and he was directed to move the night of the same day and get as far up the james river as possible by daylight, and push on from there to accomplish the task given him. he was also notified that reinforcements were being collected in washington city, which would be forwarded to him should the enemy fall back into the trenches at richmond. the same day sherman was directed to get his forces up ready to advance on the 5th. sigel was in winchester and was notified to move in conjunction with the others. the criticism has been made by writers on the campaign from the rapidan to the james river that all the loss of life could have been obviated by moving the army there on transports. richmond was fortified and intrenched so perfectly that one man inside to defend was more than equal to five outside besieging or assaulting. to get possession of lee's army was the first great object. with the capture of his army richmond would necessarily follow. it was better to fight him outside of his stronghold than in it. if the army of the potomac had been moved bodily to the james river by water lee could have moved a part of his forces back to richmond, called beauregard from the south to reinforce it, and with the balance moved on to washington. then, too, i ordered a move, simultaneous with that of the army of the potomac, up the james river by a formidable army already collected at the mouth of the river. while my headquarters were at culpeper, from the 26th of march to the 4th of may, i generally visited washington once a week to confer with the secretary of war and president. on the last occasion, a few days before moving, a circumstance occurred which came near postponing my part in the campaign altogether. colonel john s. mosby had for a long time been commanding a partisan corps, or regiment, which operated in the rear of the army of the potomac. on my return to the field on this occasion, as the train approached warrenton junction, a heavy cloud of dust was seen to the east of the road as if made by a body of cavalry on a charge. arriving at the junction the train was stopped and inquiries made as to the cause of the dust. there was but one man at the station, and he informed us that mosby had crossed a few minutes before at full speed in pursuit of federal cavalry. had he seen our train coming, no doubt he would have let his prisoners escape to capture the train. i was on a special train, if i remember correctly, without any guard. since the close of the war i have come to know colonel mosby personally, and somewhat intimately. he is a different man entirely from what i had supposed. he is slender, not tall, wiry, and looks as if he could endure any amount of physical exercise. he is able, and thoroughly honest and truthful. there were probably but few men in the south who could have commanded successfully a separate detachment in the rear of an opposing army, and so near the border of hostilities, as long as he did without losing his entire command. on this same visit to washington i had my last interview with the president before reaching the james river. he had of course become acquainted with the fact that a general movement had been ordered all along the line, and seemed to think it a new feature in war. i explained to him that it was necessary to have a great number of troops to guard and hold the territory we had captured, and to prevent incursions into the northern states. these troops could perform this service just as well by advancing as by remaining still; and by advancing they would compel the enemy to keep detachments to hold them back, or else lay his own territory open to invasion. his answer was: "oh, yes! i see that. as we say out west, if a man can't skin he must hold a leg while somebody else does." there was a certain incident connected with the wilderness campaign of which it may not be out of place to speak; and to avoid a digression further on i will mention it here. a few days before my departure from culpeper the honorable e. b. washburne visited me there, and remained with my headquarters for some distance south, through the battle in the wilderness and, i think, to spottsylvania. he was accompanied by a mr. swinton, whom he presented as a literary gentleman who wished to accompany the army with a view of writing a history of the war when it was over. he assured me--and i have no doubt swinton gave him the assurance--that he was not present as a correspondent of the press. i expressed an entire willingness to have him (swinton) accompany the army, and would have allowed him to do so as a correspondent, restricted, however, in the character of the information he could give. we received richmond papers with about as much regularity as if there had been no war, and knew that our papers were received with equal regularity by the confederates. it was desirable, therefore, that correspondents should not be privileged spies of the enemy within our lines. probably mr. swinton expected to be an invited guest at my headquarters, and was disappointed that he was not asked to become so. at all events he was not invited, and soon i found that he was corresponding with some paper (i have now forgotten which one), thus violating his word either expressed or implied. he knew of the assurance washburne had given as to the character of his mission. i never saw the man from the day of our introduction to the present that i recollect. he accompanied us, however, for a time at least. the second night after crossing the rapidan (the night of the 5th of may) colonel w. r. rowley, of my staff, was acting as night officer at my headquarters. a short time before midnight i gave him verbal instructions for the night. three days later i read in a richmond paper a verbatim report of these instructions. a few nights still later (after the first, and possibly after the second, day's fighting in the wilderness) general meade came to my tent for consultation, bringing with him some of his staff officers. both his staff and mine retired to the camp-fire some yards in front of the tent, thinking our conversation should be private. there was a stump a little to one side, and between the front of the tent and camp-fire. one of my staff, colonel t. s. bowers, saw what he took to be a man seated on the ground and leaning against the stump, listening to the conversation between meade and myself. he called the attention of colonel rowley to it. the latter immediately took the man by the shoulder and asked him, in language more forcible than polite, what he was doing there. the man proved to be swinton, the "historian," and his replies to the question were evasive and unsatisfactory, and he was warned against further eaves-dropping. the next i heard of mr. swinton was at cold harbor. general meade came to my headquarters saying that general burnside had arrested swinton, who at some previous time had given great offence, and had ordered him to be shot that afternoon. i promptly ordered the prisoner to be released, but that he must be expelled from the lines of the army not to return again on pain of punishment. chapter xlviii. commencement of the grand campaign--general butler's position --sheridan's first raid. the armies were now all ready to move for the accomplishment of a single object. they were acting as a unit so far as such a thing was possible over such a vast field. lee, with the capital of the confederacy, was the main end to which all were working. johnston, with atlanta, was an important obstacle in the way of our accomplishing the result aimed at, and was therefore almost an independent objective. it was of less importance only because the capture of johnston and his army would not produce so immediate and decisive a result in closing the rebellion as would the possession of richmond, lee and his army. all other troops were employed exclusively in support of these two movements. this was the plan; and i will now endeavor to give, as concisely as i can, the method of its execution, outlining first the operations of minor detached but co-operative columns. as stated before, banks failed to accomplish what he had been sent to do on the red river, and eliminated the use of forty thousand veterans whose cooperation in the grand campaign had been expected--ten thousand with sherman and thirty thousand against mobile. sigel's record is almost equally brief. he moved out, it is true, according to programme; but just when i was hoping to hear of good work being done in the valley i received instead the following announcement from halleck: "sigel is in full retreat on strasburg. he will do nothing but run; never did anything else." the enemy had intercepted him about new market and handled him roughly, leaving him short six guns, and some nine hundred men out of his six thousand. the plan had been for an advance of sigel's forces in two columns. though the one under his immediate command failed ingloriously the other proved more fortunate. under crook and averell his western column advanced from the gauley in west virginia at the appointed time, and with more happy results. they reached the virginia and tennessee railroad at dublin and destroyed a depot of supplies, besides tearing up several miles of road and burning the bridge over new river. having accomplished this they recrossed the alleghanies to meadow bluffs and there awaited further orders. butler embarked at fort monroe with all his command, except the cavalry and some artillery which moved up the south bank of the james river. his steamers moved first up chesapeake bay and york river as if threatening the rear of lee's army. at midnight they turned back, and butler by daylight was far up the james river. he seized city point and bermuda hundred early in the day, without loss and, no doubt, very much to the surprise of the enemy. this was the accomplishment of the first step contemplated in my instructions to butler. he was to act from here, looking to richmond as his objective point. i had given him to understand that i should aim to fight lee between the rapidan and richmond if he would stand; but should lee fall back into richmond i would follow up and make a junction of the armies of the potomac and the james on the james river. he was directed to secure a footing as far up the south side of the river as he could at as early a date as possible. butler was in position by the 6th of may and had begun intrenching, and on the 7th he sent out his cavalry from suffolk to cut the weldon railroad. he also sent out detachments to destroy the railroad between petersburg and richmond, but no great success attended these latter efforts. he made no great effort to establish himself on that road and neglected to attack petersburg, which was almost defenceless. about the 11th he advanced slowly until he reached the works at drury's bluff, about half way between bermuda hundred and richmond. in the mean time beauregard had been gathering reinforcements. on the 16th he attacked butler with great vigor, and with such success as to limit very materially the further usefulness of the army of the james as a distinct factor in the campaign. i afterward ordered a portion of it to join the army of the potomac, leaving a sufficient force with butler to man his works, hold securely the footing he had already gained and maintain a threatening front toward the rear of the confederate capital. the position which general butler had chosen between the two rivers, the james and appomattox, was one of great natural strength, one where a large area of ground might be thoroughly inclosed by means of a single intrenched line, and that a very short one in comparison with the extent of territory which it thoroughly protected. his right was protected by the james river, his left by the appomattox, and his rear by their junction--the two streams uniting near by. the bends of the two streams shortened the line that had been chosen for intrenchments, while it increased the area which the line inclosed. previous to ordering any troops from butler i sent my chief engineer, general barnard, from the army of the potomac to that of the james to inspect butler's position and ascertain whether i could again safely make an order for general butler's movement in co-operation with mine, now that i was getting so near richmond; or, if i could not, whether his position was strong enough to justify me in withdrawing some of his troops and having them brought round by water to white house to join me and reinforce the army of the potomac. general barnard reported the position very strong for defensive purposes, and that i could do the latter with great security; but that general butler could not move from where he was, in co-operation, to produce any effect. he said that the general occupied a place between the james and appomattox rivers which was of great strength, and where with an inferior force he could hold it for an indefinite length of time against a superior; but that he could do nothing offensively. i then asked him why butler could not move out from his lines and push across the richmond and petersburg railroad to the rear and on the south side of richmond. he replied that it was impracticable, because the enemy had substantially the same line across the neck of land that general butler had. he then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if butler was in a bottle. he was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place. this struck me as being very expressive of his position, particularly when i saw the hasty sketch which general barnard had drawn; and in making my subsequent report i used that expression without adding quotation marks, never thinking that anything had been said that would attract attention--as this did, very much to the annoyance, no doubt, of general butler and, i know, very much to my own. i found afterwards that this was mentioned in the notes of general badeau's book, which, when they were shown to me, i asked to have stricken out; yet it was retained there, though against my wishes. i make this statement here because, although i have often made it before, it has never been in my power until now to place it where it will correct history; and i desire to rectify all injustice that i may have done to individuals, particularly to officers who were gallantly serving their country during the trying period of the war for the preservation of the union. general butler certainly gave his very earnest support to the war; and he gave his own best efforts personally to the suppression of the rebellion. the further operations of the army of the james can best be treated of in connection with those of the army of the potomac, the two being so intimately associated and connected as to be substantially one body in which the individuality of the supporting wing is merged. before giving the reader a summary of sherman's great atlanta campaign, which must conclude my description of the various co-operative movements preparatory to proceeding with that of the operations of the centre, i will briefly mention sheridan's first raid upon lee's communications which, though an incident of the operations on the main line and not specifically marked out in the original plan, attained in its brilliant execution and results all the proportions of an independent campaign. by thus anticipating, in point of time, i will be able to more perfectly observe the continuity of events occurring in my immediate front when i shall have undertaken to describe our advance from the rapidan. on the 8th of may, just after the battle of the wilderness and when we were moving on spottsylvania i directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac, pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry: to cut the two roads--one running west through gordonsville, charlottesville and lynchburg, the other to richmond, and, when compelled to do so for want of forage and rations, to move on to the james river and draw these from butler's supplies. this move took him past the entire rear of lee's army. these orders were also given in writing through meade. the object of this move was three-fold. first, if successfully executed, and it was, he would annoy the enemy by cutting his line of supplies and telegraphic communications, and destroy or get for his own use supplies in store in the rear and coming up. second, he would draw the enemy's cavalry after him, and thus better protect our flanks, rear and trains than by remaining with the army. third, his absence would save the trains drawing his forage and other supplies from fredericksburg, which had now become our base. he started at daylight the next morning, and accomplished more than was expected. it was sixteen days before he got back to the army of the potomac. the course sheridan took was directly to richmond. before night stuart, commanding the confederate cavalry, came on to the rear of his command. but the advance kept on, crossed the north anna, and at beaver dam, a station on the virginia central railroad, recaptured four hundred union prisoners on their way to richmond, destroyed the road and used and destroyed a large amount of subsistence and medical stores. stuart, seeing that our cavalry was pushing towards richmond, abandoned the pursuit on the morning of the 10th and, by a detour and an exhausting march, interposed between sheridan and richmond at yellow tavern, only about six miles north of the city. sheridan destroyed the railroad and more supplies at ashland, and on the 11th arrived in stuart's front. a severe engagement ensued in which the losses were heavy on both sides, but the rebels were beaten, their leader mortally wounded, and some guns and many prisoners were captured. sheridan passed through the outer defences of richmond, and could, no doubt, have passed through the inner ones. but having no supports near he could not have remained. after caring for his wounded he struck for the james river below the city, to communicate with butler and to rest his men and horses as well as to get food and forage for them. he moved first between the chickahominy and the james, but in the morning (the 12th) he was stopped by batteries at mechanicsville. he then turned to cross to the north side of the chickahominy by meadow bridge. he found this barred, and the defeated confederate cavalry, reorganized, occupying the opposite side. the panic created by his first entrance within the outer works of richmond having subsided troops were sent out to attack his rear. he was now in a perilous position, one from which but few generals could have extricated themselves. the defences of richmond, manned, were to the right, the chickahominy was to the left with no bridge remaining and the opposite bank guarded, to the rear was a force from richmond. this force was attacked and beaten by wilson's and gregg's divisions, while sheridan turned to the left with the remaining division and hastily built a bridge over the chickahominy under the fire of the enemy, forced a crossing and soon dispersed the confederates he found there. the enemy was held back from the stream by the fire of the troops not engaged in bridge building. on the 13th sheridan was at bottom's bridge, over the chickahominy. on the 14th he crossed this stream and on that day went into camp on the james river at haxall's landing. he at once put himself into communication with general butler, who directed all the supplies he wanted to be furnished. sheridan had left the army of the potomac at spottsylvania, but did not know where either this or lee's army was now. great caution therefore had to be exercised in getting back. on the 17th, after resting his command for three days, he started on his return. he moved by the way of white house. the bridge over the pamunkey had been burned by the enemy, but a new one was speedily improvised and the cavalry crossed over it. on the 22d he was at aylett's on the matapony, where he learned the position of the two armies. on the 24th he joined us on the march from north anna to cold harbor, in the vicinity of chesterfield. sheridan in this memorable raid passed entirely around lee's army: encountered his cavalry in four engagements, and defeated them in all; recaptured four hundred union prisoners and killed and captured many of the enemy; destroyed and used many supplies and munitions of war; destroyed miles of railroad and telegraph, and freed us from annoyance by the cavalry of the enemy for more than two weeks. chapter xlix. sherman's campaign in georgia--siege of atlanta--death of general mcpherson--attempt to capture andersonville--capture of atlanta. after separating from sherman in cincinnati i went on to washington, as already stated, while he returned to nashville to assume the duties of his new command. his military division was now composed of four departments and embraced all the territory west of the alleghany mountains and east of the mississippi river, together with the state of arkansas in the trans-mississippi. the most easterly of these was the department of the ohio, general schofield commanding; the next was the department of the cumberland, general thomas commanding; the third the department of the tennessee, general mcpherson commanding; and general steele still commanded the trans-mississippi, or department of arkansas. the last-named department was so far away that sherman could not communicate with it very readily after starting on his spring campaign, and it was therefore soon transferred from his military division to that of the gulf, where general canby, who had relieved general banks, was in command. the movements of the armies, as i have stated in a former chapter, were to be simultaneous, i fixing the day to start when the season should be far enough advanced, it was hoped, for the roads to be in a condition for the troops to march. general sherman at once set himself to work preparing for the task which was assigned him to accomplish in the spring campaign. mcpherson lay at huntsville with about twenty-four thousand men, guarding those points of tennessee which were regarded as most worth holding; thomas, with over sixty thousand men of the army of the cumberland, was at chattanooga; and schofield, with about fourteen thousand men, was at knoxville. with these three armies, numbering about one hundred thousand men in all, sherman was to move on the day fixed for the general advance, with a view of destroying johnston's army and capturing atlanta. he visited each of these commands to inform himself as to their condition, and it was found to be, speaking generally, good. one of the first matters to turn his attention to was that of getting, before the time arrived for starting, an accumulation of supplies forward to chattanooga, sufficiently large to warrant a movement. he found, when he got to that place, that the trains over the single-track railroad, which was frequently interrupted for a day or two at a time, were only sufficient to meet the daily wants of the troops without bringing forward any surplus of any kind. he found, however, that trains were being used to transport all the beef cattle, horses for the cavalry, and even teams that were being brought to the front. he at once changed all this, and required beef cattle, teams, cavalry horses, and everything that could travel, even the troops, to be marched, and used the road exclusively for transporting supplies. in this way he was able to accumulate an abundance before the time finally fixed upon for the move, the 4th of may. as i have said already, johnston was at dalton, which was nearly one-fourth of the way between chattanooga and atlanta. the country is mountainous all the way to atlanta, abounding in mountain streams, some of them of considerable volume. dalton is on ground where water drains towards atlanta and into one of the main streams rising north-east from there and flowing south-west--this being the general direction which all the main streams of that section take, with smaller tributaries entering into them. johnston had been preparing himself for this campaign during the entire winter. the best positions for defence had been selected all the way from dalton back to atlanta, and very strongly intrenched; so that, as he might be forced to fall back from one position, he would have another to fall into in his rear. his position at dalton was so very strongly intrenched that no doubt he expected, or at least hoped, to hold sherman there and prevent him from getting any further. with a less skilful general, and one disposed to take no risks, i have no doubt that he would have succeeded. sherman's plan was to start schofield, who was farthest back, a few days in advance from knoxville, having him move on the direct road to dalton. thomas was to move out to ringgold. it had been sherman's intention to cross mcpherson over the tennessee river at huntsville or decatur, and move him south from there so as to have him come into the road running from chattanooga to atlanta a good distance to the rear of the point johnston was occupying; but when that was contemplated it was hoped that mcpherson alone would have troops enough to cope with johnston, if the latter should move against him while unsupported by the balance of the army. in this he was disappointed. two of mcpherson's veteran divisions had re-enlisted on the express provision that they were to have a furlough. this furlough had not yet expired, and they were not back. then, again, sherman had lent banks two divisions under a. j. smith, the winter before, to co-operate with the trans-mississippi forces, and this with the express pledge that they should be back by a time specified, so as to be prepared for this very campaign. it is hardly necessary to say they were not returned. that department continued to absorb troops to no purpose to the end of the war. this left mcpherson so weak that the part of the plan above indicated had to be changed. he was therefore brought up to chattanooga and moved from there on a road to the right of thomas--the two coming together about dalton. the three armies were abreast, all ready to start promptly on time. sherman soon found that dalton was so strongly fortified that it was useless to make any attempt to carry it by assault; and even to carry it by regular approaches was impracticable. there was a narrowing up in the mountain, between the national and confederate armies, through which a stream, a wagon road and a railroad ran. besides, the stream had been dammed so that the valley was a lake. through this gorge the troops would have to pass. mcpherson was therefore sent around by the right, to come out by the way of snake creek gap into the rear of the enemy. this was a surprise to johnston, and about the 13th he decided to abandon his position at dalton. on the 15th there was very hard fighting about resaca; but our cavalry having been sent around to the right got near the road in the enemy's rear. again johnston fell back, our army pursuing. the pursuit was continued to kingston, which was reached on the 19th with very little fighting, except that newton's division overtook the rear of johnston's army and engaged it. sherman was now obliged to halt for the purpose of bringing up his railroad trains. he was depending upon the railroad for all of his supplies, and as of course the railroad was wholly destroyed as johnston fell back, it had to be rebuilt. this work was pushed forward night and day, and caused much less delay than most persons would naturally expect in a mountainous country where there were so many bridges to be rebuilt. the campaign to atlanta was managed with the most consummate skill, the enemy being flanked out of one position after another all the way there. it is true this was not accomplished without a good deal of fighting --some of it very hard fighting, rising to the dignity of very important battles--neither were single positions gained in a day. on the contrary, weeks were spent at some; and about atlanta more than a month was consumed. it was the 23d of may before the road was finished up to the rear of sherman's army and the pursuit renewed. this pursuit brought him up to the vicinity of allatoona. this place was very strongly intrenched, and naturally a very defensible position. an assault upon it was not thought of, but preparations were made to flank the enemy out of it. this was done by sending a large force around our right, by the way of dallas, to reach the rear of the enemy. before reaching there, however, they found the enemy fortified in their way, and there resulted hard fighting for about a week at a place called new hope church. on the left our troops also were fortified, and as close up to the enemy as they could get. they kept working still farther around to the left toward the railroad. this was the case more particularly with the cavalry. by the 4th of june johnston found that he was being hemmed in so rapidly that he drew off and allatoona was left in our possession. allatoona, being an important place, was strongly intrenched for occupation by our troops before advancing farther, and made a secondary base of supplies. the railroad was finished up to that point, the intrenchments completed, storehouses provided for food, and the army got in readiness for a further advance. the rains, however, were falling in such torrents that it was impossible to move the army by the side roads which they would have to move upon in order to turn johnston out of his new position. while sherman's army lay here, general f. p. blair returned to it, bringing with him the two divisions of veterans who had been on furlough. johnston had fallen back to marietta and kenesaw mountain, where strong intrenchments awaited him. at this latter place our troops made an assault upon the enemy's lines after having got their own lines up close to him, and failed, sustaining considerable loss. but during the progress of the battle schofield was gaining ground to the left; and the cavalry on his left were gaining still more toward the enemy's rear. these operations were completed by the 3d of july, when it was found that johnston had evacuated the place. he was pursued at once. sherman had made every preparation to abandon the railroad, leaving a strong guard in his intrenchments. he had intended, moving out with twenty days' rations and plenty of ammunition, to come in on the railroad again at the chattahoochee river. johnston frustrated this plan by himself starting back as above stated. this time he fell back to the chattahoochee. about the 5th of july he was besieged again, sherman getting easy possession of the chattahoochee river both above and below him. the enemy was again flanked out of his position, or so frightened by flanking movements that on the night of the 9th he fell back across the river. here johnston made a stand until the 17th, when sherman's old tactics prevailed again and the final movement toward atlanta began. johnston was now relieved of the command, and hood superseded him. johnston's tactics in this campaign do not seem to have met with much favor, either in the eyes of the administration at richmond, or of the people of that section of the south in which he was commanding. the very fact of a change of commanders being ordered under such circumstances was an indication of a change of policy, and that now they would become the aggressors--the very thing our troops wanted. for my own part, i think that johnston's tactics were right. anything that could have prolonged the war a year beyond the time that it did finally close, would probably have exhausted the north to such an extent that they might then have abandoned the contest and agreed to a separation. atlanta was very strongly intrenched all the way around in a circle about a mile and a half outside of the city. in addition to this, there were advanced intrenchments which had to be taken before a close siege could be commenced. sure enough, as indicated by the change of commanders, the enemy was about to assume the offensive. on the 20th he came out and attacked the army of the cumberland most furiously. hooker's corps, and newton's and johnson's divisions were the principal ones engaged in this contest, which lasted more than an hour; but the confederates were then forced to fall back inside their main lines. the losses were quite heavy on both sides. on this day general gresham, since our postmaster-general, was very badly wounded. during the night hood abandoned his outer lines, and our troops were advanced. the investment had not been relinquished for a moment during the day. during the night of the 21st hood moved out again, passing by our left flank, which was then in motion to get a position farther in rear of him, and a desperate battle ensued, which lasted most of the day of the 22d. at first the battle went very much in favor of the confederates, our troops being somewhat surprised. while our troops were advancing they were struck in flank, and their flank was enveloped. but they had become too thorough veterans to be thrown into irreparable confusion by an unexpected attack when off their guard, and soon they were in order and engaging the enemy, with the advantage now of knowing where their antagonist was. the field of battle continued to expand until it embraced about seven miles of ground. finally, however, and before night, the enemy was driven back into the city (*26). it was during this battle that mcpherson, while passing from one column to another, was instantly killed. in his death the army lost one of its ablest, purest and best generals. garrard had been sent out with his cavalry to get upon the railroad east of atlanta and to cut it in the direction of augusta. he was successful in this, and returned about the time of the battle. rousseau had also come up from tennessee with a small division of cavalry, having crossed the tennessee river about decatur and made a raid into alabama. finally, when hard pressed, he had come in, striking the railroad in rear of sherman, and reported to him about this time. the battle of the 22d is usually known as the battle of atlanta, although the city did not fall into our hands until the 2d of september. preparations went on, as before, to flank the enemy out of his position. the work was tedious, and the lines that had to be maintained were very long. our troops were gradually worked around to the east until they struck the road between decatur and atlanta. these lines were strongly fortified, as were those to the north and west of the city--all as close up to the enemy's lines as practicable--in order to hold them with the smallest possible number of men, the design being to detach an army to move by our right and try to get upon the railroad down south of atlanta. on the 27th the movement by the right flank commenced. on the 28th the enemy struck our right flank, general logan commanding, with great vigor. logan intrenched himself hastily, and by that means was enabled to resist all assaults and inflict a great deal of damage upon the enemy. these assaults were continued to the middle of the afternoon, and resumed once or twice still later in the day. the enemy's losses in these unsuccessful assaults were fearful. during that evening the enemy in logan's front withdrew into the town. this now left sherman's army close up to the confederate lines, extending from a point directly east of the city around by the north and west of it for a distance of fully ten miles; the whole of this line being intrenched, and made stronger every day they remained there. in the latter part of july sherman sent stoneman to destroy the railroads to the south, about macon. he was then to go east and, if possible, release our prisoners about andersonville. there were painful stories current at the time about the great hardships these prisoners had to endure in the way of general bad treatment, in the way in which they were housed, and in the way in which they were fed. great sympathy was felt for them; and it was thought that even if they could be turned loose upon the country it would be a great relief to them. but the attempt proved a failure. mccook, who commanded a small brigade, was first reported to have been captured; but he got back, having inflicted a good deal of damage upon the enemy. he had also taken some prisoners; but encountering afterwards a largely superior force of the enemy he was obliged to drop his prisoners and get back as best he could with what men he had left. he had lost several hundred men out of his small command. on the 4th of august colonel adams, commanding a little brigade of about a thousand men, returned reporting stoneman and all but himself as lost. i myself had heard around richmond of the capture of stoneman, and had sent sherman word, which he received. the rumor was confirmed there, also, from other sources. a few days after colonel adams's return colonel capron also got in with a small detachment and confirmed the report of the capture of stoneman with something less than a thousand men. it seems that stoneman, finding the escape of all his force was impossible, had made arrangements for the escape of two divisions. he covered the movement of these divisions to the rear with a force of about seven hundred men, and at length surrendered himself and this detachment to the commanding confederate. in this raid, however, much damage was inflicted upon the enemy by the destruction of cars, locomotives, army wagons, manufactories of military supplies, etc. on the 4th and 5th sherman endeavored to get upon the railroad to our right, where schofield was in command, but these attempts failed utterly. general palmer was charged with being the cause of this failure, to a great extent, by both general sherman and general schofield; but i am not prepared to say this, although a question seems to have arisen with palmer as to whether schofield had any right to command him. if he did raise this question while an action was going on, that act alone was exceedingly reprehensible. about the same time wheeler got upon our railroad north of resaca and destroyed it nearly up to dalton. this cut sherman off from communication with the north for several days. sherman responded to this attack on his lines of communication by directing one upon theirs. kilpatrick started on the night of the 18th of august to reach the macon road about jonesboro. he succeeded in doing so, passed entirely around the confederate lines of atlanta, and was back again in his former position on our left by the 22d. these little affairs, however, contributed but very little to the grand result. they annoyed, it is true, but any damage thus done to a railroad by any cavalry expedition is soon repaired. sherman made preparations for a repetition of his tactics; that is, for a flank movement with as large a force as could be got together to some point in the enemy's rear. sherman commenced this last movement on the 25th of august, and on the 1st of september was well up towards the railroad twenty miles south of atlanta. here he found hardee intrenched, ready to meet him. a battle ensued, but he was unable to drive hardee away before night set in. under cover of the night, however, hardee left of his own accord. that night hood blew up his military works, such as he thought would be valuable in our hands, and decamped. the next morning at daylight general h. w. slocum, who was commanding north of the city, moved in and took possession of atlanta, and notified sherman. sherman then moved deliberately back, taking three days to reach the city, and occupied a line extending from decatur on the left to atlanta in the centre, with his troops extending out of the city for some distance to the right. the campaign had lasted about four months, and was one of the most memorable in history. there was but little if anything in the whole campaign, now that it is over, to criticise at all, and nothing to criticise severely. it was creditable alike to the general who commanded and the army which had executed it. sherman had on this campaign some bright, wide-awake division and brigade commanders whose alertness added a host to the efficiency of his command. the troops now went to work to make themselves comfortable, and to enjoy a little rest after their arduous campaign. the city of atlanta was turned into a military base. the citizens were all compelled to leave. sherman also very wisely prohibited the assembling of the army of sutlers and traders who always follow in the wake of an army in the field, if permitted to do so, from trading with the citizens and getting the money of the soldiers for articles of but little use to them, and for which they are made to pay most exorbitant prices. he limited the number of these traders to one for each of his three armies. the news of sherman's success reached the north instantaneously, and set the country all aglow. this was the first great political campaign for the republicans in their canvass of 1864. it was followed later by sheridan's campaign in the shenandoah valley; and these two campaigns probably had more effect in settling the election of the following november than all the speeches, all the bonfires, and all the parading with banners and bands of music in the north. chapter l. grand movement of the army of the potomac--crossing the rapidan --entering the wilderness--battle of the wilderness. soon after midnight, may 3d-4th, the army of the potomac moved out from its position north rapidan, to start upon that memorable campaign, destined to result in the capture of the confederate capital and the army defending it. this was not to be accomplished, however, without as desperate fighting as the world has ever witnessed; not to be consummated in a day, a week, a month, single season. the losses inflicted, and endured, were destined to be severe; but the armies now confronting each other had already been in deadly conflict for a period of three years, with immense losses in killed, by death from sickness, captured and wounded; and neither had made any real progress accomplishing the final end. it is true the confederates had, so far, held their capital, and they claimed this to be their sole object. but previously they had boldly proclaimed their intention to capture philadelphia, new york, and the national capital, and had made several attempts to do so, and once or twice had come fearfully near making their boast good--too near for complacent contemplation by the loyal north. they had also come near losing their own capital on at least one occasion. so here was a stand-off. the campaign now begun was destined to result in heavier losses, to both armies, in a given time, than any previously suffered; but the carnage was to be limited to a single year, and to accomplish all that had been anticipated or desired at the beginning in that time. we had to have hard fighting to achieve this. the two armies had been confronting each other so long, without any decisive result, that they hardly knew which could whip. ten days' rations, with a supply of forage and ammunition were taken in wagons. beef cattle were driven with the trains, and butchered as wanted. three days rations in addition, in haversacks, and fifty rounds of cartridges, were carried on the person of each soldier. the country over which the army had to operate, from the rapidan to the crossing of the james river, is rather flat, and is cut by numerous streams which make their way to the chesapeake bay. the crossings of these streams by the army were generally made not far above tide-water, and where they formed a considerable obstacle to the rapid advance of troops even when the enemy did not appear in opposition. the country roads were narrow and poor. most of the country is covered with a dense forest, in places, like the wilderness and along the chickahominy, almost impenetrable even for infantry except along the roads. all bridges were naturally destroyed before the national troops came to them. the army of the potomac was composed of three infantry and one cavalry corps, commanded respectively by generals w. s. hancock, g. k. warren, (*27) john sedgwick and p. h. sheridan. the artillery was commanded by general henry j. hunt. this arm was in such abundance that the fourth of it could not be used to advantage in such a country as we were destined to pass through. the surplus was much in the way, taking up as it did so much of the narrow and bad roads, and consuming so much of the forage and other stores brought up by the trains. the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was in advance on the right, and marched directly for germania ford, preceded by one division of cavalry, under general j. h. wilson. general sedgwick followed warren with the 6th corps. germania ford was nine or ten miles below the right of lee's line. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved by another road, farther east, directly upon ely's ford, six miles below germania, preceded by gregg's division of cavalry, and followed by the artillery. torbert's division of cavalry was left north of the rapidan, for the time, to picket the river and prevent the enemy from crossing and getting into our rear. the cavalry seized the two crossings before daylight, drove the enemy's pickets guarding them away, and by six o'clock a.m. had the pontoons laid ready for the crossing of the infantry and artillery. this was undoubtedly a surprise to lee. the fact that the movement was unopposed proves this. burnside, with the 9th corps, was left back at warrenton, guarding the railroad from bull run forward to preserve control of it in case our crossing the rapidan should be long delayed. he was instructed, however, to advance at once on receiving notice that the army had crossed; and a dispatch was sent to him a little after one p.m. giving the information that our crossing had been successful. the country was heavily wooded at all the points of crossing, particularly on the south side of the river. the battle-field from the crossing of the rapidan until the final movement from the wilderness toward spottsylvania was of the same character. there were some clearings and small farms within what might be termed the battle-field; but generally the country was covered with a dense forest. the roads were narrow and bad. all the conditions were favorable for defensive operations. there are two roads, good for that part of virginia, running from orange court house to the battle-field. the most southerly of these roads is known as the orange court house plank road, the northern one as the orange turnpike. there are also roads from east of the battle-field running to spottsylvania court house, one from chancellorsville, branching at aldrich's; the western branch going by piney branch church, alsop's, thence by the brock road to spottsylvania; the east branch goes by gates's, thence to spottsylvania. the brock road runs from germania ford through the battle-field and on to the court house. as spottsylvania is approached the country is cut up with numerous roads, some going to the town direct, and others crossing so as to connect the farms with roads going there. lee's headquarters were at orange court house. from there to fredericksburg he had the use of the two roads above described running nearly parallel to the wilderness. this gave him unusual facilities, for that country, for concentrating his forces to his right. these roads strike the road from germania ford in the wilderness. as soon as the crossing of the infantry was assured, the cavalry pushed forward, wilson's division by wilderness tavern to parker's store, on the orange plank road; gregg to the left towards chancellorsville. warren followed wilson and reached the wilderness tavern by noon, took position there and intrenched. sedgwick followed warren. he was across the river and in camp on the south bank, on the right of warren, by sundown. hancock, with the 2d corps, moved parallel with warren and camped about six miles east of him. before night all the troops, and by the evening of the 5th the trains of more than four thousand wagons, were safely on the south side of the river. there never was a corps better organized than was the quartermaster's corps with the army of the potomac in 1864. with a wagon-train that would have extended from the rapidan to richmond, stretched along in single file and separated as the teams necessarily would be when moving, we could still carry only three days' forage and about ten to twelve days' rations, besides a supply of ammunition. to overcome all difficulties, the chief quartermaster, general rufus ingalls, had marked on each wagon the corps badge with the division color and the number of the brigade. at a glance, the particular brigade to which any wagon belonged could be told. the wagons were also marked to note the contents: if ammunition, whether for artillery or infantry; if forage, whether grain or hay; if rations, whether, bread, pork, beans, rice, sugar, coffee or whatever it might be. empty wagons were never allowed to follow the army or stay in camp. as soon as a wagon was empty it would return to the base of supply for a load of precisely the same article that had been taken from it. empty trains were obliged to leave the road free for loaded ones. arriving near the army they would be parked in fields nearest to the brigades they belonged to. issues, except of ammunition, were made at night in all cases. by this system the hauling of forage for the supply train was almost wholly dispensed with. they consumed theirs at the depots. i left culpeper court house after all the troops had been put in motion, and passing rapidly to the front, crossed the rapidan in advance of sedgwick's corps; and established headquarters for the afternoon and night in a deserted house near the river. orders had been given, long before this movement began, to cut down the baggage of officers and men to the lowest point possible. notwithstanding this i saw scattered along the road from culpeper to germania ford wagon-loads of new blankets and overcoats, thrown away by the troops to lighten their knapsacks; an improvidence i had never witnessed before. lee, while his pickets and signal corps must have discovered at a very early hour on the morning of the 4th of may, that the army of the potomac was moving, evidently did not learn until about one o'clock in the afternoon by what route we would confront his army. this i judge from the fact that at 1.15 p.m., an hour and a quarter after warren had reached old wilderness tavern, our officers took off rebel signals which, when translated, were seen to be an order to his troops to occupy their intrenchments at mine run. here at night dispatches were received announcing that sherman, butler and crook had moved according to programme. on discovering the advance of the army of the potomac, lee ordered hill, ewell and longstreet, each commanding corps, to move to the right to attack us, hill on the orange plank road, longstreet to follow on the same road. longstreet was at this time--middle of the afternoon--at gordonsville, twenty or more miles away. ewell was ordered by the orange pike. he was near by and arrived some four miles east of mine run before bivouacking for the night. my orders were given through general meade for an early advance on the morning of the 5th. warren was to move to parker's store, and wilson's cavalry--then at parker's store--to move on to craig's meeting-house. sedgwick followed warren, closing in on his right. the army of the potomac was facing to the west, though our advance was made to the south, except when facing the enemy. hancock was to move south-westward to join on the left of warren, his left to reach to shady grove church. at six o'clock, before reaching parker's store, warren discovered the enemy. he sent word back to this effect, and was ordered to halt and prepare to meet and attack him. wright, with his division of sedgwick's corps, was ordered, by any road he could find, to join on to warren's right, and getty with his division, also of sedgwick's corps, was ordered to move rapidly by warren's rear and get on his left. this was the speediest way to reinforce warren who was confronting the enemy on both the orange plank and turnpike roads. burnside had moved promptly on the 4th, on receiving word that the army of the potomac had safely crossed the rapidan. by making a night march, although some of his troops had to march forty miles to reach the river, he was crossing with the head of his column early on the morning of the 5th. meade moved his headquarters on to old wilderness tavern, four miles south of the river, as soon as it was light enough to see the road. i remained to hasten burnside's crossing and to put him in position. burnside at this time was not under meade's command, and was his senior in rank. getting information of the proximity of the enemy, i informed meade, and without waiting to see burnside, at once moved forward my headquarters to where meade was. it was my plan then, as it was on all other occasions, to take the initiative whenever the enemy could be drawn from his intrenchments if we were not intrenched ourselves. warren had not yet reached the point where he was to halt, when he discovered the enemy near by. neither party had any advantage of position. warren was, therefore, ordered to attack as soon as he could prepare for it. at nine o'clock hancock was ordered to come up to the support of getty. he himself arrived at getty's front about noon, but his troops were yet far in the rear. getty was directed to hold his position at all hazards until relieved. about this hour warren was ready, and attacked with favorable though not decisive results. getty was somewhat isolated from warren and was in a precarious condition for a time. wilson, with his division of cavalry, was farther south, and was cut off from the rest of the army. at two o'clock hancock's troops began to arrive, and immediately he was ordered to join getty and attack the enemy. but the heavy timber and narrow roads prevented him from getting into position for attack as promptly as he generally did when receiving such orders. at four o'clock he again received his orders to attack, and general getty received orders from meade a few minutes later to attack whether hancock was ready or not. he met the enemy under heth within a few hundred yards. hancock immediately sent two divisions, commanded by birney and mott, and later two brigades, carroll's and owen's, to the support of getty. this was timely and saved getty. during the battle getty and carroll were wounded, but remained on the field. one of birney's most gallant brigade commanders--alexander hays--was killed. i had been at west point with hays for three years, and had served with him through the mexican war, a portion of the time in the same regiment. he was a most gallant officer, ready to lead his command wherever ordered. with him it was "come, boys," not "go." wadsworth's division and baxter's brigade of the 2d division were sent to reinforce hancock and getty; but the density of the intervening forest was such that, there being no road to march upon, they did not get up with the head of column until night, and bivouacked where they were without getting into position. during the afternoon sheridan sent gregg's division of cavalry to todd's tavern in search of wilson. this was fortunate. he found wilson engaged with a superior force under general rosser, supported by infantry, and falling back before it. together they were strong enough to turn the tables upon the enemy and themselves become aggressive. they soon drove the rebel cavalry back beyond corbin's bridge. fighting between hancock and hill continued until night put a close to it. neither side made any special progress. after the close of the battle of the 5th of may my orders were given for the following morning. we knew longstreet with 12,000 men was on his way to join hill's right, near the brock road, and might arrive during the night. i was anxious that the rebels should not take the initiative in the morning, and therefore ordered hancock to make an assault at 4.30 o'clock. meade asked to have the hour changed to six. deferring to his wishes as far as i was willing, the order was modified and five was fixed as the hour to move. hancock had now fully one-half of the army of the potomac. wadsworth with his division, which had arrived the night before, lay in a line perpendicular to that held by hill, and to the right of hancock. he was directed to move at the same time, and to attack hill's left. burnside, who was coming up with two divisions, was directed to get in between warren and wadsworth, and attack as soon as he could get in position to do so. sedgwick and warren were to make attacks in their front, to detain as many of the enemy as they could and to take advantage of any attempt to reinforce hill from that quarter. burnside was ordered if he should succeed in breaking the enemy's centre, to swing around to the left and envelop the right of lee's army. hancock was informed of all the movements ordered. burnside had three divisions, but one of them--a colored division--was sent to guard the wagon train, and he did not see it again until july. lee was evidently very anxious that there should be no battle on his right until longstreet got up. this is evident from the fact that notwithstanding the early hour at which i had ordered the assault, both for the purpose of being the attacking party and to strike before longstreet got up, lee was ahead in his assault on our right. his purpose was evident, but he failed. hancock was ready to advance by the hour named, but learning in time that longstreet was moving a part of his corps by the catharpin road, thus threatening his left flank, sent a division of infantry, commanded by general barlow, with all his artillery, to cover the approaches by which longstreet was expected. this disposition was made in time to attack as ordered. hancock moved by the left of the orange plank road, and wadsworth by the right of it. the fighting was desperate for about an hour, when the enemy began to break up in great confusion. i believed then, and see no reason to change that opinion now, that if the country had been such that hancock and his command could have seen the confusion and panic in the lines of the enemy, it would have been taken advantage of so effectually that lee would not have made another stand outside of his richmond defences. gibbon commanded hancock's left, and was ordered to attack, but was not able to accomplish much. on the morning of the 6th sheridan was sent to connect with hancock's left and attack the enemy's cavalry who were trying to get on our left and rear. he met them at the intersection of the furnace and brock roads and at todd's tavern, and defeated them at both places. later he was attacked, and again the enemy was repulsed. hancock heard the firing between sheridan and stuart, and thinking the enemy coming by that road, still further reinforced his position guarding the entrance to the brock road. another incident happened during the day to further induce hancock to weaken his attacking column. word reached him that troops were seen moving towards him from the direction of todd's tavern, and brooke's brigade was detached to meet this new enemy; but the troops approaching proved to be several hundred convalescents coming from chancellorsville, by the road hancock had advanced upon, to join their respective commands. at 6.50 o'clock a.m., burnside, who had passed wilderness tavern at six o'clock, was ordered to send a division to the support of hancock, but to continue with the remainder of his command in the execution of his previous order. the difficulty of making a way through the dense forests prevented burnside from getting up in time to be of any service on the forenoon of the sixth. hancock followed hill's retreating forces, in the morning, a mile or more. he maintained this position until, along in the afternoon, longstreet came upon him. the retreating column of hill meeting reinforcements that had not yet been engaged, became encouraged and returned with them. they were enabled, from the density of the forest, to approach within a few hundred yards of our advance before being discovered. falling upon a brigade of hancock's corps thrown to the advance, they swept it away almost instantly. the enemy followed up his advantage and soon came upon mott's division, which fell back in great confusion. hancock made dispositions to hold his advanced position, but after holding it for a time, fell back into the position that he had held in the morning, which was strongly intrenched. in this engagement the intrepid wadsworth while trying to rally his men was mortally wounded and fell into the hands of the enemy. the enemy followed up, but made no immediate attack. the confederate general jenkins was killed and longstreet seriously wounded in this engagement. longstreet had to leave the field, not to resume command for many weeks. his loss was a severe one to lee, and compensated in a great measure for the mishap, or misapprehensions, which had fallen to our lot during the day. after longstreet's removal from the field lee took command of his right in person. he was not able, however, to rally his men to attack hancock's position, and withdrew from our front for the purpose of reforming. hancock sent a brigade to clear his front of all remnants that might be left of longstreet's or hill's commands. this brigade having been formed at right angles to the intrenchments held by hancock's command, swept down the whole length of them from left to right. a brigade of the enemy was encountered in this move; but it broke and disappeared without a contest. firing was continued after this, but with less fury. burnside had not yet been able to get up to render any assistance. but it was now only about nine in the morning, and he was getting into position on hancock's right. at 4.15 in the afternoon lee attacked our left. his line moved up to within a hundred yards of ours and opened a heavy fire. this status was maintained for about half an hour. then a part of mott's division and ward's brigade of birney's division gave way and retired in disorder. the enemy under r. h. anderson took advantage of this and pushed through our line, planting their flags on a part of the intrenchments not on fire. but owing to the efforts of hancock, their success was but temporary. carroll, of gibbon's division, moved at a double quick with his brigade and drove back the enemy, inflicting great loss. fighting had continued from five in the morning sometimes along the whole line, at other times only in places. the ground fought over had varied in width, but averaged three-quarters of a mile. the killed, and many of the severely wounded, of both armies, lay within this belt where it was impossible to reach them. the woods were set on fire by the bursting shells, and the conflagration raged. the wounded who had not strength to move themselves were either suffocated or burned to death. finally the fire communicated with our breastworks, in places. being constructed of wood, they burned with great fury. but the battle still raged, our men firing through the flames until it became too hot to remain longer. lee was now in distress. his men were in confusion, and his personal efforts failed to restore order. these facts, however, were learned subsequently, or we would have taken advantage of his condition and no doubt gained a decisive success. his troops were withdrawn now, but i revoked the order, which i had given previously to this assault, for hancock to attack, because his troops had exhausted their ammunition and did not have time to replenish from the train, which was at some distance. burnside, sedgwick, and warren had all kept up an assault during all this time; but their efforts had no other effect than to prevent the enemy from reinforcing his right from the troops in their front. i had, on the 5th, ordered all the bridges over the rapidan to be taken up except one at germania ford. the troops on sedgwick's right had been sent to enforce our left. this left our right in danger of being turned, and us of being cut off from all present base of supplies. sedgwick had refused his right and intrenched it for protection against attack. but late in the afternoon of the 6th early came out from his lines in considerable force and got in upon sedgwick's right, notwithstanding the precautions taken, and created considerable confusion. early captured several hundred prisoners, among them two general officers. the defence, however, was vigorous; and night coming on, the enemy was thrown into as much confusion as our troops, engaged, were. early says in his memoirs that if we had discovered the confusion in his lines we might have brought fresh troops to his great discomfort. many officers, who had not been attacked by early, continued coming to my headquarters even after sedgwick had rectified his lines a little farther to the rear, with news of the disaster, fully impressed with the idea that the enemy was pushing on and would soon be upon me. during the night all of lee's army withdrew within their intrenchments. on the morning of the 7th general custer drove the enemy's cavalry from catharpin furnace to todd's tavern. pickets and skirmishers were sent along our entire front to find the position of the enemy. some went as far as a mile and a half before finding him. but lee showed no disposition to come out of his works. there was no battle during the day, and but little firing except in warren's front; he being directed about noon to make a reconnoissance in force. this drew some sharp firing, but there was no attempt on the part of lee to drive him back. this ended the battle of the wilderness. chapter li. after the battle--telegraph and signal service--movement by the left flank. more desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this continent than that of the 5th and 6th of may. our victory consisted in having successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in the face of an enemy, and in getting the army together as a unit. we gained an advantage on the morning of the 6th, which, if it had been followed up, must have proven very decisive. in the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but was speedily repulsed. as we stood at the close, the two armies were relatively in about the same condition to meet each other as when the river divided them. but the fact of having safely crossed was a victory. our losses in the wilderness were very severe. those of the confederates must have been even more so; but i have no means of speaking with accuracy upon this point. the germania ford bridge was transferred to ely's ford to facilitate the transportation of the wounded to washington. it may be as well here as elsewhere to state two things connected with all movements of the army of the potomac: first, in every change of position or halt for the night, whether confronting the enemy or not, the moment arms were stacked the men intrenched themselves. for this purpose they would build up piles of logs or rails if they could be found in their front, and dig a ditch, throwing the dirt forward on the timber. thus the digging they did counted in making a depression to stand in, and increased the elevation in front of them. it was wonderful how quickly they could in this way construct defences of considerable strength. when a halt was made with the view of assaulting the enemy, or in his presence, these would be strengthened or their positions changed under the direction of engineer officers. the second was, the use made of the telegraph and signal corps. nothing could be more complete than the organization and discipline of this body of brave and intelligent men. insulated wires--insulated so that they would transmit messages in a storm, on the ground or under water--were wound upon reels, making about two hundred pounds weight of wire to each reel. two men and one mule were detailed to each reel. the pack-saddle on which this was carried was provided with a rack like a sawbuck placed crosswise of the saddle, and raised above it so that the reel, with its wire, would revolve freely. there was a wagon, supplied with a telegraph operator, battery and telegraph instruments for each division, each corps, each army, and one for my headquarters. there were wagons also loaded with light poles, about the size and length of a wall tent pole, supplied with an iron spike in one end, used to hold the wires up when laid, so that wagons and artillery would not run over them. the mules thus loaded were assigned to brigades, and always kept with the command they were assigned to. the operators were also assigned to particular headquarters, and never changed except by special orders. the moment the troops were put in position to go into camp all the men connected with this branch of service would proceed to put up their wires. a mule loaded with a coil of wire would be led to the rear of the nearest flank of the brigade he belonged to, and would be led in a line parallel thereto, while one man would hold an end of the wire and uncoil it as the mule was led off. when he had walked the length of the wire the whole of it would be on the ground. this would be done in rear of every brigade at the same time. the ends of all the wires would then be joined, making a continuous wire in the rear of the whole army. the men, attached to brigades or divisions, would all commence at once raising the wires with their telegraph poles. this was done by making a loop in the wire and putting it over the spike and raising the pole to a perpendicular position. at intervals the wire would be attached to trees, or some other permanent object, so that one pole was sufficient at a place. in the absence of such a support two poles would have to be used, at intervals, placed at an angle so as to hold the wire firm in its place. while this was being done the telegraph wagons would take their positions near where the headquarters they belonged to were to be established, and would connect with the wire. thus, in a few minutes longer time than it took a mule to walk the length of its coil, telegraphic communication would be effected between all the headquarters of the army. no orders ever had to be given to establish the telegraph. the signal service was used on the march. the men composing this corps were assigned to specified commands. when movements were made, they would go in advance, or on the flanks, and seize upon high points of ground giving a commanding view of the country, if cleared, or would climb tall trees on the highest points if not cleared, and would denote, by signals, the positions of different parts of our own army, and often the movements of the enemy. they would also take off the signals of the enemy and transmit them. it would sometimes take too long a time to make translations of intercepted dispatches for us to receive any benefit from them. but sometimes they gave useful information. on the afternoon of the 7th i received news from washington announcing that sherman had probably attacked johnston that day, and that butler had reached city point safely and taken it by surprise on the 5th. i had given orders for a movement by the left flank, fearing that lee might move rapidly to richmond to crush butler before i could get there. my order for this movement was as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., may 7, 1864, 6.30 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at spottsylvania c. h. with one army corps, at todd's tavern with one, and another near the intersection of the piney branch and spottsylvania road with the road from alsop's to old court house. if this move is made the trains should be thrown forward early in the morning to the ny river. i think it would be advisable in making the change to leave hancock where he is until warren passes him. he could then follow and become the right of the new line. burnside will move to piney branch church. sedgwick can move along the pike to chancellorsville and on to his destination. burnside will move on the plank road to the intersection of it with the orange and fredericksburg plank road, then follow sedgwick to his place of destination. all vehicles should be got out of hearing of the enemy before the troops move, and then move off quietly. it is more than probable that the enemy concentrate for a heavy attack on hancock this afternoon. in case they do we must be prepared to resist them, and follow up any success we may gain, with our whole force. such a result would necessarily modify these instructions. all the hospitals should be moved to-day to chancellorsville. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. during the 7th sheridan had a fight with the rebel cavalry at todd's tavern, but routed them, thus opening the way for the troops that were to go by that route at night. soon after dark warren withdrew from the front of the enemy, and was soon followed by sedgwick. warren's march carried him immediately behind the works where hancock's command lay on the brock road. with my staff and a small escort of cavalry i preceded the troops. meade with his staff accompanied me. the greatest enthusiasm was manifested by hancock's men as we passed by. no doubt it was inspired by the fact that the movement was south. it indicated to them that they had passed through the "beginning of the end" in the battle just fought. the cheering was so lusty that the enemy must have taken it for a night attack. at all events it drew from him a furious fusillade of artillery and musketry, plainly heard but not felt by us. meade and i rode in advance. we had passed but a little way beyond our left when the road forked. we looked to see, if we could, which road sheridan had taken with his cavalry during the day. it seemed to be the right-hand one, and accordingly we took it. we had not gone far, however, when colonel c. b. comstock, of my staff, with the instinct of the engineer, suspecting that we were on a road that would lead us into the lines of the enemy, if he, too, should be moving, dashed by at a rapid gallop and all alone. in a few minutes he returned and reported that lee was moving, and that the road we were on would bring us into his lines in a short distance. we returned to the forks of the road, left a man to indicate the right road to the head of warren's column when it should come up, and continued our journey to todd's tavern, where we arrived after midnight. my object in moving to spottsylvania was two-fold: first, i did not want lee to get back to richmond in time to attempt to crush butler before i could get there; second, i wanted to get between his army and richmond if possible; and, if not, to draw him into the open field. but lee, by accident, beat us to spottsylvania. our wagon trains had been ordered easterly of the roads the troops were to march upon before the movement commenced. lee interpreted this as a semi-retreat of the army of the potomac to fredericksburg, and so informed his government. accordingly he ordered longstreet's corps--now commanded by anderson--to move in the morning (the 8th) to spottsylvania. but the woods being still on fire, anderson could not go into bivouac, and marched directly on to his destination that night. by this accident lee got possession of spottsylvania. it is impossible to say now what would have been the result if lee's orders had been obeyed as given; but it is certain that we would have been in spottsylvania, and between him and his capital. my belief is that there would have been a race between the two armies to see which could reach richmond first, and the army of the potomac would have had the shorter line. thus, twice since crossing the rapidan we came near closing the campaign, so far as battles were concerned, from the rapidan to the james river or richmond. the first failure was caused by our not following up the success gained over hill's corps on the morning of the 6th, as before described: the second, when fires caused by that battle drove anderson to make a march during the night of the 7th-8th which he was ordered to commence on the morning of the 8th. but accident often decides the fate of battle. sheridan's cavalry had had considerable fighting during the afternoon of the 7th, lasting at todd's tavern until after night, with the field his at the close. he issued the necessary orders for seizing spottsylvania and holding the bridge over the po river, which lee's troops would have to cross to get to spottsylvania. but meade changed sheridan's orders to merritt--who was holding the bridge--on his arrival at todd's tavern, and thereby left the road free for anderson when he came up. wilson, who was ordered to seize the town, did so, with his division of cavalry; but he could not hold it against the confederate corps which had not been detained at the crossing of the po, as it would have been but for the unfortunate change in merritt's orders. had he been permitted to execute the orders sheridan gave him, he would have been guarding with two brigades of cavalry the bridge over the po river which anderson had to cross, and must have detained him long enough to enable warren to reinforce wilson and hold the town. anderson soon intrenched himself--if indeed the intrenchments were not already made--immediately across warren's front. warren was not aware of his presence, but probably supposed it was the cavalry which merritt had engaged earlier in the day. he assaulted at once, but was repulsed. he soon organized his men, as they were not pursued by the enemy, and made a second attack, this time with his whole corps. this time he succeeded in gaining a position immediately in the enemy's front, where he intrenched. his right and left divisions--the former crawford's, the latter wadsworth's, now commanded by cutler--drove the enemy back some distance. at this time my headquarters had been advanced to piney branch church. i was anxious to crush anderson before lee could get a force to his support. to this end sedgwick who was at piney branch church, was ordered to warren's support. hancock, who was at todd's tavern, was notified of warren's engagement, and was directed to be in readiness to come up. burnside, who was with the wagon trains at aldrich's on our extreme left, received the same instructions. sedgwick was slow in getting up for some reason--probably unavoidable, because he was never at fault when serious work was to be done--so that it was near night before the combined forces were ready to attack. even then all of sedgwick's command did not get into the engagement. warren led the last assault, one division at a time, and of course it failed. warren's difficulty was twofold: when he received an order to do anything, it would at once occur to his mind how all the balance of the army should be engaged so as properly to co-operate with him. his ideas were generally good, but he would forget that the person giving him orders had thought of others at the time he had of him. in like manner, when he did get ready to execute an order, after giving most intelligent instructions to division commanders, he would go in with one division, holding the others in reserve until he could superintend their movements in person also, forgetting that division commanders could execute an order without his presence. his difficulty was constitutional and beyond his control. he was an officer of superior ability, quick perceptions, and personal courage to accomplish anything that could be done with a small command. lee had ordered hill's corps--now commanded by early--to move by the very road we had marched upon. this shows that even early in the morning of the 8th lee had not yet become acquainted with my move, but still thought that the army of the potomac had gone to fredericksburg. indeed, he informed the authorities at richmond he had possession of spottsylvania and was on my flank. anderson was in possession of spottsylvania, through no foresight of lee, however. early only found that he had been following us when he ran against hancock at todd's tavern. his coming detained hancock from the battle-field of spottsylvania for that day; but he, in like manner, kept early back and forced him to move by another route. had i ordered the movement for the night of the 7th by my left flank, it would have put hancock in the lead. it would also have given us an hour or earlier start. it took all that time for warren to get the head of his column to the left of hancock after he had got his troops out of their line confronting the enemy. this hour, and hancock's capacity to use his whole force when necessary, would, no doubt, have enabled him to crush anderson before he could be reinforced. but the movement made was tactical. it kept the troops in mass against a possible assault by the enemy. our left occupied its intrenchments while the two corps to the right passed. if an attack had been made by the enemy he would have found the 2d corps in position, fortified, and, practically, the 5th and 6th corps in position as reserves, until his entire front was passed. by a left flank movement the army would have been scattered while still passing the front of the enemy, and before the extreme right had got by it would have been very much exposed. then, too, i had not yet learned the special qualifications of the different corps commanders. at that time my judgment was that warren was the man i would suggest to succeed meade should anything happen to that gallant soldier to take him from the field. as i have before said, warren was a gallant soldier, an able man; and he was beside thoroughly imbued with the solemnity and importance of the duty he had to perform. chapter lii. battle of spottsylvania--hancock's position--assault of warren's and wright's corps--upton promoted on the field--good news from butler and sheridan. the mattapony river is formed by the junction of the mat, the ta, the po and the ny rivers, the last being the northernmost of the four. it takes its rise about a mile south and a little east of the wilderness tavern. the po rises south-west of the place, but farther away. spottsylvania is on the ridge dividing these two streams, and where they are but a few miles apart. the brock road reaches spottsylvania without crossing either of these streams. lee's army coming up by the catharpin road, had to cross the po at wooden bridge. warren and hancock came by the brock road. sedgwick crossed the ny at catharpin furnace. burnside coming by aldrich's to gates's house, had to cross the ny near the enemy. he found pickets at the bridge, but they were soon driven off by a brigade of willcox's division, and the stream was crossed. this brigade was furiously attacked; but the remainder of the division coming up, they were enabled to hold their position, and soon fortified it. about the time i received the news of this attack, word came from hancock that early had left his front. he had been forced over to the catharpin road, crossing the po at corbin's and again at wooden bridge. these are the bridges sheridan had given orders to his cavalry to occupy on the 8th, while one division should occupy spottsylvania. these movements of the enemy gave me the idea that lee was about to make the attempt to get to, or towards, fredericksburg to cut off my supplies. i made arrangements to attack his right and get between him and richmond if he should try to execute this design. if he had any such intention it was abandoned as soon as burnside was established south of the ny. the po and the ny are narrow little streams, but deep, with abrupt banks, and bordered by heavily wooded and marshy bottoms--at the time we were there--and difficult to cross except where bridged. the country about was generally heavily timbered, but with occasional clearings. it was a much better country to conduct a defensive campaign in than an offensive one. by noon of the 9th the position of the two armies was as follows: lee occupied a semicircle facing north, north-west and north-east, inclosing the town. anderson was on his left extending to the po, ewell came next, then early. warren occupied our right, covering the brock and other roads converging at spottsylvania; sedgwick was to his left and burnside on our extreme left. hancock was yet back at todd's tavern, but as soon as it was known that early had left hancock's front the latter was ordered up to warren's right. he formed a line with three divisions on the hill overlooking the po early in the afternoon, and was ordered to cross the po and get on the enemy's flank. the fourth division of hancock's corps, mott commanding, was left at todd's when the corps first came up; but in the afternoon it was brought up and placed to the left of sedgwick's--now wright's--6th corps. in the morning general sedgwick had been killed near the right of his intrenchments by rebel sharpshooters. his loss was a severe one to the army of the potomac and to the nation. general h. g. wright succeeded him in the command of his corps. hancock was now, nine p.m. of the 9th of may, across the left flank of lee's army, but separated from it, and also from the remainder of meade's army, by the po river. but for the lateness of the hour and the darkness of the night he would have attempted to cross the river again at wooden bridge, thus bringing himself on the same side with both friend and foe. the po at the points where hancock's corps crossed runs nearly due east. just below his lower crossing--the troops crossed at three points--it turns due south, and after passing under wooden bridge soon resumes a more easterly direction. during the night this corps built three bridges over the po; but these were in rear. the position assumed by hancock's corps forced lee to reinforce his left during the night. accordingly on the morning of the 10th, when hancock renewed his effort to get over the po to his front, he found himself confronted by some of early's command, which had been brought from the extreme right of the enemy during the night. he succeeded in effecting a crossing with one brigade, however, but finding the enemy intrenched in his front, no more were crossed. hancock reconnoitred his front on the morning of the 10th, with the view of forcing a crossing, if it was found that an advantage could be gained. the enemy was found strongly intrenched on the high ground overlooking the river, and commanding the wooden bridge with artillery. anderson's left rested on the po, where it turns south; therefore, for hancock to cross over--although it would bring him to the same side of the stream with the rest of the army--would still farther isolate him from it. the stream would have to be crossed twice in the face of the enemy to unite with the main body. the idea of crossing was therefore abandoned. lee had weakened the other parts of his line to meet this movement of hancock's, and i determined to take advantage of it. accordingly in the morning, orders were issued for an attack in the afternoon on the centre by warren's and wright's corps, hancock to command all the attacking force. two of his divisions were brought to the north side of the po. gibbon was placed to the right of warren, and birney in his rear as a reserve. barlow's division was left south of the stream, and mott of the same corps was still to the left of wright's corps. burnside was ordered to reconnoitre his front in force, and, if an opportunity presented, to attack with vigor. the enemy seeing barlow's division isolated from the rest of the army, came out and attacked with fury. barlow repulsed the assault with great slaughter, and with considerable loss to himself. but the enemy reorganized and renewed the assault. birney was now moved to the high ground overlooking the river crossings built by our troops, and covered the crossings. the second assault was repulsed, again with severe loss to the enemy, and barlow was withdrawn without further molestation. general t. g. stevenson was killed in this move. between the lines, where warren's assault was to take place, there was a ravine grown up with large trees and underbrush, making it almost impenetrable by man. the slopes on both sides were also covered with a heavy growth of timber. warren, before noon, reconnoitred his front twice, the first time with one and the second with two divisions. he was repulsed on both occasions, but gained such information of the ground as to induce him to report recommending the assault. wright also reconnoitred his front and gained a considerably advanced position from the one he started from. he then organized a storming party, consisting of twelve regiments, and assigned colonel emory upton, of the 121st new york volunteers, to the command of it. about four o'clock in the afternoon the assault was ordered, warren's and wright's corps, with mott's division of hancock's corps, to move simultaneously. the movement was prompt, and in a few minutes the fiercest of struggles began. the battle-field was so densely covered with forest that but little could be seen, by any one person, as to the progress made. meade and i occupied the best position we could get, in rear of warren. warren was repulsed with heavy loss, general j. c. rice being among the killed. he was not followed, however, by the enemy, and was thereby enabled to reorganize his command as soon as covered from the guns of the enemy. to the left our success was decided, but the advantage was lost by the feeble action of mott. upton with his assaulting party pushed forward and crossed the enemy's intrenchments. turning to the right and left he captured several guns and some hundreds of prisoners. mott was ordered to his assistance but failed utterly. so much time was lost in trying to get up the troops which were in the right position to reinforce, that i ordered upton to withdraw; but the officers and men of his command were so averse to giving up the advantage they had gained that i withdrew the order. to relieve them, i ordered a renewal of the assault. by this time hancock, who had gone with birney's division to relieve barlow, had returned, bringing the division with him. his corps was now joined with warren's and wright's in this last assault. it was gallantly made, many men getting up to, and over, the works of the enemy; but they were not able to hold them. at night they were withdrawn. upton brought his prisoners with him, but the guns he had captured he was obliged to abandon. upton had gained an important advantage, but a lack in others of the spirit and dash possessed by him lost it to us. before leaving washington i had been authorized to promote officers on the field for special acts of gallantry. by this authority i conferred the rank of brigadier-general upon upton on the spot, and this act was confirmed by the president. upton had been badly wounded in this fight. burnside on the left had got up to within a few hundred yards of spottsylvania court house, completely turning lee's right. he was not aware of the importance of the advantage he had gained, and i, being with the troops where the heavy fighting was, did not know of it at the time. he had gained his position with but little fighting, and almost without loss. burnside's position now separated him widely from wright's corps, the corps nearest to him. at night he was ordered to join on to this. this brought him back about a mile, and lost to us an important advantage. i attach no blame to burnside for this, but i do to myself for not having had a staff officer with him to report to me his position. the enemy had not dared to come out of his line at any point to follow up his advantage, except in the single instance of his attack on barlow. then he was twice repulsed with heavy loss, though he had an entire corps against two brigades. barlow took up his bridges in the presence of this force. on the 11th there was no battle and but little firing; none except by mott who made a reconnoissance to ascertain if there was a weak point in the enemy's line. i wrote the following letter to general halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 11, 1864--8.30 a.m. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. we have now ended the 6th day of very hard fighting. the result up to this time is much in our favor. but our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. we have lost to this time eleven general officers killed, wounded and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. i think the loss of the enemy must be greater--we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few except a few stragglers. i am now sending back to belle plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. the arrival of reinforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and i hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. my object in having them sent to belle plain was to use them as an escort to our supply trains. if it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to belle plain or fredericksburg, send them so. i am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. up to this time there is no indication of any portion of lee's army being detached for the defence of richmond. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. and also, i received information, through the war department, from general butler that his cavalry under kautz had cut the railroad south of petersburg, separating beauregard from richmond, and had whipped hill, killing, wounding and capturing many. also that he was intrenched, and could maintain himself. on this same day came news from sheridan to the effect that he had destroyed ten miles of the railroad and telegraph between lee and richmond, one and a half million rations, and most of the medical stores for his army. on the 8th i had directed sheridan verbally to cut loose from the army of the potomac and pass around the left of lee's army and attack his cavalry and communications, which was successfully executed in the manner i have already described. chapter liii. hancock's assault-losses of the confederates--promotions recommended --discomfiture of the enemy--ewell's attack-reducing the artillery. in the reconnoissance made by mott on the 11th, a salient was discovered at the right centre. i determined that an assault should be made at that point. (*28) accordingly in the afternoon hancock was ordered to move his command by the rear of warren and wright, under cover of night, to wright's left, and there form it for an assault at four o'clock the next morning. the night was dark, it rained heavily, and the road was difficult, so that it was midnight when he reached the point where he was to halt. it took most of the night to get the men in position for their advance in the morning. the men got but little rest. burnside was ordered to attack (*29) on the left of the salient at the same hour. i sent two of my staff officers to impress upon him the importance of pushing forward vigorously. hancock was notified of this. warren and wright were ordered to hold themselves in readiness to join in the assault if circumstances made it advisable. i occupied a central position most convenient for receiving information from all points. hancock put barlow on his left, in double column, and birney to his right. mott followed birney, and gibbon was held in reserve. the morning of the 12th opened foggy, delaying the start more than half an hour. the ground over which hancock had to pass to reach the enemy, was ascending and heavily wooded to within two or three hundred yards of the enemy's intrenchments. in front of birney there was also a marsh to cross. but, notwithstanding all these difficulties, the troops pushed on in quick time without firing a gun, and when within four or five hundred yards of the enemy's line broke out in loud cheers, and with a rush went up to and over the breastworks. barlow and birney entered almost simultaneously. here a desperate hand-to-hand conflict took place. the men of the two sides were too close together to fire, but used their guns as clubs. the hand conflict was soon over. hancock's corps captured some four thousand prisoners among them a division and a brigade commander twenty or more guns with their horses, caissons, and ammunition, several thousand stand of arms, and many colors. hancock, as soon as the hand-to-hand conflict was over, turned the guns of the enemy against him and advanced inside the rebel lines. about six o'clock i ordered warren's corps to the support of hancock's. burnside, on the left, had advanced up east of the salient to the very parapet of the enemy. potter, commanding one of his divisions, got over but was not able to remain there. however, he inflicted a heavy loss upon the enemy; but not without loss in return. this victory was important, and one that lee could not afford to leave us in full possession of. he made the most strenuous efforts to regain the position he had lost. troops were brought up from his left and attacked hancock furiously. hancock was forced to fall back: but he did so slowly, with his face to the enemy, inflicting on him heavy loss, until behind the breastworks he had captured. these he turned, facing them the other way, and continued to hold. wright was ordered up to reinforce hancock, and arrived by six o'clock. he was wounded soon after coming up but did not relinquish the command of his corps, although the fighting lasted until one o'clock the next morning. at eight o'clock warren was ordered up again, but was so slow in making his dispositions that his orders were frequently repeated, and with emphasis. at eleven o'clock i gave meade written orders to relieve warren from his command if he failed to move promptly. hancock placed batteries on high ground in his rear, which he used against the enemy, firing over the heads of his own troops. burnside accomplished but little on our left of a positive nature, but negatively a great deal. he kept lee from reinforcing his centre from that quarter. if the 5th corps, or rather if warren, had been as prompt as wright was with the 6th corps, better results might have been obtained. lee massed heavily from his left flank on the broken point of his line. five times during the day he assaulted furiously, but without dislodging our troops from their new position. his losses must have been fearful. sometimes the belligerents would be separated by but a few feet. in one place a tree, eighteen inches in diameter, was cut entirely down by musket balls. all the trees between the lines were very much cut to pieces by artillery and musketry. it was three o'clock next morning before the fighting ceased. some of our troops had then been twenty hours under fire. in this engagement we did not lose a single organization, not even a company. the enemy lost one division with its commander, one brigade and one regiment, with heavy losses elsewhere.(*30) our losses were heavy, but, as stated, no whole company was captured. at night lee took a position in rear of his former one, and by the following morning he was strongly intrenched in it. warren's corps was now temporarily broken up, cutler's division sent to wright, and griffin's to hancock. meade ordered his chief of staff, general humphreys, to remain with warren and the remaining division, and authorized him to give it orders in his name. during the day i was passing along the line from wing to wing continuously. about the centre stood a house which proved to be occupied by an old lady and her daughter. she showed such unmistakable signs of being strongly union that i stopped. she said she had not seen a union flag for so long a time that it did her heart good to look upon it again. she said her husband and son, being, union men, had had to leave early in the war, and were now somewhere in the union army, if alive. she was without food or nearly so, so i ordered rations issued to her, and promised to find out if i could where the husband and son were. there was no fighting on the 13th, further than a little skirmishing between mott's division and the enemy. i was afraid that lee might be moving out, and i did not want him to go without my knowing it. the indications were that he was moving, but it was found that he was only taking his new position back from the salient that had been captured. our dead were buried this day. mott's division was reduced to a brigade, and assigned to birney's division. during this day i wrote to washington recommending sherman and meade (*31) for promotion to the grade of major-general in the regular army; hancock for brigadier-general; wright, gibbon and humphreys to be major-generals of volunteers; and upton and carroll to be brigadiers. upton had already been named as such, but the appointment had to be confirmed by the senate on the nomination of the president. the night of the 13th warren and wright were moved by the rear to the left of burnside. the night was very dark and it rained heavily, the roads were so bad that the troops had to cut trees and corduroy the road a part of the way, to get through. it was midnight before they got to the point where they were to halt, and daylight before the troops could be organized to advance to their position in line. they gained their position in line, however, without any fighting, except a little in wright's front. here upton had to contend for an elevation which we wanted and which the enemy was not disposed to yield. upton first drove the enemy, and was then repulsed in turn. ayres coming to his support with his brigade (of griffin's division, warren's corps), the position was secured and fortified. there was no more battle during the 14th. this brought our line east of the court house and running north and south and facing west. during the night of the 14th-15th lee moved to cover this new front. this left hancock without an enemy confronting him. he was brought to the rear of our new centre, ready to be moved in any direction he might be wanted. on the 15th news came from butler and averill. the former reported the capture of the outer works at drury's bluff, on the james river, and that his cavalry had cut the railroad and telegraph south of richmond on the danville road: and the latter, the destruction of a depot of supplies at dublin, west virginia, and the breaking of new river bridge on the virginia and tennessee railroad. the next day news came from sherman and sheridan. sherman had forced johnston out of dalton, georgia, and was following him south. the report from sheridan embraced his operations up to his passing the outer defences of richmond. the prospect must now have been dismal in richmond. the road and telegraph were cut between the capital and lee. the roads and wires were cut in every direction from the rebel capital. temporarily that city was cut off from all communication with the outside except by courier. this condition of affairs, however, was of but short duration. i wrote halleck: near spottsylvania c. h., may 16, 1864, 8 a.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c.: we have had five days almost constant rain without any prospect yet of it clearing up. the roads have now become so impassable that ambulances with wounded men can no longer run between here and fredericksburg. all offensive operations necessarily cease until we can have twenty-four hours of dry weather. the army is in the best of spirits, and feel the greatest confidence of ultimate success. * * * * * * you can assure the president and secretary of war that the elements alone have suspended hostilities, and that it is in no manner due to weakness or exhaustion on our part. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. the condition of the roads was such that nothing was done on the 17th. but that night hancock and wright were to make a night march back to their old positions, and to make an assault at four o'clock in the morning. lee got troops back in time to protect his old line, so the assault was unsuccessful. on this day (18th) the news was almost as discouraging to us as it had been two days before in the rebel capital. as stated above, hancock's and wright's corps had made an unsuccessful assault. news came that sigel had been defeated at new market, badly, and was retreating down the valley. not two hours before, i had sent the inquiry to halleck whether sigel could not get to staunton to stop supplies coming from there to lee. i asked at once that sigel might be relieved, and some one else put in his place. hunter's name was suggested, and i heartily approved. further news from butler reported him driven from drury's bluff, but still in possession of the petersburg road. banks had been defeated in louisiana, relieved, and canby put in his place. this change of commander was not on my suggestion. all this news was very discouraging. all of it must have been known by the enemy before it was by me. in fact, the good news (for the enemy) must have been known to him at the moment i thought he was in despair, and his anguish had been already relieved when we were enjoying his supposed discomfiture, but this was no time for repining. i immediately gave orders for a movement by the left flank, on towards richmond, to commence on the night of the 19th. i also asked halleck to secure the cooperation of the navy in changing our base of supplies from fredericksburg to port royal, on the rappahannock. up to this time i had received no reinforcements, except six thousand raw troops under brigadier general robert o. tyler, just arrived. they had not yet joined their command, hancock's corps, but were on our right. this corps had been brought to the rear of the centre, ready to move in any direction. lee, probably suspecting some move on my part, and seeing our right entirely abandoned, moved ewell's corps about five o'clock in the afternoon, with early's as a reserve, to attack us in that quarter. tyler had come up from fredericksburg, and had been halted on the road to the right of our line, near kitching's brigade of warren's corps. tyler received the attack with his raw troops, and they maintained their position, until reinforced, in a manner worthy of veterans. hancock was in a position to reinforce speedily, and was the soldier to do it without waiting to make dispositions. birney was thrown to tyler's right and crawford to his left, with gibbon as a reserve; and ewell was whirled back speedily and with heavy loss. warren had been ordered to get on ewell's flank and in his rear, to cut him off from his intrenchments. but his efforts were so feeble that under the cover of night ewell got back with only the loss of a few hundred prisoners, besides his killed and wounded. the army being engaged until after dark, i rescinded the order for the march by our left flank that night. as soon as it was discovered that the enemy were coming out to attack, i naturally supposed they would detach a force to destroy our trains. the withdrawal of hancock from the right uncovered one road from spottsylvania to fredericksburg over which trains drew our supplies. this was guarded by a division of colored troops, commanded by general ferrero, belonging to burnside's corps. ferrero was therefore promptly notified, and ordered to throw his cavalry pickets out to the south and be prepared to meet the enemy if he should come; if he had to retreat to do so towards fredericksburg. the enemy did detach as expected, and captured twenty-five or thirty wagons which, however, were soon retaken. in consequence of the disasters that had befallen us in the past few days, lee could be reinforced largely, and i had no doubt he would be. beauregard had come up from the south with troops to guard the confederate capital when it was in danger. butler being driven back, most of the troops could be sent to lee. hoke was no longer needed in north carolina; and sigel's troops having gone back to cedar creek, whipped, many troops could be spared from the valley. the wilderness and spottsylvania battles convinced me that we had more artillery than could ever be brought into action at any one time. it occupied much of the road in marching, and taxed the trains in bringing up forage. artillery is very useful when it can be brought into action, but it is a very burdensome luxury where it cannot be used. before leaving spottsylvania, therefore, i sent back to the defences of washington over one hundred pieces of artillery, with the horses and caissons. this relieved the roads over which we were to march of more than two hundred six-horse teams, and still left us more artillery than could be advantageously used. in fact, before reaching the james river i again reduced the artillery with the army largely. i believed that, if one corps of the army was exposed on the road to richmond, and at a distance from the main army, lee would endeavor to attack the exposed corps before reinforcements could come up; in which case the main army could follow lee up and attack him before he had time to intrench. so i issued the following orders: near spottsylvania c. h., va., may 18, 1864. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. before daylight to-morrow morning i propose to draw hancock and burnside from the position they now hold, and put burnside to the left of wright. wright and burnside should then force their way up as close to the enemy as they can get without a general engagement, or with a general engagement if the enemy will come out of their works to fight, and intrench. hancock should march and take up a position as if in support of the two left corps. to-morrow night, at twelve or one o'clock, he will be moved south-east with all his force and as much cavalry as can be given to him, to get as far towards richmond on the line of the fredericksburg railroad as he can make, fighting the enemy in whatever force he can find him. if the enemy make a general move to meet this, they will be followed by the other three corps of the army, and attacked, if possible, before time is given to intrench. suitable directions will at once be given for all trains and surplus artillery to conform to this movement. u. s. grant. on the 20th, lee showing no signs of coming out of his lines, orders were renewed for a left-flank movement, to commence after night. chapter liv. movement by the left flank--battle of north anna--an incident of the march--moving on richmond--south of the pamunkey--position of the national army. we were now to operate in a different country from any we had before seen in virginia. the roads were wide and good, and the country well cultivated. no men were seen except those bearing arms, even the black man having been sent away. the country, however, was new to us, and we had neither guides nor maps to tell us where the roads were, or where they led to. engineer and staff officers were put to the dangerous duty of supplying the place of both maps and guides. by reconnoitring they were enabled to locate the roads in the vicinity of each army corps. our course was south, and we took all roads leading in that direction which would not separate the army too widely. hancock who had the lead had marched easterly to guiney's station, on the fredericksburg railroad, thence southerly to bowling green and milford. he was at milford by the night of the 21st. here he met a detachment of pickett's division coming from richmond to reinforce lee. they were speedily driven away, and several hundred captured. warren followed on the morning of the 21st, and reached guiney's station that night without molestation. burnside and wright were retained at spottsylvania to keep up the appearance of an intended assault, and to hold lee, if possible, while hancock and warren should get start enough to interpose between him and richmond. lee had now a superb opportunity to take the initiative either by attacking wright and burnside alone, or by following by the telegraph road and striking hancock's and warren's corps, or even hancock's alone, before reinforcements could come up. but he did not avail himself of either opportunity. he seemed really to be misled as to my designs; but moved by his interior line--the telegraph road--to make sure of keeping between his capital and the army of the potomac. he never again had such an opportunity of dealing a heavy blow. the evening of the 21st burnside, 9th corps, moved out followed by wright, 6th corps. burnside was to take the telegraph road; but finding stanard's ford, over the po, fortified and guarded, he turned east to the road taken by hancock and warren without an attempt to dislodge the enemy. the night of the 21st i had my headquarters near the 6th corps, at guiney's station, and the enemy's cavalry was between us and hancock. there was a slight attack on burnside's and wright's corps as they moved out of their lines; but it was easily repulsed. the object probably was only to make sure that we were not leaving a force to follow upon the rear of the confederates. by the morning of the 22d burnside and wright were at guiney's station. hancock's corps had now been marching and fighting continuously for several days, not having had rest even at night much of the time. they were, therefore, permitted to rest during the 22d. but warren was pushed to harris's store, directly west of milford, and connected with it by a good road, and burnside was sent to new bethel church. wright's corps was still back at guiney's station. i issued the following order for the movement of the troops the next day: new bethel, va., may 22, 1864 major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. direct corps commanders to hold their troops in readiness to march at five a.m. to-morrow. at that hour each command will send out cavalry and infantry on all roads to their front leading south, and ascertain, if possible, where the enemy is. if beyond the south anna, the 5th and 6th corps will march to the forks of the road, where one branch leads to beaver dam station, the other to jericho bridge, then south by roads reaching the anna, as near to and east of hawkins creek as they can be found. the 2d corps will move to chesterfield ford. the 9th corps will be directed to move at the same time to jericho bridge. the map only shows two roads for the four corps to march upon, but, no doubt, by the use of plantation roads, and pressing in guides, others can be found, to give one for each corps. the troops will follow their respective reconnoitring parties. the trains will be moved at the same time to milford station. headquarters will follow the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. warren's corps was moved from harris's store to jericho ford, wright's following. warren arrived at the ford early in the afternoon, and by five o'clock effected a crossing under the protection of sharpshooters. the men had to wade in water up to their waists. as soon as enough troops were over to guard the ford, pontoons were laid and the artillery and the rest of the troops crossed. the line formed was almost perpendicular to the course of the river--crawford on the left, next to the river, griffin in the centre, and cutler on the right. lee was found intrenched along the front of their line. the whole of hill's corps was sent against warren's right before it had got in position. a brigade of cutler's division was driven back, the enemy following, but assistance coming up the enemy was in turn driven back into his trenches with heavy loss in killed and wounded, with about five hundred prisoners left in our hands. by night wright's corps was up ready to reinforce warren. on the 23d hancock's corps was moved to the wooden bridge which spans the north anna river just west of where the fredericksburg railroad crosses. it was near night when the troops arrived. they found the bridge guarded, with troops intrenched, on the north side. hancock sent two brigades, egan's and pierce's, to the right and left, and when properly disposed they charged simultaneously. the bridge was carried quickly, the enemy retreating over it so hastily that many were shoved into the river, and some of them were drowned. several hundred prisoners were captured. the hour was so late that hancock did not cross until next morning. burnside's corps was moved by a middle road running between those described above, and which strikes the north anna at ox ford, midway between telegraph road and jericho ford. the hour of its arrival was too late to cross that night. on the 24th hancock's corps crossed to the south side of the river without opposition, and formed line facing nearly west. the railroad in rear was taken possession of and destroyed as far as possible. wright's corps crossed at jericho early the same day, and took position to the right of warren's corps, extending south of the virginia central railroad. this road was torn up for a considerable distance to the rear (west), the ties burned, and the rails bent and twisted by heating them over the burning ties. it was found, however, that burnside's corps could not cross at ox ford. lee had taken a position with his centre on the river at this point, with the two wings thrown back, his line making an acute angle where it overlooked the river. before the exact position of the whole of lee's line was accurately known, i directed hancock and warren each to send a brigade to ox ford by the south side of the river. they found the enemy too strong to justify a serious attack. a third ford was found between ox ford and jericho. burnside was directed to cross a division over this ford, and to send one division to hancock. crittenden was crossed by this newly-discovered ford, and formed up the river to connect with crawford's left. potter joined hancock by way of the wooden bridge. crittenden had a severe engagement with some of hill's corps on his crossing the river, and lost heavily. when joined to warren's corps he was no further molested. burnside still guarded ox ford from the north side. lee now had his entire army south of the north anna. our lines covered his front, with the six miles separating the two wings guarded by but a single division. to get from one wing to the other the river would have to be crossed twice. lee could reinforce any part of his line from all points of it in a very short march; or could concentrate the whole of it wherever he might choose to assault. we were, for the time, practically two armies besieging. lee had been reinforced, and was being reinforced, largely. about this time the very troops whose coming i had predicted, had arrived or were coming in. pickett with a full division from richmond was up; hoke from north carolina had come with a brigade; and breckinridge was there: in all probably not less than fifteen thousand men. but he did not attempt to drive us from the field. on the 22d or 23d i received dispatches from washington saying that sherman had taken kingston, crossed the etowah river and was advancing into georgia. i was seated at the time on the porch of a fine plantation house waiting for burnside's corps to pass. meade and his staff, besides my own staff, were with me. the lady of the house, a mrs. tyler, and an elderly lady, were present. burnside seeing us, came up on the porch, his big spurs and saber rattling as he walked. he touched his hat politely to the ladies, and remarked that he supposed they had never seen so many "live yankees" before in their lives. the elderly lady spoke up promptly saying, "oh yes, i have; many more." "where?" said burnside. "in richmond." prisoners, of course, was understood. i read my dispatch aloud, when it was received. this threw the younger lady into tears. i found the information she had received (and i suppose it was the information generally in circulation through the south) was that lee was driving us from the state in the most demoralized condition and that in the south-west our troops were but little better than prisoners of war. seeing our troops moving south was ocular proof that a part of her information was incorrect, and she asked me if my news from sherman was true. i assured her that there was no doubt about it. i left a guard to protect the house from intrusion until the troops should have all passed, and assured her that if her husband was in hiding she could bring him in and he should be protected also. but i presume he was in the confederate army. on the 25th i gave orders, through halleck, to hunter, who had relieved sigel, to move up the valley of virginia, cross over the blue ridge to charlottesville and go as far as lynchburg if possible, living upon the country and cutting the railroads and canal as he went. after doing this he could find his way back to his base, or join me. on the same day news was received that lee was falling back on richmond. this proved not to be true. but we could do nothing where we were unless lee would assume the offensive. i determined, therefore, to draw out of our present position and make one more effort to get between him and richmond. i had no expectation now, however, of succeeding in this; but i did expect to hold him far enough west to enable me to reach the james river high up. sheridan was now again with the army of the potomac. on the 26th i informed the government at washington of the position of the two armies; of the reinforcements the enemy had received; of the move i proposed to make (*32); and directed that our base of supplies should be shifted to white house, on the pamunkey. the wagon train and guards moved directly from port royal to white house. supplies moved around by water, guarded by the navy. orders had previously been sent, through halleck, for butler to send smith's corps to white house. this order was repeated on the 25th, with directions that they should be landed on the north side of the pamunkey, and marched until they joined the army of the potomac. it was a delicate move to get the right wing of the army of the potomac from its position south of the north anna in the presence of the enemy. to accomplish it, i issued the following order: quarles' mills, va., may 25, 1864. major general meade, commanding a. p. direct generals warren and wright to withdraw all their teams and artillery, not in position, to the north side of the river to-morrow. send that belonging to general wright's corps as far on the road to hanover town as it can go, without attracting attention to the fact. send with it wright's best division or division under his ablest commander. have their places filled up in the line so if possible the enemy will not notice their withdrawal. send the cavalry to-morrow afternoon, or as much of it as you may deem necessary, to watch and seize, if they can, littlepage's bridge and taylor's ford, and to remain on one or other side of the river at these points until the infantry and artillery all pass. as soon as it is dark to-morrow night start the division which you withdraw first from wright's corps to make a forced march to hanover town, taking with them no teams to impede their march. at the same time this division starts commence withdrawing all of the 5th and 6th corps from the south side of the river, and march them for the same place. the two divisions of the 9th corps not now with hancock, may be moved down the north bank of the river where they will be handy to support hancock if necessary, or will be that much on their road to follow the 5th and 6th corps. hancock should hold his command in readiness to follow as soon as the way is clear for him. to-morrow it will leave nothing for him to do, but as soon as he can he should get all his teams and spare artillery on the road or roads which he will have to take. as soon as the troops reach hanover town they should get possession of all the crossings they can in that neighborhood. i think it would be well to make a heavy cavalry demonstration on the enemy's left, to-morrow afternoon, also. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. wilson's division of cavalry was brought up from the left and moved by our right south to little river. here he manoeuvred to give the impression that we were going to attack the left flank of lee's army. under cover of night our right wing was withdrawn to the north side of the river, lee being completely deceived by wilson's feint. on the afternoon of the 26th sheridan moved, sending gregg's and torbert's cavalry to taylor's and littlepage's fords towards hanover. as soon as it was dark both divisions moved quietly to hanover ferry, leaving small guards behind to keep up the impression that crossings were to be attempted in the morning. sheridan was followed by a division of infantry under general russell. on the morning of the 27th the crossing was effected with but little loss, the enemy losing thirty or forty, taken prisoners. thus a position was secured south of the pamunkey. russell stopped at the crossing while the cavalry pushed on to hanover town. here barringer's, formerly gordon's, brigade of rebel cavalry was encountered, but it was speedily driven away. warren's and wright's corps were moved by the rear of burnside's and hancock's corps. when out of the way these latter corps followed, leaving pickets confronting the enemy. wilson's cavalry followed last, watching all the fords until everything had recrossed; then taking up the pontoons and destroying other bridges, became the rear-guard. two roads were traversed by the troops in this move. the one nearest to and north of the north anna and pamunkey was taken by wright, followed by hancock. warren, followed by burnside, moved by a road farther north, and longer. the trains moved by a road still farther north, and had to travel a still greater distance. all the troops that had crossed the pamunkey on the morning of the 27th remained quiet during the rest of the day, while the troops north of that stream marched to reach the crossing that had been secured for them. lee had evidently been deceived by our movement from north anna; for on the morning of the 27th he telegraphed to richmond: "enemy crossed to north side, and cavalry and infantry crossed at hanover town." the troops that had then crossed left his front the night of the 25th. the country we were now in was a difficult one to move troops over. the streams were numerous, deep and sluggish, sometimes spreading out into swamps grown up with impenetrable growths of trees and underbrush. the banks were generally low and marshy, making the streams difficult to approach except where there were roads and bridges. hanover town is about twenty miles from richmond. there are two roads leading there; the most direct and shortest one crossing the chickahominy at meadow bridge, near the virginia central railroad, the second going by new and old cold harbor. a few miles out from hanover town there is a third road by way of mechanicsville to richmond. new cold harbor was important to us because while there we both covered the roads back to white house (where our supplies came from), and the roads south-east over which we would have to pass to get to the james river below the richmond defences. on the morning of the 28th the army made an early start, and by noon all had crossed except burnside's corps. this was left on the north side temporarily to guard the large wagon train. a line was at once formed extending south from the river, wright's corps on the right, hancock's in the centre, and warren's on the left, ready to meet the enemy if he should come. at the same time sheridan was directed to reconnoitre towards mechanicsville to find lee's position. at hawes' shop, just where the middle road leaves the direct road to richmond, he encountered the confederate cavalry dismounted and partially intrenched. gregg attacked with his division, but was unable to move the enemy. in the evening custer came up with a brigade. the attack was now renewed, the cavalry dismounting and charging as infantry. this time the assault was successful, both sides losing a considerable number of men. but our troops had to bury the dead, and found that more confederate than union soldiers had been killed. the position was easily held, because our infantry was near. on the 29th a reconnoissance was made in force, to find the position of lee. wright's corps pushed to hanover court house. hancock's corps pushed toward totopotomoy creek; warren's corps to the left on the shady grove church road, while burnside was held in reserve. our advance was pushed forward three miles on the left with but little fighting. there was now an appearance of a movement past our left flank, and sheridan was sent to meet it. on the 30th hancock moved to the totopotomoy, where he found the enemy strongly fortified. wright was moved to the right of hancock's corps, and burnside was brought forward and crossed, taking position to the left of hancock. warren moved up near huntley corners on the shady grove church road. there was some skirmishing along the centre, and in the evening early attacked warren with some vigor, driving him back at first, and threatening to turn our left flank. as the best means of reinforcing the left, hancock was ordered to attack in his front. he carried and held the rifle-pits. while this was going on warren got his men up, repulsed early, and drove him more than a mile. on this day i wrote to halleck ordering all the pontoons in washington to be sent to city point. in the evening news was received of the arrival of smith with his corps at white house. i notified meade, in writing, as follows: near hawes' shop, va., 6.40 p.m., may 30, 1864. major-general meade, commanding a. p. general smith will debark his force at the white house tonight and start up the south bank of the pamunkey at an early hour, probably at 3 a.m. in the morning. it is not improbable that the enemy, being aware of smith's movement, will be feeling to get on our left flank for the purpose of cutting him off, or by a dash to crush him and get back before we are aware of it. sheridan ought to be notified to watch the enemy's movements well out towards cold harbor, and also on the mechanicsville road. wright should be got well massed on hancock's right, so that, if it becomes necessary, he can take the place of the latter readily whilst troops are being thrown east of the totopotomoy if necessary. i want sheridan to send a cavalry force of at least half a brigade, if not a whole brigade, at 5 a.m. in the morning, to communicate with smith and to return with him. i will send orders for smith by the messenger you send to sheridan with his orders. u. s. grant. i also notified smith of his danger, and the precautions that would be taken to protect him. the night of the 30th lee's position was substantially from atlee's station on the virginia central railroad south and east to the vicinity of cold harbor. ours was: the left of warren's corps was on the shady grove road, extending to the mechanicsville road and about three miles south of the totopotomoy. burnside to his right, then hancock, and wright on the extreme right, extending towards hanover court house, six miles south-east of it. sheridan with two divisions of cavalry was watching our left front towards cold harbor. wilson with his division on our right was sent to get on the virginia central railroad and destroy it as far back as possible. he got possession of hanover court house the next day after a skirmish with young's cavalry brigade. the enemy attacked sheridan's pickets, but reinforcements were sent up and the attack was speedily repulsed and the enemy followed some distance towards cold harbor. chapter lv. advance on cold harbor--an anecdote of the war--battle of cold harbor --correspondence with lee--retrospective. on the 31st sheridan advanced to near old cold harbor. he found it intrenched and occupied by cavalry and infantry. a hard fight ensued but the place was carried. the enemy well knew the importance of cold harbor to us, and seemed determined that we should not hold it. he returned with such a large force that sheridan was about withdrawing without making any effort to hold it against such odds; but about the time he commenced the evacuation he received orders to hold the place at all hazards, until reinforcements could be sent to him. he speedily turned the rebel works to face against them and placed his men in position for defence. night came on before the enemy was ready for assault. wright's corps was ordered early in the evening to march directly to cold harbor passing by the rear of the army. it was expected to arrive by daylight or before; but the night was dark and the distance great, so that it was nine o'clock the 1st of june before it reached its destination. before the arrival of wright the enemy had made two assaults on sheridan, both of which were repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy. wright's corps coming up, there was no further assault on cold harbor. smith, who was coming up from white house, was also directed to march directly to cold harbor, and was expected early on the morning of the 1st of june; but by some blunder the order which reached smith directed him to newcastle instead of cold harbor. through this blunder smith did not reach his destination until three o'clock in the afternoon, and then with tired and worn-out men from their long and dusty march. he landed twelve thousand five hundred men from butler's command, but a division was left at white house temporarily and many men had fallen out of ranks in their long march. before the removal of wright's corps from our right, after dark on the 31st, the two lines, federal and confederate, were so close together at that point that either side could detect directly any movement made by the other. finding at daylight that wright had left his front, lee evidently divined that he had gone to our left. at all events, soon after light on the 1st of june anderson, who commanded the corps on lee's left, was seen moving along warren's front. warren was ordered to attack him vigorously in flank, while wright was directed to move out and get on his front. warren fired his artillery at the enemy; but lost so much time in making ready that the enemy got by, and at three o'clock he reported the enemy was strongly intrenched in his front, and besides his lines were so long that he had no mass of troops to move with. he seemed to have forgotten that lines in rear of an army hold themselves while their defenders are fighting in their front. wright reconnoitred some distance to his front: but the enemy finding old cold harbor already taken had halted and fortified some distance west. by six o'clock in the afternoon wright and smith were ready to make an assault. in front of both the ground was clear for several hundred yards and then became wooded. both charged across this open space and into the wood, capturing and holding the first line of rifle-pits of the enemy, and also capturing seven or eight hundred prisoners. while this was going on, the enemy charged warren three separate times with vigor, but were repulsed each time with loss. there was no officer more capable, nor one more prompt in acting, than warren when the enemy forced him to it. there was also an attack upon hancock's and burnside's corps at the same time; but it was feeble and probably only intended to relieve anderson who was being pressed by wright and smith. during the night the enemy made frequent attacks with the view of dispossessing us of the important position we had gained, but without effecting their object. hancock was moved from his place in line during the night and ordered to the left of wright. i expected to take the offensive on the morning of the 2d, but the night was so dark, the heat and dust so excessive and the roads so intricate and hard to keep, that the head of column only reached old cold harbor at six o'clock, but was in position at 7.30 a.m. preparations were made for an attack in the afternoon, but did not take place until the next morning. warren's corps was moved to the left to connect with smith: hancock's corps was got into position to the left of wright's, and burnside was moved to bethesda church in reserve. while warren and burnside were making these changes the enemy came out several times and attacked them, capturing several hundred prisoners. the attacks were repulsed, but not followed up as they should have been. i was so annoyed at this that i directed meade to instruct his corps commanders that they should seize all such opportunities when they occurred, and not wait for orders, all of our manoeuvres being made for the very purpose of getting the enemy out of his cover. on this day wilson returned from his raid upon the virginia central railroad, having damaged it considerably. but, like ourselves, the rebels had become experts in repairing such damage. sherman, in his memoirs, relates an anecdote of his campaign to atlanta that well illustrates this point. the rebel cavalry lurking in his rear to burn bridges and obstruct his communications had become so disgusted at hearing trains go whistling by within a few hours after a bridge had been burned, that they proposed to try blowing up some of the tunnels. one of them said, "no use, boys, old sherman carries duplicate tunnels with him, and will replace them as fast as you can blow them up; better save your powder." sheridan was engaged reconnoitring the banks of the chickahominy, to find crossings and the condition of the roads. he reported favorably. during the night lee moved his left up to make his line correspond to ours. his lines extended now from the totopotomoy to new cold harbor. mine from bethesda church by old cold harbor to the chickahominy, with a division of cavalry guarding our right. an assault was ordered for the 3d, to be made mainly by the corps of hancock, wright and smith; but warren and burnside were to support it by threatening lee's left, and to attack with great earnestness if he should either reinforce more threatened points by drawing from that quarter or if a favorable opportunity should present itself. the corps commanders were to select the points in their respective fronts where they would make their assaults. the move was to commence at half-past four in the morning. hancock sent barlow and gibbon forward at the appointed hour, with birney as a reserve. barlow pushed forward with great vigor, under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, through thickets and swamps. notwithstanding all the resistance of the enemy and the natural obstructions to overcome, he carried a position occupied by the enemy outside their main line where the road makes a deep cut through a bank affording as good a shelter for troops as if it had been made for that purpose. three pieces of artillery had been captured here, and several hundred prisoners. the guns were immediately turned against the men who had just been using them. no (*33) assistance coming to him, he (barlow) intrenched under fire and continued to hold his place. gibbon was not so fortunate in his front. he found the ground over which he had to pass cut up with deep ravines, and a morass difficult to cross. but his men struggled on until some of them got up to the very parapet covering the enemy. gibbon gained ground much nearer the enemy than that which he left, and here he intrenched and held fast. wright's corps moving in two lines captured the outer rifle-pits in their front, but accomplished nothing more. smith's corps also gained the outer rifle-pits in its front. the ground over which this corps (18th) had to move was the most exposed of any over which charges were made. an open plain intervened between the contending forces at this point, which was exposed both to a direct and a cross fire. smith, however, finding a ravine running towards his front, sufficiently deep to protect men in it from cross fire, and somewhat from a direct fire, put martindale's division in it, and with brooks supporting him on the left and devens on the right succeeded in gaining the outer--probably picket--rifle-pits. warren and burnside also advanced and gained ground--which brought the whole army on one line. this assault cost us heavily and probably without benefit to compensate: but the enemy was not cheered by the occurrence sufficiently to induce him to take the offensive. in fact, nowhere after the battle of the wilderness did lee show any disposition to leave his defences far behind him. fighting was substantially over by half-past seven in the morning. at eleven o'clock i started to visit all the corps commanders to see for myself the different positions gained and to get their opinion of the practicability of doing anything more in their respective fronts. hancock gave the opinion that in his front the enemy was too strong to make any further assault promise success. wright thought he could gain the lines of the enemy, but it would require the cooperation of hancock's and smith's corps. smith thought a lodgment possible, but was not sanguine: burnside thought something could be done in his front, but warren differed. i concluded, therefore to make no more assaults, and a little after twelve directed in the following letter that all offensive action should cease. cold harbor, june 3, 1864.-12.30 p.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the opinion of corps commanders not being sanguine of success in case an assault is ordered, you may direct a suspension of farther advance for the present. hold our most advanced positions and strengthen them. whilst on the defensive our line may be contracted from the right if practicable. reconnoissances should be made in front of every corps and advances made to advantageous positions by regular approaches. to aid the expedition under general hunter it is necessary that we should detain all the army now with lee until the former gets well on his way to lynchburg. to do this effectually it will be better to keep the enemy out of the intrenchments of richmond than to have them go back there. wright and hancock should be ready to assault in case the enemy should break through general smith's lines, and all should be ready to resist an assault. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the remainder of the day was spent in strengthening the line we now held. by night we were as strong against lee as he was against us. during the night the enemy quitted our right front, abandoning some of their wounded, and without burying their dead. these we were able to care for. but there were many dead and wounded men between the lines of the contending forces, which were now close together, who could not be cared for without a cessation of hostilities. so i wrote the following: cold harbor, va., june 5, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding confederate army. it is reported to me that there are wounded men, probably of both armies, now lying exposed and suffering between the lines occupied respectively by the two armies. humanity would dictate that some provision should be made to provide against such hardships. i would propose, therefore, that hereafter, when no battle is raging, either party be authorized to send to any point between the pickets or skirmish lines, unarmed men bearing litters to pick up their dead or wounded, without being fired upon by the other party. any other method, equally fair to both parties, you may propose for meeting the end desired will be accepted by me. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied that he feared such an arrangement would lead to misunderstanding, and proposed that in future, when either party wished to remove their dead and wounded, a flag of truce be sent. i answered this immediately by saying: cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. your communication of yesterday's date is received. i will send immediately, as you propose, to collect the dead and wounded between the lines of the two armies, and will also instruct that you be allowed to do the same. i propose that the time for doing this be between the hours of 12 m. and 3 p.m. to-day. i will direct all parties going out to bear a white flag, and not to attempt to go beyond where we have dead or wounded, and not beyond or on ground occupied by your troops. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's response was that he could not consent to the burial of the dead and removal of the wounded in the way i proposed, but when either party desired such permission it should be asked for by flag of truce and he had directed that any parties i may have sent out, as mentioned in my letter, to be turned back. i answered: cold harbor, va, june 6, 1864. general r. e. lee. commanding army, n. va. the knowledge that wounded men are now suffering from want of attention, between the two armies, compels me to ask a suspension of hostilities for sufficient time to collect them in, say two hours. permit me to say that the hours you may fix upon for this will be agreeable to me, and the same privilege will be extended to such parties as you may wish to send out on the same duty without further application. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee acceded to this; but delays in transmitting the correspondence brought it to the 7th of june--forty-eight hours after it commenced --before parties were got out to collect the men left upon the field. in the meantime all but two of the wounded had died. and i wrote to lee: cold harbor, va., june 7, 1864. 10.30 a.m. gen. r. e. lee, commanding army of n. va. i regret that your note of seven p.m. yesterday should have been received at the nearest corps headquarters, to where it was delivered, after the hour which had been given for the removal of the dead and wounded had expired; 10.45 p.m. was the hour at which it was received at corps headquarters, and between eleven and twelve it reached my headquarters. as a consequence, it was not understood by the troops of this army that there was a cessation of hostilities for the purpose of collecting the dead and wounded, and none were collected. two officers and six men of the 8th and 25th north carolina regts., who were out in search of the bodies of officers of their respective regiments, were captured and brought into our lines, owing to this want of understanding. i regret this, but will state that as soon as i learned the fact, i directed that they should not be held as prisoners, but must be returned to their commands. these officers and men having been carelessly brought through our lines to the rear have not determined whether they will be sent back the way they came, or whether they will be sent by some other route. regretting that all my efforts for alleviating the sufferings of wounded men left upon the battle-field have been rendered nugatory, i remain, &c., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i have always regretted that the last assault at cold harbor was ever made. i might say the same thing of the assault of the 22d of may, 1863, at vicksburg. at cold harbor no advantage whatever was gained to compensate for the heavy loss we sustained. indeed, the advantages other than those of relative losses, were on the confederate side. before that, the army of northern virginia seemed to have acquired a wholesome regard for the courage, endurance, and soldierly qualities generally of the army of the potomac. they no longer wanted to fight them "one confederate to five yanks." indeed, they seemed to have given up any idea of gaining any advantage of their antagonist in the open field. they had come to much prefer breastworks in their front to the army of the potomac. this charge seemed to revive their hopes temporarily; but it was of short duration. the effect upon the army of the potomac was the reverse. when we reached the james river, however, all effects of the battle of cold harbor seemed to have disappeared. there was more justification for the assault at vicksburg. we were in a southern climate, at the beginning of the hot season. the army of the tennessee had won five successive victories over the garrison of vicksburg in the three preceding weeks. they had driven a portion of that army from port gibson with considerable loss, after having flanked them out of their stronghold at grand gulf. they had attacked another portion of the same army at raymond, more than fifty miles farther in the interior of the state, and driven them back into jackson with great loss in killed, wounded, captured and missing, besides loss of large and small arms: they had captured the capital of the state of mississippi, with a large amount of materials of war and manufactures. only a few days before, they had beaten the enemy then penned up in the town first at champion's hill, next at big black river bridge, inflicting upon him a loss of fifteen thousand or more men (including those cut off from returning) besides large losses in arms and ammunition. the army of the tennessee had come to believe that they could beat their antagonist under any circumstances. there was no telling how long a regular siege might last. as i have stated, it was the beginning of the hot season in a southern climate. there was no telling what the casualties might be among northern troops working and living in trenches, drinking surface water filtered through rich vegetation, under a tropical sun. if vicksburg could have been carried in may, it would not only have saved the army the risk it ran of a greater danger than from the bullets of the enemy, but it would have given us a splendid army, well equipped and officered, to operate elsewhere with. these are reasons justifying the assault. the only benefit we gained--and it was a slight one for so great a sacrifice--was that the men worked cheerfully in the trenches after that, being satisfied with digging the enemy out. had the assault not been made, i have no doubt that the majority of those engaged in the siege of vicksburg would have believed that had we assaulted it would have proven successful, and would have saved life, health and comfort. chapter lvi. left flank movement across the chickahominy and james--general lee --visit to butler--the movement on petersburg--the investment of petersburg. lee's position was now so near richmond, and the intervening swamps of the chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that i determined to make my next left flank move carry the army of the potomac south of the james river. (*34) preparations for this were promptly commenced. the move was a hazardous one to make: the chickahominy river, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and butler, by the roads i should have to travel, with both the james and the chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the army of the potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the chickahominy and the james, move rapidly on butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. then too he might spare troops enough to send against hunter who was approaching lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him. but the move had to be made, and i relied upon lee's not seeing my danger as i saw it. besides we had armies on both sides of the james river and not far from the confederate capital. i knew that its safety would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the so-called confederate government, if it was not with the military commanders. but i took all the precaution i knew of to guard against all dangers. sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with hunter and to break up the virginia central railroad and the james river canal, on the 7th of june, taking instructions to hunter to come back with him (*35). hunter was also informed by way of washington and the valley that sheridan was on the way to meet him. the canal and central road, and the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy, furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the army of northern virginia and the people of richmond. before sheridan got off on the 7th news was received from hunter reporting his advance to staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on the 5th, in which the confederate commander, w. s. jones, was killed. on the 4th of june the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, burnside on our right was moved up between warren and smith. on the 5th birney returned to hancock, which extended his left now to the chickahominy, and warren was withdrawn to cold harbor. wright was directed to send two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to bottom's bridge. the cavalry extended still farther east to jones's bridge. on the 7th abercrombie--who was in command at white house, and who had been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the start--was ordered to take up the iron from the york river railroad and put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to city point. on the 8th meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank overlooking the chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move. on the 9th abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops arriving at white house, without debarking from their transports, to report to butler. halleck was at this time instructed to send all reinforcements to city point. on the 11th i wrote: cold harbor, va., june 11, 1864. major-gen. b. f. butler, commanding department of va. and n. c. the movement to transfer this army to the south side of the james river will commence after dark to-morrow night. col. comstock, of my staff, was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to reach this side of the river at bermuda hundred. colonel comstock has not yet returned, so that i cannot make instructions as definite as i would wish, but the time between this and sunday night being so short in which to get word to you, i must do the best i can. colonel dent goes to the chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. the corps will leave its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as possible, and make a forced march to cole's landing or ferry, where it should reach by ten a.m. the following morning. this corps numbers now 15,300 men. they take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these latter marching with the balance of the army to the james river. the remainder of the army will cross the chickahominy at long bridge and at jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below city point. i directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should be sent to you. i am not advised of the number that may have gone, but suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. general smith will also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of richmond. the balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless detained by the whole of lee's army, in which case you will be strong enough. i wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. if there is a point below city point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have it laid. expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by monday night, if you deem it practicable from the force you have to seize and hold petersburg, you may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present lines. i do not want petersburg visited, however, unless it is held, nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of confidence of success. if you should go there, i think troops should take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon supplies being sent after the place is secured. if colonel dent should not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the 18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--on reflection i will send the 18th corps by way of white house. the distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of navigation on the chickahominy will be avoided. u. s. grant. cold harbor, va., june 11,1864. major-general g. g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. colonel comstock, who visited the james river for the purpose of ascertaining the best point below bermuda hundred to which to march the army has not yet returned. it is now getting so late, however, that all preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting longer. the movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and artillery accompanying the balance of the army to cole's landing or ferry, and there embark for city point, losing no time for rest until they reach the latter point. the 5th corps will seize long bridge and move out on the long bridge road to its junction with quaker road, or until stopped by the enemy. the other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one of them crossing at long bridge, and two at jones's bridge. after the crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach about fort powhattan. of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no opposition to our advance. the 5th corps, after securing the passage of the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which crosses the same bridge with themselves. the wagon trains should be kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made lower down than jones's they should take it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. p. s.--in view of the long march to reach cole's landing, and the uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the direction of the 18th corps may be changed to white house. they should be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go together. u. s. grant. about this time word was received (through the richmond papers of the 11th) that crook and averell had united and were moving east. this, with the news of hunter's successful engagement near staunton, was no doubt known to lee before it was to me. then sheridan leaving with two divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to lee's communications and supplies. much of his cavalry was sent after sheridan, and early with ewell's entire corps was sent to the valley. supplies were growing scarce in richmond, and the sources from which to draw them were in our hands. people from outside began to pour into richmond to help eat up the little on hand. consternation reigned there. on the 12th smith was ordered to move at night to white house, not to stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for city point, leaving his trains and artillery to move by land. soon after dark some of the cavalry at long bridge effected a crossing by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. a pontoon bridge was speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that might be made from the other side. warren followed the cavalry, and by the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. hancock followed warren. burnside took the road to jones's bridge, followed by wright. ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by window shades and cole's ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry. it was known that the enemy had some gunboats at richmond. these might run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be sunk or captured by our navy. general butler had, in advance, loaded some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel in an emergency. on the 13th i sent orders to have these sunk as high up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the enemy. as soon as warren's corps was over the chickahominy it marched out and joined the cavalry in holding the roads from richmond while the army passed. no attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however, but warren and wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their front. by the evening of the 13th hancock's corps was at charles city court house on the james river. burnside's and wright's corps were on the chickahominy, and crossed during the night, warren's corps and the cavalry still covering the army. the material for a pontoon bridge was already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately, under the superintendence of brigadier-general benham, commanding the engineer brigade. on the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced, hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats. when the wilderness campaign commenced the army of the potomac, including burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of may when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men. during the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were received. at the crossing of the james river june 14th-15th the army numbered about 115,000. besides the ordinary losses incident to a campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about one-half of the artillery was sent back to washington, and many men were discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* in estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. operating in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base, large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads leading to our flanks and rear. we were also operating in a country unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads accurately. the manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially. in the confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account, never, i believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. generally the latter are far enough away to be excluded from the count in any one field. officers and details of enlisted men are not included. in the northern armies the estimate is most liberal, taking in all connected with the army and drawing pay. estimated in the same manner as ours, lee had not less than 80,000 men at the start. his reinforcements were about equal to ours during the campaign, deducting the discharged men and those sent back. he was on the defensive, and in a country in which every stream, every road, every obstacle to the movement of troops and every natural defence was familiar to him and his army. the citizens were all friendly to him and his cause, and could and did furnish him with accurate reports of our every move. rear guards were not necessary for him, and having always a railroad at his back, large wagon trains were not required. all circumstances considered we did not have any advantage in numbers. general lee, who had led the army of northern virginia in all these contests, was a very highly estimated man in the confederate army and states, and filled also a very high place in the estimation of the people and press of the northern states. his praise was sounded throughout the entire north after every action he was engaged in: the number of his forces was always lowered and that of the national forces exaggerated. he was a large, austere man, and i judge difficult of approach to his subordinates. to be extolled by the entire press of the south after every engagement, and by a portion of the press north with equal vehemence, was calculated to give him the entire confidence of his troops and to make him feared by his antagonists. it was not an uncommon thing for my staff-officers to hear from eastern officers, "well, grant has never met bobby lee yet." there were good and true officers who believe now that the army of northern virginia was superior to the army of the potomac man to man. i do not believe so, except as the advantages spoken of above made them so. before the end i believe the difference was the other way. the army of northern virginia became despondent and saw the end. it did not please them. the national army saw the same thing, and were encouraged by it. the advance of the army of the potomac reached the james on the 14th of june. preparations were at once commenced for laying the pontoon bridges and crossing the river. as already stated, i had previously ordered general butler to have two vessels loaded with stone and carried up the river to a point above that occupied by our gunboats, where the channel was narrow, and sunk there so as to obstruct the passage and prevent confederate gunboats from coming down the river. butler had had these boats filled and put in position, but had not had them sunk before my arrival. i ordered this done, and also directed that he should turn over all material and boats not then in use in the river to be used in ferrying the troops across. i then, on the 14th, took a steamer and ran up to bermuda hundred to see general butler for the purpose of directing a movement against petersburg, while our troops of the army of the potomac were crossing. i had sent general w. f. smith back from cold harbor by the way of white house, thence on steamers to city point for the purpose of giving general butler more troops with which to accomplish this result. general butler was ordered to send smith with his troops reinforced, as far as that could be conveniently done, from other parts of the army of the james. he gave smith about six thousand reinforcements, including some twenty-five hundred cavalry under kautz, and about thirty-five hundred colored infantry under hinks. the distance which smith had to move to reach the enemy's lines was about six miles, and the confederate advance line of works was but two miles outside of petersburg. smith was to move under cover of night, up close to the enemy's works, and assault as soon as he could after daylight. i believed then, and still believe, that petersburg could have been easily captured at that time. it only had about 2,500 men in the defences besides some irregular troops, consisting of citizens and employees in the city who took up arms in case of emergency. smith started as proposed, but his advance encountered a rebel force intrenched between city point and their lines outside of petersburg. this position he carried, with some loss to the enemy; but there was so much delay that it was daylight before his troops really got off from there. while there i informed general butler that hancock's corps would cross the river and move to petersburg to support smith in case the latter was successful, and that i could reinforce there more rapidly than lee could reinforce from his position. i returned down the river to where the troops of the army of the potomac now were, communicated to general meade, in writing, the directions i had given to general butler and directed him (meade) to cross hancock's corps over under cover of night, and push them forward in the morning to petersburg; halting them, however, at a designated point until they could hear from smith. i also informed general meade that i had ordered rations from bermuda hundred for hancock's corps, and desired him to issue them speedily, and to lose no more time than was absolutely necessary. the rations did not reach him, however, and hancock, while he got all his corps over during the night, remained until half-past ten in the hope of receiving them. he then moved without them, and on the road received a note from general w. f. smith, asking him to come on. this seems to be the first information that general hancock had received of the fact that he was to go to petersburg, or that anything particular was expected of him. otherwise he would have been there by four o'clock in the afternoon. smith arrived in front of the enemy's lines early in the forenoon of the 15th, and spent the day until after seven o'clock in the evening in reconnoitering what appeared to be empty works. the enemy's line consisted of redans occupying commanding positions, with rifle-pits connecting them. to the east side of petersburg, from the appomattox back, there were thirteen of these redans extending a distance of several miles, probably three. if they had been properly manned they could have held out against any force that could have attacked them, at least until reinforcements could have got up from the north of richmond. smith assaulted with the colored troops, and with success. by nine o'clock at night he was in possession of five of these redans and, of course, of the connecting lines of rifle-pits. all of them contained artillery, which fell into our hands. hancock came up and proposed to take any part assigned to him; and smith asked him to relieve his men who were in the trenches. next morning, the 16th, hancock himself was in command, and captured another redan. meade came up in the afternoon and succeeded hancock, who had to be relieved, temporarily, from the command of his corps on account of the breaking out afresh of the wound he had received at gettysburg. during the day meade assaulted and carried one more redan to his right and two to his left. in all this we lost very heavily. the works were not strongly manned, but they all had guns in them which fell into our hands, together with the men who were handling them in the effort to repel these assaults. up to this time beauregard, who had commanded south of richmond, had received no reinforcements, except hoke's division from drury's bluff,(*37) which had arrived on the morning of the 16th; though he had urged the authorities very strongly to send them, believing, as he did, that petersburg would be a valuable prize which we might seek. during the 17th the fighting was very severe and the losses heavy; and at night our troops occupied about the same position they had occupied in the morning, except that they held a redan which had been captured by potter during the day. during the night, however, beauregard fell back to the line which had been already selected, and commenced fortifying it. our troops advanced on the 18th to the line which he had abandoned, and found that the confederate loss had been very severe, many of the enemy's dead still remaining in the ditches and in front of them. colonel j. l. chamberlain, of the 20th maine, was wounded on the 18th. he was gallantly leading his brigade at the time, as he had been in the habit of doing in all the engagements in which he had previously been engaged. he had several times been recommended for a brigadier-generalcy for gallant and meritorious conduct. on this occasion, however, i promoted him on the spot, and forwarded a copy of my order to the war department, asking that my act might be confirmed and chamberlain's name sent to the senate for confirmation without any delay. this was done, and at last a gallant and meritorious officer received partial justice at the hands of his government, which he had served so faithfully and so well. if general hancock's orders of the 15th had been communicated to him, that officer, with his usual promptness, would undoubtedly have been upon the ground around petersburg as early as four o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th. the days were long and it would have given him considerable time before night. i do not think there is any doubt that petersburg itself could have been carried without much loss; or, at least, if protected by inner detached works, that a line could have been established very much in rear of the one then occupied by the enemy. this would have given us control of both the weldon and south side railroads. this would also have saved an immense amount of hard fighting which had to be done from the 15th to the 18th, and would have given us greatly the advantage in the long siege which ensued. i now ordered the troops to be put under cover and allowed some of the rest which they had so long needed. they remained quiet, except that there was more or less firing every day, until the 22d, when general meade ordered an advance towards the weldon railroad. we were very anxious to get to that road, and even round to the south side railroad if possible. meade moved hancock's corps, now commanded by birney, to the left, with a view to at least force the enemy to stay within the limits of his own line. general wright, with the 6th corps, was ordered by a road farther south, to march directly for the weldon road. the enemy passed in between these two corps and attacked vigorously, and with very serious results to the national troops, who were then withdrawn from their advanced position. the army of the potomac was given the investment of petersburg, while the army of the james held bermuda hundred and all the ground we possessed north of the james river. the 9th corps, burnside's, was placed upon the right at petersburg; the 5th, warren's, next; the 2d, birney's, next; then the 6th, wright's, broken off to the left and south. thus began the siege of petersburg. chapter lvii. raid on the virginia central railroad--raid on the weldon railroad --early 's movement upon washington--mining the works before petersburg --explosion of the mine before petersburg--campaign in the shenandoah valley--capture of the weldon railroad. on the 7th of june, while at cold harbor, i had as already indicated sent sheridan with two divisions of cavalry to destroy as much as he could of the virginia central railroad. general hunter had been operating up the shenandoah valley with some success, having fought a battle near staunton where he captured a great many prisoners, besides killing and wounding a good many men. after the battle he formed a junction at staunton with averell and crook, who had come up from the kanawha, or gauley river. it was supposed, therefore, that general hunter would be about charlottesville, virginia, by the time sheridan could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do. i gave sheridan instructions to have hunter, in case he should meet him about charlottesville, join and return with him to the army of the potomac. lee, hearing of hunter's success in the valley, started breckinridge out for its defence at once. learning later of sheridan's going with two divisions, he also sent hampton with two divisions of cavalry, his own and fitz-hugh lee's. sheridan moved to the north side of the north anna to get out west, and learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same stream almost as soon as they had started. he pushed on to get to trevilian station to commence his destruction at that point. on the night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of trevilian, while fitz-hugh lee was the same night at trevilian station and hampton but a few miles away. during the night hampton ordered an advance on sheridan, hoping, no doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. sheridan, however, by a counter move sent custer on a rapid march to get between the two divisions of the enemy and into their rear. this he did successfully, so that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some confusion. the losses were probably very light on both sides in killed and wounded, but sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and sent them to city point. during that day, the 11th, sheridan moved into trevilian station, and the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. there was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of destruction went on. in the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken possession of the crossing which sheridan had proposed to take to go north when he left trevilian. sheridan learned, however, from some of the prisoners he had captured here, that general hunter was about lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to charlottesville with a view to meet him. sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way north and farther east, coming around by the north side of white house, and arriving there on the 21st. here he found an abundance of forage for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. he had been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital which he had established near trevilian, and these necessarily fell into the hands of the enemy. white house up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops were all on the james river, it was no longer wanted as a store of supplies. sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he did on the 22d of june, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train with him. all these were over the james river by the 26th of the month, and sheridan ready to follow. in the meantime meade had sent wilson's division on a raid to destroy the weldon and south side roads. now that sheridan was safe and hampton free to return to richmond with his cavalry, wilson's position became precarious. meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered sheridan over the river to make a demonstration in favor of wilson. wilson got back, though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage done was soon repaired. after these events comparative quiet reigned about petersburg until late in july. the time, however, was spent in strengthening the intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a sudden attack. in the meantime i had to look after other portions of my command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as i could have wished. general hunter who had been appointed to succeed sigel in the shenandoah valley immediately took up the offensive. he met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and defeated him. on the 8th he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured lynchburg. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent early with his corps, a part of which reached lynchburg before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by the way of the gauley and kanawha rivers, thence up the ohio river, returning to harper's ferry by way of the baltimore and ohio railroad. a long time was consumed in making this movement. meantime the valley was left open to early's troops, and others in that quarter; and washington also was uncovered. early took advantage of this condition of affairs and moved on washington. in the absence of hunter, general lew wallace, with headquarters at baltimore, commanded the department in which the shenandoah lay. his surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in number. most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to our veterans and to the veterans which early had with him; but the situation of washington was precarious, and wallace moved with commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the monocacy. he could hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and delay him until washington could be put into a state of preparation for his reception. i had previously ordered general meade to send a division to baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of washington, and he had sent ricketts's division of the 6th corps (wright's), which arrived in baltimore on the 8th of july. finding that wallace had gone to the front with his command, ricketts immediately took the cars and followed him to the monocacy with his entire division. they met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took place. the next morning early started on his march to the capital of the nation, arriving before it on the 11th. learning of the gravity of the situation i had directed general meade to also order wright with the rest of his corps directly to washington for the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that early arrived before it. the 19th corps, which had been stationed in louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about richmond, had about this time arrived at fortress monroe, on their way to join us. i diverted them from that point to washington, which place they reached, almost simultaneously with wright, on the 11th. the 19th corps was commanded by major-general emory. early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments, which were very strong, fully manned. he at once commenced to retreat, wright following. there is no telling how much this result was contributed to by general lew wallace's leading what might well be considered almost a forlorn hope. if early had been but one day earlier he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the reinforcements i had sent. whether the delay caused by the battle amounted to a day or not, general wallace contributed on this occasion, by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render by means of a victory. farther west also the troubles were threatening. some time before, forrest had met sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in mississippi and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him. this left forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the roads in rear of sherman who was then advancing. sherman was abundantly able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. two divisions under a. j. smith had been sent to banks in louisiana some months before. sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack forrest. smith met and defeated him very badly. i then directed that smith should hang to forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all means his getting upon the memphis and nashville railroad. sherman had anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance; but receiving my directions for this order to smith, he repeated it. on the 25th of june general burnside had commenced running a mine from about the centre of his front under the confederate works confronting him. he was induced to do this by colonel pleasants, of the pennsylvania volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners, and who was himself a practical miner. burnside had submitted the scheme to meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of keeping the men occupied. his position was very favorable for carrying on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its completion. the position of the two lines at that point were only about a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. in the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. the position was unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to the right and left. then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of the confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point. the work progressed, and on the 23d of july the mine was finished ready for charging; but i had this work of charging deferred until we were ready for it. on the 17th of july several deserters came in and said that there was great consternation in richmond, and that lee was coming out to make an attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he might detach troops to go to georgia where the army sherman was operating against was said to be in great trouble. i put the army commanders, meade and butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not made. i concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object that lee had had. wright's and emory's corps were in washington, and with this reduction of my force lee might very readily have spared some troops from the defences to send west. i had other objects in view, however, besides keeping lee where he was. the mine was constructed and ready to be exploded, and i wanted to take that occasion to carry petersburg if i could. it was the object, therefore, to get as many of lee's troops away from the south side of the james river as possible. accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with hancock's corps and sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of deep bottom, where butler had a pontoon bridge laid. the plan, in the main, was to let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with kautz's cavalry of the army of the james, get by lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of the virginia central railroad, while, in the mean time, the infantry was to move out so as to protect their rear and cover their retreat back when they should have got through with their work. we were successful in drawing the enemy's troops to the north side of the james as i expected. the mine was ordered to be charged, and the morning of the 30th of july was the time fixed for its explosion. i gave meade minute orders (*38) on the 24th directing how i wanted the assault conducted, which orders he amplified into general instructions for the guidance of the troops that were to be engaged. meade's instructions, which i, of course, approved most heartily, were all that i can see now was necessary. the only further precaution which he could have taken, and which he could not foresee, would have been to have different men to execute them. the gallery to the mine was over five hundred feet long from where it entered the ground to the point where it was under the enemy's works, and with a cross gallery of something over eighty feet running under their lines. eight chambers had been left, requiring a ton of powder each to charge them. all was ready by the time i had prescribed; and on the 29th hancock and sheridan were brought back near the james river with their troops. under cover of night they started to recross the bridge at deep bottom, and to march directly for that part of our lines in front of the mine. warren was to hold his line of intrenchments with a sufficient number of men and concentrate the balance on the right next to burnside's corps, while ord, now commanding the 18th corps, temporarily under meade, was to form in the rear of burnside to support him when he went in. all were to clear off the parapets and the _abatis_ in their front so as to leave the space as open as possible, and be able to charge the moment the mine had been sprung and burnside had taken possession. burnside's corps was not to stop in the crater at all but push on to the top of the hill, supported on the right and left by ord's and warren's corps. warren and ord fulfilled their instructions perfectly so far as making ready was concerned. burnside seemed to have paid no attention whatever to the instructions, and left all the obstruction in his own front for his troops to get over in the best way they could. the four divisions of his corps were commanded by generals potter, willcox, ledlie and ferrero. the last was a colored division; and burnside selected it to make the assault. meade interfered with this. burnside then took ledlie's division--a worse selection than the first could have been. in fact, potter and willcox were the only division commanders burnside had who were equal to the occasion. ledlie besides being otherwise inefficient, proved also to possess disqualification less common among soldiers. there was some delay about the explosion of the mine so that it did not go off until about five o'clock in the morning. when it did explode it was very successful, making a crater twenty feet deep and something like a hundred feet in length. instantly one hundred and ten cannon and fifty mortars, which had been placed in the most commanding positions covering the ground to the right and left of where the troops were to enter the enemy's lines, commenced playing. ledlie's division marched into the crater immediately on the explosion, but most of the men stopped there in the absence of any one to give directions; their commander having found some safe retreat to get into before they started. there was some delay on the left and right in advancing, but some of the troops did get in and turn to the right and left, carrying the rifle-pits as i expected they would do. there had been great consternation in petersburg, as we were well aware, about a rumored mine that we were going to explode. they knew we were mining, and they had failed to cut our mine off by countermining, though beauregard had taken the precaution to run up a line of intrenchments to the rear of that part of their line fronting where they could see that our men were at work. we had learned through deserters who had come in that the people had very wild rumors about what was going on on our side. they said that we had undermined the whole of petersburg; that they were resting upon a slumbering volcano and did not know at what moment they might expect an eruption. i somewhat based my calculations upon this state of feeling, and expected that when the mine was exploded the troops to the right and left would flee in all directions, and that our troops, if they moved promptly, could get in and strengthen themselves before the enemy had come to a realization of the true situation. it was just as i expected it would be. we could see the men running without any apparent object except to get away. it was half an hour before musketry firing, to amount to anything, was opened upon our men in the crater. it was an hour before the enemy got artillery up to play upon them; and it was nine o'clock before lee got up reinforcements from his right to join in expelling our troops. the effort was a stupendous failure. it cost us about four thousand men, mostly, however, captured; and all due to inefficiency on the part of the corps commander and the incompetency of the division commander who was sent to lead the assault. after being fully assured of the failure of the mine, and finding that most of that part of lee's army which had been drawn north of the james river were still there, i gave meade directions to send a corps of infantry and the cavalry next morning, before lee could get his forces back, to destroy fifteen or twenty miles of the weldon railroad. but misfortunes never come singly. i learned during that same afternoon that wright's pursuit of early was feeble because of the constant and contrary orders he had been receiving from washington, while i was cut off from immediate communication by reason of our cable across chesapeake bay being broken. early, however, was not aware of the fact that wright was not pursuing until he had reached strasburg. finding that he was not pursued he turned back to winchester, where crook was stationed with a small force, and drove him out. he then pushed north until he had reached the potomac, then he sent mccausland across to chambersburg, pa., to destroy that town. chambersburg was a purely defenceless town with no garrison whatever, and no fortifications; yet mccausland, under early's orders, burned the place and left about three hundred families houseless. this occurred on the 30th of july. i rescinded my orders for the troops to go out to destroy the weldon railroad, and directed them to embark for washington city. after burning chambersburg mccausland retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley and driven into virginia. the shenandoah valley was very important to the confederates, because it was the principal storehouse they now had for feeding their armies about richmond. it was well known that they would make a desperate struggle to maintain it. it had been the source of a great deal of trouble to us heretofore to guard that outlet to the north, partly because of the incompetency of some of the commanders, but chiefly because of interference from washington. it seemed to be the policy of general halleck and secretary stanton to keep any force sent there, in pursuit of the invading army, moving right and left so as to keep between the enemy and our capital; and, generally speaking, they pursued this policy until all knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy was lost. they were left, therefore, free to supply themselves with horses, beef cattle, and such provisions as they could carry away from western maryland and pennsylvania. i determined to put a stop to this. i started sheridan at once for that field of operation, and on the following day sent another division of his cavalry. i had previously asked to have sheridan assigned to that command, but mr. stanton objected, on the ground that he was too young for so important a command. on the 1st of august when i sent reinforcements for the protection of washington, i sent the following orders: city point, va., august 1, 1864, 11.30 a.m. major-general halleck, washington d. c. i am sending general sheridan for temporary duty whilst the enemy is being expelled from the border. unless general hunter is in the field in person, i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes let our troops go also. once started up the valley they ought to be followed until we get possession of the virginia central railroad. if general hunter is in the field, give sheridan direct command of the 6th corps and cavalry division. all the cavalry, i presume, will reach washington in the course of to-morrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the president in some way or other got to see this dispatch of mine directing certain instructions to be given to the commanders in the field, operating against early, and sent me the following very characteristic dispatch: office u. s. military telegraph, war department, washington, d. c., august 3, 1864. cypher. 6 p.m., lt. general grant, city point, va. i have seen your despatch in which you say, "i want sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." this, i think, is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. but please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here, of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "following him to the death" in any direction. i repeat to you it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day, and hour, and force it. a. lincoln. i replied to this that "i would start in two hours for washington," and soon got off, going directly to the monocacy without stopping at washington on my way. i found general hunter's army encamped there, scattered over the fields along the banks of the monocacy, with many hundreds of cars and locomotives, belonging to the baltimore and ohio railroad, which he had taken the precaution to bring back and collect at that point. i asked the general where the enemy was. he replied that he did not know. he said the fact was, that he was so embarrassed with orders from washington moving him first to the right and then to the left that he had lost all trace of the enemy. i then told the general that i would find out where the enemy was, and at once ordered steam got up and trains made up, giving directions to push for halltown, some four miles above harper's ferry, in the shenandoah valley. the cavalry and the wagon trains were to march, but all the troops that could be transported by the cars were to go in that way. i knew that the valley was of such importance to the enemy that, no matter how much he was scattered at that time, he would in a very short time be found in front of our troops moving south. i then wrote out general hunter's instructions. (*39) i told him that sheridan was in washington, and still another division was on its way; and suggested that he establish the headquarters of the department at any point that would suit him best, cumberland, baltimore, or elsewhere, and give sheridan command of the troops in the field. the general replied to this, that he thought he had better be relieved entirely. he said that general halleck seemed so much to distrust his fitness for the position he was in that he thought somebody else ought to be there. he did not want, in any way, to embarrass the cause; thus showing a patriotism that was none too common in the army. there were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed. i told him, "very well then," and telegraphed at once for sheridan to come to the monocacy, and suggested that i would wait and meet him there. sheridan came at once by special train, but reached there after the troops were all off. i went to the station and remained there until he arrived. myself and one or two of my staff were about all the union people, except general hunter and his staff, who were left at the monocacy when sheridan arrived. i hastily told sheridan what had been done and what i wanted him to do, giving him, at the same time, the written instructions which had been prepared for general hunter and directed to that officer. sheridan now had about 30,000 men to move with, 8,000 of them being cavalry. early had about the same number, but the superior ability of the national commander over the confederate commander was so great that all the latter's advantage of being on the defensive was more than counterbalanced by this circumstance. as i had predicted, early was soon found in front of sheridan in the valley, and pennsylvania and maryland were speedily freed from the invaders. the importance of the valley was so great to the confederates that lee reinforced early, but not to the extent that we thought and feared he would. to prevent as much as possible these reinforcements from being sent out from richmond, i had to do something to compel lee to retain his forces about his capital. i therefore gave orders for another move to the north side of the james river, to threaten richmond. hancock's corps, part of the 10th corps under birney, and gregg's division of cavalry were crossed to the north side of the james during the night of the 13th-14th of august. a threatening position was maintained for a number of days, with more or less skirmishing, and some tolerably hard fighting; although it was my object and my instructions that anything like a battle should be avoided, unless opportunities should present themselves which would insure great success. general meade was left in command of the few troops around petersburg, strongly intrenched; and was instructed to keep a close watch upon the enemy in that quarter, and himself to take advantage of any weakening that might occur through an effort on the part of the enemy to reinforce the north side. there was no particular victory gained on either side; but during that time no more reinforcements were sent to the valley. i informed sheridan of what had been done to prevent reinforcements being sent from richmond against him, and also that the efforts we had made had proven that one of the divisions which we supposed had gone to the valley was still at richmond, because we had captured six or seven hundred prisoners from that division, each of its four brigades having contributed to our list of captures. i also informed him that but one division had gone, and it was possible that i should be able to prevent the going of any more. to add to my embarrassment at this time sherman, who was now near atlanta, wanted reinforcements. he was perfectly willing to take the raw troops then being raised in the north-west, saying that he could teach them more soldiering in one day among his troops than they would learn in a week in a camp of instruction. i therefore asked that all troops in camps of instruction in the north-west be sent to him. sherman also wanted to be assured that no eastern troops were moving out against him. i informed him of what i had done and assured him that i would hold all the troops there that it was possible for me to hold, and that up to that time none had gone. i also informed him that his real danger was from kirby smith, who commanded the trans-mississippi department. if smith should escape steele, and get across the mississippi river, he might move against him. i had, therefore, asked to have an expedition ready to move from new orleans against mobile in case kirby smith should get across. this would have a tendency to draw him to the defence of that place, instead of going against sherman. right in the midst of all these embarrassments halleck informed me that there was an organized scheme on foot in the north to resist the draft, and suggested that it might become necessary to draw troops from the field to put it down. he also advised taking in sail, and not going too fast. the troops were withdrawn from the north side of the james river on the night of the 20th. before they were withdrawn, however, and while most of lee's force was on that side of the river, warren had been sent with most of the 5th corps to capture the weldon railroad. he took up his line of march well back to the rear, south of the enemy, while the troops remaining in the trenches extended so as to cover that part of the line which he had vacated by moving out. from our left, near the old line, it was about three miles to the weldon railroad. a division was ordered from the right of the petersburg line to reinforce warren, while a division was brought back from the north side of the james river to take its place. this road was very important to the enemy. the limits from which his supplies had been drawn were already very much contracted, and i knew that he must fight desperately to protect it. warren carried the road, though with heavy loss on both sides. he fortified his new position, and our trenches were then extended from the left of our main line to connect with his new one. lee made repeated attempts to dislodge warren's corps, but without success, and with heavy loss. as soon as warren was fortified and reinforcements reached him, troops were sent south to destroy the bridges on the weldon railroad; and with such success that the enemy had to draw in wagons, for a distance of about thirty miles, all the supplies they got thereafter from that source. it was on the 21st that lee seemed to have given up the weldon railroad as having been lost to him; but along about the 24th or 25th he made renewed attempts to recapture it; again he failed and with very heavy losses to him as compared with ours. on the night of the 20th our troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg were sent south to destroy the weldon railroad. they were attacked on the 25th at reams's station, and after desperate fighting a part of our line gave way, losing five pieces of artillery. but the weldon railroad never went out of our possession from the 18th of august to the close of the war. chapter lviii. sheridan's advance--visit to sheridan--sheridan's victory in the shenandoah--sheridan's ride to winchester--close of the campaign for the winter. we had our troops on the weldon railroad contending against a large force that regarded this road of so much importance that they could afford to expend many lives in retaking it; sherman just getting through to atlanta with great losses of men from casualties, discharges and detachments left along as guards to occupy and hold the road in rear of him; washington threatened but a short time before, and now early being strengthened in the valley so as, probably, to renew that attempt. it kept me pretty active in looking after all these points. on the 10th of august sheridan had advanced on early up the shenandoah valley, early falling back to strasburg. on the 12th i learned that lee had sent twenty pieces of artillery, two divisions of infantry and a considerable cavalry force to strengthen early. it was important that sheridan should be informed of this, so i sent the information to washington by telegraph, and directed a courier to be sent from there to get the message to sheridan at all hazards, giving him the information. the messenger, an officer of the army, pushed through with great energy and reached sheridan just in time. the officer went through by way of snicker's gap, escorted by some cavalry. he found sheridan just making his preparations to attack early in his chosen position. now, however, he was thrown back on the defensive. on the 15th of september i started to visit general sheridan in the shenandoah valley. my purpose was to have him attack early, or drive him out of the valley and destroy that source of supplies for lee's army. i knew it was impossible for me to get orders through washington to sheridan to make a move, because they would be stopped there and such orders as halleck's caution (and that of the secretary of war) would suggest would be given instead, and would, no doubt, be contradictory to mine. i therefore, without stopping at washington, went directly through to charlestown, some ten miles above harper's ferry, and waited there to see general sheridan, having sent a courier in advance to inform him where to meet me. when sheridan arrived i asked him if he had a map showing the positions of his army and that of the enemy. he at once drew one out of his side pocket, showing all roads and streams, and the camps of the two armies. he said that if he had permission he would move so and so (pointing out how) against the confederates, and that he could "whip them." before starting i had drawn up a plan of campaign for sheridan, which i had brought with me; but, seeing that he was so clear and so positive in his views and so confident of success, i said nothing about this and did not take it out of my pocket. sheridan's wagon trains were kept at harper's ferry, where all of his stores were. by keeping the teams at that place, their forage did not have to be hauled to them. as supplies of ammunition, provisions and rations for the men were wanted, trains would be made up to deliver the stores to the commissaries and quartermasters encamped at winchester. knowing that he, in making preparations to move at a given day, would have to bring up wagons trains from harper's ferry, i asked him if he could be ready to get off by the following tuesday. this was on friday. "o yes," he said, he "could be off before daylight on monday." i told him then to make the attack at that time and according to his own plan; and i immediately started to return to the army about richmond. after visiting baltimore and burlington, new jersey, i arrived at city point on the 19th. on the way out to harper's ferry i had met mr. robert garrett, president of the baltimore and ohio railroad. he seemed very anxious to know when workmen might be put upon the road again so as to make repairs and put it in shape for running. it was a large piece of property to have standing idle. i told him i could not answer then positively but would try and inform him before a great while. on my return mr. garrett met me again with the same and i told him i thought that by the wednesday he might send his workmen out on his road. i gave him no further information however, and he had no suspicion of how i expected to have the road cleared for his workmen. sheridan moved at the time he had fixed upon. he met early at the crossing of opequon creek, and won a most decisive victory--one which electrified the country. early had invited this attack himself by his bad generalship and made the victory easy. he had sent g. t. anderson's division east of the blue ridge before i went to harper's ferry; and about the time i arrived there he started other divisions (leaving but two in their camps) to march to martinsburg for the purpose destroying the baltimore and ohio railroad at that point. early here learned that i had been with sheridan and, supposing there was some movement on foot, started back as soon as he got the information. but his forces were separated and, as i have said, he was very badly defeated. he fell back to fisher's hill, sheridan following. the valley is narrow at that point, and early made another stand there, behind works which extended across. but sheridan turned both his flanks and again sent him speeding up the valley, following in hot pursuit. the pursuit was continued up the valley to mount jackson and new market. sheridan captured about eleven hundred prisoners and sixteen guns. the houses which he passed all along the route were found to be filled with early's wounded, and the country swarmed with his deserters. finally, on the 25th, early turned from the valley eastward, leaving sheridan at harrisonburg in undisputed possession. now one of the main objects of the expedition began to be accomplished. sheridan went to work with his command, gathering in the crops, cattle, and everything in the upper part of the valley required by our troops; and especially taking what might be of use to the enemy. what he could not take away he destroyed, so that the enemy would not be invited to come back there. i congratulated sheridan upon his recent great victory and had a salute of a hundred guns fired in honor of it, the guns being aimed at the enemy around petersburg. i also notified the other commanders throughout the country, who also fired salutes in honor of his victory. i had reason to believe that the administration was a little afraid to have a decisive battle at that time, for fear it might go against us and have a bad effect on the november elections. the convention which had met and made its nomination of the democratic candidate for the presidency had declared the war a failure. treason was talked as boldly in chicago at that convention as ever been in charleston. it was a question whether the government would then have had the power to make arrests and punish those who talked treason. but this decisive victory was the most effective campaign argument made in the canvass. sheridan, in his pursuit, got beyond where they could hear from him in washington, and the president became very much frightened about him. he was afraid that the hot pursuit had been a little like that of general cass was said to have been, in one of our indian wars, when he was an officer of army. cass was pursuing the indians so closely that the first thing he knew he found himself in front, and the indians pursuing him. the president was afraid that sheridan had got on the other side of early and that early was in behind him. he was afraid that sheridan was getting so far away that reinforcements would be sent out from richmond to enable early to beat him. i replied to the president that i had taken steps to prevent lee from sending reinforcements to early, by attacking the former where he was. on the 28th of september, to retain lee in his position, i sent ord with the 18th corps and birney with the 10th corps to make an advance on richmond, to threaten it. ord moved with the left wing up to chaffin's bluff; birney with the 10th corps took a road farther north; while kautz with the cavalry took the darby road, still farther to the north. they got across the river by the next morning, and made an effort to surprise the enemy. in that, however, they were unsuccessful. the enemy's lines were very strong and very intricate. stannard's division of the 18th corps with general burnham's brigade leading, tried an assault against fort harrison and captured it with sixteen guns and a good many prisoners. burnham was killed in the assault. colonel stevens who succeeded him was badly wounded; and his successor also fell in the same way. some works to the right and left were also carried with the guns in them--six in number--and a few more prisoners. birney's troops to the right captured the enemy's intrenched picket-lines, but were unsuccessful in their efforts upon the main line. our troops fortified their new position, bringing fort harrison into the new line and extending it to the river. this brought us pretty close to the enemy on the north side of the james, and the two opposing lines maintained their relative positions to the close of the siege. in the afternoon a further attempt was made to advance, but it failed. ord fell badly wounded, and had to be relieved; the command devolved upon general heckman, and later general weitzel was assigned to the command of the 18th corps. during the night lee reinforced his troops about fort gilmer, which was at the right of fort harrison, by eight additional brigades from petersburg, and attempted to retake the works which we had captured by concentrating ten brigades against them. all their efforts failed, their attacks being all repulsed with very heavy loss. in one of these assaults upon us general stannard, a gallant officer who was defending fort harrison, lost an arm. our casualties during these operations amounted to 394 killed, i,554 wounded and 324 missing. whilst this was going on general meade was instructed to keep up an appearance of moving troops to our extreme left. parke and warren were kept with two divisions, each under arms, ready to move leaving their enclosed batteries manned, with a scattering line on the other intrenchments. the object of this was to prevent reinforcements from going to the north side of the river. meade was instructed to watch the enemy closely and, if lee weakened his lines, to make an attack. on the 30th these troops moved out, under warren, and captured an advanced intrenched camp at peeble's farm, driving the enemy back to the main line. our troops followed and made an attack in the hope of carrying the enemy's main line; but in this they were unsuccessful and lost a large number of men, mostly captured. the number of killed and wounded was not large. the next day our troops advanced again and established themselves, intrenching a new line about a mile in front of the enemy. this advanced warren's position on the weldon railroad very considerably. sheridan having driven the enemy out of the valley, and taken the productions of the valley so that instead of going there for supplies the enemy would have to bring his provisions with him if he again entered it, recommended a reduction of his own force, the surplus to be sent where it could be of more use. i approved of his suggestion, and ordered him to send wright's corps back to the james river. i further directed him to repair the railroad up the shenandoah valley towards the advanced position which we would hold with a small force. the troops were to be sent to washington by the way of culpeper, in order to watch the east side of the blue ridge, and prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of sheridan while he was still doing his work of destruction. the valley was so very important, however, to the confederate army that, contrary to our expectations, they determined to make one more strike, and save it if possible before the supplies should be all destroyed. reinforcements were sent therefore to early, and this before any of our troops had been withdrawn. early prepared to strike sheridan at harrisonburg; but the latter had not remained there. on the 6th of october sheridan commenced retiring down the valley, taking or destroying all the food and forage and driving the cattle before him, early following. at fisher's hill sheridan turned his cavalry back on that of early, which, under the lead of rosser, was pursuing closely, and routed it most completely, capturing eleven guns and a large number of prisoners. sheridan lost only about sixty men. his cavalry pursued the enemy back some twenty-five miles. on the 10th of october the march down the valley was again resumed, early again following. i now ordered sheridan to halt, and to improve the opportunity if afforded by the enemy's having been sufficiently weakened, to move back again and cut the james river canal and virginia central railroad. but this order had to go through washington where it was intercepted; and when sheridan received what purported to be a statement of what i wanted him to do it was something entirely different. halleck informed sheridan that it was my wish for him to hold a forward position as a base from which to act against charlottesville and gordonsville; that he should fortify this position and provision it. sheridan objected to this most decidedly; and i was impelled to telegraph him, on the 14th, as follows: city point, va., october 14, 1864.--12.30 p.m. major-general sheridan, cedar creek, va. what i want is for you to threaten the virginia central railroad and canal in the manner your judgment tells you is best, holding yourself ready to advance, if the enemy draw off their forces. if you make the enemy hold a force equal to your own for the protection of those thoroughfares, it will accomplish nearly as much as their destruction. if you cannot do this, then the next best thing to do is to send here all the force you can. i deem a good cavalry force necessary for your offensive, as well as defensive operations. you need not therefore send here more than one division of cavalry. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sheridan having been summoned to washington city, started on the 15th leaving wright in command. his army was then at cedar creek, some twenty miles south of winchester. the next morning while at front royal, sheridan received a dispatch from wright, saying that a dispatch from longstreet to early had been intercepted. it directed the latter to be ready to move and to crush sheridan as soon as he, longstreet, arrived. on the receipt of this news sheridan ordered the cavalry up the valley to join wright. on the 18th of october early was ready to move, and during the night succeeded in getting his troops in the rear of our left flank, which fled precipitately and in great confusion down the valley, losing eighteen pieces of artillery and a thousand or more prisoners. the right under general getty maintained a firm and steady front, falling back to middletown where it took a position and made a stand. the cavalry went to the rear, seized the roads leading to winchester and held them for the use of our troops in falling back, general wright having ordered a retreat back to that place. sheridan having left washington on the 18th, reached winchester that night. the following morning he started to join his command. he had scarcely got out of town, when he met his men returning in panic from the front and also heard heavy firing to the south. he immediately ordered the cavalry at winchester to be deployed across the valley to stop the stragglers. leaving members of his staff to take care of winchester and the public property there, he set out with a small escort directly for the scene of battle. as he met the fugitives he ordered them to turn back, reminding them that they were going the wrong way. his presence soon restored confidence. finding themselves worse frightened than hurt the men did halt and turn back. many of those who had run ten miles got back in time to redeem their reputation as gallant soldiers before night. when sheridan got to the front he found getty and custer still holding their ground firmly between the confederates and our retreating troops. everything in the rear was now ordered up. sheridan at once proceeded to intrench his position; and he awaited an assault from the enemy. this was made with vigor, and was directed principally against emory's corps, which had sustained the principal loss in the first attack. by one o'clock the attack was repulsed. early was so badly damaged that he seemed disinclined to make another attack, but went to work to intrench himself with a view to holding the position he had already gained. he thought, no doubt, that sheridan would be glad enough to leave him unmolested; but in this he was mistaken. about the middle of the afternoon sheridan advanced. he sent his cavalry by both flanks, and they penetrated to the enemy's rear. the contest was close for a time, but at length the left of the enemy broke, and disintegration along the whole line soon followed. early tried to rally his men, but they were followed so closely that they had to give way very quickly every time they attempted to make a stand. our cavalry, having pushed on and got in the rear of the confederates, captured twenty-four pieces of artillery, besides retaking what had been lost in the morning. this victory pretty much closed the campaigning in the valley of virginia. all the confederate troops were sent back to richmond with the exception of one division of infantry and a little cavalry. wright's corps was ordered back to the army of the potomac, and two other divisions were withdrawn from the valley. early had lost more men in killed, wounded and captured in the valley than sheridan had commanded from first to last. on more than one occasion in these engagements general r. b. hayes, who succeeded me as president of the united states, bore a very honorable part. his conduct on the field was marked by conspicuous gallantry as well as the display of qualities of a higher order than that of mere personal daring. this might well have been expected of one who could write at the time he is said to have done so: "any officer fit for duty who at this crisis would abandon his post to electioneer for a seat in congress, ought to be scalped." having entered the army as a major of volunteers at the beginning of the war, general hayes attained by meritorious service the rank of brevet major-general before its close. on the north side of the james river the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry on the 7th of october, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery. this was followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in heavy loss to us. on the 24th i ordered general meade to attempt to get possession of the south side railroad, and for that purpose to advance on the 27th. the attempt proved a failure, however, the most advanced of our troops not getting nearer than within six miles of the point aimed for. seeing the impossibility of its accomplishment i ordered the troops to withdraw, and they were all back in their former positions the next day. butler, by my directions, also made a demonstration on the north side of the james river in order to support this move, by detaining there the confederate troops who were on that side. he succeeded in this, but failed of further results by not marching past the enemy's left before turning in on the darby road and by reason of simply coming up against their lines in place. this closed active operations around richmond for the winter. of course there was frequent skirmishing between pickets, but no serious battle was fought near either petersburg or richmond. it would prolong this work to give a detailed account of all that took place from day to day around petersburg and at other parts of my command, and it would not interest the general reader if given. all these details can be found by the military student in a series of books published by the scribners, badeau's history of my campaigns, and also in the publications of the war department, including both the national and confederate reports. in the latter part of november general hancock was relieved from the command of the 2d corps by the secretary of war and ordered to washington, to organize and command a corps of veteran troops to be designated the 1st corps. it was expected that this would give him a large command to co-operate with in the spring. it was my expectation, at the time, that in the final operations hancock should move either up the valley, or else east of the blue ridge to lynchburg; the idea being to make the spring campaign the close of the war. i expected, with sherman coming up from the south, meade south of petersburg and around richmond, and thomas's command in tennessee with depots of supplies established in the eastern part of that state, to move from the direction of washington or the valley towards lynchburg. we would then have lee so surrounded that his supplies would be cut off entirely, making it impossible for him to support his army. general humphreys, chief-of-staff of the army of the potomac, was assigned to the command of the 2d corps, to succeed hancock. chapter lix. the campaign in georgia--sherman's march to the sea--war anecdotes--the march on savannah--investment of savannah--capture of savannah. let us now return to the operations in the military division of the mississippi, and accompany sherman in his march to the sea. the possession of atlanta by us narrowed the territory of the enemy very materially and cut off one of his two remaining lines of roads from east to west. a short time after the fall of atlanta mr. davis visited palmetto and macon and made speeches at each place. he spoke at palmetto on the 20th of september, and at macon on the 22d. inasmuch as he had relieved johnston and appointed hood, and hood had immediately taken the initiative, it is natural to suppose that mr. davis was disappointed with general johnston's policy. my own judgment is that johnston acted very wisely: he husbanded his men and saved as much of his territory as he could, without fighting decisive battles in which all might be lost. as sherman advanced, as i have show, his army became spread out, until, if this had been continued, it would have been easy to destroy it in detail. i know that both sherman and i were rejoiced when we heard of the change. hood was unquestionably a brave, gallant soldier and not destitute of ability; but unfortunately his policy was to fight the enemy wherever he saw him, without thinking much of the consequences of defeat. in his speeches mr. davis denounced governor brown, of georgia, and general johnston in unmeasured terms, even insinuating that their loyalty to the southern cause was doubtful. so far as general johnston is concerned, i think davis did him a great injustice in this particular. i had know the general before the war and strongly believed it would be impossible for him to accept a high commission for the purpose of betraying the cause he had espoused. there, as i have said, i think that his policy was the best one that could have been pursued by the whole south--protract the war, which was all that was necessary to enable them to gain recognition in the end. the north was already growing weary, as the south evidently was also, but with this difference. in the north the people governed, and could stop hostilities whenever they chose to stop supplies. the south was a military camp, controlled absolutely by the government with soldiers to back it, and the war could have been protracted, no matter to what extent the discontent reached, up to the point of open mutiny of the soldiers themselves. mr. davis's speeches were frank appeals to the people of georgia and that portion of the south to come to their relief. he tried to assure his frightened hearers that the yankees were rapidly digging their own graves; that measures were already being taken to cut them off from supplies from the north; and that with a force in front, and cut off from the rear, they must soon starve in the midst of a hostile people. papers containing reports of these speeches immediately reached the northern states, and they were republished. of course, that caused no alarm so long as telegraphic communication was kept up with sherman. when hood was forced to retreat from atlanta he moved to the south-west and was followed by a portion of sherman's army. he soon appeared upon the railroad in sherman's rear, and with his whole army began destroying the road. at the same time also the work was begun in tennessee and kentucky which mr. davis had assured his hearers at palmetto and macon would take place. he ordered forrest (about the ablest cavalry general in the south) north for this purpose; and forrest and wheeler carried out their orders with more or less destruction, occasionally picking up a garrison. forrest indeed performed the very remarkable feat of capturing, with cavalry, two gunboats and a number of transports, something the accomplishment of which is very hard to account for. hood's army had been weakened by governor brown's withdrawing the georgia state troops for the purpose of gathering in the season's crops for the use of the people and for the use of the army. this not only depleted hood's forces but it served a most excellent purpose in gathering in supplies of food and forage for the use of our army in its subsequent march. sherman was obliged to push on with his force and go himself with portions of it hither and thither, until it was clearly demonstrated to him that with the army he then had it would be impossible to hold the line from atlanta back and leave him any force whatever with which to take the offensive. had that plan been adhered to, very large reinforcements would have been necessary; and mr. davis's prediction of the destruction of the army would have been realized, or else sherman would have been obliged to make a successful retreat, which mr. davis said in his speeches would prove more disastrous than napoleon's retreat from moscow. these speeches of mr. davis were not long in reaching sherman. he took advantage of the information they gave, and made all the preparation possible for him to make to meet what now became expected, attempts to break his communications. something else had to be done: and to sherman's sensible and soldierly mind the idea was not long in dawning upon him, not only that something else had to be done, but what that something else should be. on september 10th i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., sept. 10, 1864. major-general sherman, atlanta, georgia. so soon as your men are sufficiently rested, and preparations can be made, it is desirable that another campaign should be commenced. we want to keep the enemy constantly pressed to the end of the war. if we give him no peace whilst the war lasts, the end cannot be distant. now that we have all of mobile bay that is valuable, i do not know but it will be the best move to transfer canby's troops to act upon savannah, whilst you move on augusta. i should like to hear from you, however, in this matter. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. sherman replied promptly: "if i could be sure of finding provisions and ammunition at augusta, or columbus, georgia, i can march to milledgeville, and compel hood to give up augusta or macon, and then turn on the other. * * * if you can manage to take the savannah river as high up as augusta, or the chattahoochee as far up as columbus, i can sweep the whole state of georgia." on the 12th i sent a special messenger, one of my own staff, with a letter inviting sherman's views about the next campaign. city point, va., sept. 12, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill division of the mississippi. i send lieutenant-colonel porter, of my staff, with this. colonel porter will explain to you the exact condition of affairs here better than i can do in the limits of a letter. although i feel myself strong enough for offensive operations, i am holding on quietly to get advantage of recruits and convalescents, who are coming forward very rapidly. my lines are necessarily very long, extending from deep bottom north of the james across the peninsula formed by the appomattox and the james, and south of the appomattox to the weldon road. this line is very strongly fortified, and can be held with comparatively few men, but from its great length takes many in the aggregate. i propose, when i do move, to extend my left so as to control what is known as the south side, or lynchburg and petersburg road, then if possible to keep the danville road cut. at the same time this move is made, i want to send a force of from six to ten thousand men against wilmington. the way i propose to do this is to land the men north of fort fisher, and hold that point. at the same time a large naval fleet will be assembled there, and the iron-clads will run the batteries as they did at mobile. this will give us the same control of the harbor of wilmington that we now have of the harbor of mobile. what you are to do with the forces at your command, i do not see. the difficulties of supplying your army, except when you are constantly moving, beyond where you are, i plainly see. if it had not been for price's movements canby would have sent twelve thousand more men to mobile. from your command on the mississippi an equal number could have been taken. with these forces my idea would have been to divide them, sending one half to mobile and the other half to savannah. you could then move as proposed in your telegram, so as to threaten macon and augusta equally. whichever was abandoned by the enemy you could take and open up a new base of supplies. my object now in sending a staff officer is not so much to suggest operations for you, as to get your views and have plans matured by the time everything can be got ready. it will probably be the 5th of october before any of the plans herein indicated will be executed. if you have any promotions to recommend, send the names forward and i will approve them. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. this reached sherman on september 20th. on the 25th of september sherman reported to washington that hood's troops were in his rear. he had provided against this by sending a division to chattanooga and a division to rome, georgia, which was in the rear of hood, supposing that hood would fall back in the direction from which he had come to reach the railroad. at the same time sherman and hood kept up a correspondence relative to the exchange of prisoners, the treatment of citizens, and other matters suitable to be arranged between hostile commanders in the field. on the 27th of september i telegraphed sherman as follows: city point, va., september 27, 1864--10.30 a.m. major-general sherman: i have directed all recruits and new troops from the western states to be sent to nashville, to receive their further orders from you. * * * u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. on the 29th sherman sent thomas back to chattanooga, and afterwards to nashville, with another division (morgan's) of the advanced army. sherman then suggested that, when he was prepared, his movements should take place against milledgeville and then to savannah. his expectation at that time was, to make this movement as soon as he could get up his supplies. hood was moving in his own country, and was moving light so that he could make two miles to sherman's one. he depended upon the country to gather his supplies, and so was not affected by delays. as i have said, until this unexpected state of affairs happened, mobile had been looked upon as the objective point of sherman's army. it had been a favorite move of mine from 1862, when i first suggested to the then commander-in-chief that the troops in louisiana, instead of frittering away their time in the trans-mississippi, should move against mobile. i recommended this from time to time until i came into command of the army, the last of march 1864. having the power in my own hands, i now ordered the concentration of supplies, stores and troops, in the department of the gulf about new orleans, with a view to a move against mobile, in support of, and in conjunction with, the other armies operating in the field. before i came into command, these troops had been scattered over the trans-mississippi department in such a way that they could not be, or were not, gotten back in time to take any part in the original movement; hence the consideration, which had caused mobile to be selected as the objective point for sherman's army to find his next base of supplies after having cut loose from atlanta, no longer existed. general g. m. dodge, an exceedingly efficient officer, having been badly wounded, had to leave the army about the first of october. he was in command of two divisions of the 16th corps, consolidated into one. sherman then divided his army into the right and left wings the right commanded by general o. o. howard and the left by general slocum. general dodge's two divisions were assigned, one to each of these wings. howard's command embraced the 15th and 17th corps, and slocum's the 14th and 20th corps, commanded by generals jeff. c. davis and a. s. williams. generals logan and blair commanded the two corps composing the right wing. about this time they left to take part in the presidential election, which took place that year, leaving their corps to osterhaus and ransom. i have no doubt that their leaving was at the earnest solicitation of the war department. general blair got back in time to resume his command and to proceed with it throughout the march to the sea and back to the grand review at washington. general logan did not return to his command until after it reached savannah. logan felt very much aggrieved at the transfer of general howard from that portion of the army of the potomac which was then with the western army, to the command of the army of the tennessee, with which army general logan had served from the battle of belmont to the fall of atlanta--having passed successively through all grades from colonel commanding a regiment to general commanding a brigade, division and army corps, until upon the death of mcpherson the command of the entire army of the tennessee devolved upon him in the midst of a hotly contested battle. he conceived that he had done his full duty as commander in that engagement; and i can bear testimony, from personal observation, that he had proved himself fully equal to all the lower positions which he had occupied as a soldier. i will not pretend to question the motive which actuated sherman in taking an officer from another army to supersede general logan. i have no doubt, whatever, that he did this for what he considered would be to the good of the service, which was more important than that the personal feelings of any individual should not be aggrieved; though i doubt whether he had an officer with him who could have filled the place as logan would have done. differences of opinion must exist between the best of friends as to policies in war, and of judgment as to men's fitness. the officer who has the command, however, should be allowed to judge of the fitness of the officers under him, unless he is very manifestly wrong. sherman's army, after all the depletions, numbered about sixty thousand effective men. all weak men had been left to hold the rear, and those remaining were not only well men, but strong and hardy, so that he had sixty thousand as good soldiers as ever trod the earth; better than any european soldiers, because they not only worked like a machine but the machine thought. european armies know very little what they are fighting for, and care less. included in these sixty thousand troops, there were two small divisions of cavalry, numbering altogether about four thousand men. hood had about thirty-five to forty thousand men, independent of forrest, whose forces were operating in tennessee and kentucky, as mr. davis had promised they should. this part of mr. davis's military plan was admirable, and promised the best results of anything he could have done, according to my judgment. i say this because i have criticised his military judgment in the removal of johnston, and also in the appointment of hood. i am aware, however, that there was high feeling existing at that time between davis and his subordinate, whom i regarded as one of his ablest lieutenants. on the 5th of october the railroad back from atlanta was again very badly broken, hood having got on the track with his army. sherman saw after night, from a high point, the road burning for miles. the defence of the railroad by our troops was very gallant, but they could not hold points between their intrenched positions against hood's whole army; in fact they made no attempt to do so; but generally the intrenched positions were held, as well as important bridges, and store located at them. allatoona, for instance, was defended by a small force of men under the command of general corse, one of the very able and efficient volunteer officers produced by the war. he, with a small force, was cut off from the remainder of the national army and was attacked with great vigor by many times his own number. sherman from his high position could see the battle raging, with the confederate troops between him and his subordinate. he sent men, of course, to raise the temporary siege, but the time that would be necessarily consumed in reaching corse, would be so great that all occupying the intrenchments might be dead. corse was a man who would never surrender. from a high position some of sherman's signal corps discovered a signal flag waving from a hole in the block house at allatoona. it was from corse. he had been shot through the face, but he signalled to his chief a message which left no doubt of his determination to hold his post at all hazards. it was at this point probably, that sherman first realized that with the forces at his disposal, the keeping open of his line of communication with the north would be impossible if he expected to retain any force with which to operate offensively beyond atlanta. he proposed, therefore, to destroy the roads back to chattanooga, when all ready to move, and leave the latter place garrisoned. yet, before abandoning the railroad, it was necessary that he should repair damages already done, and hold the road until he could get forward such supplies, ordnance stores and small rations, as he wanted to carry with him on his proposed march, and to return to the north his surplus artillery; his object being to move light and to have no more artillery than could be used to advantage on the field. sherman thought hood would follow him, though he proposed to prepare for the contingency of the latter moving the other way while he was moving south, by making thomas strong enough to hold tennessee and kentucky. i, myself, was thoroughly satisfied that hood would go north, as he did. on the 2d of november i telegraphed sherman authorizing him definitely to move according to the plan he had proposed: that is, cutting loose from his base, giving up atlanta and the railroad back to chattanooga. to strengthen thomas he sent stanley (4th corps) back, and also ordered schofield, commanding the army of the ohio, twelve thousand strong, to report to him. in addition to this, a. j. smith, who, with two divisions of sherman's army, was in missouri aiding rosecrans in driving the enemy from that state, was under orders to return to thomas and, under the most unfavorable circumstances, might be expected to arrive there long before hood could reach nashville. in addition to this, the new levies of troops that were being raised in the north-west went to thomas as rapidly as enrolled and equipped. thomas, without any of these additions spoken of, had a garrison at chattanooga which had been strengthened by one division and garrisons at bridgeport, stevenson, decatur, murfreesboro, and florence. there were already with him in nashville ten thousand soldiers in round numbers, and many thousands of employees in the quartermaster's and other departments who could be put in the intrenchments in front of nashville, for its defence. also, wilson was there with ten thousand dismounted cavalrymen, who were being equipped for the field. thomas had at this time about forty-five thousand men without any of the reinforcements here above enumerated. these reinforcements gave him altogether about seventy thousand men, without counting what might be added by the new levies already spoken of. about this time beauregard arrived upon the field, not to supersede hood in command, but to take general charge over the entire district in which hood and sherman were, or might be, operating. he made the most frantic appeals to the citizens for assistance to be rendered in every way: by sending reinforcements, by destroying supplies on the line of march of the invaders, by destroying the bridges over which they would have to cross, and by, in every way, obstructing the roads to their front. but it was hard to convince the people of the propriety of destroying supplies which were so much needed by themselves, and each one hoped that his own possessions might escape. hood soon started north, and went into camp near decatur, alabama, where he remained until the 29th of october, but without making an attack on the garrison of that place. the tennessee river was patrolled by gunboats, from muscle shoals east; and, also, below the second shoals out to the ohio river. these, with the troops that might be concentrated from the garrisons along the river at any point where hood might choose to attempt to cross, made it impossible for him to cross the tennessee at any place where it was navigable. but muscle shoals is not navigable, and below them again is another shoal which also obstructs navigation. hood therefore moved down to a point nearly opposite florence, alabama, crossed over and remained there for some time, collecting supplies of food, forage and ammunition. all of these had to come from a considerable distance south, because the region in which he was then situated was mountainous, with small valleys which produced but little, and what they had produced had long since been exhausted. on the 1st of november i suggested to sherman, and also asked his views thereon, the propriety of destroying hood before he started on his campaign. on the 2d of november, as stated, i approved definitely his making his proposed campaign through georgia, leaving hood behind to the tender mercy of thomas and the troops in his command. sherman fixed the 10th of november as the day of starting. sherman started on that day to get back to atlanta, and on the 15th the real march to the sea commenced. the right wing, under howard, and the cavalry went to jonesboro, milledgeville, then the capital of georgia, being sherman's objective or stopping place on the way to savannah. the left wing moved to stone mountain, along roads much farther east than those taken by the right wing. slocum was in command, and threatened augusta as the point to which he was moving, but he was to turn off and meet the right wing at milledgeville. atlanta was destroyed so far as to render it worthless for military purposes before starting, sherman himself remaining over a day to superintend the work, and see that it was well done. sherman's orders for this campaign were perfect. before starting, he had sent back all sick, disabled and weak men, retaining nothing but the hardy, well-inured soldiers to accompany him on his long march in prospect. his artillery was reduced to sixty-five guns. the ammunition carried with them was two hundred rounds for musket and gun. small rations were taken in a small wagon train, which was loaded to its capacity for rapid movement. the army was expected to live on the country, and to always keep the wagons full of forage and provisions against a possible delay of a few days. the troops, both of the right and left wings, made most of their advance along the line of railroads, which they destroyed. the method adopted to perform this work, was to burn and destroy all the bridges and culverts, and for a long distance, at places, to tear up the track and bend the rails. soldiers to do this rapidly would form a line along one side of the road with crowbars and poles, place these under the rails and, hoisting all at once, turn over many rods of road at one time. the ties would then be placed in piles, and the rails, as they were loosened, would be carried and put across these log heaps. when a sufficient number of rails were placed upon a pile of ties it would be set on fire. this would heat the rails very much more in the middle, that being over the main part of the fire, than at the ends, so that they would naturally bend of their own weight; but the soldiers, to increase the damage, would take tongs and, one or two men at each end of the rail, carry it with force against the nearest tree and twist it around, thus leaving rails forming bands to ornament the forest trees of georgia. all this work was going on at the same time, there being a sufficient number of men detailed for that purpose. some piled the logs and built the fire; some put the rails upon the fire; while others would bend those that were sufficiently heated: so that, by the time the last bit of road was torn up, that it was designed to destroy at a certain place, the rails previously taken up were already destroyed. the organization for supplying the army was very complete. each brigade furnished a company to gather supplies of forage and provisions for the command to which they belonged. strict injunctions were issued against pillaging, or otherwise unnecessarily annoying the people; but everything in shape of food for man and forage for beast was taken. the supplies were turned over to the brigade commissary and quartermaster, and were issued by them to their respective commands precisely the same as if they had been purchased. the captures consisted largely of cattle, sheep, poultry, some bacon, cornmeal, often molasses, and occasionally coffee or other small rations. the skill of these men, called by themselves and the army "bummers," in collecting their loads and getting back to their respective commands, was marvellous. when they started out in the morning, they were always on foot; but scarcely one of them returned in the evening without being mounted on a horse or mule. these would be turned in for the general use of the army, and the next day these men would start out afoot and return again in the evening mounted. many of the exploits of these men would fall under the head of romance; indeed, i am afraid that in telling some of their experiences, the romance got the better of the truth upon which the story was founded, and that, in the way many of these anecdotes are told, very little of the foundation is left. i suspect that most of them consist chiefly of the fiction added to make the stories better. in one instance it was reported that a few men of sherman's army passed a house where they discovered some chickens under the dwelling. they immediately proceeded to capture them, to add to the army's supplies. the lady of the house, who happened to be at home, made piteous appeals to have these spared, saying they were a few she had put away to save by permission of other parties who had preceded and who had taken all the others that she had. the soldiers seemed moved at her appeal; but looking at the chickens again they were tempted and one of them replied: "the rebellion must be suppressed if it takes the last chicken in the confederacy," and proceeded to appropriate the last one. another anecdote characteristic of these times has been told. the south, prior to the rebellion, kept bloodhounds to pursue runaway slaves who took refuge in the neighboring swamps, and also to hunt convicts. orders were issued to kill all these animals as they were met with. on one occasion a soldier picked up a poodle, the favorite pet of its mistress, and was carrying it off to execution when the lady made a strong appeal to him to spare it. the soldier replied, "madam, our orders are to kill every bloodhound." "but this is not a bloodhound," said the lady. "well, madam, we cannot tell what it will grow into if we leave it behind," said the soldier as he went off with it. notwithstanding these anecdotes, and the necessary hardship they would seem to imply, i do not believe there was much unwarrantable pillaging considering that we were in the enemy's territory and without any supplies except such as the country afforded. on the 23d sherman, with the left wing, reached milledgeville. the right wing was not far off: but proceeded on its way towards savannah destroying the road as it went. the troops at milledgeville remained over a day to destroy factories, buildings used for military purposes, etc., before resuming its march. the governor, who had been almost defying mr. davis before this, now fled precipitately, as did the legislature of the state and all the state officers. the governor, sherman says, was careful to carry away even his garden vegetables, while he left the archives of the state to fall into our hands. the only military force that was opposed to sherman's forward march was the georgia militia, a division under the command of general g. w. smith, and a battalion under harry wayne. neither the quality of the forces nor their numbers was sufficient to even retard the progress of sherman's army. the people at the south became so frantic at this time at the successful invasion of georgia that they took the cadets from the military college and added them to the ranks of the militia. they even liberated the state convicts under promise from them that they would serve in the army. i have but little doubt that the worst acts that were attributed to sherman's army were committed by these convicts, and by other southern people who ought to have been under sentence--such people as could be found in every community, north and south--who took advantage of their country being invaded to commit crime. they were in but little danger of detection, or of arrest even if detected. the southern papers in commenting upon sherman's movements pictured him as in the most deplorable condition: stating that his men were starving, that they were demoralized and wandering about almost without object, aiming only to reach the sea coast and get under the protection of our navy. these papers got to the north and had more or less effect upon the minds of the people, causing much distress to all loyal persons particularly to those who had husbands, sons or brothers with sherman. mr. lincoln seeing these accounts, had a letter written asking me if i could give him anything that he could say to the loyal people that would comfort them. i told him there was not the slightest occasion for alarm; that with 60,000 such men as sherman had with him, such a commanding officer as he was could not be cut off in the open country. he might possibly be prevented from reaching the point he had started out to reach, but he would get through somewhere and would finally get to his chosen destination: and even if worst came to worst he could return north. i heard afterwards of mr. lincoln's saying, to those who would inquire of him as to what he thought about the safety of sherman's army, that sherman was all right: "grant says they are safe with such a general, and that if they cannot get out where they want to, they can crawl back by the hole they went in at." while at milledgeville the soldiers met at the state house, organized a legislature, and proceeded to business precisely as if they were the legislative body belonging to the state of georgia. the debates were exciting, and were upon the subject of the situation the south was in at that time, particularly the state of georgia. they went so far as to repeal, after a spirited and acrimonious debate, the ordinance of secession. the next day (24th) sherman continued his march, going by the way of waynesboro and louisville, millen being the next objective and where the two columns (the right and left wings) were to meet. the left wing moved to the left of the direct road, and the cavalry still farther off so as to make it look as though augusta was the point they were aiming for. they moved on all the roads they could find leading in that direction. the cavalry was sent to make a rapid march in hope of surprising millen before the union prisoners could be carried away; but they failed in this. the distance from milledgeville to millen was about one hundred miles. at this point wheeler, who had been ordered from tennessee, arrived and swelled the numbers and efficiency of the troops confronting sherman. hardee, a native of georgia, also came, but brought no troops with him. it was intended that he should raise as large an army as possible with which to intercept sherman's march. he did succeed in raising some troops, and with these and those under the command of wheeler and wayne, had an army sufficient to cause some annoyance but no great detention. our cavalry and wheeler's had a pretty severe engagement, in which wheeler was driven towards augusta, thus giving the idea that sherman was probably making for that point. millen was reached on the 3d of december, and the march was resumed the following day for savannah, the final objective. bragg had now been sent to augusta with some troops. wade hampton was there also trying to raise cavalry sufficient to destroy sherman's army. if he ever raised a force it was too late to do the work expected of it. hardee's whole force probably numbered less than ten thousand men. from millen to savannah the country is sandy and poor, and affords but very little forage other than rice straw, which was then growing. this answered a very good purpose as forage, and the rice grain was an addition to the soldier's rations. no further resistance worthy of note was met with, until within a few miles of savannah. this place was found to be intrenched and garrisoned. sherman proceeded at once on his arrival to invest the place, and found that the enemy had placed torpedoes in the ground, which were to explode when stepped on by man or beast. one of these exploded under an officer's horse, blowing the animal to pieces and tearing one of the legs of the officer so badly that it had to be amputated. sherman at once ordered his prisoners to the front, moving them in a compact body in advance, to either explode the torpedoes or dig them up. no further explosion took place. on the 10th of december the siege of savannah commenced. sherman then, before proceeding any further with operations for the capture of the place, started with some troops to open communication with our fleet, which he expected to find in the lower harbor or as near by as the forts of the enemy would permit. in marching to the coast he encountered fort mcallister, which it was necessary to reduce before the supplies he might find on shipboard could be made available. fort mcallister was soon captured by an assault made by general hazen's division. communication was then established with the fleet. the capture of savannah then only occupied a few days, and involved no great loss of life. the garrison, however, as we shall see, was enabled to escape by crossing the river and moving eastward. when sherman had opened communication with the fleet he found there a steamer, which i had forwarded to him, carrying the accumulated mails for his army, also supplies which i supposed he would be in need of. general j. g. foster, who commanded all the troops south of north carolina on the atlantic sea-board, visited general sherman before he had opened communication with the fleet, with the view of ascertaining what assistance he could be to him. foster returned immediately to his own headquarters at hilton head, for the purpose of sending sherman siege guns, and also if he should find he had them to spare, supplies of clothing, hard bread, etc., thinking that these articles might not be found outside. the mail on the steamer which i sent down, had been collected by colonel a. h. markland of the post office department, who went in charge of it. on this same vessel i sent an officer of my staff (lieutenant dunn) with the following letter to general sherman: city point, va., dec. 3, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding armies near savannah, ga. the little information gleaned from the southern press, indicating no great obstacle to your progress, i have directed your mails (which had been previously collected at baltimore by colonel markland, special agent of the post office department) to be sent as far as the blockading squadron off savannah, to be forwarded to you as soon as heard from on the coast. not liking to rejoice before the victory is assured, i abstain from congratulating you and those under your command, until bottom has been struck. i have never had a fear, however, for the result. since you left atlanta, no very great progress has been made here. the enemy has been closely watched though, and prevented from detaching against you. i think not one man has gone from here, except some twelve or fifteen hundred dismounted cavalry. bragg has gone from wilmington. i am trying to take advantage of his absence to get possession of that place. owing to some preparations admiral porter and general butler are making to blow up fort fisher (which, while hoping for the best, i do not believe a particle in), there is a delay in getting this expedition off. i hope they will be ready to start by the 7th, and that bragg will not have started back by that time. in this letter i do not intend to give you anything like directions for future action, but will state a general idea i have, and will get your views after you have established yourself on the sea-coast. with your veteran army i hope to get control of the only two through routes from east to west possessed by the enemy before the fall of atlanta. the condition will be filled by holding savannah and augusta, or by holding any other port to the east of savannah and branchville. if wilmington falls, a force from there can co-operate with you. thomas has got back into the defences of nashville, with hood close upon him. decatur has been abandoned, and so have all the roads except the main one leading to chattanooga. part of this falling back was undoubtedly necessary and all of it may have been. it did not look so, however, to me. in my opinion, thomas far outnumbers hood in infantry. in cavalry, hood has the advantage in morale and numbers. i hope yet that hood will be badly crippled if not destroyed. the general news you will learn from the papers better than i could give it. after all becomes quiet, and roads become so bad up here that there is likely to be a week or two when nothing can be done, i will run down the coast to see you. if you desire it, i will ask mrs. sherman to go with me. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general i quote this letter because it gives the reader a full knowledge of the events of that period. sherman now (the 15th) returned to savannah to complete its investment and insure the surrender of the garrison. the country about savannah is low and marshy, and the city was well intrenched from the river above to the river below; and assaults could not be made except along a comparatively narrow causeway. for this reason assaults must have resulted in serious destruction of life to the union troops, with the chance of failing altogether. sherman therefore decided upon a complete investment of the place. when he believed this investment completed, he summoned the garrison to surrender. general hardee, who was in command, replied in substance that the condition of affairs was not such as sherman had described. he said he was in full communication with his department and was receiving supplies constantly. hardee, however, was cut off entirely from all communication with the west side of the river, and by the river itself to the north and south. on the south carolina side the country was all rice fields, through which it would have been impossible to bring supplies so that hardee had no possible communication with the outside world except by a dilapidated plank road starting from the west bank of the river. sherman, receiving this reply, proceeded in person to a point on the coast, where general foster had troops stationed under general hatch, for the purpose of making arrangements with the latter officer to go through by one of the numerous channels running inland along that part of the coast of south carolina, to the plank road which general hardee still possessed, and thus to cut him off from the last means he had of getting supplies, if not of communication. while arranging for this movement, and before the attempt to execute the plan had been commenced, sherman received information through one of his staff officers that the enemy had evacuated savannah the night before. this was the night of the 21st of december. before evacuating the place hardee had blown up the navy yard. some iron-clads had been destroyed, as well as other property that might have been valuable to us; but he left an immense amount of stores untouched, consisting of cotton, railroad cars, workshops, numerous pieces of artillery, and several thousand stands of small arms. a little incident occurred, soon after the fall of savannah, which sherman relates in his memoirs, and which is worthy of repetition. savannah was one of the points where blockade runners entered. shortly after the city fell into our possession, a blockade runner came sailing up serenely, not doubting but the confederates were still in possession. it was not molested, and the captain did not find out his mistake until he had tied up and gone to the custom house, where he found a new occupant of the building, and made a less profitable disposition of his vessel and cargo than he had expected. as there was some discussion as to the authorship of sherman's march to the sea, by critics of his book when it appeared before the public, i want to state here that no question upon that subject was ever raised between general sherman and myself. circumstances made the plan on which sherman expected to act impracticable, as as commander of the forces he necessarily had to devise a new on which would give more promise of success: consequently he recommended the destruction of the railroad back to chattanooga, and that he should be authorized then to move, as he did, from atlanta forward. his suggestions were finally approved, although they did not immediately find favor in washington. even when it came to the time of starting, the greatest apprehension, as to the propriety of the campaign he was about commence, filled the mind of the president, induced no doubt by his advisers. this went so far as to move the president to ask me to suspend sherman's march for a day or two until i could think the matter over. my recollection is, though i find no record to show it, that out of deference to the president's wish i did send a dispatch to sherman asking him to wait a day or two, or else the connections between us were already cut so that i could not do so. however this may be, the question of who devised the plan of march from atlanta to savannah is easily answered: it was clearly sherman, and to him also belongs the credit of its brilliant execution. it was hardly possible that any one else than those on the spot could have devised a new plan of campaign to supersede one that did not promise success. (*40) i was in favor of sherman's plan from the time it was first submitted to me. my chief of staff, however, was very bitterly opposed to it and, as i learned subsequently, finding that he could not move me, he appealed to the authorities at washington to stop it. chapter lx. the battle of franklin--the battle of nashville. as we have seen, hood succeeded in crossing the tennessee river between muscle shoals and the lower shoals at the end of october, 1864. thomas sent schofield with the 4th and 23d corps, together with three brigades of wilson's cavalry to pulaski to watch him. on the 17th of november hood started and moved in such a manner as to avoid schofield, thereby turning his position. hood had with him three infantry corps, commanded respectively by stephen d. lee, stewart and cheatham. these, with his cavalry, numbered about forty-five thousand men. schofield had, of all arms, about thirty thousand. thomas's orders were, therefore, for schofield to watch the movements of the enemy, but not to fight a battle if he could avoid it; but to fall back in case of an advance on nashville, and to fight the enemy, as he fell back, so as to retard the enemy's movements until he could be reinforced by thomas himself. as soon as schofield saw this movement of hood's, he sent his trains to the rear, but did not fall back himself until the 21st, and then only to columbia. at columbia there was a slight skirmish but no battle. from this place schofield then retreated to franklin. he had sent his wagons in advance, and stanley had gone with them with two divisions to protect them. cheatham's corps of hood's army pursued the wagon train and went into camp at spring hill, for the night of the 29th. schofield retreating from columbia on the 29th, passed spring hill, where cheatham was bivouacked, during the night without molestation, though within half a mile of where the confederates were encamped. on the morning of the 30th he had arrived at franklin. hood followed closely and reached franklin in time to make an attack the same day. the fight was very desperate and sanguinary. the confederate generals led their men in the repeated charges, and the loss among them was of unusual proportions. this fighting continued with great severity until long after the night closed in, when the confederates drew off. general stanley, who commanded two divisions of the union troops, and whose troops bore the brunt of the battle, was wounded in the fight, but maintained his position. the enemy's loss at franklin, according to thomas's report, was 1,750 buried upon the field by our troops, 3,800 in the hospital, and 702 prisoners besides. schofield's loss, as officially reported, was 189 killed, 1,033 wounded, and 1,104 captured and missing. thomas made no effort to reinforce schofield at franklin, as it seemed to me at the time he should have done, and fight out the battle there. he simply ordered schofield to continue his retreat to nashville, which the latter did during that night and the next day. thomas, in the meantime, was making his preparations to receive hood. the road to chattanooga was still well guarded with strong garrisons at murfreesboro, stevenson, bridgeport and chattanooga. thomas had previously given up decatur and had been reinforced by a. j. smith's two divisions just returned from missouri. he also had steedman's division and r. s. granger's, which he had drawn from the front. his quartermaster's men, about ten thousand in number, had been organized and armed under the command of the chief quartermaster, general j. l. donaldson, and placed in the fortifications under the general supervision of general z. b. tower, of the united states engineers. hood was allowed to move upon nashville, and to invest that place almost without interference. thomas was strongly fortified in his position, so that he would have been safe against the attack of hood. he had troops enough even to annihilate him in the open field. to me his delay was unaccountable--sitting there and permitting himself to be invested, so that, in the end, to raise the siege he would have to fight the enemy strongly posted behind fortifications. it is true the weather was very bad. the rain was falling and freezing as it fell, so that the ground was covered with a sheet of ice, that made it very difficult to move. but i was afraid that the enemy would find means of moving, elude thomas and manage to get north of the cumberland river. if he did this, i apprehended most serious results from the campaign in the north, and was afraid we might even have to send troops from the east to head him off if he got there, general thomas's movements being always so deliberate and so slow, though effective in defence. i consequently urged thomas in frequent dispatches sent from city point(*41) to make the attack at once. the country was alarmed, the administration was alarmed, and i was alarmed lest the very thing would take place which i have just described that is, hood would get north. it was all without avail further than to elicit dispatches from thomas saying that he was getting ready to move as soon as he could, that he was making preparations, etc. at last i had to say to general thomas that i should be obliged to remove him unless he acted promptly. he replied that he was very sorry, but he would move as soon as he could. general logan happening to visit city point about that time, and knowing him as a prompt, gallant and efficient officer, i gave him an order to proceed to nashville to relieve thomas. i directed him, however, not to deliver the order or publish it until he reached there, and if thomas had moved, then not to deliver it at all, but communicate with me by telegraph. after logan started, in thinking over the situation, i became restless, and concluded to go myself. i went as far as washington city, when a dispatch was received from general thomas announcing his readiness at last to move, and designating the time of his movement. i concluded to wait until that time. he did move, and was successful from the start. this was on the 15th of december. general logan was at louisville at the time this movement was made, and telegraphed the fact to washington, and proceeded no farther himself. the battle during the 15th was severe, but favorable to the union troops, and continued until night closed in upon the combat. the next day the battle was renewed. after a successful assault upon hood's men in their intrenchments the enemy fled in disorder, routed and broken, leaving their dead, their artillery and small arms in great numbers on the field, besides the wounded that were captured. our cavalry had fought on foot as infantry, and had not their horses with them; so that they were not ready to join in the pursuit the moment the enemy retreated. they sent back, however, for their horses, and endeavored to get to franklin ahead of hood's broken army by the granny white road, but too much time was consumed in getting started. they had got but a few miles beyond the scene of the battle when they found the enemy's cavalry dismounted and behind intrenchments covering the road on which they were advancing. here another battle ensued, our men dismounting and fighting on foot, in which the confederates were again routed and driven in great disorder. our cavalry then went into bivouac, and renewed the pursuit on the following morning. they were too late. the enemy already had possession of franklin, and was beyond them. it now became a chase in which the confederates had the lead. our troops continued the pursuit to within a few miles of columbia, where they found the rebels had destroyed the railroad bridge as well as all other bridges over duck river. the heavy rains of a few days before had swelled the stream into a mad torrent, impassable except on bridges. unfortunately, either through a mistake in the wording of the order or otherwise, the pontoon bridge which was to have been sent by rail out to franklin, to be taken thence with the pursuing column, had gone toward chattanooga. there was, consequently, a delay of some four days in building bridges out of the remains of the old railroad bridge. of course hood got such a start in this time that farther pursuit was useless, although it was continued for some distance, but without coming upon him again. chapter lxi. expedition against fort fisher--attack on the fort--failure of the expedition--second expedition against the fort--capture of fort fisher. up to january, 1865, the enemy occupied fort fisher, at the mouth of cape fear river and below the city of wilmington. this port was of immense importance to the confederates, because it formed their principal inlet for blockade runners by means of which they brought in from abroad such supplies and munitions of war as they could not produce at home. it was equally important to us to get possession of it, not only because it was desirable to cut off their supplies so as to insure a speedy termination of the war, but also because foreign governments, particularly the british government, were constantly threatening that unless ours could maintain the blockade of that coast they should cease to recognize any blockade. for these reasons i determined, with the concurrence of the navy department, in december, to send an expedition against fort fisher for the purpose of capturing it. to show the difficulty experienced in maintaining the blockade, i will mention a circumstance that took place at fort fisher after its fall. two english blockade runners came in at night. their commanders, not supposing the fort had fallen, worked their way through all our fleet and got into the river unobserved. they then signalled the fort, announcing their arrival. there was a colored man in the fort who had been there before and who understood these signals. he informed general terry what reply he should make to have them come in, and terry did as he advised. the vessels came in, their officers entirely unconscious that they were falling into the hands of the union forces. even after they were brought in to the fort they were entertained in conversation for some little time before suspecting that the union troops were occupying the fort. they were finally informed that their vessels and cargoes were prizes. i selected general weitzel, of the army of the james, to go with the expedition, but gave instructions through general butler. he commanded the department within whose geographical limits fort fisher was situated, as well as beaufort and other points on that coast held by our troops; he was, therefore, entitled to the right of fitting out the expedition against fort fisher. general butler conceived the idea that if a steamer loaded heavily with powder could be run up to near the shore under the fort and exploded, it would create great havoc and make the capture an easy matter. admiral porter, who was to command the naval squadron, seemed to fall in with the idea, and it was not disapproved of in washington; the navy was therefore given the task of preparing the steamer for this purpose. i had no confidence in the success of the scheme, and so expressed myself; but as no serious harm could come of the experiment, and the authorities at washington seemed desirous to have it tried, i permitted it. the steamer was sent to beaufort, north carolina, and was there loaded with powder and prepared for the part she was to play in the reduction of fort fisher. general butler chose to go in command of the expedition himself, and was all ready to sail by the 9th of december (1864). very heavy storms prevailed, however, at that time along that part of the sea-coast, and prevented him from getting off until the 13th or 14th. his advance arrived off fort fisher on the 15th. the naval force had been already assembled, or was assembling, but they were obliged to run into beaufort for munitions, coal, etc.; then, too, the powder-boat was not yet fully prepared. the fleet was ready to proceed on the 18th; but butler, who had remained outside from the 15th up to that time, now found himself out of coal, fresh water, etc., and had to put into beaufort to replenish. another storm overtook him, and several days more were lost before the army and navy were both ready at the same time to co-operate. on the night of the 23d the powder-boat was towed in by a gunboat as near to the fort as it was safe to run. she was then propelled by her own machinery to within about five hundred yards of the shore. there the clockwork, which was to explode her within a certain length of time, was set and she was abandoned. everybody left, and even the vessels put out to sea to prevent the effect of the explosion upon them. at two o'clock in the morning the explosion took place--and produced no more effect on the fort, or anything else on land, than the bursting of a boiler anywhere on the atlantic ocean would have done. indeed when the troops in fort fisher heard the explosion they supposed it was the bursting of a boiler in one of the yankee gunboats. fort fisher was situated upon a low, flat peninsula north of cape fear river. the soil is sandy. back a little the peninsula is very heavily wooded, and covered with fresh-water swamps. the fort ran across this peninsula, about five hundred yards in width, and extended along the sea coast about thirteen hundred yards. the fort had an armament of 21 guns and 3 mortars on the land side, and 24 guns on the sea front. at that time it was only garrisoned by four companies of infantry, one light battery and the gunners at the heavy guns less than seven hundred men with a reserve of less than a thousand men five miles up the peninsula. general whiting of the confederate army was in command, and general bragg was in command of the force at wilmington. both commenced calling for reinforcements the moment they saw our troops landing. the governor of north carolina called for everybody who could stand behind a parapet and shoot a gun, to join them. in this way they got two or three hundred additional men into fort fisher; and hoke's division, five or six thousand strong, was sent down from richmond. a few of these troops arrived the very day that butler was ready to advance. on the 24th the fleet formed for an attack in arcs of concentric circles, their heavy iron-clads going in very close range, being nearest the shore, and leaving intervals or spaces so that the outer vessels could fire between them. porter was thus enabled to throw one hundred and fifteen shells per minute. the damage done to the fort by these shells was very slight, only two or three cannon being disabled in the fort. but the firing silenced all the guns by making it too hot for the men to maintain their positions about them and compelling them to seek shelter in the bomb-proofs. on the next day part of butler's troops under general adelbert ames effected a landing out of range of the fort without difficulty. this was accomplished under the protection of gunboats sent for the purpose, and under cover of a renewed attack upon the fort by the fleet. they formed a line across the peninsula and advanced, part going north and part toward the fort, covering themselves as they did so. curtis pushed forward and came near to fort fisher, capturing the small garrison at what was called the flag pond battery. weitzel accompanied him to within a half a mile of the works. here he saw that the fort had not been injured, and so reported to butler, advising against an assault. ames, who had gone north in his advance, captured 228 of the reserves. these prisoners reported to butler that sixteen hundred of hoke's division of six thousand from richmond had already arrived and the rest would soon be in his rear. upon these reports butler determined to withdraw his troops from the peninsula and return to the fleet. at that time there had not been a man on our side injured except by one of the shells from the fleet. curtis had got within a few yards of the works. some of his men had snatched a flag from the parapet of the fort, and others had taken a horse from the inside of the stockade. at night butler informed porter of his withdrawal, giving the reasons above stated, and announced his purpose as soon as his men could embark to start for hampton roads. porter represented to him that he had sent to beaufort for more ammunition. he could fire much faster than he had been doing, and would keep the enemy from showing himself until our men were within twenty yards of the fort, and he begged that butler would leave some brave fellows like those who had snatched the flag from the parapet and taken the horse from the fort. butler was unchangeable. he got all his troops aboard, except curtis's brigade, and started back. in doing this, butler made a fearful mistake. my instructions to him, or to the officer who went in command of the expedition, were explicit in the statement that to effect a landing would be of itself a great victory, and if one should be effected, the foothold must not be relinquished; on the contrary, a regular siege of the fort must be commenced and, to guard against interference by reason of storms, supplies of provisions must be laid in as soon as they could be got on shore. but general butler seems to have lost sight of this part of his instructions, and was back at fort monroe on the 28th. i telegraphed to the president as follows: city point, va., dec. 28, 1864.--8.30 p.m. the wilmington expedition has proven a gross and culpable failure. many of the troops are back here. delays and free talk of the object of the expedition enabled the enemy to move troops to wilmington to defeat it. after the expedition sailed from fort monroe, three days of fine weather were squandered, during which the enemy was without a force to protect himself. who is to blame will, i hope, be known. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. porter sent dispatches to the navy department in which he complained bitterly of having been abandoned by the army just when the fort was nearly in our possession, and begged that our troops might be sent back again to cooperate, but with a different commander. as soon as i heard this i sent a messenger to porter with a letter asking him to hold on. i assured him that i fully sympathized with him in his disappointment, and that i would send the same troops back with a different commander, with some reinforcements to offset those which the enemy had received. i told him it would take some little time to get transportation for the additional troops; but as soon as it could be had the men should be on their way to him, and there would be no delay on my part. i selected a. h. terry to command. it was the 6th of january before the transports could be got ready and the troops aboard. they sailed from fortress monroe on that day. the object and destination of the second expedition were at the time kept a secret to all except a few in the navy department and in the army to whom it was necessary to impart the information. general terry had not the slightest idea of where he was going or what he was to do. he simply knew that he was going to sea and that he had his orders with him, which were to be opened when out at sea. he was instructed to communicate freely with porter and have entire harmony between army and navy, because the work before them would require the best efforts of both arms of service. they arrived off beaufort on the 8th. a heavy storm, however, prevented a landing at fort fisher until the 13th. the navy prepared itself for attack about as before, and the same time assisted the army in landing, this time five miles away. only iron-clads fired at first; the object being to draw the fire of the enemy's guns so as to ascertain their positions. this object being accomplished, they then let in their shots thick and fast. very soon the guns were all silenced, and the fort showed evident signs of being much injured. terry deployed his men across the peninsula as had been done before, and at two o'clock on the following morning was up within two miles of the fort with a respectable _abatis_ in front of his line. his artillery was all landed on that day, the 14th. again curtis's brigade of ame's division had the lead. by noon they had carried an unfinished work less than a half mile from the fort, and turned it so as to face the other way. terry now saw porter and arranged for an assault on the following day. the two commanders arranged their signals so that they could communicate with each other from time to time as they might have occasion. at day light the fleet commenced its firing. the time agreed upon for the assault was the middle of the afternoon, and ames who commanded the assaulting column moved at 3.30. porter landed a force of sailors and marines to move against the sea-front in co-operation with ames's assault. they were under commander breese of the navy. these sailors and marines had worked their way up to within a couple of hundred yards of the fort before the assault. the signal was given and the assault was made; but the poor sailors and marines were repulsed and very badly handled by the enemy, losing 280 killed and wounded out of their number. curtis's brigade charged successfully though met by a heavy fire, some of the men having to wade through the swamp up to their waists to reach the fort. many were wounded, of course, and some killed; but they soon reached the palisades. these they cut away, and pushed on through. the other troops then came up, pennypacker's following curtis, and bell, who commanded the 3d brigade of ames's division, following pennypacker. but the fort was not yet captured though the parapet was gained. the works were very extensive. the large parapet around the work would have been but very little protection to those inside except when they were close up under it. traverses had, therefore, been run until really the work was a succession of small forts enclosed by a large one. the rebels made a desperate effort to hold the fort, and had to be driven from these traverses one by one. the fight continued till long after night. our troops gained first one traverse and then another, and by 10 o'clock at night the place was carried. during this engagement the sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered the best service they could by reinforcing terry's northern line--thus enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of ames. the fleet kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still occupied by the enemy. by means of signals they could be informed where to direct their shots. during the succeeding nights the enemy blew up fort caswell on the opposite side of cape fear river, and abandoned two extensive works on smith's island in the river. our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. in addition to these, there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. we had lost 110 killed and 536 wounded. in this assault on fort fisher, bell, one of the brigade commanders, was killed, and two, curtis and pennypacker, were badly wounded. secretary stanton, who was on his way back from savannah, arrived off fort fisher soon after it fell. when he heard the good news he promoted all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous gallantry. terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been confirmed. this confirmed him; and soon after i recommended him for a brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for this victory. chapter lxii. sherman's march north--sheridan ordered to lynchburg--canby ordered to move against mobile--movements of schofield and thomas--capture of columbia, south carolina--sherman in the carolinas. when news of sherman being in possession of savannah reached the north, distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. among others who went was the secretary of war, who seemed much pleased at the result of his campaign. mr. draper, the collector of customs of new york, who was with mr. stanton's party, was put in charge of the public property that had been abandoned and captured. savannah was then turned over to general foster's command to hold, so that sherman might have his own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future. i sent the chief engineer of the army of the potomac (general barnard) with letters to general sherman. he remained some time with the general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which contained suggestions from sherman as to what ought to be done in co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march northward. i must not neglect to state here the fact that i had no idea originally of having sherman march from savannah to richmond, or even to north carolina. the season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except such an army as he had, and i should not have thought of ordering such a move. i had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to carry sherman and his army around to the james river by water, and so informed him. on receiving this letter he went to work immediately to prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north through the carolinas. i was only too happy to approve this; for if successful, it promised every advantage. his march through georgia had thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that state, and had completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of it. if north and south carolina were rendered helpless so far as capacity for feeding lee's army was concerned, the confederate garrison at richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies, to very narrow limits in the state of virginia; and, although that section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of both forage and food. i approved sherman's suggestion therefore at once. the work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. sherman would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the sea. besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now become of such vast importance to the very existence of the confederate army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to save it. sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start with, made arrangements with admiral dahlgren, who commanded that part of the navy on the south carolina and georgia coast, and general foster, commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the sea coast, which he (sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of charleston. this provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast, in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward progress. he also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. this letter was brought to city point by general barnard at a time when i happened to be going to washington city, where i arrived on the 21st of january. i cannot tell the provision i had already made to co-operate with sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by giving my reply to this letter. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., jan. 21, 1865. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding mill div. of the mississippi. general:--your letters brought by general barnard were received at city point, and read with interest. not having them with me, however, i cannot say that in this i will be able to satisfy you on all points of recommendation. as i arrived here at one p.m., and must leave at six p.m., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the secretary and general halleck, i must be brief. before your last request to have thomas make a campaign into the heart of alabama, i had ordered schofield to annapolis, md., with his corps. the advance (six thousand) will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly as railroad transportation can be procured from cincinnati. the corps numbers over twenty-one thousand men. i was induced to do this because i did not believe thomas could possibly be got off before spring. his pursuit of hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would never do to conduct one of your campaigns. the command of the advance of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst thomas followed far behind. when hood had crossed the tennessee, and those in pursuit had reached it, thomas had not much more than half crossed the state, from whence he returned to nashville to take steamer for eastport. he is possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is not good on a pursuit. he also reported his troops fagged, and that it was necessary to equip up. this report and a determination to give the enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere. thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to selma under an energetic leader. he has been telegraphed to, to know whether he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select. no reply is yet received. canby has been ordered to act offensively from the sea-coast to the interior, towards montgomery and selma. thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his troops will be sent to canby. without further reinforcements canby will have a moving column of twenty thousand men. fort fisher, you are aware, has been captured. we have a force there of eight thousand effective. at new bern about half the number. it is rumored, through deserters, that wilmington also has fallen. i am inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy were blowing up their works about fort caswell, and that on the 18th terry moved on wilmington. if wilmington is captured, schofield will go there. if not, he will be sent to new bern. in either event, all the surplus forces at the two points will move to the interior toward goldsboro' in co-operation with your movements. from either point, railroad communications can be run out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of those roads. there have been about sixteen thousand men sent from lee's army south. of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if wilmington is not held by the enemy, casualties at fort fisher having overtaken about two thousand. all these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication with them. they will be so instructed. from about richmond i will watch lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to evacuate, will pitch in. in the meantime, should you be brought to a halt anywhere, i can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to your support, from the troops about richmond. to resume: canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the gulf. a. j. smith may go from the north, but i think it doubtful. a force of twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from new bern or wilmington, or both. you can call for reinforcements. this will be handed you by captain hudson, of my staff, who will return with any message you may have for me. if there is anything i can do for you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it. yours truly, u. s. grant, lieut.-general. i had written on the 18th of january to general sherman, giving him the news of the battle of nashville. he was much pleased at the result, although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at thomas for permitting hood to cross the tennessee river and nearly the whole state of tennessee, and come to nashville to be attacked there. he, however, as i had done, sent thomas a warm congratulatory letter. on the 10th of january, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to sherman and his army passed by congress were approved. sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up, commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river, and taking up all obstructions. he had then intrenched the city, so that it could be held by a small garrison. by the middle of january all his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his movement with. he proposed to move in two columns, one from savannah, going along by the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east, threatening charleston. he commenced the advance by moving his right wing to beaufort, south carolina, then to pocotaligo by water. this column, in moving north, threatened charleston, and, indeed, it was not determined at first that they would have a force visit charleston. south carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the south for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of the question before the south was fully prepared to meet it, that there was, at that time, a feeling throughout the north and also largely entertained by people of the south, that the state of south carolina, and charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a heavy hand laid upon them. in fact, nothing but the decisive results that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from condemning the movement, because charleston had been left out. to pass into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the city, and its possession by the navy and foster's troops. it is so situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have held it against all odds as long as their supplies would hold out. sherman therefore passed it by. by the first of february all preparations were completed for the final march, columbia, south carolina, being the first objective; fayetteville, north carolina, the second; and goldsboro, or neighborhood, the final one, unless something further should be determined upon. the right wing went from pocotaligo, and the left from about hardeeville on the savannah river, both columns taking a pretty direct route for columbia. the cavalry, however, were to threaten charleston on the right, and augusta on the left. on the 15th of january fort fisher had fallen, news of which sherman had received before starting out on his march. we already had new bern and had soon wilmington, whose fall followed that of fort fisher; as did other points on the sea coast, where the national troops were now in readiness to co-operate with sherman's advance when he had passed fayetteville. on the 18th of january i ordered canby, in command at new orleans, to move against mobile, montgomery and selma, alabama, for the purpose of destroying roads, machine shops, etc. on the 8th of february i ordered sheridan, who was in the valley of virginia, to push forward as soon as the weather would permit and strike the canal west of richmond at or about lynchburg; and on the 20th i made the order to go to lynchburg as soon as the roads would permit, saying: "as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. * * * this additional raid, with one starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering about four or five thousand cavalry; one from eastport, mississippi, ten thousand cavalry; canby, from mobile bay, with about eighteen thousand mixed troops--these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma and montgomery; and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina--is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday last." on the 27th of february, more than a month after canby had received his orders, i again wrote to him, saying that i was extremely anxious to hear of his being in alabama. i notified him, also, that i had sent grierson to take command of his cavalry, he being a very efficient officer. i further suggested that forrest was probably in mississippi, and if he was there, he would find him an officer of great courage and capacity whom it would be difficult to get by. i still further informed him that thomas had been ordered to start a cavalry force into mississippi on the 20th of february, or as soon as possible thereafter. this force did not get off however. all these movements were designed to be in support of sherman's march, the object being to keep the confederate troops in the west from leaving there. but neither canby nor thomas could be got off in time. i had some time before depleted thomas's army to reinforce canby, for the reason that thomas had failed to start an expedition which he had been ordered to send out, and to have the troops where they might do something. canby seemed to be equally deliberate in all of his movements. i ordered him to go in person; but he prepared to send a detachment under another officer. general granger had got down to new orleans, in some way or other, and i wrote canby that he must not put him in command of troops. in spite of this he asked the war department to assign granger to the command of a corps. almost in despair of having adequate service rendered to the cause in that quarter, i said to canby: "i am in receipt of a dispatch * * * informing me that you have made requisitions for a construction corps and material to build seventy miles of railroad. i have directed that none be sent. thomas's army has been depleted to send a force to you that they might be where they could act in winter, and at least detain the force the enemy had in the west. if there had been any idea of repairing railroads, it could have been done much better from the north, where we already had the troops. i expected your movements to be co-operative with sherman's last. this has now entirely failed. i wrote to you long ago, urging you to push promptly and to live upon the country, and destroy railroads, machine shops, etc., not to build them. take mobile and hold it, and push your forces to the interior--to montgomery and to selma. destroy railroads, rolling stock, and everything useful for carrying on war, and, when you have done this, take such positions as can be supplied by water. by this means alone you can occupy positions from which the enemy's roads in the interior can be kept broken." most of these expeditions got off finally, but too late to render any service in the direction for which they were designed. the enemy, ready to intercept his advance, consisted of hardee's troops and wheeler's cavalry, perhaps less than fifteen thousand men in all; but frantic efforts were being made in richmond, as i was sure would be the case, to retard sherman's movements. everything possible was being done to raise troops in the south. lee dispatched against sherman the troops which had been sent to relieve fort fisher, which, including those of the other defences of the harbor and its neighborhood, amounted, after deducting the two thousand killed, wounded and captured, to fourteen thousand men. after thomas's victory at nashville what remained, of hood's army were gathered together and forwarded as rapidly as possible to the east to co-operate with these forces; and, finally, general joseph e. johnston, one of the ablest commanders of the south though not in favor with the administration (or at least with mr. davis), was put in command of all the troops in north and south carolina. schofield arrived at annapolis in the latter part of january, but before sending his troops to north carolina i went with him down the coast to see the situation of affairs, as i could give fuller directions after being on the ground than i could very well have given without. we soon returned, and the troops were sent by sea to cape fear river. both new bern and wilmington are connected with raleigh by railroads which unite at goldsboro. schofield was to land troops at smithville, near the mouth of the cape fear river on the west side, and move up to secure the wilmington and charlotteville railroad. this column took their pontoon bridges with them, to enable them to cross over to the island south of the city of wilmington. a large body was sent by the north side to co-operate with them. they succeeded in taking the city on the 22d of february. i took the precaution to provide for sherman's army, in case he should be forced to turn in toward the sea coast before reaching north carolina, by forwarding supplies to every place where he was liable to have to make such a deflection from his projected march. i also sent railroad rolling stock, of which we had a great abundance, now that we were not operating the roads in virginia. the gauge of the north carolina railroads being the same as the virginia railroads had been altered too; these cars and locomotives were ready for use there without any change. on the 31st of january i countermanded the orders given to thomas to move south to alabama and georgia. (i had previously reduced his force by sending a portion of it to terry.) i directed in lieu of this movement, that he should send stoneman through east tennessee, and push him well down toward columbia, south carolina, in support of sherman. thomas did not get stoneman off in time, but, on the contrary, when i had supposed he was on his march in support of sherman i heard of his being in louisville, kentucky. i immediately changed the order, and directed thomas to send him toward lynchburg. finally, however, on the 12th of march, he did push down through the north-western end of south carolina, creating some consternation. i also ordered thomas to send the 4th corps (stanley's) to bull gap and to destroy no more roads east of that. i also directed him to concentrate supplies at knoxville, with a view to a probable movement of his army through that way toward lynchburg. goldsboro is four hundred and twenty-five miles from savannah. sherman's march was without much incident until he entered columbia, on the 17th of february. he was detained in his progress by having to repair and corduroy the roads, and rebuild the bridges. there was constant skirmishing and fighting between the cavalry of the two armies, but this did not retard the advance of the infantry. four days, also, were lost in making complete the destruction of the most important railroads south of columbia; there was also some delay caused by the high water, and the destruction of the bridges on the line of the road. a formidable river had to be crossed near columbia, and that in the face of a small garrison under general wade hampton. there was but little delay, however, further than that caused by high water in the stream. hampton left as sherman approached, and the city was found to be on fire. there has since been a great deal of acrimony displayed in discussions of the question as to who set columbia on fire. sherman denies it on the part of his troops, and hampton denies it on the part of the confederates. one thing is certain: as soon as our troops took possession, they at once proceeded to extinguish the flames to the best of their ability with the limited means at hand. in any case, the example set by the confederates in burning the village of chambersburg, pa., a town which was not garrisoned, would seem to make a defence of the act of firing the seat of government of the state most responsible for the conflict then raging, not imperative. the confederate troops having vacated the city, the mayor took possession, and sallied forth to meet the commander of the national forces for the purpose of surrendering the town, making terms for the protection of property, etc. sherman paid no attention at all to the overture, but pushed forward and took the town without making any conditions whatever with its citizens. he then, however, co-operated with the mayor in extinguishing the flames and providing for the people who were rendered destitute by this destruction of their homes. when he left there he even gave the mayor five hundred head of cattle to be distributed among the citizens, to tide them over until some arrangement could be made for their future supplies. he remained in columbia until the roads, public buildings, workshops and everything that could be useful to the enemy were destroyed. while at columbia, sherman learned for the first time that what remained of hood's army was confronting him, under the command of general beauregard. charleston was evacuated on the 18th of february, and foster garrisoned the place. wilmington was captured on the 22d. columbia and cheraw farther north, were regarded as so secure from invasion that the wealthy people of charleston and augusta had sent much of their valuable property to these two points to be stored. among the goods sent there were valuable carpets, tons of old madeira, silverware, and furniture. i am afraid much of these goods fell into the hands of our troops. there was found at columbia a large amount of powder, some artillery, small-arms and fixed ammunition. these, of course were among the articles destroyed. while here, sherman also learned of johnston's restoration to command. the latter was given, as already stated, all troops in north and south carolina. after the completion of the destruction of public property about columbia, sherman proceeded on his march and reached cheraw without any special opposition and without incident to relate. the railroads, of course, were thoroughly destroyed on the way. sherman remained a day or two at cheraw; and, finally, on the 6th of march crossed his troops over the pedee and advanced straight for fayetteville. hardee and hampton were there, and barely escaped. sherman reached fayetteville on the 11th of march. he had dispatched scouts from cheraw with letters to general terry, at wilmington, asking him to send a steamer with some supplies of bread, clothing and other articles which he enumerated. the scouts got through successfully, and a boat was sent with the mail and such articles for which sherman had asked as were in store at wilmington; unfortunately, however, those stores did not contain clothing. four days later, on the 15th, sherman left fayetteville for goldsboro. the march, now, had to be made with great caution, for he was approaching lee's army and nearing the country that still remained open to the enemy. besides, he was confronting all that he had had to confront in his previous march up to that point, reinforced by the garrisons along the road and by what remained of hood's army. frantic appeals were made to the people to come in voluntarily and swell the ranks of our foe. i presume, however, that johnston did not have in all over 35,000 or 40,000 men. the people had grown tired of the war, and desertions from the confederate army were much more numerous than the voluntary accessions. there was some fighting at averysboro on the 16th between johnston's troops and sherman's, with some loss; and at bentonville on the 19th and 21st of march, but johnston withdrew from the contest before the morning of the 22d. sherman's loss in these last engagements in killed, wounded, and missing, was about sixteen hundred. sherman's troops at last reached goldsboro on the 23d of the month and went into bivouac; and there his men were destined to have a long rest. schofield was there to meet him with the troops which had been sent to wilmington. sherman was no longer in danger. he had johnston confronting him; but with an army much inferior to his own, both in numbers and morale. he had lee to the north of him with a force largely superior; but i was holding lee with a still greater force, and had he made his escape and gotten down to reinforce johnston, sherman, with the reinforcements he now had from schofield and terry, would have been able to hold the confederates at bay for an indefinite period. he was near the sea-shore with his back to it, and our navy occupied the harbors. he had a railroad to both wilmington and new bern, and his flanks were thoroughly protected by streams, which intersect that part of the country and deepen as they approach the sea. then, too, sherman knew that if lee should escape me i would be on his heels, and he and johnson together would be crushed in one blow if they attempted to make a stand. with the loss of their capital, it is doubtful whether lee's army would have amounted to much as an army when it reached north carolina. johnston's army was demoralized by constant defeat and would hardly have made an offensive movement, even if they could have been induced to remain on duty. the men of both lee's and johnston's armies were, like their brethren of the north, as brave as men can be; but no man is so brave that he may not meet such defeats and disasters as to discourage him and dampen his ardor for any cause, no matter how just he deems it. chapter lxiii. arrival of the peace commissioners--lincoln and the peace commissioners --an anecdote of lincoln--the winter before petersburg--sheridan destroys the railroad--gordon carries the picket line--parke recaptures the line --the line of battle of white oak road. on the last of january, 1865, peace commissioners from the so-called confederate states presented themselves on our lines around petersburg, and were immediately conducted to my headquarters at city point. they proved to be alexander h. stephens, vice-president of the confederacy, judge campbell, assistant-secretary of war, and r. m. t. hunt, formerly united states senator and then a member of the confederate senate. it was about dark when they reached my headquarters, and i at once conducted them to the steam mary martin, a hudson river boat which was very comfortably fitted up for the use of passengers. i at once communicated by telegraph with washington and informed the secretary of war and the president of the arrival of these commissioners and that their object was to negotiate terms of peace between the united states and, as they termed it, the confederate government. i was instructed to retain them at city point, until the president, or some one whom he would designate, should come to meet them. they remained several days as guests on board the boat. i saw them quite frequently, though i have no recollection of having had any conversation whatever with them on the subject of their mission. it was something i had nothing to do with, and i therefore did not wish to express any views on the subject. for my own part i never had admitted, and never was ready to admit, that they were the representatives of a government. there had been too great a waste of blood and treasure to concede anything of the kind. as long as they remained there, however, our relations were pleasant and i found them all very agreeable gentlemen. i directed the captain to furnish them with the best the boat afforded, and to administer to their comfort in every way possible. no guard was placed over them and no restriction was put upon their movements; nor was there any pledge asked that they would not abuse the privileges extended to them. they were permitted to leave the boat when they felt like it, and did so, coming up on the bank and visiting me at my headquarters. i had never met either of these gentlemen before the war, but knew them well by reputation and through their public services, and i had been a particular admirer of mr. stephens. i had always supposed that he was a very small man, but when i saw him in the dusk of the evening i was very much surprised to find so large a man as he seemed to be. when he got down on to the boat i found that he was wearing a coarse gray woollen overcoat, a manufacture that had been introduced into the south during the rebellion. the cloth was thicker than anything of the kind i had ever seen, even in canada. the overcoat extended nearly to his feet, and was so large that it gave him the appearance of being an average-sized man. he took this off when he reached the cabin of the boat, and i was struck with the apparent change in size, in the coat and out of it. after a few days, about the 2d of february, i received a dispatch from washington, directing me to send the commissioners to hampton roads to meet the president and a member of the cabinet. mr. lincoln met them there and had an interview of short duration. it was not a great while after they met that the president visited me at city point. he spoke of his having met the commissioners, and said he had told them that there would be no use in entering into any negotiations unless they would recognize, first: that the union as a whole must be forever preserved, and second: that slavery must be abolished. if they were willing to concede these two points, then he was ready to enter into negotiations and was almost willing to hand them a blank sheet of paper with his signature attached for them to fill in the terms upon which they were willing to live with us in the union and be one people. he always showed a generous and kindly spirit toward the southern people, and i never heard him abuse an enemy. some of the cruel things said about president lincoln, particularly in the north, used to pierce him to the heart; but never in my presence did he evince a revengeful disposition and i saw a great deal of him at city point, for he seemed glad to get away from the cares and anxieties of the capital. right here i might relate an anecdote of mr. lincoln. it was on the occasion of his visit to me just after he had talked with the peace commissioners at hampton roads. after a little conversation, he asked me if i had seen that overcoat of stephens's. i replied that i had. "well," said he, "did you see him take it off?" i said yes. "well," said he, "didn't you think it was the biggest shuck and the littlest ear that ever you did see?" long afterwards i told this story to the confederate general j. b. gordon, at the time a member of the senate. he repeated it to stephens, and, as i heard afterwards, stephens laughed immoderately at the simile of mr. lincoln. the rest of the winter, after the departure of the peace commissioners, passed off quietly and uneventfully, except for two or three little incidents. on one occasion during this period, while i was visiting washington city for the purpose of conferring with the administration, the enemy's cavalry under general wade hampton, passing our extreme left and then going to the south, got in east of us. before their presence was known, they had driven off a large number of beef cattle that were grazing in that section. it was a fair capture, and they were sufficiently needed by the confederates. it was only retaliating for what we had done, sometimes for many weeks at a time, when out of supplies taking what the confederate army otherwise would have gotten. as appears in this book, on one single occasion we captured five thousand head of cattle which were crossing the mississippi river near port hudson on their way from texas to supply the confederate army in the east. one of the most anxious periods of my experience during the rebellion was the last few weeks before petersburg. i felt that the situation of the confederate army was such that they would try to make an escape at the earliest practicable moment, and i was afraid, every morning, that i would awake from my sleep to hear that lee had gone, and that nothing was left but a picket line. he had his railroad by the way of danville south, and i was afraid that he was running off his men and all stores and ordnance except such as it would be necessary to carry with him for his immediate defence. i knew he could move much more lightly and more rapidly than i, and that, if he got the start, he would leave me behind so that we would have the same army to fight again farther south and the war might be prolonged another year. i was led to this fear by the fact that i could not see how it was possible for the confederates to hold out much longer where they were. there is no doubt that richmond would have been evacuated much sooner than it was, if it had not been that it was the capital of the so-called confederacy, and the fact of evacuating the capital would, of course, have had a very demoralizing effect upon the confederate army. when it was evacuated (as we shall see further on), the confederacy at once began to crumble and fade away. then, too, desertions were taking place, not only among those who were with general lee in the neighborhood of their capital, but throughout the whole confederacy. i remember that in a conversation with me on one occasion long prior to this, general butler remarked that the confederates would find great difficulty in getting more men for their army; possibly adding, though i am not certain as to this, "unless they should arm the slave." the south, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen, calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be called the senior reserves. the latter were to hold the necessary points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear. general butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which i afterwards used in writing a letter to mr. washburn. it was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire army, by desertions alone. then by casualties of war, sickness, and other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. it was a mere question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while that rate of depletion was going on. of course long before their army would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field would have been able to capture theirs. then too i knew from the great number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as earnestly, i take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. many of them were making application to be sent north where they might get employment until the war was over, when they could return to their southern homes. for these and other reasons i was naturally very impatient for the time to come when i could commence the spring campaign, which i thoroughly believed would close the war. there were two considerations i had to observe, however, and which detained me. one was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. it was necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army operating in the enemy's country. the other consideration was that general sheridan with the cavalry of the army of the potomac was operating on the north side of the james river, having come down from the shenandoah. it was necessary that i should have his cavalry with me, and i was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the james river. let us now take account of what he was doing. on the 5th of march i had heard from sheridan. he had met early between staunton and charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his entire command. early and some of his officers escaped by finding refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods. on the 12th i heard from him again. he had turned east, to come to white house. he could not go to lynchburg as ordered, because the rains had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. he had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have to get over in going south as first ordered. i had supplies sent around to white house for him, and kept the depot there open until he arrived. we had intended to abandon it because the james river had now become our base of supplies. sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two divisions commanded respectively by custer and devin. general merritt was acting as chief of cavalry. sheridan moved very light, carrying only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee, salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition. they stopped at charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad back toward lynchburg. he also sent a division along the james river canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. all mills and factories along the lines of march of his troops were destroyed also. sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march to white house was now somewhat hazardous. he determined therefore to fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. he did this, destroying the canal as far as goochland, and the railroad to a point as near richmond as he could get. on the 10th he was at columbia. negroes had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the canal. his cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started, because he had been able to find plenty of forage. he had captured most of early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. when he reached ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. he resisted their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the south and north anna, going north, and reached white house safely on the 19th. the time for sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time he could get away from goldsboro where he then was. supplies had to be got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he would pass. i had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from where he was, in the neighborhood of goldsboro on the 18th of april, the earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready. sherman was anxious that i should wait where i was until he could come up, and make a sure thing of it; but i had determined to move as soon as the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. i had been tied down somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting, until sheridan, who was on his way from the shenandoah valley to join me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were necessary to the execution of the plans which i had in mind. however, having arrived at white house on the 19th of march, i was enabled to make my plans. prompted by my anxiety lest lee should get away some night before i was aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into north carolina to join with johnston in attempting to crush out sherman, i had, as early as the 1st of the month of march, given instructions to the troops around petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was undertaken. it is now known that early in the month of march mr. davis and general lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them, and that they must get away as soon as possible. they, too, were waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it possible to move. general lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening to enable them to reach the danville road with greater security than he would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an assault upon the right of our lines around petersburg. the night of the 24th of march was fixed upon for this assault, and general gordon was assigned to the execution of the plan. the point between fort stedman and battery no. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected as the point of his attack. the attack was to be made at night, and the troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left, create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my lines. lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an opportunity of escape. the plan was well conceived and the execution of it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our line. gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to charge over to not much more than fifty yards. for some time before the deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their arms with them, and this the confederate general knew. taking advantage of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through to ours as if to desert. when they got to our lines they at once took possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. in the main line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. this plan was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the troops that were to reinforce gordon had to be brought from the north side of the james river and, by some accident on the railroad on their way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge. the charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy passing through our lines between fort stedman and battery no. 10. then turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery, with all the arms and troops in them. continuing the charge, they also carried batteries eleven and twelve to our left, which they turned toward city point. meade happened to be at city point that night, and this break in his line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. parke, however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place, telegraphed the facts to meade's headquarters, and learning that the general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. general tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground between the lines very thoroughly. hartranft was soon out with his division, as also was willcox. hartranft to the right of the breach headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into fort stedman. on the other side they were driven back into the intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve were retaken by willcox early in the morning. parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and batteries, and communication was once more established. the artillery fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to join them. they all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. this effort of lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours. after the recapture of the batteries taken by the confederates, our troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line, which they strengthened and held. this, in turn, gave us but a short distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days later. the day that gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of march) i issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th. ord, with three divisions of infantry and mackenzie's cavalry, was to move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the james river and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away. he left weitzel with the rest of the army of the james to hold bermuda hundred and the north of the james river. the engineer brigade was to be left at city point, and parke's corps in the lines about petersburg. (*42) ord was at his place promptly. humphreys and warren were then on our extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. they were directed on the arrival of ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to cross hatcher's run and extend out west toward five forks, the object being to get into a position from which we could strike the south side railroad and ultimately the danville railroad. there was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for the 2d and 5th corps, in which the army of the james had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite severe. this was what was known as the battle of white oak road. chapter lxiv. interview with sheridan--grand movement of the army of the potomac --sheridan's advance on five forks--battle of five forks--parke and wright storm the enemy's line--battles before petersburg. sheridan reached city point on the 26th day of march. his horses, of course, were jaded and many of them had lost their shoes. a few days of rest were necessary to recuperate the animals and also to have them shod and put in condition for moving. immediately on general sheridan's arrival at city point i prepared his instructions for the move which i had decided upon. the movement was to commence on the 29th of the month. after reading the instructions i had given him, sheridan walked out of my tent, and i followed to have some conversation with him by himself --not in the presence of anybody else, even of a member of my staff. in preparing his instructions i contemplated just what took place; that is to say, capturing five forks, driving the enemy from petersburg and richmond and terminating the contest before separating from the enemy. but the nation had already become restless and discouraged at the prolongation of the war, and many believed that it would never terminate except by compromise. knowing that unless my plan proved an entire success it would be interpreted as a disastrous defeat, i provided in these instructions that in a certain event he was to cut loose from the army of the potomac and his base of supplies, and living upon the country proceed south by the way of the danville railroad, or near it, across the roanoke, get in the rear of johnston, who was guarding that road, and cooperate with sherman in destroying johnston; then with these combined forces to help carry out the instructions which sherman already had received, to act in cooperation with the armies around petersburg and richmond. i saw that after sheridan had read his instructions he seemed somewhat disappointed at the idea, possibly, of having to cut loose again from the army of the potomac, and place himself between the two main armies of the enemy. i said to him: "general, this portion of your instructions i have put in merely as a blind;" and gave him the reason for doing so, heretofore described. i told him that, as a matter of fact, i intended to close the war right here, with this movement, and that he should go no farther. his face at once brightened up, and slapping his hand on his leg he said: "i am glad to hear it, and we can do it." sheridan was not however to make his movement against five forks until he got further instructions from me. one day, after the movement i am about to describe had commenced, and when his cavalry was on our extreme left and far to the rear, south, sheridan rode up to where my headquarters were then established, at dabney's mills. he met some of my staff officers outside, and was highly jubilant over the prospects of success, giving reasons why he believed this would prove the final and successful effort. although my chief-of-staff had urged very strongly that we return to our position about city point and in the lines around petersburg, he asked sheridan to come in to see me and say to me what he had been saying to them. sheridan felt a little modest about giving his advice where it had not been asked; so one of my staff came in and told me that sheridan had what they considered important news, and suggested that i send for him. i did so, and was glad to see the spirit of confidence with which he was imbued. knowing as i did from experience, of what great value that feeling of confidence by a commander was, i determined to make a movement at once, although on account of the rains which had fallen after i had started out the roads were still very heavy. orders were given accordingly. finally the 29th of march came, and fortunately there having been a few days free from rain, the surface of the ground was dry, giving indications that the time had come when we could move. on that date i moved out with all the army available after leaving sufficient force to hold the line about petersburg. it soon set in raining again however, and in a very short time the roads became practically impassable for teams, and almost so for cavalry. sometimes a horse or mule would be standing apparently on firm ground, when all at once one foot would sink, and as he commenced scrambling to catch himself all his feet would sink and he would have to be drawn by hand out of the quicksands so common in that part of virginia and other southern states. it became necessary therefore to build corduroy roads every foot of the way as we advanced, to move our artillery upon. the army had become so accustomed to this kind of work, and were so well prepared for it, that it was done very rapidly. the next day, march 30th, we had made sufficient progress to the south-west to warrant me in starting sheridan with his cavalry over by dinwiddie with instructions to then come up by the road leading north-west to five forks, thus menacing the right of lee's line. this movement was made for the purpose of extending our lines to the west as far as practicable towards the enemy's extreme right, or five forks. the column moving detached from the army still in the trenches was, excluding the cavalry, very small. the forces in the trenches were themselves extending to the left flank. warren was on the extreme left when the extension began, but humphreys was marched around later and thrown into line between him and five forks. my hope was that sheridan would be able to carry five forks, get on the enemy's right flank and rear, and force them to weaken their centre to protect their right so that an assault in the centre might be successfully made. general wright's corps had been designated to make this assault, which i intended to order as soon as information reached me of sheridan's success. he was to move under cover as close to the enemy as he could get. it is natural to suppose that lee would understand my design to be to get up to the south side and ultimately to the danville railroad, as soon as he had heard of the movement commenced on the 29th. these roads were so important to his very existence while he remained in richmond and petersburg, and of such vital importance to him even in case of retreat, that naturally he would make most strenuous efforts to defend them. he did on the 30th send pickett with five brigades to reinforce five forks. he also sent around to the right of his army some two or three other divisions, besides directing that other troops be held in readiness on the north side of the james river to come over on call. he came over himself to superintend in person the defence of his right flank. sheridan moved back to dinwiddie court-house on the night of the 30th, and then took a road leading north-west to five forks. he had only his cavalry with him. soon encountering the rebel cavalry he met with a very stout resistance. he gradually drove them back however until in the neighborhood of five forks. here he had to encounter other troops besides those he had been contending with, and was forced to give way. in this condition of affairs he notified me of what had taken place and stated that he was falling back toward dinwiddie gradually and slowly, and asked me to send wright's corps to his assistance. i replied to him that it was impossible to send wright's corps because that corps was already in line close up to the enemy, where we should want to assault when the proper time came, and was besides a long distance from him; but the 2d (humphreys's) and 5th (warren's) corps were on our extreme left and a little to the rear of it in a position to threaten the left flank of the enemy at five forks, and that i would send warren. accordingly orders were sent to warren to move at once that night (the 31st) to dinwiddie court house and put himself in communication with sheridan as soon as possible, and report to him. he was very slow in moving, some of his troops not starting until after 5 o'clock next morning. when he did move it was done very deliberately, and on arriving at gravelly run he found the stream swollen from the recent rains so that he regarded it as not fordable. sheridan of course knew of his coming, and being impatient to get the troops up as soon as possible, sent orders to him to hasten. he was also hastened or at least ordered to move up rapidly by general meade. he now felt that he could not cross that creek without bridges, and his orders were changed to move so as to strike the pursuing enemy in flank or get in their rear; but he was so late in getting up that sheridan determined to move forward without him. however, ayres's division of warren's corps reached him in time to be in the fight all day, most of the time separated from the remainder of the 5th corps and fighting directly under sheridan. warren reported to sheridan about 11 o'clock on the 1st, but the whole of his troops were not up so as to be much engaged until late in the afternoon. griffin's division in backing to get out of the way of a severe cross fire of the enemy was found marching away from the fighting. this did not continue long, however; the division was brought back and with ayres's division did most excellent service during the day. crawford's division of the same corps had backed still farther off, and although orders were sent repeatedly to bring it up, it was late before it finally got to where it could be of material assistance. once there it did very excellent service. sheridan succeeded by the middle of the afternoon or a little later, in advancing up to the point from which to make his designed assault upon five forks itself. he was very impatient to make the assault and have it all over before night, because the ground he occupied would be untenable for him in bivouac during the night. unless the assault was made and was successful, he would be obliged to return to dinwiddie court-house, or even further than that for the night. it was at this junction of affairs that sheridan wanted to get crawford's division in hand, and he also wanted warren. he sent staff officer after staff officer in search of warren, directing that general to report to him, but they were unable to find him. at all events sheridan was unable to get that officer to him. finally he went himself. he issued an order relieving warren and assigning griffin to the command of the 5th corps. the troops were then brought up and the assault successfully made. i was so much dissatisfied with warren's dilatory movements in the battle of white oak road and in his failure to reach sheridan in time, that i was very much afraid that at the last moment he would fail sheridan. he was a man of fine intelligence, great earnestness, quick perception, and could make his dispositions as quickly as any officer, under difficulties where he was forced to act. but i had before discovered a defect which was beyond his control, that was very prejudicial to his usefulness in emergencies like the one just before us. he could see every danger at a glance before he had encountered it. he would not only make preparations to meet the danger which might occur, but he would inform his commanding officer what others should do while he was executing his move. i had sent a staff officer to general sheridan to call his attention to these defects, and to say that as much as i liked general warren, now was not a time when we could let our personal feelings for any one stand in the way of success; and if his removal was necessary to success, not to hesitate. it was upon that authorization that sheridan removed warren. i was very sorry that it had been done, and regretted still more that i had not long before taken occasion to assign him to another field of duty. it was dusk when our troops under sheridan went over the parapets of the enemy. the two armies were mingled together there for a time in such manner that it was almost a question which one was going to demand the surrender of the other. soon, however, the enemy broke and ran in every direction; some six thousand prisoners, besides artillery and small-arms in large quantities, falling into our hands. the flying troops were pursued in different directions, the cavalry and 5th corps under sheridan pursuing the larger body which moved north-west. this pursuit continued until about nine o'clock at night, when sheridan halted his troops, and knowing the importance to him of the part of the enemy's line which had been captured, returned, sending the 5th corps across hatcher's run to just south-west of petersburg, and facing them toward it. merritt, with the cavalry, stopped and bivouacked west of five forks. this was the condition which affairs were in on the night of the 1st of april. i then issued orders for an assault by wright and parke at four o'clock on the morning of the 2d. i also ordered the 2d corps, general humphreys, and general ord with the army of the james, on the left, to hold themselves in readiness to take any advantage that could be taken from weakening in their front. i notified mr. lincoln at city point of the success of the day; in fact i had reported to him during the day and evening as i got news, because he was so much interested in the movements taking place that i wanted to relieve his mind as much as i could. i notified weitzel on the north side of the james river, directing him, also, to keep close up to the enemy, and take advantage of the withdrawal of troops from there to promptly enter the city of richmond. i was afraid that lee would regard the possession of five forks as of so much importance that he would make a last desperate effort to retake it, risking everything upon the cast of a single die. it was for this reason that i had ordered the assault to take place at once, as soon as i had received the news of the capture of five forks. the corps commanders, however, reported that it was so dark that the men could not see to move, and it would be impossible to make the assault then. but we kept up a continuous artillery fire upon the enemy around the whole line including that north of the james river, until it was light enough to move, which was about a quarter to five in the morning. at that hour parke's and wright's corps moved out as directed, brushed the _abatis_ from their front as they advanced under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, and went without flinching directly on till they mounted the parapets and threw themselves inside of the enemy's line. parke, who was on the right, swept down to the right and captured a very considerable length of line in that direction, but at that point the outer was so near the inner line which closely enveloped the city of petersburg that he could make no advance forward and, in fact, had a very serious task to turn the lines which he had captured to the defence of his own troops and to hold them; but he succeeded in this. wright swung around to his left and moved to hatcher's run, sweeping everything before him. the enemy had traverses in rear of his captured line, under cover of which he made something of a stand, from one to another, as wright moved on; but the latter met no serious obstacle. as you proceed to the left the outer line becomes gradually much farther from the inner one, and along about hatcher's run they must be nearly two miles apart. both parke and wright captured a considerable amount of artillery and some prisoners--wright about three thousand of them. in the meantime ord and humphreys, in obedience to the instructions they had received, had succeeded by daylight, or very early in the morning, in capturing the intrenched picket-lines in their front; and before wright got up to that point, ord had also succeeded in getting inside of the enemy's intrenchments. the second corps soon followed; and the outer works of petersburg were in the hands of the national troops, never to be wrenched from them again. when wright reached hatcher's run, he sent a regiment to destroy the south side railroad just outside of the city. my headquarters were still at dabney's saw-mills. as soon as i received the news of wright's success, i sent dispatches announcing the fact to all points around the line, including the troops at bermuda hundred and those on the north side of the james, and to the president at city point. further dispatches kept coming in, and as they did i sent the additional news to these points. finding at length that they were all in, i mounted my horse to join the troops who were inside the works. when i arrived there i rode my horse over the parapet just as wright's three thousand prisoners were coming out. i was soon joined inside by general meade and his staff. lee made frantic efforts to recover at least part of the lost ground. parke on our right was repeatedly assaulted, but repulsed every effort. before noon longstreet was ordered up from the north side of the james river thus bringing the bulk of lee's army around to the support of his extreme right. as soon as i learned this i notified weitzel and directed him to keep up close to the enemy and to have hartsuff, commanding the bermuda hundred front, to do the same thing, and if they found any break to go in; hartsuff especially should do so, for this would separate richmond and petersburg. sheridan, after he had returned to five forks, swept down to petersburg, coming in on our left. this gave us a continuous line from the appomattox river below the city to the same river above. at eleven o'clock, not having heard from sheridan, i reinforced parke with two brigades from city point. with this additional force he completed his captured works for better defence, and built back from his right, so as to protect his flank. he also carried in and made an _abatis_ between himself and the enemy. lee brought additional troops and artillery against parke even after this was done, and made several assaults with very heavy losses. the enemy had in addition to their intrenched line close up to petersburg, two enclosed works outside of it, fort gregg and fort whitworth. we thought it had now become necessary to carry them by assault. about one o'clock in the day, fort gregg was assaulted by foster's division of the 24th corps (gibbon's), supported by two brigades from ord's command. the battle was desperate and the national troops were repulsed several times; but it was finally carried, and immediately the troops in fort whitworth evacuated the place. the guns of fort gregg were turned upon the retreating enemy, and the commanding officer with some sixty of the men of fort whitworth surrendered. i had ordered miles in the morning to report to sheridan. in moving to execute this order he came upon the enemy at the intersection of the white oak road and the claiborne road. the enemy fell back to sutherland station on the south side road and were followed by miles. this position, naturally a strong and defensible one, was also strongly intrenched. sheridan now came up and miles asked permission from him to make the assault, which sheridan gave. by this time humphreys had got through the outer works in his front, and came up also and assumed command over miles, who commanded a division in his corps. i had sent an order to humphreys to turn to his right and move towards petersburg. this order he now got, and started off, thus leaving miles alone. the latter made two assaults, both of which failed, and he had to fall back a few hundred yards. hearing that miles had been left in this position, i directed humphreys to send a division back to his relief. he went himself. sheridan before starting to sweep down to petersburg had sent merritt with his cavalry to the west to attack some confederate cavalry that had assembled there. merritt drove them north to the appomattox river. sheridan then took the enemy at sutherland station on the reverse side from where miles was, and the two together captured the place, with a large number of prisoners and some pieces of artillery, and put the remainder, portions of three confederate corps, to flight. sheridan followed, and drove them until night, when further pursuit was stopped. miles bivouacked for the night on the ground which he with sheridan had carried so handsomely by assault. i cannot explain the situation here better than by giving my dispatch to city point that evening: boydton road, near petersburg, april 2, 1865.--4.40 p.m. colonel t. s. bowers, city point. we are now up and have a continuous line of troops, and in a few hours will be intrenched from the appomattox below petersburg to the river above. heth's and wilcox's divisions, such part of them as were not captured, were cut off from town, either designedly on their part or because they could not help it. sheridan with the cavalry and 5th corps is above them. miles's division, 2d corps, was sent from the white oak road to sutherland station on the south side railroad, where he met them, and at last accounts was engaged with them. not knowing whether sheridan would get up in time, general humphreys was sent with another division from here. the whole captures since the army started out gunning will amount to not less than twelve thousand men, and probably fifty pieces of artillery. i do not know the number of men and guns accurately however. * * * i think the president might come out and pay us a visit tomorrow. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. during the night of april 2d our line was intrenched from the river above to the river below. i ordered a bombardment to be commenced the next morning at five a.m., to be followed by an assault at six o'clock; but the enemy evacuated petersburg early in the morning. chapter lxv. the capture of petersburg--meeting president lincoln in petersburg--the capture of richmond--pursuing the enemy--visit to sheridan and meade. general meade and i entered petersburg on the morning of the 3d and took a position under cover of a house which protected us from the enemy's musketry which was flying thick and fast there. as we would occasionally look around the corner we could see the streets and the appomattox bottom, presumably near the bridge, packed with the confederate army. i did not have artillery brought up, because i was sure lee was trying to make his escape, and i wanted to push immediately in pursuit. at all events i had not the heart to turn the artillery upon such a mass of defeated and fleeing men, and i hoped to capture them soon. soon after the enemy had entirely evacuated petersburg, a man came in who represented himself to be an engineer of the army of northern virginia. he said that lee had for some time been at work preparing a strong enclosed intrenchment, into which he would throw himself when forced out of petersburg, and fight his final battle there; that he was actually at that time drawing his troops from richmond, and falling back into this prepared work. this statement was made to general meade and myself when we were together. i had already given orders for the movement up the south side of the appomattox for the purpose of heading off lee; but meade was so much impressed by this man's story that he thought we ought to cross the appomattox there at once and move against lee in his new position. i knew that lee was no fool, as he would have been to have put himself and his army between two formidable streams like the james and appomattox rivers, and between two such armies as those of the potomac and the james. then these streams coming together as they did to the east of him, it would be only necessary to close up in the west to have him thoroughly cut off from all supplies or possibility of reinforcement. it would only have been a question of days, and not many of them, if he had taken the position assigned to him by the so-called engineer, when he would have been obliged to surrender his army. such is one of the ruses resorted to in war to deceive your antagonist. my judgment was that lee would necessarily have to evacuate richmond, and that the only course for him to pursue would be to follow the danville road. accordingly my object was to secure a point on that road south of lee, and i told meade this. he suggested that if lee was going that way we would follow him. my reply was that we did not want to follow him; we wanted to get ahead of him and cut him off, and if he would only stay in the position he (meade) believed him to be in at that time, i wanted nothing better; that when we got in possession of the danville railroad, at its crossing of the appomattox river, if we still found him between the two rivers, all we had to do was to move eastward and close him up. that we would then have all the advantage we could possibly have by moving directly against him from petersburg, even if he remained in the position assigned him by the engineer officer. i had held most of the command aloof from the intrenchments, so as to start them out on the danville road early in the morning, supposing that lee would be gone during the night. during the night i strengthened sheridan by sending him humphreys's corps. lee, as we now know, had advised the authorities at richmond, during the day, of the condition of affairs, and told them it would be impossible for him to hold out longer than night, if he could hold out that long. davis was at church when he received lee's dispatch. the congregation was dismissed with the notice that there would be no evening service. the rebel government left richmond about two o'clock in the afternoon of the 2d. at night lee ordered his troops to assemble at amelia court house, his object being to get away, join johnston if possible, and to try to crush sherman before i could get there. as soon as i was sure of this i notified sheridan and directed him to move out on the danville railroad to the south side of the appomattox river as speedily as possible. he replied that he already had some of his command nine miles out. i then ordered the rest of the army of the potomac under meade to follow the same road in the morning. parke's corps followed by the same road, and the army of the james was directed to follow the road which ran alongside of the south side railroad to burke's station, and to repair the railroad and telegraph as they proceeded. that road was a 5 feet gauge, while our rolling stock was all of the 4 feet 8 1/2 inches gauge; consequently the rail on one side of the track had to be taken up throughout the whole length and relaid so as to conform to the gauge of our cars and locomotives. mr. lincoln was at city point at the time, and had been for some days. i would have let him know what i contemplated doing, only while i felt a strong conviction that the move was going to be successful, yet it might not prove so; and then i would have only added another to the many disappointments he had been suffering for the past three years. but when we started out he saw that we were moving for a purpose, and bidding us godspeed, remained there to hear the result. the next morning after the capture of petersburg, i telegraphed mr. lincoln asking him to ride out there and see me, while i would await his arrival. i had started all the troops out early in the morning, so that after the national army left petersburg there was not a soul to be seen, not even an animal in the streets. there was absolutely no one there, except my staff officers and, possibly, a small escort of cavalry. we had selected the piazza of a deserted house, and occupied it until the president arrived. about the first thing that mr. lincoln said to me, after warm congratulations for the victory, and thanks both to myself and to the army which had accomplished it, was: "do you know, general, that i have had a sort of a sneaking idea for some days that you intended to do something like this." our movements having been successful up to this point, i no longer had any object in concealing from the president all my movements, and the objects i had in view. he remained for some days near city point, and i communicated with him frequently and fully by telegraph. mr. lincoln knew that it had been arranged for sherman to join me at a fixed time, to co-operate in the destruction of lee's army. i told him that i had been very anxious to have the eastern armies vanquish their old enemy who had so long resisted all their repeated and gallant attempts to subdue them or drive them from their capital. the western armies had been in the main successful until they had conquered all the territory from the mississippi river to the state of north carolina, and were now almost ready to knock at the back door of richmond, asking admittance. i said to him that if the western armies should be even upon the field, operating against richmond and lee, the credit would be given to them for the capture, by politicians and non-combatants from the section of country which those troops hailed from. it might lead to disagreeable bickerings between members of congress of the east and those of the west in some of their debates. western members might be throwing it up to the members of the east that in the suppression of the rebellion they were not able to capture an army, or to accomplish much in the way of contributing toward that end, but had to wait until the western armies had conquered all the territory south and west of them, and then come on to help them capture the only army they had been engaged with. mr. lincoln said he saw that now, but had never thought of it before, because his anxiety was so great that he did not care where the aid came from so the work was done. the army of the potomac has every reason to be proud of its four years' record in the suppression of the rebellion. the army it had to fight was the protection to the capital of a people which was attempting to found a nation upon the territory of the united states. its loss would be the loss of the cause. every energy, therefore, was put forth by the confederacy to protect and maintain their capital. everything else would go if it went. lee's army had to be strengthened to enable it to maintain its position, no matter what territory was wrested from the south in another quarter. i never expected any such bickering as i have indicated, between the soldiers of the two sections; and, fortunately, there has been none between the politicians. possibly i am the only one who thought of the liability of such a state of things in advance. when our conversation was at an end mr. lincoln mounted his horse and started on his return to city point, while i and my staff started to join the army, now a good many miles in advance. up to this time i had not received the report of the capture of richmond. soon after i left president lincoln i received a dispatch from general weitzel which notified me that he had taken possession of richmond at about 8.15 o'clock in the morning of that day, the 3d, and that he had found the city on fire in two places. the city was in the most utter confusion. the authorities had taken the precaution to empty all the liquor into the gutter, and to throw out the provisions which the confederate government had left, for the people to gather up. the city had been deserted by the authorities, civil and military, without any notice whatever that they were about to leave. in fact, up to the very hour of the evacuation the people had been led to believe that lee had gained an important victory somewhere around petersburg. weitzel's command found evidence of great demoralization in lee's army, there being still a great many men and even officers in the town. the city was on fire. our troops were directed to extinguish the flames, which they finally succeeded in doing. the fire had been started by some one connected with the retreating army. all authorities deny that it was authorized, and i presume it was the work of excited men who were leaving what they regarded as their capital and may have felt that it was better to destroy it than have it fall into the hands of their enemy. be that as it may, the national troops found the city in flames, and used every effort to extinguish them. the troops that had formed lee's right, a great many of them, were cut off from getting back into petersburg, and were pursued by our cavalry so hotly and closely that they threw away caissons, ammunition, clothing, and almost everything to lighten their loads, and pushed along up the appomattox river until finally they took water and crossed over. i left mr. lincoln and started, as i have already said, to join the command, which halted at sutherland station, about nine miles out. we had still time to march as much farther, and time was an object; but the roads were bad and the trains belonging to the advance corps had blocked up the road so that it was impossible to get on. then, again, our cavalry had struck some of the enemy and were pursuing them; and the orders were that the roads should be given up to the cavalry whenever they appeared. this caused further delay. general wright, who was in command of one of the corps which were left back, thought to gain time by letting his men go into bivouac and trying to get up some rations for them, and clearing out the road, so that when they did start they would be uninterrupted. humphreys, who was far ahead, was also out of rations. they did not succeed in getting them up through the night; but the army of the potomac, officers and men, were so elated by the reflection that at last they were following up a victory to its end, that they preferred marching without rations to running a possible risk of letting the enemy elude them. so the march was resumed at three o'clock in the morning. merritt's cavalry had struck the enemy at deep creek, and driven them north to the appomattox, where, i presume, most of them were forced to cross. on the morning of the 4th i learned that lee had ordered rations up from danville for his famishing army, and that they were to meet him at farmville. this showed that lee had already abandoned the idea of following the railroad down to danville, but had determined to go farther west, by the way of farmville. i notified sheridan of this and directed him to get possession of the road before the supplies could reach lee. he responded that he had already sent crook's division to get upon the road between burkesville and jetersville, then to face north and march along the road upon the latter place; and he thought crook must be there now. the bulk of the army moved directly for jetersville by two roads. after i had received the dispatch from sheridan saying that crook was on the danville road, i immediately ordered meade to make a forced march with the army of the potomac, and to send parke's corps across from the road they were on to the south side railroad, to fall in the rear of the army of the james and to protect the railroad which that army was repairing as it went along. our troops took possession of jetersville and in the telegraph office, they found a dispatch from lee, ordering two hundred thousand rations from danville. the dispatch had not been sent, but sheridan sent a special messenger with it to burkesville and had it forwarded from there. in the meantime, however, dispatches from other sources had reached danville, and they knew there that our army was on the line of the road; so that they sent no further supplies from that quarter. at this time merritt and mackenzie, with the cavalry, were off between the road which the army of the potomac was marching on and the appomattox river, and were attacking the enemy in flank. they picked up a great many prisoners and forced the abandonment of some property. lee intrenched himself at amelia court house, and also his advance north of jetersville, and sent his troops out to collect forage. the country was very poor and afforded but very little. his foragers scattered a great deal; many of them were picked up by our men, and many others never returned to the army of northern virginia. griffin's corps was intrenched across the railroad south of jetersville, and sheridan notified me of the situation. i again ordered meade up with all dispatch, sheridan having but the one corps of infantry with a little cavalry confronting lee's entire army. meade, always prompt in obeying orders, now pushed forward with great energy, although he was himself sick and hardly able to be out of bed. humphreys moved at two, and wright at three o'clock in the morning, without rations, as i have said, the wagons being far in the rear. i stayed that night at wilson's station on the south side railroad. on the morning of the 5th i sent word to sheridan of the progress meade was making, and suggested that he might now attack lee. we had now no other objective than the confederate armies, and i was anxious to close the thing up at once. on the 5th i marched again with ord's command until within about ten miles of burkesville, where i stopped to let his army pass. i then received from sheridan the following dispatch: "the whole of lee's army is at or near amelia court house, and on this side of it. general davies, whom i sent out to painesville on their right flank, has just captured six pieces of artillery and some wagons. we can capture the army of northern virginia if force enough can be thrown to this point, and then advance upon it. my cavalry was at burkesville yesterday, and six miles beyond, on the danville road, last night. general lee is at amelia court house in person. they are out of rations, or nearly so. they were advancing up the railroad towards burkesville yesterday, when we intercepted them at this point." it now became a life and death struggle with lee to get south to his provisions. sheridan, thinking the enemy might turn off immediately towards farmville, moved davies's brigade of cavalry out to watch him. davies found the movement had already commenced. he attacked and drove away their cavalry which was escorting wagons to the west, capturing and burning 180 wagons. he also captured five pieces of artillery. the confederate infantry then moved against him and probably would have handled him very roughly, but sheridan had sent two more brigades of cavalry to follow davies, and they came to his relief in time. a sharp engagement took place between these three brigades of cavalry and the enemy's infantry, but the latter was repulsed. meade himself reached jetersville about two o'clock in the afternoon, but in advance of all his troops. the head of humphreys's corps followed in about an hour afterwards. sheridan stationed the troops as they came up, at meade's request, the latter still being very sick. he extended two divisions of this corps off to the west of the road to the left of griffin's corps, and one division to the right. the cavalry by this time had also come up, and they were put still farther off to the left, sheridan feeling certain that there lay the route by which the enemy intended to escape. he wanted to attack, feeling that if time was given, the enemy would get away; but meade prevented this, preferring to wait till his troops were all up. at this juncture sheridan sent me a letter which had been handed to him by a colored man, with a note from himself saying that he wished i was there myself. the letter was dated amelia court house, april 5th, and signed by colonel taylor. it was to his mother, and showed the demoralization of the confederate army. sheridan's note also gave me the information as here related of the movements of that day. i received a second message from sheridan on the 5th, in which he urged more emphatically the importance of my presence. this was brought to me by a scout in gray uniform. it was written on tissue paper, and wrapped up in tin-foil such as chewing tobacco is folded in. this was a precaution taken so that if the scout should be captured he could take this tin-foil out of his pocket and putting it into his mouth, chew it. it would cause no surprise at all to see a confederate soldier chewing tobacco. it was nearly night when this letter was received. i gave ord directions to continue his march to burkesville and there intrench himself for the night, and in the morning to move west to cut off all the roads between there and farmville. i then started with a few of my staff and a very small escort of cavalry, going directly through the woods, to join meade's army. the distance was about sixteen miles; but the night being dark our progress was slow through the woods in the absence of direct roads. however, we got to the outposts about ten o'clock in the evening, and after some little parley convinced the sentinels of our identity and were conducted in to where sheridan was bivouacked. we talked over the situation for some little time, sheridan explaining to me what he thought lee was trying to do, and that meade's orders, if carried out, moving to the right flank, would give him the coveted opportunity of escaping us and putting us in rear of him. we then together visited meade, reaching his headquarters about midnight. i explained to meade that we did not want to follow the enemy; we wanted to get ahead of him, and that his orders would allow the enemy to escape, and besides that, i had no doubt that lee was moving right then. meade changed his orders at once. they were now given for an advance on amelia court house, at an early hour in the morning, as the army then lay; that is, the infantry being across the railroad, most of it to the west of the road, with the cavalry swung out still farther to the left. chapter lxvi. battle of sailor's creek--engagement at farmville--correspondence with general lee--sheridan intercepts the enemy. the appomattox, going westward, takes a long sweep to the south-west from the neighborhood of the richmond and danville railroad bridge, and then trends north-westerly. sailor's creek, an insignificant stream, running northward, empties into the appomattox between the high bridge and jetersville. near the high bridge the stage road from petersburg to lynchburg crosses the appomattox river, also on a bridge. the railroad runs on the north side of the river to farmville, a few miles west, and from there, recrossing, continues on the south side of it. the roads coming up from the south-east to farmville cross the appomattox river there on a bridge and run on the north side, leaving the lynchburg and petersburg railroad well to the left. lee, in pushing out from amelia court house, availed himself of all the roads between the danville road and appomattox river to move upon, and never permitted the head of his columns to stop because of any fighting that might be going on in his rear. in this way he came very near succeeding in getting to his provision trains and eluding us with at least part of his army. as expected, lee's troops had moved during the night before, and our army in moving upon amelia court house soon encountered them. there was a good deal of fighting before sailor's creek was reached. our cavalry charged in upon a body of theirs which was escorting a wagon train in order to get it past our left. a severe engagement ensued, in which we captured many prisoners, and many men also were killed and wounded. there was as much gallantry displayed by some of the confederates in these little engagements as was displayed at any time during the war, notwithstanding the sad defeats of the past week. the armies finally met on sailor's creek, when a heavy engagement took place, in which infantry, artillery and cavalry were all brought into action. our men on the right, as they were brought in against the enemy, came in on higher ground, and upon his flank, giving us every advantage to be derived from the lay of the country. our firing was also very much more rapid, because the enemy commenced his retreat westward and in firing as he retreated had to turn around every time he fired. the enemy's loss was very heavy, as well in killed and wounded as in captures. some six general officers fell into our hands in this engagement, and seven thousand men were made prisoners. this engagement was commenced in the middle of the afternoon of the 6th, and the retreat and pursuit were continued until nightfall, when the armies bivouacked upon the ground where the night had overtaken them. when the move towards amelia court house had commenced that morning, i ordered wright's corps, which was on the extreme right, to be moved to the left past the whole army, to take the place of griffin's, and ordered the latter at the same time to move by and place itself on the right. the object of this movement was to get the 6th corps, wright's, next to the cavalry, with which they had formerly served so harmoniously and so efficiently in the valley of virginia. the 6th corps now remained with the cavalry and under sheridan's direct command until after the surrender. ord had been directed to take possession of all the roads southward between burkesville and the high bridge. on the morning of the 6th he sent colonel washburn with two infantry regiments with instructions to destroy high bridge and to return rapidly to burkesville station; and he prepared himself to resist the enemy there. soon after washburn had started ord became a little alarmed as to his safety and sent colonel read, of his staff, with about eighty cavalrymen, to overtake him and bring him back. very shortly after this he heard that the head of lee's column had got up to the road between him and where washburn now was, and attempted to send reinforcements, but the reinforcements could not get through. read, however, had got through ahead of the enemy. he rode on to farmville and was on his way back again when he found his return cut off, and washburn confronting apparently the advance of lee's army. read drew his men up into line of battle, his force now consisting of less than six hundred men, infantry and cavalry, and rode along their front, making a speech to his men to inspire them with the same enthusiasm that he himself felt. he then gave the order to charge. this little band made several charges, of course unsuccessful ones, but inflicted a loss upon the enemy more than equal to their own entire number. colonel read fell mortally wounded, and then washburn; and at the close of the conflict nearly every officer of the command and most of the rank and file had been either killed or wounded. the remainder then surrendered. the confederates took this to be only the advance of a larger column which had headed them off, and so stopped to intrench; so that this gallant band of six hundred had checked the progress of a strong detachment of the confederate army. this stoppage of lee's column no doubt saved to us the trains following. lee himself pushed on and crossed the wagon road bridge near the high bridge, and attempted to destroy it. he did set fire to it, but the flames had made but little headway when humphreys came up with his corps and drove away the rear-guard which had been left to protect it while it was being burned up. humphreys forced his way across with some loss, and followed lee to the intersection of the road crossing at farmville with the one from petersburg. here lee held a position which was very strong, naturally, besides being intrenched. humphreys was alone, confronting him all through the day, and in a very hazardous position. he put on a bold face, however, and assaulted with some loss, but was not assaulted in return. our cavalry had gone farther south by the way of prince edward's court house, along with the 5th corps (griffin's), ord falling in between griffin and the appomattox. crook's division of cavalry and wright's corps pushed on west of farmville. when the cavalry reached farmville they found that some of the confederates were in ahead of them, and had already got their trains of provisions back to that point; but our troops were in time to prevent them from securing anything to eat, although they succeeded in again running the trains off, so that we did not get them for some time. these troops retreated to the north side of the appomattox to join lee, and succeeded in destroying the bridge after them. considerable fighting ensued there between wright's corps and a portion of our cavalry and the confederates, but finally the cavalry forded the stream and drove them away. wright built a foot-bridge for his men to march over on and then marched out to the junction of the roads to relieve humphreys, arriving there that night. i had stopped the night before at burkesville junction. our troops were then pretty much all out of the place, but we had a field hospital there, and ord's command was extended from that point towards farmville. here i met dr. smith, a virginian and an officer of the regular army, who told me that in a conversation with general ewell, one of the prisoners and a relative of his, ewell had said that when we had got across the james river he knew their cause was lost, and it was the duty of their authorities to make the best terms they could while they still had a right to claim concessions. the authorities thought differently, however. now the cause was lost and they had no right to claim anything. he said further, that for every man that was killed after this in the war somebody is responsible, and it would be but very little better than murder. he was not sure that lee would consent to surrender his army without being able to consult with the president, but he hoped he would. i rode in to farmville on the 7th, arriving there early in the day. sheridan and ord were pushing through, away to the south. meade was back towards the high bridge, and humphreys confronting lee as before stated. after having gone into bivouac at prince edward's court house, sheridan learned that seven trains of provisions and forage were at appomattox, and determined to start at once and capture them; and a forced march was necessary in order to get there before lee's army could secure them. he wrote me a note telling me this. this fact, together with the incident related the night before by dr. smith, gave me the idea of opening correspondence with general lee on the subject of the surrender of his army. i therefore wrote to him on this day, as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., 5 p.m., april 7, 1865. general r. e. lee commanding c. s. a. the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee replied on the evening of the same day as follows: april 7, 1865. general: i have received your note of this day. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant, commanding armies of the u. s. this was not satisfactory, but i regarded it as deserving another letter and wrote him as follows: april 8, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of last evening in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia is just received. in reply i would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon, namely: that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of northern virginia will be received. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. lee's army was rapidly crumbling. many of his soldiers had enlisted from that part of the state where they now were, and were continually dropping out of the ranks and going to their homes. i know that i occupied a hotel almost destitute of furniture at farmville, which had probably been used as a confederate hospital. the next morning when i came out i found a confederate colonel there, who reported to me and said that he was the proprietor of that house, and that he was a colonel of a regiment that had been raised in that neighborhood. he said that when he came along past home, he found that he was the only man of the regiment remaining with lee's army, so he just dropped out, and now wanted to surrender himself. i told him to stay there and he would not be molested. that was one regiment which had been eliminated from lee's force by this crumbling process. although sheridan had been marching all day, his troops moved with alacrity and without any straggling. they began to see the end of what they had been fighting four years for. nothing seemed to fatigue them. they were ready to move without rations and travel without rest until the end. straggling had entirely ceased, and every man was now a rival for the front. the infantry marched about as rapidly as the cavalry could. sheridan sent custer with his division to move south of appomattox station, which is about five miles south-west of the court house, to get west of the trains and destroy the roads to the rear. they got there the night of the 8th, and succeeded partially; but some of the train men had just discovered the movement of our troops and succeeded in running off three of the trains. the other four were held by custer. the head of lee's column came marching up there on the morning of the 9th, not dreaming, i suppose, that there were any union soldiers near. the confederates were surprised to find our cavalry had possession of the trains. however, they were desperate and at once assaulted, hoping to recover them. in the melee that ensued they succeeded in burning one of the trains, but not in getting anything from it. custer then ordered the other trains run back on the road towards farmville, and the fight continued. so far, only our cavalry and the advance of lee's army were engaged. soon, however, lee's men were brought up from the rear, no doubt expecting they had nothing to meet but our cavalry. but our infantry had pushed forward so rapidly that by the time the enemy got up they found griffin's corps and the army of the james confronting them. a sharp engagement ensued, but lee quickly set up a white flag. chapter lxvii. negotiations at appomattox--interview with lee at mclean's house--the terms of surrender--lee's surrender--interview with lee after the surrender. on the 8th i had followed the army of the potomac in rear of lee. i was suffering very severely with a sick headache, and stopped at a farmhouse on the road some distance in rear of the main body of the army. i spent the night in bathing my feet in hot water and mustard, and putting mustard plasters on my wrists and the back part of my neck, hoping to be cured by morning. during the night i received lee's answer to my letter of the 8th, inviting an interview between the lines on the following morning. (*43) but it was for a different purpose from that of surrendering his army, and i answered him as follows: headquarters armies of the u. s., april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. a. your note of yesterday is received. as i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace, the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. sincerely hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc., u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i proceeded at an early hour in the morning, still suffering with the headache, to get to the head of the column. i was not more than two or three miles from appomattox court house at the time, but to go direct i would have to pass through lee's army, or a portion of it. i had therefore to move south in order to get upon a road coming up from another direction. when the white flag was put out by lee, as already described, i was in this way moving towards appomattox court house, and consequently could not be communicated with immediately, and be informed of what lee had done. lee, therefore, sent a flag to the rear to advise meade and one to the front to sheridan, saying that he had sent a message to me for the purpose of having a meeting to consult about the surrender of his army, and asked for a suspension of hostilities until i could be communicated with. as they had heard nothing of this until the fighting had got to be severe and all going against lee, both of these commanders hesitated very considerably about suspending hostilities at all. they were afraid it was not in good faith, and we had the army of northern virginia where it could not escape except by some deception. they, however, finally consented to a suspension of hostilities for two hours to give an opportunity of communicating with me in that time, if possible. it was found that, from the route i had taken, they would probably not be able to communicate with me and get an answer back within the time fixed unless the messenger should pass through the rebel lines. lee, therefore, sent an escort with the officer bearing this message through his lines to me. april 9, 1865. general: i received your note of this morning on the picket-line whither i had come to meet you and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now request an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose. r. e. lee, general. lieutenant-general u. s. grant commanding u. s. armies. when the officer reached me i was still suffering with the sick headache, but the instant i saw the contents of the note i was cured. i wrote the following note in reply and hastened on: april 9, 1865. general r. e. lee, commanding c. s. armies. your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a.m.) received, in consequence of my having passed from the richmond and lynchburg road to the farmville and lynchburg road. i am at this writing about four miles west of walker's church and will push forward to the front for the purpose of meeting you. notice sent to me on this road where you wish the interview to take place will meet me. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. i was conducted at once to where sheridan was located with his troops drawn up in line of battle facing the confederate army near by. they were very much excited, and expressed their view that this was all a ruse employed to enable the confederates to get away. they said they believed that johnston was marching up from north carolina now, and lee was moving to join him; and they would whip the rebels where they now were in five minutes if i would only let them go in. but i had no doubt about the good faith of lee, and pretty soon was conducted to where he was. i found him at the house of a mr. mclean, at appomattox court house, with colonel marshall, one of his staff officers, awaiting my arrival. the head of his column was occupying a hill, on a portion of which was an apple orchard, beyond a little valley which separated it from that on the crest of which sheridan's forces were drawn up in line of battle to the south. before stating what took place between general lee and myself, i will give all there is of the story of the famous apple tree. wars produce many stories of fiction, some of which are told until they are believed to be true. the war of the rebellion was no exception to this rule, and the story of the apple tree is one of those fictions based on a slight foundation of fact. as i have said, there was an apple orchard on the side of the hill occupied by the confederate forces. running diagonally up the hill was a wagon road, which, at one point, ran very near one of the trees, so that the wheels of vehicles had, on that side, cut off the roots of this tree, leaving a little embankment. general babcock, of my staff, reported to me that when he first met general lee he was sitting upon this embankment with his feet in the road below and his back resting against the tree. the story had no other foundation than that. like many other stories, it would be very good if it was only true. i had known general lee in the old army, and had served with him in the mexican war; but did not suppose, owing to the difference in our age and rank, that he would remember me, while i would more naturally remember him distinctly, because he was the chief of staff of general scott in the mexican war. when i had left camp that morning i had not expected so soon the result that was then taking place, and consequently was in rough garb. i was without a sword, as i usually was when on horseback on the field, and wore a soldier's blouse for a coat, with the shoulder straps of my rank to indicate to the army who i was. when i went into the house i found general lee. we greeted each other, and after shaking hands took our seats. i had my staff with me, a good portion of whom were in the room during the whole of the interview. what general lee's feelings were i do not know. as he was a man of much dignity, with an impassible face, it was impossible to say whether he felt inwardly glad that the end had finally come, or felt sad over the result, and was too manly to show it. whatever his feelings, they were entirely concealed from my observation; but my own feelings, which had been quite jubilant on the receipt of his letter, were sad and depressed. i felt like anything rather than rejoicing at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly, and had suffered so much for a cause, though that cause was, i believe, one of the worst for which a people ever fought, and one for which there was the least excuse. i do not question, however, the sincerity of the great mass of those who were opposed to us. general lee was dressed in a full uniform which was entirely new, and was wearing a sword of considerable value, very likely the sword which had been presented by the state of virginia; at all events, it was an entirely different sword from the one that would ordinarily be worn in the field. in my rough traveling suit, the uniform of a private with the straps of a lieutenant-general, i must have contrasted very strangely with a man so handsomely dressed, six feet high and of faultless form. but this was not a matter that i thought of until afterwards. we soon fell into a conversation about old army times. he remarked that he remembered me very well in the old army; and i told him that as a matter of course i remembered him perfectly, but from the difference in our rank and years (there being about sixteen years' difference in our ages), i had thought it very likely that i had not attracted his attention sufficiently to be remembered by him after such a long interval. our conversation grew so pleasant that i almost forgot the object of our meeting. after the conversation had run on in this style for some time, general lee called my attention to the object of our meeting, and said that he had asked for this interview for the purpose of getting from me the terms i proposed to give his army. i said that i meant merely that his army should lay down their arms, not to take them up again during the continuance of the war unless duly and properly exchanged. he said that he had so understood my letter. then we gradually fell off again into conversation about matters foreign to the subject which had brought us together. this continued for some little time, when general lee again interrupted the course of the conversation by suggesting that the terms i proposed to give his army ought to be written out. i called to general parker, secretary on my staff, for writing materials, and commenced writing out the following terms: appomattox c. h., va., ap 19th, 1865. gen. r. e. lee, comd'g c. s. a. gen: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th inst., i propose to receive the surrender of the army of n. va. on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate. one copy to be given to an officer designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged, and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officer appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. very respectfully, u. s. grant, lt. gen. when i put my pen to the paper i did not know the first word that i should make use of in writing the terms. i only knew what was in my mind, and i wished to express it clearly, so that there could be no mistaking it. as i wrote on, the thought occurred to me that the officers had their own private horses and effects, which were important to them, but of no value to us; also that it would be an unnecessary humiliation to call upon them to deliver their side arms. no conversation, not one word, passed between general lee and myself, either about private property, side arms, or kindred subjects. he appeared to have no objections to the terms first proposed; or if he had a point to make against them he wished to wait until they were in writing to make it. when he read over that part of the terms about side arms, horses and private property of the officers, he remarked, with some feeling, i thought, that this would have a happy effect upon his army. then, after a little further conversation, general lee remarked to me again that their army was organized a little differently from the army of the united states (still maintaining by implication that we were two countries); that in their army the cavalrymen and artillerists owned their own horses; and he asked if he was to understand that the men who so owned their horses were to be permitted to retain them. i told him that as the terms were written they would not; that only the officers were permitted to take their private property. he then, after reading over the terms a second time, remarked that that was clear. i then said to him that i thought this would be about the last battle of the war--i sincerely hoped so; and i said further i took it that most of the men in the ranks were small farmers. the whole country had been so raided by the two armies that it was doubtful whether they would be able to put in a crop to carry themselves and their families through the next winter without the aid of the horses they were then riding. the united states did not want them and i would, therefore, instruct the officers i left behind to receive the paroles of his troops to let every man of the confederate army who claimed to own a horse or mule take the animal to his home. lee remarked again that this would have a happy effect. he then sat down and wrote out the following letter: headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. general:--i received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th inst., they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. r. e. lee, general. lieut.-general u. s. grant. while duplicates of the two letters were being made, the union generals present were severally presented to general lee. the much talked of surrendering of lee's sword and my handing it back, this and much more that has been said about it is the purest romance. the word sword or side arms was not mentioned by either of us until i wrote it in the terms. there was no premeditation, and it did not occur to me until the moment i wrote it down. if i had happened to omit it, and general lee had called my attention to it, i should have put it in the terms precisely as i acceded to the provision about the soldiers retaining their horses. general lee, after all was completed and before taking his leave, remarked that his army was in a very bad condition for want of food, and that they were without forage; that his men had been living for some days on parched corn exclusively, and that he would have to ask me for rations and forage. i told him "certainly," and asked for how many men he wanted rations. his answer was "about twenty-five thousand;" and i authorized him to send his own commissary and quartermaster to appomattox station, two or three miles away, where he could have, out of the trains we had stopped, all the provisions wanted. as for forage, we had ourselves depended almost entirely upon the country for that. generals gibbon, griffin and merritt were designated by me to carry into effect the paroling of lee's troops before they should start for their homes--general lee leaving generals longstreet, gordon and pendleton for them to confer with in order to facilitate this work. lee and i then separated as cordially as we had met, he returning to his own lines, and all went into bivouac for the night at appomattox. soon after lee's departure i telegraphed to washington as follows: headquarters appomattox c. h., va., april 9th, 1865, 4.30 p.m. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington. general lee surrendered the army of northern virginia this afternoon on terms proposed by myself. the accompanying additional correspondence will show the conditions fully. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. when news of the surrender first reached our lines our men commenced firing a salute of a hundred guns in honor of the victory. i at once sent word, however, to have it stopped. the confederates were now our prisoners, and we did not want to exult over their downfall. i determined to return to washington at once, with a view to putting a stop to the purchase of supplies, and what i now deemed other useless outlay of money. before leaving, however, i thought i (*44) would like to see general lee again; so next morning i rode out beyond our lines towards his headquarters, preceded by a bugler and a staff-officer carrying a white flag. lee soon mounted his horse, seeing who it was, and met me. we had there between the lines, sitting on horseback, a very pleasant conversation of over half an hour, in the course of which lee said to me that the south was a big country and that we might have to march over it three or four times before the war entirely ended, but that we would now be able to do it as they could no longer resist us. he expressed it as his earnest hope, however, that we would not be called upon to cause more loss and sacrifice of life; but he could not foretell the result. i then suggested to general lee that there was not a man in the confederacy whose influence with the soldiery and the whole people was as great as his, and that if he would now advise the surrender of all the armies i had no doubt his advice would be followed with alacrity. but lee said, that he could not do that without consulting the president first. i knew there was no use to urge him to do anything against his ideas of what was right. i was accompanied by my staff and other officers, some of whom seemed to have a great desire to go inside the confederate lines. they finally asked permission of lee to do so for the purpose of seeing some of their old army friends, and the permission was granted. they went over, had a very pleasant time with their old friends, and brought some of them back with them when they returned. when lee and i separated he went back to his lines and i returned to the house of mr. mclean. here the officers of both armies came in great numbers, and seemed to enjoy the meeting as much as though they had been friends separated for a long time while fighting battles under the same flag. for the time being it looked very much as if all thought of the war had escaped their minds. after an hour pleasantly passed in this way i set out on horseback, accompanied by my staff and a small escort, for burkesville junction, up to which point the railroad had by this time been repaired. chapter lxviii. morale of the two armies--relative conditions of the north and south --president lincoln visits richmond--arrival at washington--president lincoln's assassination--president johnson's policy. after the fall of petersburg, and when the armies of the potomac and the james were in motion to head off lee's army, the morale of the national troops had greatly improved. there was no more straggling, no more rear guards. the men who in former times had been falling back, were now, as i have already stated, striving to get to the front. for the first time in four weary years they felt that they were now nearing the time when they could return to their homes with their country saved. on the other hand, the confederates were more than correspondingly depressed. their despondency increased with each returning day, and especially after the battle of sailor's creek. they threw away their arms in constantly increasing numbers, dropping out of the ranks and betaking themselves to the woods in the hope of reaching their homes. i have already instanced the case of the entire disintegration of a regiment whose colonel i met at farmville. as a result of these and other influences, when lee finally surrendered at appomattox, there were only 28,356 officers and men left to be paroled, and many of these were without arms. it was probably this latter fact which gave rise to the statement sometimes made, north and south, that lee surrendered a smaller number of men than what the official figures show. as a matter of official record, and in addition to the number paroled as given above, we captured between march 29th and the date of surrender 19,132 confederates, to say nothing of lee's other losses, killed, wounded and missing, during the series of desperate conflicts which marked his headlong and determined flight. the same record shows the number of cannon, including those at appomattox, to have been 689 between the dates named. there has always been a great conflict of opinion as to the number of troops engaged in every battle, or all important battles, fought between the sections, the south magnifying the number of union troops engaged and belittling their own. northern writers have fallen, in many instances, into the same error. i have often heard gentlemen, who were thoroughly loyal to the union, speak of what a splendid fight the south had made and successfully continued for four years before yielding, with their twelve million of people against our twenty, and of the twelve four being colored slaves, non-combatants. i will add to their argument. we had many regiments of brave and loyal men who volunteered under great difficulty from the twelve million belonging to the south. but the south had rebelled against the national government. it was not bound by any constitutional restrictions. the whole south was a military camp. the occupation of the colored people was to furnish supplies for the army. conscription was resorted to early, and embraced every male from the age of eighteen to forty-five, excluding only those physically unfit to serve in the field, and the necessary number of civil officers of state and intended national government. the old and physically disabled furnished a good portion of these. the slaves, the non-combatants, one-third of the whole, were required to work in the field without regard to sex, and almost without regard to age. children from the age of eight years could and did handle the hoe; they were not much older when they began to hold the plough. the four million of colored non-combatants were equal to more than three times their number in the north, age for age and sex for sex, in supplying food from the soil to support armies. women did not work in the fields in the north, and children attended school. the arts of peace were carried on in the north. towns and cities grew during the war. inventions were made in all kinds of machinery to increase the products of a day's labor in the shop, and in the field. in the south no opposition was allowed to the government which had been set up and which would have become real and respected if the rebellion had been successful. no rear had to be protected. all the troops in service could be brought to the front to contest every inch of ground threatened with invasion. the press of the south, like the people who remained at home, were loyal to the southern cause. in the north, the country, the towns and the cities presented about the same appearance they do in time of peace. the furnace was in blast, the shops were filled with workmen, the fields were cultivated, not only to supply the population of the north and the troops invading the south, but to ship abroad to pay a part of the expense of the war. in the north the press was free up to the point of open treason. the citizen could entertain his views and express them. troops were necessary in the northern states to prevent prisoners from the southern army being released by outside force, armed and set at large to destroy by fire our northern cities. plans were formed by northern and southern citizens to burn our cities, to poison the water supplying them, to spread infection by importing clothing from infected regions, to blow up our river and lake steamers--regardless of the destruction of innocent lives. the copperhead disreputable portion of the press magnified rebel successes, and belittled those of the union army. it was, with a large following, an auxiliary to the confederate army. the north would have been much stronger with a hundred thousand of these men in the confederate ranks and the rest of their kind thoroughly subdued, as the union sentiment was in the south, than we were as the battle was fought. as i have said, the whole south was a military camp. the colored people, four million in number, were submissive, and worked in the field and took care of the families while the able-bodied white men were at the front fighting for a cause destined to defeat. the cause was popular, and was enthusiastically supported by the young men. the conscription took all of them. before the war was over, further conscriptions took those between fourteen and eighteen years of age as junior reserves, and those between forty-five and sixty as senior reserves. it would have been an offence, directly after the war, and perhaps it would be now, to ask any able-bodied man in the south, who was between the ages of fourteen and sixty at any time during the war, whether he had been in the confederate army. he would assert that he had, or account for his absence from the ranks. under such circumstances it is hard to conceive how the north showed such a superiority of force in every battle fought. i know they did not. during 1862 and '3, john h. morgan, a partisan officer, of no military education, but possessed of courage and endurance, operated in the rear of the army of the ohio in kentucky and tennessee. he had no base of supplies to protect, but was at home wherever he went. the army operating against the south, on the contrary, had to protect its lines of communication with the north, from which all supplies had to come to the front. every foot of road had to be guarded by troops stationed at convenient distances apart. these guards could not render assistance beyond the points where stationed. morgan was foot-loose and could operate where, his information--always correct--led him to believe he could do the greatest damage. during the time he was operating in this way he killed, wounded and captured several times the number he ever had under his command at any one time. he destroyed many millions of property in addition. places he did not attack had to be guarded as if threatened by him. forrest, an abler soldier, operated farther west, and held from the national front quite as many men as could be spared for offensive operations. it is safe to say that more than half the national army was engaged in guarding lines of supplies, or were on leave, sick in hospital or on detail which prevented their bearing arms. then, again, large forces were employed where no confederate army confronted them. i deem it safe to say that there were no large engagements where the national numbers compensated for the advantage of position and intrenchment occupied by the enemy. while i was in pursuit of general lee, the president went to richmond in company with admiral porter, and on board his flagship. he found the people of that city in great consternation. the leading citizens among the people who had remained at home surrounded him, anxious that something should be done to relieve them from suspense. general weitzel was not then in the city, having taken offices in one of the neighboring villages after his troops had succeeded in subduing the conflagration which they had found in progress on entering the confederate capital. the president sent for him, and, on his arrival, a short interview was had on board the vessel, admiral porter and a leading citizen of virginia being also present. after this interview the president wrote an order in about these words, which i quote from memory: "general weitzel is authorized to permit the body calling itself the legislature of virginia to meet for the purpose of recalling the virginia troops from the confederate armies." immediately some of the gentlemen composing that body wrote out a call for a meeting and had it published in their papers. this call, however, went very much further than mr. lincoln had contemplated, as he did not say the "legislature of virginia" but "the body which called itself the legislature of virginia." mr. stanton saw the call as published in the northern papers the very next issue and took the liberty of countermanding the order authorizing any meeting of the legislature, or any other body, and this notwithstanding the fact that the president was nearer the spot than he was. this was characteristic of mr. stanton. he was a man who never questioned his own authority, and who always did in war time what he wanted to do. he was an able constitutional lawyer and jurist; but the constitution was not an impediment to him while the war lasted. in this latter particular i entirely agree with the view he evidently held. the constitution was not framed with a view to any such rebellion as that of 1861-5. while it did not authorize rebellion it made no provision against it. yet the right to resist or suppress rebellion is as inherent as the right of self-defence, and as natural as the right of an individual to preserve his life when in jeopardy. the constitution was therefore in abeyance for the time being, so far as it in any way affected the progress and termination of the war. those in rebellion against the government of the united states were not restricted by constitutional provisions, or any other, except the acts of their congress, which was loyal and devoted to the cause for which the south was then fighting. it would be a hard case when one-third of a nation, united in rebellion against the national authority, is entirely untrammeled, that the other two-thirds, in their efforts to maintain the union intact, should be restrained by a constitution prepared by our ancestors for the express purpose of insuring the permanency of the confederation of the states. after i left general lee at appomattox station, i went with my staff and a few others directly to burkesville station on my way to washington. the road from burkesville back having been newly repaired and the ground being soft, the train got off the track frequently, and, as a result, it was after midnight of the second day when i reached city point. as soon as possible i took a dispatch-boat thence to washington city. while in washington i was very busy for a time in preparing the necessary orders for the new state of affairs; communicating with my different commanders of separate departments, bodies of troops, etc. but by the 14th i was pretty well through with this work, so as to be able to visit my children, who were then in burlington, new jersey, attending school. mrs. grant was with me in washington at the time, and we were invited by president and mrs. lincoln to accompany them to the theatre on the evening of that day. i replied to the president's verbal invitation to the effect, that if we were in the city we would take great pleasure in accompanying them; but that i was very anxious to get away and visit my children, and if i could get through my work during the day i should do so. i did get through and started by the evening train on the 14th, sending mr. lincoln word, of course, that i would not be at the theatre. at that time the railroad to new york entered philadelphia on broad street; passengers were conveyed in ambulances to the delaware river, and then ferried to camden, at which point they took the cars again. when i reached the ferry, on the east side of the city of philadelphia, i found people awaiting my arrival there; and also dispatches informing me of the assassination of the president and mr. seward, and of the probable assassination of the vice president, mr. johnson, and requesting my immediate return. it would be impossible for me to describe the feeling that overcame me at the news of these assassinations, more especially the assassination of the president. i knew his goodness of heart, his generosity, his yielding disposition, his desire to have everybody happy, and above all his desire to see all the people of the united states enter again upon the full privileges of citizenship with equality among all. i knew also the feeling that mr. johnson had expressed in speeches and conversation against the southern people, and i feared that his course towards them would be such as to repel, and make them unwilling citizens; and if they became such they would remain so for a long while. i felt that reconstruction had been set back, no telling how far. i immediately arranged for getting a train to take me back to washington city; but mrs. grant was with me; it was after midnight and burlington was but an hour away. finding that i could accompany her to our house and return about as soon as they would be ready to take me from the philadelphia station, i went up with her and returned immediately by the same special train. the joy that i had witnessed among the people in the street and in public places in washington when i left there, had been turned to grief; the city was in reality a city of mourning. i have stated what i believed then the effect of this would be, and my judgment now is that i was right. i believe the south would have been saved from very much of the hardness of feeling that was engendered by mr. johnson's course towards them during the first few months of his administration. be this as it may, mr. lincoln's assassination was particularly unfortunate for the entire nation. mr. johnson's course towards the south did engender bitterness of feeling. his denunciations of treason and his ever-ready remark, "treason is a crime and must be made odious," was repeated to all those men of the south who came to him to get some assurances of safety so that they might go to work at something with the feeling that what they obtained would be secure to them. he uttered his denunciations with great vehemence, and as they were accompanied with no assurances of safety, many southerners were driven to a point almost beyond endurance. the president of the united states is, in a large degree, or ought to be, a representative of the feeling, wishes and judgment of those over whom he presides; and the southerners who read the denunciations of themselves and their people must have come to the conclusion that he uttered the sentiments of the northern people; whereas, as a matter of fact, but for the assassination of mr. lincoln, i believe the great majority of the northern people, and the soldiers unanimously, would have been in favor of a speedy reconstruction on terms that would be the least humiliating to the people who had rebelled against their government. they believed, i have no doubt, as i did, that besides being the mildest, it was also the wisest, policy. the people who had been in rebellion must necessarily come back into the union, and be incorporated as an integral part of the nation. naturally the nearer they were placed to an equality with the people who had not rebelled, the more reconciled they would feel with their old antagonists, and the better citizens they would be from the beginning. they surely would not make good citizens if they felt that they had a yoke around their necks. i do not believe that the majority of the northern people at that time were in favor of negro suffrage. they supposed that it would naturally follow the freedom of the negro, but that there would be a time of probation, in which the ex-slaves could prepare themselves for the privileges of citizenship before the full right would be conferred; but mr. johnson, after a complete revolution of sentiment, seemed to regard the south not only as an oppressed people, but as the people best entitled to consideration of any of our citizens. this was more than the people who had secured to us the perpetuation of the union were prepared for, and they became more radical in their views. the southerners had the most power in the executive branch, mr. johnson having gone to their side; and with a compact south, and such sympathy and support as they could get from the north, they felt that they would be able to control the nation at once, and already many of them acted as if they thought they were entitled to do so. thus mr. johnson, fighting congress on the one hand, and receiving the support of the south on the other, drove congress, which was overwhelmingly republican, to the passing of first one measure and then another to restrict his power. there being a solid south on one side that was in accord with the political party in the north which had sympathized with the rebellion, it finally, in the judgment of congress and of the majority of the legislatures of the states, became necessary to enfranchise the negro, in all his ignorance. in this work, i shall not discuss the question of how far the policy of congress in this particular proved a wise one. it became an absolute necessity, however, because of the foolhardiness of the president and the blindness of the southern people to their own interest. as to myself, while strongly favoring the course that would be the least humiliating to the people who had been in rebellion, i gradually worked up to the point where, with the majority of the people, i favored immediate enfranchisement. chapter lxix. sherman and johnston--johnston's surrender to sherman--capture of mobile--wilson's expedition--capture of jefferson davis--general thomas's qualities--estimate of general canby. when i left appomattox i ordered general meade to proceed leisurely back to burkesville station with the army of the potomac and the army of the james, and to go into camp there until further orders from me. general johnston, as has been stated before, was in north carolina confronting general sherman. it could not be known positively, of course, whether johnston would surrender on the news of lee's surrender, though i supposed he would; and if he did not, burkesville station was the natural point from which to move to attack him. the army which i could have sent against him was superior to his, and that with which sherman confronted him was also superior; and between the two he would necessarily have been crushed, or driven away. with the loss of their capital and the army of northern virginia it was doubtful whether johnston's men would have the spirit to stand. my belief was that he would make no such attempt; but i adopted this course as a precaution against what might happen, however improbable. simultaneously with my starting from city point, i sent a messenger to north carolina by boat with dispatches to general sherman, informing him of the surrender of lee and his army; also of the terms which i had given him; and i authorized sherman to give the same terms to johnston if the latter chose to accept them. the country is familiar with the terms that sherman agreed to conditionally, because they embraced a political question as well as a military one and he would therefore have to confer with the government before agreeing to them definitely. general sherman had met mr. lincoln at city point while visiting there to confer with me about our final movement, and knew what mr. lincoln had said to the peace commissioners when he met them at hampton roads, viz.: that before he could enter into negotiations with them they would have to agree to two points: one being that the union should be preserved, and the other that slavery should be abolished; and if they were ready to concede these two points he was almost ready to sign his name to a blank piece of paper and permit them to fill out the balance of the terms upon which we would live together. he had also seen notices in the newspapers of mr. lincoln's visit to richmond, and had read in the same papers that while there he had authorized the convening of the legislature of virginia. sherman thought, no doubt, in adding to the terms that i had made with general lee, that he was but carrying out the wishes of the president of the united states. but seeing that he was going beyond his authority, he made it a point that the terms were only conditional. they signed them with this understanding, and agreed to a truce until the terms could be sent to washington for approval; if approved by the proper authorities there, they would then be final; if not approved, then he would give due notice, before resuming hostilities. as the world knows, sherman, from being one of the most popular generals of the land (congress having even gone so far as to propose a bill providing for a second lieutenant-general for the purpose of advancing him to that grade), was denounced by the president and secretary of war in very bitter terms. some people went so far as to denounce him as a traitor --a most preposterous term to apply to a man who had rendered so much service as he had, even supposing he had made a mistake in granting such terms as he did to johnston and his army. if sherman had taken authority to send johnston with his army home, with their arms to be put in the arsenals of their own states, without submitting the question to the authorities at washington, the suspicions against him might have some foundation. but the feeling against sherman died out very rapidly, and it was not many weeks before he was restored to the fullest confidence of the american people. when, some days after my return to washington, president johnson and the secretary of war received the terms which general sherman had forwarded for approval, a cabinet meeting was immediately called and i was sent for. there seemed to be the greatest consternation, lest sherman would commit the government to terms which they were not willing to accede to and which he had no right to grant. a message went out directing the troops in the south not to obey general sherman. i was ordered to proceed at once to north carolina and take charge of matter there myself. of course i started without delay, and reached there as soon as possible. i repaired to raleigh, where sherman was, as quietly as possible, hoping to see him without even his army learning of my presence. when i arrived i went to sherman's headquarters, and we were at once closeted together. i showed him the instruction and orders under which i visited him. i told him that i wanted him to notify general johnston that the terms which they had conditionally agreed upon had not been approved in washington, and that he was authorized to offer the same terms i had given general lee. i sent sherman to do this himself. i did not wish the knowledge of my presence to be known to the army generally; so i left it to sherman to negotiate the terms of the surrender solely by himself, and without the enemy knowing that i was anywhere near the field. as soon as possible i started to get away, to leave sherman quite free and untrammelled. at goldsboro', on my way back, i met a mail, containing the last newspapers, and i found in them indications of great excitement in the north over the terms sherman had given johnston; and harsh orders that had been promulgated by the president and secretary of war. i knew that sherman must see these papers, and i fully realized what great indignation they would cause him, though i do not think his feelings could have been more excited than were my own. but like the true and loyal soldier that he was, he carried out the instructions i had given him, obtained the surrender of johnston's army, and settled down in his camp about raleigh, to await final orders. there were still a few expeditions out in the south that could not be communicated with, and had to be left to act according to the judgment of their respective commanders. with these it was impossible to tell how the news of the surrender of lee and johnston, of which they must have heard, might affect their judgment as to what was best to do. the three expeditions which i had tried so hard to get off from the commands of thomas and canby did finally get off: one under canby himself, against mobile, late in march; that under stoneman from east tennessee on the 20th; and the one under wilson, starting from eastport, mississippi, on the 22d of march. they were all eminently successful, but without any good result. indeed much valuable property was destroyed and many lives lost at a time when we would have liked to spare them. the war was practically over before their victories were gained. they were so late in commencing operations, that they did not hold any troops away that otherwise would have been operating against the armies which were gradually forcing the confederate armies to a surrender. the only possible good that we may have experienced from these raids was by stoneman's getting near lynchburg about the time the armies of the potomac and the james were closing in on lee at appomattox. stoneman entered north carolina and then pushed north to strike the virginia and tennessee railroad. he got upon that road, destroyed its bridges at different places and rendered the road useless to the enemy up to within a few miles of lynchburg. his approach caused the evacuation of that city about the time we were at appomattox, and was the cause of a commotion we heard of there. he then pushed south, and was operating in the rear of johnston's army about the time the negotiations were going on between sherman and johnston for the latter's surrender. in this raid stoneman captured and destroyed a large amount of stores, while fourteen guns and nearly two thousand prisoners were the trophies of his success. canby appeared before mobile on the 27th of march. the city of mobile was protected by two forts, besides other intrenchments--spanish fort, on the east side of the bay, and fort blakely, north of the city. these forts were invested. on the night of the 8th of april, the national troops having carried the enemy's works at one point, spanish fort was evacuated; and on the 9th, the very day of lee's surrender, blakely was carried by assault, with a considerable loss to us. on the 11th the city was evacuated. i had tried for more than two years to have an expedition sent against mobile when its possession by us would have been of great advantage. it finally cost lives to take it when its possession was of no importance, and when, if left alone, it would within a few days have fallen into our hands without any bloodshed whatever. wilson moved out with full 12,000 men, well equipped and well armed. he was an energetic officer and accomplished his work rapidly. forrest was in his front, but with neither his old-time army nor his old-time prestige. he now had principally conscripts. his conscripts were generally old men and boys. he had a few thousand regular cavalry left, but not enough to even retard materially the progress of wilson's cavalry. selma fell on the 2d of april, with a large number of prisoners and a large quantity of war material, machine shops, etc., to be disposed of by the victors. tuscaloosa, montgomery and west point fell in quick succession. these were all important points to the enemy by reason of their railroad connections, as depots of supplies, and because of their manufactories of war material. they were fortified or intrenched, and there was considerable fighting before they were captured. macon surrendered on the 21st of april. here news was received of the negotiations for the surrender of johnston's army. wilson belonged to the military division commanded by sherman, and of course was bound by his terms. this stopped all fighting. general richard taylor had now become the senior confederate officer still at liberty east of the mississippi river, and on the 4th of may he surrendered everything within the limits of this extensive command. general e. kirby smith surrendered the trans-mississippi department on the 26th of may, leaving no other confederate army at liberty to continue the war. wilson's raid resulted in the capture of the fugitive president of the defunct confederacy before he got out of the country. this occurred at irwinsville, georgia, on the 11th of may. for myself, and i believe mr. lincoln shared the feeling, i would have been very glad to have seen mr. davis succeed in escaping, but for one reason: i feared that if not captured, he might get into the trans-mississippi region and there set up a more contracted confederacy. the young men now out of homes and out of employment might have rallied under his standard and protracted the war yet another year. the northern people were tired of the war, they were tired of piling up a debt which would be a further mortgage upon their homes. mr. lincoln, i believe, wanted mr. davis to escape, because he did not wish to deal with the matter of his punishment. he knew there would be people clamoring for the punishment of the ex-confederate president, for high treason. he thought blood enough had already been spilled to atone for our wickedness as a nation. at all events he did not wish to be the judge to decide whether more should be shed or not. but his own life was sacrificed at the hands of an assassin before the ex-president of the confederacy was a prisoner in the hands of the government which he had lent all his talent and all his energies to destroy. all things are said to be wisely directed, and for the best interest of all concerned. this reflection does not, however, abate in the slightest our sense of bereavement in the untimely loss of so good and great a man as abraham lincoln. he would have proven the best friend the south could have had, and saved much of the wrangling and bitterness of feeling brought out by reconstruction under a president who at first wished to revenge himself upon southern men of better social standing than himself, but who still sought their recognition, and in a short time conceived the idea and advanced the proposition to become their moses to lead them triumphantly out of all their difficulties. the story of the legislation enacted during the reconstruction period to stay the hands of the president is too fresh in the minds of the people to be told now. much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained. these laws did serve their purpose, and now remain "a dead letter" upon the statute books of the united states, no one taking interest enough in them to give them a passing thought. much was said at the time about the garb mr. davis was wearing when he was captured. i cannot settle this question from personal knowledge of the facts; but i have been under the belief, from information given to me by general wilson shortly after the event, that when mr. davis learned that he was surrounded by our cavalry he was in his tent dressed in a gentleman's dressing gown. naturally enough, mr. davis wanted to escape, and would not reflect much how this should be accomplished provided it might be done successfully. if captured, he would be no ordinary prisoner. he represented all there was of that hostility to the government which had caused four years of the bloodiest war--and the most costly in other respects of which history makes any record. every one supposed he would be tried for treason if captured, and that he would be executed. had he succeeded in making his escape in any disguise it would have been adjudged a good thing afterwards by his admirers. as my official letters on file in the war department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon general thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that i give my estimate of him as a soldier. the same remark will apply also in the case of general canby. i had been at west point with thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. he was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. he possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. he gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. this implies a very valuable quality. it is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it. thomas's dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. he could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. he was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. i do not believe that he could ever have conducted sherman's army from chattanooga to atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. on the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better. thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861-5. general canby was an officer of great merit. he was naturally studious, and inclined to the law. there have been in the army but very few, if any, officers who took as much interest in reading and digesting every act of congress and every regulation for the government of the army as he. his knowledge gained in this way made him a most valuable staff officer, a capacity in which almost all his army services were rendered up to the time of his being assigned to the military division of the gulf. he was an exceedingly modest officer, though of great talent and learning. i presume his feelings when first called upon to command a large army against a fortified city, were somewhat like my own when marching a regiment against general thomas harris in missouri in 1861. neither of us would have felt the slightest trepidation in going into battle with some one else commanding. had canby been in other engagements afterwards, he would, i have no doubt, have advanced without any fear arising from a sense of the responsibility. he was afterwards killed in the lava beds of southern oregon, while in pursuit of the hostile modoc indians. his character was as pure as his talent and learning were great. his services were valuable during the war, but principally as a bureau officer. i have no idea that it was from choice that his services were rendered in an office, but because of his superior efficiency there. chapter lxx. the end of the war--the march to washington--one of lincoln's anecdotes --grand review at washington--characteristics of lincoln and stanton --estimate of the different corps commanders. things began to quiet down, and as the certainty that there would be no more armed resistance became clearer, the troops in north carolina and virginia were ordered to march immediately to the capital, and go into camp there until mustered out. suitable garrisons were left at the prominent places throughout the south to insure obedience to the laws that might be enacted for the government of the several states, and to insure security to the lives and property of all classes. i do not know how far this was necessary, but i deemed it necessary, at that time, that such a course should be pursued. i think now that these garrisons were continued after they ceased to be absolutely required; but it is not to be expected that such a rebellion as was fought between the sections from 1861 to 1865 could terminate without leaving many serious apprehensions in the mind of the people as to what should be done. sherman marched his troops from goldsboro, up to manchester, on the south side of the james river, opposite richmond, and there put them in camp, while he went back to savannah to see what the situation was there. it was during this trip that the last outrage was committed upon him. halleck had been sent to richmond to command virginia, and had issued orders prohibiting even sherman's own troops from obeying his, sherman's, orders. sherman met the papers on his return, containing this order of halleck, and very justly felt indignant at the outrage. on his arrival at fortress monroe returning from savannah, sherman received an invitation from halleck to come to richmond and be his guest. this he indignantly refused, and informed halleck, furthermore, that he had seen his order. he also stated that he was coming up to take command of his troops, and as he marched through it would probably be as well for halleck not to show himself, because he (sherman) would not be responsible for what some rash person might do through indignation for the treatment he had received. very soon after that, sherman received orders from me to proceed to washington city, and to go into camp on the south side of the city pending the mustering-out of the troops. there was no incident worth noting in the march northward from goldsboro, to richmond, or in that from richmond to washington city. the army, however, commanded by sherman, which had been engaged in all the battles of the west and had marched from the mississippi through the southern states to the sea, from there to goldsboro, and thence to washington city, had passed over many of the battle-fields of the army of the potomac, thus having seen, to a greater extent than any other body of troops, the entire theatre of the four years' war for the preservation of the union. the march of sherman's army from atlanta to the sea and north to goldsboro, while it was not accompanied with the danger that was anticipated, yet was magnificent in its results, and equally magnificent in the way it was conducted. it had an important bearing, in various ways, upon the great object we had in view, that of closing the war. all the states east of the mississippi river up to the state of georgia, had felt the hardships of the war. georgia, and south carolina, and almost all of north carolina, up to this time, had been exempt from invasion by the northern armies, except upon their immediate sea coasts. their newspapers had given such an account of confederate success, that the people who remained at home had been convinced that the yankees had been whipped from first to last, and driven from pillar to post, and that now they could hardly be holding out for any other purpose than to find a way out of the war with honor to themselves. even during this march of sherman's the newspapers in his front were proclaiming daily that his army was nothing better than a mob of men who were frightened out of their wits and hastening, panic-stricken, to try to get under the cover of our navy for protection against the southern people. as the army was seen marching on triumphantly, however, the minds of the people became disabused and they saw the true state of affairs. in turn they became disheartened, and would have been glad to submit without compromise. another great advantage resulting from this march, and which was calculated to hasten the end, was the fact that the great storehouse of georgia was entirely cut off from the confederate armies. as the troops advanced north from savannah, the destruction of the railroads in south carolina and the southern part of north carolina, further cut off their resources and left the armies still in virginia and north carolina dependent for supplies upon a very small area of country, already very much exhausted of food and forage. in due time the two armies, one from burkesville junction and the other from the neighborhood of raleigh, north carolina, arrived and went into camp near the capital, as directed. the troops were hardy, being inured to fatigue, and they appeared in their respective camps as ready and fit for duty as they had ever been in their lives. i doubt whether an equal body of men of any nation, take them man for man, officer for officer, was ever gotten together that would have proved their equal in a great battle. the armies of europe are machines; the men are brave and the officers capable; but the majority of the soldiers in most of the nations of europe are taken from a class of people who are not very intelligent and who have very little interest in the contest in which they are called upon to take part. our armies were composed of men who were able to read, men who knew what they were fighting for, and could not be induced to serve as soldiers, except in an emergency when the safety of the nation was involved, and so necessarily must have been more than equal to men who fought merely because they were brave and because they were thoroughly drilled and inured to hardships. there was nothing of particular importance occurred during the time these troops were in camp before starting north. i remember one little incident which i will relate as an anecdote characteristic of mr. lincoln. it occurred a day after i reached washington, and about the time general meade reached burkesville with the army. governor smith of virginia had left richmond with the confederate states government, and had gone to danville. supposing i was necessarily with the army at burkesville, he addressed a letter to me there informing me that, as governor of the commonwealth of the state of virginia, he had temporarily removed the state capital from richmond to danville, and asking if he would be permitted to perform the functions of his office there without molestation by the federal authorities. i give this letter only in substance. he also inquired of me whether in case he was not allowed to perform the duties of his office, he with a few others might not be permitted to leave the country and go abroad without interference. general meade being informed that a flag of truce was outside his pickets with a letter to me, at once sent out and had the letter brought in without informing the officer who brought it that i was not present. he read the letter and telegraphed me its contents. meeting mr. lincoln shortly after receiving this dispatch, i repeated its contents to him. mr. lincoln, supposing i was asking for instructions, said, in reply to that part of governor smith's letter which inquired whether he with a few friends would be permitted to leave the country unmolested, that his position was like that of a certain irishman (giving the name) he knew in springfield who was very popular with the people, a man of considerable promise, and very much liked. unfortunately he had acquired the habit of drinking, and his friends could see that the habit was growing on him. these friends determined to make an effort to save him, and to do this they drew up a pledge to abstain from all alcoholic drinks. they asked pat to join them in signing the pledge, and he consented. he had been so long out of the habit of using plain water as a beverage that he resorted to soda-water as a substitute. after a few days this began to grow distasteful to him. so holding the glass behind him, he said: "doctor, couldn't you drop a bit of brandy in that unbeknownst to myself." i do not remember what the instructions were the president gave me, but i know that governor smith was not permitted to perform the duties of his office. i also know that if mr. lincoln had been spared, there would have been no efforts made to prevent any one from leaving the country who desired to do so. he would have been equally willing to permit the return of the same expatriated citizens after they had time to repent of their choice. on the 18th of may orders were issued by the adjutant-general for a grand review by the president and his cabinet of sherman's and meade's armies. the review commenced on the 23d and lasted two days. meade's army occupied over six hours of the first day in passing the grand stand which had been erected in front of the president's house. sherman witnessed this review from the grand stand which was occupied by the president and his cabinet. here he showed his resentment for the cruel and harsh treatment that had unnecessarily been inflicted upon him by the secretary of war, by refusing to take his extended hand. sherman's troops had been in camp on the south side of the potomac. during the night of the 23d he crossed over and bivouacked not far from the capitol. promptly at ten o'clock on the morning of the 24th, his troops commenced to pass in review. sherman's army made a different appearance from that of the army of the potomac. the latter had been operating where they received directly from the north full supplies of food and clothing regularly: the review of this army therefore was the review of a body of 65,000 well-drilled, well-disciplined and orderly soldiers inured to hardship and fit for any duty, but without the experience of gathering their own food and supplies in an enemy's country, and of being ever on the watch. sherman's army was not so well-dressed as the army of the potomac, but their marching could not be excelled; they gave the appearance of men who had been thoroughly drilled to endure hardships, either by long and continuous marches or through exposure to any climate, without the ordinary shelter of a camp. they exhibited also some of the order of march through georgia where the "sweet potatoes sprung up from the ground" as sherman's army went marching through. in the rear of a company there would be a captured horse or mule loaded with small cooking utensils, captured chickens and other food picked up for the use of the men. negro families who had followed the army would sometimes come along in the rear of a company, with three or four children packed upon a single mule, and the mother leading it. the sight was varied and grand: nearly all day for two successive days, from the capitol to the treasury building, could be seen a mass of orderly soldiers marching in columns of companies. the national flag was flying from almost every house and store; the windows were filled with spectators; the door-steps and side-walks were crowded with colored people and poor whites who did not succeed in securing better quarters from which to get a view of the grand armies. the city was about as full of strangers who had come to see the sights as it usually is on inauguration day when a new president takes his seat. it may not be out of place to again allude to president lincoln and the secretary of war, mr. stanton, who were the great conspicuous figures in the executive branch of the government. there is no great difference of opinion now, in the public mind, as to the characteristics of the president. with mr. stanton the case is different. they were the very opposite of each other in almost every particular, except that each possessed great ability. mr. lincoln gained influence over men by making them feel that it was a pleasure to serve him. he preferred yielding his own wish to gratify others, rather than to insist upon having his own way. it distressed him to disappoint others. in matters of public duty, however, he had what he wished, but in the least offensive way. mr. stanton never questioned his own authority to command, unless resisted. he cared nothing for the feeling of others. in fact it seemed to be pleasanter to him to disappoint than to gratify. he felt no hesitation in assuming the functions of the executive, or in acting without advising with him. if his act was not sustained, he would change it--if he saw the matter would be followed up until he did so. it was generally supposed that these two officials formed the complement of each other. the secretary was required to prevent the president's being imposed upon. the president was required in the more responsible place of seeing that injustice was not done to others. i do not know that this view of these two men is still entertained by the majority of the people. it is not a correct view, however, in my estimation. mr. lincoln did not require a guardian to aid him in the fulfilment of a public trust. mr. lincoln was not timid, and he was willing to trust his generals in making and executing their plans. the secretary was very timid, and it was impossible for him to avoid interfering with the armies covering the capital when it was sought to defend it by an offensive movement against the army guarding the confederate capital. he could see our weakness, but he could not see that the enemy was in danger. the enemy would not have been in danger if mr. stanton had been in the field. these characteristics of the two officials were clearly shown shortly after early came so near getting into the capital. among the army and corps commanders who served with me during the war between the states, and who attracted much public attention, but of whose ability as soldiers i have not yet given any estimate, are meade, hancock, sedgwick, burnside, terry and hooker. there were others of great merit, such as griffin, humphreys, wright and mackenzie. of those first named, burnside at one time had command of the army of the potomac, and later of the army of the ohio. hooker also commanded the army of the potomac for a short time. general meade was an officer of great merit, with drawbacks to his usefulness that were beyond his control. he had been an officer of the engineer corps before the war, and consequently had never served with troops until he was over forty-six years of age. he never had, i believe, a command of less than a brigade. he saw clearly and distinctly the position of the enemy, and the topography of the country in front of his own position. his first idea was to take advantage of the lay of the ground, sometimes without reference to the direction we wanted to move afterwards. he was subordinate to his superiors in rank to the extent that he could execute an order which changed his own plans with the same zeal he would have displayed if the plan had been his own. he was brave and conscientious, and commanded the respect of all who knew him. he was unfortunately of a temper that would get beyond his control, at times, and make him speak to officers of high rank in the most offensive manner. no one saw this fault more plainly than he himself, and no one regretted it more. this made it unpleasant at times, even in battle, for those around him to approach him even with information. in spite of this defect he was a most valuable officer and deserves a high place in the annals of his country. general burnside was an officer who was generally liked and respected. he was not, however, fitted to command an army. no one knew this better than himself. he always admitted his blunders, and extenuated those of officers under him beyond what they were entitled to. it was hardly his fault that he was ever assigned to a separate command. of hooker i saw but little during the war. i had known him very well before, however. where i did see him, at chattanooga, his achievement in bringing his command around the point of lookout mountain and into chattanooga valley was brilliant. i nevertheless regarded him as a dangerous man. he was not subordinate to his superiors. he was ambitious to the extent of caring nothing for the rights of others. his disposition was, when engaged in battle, to get detached from the main body of the army and exercise a separate command, gathering to his standard all he could of his juniors. hancock stands the most conspicuous figure of all the general officers who did not exercise a separate command. he commanded a corps longer than any other one, and his name was never mentioned as having committed in battle a blunder for which he was responsible. he was a man of very conspicuous personal appearance. tall, well-formed and, at the time of which i now write, young and fresh-looking, he presented an appearance that would attract the attention of an army as he passed. his genial disposition made him friends, and his personal courage and his presence with his command in the thickest of the fight won for him the confidence of troops serving under him. no matter how hard the fight, the 2d corps always felt that their commander was looking after them. sedgwick was killed at spottsylvania before i had an opportunity of forming an estimate of his qualifications as a soldier from personal observation. i had known him in mexico when both of us were lieutenants, and when our service gave no indication that either of us would ever be equal to the command of a brigade. he stood very high in the army, however, as an officer and a man. he was brave and conscientious. his ambition was not great, and he seemed to dread responsibility. he was willing to do any amount of battling, but always wanted some one else to direct. he declined the command of the army of the potomac once, if not oftener. general alfred h. terry came into the army as a volunteer without a military education. his way was won without political influence up to an important separate command--the expedition against fort fisher, in january, 1865. his success there was most brilliant, and won for him the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army and of major-general of volunteers. he is a man who makes friends of those under him by his consideration of their wants and their dues. as a commander, he won their confidence by his coolness in action and by his clearness of perception in taking in the situation under which he was placed at any given time. griffin, humphreys, and mackenzie were good corps commanders, but came into that position so near to the close of the war as not to attract public attention. all three served as such, in the last campaign of the armies of the potomac and the james, which culminated at appomattox court house, on the 9th of april, 1865. the sudden collapse of the rebellion monopolized attention to the exclusion of almost everything else. i regarded mackenzie as the most promising young officer in the army. graduating at west point, as he did, during the second year of the war, he had won his way up to the command of a corps before its close. this he did upon his own merit and without influence. conclusion. the cause of the great war of the rebellion against the united status will have to be attributed to slavery. for some years before the war began it was a trite saying among some politicians that "a state half slave and half free cannot exist." all must become slave or all free, or the state will go down. i took no part myself in any such view of the case at the time, but since the war is over, reviewing the whole question, i have come to the conclusion that the saying is quite true. slavery was an institution that required unusual guarantees for its security wherever it existed; and in a country like ours where the larger portion of it was free territory inhabited by an intelligent and well-to-do population, the people would naturally have but little sympathy with demands upon them for its protection. hence the people of the south were dependent upon keeping control of the general government to secure the perpetuation of their favorite institution. they were enabled to maintain this control long after the states where slavery existed had ceased to have the controlling power, through the assistance they received from odd men here and there throughout the northern states. they saw their power waning, and this led them to encroach upon the prerogatives and independence of the northern states by enacting such laws as the fugitive slave law. by this law every northern man was obliged, when properly summoned, to turn out and help apprehend the runaway slave of a southern man. northern marshals became slave-catchers, and northern courts had to contribute to the support and protection of the institution. this was a degradation which the north would not permit any longer than until they could get the power to expunge such laws from the statute books. prior to the time of these encroachments the great majority of the people of the north had no particular quarrel with slavery, so long as they were not forced to have it themselves. but they were not willing to play the role of police for the south in the protection of this particular institution. in the early days of the country, before we had railroads, telegraphs and steamboats--in a word, rapid transit of any sort--the states were each almost a separate nationality. at that time the subject of slavery caused but little or no disturbance to the public mind. but the country grew, rapid transit was established, and trade and commerce between the states got to be so much greater than before, that the power of the national government became more felt and recognized and, therefore, had to be enlisted in the cause of this institution. it is probably well that we had the war when we did. we are better off now than we would have been without it, and have made more rapid progress than we otherwise should have made. the civilized nations of europe have been stimulated into unusual activity, so that commerce, trade, travel, and thorough acquaintance among people of different nationalities, has become common; whereas, before, it was but the few who had ever had the privilege of going beyond the limits of their own country or who knew anything about other people. then, too, our republican institutions were regarded as experiments up to the breaking out of the rebellion, and monarchical europe generally believed that our republic was a rope of sand that would part the moment the slightest strain was brought upon it. now it has shown itself capable of dealing with one of the greatest wars that was ever made, and our people have proven themselves to be the most formidable in war of any nationality. but this war was a fearful lesson, and should teach us the necessity of avoiding wars in the future. the conduct of some of the european states during our troubles shows the lack of conscience of communities where the responsibility does not come upon a single individual. seeing a nation that extended from ocean to ocean, embracing the better part of a continent, growing as we were growing in population, wealth and intelligence, the european nations thought it would be well to give us a check. we might, possibly, after a while threaten their peace, or, at least, the perpetuity of their institutions. hence, england was constantly finding fault with the administration at washington because we were not able to keep up an effective blockade. she also joined, at first, with france and spain in setting up an austrian prince upon the throne in mexico, totally disregarding any rights or claims that mexico had of being treated as an independent power. it is true they trumped up grievances as a pretext, but they were only pretexts which can always be found when wanted. mexico, in her various revolutions, had been unable to give that protection to the subjects of foreign nations which she would have liked to give, and some of her revolutionary leaders had forced loans from them. under pretence of protecting their citizens, these nations seized upon mexico as a foothold for establishing a european monarchy upon our continent, thus threatening our peace at home. i, myself, regarded this as a direct act of war against the united states by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course that the united states would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike. i often spoke of the matter to mr. lincoln and the secretary of war, but never heard any special views from them to enable me to judge what they thought or felt about it. i inferred that they felt a good deal as i did, but were unwilling to commit themselves while we had our own troubles upon our hands. all of the powers except france very soon withdrew from the armed intervention for the establishment of an austrian prince upon the throne of mexico; but the governing people of these countries continued to the close of the war to throw obstacles in our way. after the surrender of lee, therefore, entertaining the opinion here expressed, i sent sheridan with a corps to the rio grande to have him where he might aid juarez in expelling the french from mexico. these troops got off before they could be stopped; and went to the rio grande, where sheridan distributed them up and down the river, much to the consternation of the troops in the quarter of mexico bordering on that stream. this soon led to a request from france that we should withdraw our troops from the rio grande and to negotiations for the withdrawal of theirs. finally bazaine was withdrawn from mexico by order of the french government. from that day the empire began to totter. mexico was then able to maintain her independence without aid from us. france is the traditional ally and friend of the united states. i did not blame france for her part in the scheme to erect a monarchy upon the ruins of the mexican republic. that was the scheme of one man, an imitator without genius or merit. he had succeeded in stealing the government of his country, and made a change in its form against the wishes and instincts of his people. he tried to play the part of the first napoleon, without the ability to sustain that role. he sought by new conquests to add to his empire and his glory; but the signal failure of his scheme of conquest was the precursor of his own overthrow. like our own war between the states, the franco-prussian war was an expensive one; but it was worth to france all it cost her people. it was the completion of the downfall of napoleon iii. the beginning was when he landed troops on this continent. failing here, the prestige of his name--all the prestige he ever had--was gone. he must achieve a success or fall. he tried to strike down his neighbor, prussia--and fell. i never admired the character of the first napoleon; but i recognize his great genius. his work, too, has left its impress for good on the face of europe. the third napoleon could have no claim to having done a good or just act. to maintain peace in the future it is necessary to be prepared for war. there can scarcely be a possible chance of a conflict, such as the last one, occurring among our own people again; but, growing as we are, in population, wealth and military power, we may become the envy of nations which led us in all these particulars only a few years ago; and unless we are prepared for it we may be in danger of a combined movement being some day made to crush us out. now, scarcely twenty years after the war, we seem to have forgotten the lessons it taught, and are going on as if in the greatest security, without the power to resist an invasion by the fleets of fourth-rate european powers for a time until we could prepare for them. we should have a good navy, and our sea-coast defences should be put in the finest possible condition. neither of these cost much when it is considered where the money goes, and what we get in return. money expended in a fine navy, not only adds to our security and tends to prevent war in the future, but is very material aid to our commerce with foreign nations in the meantime. money spent upon sea-coast defences is spent among our own people, and all goes back again among the people. the work accomplished, too, like that of the navy, gives us a feeling of security. england's course towards the united states during the rebellion exasperated the people of this country very much against the mother country. i regretted it. england and the united states are natural allies, and should be the best of friends. they speak one language, and are related by blood and other ties. we together, or even either separately, are better qualified than any other people to establish commerce between all the nationalities of the world. england governs her own colonies, and particularly those embracing the people of different races from her own, better than any other nation. she is just to the conquered, but rigid. she makes them self-supporting, but gives the benefit of labor to the laborer. she does not seem to look upon the colonies as outside possessions which she is at liberty to work for the support and aggrandizement of the home government. the hostility of england to the united states during our rebellion was not so much real as it was apparent. it was the hostility of the leaders of one political party. i am told that there was no time during the civil war when they were able to get up in england a demonstration in favor of secession, while these were constantly being gotten up in favor of the union, or, as they called it, in favor of the north. even in manchester, which suffered so fearfully by having the cotton cut off from her mills, they had a monster demonstration in favor of the north at the very time when their workmen were almost famishing. it is possible that the question of a conflict between races may come up in the future, as did that between freedom and slavery before. the condition of the colored man within our borders may become a source of anxiety, to say the least. but he was brought to our shores by compulsion, and he now should be considered as having as good a right to remain here as any other class of our citizens. it was looking to a settlement of this question that led me to urge the annexation of santo domingo during the time i was president of the united states. santo domingo was freely offered to us, not only by the administration, but by all the people, almost without price. the island is upon our shores, is very fertile, and is capable of supporting fifteen millions of people. the products of the soil are so valuable that labor in her fields would be so compensated as to enable those who wished to go there to quickly repay the cost of their passage. i took it that the colored people would go there in great numbers, so as to have independent states governed by their own race. they would still be states of the union, and under the protection of the general government; but the citizens would be almost wholly colored. by the war with mexico, we had acquired, as we have seen, territory almost equal in extent to that we already possessed. it was seen that the volunteers of the mexican war largely composed the pioneers to settle up the pacific coast country. their numbers, however, were scarcely sufficient to be a nucleus for the population of the important points of the territory acquired by that war. after our rebellion, when so many young men were at liberty to return to their homes, they found they were not satisfied with the farm, the store, or the work-shop of the villages, but wanted larger fields. the mines of the mountains first attracted them; but afterwards they found that rich valleys and productive grazing and farming lands were there. this territory, the geography of which was not known to us at the close of the rebellion, is now as well mapped as any portion of our country. railroads traverse it in every direction, north, south, east, and west. the mines are worked. the high lands are used for grazing purposes, and rich agricultural lands are found in many of the valleys. this is the work of the volunteer. it is probable that the indians would have had control of these lands for a century yet but for the war. we must conclude, therefore, that wars are not always evils unmixed with some good. prior to the rebellion the great mass of the people were satisfied to remain near the scenes of their birth. in fact an immense majority of the whole people did not feel secure against coming to want should they move among entire strangers. so much was the country divided into small communities that localized idioms had grown up, so that you could almost tell what section a person was from by hearing him speak. before, new territories were settled by a "class"; people who shunned contact with others; people who, when the country began to settle up around them, would push out farther from civilization. their guns furnished meat, and the cultivation of a very limited amount of the soil, their bread and vegetables. all the streams abounded with fish. trapping would furnish pelts to be brought into the states once a year, to pay for necessary articles which they could not raise--powder, lead, whiskey, tobacco and some store goods. occasionally some little articles of luxury would enter into these purchases--a quarter of a pound of tea, two or three pounds of coffee, more of sugar, some playing cards, and if anything was left over of the proceeds of the sale, more whiskey. little was known of the topography of the country beyond the settlements of these frontiersmen. this is all changed now. the war begot a spirit of independence and enterprise. the feeling now is, that a youth must cut loose from his old surroundings to enable him to get up in the world. there is now such a commingling of the people that particular idioms and pronunciation are no longer localized to any great extent; the country has filled up "from the centre all around to the sea"; railroads connect the two oceans and all parts of the interior; maps, nearly perfect, of every part of the country are now furnished the student of geography. the war has made us a nation of great power and intelligence. we have but little to do to preserve peace, happiness and prosperity at home, and the respect of other nations. our experience ought to teach us the necessity of the first; our power secures the latter. i feel that we are on the eve of a new era, when there is to be great harmony between the federal and confederate. i cannot stay to be a living witness to the correctness of this prophecy; but i feel it within me that it is to be so. the universally kind feeling expressed for me at a time when it was supposed that each day would prove my last, seemed to me the beginning of the answer to "let us have peace." the expression of these kindly feelings were not restricted to a section of the country, nor to a division of the people. they came from individual citizens of all nationalities; from all denominations--the protestant, the catholic, and the jew; and from the various societies of the land--scientific, educational, religious or otherwise. politics did not enter into the matter at all. i am not egotist enough to suppose all this significance should be given because i was the object of it. but the war between the states was a very bloody and a very costly war. one side or the other had to yield principles they deemed dearer than life before it could be brought to an end. i commanded the whole of the mighty host engaged on the victorious side. i was, no matter whether deservedly so or not, a representative of that side of the controversy. it is a significant and gratifying fact that confederates should have joined heartily in this spontaneous move. i hope the good feeling inaugurated may continue to the end. appendix. report of lieutenant-general u. s. grant, of the united states armies 1864-65. headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., july 22, 1865. hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. sir: i have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the armies of the united states from the date of my appointment to command the same. from an early period in the rebellion i had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. the resources of the enemy and his numerical strength were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies. the armies in the east and west acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together, enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from east to west, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing, for the support of their armies. it was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position. from the first, i was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both north and south, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken. i therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land. these views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. all i can say is, that what i have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what i conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country. at the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: the mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by federal troops, from st. louis, missouri, to its mouth. the line of the arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the mississippi, north of that stream. a few points in southern louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the rio grande. all the balance of the vast territory of arkansas, louisiana, and texas was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. the let-alone policy had demoralized this force so that probably but little more than one-half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. but the one-half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerillas scattered through missouri, arkansas, and along the mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. to the east of the mississippi we held substantially with the line of the tennessee and holston rivers, running eastward to include nearly all of the state of tennessee. south of chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in georgia, sufficient to protect east tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at dalton, georgia. west virginia was substantially within our lines. virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the potomac river, a small area about the mouth of james river, covered by the troops at norfolk and fort monroe, and the territory covered by the army of the potomac lying along the rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. along the sea-coast footholds had been obtained at plymouth, washington, and new bern, in north carolina; beaufort, folly and morris islands, hilton head, fort pulaski, and port royal, in south carolina; fernandina and st. augustine, in florida. key west and pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. the accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to general sherman and other commanders in march, 1864, shows by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864, while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy. behind the union lines there were many bands of guerillas and a large population disloyal to the government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. in the south, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning them. this enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field. the enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the mississippi into two armies, commanded by generals r. e. lee and j. e. johnston, his ablest and best generals. the army commanded by lee occupied the south bank of the rapidan, extending from mine run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending richmond, the rebel capital, against the army of the potomac. the army under johnston occupied a strongly intrenched position at dalton, georgia, covering and defending atlanta, georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under major-general w. t. sherman. in addition to these armies he had a large cavalry force under forrest, in north-east mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the shenandoah valley, and in the western part of virginia and extreme eastern part of tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land. these two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign. major-general w. t. sherman, who was appointed to the command of the military division of the mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the mississippi river to the alleghanies and the department of arkansas, west of the mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against johnston. major-general george g. meade had the immediate command of the army of the potomac, from where i exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies. general sherman was instructed to move against johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. if the enemy in his front showed signs of joining lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while i would prevent the concentration of lee upon him, if it was in the power of the army of the potomac to do so. more specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that i had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible. major-general n. p. banks, then on an expedition up red river against shreveport, louisiana (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the 15th of march, of the importance it was that shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than general sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by general sherman, even if it led to the abandonment of the main object of the red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold shreveport and the red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of new orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against mobile; that it certainly would be, if troops enough could be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements; that new orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that i had directed general steele to make a real move from arkansas, as suggested by him (general banks), instead of a demonstration, as steele thought advisable. on the 31st of march, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows: "1st. if successful in your expedition against shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the red river to general steele and the navy. "2d. that you abandon texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the rio grande. this can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. at least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. "3d. by properly fortifying on the mississippi river, the force to guard it from port hudson to new orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. according to your last return, this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against mobile. to this i expect to add five thousand men from missouri. if however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, i would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against mobile. with these and such additions as i can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon mobile. two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to admiral farragut. this gives him a strong naval fleet with which to co-operate. you can make your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select your own line of approach. my own idea of the matter is that pascagoula should be your base; but, from your long service in the gulf department, you will know best about the matter. it is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. all i would now add is, that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general n. p. banks." major-general meade was instructed that lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever lee went he would go also. for his movement two plans presented themselves: one to cross the rapidan below lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond or going north on a raid. but if we took this route, all we did would have to be done whilst the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. if we took the other route, brandy station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the york or james rivers. of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route. the following letter of instruction was addressed to major-general b. f. butler: "fort monroe, virginia, april 2, 1864. "general:-in the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished. "it will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. but, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. by such movement, they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. lee's army and richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. the necessity of covering washington with the army of the potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. i propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: the army of the potomac will act from its present base, lee's army being the objective point. you will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty--i should say not less than twenty thousand effective men--to operate on the south side of james river, richmond being your objective point. to the force you already have will be added about ten thousand men from south carolina, under major-general gillmore, who will command them in person. major-general w. f. smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department. "general gillmore will be ordered to report to you at fortress monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the 18th instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made. "when you are notified to move, take city point with as much force as possible. fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. from city point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements. "the fact that has already been stated--that is, that richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be co-operation between your force and the army of the potomac--must be your guide. this indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the james river as you advance. then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in richmond, the army of the potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit. "all the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. if, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about hicksford, about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage. "you will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." on the 16th these instructions were substantially reiterated. on the 19th, in order to secure full co-operation between his army and that of general meade, he was informed that i expected him to move from fort monroe the same day that general meade moved from culpeper. the exact time i was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the 27th of april; that it was my intention to fight lee between culpeper and richmond, if he would stand. should he, however, fall back into richmond, i would follow up and make a junction with his (general butler's) army on the james river; that, could i be certain he would be able to invest richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the james, above the city, i would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force there as possible. in co-operation with the main movements against lee and johnston, i was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal states and the armies operating against them. a very considerable force, under command of major-general sigel, was so held for the protection of west virginia, and the frontiers of maryland and pennsylvania. whilst these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the north to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front, and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. by such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. general sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from beverly and charleston, under command of generals ord and crook, against the east tennessee and virginia railroad. subsequently, general ord having been relieved at his own request, general sigel was instructed at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by beverly, and to form two columns, one under general crook, on the kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. the one on the shenandoah to assemble between cumberland and the shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to cedar creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the shenandoah valley, and advance as far as possible; while general crook would take possession of lewisburg with part of his force and move down the tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the new river bridge and the salt-works, at saltville, va. owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the 1st of may, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the 4th of may. my first object being to break the military power of the rebellion, and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that general butler should succeed in his movement against richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the east. if he failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north, and still retain enough for the defence of richmond. it was well understood, by both generals butler and meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the james river, in case of failure to destroy lee without it. before giving general butler his instructions, i visited him at fort monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of petersburg, and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. believing, however, in the practicability of capturing richmond unless it was reinforced, i made that the objective point of his operations. as the army of the potomac was to move simultaneously with him, lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of james river. i may here state that, commanding all the armies as i did, i tried, as far as possible, to leave general meade in independent command of the army of the potomac. my instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. the campaigns that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. his commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitle him to, and which he would otherwise have received. the movement of the army of the potomac commenced early on the morning of the 4th of may, under the immediate direction and orders of major-general meade, pursuant to instructions. before night, the whole army was across the rapidan (the fifth and sixth corps crossing at germania ford, and the second corps at ely's ford, the cavalry, under major-general sheridan, moving in advance,) with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. the average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. this i regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions i had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country, and protected. early on the 5th, the advance corps (the fifth, major-general g. k. warren commanding) met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near mine run. the battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness. general burnside, with the ninth corps, was, at the time the army of the potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the rappahannock river and alexandria railroad, holding the road back to bull run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. this crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the 4th. by six o'clock of the morning of the 6th he was leading his corps into action near the wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the rappahannock and rapidan rivers. considering that a large proportion, probably two-thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches, and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march. the battle of the wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the 6th, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the 5th. after dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners and creating considerable confusion. but the promptness of general sedgwick, who was personally present and commanded that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. on the morning of the 7th, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. from this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works. i therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. on the night of the 7th, the march was commenced towards spottsylvania court house, the fifth corps moving on the most direct road. but the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. on the 8th, general warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at spottsylvania. this force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. on the morning of the 9th, general sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with richmond. the 9th, 10th, and 11th were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. among the killed on the 9th was that able and distinguished soldier major-general john sedgwick, commanding the sixth army corps. major-general h. g. wright succeeded him in command. early on the morning of the 12th a general attack was made on the enemy in position. the second corps, major-general hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of johnson's division of ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. but the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. the 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, 17th, and 18th, were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from washington. deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at spottsylvania court house, orders were issued on the 15th with a view to a movement to the north anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the 19th. late in the afternoon of the 19th, ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. this delayed the movement to the north anna until the night of the 21st, when it was commenced. but the enemy again, having the shorter line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the north anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. the fifth corps reached the north anna on the afternoon of the 23d, closely followed by the sixth corps. the second and ninth corps got up about the same time, the second holding the railroad bridge, and the ninth lying between that and jericho ford. general warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got a position without much opposition. soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. on the 25th, general sheridan rejoined the army of the potomac from the raid on which he started from spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at beaver dam and ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad-track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at yellow tavern; carried the first line of works around richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the chickahominy at meadow bridge under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to haxall's landing, on the james river, where he communicated with general butler. this raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, making it comparatively easy to guard our trains. general butler moved his main force up the james river, in pursuance of instructions, on the 4th of may, general gillmore having joined him with the tenth corps. at the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of west point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under general kautz, from suffolk, to operate against the road south of petersburg and richmond. on the 5th, he occupied, without opposition, both city point and bermuda hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. on the 6th, he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. on the 7th he made a reconnoissance against the petersburg and richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. on the 9th he telegraphed as follows: "headquarters, near bermuda landing, may 9, 1864. "hon. e. m. stanton, secretary of war. "our operations may be summed up in a few words. with one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the peninsula, forced the chickahominy, and have safely, brought them to their present position. these were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets towards richmond. "general kautz, with three thousand cavalry from suffolk, on the same day with our movement up james river, forced the black water, burned the railroad bridge at stony creek, below petersburg, cutting into beauregard's force at that point. "we have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of lee's army. i have ordered up the supplies. "beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by kautz. that portion which reached petersburg under hill i have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight. "general grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to lee from beauregard's force. "benj. f. butler, major-general." on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defences at drury's bluff, or fort darling, with small loss. the time thus consumed from the 6th lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of richmond and petersburg, enabling, as it did, beauregard to collect his loose forces in north and south carolina, and bring them to the defence of those places. on the 16th, the enemy attacked general butler in his position in front of drury's bluff. he was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the james and appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. his army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. it required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there. on the 12th, general kautz, with his cavalry, was started on a raid against the danville railroad, which he struck at coalfield, powhatan, and chula stations, destroying them, the railroad-track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence, crossing to the south side road, struck it at wilson's, wellsville, and black's and white's stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to city point, which he reached on the 18th. on the 19th of april, and prior to the movement of general butler, the enemy, with a land force under general hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked plymouth, n. c., commanded by general h. w. wessells, and our gunboats there, and, after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault, and the entire garrison and armament captured. the gunboat smithfield was sunk, and the miami disabled. the army sent to operate against richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at bermuda hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most, if not all, the reinforcements brought from the south by beauregard against the army of the potomac. in addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under breckinridge from the western part of virginia. the position of bermuda hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. i determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving enough only to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the 22d, i directed that they be sent forward, under command of major-general w. f. smith, to join the army of the potomac. on the 24th of may, the 9th army corps, commanded by major-general a. e. burnside, was assigned to the army of the potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of major-general meade's command. finding the enemy's position on the north anna stronger than either of his previous ones, i withdrew on the night of the 26th to the north bank of the north anna, and moved via hanover town to turn the enemy's position by his right. generals torbert's and merritt's divisions of cavalry, under sheridan, and the 6th corps, led the advance, crossed the pamunkey river at hanover town, after considerable fighting, and on the 28th the two divisions of cavalry had a severe, but successful engagement with the enemy at hawes's shop. on the 29th and 30th we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the hanover court house and cold harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the chickahominy. late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. an attack was immediately ordered by general meade, along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line. on the 31st, general wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the south anna river, after defeating the enemy's cavalry. general sheridan, on the same day, reached cold harbor, and held it until relieved by the 6th corps and general smith's command, which had just arrived, via white house, from general butler's army. on the 1st day of june an attack was made at five p.m. by the 6th corps and the troops under general smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. this resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the 6th corps, and in front of general smith. during the attack the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but was repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. that night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. the 2d was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the 3d. on the 3d of june we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. in this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, i have reason to believe, was comparatively light. it was the only general attack made from the rapidan to the james which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. i would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as i had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion. from the proximity of the enemy to his defences around richmond, it was impossible, by any flank movement, to interpose between him and the city. i was still in a condition to either move by his left flank, and invest richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the james. while the former might have been better as a covering for washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad, a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea, from the start, had been to beat lee's army north of richmond, if possible. then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the james river, to transfer the army to the south side, and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. after the battle of the wilderness, it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. he acted purely on the defensive, behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of life than i was willing to make, all could not be accomplished that i had designed north of richmond. i therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to charlottesville and gordonsville to effectually break up the railroad connection between richmond and the shenandoah valley and lynchburg; and when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the james river, by the enemy's right flank, where i felt i could cut off all his sources of supply, except by the canal. on the 7th, two divisions of cavalry, under general sheridan, got off on the expedition against the virginia central railroad, with instructions to hunter, whom i hoped he would meet near charlottesville, to join his forces to sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the army of the potomac by the route laid down in sheridan's instructions. on the 10th of june, general butler sent a force of infantry, under general gillmore, and of cavalry under general kautz, to capture petersburg, if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the appomattox. the cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well in towards the town, but were forced to retire. general gillmore, finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to bermuda hundred without attempting one. attaching great importance to the possession of petersburg, i sent back to bermuda hundred and city point, general smith's command by water, via the white house, to reach there in advance of the army of the potomac. this was for the express purpose of securing petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place. the movement from cold harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the 12th. one division of cavalry, under general wilson, and the 5th corps, crossed the chickahominy at long bridge, and moved out to white oak swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. the advance corps reached james river, at wilcox's landing and charles city court house, on the night of the 13th. during three long years the armies of the potomac and northern virginia had been confronting each other. in that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. the southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the north, finding that they had failed to capture washington and march on to new york, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and southern territory. hence, antietam, gettysburg, and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. their army believed this. it produced a morale which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. the battles of the wilderness, spottsylvania, north anna and cold harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. his losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack, it was in the open field. the details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery, have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of major-general meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it. during the campaign of forty-three days, from the rapidan to the james river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. too much credit cannot, therefore, be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. under the general supervision of the chief quartermaster, brigadier-general r. ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water-base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them. the movement in the kanawha and shenandoah valleys, under general sigel, commenced on the 1st of may. general crook, who had the immediate command of the kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to general averell. they crossed the mountains by separate routes. averell struck the tennessee and virginia railroad, near wytheville, on the 10th, and proceeding to new river and christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including new river bridge, forming a junction with crook at union on the 15th. general sigel moved up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy at new market on the 15th, and, after a severe engagement, was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind cedar creek. not regarding the operations of general sigel as satisfactory, i asked his removal from command, and major-general hunter appointed to supersede him. his instructions were embraced in the following dispatches to major-general h. w. halleck, chief of staff of the army: "near spottsylvania court house, va. "may 20, 1864. * * * * * * * "the enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through staunton. on the whole, therefore, i think it would be better for general hunter to move in that direction; reach staunton and gordonsville or charlottesville, if he does not meet too much opposition. if he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * * * "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." "jericho ford, va., may 25, 1864. "if hunter can possibly get to charlottesville and lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. the railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about gordonsville join this army. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general h. w. halleck." general hunter immediately took up the offensive, and, moving up the shenandoah valley, met the enemy on the 5th of june at piedmont, and, after a battle of ten hours, routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle one thousand five hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small arms. on the 8th of the same month he formed a junction with crook and averell at staunton, from which place he moved direct on lynchburg, via lexington, which place he reached and invested on the 16th day of june. up to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured that, to the enemy important, point. the destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. to meet this movement under general hunter, general lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached lynchburg a short time before hunter. after some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, general hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of kanawha. this lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the north. had general hunter moved by way of charlottesville, instead of lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the shenandoah valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. if it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the james river canal, on the main line of communication between lynchburg and the force sent for its defence. i have never taken exception to the operations of general hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for i have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. the promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country. to return to the army of the potomac: the 2d corps commenced crossing the james river on the morning of the 14th by ferry-boats at wilcox's landing. the laying of the pontoon-bridge was completed about midnight of the 14th, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry. after the crossing had commenced, i proceeded by steamer to bermuda hundred to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of petersburg. the instructions to general butler were verbal, and were for him to send general smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him without sacrificing the position he then held. i told him that i would return at once to the army of the potomac, hasten its crossing and throw it forward to petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done, that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. general smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that i have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of petersburg from the appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. this was about seven p.m. between the line thus captured and petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced petersburg with a single brigade from any source. the night was clear the moon shining brightly and favorable to further operations. general hancock, with two divisions of the 2d corps, reached general smith just after dark, and offered the service of these troops as he (smith) might wish, waiving rank to the named commander, who he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. but instead of taking these troops and pushing at once into petersburg, he requested general hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight. by the time i arrived the next morning the enemy was in force. an attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under smith and the 2d and 9th corps. it required until that time for the 9th corps to get up and into position. the attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by general smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners. the 5th corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor on the 17th and 18th, but only resulted in forcing the enemy into an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. the advantages of position gained by us were very great. the army then proceeded to envelop petersburg towards the south side railroad as far as possible without attacking fortifications. on the 16th the enemy, to reinforce petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of bermuda hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the james to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. general butler, taking advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between petersburg and richmond. as soon as i was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it i ordered two divisions of the 6th corps, general wright commanding, that were embarking at wilcox's landing, under orders for city point, to report to general butler at bermuda hundred, of which general butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him. about two o'clock in the afternoon general butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. general wright, with his two divisions, joined general butler on the forenoon of the 17th, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. but instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and re-occupied his old line. on the night of the 20th and morning of the 21st a lodgment was effected by general butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the james, at deep bottom, and connected by pontoon-bridge with bermuda hundred. on the 19th, general sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the virginia central railroad, arrived at the white house just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. the result of this expedition was, that general sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near trevilian station, on the morning of the 11th of june, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. he left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. on the 12th he destroyed the railroad from trevilian station to louisa court house. this occupied until three o'clock p.m., when he advanced in the direction of gordonsville. he found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place and too strong to successfully assault. on the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. night closed the contest. not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from general hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the north anna, and commenced his return march, reaching white house at the time before stated. after breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the james river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. he commenced crossing on the 25th, near fort powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the army of the potomac. on the 22d, general wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the army of the potomac, and general kautz's division of cavalry of the army of the james moved against the enemy's railroads south of richmond. striking the weldon railroad at reams's station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road, and the south side road about fifteen miles from petersburg, to near nottoway station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry. he reached burkesville station on the afternoon of the 23d, and from there destroyed the danville railroad to roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. he then commenced his return march, and on the 28th met the enemy's cavalry in force at the weldon railroad crossing of stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. thence he made a detour from his left with a view of reaching reams's station (supposing it to be in our possession). at this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. in this last encounter, general kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. general wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. the damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. it severed all connection by railroad with richmond for several weeks. with a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near richmond to the anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the 9th corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the 26th of july the 2d corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the james river and joined the force general butler had there. on the 27th the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. on the 28th our lines were extended from deep bottom to new market road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. the fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss to both sides. the first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, i determined to take advantage of the diversion made, by assaulting petersburg before he could get his force back there. one division of the 2d corps was withdrawn on the night of the 28th, and moved during the night to the rear of the 18th corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. the other two divisions of the 2d corps and sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the 29th and moved in front of petersburg. on the morning of the 30th, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the 9th corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some cause failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. had they done this, i have every reason to believe that petersburg would have fallen. other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. the captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign. immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that general hunter was retreating from lynchburg by way of the kanawha river, thus laying the shenandoah valley open for raid into maryland and pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. as soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, general hunter, who had reached the kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to harper's ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. it became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. for this purpose the 6th corps was taken from the armies operating against richmond, to which was added the 19th corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in hampton roads from the gulf department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the red river expedition. the garrisons of baltimore and washington were at this time made up of heavy-artillery regiments, hundred days' men, and detachments from the invalid corps. one division under command of general ricketts, of the 6th corps, was sent to baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the 6th corps, under general wright, were subsequently sent to washington. on the 3d of july the enemy approached martinsburg. general sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the potomac at shepherdtown; and general weber, commanding at harper's ferry, crossed the occupied hagerstown, moving a strong column towards frederick city. general wallace, with rickett's division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. his force was not sufficient to insure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy, and thereby served to enable general wright to reach washington with two division of the 6th corps, and the advance of the 19th corps, before him. from monocacy the enemy moved on washington, his cavalry advance reaching rockville on the evening of the 10th. on the 12th a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of fort stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. a severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. the enemy's loss was probably greater. he commenced retreating during the night. learning the exact condition of affairs at washington, i requested by telegraph, at forty-five minutes past eleven p.m., on the 12th, the assignment of major-general h. g. wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push early to the last moment. general wright commenced the pursuit on the 13th; on the 18th the enemy was overtaken at snicker's ferry, on the shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the 20th, general averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. learning that early was retreating south towards lynchburg or richmond, i directed that the 6th and 19th corps be got back to the armies operating against richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that hunter should remain in the shenandoah valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. i felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the 6th and 19th corps could leave washington. subsequently, the 19th corps was excepted form the order to return to the james. about the 25th it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon maryland and pennsylvania, and the 6th corps, then at washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of harper's ferry. the rebel force moved down the valley, and sent a raiding party into pennsylvania which on the 30th burned chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry, towards cumberland. they were met and defeated by general kelley, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of west virginia. from the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between washington and city point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. it took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get dispatches through and return answers would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. to remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the department of west virginia, washington, susquehanna, and the middle department, and i so recommended. on the 2d of august, i ordered general sheridan to report in person to major-general halleck, chief of staff, at washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against early. at this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of winchester, while our forces, under general hunter, were concentrated on the monocacy, at the crossing of the baltimore and ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy western maryland and southern pennsylvania. from where i was, i hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at monocacy, lest by so doing i should expose washington. therefore, on the 4th, i left city point to visit hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. on arrival there, and after consultation with general hunter, i issued to him the following instructions: "monocacy bridge, maryland, august 5, 1864--8 p.m. "general:--concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of harper's ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. use, in this concentrating, the railroad, if by so doing time can be saved. from harper's ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. if it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. in detaching such a force, the brigade of the cavalry now en route from washington via rockville may be taken into account. "there are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. these will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the potomac. one brigade will probably start to-morrow. in pushing up the shenandoah valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. it is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed--they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrence of theses raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards. "bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. be guided in your course by the course he takes. "make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general d. hunter." the troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached halltown that night. general hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, i telegraphed to have general sheridan, then at washington, sent to harper's ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on general hunter at monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. i remained at monocacy until general sheridan arrived, on the morning of the 6th, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, i returned to city point by way of washington. on the 7th of august, the middle department, and the departments of west virginia, washington, and susquehanna, were constituted into the "middle military division," and major-general sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same. two divisions of cavalry, commanded by generals torbert and wilson, were sent to sheridan from the army of the potomac. the first reached him at harper's ferry about the 11th of august. his operations during the month of august and the fore part of september were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. the two armies lay in such a position--the enemy on the west bank of the opequon creek covering winchester, and our forces in front of berryville--that either could bring on a battle at any time. defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the states of maryland and pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. under these circumstances i hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. finally, the use of the baltimore and ohio railroad, and the chesapeake and ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving pennsylvania and maryland from continuously threatened invasion so great, that i determined the risk should be taken. but fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than i did of general sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, i left city point on the 15th of september to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. i met him at charlestown, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that i saw there were but two words of instructions necessary--go in! for the conveniences of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at harper's ferry. i asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing tuesday morning. his reply was, that he could before daylight on monday. he was off promptly to time, and i may here add, that the result was such that i have never since deemed it necessary to visit general sheridan before giving him orders. early on the morning of the 19th, general sheridan attacked general early at the crossing on the opequon creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from opequon creek to winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. the enemy rallied, and made a stand in a strong position at fisher's hill, where he was attacked, and again defeated with heavy loss on the 20th [22d]. sheridan pursued him with great energy through harrisonburg, staunton, and the gaps of the blue ridge. after stripping the upper valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to strasburg, and took position on the north side of cedar creek. having received considerable reinforcements, general early again returned to the valley, and, on the 9th of october, his cavalry encountered ours near strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. on the night of the 18th, the enemy crossed the mountains which separate the branches of the shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morning of the 19th, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries which enfiladed our whole line. our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between middletown and newtown. at this juncture, general sheridan, who was at winchester when the battle commenced arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. the enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains, and the trophies he had captured in the morning. the wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of staunton and lynchburg. pursuit was made to mount jackson. thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the north via the shenandoah valley. i was now enabled to return the 6th corps to the army of the potomac, and to send one division from sheridan's army to the army of the james, and another to savannah, georgia, to hold sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose. reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from petersburg to reinforce early in the shenandoah valley. i therefore sent the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, of the army of the potomac, and a force of general butler's army, on the night of the 13th of august, to threaten richmond from the north side of the james, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. in this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (kershaw's), of the three reputed detached, had gone. the enemy having withdrawn heavily from petersburg to resist this movement, the 5th corps, general warren commanding, was moved out on the 18th, and took possession of the weldon railroad. during the day he had considerable fighting. to regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. on the night of the 20th, the troops on the north side of the james were withdrawn, and hancock and gregg returned to the front at petersburg. on the 25th, the 2d corps and gregg's division of cavalry, while at reams's station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. by the 12th of september, a branch railroad was completed from the city point and petersburg railroad to the weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of petersburg. the extension of our lines across the weldon railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his, that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the james for the defence of richmond. on the night of the 28th, the 10th corps, major-general birney, and the 18th corps, major-general ord commanding, of general butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the james, and advanced on the morning of the 29th, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below chaffin's farm, known as fort harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the new market road and intrenchments. this success was followed up by a gallant assault upon fort gilmer, immediately in front of the chaffin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. the position captured from the enemy was so threatening to richmond, that i determined to hold it. the enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. on the morning of the 30th, general meade sent out a reconnoissance with a view to attacking the enemy's line, if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. in this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near poplar spring church. in the afternoon, troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. our cavalry under gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss. on the 7th of october, the enemy attacked kautz's cavalry north of the james, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery eight or nine pieces. this he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. on the 13th, a reconnoissance was sent out by general butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us. on the 27th, the army of the potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. the 2d corps, followed by two divisions of the 5th corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it towards the south side railroad, until the 2d corps and part of the cavalry reached the boydton plank road where it crosses hatcher's run. at this point we were six miles distant from the south side railroad, which i had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. but finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault by which he might be doubled up and shortened, i determined to withdraw to within our fortified line. orders were given accordingly. immediately upon receiving a report that general warren had connected with general hancock, i returned to my headquarters. soon after i left the enemy moved out across hatcher's run, in the gap between generals hancock and warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on general hancock's right and rear. general hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position. in support of this movement, general butler made a demonstration on the north side of the james, and attacked the enemy on the williamsburg road, and also on the york river railroad. in the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterwards abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions. from this time forward the operations in front of petersburg and richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. by the 7th of february, our lines were extended to hatcher's run, and the weldon railroad had been destroyed to hicksford. general sherman moved from chattanooga on the 6th of may, with the armies of the cumberland, tennessee, and ohio, commanded, respectively, by generals thomas mcpherson, and schofield, upon johnston's army at dalton; but finding the enemy's position at buzzard's roost, covering dalton, too strong to be assaulted, general mcpherson was sent through snake gap to turn it, while generals thomas and schofield threatened it in front and on the north. this movement was successful. johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of may 15th. a heavy battle ensued. during the night the enemy retreated south. late on the 17th, his rear-guard was overtaken near adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. the next morning, however, he had again disappeared. he was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at cassville on the 19th, but during the ensuing night retreated across the etowah. while these operations were going on, general jefferson c. davis's division of thomas's army was sent to rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. general sherman, having give his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion on the 23d, for dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at allatoona. on the afternoon of the 25th, the advance, under general hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to new hope church, near dallas. several sharp encounters occurred at this point. the most important was on the 28th, when the enemy assaulted general mcpherson at dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse. on the 4th of june, johnston abandoned his intrenched position at new hope church, and retreated to the strong positions of kenesaw, pine, and lost mountains. he was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on kenesaw, where, on the 27th, generals thomas and mcpherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. on the night of the 2d of july, sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the 3d, found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned kenesaw and retreated across the chattahoochee. general sherman remained on the chattahoochee to give his men rest and get up stores until the 17th of july, when he resumed his operations, crossed the chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to augusta, and drove the enemy back to atlanta. at this place general hood succeeded general johnston in command of the rebel army, and assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon sherman in the vicinity of atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the 22d of july. about one p.m. of this day the brave, accomplished, and noble-hearted mcpherson was killed. general logan succeeded him, and commanded the army of the tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by major-general howard, on the 26th, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division. in all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, general sherman, after securing his line of communications across the chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the montgomery and macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. in this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near rough-and-ready, jonesboro, and lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the 2d of september occupied atlanta, the objective point of his campaign. about the time of this move, the rebel cavalry, under wheeler, attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at dalton, and driven into east tennessee, whence it proceeded west to mcminnville, murfreesboro, and franklin, and was finally driven south of the tennessee. the damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days. during the partial investment of atlanta, general rousseau joined general sherman with a force of cavalry from decatur, having made a successful raid upon the atlanta and montgomery railroad, and its branches near opelika. cavalry raids were also made by generals mccook, garrard, and stoneman, to cut the remaining railroad communication with atlanta. the first two were successful the latter, disastrous. general sherman's movement from chattanooga to atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. the history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history. his own report, and those of his subordinate commanders, accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign. he was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from nashville to the point where he was operating. this passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. the cavalry force of the enemy under forrest, in northern mississippi, was evidently waiting for sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of georgia, to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon this line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. to guard against this danger, sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against forrest in west tennessee. he directed general washburn, who commanded there, to send brigadier-general s. d. sturgis in command of this force to attack him. on the morning of the 10th of june, general sturgis met the enemy near guntown, mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. by this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon sherman's line of communications. the persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. in the meantime, major-general a. j. smith, with the troops of the army of the tennessee that had been sent by general sherman to general banks, arrived at memphis on their return from red river, where they had done most excellent service. he was directed by general sherman to immediately take the offensive against forrest. this he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. on the 14th of july, he met the enemy at tupelo, mississippi, and whipped him badly. the fighting continued through three days. our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. having accomplished the object of his expedition, general smith returned to memphis. during the months of march and april this same force under forrest annoyed us considerably. on the 24th of march it captured union city, kentucky, and its garrison, and on the 24th attacked paducah, commanded by colonel s. g. hicks, 40th illinois volunteers. colonel h., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy and drove him from the place. on the 13th of april, part of this force, under the rebel general buford, summoned the garrison of columbus, kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from colonel lawrence, 34th new jersey volunteers, that being placed there by his government with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question. on the morning of the same day forrest attacked fort pillow, tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of tennessee cavalry and the 1st regiment alabama colored troops, commanded by major booth. the garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault; and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison. on the 14th, general buford, having failed at columbus, appeared before paducah, but was again driven off. guerillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by forrest's operations, were also very active in kentucky. the most noted of these was morgan. with a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the state through pound gap in the latter part of may. on the 11th of june they attacked and captured cynthiana, with its entire garrison. on the 12th he was overtaken by general burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the state. this notorious guerilla was afterwards surprised and killed near greenville, tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by general gillem. in the absence of official reports of the commencement of the red river expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by general sherman under general a. j. smith, i am unable to give the date of its starting. the troops under general smith, comprising two divisions of the 16th and a detachment of the 17th army corps, left vicksburg on the 10th of march, and reached the designated point on red river one day earlier than that appointed by general banks. the rebel forces at fort de russy, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the 14th to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, smith pushed forward to fort de russy, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small-arms. our loss was but slight. on the 15th he pushed forward to alexandria, which place he reached on the 18th. on the 21st he had an engagement with the enemy at henderson's hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery. on the 28th, he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel general taylor, at cane river. by the 26th, general banks had assembled his whole army at alexandria, and pushed forward to grand ecore. on the morning of april 6th he moved from grand ecore. on the afternoon of the 7th, he advanced and met the enemy near pleasant hill, and drove him from the field. on the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond pleasant hill, but was again compelled to retreat. on the 8th, at sabine cross roads and peach hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. during the night, general banks fell back to pleasant hill, where another battle was fought on the 9th, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. during the night, general banks continued his retrograde movement to grand ecore, and thence to alexandria, which he reached on the 27th of april. here a serious difficulty arose in getting admiral porter's fleet which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. at the suggestion of colonel (now brigadier-general) bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety. the army evacuated alexandria on the 14th of may, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached morganzia and point coupee near the end of the month. the disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plans of a movement in force sufficient to insure the capture of mobile. on the 23d of march, major-general steele left little rock with the 7th army corps, to cooperate with general banks's expedition on the red river, and reached arkadelphia on the 28th. on the 16th of april, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near elkin's ferry, in washita county, by general thayer, who had marched from fort smith. after several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, general steele reached camden, which he occupied about the middle of april. on learning the defeat and consequent retreat of general banks on red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at mark's mill, in dallas county, general steele determined to fall back to the arkansas river. he left camden on the 26th of april, and reached little rock on the 2d of may. on the 30th of april, the enemy attacked him while crossing saline river at jenkins's ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded and prisoners. major-general canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "military division of the west mississippi," was therefore directed to send the 19th army corps to join the armies operating against richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied. before starting general a. j. smith's troops back to sherman, general canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the mississippi river. general smith met and defeated this force near lake chicot on the 5th of june. our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded. in the latter part of july, general canby sent major-general gordon granger, with such forces as he could collect, to co-operate with admiral farragut against the defences of mobile bay. on the 8th of august, fort gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. fort powell was blown up and abandoned. on the 9th, fort morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the 23d. the total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery. about the last of august, it being reported that the rebel general price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached jacksonport, on his way to invade missouri, general a. j. smith's command, then en route from memphis to join sherman, was ordered to missouri. a cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from memphis, under command of colonel winslow. this made general rosecrans's forces superior to those of price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check price and drive him back; while the forces under general steele, in arkansas, would cut off his retreat. on the 26th day of september, price attacked pilot knob and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the missouri river, and continued up that river towards kansas. general curtis, commanding department of kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of kansas, while general rosecrans's cavalry was operating in his rear. the enemy was brought to battle on the big blue and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains and a large number of prisoners. he made a precipitate retreat to northern arkansas. the impunity with which price was enabled to roam over the state of missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, show to how little purpose a superior force may be used. there is no reason why general rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven price before the latter reached pilot knob. september 20th, the enemy's cavalry, under forrest, crossed the tennessee near waterloo, alabama, and on the 23d attacked the garrison at athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the 24th. soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at sulphur branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at pulaski on the 27th, and on the same day cut the nashville and chattanooga railroad near tullahoma and dechard. on the morning of the 30th, one column of forrest's command, under buford, appeared before huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. he withdrew in the direction of athens which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the 1st of october, but without success. on the morning of the 2d he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed. another column under forrest appeared before columbia on the morning of the 1st, but did not make an attack. on the morning of the 3d he moved towards mount pleasant. while these operations were going on, every exertion was made by general thomas to destroy the forces under forrest before he could recross the tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to corinth, mississippi. in september, an expedition under general burbridge was sent to destroy the saltworks at saltville, virginia. he met the enemy on the 2d of october, about three miles and a half from saltville, and drove him into his strongly intrenched position around the salt-works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. during the night he withdrew his command and returned to kentucky. general sherman, immediately after the fall of atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. the great length of road from atlanta to the cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest. during this time jefferson davis made a speech in macon, georgia, which was reported in the papers of the south, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling general sherman to fully meet them. he exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it. in execution of this plan, hood, with this army, was soon reported to the south-west of atlanta. moving far to sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about big shanty, and moved north on it. general sherman, leaving a force to hold atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to gadsden, alabama. seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold atlanta, general sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows: "centreville, georgia", october 10--noon. "dispatch about wilson just received. hood is now crossing coosa river, twelve miles below rome, bound west. if he passes over the mobile and ohio road, had i not better execute the plan of my letter sent by colonel porter, and leave general thomas with the troops now in tennessee to defend the state? he will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach nashville. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." for a full understanding of the plan referred to in this dispatch, i quote from the letter sent by colonel porter: "i will therefore give my opinion, that your army and canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get wilmington, you strike for savannah and the river; that canby be instructed to hold the mississippi river, and send a force to get columbus, georgia, either by the way of the alabama or the appalachicola, and that i keep hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on augusta, columbia, and charleston, to be ready as soon as wilmington is sealed as to commerce and the city of savannah is in our possession." this was in reply to a letter of mine of date september 12th, in answer to a dispatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which i informed him of a proposed movement against wilmington, and of the situation in virginia, etc. "city point, virginia, "october 11, 1864--11 a.m. "your dispatch of october 10th received. does it not look as if hood was going to attempt the invasion of middle tennessee, using the mobile and ohio and memphis and charleston roads to supply his base on the tennessee river, about florence or decatur? if he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the tennessee river. if you were to cut loose, i do not believe you would meet hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. hood would probably strike for nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. if there is any way of getting at hood's army, i would prefer that, but i must trust to your own judgment. i find i shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on savannah. your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of richmond takes place. i am afraid thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent hood from going north. with wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." "kingston, georgia, "october 11--11 a.m. "hood moved his army from palmetto station across by dallas and cedartown, and is now on the coosa river, south of rome. he threw one corps on my road at acworth, and i was forced to follow. i hold atlanta with the 20th corps, and have strong detachments along my line. this reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. we cannot remain here on the defensive. with the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. i would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from chattanooga to atlanta including the latter city send back all my wounded and worthless, and with my effective army, move through georgia, smashing things, to the sea. hood may turn into tennessee and kentucky, but i believe he will be forced to follow me. instead of my being on the defensive, i would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. the difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. i can make savannah, charleston, or the mouth of the chattahoochee. "answer quick, as i know we will not have the telegraph long. "w. t. sherman, major-general. "lieutenant-general grant." "city point, virginia, "october 11,1864--11.30 p.m. "your dispatch of to-day received. if you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of dalton or chattanooga, as you think best. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." it was the original design to hold atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. in other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the mississippi river. general sherman's plan virtually effected this object. general sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch hood. becoming satisfied that hood had moved westward from gadsden across sand mountain, general sherman sent the 4th corps, major-general stanley commanding, and the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, back to chattanooga to report to major-general thomas, at nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through georgia. with the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that general thomas could hold the line of the tennessee, or, in the event hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. it was therefore readily consented to that sherman should start for the sea-coast. having concentrated his troops at atlanta by the 14th of november, he commenced his march, threatening both augusta and macon. his coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. the blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending hood's army, the only considerable force he had west of richmond and east of the mississippi river, northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and sherman's route to his own choice. how that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of fort mcallister, on the savannah river, and the occupation of savannah on the 21st of december, are all clearly set forth in general sherman's admirable report. soon after general sherman commenced his march from atlanta, two expeditions, one from baton rouge, louisiana, and one from vicksburg, mississippi, were started by general canby to cut the enemy's lines of communication with mobile and detain troops in that field. general foster, commanding department of the south, also sent an expedition, via broad river, to destroy the railroad between charleston and savannah. the expedition from vicksburg, under command of brevet brigadier-general e. d. osband (colonel 3d united states colored cavalry), captured, on the 27th of november, and destroyed the mississippi central railroad bridge and trestle-work over big black river, near canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. the expedition from baton rouge was without favorable results. the expedition from the department of the south, under the immediate command of brigadier-general john p. hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up broad river and debarked at boyd's neck on the 29th of november, from where it moved to strike the railroad at grahamsville. at honey hill, about three miles from grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked in a strongly fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded, and missing. during the night general hatch withdrew. on the 6th of december general foster obtained a position covering the charleston and savannah railroad, between the coosawhatchie and tulifinny rivers. hood, instead of following sherman, continued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. at all events, had i had the power to command both armies, i should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. on the 26th of october, the advance of hood's army attacked the garrison at decatur, alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew towards courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgment on the north side of the tennessee river, near florence. on the 28th, forrest reached the tennessee, at fort heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. on the 2d of november he planted batteries above and below johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. on the 4th the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. the gunboats becoming disabled were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. about a million and a half dollars' worth of store and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. on the 5th the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the tennessee river, above johnsonville, moving towards clifton, and subsequently joined hood. on the night of the 5th, general schofield, with the advance of the 23d corps, reached johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to pulaski, and was put in command of all the troopers there, with instruction to watch the movements of hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of general a. j. smith's command from missouri, and until general wilson could get his cavalry remounted. on the 19th, general hood continued his advance. general thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back towards nashville for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. the enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by general schofield, at franklin, on the 30th, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. his loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. this was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and i am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. during the night, general schofield fell back towards nashville. this left the field to the enemy--not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned--so that general thomas's whole force might be brought together. the enemy followed up and commenced the establishment of his line in front of nashville on the 2d of december. as soon as it was ascertained that hood was crossing the tennessee river, and that price was going out of missouri, general rosecrans was ordered to send to general thomas the troops of general a. j. smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. the advance of this reinforcement reached nashville on the 30th of november. on the morning of the 15th december, general thomas attacked hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hand most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers. before the battle of nashville i grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. this impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the cumberland into kentucky. i feared hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. after urging upon general thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, i started west to superintend matters there in person. reaching washington city, i received general thomas's dispatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. i was delighted. all fears and apprehensions were dispelled. i am not yet satisfied but that general thomas, immediately upon the appearance of hood before nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. but his final defeat of hood was so complete, that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment. after hood's defeat at nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. on the 28th of december our advanced forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river. about this time, the rains having set in heavily in tennessee and north alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, general thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the tennessee river. a small force of cavalry, under colonel w. j. palmer, 15th pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and all the enemy's pontoon-bridge. the details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in general thomas's report. a cavalry expedition, under brevet major-general grierson, started from memphis on the 21st of december. on the 25th he surprised and captured forrest's dismounted camp at verona, mississippi, on the mobile and ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for hood's army, four thousand new english carbines, and large amounts of public stores. on the morning of the 28th he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence turning to the south-west, he struck the mississippi central railroad at winona, destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at grenada, arriving at vicksburg january 5th. during the operations in middle tennessee, the enemy, with a force under general breckinridge, entered east tennessee. on the 13th of november he attacked general gillem, near morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to knoxville. following up his success, breckinridge moved to near knoxville, but withdrew on the 18th, followed by general ammen. under the directions of general thomas, general stoneman concentrated the commands of generals burbridge and gillem near bean's station to operate against breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into virginia --destroy the salt-works at saltville, and the railroad into virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. on the 12th of december he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's forces wherever he met them. on the 16th he struck the enemy, under vaughn, at marion, completely routing and pursuing him to wytheville, capturing all his artillery, trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners; and destroyed wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. returning to marion, he met a force under breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of saltville, that had started in pursuit. he at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found breckinridge gone. he then moved directly to saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned general burbridge to lexington and general gillem to knoxville. wilmington, north carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. the navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of wilmington, but with only partial effect. the nature of the outlet of cape fear river was such, that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of new inlet, or fort fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners. to secure the possession of this land required the co-operation of a land force, which i agreed to furnish. immediately commenced the assemblage in hampton roads, under admiral d. d. porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. this necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal north; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both north and south. the enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. this caused a postponement of the expedition until the later part of november, when, being again called upon by hon. g. v. fox, assistant secretary of the navy, i agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with major-general butler, to hampton roads, where we had a conference with admiral porter as to the force required and the time of starting. a force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. the time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the 6th of december, if not before. learning, on the 30th of november, that bragg had gone to georgia, taking with him most of the forces about wilmington, i deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of bragg, and directed general butler to make all arrangements for the departure of major-general weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment. on the 6th of december, the following instructions were given: "city point, virginia, december 6, 1864. "general: the first object of the expedition under general weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of wilmington. if successful in this, the second will be to capture wilmington itself. there are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces now looking after sherman in georgia. the directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. the object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between cape fear river and the atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds fort fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by co-operating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. these in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of wilmington would be sealed. should fort fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture wilmington by a forced march and surprise. if time is consumed in gaining the first object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after consideration. "the details for execution are intrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops. "should the troops under general weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near fort fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against richmond without delay. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general b. f. butler." general butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. they were so sent, but general weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence, until he read general butler's published official report of the fort fisher failure, with my indorsement and papers accompanying it. i had no idea of general butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from bermuda hundred, and then did not dream but that general weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. i rather formed the idea that general butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. the expedition was detained several days at hampton roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat. the importance of getting the wilmington expedition off without any delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon general butler, and he advised to so notify admiral porter. the expedition finally got off on the 13th of december, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off new inlet, near fort fisher, on the evening of the 15th. admiral porter arrived on the evening of the 18th, having put in at beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. the sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the 24th. the powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the 24th, before the return of general butler from beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the northern press. on the 25th a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under brevet brigadier-general curtis, pushed up towards the fort. but before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, general butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the re-embarkation of the troops and the return of the expedition. the re-embarkation was accomplished by the morning of the 27th. on the return of the expedition officers and men among them brevet major-general (then brevet brigadier-general) n. m. curtis, first-lieutenant g. w. ross, 117th regiment new york volunteers, first-lieutenant william h. walling, and second-lieutenant george simpson, 142d new york volunteers voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss. soon after the return of the expedition, i received a dispatch from the secretary of the navy, and a letter from admiral porter, informing me that the fleet was still off fort fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. the natural supposition with me was, that when the troops abandoned the expedition, the navy would do so also. finding it had not, however, i answered on the 30th of december, advising admiral porter to hold on, and that i would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. this time i selected brevet major-general (now major-general) a. h. terry to command the expedition. the troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. the latter it was never found necessary to land. i communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions: "city point, virginia, january 3, 1865. "general: the expedition intrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture fort fisher, n. c., and wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. you will then proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off cape fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to admiral d. d. porter, commanding north atlantic blockading squadron. "it is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. i suggest, therefore, that you consult with admiral porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. it would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. i have served with admiral porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. i would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. the first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which fort fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. you want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any of the avenues left open to the enemy. if such a position can be obtained, the siege of fort fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters. "my own views are, that if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into cape fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. land forces cannot invest fort fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in possession of the enemy. "a siege-train will be loaded on vessels and sent to fort monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. all other supplies can be drawn from beaufort as you need them. "keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. when you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to fort monroe, to report for orders. "in case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. you will not debark at beaufort until so directed. "general sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to baltimore and place them on sea-going vessels. these troops will be brought to fort monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. should you require them, they will be sent to you. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "brevet major-general a. h. terry." lieutenant-colonel c. b. comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned, in orders, as chief-engineer to this. it will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition, and that in neither instance was there an order to assault fort fisher. this was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer. the expedition sailed from fort monroe on the morning of the 6th, arriving at the rendezvous, off beaufort, on the 8th, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the 12th, when it got under way and reached its destination that evening. under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the 13th, and by three o'clock p.m. was completed without loss. on the 14th a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of fort fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. this reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. in the afternoon of the 15th the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and army, one of the most important successes of the war. our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. on the 16th and the 17th the enemy abandoned and blew up fort caswell and the works on smith's island, which were immediately occupied by us. this gave us entire control of the mouth of the cape fear river. at my request, mayor-general b. f. butler was relieved, and major-general e. o. c. ord assigned to the department of virginia and north carolina. the defence of the line of the tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army now threatening it, i determined to find other fields of operation for general thomas's surplus troops--fields from which they would co-operate with other movements. general thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at eastport, in readiness for orders. on the 7th of january, general thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of hood south from corinth, to send general schofield with his corps east with as little delay as possible. this direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached washington on the 23d of the same month, whence it was sent to fort fisher and new bern. on the 26th he was directed to send general a. j. smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to general canby. by the 7th of february the whole force was en route for its destination. the state of north carolina was constituted into a military department, and general schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of major-general sherman. the following instructions were given him: "city point, va., january 31, 1865. "general:-* * * your movements are intended as co-operative with sherman's through the states of south and north carolina. the first point to be attained is to secure wilmington. goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from wilmington or new bern, or both, as you deem best. should you not be able to reach goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast--as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. the enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give general sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. as soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, wilmington or new bern, you can best use for throwing supplies from, to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. you will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. i believe general palmer has received some instructions direct from general sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. you will learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. a supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary. "make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at city point. communicate with me by every opportunity, and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to fortress monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph. "the supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command. "the movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base, and strike for the interior to aid sherman. in such case you will act on your own judgment without waiting for instructions. you will report, however, what you purpose doing. the details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. i would urge, however, if i did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of february; this limits your time very materially. "if rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of wilmington, it can be supplied from washington. a large force of railroad men have already been sent to beaufort, and other mechanics will go to fort fisher in a day or two. on this point i have informed you by telegraph. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general j. m. schofield." previous to giving these instructions i had visited fort fisher, accompanied by general schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with general terry and admiral porter as to what was best to be done. anticipating the arrival of general sherman at savannah his army entirely foot-loose, hood being then before nashville, tennessee, the southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to re-establish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of lee's army as the most important operation towards closing the rebellion--i sent orders to general sherman on the 6th of december, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to city point with the balance of his command. on the 18th of december, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of hood's army by general thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much towards the desired result by operating from where he was, i wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. a few days after this i received a communication from general sherman, of date 16th december, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the 6th, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. also that he had expected, upon reducing savannah, instantly to march to columbia, south carolina, thence to raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of january. the confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the 18th, i directed him, on the 28th of december, to make preparations to start as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in north and south carolina, and join the armies operating against richmond as soon as he could. on the 21st of january i informed general sherman that i had ordered the 23d corps, major-general schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at fort fisher, about eight thousand men; at new bern, about four thousand; that if wilmington was captured, general schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to new bern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior towards goldsboro', in co-operation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them. in obedience to his instructions, general schofield proceeded to reduce wilmington, north carolina, in co-operation with the navy under admiral porter, moving his forces up both sides of the cape fear river. fort anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the 19th, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it. after fighting on 20th and 21st, our troops entered wilmington on the morning of the 22d, the enemy having retreated towards goldsboro' during the night. preparations were at once made for a movement on goldsboro' in two columns--one from wilmington, and the other from new bern--and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply general sherman by cape fear river, towards fayetteville, if it became necessary. the column from new bern was attacked on the 8th of march, at wise's forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. on the 11th the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell back during the night. on the 14th the neuse river was crossed and kinston occupied, and on the 21st goldsboro' was entered. the column from wilmington reached cox's bridge, on the neuse river, ten miles above goldsboro', on the 22d. by the 1st of february, general sherman's whole army was in motion from savannah. he captured columbia, south carolina, on the 17th; thence moved on goldsboro', north carolina, via fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the 12th of march, opening up communication with general schofield by way of cape fear river. on the 15th he resumed his march on goldsboro'. he met a force of the enemy at averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. our loss in this engagement was about six hundred. the enemy's loss was much greater. on the 18th the combined forces of the enemy, under joe johnston, attacked his advance at bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. general slocum, who was in the advance ascertaining that the whole of johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward. on the night of the 21st the enemy retreated to smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. from there sherman continued to goldsboro', which place had been occupied by general schofield on the 21st (crossing the neuse river ten miles above there, at cox's bridge, where general terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon-bridge on the 22d), thus forming a junction with the columns from new bern and wilmington. among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of charleston, south carolina. it was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the 17th of february, and occupied by our forces on the 18th. on the morning of the 31st of january, general thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under general stoneman, from east tennessee, to penetrate south carolina well down towards columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to east tennessee by way of salisbury, north carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. of the feasibility of this latter, however, general stoneman was to judge. sherman's movements, i had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. general stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and sherman having passed out of the state of south carolina), on the 27th of february i directed general thomas to change his course, and order him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad towards lynchburg as far as he could. this would keep him between our garrisons in east tennessee and the enemy. i regarded it not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven from richmond, he might fall back to lynchburg and attempt a raid north through east tennessee. on the 14th of february the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, va., february 14, 1865. "general canby is preparing a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama. his force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides a. j. smith's command. the cavalry you have sent to canby will be debarked at vicksburg. it, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in co-operation. hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose sherman. (i take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. it is so asserted in the richmond papers, and a member of the rebel congress said a few days since in a speech, that one-half of it had been brought to south carolina to oppose sherman.) this being true, or even if it is not true, canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your standpoint easy. i think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. the object would be threefold: first, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to insure success to canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. tuscaloosa and selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. this, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into alabama. discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above. "now that your force has been so much depleted, i do not know what number of men you can put into the field. if not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, i think it will be sufficient. it is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. i do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as i learn. if you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received. "to insure success your cavalry should go with as little wagon-train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. i would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. no guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses. "please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." on the 15th, he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the 20th as he could get it off. i deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against richmond, that all communications with the city, north of james river, should be cut off. the enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the shenandoah valley and sent it south, or replaced troops sent from richmond, and desiring to reinforce sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, i determined to make a move from the shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of the objects. i therefore telegraphed general sheridan as follows: "city point, va., february 20, 1865--1 p.m. "general:--as soon as it is possible to travel, i think you will have no difficulty about reaching lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. from there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after mosby's gang. from lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you will strike south, heading the streams in virgina to the westward of danville, and push on and join general sherman. this additional raid, with one now about starting from east tennessee under stoneman, numbering four or give thousand cavalry, one from vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from eastport, mississippi, then thousand cavalry, canby from mobile bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for tuscaloosa, selma, and montgomery, and sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of south carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. i would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. charleston was evacuated on tuesday 1st. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the 25th i received a dispatch from general sheridan, inquiring where sherman was aiming for, and if i could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of charlotte, north carolina. in answer, the following telegram was sent him: "city point, va., february 25, 1865. "general:--sherman's movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. if strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to georgetown, s. c., and fit out for a new start. i think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. i believe he has passed charlotte. he may take fayetteville on his way to goldsboro'. if you reach lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after movements by the information you obtain. before you could possibly reach sherman, i think you would find him moving from goldsboro' towards raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to wilmington or new bern. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." general sheridan moved from winchester on the 27th of february, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. on the 1st of march he secured the bridge, which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the shenandoah, at mount crawford, and entered staunton on the 2d, the enemy having retreated to waynesboro'. thence he pushed on to waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under general early. without stopping to make a reconnoissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. the prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to winchester. thence he marched on charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the 3d. here he remained two days, destroying the railroad towards richmond and lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the rivanna river and awaited the arrival of his trains. this necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing lynchburg. on the morning of the 6th, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to scottsville, whence it marched up the james river canal to new market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. from here a force was pushed out from this column to duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the james river at that place, but failed. the enemy burned it on our approach. the enemy also burned the bridge across the river at hardwicksville. the other column moved down the railroad towards lynchburg, destroying it as far as amherst court house, sixteen miles from lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at new market. the river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the south side railroad about farmville, and destroy it to appomattox court house, the only thing left for him was to return to winchester or strike a base at the white house. fortunately, he chose the latter. from new market he took up his line of march, following the canal towards richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of goochland, concentrating the whole force at columbia on the 10th. here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at white house, which reached me on the night of the 12th. an infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of white house, and supplies were forwarded. moving from columbia in a direction to threaten richmond, to near ashland station, he crossed the annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the pamunkey to white house, which place he reached on the 19th. previous to this the following communication was sent to general thomas: "city point, virginia, march 7, 1865--9.30 a.m. "general:--i think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in east tennessee, and throw a good force up to bull's gap and fortify there. supplies at knoxville could always be got forward as required. with bull's gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of east tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign towards lynchburg, or into north carolina. i do not think stoneman should break the road until he gets into virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling-stock that may be caught west of that. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general g. h. thomas." thus it will be seen that in march, 1865, general canby was moving an adequate force against mobile and the army defending it under general dick taylor; thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions--one from middle tennessee under brevet major-general wilson against the enemy's vital points in alabama, the other from east tennessee, under major-general stoneman, towards lynchburg--and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to commence offensive operations from east tennessee; general sheridan's cavalry was at white house; the armies of the potomac and james were confronting the enemy, under lee, in his defences of richmond and petersburg; general sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of general schofield, was at goldsboro'; general pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under kirby smith and price, west of the mississippi; and general hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of winchester, virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary. after the long march by general sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to rest and refit at white house. at this time the greatest source of uneasiness to me was the fear that the enemy would leave his strong lines about petersburg and richmond for the purpose of uniting with johnston, and before he was driven from them by battle, or i was prepared to make an effectual pursuit. on the 24th of march, general sheridan moved from white house, crossed the james river at jones's landing, and formed a junction with the army of the potomac in front of petersburg on the 27th. during this move, general ord sent forces to cover the crossings of the chickahominy. on the 24th of march the following instructions for a general movement of the armies operating against richmond were issued: "city point, virginia, march 24, 1865. "general: on the 29th instant the armies operating against richmond will be moved by our left, for the double purpose of turning the enemy out of his present position around petersburg, and to insure the success of the cavalry under general sheridan, which will start at the same time, in its efforts to reach and destroy the south side and danville railroads. two corps of the army of the potomac will be moved at first in two columns, taking the two roads crossing hatcher's run, nearest where the present line held by us strikes that stream, both moving towards dinwiddie court house. "the cavalry under general sheridan, joined by the division now under general davies, will move at the same time by the weldon road and the jerusalem plank road, turning west from the latter before crossing the nottoway, and west with the whole column before reaching stony creek. general sheridan will then move independently, under other instructions which will be given him. all dismounted cavalry belonging to the army of the potomac, and the dismounted cavalry from the middle military division not required for guarding property belonging to their arm of service, will report to brigadier-general benham, to be added to the defences of city point. major-general parke will be left in command of all the army left for holding the lines about petersburg and city point, subject of course to orders from the commander of the army of the potomac. the 9th army corps will be left intact, to hold the present line of works so long as the whole line now occupied by us is held. if, however, the troops to the left of the 9th corps are withdrawn, then the left of the corps may be thrown back so as to occupy the position held by the army prior to the capture of the weldon road. all troops to the left of the 9th corps will be held in readiness to move at the shortest notice by such route as may be designated when the order is given. "general ord will detach three divisions, two white and one colored, or so much of them as he can, and hold his present lines, and march for the present left of the army of the potomac. in the absence of further orders, or until further orders are given, the white divisions will follow the left column of the army of the potomac, and the colored division the right column. during the movement major-general weitzel will be left in command of all the forces remaining behind from the army of the james. "the movement of troops from the army of the james will commence on the night of the 27th instant. general ord will leave behind the minimum number of cavalry necessary for picket duty, in the absence of the main army. a cavalry expedition, from general ord's command, will also be started from suffolk, to leave there on saturday, the 1st of april, under colonel sumner, for the purpose of cutting the railroad about hicksford. this, if accomplished, will have to be a surprise, and therefore from three to five hundred men will be sufficient. they should, however, be supported by all the infantry that can be spared from norfolk and portsmouth, as far out as to where the cavalry crosses the blackwater. the crossing should probably be at uniten. should colonel sumner succeed in reaching the weldon road, he will be instructed to do all the damage possible to the triangle of roads between hicksford, weldon, and gaston. the railroad bridge at weldon being fitted up for the passage of carriages, it might be practicable to destroy any accumulation of supplies the enemy may have collected south of the roanoke. all the troops will move with four days' rations in haversacks and eight days' in wagons. to avoid as much hauling as possible, and to give the army of the james the same number of days' supplies with the army of the potomac, general ord will direct his commissary and quartermaster to have sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the road to fill up in passing. sixty rounds of ammunition per man will be taken in wagons, and as much grain as the transportation on hand will carry, after taking the specified amount of other supplies. the densely wooded country in which the army has to operate making the use of much artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the army will be reduced to six or eight guns to each division, at the option of the army commanders. "all necessary preparations for carrying these directions into operation may be commenced at once. the reserves of the 9th corps should be massed as much as possible. while i would not now order an unconditional attack on the enemy's line by them, they should be ready and should make the attack if the enemy weakens his line in their front, without waiting for orders. in case they carry the line, then the whole of the 9th corps could follow up so as to join or co-operate with the balance of the army. to prepare for this, the 9th corps will have rations issued to them, same as the balance of the army. general weitzel will keep vigilant watch upon his front, and if found at all practicable to break through at any point, he will do so. a success north of the james should be followed up with great promptness. an attack will not be feasible unless it is found that the enemy has detached largely. in that case it may be regarded as evident that the enemy are relying upon their local reserves principally for the defence of richmond. preparations may be made for abandoning all the line north of the james, except inclosed works only to be abandoned, however, after a break is made in the lines of the enemy. "by these instructions a large part of the armies operating against richmond is left behind. the enemy, knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, while they hurl everything against the moving column, and return. it cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. the very fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he does so, might be regarded as almost conclusive evidence of such a weakening of his lines. i would have it particularly enjoined upon corps commanders that, in case of an attack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly, and notify the commander of their action. i would also enjoin the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engaged. in like manner, i would urge the importance of following up a repulse of the enemy. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-generals meade, ord, and sheridan." early on the morning of the 25th the enemy assaulted our lines in front of the 9th corps (which held from the appomattox river towards our left), and carried fort stedman, and a part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us, but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up, when the enemy was driven back with a heavy loss in killed and wounded, and one thousand nine hundred prisoners. our loss was sixty-eight killed, three hundred and thirty-seven wounded, and five hundred and six missing. general meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the enemy in their respective fronts. pushing forward, they captured and held the enemy's strongly intrenched picket-line in front of the 2d and 6th corps, and eight hundred and thirty-four prisoners. the enemy made desperate attempts to retake this line, but without success. our loss in front of these was fifty-two killed, eight hundred and sixty-four wounded, and two hundred and seven missing. the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was far greater. general sherman having got his troops all quietly in camp about goldsboro', and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at city point on the 27th of march, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of april, fully equipped and rationed for twenty days, if it should become necessary to bring his command to bear against lee's army, in co-operation with our forces in front of richmond and petersburg. general sherman proposed in this movement to threaten raleigh, and then, by turning suddenly to the right, reach the roanoke at gaston or thereabouts, whence he could move on to the richmond and danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of burkesville, or join the armies operating against richmond, as might be deemed best. this plan he was directed to carry into execution, if he received no further directions in the meantime. i explained to him the movement i had ordered to commence on the 29th of march. that if it should not prove as entirely successful as i hoped, i would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the danville and south side railroads, and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies, and also to prevent the rapid concentration of lee's and johnston's armies. i had spent days of anxiety lest each morning should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. i was firmly convinced that sherman's crossing the roanoke would be the signal for lee to leave. with johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. by moving out i would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the danville road, retard the concentration of the two armies of lee and johnston, and cause the enemy to abandon much material that he might otherwise save. i therefore determined not to delay the movement ordered. on the night of the 27th, major-general ord, with two divisions of the 24th corps, major-general gibbon commanding, and one division of the 25th corps, brigadier-general birney commanding, and mackenzie's cavalry, took up his line of march in pursuance of the foregoing instructions, and reached the position assigned him near hatcher's run on the morning of the 29th. on the 28th the following instructions were given to general sheridan: "city point, va., march 28, 1865. "general:--the 5th army corps will move by the vaughn road at three a.m. to-morrow morning. the 2d moves at about nine a.m., having but about three miles to march to reach the point designated for it to take on the right of the 5th corps, after the latter reaching dinwiddie court house. move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, and without being confined to any particular road or roads. you may go out by the nearest roads in rear of the 5th corps, pass by its left, and passing near to or through dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the enemy as soon as you can. it is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. i shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. should i not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the danville road. if you find it practicable, i would like you to cross the south side road, between petersburg and burkesville, and destroy it to some extent. i would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the danville road, which i would like you to strike as near to the appomattox as possible. make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. you can then pass on to the south side road, west of burkesville, and destroy that in like manner. "after having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go on into north carolina and join general sherman. should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that i may send orders to meet you at goldsboro'. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." on the morning of the 29th the movement commenced. at night the cavalry was at dinwiddie court house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the quaker road, near its intersection with the boydton plank road. the position of the troops from left to right was as follows: sheridan, warren, humphreys, ord, wright, parke. everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy and the capture of petersburg and richmond, if the proper effort was made. i therefore addressed the following communication to general sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so: "gravelly creek, march 29, 1865. "general:--our line is now unbroken from the appomattox to dinwiddie. we are all ready, however, to give up all, from the jerusalem plank road to hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. after getting into line south of hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. general griffin was attacked near where the quaker road intersects the boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. humphreys reached dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from. "i now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before going back. i do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. in the morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his right rear. the movements of the enemy's cavalry may, of course, modify your action. we will act all together as one army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. the signal-officer at cobb's hill reported, at half-past eleven a.m., that a cavalry column had passed that point from richmond towards petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general p. h. sheridan." from the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. during the 30th, sheridan advanced from dinwiddie court house towards five forks, where he found the enemy in full force. general warren advanced and extended his line across the boydton plank road to near the white oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and fortify. general humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the hatcher, near burgess's mills. generals ord, wright, and parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. the two latter reported favorably. the enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from richmond to our extreme left, i conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. i determined, therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce general sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. the result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted fort stedman, particularly favored this. the enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. preparations were at once made to relieve general humphreys's corps, to report to general sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. on the morning of the 31st, general warren reported favorably to getting possession of the white oak road, and was directed to do so. to accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the 2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. a division of the 2d corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss, and possession of the white oak road gained. sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the five forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him back towards dinwiddie court house. here general sheridan displayed great generalship. instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. this compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. at this juncture he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on dinwiddie court house. general mackenzie's cavalry and one division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. soon after receiving a report from general meade that humphreys could hold our position on the boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the 5th corps could go to sheridan, they were so ordered at once. thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of warren, because of his accessibility, instead of humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. on the morning of the 1st of april, general sheridan, reinforced by general warren, drove the enemy back on five forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five and six thousand prisoners. about the close of this battle, brevet major-general charles griffin relieved major-general warren in command of the 5th corps. the report of this reached me after nightfall. some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon general sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. to guard against this, general miles's division of humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (april 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. general wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left towards hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. he was closely followed by two divisions of general ord's command, until he met the other division of general ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near hatcher's run. generals wright and ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in petersburg, while general humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined general wright on the left. general parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. general sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, returned general miles to his proper command. on reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding petersburg, a portion of general gibbon's corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the most salient and commanding south of petersburg--thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. the enemy south of hatcher's run retreated westward to sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by miles's division. a severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of general sheridan, who was moving from ford's station towards petersburg, and a division sent by general meade from the front of petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. this force retreated by the main road along the appomattox river. during the night of the 2d the enemy evacuated petersburg and richmond, and retreated towards danville. on the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. general sheridan pushed for the danville road, keeping near the appomattox, followed by general meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while general ord moved for burkesville, along the south side road; the 9th corps stretched along that road behind him. on the 4th, general sheridan struck the danville road near jetersville, where he learned that lee was at amelia court house. he immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of general meade, who reached there the next day. general ord reached burkesville on the evening of the 5th. on the morning of the 5th, i addressed major-general sherman the following communication: "wilson's station, april 5, 1865. "general: all indications now are that lee will attempt to reach danville with the remnant of his force. sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. we hope to reduce this number one-half. i shall push on to burkesville, and if a stand is made at danville, will in a very few days go there. if you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with lee's and johnston's armies. whether it will be better for you to strike for greensboro', or nearer to danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "major-general w. t. sherman." on the morning of the 6th, it was found that general lee was moving west of jetersville, towards danville. general sheridan moved with his cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to general meade on his reaching jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps, while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. general ord advanced from burkesville towards farmville, sending two regiments of infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under brevet brigadier-general theodore read, to reach and destroy the bridges. this advance met the head of lee's column near farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until general read was killed and his small force overpowered. this caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled general ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy immediately intrenched himself. in the afternoon, general sheridan struck the enemy south of sailors' creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. the movements of the 2d corps and general ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success. on the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the 5th corps moving by prince edward's court house; the 6th corps, general ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on farmville; and the 2d corps by the high bridge road. it was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the appomattox; but so close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common bridge at high bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. the 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at farmville to its support. feeling now that general lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, i addressed him the following communication from farmville: "april 7, 1865. "general--the result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia in this struggle. i feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the confederate states army known as the army of northern virginia. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, i received at farmville the following: "april 7, 1865. "general: i have received your note of this date. though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of northern virginia, i reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." to this i immediately replied: "april 8, 1865. "general:--your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which i will accept the surrender of the army of northern virginia, is just received. in reply, i would say, that peace being my great desire, there is but one condition i would insist upon --namely, that the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the government of the united states until properly exchanged. i will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of the northern virginia will be received. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." early on the morning of the 8th the pursuit was resumed. general meade followed north of the appomattox, and general sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight ahead for appomattox station, followed by general ord's command and the 5th corps. during the day general meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear-guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. late in the evening general sheridan struck the railroad at appomattox station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for lee's army. during this day i accompanied general meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from general lee: april 8, 1865. "general:--i received, at a late hour, your note of to-day. in mine of yesterday i did not intend to propose the surrender of the army of northern virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. to be frank, i do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, i desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. i cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to the surrender of the army of northern virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the confederate states forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, i should be pleased to meet you at ten a.m. to-morrow on the old stage-road to richmond, between the picket-lines of the two armies. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." early on the morning of the 9th i returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the appomattox: "april 9, 1865. "general:--your note of yesterday is received. i have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for ten a.m. to-day could lead to no good. i will state, however, general, that i am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole north entertains the same feeling. the terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. by the south laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, i subscribe myself, etc. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." on this morning of the 9th, general ord's command and the 5th corps reached appomattox station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. the infantry was at once thrown in. soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender. before reaching general sheridan's headquarters, i received the following from general lee: "april 9, 1865. "general:--i received your note of this morning on the picket-line, whither i had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. i now ask an interview, in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday, for that purpose. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the interview was held at appomattox court-house, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence: appomattox court-house, virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: in accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the 8th instant, i propose to receive the surrender of the army of northern virginia on the following terms, to wit: rolls of all the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such officer or officers as you may designate. the officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the government of the united states until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. the arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. this will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. this done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to his home, not to be disturbed by united states authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside. "u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. "general r. e. lee." "headquarters army of northern virginia, april 9, 1865. "general: i have received your letter of this date containing the terms of surrender of the army of northern virginia as proposed by you. as they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 8th instant, they are accepted. i will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect. "r. e. lee, general. "lieutenant-general u. s. grant." the command of major-general gibbon, the 5th army corps under griffin, and mackenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at appomattox court-house until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. the remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of burkesville. general lee's great influence throughout the whole south caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers. on the receipt of my letter of the 5th, general sherman moved directly against joe johnston, who retreated rapidly on and through raleigh, which place general sherman occupied on the morning of the 13th. the day preceding, news of the surrender of general lee reached him at smithfield. on the 14th a correspondence was opened between general sherman and general johnston, which resulted on the 18th in an agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the president. this agreement was disapproved by the president on the 21st, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to general sherman by me in person on the morning of the 24th, at raleigh, north carolina, in obedience to your orders. notice was at once given by him to general johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. on the 25th another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the 26th, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to general lee. the expedition under general stoneman from east tennessee got off on the 20th of march, moving by way of boone, north carolina, and struck the railroad at wytheville, chambersburg, and big lick. the force striking it at big lick pushed on to within a few miles of lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between new river and big lick, and then turned for greensboro', on the north carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between danville and greensboro', and between greensboro' and the yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. at salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under general gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. at this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges towards charlotte. thence he moved to slatersville. general canby, who had been directed in january to make preparations for a movement from mobile bay against mobile and the interior of alabama, commenced his movement on the 20th of march. the 16th corps, major-general a. j. smith commanding, moved from fort gaines by water to fish river; the 13th corps, under major-general gordon granger, moved from fort morgan and joined the 16th corps on fish river, both moving thence on spanish fort and investing it on the 27th; while major-general steele's command moved from pensacola, cut the railroad leading from tensas to montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested fort blakely. after a severe bombardment of spanish fort, a part of its line was carried on the 8th of april. during the night the enemy evacuated the fort. fort blakely was carried by assault on the 9th, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. these successes practically opened to us the alabama river, and enabled us to approach mobile from the north. on the night of the 11th the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the 12th. the expedition under command of brevet major-general wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until march 22d, when it moved from chickasaw, alabama. on the 1st of april, general wilson encountered the enemy in force under forrest near ebenezer church, drove him in confusion, captured three hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the cahawba river. on the 2d he attacked and captured the fortified city of selma, defended by forrest, with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine-shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. on the 4th he captured and destroyed tuscaloosa. on the 10th he crossed the alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to general canby, marched on montgomery, which place he occupied on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned it. at this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. thence a force marched direct on columbus, and another on west point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the 16th. at the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field-guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. at the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. on the 20th he took possession of macon, georgia, with sixty field-guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by general howell cobb. general wilson, hearing that jeff. davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of may 11th. on the 4th day of may, general dick taylor surrendered to general canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the mississippi. a force sufficient to insure an easy triumph over the enemy under kirby smith, west of the mississippi, was immediately put in motion for texas, and major-general sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the 26th day of may, and before they reached their destination, general kirby smith surrendered his entire command to major-general canby. this surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel president and vice-president; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property. owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the government had taken refuge upon the soil of mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the united states, which had been surrendered to us by agreement among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person and the disturbed condition of affairs on the rio grande, the orders for troops to proceed to texas were not changed. there have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that i have not mentioned. many of these will be found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief dispatches announcing them, and others, i regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported. for information touching our indian difficulties, i would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of departments in which they have occurred. it has been my fortune to see the armies of both the west and the east fight battles, and from what i have seen i know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. all that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. the western armies commenced their battles in the mississippi valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in north carolina. the armies of the east commenced their battles on the river from which the army of the potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonists at appomattox court house, virginia. the splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have unfortunately experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. all have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of law over every foot of territory belonging to the united states. let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor. i have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. the end __________ footnotes (*1) afterwards general gardner, c.s.a. (*2) general garland expressed a wish to get a message back to general twiggs, his division commander, or general taylor, to the effect that he was nearly out of ammunition and must have more sent to him, or otherwise be reinforced. deeming the return dangerous he did not like to order any one to carry it, so he called for a volunteer. lieutenant grant offered his services, which were accepted.--publishers. (*3) mentioned in the reports of major lee, colonel garland and general worth.--publishers. (*4) note.--it had been a favorite idea with general scott for a great many years before the mexican war to have established in the united states a soldiers' home, patterned after something of the kind abroad, particularly, i believe, in france. he recommended this uniformly, or at least frequently, in his annual reports to the secretary of war, but never got any hearing. now, as he had conquered the state, he made assessments upon the different large towns and cities occupied by our troops, in proportion to their capacity to pay, and appointed officers to receive the money. in addition to the sum thus realized he had derived, through capture at cerro gordo, sales of captured government tobacco, etc., sums which swelled the fund to a total of about $220,000. portions of this fund were distributed among the rank and file, given to the wounded in hospital, or applied in other ways, leaving a balance of some $118,000 remaining unapplied at the close of the war. after the war was over and the troops all home, general scott applied to have this money, which had never been turned into the treasury of the united states, expended in establishing such homes as he had previously recommended. this fund was the foundation of the soldiers' home at washington city, and also one at harrodsburgh, kentucky. the latter went into disuse many years ago. in fact it never had many soldiers in it, and was, i believe, finally sold. (*5) the mexican war made three presidential candidates, scott, taylor and pierce--and any number of aspirants for that high office. it made also governors of states, members of the cabinet, foreign ministers and other officers of high rank both in state and nation. the rebellion, which contained more war in a single day, at some critical periods, than the whole mexican war in two years, has not been so fruitful of political results to those engaged on the union side. on the other side, the side of the south, nearly every man who holds office of any sort whatever, either in the state or in the nation, was a confederate soldier, but this is easily accounted for from the fact that the south was a military camp, and there were very few people of a suitable age to be in the army who were not in it. (*6) c. b. lagow, the others not yet having joined me. (*7) note.--since writing this chapter i have received from mrs. w. h. l. wallace, widow of the gallant general who was killed in the first day's fight on the field of shiloh, a letter from general lew. wallace to him dated the morning of the 5th. at the date of this letter it was well known that the confederates had troops out along the mobile & ohio railroad west of crump's landing and pittsburg landing, and were also collecting near shiloh. this letter shows that at that time general lew. wallace was making preparations for the emergency that might happen for the passing of reinforcements between shiloh and his position, extending from crump's landing westward, and he sends it over the road running from adamsville to the pittsburg landing and purdy road. these two roads intersect nearly a mile west of the crossing of the latter over owl creek, where our right rested. in this letter general lew. wallace advises general w. h. l. wallace that he will send "to-morrow" (and his letter also says "april 5th," which is the same day the letter was dated and which, therefore, must have been written on the 4th) some cavalry to report to him at his headquarters, and suggesting the propriety of general w. h. l. wallace's sending a company back with them for the purpose of having the cavalry at the two landings familiarize themselves with the road so that they could "act promptly in case of emergency as guides to and from the different camps." this modifies very materially what i have said, and what has been said by others, of the conduct of general lew. wallace at the battle of shiloh. it shows that he naturally, with no more experience than he had at the time in the profession of arms, would take the particular road that he did start upon in the absence of orders to move by a different road. the mistake he made, and which probably caused his apparent dilatoriness, was that of advancing some distance after he found that the firing, which would be at first directly to his front and then off to the left, had fallen back until it had got very much in rear of the position of his advance. this falling back had taken place before i sent general wallace orders to move up to pittsburg landing and, naturally, my order was to follow the road nearest the river. but my order was verbal, and to a staff officer who was to deliver it to general wallace, so that i am not competent to say just what order the general actually received. general wallace's division was stationed, the first brigade at crump's landing, the second out two miles, and the third two and a half miles out. hearing the sounds of battle general wallace early ordered his first and third brigades to concentrate on the second. if the position of our front had not changed, the road which wallace took would have been somewhat shorter to our right than the river road. u. s. grant. mount macgregor, new york, june 21, 1885. (*8) note: in an article on the battle of shiloh which i wrote for the century magazine, i stated that general a. mcd. mccook, who commanded a division of buell's army, expressed some unwillingness to pursue the enemy on monday, april 7th, because of the condition of his troops. general badeau, in his history, also makes the same statement, on my authority. out of justice to general mccook and his command, i must say that they left a point twenty-two miles east of savannah on the morning of the 6th. from the heavy rains of a few days previous and the passage of trains and artillery, the roads were necessarily deep in mud, which made marching slow. the division had not only marched through this mud the day before, but it had been in the rain all night without rest. it was engaged in the battle of the second day and did as good service as its position allowed. in fact an opportunity occurred for it to perform a conspicuous act of gallantry which elicited the highest commendation from division commanders in the army of the tennessee. general sherman both in his memoirs and report makes mention of this fact. general mccook himself belongs to a family which furnished many volunteers to the army. i refer to these circumstances with minuteness because i did general mccook injustice in my article in the century, though not to the extent one would suppose from the public press. i am not willing to do any one an injustice, and if convinced that i have done one, i am always willing to make the fullest admission. (*9) note.--for gallantry in the various engagements, from the time i was left in command down to 26th of october and on my recommendation, generals mcpherson and c. s. hamilton were promoted to be major-generals, and colonels c. c. marsh, 20th illinois, m. m. crocker, 13th iowa j. a. mower, 11th missouri, m. d. leggett, 78th ohio, j. d. stevenson, 7th missouri, and john e. smith, 45th illinois, to be brigadiers. (*10) colonel ellet reported having attacked a confederate battery on the red river two days before with one of his boats, the de soto. running aground, he was obliged to abandon his vessel. however, he reported that he set fire to her and blew her up. twenty of his men fell into the hands of the enemy. with the balance he escaped on the small captured steamer, the new era, and succeeded in passing the batteries at grand gulf and reaching the vicinity of vicksburg. (*11) one of colonel ellet's vessels which had run the blockade on february the 2d and been sunk in the red river. (*12) note.--on this occasion governor richard yates, of illinois, happened to be on a visit to the army and accompanied me to carthage. i furnished an ambulance for his use and that of some of the state officers who accompanied him. (*13) note.--when general sherman first learned of the move i proposed to make, he called to see me about it. i recollect that i had transferred my headquarters from a boat in the river to a house a short distance back from the levee. i was seated on the piazza engaged in conversation with my staff when sherman came up. after a few moments' conversation he said that he would like to see me alone. we passed into the house together and shut the door after us. sherman then expressed his alarm at the move i had ordered, saying that i was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to manoeuvre a year--or a long time--to get me in. i was going into the enemy's country, with a large river behind me and the enemy holding points strongly fortified above and below. he said that it was an axiom in war that when any great body of troops moved against an enemy they should do so from a base of supplies, which they would guard as they would the apple of the eye, etc. he pointed out all the difficulties that might be encountered in the campaign proposed, and stated in turn what would be the true campaign to make. this was, in substance, to go back until high ground could be reached on the east bank of the river; fortify there and establish a depot of supplies, and move from there, being always prepared to fall back upon it in case of disaster. i said this would take us back to memphis. sherman then said that was the very place he would go to, and would move by railroad from memphis to grenada, repairing the road as we advanced. to this i replied, the country is already disheartened over the lack of success on the part of our armies; the last election went against the vigorous prosecution of the war, voluntary enlistments had ceased throughout most of the north and conscription was already resorted to, and if we went back so far as memphis it would discourage the people so much that bases of supplies would be of no use: neither men to hold them nor supplies to put in them would be furnished. the problem for us was to move forward to a decisive victory, or our cause was lost. no progress was being made in any other field, and we had to go on. sherman wrote to my adjutant general, colonel j. a. rawlins, embodying his views of the campaign that should be made, and asking him to advise me to at least get the views of my generals upon the subject. colonel rawlins showed me the letter, but i did not see any reason for changing my plans. the letter was not answered and the subject was not subsequently mentioned between sherman and myself to the end of the war, that i remember of. i did not regard the letter as official, and consequently did not preserve it. general sherman furnished a copy himself to general badeau, who printed it in his history of my campaigns. i did not regard either the conversation between us or the letter to my adjutant-general as protests, but simply friendly advice which the relations between us fully justified. sherman gave the same energy to make the campaign a success that he would or could have done if it had been ordered by himself. i make this statement here to correct an impression which was circulated at the close of the war to sherman's prejudice, and for which there was no fair foundation. (*14) meant edward's station. (*15) chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general w. t. sherman: enclosed herewith i send you copy of instructions to major-general thomas. you having been over the ground in person, and having heard the whole matter discussed, further instructions will not be necessary for you. it is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad between cleveland and dalton, and longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south, but being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected until the result of our first effort is known. i will add, however, what is not shown in my instructions to thomas, that a brigade of cavalry has been ordered here which, if it arrives in time, will be thrown across the tennessee above chickamauga, and may be able to make the trip to cleveland or thereabouts. u. s. grant maj.-gen'l. chattanooga, november 18, 1863. major-general geo. h. thomas, chattanooga: all preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on missionary ridge by saturday at daylight. not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountains, and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. however, the general plan, you understand, is for sherman, with the force brought with him strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the tennessee river just below the mouth of chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights on the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. you will co-operate with sherman. the troops in chattanooga valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. this division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. your effort then will be to form a junction with sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of missionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. the junction once formed and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. lookout valley, i think, will be easily held by geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old army of the cumberland. howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at chattanooga or with sherman. it should be marched on friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon-bridge, and there held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. all these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted or unnecessarily fired away. you will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek. u. s. grant, major-general. (*16) in this order authority was given for the troops to reform after taking the first line of rifle-pits preparatory to carrying the ridge. (*17) chattanooga, november 24,1863. major-general. ceo. h. thomas, chattanooga general sherman carried missionary ridge as far as the tunnel with only slight skirmishing. his right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill, his left at chickamauga creek. i have instructed general sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in cooperation. your command will either carry the rifle-pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. if hooker's position on the mountain [cannot be maintained] with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare, and ascend by the first practicable road. u. s. grant, major-general. (*18) washington, d. c., december 8, 1863, 10.2 a.m. maj.-general u. s. grant: understanding that your lodgment at knoxville and at chattanooga is now secure, i wish to tender you, and all under your command, my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. god bless you all, a. lincoln, president u. s. (*19) general john g. foster. (*20) during this winter the citizens of jo davies county, ill., subscribed for and had a diamond-hilled sword made for general grant, which was always known as the chattanooga sword. the scabbard was of gold, and was ornamented with a scroll running nearly its entire length, displaying in engraved letters the names of the battles in which general grant had participated. congress also gave him a vote of thanks for the victories at chattanooga, and voted him a gold medal for vicksburg and chattanooga. all such things are now in the possession of the government at washington. (*21) washington, d. c. december 29, 1863. maj.-general u. s. grant: general foster has asked to be relieved from his command on account of disability from old wounds. should his request be granted, who would you like as his successor? it is possible that schofield will be sent to your command. h. w. halleck general-in-chief. (official.) (*22) see letter to banks, in general grant's report, appendix. (*23) [private and confidential.] headquarters armies of the united states, washington, d. c., april 4, 1864. major-general w. t. sherman, commanding military division of the mississippi. general:--it is my design, if the enemy keep quiet and allow me to take the initiative in the spring campaign, to work all parts of the army together, and somewhat towards a common centre. for your information i now write you my programme, as at present determined upon. i have sent orders to banks, by private messenger, to finish up his present expedition against shreveport with all dispatch; to turn over the defence of red river to general steele and the navy and to return your troops to you and his own to new orleans; to abandon all of texas, except the rio grande, and to hold that with not to exceed four thousand men; to reduce the number of troops on the mississippi to the lowest number necessary to hold it, and to collect from his command not less than twenty-five thousand men. to this i will add five thousand men from missouri. with this force he is to commence operations against mobile as soon as he can. it will be impossible for him to commence too early. gillmore joins butler with ten thousand men, and the two operate against richmond from the south side of the james river. this will give butler thirty-three thousand men to operate with, w. f. smith commanding the right wing of his forces and gillmore the left wing. i will stay with the army of the potomac, increased by burnside's corps of not less than twenty-five thousand effective men, and operate directly against lee's army, wherever it may be found. sigel collects all his available force in two columns, one, under ord and averell, to start from beverly, virginia, and the other, under crook, to start from charleston on the kanawha, to move against the virginia and tennessee railroad. crook will have all cavalry, and will endeavor to get in about saltville, and move east from there to join ord. his force will be all cavalry, while ord will have from ten to twelve thousand men of all arms. you i propose to move against johnston's army, to break it up and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources. i do not propose to lay down for you a plan of campaign, but simply lay down the work it is desirable to have done and leave you free to execute it in your own way. submit to me, however, as early as you can, your plan of operations. as stated, banks is ordered to commence operations as soon as he can. gillmore is ordered to report at fortress monroe by the 18th inst., or as soon thereafter as practicable. sigel is concentrating now. none will move from their places of rendezvous until i direct, except banks. i want to be ready to move by the 25th inst., if possible. but all i can now direct is that you get ready as soon as possible. i know you will have difficulties to encounter in getting through the mountains to where supplies are abundant, but i believe you will accomplish it. from the expedition from the department of west virginia i do not calculate on very great results; but it is the only way i can take troops from there. with the long line of railroad sigel has to protect, he can spare no troops except to move directly to his front. in this way he must get through to inflict great damage on the enemy, or the enemy must detach from one of his armies a large force to prevent it. in other words, if sigel can't skin himself he can hold a leg while some one else skins. i am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*24) see instructions to butler, in general grant's report, appendix. (*25) in field, culpeper c. h., va., april 9, 1864. maj.-general geo. g. meade com'd'g army of the potomac. for information and as instruction to govern your preparations for the coming campaign, the following is communicated confidentially for your own perusal alone. so far as practicable all the armies are to move together, and towards one common centre. banks has been instructed to turn over the guarding of the red river to general steele and the navy, to abandon texas with the exception of the rio grande, and to concentrate all the force he can, not less than 25,000 men, to move on mobile. this he is to do without reference to other movements. from the scattered condition of his command, however, he cannot possibly get it together to leave new orleans before the 1st of may, if so soon. sherman will move at the same time you do, or two or three days in advance, jo. johnston's army being his objective point, and the heart of georgia his ultimate aim. if successful he will secure the line from chattanooga to mobile with the aid of banks. sigel cannot spare troops from his army to reinforce either of the great armies, but he can aid them by moving directly to his front. this he has been directed to do, and is now making preparations for it. two columns of his command will make south at the same time with the general move; one from beverly, from ten to twelve thousand strong, under major-general ord; the other from charleston, va., principally cavalry, under brig.-general crook. the former of these will endeavor to reach the tennessee and virginia railroad, about south of covington, and if found practicable will work eastward to lynchburg and return to its base by way of the shenandoah valley, or join you. the other will strike at saltville, va., and come eastward to join ord. the cavalry from ord's command will try tributaries which would furnish us an easy line over which to bring all supplies to within easy hauling distance of every position the army could occupy from the rapidan to the james river. but lee could, if he chose, detach or move his whole army north on a line rather interior to the one i would have to take in following. a movement by his left--our right--would obviate this; but all that was done would have to be done with the supplies and ammunition we started with. all idea of adopting this latter plan was abandoned when the limited quantity of supplies possible to take with us was considered. the country over which we would have to pass was so exhausted of all food or forage that we would be obliged to carry everything with us. while these preparations were going on the enemy was not entirely idle. in the west forrest made a raid in west tennessee up to the northern border, capturing the garrison of four or five hundred men at union city, and followed it up by an attack on paducah, kentucky, on the banks of the ohio. while he was able to enter the city he failed to capture the forts or any part of the garrison. on the first intelligence of forrest's raid i telegraphed sherman to send all his cavalry against him, and not to let him get out of the trap he had put himself into. sherman had anticipated me by sending troops against him before he got my order. forrest, however, fell back rapidly, and attacked the troops at fort pillow, a station for the protection of the navigation of the mississippi river. the garrison to force a passage southward, if they are successful in reaching the virginia and tennessee railroad, to cut the main lines of the road connecting richmond with all the south and south-west. gillmore will join butler with about 10,000 men from south carolina. butler can reduce his garrison so as to take 23,000 men into the field directly to his front. the force will be commanded by maj.-general w. f. smith. with smith and gillmore, butler will seize city point, and operate against richmond from the south side of the river. his movement will be simultaneous with yours. lee's army will be your objective point. wherever lee goes, there you will go also. the only point upon which i am now in doubt is, whether it will be better to cross the rapidan above or below him. each plan presents great advantages over the other with corresponding objections. by crossing above, lee is cut off from all chance of ignoring richmond and going north on a raid. but if we take this route, all we do must be done whilst the rations we start with hold out. we separate from butler so that he cannot be directed how to co-operate. by the other route brandy station can be used as a base of supplies until another is secured on the york or james rivers. these advantages and objections i will talk over with you more fully than i can write them. burnside with a force of probably 25,000 men will reinforce you. immediately upon his arrival, which will be shortly after the 20th inst., i will give him the defence of the road from bull run as far south as we wish to hold it. this will enable you to collect all your strength about brandy station and to the front. there will be naval co-operation on the james river, and transports and ferries will be provided so that should lee fall back into his intrenchments at richmond, butler's force and yours will be a unit, or at least can be made to act as such. what i would direct then, is that you commence at once reducing baggage to the very lowest possible standard. two wagons to a regiment of five hundred men is the greatest number that should be allowed, for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. one wagon to brigade and one to division headquarters is sufficient and about two to corps headquarters. should by lee's right flank be our route, you will want to make arrangements for having supplies of all sorts promptly forwarded to white house on the pamunkey. your estimates for this contingency should be made at once. if not wanted there, there is every probability they will be wanted on the james river or elsewhere. if lee's left is turned, large provision will have to be made for ordnance stores. i would say not much short of five hundred rounds of infantry ammunition would do. by the other, half the amount would be sufficient. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*26) general john a. logan, upon whom devolved the command of the army of the tennessee during this battle, in his report gave our total loss in killed, wounded and missing at 3,521; and estimated that of the enemy to be not less than 10,000: and general g. m. dodge, graphically describing to general sherman the enemy's attack, the full weight of which fell first upon and was broken by his depleted command, remarks: "the disparity of forces can be seen from the fact that in the charge made by my two brigades under fuller and mersy they took 351 prisoners, representing forty-nine different regiments, eight brigades and three divisions; and brought back eight battle flags from the enemy." (*27) union army on the rapidan, may 5, 1864. [compiled.] lieutenant-general u. s. grant, commander-in-chief. major-general george g. meade, commanding army of the potomac. maj.-gen. w. s. hancock, commanding second army corps. first division, brig.-gen. francis c. barlow. first brigade, col. nelson a. miles. second brigade, col. thomas a. smyth. third brigade, col. paul frank. fourth brigade, col. john r. brooke. second division, brig.-gen. john gibbon. first brigade, brig.-gen. alex. s. webb. second brigade, brig.-gen. joshua t. owen. third brigade, col. samuel s. carroll. third division, maj.-gen. david b. birney. first brigade, brig.-gen. j. h. h. ward. second brigade, brig.-gen. alexander hays. fourth divisin, brig.-gen. gershom mott. first brigade, col. robert mcallister. second brigade, col. wm. r. brewster. artillery brigade, col. john c. tidball. maj.-gen. g. k. warren, commanding fifth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. charles griffin. first brigade, brig.-gen. romeyn b. ayres. second brigade, col. jacob b. sweitzer. third brigade, brig.-gen. j. j. bartlett. second division, brig.-gen. john c. robinson. first brigade, col. samuel h. leonard. second brigade, brig.-gen. henry baxter. third brigade, col. andrew w. denison. third division, brig.-gen. samuel w. crawford. first brigade, col. wm mccandless. third brigade, col. joseph w. fisher. fourth division, brig.-gen. james s. wadsworth. first brigade, brig.-gen. lysander cutler. second brigade brig.-gen. james c. rice. third brigade, col. roy stone artillery brigade, col. s. s. wainwright. maj.-gen. john sedgwick, commanding sixth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. h. g. wright. first brigade, col. henry w. brown. second brigade, col. emory upton. third brigade, brig.-gen. d. a. russell. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. alexander shaler. second division, brig.-gen. george w. getty. first brigade, brig.-gen. frank wheaton. second brigade, col. lewis a. grant. third brigade, brig.-gen. thos. h. neill. fourth brigade, brig.-gen. henry l. eustis. third division, brig.-gen. james ricketts. first brigade, brig.-gen. wm. h. morris. second brigade, brig.-gen. t. seymour. artillery brigade, col. c. h. tompkins maj.-gen. p. h. sheridan, commanding cavalry corps. first division, brig.-gen. a. t. a. torbert. first brigade, brig.-gen. g. a. custer. second brigade, col. thos. c. devin. reserve brigade, brig.-gen. wesley merritt second division, brig.-gen. d. mcm. gregg. first brigade, brig.-gen. henry e. davies, jr. second brigade, col. j. irvin gregg. third division, brig.-gen. j. h. wilson. first brigade, col. t. m. bryan, jr. second brigade, col. geo. h. chapman. maj.-gen. a. e. burnside, commanding ninth army corps. first division, brig.-gen. t. g. stevenson. first brigade, col. sumner carruth. second brigade, col. daniel leasure. second division, brig.-gen. robert b. potter. first brigade, col. zenas r. bliss. second brigade, col. simon g. griffin. third division, brig.-gen. orlando willcox. first brigade, col. john f. hartranft. second brigade, col. benj. c. christ. fourth division, brig.-gen. edward ferrero. first brigade, col. joshua k. sigfried. second brigade, col. henry g. thomas. provisional brigade, col. elisha g. marshall. brig.-gen. henry j. hunt, commanding artillery. reserve, col. h. s. burton. first brigade, col. j. h. kitching. second brigade, maj. j. a. tompkins. first brig. horse art., capt. j. m. robertson. second brigade, horse art., capt. d. r. ransom. third brigade, maj. r. h. fitzhugh. general headquarters....... provost guard, brig.-gen. m. r. patrick. volunteer engineers, brig.-gen. h. w. benham. confederate army. organization of the army of northern virginia, commanded by general robert e. lee, august 31st, 1834. first army corps: lieut.-gen. r. h. anderson, commanding. maj.-gen. geo. e. pickett's division. brig.-gen. seth m. barton's brigade. (a) brig.-gen. m. d. corse's " " eppa hunton's " " wm. r. terry's " maj.-gen. c. w. field's division. (b) brig.-gen. g. t. anderson's brigade " e. m. law's (c) " " john bratton's " maj.-gen. j. b. kershaw's division. (d) brig.-gen. w. t. wofford's brigade " b. g. humphreys' " " goode bryan's " " kershaw's (old) " second army corps: major-general jubal a. early, commanding maj.-gen. john b. gordon's division. brig.-gen. h. t. hays' brigade. (e) " john pegram 's " (f) " gordon's " (g) brig.-gen. r. f. hoke's " maj.-gen. edward johnson's division. stonewall brig. (brig.-gen. j. a. walker). (h) brig.-gen. j m jones' brigade. (h) " geo h. stewart's " (h) " l. a. stafford's " (e) maj.-gen. r. e. rodes' division. brig.-gen. j. daniel's brigade. (i) " geo. dole's " (k) " s. d. ramseur's brigade. " c. a. battle's " " r. d. johnston's " (f) third army corps: lieut.-gen. a. p. hill, commanding. maj.-gen. wm. mahone's division. (l) brig.-gen. j. c. c. sanders' brigade. mahone's " brig.-gen. n. h. harris's " (m) " a. r. wright's " " joseph finegan's " maj.-gen. c. m. wilcox's division. brig.-gen. e. l. thomas's brigade (n) " james h. lane's " " sam'l mccowan's " " alfred m. scale's " maj.-gen. h. heth's division. (o) brig.-gen. j. r. davis's brigade. " john r. cooke's " " d. mcrae's " " j. j. archer's " " h. h. walker's " _unattached_: 5th alabama battalion. cavalry corps: lieutenant-general wade hampton, commanding.(p) maj.-gen. fitzhugh lee's division brig.-gen. w. c. wickham's brigade " l. l. lomax's " maj.-gen. m. c. butler's division. brig.-gen. john dunovant's brigade. " p. m. b. young's " " thomas l. rosser's " maj.-gen. w. h. f. lee's division. brig.-gen. rufus barringer's brigade. " j. r. chambliss's " artillery reserve: brig.-gen. w. n. pendleton, commanding. brig.-gen. e. p. alexander's division.* cabell's battalion. manly's battery. 1st co. richmond howitzers. carleton's battery. calloway's battery. haskell's battalion. branch's battery. nelson's " garden's " rowan " huger's battalion. smith's battery. moody " woolfolk " parker's " taylor's " fickling's " martin's " gibb's battalion. davidson's battery. dickenson's " otey's " brig.-gen. a. l. long's division. braxton's battalion. lee battery. 1st md. artillery. stafford " alleghany " cutshaw's battalion. charlotteville artillery. staunton " courtney " carter's battalion. morris artillery. orange " king william artillery. jeff davis " nelson's battalion. amherst artillery. milledge " fluvauna " brown's battalion. powhatan artillery. 2d richmond howitzers. 3d " " rockbridge artillery. salem flying artillery. col r. l.walker's division. cutt's battalion. ross's battery. patterson's battery. irwin artillery. richardson's battalion. lewis artillery. donaldsonville artillery. norfolk light " huger " mclntosh 's battalion. johnson's battery. hardaway artillery. danville " 2d rockbridge artillery. pegram's battalion. peedee artillery. fredericksburg artillery. letcher " purcell battery. crenshaw's battery. poague's battalion. madison artillery. albemarle " brooke " charlotte " note. (a) col. w. r. aylett was in command aug. 29th, and probably at above date. (b) inspection report of this division shows that it also contained benning's and gregg's brigades. (c) commanded by colonel p. d. bowles. (d) only two brigadier-generals reported for duty; names not indicated. organization of the army of the valley district. (e) constituting york's brigade. (f) in ramseur's division. (g) evan's brigade, colonel e. n. atkinson commanding, and containing 12th georgia battalion. (h) the virginia regiments constituted terry's brigade, gordon's division. (i) grimes' brigade. (k) cook's " (l) returns report but one general officer present for duty; name not indicated. (m) colonel joseph m. jayne, commanding. (n) colonel thomas j. simmons, commanding. (o) four brigadier-generals reported present for duty; names not indicated. (p) on face of returns appears to have consisted of hampton's, fitz-lee's, and w. h. f. lee's division, and dearing's brigade. *but one general officer reported present for duty in the artillery, and alexander's name not on the original. (*28) headquarters armies u. s., may ii, 1864.--3 p.m. major-general meade, commanding army of the potomac. move three divisions of the 2d corps by the rear of the 5th and 6th corps, under cover of night, so as to join the 9th corps in a vigorous assault on the enemy at four o'clock a.m. to-morrow. will send one or two staff officers over to-night to stay with burnside, and impress him with the importance of a prompt and vigorous attack. warren and wright should hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by this attack, and to push in if any opportunity presents itself. there is but little doubt in my mind that the assault last evening would have proved entirely successful if it had commenced one hour earlier and had been heartily entered into by mott's division and the 9th corps. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*29) headquarters, armies u. s., may 11, 1864.-4 p.m. major-general a. e. burnside, commanding 9th army corps. major-general hancock has been ordered to move his corps under cover of night to join you in a vigorous attack against the enemy at 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow. you will move against the enemy with your entire force promptly and with all possible vigor at precisely 4 o'clock a.m. to-morrow the 12th inst. let your preparations for this attack be conducted with the utmost secrecy and veiled entirely from the enemy. i send two of my staff officers, colonels comstock and babcock, in whom i have great confidence and who are acquainted with the direction the attack is to be made from here, to remain with you and general hancock with instructions to render you every assistance in their power. generals warren and wright will hold their corps as close to the enemy as possible, to take advantage of any diversion caused by yours and hancock's attack, and will push in their whole force if any opportunity presents itself. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*30) headquarters armies u. s., may 12, 1864, 6.30 p.m. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers, and over thirty pieces of artillery. the enemy are obstinate, and seem to have found the last ditch. we have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (johnson's), one brigade (doles'), and one regiment entire from the enemy. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*31) spottsylvania c. h., may 13, 1864. hon e. m. stanton, secretary of war, washington, d. c. i beg leave to recommend the following promotions be made for gallant and distinguished services in the last eight days' battles, to wit: brigadier-general h. g. wright and brigadier-general john gibbon to be major-generals; colonel s. s. carroll, 8th ohio volunteers colonel e. upton, 121st new york volunteers; colonel william mccandless, 2d pennsylvania reserves, to be brigadier-generals. i would also recommend major-general w. s. hancock for brigadier-general in the regular army. his services and qualifications are eminently deserving of this recognition. in making these recommendations i do not wish the claims of general g. m. dodge for promotion forgotten, but recommend his name to be sent in at the same time. i would also ask to have general wright assigned to the command of the sixth army corps. i would further ask the confirmation of general humphreys to the rank of major-general. general meade has more than met my most sanguine expectations. he and sherman are the fittest officers for large commands i have come in contact with. if their services can be rewarded by promotion to the rank of major-generals in the regular army the honor would be worthily bestowed, and i would feel personally gratified. i would not like to see one of these promotions at this time without seeing both. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*32) quarles' mills, va., may 26, 1864. major-general halleck, washington, d. c. the relative position of the two armies is now as follows: lee's right rests on a swamp east of the richmond and fredericksburg road and south of the north anna, his centre on the river at ox ford, and his left at little river with the crossings of little river guarded as far up as we have gone. hancock with his corps and one division of the 9th corps crossed at chesterfield ford and covers the right wing of lee's army. one division of the 9th corps is on the north bank of the anna at ox ford, with bridges above and below at points nearest to it where both banks are held by us, so that it could reinforce either wing of our army with equal facility. the 5th and 6th corps with one division of the 9th corps run from the south bank of the anna from a short distance above ox ford to little river, and parallel with and near to the enemy. to make a direct attack from either wing would cause a slaughter of our men that even success would not justify. to turn the enemy by his right, between the two annas is impossible on account of the swamp upon which his right rests. to turn him by the left leaves little river, new found river and south anna river, all of them streams presenting considerable obstacles to the movement of our army, to be crossed. i have determined therefore to turn the enemy's right by crossing at or near hanover town. this crosses all three streams at once, and leaves us still where we can draw supplies. during the last night the teams and artillery not in position, belonging to the right wing of our army, and one division of that wing were quietly withdrawn to the north bank of the river and moved down to the rear of the left. as soon as it is dark this division with most of the cavalry will commence a forced march for hanover town to seize and hold the crossings. the balance of the right wing will withdraw at the same hour, and follow as rapidly as possible. the left wing will also withdraw from the south bank of the river to-night and follow in rear of the right wing. lee's army is really whipped. the prisoners we now take show it, and the action of his army shows it unmistakably. a battle with them outside of intrenchments cannot be had. our men feel that they have gained the morale over the enemy, and attack him with confidence. i may be mistaken, but i feel that our success over lee's army is already assured. the promptness and rapidity with which you have forwarded reinforcements has contributed largely to the feeling of confidence inspired in our men, and to break down that of the enemy. we are destroying all the rails we can on the central and fredericksburg roads. i want to leave a gap on the roads north of richmond so big that to get a single track they will have to import rail from elsewhere. even if a crossing is not effected at hanover town it will probably be necessary for us to move on down the pamunkey until a crossing is effected. i think it advisable therefore to change our base of supplies from port royal to the white house. i wish you would direct this change at once, and also direct smith to put the railroad bridge there in condition for crossing troops and artillery and leave men to hold it. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*33) near cold harbor, june 3, 1864, 7 a.m. major-general meade, commanding a. p. the moment it becomes certain that an assault cannot succeed, suspend the offensive; but when one does succeed, push it vigorously and if necessary pile in troops at the successful point from wherever they can be taken. i shall go to where you are in the course of an hour. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*34) cold harbor, june 5,1864. major-general halleck, chief of staff of the army, washington, d. c. a full survey of all the ground satisfies me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north-east of richmond that would protect the fredericksburg railroad to enable us to use that road for supplying the army. to do so would give us a long vulnerable line of road to protect, exhausting much of our strength to guard it, and would leave open to the enemy all of his lines of communication on the south side of the james. my idea from the start has been to beat lee's army if possible north of richmond; then after destroying his lines of communication on the north side of the james river to transfer the army to the south side and besiege lee in richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. i now find, after over thirty days of trial, the enemy deems it of the first importance to run no risks with the armies they now have. they act purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where in case of repulse they can instantly retire behind them. without a greater sacrifice of human life than i am willing to make all cannot be accomplished that i had designed outside of the city. i have therefore resolved upon the following plan: i will continue to hold substantially the ground now occupied by the army of the potomac, taking advantage of any favorable circumstance that may present itself until the cavalry can be sent west to destroy the virginia central railroad from about beaver dam for some twenty-five or thirty miles west. when this is effected i will move the army to the south side of the james river, either by crossing the chickahominy and marching near to city point, or by going to the mouth of the chickahominy on north side and crossing there. to provide for this last and most possible contingency, several ferry-boats of the largest class ought to be immediately provided. once on the south side of the james river, i can cut off all sources of supply to the enemy except what is furnished by the canal. if hunter succeeds in reaching lynchburg, that will be lost to him also. should hunter not succeed, i will still make the effort to destroy the canal by sending cavalry up the south side of the river with a pontoon train to cross wherever they can. the feeling of the two armies now seems to be that the rebels can protect themselves only by strong intrenchments, whilst our army is not only confident of protecting itself without intrenchments, but that it can beat and drive the enemy wherever and whenever he can be found without this protection. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*35) cold harbor, va., june 6, 1864. major-general d. hunter commanding dept. w. va. general sheridan leaves here to-morrow morning, with instructions to proceed to charlottesville, va., and to commence there the destruction of the va. cen. r. r., destroying this way as much as possible. the complete destruction of this road and of the canal on james river is of great importance to us. according to the instructions i sent to general halleck for your guidance, you were to proceed to lynchburg and commence there. it would be of great value to us to get possession of lynchburg for a single day. but that point is of so much importance to the enemy, that in attempting to get it such resistance may be met as to defeat your getting onto the road or canal at all. i see, in looking over the letter to general halleck on the subject of your instructions, that it rather indicates that your route should be from staunton via charlottesville. if you have so understood it, you will be doing just what i want. the direction i would now give is, that if this letter reaches you in the valley between staunton and lynchburg, you immediately turn east by the most practicable road. from thence move eastward along the line of the road, destroying it completely and thoroughly, until you join general sheridan. after the work laid out for general sheridan and yourself is thoroughly done, proceed to join the army of the potomac by the route laid out in general sheridan's instructions. if any portion of your force, especially your cavalry, is needed back in your department, you are authorized to send it back. if on receipt of this you should be near to lynchburg and deem it practicable to detach a cavalry force to destroy the canal. lose no opportunity to destroy the canal. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*36) from a statement of losses compiled in the adjutant-general's office. field of action and date. | killed. | wounded. | missing. | aggregate. | wilderness, may 5th to 7th | 2,261 | 8,785 | 2,902 |13,948 | spottsylvania, may 8th to 21st | 2,271 | 9,360 | 1,970 | 13,601| north anna, may 23d to 27th | 186 | 792 | 165 | 1,143 | totopotomoy, may 27th to 31st | 99 | 358 | 52 | 509 | cold harbor, may 31st to june 12th | 1,769 | 6,752 | 1,537 |10,058 | total ................ | 6,586 | 26,047 | 6,626 | 39,259 | (*37) city point, va., june 17, 1864. 11 a.m. major-gen. halleck, washington, d. c. * * * * * * * the enemy in their endeavor to reinforce petersburg abandoned their intrenchments in front of bermuda hundred. they no doubt expected troops from north of the james river to take their place before we discovered it. general butler took advantage of this and moved a force at once upon the railroad and plank road between richmond and petersburg, which i hope to retain possession of. too much credit cannot be given to the troops and their commanders for the energy and fortitude displayed during the last five days. day and night has been all the same, no delays being allowed on any account. u. s. grant, lieut.-general. (*38) city point, va., july 24, 1864. major-general meade, commanding, etc. the engineer officers who made a survey of the front from bermuda hundred report against the probability of success from an attack there. the chances they think will be better on burnside's front. if this is attempted it will be necessary to concentrate all the force possible at the point in the enemy's line we expect to penetrate. all officers should be fully impressed with the absolute necessity of pushing entirely beyond the enemy's present line, if they should succeed in penetrating it, and of getting back to their present line promptly if they should not succeed in breaking through. to the right and left of the point of assault all the artillery possible should be brought to play upon the enemy in front during the assault. their lines would be sufficient for the support of the artillery, and all the reserves could be brought on the flanks of their commands nearest to the point of assault, ready to follow in if successful. the field artillery and infantry held in the lines during the first assault should be in readiness to move at a moment's notice either to their front or to follow the main assault, as they should receive orders. one thing, however, should be impressed on corps commanders. if they see the enemy giving away on their front or moving from it to reinforce a heavily assaulted portion of their line, they should take advantage of such knowledge and act promptly without waiting for orders from army commanders. general ord can co-operate with his corps in this movement, and about five thousand troops from bermuda hundred can be sent to reinforce you or can be used to threaten an assault between the appomattox and james rivers, as may be deemed best. this should be done by tuesday morning, if done at all. if not attempted, we will then start at the date indicated to destroy the railroad as far as hicksford at least, and to weldon if possible. * * * * * * * whether we send an expedition on the road or assault at petersburg, burnside's mine will be blown up.... u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*39) see letter, august 5th, appendix. (*40) see appendix, letters of oct. 11th. (*41) city point, va., december 2,1864. major-general thomas, nashville tenn. if hood is permitted to remain quietly about nashville, you will lose all the road back to chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the tennessee. should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employees, citizens, etc. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 2, 1864.--1.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. with your citizen employees armed, you can move out of nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. after the repulse of hood at franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. at this distance, however, i may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. you will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads if hood is not speedily disposed of. put forth therefore every possible exertion to attain this end. should you get him to retreating give him no peace. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 5, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. is there not danger of forrest moving down the cumberland to where he can cross it? it seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after forrest, hood should be attacked where he is. time strengthens him in all possibility as much as it does you. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 6, 1864--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. attack hood at once and wait no longer for a remnant of your cavalry. there is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the ohio river. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 8, 1864.--8.30 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. your dispatch of yesterday received. it looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the cumberland river, and are scattered. why not attack at once? by all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you or hood, can beat to the ohio. if you think necessary call on the governors of states to send a force into louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. you clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. if destroyed he never can replace it. use the means at your command, and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. city point, va., december 11, 1864.--4 p.m. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. if you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the ohio river, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. let there be no further delay. hood cannot even stand a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. if he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. i am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you to-day announcing that you have moved. delay no longer for weather or reinforcements. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. washington, d. c., december 15, 1864. major-general thomas, nashville, tenn. i was just on my way to nashville, but receiving a dispatch from van duzer detailing your splendid success of to-day, i shall go no further. push the enemy now and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up hood's army and render it useless for future operations. do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. much is now expected. u. s. grant, lieutenant-general. (*42) see orders to major-general meade, ord, and sheridan, march 24th, appendix. (*43) see appendix. (*44) note.--the fac-simile of the terms of lee's surrender inserted at this place, was copied from the original document furnished the publishers through the courtesy of general ely s. parker, military secretary on general grant's staff at the time of the surrender. three pages of paper were prepared in general grant's manifold order book on which he wrote the terms, and the interlineations and erasures were added by general parker at the suggestion of general grant. after such alteration it was handed to general lee, who put on his glasses, read it, and handed it back to general grant. the original was then transcribed by general parker upon official headed paper and a copy furnished general lee. the fac-simile herewith shows the color of the paper of the original document and all interlineations and erasures. there is a popular error to the effect that generals grant and lee each signed the articles of surrender. the document in the form of a letter was signed only by general grant, in the parlor of mclean's house while general lee was sitting in the room, and general lee immediately wrote a letter accepting the terms and handed it to general grant. transcriber's note for this version of the text, italics are denoted with _underscore_ characters, and bold text with =equal= signs. the ligature for 'oe' is separated into its two letters, e.g., 'manoeuvre'. there are three types of notes in the text. the lettered notes (originally asterisks) were printed as standard footnotes on each page. references to these notes now appear in brackets as [a], [b] and so on. the notes themselves have been moved to directly follow the paragraph within which they are referenced. occasionally, an asterisk is used for some other purpose, usually preceding rather than following a word or phrase, and remain asterisks. numeric references referring to the extensive notes section of the text appear as bracketed numbers. unlike standard footnotes, the references to those notes in the text are themselves not necessarily consecutive, nor are they unique. to assist in consulting those notes using search features, the chapter number has been prefixed to each, using arabic numerals, as [21.1], [25.2], [30.3], etc. any internal references directing attention to another note have also been changed. within the notes, there are =bold= numbers prefixed to key words (e.g., '=123=keyword') which serve as references to sources. these numbered sources are found in the final section of the text. there may be multiple references to the same source. the logic behind this system is explained by the author in his preface, and in more detail in the fifth note [p.5] of the notes to that preface. the notes themselves have several footnotes, using numbers and asterisks. these footnotes have been re-numbered sequentially as [1], [2], [3], etc. right-side page headers contained descriptions of the current topic covered by the two open pages. these were retained and are placed on separate lines prior to the paragraph where the topic is introduced, and enclosed in brackets, as [topic headers]. the choice of that position is not always obvious and should be regarded as approximate. should the topic persist over multiple pages, any redundant headers have been removed. illustrations are denoted with square brackets as [illustration: <caption>] at approximately the point where they were printed. the captions are usually printed on the maps themselves. where there is no title to the map, the caption has been provided from the table of illustrations, in mixed case. references to chapters i through xx, as well as their respective notes, refer to the volume i of this work. see http://www.gutenberg.org/ebooks/44437 project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see 44438-h.htm or 44438-h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/44438/44438-h/44438-h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.org/files/44438/44438-h.zip) the war with mexico +----------------------------------------+ | by the same author | | | | the | | annexation of texas | | | | _octavo ix + 496 pages_ | | | | _by mail, postpaid, $3.00_ | | | | ----------------------- | | this is the only work attempting to | | deal thoroughly with an affair that | | was intrinsically far more important | | than had previously been supposed, | | and was also of no little significance | | on account of its relation to the war | | with mexico. | | ----------------------- | | | | the macmillan company | | _publishers_ | +----------------------------------------+ the war with mexico by justin h. smith formerly professor of modern history at dartmouth college author of "the annexation of texas," "our struggle for the fourteenth colony," "arnold's march from cambridge to quebec," etc. volume ii new york the macmillan company 1919 _all rights reserved_ copyright, 1919, by the macmillan company. set up and printed. published december, 1919. norwood press j. s. cushing co.--berwick & smith co. norwood, mass., u.s.a. contents of volume ii page maps and plans in volume ii vi conspectus of events xi pronunciation of spanish xiii chapter xxi. behind the scenes at mexico 1 xxii. vera cruz 17 xxiii. cerro gordo 37 xxiv. puebla 60 xxv. on to the capital 79 xxvi. contreras and churubusco 99 xxvii. negotiations 120 xxviii. molino del rey, chapultepec and mexico 140 xxix. final military operations 165 xxx. the naval operations 189 xxxi. the americans as conquerors 210 xxxii. peace 233 xxxiii. the finances of the war 253 xxxiv. the war in american politics 268 xxxv. the foreign relations of the war 294 xxxvi. conclusion 310 notes on volume ii 327 appendix (lists of sources) 517 index 563 maps and plans in volume two as equally good sources disagree sometimes, a few inconsistencies are unavoidable. numerous errors have been corrected. an asterisk indicates an unpublished source. statements, cited in the notes, have also been used. page 1. the fortress of san juan de ulúa in 1854 21 from a *plan in the war dept., washington. 2. siege of vera cruz: general plan 24 from a map drawn by mcclellan from surveys done by six american officers (n. y. city public library); *a map drawn by order of lieut. col. henry wilson (war dept., washington). 3. siege of vera cruz: the american works 28 from a map drawn by lieut. foster, based on surveys of four american officers (war dept., washington). 4. from vera cruz to perote 39 based on a map issued by manouvrier and snell, new orleans, 1847 (papers of n. p. trist). 5. contour lines near cerro gordo 40 from a *drawing in the war college, washington. 6. battle of cerro gordo: general map 43 based on a map drawn by lieut. coppée from the surveys of maj. turnbull and capt. mcclellan (sen. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 1 sess.); a map drawn by mcclellan (mass. hist. society); a *sketch of a reconnaissance by lieut. tower (war dept., washington); *croquis de la posición del campo de cerro gordo, 1847 (war dept., washington); a plan by i. a. de soiecki (vera cruz city archives); and a *sketch by lieut. thos. williams (among his letters). 7. battle of cerro gordo: central portion 51 based on the same sources as no. 6 _supra_. 8. from jalapa to puebla 61 based on a fomento dept. map. 9. profile of the route from vera cruz to mexico 62 from a map published by manouvrier and snell, new orleans, 1847 (papers of n. p. trist). 10. a part of the valley of mexico 80 from a map surveyed and drawn by lieut. m. l. smith and bvt. capt. hardcastle (sen. ex. doc. 11; 31 cong., 1 sess.); and a map by balbontín (invasión americana). 11. battles of august 19 and 20, 1847: general map 100 based on a map drawn by hardcastle from the surveys of maj. turnbull, capt. mcclellan and lieut. hardcastle (sen. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 1 sess.); the smith and hardcastle map (no. 10 _supra_); a *map drawn by capt. barnard from the surveys of capt. mason and lieuts. beauregard, mcclellan, and foster (war dept., washington); a map drawn by hardcastle from the surveys of mason and hardcastle (sen. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 1 sess.); a map in apuntes; and a map drawn by mcclellan (mass. hist. society). 12. battle of contreras 108 based on the turnbull map (no. 11 _supra_); a *plan of capt. gardner (pierce papers); *notes by capt. henshaw on a map by hardcastle (mass. hist. society); a *sketch by lieut. collins, 4th artillery (collins papers); new orleans _picayune_, sept. 12, 1847; a plan by balbontín (invasión americana); and a map in apuntes. 13. battle of churubusco 111 based on the turnbull map (no. 11 _supra_); a map drawn by hardcastle from the surveys of mason and hardcastle (sen. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 1 sess.); and a sketch by balbontín ("invasión americana"). 14. the tête de pont, churubusco 112 *drawn by lieuts. beauregard and tower from beauregard's survey (war dept., washington). 15. profile of east curtain, tête de pont, churubusco 113 *drawn by beauregard from the surveys of lieuts. mcclellan, beauregard, and foster (war dept., washington). 16. the fortifications of churubusco convent 114 *drawn by beauregard and tower from beauregard's survey (war dept., washington). 17. battles of mexico: general map 141 based on a map drawn by hardcastle from the surveys of turnbull, mcclellan, and hardcastle (sen. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 1 sess.); and a map drawn by mcclellan and hardcastle (published by the government). 18. battle of molino del rey 143 based on the maps specified under no. 17 _supra_; a sketch by hardcastle (sen. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 1 sess.); and a sketch in new orleans _picayune_, oct. 17, 1847. 19. battle of chapultepec 150 based upon the maps specified under no. 17 supra; a *sketch drawn by tower from surveys of beauregard and tower (war dept., washington); a plan accompanying gen. quitman report (sen. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 1 sess.); *recollections of señor d. ignacio molina, chief cartographer of the fomento dept., mexico. 20. blindage at chapultepec 151 21. the citadel, mexico, in 1840 (war dept. *plan, washington) 159 22. alvarado, mexico 198 a *plan by j. l. mason (war dept., washington). 23. a part of tabasco river 205 based on a map in ho. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 2 sess. 24. guaymas, mexico 206 from a plan in ho. ex. doc. 1; 30 cong., 2 sess. 25. mazatlan, mexico 207 from a *drawing by commander wouldridge of brigantine _spy_ (admiralty papers, public record office, london). 26. the tip of lower california 207 based on a map in sen. ex. doc. 18; 31 cong., 1 sess. 27. territory acquired from mexico 241 conspectus of events 1845 march. the united states determines to annex texas; w. s. parrott sent to conciliate mexico. july. texas consents; taylor proceeds to corpus christi. oct. 17. larkin appointed a confidential agent in california. nov. 10. slidell ordered to mexico. dec. 20. slidell rejected by herrera. 1846 jan. 13. taylor ordered to the rio grande. mar. 8. taylor marches from corpus christi. 21. slidell finally rejected by paredes. 28. taylor reaches the rio grande. apr. 25. thornton attacked. may 8. battle of palo alto. 9. battle of resaca de la palma. 13. the war bill becomes a law. june 5. kearny's march to santa fe begins. july 7. monterey, california, occupied. 14. camargo occupied. aug. 4. paredes overthrown. 7. first attack on alvarado. 13. los angeles, california, occupied. 16. santa anna lands at vera cruz. 18. kearny takes santa fe. 19. taylor advances from camargo. sept. 14. santa anna enters mexico city. 20-24. operations at monterey, mex. 22-23. insurrection in california precipitated. 23. wool's advance from san antonio begins. 25. kearny leaves santa fe for california. oct. 8. santa anna arrives at san luis potosí. oct. 15. second attack on alvarado. 24. san juan bautista captured by perry. 28. tampico evacuated by parrodi. 29. wool occupies monclova. nov. 15. tampico captured by conner. 16. saltillo occupied by taylor. 18. scott appointed to command the vera cruz expedition. dec. 5. wool occupies parras. 6. kearny's fight at san pascual. 25. doniphan's skirmish at el brazito. 27. scott reaches brazos id. 29. victoria occupied. 1847 jan. 3. scott orders troops from taylor. 8. fight at the san gabriel, calif. 9. fight near los angeles, calif. 11. mexican law regarding church property. 28. santa anna's march against taylor begins. feb. 5. taylor places himself at agua nueva. 19. scott reaches tampico. 22-23. battle of buena vista. 27. insurrection at mexico begins. 28. battle of sacramento. mar. 9. scott lands near vera cruz. 29. vera cruz occupied. 30. operations in lower california opened. apr. 8. scott's advance from vera cruz begins. 18. battle of cerro gordo; tuxpán captured by perry. 19. jalapa occupied. may 15. worth enters puebla. june 6. trist opens negotiations through the british legation. 16. san juan bautista again taken. aug. 7. the advance from puebla begins. 20. battles of contreras and churubusco. aug. 24-sept. 7. armistice. sept. 8. battle of molino del rey. 13. battle of chapultepec; the "siege" of puebla begins. 14. mexico city occupied. 22. peña y peña assumes the presidency. oct. 9. fight at huamantla. 20. trist reopens negotiations. nov. 11. mazatlán occupied by shubrick. 1848 feb. 2. treaty of peace signed. mar. 4-5. armistice ratified. 10. treaty accepted by u. s. senate. may 19, 24. treaty accepted by mexican congress. 30. ratifications of the treaty exchanged. june 12. mexico city evacuated. july 4. treaty proclaimed by president polk. the pronunciation of spanish the niceties of the matter would be out of place here, but a few general rules may prove helpful. _a_ as in english "ah"; _e_, at the end of a syllable, like _a_ in "fame," otherwise like _e_ in "let"; _i_ like _i_ in "machine"; _o_, at the end of a syllable, like _o_ in "go," otherwise somewhat like _o_ in "lot"; _u_ like _u_ in "rude" (but, unless marked with two dots, silent between _g_ or _q_ and _e_ or _i_); _y_ like _ee_ in "feet." _c_ like _k_ (but, before _e_ and _i_, like [a]_th_ in "thin"); _ch_ as in "child"; _g_ as in "go" (but, before _e_ and _i_, like a harsh _h_); _h_ silent; _j_ like a harsh _h_; _ll_ like [b]_lli_ in "million"; _ñ_ like _ni_ in "onion"; _qu_ like _k_; _r_ is sounded with a vibration (trill) of the tip of the tongue (_rr_ a longer and more forcible sound of the same kind); _s_ as in "sun"; _x_ like _x_ in "box" (but, in "méxico" and a few other names, like spanish _j_); _z_ like [a]_th_ in "thin." words bearing no mark of accentuation are stressed on the last syllable if they end in any consonant except _n_ or _s_, but on the syllable next to the last if they end in _n_, _s_ or a vowel. [a] in mexico, however, usually like _s_ in "sun." [b] in mexico usually like _y_. [illustration: mexico in 1919] the war with mexico xxi behind the scenes at mexico september, 1846-march, 1847 the revolution of august 4, as already has been suggested, was a complex and inconsistent affair, combining most heterogeneous elements: the popular institutions of 1824 and the autocratic power of the soldier upheld with bayonets; the army and the people, whose relations had always been, and in mexico always had to be, those of wolf and lamb; the regular troops and the national guards, who loved each other as fire loves water; general salas reluctantly taking orders from citizen farías, and both of them doing obeisance to liberator santa anna, whom both distrusted; and all coöperating to revive a federal constitution, which had been found in practice unworkable, and needed, in the opinion of everybody, to be redrawn.[21.3] such a state of things argued insincerity; and in fact many had taken up the cry of federalism at this time simply because the failure of reactionary designs had made the word a popular appeal, and because--nearly all the former leaders of that school having been crushed by the centralists--there seemed to be room for new aspirants; while the state of things indicated also that more troubles were soon to arrive, since evidently no final solution of the political problem had been achieved, and such a welter of principles, traditions and methods was a loud invitation to the demagogue and the schemer. _don simplicio_ predicted that new stars were to flash out soon in the political heavens, and then disappear before the astronomers would have time to name them; and it added significantly, "the comets will be found to be all tails."[21.3] in particular the field was open for radical democracy. calm judgment is never listened to in a period of excitement, and the mexicans, like the french of 1792, instead of resorting to the practical anglo-saxon rule of compromising differences, believed in carrying principles to their logical end. centralism and monarchical ideas had failed to render the nation happy; democracy was therefore the panacea, and the more of it the better. the demoralized condition of the people promoted this dangerous policy. referring to all those concerned with public affairs, a thoughtful writer of the day characterized them as ignorant, destitute of honor, patriotism, morality, good faith or principles of any kind, and influenced exclusively by self-interest and ambition; and naturally men of the opposite kind held aloof in disgust and despair. for these reasons the conservative wing of the federalists, led by pedraza and known as the moderados (_moderates_), found itself distanced in the race for support; and the puros--that is to say, pure federalists and democrats--gained the ascendency at once.[21.3] their acknowledged leader, as we have seen, was the patriotic though indiscreet farías, but he was more honest than brilliant, and a man stepped forward now who reversed that description. this man was rejón. a keen, subtle mind, a bold, unfaltering will, a ready, plausible tongue and a tireless ambition quite indifferent about means, characterized him chiefly, and for the present crisis these were redoubtable qualifications. the spanish minister once remarked, after conversing with him, that it was impossible to trust a person who possessed no principles except the transient interests of his ambition. and rejón had another qualification that was no less important. though unworthy of confidence and everywhere distrusted, santa anna counted as an essential factor in all plans, a power that each party felt it must have; and rejón was believed at this time to represent santa anna.[21.3] [politics at mexico] the aims and to some extent the methods of the radical faction were borrowed from the united states, but without regard to differences of race, experience and present circumstances. government, they maintained, should be completely democratic and completely secular; and they dreamed of this consummation almost voluptuously, as a mussulman dreams of paradise. they held public meetings, where everybody was free to speak; and in these disorderly gatherings they discussed religious freedom, the seizure of church property, the reformation of the clergy, the secularization of marriage and education, the necessity of destroying military domination in politics, and the capital punishment of all suspected monarchists. in short, from the conservative point of view, they passed sentence of death on society. santa anna did not sympathize with their programme. he wished society to live--for him, and he was conducting now an equivocal correspondence with men hostile to the puros. but it probably suited his purpose to have them succeed for a time, and to have the substantial citizens add to their litany, "from rejón deliver us, good lord!" he himself had played the part of the lord before now, and was willing to do so again, though he preferred the more terrestrial name of dictator.[21.3] of course property felt the menace, and it had reason to do so. during the latter part of september, 1846, an editorial in the official journal, commonly attributed to rejón, intimated that if the rich did not contribute for the war, the people would know where to find their wealth; and even foreign houses were threatened. the british minister forced a prompt retraction of this language so far, at least, as his fellow-countrymen were concerned; but within two weeks a number of capitalists were invited to loan $200,000 with an intimation that, unless they did so, the money would be taken. every one understood that the leopard, though now comparatively silent, had not changed his spots and would not, and hence four élite militia corps, familiarly known as the polkos, were formed at mexico to protect life and property. one of these, called the victoria battalion, was composed of merchants, professional men and scions from wealthy families. another, which bore the name of hidalgo, consisted of clerks; and the bravos and independencia battalions, made up largely of artisans, represented the industrial interests of the city. the ministry, who desired to exclude such persons from the national guard, opposed the recognition of these corps; but, supported by salas, the substantial citizens carried the day.[21.3] an equally natural reaction caused by radical violence was political. in the hope of welding the federalists into a harmonious party, the council of government had been revived, and members of both wings had been appointed to it. santa anna, in order to establish his particular friend haro at the head of the treasury, next proposed to transfer farías from that office to the presidency of the council. this was understood--correctly, no doubt--as a move to eliminate him virtually from the government, and was fiercely denounced; but santa anna then remarked that should salas for any reason drop out, the president of the council would take his place at the head of the government, and pedraza could have the post in case farías preferred to remain as he was.[21.1] this put a new look on the matter, and the programme was carried out; but the puro attacks upon their rivals continued to excite bitter resentment. when it was arranged that farías and pedraza should publicly shake hands, and crowds gathered to witness the amazing ceremony, it failed to occur. the moderados belonging to the council resigned; the body ceased to enjoy prestige and influence; and farías lost all official power. naturally some of the blame for this result was laid to the charge of the pedrazists. partisan rancor grew still more savage. the fury of the french revolution was rivalled. "we must finish with our enemies or die ourselves," cried one factional organ; "the scaffold must be raised; we must drink their hearts' blood." bankhead described the situation as one of "universal terror and distrust."[21.3] about the middle of october there came an explosion. apparently rejón demanded that salas initiate the puro reforms, and the acting executive, who was not only weak and incompetent but obstinate, resented the pressure, and turned his face toward the moderados. to the puros this looked reactionary, and he was charged with a design to prevent congress from assembling. next it was required of salas that he should give way to farías as the representative of the new régime, and probably there were threats at least of bringing this change about, if necessary, through an insurrection of the populace.[21.2] then salas, with the hidalgo battalion of which he was the commander, took possession of the citadel. the people, alarmed by rumors that a sack was contemplated, flew to arms; and rejón found it necessary to moderate his tone.[21.3] [an explosion] when the executive, as was inevitable, dismissed him from office, he submitted; and santa anna himself, though his orders to rejón had been to hold the post whatever salas might do, found public sentiment at the capital too strong for him, and concluded to accept the change. rejón's conduct had excited so much dissension and alarm, that his removal gratified all sensible persons at mexico. the rumors and the disturbance were now attributed officially to agents of the united states, and comparative quiet returned.[21.3] the aims of santa anna and those of the puros may have been exactly contrary in these events; but both overshot the mark, and they suffered a common loss of prestige. as one method of restoring it, they induced the governors of san luis potosí and querétaro to declare that within their jurisdictions the liberator would be recognized as head of the nation until the assembling of congress; but their principal scheme was to carry the presidential election. congress, chosen on the first day of november, was to elect, and it consisted chiefly of men termed by well-to-do citizens "the dregs of society"--that is to say, poorly educated radicals taken from the masses.[21.3] this appeared to ensure a puro triumph, yet there were serious difficulties. rejón had been discredited, and the former administration of farías had left painful memories. besides, it was feared that his election would offend santa anna, who of course was not on very cordial terms now with the tribune of the people, and preferred to have a weak man like salas, with whom satisfactory relations had grown out of the rejón episode, continue in power. at one time almonte seemed to be the puro favorite; but finally it was decided to cast the presidential vote for santa anna, who could not legally hold the chief political and the chief military offices at the same time and would no doubt remain with the army, and to elect farías to the vice presidency as the actual executive.[21.3] even this combination, however, met with strong and unexpected opposition. the conservatives and moderates were naturally against it; certain states--for the voting was done by these quasi sovereignties as units--could not forgive santa anna for past misdeeds, and the powerful church party looked upon farías as antichrist. finally escudero of chihuahua, whose delegation held the balance of power, opened negotiations with farías, and that gentleman declared in writing his willingness to "join loyally" with any one who desired "in good faith the welfare of the country." holding this instrument--a weapon, should there be need of it--in their hands, a number of the moderados, who realized his honesty, vigor and good intentions, and believed now that he would give them a share in the administration, accepted the puro candidates, and on december 22 by a narrow majority these were elected. the news produced a commotion; but without encountering serious opposition farías took up the reins of government at once.[21.3] his primary aim was to support the war. this he intended to do because he felt an ardent patriotism, but other reasons also lay in his mind. abominating the military class, he desired to have as many as possible of the corrupt officers left on the field, and he designed to keep the army so busy, that it would not be able to prevent the states, which were generally federalist and democratic in sentiment, from organizing their strength, and making sure that no tyrannical central power would ever raise its front again. but the first requirement for military operations was money. farías had, therefore, to take up immediately the financial problem, and he found it most difficult.[21.3] of all the fields of mexican misgovernment the worst had been the treasury, for it not only required a care and a good judgment that were peculiarly foreign to the national temperament, but provided opportunities for illegitimate gains that were most congenial. during spanish rule the needs of the country had been fully met, and about nine millions a year, almost half of the revenues, left as a surplus. under itúrbide a financial system which three centuries of able administration had built up was despised, and with mines abandoned, agriculture discouraged, commerce paralyzed, honesty relaxed, taxes diminished for the sake of popularity, and expenses increased for the sake of glory, the foundations of ruin were promptly laid. the logical superstructure soon mounted high in the shape of two british loans, which bound mexico to pay about twenty-six million dollars in return for about fifteen, a large part of which was practically thrown away by her agents.[21.5] [financial difficulties] the expulsion of the rich and thrifty spaniards, the costs of civil wars, in which the nation paid for both sides, unwise and unstable fiscal systems, borrowing at such rates as four per cent a month, incredibly bad management,[21.4] and methods of accounting that made it impossible for the minister of the treasury to know the actual state of things, were enough to complete the edifice; but they were supplemented with peculation, embezzlement, multiplication of offices, collusion between importers and customhouses, and systematic smuggling winked at by half-starved officials. revenue after revenue was mortgaged, and by 1845 the government found itself entitled to only about thirteen per cent of what entered the treasury.[21.5] since the beginning of hostilities our blockade, assisted by new methods of wholesale smuggling, had greatly reduced the income from duties, which had always been the principal reliance; the adoption of the federal system had given the best part of the internal revenue to the states; and the residue was almost wholly eaten up by the officials. the foreign debt amounted now to more than fifty millions and the domestic debt was nearly twice as great. every known source of income had been anticipated. freewill offerings had proved illusory. by ceasing to make payments on account of the debt in may, 1846, the government had largely increased its income, of course, but it had forfeited all title to financial sympathy; and the high officials, who robbed the treasury still in this time of supreme distress, had stripped it of all title to respect.[21.5] the government, therefore, had no real credit. men who made this kind of gambling their business would now and then furnish a little money for a brief term at an exorbitant rate. in february, 1846, for example, a loan was placed at a total sacrifice of about thirty-seven per cent. but when the treasury was authorized to borrow fifteen millions in a regular way, nobody cared to furnish any part of the sum. new taxes were equally vain. in october, 1846, the government imposed a special war "contribution" in order to save the mexicans, it explained, from becoming foreigners in their own country, like the spaniards of florida; and the chief result was to enrage a handful of persons, who found they had been silly enough to pay while almost everybody else had laughed. in november a forced loan was demanded of the clergy, but the project aroused such opposition that substantially it had to be given up. the whole gamut of methods, even violence, has been tried in vain, said the ministry in december. business was dead, confidence gone, capital in hiding or sojourning abroad; and if by good luck a bag of silver dropped into the treasury, it seemed to evaporate instantly. financially, reported the spanish minister, the situation of the country was "truly frightful."[21.5] to make it more, not less, frightful, there did exist one vast accumulation of riches. this was the property belonging to the church. no one could seriously deny that the nation had authority to use, in a time of dire need, funds that had been given to the organization in days of plenty, for this was a principle of spanish law, and the crown had exercised the right without so good an excuse. there was also a particular reason in the present instance, for the wealth of the church, aside from articles used in worship, consisted mainly of land, and, as virtually no land tax existed in mexico, it was escaping the common burden--a burden, too, that was peculiarly for its advantage, since in the case of american conquest it was bound to lose its exclusive privileges. besides, there was the saying of its founder, "freely ye have received, freely give."[21.5] [the policy of farías] very naturally, then, people had been casting their eyes for some time at the riches of the church. in june, 1844, _el siglo xix_, the most thoughtful newspaper of mexico, had suggested raising funds for the texas war by mortgaging some of its property; and a few months later duff green, then on the ground, had expressed the opinion that mexico would have to choose between that resource and forced loans. in july, 1845, the correspondent of the london _times_ dropped a similar hint in that journal, and in the course of the year it became a popular idea, that the church could perform a great public service, and at the same time vastly strengthen its own position, by providing means for the anticipated war against the united states. in october, 1846, the _monitor republicano_ suggested once more a mortgage of ecclesiastical property; and at one time the government actually decided upon the measure. bankhead admitted that he could see no other resource. these hints were not, however, acted upon by the clergy; and after many long discussions they would only agree to advance $10,000 or $20,000 a month for a limited period. this was to insult the nation, exclaimed the _monitor republicano_.[21.5] charged now with full responsibility, farías met the issue squarely. not only was he determined to carry on the war, but the letters of santa anna had been, and were, most urgent. november 7 the general demanded that "no step" should be neglected, if it could "help to prevent the name of mexican from soon becoming the object of ridicule and contempt for the whole world." "do not reply that the government cannot obtain funds," he wrote later; "this would be saying that the nation has ceased to exist ... so rich a nation cannot lack money enough to support its independence, nor can the government say that it has no authority to look for the money." these letters evidently referred to ecclesiastical property, and they were followed up at new year's with almost daily communications of the same tenor. such fearful urgency had a good excuse, for the government was now sending him no funds.[21.6] it had none. although farías kept faith with escudero, the moderados as a party showed the radical chief no mercy; the centralists loathed the apostle of federalism; all conservatives detested the typical democrat, and the clericals abominated the extinguisher of titles. all the old ladies thought him worse than luther, and many of every kind and condition rebelled at his brusque and tactless ways. no person of substance would lift a finger to support his measures. a cloud of distrust, passion, hostility and mortal hatred--mostly an emanation from the whole wretched past of the country--grew thicker about him each day. raise money he could not. moreover he probably felt little desire to do so by any of the ordinary methods. one of his cardinal principles was the necessity of destroying the fuero, the political strength and the intellectual domination of the church by reducing its wealth; and now the demand of santa anna, the army and the nation that funds be provided for the war, appeared to make this policy opportune and even irresistible.[21.6] a committee of congress reported against the plan of borrowing on the security of church property; but that signified little, for no practical substitute was offered. there were fears that the army would break up. there were fears that for self-protection it would proclaim a dictatorship or march upon the capital. santa anna's warning and threatening communications were shown to congress. the legislators tried to evade the issue, but they were told that all the responsibility rested upon their shoulders; that it was for them to choose between the salvation and the ruin of the fatherland; and on january 7 they grappled with the problem. behind them--tireless, uncompromising, inexorable--the executive insisted upon action; and behind him stood santa anna, demanding the same thing and promising to support it.[21.9] the session lasted virtually until january 11. the debates were hot, and they were bitter. to make use of the church lands, it was argued, would invade the rights of property, lay upon one class of society the general burden, and, should the lands be sold, involve a tremendous loss of values, since there was little ready money in the country, and few would have the means and inclination to purchase. the country must be saved, answered rejón, juárez and their allies; is there any other resource?--point it out. "if the yankee triumphs," cried one speaker, "what ecclesiastical property or what religion will be left us?" and upon these principal themes were played an infinite number of variations in all the possible tones of mexican eloquence and fury.[21.9] just before midnight on the ninth, however, the turmoil ceased; the handsome chamber of the deputies became still. high above the throne in front glimmered pallidly the sword of itúrbide; in letters of gold, on the semi-circular wall at the rear, all the names of the beneméritos of mexico reflected the subdued light; shadows filled the galleries; exhausted members half-slumbered in their chairs, and others talked wearily here and there in groups; but the stillness was momentous, for the first article of a new law had been passed, authorizing the executive to raise fifteen millions, for the purposes of the war, by pledging--if necessary, even selling--property vested in the church.[21.7] minor discussions followed. the religious, charitable and educational work of the clergy was guarded completely; many provisions designed to hamper the realization of the main purpose were accepted in order to conciliate opposition; and at length, on january 11, the plan became law.[21.9] [a crisis at mexico] "the crisis is terrible," wrote the minister of relations two days later, and well he might. all the fierceness and intrigues of partisan politics, all the cunning of high and low finance, all the subtleties of priestcraft and all the terrors of a haughty church came into play.[21.8] freely we have received, but we will not give, and anathema to him who takes, was in effect the dictum of the prelates. for a time it looked as if no official would venture, at the peril of excommunication, to promulgate the law; but farías and juárez found a man, and he was appointed governor of the federal district, in which lay the capital, for that purpose. then came protests from the "venerable" clergy, complaints from state governments, mutinies of troops, and civilian insurrections organized by priests. cries of "_viva la religión!_ death to the government!" resounded in the streets of the capital. ministers of state were hard to find, and they soon went out of office. minor officials resigned so rapidly they could hardly be counted. santa anna, after hailing the law as the salvation of the country, turned against it. moderados in congress, encouraged by the outcry, hurled epithets harder than stones at the puros.[21.9] on the other hand some of the deputies, the regular troops at the capital, who expected to profit by the law, the comandante general of mexico, the national guards and the democratic masses rallied to the support of the government; and farías, his long head erect, and his face, always thoughtful and sad, now anxious but set, appealed to the patriotism of the nation, made the most of his authority as chief of the state, and held to his course with inflexible energy and courage. not only was he determined to have the law respected, but he demanded that it should be made effective. chaos was the result. "when we look for a ray of hope," said _el republicano_, "we discover nothing but alarms, anxieties and every probability of social dissolution." "furious anarchy," was haro's description of the scene. there must soon be a crash, he added; "the devil is running away with us."[21.9] peaceful interests were not, however, entirely forgotten amid this turbulence. during the second week of january moses y. beach, proprietor and editor of the new york _sun_, arrived at vera cruz from havana. he carried a british passport. besides his wife mrs. storms, a remarkably clever newspaper woman, accompanied him. presumably she was to play the part of secretary, for beach had large financial enterprises in mind, and confidential clerical assistance would certainly be necessary. for some reason letters were written from cuba to santa anna and the authorities at vera cruz denouncing him as an american agent; and the party had to go through with a tedious examination of three days, for the comandante general had been expressly ordered to watch all suspicious foreigners hailing from the united states. but the ordeal was passed satisfactorily, and on the twenty-third or twenty-fourth of january beach arrived at the capital. letters from roman catholic prelates of the united states and cuba gave him a confidential standing at once in the highest church circles; his project of a canal across the isthmus of tehuantepec excited the lively interest of santa anna's particular friends; and his plan for a national bank brought him into friendly relations with farías and the other puro leaders.[21.10] still, the presence of this agent of civilization did not restore tranquillity. on february 4 the government contrived by shrewd management to put a law through congress, which in effect gave it autocratic power to raise five millions, and thus cut through the complications and restrictions that had rendered the action of january 11 substantially inoperative. the wrath of the church blazed afresh. at all hazards antichrist must be put down. already they had concluded to supply santa anna with money, in return of course for his aid against farías, and now they opened negotiations with the moderados. this party, however, thought it would be good tactics to divide the puros by supporting farías, provided he would let them control his policy, and they so proposed; but the impracticable fellow, who was battling for principles and not place, declined the offer. finally the puros themselves, realizing that all the other factions were against their chief, decided that under his leadership they could not succeed, and resolved to throw him overboard.[21.11] [insurrection at mexico] while they were casting about for a method, a certain person advised the clericals to offer an organized resistance against the laws of january 11 and february 4, and circumstances made that course easy. general peña y barragán, suspected of conspiring against the government, was placed under temporary arrest, and this made him eager to head a revolution. farías, understanding that the independencia battalion could not be trusted, ordered it to vera cruz, imagining that it would not refuse to march against the enemy. but on various more or less valid pretexts it did so; the other three élite battalions joined with it; and on february 27 they declared that farías and congress, having lost the confidence of the nation, had forfeited their authority, demanding at the same time the annulment of the "anti-religious" laws.[21.12] amidst the ringing of bells and burning of gunpowder, the city echoed with the cries, "death to gómez farías! death to the puros!" cannon were soon at the street corners, and the usual scenes of a mexican insurrection, fatal chiefly to peaceful residents, were presently on exhibition. the clergy, there is ample reason to believe, paid the costs, and priests left the confessionals to herald this new crusade in the streets.[21.13] after about nine days of indecisive skirmishing, however, the clericals felt discouraged. the nation had not rallied to their cause as they had expected. the sum of $40,000 was required for the next week of fighting, and they hesitated. but again a certain person urged them on. the awkwardly drawn plan was reduced to one article--farías must be deposed. on that almost all could agree. monarchists, centralists, santannistas, clericals, moderados, puros were for once in happy unison. salas reappeared with some troops to take revenge on his old enemy. and yet with epic heroism farías, never faltering and never compromising either his official dignity or his personal character, held firmly on with his few soldiers and such of the populace as he could arm. again the battle raged, and again the innocent fell. but who was it that directed this tempest? who was the mysterious person, overwhelming the government of mexico with darkness and confusion at this critical hour? he was moses y. beach, agent of the american state department and adviser to the mexican hierarchy. permission had been given him to bring about peace, if he could; and, unable to do this, he seized the opportunity to help scott.[21.13] the time had now arrived for the saviour of society to appear, since all rational persons were desperately tired of the vain struggle; and peña y barragán wrote to santa anna, begging him to take possession of the presidential chair. congress did nothing, for many deputies--fearing that it might act in a manner contrary to their sentiments--remained away from the chamber, and a quorum could not be assembled; but when pedraza was arrested by the government, a large group of moderado members, feeling that santa anna's "victory" at buena vista had confirmed his power, addressed him to the same effect as peña; and the liberator, giving his best corps barely four days of repose, and explaining his departure from the north as one more sacrifice on the altar of his country, set out with a substantial body of troops for mexico.[21.14] along his route women made wreaths and threw them before his feet. men of every faction acclaimed him; and from querétaro to the capital the road was filled with carriages, in which all sorts of persons desiring to reach his ear strove to outdo one another in despatch.[21.20] on the first news of the insurrection santa anna's impression had been that its ulterior aim was hostile to him,[21.15] for his partisans at the capital supported the government; and, as a puro envoy confirmed this impression, he promised farías military aid; but then appeared moderado agents with strong assurances and probably with stronger financial arguments, and he went over, though not openly, to their side of the controversy. both parties were ordered by him to discontinue hostilities, and both did so at once; for, as the clergy had now shut their strong boxes, the insurgent officers were anxious to reëstablish a connection with the national treasury, while the regulars of farías would not disobey santa anna. after the president's arrival at guadalupe hidalgo a _te deum_ was celebrated there in honor of his triumph over the americans; and the next day, march 23, amidst real demonstrations of joy, he formally superseded farías, while a certain person[21.16]--diligently but vainly sought after by the police--was hastily making his way through the mountains in the direction of tampico.[21.20] [santa anna triumphant] apparently santa anna had experienced the luckiest of turns. precisely when the americans had shattered his plans, and he found himself buried in the northern deserts with a broken, starving army,[21.17] this insurrection gave him a splendid occasion for making a triumphal march to the capital amid plaudits of gratitude and admiration, and he now found himself at the summit of prestige and power.[21.18] in reality, however, his situation was by no means entirely satisfactory. understanding that the puros--who in reality had served him with substantial good faith and therefore stood highest in his present sympathy--had lost their dominant position, he allied himself with their opponents; but the moderados disliked and distrusted him still, and he received at least one distinct notice that by taking their side he was placing himself gratuitously in the hands of his enemies. the puros did not feel extremely grateful to him for merely avoiding an open break with them; and, although it seemed wise to join in the acclamations lest some worse thing befall them, they were already sharpening their arrows against him. indeed, they were believed to be sharpening their daggers, and he took full precautions. the clergy had trembled and recoiled on hearing that his arms had triumphed against the americans, and the saviour of society now appeared to lean toward them--or toward their strong boxes; but they knew him well enough to foresee, as they soon realized, that he intended to extort ample compensation for all the favor shown them.[21.20] such was the inner state of things, and the external course of events proved not less interesting. the effect of the insurrection upon the progress of the war, as we shall presently see, was notable, and in substance it produced a counter-revolution in domestic politics. as farías was no more willing to resign than to compromise, some disposition of him seemed necessary, for santa anna would evidently have to take the field again shortly, and it would not have been expedient, whatever the rights of the case, to let the executive power fall back into his control. it was therefore decided to abolish the vice presidency; and in this way fell on april fool's day the noblest but most unpopular man in the country.[21.19] at the positive dictation of santa anna general p. m. anaya, a moderado, was then elected substitute president, while the raging puros raged in vain. the clergy succeeded, by offering two millions of real money, in persuading santa anna to annul the laws of january 11 and february 4; but the day before he did this, church property worth twenty millions was placed by congress--theoretically, at least--within the reach of the government.[21.20] not many weeks before this, _don simplicio_ had announced, "there will be presented an original tragi-comedy entitled 'all is a farce in our beloved mexico,'" and now j. f. ramírez, who had been minister of relations when the hated law passed, exclaimed in bitterness of heart: all of us, without an exception, have been acting in a way to deserve the contempt and chastisement of cultivated nations; "we are nothing, absolutely nothing, with the aggravating circumstance that our insensate vanity makes us believe that we are everything."[21.20] xxii vera cruz february-march, 1847 on the twenty-first of february, general scott, who had sailed from tampico in a storm the day before, observed in the distance what seemed to be greenish bubbles floating on the sea. these were the lobos islands, and presently he found there on transports the first and second pennsylvania, the south carolina, and parts of the louisiana, mississippi and new york regiments of new volunteers. within a week many more troops, including nearly all the regulars of the expedition, arrived from tampico or the brazos, and the natural break-water that protected the anchorage--a sandy coral island of about one hundred acres, fringed with surf, covered with bushes and small trees woven together with vines, and scented by the blossoms of wild oranges, lemons and limes--veiled itself behind the spars and cordage of nearly a hundred vessels.[22.3] judicious measures prevented the smallpox from spreading. drilling began; and the drum, fife and bugle aroused a fighting spirit, while visiting, social jollity and military discussion tended to create an army solidarity. in the evening bands played martial airs, and the watch fires on the coast gave an additional sharpness to the ardor of the soldiers. meanwhile the general, who still expected vigorous opposition to his landing, waited impatiently for more surf-boats and heavy ordnance, looked anxiously for the ten large transports[22.1] in ballast requisitioned by him in november, elaborated his plans for disembarking, and issued the corresponding orders.[22.3] the next rendezvous was to be off antón lizardo, about a dozen miles beyond vera cruz and some two hundred more from the lobos anchorage, where islands, reefs and the shore of the mainland combined to form a deep and capacious harbor; and about noon on the second of march the steamer _massachusetts_ plowed through the fleet, dashing the spray from her bows, and set off in that direction. a blue flag with a red centre waving at her main-truck indicated that scott was aboard, and when the noble figure of the commander-in-chief, standing with uncovered head on the deck, was observed, peal after peal of cheers resounded from ship to ship. the clanking of anchor chains followed them; the sailors broke into their hearty songs; the sails filled gracefully; and the fleet stood away.[22.3] for two days its progress was not fast, but then a norther set in. like a panorama, peak after peak on the lofty sky line passed rapidly astern; and finally orizaba, the "mountain of the star," upreared its head superbly more than three miles above sea level not far inland. then came green island, where the _albany_ and _potomac_ were on hand to give any needful assistance,[22.2] and the _john adams_ showed her black teeth to lurking blockade-runners; while in the distance the frowning bastions of ulúa "castle" could be made out, and the sixteen domes of vera cruz appeared to be promenading along her white wall. pitching and rolling on the huge billows of inky water, with foam leaping high over their bows, the transports threaded their way swiftly between the tumbling and roaring piles of surf that marked the reefs, and finally, on march 5, the swallow-tail pennant of commodore conner and the flags of the american squadron were seen off antón lizardo. cheers followed cheers as the transports dropped anchor one after another; and when the sun went down in a blaze of glory behind orizaba, the spirits of the men, stimulated by so many novel, beautiful and thrilling scenes, by the approach of combat and the expectation of triumph, reached the very culmination of military enthusiasm. it was a good beginning--except that scott arrived a month late, and the yellow fever usually came on time.[22.3] [vera cruz] "heroic" vera cruz, the city of the "true cross," was in form an irregular hexagon, with a perimeter some two miles in length, closely packed with rather high buildings of soft, white-washed masonry. although famous as the charnel house of europeans, it was a rather pleasant place for those who could endure the climate. the little alameda, across which many a dandy strutted every day in tight linen trousers, a close blue jacket, gilt buttons and a red sash, and many a pretty woman tottered coquettishly in pink slippers, was charming. the curtained balconies gave one a hint now and then of ladies making their toilets and smoking their cigarettes just within; and the flat roofs, equipped with observatories commanding the sea, were delightful resorts in the cool of the day. along the water front extended a massive wall, supplemented at the northern end with fort concepción, at the southern end with fort santiago--both of them solidly built--and, between the two, with a mole of granite some two hundred yards in length. landward the defences were feeble, for it had long been assumed that any serious attack would be made by water; but there were nine well-constructed, though in most cases not large, bastions, and between them dilapidated curtains of stone, brick and cement about fifteen feet high and two and a half or three feet thick.[22.9] behind the town extended a plain rather more than half a mile wide; and beyond that rose hills of light sand--enlarged editions of the dunes that ran along the shore north and south of vera cruz--which gradually increased in height until some of them, two or three miles inland, reached an elevation of perhaps three hundred feet. then came dense forests, cut here and there by a road and occasionally diversified with oases of cultivated land, richly scented by tropical fruits and flowers. to the southwest of the city lay a series of ponds and marshes, drained by a small stream that passed near the wall; and this creek, supplemented by cisterns and an underground aqueduct, provided the town with water. in the opposite direction, on a reef named the gallega--distant nearly three quarters of a mile from fort concepción--rose the fortress of ulúa, built of soft coral stone, faced with granite, in the most scientific manner, and large enough to accommodate 2500 men.[22.4] water batteries lay wherever it seemed possible to effect a landing, and tremendous walls, enfeebled by no casemates, towered to a height of about sixty feet.[22.9] at the beginning of march, 1846, mora y villamil, the highest engineer officer in the mexican army and at this time comandante general of vera cruz, feared that on account of slidell's departure the americans might suddenly attack him. aided by lieutenant colonel manuel robles, a skilful and active subordinate, he drew up detailed plans for repairing the crumbling fortifications of the city and castle, and these were approved by the government; but the lack of money prevented the full execution of them. in october the captain of a british frigate warned the new comandante general that an american attack was imminent; and at about the same time santa anna, while bitterly reproaching the government for its neglect of the town and pointing out what needed to be done, charged him to make the "strong buildings" a second and a third line of defence in case of attack, and then perish, if necessary, under the ruins of the city; but again the want of funds vetoed adequate preparations. on the other hand, unpaid soldiers paid themselves by stealing powder and selling it.[22.9] about the middle of november it was learned at mexico from a new orleans newspaper that an expedition against vera cruz had been projected, and within two months the news was confirmed. santa anna heard of it, and wrote that 6000 militia should be assembled there. he was told in reply that his demand would be met early in february; and assurances were given to congress that everything requisite had been done.[22.5] by the fourth of march the comandante general, to whom the information had been transmitted, was inditing urgent appeals for help, and soon the appearance of scott showed that a crisis had arrived. in reliance on the promises of the general government, hopeful and incessant work on the fortifications now began; but within four days letters from the war department, conferring unlimited powers upon the commander, admitted that on account of the polko insurrection at the capital no assistance could be given, and many of the people not only left the city, but endeavored to draw their friends and relatives from the national guards.[22.9] in point of fact military men had long known that vera cruz, as a fortified town standing by itself, was indefensible. general mora admitted that it needed stronger exterior works than could be constructed; and there was no squadron to keep ulúa supplied with provisions. the proper course for the comandante general was either to strip the city of whatever scott could use, and merely endeavor to prevent him from advancing farther, as was privately argued by leading members of congress, or--for the moral effect of such an example--to send all non-combatants away, and struggle until crushed; but neither public sentiment nor the government would have permitted the first of these plans, and, while the comandante had the second in mind on the fifth of march, it was too heroic for execution.[22.9] [illustration: san juan de ulúa] [a fighting chance] besides, there seemed to be a fighting chance. ulúa was much stronger than when the french, aided by fortune, had captured it, and the anchorage occupied by them could now be shelled. some of the guns had been improperly mounted; some of the carriages were old; at some of the embrasures balls of different calibres were mixed; pieces without projectiles could be found, and projectiles without pieces; rust had impaired the fit of many balls; but the city and the fortress together had probably three hundred serviceable cannon and mortars,[22.6] more muskets than men, and plenty of ammunition. as an assault was expected, the streets were defended with cannon and barricades, sand-bags protected the doors and windows, loopholes without number were made in the wall, the rather shallow but wet ditch was cleared, and although barbed cactus made the approach of an enemy to the bastions almost impossible, thousands of pitfalls--each with a sword, bayonet or short pike set erect at the bottom--were dug beyond the wall, so arranged that no one marching straight forward could well avoid them.[22.9] juan soto, the governor of the state, was indefatigable, and as the state militia numbered about 20,000, it seemed reasonable to count upon succor. giffard, the british consul, expected that substantial help would come from that source. other states were likely to furnish aid; and the people, taught by the long inaction of the americans off the shore to despise them and encouraged by fictitious reports that assistance would be rendered by the national government, felt united and enthusiastic.[22.7] the city council offered all its resources, and the well-to-do raised funds for a hospital by giving a theatrical performance. the garrison, led by the brave, active and popular though not very able morales, now comandante general, may be estimated as at least 1200 in ulúa and 3800 in the city.[22.8] about half of them were merely national guards; but these, decorated with tricolored cockades and red pompons, looked and felt extremely dangerous. "as god lives," cried one of their leaders, "either we will triumph, or all of us, without a solitary exception, will be interred in the ruins." the civilians remaining in town may have numbered 3000.[22.9] bearing in mind the necessity, not merely of taking vera cruz and ulúa, but of getting his army away from the coast before the advent of yellow fever, and satisfied that polk would show him no mercy in case of ill-success, general scott examined his problem with all possible care, and consulted freely the officers he particularly trusted.[22.10] he could not very prudently have left, say, 5000 men to mask or possibly reduce vera cruz, as some critics insisted he should have done, and advanced with the rest, for the essential purpose of his expedition was to capture that place, and such a course might have been viewed by the government as insubordinate. besides, that policy would probably have been regarded by the mexicans as a sign of weakness; the possession of the harbor and shipping facilities would evidently aid all further operations; by holding them it would be possible to deprive the enemy of war supplies and other necessaries; the arms, ammunition and cannon of the mexicans were highly valuable, especially to them; and the american army would not have been an adequate aggressive force after thus detaching nearly half its numbers. the obstacle before scott had, therefore, to be faced and overcome.[22.13] the best method, evidently, was to reduce the town before seriously attacking ulúa, because that success would greatly diminish the enemy's fire, make it possible to contract and so strengthen the american line, and somewhat facilitate the transportation of supplies. such had been the general's plan from the first. officers eager for distinction recommended an assault, and scott well knew that a quick, brilliant stroke would best win him fame and popularity.[22.11] but he understood equally well that an assault, necessarily made at night, would entail a heavy loss of his best men--enough, perhaps, to prevent his advancing farther and escaping the pestilence--besides involving a great slaughter of both combatants and non-combatants in the town. on the other hand, as the british consul and the british naval commander agreed, there was not enough time before the yellow fever season to warrant relying upon starvation alone.[22.12] siege and bombardment were therefore indicated, and scott promptly decided upon that plan as combining, better than any other, humanity with effectiveness.[22.13] [the debarkation] the initial step was to select a point for debarking; and conner, whom scott had requested in december to study this problem, had already fixed upon the beach of mocambo bay, two and a half or three miles southeast of vera cruz, which was somewhat sheltered from northers and could be swept by the guns of the fleet. sacrificios island, a strip of sand representing a large reef, was just off shore, too, forming an anchorage here. accordingly scott, with conner, the principal generals, robert e. lee, p. g. t. beauregard and other officers, went up in the little steamer _petrita_, reconnoitred the spot, and then--probably to deceive the mexicans regarding his intentions--ran within a mile and a half of ulúa, where he was almost sunk by the gunners.[22.14] his judgment agreed with the commodore's, and orders were given to land on the eighth. but when that morning came, signs of a norther showed themselves. the glass fell. the heat became stifling. a southerly wind loaded with moisture blew, and the summit of orizaba, clad in the azure hue of the poet, stood sharply forth; hence the orders were countermanded.[22.17] [illustration: siege of vera cruz general plan] the signs failed, however, and the extra day was available for the last preparations. a detailed plan of debarkation had been drawn up and announced while the army was at lobos islands, but certain difficulties had not been anticipated. the ten large transports in ballast had not come, and to land from a great number of small vessels at sacrificios, where there was little room and foreign warships occupied all the safe anchorage, appeared imprudent. conner, therefore, offered to transport the army on larger, better and more ably handled vessels belonging to the squadron, and scott's wise acceptance of the proposal involved extensive readjustments.[22.17] these, however, were skilfully arranged, and when the dawn of march 9 announced a perfect day, a scene of the greatest activity began. signals fluttered to mastheads. in clarion tones officers issued their orders. despatch boats dashed here and there. sailors and soldiers roared their favorite airs. fully half of the 10,000 and more troops were placed on the frigates _raritan_ and _potomac_, and most of the others on smaller vessels of the squadron. at about eleven o'clock the order to sail was given. amid thunderous cheers the _massachusetts_ plunged through the fleet, and took its place in the lead with conner's flagship. a gentle breeze from the southeast filled the sails; and the war vessels and transports were off. after a smooth voyage they began to arrive near sacrificios at about one o'clock, and in close quarters, but without mishaps or even the least confusion, each dropped anchor in its allotted space.[22.15] the yards and rigging of the foreign war vessels were black with men, and ladies, armed with glasses and parasols, gazed impatiently from the deck of the british packet.[22.17] without the loss of a moment three signal flags rose to the main-truck of the _massachusetts_, and the work of landing worth's brigade of regulars began. the double-shotted cannon of the squadron were brought to bear on the shore. seven gunboats drawing eight feet or less formed a line within good grape range of the beach, and cleared for action. about sixty-five surf-boats, which had been towed from antón lizardo by steamers, were rowed by naval crews to the vessels carrying troops--each having a definite assignment--and after receiving from fifty to eighty soldiers apiece, making up the whole of the brigade, attached themselves in two long lines to the quarters of the steamer _princeton_, which had now anchored about 450 yards from the shore. this process consumed several hours, and it was hardly ended when a shell whizzed over them. "now we shall catch it," thought the soldiers, for rumors of opposition had been heard, two or three hundred cavalry could be seen, and artillery was supposed to be lurking behind the dunes.[22.17] the flash of a signal gun shot now from the _massachusetts_; the surf-boats cut loose, faced the shore abreast in the order of battle, and struck out for land; and a cheer burst from every american throat. great orizaba cast aside its veil of haze, and stood out against the setting sun. not a cloud flecked the sky; not a ripple marred the burnished water. ulúa and vera cruz thundered loudly, though in vain. national airs rolled from our squadron. shells from the gunboats broke up the mexican cavalry and searched the dunes. the oars of the straining sailors flashed. muskets--not loaded but with fixed bayonets--glittered. regimental colors floated at the stern of each boat. suddenly one of the boats darted ahead and grounded on a bar about a hundred yards from the shore. out leaped worth; his officers followed him; and the whole brigade were instantly in the breaking ground-swell, holding aloft their muskets and cartridge-boxes.[22.17] here was the chance of the enemy, for our vessels could not fire without endangering americans; but no enemy was to be seen.[22.16] led by their color-bearers the regulars quickly splashed ashore, formed in a moment, charged to the crest of the first dune, planted their standards and burst into cheers; the men on the ships, tongue-tied for some time by an excitement and anxiety that made their brains reel, answered with huzza after huzza till they made the bay "seem peopled with victorious armies," wrote one of the soldiers, and the strains of "star-spangled banner" broke from the bands. less formally, but rapidly and in order, the boats went back for the troops of patterson and twiggs; and by midnight, without having met with a single accident, more than 10,000 men, duly guarded by sentries, were eating their biscuit and pork on the sand or preparing to bivouac.[22.17] [vera cruz invested] during the night mexicans in the rear did some shooting but without effect, and the process of investment began. diverting attention from this by having a gunboat, sheltered about a mile from the city behind point hornos, throw shot and shell into vera cruz for a couple of hours the next forenoon, scott had pillow's brigade capture the hill of malibrán behind worth's camp, and push on toward the rear of the city. quitman then passed it; shields passed quitman, and twiggs passed him. wallowing up and down the slopes of deep sand in a sultry heat without water to drink proved to be extremely hard work; and breaking through the valleys, where a matted growth of chaparral--armed with thorns as keen as needles and stiff as bayonets--resisted everything but sharp steel, was harder yet. day and night mexican irregulars, both infantry and horse, and cannon salutes from the city and the castle embarrassed operations, and there were many brisk skirmishes. moreover the landing had scarcely been made when a norther set in, covering the men with sand, blowing away old hilltops and building up new ones. but not long after noon on march 13 twiggs reached the gulf north of the city. the next morning a well-supported detachment from each brigade advanced as far as it could find cover, driving the mexican outposts before it; and by night these detachments were only about seven hundred yards from the town.[22.21] the american position as a whole, known as camp washington, was now a semi-circular line about seven miles long. there were gaps, but these were rapidly closed with strong pickets. the railway and the roads were all occupied; the visible water supply of the city was cut off; and on march 16 scott announced that nothing less than a small army could break through. meantime, whenever the weather permitted, artillery, stores, horses and provisions were landed in the most systematic manner. safeguards were issued to the representatives of foreign powers at vera cruz, and in a letter of march 13 to the spanish consul[22.18] scott indicated plainly that "bombardment or cannonade, or assault, or all" of these might be expected by the citizens.[22.21] the time to plant artillery had now arrived, and the ideal spot was found on the sixteenth; but after a battery had been laid out there, access to it proved to be dangerously exposed. two days later, however, a fairly good point was discovered, near the cemetery and worth's position, about half a mile south of the town, which screened it somewhat from the castle; and preparations to establish two mortar batteries there, about one hundred yards apart, began the following night. at the same time a deep road, wide enough to admit a six-mule team, was under construction.[22.21] [illustration: siege of vera cruz american batteries] most of this labor had to be done at night, and the utmost possible silence observed. as the transports lay a mile off shore, while the only wharf was an open beach, and a norther blew violently from the twelfth to the sixteenth, the work of landing ordnance and ordnance stores proceeded slowly. fortunately the work on the batteries was not discovered; but the fire of paixhan guns and heavy mortars from the city and castle, though irregular and singularly unfruitful despite the undeniable skill of the gunners,[22.19] compelled the americans to adopt extreme precautions. nor were these embarrassments the only ones. notwithstanding seasonable orders, only fifteen carts and about a hundred draught horses had arrived. not more than one fifth of the ordnance requisitioned by scott about the middle of november and due at the brazos--he now reminded marcy--by january 15, had yet appeared. a great many artillery and cavalry horses had been drowned, injured or delayed; and there was a shortage of almost every requisite for siege operations.[22.20] but the army and the navy coöperated zealously; soldiers took the places of draught animals; and in spite of every difficulty three batteries, mounting seven 10-inch mortars, were in readiness by two o'clock on the afternoon of the twenty-second, and the soldiers felt eager to hear what they called the "sweet music" of these "faithful bull-dogs."[22.21] [the bombardment] at this hour, therefore, scott formally summoned the town, intimating that both assault and bombardment were to be apprehended. the reply was a refusal to surrender; and at a quarter past four, accompanied by a deafening chorus of joyous, frantic shouts and yells, the american batteries opened, while the "mosquito fleet" of two small steamers and five gunboats,[22.22] each armed with a single heavy cannon, stationed themselves behind point hornos, and fired briskly.[22.24] like "hungry lions in search of prey," a soldier thought, the shells from the mortars flew "howling" to their mark. with heavier metal and vastly more of it, vera cruz and the castle replied. the city wall blazed like a sheet of fire. shot, shell and rockets came forth in a deluge, it seemed to the men; and the two columns of smoke, rolling and whirling, mounted high and collided as if striving to outflank and conquer each other. still more terrible was the scene at night. a spurt of red fire; a fierce roar; a shell with an ignited fuse mounting high, pausing, turning, and then--more and more swiftly--dropping; the crash of a roof; a terrific explosion that shook the earth; screams, wailing and yells--all this could be distinctly seen or heard from the american lines. during the twenty-third and the following night the fire still raged, but on the american side more slowly, for although ten mortars were now at work, a norther interrupted the supply of ammunition.[22.24] but while the bombardment made an interesting spectacle, as a military operation it was proving unsatisfactory. the ordnance thus far received by scott was inadequate for the reduction of the city--to say nothing of ulúa. with mortars, especially as the distances could not be ascertained precisely, it was impossible to be sure of hitting the bastions and forts. shells could be thrown into the town, but while the houses suffered much, the fortifications and garrison escaped vital damage, and there was no sign of yielding. not a few in the american army, who had supposed that a fortified city could be taken at sight like a mint julep, grew impatient; the officers eager for assault fumed; worth, proud of his quick work at monterey, sneered; twiggs grunted. as an army man scott naturally desired that branch of the service to reap all the glory of its campaign, but he now found himself compelled to ask for naval guns heavy enough to breach the wall, and make an assault practicable; and when perry, who had taken conner's place on the twenty-first, insisted that men from the squadron should work them, he consented.[22.24] the new battery, constructed by robert e. lee and mounting three long 32's for solid shot and three 68's for shells, was planted just behind the bushy crest of a slight eminence, only some 800 yards from the city wall, where the enemy did not suppose that such an enterprise would be ventured; and until the guns were about ready to be unmasked on the morning of the twenty-fourth, its existence was not suspected.[22.23] here were instruments of power and precision, and they told. the mexicans concentrated upon them a terrific fire, but with no serious effect; and when on the next morning a battery consisting of four 24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers joined the infernal chorus, the fire, though hindered occasionally by the tardiness of ammunition, was "awful," said scott and lee, while the city appeared like one dense thunder-cloud, red with flashes and quivering with incessant roars.[22.24] that night the batteries played still more fiercely. sometimes four or five shells were sizzling through the air at once. the fire, said an officer, was now "perfectly terrific"; and to heighten the wildness of the scene, many vessels could be observed by the light of the moon going ashore in the norther. about thirty were wrecked by this one gale, and others had to cut away their masts. in the meantime preparations for assaulting both by land and by water, should an assault prove to be necessary, were actively pressed.[22.24] [the situation in vera cruz] in town, during the early period of these operations, the enthusiasm continued to run high, for the cautious and faint-hearted had gone away, and the reports of the irregulars, constantly skirmishing against the americans, were colored to suit the popular taste. work on the fortifications proceeded, and fresh cartridges for the artillery were made with feverish haste. bands played; the gunners amused themselves by firing at small and far distant groups among the sand-hills; and at night fireballs and rockets lighted up the plain in anticipation of the hoped-for assault. when the investment was completed, when the american outposts drew near the town, and especially when it became known that preparations for a bombardment were under way, the people grew more serious; but it was expected that forces from without would break the line, or at least prevent the construction of batteries.[22.26] a painful disappointment followed, however. soto made great efforts to collect the tax levied by the state; but the citizens, impoverished by the long blockade, had no money, and without cash troops could not be fed. in spite of many hopes the fluctuating bands under colonel senobio, the chief leader of the irregulars in the vicinity, do not seem to have risen at any time far above 1000, and perhaps never reached that number. in vain soto appealed for an able general and a nucleus of regulars. they were not within reach, and the few pieces of artillery could not be moved. the states of puebla and oaxaca tried to help, but were tardy and inefficient.[22.26] men from the upper country dreaded the yellow fever; and those of the coast, volatile by nature, ignorant of real warfare, without organization, training or discipline, were astonished and confounded when they struck the solid american line. they pecked at it continually, but morales himself could see that no skill, concert or strength marked their efforts. discouragement and wholesale desertion followed. the city, therefore, could not obtain provisions by land; and as most of the seamen alongshore fled to the mountains, and boat communication became more and more difficult, it was realized that supplies from the interior were out of the question. after march 20 the troops could be given little or no meat; but soldiers were detailed to fish the prolific waters under the guns of ulúa, and no doubt beans and tortillas, the staple food of the common people, continued to be fairly plentiful.[22.26] the opening of the bombardment, however, precipitated a crisis, and as our fire grew more and more intense, the consternation and suffering increased. crashing roofs; burning houses; flying pavements; doors, windows and furniture blocking the streets; a pandemonium of confused and frightful sounds; bells ringing without hands; awful explosions; domes and steeples threatening to fall; the earth quaking; crowds of screaming women, who rushed hither and thither; terrible wounds and sudden deaths--all these were new and overwhelming scenes.[22.25] only one bakery escaped destruction, as it happened, and the children cried in vain for bread; the priests would not leave their shelter to comfort and absolve; and finally the very instinct of self-preservation was lost in a stupid despair more dreadful to witness than death itself.[22.26] the troops in the southwestern section, under our heaviest fire, became terror-stricken. in other quarters men left the ranks to look after families and friends; and when a murky dawn ended the terrible night of the twenty-fifth, demoralization was rife. people wandered about the streets crying for surrender. always passionate, they now hated their own government for deserting them. the consuls went out under a flag of truce, but scott refused to see them, sending them word--it was reported--that any persons leaving the city would be fired upon, and that unless it should surrender in the meantime, new as well as the old batteries would open the next morning. this fact overwhelmed the people; and the prospect of being exterminated at leisure by an enemy who could not be injured, beat down their last thought of resistance.[22.26] consul giffard had predicted that any plausible excuse for surrender would be turned to good account. supplies were now said to be failing, and in the course of this dreadful night an informal meeting of officers agreed upon capitulation. naturally the idea gave offence to many, and there was talk of opening a way through the american line with the sword. but a council of war soon decided to negotiate; commissioners were appointed; and scott, who was invited to take similar action, did so. the six men came together on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth, but could not agree; and the mexicans returned to the city, leaving behind them a proposition.[22.29] [the surrender of vera cruz] worth, who was our chief representative, believed the negotiations were simply a waste of time, and favored an immediate assault; but scott saw that the mexicans, while trying to save appearances, really meant surrender, and the next morning granted with certain vital modifications their terms.[22.27] his demands were accepted, and it was thus agreed in substance that landero, to whom the command had been turned over, should march his army out with all the honors of war, the troops be paroled, and the armament--so far as not destroyed in the course of the war--be disposed of by the treaty of peace. it was further agreed that all the mexican sick should remain in town under mexican care, private property be respected, and religious rights be held sacred.[22.29] it was a "shameful surrender," declared santa anna, and from a military point of view this could hardly be denied. ulúa had practically not been touched; it had a considerable supply of provisions, and there was a chance of obtaining more from blockade-runners. vera cruz was in a harder yet not in a desperate plight. men of importance there, knowing the city would be denounced for surrendering, naturally endeavored to prove that it had suffered terribly and exhausted its resources before yielding; and the principal neutrals--friendly toward them, engaged mostly in trade, and more willing to have life sacrificed than property--raised an outcry against the proceedings of scott that became a fierce indictment in europe and the united states. but the british naval commander, though not inclined to favor the general, reported that the casualties in the city were only eighty soldiers killed or wounded, about one hundred old men, women and children killed, and an unknown number injured, and that its food supply, while no doubt less delicate and varied than could have been desired, would have lasted beyond the middle of april; and there is considerable evidence that his figures were approximately correct.[22.28] ammunition did not fail, nor did water.[22.29] the surrender was really due therefore to the moral effect of scott's artillery. even giffard, who termed his operations cruel and unnecessary, admitted this; and, bearing in mind the general's obligations to obey his government and save the lives of his men, the inevitable horrors of an assault by night, and the serious danger that a reliance upon starvation as the sole means of reducing the city would have given time for santa anna's regulars and the yellow fever to arrive, one concludes again and finally that scott's method was humane and wise.[22.29] owing to inequalities of the ground, the character of the soil, great skill on the part of our engineers, incessant care and remarkable good fortune, the total losses caused by 6267 mexican shot, 8486 shells and all the bullets of the irregulars were only about nineteen killed and sixty-three wounded. the siege was not exactly a _fête champêtre_, however. it was tiresome to be awakened at night so often by mexican skirmishers, disagreeable to be routed out by the diabolical screech of a heavy shell, and quite annoying to have one of the "big dinner-pots," as the soldiers called them, explode close by. saturating dews, abominable drinking water, scanty and bad rations, howling wolves, lizards in one's boot, "jiggers" that made the feet itch incessantly, fleas that even a sleeping-bag could not discourage, and sand-flies nearly as voracious, were minor but real afflictions. when a norther began, the whole aspect of nature seemed to change. the sky became a pall, the atmosphere a winding-sheet, the wind a scourge; and the roaring, chilling blast filled one's ears, eyes, mouth and even pores with biting grit, cut the tents into ribbons, and sometimes buried their sleeping inmates.[22.30] to escape from the mexican shot sentries often had to burrow in the sand, and under the tropical sun they learned to appreciate the power of the old brick oven. when carrying provisions or dragging cannon, amidst hills that blazed like the mirrors of archimedes at syracuse, men often dropped.[22.31] on the other hand, besides the initial high spirits, which helped immensely, and the excitement and comradeship that knocked off the edge of hardships, there were special sources of cheer--particularly the "blue-shirts," as the seamen were called. when turning out in the face of an icy sand-blast sharp enough to cut granite, it was something to hear a salty voice give the order, "form line of battle on the starboard tack!" but sailors on shore leave, who burst from their long confinement like birds let loose, and "cruised" in the environs with perfect abandon, were better yet. their sport with the wild monkeys was truly edifying, and their delight over the burro would have set diogenes laughing. sometimes they rode him, and sometimes they carried him. planted in the mexican style just forward of the creature's tail, they felt that at last they were riding the quarter-deck, and commanding a snug vessel of their own. above all they enjoyed "mooring ship." this congenial manoeuvre was achieved by taking aboard for "anchor" a heavy block of wood, previously attached to the donkey's neck with a long rope, then racing at full speed, heaving the "anchor," paying out the cable, and bringing up in a heap on the sand--the donkey on top, very likely.[22.31] not less cheering and a little more military was the news, which arrived by the fifteenth of march, that "old wooden-leg's" army had been "licked up like salt" at buena vista. and still another comfort was to gaze from a safely remote hill at vera cruz, which looked--the soldiers agreed--so oriental, with airy palm trees visible over the white wall, hundreds of buzzards floating in wide circles far above, the dark bulwarks of ulúa set in waves of purple and gold on the left, a forest of american spars and masts on the right, piercing the misty splendor of the yellow beach, the bright sails of fishing boats in the middle distance, and the vast, blue, cool gulf beyond it all. how the panting soldiers gloated on the prospect of taking possession![22.31] [vera cruz occupied] and on march 29 they did so. the day was enchantingly summerlike; a delightful southeast breeze came over the water; and the domes of vera cruz were gilded with splendid sunshine. in a green meadow, shaded with cocoanut palms, a little way south of the town, worth's brigade was drawn up in a dingy line, and a dingy line of volunteers, about seventy yards distant, faced it. at one end of the intervening space, near the city wall, stood sailors and marines. the american dragoons and a battery were opposite them, and a white flag waved at the centre. a little before noon the mexican troops, in their best uniforms of blue, white and red, marched out of the gate, formed by company front with a band at the head of each regiment, advanced to the flag, and stacked arms. a few slammed or even broke their muskets; many kissed their hands to the city; and a standard bearer, who had removed his flag from the staff and secreted it in his bosom, wept for joy when permitted to keep it. but most of the men seemed in fairly good spirits, and as a rule the much-decorated officers, who retained their swords, produced a fine impression.[22.32] as the rear of the column left the gate, the mexican banner on fort santiago, after receiving a last salute from the guns of the city and castle, was lowered; and then issued forth a crowd of men, women and children, loaded with fiddles, guitars, parrots, monkeys, dogs, game-cocks, toys and household utensils, that was enough to destroy any funereal sentiments which otherwise might have been felt. even by the mexican accounts, not a word or look of triumph, not even a note of authority, was chargeable to the victors; and worth, who received the column, proffered a thousand courtesies. general scott, the so-called "vain-glorious," remained in the background; but he sent a note excusing from their parole about forty officers, whom he expected to aid him at the capital as in effect advocates of peace.[22.32] amid cheers and the waving of caps, american flags then rose on the forts, greeted by hundreds of salutes from sea and shore. it seemed, wrote a soldier, as if there were nothing in the world but cannon, and all the cannon thundering; and the glory of the stars and stripes, gleaming amidst the smoke, gave a new significance to the emblem of patriotism. with his bands playing favorite american airs, worth's brigade now marched into the town; and later scott, with his staff and a brilliant escort, followed it. perry took formal possession of ulúa; and the disbanded mexican troops that resided elsewhere scattered to their homes, preparing the people for submission wherever they went by tales of american invincibility, and teaching them by every sort of outrage to welcome american rule.[22.32] xxiii cerro gordo april, 1847 i believe it would be many months after the capture of vera cruz and the fortress of ulúa, said minister pakenham in substance at the end of january, 1847, before an army strong enough to advance any distance into the interior could be collected there, and meantime the climate would be "frightfully destructive." heat, fatigue, differences in food, and the yellow fever will cause heavy losses, wrote bermúdez de castro, the spanish minister at mexico in march, and the road to the capital passes so many centres of population and so many fine military positions, that without great labor and preparations an invading force can be destroyed. two men better qualified to express opinions on the matter could scarcely have been found; but without hesitation the "scientific and visionary" scott addressed himself to the task. had the requisitions duly made by him in november been complied with, he might by this time, at a trifling cost in lives, have been standing on the great plateau, and quite possibly within the capital; but now, with only two thirds of the desired troops[23.1] and an insufficient supply of many other essentials, he fearlessly girded up his loins.[23.5] stores were expeditiously landed. the first infantry and two independent volunteer companies received orders to garrison the town and the fortress. it was arranged to minimize the danger of yellow fever by keeping the americans at the water-front as much as possible and cleaning the city. the military department of vera cruz, extending fifty miles inland, was created. foreign merchants, under the threat of a six per cent duty on exported gold and silver, supplied funds by cashing official drafts on the united states at par. "one more appeal ... to the ninety-seven honorable men, against, perhaps, the three miscreants in every hundred," urging them to coöperate actively in preventing even trivial outrages, was issued; and the people of the region were addressed[23.2] in a proclamation.[23.5] "mexicans," said scott, i am advancing at the head of a powerful army, which is soon to be doubled, and another army of ours is advancing in the north. "americans are not your enemies," however, but only the enemies of those who misgoverned you, and brought about this unnatural war. to the peaceable inhabitants and to your church, which is respected by the government, laws and people in all parts of our country, we are friends. everything possible will be done to prevent or punish outrages against you; and on the other hand any citizen, not belonging to the regular forces, who undertakes to injure us will be severely chastised. "let, then, all good mexicans remain at home, or at their peaceful occupations." let them also furnish supplies, for all who do so will be paid in cash and protected. if such a course be followed, the war may soon end honorably for both sides; and the americans, "having converted enemies into friends," will return home.[23.5] the problem of transportation, however, caused the general a great deal of trouble. as early as the beginning of february notice of his probable needs had been given by him to the quartermaster's department, and presumably steps had been taken to meet them; but the loss of animals on board the ships during storms or by the wrecking of transports had upset all calculations.[23.3] for wagons especially he was dependent upon the united states. at least eight hundred were needed, and up to april 5 only one hundred and eighty had arrived, though three hundred more were known to be on the way. four or five thousand mules were required for wagons, two or three thousand for pack-saddles, and about four hundred mules or horses for the siege train; and by the same date less than 1100 had been obtained. an expedition to the village of la antigua[23.4] on the north shore met with little success in this regard, and a more important one, to the rich country on the upper alvarado river,[23.4] which was supposed to abound in horses and mules, produced but very disappointing results.[23.5] in the opinion of scott, however, the district near jalapa, a beautiful city about seventy-four miles inland, was likely to prove more satisfactory. from beach's friend, mrs. storms, who had presented herself to him on march 20, he seems to have learned that friendly sentiments were entertained there. no serious opposition below that point and even for some distance beyond it seemed to him probable; and hence on april 8, although his means for equipping a road train were but a quarter of what he desired, and only an inadequate siege train could be moved, the second division of regulars, commanded by brigadier general twiggs, marched for jalapa, which was also the first point where large quantities of subsistence and forage could be obtained.[23.5] [illustration: vera cruz to perote] [mexican defensive plans] measures to defend the route had been set on foot by mexico in good season.[23.6] from the lofty plateau of the interior the national highway--which it was evident that an american army would have to follow on account of its artillery--wound through mountains to sea level, presenting, according to the minister of war, "almost insuperable obstacles against any audacious invader." not far above jalapa the village of las vigas marked a spot of military value, and the narrow, rugged pass at la hoya, though it could be turned without much difficulty, afforded an excellent opportunity to stop a weak force or delay a strong one, while below that city corral falso, cerro gordo, plan del río and the national bridge (_puente nacional_) were fine points. as early as october 11, 1846, an order to fortify several of these positions was issued. some gangs of laborers assembled, a little preparatory clearing of the ground was done, a few cannon were moved about; but energy, money, supplies, appliances and engineering skill fell indefinitely short of the requirements, and up to the twentieth of march, 1847, nothing substantial was accomplished.[23.9] [illustration: contour lines near cerro gordo. the difference of elevation between two lines is fifty metres.] that day santa anna arrived near the capital on his return from the north, and, although he expected vera cruz to delay the americans much longer than it did, he seems to have taken the southern danger into consideration at once. disputes between the generals had sprung up. as a result la vega was given the district from vera cruz to corral falso, general gregorio gómez that extending from corral falso to las vigas, and general gaona a jurisdiction above this; and each was ordered to fortify his best points and raise as many troops as he could. over all of these officers was then placed general canalizo, a little man with a big tongue, as commander-in-chief of the eastern division. the forces under senobio and other chiefs were to be gathered, "regularized" and trained. the troops--a cavalry brigade, two brigades of infantry and a force of artillery--that had followed the president from la angostura were ordered to march toward vera cruz by the shortest route, a brigade under rangel to proceed from the capital in the same direction, and 2000 national guards, from puebla to join those corps; and general mora, who now commanded the army of the north, was instructed to send his bronze 16-pounders to jalapa with all possible speed.[23.7] every effective engineer then at the capital received similar marching orders, and attention was given to the need of ammunition, wagons, mules and other necessaries. at the same time instructions were issued to block the route _via_ orizaba at chiquihuite, a naturally strong position below that city.[23.9] late on march 30 news that vera cruz had fallen reached the capital. at once the government expelled black, the american consul residing at mexico, and issued a circular calling upon all citizens to forget rancor and dissension, offer their lives and fortunes, and stand unitedly behind the president. "mexicans," exclaimed santa anna, "do not hesitate between death and slavery.... awake! a sepulchre opens at your feet; let it at least be covered with laurels!" and he adjured canalizo in the name of the country to fortify corral falso and cerro gordo, and above all to defend the national bridge "in all possible ways and at all costs" in order to give time for troops to concentrate above it. with senobio's forces and the militia--amounting, said this letter, to more than 2000 men--and aided by the topography of the ground, itself "equal in value to an army," the enemy could be detained, the president assured him; and he was authorized to shoot every deserter and every coward. at the same time governor soto was directed to proclaim martial law, call out all the fit men between the ages of fifteen and fifty years, and aid canalizo in every possible way. then, after transferring the executive power to general anaya, the substitute president, santa anna left the capital on april 2. as he went down the steps of the palace to his waiting carriage, he and the onlookers felt sad presentiments they could not hide. even his enemies had tears in their eyes, and it seemed to every one like a final good-by.[23.9] [santa anna at the front] on the way gloomy reports met him. soto wrote that while all in his power had been done, the fate of vera cruz had smitten the people with terror, and the resources of the state were far from adequate. canalizo wrote no more hopefully. efforts had been made to rouse the spirit of the public.[23.8] under penalty of death all intercourse with the americans had been prohibited, and under the same threat all citizens had been ordered to place beyond the invader's reach whatever could be of service to him. but the outlook was dark. although a good engineer had been at the national bridge for a week, work on the fortifications had scarcely begun; eight hundred out of a thousand men had fled panic-stricken on learning of scott's triumph at vera cruz, there was little ammunition or money, and the bridge could not be held. in view of santa anna's adjuration canalizo promised to make another effort, but he soon ordered la vega to abandon the position. the light fortifications recently built were demolished, and as wagons to carry the guns away could not be obtained, they were spiked and pitched into a ravine.[23.9] observing at la hoya that virtually nothing had been done, santa anna ordered engineer cano to fortify the pass, and then went on to his great hacienda of el encero, eight miles below jalapa, where he arrived on the fifth. two days later, in company with lieutenant colonel robles, he passed corral falso, five miles farther down the highway, and the hamlet of cerro gordo, nearly five miles beyond that, and finally, making a steep and circuitous descent, he came to plan del río, about five miles from the hamlet. near the first of these three positions the highway passed through a narrow, craggy defile, that could not be turned; but santa anna decided to make a stand at the second, because according to the country people and the traditions of both the spanish régime and the revolutionary war, it was equally unassailable on the flanks, and holding it would force the americans to remain within reach of the yellow fever, which ceased to be terrible just above plan del río.[23.14] [cerro gordo] very little work had been done at cerro gordo, but the position seemed admirable. about half a mile below the hamlet the descending highway entered a ravine, which rapidly deepened. on the left of this rose a hill named el telégrafo, which, though low and easily ascended from the direction of the hamlet, was five or six hundred feet high on the opposite side and extremely steep. to the right of the ravine the grade of the hamlet continued for more than a mile, ending finally in three tongues, just south of which the plateau was cut, approximately east and west, by a precipitous canyon of rock more than five hundred feet deep, the channel of a small stream called the río del plan. the tongues, which may be designated from south to north as _a_, _b_ and _c_, were parallel to the highway and more or less fully commanded it.[23.10] near the head of the ravine, at a spot that may be called _d_, a road branched off from the highway toward the tongues, and there was a low eminence, _e_, in this vicinity.[23.14] [illustration: battle of cerro gordo general plan] believing that scott could advance with artillery only by the highway, santa anna gave his chief attention to this part of the terrain, and recalling cano and his men from la hoya, he sent them to assist robles here. at the ends of the tongues parapets were laid out, which, though not completed, served to indicate the correct positions; and in front of each the bushes and trees were cut down and left on the ground, so that an assailant should be impeded and should have no screen. on _a_ general pinzón, a mulatto of considerable ability, was placed with about six guns and some five hundred men. at _b_, where the highway had formerly run, there were not less than eight guns and about a thousand troops under general jarero. _c_ was held by colonel badillo with about five pieces and nearly three hundred men.[23.11] _e_ was entrusted to general la vega with a reserve of some five hundred grenadiers; and that officer had charge also of a six or seven gun battery at _d_ and of a neighboring breastwork, parallel to the highway--which was cut at that point--and completely dominating it, where the sixth regiment, counting nine hundred bayonets, was placed. in all some 3500 men, including the artillery, occupied this wing.[23.14] april 17 santa anna transferred robles, cano and their laborers to the other side of the highway. on the summit of el telégrafo, which commanded the entire position, there was a level space of about an acre, and in it stood a square stone tower. here a breastwork, some distance back from the crest and partly enclosing the tower, was imperfectly constructed; four 4-pounders were planted; all the bushes, cactus and small trees within musket range on the slope were cut down and left on the ground; and the third infantry, consisting of about one hundred men, took possession of the summit. to the left and rear of this point ran a spur, which rose to a minor crest--a broken ledge eighteen or twenty feet high--some thirty feet lower than the summit and about a hundred yards from it. in the rear of all these points, close to the hamlet, lay the main camp and strong reserves of troops and guns. to santa anna the position seemed impregnable. he reported to the government that it was completely fortified, well armed with artillery and garrisoned with 12,000 men.[23.12] news from the capital that revolutionary movements were on foot and that something must be accomplished to prevent the idea of peace from gaining currency, no longer troubled him. confiding in his army and his position he gave free rein to his vanity, his lordliness and his exultation. here should the proud invaders be rolled back or here under the saffron wing of the plague should they rot. and then let domestic foes tremble![23.14] but a number of circumstances undermined him. the narrow camp, too much crowded with cottages, tents, huts and market booths, became confused even while there were no hostilities. insects kept the troops restive. the supply of water, brought in barrels from the río del plan, was insufficient,[23.13] and many drank the crude sap of the maguey, which made them ill. a sort of cholera set in, and exposure produced lung troubles. far worse, however, were the moral distempers. some of the troops had turned their backs to the americans at palo alto, the resaca, monterey and buena vista, while others had recently, to their utter amazement, seen heroic vera cruz and mighty ulúa, the pride of mexico, haul down their flags; and men of both classes represented the enemy as invincible. every deserter was ordered shot, and this interference with a popular diversion gave offence.[23.14] looking at the shaggy hills and ravines on his left, santa anna declared that a rabbit could not get through there. perhaps not, thought many a soldier, but the americans are not rabbits. about seven hundred yards in front of el telégrafo stood a similar though somewhat lower hill called la atalaya, which commanded a wide expanse of the rough country, and the engineers felt it should be fortified and strongly held; but the president would merely station twenty-five men there. robles himself believed that scott could turn the main position, and wanted fortifications erected at the extreme left; but santa anna would listen to no advice, and his cocksureness itself excited alarm. in private, officers talked of a disaster, and even canalizo foreboded it. the tinder of a panic was ready.[23.14] [twiggs's advance] meanwhile twiggs with two field batteries,[23.15] six 24-pounders, two 8-inch howitzers, four 10-inch mortars, and a squadron of dragoons--in all some 2600 men--set out in the footsteps of cortez.[23.16] most fortunately the troops had a stock of enthusiasm, for the beginning of the march was terrible. after going three miles along the beach they struck off at a right angle for six or eight on a deep, sandy road, sometimes three or four feet below the level of the ground, with a blazing sun overhead, not a breath of moving air, and twiggs's horse for a pace-maker. many threw away everything detachable, and the greater part of the division--at least four fifths, it was said--fell by the way. some died, and many others did not rejoin the command for days. unbroken mules and drivers ignorant of their business added to the difficulties. the meagre facilities for transportation did not permit even officers to have tents, and some of the scanty supplies were lost through the breaking down of wagons.[23.19] the next day, happily, a change took place. the column set out before sunrise, marched more slowly, and halted occasionally; and the national highway, no longer buried in sand, proved to be a spacious, comfortably graded cement avenue, carried over the streams by handsome bridges of cut stone, and flanked on both sides by the estates of santa anna.[23.17] now it penetrated a dark forest of palms, cactus, limes and countless other trees festooned with vines, and now it crossed rolling prairies. here it was cut through solid rock; here it skirted a beautiful hill, with a charming vista of leafy glades; and presently it was clinging as if in terror to the face of a cliff. bowers carpeted with many soft hues and perfumed with heliotrope recalled ideas of eden, while marshes full of strange bloated growths, bluish-green pools rimmed with flowers of a suspicious brilliancy, and thick clumps of dagger plants tipped with crimson offered suggestions of a different sort.[23.19] matted tangles of leafage spattered with gold, big tulipans gleaming in the shadows like a red rose in the hair of a spanish dancer, blossoms like scarlet hornets that almost flew at one's eyes, and blooms like red-hot hair-brushes, the sight of which made the scalp tingle, were balanced with big, close masses of white throats and purple mouths, and with banks of the greenish-white cuatismilla, discharging invisible clouds of a fragrance that seemed to be locust blended with lily of the valley. trees with tops like balloons, like corkscrews and like tables, trees drained almost dry by starry parasites that swung from their branches, trees covered with strawberry blossoms--or what appeared to be strawberry blossoms--that were to graduate into coffee beans, trees bare of everything except great yellow suns, the flower of god, that fascinated one's gaze--these and countless other surprises followed one another; and then would come a whole grove netted over with morning glories in full bloom. amid scenes like these our exhausted troops quickly regained their spirits.[23.19] toward the end of the march on the eleventh, when about thirty-seven miles from vera cruz, the troops crossed a branch of the antigua, and soon came to the river itself. in the triangular space thus bounded rose a hill crowned with an old fort.[23.18] here stood the national bridge, a magnificent structure more than fifty feet high and nearly a quarter of a mile in length, commanding romantic views of the rapid stream winding through towering vistas of luxuriant vegetation. on leaving the bridge the road made a sharp turn to the left at the foot of a high and very steep bluff; and it seemed as if a battery planted at the top of the bluff, as la vega's had been, might stop an army until overpowered with siege guns. but canalizo had been wiser than his chief, for there were fords above and below and cross-roads in the rear, that made it possible to turn the position. so amidst a wondrous illumination from glow-worms and fireflies, the troops made their third camp here in peace.[23.19] beyond this point the influence of canalizo could be seen. the bamboo huts thatched with palm-leaves were all vacant and empty. scarcely one living creature could be seen except flitting birds. these, however, still abounded: parrots, macaws, hawks, eagles, orioles, humming-birds, mocking-birds, cardinals brighter than cardinals, cranes larger than cranes, talkative chachalacas, toucans as vociferous as their bills were huge--every color from indigo to scarlet, and every note from the scream to the warble; and the same ocean of green still rolled its vast billows, warmed and brightened by the same golden sun.[23.19] at the end of this march, about thirteen miles from the national bridge, the highway narrowed and pitched down a long, steep, winding descent, with overhanging trees and rocks on one side and a precipice on the other, as if making for the centre of the globe. then it crossed río del plan, and came to a small, irregular opening, where a few scattered huts could be seen. this was plan del río. views of superb heights delighted the eye, but the hot breath of the coast could be felt in the valley. even the hollows between the sand-hills of vera cruz were thought less pestilential. but the men lay down, and, as a soldier wrote, covered themselves with the sky.[23.19] in the midst of scenery like this, "old davy" twiggs appeared like a perfectly natural feature. his robust and capacious body, powerful shoulders, bull-neck, heavy, cherry-red face, and nearly six feet of erect stature represented physical energy at its maximum. with bristling white hair and, when the regulations did not interfere, a thick white beard, he seemed like a kind of snow-clad volcano, a human ætna, pouring forth a red-hot flood of orders and objurgations from his crater of a mouth; and he was vastly enjoyed by the rough soldiers even when, as they said, he "cursed them right out of their boots." in a more strictly human aspect he made an excellent disciplinarian, and he could get more work out of the men than anybody else in the army; but as a warrior, while he always looked thirsty for a fight, he was thought over-anxious to fight another day--to be, in short, a hero of the future instead of the past; and as a general, scott had already said that he was not qualified "to command an army--either in the presence, or in the absence of an enemy." his brains were, in fact, merely what happened to be left over from the making of his spinal cord, and the soldiers' names for him--the "horse" and the "bengal tiger"--classed him fairly as regarded intellect.[23.20] twiggs had been warned by scott that a substantial army, commanded by santa anna, lay in his front; lancers were encountered on april 11; and a reconnaissance of that afternoon, made because the enemy were said to be in force just ahead, proved that guns commanded the pass of cerro gordo; yet the next morning he advanced in the usual marching order. nothing saved his division but the eagerness of the mexicans. they opened fire before he was entirely within the jaws of death, and he managed to retreat--extricating his train with difficulty, however. the enemy have given up and withdrawn, boasted santa anna, while the americans felt ashamed. further reconnoitring on that day gave a still more impressive idea of the problem ahead; but the general, as if intoxicated by holding an independent command, ordered an assault made at daybreak the next morning. the volunteer division, consisting at present of two brigades, a field battery and a squadron of cavalry, then arrived. patterson, who led it, seemed, however, by no means eager to accept the responsibility of command, and, as no confidence whatever was felt in pillow, the second in rank, he placed the entire force under twiggs on the ground of illness. pillow and shields, who were thought no less willing than twiggs to make a bid for glory at the expense of their men, then demanded a day for rest and preparation; and accordingly, about sunset on the thirteenth, orders for the attack were issued.[23.20] [discouragement] but the officers and soldiers, distrusting alike the information and the ability of their commander, now felt extremely depressed. the situation appeared hopeless, thought even lieutenant u. s. grant; and captain robert e. lee described the mexican position as an "unscalable" precipice on one side and "impassable" ravines on the other. it seemed, wrote a third man, like a gibraltar; and the idea of assailing it with twiggs for leader inspired the deepest alarm. everybody not selfishly ambitious desired to wait for the commander-in-chief; and yet polk, in order to justify his depreciation of scott, said with reference to this very situation, that our forces would be victorious "if there was not an officer among them." suddenly, however, the faces of the men brooding round their bivouac fires lighted up, for news came that patterson, in order to veto the project of twiggs, had assumed the command, and ordered offensive operations to be suspended.[23.20] scott, whose ideas of an army differed radically from those prevalent in mexico, hardly believed that santa anna could place himself below jalapa at this time with as many as 4000 men, even though reports of a larger number reached him; but he arranged to drop his work at vera cruz on the first news of serious opposition, and letters from twiggs and pillow, received late on april 11 led him to set out the next day. early on wednesday afternoon, the 14th, he was at plan del río, doffing his old straw hat as the soldiers, who doubtless realized that in taking vera cruz by siege instead of assault he had spared their lives, cheered tumultuously. instantly chaos became order, confidence reigned, and the jealous clashes of the commanders ended. now something will be done, thought the officers; the soldiers began to laugh and whistle; and what an officer called a "hum of satisfaction" pervaded the camp. already the battle was half gained.[23.23] engineers beauregard and tower had by this time done some reconnoitring, and, as indeed would have been fairly obvious to any intelligent person, had concluded that a turning movement against the mexican left--toward which a trail had been found to lead--offered the best hope. but an idea was not a plan. the reconnaissances were far from complete, and reports upon the mexican position and numbers differed materially. hence the commander-in-chief, who accepted everything valuable done by his subordinates but never surrendered his own judgment, decided to begin anew, and, in the hope of gaining the highway in santa anna's rear and cutting off his entire army, sent captain lee at once to the ravines.[23.21] friday that indefatigable engineer found himself in contact with the mexican lines far to the rear of el telégrafo. reconnoitring could go no farther, and the highway toward jalapa was not actually seen; but there were good reasons for believing it near, and the construction of a "road" for troops and artillery on the route discovered by lee was pressed with great energy. at about 9 o'clock on friday evening all the facts and conclusions were brought together in a plan by major john l. smith, senior engineer on the ground, and in substance his plan was adopted. its essential point was, in accordance with scott's announced aim, to gain the highway in the mexican rear first of all, and then--not until then--attack in the rear and perhaps also on the front.[23.22] after the adjournment of this conference the army was further cheered by the arrival of worth, 1600 picked men and a number of heavy guns. the mexican forces were estimated as 12-18,000, and scott had only 8500; but the bright stars of that night looked down on an army sleeping soundly in full courage and confidence.[23.23] [preliminary operations] at seven or eight o'clock the next morning twiggs advanced. his instructions were to avoid a collision, occupy la atalaya, reach the mexican left, and rest on his arms near the highway until the remainder of the army should be in position, and the time for acting decisively should arrive. accordingly, after marching about three miles along the highway he turned off to the right by the road already cut, ordering the men to trail arms and preserve absolute silence. at one point the road lay for twenty-five or thirty feet in view of the enemy, and lee proposed to screen it with brush. but this appeared to twiggs quite unnecessary, and hence the mexicans could observe not only the troops but four mountain howitzers, four 6-pounders, and two 12-pounders gleaming in the sun. pinzón and also the outpost on la atalaya notified santa anna of the american movement, and strong reinforcements were therefore despatched to that hill.[23.26] [illustration: battle of cerro gordo central part of the field] twiggs advanced but slowly, for the road--hewed in the roughest way through oaks, mesquite, chaparral, cactus and the like and over almost impassable ground--could barely answer its purpose, but about noonday the command found itself in the vicinity of la atalaya. lieutenant gardner of the seventh infantry was then directed to ascend a neighboring hill with company e, and take an observation of the enemy. he was attacked; upon which colonel harney, now commanding twiggs's first brigade in place of persifor f. smith, who was ill, sent forces to relieve him, pursued the mexicans to la atalaya with the mounted rifles, first artillery and other troops, and after a stiff combat occupied that point.[23.26] one of the captains--for on such ground independence of action was unavoidable--inquired of twiggs how far to charge the enemy. "charge 'em to hell!" roared the bengal tiger; and naturally enough a small american force rushed down the farther slope of la atalaya and began to ascend el telégrafo. it was then in a desperate situation, exposed to the cannon of the mexicans and to overwhelming numbers. a party of americans under major sumner, which bravely hastened to its relief, succeeded only in sharing its plight. but happily cover was found; a howitzer discouraged the enemy; and later this group was able to retire. la atalaya remained in american hands despite attempts to recover it; but the mexicans had been fully warned, and our troops were not lying on their arms near the jalapa route. meantime or soon shields's brigade came to the support of twiggs, who now had control of nearly 5000 men. the casualties amounted to about ninety on our side and more than two hundred on the other; but the mexicans, whose operations had been directed by santa anna himself, believed the americans had seriously attacked el telégrafo, and exulted loudly with shouts and music over what seemed to them a triumph.[23.26] santa anna did not yet believe, or would not admit, that scott's main drive would be aimed against his left, but he recognized the wisdom of strengthening that wing. he therefore ordered a breastwork, which was made of short palisades reinforced behind with stones and brush, to be thrown up near the base of el telégrafo, placed a couple of 12-pounders, the second ligero and the fourth line regiments on the summit, selected brave ciriaco vázquez to command there, planted five guns on a slight eminence near headquarters to guard the mouth of a wooded ravine on the left, had the ground in front of this battery partly cleared, and ordered the eleventh regiment and canalizo's cavalry to support the guns. the americans were not less active. by dint of extraordinary exertions general shields's brigade, assisted by other troops, dragged a 24-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers with ropes through the woods and rocky gorges, pulled them up the steep and bristling side of la atalaya, mounted them, and constructed a parapet for them and the rocket battery; and with perhaps even greater difficulty four new york companies placed an 8-inch howitzer on the farther side of río del plan over against the tongues, _a_, _b_ and _c_. darkness and rain did not facilitate these operations.[23.26] [the battle of cerro gordo] sunday morning the sky was clear, a gentle breeze from the gulf just fluttered the red, white and green flag on the stone tower, and the mexican trumpets blared in all directions. soon the guns of la atalaya solemnly announced the battle, producing consternation at first on the summit of el telégrafo; but the pieces were badly aimed, and accomplished little beyond encouraging the americans and calling forth a vigorous reply.[23.24] the second infantry and fourth artillery under brevet colonel riley of twiggs's division now moved on toward santa anna's rear and the jalapa route, supported by the brigade of shields, which included the new york regiment and the third and fourth illinois. learning of this activity in the valley, general vázquez ordered colonel uraga with the fourth infantry and a 4-pounder to the minor crest of el telégrafo, and as riley crossed the continuation of the spur he was much annoyed by their fire. four companies of the second infantry were therefore detached as skirmishers, and before long, in spite of scott's orders and the protest of lee, who was conducting riley's command, twiggs, pawing the ground somewhere out of range, ordered riley's whole brigade up the hill. shields, however, proceeded along the route discovered by lee. the ground was rough and precipitous, and the growth of trees and thorny chaparral dense; but the general--a stout, soldier-like man with a heavy mustache, black hair and brilliant dark eyes--had a great deal of energy, and in three straggling files his men pushed on.[23.26] during the artillery duel harney's command lay under cover on the summit of la atalaya, listening to the harsh, bitter shriek of the mexican grape, which tore the bushes into shreds; but at about 7 o'clock a charge upon el telégrafo was ordered.[23.25] as the troops measured the height, crowned with guns and fortifications and topped off with a scornful banner, the attempt seemed almost impudent; but that was the day's work, and it had to be done. first the "cursed riflemen," as the mexicans named them, were diverted to the left, where the mexican sixth infantry could be seen approaching; the bugles sounded; and then the third and the seventh infantry, supported by the first artillery, dashed down the slope of la atalaya. here and in the valley they were swept by a deadly shower of bullets, canister and grape, and the front melted like snowflakes; but, as fearless captain roberts of the rifles put it, "when dangers thickened and death talked more familiarly face to face, the men seemed to rise above every terror." the contest at the palisade breastwork was hard, and the mexicans dared even to cross bayonets with americans; but they finally gave way. here a little time was taken for rest, and then forward pressed the troops, helping themselves up the slope, over craggy rocks and loose stones, and through the chaparral by catching at bushes and trees. the screen of woods and the steepness of the incline protected them now.[23.26] very different proved the cleared part of the hill, where small trees, bushes and thorny cactus lay spread with tops pointing down. here progress was slow and concealment impossible. but with deliberate fearlessness the men plodded firmly on, firing at will, strong in that mutual confidence which gives a charge its force. they "seem to despise death," cried the mexicans in astonishment. here and there one was struck down; here and there, breathless and exhausted, one dropped; but no flinching could be seen. like the wave of fire in a burning prairie, the line moved steadily up. "charge, charge!" shouted the officers; and the men yelled and cheered, yelled and cheered, yelled and cheered till sometimes it seemed as if even the trees were cheering, till sometimes the roar of the guns could not be heard; and harney--red-headed, tempestuous harney of the steel-blue eyes--at last in his element, led them as they deserved to be led. superbly tall, his athletic figure needed no plume; the sword in his long arm waved them on; like the keen edge of a billow rushing upon the shore his calm, shrill voice rode the tumult.[23.26] just below the crest a pause for breath; and then the blue stripe was up and over. at the breastwork the fighting was sharp, for santa anna had sent up two more regiments; but soon vázquez fell; with pistols, bayonets and clubbed muskets the mexicans were driven from the summit; and in a moment big sergeant henry of the seventh had the stars and stripes flying from the tower. riley's men, pushing up through dense thickets under a hot fire, had now taken possession of the spur; and while some of them hurried on to join harney, others shot down the gunners of the battery on the summit. in a twinkling captain magruder turned the pieces, and poured a storm of iron on the flying mexicans. general baneneli, commanding the reserve just below, tried hard to charge, but his men would not face the yelling americans. the grenadiers and the eleventh infantry, hurried by santa anna in that direction, were overwhelmed by the fugitives; riley's advance plunged down the hill toward the mexican camp; and an indescribable confusion ensued.[23.26] just at this time, after a fearful march of perhaps two miles, shields with his foremost companies emerged from the chaparral on the mexican left, and hastily prepared to charge. three guns of the headquarters battery, one hundred and fifty or two hundred yards distant in their front, had been turned upon riley, but the other two let fly at them. shields fell and his men recoiled. it was no wonder. about three hundred raw volunteers, without regulars and without artillery, stood before cannon and an army! some two thousand fresh horse under canalizo, guarding that very ravine, faced them just at the left of the battery, and the cannon kept at work. but their mere emerging from the close chaparral at this point, in a strength which the enemy could not measure, was of itself a triumph.[23.26] "the yankees! they have come out to the road!" cried the mexicans; "every one for himself!" some of riley's men shot down or frightened away the gunners of the battery, and in another moment seized three of the pieces. at the same instant a section of shields's brigade, which had now come up in more force, captured the other two, while a second section, followed by the seventh infantry, struck for the highway. canalizo, afraid of being cut off, took flight, as many had already done; and all the rest of the mexicans who could, either followed him or, like santa anna himself, rushed headlong down one or the other of two paths, narrow and steep, that descended into the canyon of the río del plan. scott, who had watched the charge "under a canopy of balls," as major patten said, was now on the scene. harney, his old foe, he greeted in the warmest and friendliest of terms; and, as he moved among the victorious troops with tears rolling down his cheeks, he spoke to them noble and touching words, as not merely their commander but their elder brother in arms, fully sharing their pains, their pride and their joy.[23.26] while these brave scenes were enacted, the other flank witnessed a burlesque of war. naturally scott planned to attack the mexican right in order to deceive santa anna regarding his intentions, prevent the troops of that wing from going to the assistance of the other, and perhaps accomplish something positive in that quarter.[23.27] this piece of work was assigned to pillow's brigade, and although he objected to it as dangerous, a hint about discipline brought him into line. as early as april 13, in view of twiggs's plan, he and lieutenant tower of the engineers had reconnoitred the ground, and this examination had been continued on the fifteenth and sixteenth; but the general did not understand or did not remember what he saw. it was clear, however, that a force attacking between _a_ and the canyon would have the enemy on but one side, and would be as far as possible from the guns occupying _b_ and _c_. with scott's approval this plan was adopted, and the 8-inch howitzer was placed so as to command the flank and rear of the battery at _a_.[23.29] pillow's orders were to set out on his march of about four miles at 6 o'clock on sunday morning, yet he did not reach his position until almost 9. one reason for the delay probably was, that in consequence of a manoeuvre, executed by his order, the rear of the column missed the proper route. another reason also may be surmised. aside from wanting confidence in their general's military capacity, his troops had long disliked him; and his display of unfeeling harshness on the march from vera cruz had given further offence. under such circumstances things never can go well.[23.29] during the march he announced that he had changed his mind, and would have the first pennsylvania (wynkoop) supported by the first tennessee (campbell) attack on the northern face of tongue _a_, and the second tennessee (haskell) supported by the second pennsylvania (roberts) attack on the southern face of _b_, which was obviously sure--since it guarded the old road--to be held more strongly than either of the other tongues.[23.28] this ingenious plan, moreover, divided the american while tending to concentrate the mexican strength. by mismanagement he reversed both of his attacking regiments--a mistake that caused embarrassment and loss of time; and then on leaving the highway, about three miles from plan del río, and entering the narrow path leading to the point of attack, he adopted this order: wynkoop, haskell, campbell, roberts, which--since it was necessary to advance mostly in single file--placed campbell and roberts a long distance from the troops that each was to support, so that neither of them reached his position before the fighting on this wing ended.[23.29] on arriving at the appointed spot, where the orders of mexican officers at _b_ could be heard very distinctly, haskell began to form his badly scattered regiment. "why the hell don't colonel wynkoop file to the right?" shouted pillow at the top of his voice. a bugle in the front sounded instantly, and within three minutes the mexicans opened a heavy fire of grape and canister. some of haskell's men, brave but not in hand, bolted; others took shelter; and the rest, at pillow's order, charged pell-mell. emerging into the cleared space they received a murderous fire from all of the tongues. in less than three minutes about eighty, including every field officer except the colonel, were either killed or wounded, and all able to move were in flight. pillow meanwhile, squatting in the bushes with his back to the enemy at a distance of about 450 yards, was "shot all to pieces," as he said, by a canister bullet that slightly wounded his upper arm; and he retired at a run, leaving wynkoop without the promised instructions.[23.29] a state of general confusion ensued. campbell and his men were anxious to charge; wynkoop felt no less eager when it was too late; the second pennsylvania was demoralized; all were more or less under fire. campbell, however, to whom pillow resigned the command, got the men almost ready to charge upon tongue _a_; but then pillow, venturing back from the rear, withdrew his brigade so far into the woods that, until notified by scott, he did not know the mexicans in his front, who found their rear was occupied by the americans, had surrendered. as for the 8-inch howitzer, it fired seven ineffective shells; and then, at the critical time, as pillow had neglected to arrange a code of signals, ripley, who controlled it, suspended work. evidently, as polk said, gallant americans--and such pillow's men really were--did not require a commander![23.29] a little before 10 o'clock the fighting was over and pursuit began. having little cavalry and no adequate subsistence train scott's powers in this respect were limited; but every man had been expected to set out in the morning with rations for two days, and substantially all the troops except pillow's, accompanied by two incomplete batteries, moved actively forward. patterson once more became well enough to act, and took charge of the advanced forces. frequently bands of fugitives were seen at a distance, looking in their cotton or linen jackets like flocks of sheep. the artillery had some fair long shots, and occasionally other troops also came within reach of the enemy. but the mexicans fled--even the cavalry--without stopping for ceremony, too much cowed to face even a small party of americans; and the results were of little significance.[23.31] heat and exhaustion checked the most advanced pursuers about four miles from jalapa, but nothing could stop the mexicans. like stampeded cattle, the fugitives thought only of flying until worn out. no stand was made at jalapa. at la hoya, the second line of defence, general gómez, hearing of the disaster, sent word to the rear, "all is lost at cerro gordo, all, all!" and fled. in complete disorder, panting, starving, falling by the way--the horses of the cavalry in a like state--the men streamed on toward puebla, plundering when they could. thousands also of those who surrendered managed to escape at one place or another in the rough, wooded country, and, as scott could with difficulty feed his own army and thought future opposition could be weakened by proving the friendly sentiments of his proclamation, the remaining 3000 were released on parole.[23.30] more than 4000 stand of arms, old and not worth using, were destroyed; and about forty cannon, which scott had no means of transporting, were rendered unserviceable and left at cerro gordo. the mexican casualties were estimated at 1000 or 1200, while the american loss during the two days amounted to only thirty officers and 387 men, of whom sixty-four were killed.[23.31] [jalapa occupied] next morning the americans advanced again. for the two last miles below jalapa the highway ran between continuous hedges loaded with blossoms and vocal with the songs of birds, while bougainvillea flamed here and there on a cabin or tree-top in a conflagration of purple, and the air was laden with delicious perfumes; and when the town was descried from an eminence, it seemed like a delicate mosaic set in a massive frame of rich emerald. friends had been left behind forever, but grief was offset by the joy of surviving; and after dressing ranks the troops began to enter jalapa at about 9 o'clock with bayonets fixed, colors flying and bands playing. some of the girls could not help laughing at the unkempt appearance and nondescript costumes of the terrible and victorious yankees; but the people, who lined the streets, appeared neither hostile nor afraid, and the bells rang out a welcome.[23.32] the soldiers for their part soon felt they had reached eden, and they were none the less content on hearing of the dull saffron haze which now hung over vera cruz--a visible token that "king death in his yellow robe" had once more set up his throne there; while scott himself, wishing to tranquillize the army and favorably impress the public, proceeded to hide the errors of his subordinates with reports that misled the public.[23.33] as for the future he cheerfully announced, "mexico has no longer an army." apparently the united states had a very substantial one; but surprises were soon to occur.[23.34] xxiv puebla april-august, 1847 [the advance from jalapa] wishing to take advantage of the mexican panic, scott hurried worth's division after the fugitives. down the steep hill on which jalapa lies poured the men in blue, passing the little plaza and the quaint cathedral; and then without halt, leaving the city of flowers and its groves of liquidambar, they set out on a long, gradual ascent. what a march they now had! "the most beautiful country there is," commented an officer; and his remark was truer than he knew. dominated by the splendid snowy peak of orizaba, there spread a vast expanse of hills and gorges, mountains and valleys, here studded with white villages, there gemmed with a silver cascade, yonder brightened with fresh fields of corn and grain, always variegated with the shadows of lazy clouds, and everywhere softly receding into a deeper and still deeper blue; and as the column wound in and out through the clear, cool and fragrant atmosphere, every turn revealed new beauties or displayed once more the beauties already seen--only a little nearer each time, or a little more remote.[24.1] gradually the ascent grew sharper and the air cooler, and about a dozen miles from jalapa worth came to the black pass--the "terrible pass," wrote scott--of la hoya, where for more than a mile the troops were squeezed between two steep mountains, cleared to afford artillery a fair sweep, and partly fortified; but the seven or eight guns lay on the ground spiked, and not an enemy could be seen. then after making a sharp twist they kept on winding and ascending for about six miles till they reached the log houses of las vigas, much like those of russia and sweden. vegetation was luxuriant still; but the trees on the steep hills at the left were evergreens, and the flowers that brightened the overtowering walls, buttresses and spurting arches of black lava were mostly dandelions and yellow jarilla, for the americans now stood a mile and a half above the sea and almost three quarters of a mile above jalapa. here the winds bit; and now and then masses of thick vapor, whirling up from an immense gorge and burying the column for a time in wintry twilight, would sweep on ahead of it in rolling, shining volumes of heaven-high clouds.[24.1] [illustration: jalapa to puebla] this was the final pass; and after marching some twelve miles farther, one saw at the left edge of a sandy, gravelly plain, set with occasional tufts of coarse grass, the dust-brown castle of perote and, seemingly just above it though in reality several miles distant, the pine-clad mountain of that name. the castle was a superb specimen of military architecture, capable of accommodating more than 2000 men; but it had long served chiefly as a state prison, a refuge for troops, an arsenal, and a dépôt for the rich convoys that went this way. the american troops could have passed by on the other side of the plain, had that been necessary; but it was not. with only twenty-three gunners and scarcely any powder, general gaona could not have defended the place. canalizo therefore ordered him to evacuate it on the nineteenth; and at noon on the twenty-second worth took possession of its elaborate bastions, more than fifty cannon, more than 25,000 balls and shells and even 500 muskets, which the terror-stricken mexicans had not cared to remove. throwing garland's brigade and duncan's battery about fifteen miles in advance to facilitate the gathering of subsistence, worth now halted in accordance with his orders.[24.1] [scott's difficulties] scott meantime remained at jalapa to study his problems and make his preparations. the capital of mexico, he believed, lay at his mercy, and this opinion seems to have been correct; but unlike his critics, who merely had to deal with legions of ink on areas of paper, he found that much needed to be done before seizing it. the position of the americans depended vitally on military prestige, and it was therefore of the utmost importance to suffer no reverse. his first care was to make sure of getting up in advance of the especially fatal rainy season, which was expected to begin at the latest by the first week of june, the needful clothing, equipments, ammunition, salt, medicines and many other imported articles; and since the lack of cavalry and a due regard for the health of the troops forbade trying to keep the road below cerro gordo clear of mexicans, this tedious work involved the use of heavily escorted convoys,[24.2] and the exercise of unceasing vigilance, energy and skill.[24.6] [illustration: profile of the route from vera cruz to mexico] his next care was to gather provisions, determine whether supplies of breadstuffs, meats, rice, beans, coffee, sugar and forage existed near the proposed line of march, and arrange for obtaining them despite the hatred of the people, which quite equalled their fear.[24.3] a third care was to divine what santa anna intended and was able to do, for news came that he was now on our flank and rear, preparing to conduct guerilla war against the american detachments and convoys. contrary to his expectation scott found subsistence and forage scarce at jalapa, and as quitman's brigade came up without the extra rations it had been ordered to bring, the situation proved embarrassing. a scarcity of funds aggravated it alarmingly. an immediate advance upon the capital was therefore out of the question; but on april 30 scott issued preliminary instructions, enjoining kind treatment of the people in the strongest possible terms, as absolutely necessary if the troops did not wish to starve; and the volunteers were ordered to set out on the fourth and fifth of may.[24.6] but now a difficulty that had been feared by scott rose directly in his path. seven regiments and two companies of volunteers were to be free at various near dates, averaging about the middle of june. polk, believing that many would reënlist, had recommended that a bounty should be offered as an inducement, and congress had acted upon the suggestion. april 26 general scott received the law and promptly circulated it; but he soon found that polk's expectations were to be disappointed.[24.6] it would have been quite agreeable to linger at jalapa, strolling about this paradise of birds, gazing at the many-hued blossoms of a perpetual springtime, feasting on the delicacies of semi-tropical gardens, winning occasional glimpses of exotic luxury through doors ajar, listening to ever-graceful señoritas--a few dazzling blondes as well as many sparkling brunettes--who played the guitar hour after hour in their grated windows, and catching glances now and then from eyes of fire; but the soldiers had learned what campaigning really meant. they had been allowed to go unpaid and unprovided for. they had met with hardships and privations not counted upon at the time of enlistment. disease, battle, death, fearful toil and frightful marches had been found realities. besides, they had now "seen the elephant," as they said; they felt they had won glory enough; and, as even colonel campbell admitted, they "sighed heavily" for home, family and friends. in spite of their strong desire to see the halls of the montezumas, out of about 3700 men only enough to make one company would reëngage, and special inducements, offered by the general, to remain as teamsters proved wholly ineffective.[24.6] one course now open to scott was to march on, trusting that new forces would arrive seasonably to replace the soldiers discharged; but of this he had no assurance. another was to assume that even when legally free the volunteers would not abandon him in the enemy's capital; but the evidence was all to the contrary. more than once american troops had insisted upon their rights without considering the needs of the country; and now five colonels declared in writing that "only a very small proportion" of their men would "under any supposable circumstances" remain in the service "for any time whatever" beyond their term. such was the sentiment of all these volunteers.[24.6] moreover, to advance, capture mexico and so force the men to sail from vera cruz in the midst of the pestilential season would have been insubordinate as well as inhumane, for the government had ordered most emphatically, with particular reference to the yellow fever, that regard for their health must outweigh all military considerations.[24.4] the returning volunteers would also have been exposed, under inexperienced commanders and without a proper complement of artillery, to santa anna and the guerillas, and those remaining behind at the capital would have been regarded by the mexicans as destined prey. on the other hand, should the entire army retreat after capturing mexico, the exultant people would have risen almost _en masse_ to starve, harass and slaughter them; while even worth doubted whether scott's whole force, could it by any possibility be persuaded to remain intact, would be strong enough to hold the capital. finally, as the sequel was to show and as any well-informed person could have foreseen, merely capturing and retaining mexico city was not sure by any means to end the war. the seat of government could easily move, and scott was correctly informed that it proposed to do so. santa anna was in the field with a growing army; his moral and physical resources had not been exhausted; and more fighting needed to be done.[24.6] scott was called slow by some of his critics, but when the case permitted he could make a quick decision; and on the sixth and seventh of may the volunteers referred to--"with a joyous and pleasant countenance upon every man," as one of them wrote--set out for home under patterson.[24.5] their departure left the general with an army of 7113. as for early reinforcements, he had recommended on november 29 the addition of twelve regiments to the regular establishment, and had said that about the first of may they would be indispensable; but at present he only knew that 960 recruits were on the way. none the less he sent quitman forward with three regiments of november volunteers, and on the sixth of may instructed worth to advance with his division and two of those regiments, led by quitman, against puebla, leaving the third regiment with a sufficient number of artillerists at perote.[24.6] [mexican assistance] for the confidence with which less than 4000 men were thus advanced beyond the reach of prompt assistance, to cope with a strong city and the mexican troops, there was a special reason. the heads of the roman catholic church in mexico, who did not feel all the religious intolerance which they deemed it proper to exhibit in public, cherished no love toward santa anna. for many years his rapacity had given them offence; and one of his first acts on landing at vera cruz in august, 1846, had been to strike at their power. they had therefore felt disposed to favor the continuance of hostilities, hoping that he and his myrmidons would be destroyed. but when moses y. beach made it plain to them on the one hand that resistance to the united states would be dangerous, and on the other guaranteed the freedom and the property of church and citizens, they decided to support our efforts in behalf of peace, work against santa anna as the chief obstacle, and arrange secretly to have jalapa, perote, puebla and mexico city refrain from opposing scott.[24.8] at "unconquered puebla," which was more fully under the domination of the church than any other mexican town, circumstances favored the clerical design. terrible stories had been circulated there about the americans. they were barbarians, vandals, tigers; they had branded and sent across the gulf into slavery shiploads of tampico people, and stuck little children on their bayonets at vera cruz. but these tales had now lost all credibility. santa anna had been found out. buena vista no longer seemed a mexican victory. the military caste was not only hated but despised. news had come that wherever the americans took possession, odious taxes were abolished and trade became brisk. scott's treatment of the people shone in comparison with santa anna's, and his soldiers looked angelic beside the guerillas. the defeat at cerro gordo caused not only deep discouragement but even deeper disgust, for the men and money of the state had been sacrificed to the incompetence of the commanders. besides, marvels were told of the americans. they could hew a man asunder at one stroke; their horses were gigantic and incredibly swift; their artillery was unspeakably terrible; and every one of their bullets might split into fifty pieces, each of the pieces fatal. worth's division included 5000 of these warriors, an american deserter stated.[24.8] with such popular support the clericals had isunza, who was closely connected with them, put in place of the vigorous ibarra as governor, and he not only took a stand for non-resistance, but answered the appeals of the national government with sharp complaints. instead of preaching against the americans, the churchmen led pious processions about the streets, to show that prayer and not the arm of flesh was to be relied upon. the arms and ammunition were sent away--for safe-keeping. the governor would supply no funds for military purposes. "reason prohibits vain sacrifices," he remarked. the comandante general decided that the city could not be defended. the prefect ordered that after the arrival of the americans, not more than three citizens were to meet in public, and that none should carry arms; while the ayuntamiento announced that no unsigned placards would be tolerated. "men are not all called to play the rôle of heroes," observed the _monitor del pueblo_. we can only "await with resignation the terrible blow with which providence chooses to afflict us," decided the city authorities. all the arrangements are complete, worth was notified by headquarters on the tenth of may. the people are waiting for you, reported foreigners from puebla.[24.8] scott, for his part, agreed to protect the citizens and especially the church, and he put forth on the eleventh of may a proclamation called by him "the crowning act of conciliation," which was drawn up under his direction by a representative of the bishop of puebla, and embodied the ideas and sentiments deemed by the leaders of the clerical party most likely to be effective.[24.7] the oppression under which the people of mexico lay crushed received in this proclamation brief but vivid treatment, distrust regarding santa anna's abilities, honor and aims was excited, and the americans were represented as true brethren of the mexicans. paredes, an unpatriotic usurper, had forced us to take up arms in behalf of republican institutions and the welfare of the whole continent, as well as for the maintenance of our proper dignity; but we were anxious now as ever, to live in peace and friendship with mexico, even though determined, if the war must continue, to do the work of the sword thoroughly.[24.8] [santa anna's measures] on the other hand santa anna was not idle. his first thought on quitting the terrible field of cerro gordo was that canalizo's horse would stop at el encero, and that he might rally the flying infantry upon it; but on moving in that direction by the southern bank of río del plan he found himself cut off by the american pursuit, and turned abruptly to the left. always profoundly depressed after a reverse, he rode along grim and speechless, as if stunned; but the next day an enthusiastic reception at a small town, aided perhaps by the marvellous beauty of the district, lifted his head. in the early evening of april 21 he reached orizaba, and here the applause of the readily excited townsfolk made him feel himself once more a general and a president.[24.12] his low intellectual plane did not permit him to understand his mental inferiority or to perceive the real strength of the unpretentious and apparently careless americans.[24.9] it was impossible for him, looking abroad upon a vast and potentially rich country with all the vanity of his people, to believe that a handful of poorly dressed yankees, imperfectly trained and seemingly not very martial, could overpower its millions. he felt that sooner or later his groping finger would touch the right spring, as it had done so many times before, and the nation would rise up about him. pride, self-will and blind passion, raging in his heart, inflamed his courage; and his sense of a proprietary claim to the country inspired him with a sort of patriotism. what has been lost after all, he said, except a position and some cannon? the nation is still mighty. let it but join me, and i shall yet be victorious.[24.12] within his reach lay the brigade of antonio de león--a little more than 1000 poorly armed men with two 6-pounders--just from oaxaca, the presence of which in this quarter had brought him to orizaba, and also the national guards ordered before the battle to chiquihuite. larger and smaller bodies of fugitives and irregulars, learning where he was, came in. all the armed men of the vicinity, whatever their proper function, he caught in his unsparing net, and he summoned to the colors every citizen from sixteen to forty years of age. beyond the sweep of his arm far less animation reigned. one disappointment more, one hope less now, was the mildest frame of mind among the public. canalizo, a faithful dog that for the present had been kicked one time too many, sharply resented santa anna's complaints. the scattering soldiers and officers, denouncing him bitterly as well as exaggerating the power of the americans, discouraged the people. a popular newspaper demanded savagely that he should be court-martialled. the charge of collusion with the invaders came back to life. many of the indians, feeling that an american triumph would help them, became restive.[24.12] but the government stood resolutely behind him, and he was invested with plenary powers. soto tried again to rouse the people of the state. from a wider and wider circle fugitives and laboring men were gathered. small cannon and some artillerists came within his reach. the stocks of horses and mules that scott had tried in vain to get from the region of the upper alvarado river were turned to account. considerable money and supplies arrived from the government, and other funds and necessaries were taken without formalities wherever they could be discovered.[24.10] by the first of may he pretended there were 4000 men under his flag, and no doubt he did have 2500.[24.12] by good fortune more than by design, too, he found himself in an excellent position, within striking distance of scott's communications, rear and base; and even though not richly imbued with the spirit of napoleonic warfare, he laid his plans accordingly. but--fortunately for scott, who might have been seriously embarrassed[24.11]--santa anna was more politician than general. on may 15 the election of a president was to occur, and the votes had to be counted at the seat of government. his enemies and rivals were incessantly busy there. a revolution had begun to brew, he understood. a suspicion had got abroad that he intended to give up the fight and move into guatemala; and news reached him that mexico city was to be surrendered. for these reasons and to obtain additional supplies, all his forces were directed upon puebla; and at the head of a motley and miserable army numbering--he boasted--4500 men he arrived there on may 11.[24.12] his reception was not flattering. aside from the fact that everybody of much account felt ready to see scott, the town had suffered previously through santa anna's visiting it, accounts of his exactions had come from orizaba, his presence was thought likely to result in hostilities, and the people feared that he would compel them to take up arms. many fled at his approach, and many more wished they were elsewhere. not without excuse under the circumstances, his conduct was arbitrary, insulting and extortionate. he cashiered all the officers of the vera cruz garrison, raved at the indifference of the authorities and people at puebla, seized the horses, made liberal demands for cash, and--it was asserted--even took ornaments of gold from the churches. some funds, a quantity of ammunition and some cannon were finally obtained here; but isunza furnished him less than two hundred men, and perhaps the indignation of the people quite offset his gains.[24.13] [the americans march on] close behind him, too, came the americans. already a day's march apart, worth's two brigades maintained that interval for some time, followed by quitman with the new york and south carolina regiments at an equal distance. for six or eight miles from perote the country was highly cultivated and already brown with ripening wheat and barley; but then came a sandy, arid region where steep, conical hills of bare limestone, calcined like those of the rhone valley, shot up from a wide, smooth plain in extravagant confusion, and appeared to bar the way. hacienda buildings that were crenellated fortresses could be seen here and there; but the only cheering sights were glimpses of silvery orizaba, a number of smaller mountains with italian profiles, forked lightnings at play sometimes in the black clouds, and mirages of gardens, lakes and sylvan shores that deceived even the most experienced.[24.14] at ojo de agua, about thirty-five miles from perote, a spring of water almost as large as the fountain of vaucluse gave rise to a creek, which watered palmettoes and extensive meadows. eight or nine miles farther on, the troops came to dark nopalucan, which lay reclining on a comfortable eminence and viewing complacently its fertile valley. then some twenty-five miles of romantic scenery brought them to amozoc, a manufacturing town of 2000 souls ten or eleven miles from puebla, and here worth, who had made easy marches for two days in order to lessen the interval between him and quitman, halted his now united brigades at noon on the fourteenth to await that officer, and to give his own dusty division time to "brush up."[24.14] santa anna, after sending his infantry and artillery toward mexico early that morning, had moved off with some 2000 cavalry to surprise quitman, supposing that he would be at his usual distance behind worth, and that worth had continued his march. the consequence was that his troops, finding themselves at about eight o'clock within half a mile or so of duncan's battery and under fire, scattered promptly up the hills and into the woods. divining correctly that he would reassemble them to strike at quitman, worth despatched forces at once to the rear; but quitman, who had set out in the night, was now only two miles distant, and, warned by the artillery fire, had prepared to meet the enemy. santa anna therefore accomplished nothing more than to fatigue his men, and give them a superfluous lesson in running away; and after returning with them to puebla for the night, he evacuated that city before daybreak the next morning with one more failure to his account.[24.14] while at nopalucan, may 12, worth had addressed the governor and the municipality at puebla, saying that in three days he should take possession of the city, and that he desired to confer with the civil authorities before doing so, in order to arrange for the maintenance of order and worship. owing to what was regarded as a lack of formality in this proceeding and to santa anna's insistence that worth should have addressed him, no reply was made. but when a second letter arrived in the evening of the fourteenth, the ayuntamiento appointed a commission to meet the american general, and the next morning a conference took place at chachapa, where our troops arrived at an early hour. generous pledges of civil and religious protection were then offered and accepted; and the pueblans, who adopted the usual jockeying tactics, drew from worth an agreement that mexican law, to be administered by mexican authorities, should remain in force, although scott's general orders 20 had thrown the protection of military law round the american troops.[24.15] in short, said hitchcock, the inspector general of the army, worth--not puebla--surrendered; and scott found it necessary to rectify the error.[24.17] [worth takes possession of puebla] at a little before ten o'clock that day the american troops--who had suffered badly from dust on the arid, stony hills, consoled only by views of the great snow-clad volcanoes glittering behind puebla--approached the city. it was a proud moment for them when, as their brilliant commander said, "with all the flush and glow of victory in their hearts" they entered the second city of mexico in importance and the first in military fame. almost the entire population of the town looked on. streets, sidewalks, windows and balconies were thronged with holiday-makers. as usual, the appearance of the victorious americans fell sadly below expectation--perhaps only demigods in luminous mail could have reached it; but the people showed an intense curiosity to scrutinize them. sometimes the troops had to work their way through the crowd; but no ill temper was displayed on either side, and finally, reaching the main plaza, our men stacked their arms and lay down to sleep as if at home.[24.17] puebla, a fine city laid out in the rectangular style and inhabited by some 80,000 persons, was chiefly noted for piety, cotton mills, dolls and sweetmeats. the principal feature was the cathedral with its two dark towers--each of them capped with a yellowish, incrusted dome bearing aloft a globe and cross, and each filled with numberless bells of all sizes, which singly performed special offices, and three times a day rang together in a celestial chorus. eight or ten altars, refulgent with sacred vessels of gold, silver and precious stones in amazing profusion, lighted up the interior; and there was also a candelabra so big--or was it so grimy?--that $4000 had been paid a few months earlier for cleaning it. near by, in the arcades of the plaza, could be found the dolls and sweetmeats; and of course poblana market girls, too, were there: black eyes, black hair combed over the ears, huge silver ear-rings, snowy chemisette partly hidden with a gray _rebosa_ (scarf), short red petticoat fastened round the waist with a silk band and fringed with yellow, small shoes and large silver buckles.[24.17] for almost a fortnight worth now had an opportunity to show the real breadth of his admired talents. with the ecclesiastical authorities, for obvious reasons, no difficulties occurred. he and the bishop exchanged calls promptly. bells rang, churches opened, and in some of them public rejoicings were celebrated. but between him and the civil functionaries, mainly in consequence of his excessive complaisance, there sprang up not a little friction. his troops felt very much dissatisfied, for his nervous and restless temperament was in continual excitement about mexican attacks, and once he kept them standing under arms needlessly all day. such alarms came to be known as "worth's scarecrows"; and as the natural consequence, had a real danger presented itself, the men would have responded tardily and half-heartedly.[24.17] worse yet, on evidence for which he himself could not say much, he warned his division a little later (june 16) by means of a circular, that attempts to poison them were to be feared, adding gratuitously, "doubtless there are among those with whom we are situated many who will not hesitate, as is the habit of cowards, to poison those from whom they habitually fly in battle--a resource familiar in spanish history, legitimately inherited and willingly practised by mexicans." of course the circular was not likely to elude publicity, and its indiscretion blazed. it gave the pueblans a dangerous hint, insulted all mexicans, and reflected grossly upon spain, whose continued neutrality was highly desirable.[24.16] evidently, though quite able to criticise, worth did not possess all the qualifications of a commander-in-chief.[24.17] [the american situation at puebla] happily a wiser mind and steadier hand now took charge. until may 20 general scott had felt compelled to wait at jalapa for a heavy train, from which he expected much more than he received. two days later twiggs set out, and on the twenty-eighth scott--after leaving a garrison at jalapa and a smaller one at perote--reached puebla with four troops of horse one day in advance of the division.[24.18] as at plan del río his arrival brought confidence and tranquillity. needless alarms ended. rumors of hostile forces were investigated promptly by his mexican spy company[24.19] or other trustworthy persons, and the general fixed his mind on greater work than trying to hunt down every party of irregulars that raised a dust in the vicinity. the troops were drilled each morning and, if the weather permitted, later each day, and after about six weeks of this made a brilliant showing, when reviewed by divisions. the engineer soldiers received special training for the work supposed to lie before them; careful maps of the district between puebla and the capital were prepared; and scott frequently gathered the engineers and the heads of the army at his quarters of an evening, discussing military affairs or monologuing inimitably on the many interesting persons and events familiar to him.[24.22] the mexican government ordered that nothing marketable should be taken into the city, but the pueblans replied unanswerably: there is no power to enforce that policy; and if there were, the result would be to starve us, not the americans, for they could supply their needs by the sword and we could not. the markets offered, therefore, all sorts of articles and at moderate prices. indeed they were too abundant, for the soldiers gormandized on fruits and sugar-cane brandy, and these indulgences, added to the want of salt meat, the change of climate and water, the rare atmosphere, the chilling winds and the lack of suitable clothing, caused a great amount of sickness--principally dysentery and ague. on the fourth of june more than 1000 americans were on the invalid list, and that number largely increased.[24.22] sickness of mind prevailed no less. it depressed one to hear the dead march almost every evening. rumors of wholesale plots to assassinate the officers and poison the men tried their nerves. renewed efforts to cause desertion excited alarm. whig speeches condemning the war and suggesting that bloody hands and hospitable graves ought rightfully to be the welcome of our soldiers in mexico undermined confidence and courage. poverty chilled their marrow. men had served eight months and been paid for two. at the time when shoes and other indispensable clothing had to be obtained at an exorbitant cost, the army was already in debt and credit was flickering.[24.20] through an intercepted letter the mexicans knew of scott's financial difficulties, and the americans knew that they knew. the expected revolution against santa anna did not break out, and a pacific president was not elected on june 15, as general scott had almost expected.[24.22] to crown all other discouragements, we had a ridiculously small army, while news came repeatedly that santa anna's forces were growing rapidly. with less than 5800 privates--not over 4000 of them available for an advance--the general had to face, not only the mexican army, but a nation of seven million inflammable persons, who might at any time be roused to fury by some untoward event. even the 960 recruits that had been counted upon did not arrive. june 3, therefore, deciding to throw away the scabbard and meet all odds with the naked sword, he reluctantly ordered up to puebla the garrison of jalapa[24.21] and a part of the men left at perote, cutting himself off in the heart of the enemy's country.[24.22] pillow, the great captain, wrote censures on this course to polk, and polk, the consummate strategist, agreed with his agent; but scott understood that necessity is a supreme law and courage the soldier's first axiom. a farther advance was, however, impossible. to leave puebla without a garrison, allowing that strong city, reoccupied by the enemy, to menace the rear and stand like a wall of stone across the path of reinforcements and supplies, was out of the question; and troops were also needed to protect helpers and overawe enemies among the civil population. if reduced by these deductions the army would not have constituted a striking force. nothing could be done but stand at guard, and await new troops.[24.22] [the problem of reinforcements] these, for a number of reasons, were delayed. marcy's report of december 5, 1846, presented to congress at the opening of the session, admitted that the regular army stood nearly 7000 below full strength, and it also recommended the addition of ten regiments; but the administration, feeling at sea about its war policy, and not realizing how far the men on the firing-line came short of their estimated numbers or how much time would be required to place new troops there, took no decided stand in the matter. on the twenty-ninth, however, a bill authorizing the new regiments was presented in the house by the military committee, and the president followed this up some days later with a message. a law offering a bounty of twelve dollars to encourage enlisting, upon which the war department acted promptly, was the next move; and on january 11, 1847, the house, excited by news that worth stood in great peril at saltillo, voted the new regiments. the senate, on the other hand, procrastinated until marcy was in despair, and polk twice decided to address the country. without much doubt partisan scheming and personal aims were chiefly responsible for the delay; but differences of opinion, more or less honest, regarding the comparative utility of regulars and volunteers, the expediency and proper terms of a land bounty, and the rights of the senate in regard to the choice of officers caused much discussion, in which every issue touching the inception and conduct of the war had to run the gantlet of passionate vociferation.[24.25] progress was also hindered in another way. although polk had found it necessary to appoint scott and had given that officer to understand that bygones were to be bygones, he liked him no better than before, did not wish the whigs and their possible candidate for the presidency to win more glory in the war, and realized the political wisdom--particularly in view of calhoun's unfriendliness--of pleasing the van buren democrats. there were also objections to the existing arrangement that could be stated publicly. the number of troops to be employed in mexico was said to require a chief of higher grade than a major general, and polk took the ground that the commander--especially since he might be desired to handle the question of a treaty--should be in full agreement and sympathy with the executive.[24.25] for these combined reasons he offered to benton the post of lieutenant general, provided it could be established, before scott left washington, and about the first of january requested congress to authorize the appointment of such an officer.[24.23] this precipitated a commotion. the senator's harsh, domineering ways had made him unpopular, and grave doubts regarding his technical and temperamental fitness for the place existed not only in congress but in the cabinet. calhoun and his friends detested the idea of letting benton gain so much prestige and with it very likely the presidency; the partisans of taylor and scott resented such treatment of their favorites; all the whigs, besides suspecting polk of scheming to evade responsibility and make benton his grateful successor, rallied to the support of their two most prominent men; and, after serving for some time as an embarrassment, the plan was rejected.[24.25] finally, then, after a conference committee had adjusted the differences between the two houses, the ten regiment bill, though defeated once in the senate, passed that body on february the tenth, and received polk's approval the next day; and as a loan bill had been worried through congress at the end of january, something was apparently to be done.[24.24] since, however, the officers were liable to be discharged on the conclusion of peace, it was not believed that many already in the service could be induced by a slight advance in rank to enter the new establishment, and for this and probably other reasons few of the more than five hundred places were offered to the army. the field was therefore clear for civilian warriors, and their campaign opened at once. not limiting their operations to capitol hill, applicants for commissions besieged and assaulted the white house. "i have pushed them off and fought them with both hands like a man fighting fire," wrote polk in his diary, but "it has all been in vain." "loafers without merit" came, and equally meritorious congressmen supported them. not one in ten of the appointees was known to the president, and their degree of unfitness was precisely what might have been expected. a considerable number of them had actually been run out of the service--in some cases for bad conduct before the enemy--and many were found less teachable than privates.[24.25] during february this beautiful exhibition continued, and such were the only immediate fruits of the much debated law, for it empowered no one to organize the new troops into brigades and divisions or to appoint general officers, and the military appropriations had not yet been made. further congressional exertions, therefore, had to be put forth; but at last on the second and third of march, after a loss of almost three months at this crisis of the war, the deficiencies were supplied, and enlistment shortly began. vigorous efforts were made by the administration to set the new regulars in motion, company by company, and even squad by squad; and finally on the nineteenth of april, since little more could be expected from the november calls, requisitions for six and a half new regiments of volunteer infantry and twelve companies of horse--all to serve until the conclusion of peace--were issued.[24.25] on the fourth of june, then, about six hundred new troops, commanded by brevet colonel mcintosh, left vera cruz for the interior, escorting a long train of loaded mules and wagons and two or three hundred thousand dollars in specie. mexican irregulars, who knew the value of the convoy, soon attacked and stopped it. cadwalader, then waiting for a part of his brigade, reinforced mcintosh on the eleventh with about five hundred men and took command. fighting his way along he incorporated the garrison of jalapa commanded by colonel childs, and on the twenty-first reached perote.[24.27] meanwhile pillow, now a major general by the grace of his former law partner, arriving at vera cruz and finding there some 2000 of his men, had advanced with most of them on june 18; and although scott was in the most urgent need of money, pillow ordered cadwalader to await his arrival at perote. eventually, on july 3, the combined forces were in motion, and five days later all of them--including the recruits long since expected--passed the brown gate of puebla. of the rank and file scott now had 8061 effectives and 2215 sick. next brigadier general pierce with some 2500 men got away from the coast about the fifteenth of july,[24.26] and after similar fighting appeared at headquarters on the sixth of august with a heavy siege battery, a long train of wagons and $85,000 in unsalable drafts, but with none of the specie that had been expected and regarded as indispensable.[24.27] [the american army] scott now had about 14,000 men, some 2500 of whom lay, however, in the hospitals, while about six hundred were convalescents too feeble for an ordinary day's march. the cavalry, led by colonel harney, included portions of the three dragoon regiments under captain kearny, major sumner and major mcreynolds. for artillery, besides the siege train, there were the field batteries of duncan, taylor, steptoe and others,[24.28] and the howitzer and rocket battery of talcott. brevet major general worth's division of infantry, known as the first, consisted of brevet colonel garland's brigade (second and third artillery, fourth infantry and a light battalion) and the brigade of colonel clarke, which included the fifth, sixth and eighth infantry. the second division, commanded by brigadier general twiggs, was composed of the regiments under brevet brigadier general persifor f. smith (mounted riflemen, first artillery and third infantry) and brevet colonel riley (fourth artillery, second and seventh infantry). major general pillow, higher in rank than the brave, able and experienced worth, a professional soldier, had the eleventh and fourteenth infantry and the voltigeur regiment under brigadier general cadwalader, a polished veteran of chestnut street parades, philadelphia, and the ninth, twelfth and fifteenth infantry under the gentlemanly franklin pierce, a social and political hero of concord, new hampshire; while general shields's brigade (new york and south carolina volunteers) and lieutenant colonel watson's, consisting of three hundred marines and a detachment of the second pennsylvania, made up the division of quitman, an excellent person and politician, who had now reached the highest military grade.[24.29] the troops that had been waiting at puebla were by this time in fine training; and the new men, besides receiving the soldier's baptism on the way up, had learned at least the value of discipline and skill. the former had become to a large extent acclimated, and they felt an entire confidence in their commander, which, fully accredited by his victories, extended promptly to the reinforcements. the essential clothing had been purchased or manufactured. thanks to indefatigable exertions a large stock of provisions had been accumulated, and at a cost of 15 per cent funds for the march to the capital had been raised. although time had permitted the friendly sentiments and reasonable arguments of scott's proclamation to leaven the people, and association with the americans had refuted the calumnies previously effective against them, our officers and men expected hard fighting. thoughts of distant homes and of near perils were silvering many a fine head. there were no good laughers in the army now. but in an equal degree hearts were nerved. mentally the cost of success, figured without discount, was already paid. all felt eager to advance. and when, anticipating pierce's arrival by one day, scott gave the order, a soldier's joy lighted up their bronzed features.[24.30] xxv on to the capital april-august, 1847 almost immediately after santa anna left the seat of government for the cerro gordo campaign, more than twenty generals and several members of congress were called together at the palace by anaya to consider the defence of the capital.[25.1] apparently the problem could be solved without much difficulty. mexico lies in a rather shallow basin--said to be the crater of an ancient volcano--about thirty-two by forty-six miles in diameter. in the time of cortez the site had consisted of islands barely rising above the water, but the spaces between these had gradually been filled, and the water had subsided. six lakes could still be counted, however; almost everywhere else in the environs there were marshes traversed by elevated roads or causeways; and the rim of the basin, as well as the routes beyond it, seemed to offer advantageous points for defence.[25.2] the sentiment of this council and of the city, though concealed under a cloak of bellicose ardor, opposed resisting the americans in earnest, or at all events opposed inviting bombardment; and it was therefore decided merely to take precautions against a raid, fortify certain points on the roads, and bring out a host of irregulars to hang upon the rear and flanks of the enemy. all men capable of bearing arms were summoned to the colors. the states were called upon for aid. hopes of borrowing twenty millions imparted a sunny look to the situation; and ecclesiastics, naturally passive in view of the agreement with beach to let scott have the city, were deliberately forced into the streets by the civil authorities to preach fanaticism and rouse the public from their apathy. except perhaps by this last method, however, little was accomplished. "let us unite, let us unite, and do you go and fight against the french," some of the spanish priests had said when their country was invaded by napoleon. so things went now in mexico, and every one assigned to himself the duty of exhorting. fine ideas beamed forth, but everything of practical utility was conspicuously wanting. still, as the american volunteers were considered "banditti, without the slightest knowledge of military tactics, without any sort of training, without confidence, and in general easily terrified," no keen sense of alarm was felt.[25.2] [illustration: valley of mexico] [political chaos at mexico] the disaster of cerro gordo cast new and fearful shadows upon the scene. that defeat, said anaya, "simply means complete ruin for the whole republic," and even his gratification that santa anna's "interesting person" had not gone down in the wreck seemed rather of an iridescent kind. military confidence, which had revived after earlier shocks, gave way entirely. the prestige derived by santa anna from his alleged success at buena vista was now torn to shreds by panting fugitives from the south. about a thousand pamphlets, for which no language was too savage or too true, poured light upon his character and achievements, and the military men as a class met with similar treatment.[25.3] to be sure, the government promised boldly to continue the war. april 20 congress invested the executive with autocratic powers, and prohibited all steps toward peace.[25.4] the federal district, in which lay the capital, was placed under martial law. urgent demands for troops were sent wherever soldiers could be supposed to lurk. once more the authorities called upon every citizen of the proper age to take up arms. quotas aggregating 32,000 men were formally assigned to the states. light fortifications, intended to delay and perhaps block the americans, were ordered to be thrown up along the route; and the heads of the church issued an appeal for concord and morality.[25.5] but all of these proceedings displayed more alarm than courage, more desperation than intelligence. many of the defensive points were found valueless. tools, funds, engineers and laborers fell short. the meagre donations for continuing hostilities evinced a total want of enthusiasm. the problem of obtaining enough troops, provisions and artillery to defend the town seemed more and more insoluble, and the danger not only of bombardment but of sack more and more terrible. grandees got out their old travelling coaches, and even plain citizens began to emigrate. the government itself decided that against an army represented by american deserters as more than 16,000 strong, fully equipped, shortly to be reinforced, and soon to advance, the city could not possibly be held; and the favorite plan of the administration, the most promising that could be devised, was to buy up scott's irish soldiers through the priest mcnamara, recently conspicuous in california, and facilitate their desertion by having santa anna attack puebla. should this fail, submission and peace appear to have been deemed inevitable.[25.5] with some exceptions rulers and people alike, wearied by decades of dissensions, oppression, scheming, robbery and illusory promises, discouraged by the passive opposition of the clergy and the wealthy classes, overwhelmed by a series of military disasters, convinced that incompetent and perhaps traitorous generals led the armies, and powerless to discern any happy omens for the country, felt neither hope nor spirit; and the kindness of the americans, added to their invincibility, had now overcome even the instinct of race.[25.5] to heighten the confusion, a state of governmental chaos reigned. anaya had at most but little prestige or influence, and friends of santa anna, angry because excluded from office, created a friction between the two that weakened both. the ministers could not coöperate harmoniously. general bravo was given command of all the troops in the federal district and the state of méxico, and santa anna did not want him in that important position. congress devoted itself, when not harassing the administration, to wrangling over a new constitution, substantially that of 1824, which finally was voted on the eighteenth of may. in conscious impotence the puros writhed and snarled; and their enemies, the moderados, after having triumphed and brought santa anna to their side, now boldly paraded their dislike of him, and, by showing no concern except about retaining their power, excited hostility and contempt. common sense was no less wanting than patriotism; and when these two parties finally agreed to save the country, their plan was--to supplement the constitution with two more articles.[25.5] of all the discontent, resentments and ambitions the now despised santa anna became naturally the target. almonte still plotted to be president. arista and ampudia, joined now in disgrace as formerly in misfortune, felt thoroughly dissatisfied. gómez farías could not forget his betrayal, and olaguíbel, governor of the most important state, méxico, loyally supported him. bravo reciprocated santa anna's dislike. valencia aspired to the chief military command. all in favor of ending the war--who now had an organ, _el razonador_--considered santa anna a bar to peace and even to the faithful observance of a preliminary armistice; and some of them, arguing that his extraordinary powers were cancelled automatically by the adoption of a new organic law, advocated placing him in the interior somewhere, ostensibly to wait for new troops, and negotiating a treaty without his knowledge. the puros were expected to explode a revolution against him about the twentieth of may, and for all sorts of personal or patriotic reasons a host of minor individuals made ready to coöperate with it.[25.5] [santa anna at the capital] but all these busy folks were only mice, reckoning without the cat. on leaving puebla santa anna proceeded to san martín, which lay on the direct road to mexico where it began to ascend the rim of the valley. works had been erected near, but it was found they could easily be turned and not easily be provisioned; and a council of war decided to occupy the capital, since only there could large resources be counted upon. may 18, therefore, the wretched army of 3000 or 3500 men arrived at ayotla, fifteen miles from their destination. learning of this unexpected and undesired event, the hostile elements undertook to "pronounce" at once, but could not set the movement off. three leading statesmen of the dominant party then hurried to meet the general, and after arguing all day persuaded him to write that anaya might remain in office and even decide whether mexico city should be defended, while he himself would retain his military command, or, if dissatisfied with anaya's decision, would resign.[25.6] but presently cunning tornel and one or two others convinced santa anna that a mere handful of enemies had spread this net in order to drag him from power, and eliminate his influence on the vital question of peace. jealousy and fears inspired by the favor that valencia and bravo were apparently enjoying, added to the urgency of his officers, did the rest; and on the nineteenth, in spite of the understanding just agreed upon--indeed, only about an hour after his letter reached the palace--his troops entered the city. anaya's rather sour and curdled face flushed hot and bitter. he did not care to retain the presidency, for he believed a revolution would soon break out; but forcible ejection, in disregard of a written promise, was another affair. he found himself powerless, however; and the next day, after inducing a council of generals to decide upon holding mexico, santa anna announced that he would sacrifice his wishes, and resume the executive power.[25.6] the state of things that ensued was indescribable. nothing equal to it has been known perhaps, and nothing imagined save the witches' caldron. one public man estimated the number of bubbling intrigues as twenty millions. nothing is left us except vanity and dissension, but those we possess in the superlative degree, wrote ramírez. congress had no prestige, no power, no capacity; and its factions could see nothing except opportunities to stab one another. santa anna's breach of faith intensified the distrust and hatred of the moderados without gratifying the puros. hoping to win some popularity, he restored the freedom of the press, which had recently been curtailed; but his enemies merely took advantage of it. "the man of la angostura, of cerro gordo, of amozoc, weary of destroying mexicans on the field of battle, comes home tranquilly to find repose in the presidential chair," exclaimed almonte's organ.[25.6] a plausible and eloquent manifesto put out over santa anna's name dropped cold on the pavement. no basis of popular or political strength for even a temporary footing could be discovered by his counsellors. santa anna himself felt staggered by the opposition. his only chance was to place the nation between the devil and the deep sea--between bayonets and chaos--hoping it would again call upon him to save it; and so on the twenty-eighth, declaring that schemers and revolutionists, who found him in their way, paralyzed his efforts to serve the country, he made another sacrifice, and resigned the presidency.[25.6] unhappily for him it soon appeared likely that congress would accept the sacrifice, while on the other hand certain aspects of his outlook brightened. busy tornel induced a fraction of the puros, who realized their helplessness, to adopt his cause. valencia, though much to santa anna's repugnance, had been given for his present portion the chief command at san luis potosí, and so disappeared from the capital. almonte found himself in prison under a charge of conspiracy. arista and ampudia were banished from the vicinity. bravo retired from his command. at the same time promotions fell copiously on devotees; and the happy recipients knew these might well cease to be valid, should their patron fall. almonte was said to have received a majority of the votes for president, while santa anna had been supported by only chihuahua; but so much territory lay in american hands that a question about the legality of the election arose, and congress deferred the matter. on the second of june, therefore, the arch-prestidigitator laid himself once more upon the altar, and in order to save the country from scott and anarchy withdrew his resignation.[25.6] "mexicans, i shall be with you always--to the consummation of your ruin," so the _monitor republicano_ paraphrased his announcement; and then it added: "what a life of sacrifice is the general's; a sacrifice to take the power, to resign, to resume; ultimate sacrifice; ultimate final; ultimate more final; ultimate most final; ultimate the very finalest. but let him cheer up. he is not alone in making sacrifices. for twenty-five years the mexican people have been sacrificing themselves, all of them, in the hope that certain persons would do good to the country." but in spite of sarcasm and ridicule santa anna had triumphed. hated by many, disliked by most, distrusted by nearly all, yet forging ahead because he was on the ground with troops, because his combination of good luck, audacity and cunning could not be matched, because the moderado government had proved incompetent, because a régime of dissension and anarchy could organize no solid opposition against him, and because a group of selfish interests found in him a sharp, tough bit of steel to fix at the head of their spear, he triumphed once more.[25.6] [santa anna still supreme] the victory threatened, however, to be fatal. in every direction lurked pitfalls charged with gunpowder. in all the history of mexico dissensions had never been more bitter, nor political and social chaos nearer. congress annoyed him until at length, by failing week after week to form a quorum lest one faction or another should score an advantage, it fell into abeyance and left him virtually a dictator.[25.7] in the hope of obtaining funds from the church, he gave deeper offence than ever to the most prominent of the moderados; but the prelates, in alliance with leading monarchists, continued to plot against him. newspapers waged a bitter campaign until choked with an iron hand. his persecution of the generals excited fierce resentment. a puro chief, entering the cabinet and getting a glimpse of his ulterior aims, resigned in six days.[25.8] in short the administration had no political creed, and could find no political support; and the assistance of that indispensable villain, tornel, who could be seen stealing to the palace at the hour when the night-hawk begins to fly, covered it with discredit. executive authorities waged almost civil war upon one another. rumors, not without some basis, that a formal dictatorship was in view, could not be stilled; and the general want of confidence in the president's character and aims rendered the most skilful appeals to patriotism vain. only by the utmost exertions could the fragile edifice of government be kept balanced on the point of the bayonet.[25.8] nor was the opposition against santa anna confined to his immediate vicinity. the people of mexico city had always despised the outlying states; and not only was this disdain repaid, but the capital, source of so many political and financial ills experienced by the rest of the country, was looked upon by a great number of thoughtful men as hopelessly corrupt--as a diseased part that required amputation. when restoring the old federal system in august, 1846, in order to satisfy his democratic allies and win popularity, santa anna apparently did not foresee, as consul black did, that after realizing their power and getting into touch with one another, the states would take a firm position upon their prerogatives. in addition to such difficulties, it was commonly felt that military men and the army stood mortally opposed to democracy and federal institutions, that success in the field might enable santa anna to overthrow this principle and these institutions, and that a loud cry for patriotism and war, combined with a systematic withholding of men and supplies, would compel him to fight and ensure his ruin.[25.8] by evasions, therefore, or in some cases positive refusals to obey the commands of the general government, substantially all the states withheld support, frequently alleging that under the régime of the new constitution its extraordinary powers, conferred by the law of april 20, did not exist, and that all national guards, as well as all revenues assigned to the states in september, 1846, were independent of the national authorities. in this opposition zacatecas naturally played a leading part, but perhaps olaguíbel, an impressive, honest and able man, who had travelled in the united states and europe and had filled his library with busts of the leading american statesmen, was its foremost representative; and the firm support of his constituents, who felt intensely jealous of santa anna, as well as the coöperation of gómez farías, rendered him a formidable person. balked thus by constitutional theories that not only flattered local interests and pride but were noticeably economical, santa anna could obtain--aside from the troops brought by general juan alvarez and a few others--very little assistance outside of the federal district.[25.8] that was hard enough, but still greater difficulties lay behind it. in the far northwest sonora, sinaloa and durango entertained the idea of uniting as a new republic, and six of the central states were banded together in a coalition. this extra-legal, if not illegal, organization had been called into existence in january, 1847, by the pronunciamiento of the mazatlán garrison, which aimed at making santa anna dictator. by the end of may it was in good shape, and had a plan for troops of its own. two weeks later the delegates, who made lagos their place of meeting, called themselves an assembly, and were buying arms; and by the fourth of july they felt bold enough to declare null a decree of santa anna. of course the ostensible purpose was to protect independence, nationality and federal institutions; but, as the correspondence of the state governors reveals, the real aims included the establishment of a "new pact of alliance," a new confederation, in which santa anna and that babylon, the city of mexico, should have no part. with this coalition a large number of the puros naturally sympathized.[25.8] [santa anna prepares for battle] in the face of it all, however, the futile strategist of cerro gordo, with a truly superb wilfulness and a more truly pitiful self-confidence, snatched up once more the bloody dice. cannon were brought from distant points, cast by the government from bells and old ordnance at chapultepec and elsewhere, or manufactured by contractors. new muskets, of which foreigners offered to deliver great stocks at mexican ports or by way of guatemala, were purchased; old ones, appropriated by deserters or stolen during revolutions, were hunted up; and all citizens were ordered, though perhaps without great results, to let the government have what arms they owned. immense quantities of powder were produced at morelia, at guanajuato, at santa fe near mexico, and at the capital; a great deal was imported overland from british honduras, and additional supplies came from new orleans by the way of campeche. at various points mortars, bayonets, projectiles and numberless other articles were turned out by government establishments or private contractors. forges clanged on all sides; and wherever the president's restless and unscrupulous mind could have its way, there reigned a feverish activity, cooled only by a want of funds.[25.11] at mexico city, before his arrival, some 2000 regulars and 8000 national guards, besides the officers, were in garrison; and these with his army, five hundred from querétaro, some two hundred irish deserters, an unknown number of able-bodied loafers impressed at the capital, and larger or smaller accessions from other sources, made up the army of the east. the army of the south under juan alvarez, who commanded the line to acapulco with headquarters near mexico, had on its roll at the end of june 2748 officers and men; and canalizo, comandante general of puebla, who became reconciled to his chief in june, was supposed to have a few thousands of national guards and irregulars. but as most of these forces were poorly paid and a large part of them served unwillingly, desertion--in spite of the severest rules--was common, and the numbers fluctuated incessantly.[25.11] at san luis potosí, meantime, lay the army of the north, which contained the largest percentage of veterans. in may valencia, so long a rival of the president, had talked in a very lofty style, as if already the military head of the nation, about marching south and cutting worth to pieces, and santa anna, though anxious to get his troops, now wished him to remain at a distance; but in july, on account of scott's approaching reinforcements, it seemed necessary to bring down that army, and it arrived at guadalupe hidalgo, a few miles north of mexico, on the twenty-seventh, numbering more than 4000 men with twenty-two guns. just how many soldiers the president then had cannot be stated, and in all probability no one could have stated at the time; but, such as they were, there seem to have been fully 25,000 men and probably, as reports and intercepted letters convinced many of the americans, 30,000, if not more.[25.9] some were well dressed, well equipped and well trained; but from that pinnacle the army descended to mere off-scourings, whose rags were as the president said, "a disgrace to the nation," and whose military efficiency doubtless corresponded.[25.11] of equally varied quality were the officers. the generals best known to the country were nearly all out of the service now, being under charges or at odds with the head of the government. valencia was a conspirator, a drunkard, a dolt and a volcano. alvarez, an ignorant mulatto from the wilds, understood only half-savage, partisan fighting. lombardini, a strutting lackey, who commanded the army of the east except when santa anna took personal charge of it, strove to conceal behind a swarthy face, a heavy mustache and goatee, and a ceaseless volubility the poverty of his intellect; and the great mass of the officers were--well, they had already shown their value. they were now ordered to be intelligent and brave, to be zealous whether paid or not paid, to do their full duty and something more, to cast behind them every thought of accepting parole, and to say nothing against their superiors; but it lay beyond the power of orders to make them what they could not be, and the small number of excellent men were lost in the crowd.[25.11] [the mexican plans] regarding the plan of operations a radical difference of opinion existed. to not a few the idea that scott was lying comfortably at puebla seemed almost unendurable. they longed to have him attacked unceasingly; and they insisted that, should the arrogant invader dare to march for the capital, every step of the route should be contested. santa anna on the other hand still believed in concentration, and though some regard was paid to the apprehensions of the ayuntamiento, his views naturally prevailed. the plan adopted, then, after considerable vacillation in regard to details, was to protect the entire perimeter of the city with fortifications, inundate more or less the surrounding meadows, and prevent scott from seriously injuring the town with his artillery by erecting a series of works at the most advantageous points of the environs. these protected lines were to be held by the less reliable corps--national guards, for example--and the troops belonging to the regular army were to be a mobile force ready to defend the city at any threatened point.[25.11] the plan was thus essentially defensive, and it has been said with much force that a system of this kind promises merely negative results in the case of success, and positive ruin in the case of defeat. but the present situation was peculiar. supplied with provisions for no long period, and without hopes of early and strong reinforcements, the americans were bound to fail unless promptly and signally victorious, and their entering the valley would then have meant destruction. "scott is lost," exclaimed the duke of wellington after the americans crossed the rim; "he cannot capture the city and he cannot fall back upon his base." santa anna's plan, therefore, did not merit the criticism bestowed upon it.[25.11] besides, alvarez with nearly all the mexican horse was to swing in behind the advancing americans, cut off their communication with puebla, follow, annoy and injure them in every possible way, conceal his real strength so as to bring out and overwhelm their cavalry, attack vigorously whenever scott should become seriously engaged before mexican fortifications, and be ready to prevent his retreat. canalizo with his thousands was to support alvarez; and valencia also, advancing from guadalupe hidalgo to the, village of texcoco, east of mexico, was to coöperate with him, and especially to throw himself with all his energy into the attack on the american rear or flank, whenever scott should assail the outer works. at the same time the people of the neighboring towns and villages were to swarm about the invader like hornets, and sting him day and night incessantly. in short the plan was excellent--only santa anna overlooked, as usual, several possibilities.[25.11] as soon as he took up the reins of government the construction of defences had begun, and now, under the technical direction of general mora, manuel robles and juan cano, it was pushed with all the energy of an intense military despot who stuck at nothing. villages were depopulated, haciendas robbed of their laborers, jails emptied, and the streets cleared of vagabonds. enforce obedience, the governor of the district was curtly told when he reported that his orders had no effect. sunset no longer promised repose, and the church bells no longer meant worship. informed on july 18 that scott would leave puebla on the twenty-first, santa anna rose above his exemplar, napoleon, and took for model the creator. within eight days let all the works be completed, he decreed. but engineers, laborers, tools, instruments, timber, provisions, time and cash--much of which was embezzled by high officers and officials even at this juncture--all fell short, and santa anna's serviceable cannon were not enough to equip even the works constructed.[25.11] certain points, however, became quite formidable, and especially old peñón, a lofty, precipitous hill of rock standing by itself, close to the puebla route, seven miles from the city.[25.10] stockades, breastworks, parapets and guns bristled on summit and brow; works at the base and in advance commanded all dangerous approaches; a trench full of water crossed the road; the meadows in front--cut with ditches--were inundated; and the swampy edge of lake texcoco guarded the opposite side of the road. to the mexicans, who always measured the strength of a chain by its heaviest link, this position seemed a wonderful protection; and in general the people, if not the city, were strongly fortified by the president's labors.[25.11] [the people enthusiastic] for other reasons also the morale of the inhabitants improved. characteristic light-heartedness made them turn from past defeats to future triumphs. they were told that at cerro gordo scott had made his troops fight by opening a battery upon them from the rear; that his men, while they presumed to think they could make "vile slaves" of the generous and valiant mexicans, were few, sickly, poverty-stricken, dissatisfied; and that polk, embarrassed by the expense of the war, could send him but scanty reinforcements. greed, brutality and sanguinary ambition were charged against us at this crisis by the london _times_ in its usual contemptuous manner, and the _diario_ eagerly quoted it. the successes of the guerillas against american convoys roused a lively enthusiasm. "only a little, a very little" effort is necessary to beat the hateful anglo-saxon, proclaimed the government; and a review of the brilliant eleventh infantry, headed by its band of twenty-five pieces, made that little seem easy and agreeable.[25.11] people who bore the names of saints as a matter of course easily exploded scott's address of may 11. how absurd, they cried, for the american general to pretend he is a christian: there is no st. winfield in the calendar! the only hope of the americans lies in mexican dissension, therefore let us disappoint them, it was urged; and to promote harmony all the newspapers except the official organ were suspended on plausible grounds. santa anna's activity and warlike spirit had to be recognized by all. we must confide in him and gather round him like a band of brothers, preached the _diario_; and when all political trials were ordered to end, and the president banqueted at valencia's house, the fraternal era so long hoped for seemed at hand.[25.11] finally, on the ninth of august, at two o'clock in the afternoon, a 16-pounder boomed portentously from the citadel. the long roll was beaten. bands of music patrolled the city. hands clapped. vivas echoed through the streets. rockets flashed rosettes in the sky. "blinded by pride the enemy have set out for the capital," proclaimed santa anna; "for this, mexicans, i congratulate myself and you." the government, while savagely and contemptuously scoring the americans, announced a series of reforms to be effected by santa anna, not as a constitutional magistrate, but as a divine providence; and the _diario_ echoed back, "half a dozen of these measures would change the face of the republic." the president assumed command of the army, and every citizen from sixteen to fifty years of age took his place in the ranks. amidst the most fervid enthusiasm of crowds that filled the streets, balconies and housetops, troops followed troops gaily toward old peñón, and two days later the forces were reviewed there.[25.12] tents gleamed under a splendid sun. bands played as if inspired. the soldiers marched with a quick, impatient step. anaya--recently the chief magistrate, gorostiza--the primate of mexico's literary men, white-haired herrera--the most honored of her political chiefs, and countless other dignitaries did honor to the occasion. the rich vestments of the clergy gave exquisite lustre and color, and their pompous benedictions added a sense of more than human grandeur. all were happy, radiant, brotherly. every thought of peace, every thought of opposing or even doubting santa anna appeared to be forgotten. in all his previous career so refulgent a day had never been his. "ecce homo!" cried the _diario_; "behold the illustrious champion of 1821, the hero of 1829, the genius of 1838!" for him the hill became a mount of transfiguration. or rather, perhaps, it was mt. sinai, where deity appeared in thunders and lightnings. you must, was the command to the governor of zacatecas this day. let the state of mexico send me her troops, rang the message to olaguíbel. and olaguíbel replied meekly, they shall go to-morrow.[25.12] [scott's march to mexico] scott was in fact advancing. on the morning of saturday, the seventh, his camp was astir early. the base of popocatepetl seemed black, and the slopes a pale, silvery blue; but its top, almost 18,000 feet above the sea, was a "blazing star," as some of the indians named the mountain, and appeared like an omen of victory. the second division was soon ready. twiggs faced it, waved his hat round his white head, and cried in the voice of ajax, "now, my lads, give them a cerro gordo shout!" a simultaneous hurrah from twenty-five hundred iron throats was the response; and at six o'clock, preceded by the cavalry and the engineer company and followed by the siege train--while his band, mounted on splendid white horses, played our national airs--he began the eventful march. one day apart, quitman, worth and pillow followed him. though it was announced that no man unable to do three marches could be permitted to go, hundreds of convalescents unequal to the effort insisted upon trying, and, gradually falling out, rejoined the garrison of puebla. feeble in numbers[25.13] for such an enterprise, but confiding in their quality, their leader and their prestige, the 10,738 men and their officers pressed boldly forward.[25.15] for a time the dust proved extremely annoying and the sun scorched; but soon mountain air began to be felt, and the troops entered a wide, blooming and scented valley, full of rich fields, grazing herds, noble hacienda houses that were almost palaces, and trim white churches that seemed like stragglers from the great host at puebla. in the rear shone orizaba and the nearer pyramid of malinchi. on the left popocatepetl and his consort, the sleeping woman (iztaccihuatl), deeply blanketed in fleecy white, looked hardly a stone's throw distant; and after the sun had set, the air grown cold, and the valley--now less open--filled with shadows, their purple tops glowed like interplanetary lighthouses.[25.15] soon after passing the ugly little town of san martín, twenty miles from puebla, the troops began to ascend more rapidly. eleven miles more brought them to a mountain river, tesmelucan, where the elegant aërial bridge that spanned the abyss made them almost feel they were flying. the scenery now became alpine. deep chasms, answered to peaks, and lovely glens to precipices; and the cedar, the oak and the ash, as well as pines of extraordinary height and straightness, reared themselves on the slopes. at río frio, about thirty-six miles from both puebla and mexico, where an icy stream dashed foaming down the rocks, the mountains closed in on the left, and their crest, lined with deserted parapets, almost overhung the road.[25.14] then a stiffer climb of about five miles placed the troops on a narrow plateau which formed the summit; and they were now 10,500 feet above the sea.[25.15] a few miles down the steep descent on the other side their prospect opened, and below, girt round with singularly bold mountains--rough, dark and purplish, but softened here and there with a wisp of shining vapor--lay the valley of mexico, which the pellucid atmosphere, transmitting colors and outlines undimmed, brought wondrously nigh. ten small volcanoes, that had been crumbling for ages untold, stood clothed in luxuriant verdure nearly to the summit. six broad lakes now laughed under the brilliant sun and now brooded in the shadows of passing clouds. velvet champaigns--cut with ash-colored roads, gleaming canals and straight lines of poplars, and studded with walled haciendas, rambling towns and cozy-looking villages--were further variegated with highly cultivated fields of many crops, with groves and orchards from which peered steeples and bell-towers, with villa roofs of tiles, red and cheery, and with whitewashed cottages that shone like silver. every possible hue of green and every possible tone of light and shade blended into one harmonious effect. and in the midst of this wonderful scene, as the climax of the stillness and beauty, the focus of all eyes, the aim of all desires, untarnished by smoke, seemingly without stain, bright with sunshine, begemmed with many a palace, park and lofty church, slumbered the capital of mexico, venice-of-the-mountains. not one of the fascinated soldiers but held his breath; and not one, testified the commander-in-chief, but said to himself or his neighbor, "that splendid city shall soon be ours!"[25.15] along this part of the route almost 13,000 trees had been cut down for barricades, and some of them had been placed in the road; but the americans were not materially hindered, and in crossing the lower slopes they found little to do except admire the wondrous variety and profusion of the wild-flowers. on the eleventh, seeing mexicans ahead for the second time, twiggs waited for quitman; but a few hours later, after passing a cross-road, he went on about four miles, and occupied the adobe village of ayotla, half-buried in olive trees, while harney's cavalry took post at san isidro, a mile and a half in advance, and quitman camped in the rear. the next day worth's division turned to the left by the cross-road, marched three miles and a half to the squalid little town of chalco, simmering at the margin of the shallow, marshy lake bearing that name, and finally halted a little distance beyond; and pillow camped at chimalpa, not far beyond worth.[25.15] but what had the enemy been doing? the people along the route, who were to have stung the americans day and night, recognized the difference between them and the mexican irregulars, welcomed them cordially, and gave them all possible assistance. canalizo--who seems to have been cowed by the disaster of cerro gordo, and some time before this had fled from san martín, with six hundred men at his back, on seeing an american officer, detailed to arrange an exchange of prisoners, approach with a small escort--felt no desire to fight, besides which most of his troops revolted or deserted; and governor isunza not only failed to assist him with men and means, but flatly refused him a particular corps, expressly demanded by the executive at mexico.[25.16] alvarez, well-nigh a brigand, had always fought for his own advantage, knew that all the other chief leaders were doing this now, and, in addition to cherishing resentments against santa anna, probably felt no craving to play a strictly inferior part. though he did not have all the men for whom he seems to have been drawing rations, his force was important, and in three particulars he obeyed his orders. he stationed himself at the designated point on the flank of san martín, kept beyond the reach of scott's artillery, and scrupulously refrained from attacking the americans on unfavorable terms; but while he made excuses bravely, and proposed valiant operations that santa anna forbade as inconsistent with his general plan, he retired some ten miles from the route on the plea that his exhausted horses required pasturage. for probably similar reasons valencia quibbled and shirked; his train of heavy guns--which, though needed in the fortifications, he would not give up--impeded his movements; and so the only hostilities were a trifling skirmish with irregulars, in which one american trooper fell a victim to his own rashness. thus ended, to his deep disgust, the first chapter of santa anna's hopes.[25.16] [the approach to mexico] four lines of advance now offered themselves to scott. by taking the cross-road to the right he could have skirted lake texcoco, passing the village of that name, and approached the north or the northwest quarter of mexico. but the route would have been long, deficient in water and fuel, and circuitous; it was defended by valencia with an ample supply of artillery; a movement in that direction would have made surprise or even sudden attack impossible for him; at a pass near guadalupe hidalgo stood fortifications; and a march round these would have involved another long circuit on exposed and unknown ground. this route, therefore, was not seriously considered. on the other hand, after the most thorough investigation, scott had planned before leaving puebla to take the cross-road to the left, march along the southern shores of lakes chalco and xochimilco, and reach san agustín, some ten miles to the south of mexico; and it was for this reason that he placed worth, who was to lead the movement while twiggs was to menace old peñón, near chalco.[25.17] on reaching the ground, however, unfavorable reports about this road were given by mexican spies; and the general, partly for that reason and partly to mystify the enemy, reconnoitred the peñón and also a fourth route, which led to the village of mexicaltzingo, about five miles from the city. in regard to the peñón his engineers--who pushed their investigations with the utmost intrepidity, studied every foot of the red ledges dripping with crimson gravel, and even penetrated behind the hill--decided that it could be carried, but only at a severe loss; while the evidence concerning the fourth possibility led to a substantially similar conclusion, supported by the additional objection, that apparently success would place the americans on difficult and unknown ground. at about the same time scott obtained further information regarding the chalco route, which seemed to justify the opinion formed at puebla. consequently the orders to attack mexicaltzingo--issued either because at the time scott thought he should march that way or because he desired to mislead the cunning mexican spies, who even gained the confidence of high american officers--were suddenly rescinded in the night of the fourteenth, and the next day, though twiggs continued to threaten the peñón until the morning of the sixteenth, all the rest of the army, headed by the cavalry and worth's division, set out for san agustín, distant from chalco some twenty-five miles.[25.17] for about half this distance the road was little more than a narrow lane, with a lake--or more properly a watery marsh--on the right and bold foothills close on the left. spaces of firm ground there were. at one time venerable olive trees formed an arch over the road; once the troops camped in a fine grove, and some ledgy, rocky spurs had to be crossed. but for much of the way, although the weather had been remarkably dry for the midst of the rainy season, the story, as scott had anticipated, was "mud, mud, mud." now and then a man would slip and sink to his waist in a bog-hole; in places the track was quite overflowed; the chilly, torrential rains of almost every afternoon increased the difficulties; and the labor of getting several miles of wagons and heavy guns along such a route was almost incredible. besides, the troops had to be ready at all hours for attack--frontal, rear or flank. but early in the afternoon of the seventeenth harney and worth's advance reached san agustín, a delightful place full of handsome gardens and orchards; and the next day the rest of the troops joined them--"ready," as a soldier put it, "for anything except a thrashing."[25.18] [to san agustín] but again, where were the mexicans? with so many works to construct, santa anna could hardly be censured for leaving unfortified--especially as both an inner and an outer line were made ready against any forces using it--a route that seemed to be quite impracticable for an army train; but he might have placed upon it a few light guns and a body of skirmishers, who could have embarrassed the americans greatly. this, however, with his usual over-confidence and faulty judgment, he neglected to do. yet he was not idle. on the fourteenth he knew the americans were talking of a march to san agustín; and though he suspected this language might be a blind, he not only sent additional forces to that quarter, but ordered alvarez to follow scott, should such a movement occur, and be ready to fall upon him bravely should he attack a fortified position; and when the movement actually began on the following day, though santa anna misinterpreted its aim, he promptly took further defensive steps on that line.[25.18] one result was a slight brush between alvarez and twiggs after the latter moved from chalco on the sixteenth; but alvarez soon found so many difficulties in the road pursued by the americans and so little food or pasturage left in their rear, that he once more abandoned his appointed field of operations. santa anna would not break up his general plan by sending strong detachments from the southern line; and consequently scott's march was merely annoyed by a few hundred irregulars, who fired at intervals, rolled great stones down the slopes, and cut ditches in the road, but broke from cover and fled like scared rabbits when c. f. smith's corps of light infantry ran leaping and shouting across the hillsides. thus ended the second chapter of santa anna's hopes.[25.18] meantime a precipitate rearrangement of the mexican forces took place. the president, after reconnoitring the american advance, hastened to place himself between san agustín and mexico. troops were despatched from the peñón to various points on the southern front, and valencia was ordered to proceed by the way of guadalupe hidalgo to the same quarter. but the former status could no more be restored than one could put back the smoke of an exploded shell. the strongest fortifications had been turned and rendered useless; and any one could see that on the side now threatened, where a number of causeways approached the city, the defence of it would almost necessarily be weakened by a division of the garrison. after such enthusiasm and such impatience to meet the enemy, retirement unadorned with laurels or with even the stains of combat produced a humiliating reaction in all hearts.[25.19] at mexico the returning soldiers found empty streets, untenanted balconies and bolted windows; and the silent, sombre, fearsome aspect of a besieged city enveloped and oppressed them. doubts as to santa anna's competence or loyalty, which had slept but not died amidst the recent glorification and his confident promises of "a splendid triumph," awoke. people recalled that precisely when the enemy were moving against vera cruz, the mexican army had been led off into the northern deserts; and they hotly demanded why the engineers, the laborers, the troops and the cannon had been massed at old peñón, where scott could nullify them all by a turn of the wrist. as if in answer, it was publicly stated that an outpost had found a treasonable communication addressed by the president of mexico to the american commander; and so ended chapter iii of santa anna's hopes.[25.19] xxvi contreras, churubusco august, 1847 while grievously disappointed by the collapse of his efforts at old peñón, santa anna felt by no means despondent regarding his new line. toward the south ran the great highway of acapulco--along which numberless cargoes of silks, teas and spices had approached--guarded at about a mile from the city by the gateway or _garita_ of san antonio abad. three miles and a half beyond that garita the highway crossed a bridge over churubusco river, here practically a drainage canal running between high embankments planted with maguey, with mexicaltzingo about a mile and a half distant at the left. on the farther side of the river, a fifth of a mile southwest of the bridge, stood a massive convent and church, skirted by the rambling hamlet of churubusco. passing the church at a distance of three hundred and fifty yards the highway veered slightly toward the east, and some two and a quarter miles from the river came to a great feudal hacienda named san antonio, adorned with trim silver poplars and peruvian pepper trees along the front of its buildings. a scant mile then brought one to the similar but far less pretentious establishment of cuapa; and two scant miles more to san agustín.[26.1] at the churubusco bridgehead and convent and at san antonio, where the erection of defences had begun some time before, laborers could now be seen working--particularly at san antonio--like bees; and with all possible haste guns, as well as troops, were brought over from the peñón. here, said the president, he "desired to have the battle fought."[26.4] [illustration: battles of aug. 20, 1847 general plan] to increase his confidence, troops not only occupied mexicaltzingo on the left, but in even stronger force guarded the opposite flank. about three miles toward the south from san cosme, the western garita of mexico, the traveller, passing the fortified hill of chapultepec on the right, found himself at the genial suburb of tacubaya. keeping on in the same general direction for nearly six miles and traversing mixcoac at about half-way, one came to san angel, a pretty but narrow town of some importance on the skirt of the foothills. two miles from here toward the east at coyoacán, a garden spot loved by cortez and alvarado, the fine brigade of pérez, which consisted of about 3500 infantry, was now placed; and at san angel itself a high military officer, followed by some 5500 troops[26.2] from guadalupe, drove up in a coach about noon on tuesday, the seventeenth of august. the man was of average height but unusually broad, with a bull-neck deep in his shoulders, as if some person had tried to force a good idea into his head with a pile-driver, a hard, cruel, domineering look about his blue eyes, small side-whiskers, and a heavy mustache. it was valencia, whose imputed schemes and intrigues had of late been keeping every tongue busy.[26.4] [valencia's movements] valencia's instructions were to block the way from coyoacán to tacubaya with men and works; but he mounted at once, rode on south by the turnpike, passed ansaldo--a farmhouse buried in its orchard, two miles and a half or so from san angel--and a strong half-mile beyond it paused. on his right, open ground sloped gradually back into a rounded hill, some three or four hundred yards from the road; and below him on the left flowed a small but lively stream at the bottom of a deep, wide ravine, near the opposite side of which stood the adobe buildings of padierna farm.[26.4] from this point a mule-path, barely practicable for horses, wriggled off in the direction of san agustín, here about four miles distant in a straight line; and--covering the whole intermediate plain from san antonio and san agustín on the one side to padierna and san angel on the other, from coyoacán on the north to the mountains on the south--extended a _pedregal_ or lava bed, which looked as if a raging sea of molten rock had instantly congealed, had then been filled by the storms of centuries with fissures, caves, jagged points and lurking pitfalls, and finally had been decorated with occasional stunted trees and clumps of bushes. after pursuing the mule-path for some distance, ordering a camp and batteries established on the slope of the rounded hill, and instructing experts to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly, valencia returned to his post; and in the evening, on learning from the experts that four other paths--one of them available for artillery--led from san agustín to san angel, he summarized the reconnaissances in a letter to santa anna, complaining that he had neither room to manoeuvre nor time to fortify where he was, asking leave to change his position, and calling for 2000 more men.[26.4] the next day, wednesday, the eighteenth, santa anna, writing back that scott intended to attack san antonio, ordered valencia to place his troops at coyoacán, and send his artillery to churubusco, a mile farther east. valencia, who by this time had placed a strong outpost on the mule-path and sappers on the rounded hill, replied that scott, striking both at san antonio and at san angel, would push his thrust in whichever direction he should find the easier, and that he could not conscientiously leave the second point unguarded by obeying those orders. notes worthy of the most finished and effusive pirates were then exchanged; and in the end santa anna, who longed to remove his insubordinate general but dared not, authorized him to do as he pleased and assume, of course, the attendant responsibility.[26.3] accordingly on thursday morning valencia advanced with trumpets, drums and flags to the rounded hill, and proceeded to array his forces. a long, low, earthen parapet with an angle at the southern end already faced padierna, and five guns were in battery; but the summit of the hill was neglected.[26.4] [scott feels his way] during this time the americans were not inactive. early on wednesday scott directed worth and engineers mason and tower, supported by garland's brigade of infantry and a body of dragoons, to reconnoitre san antonio.[26.5] the task was accomplished boldly and thoroughly; and they found the place heavily defended, not only in the vicinity of the white castle which formed the headquarters of the hacienda, but for a long distance eastward--where, moreover, the water-soaked ground almost forbade approach--and saw countless laborers toiling hard upon the works. the presence of at least one 24-pounder was demonstrated, and other heavy cannon were believed to be there. in worth's opinion, the cost of making a successful assault by the narrow, gun-swept causeway with fascines and ladders would cripple the army.[26.6] questioning peons through an interpreter, the officers learned of a path which began at the highway near cuapa, made a circuit on the left through the pedregal, and apparently returned to the highway some distance inside the works, and this received careful attention; but the conclusion was, that while infantry could filter through it, artillery could not pass; and to advance by such a route in the presence of a strong, unshaken enemy, whose front and other flank could not be attacked or seriously threatened, appeared worse than hazardous. even scott felt rather depressed on hearing the reports, especially as fortifications were said to exist north of the hacienda. the men, wagons and guns, all covered with mud, that lay scattered about on the wet ground, seemed little indeed like a conquering army. except for some cattle, the army had only four days' provisions; the hard bread was already musty, and the horses lacked forage.[26.6] later, however, lee and beauregard brought somewhat more promising information. to the hacienda of peña pobre, a mile and a quarter from san agustín toward the west, they had found a good road; and then, after proceeding about an equal distance by a mule-path to the top of a sharp ridge, they had seen the path continue to padierna and the turnpike, which lay in full view nearly a mile and a half away, and they believed it possible to make a road by that line. their escort had routed a hostile corps of observation, and some men had been seen at work on a rounded hill beyond the turnpike, but no other mexican forces appeared to be near. indeed, it seemed probable that much less adequate defences had been provided here than on the great southern highway, and in this direction scott resolved to strike. "an enemy that halts, vacillates, declines the battle offered him, makes a circuit, hunts for a position and finds none to suit him is an enemy lost," exulted the _diario_.[26.6] [the battle of contreras] the next morning, august 19, therefore--while quitman unwillingly remained at san agustín to guard the base,[26.7] and worth, with his engineers and troops, continued to reconnoitre and threaten on the san antonio side--scott ordered a force of engineers to build a road in the other direction. pillow's division was to furnish working-parties, and twiggs's to clear away whatever mexican detachments might undertake to hinder the operations; and the implied instructions were to gain and hold the san angel turnpike, so that san antonio could be turned. scott did not expect or desire a general engagement at this time; but he directed pillow to take command and employ both divisions, if a battle should be opened, promising that in such an event he would soon appear on the field. under these instructions the troops advanced cautiously but rapidly the first mile and a quarter, constructed a road to the summit of the ridge, pulled up the guns with drag-ropes, and looked over. as the returning tide makes a sea in the bay of fundy, where only bare ground had been visible a few hours earlier, valencia's army had taken possession. it was now one o'clock, and evidently road-building was over for a while.[26.11] pillow, however, knew all about winning victories. from a central hill, zacatepec, where he stood, he could measure valencia's forces to a nicety, and he decided to brush them away. by his order the mounted rifles, particularly the advanced companies of roberts and porter, deployed quickly, drove the mexican skirmishers in a handsome style from rocks and fissures, and finally occupied padierna. at the same time and under his instructions magruder--tall, blonde and intrepid--advanced his field battery nearly a mile without cover over that almost impassable ground, which the enemy had now barred with stone walls, planted it under the slight protection of a transverse ledge, and not long after two o'clock opened a duel with mexican siege guns, 68-pound howitzers and many lighter pieces, more than twenty in all, at a range of about 900 yards, while brave callender fought the howitzer battery beside him, dashing little reno set off rockets, and smith's and pierce's brigades, which were presently to attack valencia's camp, furnished support. and pillow knew also how to "bag" a defeated enemy. so he ordered riley's brigade to the extreme right to coöperate with the frontal attack by checking reinforcements and cutting off valencia's retreat. then he countermanded this order, but not in season.[26.11] zigzagging, scrambling, leaping, and sliding as best they could over about a mile of pedregal, riley's brigade crossed the stream and the turnpike, formed in the orchard of ansaldo, routed small bodies of lancers, passed through san gerónimo--an indian village lying amid trees and ravines a quarter of a mile west of ansaldo and about three times as far from valencia--had a stiff but victorious brush with torrejón and three regiments of cavalry, defied valencia's cannon, some of which now faced this way, found cover at length in broken ground between the village and his camp, and waited for the mexicans to be routed. but the major general commanding failed in the prime essential of his plan, for he did not induce valencia to retreat. badly crippled, the american batteries became silent after an hour or so, the brigades that had expected to charge saw clearly they could accomplish nothing, and riley found himself isolated. so ended wretchedly the first phase of the battle of contreras,[26.8] pillow's phase.[26.11] but by this time a second phase was taking shape. pillow himself perceived that riley had been thrown into imminent peril, and sent cadwalader's brigade, which was followed by the fifteenth infantry, to his support. smith, useless where he was and probably feeling little confidence in pillow or twiggs, decided to regard himself as the senior officer present, gathered his men, except those employed in skirmishing, and, with a yell of endorsement from them, proceeded in the direction that riley had taken--not, however, primarily to intercept valencia's retreat or reinforcements, but with a direct view to attacking his left flank. at about the same time--probably by half-past three o'clock--scott himself joined pillow and other officers on zacatepec, viewed with his usual battlefield equanimity the desperate state of things, now spread before him like a map on a table, studied valencia's batteries, the heavy ranks of supporting infantry and the long lines of cavalry in the rear, and soon fixed upon woody san gerónimo--marked at a line distance of about a mile and three quarters by its white steeple--as the key to the situation, since it both flanked and isolated valencia, and ordered shields's brigade also, which had followed him from san agustín, to that point.[26.11] smith, arriving at san gerónimo about an hour before sunset, found all of the commands, except shields's, that had been ordered to go there; and he also found that santa anna, after hurrying from san antonio through coyoacán and san angel, had placed himself with pérez's brigade and seven or eight hundred cavalry and artillery on low hills about one half or three quarters of a mile behind san gerónimo, and--though checked by cadwalader's brigade--was making ready to attack. smith at once began preparing to dispose of him, while the mexicans on the hills, after four or five guns arrived, indulged in vivas, music and a little harmless cannonading; but both commanders finally concluded that the hour was now too late for a battle. santa anna also decided that an impassable ravine separated him from the americans, and that he could not prudently expose his men and arms to the rain then imminent; and therefore, leaving his cavalry and artillery behind, he put the rest of his forces under cover at san angel.[26.11] night and a storm now set in, but behind the curtain of darkness four striking scenes were presented. scott, the general who seemed to have lost half his army all at once without a battle, sat at headquarters anxious and helpless. seven times he despatched an officer to his isolated right with orders, and seven times the officer failed to get through. but still he waited--patient, considerate for those about him, hopeful and alert, reflecting no doubt that brave men, skilful officers and the natural strength of san gerónimo would count. valencia, on the other hand, feeling that at last he had proved santa anna a blunderer, and had forced him into the position of a mere assistant, was jubilant, boastful and literally intoxicated. he reported grandly on his "brilliant day," and scattered promotions as if already head of the state.[26.11] santa anna, devoured by passions and perplexities, now sent josé ramiro to valencia by a circuitous route with orders to retreat at once. not long afterwards two of valencia's aides reached san angel, bringing news that, instead of being exterminated, thousands of americans were established in the san gerónimo woods. don't talk to me, santa anna cried to the aides, who endeavored to excuse the situation; valencia is an ambitious, insubordinate sot; he deserves to have his brains blown out, and i will not expose my men to the storm for him; let him spike his guns, make the ammunition useless, and retreat. when ramiro arrived at the camp, valencia would not listen to his message, and fiercely demanded ammunition and men; but when his aides reported, he saw his doom.[26.9] "traitor, he has sold us!" he cried, storming like a madman in the midst of his troops. soldiers heard and echoed the cry. women shrieked. frightened horses broke loose and galloped into the night. americans with lights are creeping in behind us, reported torrejón. the army understood. scouts were feeling the way. the price had been paid to santa anna. their blood would soon be claimed.[26.11] [illustration: battle of contreras] in ignorance of all these outside events the americans at san gerónimo, too exhausted to eat, bore the torrents of chilling, beating rain without fires and in darkness as best they could. some found huts, but most of them lay in the mud or stood up under trees. smith's and riley's men occupied the lanes, and shields's brigade, which stumbled in at about midnight, put up in the road and an orchard. officers fared like privates. in such a plight, the troops listened for hours to the music and vivas of the enemy, and for their own part could only reflect on the painful and fruitless exertions of the day and on the prospects of the morrow. without cavalry, without cannon, without reserves of provisions or ammunition, without hope of quarter, they felt that with some 4200 men they might have to face 25,000 exultant mexicans and any amount of artillery at daybreak. but everybody believed in general smith.[26.10] "here he is!" "now we'll have them!" riley's soldiers had cried on seeing smith arrive; and the confidence was not misplaced.[26.11] during the afternoon a ravine leading toward valencia's rear had been found. smith seized upon the hint at once, and proposed to attack by that route before daybreak with bayonets only; a conference of officers agreed to his plan; it was decided to notify scott, and suggest that a diversion be made on valencia's front at the proper time; lee undertook the almost impossible feat of carrying this message across the pedregal; and officers tower and brooks, whose lights--probably occasional matches--torrejón had reported, were sent off to study the ravine, and prepare to be the guides. as santa anna was expected to attack early, shields accepted the charge of building fires in the morning as if no americans had left the ground, and holding san gerónimo.[26.11] two hours after midnight the troops were roused, and at three o'clock riley began to move. but it was tedious work to marshal the scattered corps in the darkness and rain by touch and whisper, and morning broke before the last were out of the village. the ravine branched deceptively; it was full of rocks, too; and the watery clay, a soldier said, slipped like "soft soap." finally, however, the units closed up at about a mile from san gerónimo, and, partially hidden in a fog, scrambled up to firm ground behind a low hill. as it was now light, the firearms were put in order; and with quick adaptation to the topography, the present arrangement of the mexicans and their probable movements, general smith marshalled and instructed the troops.[26.11] riley's brigade, about 1300 strong, was to be the storming party. cadwalader's in halves formed a wing on each side to keep off cavalry. a part of smith's, together with the engineer company, was directed to slip along behind elevated ground, and fall upon the flank or rear of a mexican force posted in advance; and the rest of it, marching by the left, was ordered to strike the camp and a large body of lancers on the flank. even the possibility of a rear attack from santa anna, supposed to be still where he had been seen the evening before, was provided against. meanwhile the troops that had remained in the pedregal, assembled as well as possible by twiggs and lee during the latter part of the night, in accordance with orders from scott, watched and waited near padierna under colonel ransom of the ninth infantry.[26.11] finally a slightly round-shouldered man, with blue eyes, a sandy mustache and sandy hair, walked slowly to the front and looked at his watch. it was about six o'clock. "are you ready?" he asked in a cheery voice. "ready!" the troops answered with a meaning smile. he gave them a keen glance. "men, forward!" he then ordered, for it was general smith. "forward, forward!" flew the command through the ranks, and ahead they went.[26.11] struck on front and rear general mendoza's advanced corps fired without aiming, turned and bolted; but ransom's men, darting across the ravine, gave valencia something else--something he fancied more serious than smith's approach--to think about. only a pair of 6-pounders bore on riley, and they fired high. soon the mexicans at the breastwork, exchanging shots wildly with ransom, found that bullets were coming from behind, leaped over the parapet and fled. attacked by smith's men, the lancers gave way and upset the rest of the infantry; and riley's column, deployed as well as time and the ground would allow, bore down like a flood. all was now confusion in the camp: infantry, horse, artillery, mules, women, laborers in a mob. some of the gunners remained at their pieces--chained to them, it was said--but, like the infantry, they aimed little; and almost in a moment, like a bag turned upside down, the camp was empty of all the mexicans who could get away. again general smith drew out his watch. "it has taken just seventeen minutes," he remarked.[26.11] riley's brigade halted to secure the prisoners and the spoils, among which--to the frantic delight of the soldiers--were the two cannon lost so nobly at buena vista; but the rest of the victorious troops pursued the enemy to san angel; and the mexicans fleeing by the turnpike toward ansaldo, cannonaded from their own camp and running the gantlet of smith, ransom and even shields, who had moved down toward the road, fared badly. others, including torrejón and a large part of the cavalry, managed by taking rough paths to reach san gerónimo and the hills. valencia also escaped; but salas, who tried to check the flight, was captured. seven hundred mexicans fell, it was estimated; over eight hundred were made prisoners; the captured cannon, including the best that santa anna had, and the captured ammunition proved invaluable; and the cost, as reported by scott, was not over sixty americans killed and wounded.[26.11] [after the battle of contreras] nor were such the only consequences of this lightning-stroke. santa anna, having at length decided to rescue valencia and raised his forces to at least 7000 by drawing rangel's reserve brigade from the city, had set out at daybreak for his position of the night before; but when in sight of valencia's camp he learned from flying soldiers that all was over, and that his outer line of defences had failed. angrily striking at fugitives with his whip he turned back, and waited near san angel for a while, unable to decide anything. then he sent rangel to guard the southwest section of mexico, despatched orders to evacuate san antonio and mexicaltzingo, and marched with the rest of his forces to churubusco. here priceless time was spent in raving against valencia--whom he ordered shot at sight--in a passion that almost crazed him. his dominant idea now, so far as he could think at all, was to make the capital a second troy; and, probably with that in view, he set pérez's brigade in motion toward the city.[26.12] after a time, however, reason gained the better of desperation, and seeing the necessity of protecting the retreat of the san antonio garrison, he ordered general rincón, who was ably seconded by anaya, to hold the churubusco convent as long as possible, garrisoned the bridgehead with one of pérez's regiments, extended two others far down behind the embankment of the river eastwardly, used a part of the remaining two as a line from the bridgehead to the convent, and stationed the rest on the highway behind.[26.12] the convent position included, besides the building proper, a strong church with a parapeted roof, a high stone enclosure provided on the inside with scaffolds for troops, a broad, wet ditch, two outside bastions facing coyoacán, unfinished but strong breastworks on the west and south, two detached adobe huts pierced with embrasures on their southwest sides, four 8-pounders, three smaller guns, and for garrison some 1500 or 1800 men, consisting of the mexico battalions named independencia and bravos, the san patricio contingent of american deserters or most of it, and some detachments of other corps; while the bridgehead, a powerful, scientifically constructed work, with four feet of water in the ditch and three heavy cannon, appeared to defy attack. surveying this excellent position santa anna recovered some of his courage, and began work actively to complete the fortifications near the bridge. the untried militia at the convent were almost in despair when they found themselves in the forefront, but he promised to aid them at the critical time.[26.12] [illllustration: battle of churubusco] scott, for his part, left san agustín before he knew how smith's plan had worked out, met the news on the pedregal, kept on to san angel, and near that place, amid tumultuous cheering, took command of pillow's and twiggs's divisions.[26.13] the road to mexico by way of tacubaya lay open, but he could not move now in that direction and leave worth, quitman, the artillery, the baggage, the stores and the sick to join him as best they could, exposed--as it was believed--to some 25,000 mexicans. the first needful step was to capture san antonio and reunite his army. worth had already been directed, after the rout of valencia became known, to attack and also turn that position whenever he should learn that pillow and twiggs had gained its rear; and as a cross-road led from san antonio to coyoacán, coyoacán was the proper point of concentration. scott therefore went there with his troops, and sent lee, strongly escorted by dragoons and mounted rifles, to reconnoitre the enemy and give the preconcerted signal for worth's advance. further to assist that general, pillow with cadwalader's brigade was now ordered down the cross-road.[26.14] [illustration: the tête de pont, churubusco] [the battle of churubusco] worth did not, however, wait for assistance. at about eleven o'clock he sent colonel clarke's brigade--the fifth, sixth and eighth infantry--and brevet colonel c. f. smith's battalion from cuapa to turn san antonio by the path on the left hand and cut off retreat, and placed garland, accompanied by duncan's battery, in a somewhat sheltered spot, as near as possible to the fortifications, with orders to advance on hearing the other brigade at work. clarke's tortuous path seemed to be three miles long, and as it lay for two thirds of the distance in the pedregal, where the troops had to slide and scramble in single file, two hours were occupied in the march. the mexicans, therefore, warned by seeing this movement--which they vainly attempted to check--as well as ordered by santa anna to retire, made the utmost efforts, after spiking some of their guns, to escape with the rest of them. but the garrison of san antonio and the neighboring fortifications, which consisted of the hidalgo and victoria battalions of mexico and some other militia, were wholly unfitted to execute a difficult retreat in the face of the enemy. not far from its middle clarke struck their column; and while the first part, led by general bravo, kept on toward churubusco bridge, the second broke up and scattered.[26.15] by this time garland, having found by pushing a company forward that san antonio had been evacuated, hastened on to unite with clarke. the enemy were quickly driven from fortifications of a minor importance at sotepingo, and the division then rushed forward after bravo, while the mexicans--a mass of cavalry, infantry and artillery, wagons, mules, women, servants, carriages and camp-followers--made all possible speed. owing to the effects of the rains, two mexican guns and a number of wagons were mired on the way; and near the churubusco bridge pérez's brigade, hard pressed by the americans from san angel, crowded in upon the stream of fugitives.[26.15] [illustration: tête de pont. profile of east curtain.] so it happened that when engineer stevens climbed the church tower of coyoacán at about noon to reconnoitre, he observed a large body of mexican troops pouring along the highway from san antonio. apparently santa anna was drawing all his forces to the city. dense fields of corn six feet high or more almost hid the works at the convent. perceiving, however, the nose of a bastion, stevens concluded there might be one gun at that point, which he thought could be rushed; and a prisoner mentioned only two guns. the entire american army, reacting from the gloom of the previous evening, exultant over smith's victory, and almost intoxicated by the change from storm to splendid sunshine, was now feeling invincible, eager and over-confident. stevens merely shared the contagion; his report--precipitate and misleading, as he fully admitted later--signified that without loss of a moment the san antonio garrison ought by all means to be intercepted; and so scott did what we know it had not been his intention to do: ordered twiggs immediately to the convent and highway by the direct road. "make haste, my sons," he called to the troops, "or they will be gone before you reach them!"[26.16] at his instance and by way of precaution, engineers were sent on to make investigations; but, as the case appeared simple and urgent, the investigating and the fighting began hastily together. in a haphazard way the mounted rifles, or at least a part of them, became engaged; then the first artillery advanced; and soon the rest of smith's brigade--the third infantry--besides the engineer company and taylor's battery were thrown in. rincón, a gray-haired spanish veteran, deceived our generals, for he desired to save ammunition, and therefore did not open his artillery fire till the americans had come within musket range. to pause after the conflict began would have chilled the ardor of the troops and encouraged the enemy. victory or defeat were the only alternatives, and a defeat could not be thought of.[26.16] [illustration: the fortifications of churubusco convent] victory did not arrive, however; so now the second and the seventh infantry, led by riley, attacked the mexican right. amidst the corn the american infantry became scattered, yet in the same haphazard way fought on; and taylor, placed in a very exposed position before the state of things was understood, fired at short musket range with beautiful precision and rapidity. but the mexicans, inspired by good leaders and by the example of the american deserters, who aimed the cannon, stood their ground. from parapets and bastions poured sheets of unceasing flame, sally followed sally, and guns at the bridgehead coöperated. in an hour and a half taylor drove the enemy from the walls and from the roof of the church, but he lost twenty-four men and fourteen horses killed and wounded. the battery had to be withdrawn, and victory seemed almost beyond reach.[26.16] worth had now been attacking the bridgehead for half an hour or more. hurrying the troops along, without giving them definite instructions, at a speed limited only by their wind and the obstacles in their way, he had left the sixth infantry on the highway, placed the fifth and the eighth at the right of it, and sent the rest of his infantry obliquely against the mexican left; and then, without a reconnaissance of the bridgehead, the sixth was ordered to charge whatever lay in its front.[26.15] probably the army contained no better corps, but it recoiled twice in confusion under a terrific storm of iron and lead. valor was not lacking, but the men were dumfounded to come "butt-end first," as a soldier put it, upon such a fort so strongly held, when they had supposed they were chasing a parcel of rabbits; and their numbers were unequal to the task. officers as well as men showed every sign of panic. the regiment could not be kept on the highway; and the troops in the tall corn on the right accomplished no more. the ground was soft there; and it was cut up with dikes and with deep, wide ditches containing about three feet of water. the men fought, but they fought in general disorder. c. f. smith found himself with not more than twenty of his battalion at hand. even the artillery, the backbone of the army, failed now, for duncan's light pieces could not challenge the bridgehead squarely on the highway, and the ground beside it was unsuitable for them; while occasional fire from the convent and the explosion of an ammunition wagon abandoned by the mexicans added to the difficulties.[26.15] at the same time, besides these two combats which scott had not expected, one planned by him was taking place. a few minutes after sending twiggs toward churubusco he ordered pierce--and presently shields also--to follow a road leading north from coyoacán, cross churubusco river, and move toward santa anna's rear, so as to protect the american flank and rear, favor the attack on the convent, and cut off the retreat of the mexicans. the route adopted by the troops after leaving the road took them for a mile and a half through cornfields and marshes, and placed them near the highway, about three quarters of a mile north of the bridgehead, not far from the hacienda of los portales. to parry the blow santa anna at once moved in that direction with the fourth ligero, the tulancingo regiment and most of the eleventh line, his finest corps, extending his men--perhaps 2200 in all--until they almost overlapped the americans; while some 1500 or 2000 cavalry, probably consisting of the horse that had followed him to san angel reinforced by that which had escaped from contreras, menaced--though afraid to attack--shields's left.[26.17] precisely what occurred now cannot be stated, for apparently most of the reporting officers were more anxious to conceal than to disclose facts; but it seems clear that shields handled the men clumsily, that his own regiments fell into disorder when charging and shrank from the devouring mexican fire, and that pierce's brigade, composed of excellent material but officered to a large extent with political favorites, actually skulked. the mexicans, on the other hand, finding two ditches along the highway to protect them from the dreaded bayonet and an embankment to screen them somewhat from bullets, fought stiffly. shields was therefore unable, with his six hundred good men and two small howitzers, to make any impression, and after a time his troops huddled wherever they could in the shelter of some buildings.[26.17] but finally, between three and four o'clock, the spell broke. worth's men, though astonished and for a time dismayed, had no thought of giving up. "victory or death" was not a phrase to them, but a conviction. though dikes, ditches, bad ground, corn higher than their heads, and the mexican artillery fire broke up their organization, personal courage and personal leadership survived. in smaller or larger groups they fought on. santa anna, by taking the fourth ligero from pérez to defend the rear, deducted half the strength of his left wing, and no doubt shields's operations, very suggestive of the american methods used in previous battles, tended to make the troops at the bridgehead nervous. gradually a part of the unlucky sixth and men of c. f. smith's and garland's commands, working toward the extreme american right, out-reached the enemy, crossed the river, turned the mexican line, and moved on toward the highway. this created great alarm. the fate of valencia was recalled. many of the officers wilted. ammunition seems partially to have failed; and at length, under a still galling fire, some of the eighth infantry, followed by more of the fifth, waded the ditch of the bridgehead--twenty feet broad it was--climbed over the parapet or pushed through the embrasures, and settled the question hand to hand.[26.15] at once duncan planted two of his guns on the highway near the convent, and for ten or fifteen minutes, aided by a piece or two at the bridgehead, he fired with a judgment, rapidity and accuracy that delighted the on-lookers. by this time two of rincón's guns at the right of the convent and one of the other pieces had become unserviceable; the ammunition, so lavishly expended, had failed the infantry; and the loss of the bridgehead, which stood on higher and commanding ground, was recognized as a most serious blow. the artillery commandant began to move a cannon from the front side to the right. only two guns were in play on the front; and our third infantry, noting the slackened fire, dashed over the parapet at the left of the convent. still the american deserters would not permit a white flag to be shown, and the garrison retired sullenly to the interior of the building. but captain j. m. smith, seeing that active resistance was over, now put up a white handkerchief himself to prevent further bloodshed. the signal of surrender stopped duncan's work, too; and the mexicans, astonished by the consideration shown them, laid down their arms.[26.18] pérez and bravo with a large part of the troops were now on the way to mexico _via_ mexicaltzingo and old peñón, and others were taking flight along the highway, pursued by worth's division. shields perceived what was occurring, and harangued his brigade. "the south carolinians will follow you to the death," answered the "tigers," as they were called by scott. many, if not all, of the new yorkers joined them; pierce's officers mustered pluck enough to guard the left; and once more a charge was made. it proved no easy work, though, even now. first and last more than a third of shields's brigade were killed or wounded. brave, handsome butler, commanding the tigers, and his lieutenant colonel went down, and colonel burnett of the new yorkers fell. but at last shields carried the day, captured nearly four hundred mexicans, and met worth's cheering van on the highway.[26.17] all joined then in the pursuit, supported with a captured 6-pounder and a howitzer, and took liberal toll as they went, until, after charging nearly two miles, they were halted by worth. orders from the commander-in-chief to the same effect soon arrived. four companies of dragoons under harney were permitted, however, to keep on, and when the sight of a battery led him to pull up, captain kearny of the first resolved to charge the guns, and galloped ahead.[26.19] "oh, what a glorious sight it was to see phil kearny riding into them!" wrote a soldier. his own troop were picked men; they rode picked horses--all iron-gray--that now seemed endowed with supernatural strength; and his other troop were fit comrades. standing quite upright in the stirrups they looked like centaurs. little by little the rear fours, hearing the trumpet sound the recall, dropped off; but the leader and about a dozen others kept on like a swift vessel, dashing the billows of humanity right and left. the battery, which stood at the garita, fired upon friend and foe alike. still the little group arrived there, leaped from their horses to carry it, and found--that they were alone. the panic of the enemy, however, saved them. tearing loose and springing into the saddle, they got away. but a grape-shot was faster than kearny; and so, losing an arm but winning a brevet, he finished valiantly the battle of churubusco.[26.19] [after the battle of churubusco] santa anna's total loss for the day--the killed, the wounded and especially the missing--may be roughly estimated as 10,000. he admitted that he lost more than a third of his men. after he was able to find where he stood (august 30) the army of the east contained 11,381 privates. alvarez had 2447 privates (august 26); and, besides remnants of valencia's troops, there were doubtless many small bodies of militia. scott estimated the mexicans killed and wounded as 4297, and 2637 prisoners, including eight generals, were reported; while the american ordnance was more than trebled, and the scanty stock of ammunition enormously increased. out of 8497 engaged in the two battles, we lost fourteen officers and 119 privates killed, sixty and 805 respectively wounded, and some forty of the rank and file missing, who probably lost their lives.[26.20] the high moral qualities displayed by our troops made the day glorious, as hitchcock said, "in the highest degree"; and the army, naturally overestimating the numbers of the enemy, felt exceedingly proud. scott, riding about the field, gray and massive, was hailed by the troops as the very genius of power and command. "never did mightier man or horse stem a tempestuous torrent's course," they felt; and when he addressed them with the eloquence of a soldier's heart, it seemed as if the cheers that followed must have shaken the "halls." nature, however, appeared to view the situation differently. the mountains above padierna wrinkled their foreheads with still deeper furrows, or knit them with still darker scowls. dense black clouds, preceded by gleaming heralds, rushed suddenly across the sky. lightning flashed in sheets. thunders rolled until the earth seemed to tremble. torrents of rain deluged the ground; and in a little while, almost like something heavy and solid, night swiftly and prematurely descended.[26.21] xxvii negotiations may, 1846-september, 1847 after fighting ceased, the americans found temporary quarters wherever they could. most of shields's command occupied los portales "in a most deplorable condition," and worth's division remained at the same point or in churubusco. some of pillow's men retired to san antonio, and there passed the night without rations, blankets, fires or lights, while others moved across to mixcoac. a part of twiggs's lay in a muddy field without shelter, while the rest made their way to coyoacán or san angel. some of the troops, covered with sticky mud, slept in a barn on straw, and acquired an extremely curious appearance. for all it was a hard night, and perhaps hardest for the officer on guard. the hours crawled. thoughts of the battle, the morrow and the distant home barely stirred his leaden brain. every instant, drowsiness threatened to become stupor. now and then a sentry's challenge, the snort of a horse, the blast of a bugle roused him with a start. at last came a streak in the east. he called the drummer, and ordered him to "beat off." instantly the sharp roll was taken up by others. the bustle of men awoke; and the troops were alive again. joy and pride welled up in their hearts, but the sadness of bereavement also and a sense of disappointment. they seemed to have won the race but lost the prize. why had they not slept in the city?[27.1] there were adequate military reasons for this. it was believed that santa anna still had some 20,000 men, and what fortifications defended the interior of mexico no one pretended to say. three surprises had met the americans during the past forty-eight hours. they had sick and wounded, prisoners, wagons and captured material to look after. they were scattered, unmunitioned, spent. not a few had become ill. in spite of scott's precise orders to carry rations a large number had gone hungry for about a day, and many had fasted longer. the stock of provisions had practically been exhausted. if repulsed, the troops would have faced starvation; if successful, they would have been a disorganized mass of ravenous, infuriated soldiers in a hostile city. almost all, even officers, were eager for a revel in the "halls"; they would largely have scattered for something to eat and something to drink; many would soon have been intoxicated; and fearful scenes, costly alike to them and the inhabitants, would have disgraced the victory and imperilled the army.[27.1] [american efforts to make peace] besides, the aim of the united states was peace; it appeared certain that in view of the battle just won the mexicans would be disposed to offer acceptable terms; and resident americans as well as neutrals had assured scott that by taking the city, breaking up the government, dispersing the sensible and substantial men who desired a settlement, and perhaps rousing the people to desperation, he would be defeating his own government. on the other hand, as the general had reckoned before leaving puebla, the presence of a victorious american army waiting at the gate seemed likely to excite intense fears of slaughter and sack, and prove a most effective argument for negotiation. consequently, though sure he could break his way in, scott deliberately sacrificed military glory, and halted. the wish to end hostilities was the dominant consideration; and, fully to understand this, we must now place ourselves at washington, and then return to our present point by a singularly winding route.[27.1] both in his war message of may 11, 1846, and later, polk announced that he would be ready to negotiate whenever mexico would make or even hear propositions; and he sought a listening ear with a persistence due to several causes: a real desire to end the war, a naïve ignorance of mexican psychology, the exigencies of home politics and foreign relations, a natural predilection on his own part and on buchanan's for schemes and tactics, and behind all a sincere wish, in accordance with our long-standing sentiment and policy, for the prosperity and friendship of the sister republic. taylor was therefore instructed to place himself on confidential terms, if possible, at the mexican headquarters with a view to bringing about negotiations; and in line with this policy worth, while at saltillo, offered pleasant sentiments to santa anna on the subject of peace.[27.2] the battles on the rio grande and the unwelcome effects of the blockade tended to sober mexico, as did the aloofness of great britain; and marcy counted not a little on the settlement of the oregon question. intimations were received from consul black in june and july, 1846, that not only all thoughtful citizens but paredes himself desired to reach an agreement. bravo and his cabinet, who temporarily assumed the reins of government, felt more strongly in the same way, and were more free to act; other signs also pointed in that direction; and it was hoped that santa anna, should he regain power, would favor peace. the american administration, on the other hand, felt much embarrassed by the unexpected seriousness of the problems involved in the conflict. so on the twenty-seventh of july buchanan addressed the mexican minister of relations, waiving as undesirable all discussion upon the causes of the war, and inviting negotiations in the most conciliatory manner.[27.4] but the government of salas, which received this overture, had attacked paredes for slackness in prosecuting the hostilities; and he now counted upon this issue for maintaining the power it had given him. besides, wrote bankhead, the mexicans were still confident they could hold their own against the united states; and the war spirit ran so strongly that santa anna, returning from exile to treat, remained to fight.[27.3] rejón, therefore, answering buchanan in a lofty and cutting strain, refused to ignore the causes of the war, and only promised that congress, on meeting in december, would take the matter up. in other words, as an american newspaper observed, he said in effect: we are sorry that you feel so tired of the campaign; as for ourselves, we are quite comfortable. the reply was not one to fire the popular heart of the united states; and without committing mexico to anything, it required our executive to prepare for a long and arduous contest. nor was salas reassuring when he laid the subject before congress. "if mexico fights with constancy and courage, hers will be the triumph," he proclaimed, and therefore the government has not desired to hear proposals of peace. polk answered rejón by ordering the hostilities to be conducted more harshly, and by announcing in his message at the beginning of december that an indemnity covering the costs of the war, as well as our claims, would be required; but the mexican congress did nothing.[27.4] about a week after buchanan addressed the minister of relations in july, polk recommended to congress a naïve measure admirably fitted to embarrass peace negotiations as much as it was intended to facilitate them. this was an appropriation of $2,000,000 to be used in that business for "extraordinary expenses." probably the measure, vigorously though confidentially pressed by the executive, would have passed; but senator davis killed it by speaking against time. in the following session a similar proposition granting three millions came up about the middle of january, 1847, and on march 3, after every congressman with a voice had talked himself out, it was carried. the natural result followed. even at our capitol there were open though false charges that bribery was contemplated, and to the mexican that design seemed of course transparently plain. no public man who cares for his reputation can vote for peace now, said the _diario_.[27.5] the sentiment in favor of offering to treat with our weak and unfortunate neighbor--as illustrated by formal action in rhode island and new york, for example--was in fact strong. even the british minister at washington recognized that the feeling in the senate was "entirely in favor of generous and pacific measures towards mexico." such whigs as webster and winthrop demanded that a commission be sent; benton favored that idea; and about the middle of january, 1847, it was powerfully supported by atocha, who presented himself at the capital. this cunning and perfectly unscrupulous intriguer, who had been expelled by santa anna's enemies in 1845 because he represented the dictator's corrupt financial methods and then by santa anna himself in september, 1846, because he knew too much about the liberator's dealings with mackenzie, readily proved his intimacy with leading mexicans, created the belief that he was the government's peace agent, induced our administration to propose on january 18 a meeting of american and mexican commissioners at jalapa or havana, and was made the bearer of buchanan's despatch to the minister of relations.[27.6] undoubtedly, though invested with no diplomatic functions, atocha was expected to do much personally; but in this he totally failed. at vera cruz the people attempted to murder him. at mexico he was ordered to leave almost immediately, and was prevented from talking with any person of influence; and such use as he contrived to make of the pen, in suggesting terms of peace to rejón, proved utterly fruitless. in short, the american messenger was handled with tongs, and he was back at washington about the twentieth of march with an offensively worded note, refusing to treat until all mexican lands and waters should be evacuated by our forces. clearly this was a most unhappy overture.[27.6] [why mexico would not treat] many circumstances combined to inspire such boldness on the part of our antagonist. aside from the personal interest of many public men in continuing the war, and the belief, prompted by vanity and encouraged by specious arguments, both domestic and european, that natural defences, latent resources and the military ardor of brave citizens fighting for their homes would enable her to beat untrained money-grubbers and "cowardly adventurers," operating far from their base--aside from all this, hatred of "the rapacious invader," a fear that peace would only lead to fresh demands and fresh encroachments, and the fine theory that no people struggling for their independence could be vanquished exerted a strong influence.[27.7] the fact that an actual occupation of california would have to be reckoned with could hardly be faced. to make peace without first gaining a victory seemed humiliating, sure to be disadvantageous, and likely to make dispirited mexico the sport and prey of the whole world; and santa anna in particular felt strongly on this point, because his personal future as well as the cause of the nation required some show of success. no peace is possible now except the peace of the grave--national and racial extinction--it was insisted. many reasoned that polk, to satisfy the united states, would have to demand, as matters stood, a huge indemnity. why regret a war that is bringing so much gold into the country; a war that will overthrow santa anna, the corruptionists, the intriguers, the military men and the sham patriots; a war that will put an end to extortion and finally unite all the good elements of the nation, demanded not a few; and why make sacrifices to stop it, when peace will bring civil wars, which are worse?[27.7] better subjugation than surrender, cried some in desperation; while others believed that an american conquest and annexation would extinguish privilege and monopoly, set up a pure democracy, ensure stability and order, bring in a flood of enterprising northerners, and make the country prosper. the clergy in particular, anxious to preserve their property and their ease, felt rather more than willing to accept such a dénouement. on the other hand, many believed that our people neither would nor could bear for any length of time the expense of the contest. this was the key to rejón's policy, as he told the spanish minister. it was, therefore, only necessary to protract the war a little--meanwhile allowing the wrath of heaven time to pass away--in order to reach the very pinnacle of glory.[27.7] european journals offered much encouragement. mexico need only be obstinate, advised the london _times_, and it seemed a most agreeable prescription. the united states cannot long maintain the necessary troops, predicted the _globe_. the americans are tired of the war, need peace more than mexico, have no disciplined soldiers, cannot follow up their successes, and with good reason dread british interference, remarked some of the french papers. even more significant were expressions coming from the united states. hold fast, and you can make "a brilliant treaty," said a letter. all are disgusted with the hostilities, and in four years this country will kneel and pray for peace, declared others. persistent american denunciations of the war as dishonorable made the idea of submission look shameful to our enemies. no nation as brave and numerous as the mexicans have ever been conquered, announced the new york _express_. the american treasury will soon be empty, predicted the _national intelligencer_; and that influential paper endorsed the view that our antagonist could wear us out. calhoun used all his powers to show that it would be "folly" to push the war, and ruin to push it successfully. still more encouraging were the whig orators. in the voice of doom webster threatened the president with impeachment; and corwin exclaimed, "call home your army; i will feed and clothe it no longer." reports of a whig revolution circulated at mexico; and the belief, accepted by many in europe also, that at any rate the whigs would soon come into power and reverse the policy of the american government, was confidently entertained by our foes.[27.7] but nothing proved so comforting, so cheering, as the conduct of our government. the call for 12-months volunteers appeared to indicate the limit of our endurance, and invited procrastination. polk's assurances, following so many earlier assurances from american presidents, that for our own sake we desired mexico to be strong, prosperous and friendly, implied that we did not intend to crowd her far. our conciliatory language and repeated efforts to negotiate were noted as clear signs of weakness. the employment of an agent like atocha seemed a confession of impotence; and the appropriation of three millions for secret expenses in order to obtain peace, as _el republicano_ put it, looked like throwing up the sponge. polk wishes to exchange a bad war for a good bargain, sneered _le constitutionnel_ of paris. an extension of our boundary was believed to be one aim of the negotiations we urged; and the mexicans felt, said pakenham, that we should not think of buying territory, if able to take it by force. the idea of selling it under such circumstances was viewed as doubly degrading.[27.7] happily saved by his ignorance of mexican character and sentiment from the mortification of knowing all this, fully conscious that the war was unpopular even with his own party, and hopeful that buena vista and the capture of vera cruz had affected mexico, polk favored the idea of a commission. benton, however, would not have slidell on the board; the president could not well ignore slidell unless a higher official--the secretary of state himself--should be made sole representative; and no first-class man could go to mexico and dance attendance on the whims, delays and insults of a government that scornfully held off. indeed, the nation could not afford to place the head of our state department or a commission of leading public figures in such a predicament.[27.8] [trist appointed peace commissioner] at length, however, buchanan's resourceful mind thought of sending nicholas p. trist, a protégé of his own and now chief clerk of the state department. trist's dignity, it was doubtless thought, would not be too delicate; his action, it seemed evident, could be controlled; and the glory of success, if a treaty should be made, would belong to the administration--particularly the secretary of state--and not exalt the agent in any dangerous political sense. besides, the chief clerk was a man of agreeable and impressive appearance, admitted talents, unusual industry and the highest character; he had studied at west point; he knew diplomatic business; as consul at havana for a term of years, he had become acquainted with spanish-american traits; and he spoke the language of mexico fluently. he was therefore immediately appointed as polk's agent--though officially styled "commissioner plenipotentiary"--to be paid, not as a diplomatic representative, but from the appropriation for the contingent expenses of foreign intercourse.[27.8] the appointment was not, however, entirely felicitous. trist, associated with jefferson as law-student and as grandson by marriage and associated with jackson as private secretary, had sojourned on olympus and tasted the ambrosia of the gods; but he did not possess their divine constitution, and ambrosia disagreed with him. it gave him queer feelings in the head that were not exactly growing pains, and produced a state of mind that was neither of heaven nor of earth. the declaration of independence was always resounding in his thoughts, and mentally he was always walking up the stairs of the white house arm in arm with a hero, sage and prophet; but he overlooked the foundation of downright common sense on which great men build, and lacked the humor that might at least have kept him near the ground.[27.8] aspiring, as he said, to influence the course of the world by drawing supernal truths from the region of abstract speculation, he resembled the gazing astronomer who walked into the ditch; and a deep, sticky ditch lay just before him. cordial coöperation with scott was almost indispensable for the proper execution of his work; but he thought he disliked the man, he knew that polk and the cabinet disliked him, and his chiefs--probably afraid that he might be overpowered by the whig general--took superabundant pains to brace him. polk urged him to consort with pillow, whom he represented as a cincinnatus compounded with a scipio africanus; and buchanan, uprearing his big person impressively, expanding in his courtly, diplomatic style, and beaming upon the artless, ethereal chief clerk with his uncommunicative blue eyes, intimated that by faithfully carrying out the wishes of the government he might become the next democratic nominee for the presidency![27.8] [negotiations opened] trist was equipped with a commission, credentials, letters from the secretaries of the war and the navy departments to scott and perry, a draft or _projet_ of a treaty, instructions directing him to inform our military and naval commanders, if mexico should make and ratify the treaty, and a sealed despatch to the minister of relations, in which buchanan pointed out that an evacuation of mexican territory would be a surrender of all our costly gains, but announced that a commissioner, ranking second in our state department, would attend the army, and be ready at all times to negotiate. ostensibly a mere bearer of despatches, the chief clerk hastened incognito to new orleans, reached vera cruz on may 6, fell very sick there, and forwarded to scott both marcy's letter and buchanan's despatch, which was to be placed at once in the hands of the mexican commander. he was authorized--not ordered, as he should have been--to let the general see his own instructions and his copy of the sealed despatch, which would have explained the plans of the government; but instead of doing this he merely wrote a letter of his own.[27.9] what that letter said was never disclosed; but we know that it proceeded from a truly amiable but high-strung, "top-lofty" man, who felt expressly called by destiny to perform a great national act and incidentally to put winfield scott where he belonged. the general's reply, on the other hand, is extant, and can readily be understood. he was already in a state of mind regarding the administration. friends had warned him against it since his departure from the united states, and the warnings had seemed to be coming true. after polk had promised him confidence and coöperation, and after he as a grateful return had assisted polk with the whigs, the president had immediately branded him before the world as unfit, and outraged his natural pride as a military man, by trying to have a civilian placed over him. polk had infringed upon his rightful power to discipline unruly subordinates; his requisitions for vessels, troops and supplies had not been met; and now, though general-in-chief, he was required to transmit a despatch, doubtless bearing seriously upon the war, without knowing its contents or using a proper discretion as to its opportuneness--a requirement that marcy did not undertake to defend; and he read in the secretary's letter these words: "mr. trist is clothed with such diplomatic powers as will authorize him to enter into arrangements with the government of mexico for the suspension of hostilities." this looked mysterious and, in view of polk's course toward him, alarming. he believed that in a highly important respect the management of the campaign had been taken from him, and he felt that he was to be degraded before his army, the mexicans and the public at large by a clerk from the state department, of whom he had known at washington just enough to believe he disliked him.[27.9] it seemed unjust and insulting; and being an irascible, overworked, over-worried soldier and master of language, seven of whose regiments had just gone home unexpectedly, he answered as might have been foreseen. trist, angry, ill, conscious to his pen's point of every convolution, involution, evolution, ramification and complication of his mental processes, and unaware of marcy's blundering phraseology, replied at a length and in a tone that were enough to drive scott wild; and when he finally reached headquarters on may 14, though scott provided amply for his dignity and comfort, the two were not on speaking terms, and further epistolary exchanges only widened the breach. i fear scott and trist have got to writing, groaned marcy, who knew them both; if so, all is over. as for the sealed despatch, on the grounds that it was doubtful whether the present circumstances warranted its presentation, and that anyhow a proper escort for protection against guerillas could not then be afforded, it was returned to the commissioner.[27.9] on the sixth of june, therefore, trist wrote a letter to bankhead, explaining the character of buchanan's despatch, asking him to make known the existence of the despatch and trist's presence with the army, and inquiring whether at a proper time that minister would transmit the paper to the mexican government. bankhead, as we know, strongly desired peace. the interests of the british merchants at puebla and the capital and of consul-general mackintosh, who not only was in business but had made large advances to santa anna, lay in the same direction; and hence edward thornton, a member of the british legation, called on trist at puebla five days later.[27.10] trist's verbal explanations of his government's aims proved satisfactory, and soon the despatch arrived at its destination.[27.12] the law of april 20 had forbidden, however, all negotiations with the united states. ibarra, the minister of relations, therefore, replied to buchanan that his communication would be laid before congress, and santa anna promised bankhead that he would use his best efforts to have it considered promptly and favorably. meantime the public disputed fiercely whether an american proposition should be heard. many of course denounced the idea, but others said it would place mexico in a better position to listen, than to reject a proffer of peace without knowing its terms. the _diario_--that is to say, the president--advocated this opinion, and the peace feeling, represented by the most sober and intelligent citizens, especially of the mercantile class, and supported by the sensible arguments of _el razonador_, showed no little strength.[27.12] june 24 thornton visited puebla again, delivered ibarra's reply to buchanan, stated that santa anna had openly declared in favor of negotiations, and added that santa anna felt--as did bankhead--that an immediate attack upon the capital would be most unfortunate for the cause of peace. trist, therefore, perhaps having had pains in the head for some time that were growing pains, addressed scott on the subject, and sent him the official documents that explained his mission. the general replied in a friendly and high-minded style. the two met. each discovered that his impression of the other had been radically incorrect. when trist became very ill again, as he soon did, scott anxiously went through his personal stores for guava marmalade; and they became intimate and mutually admiring friends. the commander-in-chief cordially proposed to disregard for the sake of his country every thought of personal glory, and he was ready to assume all needful responsibility.[27.] [santa anna's embarrassments] in mexico, however, a lubricant almost always had to be applied in government affairs, and that lubricant was gold. knowing that the united states eagerly desired peace and had already appropriated millions to gain it, not a few mexicans would have felt they sinned against nature and custom had they been willing to oblige us for nothing. santa anna's greed overtopped the mountains. rejón was well understood to be corrupt. valencia, one of the loudest declaimers against peace, had a large family, was old and was poor; and in santa anna's opinion he desired to be a little more comfortable. numerous minor figures, more or less prominent in congress, also appreciated comfort. the british merchants, with whom "arrangements" were a regular feature of dealings with the government, believed the americans would have to apply the lubricant. such was bankhead's opinion, and on his second visit thornton intimated as much. scott, though he would not have attempted to corrupt an honest person, considered it no worse to employ a "statesman" than a spy, if the statesman desired to serve him; and he believed that without the use of money a year of bloodshed would not force mexico to sign an acceptable treaty. he offered, therefore, to provide the requisite funds for carrying out thornton's idea, and trist welcomed his assistance.[27.12] santa anna doubtless felt eager to obtain peace provided he could remain in authority, and that proviso was natural, for otherwise he would have lost a position he loved, and exile or death would have been his early portion; but it was not easy to calculate the chances. buchanan's despatch seemed to many a fresh sign of weakness. scott had less than half the numbers that marcy had promised, and many inferred that no more good troops could be sent. for a nation to succumb before less than 10,000 isolated men, poorly trained and poorly supplied, seemed ridiculous and even irrational. trist's lack of prestige was another offence to mexican pride. the charge of collusion, supported by the known fact that an american officer had visited santa anna in cuba, manacled him; his countless enemies were awake and implacable; and he found it necessary to deny that he thought of treating.[27.12] the coalition opposed all thoughts of peace. fearful of responsibility and paralyzed by personal and factional intrigues, congress would not assemble. nobody of influence had the courage to advocate what all knew to be necessary. each party held back, hoping the other would make a tactical blunder of that sort. the law of april 20 towered squarely in the way. a caricature represented polk amputating santa anna's remaining leg, and the ether sponges were labelled "3,000,000 pesos." as the president and his friends could see no way out of the predicament, he decided--so the spanish minister reported--to smash his army against scott's, hoping that a treaty would then be acceptable to the nation. but the loss of his troops would have left him powerless; and he confined himself now to advising, as did the british, that scott should alarm the capital by advancing toward it.[27.12] at length, however, an arrangement for a meeting of congress was made by the factions, and on july 13 that august body convened; but it referred buchanan's letter back to the administration as executive business, declaring at the same time against an "ignominious" treaty, and leaving untouched the law of april 20; and then practically, though not in form, it broke up. santa anna was now inclined to hold that congress had abandoned him, negotiate a treaty of peace as a military act, and carry it through by means of the american lubricant. three days later, therefore, after discussing the matter with pillow and the commander-in-chief, trist formally asked the coöperation of scott in providing $10,000 at once and promising to hand over a million whenever a treaty should be ratified by mexico; and scott not only assented,[27.11] but paid the smaller sum that day, as bread upon the waters, out of his fund for secret expenses.[27.12] the outlook seemed favorable. pedraza and baranda, both of them in favor of a settlement, were virtually decided upon as the mexican commissioners, and july 27 santa anna called his generals together--presumably to bring them round. but valencia arrived that day from san luis potosí with his army, loudly declaiming for war and closely watching for a slip on santa anna's part; scott's delay about advancing weakened the plan; and so the council of generals did nothing. santa anna now hesitated more and more. both he and his officers became encouraged by the accumulation of troops and war material. finally they concluded that a triumph lay within their reach, and the idea of making peace lost its attractiveness. scott for his part allowed the negotiations to have no influence on his military plans. he doubtless hoped that a white flag and an offer to treat would meet him on the way to mexico; but as they did not come, those plans were unflinchingly executed, and our arms triumphed.[27.12] soon after the battle of churubusco ended, he returned to san agustín, and as the initial step toward peace negotiations wrote a note summoning mexico city to surrender. but santa anna did not wait for it. the town was in a dreadful state of confusion and panic. wounded or demoralized soldiers could be seen everywhere. many roamed about the streets, crying out at the slightest alarm, "here come the yankees!" astounded by the american victories and utterly disheartened by the incompetence, cowardice and quarrels of their leaders, many felt that god had pronounced the doom of belshazzar against "this accursed babylon." hence, though santa anna rallied troops as well as possible, he felt that an assault could not be repulsed, and at about midnight had pacheco, then minister of relations, address a despatch to buchanan proposing the negotiations requested so many times by the american government.[27.13] the purpose of the despatch, which bankhead transmitted open to trist with an appeal from himself to heed it, was to prevent the americans from entering the city; and the spanish minister, who was consulted with reference to it, agreed that in view of polk's repeated assurances it could not fail to have that effect.[27.14] [an armistice] thornton and mackintosh also brought their influence to bear; and the next morning, while scott was preparing to take up battering or assaulting positions to warrant the summons, general mora met him at coyoacán with a proposal for a truce. the terms of this proposal were not satisfactory; but scott sent back by him an overture for a short armistice. this was accepted by santa anna as a gift from heaven. commissioners to arrange the terms were appointed the next day, and on the twenty-fourth ratifications of their agreement settled the matter. the army, though its entire confidence in scott prevented all trouble, felt profoundly dissatisfied; but with a total disregard of personal considerations the general took what reasonably seemed to him the wise course.[27.14] scott, who was now at tacubaya with trist, held his troops at command--worth and the dragoons at tacubaya, pillow at mixcoac, twiggs about four miles farther out, and quitman at san agustín--in such a manner as to be fairly safe himself, and to threaten the western and southern approaches of the city. the well men cleaned their clothes and arms, and the sick and wounded soon found themselves comfortable and cheerful. several mexican congressmen among the prisoners were set free. about half a million of needed specie was obtained from the city--principally and perhaps entirely by cashing drafts on the united states government. a large quantity of provisions, contracted for while the americans lay at puebla, was brought out, and a train of wagons proceeded for the same purpose to the valley of toluca, where olaguíbel, ostensibly the implacable enemy of the americans, helped them to obtain supplies. apples, pears and peaches of an indifferent quality were now ripe, and the soldiers lived fairly well.[27.15] santa anna was even busier than scott. measures were taken to collect all missing soldiers, reorganize and rearrange the corps, maintain a state of defence, and revive morale by removing disaffected officers as well as by punishing conspicuous delinquents. all american prisoners in the city were freely given up. gamboa, a politician of méxico state, caused some trouble by critically reviewing santa anna's course during the war, and formally charging him with treason. far more serious was the combination of valencia--who was still regarded by many as a martyr, had gathered a small army, and had pronounced against santa anna--with olaguíbel, who stood on confidential terms with alvarez; and to make this combination still more threatening, it seemed to be supported by paredes, now at the head of a small force, by almonte and by canalizo. all possible care was taken to guard against the movement. every officer known to have been associated with valencia was imprisoned or at least cashiered; every hint of intrigue excited attention; and the government heard with deep concern that somebody on a sorrel horse had carried letters from toluca to querétaro. naturally santa anna did not fail to assemble the generals, and offer his place to any one who would take it; and of course none of them had the bad taste--not to say imprudence--to come forward. moreover behind all the military disaffection, rejoicing over it as a threat against santa anna, though unwilling to join forces with the army in any cause, towered the coalition, justly regarded as even more dangerous.[27.15] [negotiations] but obviously the chief business of the government was the negotiation with trist. here santa anna acted sincerely--as sincerely as the drowning man who clutches at a plank, no matter how great a rascal he has been. on this point we have a superabundant amount of evidence, and in particular the full reports of lozano, chargé d'affaires of spain, with whom santa anna talked explicitly and at great length. texas and upper california could be given up, the general thought, as territory already lost. the region between the rio grande and the nueces, it was hastily inferred from a vague remark dropped by trist at puebla, could be made neutral, perhaps under a european guaranty; and with that barrier established against smuggling and the dreaded encroachments of the united states, and with millions of shining american dollars pouring into the treasury for the benefit of those supporting him and the treaty, santa anna felt he could meet all opponents. in his own mind, though he intended to get still better terms if possible, the bargain was as good as made. he therefore placed on the commission superior men, disposed to effect an amicable settlement, and not mere partisans of his own: ex-president herrera, j. b. couto, a man of the highest integrity and leader of the mexican bar, general ignacio mora, chief of the military engineers, and miguel atristain, a lawyer supposed to represent british commercial interests; and he put forth a manifesto entirely satisfactory from the american point of view, in which he declared openly for peace, and, holding that congress on being duly consulted had referred the subject back to the executive, brushed aside the law of april 20.[27.17] trist, for his part, stated promptly the full demands of the united states, which required that mexico should not only accept the rio grande line but cede new mexico and upper california; and three or four days later, in the hope of removing difficulties, he decided to inform santa anna confidentially that he would pay the highest sum authorized by his instructions. this course was proper for the representative of a country that had always loved frank diplomacy, and felt no need of jockeying in the present negotiations; and it was also prudent, for in tedious haggling and crafty special pleading no anglo-saxon could rival the mexicans. september 1 and 2 the terms were fully discussed.[27.16] regarding certain minor points that might have entered into an agreement a mutual disposition to be conciliatory showed itself, but on the essentials trist held firmly. much to his surprise, the pecuniary consideration appeared to count for little in comparison with the alienating of territory and its population, and the mexicans proved obdurate. at last, therefore, to save the only hope of peace, trist proposed that the armistice be extended forty or forty-five days, and the decision of washington be obtained as to excluding nationality and population from the nueces-rio grande district.[27.17] the proposed extension of time santa anna, angry at what he thought had been a deception on trist's part with reference to this district, rejected at once as a scheme to get provisions and reinforcements, and so he found himself confronted squarely by unexpected and unpalatable terms. nor were these his only difficulties. with light-hearted vanity the people still ignored their long series of defeats. an intense fear prevailed that santa anna, with what military forces remained and the money coming from washington, would sweep away republican institutions, establish himself as autocrat for life, and wreak vengeance on his enemies. all the standard objections against ending the war marshalled themselves anew. arguments, protests and threats, official as well as unofficial, poured in.[27.17] any sale of territory, wrote the governor of querétaro, would authorize a general secession. negotiations not shared in by congress are treasonable, proclaimed farías, otero, rosa and other statesmen in concert. rejón, who probably wished the americans to capture mexico, install the puros in authority and make a treaty with them, added his loud voice to the chorus. the coalition and the valencia-olaguíbel conspiracy loomed up darker than before. states and citizens who refused to support the war denounced santa anna for proposing to end it. many who longed for a treaty would not think of a treaty signed by him. the friends of peace lacked organization and the courage necessary to dominate the situation. the members of congress would not gather, and it seemed evident that no popular assembly would ever ratify the "sale" of loyal fellow-citizens, which the new mexicans were believed to be.[27.17] [failure of the negotiations] apparently santa anna's one chance was to declare himself dictator immediately, and, if he cared to make so distasteful a bargain, ratify it himself; but there were signs that his army--with valencia and paredes, long favorites of the military caste, bidding against him--would not support his authority against such opposition in such a cause. rascally but keen tornel, who called himself the rainbow because he shone in stormy times, but was likened by others to the bat, poured self-interested counsels against peace into his ear; and from similar motives pacheco assisted tornel. santa anna's nerve weakened. besides, an alternative offered itself. had not scott lost a good part of his little army in the recent fighting, and made the armistice in the desperate hope of receiving fresh troops? might not fickle fortune change in the next battle? whatever its result, could the americans venture to demand more than was now demanded? why not have another throw of the dice, and then make the treaty, if it could not be avoided?[27.17] as soon as trist's persistence in our demands was made known to him, therefore, although he still felt some hope they would be modified, santa anna began to prepare a line of retreat. warlike instead of pacific reasons for agreeing to the armistice made their appearance in public. every thought of negotiating a treaty was denied, and papers were drawn up representing him as a bold and indignant champion of mexican rights. at first his orders had been to keep the agreement with scott inviolably; but on finding that no acceptable modification of trist's demands was in sight, he proceeded to break it--especially by preventing money and supplies from leaving the city, and by having work done on the fortifications of chapultepec--and appeals for troops, funds and materials were issued. scott, on the other hand, there is good reason to believe, adhered to his pledges; but he was alert, and his paid agents in the city watched santa anna's proceedings. on september 2 he relinquished all real expectation of peace, yet he still clung to hope.[27.19] the mexican leader also shrank from drawing the sword. but on the afternoon of the 6th his commissioners, arriving late and agitated at the rendezvous, presented trist with a counter-projet, which they knew he would reject, and an argumentative note intended for the mexican public. no discussion took place. evidently the time for words had passed. scott then sent a letter charging that santa anna had violated the armistice, and announcing that unless complete satisfaction should be made before noon the following day, hostilities would be resumed. santa anna's ingenious reply was mainly a counter-blast of accusations designed to rouse what he called "the first city of the american continent"; and again it was war.[27.18] yet something had been accomplished. the word "peace" had been uttered and seriously considered; it was trist's firm belief that not only the commissioners but most of the cabinet were for accepting the american terms; in a measure this attitude on the part of leading moderados committed their party; and the mexican plenipotentiaries retired from the meetings filled with cordiality and even admiration for trist.[27.19] in the united states great disappointment was felt over the issue of these negotiations. the general view of the armistice was the easy, superficial one that all mexicans were rascals, and that santa anna had shamelessly tricked our good faith. marcy, not seeing that the counter-projet was a political ruse, gravely pronounced it "extravagant and inadmissible." polk, whose knowledge of the mexicans was revealed by his quaint idea that an extension of the american ægis over new mexico might be welcomed by them, condemned the armistice as if peace had not been his avowed aim; and the administration organ, besides representing scott and trist as dupes, described it as contrary to the intentions of the government, when in fact a commissioner had attended the army for the express purpose of negotiating at the earliest possible moment. mexico rejects peace, proclaimed the _union_; let us give her war. "burn the olive branch and whet the sword," was the popular cry; let her be humbled in dust and ashes![27.20] [the american view] to the army the respite of a fortnight proved a physical, mental and moral blessing. san agustín, buried in orchards, umbrageous coyoacán, cozy san angel and lively mixcoac had each its charms; and tacubaya, where the palace, embowered in blossoms and fragrance, crowned a hill gently--even pensively--shaded by silvery old olives, was lovelier yet, and afforded the noblest views. here the brilliant sunrise, first lighting up the distant white volcanoes that propped the sky, and then stooping to brighten the near-by villas of the city merchants, ushered in gorgeously the perfect day. after noon black, jagged clouds could be seen gathering quickly in the soft and luminous blue; the edge of one would melt into a slender gray shadow, dripping to the earth; and in a few moments the grandest artillery of the heavens would be at work. then sometimes a rainbow followed; the sunset was fair; the moon rose clear and full; and the white houses, massive towers and brilliant porcelain domes of the city appeared to be afloat in a magical radiance toned with slumber and with dreams. "heaven help those at home," wrote a soldier, "who think they know what moonlight is!"[27.21] amid experiences like these it seemed hard, almost impossible, to contemplate war and bloodshed. but the troops felt thoroughly angered by what they looked upon as mexican treachery--first in pretending to negotiate, and then in violating the armistice; and they quickly nerved themselves, not without satisfaction, for the coming struggle. all realized that only triumph could save them now from destruction.[27.21] xxviii molino del rey, chapultepec, mexico september, 1847 rather more than half a mile west of chapultepec and still farther north of tacubaya stood a complicated range of low stone buildings known as el molino del rey (the king's mill). they extended in a rambling fashion approximately north and south more than 300 yards, and consisted essentially of a flour mill and a foundry for bronze cannon. the heavy walls and the parapets of the flat roofs, reinforced with sand-bags, made these buildings almost a fort. nearly half a mile from them toward the northwest lay a very solid stone edifice, at one time a powder magazine, called the casa mata, protected now with a small, dry fosse and light, incomplete breastworks. along the west front of el molino extended a somewhat irregular drainage ditch, or series of ditches, at this critical time free from water, which then made a bend, passed some twenty-five yards from the south face of casa mata, continued in the same direction nearly one fourth of a mile, and finally joined a deep, wide ravine, that ran for a long way northeast and southwest, and could not easily be crossed except (at x) near this junction. for military uses the ditch gained strength from dirt thrown up in front of it and a line of maguey growing some thirty yards back. from it an easy slope, clear of trees but somewhat obstructed with cornfields near the bend, rose toward the southwest for about 600 yards and culminated in a ridge, which overlooked tacubaya; while west of the ravine and a mile or so from casa mata stood the hacienda buildings of los morales.[28.1] [illustration: battles of mexico] [scott's preparations] inferring from supposed signs of american activity, and also from scott's peremptory letter, that on the afternoon of september 7 a determined effort would be made to seize chapultepec and attack the defences of the city, which had not become very strong in this quarter, santa anna made special efforts during the sixth to place his most serviceable troops on the terrain just described; and the next day, taking command there in person, he posted and instructed them with particular care. león's and rangel's brigades were stationed in el molino; the best of pérez's brigade garrisoned the casa mata; ramírez's occupied the intermediate space; four guns were placed a little in front of the bend; 3000 or 4000 horse under alvarez--the first division commanded by him and the second by manuel andrade--proceeded to los morales; reserves of infantry and artillery lay in the rear, and the cannon of chapultepec were made ready to sweep the ridge and slope.[28.2] at the same time pains were taken to rouse mexico city. suspicion of santa anna persisted, but his credit had been improved not a little by valencia's conduct, and the public felt inclined to believe in him once more. the image of the virgin of guadalupe, the patroness of mexico, now passed through the streets. under orders from tornel the clergy preached a crusade against the heretical invaders. tales of alleged american atrocities supplemented their exhortations. people were ordered to sharpen their daggers, and make ready to throw paving-stones from the azoteas. that scott's handful--only some 8000 available men and supposed to number even less--could beat 18,000 or 20,000 valiant mexicans, protected by strong defences, and capture a city still occupied by perhaps 200,000 persons, appeared incredible. citizens as well as troops grew confident. when the bells began to ring at about half-past nine on the morning of the seventh, all welcomed the alarm; and when santa anna visited the chosen terrain during the afternoon to issue his orders for battle, he was received with applause.[28.3] [battle of molino del rey] scott also prepared. september 7 the engineer company and cadwalader's brigade advanced from mixcoac to tacubaya, the rest of pillow's division and one of twiggs's brigades moved toward the city as a feint, and twiggs's other brigade and quitman's division were ordered to concentrate at mixcoac. captain mason and lieutenant foster of the engineers daringly reconnoitred the mexican position, and, although casa mata--standing on low ground and partially masked by its earthworks and the maguey--was not adequately made out, they analyzed the situation correctly otherwise. then, to prevent errors, brevet lieutenant colonel duncan and two engineers did the work a second time; and scott and worth also made observations. information that he deemed thoroughly safe led the commander-in-chief to believe that guns needed for the defence of the city were now under construction at el molino, and he desired worth to have a party destroy the works and material during the coming night--in his opinion an easy task--and immediately retire. at worth's request, however, a daybreak attack and, as the natural consequence, a broader plan were decided upon.[28.4] [illustration: battle of el molino] accordingly, the first gray light of september 8 found the americans waiting to assault the position. one cannon guarded the road from mexico to tacubaya. brevet colonel garland's brigade and captain drum of the fourth artillery with his two buena vista 6-pounders were directly south of el molino, at a distance of about 400 yards from it, to ward off a flank attack from chapultepec, threaten the mill, and be ready to assist as might be necessary. on the ridge, not far to their left, stood captain huger with two 24-pound siege guns, brevet major wright's party of stormers--twelve officers with five companies of 100 men each, drawn during the night from the six regiments of worth's division--and a supporting body composed of brevet lieutenant colonel c. f. smith's light battalion. some 500 yards farther to the left and higher up the ridge the guns of duncan, who had charge of all the artillery, bore upon the mexicans near casa mata, about 700 yards distant, with colonel clarke's brigade--now commanded, on account of clarke's illness, by brevet colonel mcintosh--on the left of the pieces and general cadwalader's brigade, acting as a reserve, at their right and rear. and finally, near the ravine, major sumner of the second dragoons with some 270 mounted men occupied our extreme left under orders to hold the mexican cavalry in check and coöperate wherever he could. in all there were 3447 officers and men.[28.5] apparently worth's dispositions had been wisely planned, and a scrutiny of the mexican position, could it have been made, would have confirmed the expectations of a quick victory. deceived by scott's feint against the southern front of the capital, santa anna had broken up his army during the night, and now, with a considerable part of it and some of the guns, he was fully two hours distant. no one officer commanded the troops before worth. only a sharp, strong thrust was required.[28.5] as soon as huger could make out the low, white walls of el molino, about a third of a mile distant, he opened fire; and at the same time engineers mason and foster advanced some 350 yards. all was perfectly still in front. both of them believed the position had been abandoned, and mason sent foster back to have wright's party--now deployed in line--advance. consequently, instead of waiting, as had been the plan, until the 24-pounders had perceptibly shaken the mill, the stormers advanced and masked those guns when some ten rounds had been fired. the mexican pieces, which had been moved nearer the mill during the night, at once opened furiously with canister from an unexpected quarter, and soon a terrific fusillade burst from the parapeted azoteas of el molino. in spite of it all, three of the pieces were taken, however.[28.5] but the american spearhead--wright's party--was merely glued fragments of steel, not a forged blade. a large part of the men were separated from the comrades and officers whom they knew and relied upon, and all from the colors they adored. mason, foster, wright and eight other officers out of fourteen went down. the column broke. nearly a third of the men, whose comrades fought later in the engagement, under their proper colors and officers, like heroes, absolutely bolted. the enemy saw that only a handful were persisting, and promptly rallied. without orders brave lieutenant colonel echeagaray brought from chapultepec the third ligero. "at them!" he cried; and instantly a counter-attack was launched. the guns were recaptured. the americans had to retreat. and the pursuing mexicans butchered and robbed our wounded.[28.5] smith's battalion rapidly advanced, however, though possibly not quite soon enough. drum directed a quick, accurate fire upon the mexican battery. garland moved up by a road that sheltered his command until it came within some 200 yards of the mill. drum followed him, stopping at intervals to deliver canister. cadwalader sent aid. tall, swarthy león crumpled suddenly with a bullet in his side; valiant balderas fell over into the arms of his son; and for these ardent leaders the mexicans had no substitutes. ramírez took flight. the mexican reserves would not budge. the americans captured the enemy's guns, penetrated into the buildings, and forced their way to the azoteas. close fighting then settled the issue; and before very long, under the fire of their own pieces, as well as drum's and one from huger, the mexican left wing and the troops coming to its aid from chapultepec were in precipitate retreat.[28.5] casa mata, still held by the excellent men under pérez but wholly destitute of artillery and feebly protected by its earthen enclosure, might have been cleared of defenders by a vigorous application of artillery. duncan began work. but worth believed in brilliant operations, and ordered mcintosh to assault the position. with a smile that beautified his rugged face, the old warrior set out; and soon, bleeding from two wounds, he was lying on the slope. the second and the third in command fell. officer after officer was struck down. the men toppled over by the wholesale. wild with enthusiasm some of the mexicans leaped over the defences and came to meet their assailants.[28.5] in spite of their well-aimed and murderous volleys, however, they were soon punished and driven back. but what more could be done? the walls of casa mata had not been breached, and there were no ladders. so the americans lay down behind the embankment of the ditch, and coolly picked off mexicans at casa mata and behind the maguey. after a time their muskets became foul. their ammunition began to give out. somehow an order to retire got started; and finally the shattered remnants of the brigade fell back to the rear, followed by miscreants who glutted their fury on our wounded. but duncan, whose guns had been masked by mcintosh's advance, now resumed his work upon casa mata, and in a short while the mexicans were in flight, pursued by the unerring missiles of the battery.[28.5] yet there were still 3000 or 4000 horse at los morales. these troops had been expected by santa anna to sweep the field, and he had personally given their commander his instructions. but a mere partisan fighter like alvarez did not know what to do with two divisions of cavalry, an arm that it requires distinctive qualifications and much experience to handle well. besides, his division included no artillery, and he probably felt no more anxious than before to help the president at his own expense. he followed but carelessly santa anna's instructions. his orders to andrade were more or less confused and impracticable; and that officer, who was at odds with his commander and felt that santa anna had overlooked his achievements at buena vista, concluded to keep himself and his men out of danger.[28.5] at length, however, while mcintosh was charging, alvarez advanced in brilliant array with his own division. sumner at once dashed hotly across the ravine and at them, passing the mexican infantry within pistol range and losing forty-four men and 104 horses in perhaps ten seconds. duncan turned his now unemployed guns in the same direction. one of alvarez's brigades, made up of untrained guerillas, broke immediately under the cannon fire; and the whole division soon retreated in disorder upon andrade's men, fiercely pursued by the riderless horses of sumner's command, as if to get revenge for the loss of their masters. later some of the cavalry undertook, or so pretended, to cross the ravine at another point. but sumner dashed at them again, a part of cadwalader's brigade was now in that quarter, and both duncan and huger--the latter being at present near the american centre with one gun-sent their compliments; the mexicans retreated; and at about seven o'clock the battle ended.[28.5] "a sad mistake," said hitchcock, and he was right. a few cannon moulds were found. the partial destruction of el molino and casa mata cancelled the military value of the position, and facilitated later american operations; but such operations were not contemplated at this time. a few small cannon and a quantity of more or less valuable ammunition fell into our hands, and a heavy gun at chapultepec became disabled. probably 2000 mexicans were killed or wounded, and perhaps an equal number deserted. nearly 700 prisoners were taken. the loss of two excellent officers meant still more, perhaps. intrenching implements needed at chapultepec were lost. the want of coöperation among the mexican generals and especially the total failure of the cavalry to meet expectations disheartened the capital. but the casualties in the little american army amounted to 124 killed and 582 wounded. the confidence of the officers, if not the men, in their leaders faltered at the evident mistakes of scott and worth. each of those generals blamed the other, and the discord between them, which reached down to the private soldier, became worse than ever. no american could find satisfaction in a barren victory gained with such difficulty and at such a cost; and the mexicans, believing we had aimed to accomplish far more, exulted over their imaginary triumph. scott faced the situation with unshaken fortitude, but those who knew him intimately saw that he felt anxious.[28.6] [the great problem] however, the great problem before them soon occupied the minds of all. mexico, lying on a very slight elevation or swell, could be entered on its western side by the garita of san cosme and at the southwest by the garita of belén, to each of which led a causeway from the fortified hill of chapultepec, about a mile and a half southwest of belén. from this garita a second causeway ran south about an equal distance to the picturesque chapel of la piedad, where it was crossed by one extending eastwardly from tacubaya to the san antonio or acapulco highway, which--it will be recalled--led south to churubusco and san agustín. not far north of the latter junction and about a mile from the city proper stood the garita of san antonio; while, intermediate between the san antonio and the piedad routes, the niño perdido causeway, coming from san angel, connected with niño perdido garita, which stood at the edge of the city. finally, a road leading nearly east from san antonio gateway conducted one to la viga garita and la viga canal, a deep and broad waterway, which, since it could not well be bridged in the face of the enemy, practically bounded scott's field of operations. there were thus four garitas--belén, niño perdido, san antonio and la viga in this order from west to east--each guarding an approach to the capital from the south.[28.7] scott's expectation was to break the south front, and after the armistice ended, his engineers, assisted to some extent by himself and a mexican officer in his pay, reconnoitred it actively and boldly except on the forenoon of the eighth. had it been feasible to strike immediately on the resumption of hostilities, the enemy's lines would have been found poorly fortified and armed. but this could not well be done with santa anna's principal forces menacing our flank; the american army was not yet in position; and scott desired first of all to destroy el molino. after the battle of the eighth half of his troops imperatively required a breathing space. the wounded had to be given attention. the army still needed to be placed. it was necessary to protect hospitals, baggage and stores--especially since governor olaguíbel and about 700 militia, supposed by americans to be alvarez with his two divisions, were approaching the rear, and according to reports valencia had 8000 men in that vicinity. moreover scott's information was not complete. the eighth of september, following the twentieth of august, had proved the danger of rashness; and the fresh losses made extreme caution absolutely necessary. finally, scott felt a suspicion that the mexicans expected and wished him to attack their apparently unfinished works covering the south front.[28.8] on the morning of the eleventh he inspected these once more, and then had a conference of generals and engineers at la piedad. it was a solemn gathering. before them lay the fortified capital of mexico, a hopeful army of perhaps 15,000, a good equipment of artillery, nearly 700 trained gunners, and a large population, somewhat disillusioned, but excited and vengeful; and in view of the american situation it was essential, as the commander-in-chief clearly indicated, to strike a vital blow at once.[28.9] but where? point by point scott fully and fairly stated the case: at the southwest the mighty porphyritic hill of chapultepec to carry, but a clear problem, hard ground, excellent places for batteries, huger's opinion that in one day the fortified college on the top of the hill could be demolished, in the event of success a position from which to operate freely, and at least a possibility that, after losing what was commonly deemed its key, mexico would listen to terms; on the southern front marshes, inundations, large ditches full of water everywhere, causeways already cut by the enemy, bridges destroyed, a topography that made rear and flank attacks impossible, an extensive series of well-planned and well-armed fortifications crossing their fires and commanding one another, and an enemy apparently eager to have the attack made here. scott, while disclaiming any wish to influence the judgment of others, pronounced frankly for chapultepec.[28.9] then one of the engineers--a tall, handsome young man, with a positive chin, a strong nose, a dark, closely trimmed mustache, dark hair clustering above his ears, and a fresh, clear color in his face--stood up and reported crisply on the work of reconnoitring. his name was robert e. lee, and he recommended approaching by the southern front. three other engineers concurred with him. four generals, doubtless influenced by these experts, took the same view. twiggs and riley inclined the other way. the fifth engineer present was then called upon, and he--beauregard--in a long, technical statement argued for the chapultepec route. pierce changed his opinion. a silence followed; and then scott, drawing up his magnificent figure to its full height, announced in his grand way: "gentlemen, we will attack by the western gates. the general officers present here will remain for further orders--the meeting is dissolved." and so the die was cast.[28.10] [chapultepec] the preparation of chapultepec for defence had begun in may, and santa anna had insisted upon it as of the "highest importance"; but want of money hindered and at times checked operations. during the armistice a little progress was made, and september 9, under the direction of a competent engineer and of the president himself, the work began in earnest. but alterations in plan, a lack of implements, a shortage of materials, the general confusion and the want of time naturally made thoroughness impossible. chapultepec was therefore a fort but not really a fortress. it stood alone, too, without the supporting positions that a fortress must have; and shot and shell could penetrate the defences of the college on the summit of the hill almost everywhere. even the parapets were not ready; and instead of the 2000 men required for an adequate garrison of the buildings and works, only a few hundreds occupied them. their elevation merely hindered approach--not assault--and artillery could largely offset that advantage. to hold the grove was essential, for without it the garrison above could not obtain supplies or even water; and here the want of adequate defences had a still worse effect, since large forces could not be protected against artillery.[28.11] [illustration: battle of chapultepec] yet for 7180 available americans including those required to make a feint against the southern front--an "army" that had to contemplate still harder work beyond, and could not afford severe losses here--chapultepec meant a great deal. in general the position formed an approximate rectangle about three fourths of a mile in length by one fourth of a mile in width, bounded at its western end by el molino and on the other sides with high stone walls. in the south wall, at about its middle point, there was an opening covered on the outside by a sand-bag redan (b), unarmed. from the main gateway in the eastern end the causeway of belén struck off toward the city, another road--guarded here by a cut and by two batteries--ran toward tacubaya, and a third, after running westwardly into the rectangle and a little way up the slope until it arrived at a 4-pounder in a circular redoubt (c), flanked with an infantry entrenchment (d), turned sharply toward the northeast, and finally climbed to the summit.[28.12] [illustration: blindage at chapultepec.] here on a rectangular level space or terre-plein, supported at the eastern end by an almost vertical precipice and on the other sides by high, parapeted walls, rose the masonry buildings of the military college, skilfully though incompletely reinforced with sand-bags and screens of timber (blindage), supplemented with parapeted azoteas, and surrounded with ten effective guns, heavy and light. a deep, broad fosse at the base of the western wall, mines below that, and finally, half-way down the slope, a redan (e) strengthened this end, where the incline was gentlest. in swamps at the western foot of the hill stood a large grove of huge cypresses--extending also toward the main gateway--through which ran an east and west road commanded by this redan (e) and also by the wall of the fort. beyond the grove came a north-and-south ditch, intended for drainage, with a redan-breastwork (a)--looking westward--at its northern end; and finally, after traversing level and open fields for about a quarter of a mile toward the west, one arrived at el molino. placed so conspicuously in view, 150 or 200 feet in height, chapultepec seemed to deserve its popular reputation of impregnability, and the american soldiers gazed at the white walls on the summit, transfigured in the sunlight, with dread if not with consternation.[28.12] late in the afternoon, september 11, quitman's division ostentatiously presented itself at la piedad, but after dark both his and pillow's moved to tacubaya, leaving twiggs with brevet colonel riley's brigade and steptoe's and taylor's field pieces behind. during the night two 16's and an eight-inch howitzer under drum were placed behind bushes on the road from tacubaya to mexico, about 1000 yards from chapultepec, and a similar howitzer with a 24-pounder, masked in the same way, south of el molino under hagner; and these batteries (nos. 1 and 2) opened fire the next morning (september 12). later in the day a 16-pound siege gun and an eight-inch howitzer (battery no. 3) and a ten-inch mortar (no. 4), planted nearer the mill, joined in the work. chapultepec replied; and, as usual, the mexican artillerymen--of whom there was a full complement--did well, occasionally knocking sand-bags from the american parapets, while our own gunners, warned by the burst of smoke, took shelter at each discharge. meantime steptoe, in the hope of deceiving the mexicans as to scott's purpose, made as much noise as possible opposite the san antonio garita.[28.13] during these preparations the mexicans passed their days in a state of fever. reports that our army had only half-rations cheered them, and scott's deceptive manoeuvres were attributed by many to indecision or timidity. on the eleventh a review and a valiant proclamation from the president recalled his "victory" of 1829 over the spaniards. but a sense of weakness and confusion, the loss of friends, the continual alarms, the marchings and countermarchings, and the ominous clang of the bells kept them sad and anxious. santa anna, for his part, displayed as usual a remarkable activity and a remarkable want of judgment and method. during the night of september 9 he set perhaps 2000 men at work--one hour each--on the southern fortifications, and the parapets rose as if by enchantment. not knowing where scott would strike, he broke his army into a number of detachments, and shifted troops and guns frequently according to his notion of the probabilities, while always maintaining a reserve. but he lost himself in a maze of details; and on the eleventh, deceived by the rather weak american feint, he unwisely drew men and cannon from chapultepec and belén.[28.14] [september 12] early the next morning, however, the reports of spies and the roar of scott's heavy guns enlightened him. troops were hurried to the real point of danger. with all speed he went there himself, ordered his best engineers to work on the fortifications near the main gateway of the chapultepec enclosure, and posted troops close by. but there was little he could do. more and more accurately the american batteries fired and kept on firing. two of the best cannon in the fort were disabled. the buildings of the college suffered, the garrison suffered more, and their morale suffered most of all, for except the engineers and gunners the men felt utterly helpless. when santa anna entered the rectangle unattended to reconnoitre, a shell burst near him and covered his red pony with dirt. toward evening general bravo, the commander of the position, came down, reported to him that the garrison were cowed, and demanded fresh troops; but santa anna could see no use of sending them forward to be destroyed on the way or else demoralized after arriving. they should be provided, he said, at the critical moment.[28.15] scott saw, however, as the day waned, that huger's expectations would not be realized--that an assault would be necessary. for this last resort preparations had in fact been made. the troops and the ladders were now ready. fearing the mexicans would repair the damages under cover of night he thought at first of delivering the blow at once; but he concluded that it was now too late in the day, that his guns could soon dispose of repairs and reinforcements, and that a morning attack would give many hours for pursuing the advantages gained. engineers proceeded to mend and improve our own batteries, and the generals met for a conference. here the plans were finally decided upon. quitman's division and a forlorn hope of about 265 selected officers and men from twiggs's division, under captain casey of the second infantry, were to advance by the tacubaya road; and pillow's, preceded by a similar party from worth's division, led by captain mckenzie of the second artillery, was to attack by way of el molino and the grove. then every one betook himself to his post. but pillow felt discontented. "we shall be defeated," said worth privately; and even scott admitted to hitchcock, "i have my misgivings."[28.16] [battle of chapultepec] at daybreak--about half-past five--the next morning a signal gun broke the stillness, and then our batteries opened. for two hours or so they hurled shot and shells at the fort, and then for some thirty minutes grape, canister and shells were poured into the grove. at about eight o'clock, as if by common consent, they stopped--but only to burst forth again with new fury.[28.17] that one momentary pause was the command to attack. colonel trousdale, with the eleventh and fourteenth infantry and a section of magruder's field battery under the "stonewall" jackson of our civil war, moved some distance eastward from near el molino by the anzures causeway along the northern side of the rectangle, to prevent reinforcement and embarrass escape in that quarter. lieutenant colonel johnston with four companies of the gray voltigeurs advanced outside the south wall, drove the mexicans from the redan (b) and from the wall, behind which they had been standing on platforms, passed through the opening, captured the circular redoubt (c) and the breastwork near it (d), and opened fire on the southern parapet of the fort. reno's howitzers, taken from el molino eastward into the fields, poured shells upon the grove and the mexican entrenchments (a and e). four other voltigeur companies under colonel andrews, after crossing those open fields, rushed with loud cheers into the swamp; and the ninth and the fifteenth infantry, deploying into line, followed them closely. decorated with long, hanging moss, the venerable cypresses, dear alike to cortez and to montezuma, seemed like the fit guardians of some mystical and melancholy religion; but now hurrahs and sharp flashes and the terrible crash of cannon-balls amidst the branches broke their shadowy silence, and the americans, wallowing through the mire, drove the mexican skirmishers from tree to tree, from the grove, and at last from the battle.[28.17] clearly it was time for santa anna to support the garrison. attempts had been made to repair the fort during the night, but no adequate materials could be found there. a cannon had burst. the dead and wounded lay about. there were no surgeons, no medical supplies. the expected reinforcements did not appear. most of the students, gallant lads in gray uniforms and gaily tasselled blue caps, withdrew by command. bravo--thickset and erect, with deep eyes and a powerful chin--though he was cold and unenterprising, had flawless courage, and he stood with folded arms or marched calmly from post to post. but the infantry of the garrison--hungry, exhausted, stunned, hopeless--cowered behind the parapets. many had to be driven to their places, and some had to be fired on. even the engineers and gunners felt despondent.[28.17] but santa anna could not see what to do. no doubt the hill was to be attacked from the grove, but the enemy seemed likely to assault by the tacubaya causeway also, and trousdale, he fancied, might come round by a road that skirted the eastern end of the rectangle to strike his rear. besides, the officers and men showed no desire to challenge the american artillery by marching up the hill, and he understood well enough himself how few of them could probably reach the fort. at length, however, he strengthened the forces on the tacubaya road, and sent most of the san blas activo battalion to bravo. at the circular redoubt this corps met the americans, and not many of them lived to go farther.[28.17] east of the grove, andrews with his voltigeurs and reno with his howitzers turned a little to the right and united with johnston. this left the ninth a clear front. colonel ransom had promised, the day before, that he and his men would go into the fort or die. proudly erect, sword in hand, the beau-ideal of a soldier, he strode in front up the steepest part of the slope, while the fifteenth marched on his left. the breastwork (e) was captured; and then, coming in view of the fort--its buildings almost hidden in smoke, its parapets a sheet of flame, the air filled with the hiss and shriek and roar of missiles--he waved his sword, shouted, "forward, the ninth!" and fell dead with a bullet in his forehead. a terrible cry rose from his men: "ransom has fallen--the colonel is shot!" wild for revenge they all charged on, and a part of them reached the fosse.[28.17] but there had been some mistake. the ladders had been entrusted to raw men, it was said; perhaps they had not been started off in time; apparently some of the bearers had left their places and hurried on; some had been killed and others frightened. anyhow the ladders did not arrive. like the voltigeurs on their right, the ninth and the fifteenth sought shelter behind rocks and stumps and fired at the parapet; and the tardy storming party, which was to have passed through them, feeling no desire to get between the two lines of fire and really unable to do anything without ladders, halted.[28.17] the men were fairly safe. their muskets taught most of the enemy to keep down behind the parapet. the rest of the mexicans fired very badly, and the americans near the wall could not be reached by the cannon. but the attack was making no progress. time passed--five, ten, fifteen dreadful minutes, and still no ladders could even be seen. the american batteries, which had been firing over the heads of our troops, could no longer do it safely. the ardor of battle was cooling. low mounds that looked like graves, but in reality were the mines, lay under our men, and a mexican lieutenant of engineers had orders to fire them at the right moment. santa anna with perhaps 4000 or even 5000 reserves so near--might he not come round the hill? scott's whole gazing army, back even to lieutenant mayne reid at battery no. 2, was seized with a horrible fear. pillow, lying at the foot of the hill painfully hurt in the ankle, sent for the whole of worth's division, which was supporting him as a reserve, and begged worth to make "great haste" or it would be "too late."[28.17] there was, however, a nearer source of help. when the signal for attack was given, quitman's division--preceded by forty pioneers under captain reynolds of the marines, casey's forlorn hope, and 120 stormers from the volunteer division led by major twiggs of the marines--advanced on the tacubaya causeway until about 200 yards from the gateway batteries. to support it, repel a body of mexicans on its right, ward off any force that might approach from the city, perhaps turn those batteries, and if possible gain the mexican rear, general smith struck off into the meadows and pushed on despite the ditches; and captain drum and lieutenant benjamin, each with a single gun, and lieutenant hunt with two of duncan's pieces advanced by the road, firing on those batteries or at the hill and fort as opportunities offered.[28.17] on each side of the causeway ran a ditch that was almost a canal and cramped the troops not a little; and a terrible fire of artillery and musketry from the meadows, the front, the wall of the rectangle and the fort on the hill-top greeted them. quitman had reconnoitred here the day before, and thought he understood the problem; but the mexicans had made further preparations afterwards, and when he ordered a charge, it was checked, and twiggs and casey fell. ahead of him, partly enfilading the road, blazed at least five guns, and some of the best soldiers in the mexican army--commanded by general rangel--occupied the stone buildings near them, while others fired from behind the wall near the gateway. under this concentrated and awful storm the americans recoiled, and sheltered themselves near a bend in the road by lying down, getting into the ditches or occupying some houses. here, too, the offensive was blocked; the attack failed.[28.17] but "the issue of battle lies in the hearts of men," and the will of every american heart was victory. lieutenant reid, hurrying over from the battery with two companies, dropped on the slope, but his men went forward. by quitman's order the new york and the second pennsylvania regiments left the tacubaya causeway, under a heavy fire waded the ditches on the left and rear to the redan (b), and charged through the opening, while the palmettoes, finding a break in the same wall, made a little farther east by an american cannon, enlarged it with their bayonets and squeezed through. shields and the commanders of the new york and pennsylvania regiments were wounded, but the troops kept on. clarke's brigade, sent forward by worth, hastened up the western slope, and when lieutenant longstreet of the eighth fell, lieutenant pickett seized the colors. for some reason the mines failed to explode; and at last the ladders came up.[28.17] shouting and yelling, the voltigeurs, the ninth and fifteenth, some of mckenzie's and the foremost of quitman's men, all closely intermingled, and brilliant with flags and the sparkle of arms, crowded to the fosse. the first ladders, with all the bold fellows upon them, were thrown down, but in a moment so many more were placed, side by side, that fifty could go up abreast. the blue voltigeur flag, now full of holes, was planted on the parapet. a tide of brave americans overflowed the fort. resistance was vain. a little before half-past nine bravo gave up his diamond-hilted sword, and the tricolor, that had been waving placidly amidst the uproar, came down with a jerk.[28.17] fire was opened then upon the mexicans at the gateway below, and fearless captain roberts of casey's storming party, at the head of all the troops on the causeway and supported by general smith's brigade, carried the gateway batteries. many from quitman's and smith's commands rushed to the summit, dealing with flying enemies as they went. scott himself came up--the hero of chippewa and lundy's lane. the men pressed round him. he told them how glad he was, and how proud of them; and how proud their country, their wives, their sisters and their sweethearts would be; and it seemed as if such cheering had never been heard, anywhere in the world, before.[28.17] exultant but weary, the soldiers now looked about them as they took breath. from this eyrie the whole wonderful valley of mexico could be surveyed. all round the west the great wall of rugged mountains closed it in, and two vast, snowy peaks guarded its portal on the east. as if reluctantly the mountains gradually subsided into verdant hills and a wide plain, enamelled in a thousand soft hues. the broad, smooth lakes gleamed like molten silver. the gold of ripening grain, penciled lines of pale-green maguey, cottages radiant in the sun like the sails of distant ships, country-houses and villas half hiding in foliage, and many straight, converging avenues, lined with trees, delighted the eye. in the midst, clear-cut as a medallion, lay the city of mexico, the capital, its roofs and towers black with people; and there, just yonder, stood the halls of the montezumas, the jerusalem of these ardent young crusaders. unfortunately breastworks, redoubts, cannon and a mexican army were still to be reckoned with. santa anna had probably lost not more than 1800 killed, wounded and missing this day, and apparently scott's loss had been about one fourth as great.[28.18] [quitman's operations] but the americans quickly prepared to advance--first of all, quitman. naturally a certain discretion had been given to the commanding generals, and he intended to make the most of it. looking from the hill along the belén causeway, he saw a wide avenue divided through the middle by a stone aqueduct some eight feet wide and fifteen feet high, resting on heavy arches and pillars of masonry. owing to fine weather the road was unusually firm. a small number of troops, fleeing in the utmost confusion, could be seen upon it, but at only one point fortifications. borrowing all of pillow's troops except the fifteenth infantry, which remained to hold chapultepec and guard the prisoners, he quietly gave orders that his men should assemble near the main gateway. at once the inspiring words began to circulate, "quitman's division to the city!" and as soon as possible the rifles, in their crimson sashes, were leading the march forward. about a mile on, a two-gun battery, with a field redan at its right on the marsh, blocked the way. for an hour or so drum used a small gun upon it. then the rifles, after creeping along the aqueduct from arch to arch, took it by assault, and the march continued toward the fortifications at the garita.[28.19] [illustration: the citadel in 1840.] as at the other garitas, no gates existed here, but a ditch and a parapet blocked one half of the causeway and a zigzag redoubt the other. just at the north was the stone house intended for guards and customs officials, beyond which lay the wide _paseo_ (promenade). south, on the piedad road, were artillery and infantry that could fire through the arches. inside the garita, buildings extending toward the east offered shelter, and in open ground a little more toward the north and about 300 yards distant, the extensive edifice called the citadel, protected with a wall and a wet ditch, constituted a serious obstacle.[28.19] santa anna, after acting like a madman when chapultepec fell, came to this garita. general terrés, a brave old spaniard, commanded here with about 180 infantry and some artillerymen. santa anna gave him three guns of medium power, and stationed general ramírez in the paseo, brevet general argüelles on the opposite side, and general perdigón garay and colonel barrios in the rear with substantial reserves.[28.19] on approaching this formidable position, quitman encountered a withering storm of bullets, grape and solid shot from both sides and the front, and suffered rather severely. but drum and benjamin, iron men, bringing up as soon as possible a long 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer on the opposite sides of the aqueduct, dampened the ardor of the mexicans not a little, and splinters from the masonry did havoc among the sheltered artillerymen at the garita. some troops already beaten at chapultepec and at the intermediate battery soon became demoralized. at about one o'clock rumors crept in that americans from the southern front were turning the position. ramírez, garay, argüelles and barrios retired without the formality of saying good-by; and terrés, whose cannon ammunition had failed, withdrew prudently to the citadel with two of the guns and about seventy panicky men, the remnant of his garrison. the rifles now dashed over the parapet; and at exactly twenty minutes past one a tall, slender man with short, bristling, grayish hair stood on it, smoking a cigar and waving a red handkerchief tied to a rifle. it was quitman, self-possessed but exultant; and in a few moments the palmetto colors and the green banner of the rifles, with its blazing gold eagle, were flying at the portal of the city.[28.19] the advance then continued for some little distance, and, as the ammunition of our two heavy guns had been exhausted, the captured mexican 8-pounder was made to do good service. but santa anna, who had thought the position safe and gone on to san cosme, soon arrived with ordnance and troops. the citadel was reinforced, and infantry and cannon were placed at other points. quitman's last artillery cartridges were used, and under the enemy's fire no more could be brought up. solid shot cut down both drum and benjamin. our infantry had to retire to the vicinity of the garita. attempts were then made to strengthen the position; but they did not accomplish very much. ammunition gave out entirely, and firing ceased. the enemy grew bolder. again and again they charged, and though repulsed they did not appear to be discouraged. by this time every member of quitman's staff, beauregard, his engineer officer, and all his artillery officers had been killed or wounded, and he longed anxiously for night.[28.19] meanwhile, events had occurred on scott's other wing. trousdale's command, supplemented with jackson's guns, pushed along the road and aqueduct on the north side of the rectangle, and the latter distinguished himself by fearlessly attacking a one-gun redoubt, which, supported by infantry and by fire from the summit of the hill, barred the way. to check mexican reinforcements and threaten the enemy--particularly the troops in quitman's front--scott now had worth, garland's brigade, c. f. smith's battalion, duncan's battery, the rest of magruder's battery and sumner's dragoons pursue the same route. the one-gun redoubt was flanked and occupied; and worth's forces arrived at the northeast corner of the rectangle in time to annoy the retreat of rangel and other departing mexicans.[28.20] [the san cosme approach] here began the broad, straight verónica causeway--closely similar to that of belén--which extended almost north for nearly two miles (3530 yards) to the english cemetery, and there joined the san cosme highway at approximately a right angle. understanding the difficulties of the belén approach, scott intended to make only a feint in that quarter, and let his left wing break into the city. he therefore sent the brigades of clarke and cadwalader and also huger with siege guns to worth. to organize the attacking column, replenish the ammunition, make other needed preparations, and sweep away the resistance encountered at several minor fortifications, especially near the cemetery, required time; but at about four o'clock worth found himself on the straight highway about half a mile from the san cosme garita.[28.20] this entrance to the city had been included in the general scheme of defence, but on account of its remoteness from pressing danger few workmen had been employed here; and when chapultepec fell, it lay entirely open except for a small parapet without a ditch extending partly across the highway some 250 yards to the west. general peña, however, coming this way from chapultepec, stopped at the parapet, and rangel placed at the garita such troops as he could assemble. santa anna, who displayed on this occasion reckless valor and an almost fiendish activity, sent three available cannon and brought additional troops. the roofs of buildings in the vicinity were occupied. a redoubt with embrasures was hastily erected at the garita, the near arches of the aqueduct were stopped up with sand-bags, and some guns in the paseo were prepared to coöperate.[28.20] on attempting to advance, therefore, worth found the highway swept with bullets, canister, grape and shells. garland, however, was ordered to creep forward under the protection of the arches, and endeavor to reach the south flank of the garita, and clarke to burrow through the continuous line of buildings on the other side, and strike the northern flank. lieutenant u. s. grant, who was reported as acquitting himself at this time "most nobly," waded some ditches with a party of men and a mountain howitzer, and planted the gun on the roof of a church at the right; and lieutenant raphael semmes of the navy performed a similar exploit on the left. artillery fire compelled peña, who--reinforced by santa anna with two companies of the eleventh infantry--was fighting gallantly, to leave the parapet; and hunt, of duncan's battery, though he lost more than half his men in dashing 150 yards at full speed, landed a gun at that point, where he could load in safety and then fire from the one embrasure.[28.20] by five o'clock these preparations were complete. on the other hand rangel had been severely wounded, and his principal gun, a 24-pound howitzer, had become unserviceable. suddenly, to his utter astonishment, americans appeared on the top of a three-story house that commanded the interior of his redoubt, and with a single volley disposed of almost every gunner and artillery mule. then some of them hurried down to the front door of the house, burst it open, and rushed into the redoubt, where they met americans just arrived by a flanking movement from the other side of the highway. in a panic the mexicans fled, literally sweeping away santa anna and a body of troops, who had come at all speed from belén to support the position. many of them scattered, but with no little difficulty others were conducted to the citadel. by six o'clock worth entered mexico. near the garita his forces were safely housed, and by way of "good-night" and good advice, huger dropped a few shells in the vicinity of the palace.[28.20] the end, however, was not yet in view. santa anna had some 5000 infantry and fifteen cannon at the citadel, with probably about 7000 more troops not far away, and the americans, besides having lost many in the day's fighting, were now fearfully divided. not only worth but quitman, who planted three heavy guns in battery during the night, intended to advance in the morning, and apparently a day of carnage was to ensue.[28.20] but santa anna probably began to feel the reaction that always followed his great efforts. funds and provisions were scanty. the army was demoralized, and the mass of the people felt disheartened. within the town there were no fortifications, and it looked as if another battle under these conditions might scatter the troops, and involve the loss of nearly all the war material. besides, leading persons in the city had always been strenuously anxious to prevent bombardment and assault; and the president was urged now, as four months previously, to spare it. early in the evening, therefore, he briefly discussed the situation with olaguíbel, the minister of war and three generals. the governor was for acting deliberately; but santa anna, declaring that honor had been satisfied and the city could not be defended successfully, ordered immediate evacuation; and by one o'clock the troops retired in a somewhat orderly fashion to guadalupe hidalgo. about three hours later a commission of the city council (_ayuntamiento_) offered terms of capitulation at the american headquarters in tacubaya. these were of course rejected, for the town lay at our mercy; but scott gave informally the usual assurances of good treatment.[28.21] [the americans capture mexico] so when the first thin streak of dawn glimmered forth behind the gray volcanoes, and our cannon at belén garita were on the point of opening fire, a white flag and an invitation to enter the capital reached quitman. first making sure there was no deception, he advanced; and after stopping about half an hour at the citadel he moved forward under a splendid sun to the grand plaza, which fronted the palace and the cathedral, with smith's brigade, the marines, the new york volunteers and steptoe's battery. as a triumphal procession the command looked rather strange. quitman and smith marched at its head on foot--the former with only one shoe; and behind them came troops decorated with mud, the red stains of battle and rough bandages, carrying arms at quite haphazard angles. not less astonishing looked the city, for sidewalks, windows, balconies and housetops were crowded with people. except for the silence, the countless white handkerchiefs and the foreign flags, it might have been thought a holiday. before the palace, which filled the east side of the plaza, the troops formed in line of battle. officers took their places at the front, and when captain roberts hoisted a battle-scarred american flag on the staff of the palace at seven o'clock, arms were presented and the officers saluted.[28.22] soon loud cheering was heard. a few squares away the commander-in-chief, escorted by cavalry with drawn swords, had reached worth's command, which had stopped at six o'clock by orders opposite the high ash trees of the alameda. a clatter of galloping hoofs followed; and in another moment, amidst the involuntary applause of the mexicans, general scott, dressed in full uniform and mounted on a tall, heavy bay charger, dashed with his staff and harney's dragoons into the grand plaza--his noble figure, gold epaulets and snowy plumes, resplendent under the brilliant sun, fitly typifying the invisible glory of his unkempt and limping army. uncovering, he rode slowly along the line of battle to the music of our national airs; the troops, presenting arms again, cheered and hurrahed till it seemed as if the earthquake-proof cathedral must be shaking, and the cavalry escort waved high their flashing blades.[28.22] in stentorian tones the commander-in-chief appointed quitman governor of the city; and then, dismounting in the courtyard, he clanked up the broad stairway of the palace, to indite congratulations on the "many glorious victories" of his army. presently cross-belted american marines were calmly patrolling the halls of the montezumas as if they owned them, while the rest of the troops gazed with profound exultation at the long pinkish façade and the endless balconies of the upper story, and the people gazed silently at the troops. "they are all and each of them heroes," commented a foreigner present, and others in the world thought the same. "light up your homes, o fathers, for those young hero bands, whose march is still through vanquished towns and over conquered lands, whose valor, wild, impetuous in all its fiery glow, pours onward like a lava-tide, and sweeps away the foe!"[28.22] xxix final military operations january, 1847-april, 1848 at the north, after the buena vista campaign and the embarrassments growing out of it came to an end, taylor probably wished, in what an officer called "his easy dog-trot fashion," to advance as far as san luis potosí, and retained troops urgently needed by scott; but by the middle of june, 1847, he doubtless realized that effective operations on so long a line, especially through hostile and much of the way through barren territory, were impracticable, and advised that scott's column alone should act on the offensive. a month later orders of a corresponding tenor were issued at washington, and then some 3000 surplus troops of the northern army proceeded toward the capital, though too late, of course, to assist in the decisive struggle.[29.1] valencia, during his brief stay at san luis potosí in the early summer of 1847, not only requested permission to move against saltillo, but planned that general filisola, aided by a brigade under avalos, then lying at matehuala, by reyes, the comandante general of zacatecas, and by urrea--who still commanded the "brigade of observation," and could easily pass across the sierra madre from tula--should threaten, if not attack, saltillo and monterey, and at least keep the americans on the defensive. some disquieting movements of these troops resulted; but valencia was soon called to mexico, and various difficulties, chiefly a lack of means resulting from the american occupation, proved fatal to this ambitious enterprise, besides hindering the mexican preparations to receive taylor at san luis potosí.[29.1] during the winter of 1846-47 and to some extent later, the garrison of tampico was menaced by plans for an uprising, to be assisted by outside forces, and sometimes it was feared that a move to capture the city would be launched from tula in the hope of embarrassing scott's communications; but the americans, though not strong in numbers there, were vigilant and well protected by fortifications. besides, the authorities of tamaulipas, now living on fairly good terms with the invaders, had little wish to take part in active hostilities. they quarrelled bitterly with urrea, who naturally attempted to draw supplies and money from the region, and in november, 1847, with a view to bringing about harmony, that officer was removed. scott's victories and especially the fall of mexico had no little effect in this quarter; the prospect of serious operations entirely disappeared; and early in november, 1847, general taylor, who had reached the conclusion some time before that his country wanted him for president, and had laid aside his old brown coat in favor of checked shirt sleeves, set out for home on a leave of absence, which actually continued until the close of the war. wool took his place; but nothing occurred in this region except guerilla affairs, of which a due account will be given presently.[29.1] in the northwest, meantime, price, who commanded in new mexico and was disturbed by rumors of danger from the south, decided on his own responsibility, ignoring instructions to do otherwise, that he must assume the aggressive. early in march, 1848, the city of chihuahua was therefore reoccupied; and on the sixteenth of that month, after a little brisk fighting, the town of rosales, about sixty miles to the southeast, which angel trias held with some 800 men, chiefly national guards, was captured by assault with a trifling loss. but this campaign had no general effect on the war--indeed, the treaty of peace had already been signed--and price was ordered by marcy to retire.[29.1] [fighting in the capital] in scott's department the final military operations began very promptly. immediately after the americans took possession of the grand plaza at mexico on the morning of september 14, a multitude of blanketed léperos crowded closely upon them. already these miscreants had tasted the disorder they loved, for the palace had been left unguarded, and they had sacked it; and now they showed signs of turbulence. the plaza was cleared, however, and no further trouble seemed likely. but when our troops began to march away to their quarters, a shot was heard. a bullet probably intended for worth struck garland, and almost instantly firing from street corners, windows and the tops of houses became general, though not systematic. thousands of convicts from the jail supported the populace, and in one way or another not a few of the better class coöperated. by tornel's order paving stones had been taken to many of the azoteas with a view to resisting the invader step by step, and these, like every other sort of weapon, were now used.[29.2] though surprised, the americans promptly accepted the challenge. skirmishers drove back the mobs. grape and canister swept the streets. as a rule, every house from which a shot flew became a target for our heavy cannon, which seemed to shake the very foundations of the city, and when breached was immediately sacked; and sharpshooters worked effectively on towers and roofs. scott threatened even sterner measures; and the city authorities not only put up notices, embodying his threats and imploring the people to desist from a vain and imprudent contest, but interceded personally with them in the streets. by about noon the americans held all the points of vantage, and as evening approached, the firing died away. a fearful night ensued. it was dark and cold. no lights relieved the gloom. wild mobs ran shouting through the streets, and the hoof-beats of american patrols resounded from square to square.[29.2] santa anna, finding it impossible on the morning of the fourteenth to subsist his army at guadalupe, had ordered the infantry and heavy guns to querétaro under general herrera, and proceeded with four small pieces and the cavalry to san cristóbal, a point about fourteen miles northeast of the capital. after seeing the people of mexico view with indifference his efforts of the previous day, he expected nothing of them; but on learning of the outbreak he marched back to guadalupe, and at a late hour sent into mexico a small force of cavalry and infantry to investigate and assist. this met duncan's battery and retreated; but santa anna, assured that on the next day there would be a rising _en masse_, erected a breastwork at the peralvillo garita on the north side of the town, and waited.[29.2] as soon as day broke, gloomy and wet, the shooting was in fact resumed, at least in the northern quarters. but he soon perceived that no general movement was taking place, and again marched away. this disheartened the people still more; the efforts of the authorities influenced them greatly; and by the end of the afternoon, realizing that much was to be suffered and nothing gained, they generally abandoned hope. during the next day or two scattering shots could be heard, but real fighting was over. extravagant hopes of destroying the small american army were still entertained by lightheaded men. "you will soon behold the banner of the haughty invader trailing in the dust," wrote one of these, and attempts were made by military officers to organize a real conspiracy; but lack of courage, means, confidence and mutual trust--as well as the watchfulness of the americans--made success impossible. scott repeatedly warned his troops to be vigilant and orderly, to keep together, and to refrain from drinking. as the danger grew less menacing, however, they became less careful, and for probably a month assassinations were frequent. from first to last several hundred americans perished in the hostilities, and no doubt far more of the enemy. but by the middle of october the city was tranquil.[29.2] the concluding field operations in scott's department resembled for the most part the fighting just described, for they had to do chiefly with guerillas. that style of warfare suited the national character. it had figured prominently in the spanish struggle against napoleon and in the mexican war of independence; and when the public began to see clearly that battles could not stop the americans, it was invoked--even though by universal military practice in europe those who robbed and fought at will, while pretending to be inoffensive, were considered brigands and assassins--as the one hope.[29.3] thoughtful persons like j. f. ramírez and general mora pointed out serious dangers: the impossibility of discipline, the relaxation of morale, the destruction of all standards, and the certainty that a spirit of violence and rapine would grow by what it fed upon; and they recognized the improbability that such methods could prevail against the strength, equipment, compactness and skill of the americans. but the obvious advantages of the guerilla system, which it required far less intelligence to perceive and appreciate, counted powerfully on the other side. how much the spanish themselves had suffered from their irregulars during the hostilities against napoleon was not understood, and patriotic pride in the war of independence had tended to draw a veil over its horrors.[29.3] the dagger, said the official newspaper, was the favorite weapon of the people. unarmed men could burn wagons and intercept communications, it was pointed out. even women and children could help. a thorough knowledge of the country, its mountains and its by-paths, would evidently constitute an enormous advantage. light corps of the abstemious rancheros, embarrassed with no baggage, could travel quickly day and night, concentrate in large numbers against an american detachment, strike, vanish, and then, when least expected, reappear, making the most of all neglects, all mistakes, nullifying superior strength by avoiding it, and nullifying discipline by fighting in a style that had no need of discipline. situated even more favorably than spain for such warfare, the mexicans were to outdo her example.[29.3] this is what will save us, proclaimed in effect the legislature of méxico state. "let the echo of our mountains repeat the cry of war and liberty," exclaimed the congress of vera cruz. santa anna endorsed the plan. salas organized the "guerillas of vengeance," which were to make "war without pity" "in every manner imaginable"; and in april, 1847, the government, pinning its faith to the system, set it on foot in earnest. scott, the "cowardly tiger," was to be routed after all.[29.3] [the guerillas of the northeast] in the north february, 1847, was the golden month of the irregulars, for the approach of the mexican army under santa anna encouraged the rancheros to lay aside the habits of peace. canales boasted of 161 americans killed that month, and urrea with his combined force of regulars and guerillas, besides engaging in other operations, captured a train of wagons at agua negra, and horribly slaughtered a large number of guards and teamsters. to avenge this butchery a party of rangers, teamsters and other civilians murdered twenty-four men in a village not far distant. upon this canales declared what he called martial law, announcing that every american, armed and unarmed, and every mexican living peaceably would be shot; and many were led by fear or a lust for plunder to take up arms.[29.4] the american trains in particular seemed likely to be easy prey. as they commonly stretched out for some two miles and were guarded only--for so the character of the road usually dictated--at the ends, the mexicans, trained to charge at full speed through an ordinary thicket, could readily attack them from ambush at about the middle point, create a stampede, and do a great deal of mischief. infantry could not pursue the guerillas with success, and the number of our mounted men was always comparatively small, for every mexican ranchero had at least one smart pony. in september, 1847, a band even attacked mier. governor aguirre of coahuila exerted himself particularly to organize forces of this character, and not only alcaldes but priests aided the cause.[29.4] the american leaders, however, pursuing a course that was now conciliatory, now severe, and in many instances technically unjust, succeeded in coping with a system that was itself unjust. taylor levied on the people of nuevo léon a tax of $96,000, the estimated value of the goods destroyed at agua negra, but suspended it indefinitely, when representative authorities proved the substantial innocence of the population and begged for mercy. cavalry patrols and detachments pursuing culprits fairly wore out their horses. villages, if even suspected of harboring the "banditti," were burned. contributions were imposed wherever connivance appeared probable. by april, 1847, canales was in despair.[29.5] then wool determined to stamp out the evil, and announced in july that any guerillas caught by him would be executed. in december, 1847, he issued his famous order 11, which not only made the mexican authorities and their towns responsible for all damages done, but required them to hunt down the "brigands." aguirre attempted to retaliate, but in vain. the americans had power enough to carry out threats, whereas he had not; and he admitted his failure. besides, the mass of the population were indolent in mind as well as body, and looked upon submission as preferable to danger. in february, 1848, finding the guilty rancheros were anxious to give up the business, wool enabled them to resume peaceful occupations by declaring an amnesty, and in the following may he stated that the country had never before been so free from highway robbery.[29.5] [guerillas in vera cruz state] in the south, vera cruz, a state of mountains, gorges, thickets and forests threaded with blind paths, was the chief home of the guerilla, and it looked as if scott's line of communication might be virtually destroyed. not only many hardy, hot-blooded and unscrupulous natives, but a great many desperadoes hailing from cuba were ready to enlist. after the fall of vera cruz, and still more after the battle of cerro gordo, a large number of regular officers, to say nothing of privates, could scarcely find bread, and some men, like the ex-divinity student, ex-carlist, jarauta--whose small, close beard, fierce black eyes, braided jacket, graceful cloak and gold-laced sombrero gave him a romantic air--had acquired in spain a taste for this adventurous, reckless life; but a vastly greater number were prosaic felons, liberated from prison under a pledge to rob and murder. nominally j. c. rebolledo, a fine looking man of rather humane instincts, was the chief in this district, but the 800 or so persons belonging to many small bands, while occasionally acting more or less in concert, were mainly independent. the decree under which all goods coming from points occupied by the americans were lawful booty opened possibilities of large gains, and rebolledo's capture of ten loaded wagons in april, 1847, set the people aflame with cupidity.[29.6] brevet colonel mcintosh and his inexperienced officers, who left vera cruz for the interior--it will be recalled--about the first of june, 1847, with a well-advertised convoy including a large amount of specie, dependent on wild mustangs under raw, half-mutinous drivers largely ignorant of english, received the full benefit of this ambitious feeling. near tolomé and at paso de ovejas he lost men, wagons and pack-mules; and at the national bridge there was a genuine skirmish, in which a number of americans were killed or wounded. out of about 130 wagons twenty-four had to be abandoned in the low country; and a little way above jalapa, though strongly reinforced, the troops had to fight again. general pierce, who left vera cruz about six weeks later than mcintosh, had similar experiences. early in august major lally set out from the coast with a few more than 1000 soldiers, two 6-pounders and sixty-four wagons. he lost no merchandise, but his four fights cost him nearly 100 men killed, wounded and missing; and captain wells, who followed lally with some 200 recruits and additional ammunition, lost forty and had to retreat. these and other affairs proved that irregulars, favored by the geography of the region, were capable of doing substantial harm.[29.7] but in vera cruz, as in every other quarter where they operated, though perhaps nowhere else in so marked a degree, the lack of morale, which enabled the guerilla system to exist, proved the cause of its failure. poor arms, poor ammunition, poor marksmanship, and the want of artillery might have been remedied, or at least might have been offset by the counter-balancing advantages; but this defect was fatal. the mexican guerillas were very different from what the guerillas of spain had been. they fought like savages without the excuse of savages, for they knew better. infuriated by their treacheries and cruelties, the americans were persistent and unsparing in severity. patrols who seemed never to sleep hunted out their nests in the mountains. on the march, flanking parties would force their way through the woods five miles or more from the road to catch them between two fires. the torch was applied with much liberality on suspicion, and sometimes on general principles, to huts and villages; and in the end a black swath of devastation, leagues in width, marked the route.[29.8] scott ordered that in every case of outrage the nearest alcalde, if he failed to deliver up the guilty, should be fined at least $300 for a murder or the value of the stolen property for a robbery, and that any robber or murderer and any person belonging to a known party of such miscreants might, when caught, be summarily tried by three officers, and either flogged or executed. this plan, however, did not quite satisfy those on the ground--especially the texas troops. captain walker, on his cream-colored horse, and colonel hays, in his blue roundabout, black trousers and black leather cap, impressed themselves on the mexican imagination as the agents of diabolical wrath; and in general it was a tale of merciless atrocities followed by merciless reprisals.[29.8] at the same time this lack of morale deprived the guerillas of mexican support. by taking bribes for letting merchandise pass up to the interior and sometimes even guarding it, they violated the laws on which their existence rested. mostly they were brave only where they felt safe. when laden with booty they would scatter to their homes, no matter how important the business in hand. rivalries and even hostilities between parties operating in the same district arose. cooperation could seldom be reckoned upon, and hardly any would face the climate far above jalapa. soon learning that it was more wholesome to waylay mexicans than americans, they plundered their fellow-countrymen without ceremony; and they would rob even old women or young children of their needful clothing. sheafs of complaints against them piled up in the state and national archives. people organized to fight them, and sometimes appealed to the americans against the very men who were to have been their champions. "the mexicans have sown to the storm, they are now reaping the whirlwind," said an american officer.[29.9] [guerillas of the centre] in the states of puebla, méxico and oaxaca also guerillas were organized, and in puebla all these parties could find an opportunity. general rea, a pupil of morelos and the mexican revolution, had the discredit of the chief command, though bravo, who stood at the summit of the social scale, was mainly responsible for their iniquities, since during his brief term as comandante general of puebla he issued a great number of patents to unfit leaders. what rea did particularly in this regard was to combine individuals and small groups, and place them under some kind of supervision. he loved to answer critics by saying that his guerillas were in the field because honorable men were not; and that, had not the government condoned their crimes, they would have served the americans as counter-guerillas. after a time his officers adopted a set of rules which aimed to regulate operations, but even this measure seems to have accomplished little. the guerillas robbed the people, seized funds belonging to the state, and pillaged even churches. some gangs were large enough to attack haciendas. one party called themselves the "lancers of the poisoned spear."[29.10] soon after scott left puebla for mexico early in august, 1847, these banditti and every individual ruffian of that vicinity hurried to the city. mexicans and even foreign residents were robbed and outraged, and about the first of september, in the hope of more booty, the americans also were attacked. two thousand soldiers were needed for a garrison, and colonel childs, the civil and military governor, actually had 2193; but 1800 of these were in hospitals. his effectives consisted of about fifty cavalry, 100 artillery, 250 of the first pennsylvania volunteers, and a small spy company of mexicans.[29.11] headquarters, lieutenant colonel black of pennsylvania and the main body of troops occupied the "cuartel san josé," a large rectangular building on the eastern side of the town, which had a plaza of its own opening toward a public promenade called the tivoli. to this position five howitzers were allotted, and within a hundred and fifty yards of it all the sick were placed. half a mile or so from the town on a hill stood loreto fort, a stone affair equipped with two 12-pound field guns and a 10-inch mortar, where major gwynn of the sixth infantry commanded; and not far distant, on a higher point of the same hill, was guadalupe church, now protected with mountain howitzers, a ditch and an earthen wall, under captain morehead of the pennsylvania regiment. but the chief element of the defence was the large, robust, finely-featured childs, a skilful and veteran officer, cold in manner, clear in judgment, and inflexible in courage. september 13 the "siege" began in earnest, and from that day on there was a continual small-arm attack, particularly at night, upon san josé, which replied with a musket and howitzer fire that kept the assailants at a respectful distance. what was more serious than guerilla shooting, all supplies were now cut off. such was the state of things at the second city of mexico when santa anna retired from the first.[29.11] [the "siege" of puebla] santa anna's real intention was probably to seek an asylum in guatemala. but many of his friends urged that he could make himself dictator as the sole hope of the country, and it was clear that, if he should recover puebla and cut off scott, he would still be able to boast of a triumph. his cavalry, though greatly reduced by desertion, included some 2000 men backed with four light guns. alvarez, who was ordered to puebla, still had about 600 foot and horse. rea, santa anna understood, commanded 600 irregulars; 2500 national guards lay near him with two field pieces, it was reported; and the pueblans were described as eager to fight. six thousand men and six guns appeared quite enough to dispose of "six hundred sick yankees," as mexicans described the garrison; and he therefore presented himself at puebla on september 21. two days later alvarez arrived there. but between these two events childs appeared at a second-story balcony, "winking and smiling all over his face," as a soldier expressed it, and announced that scott had taken the capital. evidently, therefore, the mexican president was not greatly to be feared.[29.11] after looking about, santa anna concluded that it would not be easy to capture the american positions by assault, and appealed to the minister of war--wherever that official might be--for 1000 infantry, a 16-pounder, a 12-pounder, ammunition and supplies. he now had ten cannon, but all of them were light; owing to desertion his force included only some 4000 men; and the citizens had no arms, he reported. probably, too, the annoyances and outrages inflicted upon them by him and his troops, and his appointing the guerilla chief military commandant of the city dampened whatever ardor they had possessed.[29.12] on september 23 and 24 unsuccessful attempts were made at guadalupe, and the next day santa anna summoned childs, describing his army as 8000 strong, and graciously announcing that "for the sake of humanity" the americans might retire "within a limited time" with the honors of war. childs replied as was proper, and then, riding to the posts, gave notice amid cheers that no surrender need be expected. to add the touch of humor that soldiers love, an american flag was manufactured out of an old mexican uniform, and raised aloft; and the garrison settled down to severe duty, stern discipline, short rations and incessant watchfulness at all hours. the mexicans tried to approach san josé by throwing up successive breastworks at night in the streets leading that way, but shot, shell and rockets from loreto kept them back. september 30 santa anna learned that no ammunition could be provided for the heavy cannon demanded of the minister, and resolved apparently to make a bold effort. with two 6-pounders he fired all day on the weak, plaza face of san josé. but childs, anticipating such a manoeuvre, had brought a 12-pounder from loreto the night before; and this, protected with bags of tobacco, made an assault impracticable.[29.12] a new factor now entered the military situation. about the middle of september general "jo" lane, one of taylor's chief officers at buena vista, arrived at vera cruz from the rio grande, and on the nineteenth his brigade set out for the interior. aware of the situation at puebla but not aware what was to be encountered on the route, the general had not made adequate preparations, and on meeting guerillas at the national bridge he was obliged to send back for ammunition and supplies. by october 1, however, he managed to leave jalapa.[29.13] it was a hard march that ensued. torrents of rain deluged the troops. sometimes the road lay deep under water. for dinner they had a thin slice of beef, a couple of "crackers" and some coffee; for supper, after darkness fell upon them with tropical abruptness, the same without the beef; and perhaps mud for a couch. but lane, a hearty westerner with a stout frame and unbounded vigor, led on unshrinkingly in his black hat and old blue overcoat, and the rest followed him eagerly. october 5, after incorporating additional troops at perote, he left that place with a force of about 3300 and seven guns, and marched on across hot plains, where water sold for five dollars a drink, and men died of sheer fatigue.[29.13] santa anna, informed by spies that 1000 americans were approaching, and anxious, not only to prevent them from joining childs, but still more to win the glory of routing them, had set out from puebla four days earlier with perhaps 3500 men, leaving rea to continue the fighting. desertion played havoc with his command, especially when the strength of lane's force was ascertained; but, after sending back a large part of the faithful in order to keep control of them, he took possession of el pinal, where the national highway passed between a precipitous mountain and a ravine, with about 1000 cavalry and six guns, and made preparations to ambush lane's rear. this done, he moved to huamantla, a sizable town eight miles distant, and waited.[29.13] [the fight at huamantla] early on october 9 the drums and bugles awoke lane's troops at the hacienda of san antonio tamaris, approximately ten miles from huamantla and twelve from el pinal; and the men, leaping from the damp grass and buckling their muddy belts, found the white walls of the hacienda, the church towers of neighboring villages, the dark woods on the hillsides, and the distant, snowy peaks all aglow under a splendid sun. never, perhaps, did soldiers feel more like having an adventure. santa anna had just marched from huamantla to conceal his force at el pinal, leaving behind him with no scouts or outposts his six guns, a very small guard for them and a party of irregulars; but a spy reported to the americans that he was at huamantla, and lane moved off to attack him. first rode four mounted companies, and at their head a rather short, slender, spare, slouchy man, with reddish hair, a small reddish beard, mild blue eyes and a quiet, kindly manner, whom nobody would have picked out as a fearless, indomitable fighter, the scourge of the guerillas, but in fact he was captain walker; and then marched lane with five guns and some 1800 men.[29.14] when about three miles from their destination, walker and his 200 cavalry, seeing a party of mexican horse approach the town, dashed ahead. entering huamantla they formed in fours, and then with a yell, a flash of sabres and a thunder of hoofs they swept through to the plaza. the mexicans had time to get four of the guns away, but the others were captured, and most of the american troopers, concluding their work had been finished, scattered to drink, loot or hunt for cannon and ammunition. but now santa anna, who had observed lane's movement from a church tower near el pinal, appeared with his full command. they were a beautiful sight--galloping horses, red and green uniforms, brilliant pennons and a billowy sea of flashing lance points; but they were enemies, and the americans accepted their challenge.[29.14] "take it cool, my boys, but run like the devil!" cried lane. every nerve was taxed. blood gushed from nostrils. the mexicans, lashing their steeds into foam, reached the goal first, however, and the american troopers found themselves attacked on all sides. walker was shot from a house, and soon expired; but he lived long enough to give a final order: "don't surrender, boys; the infantry will soon be here." and so they were--"with a shout and a bound," said one of them. the tide was quickly turned, and giving up the town, "peg-leg," as the soldiers loved to call santa anna, passed the night some distance away. so ended the tale of huamantla or the biter bitten, which received no little applause at the time.[29.14] while these events were taking place, the garrison of puebla continued to be hemmed in, starved and harassed. their casualties numbered in all only fifty-two, but they felt severely the effect of so long a strain. though a number of sorties were made, and their persecutors had to retire from several annoying positions, the americans were not strong enough to do more. their day of deliverance was approaching, however. october 10 lane moved forward, dogged and somewhat annoyed by santa anna. two days later his men saw the spires of puebla, dominated by the sombre towers of the cathedral, and set off by white volcanoes veiled with clouds. and now and again the numberless bells of the city, great and small, pealed forth harmonious tones of many colors, that seemed to blend and interweave in rich and varied tapestries of sound, hung out in the mediaeval style to honor their triumphal approach.[29.15] at about one o'clock, announced by the bells of guadalupe, they entered the suburbs--not a few of them at a run. one column then advanced by the main street, while another flanked the town by the left. for two hours there was considerable firing from houses, though rea's guerillas had begun to leave their posts the night before; but at length lane extended his "rough paw" to childs, with a sunny smile on his rather hard features, and the garrison joyously welcomed their deliverers. in the main plaza a bugler played "the star-spangled banner," and all sang the chorus: "the star-spangled banner, oh, long may it wave o'er the land of the free and the home of the brave!"[29.15] now followed the punishment of rea. some twenty-five miles from puebla toward the southwest lay beautiful atlixco, a defensible point that not only reconciled the climates of the temperate and the cold zones of mexico, and controlled a region fertile in grains, flocks and herds, but, while fairly remote from the americans, gave convenient access to important roads. here, in the midst of flowers, fruits and snowy mountains, the government of puebla had found a refuge, when the americans under worth approached the state capital; and to this asylum rea now withdrew. _de facto_, at least, the guerilla chief was the most important person on the ground. the authorities did not relish his prominence; they detested his men and his methods; and on october 18, tired of spending money fruitlessly on the national guards for rea to command, they dissolved the corps. but many of the irregulars proposed to make the best of what appeared to be a good situation, in which they could live on plunder, if not paid.[29.16] october 18 lane, who apparently never slept nor expected his followers to sleep, ordered them to be ready in the morning for an expedition. many of the soldiers were barefoot, but they borrowed shoes; and at about nine o'clock, cheered by the fife and the drum, some 1500 men set out round the base of popocatepetl under a hot sun. at about four in the afternoon, after making twenty miles or so, they came in sight of the enemy, and a running fight began. blistered feet and parching tongues were now forgotten. the mexicans, holding some good position and protected by chaparral, could make a stand against cavalry, but when the infantry came up they always fled. shortly after sunset lane reached atlixco, which stood on the slope of a lofty hill. as it was unsafe to risk a street fight in an unknown town at night, he ordered the artillery to open. the moon was full. marks were easily selected. by their burning fuses the shells could be traced until they fell amidst the shadows; and then a burst of red fire, the crash of roofs and walls, and the cries of the people told the rest.[29.17] after about an hour of cannonading, the troops advanced into the town--which surrendered at once--and there slept as best they could. rea, with two guns and the disordered remnants of his force, retreated to izucar de matamoros, about thirty miles farther down the valley; but from that point he was routed a month later. these and other exploits of lane's discouraged as well as dispersed the chief guerilla forces of the plateau, and in february, 1848, rea asked permission of the mexican authorities to leave the country.[29.17] [political chaos in mexico] neither in these affairs nor in any other military operations did santa anna figure at this time, and there was a good reason for his inactivity. officially he no longer existed. as general scott had feared, our entering the capital had resulted in the destruction of the mexican government. september 16 santa anna resigned, explaining that it was advisable to preserve the chief magistracy from the hazards of war, and fix it near the centre of wealth and population, whereas he proposed to continue the hostilities wherever that should be possible. the same proclamation or decree assigned the executive power to a triumvirate: the president of the supreme court, general herrera and general alcorta, and santa anna then ceased actually to exercise any civil authority.[29.18] but as congress was not in session to accept his resignation, some doubted whether it became effective; the presidency of the supreme court was vacant on account of the incumbent's death; the appointment of herrera and alcorta needed to be made, or at least confirmed, by the council of government, a body no longer acting; and it was denied broadly that santa anna had the power to issue such a decree. peña y peña, to be sure, was regarded as a member of the court, and, if he was, he could claim by right of seniority to act as the chief justice; but the legality of his membership was questioned, and the presidency of that body was really an elective office. peña was old, feeble and even timid; his ill-success as herrera's minister of relations doubtless weighed heavily upon him; and he was now living, almost as a recluse, in the country. indeed there was really no organic law even, for the amended constitution of 1824, though formally adopted, had not come into effect. in short, chaos reigned, and the states were officially "resuming" their individual sovereignty.[29.18] but a number of good and able men, particularly cuevas and couto, determined to ward off ruin, and awakened others. peña, drawn from his retirement, consented for patriotic reasons to override all the technical difficulties; and on september 22 he announced formally that, in order to give the nation a head, he would act as the executive until an interim president could somehow be chosen. at the small city of toluca, capital of the state of méxico, just outside the valley, this fiction of a government pitched its tent; and perhaps it gained some feeling of security from the vast bastioned, battlemented ridge between it and the americans, from snowy mt. miguel towering above the city, and from the peacefully shining lagoons of the intervening meadows. what was more important, herrera, olaguíbel and many others of the best men rallied to the support of peña, the representatives of neutral governments recognized him, and the states began to concur. early in october, however, he removed to querétaro, a safer yet central place, and with luis de la rosa as sole minister addressed himself to his task.[29.19] [santa anna eliminated] the programme that he announced was honorable and straightforward. my tenure of office will be extremely brief, he said in effect, for congress will be assembled as soon as possible; i will usurp no powers, but will not be turned from the path of duty by insurrections; the closest economy will be practised, the necessary taxes laid fairly, and all interests respected; union and harmony will be the watchwords, and the national rights will be maintained. his most urgent problem, of course, was to deal with santa anna, who not only held the chief military command, but insisted that he could resume the presidential authority by simply withdrawing his resignation; and in this matter the government showed a decision that earned it no little prestige. all santa anna's protests against political effacement were disregarded, and on october 7 he was instructed both to give up his troops and to submit, as did other unsuccessful commanders, to a military trial.[29.20] at about the time this order overtook him, the huamantla affair occurred. from a military point of view he was now prostrate. he saw it himself, and knew that the country would see it. evidently his countless political enemies would make the most of his complete failure, and he was doubtless aware that his military reports had offended many officers. his chief executive merits--decision and activity--had led only to a useless expenditure of life and money, it was now pointed out, and his ostensible patriotism was attributed to passion and obstinacy. even his confidence in himself broke down. unable to understand why failure had attended all his efforts, he fell into a sombre depression, and without a struggle he placed his troops at the orders of general reyes, who joined him on october 11 with about 1000 men. his part in the war was over; and in the following january, realizing that nothing could be gained through intrigue or conspiracy and fearing the americans would make him a prisoner, he asked for permission to leave the country. both his own government and our authorities consented. and after giving a dinner at el encero to the american officers of that vicinity, who had treated him with distinguished consideration, he sailed once more, about the first of april, from what he regarded as an ungrateful country.[29.21] santa anna being now eliminated, the government had to face its military difficulties without his assistance. in general the problem was to make bricks with neither straw nor clay. almost every good cannon had been taken by the americans, and the muskets had nearly all been captured, thrown away or sold. ammunition was almost wholly wanting. the engineering material had been lost or destroyed. vast sums of money were needed to provide fortifications as well as replace all this equipment, and the government could hardly obtain enough, day by day, to cover its minimum expenses. even officers had to sell their shoes for bread.[29.22] as for an army, santa anna and alvarez together had some 2000 troops the first week of october, reyes had about 1000, about 3000 from mexico city concentrated at querétaro under herrera, about 1000 from jalisco were on their way to the same point, and small detachments existed at various other places. but nearly all of these men were utterly demoralized. "almost useless," they were officially termed; and the army as a whole felt the crushing weight of general contempt. herrera, the commander-in-chief, became so disgusted over the uncontrolled excesses of the troops that he resigned. rincón declined on the ground of ill-health to serve. arista, when summoned to querétaro, declared he would not command a soldier until exonerated for his conduct on the rio grande. no officers of high distinction, indeed, were available except the aged, torpid and infirm bustamante and "the old woman," filisola, as bancroft described him.[29.22] attempts were made to lay plans of campaign, but an expert summed up one of them by saying it appeared excellent--only it was based upon things as they should have been, not as they were; and all the others had the same defect. schemes were devised to reform, reorganize and build up the forces, and quotas amounting to 16,000 were assigned to the states; but méxico, which had been expected to furnish nearly a quarter of these men, promptly answered that she could not, and other states did not even reply. in fact, the regular forces decreased instead of multiplying, for sometimes a general could not feed his troops, and frequently, when soldiers were let out of the barracks on service, they vanished; and the people, instead of helping to support the mexican troops, even dreaded to see them approach, for their coming was liable to draw an american attack, and more than liable to mean extortion, outrage and robbery. nowhere on the military horizon could a glimmer of light be seen.[29.22] [the american policy] over against this pitiful government stood the united states--wealth against poverty, strength against weakness; and the antithesis was complete, for while the mexicans could only plan, that was the hardest thing for us to do. the idea of retiring to a defensive line still persisted. taylor himself adhered to it. but in addition to the other overwhelming objections to this project, it seemed improbable that a majority in congress could agree where to draw the line. even calhoun, though qualified to make a better argument for an untenable proposition than any other man in the country, was unable to present this policy in such a manner as to satisfy either the friends or the opponents of the war. some advised holding, in addition to the territory thus to be cut off, the chief ports of mexico; and some advocated retaining the capital also, and the line to vera cruz. others favored the occupation of still more cities; and many were for subjugating and holding the entire country.[29.23] to this last plan, however, even had it been practicable to levy all the costs upon mexico, there were tremendous objections. it would have involved keeping under arms 80,000 or possibly 100,000 young men, seriously needed at home for the most part, in order to be sure of having effectives enough at the front. the troops in mexico would have become corrupted both physically and morally; and the commanders would have acquired the ideas and vices of proconsuls. it seemed to be almost an insoluble problem. no final decision was made. but the government determined to occupy the capital, hold the line to vera cruz, retain the chief ports, and extend our holdings according to circumstances.[29.23] to scott, however, the lack of a definitive plan signified little. not one reinforcement entered the capital until after the first of november, and even at the end of that month he was barely able to garrison mexico and chapultepec. december 4 his army included only about 8000 privates, of whom a quarter were sick. during the next three weeks generals patterson, butler and cushing, colonel hays, lieutenant colonel johnston and major lally, each with troops, arrived; and the forces then numbered about 11,000 effectives and 3000 sick.[29.24] scott therefore announced, with no doubt a strategic purpose as well as a rhetorical flourish, that our army was "about to spread itself over and to occupy the republic of mexico." what he really intended was to take possession successively of the principal mining regions--those of zacatecas and san luis potosí--and the capitals of such important states as lay within easy reach. even for the former purpose, however, two columns of some 5000 effectives each were needed, and the men as well as clothing for them could not be provided. the only immediate operations, therefore, aside from the establishment of new posts on the road to vera cruz, were the peaceful occupation of pachuca, a mining town about fifty miles northeast of mexico, toluca, about thirty-eight miles distant in the opposite direction, and cuernavaca, the key to the acapulco region, a little farther away toward the southwest.[29.24] february 6, 1848, an expedition of more consequence marched, by scott's orders, from vera cruz. most of the guerillas who infested the road to the interior lived and found a market at or near córdoba, a city about sixty-five miles to the southwest, and orizaba, sixteen or eighteen miles beyond it in the same direction; and bankhead was instructed to occupy those towns. very different from lane's rough trips on the plateau was this march. near córdoba flourished such genuine tropical wonders as the bread tree, the butter tree, the milk tree, and a kind of palm called "the traveller's friend," which covered the wayfarer's head with a tent, and quenched his thirst with abundant sap. going on, one found enormous masses of vegetation--thick, matted, boundlessly prolific--moulded into astonishing yet harmonious forms by the bays and promontories of the rapidly mounting foothills; terraces of luxuriant foliage piled on sheer cliffs, castles on the terraces, and cathedrals on the castles; verdure, verdure everywhere, dripping, flowing, spurting, tumbling in every hue and shade of green, with a dark, velvety mist in the gorges that became clear sapphire when the sun touched it, and here and there a cascade letting fall its crystal thread from a mossy crag.[29.25] then came the rich orizaba valley, hemmed in with jungles, and winding off between sombre, precipitous mountains until lost in the dreamy distance; and above it the sparkling snows of the vast peak sent down a torrent of gray glacier water, that leaped into mid-air, and then, gathering itself below, wound on through splendid, odorous trees full of parrots, canaries and mocking-birds, hurried past fragrant orange groves and still more fragrant blossoms, poured through the arches of a noble old bridge, and buried itself in the woods. but the americans did not forget their orders. both cities were occupied without resistance, and both were garrisoned; and the guerillas now found their proceedings considerably hampered.[29.25] [the removal of scott] the final military operations of scott seemed thus rather tame, as was natural; but polk executed one that could be termed startling, if not exactly brilliant. his principal assistants were pillow, worth and duncan; and in different ways each had excellent qualifications for the work. pillow was not "the lie incarnate," as trist believed, nor even "a perfect ass," as many thought; but vanity, ambition, lack of probity, and a gift for dark and cunning methods characterized him. his instincts and talents, indeed, were those of the criminal lawyer who minds nothing about his case except the verdict. when the president's brother shot a man down in the street at nashville, pillow got him off. with reference to his work in helping bring about polk's nomination at baltimore he wrote, "the fatal blow was given, but it was not seen nor known what produced such a result--nor where the blow came from." "i feel as boyant as the air," he said in december, 1846, when great dissatisfaction with taylor prevailed at washington, because i know "that _i have done the work_.... i have paid him in full" for his treatment of me. and one could seldom get a finger on pillow's back, when he was not wriggling actively toward some object of selfish desire.[29.26] without a particle of real military ability or success to his credit, he now stood second in our army, and hence logically enough saw no reason why he might not, by some devious path, arrive at the first position and even at the presidency. "modesty," said burke, "does not long survive innocence." to plant such a person, with urgent recommendations, at open, big-hearted scott's right hand, to win his confidence, to spy upon, criticise and undermine him, and inevitably to scheme for his place, was indecent; but polk did it.[29.26] very unlike pillow was the courtly and fascinating worth; but his mind was intense, narrow and self-centred. after the battle of monterey he exclaimed, "i am satisfied with myself. the most vindictive foes crouch at my feet, and my friends choke with joy and delight." and there is one sin of which even angels are capable, we have been told. all his military recognition he owed to scott, but probably the debt weighed heavily on his proud and restive nature; and, while apparently reciprocating the genuine affection of his chief, he had inwardly rejected scott's principles and methods nearly thirty years before the mexican war. regarding his friend, fellow new yorker and brother democrat, marcy, an adroit politician, he felt very differently. "i would not give an ounce" of his wisdom, he wrote in june, 1846, for all scott's glory; scott "is determined to sink and draw his friends down with him."[29.27] at vera cruz the commander-in-chief, relying on their long intimacy, told worth frankly that he believed the administration intended to ruin him, and the subordinate officer evidently determined not to be drawn down. at the same place a brother officer suggested to worth a higher position than was even the highest in the army. the suggestion appears to have struck root. all military men believed the next president would be one of them, and what commander had acquired a more brilliant reputation? the new york _sun_ recommended him for the place; and the idea of his candidacy was favorably received by many. this prospect naturally turned him still more against his old friend, for either scott or taylor seemed almost certain to be the whig nominee. through a series of clashes, for which little--if any--justification can be seen, and in spite of scott's efforts to conciliate him, worth proceeded then to gain emancipation from his burden of gratitude, and place himself in open antagonism to his former patron.[29.28] [the removal of scott] duncan's motives were different again. he was intimate with worth; and pillow, who offered to marry the colonel to a rich and handsome widow, doubtless promised him the post of inspector general. at any rate he urged polk to make the appointment, hinting at other reasons than mere qualifications, and it was made; and we know that duncan gave himself much trouble to assist pillow as a partisan supporter. the power of such a combination, headed by the president himself, to gather adherents from the many ambitious officers hardly needs to be pointed out; and finally there were, of course, jealous and envious men. "since we cannot attain to greatness, let us revenge ourselves by railing at it," said montaigne for the benefit of such persons; and many of the officers knew that greatness was beyond their powers. none of them could monologue as scott did; none could look in a cocked hat as he looked; none had won the mexican war; and, moreover, he was the sole general-in-chief.[29.29] the result was a powerful movement against the prestige and authority properly belonging to scott. pillow's reports on the battles of contreras and chapultepec tended to represent the general as a nonentity; and worth not only did somewhat the same, but referred to the commander in terms of ridicule and contempt. a letter, doubtless written directly or indirectly by pillow over the signature of "leonidas," extolling pillow shamelessly and belittling scott, was trickily worked into the new orleans _delta_ of september 10, 1847; and another letter, containing a passage intended to show that worth and duncan had saved scott from choosing the wrong approach to the capital, appeared in the united states, then in a tampico newspaper and finally at mexico city. both letters were grossly improper, especially since the army lay in the enemy's country; and scott found it necessary to act. as he well said, "the general-in-chief who once submits to an outrage from a junior, must lay his account to suffer the like from all the vicious under him," and "even the great mass of the spirited, intelligent, and well affected, among his brothers in arms, would soon reduce such commander to utter imbecility, by holding him in just scorn and contempt" for his recreancy to himself and the country.[29.30] on november 12, therefore, he issued his general orders 349, which aimed to stigmatize these offences in such a way as to prevent a recurrence of them. duncan then assumed in a plainly defiant manner the paternity of the tampico letter, although in fact the offensive passage had not been written by him. his primary object in doing this was evidently to give worth a handle, and the handle was promptly seized. one thing led to another; and in the end formal charges were brought by the commander-in-chief against pillow, worth and duncan, and by the two generals against him; appeals--insulting to scott--were made by pillow and worth to the government; and the technical "arrest" of the three officers followed.[29.31] the government then stepped in. scott had no doubt given it offence during the campaign, for his letters had plainly enough revealed a conviction that polk had broken faith with him, and purposely thrown difficulties and annoyances across his path; but the circumstances had appeared to warrant his complaints, and marcy had at least "got even" by administering liberal censures in reply. the balance in fact--aside, perhaps, from a mere acerbity of language--was against the administration. besides, having served the country well and saved the government from disaster, scott was entitled to some indulgence for irritation caused by the peculiarly trying circumstances that surrounded him. he was a large man, had done a large work and merited large treatment. but there was nothing large about the administration. the confines of mediocrity hemmed it in. pillow and duncan were therefore by its orders relieved of arrest; worth was not only released, but assigned to duty according to his highest brevet rank; and "in view of the present state of things in the army," chiefly or entirely caused by polk's agent and marcy's friend, scott was deposed. he had performed his task, said robert e. lee, and now was "turned out as an old horse to die." april 22, 1848, amidst the lamentations, cheers and blessings of the army as a whole--trembling himself with emotion--he took his leave, and major general butler, who was a democrat and looked well on a horse, bore sway at headquarters.[29.32] xxx the naval operations of the war 1845-1848 in january, 1846, the united states had available for naval hostilities one ship-of-the-line, seven frigates and razees, fifteen sloops-of-war, six brigs, one schooner and three steamers--that is to say, thirty-three war craft. as ships-of-the-line carried more than seventy guns, frigates about forty-four to fifty, sloops twenty, brigs ten and other vessels in proportion, this fleet had 1155 cannon. two of the vessels, under commodore james biddle, were on the coast of asia; several occupied the brazil station; and five cruised in african waters to check the trade in slaves. the pacific squadron, commanded by commodore john d. sloat, comprised on july 1, 1846, the frigate _savannah_, the sloops _portsmouth_, _levant_, _warren_ and _cyane_, the schooner _shark_ and the storeship _erie_, to which the frigate _congress_, the razee _independence_ and the sloops _dale_, _saratoga_ and _preble_ were added later in the year, while the _levant_ went home; and substantially all the rest of the fleet, known as the home squadron, attended to the west indies and gulf service, under commodore david conner.[30.1] the appropriation for the year ending with june, 1846, was a little less than ten millions, but only about six and a half millions were expended. the war bill of may 13 permitted the completion of all vessels then building and the purchase of others; and by november, 1847, after suffering a number of losses, the navy had in commission five ships-of-the-line, one razee, four frigates, thirteen sloops, six brigs, eleven schooners, four bomb-vessels, twelve steamers and six storeships.[30.1] the peace establishment created by congress in 1844 provided for 7500 petty officers, seamen, landsmen and boys, and in august, 1846, this number was raised to 10,000 for the period of the war; but owing to the remarkable activity of the merchant marine and the consequently high wages, men could not easily be obtained. during the most important year--november, 1846, to november, 1847--not over 8000 were in the fleet at any one time. the whole number of seamen employed in the course of the war did not exceed 7000; and hence plans to strengthen our forces in the gulf and the pacific had to be curtailed. the service, too, did not enjoy unqualified popularity. in the sailor's decalogue appeared this commandment: "six days shalt thou work and do all thou art able, on the seventh thou shalt holystone the deck and scrape the cable"; and the cannon had to be rubbed with fragrant "sea pitch" from the bottom of the ocean until they shone like japanese lacquer. discipline, therefore, not reinforced by the enthusiasm and the necessities of war, fell considerably below its reputation, and the crews were eager to be free when their time expired. the officers, even, had become lax after thirty years of peace, and in too many instances their standards of conduct had given way.[30.2] in the administration of the navy, also, the effects of a long peace could be seen. the control of matters had fallen, though not by accident, into the hands of shrewd officers deeply interested in themselves and their friends. supernumeraries abounded. those who drew the most pay often rendered the least service. the pet ambition was for a safe, quiet and easy position. shore billets were too numerous. no field officer of the marines had cruised since his promotion, and one of them had been in the service more than a generation without going to sea. secretary bancroft, eager for distinction, undertook to eliminate the abuses, but only succeeded in eliminating himself. he had taught greek, and was ridiculed by the naval men as undertaking to play the pedagogue over them. having no dominating force of character nor even a commanding presence, he could not stand against the governing clique. the requirements of the war, which might have assisted an abler administrator to win the day, only increased his difficulties. the senate refused to confirm some of his appointees; and early in september, 1846, he became our minister to england.[30.3] j. y. mason, who succeeded him, was a fat, easy, agreeable man, quite innocent of the desire to achieve reforms. nobody disliked him, but nobody felt obliged to obey him; and as late as the twentieth of february, 1847, suddenly discovering that scott had mentioned certain designs of the army against vera cruz, he awoke to the fact that his department had failed to give the anticipated assistance. just what could be expected of the navy under all these prejudicial conditions was, therefore, in some minds, a little uncertain.[30.3] [privateering] one of the most serious duties imposed upon it was to guard against privateering, for not only our commerce but the supplies required by our troops depended upon free lanes. about the middle of 1845 the government issued orders that any activity of such a kind on the part of mexico should be considered the signal for war; and as a deterrent it was announced by the newspapers, though incorrectly, that privateersmen were to be regarded as pirates. crews not predominantly composed of mexicans, it was often asserted, could legally be "strung up to the yard-arm," since we were understood to have treaties that sanctioned this principle with most countries.[30.4] after the war actually began, a great deal of danger was apprehended. desperate characters were believed to be waiting at new orleans, and "piratical gangs" in the ports of cuba, where almonte seemed to be at work. news arrived early in august, 1846, that privateering regulations had been issued by mexico, and suspicious craft soon appeared off key west. in december the mexican minister of war openly avowed that great hopes of injuring the united states in this manner were entertained. blank certificates and commissions reached washington; information regarding efforts to set vessels at work in various quarters arrived there; and finally the _carmelita_ of bangor, maine, was captured near gibraltar by a felucca named _el unico_, fitted out at oran, algeria, and run by spanish desperadoes.[30.4] mexico had not in reality, after studying the subject with deep interest, much expectation of accomplishing any large results by issuing letters of marque, and the regulations of july, 1846, were intended principally or wholly to annoy this country; but in september and october she took the matter up rather seriously. a new law provided that any foreigner entering her naval service might become a mexican at once, and blank naturalization papers as well as thousands of privateering commissions, duly signed but not filled out, were carried by agents to the west indies, great britain, france and spain. almonte did his best at havana. j. n. pareda, appointed mexican chargé d'affaires at madrid, appears to have circulated the documents actively in the peninsular ports; and another privateer, a spanish steamer named _la rosita_, put out from oran.[30.5] on the other hand, the representatives of the united states insisted upon our treaties and the obligations of neutrality. polk's annual message of december, 1846, denounced the mexican plan as inviting "all the freebooters upon earth," who felt like paying for the privilege, to cruise against american commerce, announced that our own courts would say whether such papers could protect them from the pirate's doom, recommended that congress provide at once for the trial of spanish subjects caught in such business, and suggested american privateers--intended mainly to recapture vessels taken under mexican letters. an american force hastened to the mediterranean, and our squadrons were expected to seize all the rovers putting out, as well as intercept all prizes on their way to the enemy's ports. these precautions looked rather discouraging to enterprising desperadoes.[30.6] in england there was a feeling, as will appear later, that mexico should be allowed the utmost license against us, and the mexican minister at london received many applications for letters; but great britain did not really wish her supplies of cotton to be endangered, and all the seas to be filled with corsairs preying upon the trade of the world; and in october, 1845, her minister to mexico was instructed to prevent that country, if he could, from issuing letters of marque indiscriminately. bankhead protested also, as did the spanish minister, against important features of the regulations. palmerston himself, though he acted in a languid fashion, and gave notice at washington that british subjects, found on mexican privateers, could not be treated as pirates, announced that his government would faithfully do its duty.[30.7] france was prompt and active in responding to our demands. spain, placed under stringent obligations by the treaty of october, 1795, promised full compliance with its requirements, captured _el unico_, punished its crew, pursued _la rosita_, and ordered o'donnell, the captain general of cuba, to act as her obligations required; but she accepted pareda, the colporteur of what was piracy under her agreement, as consul of mexico; and the captain general, while he convinced the american representative of his good-will and in fact would not permit an open violation of the treaty, suggested to the mexicans ways--fortunately impracticable--of evading his own rules. but the risks of privateering under so many embarrassments and the virtual impossibility of converting a prize into cash, prevented all attempts except the feeble ones already mentioned. in this field, consequently, our navy, though incessantly watchful, could acquire no laurels.[30.7] [the blockade] another aspect of the situation concerned it more seriously. on the day congress passed the war bill (may 13, 1846) orders were issued to blockade the ports of mexico. several definite aims prompted this action. primarily, of course, it was desired to prevent supplies of all kinds from reaching the enemy, and to deprive them of the almost indispensable revenues obtained in peace by taxing imports; but there were also hopes that loss of business would induce great britain and france, which had a profitable trade in that quarter, to urge upon mexico the acceptance of our terms. the blockade was therefore to be enforced vigorously. at the same time neutrals were to be treated with all reasonable indulgence. theoretically only their war vessels had the right of entering closed ports, but practically the intention was to broaden that narrow door considerably. toward itself, however, the united states determined to be strictly faithful in observing its declared principles. merely those ports where the order could become effective were in view. the announcement of blockade was to be made as public as it could be; and in particular the government required that a full warning should be given to neutral ships.[30.8] for the work thus imposed upon him conner had ample time to prepare. as early as august, 1845, he was directed to blockade the gulf ports in case of war; early in 1846 he knew of mexico's attitude regarding slidell; before the end of march his vessels occupied convenient positions; and promptly on the outbreak of hostilities a blockade was announced at the chief harbors. by july, with some assistance from the revenue service, it extended from the rio grande to the goatzacoalcos.[30.9] but the difficulty of making it continuously effective proved to be extraordinary. there were not vessels enough of the proper kind; occasionally a more or less complete concentration became necessary; and accidents of many sorts occurred. uncharted shoals and rocks, currents of unknown direction and force, the frequent haze, and the darkening of the lighthouses made extreme caution imperative. the suddenness and violence of the storms almost surpassed belief. at vera cruz the _somers_ was blown over and sunk before semmes, her able commander, could take steps to avert the disaster. even at the anchorages one would suddenly hear on a calm afternoon the clarion orders of the speaking trumpet; the ship would quiver and reverberate as the cable of the heaviest anchor ran swiftly out; in a moment the storm would burst; and for days it might be a question almost hourly of going ashore. at such times all sailing vessels on patrol duty had to make instantly for the open sea, and before they could return to their stations a lurking blockade runner could perhaps enter the port. owing to such difficulties alvarado and frontera, for instance, could not be watched continuously.[30.9] embarrassments also of a minor yet serious character had to be encountered. our vessels, unlike those of england, were designed exclusively for war, and long confinement impaired the efficiency of the men. the government supplies of eatables needed to be eked out from new orleans huckster boats and european merchant ships. water could not be obtained readily from a hostile shore. at the antigua river, in july, 1846, the boats going up with casks were fired upon, and such affairs had to be expected. vessels were despatched long distances occasionally to obtain fresh provisions, but even then scurvy of a most serious nature broke out in the summer of 1846, disabling some of the largest and most efficient ships for several months. the _raritan_ had more than 200 cases. nearly all on the _potomac_ suffered. the _falmouth_ had to go as far north as boston to throw it off. swampy shores and kelp rotting under the torrid sun produced myriads of poisonous as well as otherwise annoying insects. during a brief stay in the river off tampico nearly all the officers and men contracted ague, and the yellow fever scourged a number of the vessels. more than two thirds of those on the _saratoga_ had the latter disease. in august, 1847, the _mississippi_ left her station with some 200 men suffering from it.[30.10] being strangers and enemies, the americans labored under peculiar disadvantages. the people gladly assisted blockade runners in every possible way. spanish captains in particular, having friends on shore and pilots thoroughly familiar with the coast, could not be prevented from reaching harbor at night or in thick weather by way of the shoals. sometimes it looked, for one or another of these many reasons, as if our officers were careless or incompetent. army observers, not well informed regarding the conditions, felt disposed now and then to pronounce the blockade a humbug, and naturally some foreigners did so. this opinion had neither truth nor probability in its favor. but naturally, in view of all the circumstances, it proved more satisfactory to occupy the ports, and open them to commerce on the basis of a reasonable contributory tariff.[30.11] [offensive naval operations] besides cruising to watch for privateers and hovering off the chief harbors to maintain a blockade, our fleet was expected to share in the general offensive. for one thing bancroft ordered conner to seize all the mexican war vessels that he could reach. but here a singular difficulty arose: none of that sort existed. the navy of mexico, aside from small craft in the pacific, included nine vessels amounting to about 3200 tons. the most important were the steamers _guadalupe_ and _moctezuma_, built in england, which made up nearly two thirds of this meagre total; but as these had never been paid for, they were easily transferred to a british firm, and in consequence of a calm succeeded in escaping to havana. the rest of the vessels--a small brig, which changed its name too often to have one, and six even smaller craft--took refuge early in the alvarado river. the commander sank three of them to obstruct the channel, and when hunter took alvarado in april, 1847, the rest were burned.[30.12] conner's only chance for offensive work, therefore, aside from capturing a merchant vessel occasionally, was to engage in shore operations; and while the officers and men felt eager to get a nearer view of the scenery, as they said, and rival the glories of the army, they found themselves embarrassed by the same difficulties that attended blockading and by others also. the want of tenders and storeships proved especially serious when hostilities were in view. each vessel had to obtain supplies at the pensacola navy yard; the round trip cost a month or so; and that base lacked the needed equipment. once it spent about four weeks in supplying the _potomac_ with bread for a three-months cruise, and in july, 1846, the yellow fever broke out there. a point of capital importance was to reach the small harbors and cut off all trade; but until the last of september, 1846, conner had not a vessel that could cross the bars, tow boats over, and operate in the rivers; and the first load of coal reached him two weeks later. a shortage of officers and men hampered operations; and mason, besides failing to anticipate such a case, failed to be awake when it occurred. by december, 1846, the home squadron included a substantial flotilla of small craft, mounting from one to four guns each; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies and making repairs on a hostile coast in a season of storms almost paralyzed it.[30.13] another embarrassment existed. conner was a brave, able, accomplished, excellent man, but for a generation his business had been that of a navigator. his duty had been to go his rounds in safety, and he did it well. nobody could handle a frigate better in a storm. he looked carefully after the health of his men, too. in thoughtfulness, prudence, judgment and fidelity he left nothing to be desired. but his constitution had never been robust, and the effects of an old wound, thirty years of service in a southern climate and the torture of neuralgia had now made him a confirmed invalid, worn and wasted, and subject at intervals to almost maddening pain. his powers both of thought and of execution were impaired. naturally such a man did not wish to risk either men or ships; and, lacking the vigor for quick decisions and powerful action, he could not wisely involve himself in dangerous complications. on the outbreak of war he should have retired; but he knew that he stood high in favor at washington, bancroft had assured him that he could retain the command indefinitely, and no doubt he failed to realize the situation. more or less well, however, shore operations were carried on, and our next business will be to trace them from the beginning.[30.14] [the home squadron] owing to the state of our relations with mexico the home squadron concentrated at vera cruz in february, 1846, and later, in accordance with instructions to coöperate with taylor, conner presented himself at point isabel in time to safeguard that position during the battles on the rio grande, and assist in occupying burrita. when the war bill passed, his forces consisted of the steamer _mississippi_, which could tow a number of small craft at full speed, the steamer _princeton_, a swift vessel designed by the celebrated ericsson, the handsome frigate _raritan_, which flew the broad blue pennant of the commodore at the main, the frigates _cumberland_ and _potomac_, the sloops _falmouth_, _john adams_ and _st. mary's_, the brigs _porpoise_ and _somers_ and the schooner _flirt_, with probably some 2700 men. leaving the brazos about the twentieth of may conner sailed with a part of the squadron for pensacola, while other vessels did blockade work or scouted along the coast as far as yucatan. in june captain saunders of the _st. mary's_, lying off tampico bar, opened fire twice on the mexicans, who seemed to be erecting works, and made a bold, well-planned effort against three gunboats anchored inside the mouth of the pánuco, which only circumstances defeated. by august the composition of the squadron and its distribution changed somewhat; three small schooner-gunboats had arrived; but there was no material difference in strength.[30.15] meanwhile conner had in mind the small, handy mexican vessels then lying in alvarado river, which did nobody any good there, and were capable of assisting in his work materially. it seemed very proper to seize or at least destroy them. from residents of alvarado, who traded with the americans, useful information was doubtless obtained; and the master of a captured launch, well fed and well frightened, gave correct details regarding the bar, channel and shipping. a redoubt stood near the beach, but it contained no large guns; and, although warned by the questioning of the launch's master, the mexicans gathered no forces except some 200 militia in the town and about as many more several hours distant up the river. the situation invited a bold stroke.[30.16] accordingly the _mississippi_ and _princeton_, two frigates and the schooner-gunboats--each of these mounting one piece--dropped anchor in line opposite the fort at eleven o'clock in the morning, august 7, 1846, and the steamers opened a fire, to which the lightness of the mexican ordnance permitted no reply. the bombardment continued more or less actively for about six hours, but without effect. owing to the swift current of the river, swollen by heavy rains, it seemed hardly possible to row up to the town, and finally the gunboats were placed within musket range of the shore some distance north of the fort. apparently the intention was to land under the protection of our artillery. the mexicans therefore opened a small-arms fire from the sand-hills, to which our cannon and the muskets on the gunboats replied; but in about half an hour darkness put an end to the operations. bad weather came on immediately; the open roadstead was unsafe; and after nightfall, although it had been proposed to resume the attack the next day, conner withdrew with his disgusted men to antón lizardo.[30.16] [illustration: alvarado, mexico] the following month one of the bureau chiefs gave him to understand that the administration wished something done for the newspapers to make a "noise" about, and another attempt upon the same position was planned. by this time the enemy had improved the defences, and mounted a heavy pivot gun on a high knoll; and a letter from one of our sailors, picked up on the beach, gave them ample notice of the attack. these facts did not signify materially, however, for the americans realized they must positively win a victory this time, and braced themselves for whatever might occur. a little after sunrise, october 15, the _mississippi_, the _vixen_ (a small steamer carrying three guns which had recently joined the squadron), the _mclane_ (a steamer loaned by the revenue service), the three gunboats, the _nonata_ (a prize schooner mounting four guns), and a revenue schooner named the _forward_ arrived off the bar. the plan was to have the _mississippi_ cannonade with shells, and the other steamers, towing the gunboats, ascend the river.[30.17] everything went wrong, however. the _mississippi_ produced no effect. owing to the strength of the current it seemed necessary to have wind, and conner waited in vain until about 2 o'clock for the usual sea breeze. the bar stood higher than it ordinarily did; and although he, aboard the _vixen_, crossed with two gunboats, the _mclane_ grounded, and her section--the larger section--of the force was thrown into the utmost disorder amidst the breakers. not only did the mexican fire prove serious, for a shot struck near the wheelhouse of the _vixen_, but up the river could be seen another fort, and also mexican vessels carrying more metal than conner now had available. he therefore retired across the bar, touching twice; and when at length his other section found itself ready to try once more, he deemed the hour too late. besides, he now believed the _mclane_ would be unable to go up the river with even one gunboat in tow. again bad weather came on, and again the expedition withdrew. officers and men were angry this time as well as disgusted; and although the mexicans on the ground realized that accidents had saved them, a shout of triumph and encouragement rang through their country.[30.17] [operations at the southeast] the _mississippi_ now bore the red pennant of matthew c. perry, who was to have command of the squadron on conner's retirement, and meantime, feeling anxious to serve, contented himself with the dignity of a vice commodore and acted as a captain; and since not only the _vixen_ but coal to make her effective were at last on hand, conner despatched his energetic lieutenant southeastward, on the next day after the second alvarado fiasco, with all the vessels employed in that affair except one of the gunboats. after seizing on the way an american barque, found in communication with mexicans, perry entered tabasco river on the twenty-third, took possession of the town (frontera), and the next day--transferring men from his flagship, which drew too much water for the bar, to the captured _petrita_, a small but swift american-built steamer--he proceeded about seventy-five miles up the rapid and winding stream through heavy and splendid forests, disabling the guns of a small, deserted fort on the way, and reached san juan bautista, capital of the state of tabasco, and seat of an active commerce in munitions and other goods, that reached as far as mexico city. here five merchant vessels fell into his possession. but now, unfamiliar with mexican tactics, perry blundered into peremptorily summoning the town, which j. b. traconis, the comandante general, refused to give up.[30.18] san juan bautista was a small, dull city of broad streets and one-story brick houses, lying in a wide plain. in spite of scandalous desertion traconis probably had about 400 men supported by two small guns. these forces he broke into a number of parties and placed in the outskirts. perry opened fire on the town with cannon, and after a time sent a party ashore. a skirmish followed, but nothing decisive could be accomplished, and after sunset, fearing the sailors would be shot down in the streets during the night, he recalled them.[30.18] on the following day the foreigners protested against the bombardment. negotiations were then tried; but the comandante general, who cared much for his dignity and nothing for the people, insisted on playing out his rôle of the fearless patriot. since it was impracticable to garrison the town, perry decided to retire. but as one of the prizes grounded near the shore and a party of the mexicans--although a white flag could be seen on the _vixen_ and other vessels--fired on the americans who were aboard, causing the death of one and injuring two more, he resumed the cannonade. of course the enemy gracefully withdrew; and then perry did the same, leaving traconis to magnify his triumph. the _mclane_ and _forward_ were left at frontera to blockade the river and protect neutrals; and after burning four vessels and capturing one more on the way, perry rejoined conner on the last day of the month with nine prizes. in its real aim the expedition had succeeded; but the affair at san juan bautista had been so indecisive and murderous that even american soldiers, eager to claim credit and inured to the chances of war, felt humiliated.[30.18] the fortnight of activity and excitement cheered the men of the squadron a great deal, however, and then followed the capture of tampico, which delighted secretary mason beyond measure, and gave the newspapers genuine material for a "noise." when this affair, including the trip up the pánuco, ended, conner despatched his lieutenant southeastward in the _vixen_, accompanied by two gunboats. december 21, at the town of laguna on el carmen island, yucatan, perry seized a couple of small forts, garrisoned by a few timid soldiers, and disabled the guns; and after reinforcing the blockade of tabasco river, looking into the coastal waters, and making two prizes on his return voyage, he joined the squadron two days after christmas. a visit of conner's to the same point the following month ended important operations in this quarter for some time. the occupation of laguna checked a thriving illicit commerce by the river that entered the gulf here.[30.19] all this while the haughty, outstanding challenge--the scalp-lock, so to speak--of mexico, the fortress of san juan de ulúa in vera cruz harbor, remained secure. the capture of it, many of our citizens felt, would wrap the gulf in a blaze of american glory; and young porter, young farragut and other possible decaturs had plans of attack ready. but older men thought the enterprise impracticable for the navy alone. at the beginning of the war bancroft expressly notified conner that his forces were not deemed adequate for such an undertaking. not only had the fortress been strongly and shrewdly constructed, but the channel that led to it was narrow and winding, so that a mishap would have endangered all of the attacking vessels. the french had taken it in 1838, but only by good luck and a sort of treachery, and since that year it had been greatly strengthened. conner and scott agreed that it could not be captured by the fleet. but in march, 1847, misfortune overtook ulúa, for scott, supported brilliantly by the naval forces, laid siege to vera cruz.[30.20] [perry succeeds conner] to the home squadron and its commander as well as to the "castle" this event signified a great deal. in fact it brought conner both to the climax and to the tragedy of his professional career. it enabled him to display in the debarkation his real abilities; and then precipitated him on the eve of a triumph into oblivion. his regular term as commander had expired in november, 1846, and perry notified him that a successor was ready. but conner held bancroft's promise of an indefinite continuance in his position; he doubtless felt that after long withholding needed means, the department owed him a chance to do something worth while; and when he found that scott was to move against vera cruz, he saw his opportunity. unfortunately for him the change of secretaries, the complaints and bold proposals of young officers, and the clamor of the public, ignorant both of what had been possible and of what had been accomplished, had undermined his position.[30.21] in january, 1847, slidell informed the government that conner had lost not only his physical and mental vigor but the confidence of his men. the following month perry, whose ship had gone to norfolk for repairs, visited washington frequently; and how that ambitious, coarse-grained, wilful man talked, one can readily imagine. besides, while perry's outfit of christian graces was noticeably defective, it could not be denied that he possessed energy and a fighting temper. the government therefore decided that conner had not "shown himself equal to the crisis." march 3 a change of commanders was ordered; and when the dénouement of the operations at vera cruz approached, instead of gracefully permitting conner to finish what he had begun, "old bruin," as the sailors called perry, insisted upon his rights. march 21, therefore, his broad blue pennant went up on the _mississippi_, and in a few days his name shone forth in the capitulation of vera cruz and ulúa. "poor commodore conner," said marcy.[30.21] only one important fortified place on the gulf, tuxpán, now flew the tricolor, and it was a point of pride to capture the town, for guns from the _truxtun_--our finest brig, wrecked on the bar--had been mounted there, and the strength of the position challenged our squadron. the city stood on the left bank of a river bearing the same name and about six miles from its mouth. on the lower edge of it rose a steep eminence, hospital hill, with a 9-pounder not far from its base and a 32-pound carronade pivoted at its top, both of them bearing upon the river. nearly a mile and a half below, at the junction of a tributary, stood a water battery of two 18's called palmasola; and some distance farther down, on a bluff about sixty feet high jutting into the stream, two 32-pound carronades and a long nine in la peña redoubt commanded the stream for perhaps two miles. in and near these forts were stationed some three or four hundred mexicans under general cos.[30.22] [tuxpán captured] early on april 17 a large american force, including the "two pollies," as forecastle wit or experience had christened the _spitfire_ and _vixen_, concentrated off the mouth of the river. perry had the channel of the bar sounded and marked with buoys, and the small steamers lightened. the next morning at high tide--near ten o'clock--in spite of serious misgivings the flotilla got through the surf into the placid river. the _spitfire_, commanded by tattnall and carrying perry, the _vixen_ and another small steamer named the _scourge_, then took in tow three armed schooners and some thirty rowboats, which contained four light guns and almost 1600 men; and this fine procession, adorned with brilliant pennants and ensigns, wound upward in admirable order between the low and verdant banks.[30.22] perhaps two miles below la peña the river, here two or three hundred yards in width, straightened, the current became swifter, and the banks rose into thickly wooded hills. when the flotilla reached this point, a curl of smoke burst from the redoubt. "go ahead fast!" signalled the commodore. the steamers dropped their tows. the sails of the schooners filled, and hundreds of oars flashed in the now declining sun.[30.22] it was a race, but more than a race. the shore artillery spoke loudly and well. the _spitfire_ suffered repeatedly. tattnall was wounded. with boom after boom steamers and gunboats replied. as the americans approached it, la peña's fire died out. "land and storm!" ordered perry. "ay, ay, sir," was the response. amidst the thunder of cheers it was done, but the mexicans did not wait for their visitors. dropping rammers and sponges they ran, and the stars and stripes flew up. a fire from the woods was quickly silenced. no less promptly yielded the other forts; and "at a gallop" the town was captured. in all, the casualties numbered only fourteen. a few prizes fell into perry's net above tuxpán; the forts were demolished; the _truxtun's_ guns were shipped off, and leaving two vessels to blockade the river, he sailed away.[30.22] after this perry and his officers cruised for prizes, and invited a number of small ports to raise our flag--an invitation always accepted with alacrity if not enthusiasm--but his attention was chiefly fixed on the southeast. yucatan and to a certain extent her neighbor, tabasco, endeavored to carry water on both shoulders. the former province, which was more industrious and prosperous than any other part of mexico, had always demanded and usually been accorded under both spanish and mexican rule a position of semi-independence. in recent years difficulties had arisen between her and the government, but her sympathies were entirely against the united states. both from policy and from a sense of humanity, our desire was to see her remain neutral and to spare her the rigors of war; but yucatan, without appreciating either our wish or our conduct, aimed simply to preserve her export commerce, her no less valued business of importing american flour, and her trade--especially in foodstuffs and munitions--with mexico, escape all the burdens and losses of the conflict, and run no risk of later mexican vengeance.[30.23] to accomplish so difficult a task her cunning and unscrupulous politicians veered and turned, put out statements, and organized revolutions according to the exigencies of the moment. her two chief cities, mérida and campeche, now joined hands and now seemed or were antagonistic. local rivalries complicated the situation further; and on our side, owing to the distance between washington and the home squadron, there could not be perfect cöoperation. the blockade was therefore imposed and lifted, imposed and lifted by turns. at length, in may, 1847, perry took possession of laguna and el carmen island, appointed a naval officer as governor, and authorized commerce under the contributory tariff; but at the same time our efforts to prevent all contraband trade, both there and by tabasco river, continued.[30.23] in june perry decided to attack san juan bautista again. on the thirteenth he reached the bar at frontera in the _mississippi_, and the next day he proceeded up the river, with a flotilla of one brig, one schooner, four small steamers, three bomb-vessels and a fleet of rowboats. after easily silencing the fire of two breastworks on the way, he found obstructions in the river opposite a third, and fearing the steamers might not be able to pass them without delay, landed quickly with ten guns and more than 1100 men, and under an almost insupportable heat routed a hostile party. the steamers, however, passed on, driving the enemy from the breastwork, and by the sixteenth san juan bautista once more became ours. the fortifications were destroyed, and the guns put aboard.[30.24] [operations on the pacific coast] perry decided to hold the place, and on retiring left there nearly two hundred men besides four small vessels and their complements. but this proved another mistake. the mexicans were driven from the vicinity, but when our force went back to the town, they immediately returned to blockade it; and on july 22, after the climate had laid low more than a third of the americans, our garrison abandoned the place. from this time on, perry found occupation enough in watching tuxpán river, protecting against mexican irregulars the ports where american customhouses existed, and patrolling the coast.[30.24] [illustration: a part of tabasco river from devil's bend to s. juan bautista showing the landing and march of com. perry's forces june 16, 1847] during these operations of the home squadron significant events had been taking place also on the other coast of mexico. its enormous length made a strict blockade practically impossible; but on the nineteenth of august, 1846, the magnificent stockton covered it completely--with a proclamation. it was not that he intended to declare a paper blockade, but only that he did not, like finite creatures, realize the necessity of adequate means. about three days later du pont in the _cyane_ and hull in the _warren_ left california for the south. during their cruise fourteen or fifteen prizes were taken--including the _malek adel_, an armed brig--and so all probability that our commerce and whalers in the pacific would be molested happily vanished. guaymas was cannonaded a little (october 6), and mazatlán suffered a rather nominal blockade of about four weeks. that period ended on the eighth of november, and for almost three months no american vessel appeared there.[30.25] [illustration: guaymas, mexico] in february and march, 1847, the _portsmouth_ watched the port for about five weeks, but then it was left wide open again. england refused to recognize such a blockade. the united states admitted its illegality; and on the sixth of march, 1847, commodore biddle, now commanding the squadron, cancelled stockton's proclamation. during the spring of 1847 mazatlán, which had almost a monopoly of the commerce, was again blockaded for a time, and after may the summer hurricanes interdicted commerce. since mexico had no armed vessel of any importance in the pacific, naval operations then became unnecessary.[30.25] in july, 1847, shubrick succeeded biddle. as the blockade of mazatlán had been raised, he issued on august 6 a fresh notice, covering that port, guaymas and san blas, and about the middle of october sailed from monterey, california, in the _independence_, accompanied by the _cyane_. the rest of his active squadron--which had preceded him southward or was to join him in that quarter--consisted of the _congress_, _portsmouth_, _preble_, _dale_ and two storeships. on the twenty-ninth near cape san lucas he met lavallette in the _congress_, and learned that after an hour's cannonading--caused by the disobliging refusal of general campusano to surrender--guaymas had been occupied nine days before. november 10 mountains lighted by a declining sun and canopied by a turquoise sky rose from the gulf of california before him on the east; and soon, approaching a long, curving line of white beach, he dropped anchor near the lioness-hill of crestón island, which crouched, grandly recumbent, with her fore paws extended, watching over two islet cubs that slept in front of her. here, on the mainland, was mazatlán.[30.26] [operations on the pacific coast] for nearly eighteen months the port, second only to vera cruz in the value of its commerce, had been controlled by colonel rafael téllez, a happy-go-lucky insurgent of convivial tastes, oriental convictions on the subject of seraglios, and aboriginal ideas touching honor. in finance he succeeded, for it was only necessary to put his fist, whenever it felt empty, into the till at the customhouse; but as a warrior he proved hardly equal to the crisis. in short, he retired promptly and contented himself with partially blocking the port, which our forces occupied on the eleventh. november 20 an attempt of the americans to cut off an annoying mexican party some ten miles from the city failed; but the town was presently fortified in such a way that it stood in no danger. early in january, 1848, san blas was blockaded. manzanillo's turn came on the seventeenth of that month; and numerous expeditions, which scoured the coast and went short distances inland, seized light craft, destroyed fortifications, and captured ordnance.[30.27] [illustration: plan of mazatlán] in tracing all these operations in the pacific one receives a certain impression of tardiness and inefficiency. acapulco, a point of slight commercial importance but one distinctly in the view of our naval commanders, escaped entirely; and other ports, especially san blas, were apparently neglected. but the american vessels had no base near at hand. few safe harbors could be found. long voyages were necessary to obtain provisions and to send or pick up despatches. the sailors often found themselves compelled to do the work of soldiers ashore; and in particular vexatious duties had to be performed by the navy in lower california.[30.28] [illustration: lower california] january 11, 1847, j. y. mason informed stockton that both californias were to be retained; and in the course of fifteen days, beginning with march 30, la paz, san lucas and san josé, the chief towns of the peninsula, were occupied by our squadron. the authorities readily submitted, and the people seemed to concur. an intensely hostile spirit showed itself before long, however, and, with the aid of leaders and resources drawn from the mainland, bitter attacks--heroically resisted--were made upon our feeble posts at san josé and la paz during the fall and winter. some american troops from upper california rendered great assistance; but shubrick's watchful coöperation was constantly requisite, and the spirit of resistance could not be exorcised until the end of march, 1848.[30.28] [review of the naval operations] the naval operations on both coasts failed to win loud applause, but there were obvious reasons. the high expectations of the public, based upon the war of 1812, could not possibly be satisfied, for our navy met with no enemy on its proper element. its work had to be plodding and monotonous. due preparations for that had not been made, and even the best informed landsmen understood but very imperfectly the difficulties that were encountered. under such circumstances to conduct the blockade with as much efficiency as was actually shown, depriving mexico of revenues and to a large extent of munitions, giving general satisfaction meanwhile to foreign interests more than willing to complain, was no slight achievement; and to play at the same time so effective a part on land, especially in the conquest of california, merited far higher encomiums than were bestowed.[30.29] the conduct of naval men in occupied territory crowned their services. at mazatlán, for example, shubrick announced that he would exert himself to benefit, not injure, the people. religious freedom, the protection of person and property, firm support of the city authorities, a low tariff and unrestricted commerce--except in munitions and with mexican ports--were granted. vexatious taxes that burdened the poor disappeared, and a wise, economical fiscal system took their place. the sale of ardent spirits to men in our service was prohibited. the americans mingled freely with the people and, as the local historian admitted, "behaved like gentlemen." after six weeks of this régime shubrick was formally requested by the merchants to stay there. at guaymas a similar policy produced similar results, and the people felt anxious to have campusano's forces leave the vicinity. laguna became under our authority more prosperous than ever before. the naval balls and parties were extremely popular; and even after peace came, the commodore was "most earnestly" requested by the people to let our forces remain for a while.[30.30] xxxi the americans as conquerors 1846-1848 for a considerable time large parts of mexico were occupied by our troops, and it is quite worth while to know something of their life and behavior there. conquering soldiers in a foreign land, especially when the enemy is deemed cowardly, treacherous and cruel, are not likely to be angels; and we may count upon meeting here with disagreeable as well as complimentary facts. but we must face these as brave and honest men who love the truth, believe in our country, and are not foolish enough to expect perfection of human nature. it will be some consolation to recall napoleon's maxim, "the conduct of a general in a conquered country is beset with difficulties," and to remember that no nation, if well acquainted with its history, will think of pointing the finger at us. the purpose of the united states was to treat non-combatants as friends, and protect them in all their rights of person, property and religion.[31.1] civilization prescribed this course, and policy emphasized it. both for immediate military success and for the restoration, after the war, of mutually profitable relations, it seemed highly desirable to strike only at the government and the army of mexico, and to avoid angering the great body of the citizens.[31.2] accordingly taylor was promptly supplied with a proclamation, to be distributed in both english and spanish, which threw upon paredes the odium of the conflict, assured the mexican people that a government of "usurpers and tyrants" had involved them in its losses and miseries, and promised that no one behaving as a neutral would be molested; the general was instructed that his "utmost endeavors" must be put forth to make good the pledge; and an active policy of conciliation was urged upon him. as will be seen later, the course of the war and the attitude of mexico eventually suggested a programme considerably sterner in certain respects; but such was the real desire of our government, and it went so far that in order to prove we had no intention of attacking the religion of the mexicans, roman catholic priests were engaged to accompany our army.[31.2] taylor, besides resting under a strict obligation to obey his orders, doubtless concurred fully in this view of the matter, and for a time good conduct on the part of our troops prevailed. the authorities of matamoros were respected; the people felt contented, and viewed the war with indifference; persons of the upper classes began to show themselves; and the town seemed on the way to being a smart little new orleans. but the arrival of the volunteers in force gave the situation a new aspect.[31.3] even men of unblemished reputations appeared to feel that becoming soldiers exempted them from every law, both civil and moral.[31.6] [disorders at matamoros] when in camp below new orleans the troops were guilty of some "sky-larking"--that is to say, plundering; and when they entered the enemy's country they became, said a regular officer, "the living embodiment of a moral pestilence. crime followed in their footsteps, and wherever they trod, they left indelible traces of infamy." to meet their wishes, disorderly establishments of every kind sprang up,[31.4] and the streets were constantly filled with drunken, brawling, insolent officers and men carrying arms. one of them drew a pistol on the british consul because his cane was black; many depredations were committed; and before the tenth of july at least five or six harmless persons were shot down for amusement.[31.6] although it would seem as if taylor, with some 2500 regulars at his back, might have enforced order, he declared that he could not, and soon gave up the effort. unwilling to bring offenders before a military court, he endeavored to have the mexican judges act in some cases, but of course they dared not; and he shipped a few of the malefactors to new orleans, where they could not be held a moment for crimes perpetrated abroad. the result was practical impunity--"perfect impunity," wrote the british consul--for the worst of crimes. at the beginning of august, however, the general prohibited the importation of liquor by the rio grande; and as the army was then moving on, matamoros became comparatively quiet.[31.6] later commanders undertook with considerable success to keep it so; but even in january, 1847, robbery and violence were not unknown there, and the non-commissioned officers as well as the soldiers were forbidden to leave their quarters with arms unless on duty. discharged volunteers on their way down the river did great harm,[31.5] and taylor wrote in june, 1847, "there is scarcely a form of crime that has not been reported to me as committed by them." above matamoros determined efforts were made with partial success to keep liquor from the troops, and the conditions were better. here and there americans would "muster in" some fruit or fowls. "soldiers who have to fight their enemy in the enemy's country will never go hungry as long as there are any chickens about," wrote one of them; and in fact, said an officer, it was a patriotic duty for uncle sam's men to keep their souls and their bodies together. but the rule in such cases was to compensate the owners, and probably no serious resentment lingered.[31.6] during the battles of monterey there was enough shooting to satisfy any reasonable person, and the quiet beauty of the scene should soon have banished thoughts of carnage. the tranquil mountains that stood about the town on three sides, receding as the clouds enveloped them in shadow or approaching as the splendor of the sun brightened every point, the statuesque aguacates clothed in foliage like dark green velvet, the fan-like palmettoes, the feathery date palms, the delicious oranges and pomegranates, the murmuring streams, and the lilies that brightened many a pool invited to repose; yet no sooner was battle over than murder began.[31.10] the chief criminals were the texans,[a] who felt that barbarities committed by the mexican on their soil during the revolution warranted the crudest retaliation. at matamoros they had been the fiercest of the volunteers, and now--stationed for a while at the town--they found a still better opportunity.[31.7] other volunteers aided them. to say nothing of robberies and minor outrages perpetrated "in the broad light of day," it was thought, noted a regular officer in his diary, that not less than one hundred mexicans were slain in cold blood, and out of about 7000 still in town, 5000, more or less, fled. a citizen cannot take his hat off, wrote a mexican, without some american's saying, "that is mine"; and if the owner denies it, he gets a bullet. strict regulations[31.8] were soon framed, however, and under worth's command the volunteer learned what they meant.[31.10] [footnote a: these men have to be called texans because they hailed from that state, but it should be remembered that nearly all of them had come from other parts of the union.] to a large extent, if we leave the texans out of the account, the mexicans themselves were responsible for the worst outrages of monterey and the vicinity. they sold liquor to the troops persistently, and retaliated indiscriminately for the excesses that resulted. the americans then took vengeance, and in the end some ghastly deeds on rather a large scale occurred. singularly enough, too, the punctiliousness of our officers contributed to the same end. they would not convict a mexican without legal proof of his guilt, and when soldiers saw a man, who was almost certainly the murderer of their comrade, let off because a drove of mexicans testified to an alibi, they were likely to steal out after him or make some one else pay his forfeit.[31.9] still, the many injunctions to be fair and kindly toward the people were not without effect. one soldier used to sit cross-legged in the square of monterey, and play his rickety accordion for the benefit of the populace.[31.10] [affairs at saltillo] at saltillo strict police regulations were made. as had now become the general rule, to provide soldiers with intoxicating beverages, except by special permission, was forbidden, and fifty lashes were made the penalty for disobedience. the troops had to seek their quarters at retreat, and the mexicans go home when the ten o'clock bell rang. but in spite of every precaution the "lawless volunteers," as worth called them, were guilty of many offences, and--with the perhaps excessive emphasis of a high-minded regular officer--he wrote to his daughter, "the innocent blood that has been basely, cowardly and barbarously shed in cold blood, aside from other and deeper crimes, will appeal to heaven for, and, i trust, receive, just retribution."[31.12] here, as at monterey, worth made an admirable governor, sitting four hours a day to hear complaints, and administering substantial justice without reference to legal technicalities; and his successors were much like him.[31.11] a sergeant was discharged for treating a mexican unjustly. an american "doctor" was expelled for disorderly conduct. soldiers were not allowed to endanger the people by riding fast in the streets. property stolen or destroyed was paid for by the army, and this rule was made to work the other way also. the town prospered; and although some of the soldiers would now and then help themselves to fruit or snatch a piece of candy from a stand, and cases of outrage on the one hand or assassination on the other occurred at intervals, the people--notably hostile at first--became friendly, the windows were always full of laughing girls, and the women in their rebosas, red petticoats and blue cloth slippers went every evening to the fountain in the plaza with their tall earthen jars, unmolested and unafraid.[31.12] tampico, to say nothing of the drills and parades, offered enough interesting sights and amusements to keep the soldiers out of mischief, one might have thought. the many strange and beautiful trees; the mullard and sea-trout, schools of yellow jackfish, huge, pearly tarpon, and many other denizens of the rivers and lagoons; the buzzards coasting on air, the grunting ravens, and forty other kinds of birds; the long, slender pirogues of red cedar constantly bringing luscious fruits to the market; the many vessels coming and going: these were only a few of the attractions. but in reality the town was a hard problem, for its nearness to the united states and its commercial relations made the exclusion of all undesirable visitors impossible. so-called restaurants bearing popular american names flourished, and, in spite of the prohibition against importing liquor, strong drink was about all they offered except hard beef; while the existence of gambling houses was proved by the severe and repeated orders against them. almost every volunteer, said a regular officer, celebrated his arrival with a "frolic,"[31.13] and according to the mexican accounts, threats, insults and small depredations were not infrequent.[31.14] [affairs at tampico] but in tampico as elsewhere, the people had much less to suffer, in all probability, than from the mexican troops who formerly had garrisoned the town, and the big united states flag set up in the plaza near the pánuco represented substantial benefits. many new kinds of manufactured articles made their appearance, and all such things were sold at low prices. business became active. according to tradition the paving of the city dates from this time. a theatre was built. preparations were made and presumably carried out for the extension of the mole. an american newspaper appeared. mexican visitors had to give an account of themselves, and there were no riots and no dirks. patrols marched up and down the broad streets; sentries with fixed bayonets were on hand at every gathering, even balls; and the very happiest of frolics were pretty sure to end before morning with a nap on the guard house floor.[31.14] some of the mexicans thought our volunteer officers were afraid of their men, but gates, shields and the other commanders do not seem to have been. the assistance of the leading mexicans in maintaining order was invited; many of the citizens fraternized with our men; and in general a high rate of mortality was probably the only serious consequence of reckless tendencies. the residents thought the american volunteers careless, badly dressed and poorly drilled; but some of them admitted they had never felt so safe before.[31.14] clearly our troops improved in conduct as time went on, but none the less their early excesses had serious consequences. for a long while there had been a tendency in the northeastern parts of mexico to secede. the primary scheme had been to join texas; and after our absorption of texas ended it, the idea of an independent republic, with american protection or annexation to this country in view, gained much support. early in 1846 the authors of this project were in communication with taylor and the american government. whether such a plan could have been executed or not, there were reasons for our wishing to have the people cherish it. in such a mood they were bound to be our friends instead of enemies, and the paralyzing influence of their temper would have extended into other provinces.[31.15] accordingly taylor was instructed to favor the idea. but reports of the outrages committed by our volunteers penetrated to all quarters; the mexican authorities, who understood the popular tendencies, were doubtless active in spreading the reports; and the disposition to view us with cordiality received a shock from which it never recovered. "people near matamoros, previously inclined to favor the americans," declared the comandante general of nuevo león in a broadside, "have written these weighty words: 'the domination of the grand turk is kinder than that of the americans. their motto is deceit. their love is like the robber's. their goodness is usurpation; and their boasted liberty is the grossest despotism, iniquity and insolence, disguised under the most consummate hypocrisy.'" as an offset, the bad conduct of mexican officers and troops did not signify. that was a family affair.[31.15] the blackest shadow in the picture, however, was new mexico. armijo had compensated the people for his tyranny and robbery by permitting them every sort of license in their social relations. virtue was little known and less valued. even women fought duels with dirks or butcher-knives. dances, at which all classes mingled in the revelry, were the chief amusements; the church bells announced them; and at mass one heard the same music, played by the same musicians. gambling and cock-fighting stood next in esteem, perhaps; and then came other vices that seemed more precisely necessities than ornaments of existence.[31.18] to throw into a small and isolated community of that sort, without books or society or proper diversions, a large number of young and reckless frontiersmen greatly above the average in physical vigor, was to make it a seething caldron of gross passions. the soldiers were not willing to do what little work there was, and they scorned regulations. "the dirtiest, rowdiest crew i have ever seen collected together," was a responsible british traveller's description of the american forces; and a soldier wrote in his diary, "a more drunken and depraved set, i am sure, can never be found." to be liked, an officer had to be lax, and to be unpopular was liable to mean--as good officers learned--a pistol or a sabre in one's face. half the captains, a letter said, could be found every night in bad places. the disorder of the governor's christmas dinner party disturbed the whole town. there was probably no deliberate oppression. gross outrages appear to have been few. but the drunken, brawling, overbearing volunteers despised the men about them and showed it; and the latter, flouted at every turn, and in particular robbed of their women, scowled and brooded with all the ferocity of an indolent but passionate, jealous race, and plied the knife when they dared.[31.18] kearny might perhaps have ridden the tempest, but a local politician like price could only be swept away. a few of the better americans got up a prayer-meeting, but that was just a dewdrop in tartarus. one began to be ashamed of one's nation, wrote a good officer. to enhance dissatisfaction, the indians continued their depredations as if no treaties had been made. a well-meant code of laws was drawn up, but it contained certain troublesome provisions about land titles; and some taxation had to be imposed. the people took fright. "we have come for your good; yes, for all your goods," began to be their interpretation of kearny's assurances.[31.18] naturally an insurrection occurred. price now showed energy, and the troops courage. in a brief campaign, january and february, 1847, the malcontents were put down. but the people, though cowed, loved the victors none the better, and the victors trusted and respected the people none the more. the conditions became perhaps worse than ever.[31.16] supplies were uncertain. discipline became lax again, and the indians were now more rapacious than for twenty years. dissipation resulted in much sickness and many deaths. moreover the people felt wronged because political privileges bestowed by kearny in excess of his authority had to be withdrawn. for most, if not all, of the time it was impossible to obtain the money required for the administration of civil affairs, and the civil authorities clashed with the military.[31.17] undoubtedly serious difficulties were inherent in the situation, but nothing could excuse our government for permitting such a state of things to continue for so long a time.[31.18] [american rule in california] very different was the scene in california. soon after the treaty of cahuenga was made stockton returned to his naval duties, and frémont, appointed by him under the law of nations, assumed the governorship.[31.19] in february, 1847, however, orders that had been issued at washington early in november, directing that the chief military officer should take command, reached san francisco, and about the first of march kearny became the executive. in general he was inclined to be less indulgent than frémont or sloat, but he intended to be fair and kind. "the americans and californians," he proclaimed with the same exaggeration of his authority as at santa fe, "are now but one people; let us cherish one wish, one hope, and let that be for the peace and quiet of our country. let us as a band of brothers unite and emulate each other in our efforts to benefit and improve this our beautiful, and which soon must be our happy and prosperous home."[31.21] at the end of may, 1847, he returned to the east, and colonel r. b. mason of the first dragoons, whom the government had sent out for the purpose, became governor and commander-in-chief. mason was an excellent executive, able, experienced, sensible, strong and faithful. some thought his character hard, but probably all clear-headed persons realized that it was just. he believed in firm though kind methods, avoided entanglements, and bore sway successfully till the close of the war.[31.21] the restless faction of the los angeles district, free from the restraint of a large american element, still existed, and at intervals caused considerable anxiety. indeed it is clear from mexican sources that a hope of troops from the south was fondly cherished there for a long time. the approach of the mormon battalion, which--after suffering many hardships on the route from santa fe--arrived at san diego under captain cooke in january, 1847, excited the people, for that sect was loathed in california. a great deal of trouble about land titles arose, for the surveying had been poorly done, the boundaries overlapped in many instances, and few had the proper documents. frémont's volunteers, expecting large pay, refused to be mustered into the service under the law of may 13, 1846, and were discharged in a very angry frame of mind, april, 1847, with no pay at all; and very little was done toward compensating the people for the spoliations committed by the volunteers.[31.21] the government, though tempered by the maintenance of the alcalde system, was necessarily a military one; the old alcaldes, familiar with the customs of the land, would not serve; the new ones, though generally good men, could not always give satisfaction; and the growing american element, disgusted with so unsystematic a system, demanded self-government and written laws. no funds could legally be had for the expenses of war and civil administration except those derived from the customhouses, and the americans were so deeply committed by their promise of low duties that mason felt compelled to reduce the tariff explicitly ordered by the government. there were jealous differences of opinion on many points between the californians and the americans, between the various nationalities of the foreigners, and between the old and the new immigrants; and finally the people were disturbed by serious quarrels between the stockton-frémont party and the kearny-mason party, and by the old fear that eventually the americans would sail away, leaving them to settle with mexico as best they could.[31.21] for troops, besides company c of the first dragoons, kearny's escort from santa fe, there were company f of the third artillery, which arrived in february, 1847, the mormon battalion, and a regiment of new york volunteers under colonel j. d. stevenson, who came in march, 1847, and were expected to remain in california as settlers after the close of the war.[31.20] apparently the mormons were to be a source of weakness rather than strength, and the antecedents of the new york regiment inspired little confidence. stevenson's men did in fact begin promptly to "sow wild oats." they were not disposed to work on the fortifications, and they were insubordinate. but under mason's control they soon learned to do well, and he reported that at the close of the war "one common cry of regret arose [from the californians] at the order for their disbandment; [and] the little petty causes of complaint were forgotten in the remembrance of the more substantial advantages they had enjoyed under the protection of the military." the conduct of the mormons was always exemplary and they won the esteem of the people.[31.21] imported articles became cheap. real estate and all the products of the soil, particularly at the north, increased in value. commerce trebled in a year. all damages caused by men recognized as in the service of the united states were repaired, and the offenders punished. the return of josé castro without means or hopes at the beginning of 1848 produced an excellent effect. gold-digging became more attractive than conspiracies. and although a certain number of irreconcilables cherished regrets and grievances, the official news of peace and absorption in the united states--which came on the evening of august 6, 1848--greeted a busy and hopeful community.[31.21] so much for the north, and we pass now to the régime of scott. after learning of the atrocities perpetrated on the rio grande, that "scientific and visionary" officer drafted and laid before the secretary of war a martial-law order, to be enforced in mexico until action should be taken by congress. but the idea of putting constraint on the free american voter probably struck marcy with terror. he started at the title, said nothing, and after a while returned the paper without comment. scott then sent it on to taylor, and was informed that the general threw it aside almost instantly, calling it "another of scott's lessons." the crying need of some adequate method for punishing american soldiers in foreign parts compelled marcy in december to recommend that congress authorize a military tribunal; but that body also doubtless had an eye to votes, and took no action.[31.25] [scott's policy] scott, however, though an aspirant for the presidency, did not shrink from his duty, and on arriving in tampico he issued general orders 20, which threw the pale of martial law round all united states forces operating in mexico, and provided for the punishment, through "military commissions," of offences committed by, in or upon them.[31.22] orders 20, republished at vera cruz, puebla and the capital and widely circulated in spanish, were supplemented by issuing safeguards, under which one or more soldiers, bearing a proper document signed by a corps or division commander, could be quartered at any place which it was especially for the interest of the army to protect.[31.23] in occupying towns the rule was to billet no officer or man, without consent, upon any inhabitant, and to quarter the troops in barracks and other public buildings already used for the purpose by the mexican government.[31.24] these arrangements, the practice of paying for everything used by the army, the principle of treating non-combatant mexicans as fellow-citizens, and a strenuous endeavor to enlist the coöperation of all the decent men of the army in the suppression of outrages constituted the system of scott.[31.25] at vera cruz misdeeds were perpetrated, of course, but the culprits who could be detected paid a price for their sport that put the fear of the lord--or at least of scott--into the hearts of others. one tipsy fellow, who nearly killed a mexican woman with kicks and blows, was strapped over a wagon, given twelve good lashes, and then placed at labor in a fort with a ball-and-chain for the rest of the war. a second ruffian, for a worse offence against a woman, was promptly and publicly hanged.[31.26] on the other hand preventive regulations[31.27] concerning liquor, gambling, roaming about the city and the like soon went into force.[31.30] but the american measures were not simply negative. worth, who became governor as soon as the town surrendered, distributed free rations among the people, and prevented extortion by establishing a fair scale of prices for eatables. a large force of laborers was employed at liberal wages to clean the streets and the augean castle of ulúa. assured of protection the shops reopened promptly. in ten days the general effects of the bombardment appeared hardly noticeable. freed from the exactions of their officials and military chiefs and rapidly gaining confidence in our intentions, the people seemed like new men. commerce, favored by the low american duties, took on fresh life. although anti-catholic sentiment was raging in the united states, scott and some of his principal officers attended mass and even marched in the processions; and the soldiers were bidden to salute not only the tasselled cane of the magistrate but the cassock of the priest.[31.30] worth soon moved on with scott's army; but his successor was described by the british consul as deserving "all praise." those who followed him did perhaps equally well;[31.28] all branches of the public service were maintained; the good-will of the citizens was acquired and held; and lerdo de tejada, one of the best statesmen and historians of mexico, has declared that vera cruz had to suffer scarcely anything from the american occupation except the humiliation of foreign rule, while profiting substantially in several respects.[31.30] these results were achieved, too, under serious and almost crippling embarrassments. in some regards the city was highly agreeable. fish more resplendent than gems lay always in the market. a long list of delicious fruits and vegetables graced each its proper season. often a duet of the military band and the mocking-birds enchanted the ear. to sip a sherbet at noonday--all the curtains drooping over the balconies, the blue sky gray with excess of light, the blackbirds panting with beaks wide open and wings partly spread, the lépero drunk with sleep in the shadow of a wall, a hush over the docks, a stillness in the market--had an exotic fascination; and an evening stroll round the plaza or along the beach at vergara, where the principal camp lay, with the soft, languid, lingering breeze of the gulf on one's face and every star asking to be counted, was a delight one could not soon forget.[31.30] this region, however, was a favorite hunting-ground, not only of the yellow fever, but of diseases even more fatal.[31.29] a few slices of the fragrant córdoba pineapple, washed down with a glass of the almost irresistible brandy, left one hardly time to make a will. through the long day a huge ball of fire called the sun poured down an intense heat, and at night the mosquitos were numberless. the story of the invalids was long and sad; and sadder yet the tale of many a gallant soldier-boy, full of thoughts of the loved ones, who breathed his last sigh in the crowded wards of a hospital--_alone_.[31.30] at córdoba, where the lanes blazed with small red roses, the sentiment was intensely mexican, and the authorities ordered that on the approach of the american forces as many of the inhabitants as possible should leave town with everything belonging to the state that could be of service. but the people were mostly satisfied with shutting themselves up during the brief stay of general bankhead, and the merchants did not go so far as that. the legitimate rights of the conqueror were asserted, but the american commander perhaps made full compensation for this by requiring the city council to reduce the expenses of administration. care was taken to provide for the punishment of all disorders, and in particular for all interference with religious observances. after bankhead left, hearing that some of the garrison were plundering, he threatened to send an entire battalion, if necessary, to apprehend the culprits.[31.31] on higher ground farther west lay orizaba, sombre yet beautiful amidst its orchards, gardens, palm groves, orange trees and rich fields of tobacco and sugar-cane, like a proud spanish dowager surrounded by her grandchildren. here the troops helped themselves occasionally to fruit and cane, injured trees and committed some graver offences. the consequence was that soldiers were forbidden to leave the town except on service and the officers commanding guards in the outskirts had to arrest every man guilty of such acts or pay for the damages, and in either case were held responsible for disobedience and neglect of duty.[31.32] [the state of things at jalapa] of all the places occupied by american troops in mexico the most delightful was jalapa. in fact, probably a more delightful place is nowhere to be found. for natural attractiveness it surpasses even taormina, kandy and nikko, the beauty-spots of sicily, ceylon, japan. the abundant water was excellent, which could rarely be said of mexican towns, and ice from orizaba mountain could be had to cool the abundant refreshments. the mercury never stood high and never low. spring was almost the only season. the foliage always looked new and exuberant, and blossoms were constantly opening as if with ever fresh surprise.[31.34] from the plaza one gazed into a broad valley tapestried with many-hued verdure. here palms, live-oaks, magnolias, tamarinds and aguacates--often enmeshed with beautiful and sometimes with aromatic vines--gracefully sheltered the azalea, the verbena, the poppy, the jasmine and countless varieties of geraniums and roses. here such exquisite plants as the vanilla, heliotrope and tree-lily exhaled with unceasing generosity their delightful odors. here, amid ancient forests, gorges curtained with exotic ferns and orchids extended to mysterious depths teeming with all manner of strange, fascinating growths. and when, after long surveying this eden, or descending to wander far in its mazy paths, one's eye rose to a broad belt of pines and firs clothing jagged sierras, and at last, above their rich green, beheld a slender but enormous pyramid of snow, the peak of orizaba, heaven-high and resplendent against the deep, tropical blue, it seemed as if nature had lavished on this chosen spot the whole diapason of her beauty. music hath charms to soothe; and such loveliness, grace, perfume and grandeur, combined, were splendidly suited to still the passions of war.[31.34] scott and the first american troops proved worthy of this paradise. nobody was molested. the officers lodged only in vacated houses. the soldiers tried to make friends among the townsfolk. our generals attended the funeral of a worthy mexican officer killed at cerro gordo. gold and silver flowed in streams--brighter than "abana and pharpar, rivers of damascus"--that reached the humblest cottage. many of the people wept when scott marched away.[31.34] but some later commands, untamed volunteers who stopped there for a brief time, left a different impression. lally's men seem to have been a scourge, and wynkoop's proved so lawless that even lally's were glad to see the last of them. during their stay the shops were closed, and all business came to an end. seven officers left their accounts unpaid at the hotels, and some of them carried away towels or the shirts of brother officers. in a word they were natural thieves. other misdeeds could be traced to the lack, for some time, of pay. but the main cause of trouble was liquor. against this evil, as against gambling and the rest, adequate regulations were issued; but sometimes commissioned officers, anxious to be popular, would force hotel keepers to let their men have drink. at the bottom of everything lay the selling of liquor by wholly unauthorized persons. "let the municipal authorities unite with me to put a stop to that _infamous traffic_," wrote one american governor of the city to the first alcalde, "and i will answer for it that there will be no disturbances or outrages committed by the soldiers."[31.34] another feature also of the american occupation came out with especial clearness at jalapa. not only were offences, extending to robbery and murder, committed against our troops, but it was found on scrupulous investigation that often definite stories of misdeeds charged to our men were plausible only till the other side came out, and that many claims for damages were deliberately invented or grossly exaggerated.[31.34] against all real offenders the successive governors--particularly colonel george w. hughes, who remained in office a considerable time--were as a rule severe. stern orders, biting rebukes, earnest appeals to represent our country worthily, precautions like patrols and frequent roll-calls, and at need exemplary punishments were not lacking. one day four soldiers received thirty lashes each, had their heads shaved, and were drummed out of camp, with the word "robber" pasted on their backs, for breaking into a house.[31.33] but at the same time careful measures had to be taken for the protection of our men and our government. happily the people in general seem to have understood that some pilfering and occasionally other misdemeanors were unavoidable, and to have appreciated our efforts to defend, conciliate and please them, to maintain--in coöperation with the town officials--the municipal service, to provide for the charities of the city, and to ensure respect for woman, religion and civil authority. vigne, a french traveller, says the americans were much liked at jalapa, and probably they were nowhere treated more pleasantly.[31.34] [the americans at puebla] at puebla, august 1, 1847, the robert anderson of fort sumter wrote: "we have been now in this large city since may 15th, with a soldiery gathered from many nations, many of them undisciplined, and yet, i will venture the assertion, without fear of contradiction, that, in no city of the same size, either in our own blessed country or in any other, is private property, or are private rights, more secure and better guarded than here.... not an instance, i am certain, has been elicited, or brought to light, of one of our soldiers killing a mexican.... 'tis truly wonderful, i cannot understand it."[31.35] the people are all contented, said a letter to _el republicano_, for business is good and taxes are low; and, he might have added, an american band plays for us in the park. it is "almost incredible," admitted a writer in _el nacional_, a newspaper of the state, how well the american soldiers treat our priests and women. how are they able to wear the mask so long? the common people, not seeing through the trick, accept their conduct in good faith.[31.37] after the siege ended, some of our men were arrested for plundering houses from which they had been fired upon, and there was a little pilfering at the fruit stands; but fúrlong, the mexican prefect, urged the people to give the war no further thought, and friendly relations very soon returned. street lanterns were still punctured occasionally by tipsy and facetious americans with their bayonets, but they were paid for. when lane's brigade of volunteers arrived, complaints began in earnest, and a committee laid the situation before scott; but there was no case of such importance that amends or even investigation was demanded.[31.36] the city council stated to the prefect that childs had saved its authority, improved the condition of the town, aided the mexican officials, and given them willing audience in order to concert measures for the public good. one measure in particular was the re-establishment of the chamber of commerce, destroyed by the state government; and, as the bishop admitted, childs did all in his power to prevent and remedy abuses.[31.37] [american rule at the capital] at mexico city there were "some outrages naturally," reported doyle, chargé d'affaires of england; and emphasis can fairly be placed on his last word, for the troops, entering the town excited by desperate fighting and crowned with victory, were fired upon by the populace, and found themselves hunted at every turn by robbers, assassins and their confederates.[31.38] doyle added that "even from the beginning a great deal of forbearance" was displayed by the americans; and the correspondent of the london _daily news_ wrote, "on the whole i must confess that general scott and his troops have acted with unexpected moderation." indeed, they "have shown an exemplary clemency," admitted a mexican letter printed by a mexican paper.[31.43] the restaurant-keeper who furnished a meal and got rather less than he expected or the janitor who tried to keep soldiers out of their assigned quarters and got rather more, had little reason to complain. indeed, both had reason to be content, for in a city full of léperos and escaped felons property and life depended upon our protection. "we must endure the presence of the americans or suffer worse things," said a mexican. no allowances were made by scott, however.[31.39] "revelling in the halls of montezuma" means now, a soldier wrote home, that if the patrol finds you in the street after eight o'clock in the evening you are taken to the guardhouse, and if noisy, you are handcuffed; and for more serious offences the punishments were extremely severe. quitman, the first governor of the city,[31.40] and p. f. smith, who succeeded him, ably seconded the commander-in-chief.[31.43] under such auspices the shops began to open within a week after the capital surrendered, and business was soon brisker than ever. the clergy were somewhat refractory, and on september 19 all the churches were found closed; but quitman immediately sent word that should they remain closed, the united states flags would be removed from their towers as a sign that our army had withdrawn its protection. no further hint was needed, for millions in gold, silver and gems lay within their dark walls; and soon the relations between army and church became entirely satisfactory.[31.43] the troops then felt at liberty to make themselves at home. the _american star_, "a neat and saucy little sheet," whose proprietors and editors had followed the troops from vera cruz, and set up their press wherever scott made a stay, appeared on september 20, and later was followed by the _north american_.[31.41] the cafés and eating places took on strange names: new york restaurant eagle hotel, old kentucky house and the like. "american dry goods," read one sign; "mince pies for sale here," another; "mush and milk at all hours," a third. officers formed an association called the aztec club. an agitation for an american railroad to vera cruz began. an american sermon was preached at the palace in the splendid ambassadors' hall, on the text: "only fear the lord, and serve him in truth with all your heart; for consider how great things he hath done for you"; and other sermons followed. american citizens, temporarily soldiers, made all the shows prosperous, and a complimentary benefit was given to señora canete at the national theatre by "the chiefs and officers of the american army." as cold weather came on, stoves, chimneys and smoke made their appearance to the intense astonishment of the natives, total strangers to such abominations; and finally that proud spanish institution, the bull-fight, succumbed in this manner:[31.43] "the publid are respectfull informed thoh the _secind bull fihk_ nill take place, _this evening, wsdnesday_, 10te instant, cohen nill bi introduced á variez of new performanas, by the compay of bull fighk, and fa which occasia has been obtaind. some of the mest fusian bulls in the countri. this wsdnesday. night 10 novembre 1847." unfortunately, under such names as "contreras," "churubusco" and "old chapultepec," american drinks of established fame arrived. music halls and dance houses, familiarly known as the hells of montezuma, were crowded. relieved now from the anxiety and tension of the campaign, the gallant volunteers could not be still a moment. generally they were rather brusque and rowdyish, and to the polite mexicans they appeared even more so than they really were. they loved to present themselves at a show with trousers tucked into their boots, drape their legs over the backs of the seats, and yell for american patriotic airs; and they seemed to be always eating except when busy with a glass.[31.43] gambling became a rage, and in its temples were other priestesses besides those of chance. of _la bella unión_, the chief resort, it was said, what is unknown "is as well as what is known." eager for popularity and advancement many officers would not interfere, and in fact some of them sank almost as low as their men. one consequence of such dissipation was illness,[31.42] and another was robberies, quarrels and fights. the arrival of reinforcements--fresh volunteers and recruits--quickened all riotous tendencies. so far as personal morals went the conditions of santa fe were approached by not a few, and to crown all two volunteer officers, involved in what seems to have been a gambling-house fracas, were convicted of murder. conqueror as well as conquered must pay his penalty.[31.43] most, however, shrank from such a life, and many tried to render the american stay a fine experience for themselves and for others. it was not in vain. their nobler tastes found congenial soil. the turquoise sky, the pictured façades of the houses, the handsome gray old palaces curiously and lavishly sculptured, and embellished with precious tiles in blue and white, the alameda with its grand trees and its fountain, the amazing richness of the churches and their wondrous gilded carvings, the embroidered gold vestments of the priests, the perfume here and there of an ancient garden stealing out through a broken wall, the red conflagration of sunrise behind snowy mountains, the distant, mellow clang of a convent bell as evening shadows gathered, the brilliant round moon turning the peaks into gigantic veiled watchmen and setting massive domes and spires a-quiver with a mystical sort of life--these things helped introduce our finer spirits to the heart of the land, and fill them with sympathy and good-will. mexico has never been without strangers to love her, and she found such among her conquerors.[31.43] here our survey of the ground ends, but a few vertical sections will be instructive. while always having it understood that our authority was paramount, the american local governors desired to let the alcaldes and ayuntamientos (city councils) look after municipal affairs, and were disposed to coöperate in a liberal fashion with them for the good order, the efficient and economical administration and even the improvement of the towns.[31.46] [american methods] naturally enough those officials, exposed to the criticism of both sides, found their positions irksome. usually, though not always, they were permitted to resign if they chose to do so, and new officials were then elected by the people or appointed by the governor. shields extinguished the ayuntamiento of tampico for incompetence and malfeasance in office, and selected their successors. at mexico a refractory council was dissolved by scott, and a puro body, friendly to the americans and anxious to make the city government democratic through our aid, was chosen in a somewhat irregular way. when provisions, mules and other such things were needed, it was usual to call upon the town authorities to furnish them at liberal prices. a threat that otherwise the needed supplies would be taken by force and nothing paid, often accompanied the request; but this was in most cases only designed to justify the authorities, in the view of the people, for complying.[31.46] attention was paid by the governors to the care and lighting of the streets, proper sanitation, the maintenance of schools, hospitals, prisons and public works, and especially to the police. at córdoba the city guards were allowed to carry only clubs, but such a restriction was not usual. worth had regulars for policemen at one time. at puebla after the siege a guard of 100 volunteers patrolled the streets all night. general smith enlisted at mexico a picked body of four hundred american soldiers. shields, while governor of tampico, placed an officer of the regulars at the head of this department. the police were firmly supported by the governor, if they proved reliable; if not, a change occurred. the americans held that peaceable citizens lost none of their political rights during our occupation, and on election days our troops were kept in their quarters or marched out of town.[31.44] so, too, mexican tribunals were entirely free in dealing with mexican affairs, though no one connected with our army could be tried by them; and their decisions were enforced by our commanders.[31.45] when mexicans were placed before an american military commission they were permitted to bring counsel, but occasionally somewhat unusual methods had to be employed, because men ready to make any sort of an oath in defence of a fellow-countryman could always be found. our protection extended, of course, to the subjects of foreign powers.[31.46] social relations between the mexicans and our armies were hindered by the old impression that americans were haughty, taciturn and insolent, by the fear of receiving actual insults and injuries from our soldiery, and, when this fear wore off, by a dread that any association with americans would later be punished by fellow-citizens--as proved to be the result at victoria, for example. the relations of scott and his officers with churchmen were generally good, but as a rule the educated and wealthy moved away on our approach or shut themselves up. in the case of tampico,[31.47] however, officers were able to secure the presence of mexican ladies at a steamboat excursion and a ball.[31.50] as a rule, parras was hospitable throughout the war. at jalapa the two nationalities mixed somewhat freely. governor hughes became intimate with the leading clergymen, and he stated that on account of the general cordiality shown by the franciscans the head of that order was banished from the capital. a handsome ball was given there to childs when he left the city. it was at mexico, however, that social relations were best established.[31.48] society decided rather promptly to appear in public as usual. even common soldiers were often able to make friends of respectable persons, and officers became intimate in many families. what was more surprising, a figure in public affairs like alamán opened his door.[31.50] the women, usually so ardent in their patriotism, were noticeably cordial. the mexican men were as a rule essentially feminine, and the downright virility of the northern breed made itself deeply and quickly felt. less than three weeks after the capture of monterey private kingsbury naïvely wrote, "the women are very kind.... i enjoy myself much in company with the fair señoras." conversation was probably somewhat limited; but a great many soldiers made a dash at spanish, and while some concluded the people did not understand their own language, others achieved results that were at least interesting.[31.49] our officers, it hardly need be said, never lagged behind their men.[31.50] a fandango on hard ground beside a winding river with mandolins and guitars softly singing and moonlight sifting down through gently waving palms, was not despised, and to go from leaky canvas to a gilded ball-room for a whirl with a black-eyed beauty who could waltz with a full glass of water on her head, was a strong argument for treating mexicans kindly. the dark señoritas of jalapa in particular, and still more their celestial cousins of the golden hair and blue eyes, loved to dance, chat and intrigue, and now their wit and their fans had the opportunity of a lifetime; at puebla, the full name of which meant the city of angels, "bewitching glances" often made our officers feel "aguish," said one of them; and the capital stood first in this as in all other respects. romance never had a more brilliant or a deadlier course. many a brave heart was thrilled by a mysterious invitation that meant perhaps a kiss and perhaps a stab, and many a fearless gallant made a wild ride into the night. that woman's subtle power, added to the influence of our gentlemanly and highly educated officers in social intercourse, had important effects on public sentiment cannot be doubted. still, fear of their own countrymen prevented people from associating openly with americans to any great extent.[31.50] in short, as this phase of the subject is reviewed, one finds, much that was deplorable and in the case of a foreign war should always be guarded against. but that is not strange. war is ugly business; and since all of us begin conscious existence as savages, and many rise little above that stage, we should not be surprised if some of our soldiers, deprived to such an extent of uplifting influences, reverted more or less toward it. besides, a grain or two of lawlessness is after all a normal and useful ingredient in human nature.[31.52] [american rule beneficent] on the whole there was a vast deal to admire and praise. scott, a man well versed in the history of campaigns, asserted that his troops displayed "the highest moral deportment and discipline ever known in an invading army." doyle, after making careful inquiries all the way from vera cruz to the capital and viewing the case as a practical man, reported with reference to our troops that "even from the account of the mexicans themselves they seem to have behaved very well." gutiérrez de estrada, a mexican of high standing, said to his people that the americans occupying their country ensured them security of person and possessions and all proper satisfactions better than their own governments had ever done.[31.52] and when one considers also the relative fewness of serious outrages and the comparatively small number of individuals affected, the great sums of money paid for supplies and labor,[31.51] the reduced prices of almost all manufactured articles, the prevention of brigandage, insurrections, and civil as well as military extortions, tyranny and excesses in the territory that we held, the promotion of commerce and trade, the good ideas of municipal administration frequently exhibited by the governors of towns, and the fine examples of subordination to authority, both military and civil, exhibited by all grades of our troops from the private up to general scott himself--when these things are considered, one may well feel that our occupation was a blessing to the people. yet--they would rather have had mexican abuse than american benefits.[31.52] xxxii peace october, 1847-july, 1848 in the end peace came, for sooner or later it had to come; but nobody could have imagined the extraordinary course of events that was to bring it about, and for a long while it seemed impossible. all the men of sense in mexico recognized that she had neither physical nor moral strength enough to continue the struggle, but the majority of the nation were not sensible. the old influences operated still. some could not forgive the outrages perpetrated by our volunteers; some wished so lucrative a war to continue; some dreaded the demoralizing effect of the millions coming from the united states, of which every politician and every military chief were sure to want as much as possible. incorrigible vanity still ignored failures and offered iridescent hopes. pride revolted against making terms while the invader's foot pressed the sacred earth of the fatherland, and against the inevitable surrender of territory. at least, said not a few, we must wait until we make ourselves look formidable, so as to command respect; and this meant indefinite postponement.[32.1] our army still appeared insignificant; many of our troops were deserting, and some of the generals hated one another. most of the people saw an american soldier or heard a word of english seldom, if at all. almost everything went on as before. the people confessed their sins to the same priests, answered for their misdemeanors in the same courts, bribed the same officials, paid taxes to the same embezzlers, and were bullied by the same policemen in the same uniform. evidently the americans dared not use their advantage. on the other hand they were eager for peace. doubtless they knew the war had few apologists in the united states, thought many, and realized that soon a change of administration would end it.[32.1] a large section of the puro party--a section which may be called for the present purpose eventualists--felt, even though santa anna's fall had removed one great objection to peace, that it was highly desirable to have the war continue until the old army should be virtually exterminated, or desired that at least we should hold the country until the military, clerical, political and social reforms desired by the puros could be effected and public tranquillity be ensured. a larger number than ever craved annexation to the united states as the only guaranty of order and prosperity; and still others dared not advocate peace, lest they should be charged with lacking patriotism or touching "foreign gold." besides, had not the government, since the fall of the capital, announced that all damages resulting from hostilities would have to be made good by the united states? that did not seem like throwing up the sponge.[32.1] in addition to these embarrassments many facts appeared to show that sensible, concerted action, even if generally desired, would be impossible. political organization seemed to be dissolving. news of riots and insurrections came on every wind. even the governor of méxico state was made a prisoner by malcontents. many believed with reason that, like the texas war, the present conflict had been used as a pretext for official extortion, and refused to pay taxes. the central government was regarded not infrequently as a common enemy. unruly, vicious, greedy men--especially the unpaid army officers--plotted incessantly. signs pointed to indian uprisings, which the presence of the americans encouraged. state decrees against an ignominious peace, and state governments that had not experienced the ills of invasion, barred the way of negotiation.[32.2] secessions looked highly probable. the coalition of lagos agitated constantly. the legally obliterated state of aguas calientes threatened to take up arms. zacatecas made trouble about internal affairs. the eventualists, or a large part of them, felt ready to smash the federal union into bits. the monarchists labored, not without success, to prove that a european king and european troops could save the nation. the santannistas hoped to make the prince of spoilers dictator. many of the puros felt ready to join them in order to regain a share of the power, and a dull, subterranean rumbling satisfied not a few that santa anna would soon be supreme. almonte, the implacable foe of peace, though now regarded by nearly every one as a cunning, selfish adventurer, seemed to many a useful tool; and his presidential hopes found strong support.[32.2] among the americans officers pessimism reigned. in point of time, wrote the commanding general, we may not be half through the war. bankhead could observe no sign of peace. "mexico is an ugly enemy. she will not fight--and will not treat," said webster. the venerable albert gallatin, scanning the horizon from his watchtower, discovered "hardly any hope" that peace would be concluded by polk's administration. with the capture of mexico city the real difficulties of the americans begin, thought _le correspondant_ of paris; and the london _times_ declared that we should have to drop the war or annex a country that would cost us more than its value. [peace negotiations reopened] the conditions threatened a long, expensive, demoralizing occupation of mexico, leading almost inevitably to either our absorbing millions of undesirable aliens or our becoming involved in a general state of irritation and hostility liable to end in a national outburst of hatred and fury against us. to avoid these deplorable alternatives polk thought of practically setting up a government with which to make peace. but such an organization--even if really feasible, which polk himself doubted--would have required protection for a length of time that no one could forecast, would very likely have ended in the same dilemma as undisguised occupation, and, if at all successful, might have given the world a pretext for saddling mexico's future upon us. how to escape from the predicament polk and his advisers discussed anxiously but without success.[32.3] president peña y peña, however, supported by his cabinet, by a group of true, honest patriots and by the moderado party in general, determined to end the war; and trist, who understood their sentiments, reopened the subject on the twentieth of october. within a fortnight he was informed that mexico desired peace, and would appoint commissioners in a few days. november 2 congress met. letters in favor of concluding the hostilities poured in upon the members and had their effect. the puro-santannista league attacked the government promptly on the ground of remissness in conducting the war, but a resolution calling upon the ministry to state what military steps it had taken failed by more than two to one. senator otero offered a motion, forbidding the authorities to consider the cession of any territory held without question by mexico before the war; but this was rejected, to the surprise of all, by a vote of 46 to 29. señor del rio then summoned the administration to state whether negotiations with trist had been resumed, and he also went down.[32.4] on the eleventh came the election of an interim president, and again the peace party triumphed. the opposition--which had found almonte too unpopular, especially among the santannistas--gave their votes to cumplido, on the basis of an understanding that santa anna should neither be reinstated nor be put on trial, but anaya was chosen by 42 against 31. about a week later the representatives of seven states met at querétaro by invitation of the government, and after a desultory but illuminating discussion of nearly ten days agreed, with the exception of san luis potosí, to support a movement for peace. even the war party felt the strength of the current.[32.5] some action in that sense looked almost sure; and, as a new congress was expected to assemble at the beginning of the year, the present members, partly in consequence of intrigues and partly from a fear of responsibility, slipped away in such numbers as to conclude the session, leaving the government a free field. the opposition then came to a head in an insurrection at querétaro. but anaya brought out artillery and some reliable troops, particularly 200 american deserters, and announced that he would not only fight in deadly earnest but make examples of the chief rebels. to the insurgents these ideas were novel and shocking, and they declined to play the game out. the road to peace then seemed to be open.[32.5] [trist recalled] but the marplot had been at work. finding he could not control scott's policy with reference to the armistice and probably wishing to undermine the general-in-chief, pillow had written to the president. exactly what he said cannot be stated, but probably he described the armistice as a gross blunder, and accused our peace commissioner of acting as a tool of scott for the injury of polk's friends--especially pillow; and on october 4 polk ordered the recall of trist. in his despatch buchanan intimated that our envoy's presence might encourage the mexicans to insist upon insulting terms, like those tendered by them on september 6, and--probably with a view to hardening our conditions--announced that mexico must sue for peace at washington. by the twenty-first came news that scott had entered the capital, and that trist had fallen short of obedience by intimating that possibly we might not insist upon the rio grande line. polk's feelings grew hot as he reflected, and on the twenty-fifth a special messenger set out with a reprimand and a repetition of the order to leave mexico. both despatches reached their destination on the same day, november 16.[32.6] on receiving them trist decided to inform the mexican authorities of his recall and go home at the first opportunity. indeed it seemed to him the best policy to return and lay before his government some of the information it lacked. but a special escort could not be spared, and, as no train was to go down until december 4, he could be deliberate. by thornton, therefore, who was temporarily in charge of the british legation and set out for querétaro the next day, he sent merely an informal notice of what had occurred, with a request that some proposal be sent on to polk. by the day thornton arrived (november 21) mexican peace commissioners had been appointed; and peña, minister of relations under the interim government, listened to his news with signs of emotion painful to witness. no mexican felt ready to sue for peace at washington, and polk's demand signified the failure and political ruin of the peace men.[32.7] peña took the ground that trist's proposal to reopen the negotiations bound his government, and implored the chargé to urge upon him the sincerity and the difficulties of the mexican authorities. he also begged thornton for an intimation, to be used against the war party, that england could not be counted upon for assistance; and the chargé complied promptly with both requests. fortified also by the action of congress and the sentiment of the governors, and believing that in view of mexico's present attitude the united states would shortly cancel its orders of recall, peña then officially notified trist that negotiators had been appointed.[32.7] our commissioner now found himself in a most extraordinary position. buchanan's letters of recall proved that peace was desired and the situation misunderstood by our executive, but these facts could not obliterate certain others. trist was not merely a private citizen but a discharged official under the frown of his government. dealings with peña could be described as traitorous. a warning against confidence in mexican pretences and a notice that harder terms would now be exacted by the united states had been served upon him; and what those terms would be he could only imagine. yet he fully believed in the sincerity of peña and his associates. thornton confirmed this opinion, and adjured him to improve the opportunity. no one on the ground could see any other way to peace. general scott favored negotiating and probably expressed the opinion to trist, as to mexicans, that, should he make a treaty, it would be accepted by the united states. but on him, nicholas p. trist alone, it depended to say whether two nations were to be miserable or happy, to keep on cutting at each other's throats or enjoy the blessings of peace; and on him it rested to assume, should he take humanity and patriotism for guides, a most arduous task at the gravest personal risk and with no substantial profit in view. at noon on december 4 he decided aright, and it was a truly noble act.[32.8] trist now had it intimated to the mexican commissioners, that if they were disposed to accept a boundary line traced up the rio grande to thirty-two degrees of latitude and thence west, he would meet them privately to make further arrangements. the outcome was a strong recommendation from the mexican commissioners, presented and urged by thornton, that peña consent. peña did so; but he pointed out that it would be necessary to defer action until the new senate should confirm the nomination of the commissioners. encouraged, however, by advices from thornton, trist revoked his official notice that polk had recalled him, and waited, with feelings that can be imagined, for the waters to move.[32.9] [the peace negotiations] the negotiations stood in fact at a graver crisis than he thought. news that leading whigs talked of settling with mexico on terms far easier than trist proposed caused hesitation at querétaro, and fresh hopes of english assistance had a still greater effect. but fortunately doyle arrived at this juncture to take charge of the british legation, and promptly directed thornton to state that nothing more than good offices could be expected of his government. the support of these british diplomats, one at the capital and the other at querétaro, proved most helpful; but then came polk's message, which encouraged the eventualists by saying that, should mexico continue the war, our protection might be given to any party able and willing to set up a republican government and make peace. trist grew more and more anxious, and on the day after christmas expressed his desire to proceed. in consequence of doyle's attitude all mexican scruples about the confirmation of the commissioners vanished. on january 1 their full "powers" reached the capital; and, beginning on the second, couto, cuevas and atristain met there secretly with trist almost every day. rincón, the other member of the board, did not serve.[32.9] trist was prepared to stimulate his colleagues with news that a sentiment in favor of pushing the war through without delay had now become pronounced in the united states. at the same time his letter of september 7 provided them with a most convenient position, for it maintained that all the districts now held by american troops were ours by right of conquest, and that by accepting our terms mexico, instead of selling lands and population, would recover a large amount of both. he gave them, too, an agreeable surprise by proposing substantially the same terms as during the armistice.[32.10] they for their part knew california and all of texas were lost; but their instructions were exacting, and they struggled for all conceivable advantages. foreign arbitration and a european guaranty of the boundary were promptly demanded, and were as promptly refused. it was proposed that on the signing of the treaty all american forces in the country should retire to within fifty leagues of the coast; but this and other unreasonable conditions met the same fate. anticipating sharp and captious criticism from opposing lawyers in congress, the mexicans devoted the most wearisome care to phraseology. cordiality prevailed, however. trist's good-will, self-sacrifice and courtesy received full recognition, and he seems to have been rather intimate with couto, the ablest of his colleagues. doyle and thornton, though always respecting the line of strict neutrality, assisted materially in removing difficulties.[32.10] trist felt intensely anxious to save time, and for good reasons. orders might arrive any day--and eventually did arrive--making it absolutely impossible for him to act as an american representative. scott was placed by his orders under a military obligation to drive the government from querétaro, and though he granted a _de facto_ truce, thinly disguised by occupying a few places and intimating a desire for new instructions, a positive despatch might at any hour end that state of things.[32.11] yet day after day passed. the mexican government and commissioners felt obliged to stick at everything and to confer often by letter. january 8 anaya's term expired by limitation; and, as congress had not assembled, his predecessor became once more the provisional executive. four days later an abortive insurrection at san luis potosí frightened the timid peña nearly out of his wits, for it seemed like the prologue of a revolution, and he demanded that before signing a treaty he should have sufficient american funds to provide adequate support against malcontents; but at length his commissioners, insisting that such a proposal would be indecorous, eliminated this difficulty. finally the government stopped short at the financial consideration. it asked for thirty millions, and our commissioner, in view of the expenses already caused by the protraction of the war, would give but fifteen. on the twenty-ninth of january, therefore, trist, in very considerate but very positive language, officially declared the negotiation ended.[32.11] [a treaty signed] by arrangement, however, doyle informed the mexican commissioners that enough time to communicate once more with querétaro would be given. through the same channel they received a hint from scott, that he would protect the authorities against the dreaded revolution, should a treaty be signed, but would otherwise have to dislodge the government, and thenceforth hunt it like a deer on the mountain. doyle talked with british directness and good sense. the commissioners brought all this pressure to bear on their government. it yielded; and, on the second of february, at the suburb of guadalupe hidalgo, seat of the most venerated shrine in mexico, in the profound secrecy that had shrouded all these negotiations, the treaty was at last signed.[32.12] by its terms mexico appeared to sacrifice, independently of texas, an immense area; but she really suffered little, for she had no grip--and deserved to have none--upon california and new mexico. indeed she had found those distant regions merely embarrassing. nor did she really cede any territory. as trist contended and our supreme court has in effect decided, the only cession was that made by the united states in surrendering districts then in our hands. our real title was conquest--conquest from those who had taken the country by conquest from its conquerors. what mexico granted us was peace and an acknowledgement of our title. in return we gave her not only peace, which meant vastly more to mexico than to us, but extensive lands, the renunciation of all american claims antedating the treaty, and fifteen million dollars in money--a wealth of gold that her treasury had never seen before. on both sides the treaty conferred benefits; on our part it was magnanimous; and to settle the matter in this way gave the united states a feeling of satisfaction worth all it cost.[32.13] [illustration: territory acquired from mexico] the wish of the mexican government had been to open the peace negotiations by making an armistice. to the americans this could offer little advantage, for the only enemies they now had to fear were guerillas, and these recognized no laws. to peña, on the other hand, it meant security from hostile expeditions, larger revenues, diminished expenses, congressional elections in the territory under american control, and hence the political support of those who felt the burdens of war. but scott, while ready to grant a virtual immunity from attack during the negotiations, was neither authorized nor willing to sign an armistice at that stage; and to have done so, indicating that peace was contemplated, would have endangered the plans of the mexican government itself. in order, however, to bring about the execution of the treaty our commissioner had to demand of scott a pledge that he would send out no more expeditions until new instructions, issued after the arrival of the treaty at washington, should reach him. in short, he requested the general to disregard the orders of a government eager to put him in the wrong; and scott, placing the public weal above all personal considerations, promptly consented.[32.14] the second article of the treaty provided expressly for a suspension of hostilities, and in view of its previous anxiety to obtain that concession, the mexican government was expected to act in the matter at once; but it procrastinated so much as to excite suspicions of bad faith at the american headquarters. this conduct, however, was merely owing to its constitutional apathy; and on the twenty-second of february, 1848, generals mora and quijano opened negotiations with worth and smith at the capital. true to the mexican practice, followed on almost every occasion since the first of our dealings with mexico, they began with what doyle fairly characterized as "exorbitant" demands. for example, they asked for the evacuation of the capital, puebla, jalapa and vera cruz, and for concessions incompatible with the treaty of peace itself.[32.14] but worth and smith, assuming promptly a just and firm attitude, as our civil officials ought to have done from the beginning, refused to consider such demands, and the mexicans then withdrew them. everything within reason, however, was granted. doyle called the armistice, indeed, "very favourable" to the weaker side, and the ratification of it on march 4 and 5 by the mexican and american commanders-in-chief supplemented happily the treaty of peace. not only that, but it stopped for the time being every attempt at revolt, for under one of the articles insurgents were to be opposed by the armies of both nations. paredes and almonte found it wise to be quiet, and--as we have observed--santa anna sailed away.[32.14] [american ideas about mexico] the treaty, conveyed with extraordinary speed, reached the white house on february the nineteenth, but whether it did well to arrive so soon--or even to arrive at all--appeared extremely doubtful. as we have learned, a strong appetite for territory had existed in the united states before the war, and mexico had looked inviting. in january, 1846, baker of illinois suggested in congress the absorption of that country. by the following july a somewhat organized annexation party existed at new york, and later senator dickinson became its champion. the wish to acquire soon became strong. perhaps moses y. beach visited mexico in this cause. certainly mrs. storms, who accompanied him, worked actively for it, and his paper ardently recommended annexation as not only advantageous for the united states but sure to benefit mexico.[32.15] other papers warmly took up this idea, arguing that providence called upon us to regenerate her decadent population. "the spanish have ceased to rule in mexico," announced the _democratic review_ as its watchword in february, 1847. secessionists like simms of south carolina thought the proposed confederacy would need that country to give it bulk; and by a different route senator hannegan of indiana, representing the strong expansionist sentiment of the west, arrived at the same point of view in regard to annexing mexico.[32.15] the recall of trist, which seemed to give the united states a free hand, and also the plan to extend our occupation of her territory, which logically pointed that way, strongly promoted the idea, for besides the obvious tendency of these measures they were supposed to mean that polk had that end in view. the attitude of men high in the administration circle produced a similar effect. bancroft held that we should "rescue a large part of mexico from anarchy." cass used language that suggested rescuing the whole, and followers of his talked that way explicitly. apparently he thought he could win the next presidential election on this issue; and the war party at his back offered mexico as a reward for supporting its views. buchanan, at first opposed to the acquisition of any territory, trimmed his sails to the rising breeze, and wrote that if mexico did not conclude the war, it would be necessary for us to "fulfill the destiny" assigned to us by providence. walker, who knew more about the far southwest than any other man at washington, favored annexation strongly, and even tried to drag the subject into his annual report. indeed, the financial editor of the new york _herald_ saw in him the regenerator of mexico; and very likely he himself, as head of the treasury, dreamed of winning immense economic triumphs in that field.[32.16] soon after 1848 came in, the annexation cause began to put on a bold front. naturally the younger element in the party and the country felt inclined to take it up. crocodile tears were shed over the "poor foundling"--though a future heiress--placed by divine providence at our threshold. the danger that england or france might ravish it away from us came to the fore. conquest was pronounced in the senate a legitimate method of expansion. orators in both houses pointed more plainly toward an extension at the cost of mexico. declarations in the contrary sense indicated the force of the current. senator niles believed that substantially all of the democrats among his colleagues would fall in with the plan. enthusiastic citizens acclaimed it. speculators fancied it would help their schemes in various ways. capitalists believed that by stimulating enterprise it would enlarge and continue the demand for money. manufacturers and high tariff men argued that it would increase the national expenses and therefore the duties. army officers could see a wide field for them; and the opponents of slavery, led by the _national era_, felt that mexican plantations would draw away the negroes--now understood to be unprofitable--of kentucky, tennessee and virginia. public meetings became excited on the subject. the country is going mad for mexico, inferred buchanan; and walker believed that only a systematic newspaper agitation was needed to ensure success.[32.17] [the question before polk] polk moved in the same direction. in september, 1847, he concluded that, should the war continue, he might demand tamaulipas and the line of thirty-one degrees, and reduce the compensation to fifteen millions; and before the end of january, 1848, he felt inclined to throw aside entirely the terms offered through trist. besides, he loathed the treaty on account of the man who made it and the man who gave assistance. after his recall, considering himself a private citizen, trist reported with a free hand, criticising the president's recent message as encouraging the eventualists, and expressing his opinions on the business without much reserve. naturally polk the mediocre, guided by pillow the cunning, totally misconceived the spirit of trist and scott. in his eyes they had contrived a wicked political "conspiracy" against him, his administration, his party and his pillow. both had proved "utterly unworthy," and on january 25 the "arrogant, impudent" and "very base" trist was ordered to leave headquarters. to accept, approve, endorse, recommend and support the work of such a scoundrel seemed impossible.[32.18] but polk had professed to be considerate and forbearing toward our erring sister, and to seek only redress, indemnity, security and peace. his terms had been officially stated; and while his message of december, 1847, had suggested that a continuance of the war might be expected to modify them, no real fighting had occurred since then, and--although polk had known for about six weeks that negotiations on virtually the old basis were afoot--no modification of them had been announced. that message had expressly disclaimed all thought of making "a permanent conquest" of mexico; and on the fourth of this very february sevier, chairman of the committee on foreign relations, had stated in the senate that polk was anxious for peace, desired only indemnity, and wanted to preserve mexican nationality.[32.19] trist had substantially embodied polk's terms in the treaty, and had even anticipated his thought of reducing the compensation. congress had voted men and money on the basis of polk's professions and terms; and, should he now raise his demands, all his enemies would say their charges of greed, falsehood, injustice, o'ervaulting ambition and bloodthirsty wickedness had been proved. hostilities might continue, the whigs might carry the election, the war might end in disaster and ignominy, and all the gains now embodied in the treaty might be lost. even should these perils be avoided, it seemed extremely doubtful whether mexico would ever accept by treaty a more encroaching boundary, and quite possible that an endeavor to obtain it would open a long vista of expenses, guerilla warfare, foreign complications and heaven only knew what. extension toward the south was liable to kindle the fires of an anti-slavery agitation and perhaps disrupt the union. the treaty and the victories that it consummated meant enough glory for any president. finally, polk, now moving about with dragging steps, dry, brown face, gray hair and sunken eyes, perhaps felt weary of battling both abroad and at home; and at the very least, should he endorse this paper and lay it before the senate, his responsibility would cease.[32.19] buchanan and walker opposed the treaty; but the former, as well as polk himself, recognized that any personal misconduct of trist, a mere agent of the executive, had no proper bearing on the question. the rest of the secretaries favored placing the document before the senate. on february 22, after full debates in the cabinet, polk did this, recommending by implication the acceptance of it; and so a paper which had been simply a memorandum drawn up by a private american citizen and several mexicans holding official positions, became a real treaty, merely awaiting confirmation.[32.20] among the senators the treaty met with jeers and scowls. "great jehovah!" exclaimed lieutenant w. t. sherman on learning its terms; it is "just such a one as mexico would have imposed on us had she been the conqueror"; and so thought a number of the senators. it is a mere piece of waste paper, cried many; the impudent, perhaps traitorous, work of a discredited agent, whom the president had ordered out of mexico; and it would be undignified, ridiculous, degrading, to accept such a thing. the war party opposed it. the annexationists opposed it. the no-territory men opposed it. the little unionists, who thought the country too big already, opposed it. not a few hated to think of letting polk elude them so easily.[32.21] but suddenly the head of john quincy adams, as he sat in the house, dropped. he was borne to the speaker's room. "this is the last of earth; i am content," murmured the venerable statesman. for two days he lingered, unconscious; and then he passed away. this tragic event had a deep effect. there fell a hush, as when snow descends upon the city pavement. the sessions of congress were suspended. senators were prevented from announcing their positions hastily. and when discussion began once more, it was resumed with a new feeling of seriousness, a new sense of responsibility.[32.21] [the treaty before the senate] if the president could put up with trist and his work, surely the senate could, one began to think; and in every way polk's virtual endorsement gave the paper enough respectability. politics played a leading rôle in almost every mind, but after a little it seemed like bad strategy to vote against the glory and the territory ensured by its terms. the committee on foreign relations, which decided to throw the treaty aside and send an "imposing" commission to do the work over, dropped the scheme when polk told them bluntly this would be "worse than an idle ceremony." benton, thoroughly angry at the administration because frémont, his son-in-law, had been condemned for insubordination in california; berrien, wedded to his "no-territory" idea; corwin, anxious perhaps to have more americans find hospitable graves in mexico; webster, who asserted that california and new mexico were "not worth a dollar"; and certain other senators, committed for this or that reason, were beyond argument; but all their hopes failed.[32.22] the deep current set against them. "what better can we do?" became an unanswerable argument for the treaty. the people wanted peace. they desired no more bloodshed, no more costs. one could not be sure of obtaining another treaty from chaotic mexico, or sure that any treaty differing from the present one could have as good a chance in the american senate. to reject the work of trist was understood more and more clearly to involve, perhaps, not only interminable fighting, but a train of moral, political, industrial, commercial and financial ills of which no one could see the end. already enough generals had built up reputations, thought many of the politicians. it would be of priceless advantage, urged some of the finer men, to supplement our military triumphs with a great act of magnanimity. by march 7 ratification, which had been for a time extremely doubtful, appeared probable. houston of texas, a leading opponent, concluded to visit new hampshire. and on the tenth by 38 against 14--a narrow margin, since a majority of two-thirds was requisite--the treaty won. a transfer of four votes from the affirmative to the negative would have defeated it.[32.22] there were a few amendments. article x, which might have revived extinct mexican claims to lands in texas now occupied by _bona fide_ settlers, went overboard at once. the provision of security for the roman catholic church in the acquired territory (art. ix) fell out as unnecessary, as reflecting on the good faith of the united states, as suggesting government interference with religious affairs in this country, and as tending to confirm the mexican pretence that we entertained hostile feelings toward that communion. the senate refused to agree that california and new mexico should be made into states "as soon as possible" (art. ix), regarding that as a step to be taken with deliberation, and only when, in the judgment of congress, all the prerequisites of statehood should exist. instead of allowing mexico to choose between payment by instalments and payment in securities convertible at once into cash (art. xii) it was decided to offer only the former method, as a veiled hint that an infraction of the treaty would cause a suspension of the instalments. another amendment permitted the indians to have firearms, which, as they lived by the chase, had to be done. a further modification, intended to hasten the conclusion of peace, authorized the exchange of ratifications at querétaro whenever mexico should accept the amended treaty; and it was also provided by the senate that evacuation could then begin. finally a secret article, which permitted mexico to consummate the ratification of the agreement at any time within eight months, instead of the four months of article xxiii, was cancelled, because it seemed to encourage procrastination, and allow her time to escape from the treaty, while compelling us to bear great expenses. but none of these changes touched the essentials.[32.23] [the treaty in mexico] it now became necessary to have some one explain the amended treaty to mexico, bring about her acceptance of it, and, should it be confirmed, exchange the ratifications. this gave polk a chance to prove himself a large man. scott, though not without serious grounds of offence against hitchcock, harney and quitman, had forgiven and honored them, because they deserved well of the country. trist, the bringer of peace, the negotiator of its terms, high in the favor of the mexican government, and able to exert much influence on the mexican congress, deserved the appointment. if the treaty represented a great national service and had merit enough to be accepted, its maker had merit enough to be recognized. but the president was only polk the mediocre after all. his plumage had been ruffled; and instead of giving trist this high and lucrative post, he relegated the peacemaker to a dishonorable oblivion, and would not even pay him for the time actually spent in the negotiations. to think that a president of the united states could be so small![32.24] aside from this petty meanness and spite, however, polk selected a man worthy, both personally and officially, of the position. this was sevier, chairman of the senate committee of foreign relations and leading champion of the treaty in that body. then, as sevier became suddenly though temporarily ill and no delay could be risked, clifford, the attorney general, was appointed associate commissioner with equal powers; and eventually the two--both arriving at mexico by the fifteenth of april--acted in concert.[32.24] mexico now became the scene of action again. february 6 the government announced what had been done about peace. knowing how loud an outcry had been raised against even considering a treaty, one can imagine what occurred, now that a treaty had been made. the old objections were reiterated. trist's lack of authority was dwelt upon. secret, despotic, illegal, treasonable, shameful, ruinous, were a few of the everyday epithets that bombarded the government. it had no power to alienate mexican territory. it should have waited for the american friends of peace to act. even "the sepulchral comfort" of temporary subjugation was described as preferable to such a peace. "approval of the treaty," exclaimed rejón, "is the political death of the republic." another insurrection broke out at san luis potosí, and all the comandantes general were notified to expect revolts.[32.25] the peace men, however, stood firm. honor has been saved, they insisted. the united states has recognized mexico as an independent nation. there has been no suing for terms at washington. territory has been regained, not sold. to speak properly, indeed, this is a "treaty of restitution"; fifteen millions are to be paid for injuries done us; the territory acquired by the united states costs her more dearly than louisiana; and full rights have been secured for all mexicans adopted by another government. whatever harshness can be found in the conditions is due to the circumstances, not the government. war has no respect for justice. besides, in case of need a nation, like an individual, may find amputation expedient, and be the stronger for it. above all, the administration has merely done its duty in treating according to its best judgment. it has determined nothing, settled nothing. the facts of the case will be laid before congress, and the representatives of the people shall decide.[32.25] here, then, came the real crisis: would congress ratify the treaty? at washington, in spite of some encouraging reports, the impression gained ground that it would not. the amendments appeared to cause little excitement, but they were not the real issues. opponents of peace had the speeches of american statesmen printed, and hawked them about the streets. prudent mexicans demanded an end of the uncertainty, disorder and chaos that was paralyzing the country; but so had they always demanded it. the government exhibited little activity, while the puros and the friends of santa anna did not sleep. the especially important elections in the occupied territory did not end until april 23, and by that date one could see that something else was to be feared even more than opposition. as on every other occasion demanding a patriotic stand, most of the decent men felt afraid to assume responsibility. another difficulty was that money for their travelling expenses had customarily been advanced to the members by the government, and now it had no money for the purpose. finally, however, said an american who did not precisely understand the affair, merchants at the capital subscribed a large sum to hunt up the congress and feed it long enough to ratify the treaty; severer measures also were taken to ensure attendance; and early in may a quorum of shaking legislators convened.[32.26] in opening congress peña stated the grand question ably. honor, union, independence and the hope of national prosperity and felicity have been saved, he pointed out; the united states made the proposals, and mexico has obtained all the advantages possible under the circumstances; we have given up some territory, but the foremost nations of the world have done the same at one time or another; every one sees that we should have adjusted our difficulties in 1845, but it is now possible once more to settle them, and the opportunity to do so should not again be lost. the ministers of war and finance presented statements proving the impossibility of continuing the war successfully, and the peace commissioners justified the terms of the treaty. the prospect of recovering the mexican customhouses and receiving the american millions looked highly attractive. no less telling, doubtless, were the preparations of the united states to resume hostilities with fresh energy, and to tax mexico rigorously. the most efficient american army that had yet been seen in the country awaited butler's orders, and large reinforcements had been voted by congress. no responsible men in their senses could resist such arguments. the treaty, as amended by the american senate, was promptly ratified, and by june 9 washington had the news. with all speed it ran from city to city, from town to town, from vale to vale; and everywhere it was greeted with quiet but heartfelt rejoicings.[32.27] by an arrangement already made, sevier and clifford, after learning what had been done by the mexican congress, proceeded to the seat of government. it was a tiresome journey of about 145 miles; but at last, from the summit of a high ridge, they saw domes and spires two miles or so distant, glittering on a low eminence in a fine valley, which was enclosed by parallel ranges of mountains. the town was querétaro; and on may the twenty-sixth, in the president's rather plain reception room, dignified with crimson curtains and with chairs of state, clifford presented their credentials.[32.28] [the treaty ratified by mexico] peña, tall and benign though sadly worn, rosa, the minister of relations, rather short and swarthy but with large, thoughtful eyes lighting up his countenance, and anaya, the minister of war, tall and gaunt, with high cheek bones and a face of indian stolidity, received them with all due courtesy. "sister republics, may the two countries ever maintain the most friendly relations," was the american greeting; and peña replied, "as the head of this nation, i desire nothing more ardently than that our treaty may prove the immutable basis of that constant harmony and good understanding which should prevail sincerely between the two republics." conversations and formalities ensued, and on may 30 an exchange of the ratifications concluded this momentous business.[32.28] in the execution of the treaty a few misunderstandings arose, but none of serious importance; and the minister of relations attested the good faith of the united states.[32.29] orders for the evacuation of mexican territory were promptly given to our commanders in the various fields of operation, and were promptly obeyed.[32.30] even before the last formalities occurred, in fact, butler called in his outposts, and as the sun rose on the twelfth of june it shone upon the arms of his rejoicing troops, drawn up--facing the palace--in the grand plaza of the capital. housetops, balconies and the near streets were full, but perfect order and stillness prevailed except for the sharp commands of our officers. thirty guns saluted the american banner on the palace, and then it was lowered. the mexican flag took its place on the staff and received the same honors. an american band struck up gaily. the unconquered ranks wheeled, marched and left the city. herrera, the new president, returned to the chair from which paredes had ejected him, and the proud capital rejoiced to be free once more. but it rejoiced soberly. "i question," said u. s. grant, "whether the great majority of the mexican people did not regret our departure as much as they had regretted our coming."[32.31] the plan of evacuation was to let the troops wait near jalapa until transports could be provided and their baggage go aboard, and then march to the unhealthy coast and sail away as quickly as possible. for some time general smith had now been making preparations at vera cruz with his characteristic efficiency; and soon the army, the sick, the wounded and the many who attended to their needs, took ship rapidly for new orleans. by the twelfth of july more than 25,000 embarked, and on the last day of the month all the fortifications of vera cruz and frowning ulúa, the symbol of mexican pride, were given up. stirred by feelings deep and strong, the departing soldiers looked round them with a farewell gaze--at the low white walls, at the exotic vegetation that had now come to be familiar, and at the gleaming, snowy peak of orizaba, towering above its belt of dark evergreens. they had trodden the soil of that wonderful country with the stern, proud foot of the conqueror, but they now left it full of sympathy and good wishes; and one of the number put his feelings into terse and soldierlike rhymes: "the stranger parting from the shore, thy glories to behold no more, bids thee farewell with swelling heart as his swift bark leaps o'er the sea, and, as the truant tear-drops start, prays god that thou mayst yet be free."[32.32] xxxiii the finances of the war 1846-1848 mexico, as we have learned, entered upon the contest with neither money nor revenues nor credit. from nothing, nothing comes; and many supposed she was too poor to fight. but she did fight--or at least men fought in her name--and one cannot help asking how they contrived to do so. in full the question cannot be answered, but some of the facts lie within our view, and these are not only valuable in themselves but highly suggestive.[33.1] aside from loans, the income of the government in 1844 was figured roughly as follows: import duties, seven million dollars; duties on commerce in the interior, four and a quarter millions; profits from the monopolies of the mints, tobacco, stamped paper, playing cards, national lottery, post-office, etc., two and a quarter millions; miscellaneous taxes and revenues, three millions; total, sixteen and a half millions net. but the american blockade cut off nearly fifty per cent of this income at one stroke; and not only our progressive occupation of territory, but the dislike of the people for national taxes, their growing dissatisfaction with santa anna's régime, and their increasing destitution caused a rapid shrinkage of the residue.[33.2] it was proposed to contrive a general plan of taxation for the emergency; but probably the interests principally threatened put a stop to it, and at all events it mysteriously disappeared. the government was given ample authority, but could do nothing. a war tax was laid on house-rents, for example; but it could not be collected everywhere, and probably its net proceeds amounted to little. in november, 1846, it was decided to issue drafts for two millions, to be accepted by the clergy and then purchased by designated citizens; but the scheme, though actually decreed, proved a failure, and the famous laws of january 11 and february 4, 1847, were no more successful. june 17, 1847, a special tax of one million was assessed upon the entire population; but only a small fraction of this appears to have been paid. in november, 1847, the government offered to deduct one half of the pending national taxes levied before may 1, 1846, if citizens would pay them by february 1, 1848; and this indicates clearly how the people had been acting. a few of the states, besides maintaining national guards, erecting fortifications and manufacturing cannon, remitted some cash to the central government; but when we find the richest of them all, mexico, boasting that she had sent the insignificant sum of about $160,000, we have reason to place a rather slight value upon this kind of assistance. moreover, accepted drafts on that state, payable in one, two and three months, could not be sold--even at a discount.[33.3] the clergy gave nominally a million and a half, but they appear to have taken up indirectly, at a discount of forty per cent, the drafts of which this donation consisted. citizens provided a large part of the new ordnance, but aside from this we hear of few substantial gifts. just after the battle of molino del rey, in order to obtain bread for the army, the government requested the bakers of the capital to meet, but only a part of them came. a "positive supreme order" then brought them together, and they promised contributions; yet the promises were not kept.[33.4] every possible effort was made to borrow. once the treasury offered a national loan of two and a half millions, but it fell flat in the states that might have paid the most. just before the battle of cerro gordo there was a door-to-door canvass at mexico; but only small sums can have been picked up. about three months later the government imposed a forced loan, of which more than $280,000 were assigned to the capital; but the mexicans had learned to evade such extortions, and it proved hard to collect the allotted amounts. in july, 1847, the british consul general, mackintosh, loaned $600,000 in exchange for the ratification of an arrangement negotiated with the british bondholders. in four loans the clergy furnished some three millions, all told. the president raised money, it was reported, on public and private securities, sold bonds freely at very low rates, and borrowed in effect by giving contracts on terms favorable enough to make the transactions worth while as gambling propositions. the principal mint, for example, was turned over to the british consul general for a period of ten years in february, 1847, in exchange for some $200,000 in cash and a promise to pay one per cent on the amount coined; and on similar principles arms and other necessaries were sometimes obtained.[33.4] all of these financial operations were at least ostensibly lawful, but santa anna did not pause here. wherever money could be found, he seems to have taken it, holding that the exigency outweighed all rights and all pledges. funds belonging to the tobacco revenue were illegally seized, for instance; and a large sum due the academy of fine arts fell into this voracious maw. not only cash but everything needed for the army went the same way. at jalapa early in april, 1847, for example, all the owners of horses received orders to bring them in. grain, forage, lead, lumber, arms, ammunition, tools, cattle, mules and laborers were taken by force; and sometimes military officers exhibited the burglar's predilection for a midnight hour. here was a kind of finance that saved the expenses of accounting, and without it even the low cost of the mexican soldier would not explain santa anna's holding out so long.[33.5] [the american financial outlook] the united states, happily, stood far above this level, but not so far that probably mere good luck did not save us from grave trouble; and it was easy to foresee many dangers--all the worse because they naturally made capital timid--when the hostilities began. the total receipts of the treasury for the fiscal year ending with june 30, 1845, were nearly thirty millions and the ordinary expenditures $22,935,828. it was estimated that during the next year the receipts would fall about three millions, and walker--allowing the munificent amounts of something more than two and a half millions for the army and something less than five for the navy--expected to reduce the total disbursements a little, anticipating for the period ending with june, 1847, a further saving of more than four millions. the receipts for july-september, 1845, proved to be more than two millions below those of the corresponding months of 1844, and the customs income for the fiscal year 1845-46 was $815,445 less than for the preceding twelve-month. in a word, shrinking revenues and curtailed outlays were the prospect.[33.6] in this condition of things, not only had the unpredictable costs and embarrassments of war to be faced, but those of war in a distant land. money was to be sent out of the country, never to return, and the bills for supplies to be increased by the burdens of marine transportation, insurance and losses; while risks from privateers and european complication could be seen. before such an outlook business men shrank from large enterprises. people with money felt disposed to keep it.[33.7] where, then, were funds to come from? the currency had been inflated by the paper issues of many banks. stocks were selling far below the prices of twelve months before. even the business men who did not endorse the tariff of 1842 had adjusted their affairs to it, and now everybody understood that a new scale of duties, based upon free-trade ideas, lay on the treasury anvil. calls for the government funds held and used by state depositories and for the specie of all the banks were feared. the banks cannot support a loan, and even in peace our capitalists have never done so, remarked the financial editor of the new york _herald_, probably the best newspaper authority.[33.7] the government must look abroad, concluded the editor, and in europe no light could be seen. by 1842 our state debts, mostly held there, had amounted to nearly $200,000,000. mississippi, michigan, arkansas and florida sank in the mire of repudiation. pennsylvania, maryland, indiana, illinois and louisiana became delinquent. the bonds of south carolina fell below par. missouri passed a stay law. sidney smith, when he met a pennsylvanian at dinner, felt like dividing the man's raiment among the british guests, most of whom, if not all, had probably suffered by the "dishonor" of the state. indeed, the bondholders were disposed to throw off half of the interest rate, if our national treasury would assume the debts; but a proposition to do this failed in congress.[33.8] as early as 1841 even our six per cent national bonds would not sell in europe, though money commanded less than half as large a return there. "who will lend on american securities?" asked the london _spectator_ the very month we began war upon mexico. our credit then grew worse instead of better. the war bill precipitated a panic in wall street, and soon business in the west and south was described as prostrate. bad as such a financial outlook was in itself, too, it involved a consequent ill. evidently the administration would have to pinch; and, as madame de sévigné once remarked, "there is nothing so expensive as want of money."[33.8] the democrats, however, were committed against the protective tariff of 1842, now in force, and polk as a party man felt that something must be done about it. walker no doubt shared this opinion; and, having gained immense prestige in the south by his brilliant advocacy of the annexation of texas, he very likely hoped that by now carrying into effect the fiscal ideas prevalent in that section, he might supplant calhoun. probably, too, he sincerely believed in these ideas. to him the existing scale of duties appeared to be the cause of the shrinking revenues; and he stated boldly that war, which had been recognized for some time as a possibility, "would create an increased necessity for reducing our present high duties in order to obtain sufficient revenue to meet increased expenditures."[33.9] [new fiscal laws] soon after hostilities began, therefore, a tariff bill came before congress. it was bitterly and stubbornly fought. in the senate its defeat appeared sure; but crittenden and clayton, believing it could only prove a discreditable failure, had a whig support it in order to gain party advantage at the expense of the nation, and by this unworthy trick and the casting vote of the presiding officer it passed. in company with it went a warehouse bill and the restoration of the sub-treasury system, which divorced the government from the banks, and required the treasury to accept and pay out only specie. about the first of august, 1846, this entire system became law. "our administration seems enamoured of ruin, and woos calamity for itself," exclaimed the whig _north american_; our credit is threatened by the sub-treasury plan; our industries are deprived of protection; "while an expensive war is eating out our vitals, our revenue is to be diminished"; and a direct tax will have to be laid.[33.9] the new tariff became effective on the first of december, 1846. as of course importers waited for it, a lean period preceded that event, and the heavy receipts that followed it, providing walker with an apt retort, did not prevent the total for the year ending with june, 1847, from coming short of his estimate by more than four millions. without waiting to acquire this unwelcome fact, however, the government found itself compelled in june, 1846, to revise at a sharp angle upward its predictions of the expenditures. over and above their calculations of the previous december the war and navy departments now called for $23,952,904, which polk informed congress was "the largest amount which any state of the service" would require up to july 1, 1847. the secretary of the treasury had expected to find on july 1, 1847, a surplus (virtually that estimated for the previous year minus half a million) of at least $4,332,441, and had confidently hoped for a substantial gain in revenue; but he admitted that it was now requisite, since a working capital of four millions for the treasury and the mints had to be kept on hand, to provide $12,586,406 of additional income.[33.10] the proper method of handling our war finances was, in the first place, to increase the existing taxes--not only to obtain funds promptly, but as a firm support for the nation's credit and a basis for those temporary loans which are a wise expedient at the beginning of a war; and walker expected the proposed tariff to answer this purpose. but the question how to raise these twelve and a half millions remained. excise and direct taxes, the administration believed, would not be prompt enough, and would not seem to the public warranted by the circumstances. it was therefore recommended to congress that both treasury notes and a loan should be resorted to; and on july 22, 1846, without much debate, the issue of ten millions in such obligations, to be sold at not less than par, was authorized.[33.11] treasury notes could not really serve the government's purpose well, for they were soon to be paid, the expense of handling them fell upon the treasury, and, as they were receivable for duties, they were sure to pour into the customhouses instead of real money whenever they should be cheaper than specie. the treasury, bound by law to pay out only the latter, would then have to buy coin at the market price--presumably, as gallatin said, with depreciated notes. these would then fall still more, and so the process appeared certain to continue. [bonds issued] but notes were the most convenient and readiest, if not the only way of quickly anticipating revenue; they were particularly suited to the nature of the government's expenditures; they provided an easy method of transmitting the large sums that would be needed in the south on the war account; and financial critics at new york approved of them. not all were of that opinion, however. about the middle of september the appearance of notes for half a million was announced by one journal under the heading, "extensive paper money manufactory"; but the government persisted, and by the ninth of december, 1846, nearly four millions of them were out. this with the balance--more than nine millions--handed over by the previous fiscal year, made up for the lean customs receipts of this period.[33.12] meanwhile attention was given to the more substantial resource of a loan. at the end of september the secretary of the treasury disappeared mysteriously from his accustomed haunts, and to polk's acute distress of mind wandered for more than two weeks in the perilous jungle of wall street. his experiences there were in fact rather hard. the capitalists looked with favor on the project of a loan and had plenty of money, but--believing the government would require a large amount, and therefore that a loan made now would be likely to depreciate, as well as actuated by their characteristic spirit of thrift--they stood out for six per cent. the new york and boston banks, it was thought at the white house, were in league against the administration. besides, the public had little information about the way money was being spent, and felt apprehensive of extravagance and a huge debt. many believed the war had cost half a million each day. not a few distrusted walker. he had engineered mississippi into bankruptcy, and had become insolvent personally. in the senate his reputation had been that of a needy adventurer, intensely ambitious, clever in debate and intrigue, but not of solid ability, and especially not a financier. at present nobody denied his real talents or his extreme devotion to work, but he was charged with inaccuracy and with sophistical reasoning.[33.13] apparently five and two fifths per cent was all he felt ready to offer, and special reasons could be given for halting there, since it was feared that issuing a six per cent loan at par would injure the united states sixes, now held at 106, and also the credit of the government. but finally, with the approval of the president and the cabinet, he advertised, october 30, for bids on a five million loan for ten years at six per cent. november 12 the tenders were opened. for a small fraction of the amount a slight premium was offered, and for the rest par. no doubt the rate, in comparison with european standards, had to be regarded as high, but on the other hand this was our first specie loan, and was said to be the only war loan ever taken without a discount.[33.13] plainly, however, more needed to be done. it was already extraordinarily difficult to pay the comparatively small expenses of the war, wrote the british minister at this time. congress had not fully provided for even the minimum needs recognized by the sanguine, if not sophistical, walker; and early in december, 1846, his annual report intimated that on july 1, 1848, with a due allowance for the working capital of the treasury, there would be a deficit of twenty-three millions. apparently a loan was requisite, and he advised making the term twenty years. then, with no little anxiety, the administration waited. at the end of december bancroft wrote privately, "if we can raise the ways and means," we can surmount the other difficulties. on the eleventh of january, 1847, a bill virtually embodying walker's recommendations was thrown into the house, and a long, acrimonious debate ensued. the treasury "languishes," announced the organ of the government; needed volunteers could not be called out; but the legislators had irrepressible things to say. at length, however, on january 28 the bill providing $23,000,000 became a law. though it primarily contemplated treasury notes, it permitted the executive liberty of action; and a large amount of six per cent bonds were sold.[33.14] but polk was by no means out of trouble now. walker's estimate made no mention of great outstanding purchases, for which the contractors had not yet sent in their accounts. not only the customs duties but the sales of public lands were coming far short of his expectations. no allowance appeared to be made for the effect of bounty land scrip that was likely to reduce them still more. the vera cruz expedition and a possible march to the enemy's capital were in view. indeed, the real war had only begun. besides, the temper of congress had already threatened trouble and made it. not only to ensure additional revenue in general, but in particular--it would seem--to strengthen the credit of the government by showing how the interest on its obligations would be taken care of, the secretary brought up again the suggestion of his annual report, that a duty of twenty-five per cent should be placed on tea and coffee, which--although the free list had been restricted in the tariff of 1846--had been left untaxed. in fact it had been intimated by him at new york, even if not actually promised, that such a step would be taken; and a few days before christmas, 1846, he notified the committee on ways and means that probably without this assistance a satisfactory loan could not be made. yet congress rejected the proposition by a great majority.[33.15] a plan of benton's also--to grade the public lands on the basis of their attractiveness, and reduce prices accordingly--which would have increased the income of the government, failed to pass, though endorsed by polk, walker and the general land commissioner. pessimists were happy. with polk, the war, the weather, the sub-treasuries "and perhaps the devil" to struggle against, wrote a correspondent of martin van buren, soon not an ingot would be "left standing," and there was "no calculating, no prophesying" what would become of the nation.[33.15] [a tariff for mexican ports] apparently to offset the failure of the tea and coffee tax, walker's active brain produced another scheme, designed not only to bring in revenue and reassure the capitalists, but also to please the shipping men of the united states and neutral countries. this was to open the mexican ports controlled by us, and permit merchandise to enter there under a moderate scale of duties. during march, 1847, assisted by senator benton and the attorney general, polk satisfied himself that under his powers as commander-in-chief he could impose and collect the duties as military contributions, for by the right of conquest he could either exclude commerce or admit it on his own terms, and contributions were legitimate under the laws of war. said vattel, "a nation [at war] on every opportunity lays its hands on the enemy's goods, appropriates them to itself, and thereby, besides weakening the adversary, strengthens itself, and at least in part, procures an indemnification, an equivalent, either for the very cause of the war, or for the expences and losses resulting from it"; and a low scale of duties was an extremely mild application of this principle.[33.16] moreover, it was quite as legitimate under our constitution also, though not expressly mentioned, as to blockade or bombard vera cruz, respecting which the organic law was equally silent. indeed, to have left the ports wide open or allowed the high mexican tariff to remain in force would, in addition to being harmful to us, have required as great an exercise of authority. finally, scott and some of our naval commanders, moved by the evident proprieties of the situation, fixed duties and used the proceeds at their discretion, and it was manifestly better to arrange the business in a uniform, well-considered manner.[33.16] it might have been expected that substantially either our own or the mexican tariff would be applied, but neither would have answered. mexican imports were very different from ours; specific, not _ad valorem_, duties had been customary there; and competent appraisers could not be found. on the other hand the unreasonable mexican duties, besides preventing commerce to a large extent, encouraged fraud and smuggling. in march, 1847, therefore, a special tariff was prepared by walker, lowering the mexican duties on imports more than one half, and substituting for all port dues and charges a uniform tax of one dollar per ton; and on march 31 polk ordered the system to be put in force. mexico retorted that goods paying the american duties--especially goods prohibited by her laws--would be confiscated, and this attitude caused some uneasiness in france; but it seemed fairly evident that the united states would protect neutrals accepting our policy, and not only the foreign merchants in mexico but the neutral governments felt highly pleased with our course.[33.17] the authorities at washington, however, did not rejoice as much. the real difficulty lay, not in landing merchandise at the ports, but in placing it before mexican customers, and comparatively few of the latter could be reached. persevering efforts were made to solve the problem on both coasts. sometimes, for reasons not fully understood, the mexican government issued licenses for the passage of goods to the interior, and for a consideration local authorities in the northeast did the same; but even these documents were not always valid against officials and military men whose "patriotism" had not been "sweetened." european merchants could see this difficulty. up to october 20, 1847, only one small cargo from that direction entered the harbor of vera cruz, and walker admitted privately that a very small part of the few imports was disposed of for consumption beyond the coast. in a word, this vaunted plan gave no substantial help on the problem of supporting the war.[33.18] [good fortune helps us] but by this time the good luck which has been supposed to keep an eye on the united states of america had intervened. in 1846 came the great irish famine. british provision laws were suspended. faced with starvation people cared little what they paid, if they could obtain food. our agricultural products, which had fallen heavily in market value since october 1, 1845, rose with astonishing buoyancy. western grain that had scarcely been worth transporting--frequently not worth it--became precious. a ship could earn thirty per cent of her cost in one round trip, yet hardly enough vessels could be found. so abrupt was the turn that a financial editor who had predicted on december 17, 1846, a speedy return to the distress of 1837, declared on january 30, 1847, "we are on the high road to an unprecedented prosperity." the abolition of the british corn laws ensured our farmers not only temporary relief but a permanent market. cotton, too, and even cotton goods were in active demand abroad; and a famine in germany gave us additional support.[33.19] every vessel from the other side brought more of the specie that had been expected to disappear from circulation here. between the first of january and the middle of july, 1847, approximately twenty-four millions came in, besides about five millions in the pockets of immigrants. everybody who did anything or had anything shared in the general increase of wealth. hoarding went out of fashion. all were spenders. in particular, a craze for dress demanded great quantities of european fabrics. the warehousing plan also stimulated importation. for the quarter ending with september, 1847, the customs duties amounted to more than eleven millions--almost half the total of the preceding year--and for the week ending with october 1 they were nearly double those of the corresponding week in 1846. in a word, gold rained upon us; the languishing treasury revived; and the credit of the government revived with it. later, in the autumn of 1847, to be sure, the financial downpour abated, but it had already done its work. the ship of state rode now beyond the bar.[33.19] yet polk still had to cope with difficulties. early in december, 1847, when congress assembled, he found it necessary to present large estimates and to admit that a deficit of nearly sixteen millions was to be expected by july 1, 1848; and there seemed to be little hope that congress would provide additional revenue. borrowing was inevitable, and walker's report of december 8 proposed a loan of $18,500,000. nothing was done, however. the banks of new york and boston endeavored to force upon the government a fiscal policy more acceptable to them, and a strong element in congress, of which more will be heard in the next chapter, not only entertained a similar desire, but seemed willing to impair the credit of the administration. at length, on the nineteenth of january, 1848, a bill was introduced, and after a further delay another long debate opened. "how is the loan bill getting on, sir?" inquired a newspaper correspondent of a representative of the people after it had been on the tapis for about a month. "oh, they are spouting away, spouting away, sir," was the careless reply. but on the last day of march a six per cent loan of $16,000,000 was authorized on substantially the same basis as the previous loans. the treaty of peace had been signed on february 2, and the new bonds brought a premium rising in some instances to $4.05 on a hundred.[33.20] [the mexicans taxed] in the same report (december, 1847) walker announced, though evidently a little chastened in spirit, that relief would soon come from mexico. what he chiefly counted upon at this time, however, was not customs duties. as early as the nineteenth of september, 1846, polk, justly offended by the enemy's disdainful treatment of our olive branch, decided that instead of endeavoring longer to conciliate the mexicans by paying liberally for supplies, we should bring them to terms by levying contributions or taking needed articles without compensation, and this course was promptly recommended to general taylor; but he replied, as we have seen, that such a policy was impracticable. shortly after the capture of vera cruz general scott received instructions of the same tenor, and he made a similar reply. early in the autumn of 1847, however, as mexico had again rejected the olive branch, this change of system was pressed upon scott with fresh urgency, and before long explicit orders to make all the revenues and resources of mexico available, as far as they could be, followed.[33.21] scott, however, knowing the laws of war and the wishes of his government, began operations without waiting for these later instructions. almost immediately after entering the capital he laid upon it an assessment of $150,000, and set on foot an examination into the general question of drawing revenues from the country, which eventually showed that nearly twenty-three millions a year could theoretically be collected, should we take possession of the whole territory. november 25, he directed that no rent should be paid for houses and quarters except so far as contracts existed. about three weeks later, notice was given that in the districts held by the americans all the taxes and dues previously paid to the mexican government would be required of the authorities for the support of our army; and at the end of december an assessment equal to four times the direct taxes paid in 1843 was laid upon the states. scott's action was of course taken by wool, now commanding in the northeast, as a pattern.[33.22] but again walker's hopes were disappointed. the most important of the monopolies, tobacco, had to be given up because the american product could not be excluded, and for administrative reasons the other monopolies also were surrendered. owing to the dangers of waste, corruption, extortion and resentment, the business of collecting taxes had to be entrusted to the state authorities, and they possessed wonderful dexterity in the arts of evasion. state assessments were actually made on méxico and vera cruz only. the owners of occupied buildings were in many cases friends, and could not well be deprived of their rents. contracts or agreements that stood in the way had to be respected. gold and silver were clandestinely exported. smuggling across the northern border could not be stopped. brigands exacted their toll. the time required for investigation and planning, and in certain instances for correspondence with our government, militated against prompt action. we strongly desired to settle with mexico and evacuate the country, and hence--especially after the peace negotiations began--it would not have been wise to run the risk of exasperating the nation for the sake of a few dollars. in short the net proceeds, including $106,928 turned in by naval officers, were only $3,935,676.[33.23] some of this money went directly to supply needs of the army and navy, but by far the greater part of those needs had to be met in other ways. during the first nine months of 1847, it was figured that the united states exported more than $12,000,000 in specie to mexico. many drafts on the principal american cities were sold there, and those on the quartermasters at new orleans, philadelphia, washington and new york amounted to nearly $8,000,000 before december, 1847. payments were also made in the united states on the certificates of officers acting in the field; and about the first of august, 1847, belmont, the new york agent of the rothschilds, arranged with our administration to place funds in the hands of any paymaster or quartermaster named by scott. in general the large financial operations made necessary by the transfers of money were skilfully, honestly and safely conducted. some $24,000,000 were distributed by the pay department through its thirty-five officers, for instance, and nothing was lost by accident, robbery, theft or capture.[33.24] [the cost of the war] the total money cost of the war on the american side has been given at very low and at very high amounts, and none of the estimates inspires much confidence. the excess expenditures of the army and navy appear to have been $63,605,621; of which $49,000,000 were raised by selling bonds and treasury notes, and were substantially added to the national debt. but these figures by no means answer the question. to the apparent cost we must add twelve millions paid later to mexico, the american claims of which we relieved her, the war expenses of the treasury department, bounty lands, pensions, valid claims for damages, and other liabilities of many kinds gradually discharged after peace returned; and from the total must be subtracted the bonds and treasury notes then available for issue and the actual worth of ships, ordnance and other materials required for the war and left over. evidently it is not feasible to reach a satisfactory conclusion, but as a very bold guess one may suggest a hundred millions.[33.25] even were that a close estimate, however, it would mean little. on the one hand lives, physical and mental sufferings, personal losses of every description, much national obloquy and a thousand minor factors would need to be considered, and on the other our gain in territory, in recognized power, in military and naval efficiency, in national self-consciousness and in particulars not so obvious. one thing, however, is clear. the war cost far less money than its opponents had expected. webster solemnly predicted in december, 1846, that should it end the following spring, our debt would be a hundred millions, but on the first of july, 1848, the debt was less than sixty-six millions.[33.26] xxxiv the war in american politics 1846-1848 in mexico the war had far more intimate relations with politics than it had in our own country. here invading troops did not scatter our civil authorities, presidents did not rise and fall, cabinets did not organize and melt away, revolutions and revolts did not hover continually at the door. every part of the country contributed to the result. supplies were voted, and troops assembled according to law. we have therefore studied mexican politics in connection with events as these occurred, and reserved american politics to be surveyed more comprehensively; but this does not imply any lack of significance in the second topic.[34.1] at first the war seemed extremely popular. the rush to volunteer showed that. a tone of opposition prevailed in new england, but it was quiet--hardly perceptible. may 21, 50,000 people gathered in front of the city hall at new york and called for vigorous measures. hostilities appeared to be regarded by all as a just punishment for the long series of mexican insults, barbarities and outrages. the country called; patriotism responded, and other considerations helped. democratic politicians believed their party would gain prestige and strength. a great and common purpose would bind it firmly together. many offices and appointments would follow, and almost everybody would gain some profit in a business way. taylor's "victories" on the rio grande intensified the enthusiasm. "upon the duties which the present crisis invoked," exclaimed the philadelphia _north american_, "our country has but one heart," and an invasion of the enemy's territory "will meet the approbation of the entire american public." accordingly the first session of the twenty-ninth congress pushed its work far into the summer of 1846--even after senator fairfield wrote, "all nature [is] hissing"--and embodied the government's policy in laws.[34.2] [the war soon unpopular] but this mood changed surprisingly. when congress adjourned, it was in bad humor, and the country sympathized with it. news of the occupation of california produced little enthusiasm, for it had been expected. the fighting at monterey excited interest, but it was followed at once by a long armistice, and it had no permanent effect on the downward course of public sentiment. instead of glorying in the war, the democrats now defended it feebly, and a great many regarded it as a grave political blunder. the fall congressional elections went strongly against them. every reverse could be explained, of course--in pennsylvania a heavy storm, in new york the opposition of "every most pestilential and reckless form of law-hating faction," apathy here, lack of organization there--but the _national intelligencer_, chief organ of the whigs, brushed explanations aside, and coldly remarked, "we presume that our president and his cabinet are by this time convinced that they have forfeited the public confidence--the confidence, that is, of their own party; that of the other they never possessed"; and by mid-winter the political outlook for the war seemed extremely dark.[34.3] the reasons for this change were complex and interesting. the people--democrats and whigs alike--knew they did not want polk for chief executive. to the millions demanding, "who is james k. polk?" the answer had been given, "he is president of the united states"; but this excellent retort silenced instead of satisfying. disagreeable ideas prevailed regarding the methods of his nomination and his election. many viewed him as an accident, an unpleasant surprise, a surreptitious incumbent; and his unpopularity not only was a disadvantage in itself, but colored the interpretation placed upon everything he did or said.[34.4] besides this initial difficulty, he was not considered a large enough man for the place, and the cabinet seemed too much of a piece with him in that respect. the public did not hear polk's confidential declaration, "i intend to be myself president of the united states." they were not aware that he risked a great deal to avoid having calhoun and flagg, a new york man of unusual ability, in his official family. but they felt like the washington correspondent of the boston _atlas_, who said, they are "little fellows," and "were they all thrown in a bag together, it would make little difference which came out first"; and they suspected that polk aimed to eliminate all possible competitors. many, indeed, believed it should be so. "who would not regret," asked senator mangum, "to see the choice of this great and free people thrown into shadow by over-topping talent?" the president was inaugurated on a cold, rainy, cheerless day, and sentiment, among those who counted, resembled the weather.[34.4] the policy of the administration confirmed these impressions. polk had no great ideas, no inspiring imagination, no kindling enthusiasm, no moving eloquence, no contagious humor, no winning personality. he was not exactly a "burning bush" of patriotism, hallowing the ground about him, and forcing men to put off their grimy, everyday shoes of selfish designs. to sway the nation or even the democrats in any grand way lay beyond him. he was a partisan, to be sure, but without a party. his trumpet note--has shed "american blood upon the american soil"--came from a newspaper. almost his only resource, therefore, was patronage, and the business of trading offices for support is essentially a mean one. it makes intrigue a profession, creates many enemies while it creates few friends and renders confidence well-nigh impossible. without calling the president "mendacious," one can understand how j. k. paulding came to say, that he possessed no honesty of purpose, no frankness of heart. tossing out a plump lie now and then would have given less offence than continual secretiveness and evasion caused. polk described the cunning pillow as "one of the shrewdest men you ever knew." that gave polk's measure, and political necessities developed his natural disposition. "this little mole," blair called him. blair was prejudiced; but for a different _bête noire_ he would have chosen a different name.[34.5] [polk disliked] new york state affairs had an especially bad effect on polk's reputation and influence. knowing that he had played the part of jacob, the supplanter, to van buren's esau at the baltimore convention, and not expecting to be forgiven, polk probably felt thoroughly distrustful of the locofocos from the beginning. silas wright's declining positively to run for the vice presidency on his ticket doubtless gave offence. his bad faith in refusing to accept flagg, apparently to save himself from being overshadowed, after virtually agreeing to do it, seemed inexcusable. his taking marcy into the cabinet at the behest of an active but rather unscrupulous remnant of the "irregular" conservatives heightened the dissatisfaction of the substantial elements. the defeat of the new york democrats in the fall elections of 1846, which was charged by the regulars to treachery on the part of the conservatives, created still further trouble. making factional appointments, and especially choosing for a high post at new york city a "poor, stupid dutchman by the name of bouck," as an extremist called him, seemed to the faithful nothing less than party treason. in thus alienating the ablest and best democrats of the state, who were trusted and admired by the party as a whole, and supporting a faction that had no national standing, the president made a great mistake. he "has proved himself to be a poor devil," said one of van buren's correspondents; even tyler's name was less execrated than "jim polk's," wrote one of judge mclean's; and for thus weakening the democrats in the empire state, he was naturally blamed in all quarters.[34.6] a variety of minor yet serious complaints helped fill up the measure. polk was equally anxious and unable to harmonize the party, and as he tried to satisfy clamorous malcontents, it came to be said that he was always ready to hang an old friend for the sake of gaining two new ones. ranking low in ability to judge of character, enjoying but a limited acquaintance, and placing an unreasonable value upon experience in congress, he too often appointed unfit men when he meant well, or put the right men into the wrong places. naturally office-seekers dogged his footsteps, and numberless disappointed aspirants bore grudges deadlier than stilettos. his wriggling out of emphatic declarations in favor of our broad oregon claims excited profound wrath in the west, and made a bad impression in other sections. senator hannegan proclaimed that if the president accepted the line of forty-nine degrees, he would be consigned to "a damnation so deep that the hand of resurrection" would never be able to "drag him forth"; and he did accept it.[34.7] the veto of a river and harbor bill that offered captivating opportunities for looting the treasury brought upon him the woes of tyler. the government, said the aggrieved, "is fast degenerating into a mere quadrennial elective despotism"; polk "wants the purse of the nation for his own schemes of presidential ambition." finally, the apparent hampering of taylor and scott, and the playing off of the one against the other seemed to a multitude of citizens unworthy of a president, unpatriotic and mean; and then partisans accused him of letting whig generals have all the glory, lest a democratic warrior should gain the presidential nomination in 1848. truly, "deep and dismal was the ditch," as b. f. butler said, into which polk fell.[34.7] moreover a whole sheaf of arrows, not directly aimed at him, struck his administration. the annexation of texas rankled still in many bosoms, and the extremists were implacable. lowell did not shrink from recommending secession: "ef i'd _my_ way i would ruther we should go to work an' part,- they take one way, we take t'other,- guess it wouldn't break my heart." john quincy adams contemplated the same extreme remedy, and giddings went so far as to write, "ohio is now a party to no subsisting union." those opposed to the measure felt hostile to the president who had favored and consummated it; the great number whose theory had been that it would not lead to war felt obliged to argue now that polk had brought about a conflict unnecessarily; and everything in our relations with mexico was viewed through a fog of prejudices and animosities rising from that gory political battlefield. not a few appointments to high military positions had seemed to rest on political expediency, and the battles near the rio grande had been followed by a long period of inactivity, charged by many to the government. volunteers not accepted for the war had remarks to make, and troops returning from the front often used expressions hardly coherent enough to be termed remarks. the six-months men called out by gaines belonged in the latter class; and although marcy did nothing respecting them save to obey the plain requirement of the law, citizens of louisiana applied language to him that might have kindled sympathy for judas iscariot.[34.8] the government's fiscal system, though of course accepted by many, excited sharp resentment. overwhelming the country all at once with such a combination of new laws--a warehouse act, a sub-treasury bill and a "free-trade" tariff--was denounced as an unspeakable outrage, and each of those measures amounted in the opinion of many to a crime. gideon welles thought the idea of reducing our tariff during the war an "insane project"; and the measure as framed, a compromise between theory and expediency, satisfied hardly any one. real free-traders complained because their principles had been sacrificed, and the new englanders because those principles had not been sacrificed enough. the iron and coal state raged and wept by turns: she had been betrayed, and "her groans were music" to the arrogant low-tariff section cherished by the government. only corruption and intimidation could have carried such a monstrosity through congress; and, worse yet, "sir robert walker" had been truckling to england. "british all over," scribbled the _american sentinel_ on the warehousing system; and the tariff was trailed to a british lair packed with british statesmen, british capitalists, british manufacturers and british merchants. to please them our wheels of production were to stop, our banks close, and the industrious north fall in despair at the feet of an implacable south. "'to your tents, o israel!'" cried the _national intelligencer_.[34.9] [denunciations of the war] in countless eyes the war itself soon lost its glamour. imagining that our advance to the rio grande had been the cause of it, many felt bound to denounce it as unauthorized, unconstitutional, unjust, aggressive; and not a few, in dense ignorance of the history, character and views of the mexicans, thought, like professor kent of harvard university, that it was "demoniacal" to make war upon those poor innocents, as if they had not been shooting one another pretty continuously and also aching to shoot us. not reflecting that nations begin to think of indemnities as soon, at least, as they begin to fight, and that legitimate advantages might accrue from occupying mexican territory, people viewed suspiciously the operations of taylor, wool, kearny, stockton and stevenson, threw up their hands, and exclaimed, "conquest!" as if the ground they stood upon and half the world besides had not been gained by the sword. "cormorants of territory!" hissed a thersites. "sages and heroes of the revolution, lo, the consummation of your labors!" wailed a cassandra; mexico is to be absorbed, and "the original, moving, burning stimulus" of the crime is the wish to manufacture glory for polk, and gratify him with a second term. to be sure, the nation had officially endorsed the war; but multitudes were eager to have the nation disgraced, if they could only disgrace polk.[34.10] toward the future as well as the past frowned the critics of the administration. territory seemed likely to be acquired, and it was feared that slavery would plant its black hoof upon the soil. in massachusetts a group of young men, who doubtless believed in freedom unselfishly, believed also that it was the coming idea, and might carry them ahead of such conservative leaders as webster and winthrop. sumner was one of these; and he, without offering proof that slavery stood behind the war, pushed through the legislature some bloodcurdling resolutions against the "gigantic crime"; while lowell, not stopping to ascertain whether negro servitude could thrive on the pacific, sounded an appeal to sectional feelings: "they jest want this californy so's to lug new slave-states in to abuse ye, an' to scorn ye, and to plunder ye like sin."[34.11] from the increased political power of the south, northern agriculture, commerce and manufactures would suffer. new, sparsely settled states would have the same authority in the senate as massachusetts or pennsylvania. the augmenting of western strength would prove an injury to older sections. new orleans would gain ground financially and commercially at the expense of new york. annexing new territory would lessen the value of lands already in the union. the war would increase the power of the executive, and bring home an army of "heroes" to monopolize the offices. it was most likely to be interminable and costly, for in the autumn of 1846 mexico showed no signs of begging for peace and taylor no signs of accomplishing anything decisive. privateers might ruin our commerce, and the blockade might lead to european interference. the nation, debased by dwelling upon scenes of devastation and violence, and by the absorption of aliens low in the scale of humanity, would become barbarous, cruel, rapacious, bloodthirsty. taxes, debt, waste of public funds, corrupt elections, a great standing army, despotism, fanaticism, civil war, disunion, the reprobation of mankind and the retribution of heaven would follow.[34.11] [policy of the whigs] under these circumstances the gyrations and contortions of whig politics, viewed as a whole, were curious to observe. at first the party joined in shouting and voting for stern hostilities. "doubt, division, reproach will be unknown," announced the _north american_. but the whigs presently saw, as the new york _tribune_ pointed out, that a full share of the burden would be theirs, while most of the glory and profit would fall to the other side. moreover, these criticisms of polk and the war, even when not suggested by the whigs, seemed like yellow fields of ripening party advantage. very soon, therefore, they withdrew to a respectable, intrenched position: they would support the war, but on its conclusion polk and the democrats would be called to a strict account. "i have no doubt we shall make much capital out of it," wrote a whig congressman. presently, however, it looked as if the conclusion of the war might lie beyond the next presidential election, and most of the party sallied forth impatiently, sickle in hand.[34.12] castigating polk was the most obvious opportunity for the harvesters, and they used it with due zeal. some of the jibes were good-natured. playing on the powers legally his, the _national intelligencer_ happily exclaimed, "here, there, everywhere at once, civil, military, judicial and executive, dove of peace, thunderbolt of war, and a perfect serpent of diplomacy, who was ever so various or so amazing?" bracketing the president of the united states with a famous dwarf of the day as "tom thumb's cousin, jim thumb," was another merry as well as able fling. to remark, however, when he sent in a message, that he came "puffing and blowing into congress," went a trifle too far, perhaps; and other pleasantries exposed themselves distinctly to that criticism. the boston _atlas_ described the war message as "perfectly characteristic of its author;--weak, wheedling and sneaking," while some thought it better to sail on the other tack, and picture "his high mightiness," the arrogant, domineering tyrant of the white house, as planting "his foot upon the charter of our liberties."[34.13] despatching taylor to the rio grande was called "a well-nigh fatal blunder," even though suggested by the "demon," who was commonly thought rather shrewd. letting santa anna go back to mexico seemed to different whigs like treason, treachery, folly and idiocy. polk "takes his ease on some _sixty-eight dollars per day_," while the soldiers he has driven to the field subsist on fare that "his very slaves would loathe," the whig _almanac_ luckily discovered. bribery, duplicity, falsehood, imbecility, cowardice and infamy were a few of the other good things found in the president's conduct; and the chief whig organ undertook to lay him finally at rest on the greensward in this elegant fashion: "why, the very savage of the courtyard in other times--that most brutal of mankind, the bully of the bailiwick, who chewed up an ear or nose, or scooped out with thumb a prostrate adversary's eye--was generous in comparison."[34.13] in attempting more serious criticism the whigs met with embarrassments. the majority of them, whose argument had been that immediate annexation of texas would necessarily mean war, could not with inward peace declare that polk had brought on the war by sending taylor to the rio grande; and the great number whose contention had been that mexico still owned texas could not well deny that annexing her province by an act of congress, which amounted on their theory to a constitutional declaration of war, had created a state of things which made it entirely proper for polk to send taylor there. "swindlers of 1844, with your 'peaceable annexation,' do not skulk! here is the fruit of _your_ doings! look it in the face!" exclaimed the new york _tribune_ when the war bill passed, but it soon appeared more tactful to ignore this aspect of the matter.[34.14] [embarrassments of the whigs] other embarrassments remained, however. it was very well for northern whigs to indulge in what carlyle might have called a "running shriek" against "a pro-slavery war," but they were cautioned to let no echoes of it cross the potomac. when a senator greeted the war message by saying he would later read the documents that accompanied it, and for the present would merely observe that polk's course was "utterly unjustifiable," ritchie paraphrased master dogberry at him: "by virtue of mine office i do suspect thee to be a thief." while some papers denounced the government for not settling with mexico by negotiation, others admitted that mexico had refused to treat. when delano announced for the sake of buncombe that he was "ready to go shoulder to shoulder with all those who supported the honor of the country," thurman replied that it seemed a strange method of supporting one's country, to declare like delano, after war had begun, when it existed both in law and in fact, that it was "illegal, unrighteous, and damnable." abraham lincoln, wishing to distinguish himself before the home folks, did this feat in the house by revealing, in a manner suited to his years, that since mexico had exercised jurisdiction on the northern bank of the rio grande, the first american blood must have been shed on mexican, not american, soil; but unhappily the fact remained that connecticut had for some time exercised effective jurisdiction over northeastern pennsylvania, yet did not own the territory.[34.15] those who raved against polk and his "tribe" for driving the war bill through congress had to face winthrop and a galaxy of other whigs, who admitted that war did already exist. congressmen denouncing the executive for sending taylor to the rio grande were unable to deny that notice of his march from corpus christi had been given on the floor of the house (march 23) long before the outbreak of hostilities, and nothing had been done about it; that on may 12 whigs of the senate, led by crittenden, had recognized that american territory extended to the rio grande; and that after the army could safely have withdrawn from that vicinity no serious attempt had been made to bring about its recall. partisans of the unoffending mexicans were startled to hear the impeccable boston _atlas_ confess in a moment of candor: "the conduct of that government towards us has been such as might have justified the extreme resort to war"; and those eager to berate polk for unconstitutional aggressiveness had to digest a similar lapse on the part of the _national intelligencer_, which conceded that congress had thrown round him a mantle of indemnity by a vote "implying confidence in the rectitude of the president in beginning this war."[34.16] while polk was roundly taken to task for appointing so many democratic generals, whig journals boasted that most of the leading officers belonged to their party. the military operations afforded numerous opportunities for invectives against the administration, but ere long a number of the invectives came home to stay. taylor, it appeared, had recommended the advance to the rio grande; he protested against embarrassing the prosecution of the war by discussing its genesis; and the smallness of his army at the critical time, his waiting so long after the occupation of matamoros, the terms given at monterey, his peril at buena vista, kearny's off-hand annexation of new mexico, scott's discharging volunteers after the battle of cerro gordo, and his famous jalapa proclamation, all brought up against the administration, proved in every case chargeable to the whig commanders.[34.16] [whig orators] orators caused as much pain as generals, perhaps. "black tom" corwin's brilliant advice that american soldiers in mexico should be welcomed to hospitable graves, though it gained high rank in the nightmare school of literature, overshot the mark. it scandalized the nation. it staggered patriotism. it shocked humanity. most of all it infuriated the troops, battling for their country in a foreign land. the speech arrived at buena vista soon after the struggle with santa anna. a rude effigy of corwin was made up of the vilest materials, dressed in a mexican uniform and burned; and over the ashes these lines were posted up: "old tom corwin is dead and here he lies; nobody's sorry and nobody cries; where he's gone and how he fares, nobody knows and nobody cares." the soldiers had friends at home, and of course made their sentiments known. the speech sounded the knell of its author's great political hopes; and there is reason to believe that its reception frightened into dumbness a number of his colleagues, who had arranged to follow his lead.[34.17] but other styles of oratorical attack were still feasible. just before congress met in december, 1846, the whigs hung out at the chinese museum, philadelphia, their great blue light. in other words a powerful orator, a powerful lawyer, a powerful statesman--daniel webster by name--after studying on the problem for half a year, undertook, if one may quote an admirer, to "knock the sand" from under the government. hour after hour he talked on, till he mortgaged fourteen columns of the _united states gazette_, and the reporters fled; but he came far short of making out a case. other efforts of his proved no more successful. before the whig convention at springfield he argued in a tedious, prosy, court-room style. this is "a war of pretexts"--three of them, he asserted: first, that mexico invaded american territory; secondly, that she would not receive slidell; and thirdly, that she would not pay our claims. did webster fail to see that a _casus belli_ recognized almost unanimously by our executive and congress was for this country at least more than a "pretext"? did he fail to see that his other "pretexts" had not been offered by polk as grounds for passing the war bill? and how could he say the pretexts were "all unfounded"? did he suppose that mexico had paid our claims? did he suppose that she had welcomed slidell? of course not; but he was the attorney of new england whiggism, trying to make a good case out of a poor one.[34.18] his really effective contributions to the polemics consisted, not of arguments, but of impressive hints: "i am greatly deceived, mr. president, if we shall not ere long see facts coming to the light, and circumstances found coinciding and concurring, which will fix on the government" its alleged guilt; and a president bringing on war in the manner charged against polk, would commit "an impeachable offence," as if polk might have been impeached after congress had assumed the responsibility for his acts. but unhappily father ritchie offered another citation, "well, well, we know; or there be, and if there might; or if we list to speak."[34.18] and not only did webster disappoint, but he mortified whig friends. texas had been an independent state as early as 1840, he said; our annexing it gave mexico no just ground of complaint; she was "entirely unreasonable and senseless" in rejecting our offer to treat; if she preferred war to peace we could but fight; and now the war must be vigorously prosecuted. he squarely refused to call the invasion of her territory unjust. he seemed to approve of his son's going to the field in the "unholy" cause of his country. he admitted that whig policy in massachusetts was in some respects "quite narrow." "i am tired--and disgusted--as much as you possibly can be, with the fanaticism and narrowness of some of our people," he wrote; and no doubt it made him still more tired to hear lowell's captivating but wayward muse advise young fellows, on grounds of personal advantage, to keep out of the army, and suggest that, should they get seduced by some "strutting" sergeant into taking up arms for the country, insubordination and even desertion would become them. "thrash away, you'll _hev_ to rattle on them kittle-drums o' yourn,- 'taint a knowin' kind o' cattle that is ketched with mouldy corn."[34.19] while such were the troubles of waking hours, the bedchamber, too, of many whigs had its troubled moments. ghosts walked. john jay, a sincere opponent of our second war against england, came back, holding out a scroll that bore these words of his, "as the war has been _constitutionally_ declared, the people are evidently bound to support it." came back the rev. david osgood, d.d., of medford, massachusetts, with his sermon of june 27, 1812: "my mind has been in a constant agony, not so much at the inevitable loss of our temporal prosperity and happiness, and the complicated miseries of war, as at its guilt, its outrage against heaven, against all truth, honesty, justice, goodness, against all the principles of social happiness." came back another federalist, the rev. elijah parish, d.d., with a sermon recommending treason as a pious duty: "new england, if invaded, would be obliged to defend herself. do you not then owe it to your children, and owe it to your god, to make peace for yourselves?" unlike jay, these men appeared to be unhappy; and then certain patriots of the hartford convention filed by with averted eyes, each dragging after him a blasted reputation.[34.20] in one thing, however, the opponents of the war succeeded. going far beyond the limits of reasonable criticism and helpful suggestions, and indulging in language calculated to dishearten and hamper the administration, they encouraged the enemy. it is merely polk's war, announced the boston _atlas_, quoted in the _monitor republicano_. mexico would have disgraced herself by receiving slidell, declared the same journal. her spirit, proclaimed the _national intelligencer_, was fitted to "command the admiration of all men capable of appreciating the virtue of courage and fortitude under the most disastrous circumstances." severance, a member of congress, openly applauded her resistance. we cannot beat her without ruining our finances, maintained waddy thompson. the destruction of her national independence was "the true issue," one sheet falsely assured her, as if to whet her sword. it was entirely uncertain, proclaimed calhoun in february, 1847, whether our army could reach mexico city or dictate a peace if it should. she cannot be conquered, it was often said.[34.21] magazines of epithets and arguments, that became gunpowder the moment they crossed the rio grande, poured from the whig presses. leading papers invoked foreign intervention. the official journal of the mexican government offered the thanks of the nation to webster for threatening our president with impeachment. "if there is in the united states a heart worthy of american liberty, its impulse is to join the mexicans," exclaimed a boston journal; "it would be a sad and woeful joy, but a joy nevertheless, to hear that the hordes under scott and taylor were, _every man of them, swept into the next world_." no wonder that polk dropped a hint about aiding and abetting the enemy. it was proper. in 1813-14 the _national intelligencer_ had stigmatized those who denounced the country's war after its own present fashion as "traitors in thought and purpose."[34.21] [the democrats in congress] early in december, 1846, amidst feelings of depression, dissatisfaction with the government and opposition to the war, the second session of the twenty-ninth congress opened. the democrats of that body found themselves in a general state of dissension. at the beginning of the year marcy had written privately, "our noble party [is] on the brink of ruin," and there it still hung.[34.22] van buren's implacable followers nursed a grudge against polk for the intrigues that had led to his nomination; and the partisans of cass nursed one against them for their votes at the baltimore convention. new york barnburners and old hunkers glared at one another. calhoun's friends were sour because of his exclusion from the cabinet. the old free-traders cursed walker in their hearts for stealing their tariff hobby. the westerners had no thought of forgiving the south for dropping oregon, and the south refused to be scared by those "big braggarts" of the west, who seemed to want all the funds in the treasury for their internal improvements. many wore crape and hatchets, one might say, for the river and harbor bill. everybody wished to blame somebody for the recent election returns. some were quite ready to break openly with the administration. the partisans of buchanan and those of dallas marched with daggers drawn. "all around is dissension and distrust. gloom overspreads the party," wrote g. w. thompson of wheeling.[34.22] the best of leadership was needed, and it could not be found. if a person did not understand the situation, he wondered; if he did, he wondered more. nobody credited polk with possessing the rod of moses. many disliked the man too much to respect the official. he could inspire neither love nor fear. while at one end of the avenue sat a party without a president, at the other sat a president without a party. with a large democratic margin in each chamber, he admitted that he was practically in the minority; and at first sight this appeared the more surprising because polk, knowing congress and not knowing the country, labored with his eye on the former. but the explanation could easily be found. the people were not believed to be standing behind him. within a month he was to be rebuffed three times in the house on important matters during as many days. one of his favorite measures was to go down amid shouts of laughter without a single friendly vote. the cabinet enjoyed no greater respect. walker seemed to be regarded as its leading spirit, but men distrusted his character as much as they admired his talents and energy. moreover, in spite of polk's determination to shut presidential aspirants from his council, both walker and buchanan probably felt less interest in the war than in personal schemes.[34.23] these circumstances left the party to find such leadership as it could in congress, and the leadership it found was a triangular fight--benton, cass and calhoun. benton had remarkable powers and seldom failed to be a democrat, a senator and a patriot, but he was egotistical, moody, overbearing, passionate; he despised cass, he more than hated calhoun, and he treated his fellow-democrats in general as minions. cass, a courtier and somewhat a scholar, lacked parliamentary experience, drew more timidity than courage from his presidential hopes, and possessed no political convictions to reinforce his talents. calhoun's high character, rare intellectual strength and frank, affable manners made him personally the most influential man at the capital; but his judgment was erratic, and he aimed to stand aloof, with a following of about four senators, as a balance-of-power faction. he was intensely narrow, too. for him there seemed to be only one region in the world; only one state in the south, and only one public man there. cass was loyal to the administration, benton helpful but domineering, and calhoun unfriendly. not a very firm tripod, this, to support a government engaged in war. with almost all the democrats, politics--that is to say, offices--held the stage, and country occupied the background. dissatisfaction with polk's appointments increased the confusion. indeed, a "passion" for getting jobs invaded the sacred halls of legislation, and the president found not less than twenty men voting against his measures to avenge personal disappointments.[34.24] [the whigs in congress] whig harmony and efficiency were happily not impaired by these allurements of the fleshpots, for the executive did not belong to their party; but their numberless inconsistencies proved most embarrassing, and the necessity of satisfying public sentiment, and throwing the responsibility upon the administration, by voting supplies for hostilities they denounced, weakened them. no absurdities, however, were too glaring, no contradictions too thorny for what they termed their "patriotic sublimity" to ignore or surmount. they denounced the war enough to incriminate themselves when they supported it, and they supported it enough to stultify themselves when they condemned it. combining the views of several groups, one discovered a line of policy truly remarkable: the attack upon mexico was unconstitutional and wicked, but it should be carried on; so let us halt, send an embassy, and proffer again the negotiations that mexico has repeatedly and recently spurned.[34.25] the success of the government's military and fiscal policies in comparison with what had been predicted, and the freedom of our commerce from mexican and european molestation were troublesome facts; but hopes of disaster could still be entertained, and prophecies of woe still be chanted. constructive statesmanship, they held, was not their affair. the country's difficulties occasioned them but slight concern. on that score their detachment was charming. "i heard a lion in the lobby roar; say, mr. speaker, shall we shut the door and keep him out, or shall we let him in and see if we can get him out again?" in fact they found it most agreeable to hear savage growls and roars, and proclaim that all responsibility belonged to the democrats. to heighten the turmoil taylor and scott were in politics, where they should not have been, and they had active and hopeful friends in congress. many of the whigs, indeed, felt quite ready to put up "old zack" for president and "old whitey" for vice president, if only they could injure polk and whip the democrats thereby; and their opponents, understanding the game, fended off with no more scruple.[34.25] the speeches, which ran on almost interminably, were often able, sometimes eloquent, almost always prejudiced, and quite always deficient in information. indeed, a multitude of essential or important data were wholly unknown. the same facts, the same errors, the same arguments, the same epithets, the same laudable sentiments and the same ignoble aims presented themselves over and over again. assertions and denials, proofs and refutations, accusations and answers, flings and retorts pursued and were pursued. there was what the _public ledger_ called "an everlasting begging of the question"--taking premises for granted and reaching conclusions that any one could accept, if he pleased. "how glad i shall be when i escape from the region of speeches--and get into the region of [undisguised] pigs and calves," senator fairfield had exclaimed a few months earlier; and no doubt many felt in the same way now.[34.26] naturally the genesis of the conflict proved to be a favorite object of contemplation, and almost every complaint against the administration that wit could invent or stupidity fall into was brought forward. the fact that the action of the same congress at its first session had turned the leaf upon that subject made no difference. the fact that polk's newspaper organ challenged in his name "the most rigorous investigation--not at any future time, but _now_"--into the executive's "whole conduct of our mexican relations" did not signify. no such investigation was attempted, but invective continued. the opposition merely cocked its eye suspiciously at everything, and found everything iniquitous. "he must have optics sharp, i ween, who sees what is not to be seen," but the feat was now accomplished.[34.27] [opposition schemes] for example, congress had scarcely assembled when attacks began on the establishment of civil governments in california and new mexico. with such unusual strength of vision it could readily be seen that polk had been indulging in some villainy there. for a week or so excitement raged. but after a while several things appeared. our only aim had been to mitigate the harshness of military rule, about which the kindly whigs had felt much exercised. the action complained of had been taken under a military sanction, and was proper legally as well as by common sense, for the executive, as commander-in-chief, possessed the fullest military authority in regions occupied by our arms. harrison, a whig, had proceeded after a similar fashion in canada during the war of 1812; and our supreme court had even endorsed the view of a whig lawyer, daniel webster by name, that british occupation of castine, maine, during the same war gave england rights of sovereignty there for the time being. so far as kearny, a whig officer, had gone wrong, the fault had been his own; and, finally, the unholy word "conquest," which had made the whigs most unhappy when applied by polk to the occupation of new mexico, was found to have been applied to the british occupation of castine by our own supreme court.[34.28] behind idealistic declamation lay schemes that were distinctly practical. it was thought, for example, that if the war could be made odious, and the government's measures be hindered in congress, polk would have to placate the whigs by restoring the protective tariff. this came out beautifully in the treatment of the proposal to lay a duty on tea and coffee, which even the _national intelligencer_ endorsed. a democrat, "long john" wentworth of illinois, fully as noted for corporeal as for spiritual grandeur, and wrathful over polk's course in the oregon and river and harbor affairs, moved the rejection of the plan, and the whigs fell into line.[34.29] it was a noble scene. regard for the poor man filled the mouths of the orators. though his cottons, his sugar and his salt had been cheerfully made to pay, this duty would be "inhuman," a "tax on poverty," a tax "against the fireside and against woman," a tax "against the wages of weary labor" to support the "extravagance" of the "tiberius" in the white house. but almost in the same breath came the hint, "if the administration needs money, let it re-enact the [protective] tariff of 1842." "the first condition [of whig support] is," explained the boston _atlas_, "repeal the _british bill_. repeal the bantling of the house of lords. repeal the offspring of british paternity and precedent." "should they be in want of money," proclaimed webster, "i would say to them--restore what you have destroyed." a fairly definite understanding to this effect seems to have existed among the whigs; malcontents on the other side gave them help; and the proposed duty was rejected in the house by a vote of 115 to 48. partly for the same reason troops were not promptly voted. if the government does not need money, it does not need men, said the opposition. thus the "patriotic sublimity" of the whigs again commanded admiration, and some of the democrats now had a share in it. [34.29] another illustration of sublimity was the "wilmot proviso," that "firebell in the night," as alexander h. stephens called it, which no doubt some congressmen accepted at its face value, and a multitude of honest citizens regarded as a new commandment revealed on a new sinai. the introduction of this measure, which prohibited slavery in territory acquired from mexico, was both unnecessary and unwise. it blocked needed war legislation, added to the prevailing discord, and weakened the government in the face of the enemy.[34.30] but reasons of state outweighed all such trifling considerations. the northern whigs, to hurt their opponents and gain recruits, had for some time been taunting the northern democrats with subserviency to the slave power, and it seemed to the latter that a declaration of independence would help their electioneering. van buren men, especially in the state of new york, desired to annoy polk in return for his beating their favorite, and taking an old hunker instead of a barnburner into the cabinet. wilmot, the only pennsylvania democrat that had voted for the new tariff, did not feel precisely happy about his action, and was anxious to repel the charge of truckling. his great state and new england considered the "southern" tariff an abomination, and longed to retaliate. many felt that walker and tyler had used sharp practice in the annexation of texas for the advantage of their section. the west believed the south had actually broken a bargain by getting its help in that matter and then dropping the oregon issue. a general sense that southern politicians had been overbearing prevailed above the line. the fear that southern domination would blight interests dear to the north exerted its usual strength; and as a final merit, the proviso helped to make the war odious by suggesting that it aimed to extend slavery.[34.30] so without regard to the logic of the situation, the welfare of the country or the needs of our armies it was urged; and then calhoun made a profit in his turn by bringing in a series of pro-slavery dogmas to rally the southerners under his banner. the northern whigs, for reasons just mentioned, and particularly to save themselves at home, took up the proviso, and it fared well; but after a time the party discovered that favoring it might cost them several states in the next presidential contest, and so the new commandment was quietly filed away.[34.30] [berrien's plan] to replace it, however, calm the "proviso men," and avert a party split by preventing the emergence of a slavery issue, the "patriotic sublimity" of the whigs evolved another idea. this was the proposition of senator berrien that no territory should be taken from mexico, and that while it would be "desirable" to have the texas boundary settled and our claims paid, we should always be ready to make terms that would leave mexican honor "inviolate." here was truly a remarkable proposition. by voting three millions to facilitate a settlement with mexico, in full view of polk's grounds for proposing that measure, congress had already committed itself to the principle of acquiring territory.[34.31] but other objections to berrien's plan far outweighed the point of consistency. if the united states was to decide what would satisfy mexican honor, the plan could only have proved futile--even insulting; and if mexico herself, it was ludicrous. nothing would have satisfied mexico's ideas of honor except the evacuation of her territory and the surrender of texas. when convinced by the passage of this resolution that she had nothing to lose in the end, she would have felt still less anxiety to sacrifice her daily golden egg--the money that our armies paid out--by ending the war. implying that she had done nothing worthy of stripes, berrien turned the war message and the war bill into falsehoods, and accused the united states of a horrible crime--the crime of warring upon an innocent neighbor merely to do havoc. he reduced the minima of our solemn demands to mere desiderata. he represented our expenditures, our dead and our victories as elements of a senseless farce, and left us no respectable excuse for having troops in mexico, except that we sent them down to scatter silver dollars and study the fandango. he proposed to make this nation unique in history as combining the villain, the ruffian, the simpleton and the comedian. he attempted to revive the unendurable _status quo ante_, leave the united states without indemnity for the past or security for the future, stimulate mexican vanity and self-confidence, and weaken the prestige of our arms in europe. in order to preserve whig solidarity he aimed to deprive us, not merely of california, but of self-respect.[34.31] all this berrien proposed. yet webster, dreaming still of the presidency, endorsed the plan. he was put up as a candidate by the massachusetts whigs on that basis; and his party, hoping to win spoils in the approaching national election by this device, quite generally accepted it. said a correspondent of the _national intelligencer_, vouched for by the editor as a whig statesman, "_no mexican territory_. let this be the issue. let this be the motto inscribed on the whig banner, and victory is certain."[34.31] all these manoeuvres of the whigs, aided by the democratic underworking, resulted, of course, in the protraction of a war which they posed as hating. the first seven weeks of the session were almost thrown away. the opposition hung back from granting needed troops for reasons already suggested, and also lest the administration should turn the appointments to party account. democratic dissensions and probably a wish to annoy whig generals had a similar effect. grudges on account of the tariff and the river and harbor veto played their part against war legislation. men stooped so low as to argue that polk, the president of the united states, could not be trusted with $3,000,000, when customhouse officials had larger sums in their keeping. and then his "imbecile" administration was charged with permitting the war to drag, "when by a few vigorous blows it could have been ended long since." its course exhibited "unsurpassed inefficiency," declared the boston _atlas_, as well as "one unrelieved picture of wrongdoing, corruption, weakness and blunders." indeed, the government, "rolling this war, as a sweet morsel, under its tongue," was detected in wilfully doing "everything in its power to prevent" the energetic operations upon which, as any one could see, its financial, political and personal credit vitally depended.[34.32] [clay's leadership] in november, 1847, henry clay, the plumed leader of the national whig party, celebrated also as the man who elected polk, after taking even a longer time than others to consult the omens, gave out a speech and a set of resolutions. these were intended as a chart for the party to be guided by under the pilotage of that distinguished though unlucky navigator. the author forgot having said in 1813, "an honorable peace is attainable only by an efficient war," but he remembered to condole with suffering ireland. he forgot that a country engaged in hostilities of uncertain duration and cost cannot wisely bind itself to specific terms of peace, but reiterated the favorite whig taunt that it was a blind war, without known aim. historically too, he wandered a little, for he charged the president with ordering taylor to plant cannon opposite matamoros "at the very time" when slidell was "bending his way" to mexico; but polk was unpopular, and few thought it necessary to speak the truth about him. we oppose the annexation of mexico, clay proclaimed, which, on the other hand was perhaps too true to be interesting; and we demand only a proper boundary for texas, which bore him a long distance toward berrien.[34.33] but here was the master stroke: we desire to acquire no foreign territory "for the purpose" of extending slavery to it. this had the threefold merit of completely "dodging" the great question of principle, giving the northern whigs a graven image to worship, and conceding to their southern brethren a full privilege to do anything possible in the acquired territory, after it should be ours. but unfortunately for his party the navigator admitted that congress had made the conflict a national war, that a long series of "glorious" victories had been won, and that since congress had formulated no declaration regarding the objects in view, polk--frequently accused by whigs of carrying on the war for diabolical purposes both abhorrent and fatal to the constitution--had been free to use his judgment. in mexico clay's speech was widely circulated, and a competent observer thought it might delay peace one or two years. such was the highest whig leadership in what webster called a "dark and troubled night."[34.33] one idea in the minds of not a few who endorsed the "no territory" plan was that its adoption would render the prosecution of the war aimless, and so check it abruptly. others favored gaining the same end by stopping supplies. ex-senator rives, a leader of prominence, advised crittenden to concert measures for this purpose with democratic "patriots"; and in fact an understanding on the point seems to have been reached. "be prompt, when you are wrong, to back straight out," urged the new york _tribune_, demanding the recall of our troops. other whigs, after doing all they could to make the war aimless, argued, we are fighting for nothing, why persist? "let us call home our armies," insisted corwin. "stop the war. withdraw our forces," cried sumner; and corwin believed, early in february, 1847, that only two more votes would commit the senate for this plan of complete national stultification, and for bringing back in a keenly aggravated state all our mexican difficulties. practically nobody dreamed of offering to mexico the reparation that such an idea of dropping the war implied. the proposition was therefore hollow and insincere; little more than politics weakly flavored with sentimentality.[34.34] the month after clay's chart appeared, the first session of the thirtieth congress assembled. about half the representatives were new men, a majority belonged to the whig party, and all had been chosen during the gloomy autumn of the previous year. by the navigator and by other party leaders their work had been mapped out for them. the objects of the war were to be defined as at most a settlement of the texas boundary at the rio grande, or a little farther north, and payment of the old american claims; supplies were to be qualified and limited accordingly, or entirely cut off; and in this manner hostilities would be ended.[34.35] but politics, not principle, still dominated most of the whigs. they viewed everything with reference to the impending election of a president; and public sentiment regarding the war had now changed. the battle of buena vista had aroused extraordinary enthusiasm; scott's victories, refuting the charges of inefficiency and silencing the prophets of calamity, had been decisive as well as brilliant; the expenses of the war were far less burdensome than its opponents had prophesied; mexico had proved stubborn and unreasonable; the sort of opposition that had been practised was seen to be aiding the enemy, and hence fell somewhat into disfavor; and the people, believing peace and a reward for their sacrifices within reach, had made up their minds to carry the business through. besides, many of the whigs themselves were too proud to "back out," and many at the north--high-tariff men--wished the war to continue. by a rather small vote and a very narrow margin--85 to 81--it was duly branded as unnecessary and unconstitutional, and webster, now an out-an-out opposition candidate for the presidency, approved of this little black "blister-plaster"; but in view of national sentiment "patriotic sublimity" of a practical sort now looked expensive, and a motion contemplating the withdrawal of our troops perished in the house under a vote of 41 to 137.[34.35] [the opposition fails] it was perfectly feasible, however, to snarl, nag, procrastinate and work for personal aims; and few opportunities passed unheeded. "tiger hunts"--ambitious members attacking rivals--used up much time. cliques locked horns over pressing military needs. webster seemed to forget everything except his ambition. benton raged over the fate of the lieutenant general bill and the censure of frémont for disobeying kearny. calhoun, having allowed his hair to grow, resembled a porcupine less than before, but felt no less anxious to prove himself the sole hope of the south. polk, instead of gaining popularity from the success of his administration, was looked upon as intoxicated by its fumes, and a section of his party advised throwing him openly to the sharks. congressional resolutions were aimed at him. all the dying embers of controversy were solicitously fanned. the causes of the war, the conduct of the war, the instructions to slidell, the return of santa anna, the occupation of new mexico, the tariff in mexican ports and the treatment of taylor and scott furnished themes for stale speeches. to chill the growing popularity of the war, direct taxes were suggested; and the chairman of the ways and means committee piled up the prospective costs far above the estimates of the government. after some two months of it marcy gave up hope. but the whigs knew they must do nothing serious against the war, and before long it happily ended.[34.36] the results of all this personal, designing or factious opposition to the government and the war proved most unfortunate. the administration could never be sure what action congress would take, nor when; and therefore its course was necessarily timid, weak and hesitating. time and strength had to be consumed in foreseeing and in meeting captious objections, and in battling against public prejudices that hampered both military and financial efficiency. "we shall have three months of turmoil--our errors exposed, our good deeds perverted," wrote marcy to a friend at the beginning of december, 1846; and such an expectation did not conduce to satisfactory work. bold, rapid strokes could not be ventured; caution and cheese-paring had to be the rule. in the field all this bore fruit in vexation, delay, expense and loss of life. "in the name of god," exclaimed a man at the front, "will the politicians of our country never cease gambling for the presidency upon the blood of their countrymen?"[34.37] and the uproar had another consequence. when the treaty was ratified the government organ referred to the conflict with mexico as "one of the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the annals of any nation"; and the chief whig journal placed these words without criticism in its own editorial column. the trial was over, and the fiercely contesting lawyers walked off, arm in arm, to dine. the inefficient and shameless war was now brilliant and most creditable. indeed, the whigs chose for standard-bearer a man who represented professionally the military spirit they had raised pious hands against, who belonged to the slaveholding order so plainly viewed askance by the new commandment, who had recommended the advance to the rio grande, who had aimed the cannon at matamoros, who had advised appropriating mexican territory by force of arms, and who owed in fact all his prominence to playing a leading rôle in the "illegal, unrighteous, and damnable" war. nobody thought of impeaching polk, or of bringing home to him the guilt that was to have sunk him to the bottom of the bottomless pit.[34.38] [results of the opposition} yet all the whig journalism and oratory stood in the record. hosea biglow became an immortal.[34.39] new englanders gained the ear of reading people. keen young radicals of the northeast, where the muse of history chiefly dwelt, dominated to a great extent the public thought. polk retired from power and from life, and nobody cared to defend, or even to hear defended, a creature so unpopular and so generally denounced. declamation that well-informed men of the day had rated at its true value came to be taken seriously. one side of the case faded from sight, the other was engraved on bronze. and so the patriotic habit of eagerly throwing stones at the mexican war and its backers became traditional.[34.40] this has been a mistake. no doubt, as we have seen, errors and misdeeds enough must be charged to the administration. all the actors were vessels of clay, like the rest of us. but in reality the least creditable phase of our proceedings was the conduct of the opposition. xxxv the foreign relations of the war 1846-1848 at the time our difficulties with mexico approached their climax, the popularity and prestige of the united states abroad were not the highest possible. england, our gentle mother, showed a particular want of regard for us.[35.1] herself recently weaned from slavery, she viewed with a convert's intolerance our adhering to that institution. having just cured her most outrageous electoral abuses, she enjoyed hearing the london _times_ describe our government as "a polity corrupted in all its channels with the foulest venality." ever scrupulous and self-denying when a question of gaining territory was concerned, she felt shocked by american "rapacity"; and the _times_, while infinitely proud that england's banner waved in every quarter of the globe, ridiculed american "imperial pretensions" as echoed and re-echoed "in a nasal jargon, compounded at once of bad grammar and worse principle."[35.3] [the united states criticized abroad} the disposition of certain states to repudiate bonds held in great britain, and their tardiness in paying interest, excited all the righteous indignation of the creditor. the descriptions of this country put forth by honored guests like dickens and mrs. trollope, who made themselves merry and popular at our expense, furnished excuses for countless jibes; and in september, 1845, the _times_ discovered "great danger" that the nightmare of an old english writer would come true in the united states: "no arts, no letters, no society, and, what is worst of all, continual feare and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short."[35.3] if one aspect of our civilization appeared more laughable than all the rest, it was the military side. the title of general, observed the _times_, was "legitimately common to the greater part of the respectable male population," and _britannia_ outdid this excellent jest by telling of "majors who serve out beer, and colonels who rub down the heels of one's horse." literary men were angered by our failure to amend the copyright law as they desired; and our pronounced republicanism, trumpeted by polk in his annual message of 1845, irritated almost everybody. the plain intimation of the same message that european monarchies were not expected to interfere in america seemed even worse; and the president was represented as meaning that we intended to get mexico into a dark alley alone, and rob her. the annexation of texas, which england had exerted all her diplomatic strength to prevent, could not be forgiven, and the oregon difficulty threatened war.[35.3] even englishmen who believed in the rights of the people, said the _times_, turned from us with "indignant scorn;" and in another of its many outbursts, which would have been terrible had they not been ludicrous, that paper warned us that, as we followed the example, we invited the punishment of self-willed corcyra. "the most impudent, bullying, boasting nation of mankind," was _britannia's_ genial description of us; and she loved to parade "our national scorn of america and her statesmanship." in short, mclane, the american minister at london, reported privately--with some exaggeration, one desires to believe--that a deep-seated dislike, "amounting almost to hate, of our people, of our country and of our institutions," prevailed universally in england.[35.3] on the continent these opinions were more or less distinctly reflected. in france the heart of the people beat warmly for us and against their neighbors across the channel; but the court and the government, regarding a close alliance with great britain as of cardinal importance, and the newspapers which, like the _journal des débats_, represented them with more or less fidelity, exerted a strong influence the other way. at the end of 1845 polk deepened this, for his message referred in cutting terms to the interference of that country on the side of great britain[35.2] in our business of absorbing texas.[35.3] the french government occupied a weak position in reference to that affair, for guizot, the chief minister, believing that henry clay would be elected president and shelve it, had thought he could safely gratify england. thiers, ardent and eloquent, now attacked his course in parliament, insisting that an ally had been sacrificed to an enemy. guizot, pale, scholarly and calculating, said in reply, thiers has appealed to your instincts, i will appeal to your judgment; and pressed his theory of an american balance of power. but good-will for the united states and hatred for england were too strong for him. "what empty vocalization!" exclaimed _le national_; "what unhappy exertions! what reverberating accents, like echoes in the desert! it was poor. it was cold. it was null." yet no doubt the sting of polk's rebuke lingered, though guizot intimated in bitterly sweet language that it should not be resented, since he knew no better; and many frenchmen who condemned their government's policy, condemned the united states for publicly recalling it.[35.3] mexico, however, stood in a much worse position abroad than we. for many years, it is true, she had been representing herself as andromeda, shivering at the american crocodile or what-not that was approaching to devour her; and at the end of july, 1845, in announcing to foreign governments that hostilities were shortly to begin, she repeated that while she had done everything honorable to preserve peace, the united states had exhibited "no rule of conduct toward mexico except a disloyal and perfidious policy, and no purpose except to seize successively every part of her territory that it could obtain."[35.4] by such reiterated protestations considerable sympathy was aroused at london and paris. englishmen holding mexican bonds naturally had tender feelings on the subject. british capitalists involved in mexican silver mines and other investments, and british merchants and manufacturers, who enjoyed the lion's pre-eminence in mexican commerce, felt deeply interested. british finances required silver bullion, and british statesmen dreaded a further extension of our boundary toward the southwest. but the politics of mexico excited such contempt, her financial conduct such disgust, her restrictions upon foreign trade such irritation, and her treatment of foreign powers such resentment that she could not be viewed with cordiality, confidence or even respect.[35.4] [mexico unpopular in europe] disraeli spoke of every government of mexico as "born in a revolution and expiring in a riot." the chargé d'affaires of spain told santa anna that, on account of the instability of chiefs and systems, it was impossible to have a settled policy toward his country. in twenty years british imports did not increase, and the number of british houses engaged in mexican business diminished. the treaty made with france after the war of 1838 was not carried out by mexico; and at the beginning of 1846, owing to a long-standing quarrel, which france would have settled on reasonable terms, that country was represented by the spanish minister. mexico has "wilfully incurred the odium of foreign nations," declared the british foreign office; and the mexican correspondent of the _times_ was permitted to say in its columns that an american absorption of mexico would be greatly for the advantage of humanity. the london _athenæum_ expressed the same opinion. even _le journal des débats_, besides complaining that every nation in europe had been treated outrageously by mexico, admitted that she had "sunk to the lowest point of weakness and folly." the country "is destitute of intelligence, of energy, of principle," said that paper; "it is a government of barbarians, but of barbarians enervated by the corrupting vices of civilization."[35.4] to conciliate public opinion abroad, our state department on may 14, 1846, one day after congress authorized war, issued a circular to the american ministers and consuls.[35.5] "it is our interest, as it has ever been our inclination," said buchanan, "that mexico should be an independent and powerful republic, and that our relations with her should be of the most friendly character"; but "the avaricious and unprincipled men who have placed themselves at the head of her government" have prevented her from acting the part of a stable and orderly nation. "for some years, in our intercourse with her, we have incurred much of the expense, and suffered many of the inconveniences of war whilst nominally at peace. this state of things had, at last, become intolerable. we go to war with mexico solely for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace. whilst we intend to prosecute the war with vigor, both by land and by sea, we shall bear the olive branch in one hand, and the sword in the other; and whenever she will accept the former, we shall sheathe the latter." this despatch and the president's recent message[35.6] were to guide our foreign representatives in conversation about the war.[35.7] by the spanish-americans the outbreak of hostilities was received with surprising calmness. mexico endeavored to make them feel that a conflict of races had begun, and that she was leading the van in a common cause; but whether dissatisfied with her course in the past--especially with reference to preferential trade relations--thankful to the united states for the shelter of the "monroe doctrine," or simply indifferent to outside concerns, they held aloof. guatemala alone displayed a strong sympathy. the official gazette of new granada printed polk's war message in full without a word of criticism.[35.9] the mother-country, spain, would naturally have been expected to take a deep interest in the contest; but mexico had been a rebellious daughter, had treated the spanish subjects within her borders with cruel unfriendliness, and had recently shown a fierce aversion to the scheme of subjecting her to a spanish prince. for commercial reasons that power desired an early termination of the hostilities, and signified as much to our government;[35.8] but at the same time she pledged herself to "the strictest neutrality," and she refrained from even offering mediation. her minister at mexico, bermúdez de castro, assisted the authorities there with advice, but before the war ended he turned over the legation to a chargé, and went home. a band of carlist officers talked of going to the scene of action in may, 1847; but if their plan was carried out, they successfully avoided publicity. about the same time _el heraldo_ of madrid asked whether europe would permit the united states to absorb, little by little, all of america; but this was academic, and the journal admitted that mexico was then practically beyond relief.[35.9] baron von canitz, the prussian minister of foreign relations, when officially notified of the war, said it must be far from easy to live on amicable terms with a country like mexico, "where anarchy reigns and where the supreme power was constantly contested by a succession of military chieftains, who were compelled to maintain their usurped authority by the same unworthy means by which they had obtained it." aided by alexander von humboldt, who had lived in mexico, king frederick william followed the operations of the war attentively; but, happy enough that we were not his own neighbors, he felt no concern about a possible enlargement of our territory at the expense of mexico. indeed, he looked upon our success as in the interest of civilization, and at a distinguished public meeting one of the ministers referred to our future power on the shores of the pacific with hope and approbation. for the rest, as the zollverein had little direct commercial business with the region blockaded, prussia busied herself with her own affairs.[35.10] [sentiment in england] at london the announcement of hostilities was both unexpected and unwelcome. ostensibly they grew out of the annexation of texas, and for that reason were a disagreeable reminder. they took place in spite of earnest efforts to prevent mexico from challenging the united states, and hence recalled another diplomatic failure. they seemed almost certain to injure british interests, and increase the territory and prestige of the united states. there was a notion, voiced in parliament by disraeli, that success might be followed by an attack upon canada or the british west indies. it seemed highly probable that had england postponed for a few days the offer which finally settled the oregon dispute, better terms might have been extorted from the united states. her policy had been to have our difficulties with mexico kept alive until after an adjustment of that affair, and now it was thought possible that we might bring mexico to terms at once, and use in some other unpleasant way our military preparations. the war, so much regretted by her, was seen to be largely, if not mainly or wholly, due to this policy and that of the british newspapers, which had urged mexico to despise our military power, and to rely upon the difficulty of invading her territory successfully; and finally an uncomfortable fear prevailed that in some way the peace of the world might be imperilled.[35.11] hence disappointment and irritation were felt at the british foreign office. aberdeen warned our minister that dangers of collision would be involved in a blockade and in any project of acquiring territory; and he said frankly that he could not be expected to contemplate with any pleasure the disastrous injuries the war might very probably inflict upon the mexican government and people. only one cause of satisfaction could be seen by the british cabinet. an apprehension had been felt that france might be induced--through her friendship for the united states or the idea that american control of mexico would be for her diplomatic and commercial advantage--to join us; and the french king, confirming an anticipatory declaration already made by guizot, took position at once for strict neutrality.[35.11] in the press and the commercial circles of london sympathy with mexico was general, said our minister; and the news that americans were fighting aroused no sentiment in our favor. of course little could be expected of "that napoleon of the backwoods," as _britannia_ called our president. the defeat of taylor on the rio grande was hoped for and counted upon; and even after his overthrow of arista the _times_, which had already predicted that our operations, in the case of hostilities, would be "utterly uninteresting and inglorious"--even "disgusting"--concluded that we should probably fail. "bluster does not win battles, though it may begin brawls," the editor moralized. all europe must consider the war "an insulting and illegal aggression," said the _chronicle_; and the _post_ attributed our course to "the angry passions of the untamed democracy of the states," which polk was ready to gratify at any cost.[35.11] the press of france, on the other hand, was in general friendly. let the americans have mexico, and a prodigious development of the country will follow, urged _le national_; would not that be preferable to seeing the english get it? to support the united states is to strengthen an ally against great britain, it added. _le correspondant_ said, "the anglo-saxon race will flow unchecked over the fair provinces where the people, descendants of the conquering spaniards, have allowed themselves to slumber in corruption"; and it argued that such a change would benefit the roman catholic church in mexico by purifying and energizing it. even _le journal des débats_ admitted that our invasion "would be something which humanity would have to applaud, in spite of the just reprobation attached to a spirit of conquest." in view of such public sentiment w. r. king, our minister at paris, had reason to predict, that no trouble was to be apprehended from the government, since the country would restrain it.[35.12] even guizot, when bitterest at heart, found it necessary to profess high respect for that "great nation," the united states.[35.13] [england disposed to intervene] june 6, 1846--that is to say, without loss of time--aberdeen, the british minister of foreign affairs, intimated to mclane in a private conversation, unofficially, and upon his personal responsibility, that should polk desire it, "he would be happy, in a more formal way, to propose a mediation."[35.14] this proposal, received by mclane in his private capacity only, was duly made known to our government, but it elicited no reply. our silence did not please palmerston, who succeeded aberdeen about the beginning of july; and that young "fop with grey hair," as _le journal des débats_ described him, resolved to propose mediation in such terms as to require an answer.[35.17] soon after the middle of august, therefore, he instructed pakenham to ascertain whether a formal offer of mediation would be acceptable, and if so to make it in "the form which might be agreed upon" by pakenham and buchanan.[35.15] the only result, however, was a memorandum received from our government on september 11, which said that it duly appreciated the friendly spirit of the british cabinet, that it desired to make peace upon just and honorable terms and had therefore made an overture to mexico on july 27, and that it thought the formal mediation of a foreign power unnecessary and inexpedient, but would regard with favor any influence used to induce mexico to accept this overture.[35.16] later pakenham improved every opportunity to remind buchanan of the british government's "anxious desire ... to be useful in bringing about a reconciliation between the two republicks," but he found himself unable to accomplish anything in this direction.[35.17] the real question, however, was whether great britain would forcibly interpose. such a policy she forbade mexico to count on, saying that she could not be expected to assume the chief burden of a war which had resulted from the failure of that country to act upon her advice;[35.18] but this did not bind her own hands, and no doubt the government felt a pressure, if not a leaning, in the direction of interference. both certain interests and certain passions demanded such a course. the _times_ and other newspapers pointed that way,[35.19] and in the house of commons disraeli and bentinck spoke on that side. "a pretence only is wanting," wrote mclane. this, however, was not precisely correct. aberdeen told murphy, the mexican minister, that it would be quixotic to take up arms on the simple ground that mexico had been wronged; and in view of england's own course, it would also have been ridiculous. "scinde is ours," exclaimed _britannia_ at about this time, thus announcing one more step in the conquest of india, "and we pay the penalty of the treachery by which it was acquired in the curse of possession." what great britain wanted was a substantial advantage in prospect.[35.20] for a time it looked as if california might provide this. peel himself was rather dazzled by the idea of gaining san francisco, and aberdeen viewed with "the utmost repugnance," wrote murphy, the likelihood that we should acquire the province. during the last three months of 1845 the subject was thoroughly discussed by murphy and aberdeen, and the latter's mind appeared to be "tormented" for a solution of the problem. the method of interposition followed in the war between buenos aires and montevideo appealed to him, but he felt that france could not easily be drawn into it. the mackintosh plan of british colonization received careful attention as possibly the means of creating a british interest in california; but aberdeen thought it would be unbecoming, and would give the united states a just ground of offence, to put the plan in operation at so late a day, evidently for the purpose of blocking us (_á propósito para las circunstancias_), and he feared it would not be effective after all against american immigration. the mexican decree of april, 1837, which mortgaged a certain quantity of lands (for instance, in california) to the bondholders appeared to promise better, and on that basis a scheme was actually drawn up at london in october, 1845, for submission to the government of mexico. but at this juncture herrera was overthrown, the british cabinet felt profoundly disgusted, and murphy's position became uncertain.[35.21] after aberdeen retired from the foreign office in 1846, the suggestion of paredes that great britain take military possession of california seems to have tempted palmerston; but, aside from other objections, he shrewdly suspected that mexico had by this time lost control of the territory. in december, 1847, dr. mora, who succeeded murphy, proposed on his own responsibility a sale of california to england, arguing that by our endeavor to purchase it the united states had confessed we had no claim there; but palmerston, though evidently tempted again, merely decided that any authorized communication on the subject should receive the attention justly due to its importance, and soon the treaty of peace put an end to the matter. no "substantial advantage" had seemed to come within reach.[35.21] nor had even a satisfactory pretext for intervention been found. mclane had urged our government to give none, and in particular to avoid all infringement upon the rights of neutrals.[35.22] the policy of our blockade was extremely liberal. british mail packets were exempt from its restrictions, and they were permitted to embark specie and land quicksilver at vera cruz and tampico. during the blockade of mazatlán british subjects were treated with such consideration that our courtesy was formally acknowledged, and it was admitted that scott "invariably" guarded their interests in the sphere of his operations. our opening the ports to all nations, establishing a low tariff, and endeavoring to protect commercial relations with the interior were boons that foreign powers had no reason to expect, and british traders appreciated our attitude.[35.23] by december, 1847, the merchants of london were distinctly opposed to intervention; and when the duc de broglie demanded in astonishment why england had viewed our military operations with such indifference, he was told that mexico in the hands of the united states would be of far more value in regard to commerce and investments than ever before. at the same time persons of less narrow views hoped to see that country regenerated through us.[35.24] [british intervention not feasible] on the other hand embarrassments of the most serious character stood in the way of interposition. as the _globe_ said, the project of annexing texas had afforded better grounds, yet england had looked aghast before the prospect of losses and risks involved in a collision with this country. so had she done in the case of oregon; and the advantages of remaining at peace with the united states were still obvious. there were other considerations also. she wanted time to readjust her business under the régime of free trade, and _le national_ thought she desired to develop her india cotton fields before severing her relations with us. the political situation in ireland and the irish famine were grave embarrassments, and the generous aid given by the united states to the starving population of that island excited gratitude. british mercantile finances proved to be unsound, and a bad panic occurred; and manufacturing interests awoke to the fact that many rivals threatened them. the profound unrest which precipitated europe into the revolutionary convulsions of 1848 could already be felt;[35.25] and finally the relations of england to france occasioned a grave sense of uncertainty.[35.26] with the support of that power, said murphy, aberdeen would have been willing to fight.[35.27] her military assistance did not particularly matter, but he was afraid that popular unfriendliness toward the government--already shown by a violent opposition in the press and the parliament--and the scarcely slumbering hatred of england might drive the country into active support of the united states, and bring on a general conflagration.[35.28] such was the situation when peel, whom louis philippe leaned heavily upon, stood at the head of the british government; and after he resigned at the end of june, 1846, it became far more difficult. for the new administration louis entertained no such regard. the marriage of the duc de montpensier, his son, to a spanish princess destroyed the _entente cordiale_. harsh language was exchanged. guizot and palmerston endeavored to overthrow each other, and the british ambassador at paris had a personal difficulty with guizot.[35.29] as for france herself, the premier's loud advocacy of an american balance of power compelled him logically to prevent the united states, if he could, from acquiring new territory. influential writers--gabriel ferry, for example--insisted that french interests, principles and prestige in mexico demanded protection. _l'epoque_, which many regarded as guizot's personal organ, took that ground firmly in a long and studied article, and called for joint intervention. _le journal des débats_, our persistent enemy, suggested the same view. but the diplomatic journal, _la portefeuille_, was resolute for neutrality, and the other leading papers reiterated the familiar objections against playing the british game; and hence, while it appeared reasonable to expect that guizot would aid england more or less in a diplomatic way to limit the extension of our boundaries, no other sort of french intervention seemed at all probable.[35.30] [effects of american success] the success of our armies clinched the argument. from the first, mclane urged that a vigorous campaign should be waged. that, he said, would be the best way to prevent interference, and he predicted that victories would overcome sympathy with mexico. had taylor been defeated on the rio grande, as londoners expected, those ill-disposed toward us in europe, wrote our minister at paris, "might have been emboldened to unfriendly or offensive demonstrations"; but as it was, reported mclane, the conduct of the american army and the magnanimity of the american general served to "inspire a respect for our country and our cause which was not felt before, and which nothing less could have produced." the failure of ulúa to detain scott until the yellow fever should force him to decamp had no slight effect; and the victories at vera cruz and cerro gordo, reported bancroft, who succeeded mclane at the court of st. james, totally changed the complexion of sentiment in europe regarding the united states. after the battles of contreras and churubusco the same minister said to a friend, "you should be here to see how our successes have opened the eyes of the old world to our great destinies." in england racial sympathy, too, could not wholly be suppressed. scott received very handsome compliments from the commander of the british fleet at vera cruz and from a son of sir robert peel, who was aboard one of the vessels; and robert anderson remarked in his diary: when our arms do something glorious, "jealousy, for the moment, is conquered by pride." indeed lord palmerston himself spoke most warmly to bancroft of our victories as illustrating the superiority of the anglo-saxon.[35.31] king believed they "secured a perhaps doubtful neutrality." "let mexico show the determination and the power to resist," remarked _le journal des débats_ significantly, and a way to aid her will doubtless be found, but "europe cannot intervene effectively in behalf of a people who throw themselves away." it is impossible to help those who will not help themselves, admitted the london _times_; and palmerston--disgusted, no doubt, like every one else, with mexico's failure to achieve anything except fresh revolutions--admitted to bankhead that it would be very imprudent to break with the united states for the sake of a country which did nothing effectual to defend itself.[35.31] some things, however, it was possible to do against us. at the beginning of the conflict our minister observed in london a systematic endeavor to break down american credit, and so embarrass our military operations. viscount ranelagh proposed to bring over enough british officers for some four or five thousand men, and it was not their fault nor his that murphy said the mexicans would not serve under foreigners. a captain employed by the highly favored company of english mail packets landed paredes, an avowed enemy of the united states, at vera cruz. mexico is "the very country for the guerilla," hinted _britannia_; it "has ready-made guerillas by the ten thousand or the hundred thousand; it has hills and hollows where ten men might stop the march of 50,000." and the same journal went still farther. in the case of an invasion, it proclaimed, "the soldier is a soldier no more; he is a burglar, a robber, a murderer"; and should foreign troops invade england, "no quarter!" ought rightfully to be the cry.[35.32] but the special delight of unfriendly journals was to misrepresent our military operations.[35.33] apparently taylor's battles on the rio grande surprised the editorial mind so much that few comments were ready, but after a while the _times_ remarked, "no hostile army has been really beaten"; and it described our success at monterey as merely occupying "a town of log-huts." that paper long professed to regard the war as "a border squabble," "ridiculous and contemptible," "justified by hypocrisy," "carried on with impotence," and sure to end "in some compromise more humiliating to the united states than to mexico." "the americans who have to conduct this most wearisome of wars," it assured its gratified readers, "are least of all nations competent to the task. they have no army, and have constitutional objections to raising one. they have no money, and are resolutely determined to find none. they have no general, and have just agreed [by rejecting the plan of a lieutenant general] never to have one."[35.34] [views of our military operations] "the military tactics of the americans," remarked the _examiner_ at the same stage, "have displayed an equal want of talent and of purpose"; while its fair colleague, _britannia_, exclaimed: the hostilities against mexico are "at once wretched and ridiculous.... so much for the boasting of jonathan!" with unwinking and unsuspecting humor the _times_ commented thus on the fight at buena vista: "beyond the fact that the americans undoubtedly beat off, though from a strong position, a force nearly quadrupling their own, they seem to have no great grounds for triumph." in fact they were now "worse off than ever"; they had actually lost prestige; and all the mexicans needed to do was "to sit still and be sulky."[35.34] scott fared no better than taylor. his bombarding vera cruz was characterized as "revolting," as an "infamy," as "one of the most atrocious and barbarous acts committed in modern times by the forces of a civilized nation," as "degrading to mankind." somehow the _times_ was repentant enough to publish a reply, which said: "the first broadside of lord exmouth's guns at algiers destroyed a greater number of unoffending, unarmed people, than the bombardment of vera cruz," and pointed out that scott was under some obligation to treat with humanity his own troops, whom delay would have exposed to the yellow fever. compassionate john bull! exclaimed the _american review_; "is it true that the english bombarded copenhagen? is hindostan more than a fiction? had clive and hastings any substantial bodily existence? is not ireland a _mythe_" and of course it might have added that an assault would have caused immensely more loss of life at vera cruz than did the bombardment.[35.35] according to the _times_ our contemplated advance against mexico city was "the mere dream of an ignorant populace"; while the more prudent _morning chronicle_ termed it "about as visionary as that of napoleon upon moscow." "there is but one thing we know of," added the _chronicle_, "that is more difficult than for the united states army to get to mexico, and that would be to get back again to vera cruz." when the americans triumphed at cerro gordo over both nature and man, the _chronicle_ itself had to admit that our courage was "unquestionable," but it consoled itself by placing the american and mexican armies on the same level as partaking "pretty considerably of the nature of mobs." the victories of contreras and churubusco were viewed by the _times_ as calculated "to raise the confidence" of our enemy, and the editor announced that scott, after these disastrous triumphs, was "much more likely to capitulate" than to capture mexico. naturally _britannia_ pronounced our invasion of the country "a great mistake," and asked in deep concern, how are the americans going to get out of it?[35.36] the occupation of the capital was regarded as only one misfortune more. "the americans have played out their last card," roared the thunderer, "and are still as far as ever from the game." worse yet, it foresaw, we were now going to crown our outrages. the churches would be robbed, and "when churches are ransacked will houses be spared? when saints are despoiled will citizens be spared?" the war never can end, added the same paper, for "the invaders of mexico ... are not the men to build the temple of peace"; and retribution is inevitable, since the passion for conquest, which has already "extinguished" the political morality of the united states, will eventually impair their political institutions, and the annexed provinces will be an american ireland.[35.36] the treaty of peace caused no serious trouble. as early as january, 1846, _le journal des débats_ said the americans would soon have california, and thus prepared its readers for the main feature of our terms. the united states will obtain california, for mexico cannot pay an indemnity, echoed _le national_. in reply to aberdeen's hint on the opening of hostilities, that it would be imprudent for this country to appropriate any mexican territory, mclane remarked that "it was at present not easy to foresee all the consequences of a war which mexico had so wantonly provoked, and in which the united states had so much injustice and so many wrongs to redress"; and no british statesman could have failed to understand what this meant.[35.37] when polk's message of december, 1846, clearly showed that we expected to retain california, the british newspapers set up an incoherent, savage growl; but the triumphs at vera cruz and cerro gordo made it plain that we had earned--or were likely to earn--the rights of a conqueror, and must be taken seriously. bancroft soon wrote that england was "preparing to hear of our negotiating for half, or two thirds, or even the whole of mexico"; and palmerston himself said we might as well take it all. "you are the lords of mexico," exclaimed lord ashburton to our minister. after the occupation of the capital even _le journal des débats_ admitted that the only possible indemnity would be a province or two, and _britannia_ remarked, "from this time the whole country must be considered as part of the territory of the united states." "it is becoming a fashion, rather, to expect the absorption of all mexico," reported bancroft.[35.37] [our peace terms acceptable to europe] when the treaty arrived in europe, the convulsions of widespread revolution had begun there, people on the continent were too busy to think much about our gains, and the british did not wish to think of them; but the general sentiment of those who considered the matter appears to have been surprise at our moderation. humboldt, though a citizen of mexico, conceded that our terms were proper; and the critical _journal des débats_ remarked, "assuredly this is sparing a foe who lies in the dust." such a characterization of our behavior was for us a legitimate source of pride; and, as the respect universally paid to valor and success accompanied it all over europe, we had ample reason to feel gratified.[35.37] xxxvi conclusion 1825-1848 the conflict with mexico came to pass as logically as a thunderstorm. at the beginning of her independent existence our people felt earnestly and enthusiastically anxious to maintain cordial relations with our sister republic, and many crossed the line of absurd sentimentality in that cause. friction was inevitable, however. the americans were direct, positive, brusque, angular and pushing; and they could not understand their neighbors on the south. the mexicans were equally unable to fathom our good-will, sincerity, patriotism, resoluteness and courage; and certain features of their character and national condition made it far from easy to get on with them.[36.1] though generally amiable and often brilliant or charming, they lacked common sense, principle, steadiness and knowledge of the world. they were passionate, suspicious, over-subtle, self-confident and fond of gamblers' risks. they regarded firmness on our part as arrogance, and kindness as debility. their policy was defined by the mexico correspondent of the london _times_ as a compound of spanish intrigue and indian cunning, dominated--it might have been added--by provincial vanity and sensitiveness. they scarcely possessed the character of a nation. the whole period from 1822 to 1848 has been classified by their national museum as a period of anarchy. their international duties were not recognized. unscrupulous factions and usurpers used foreign relations as the shuttlecocks of selfish schemes. pride, said their own statesman, j. f. ramírez, forbade them to treat on the necessary basis of mutual consideration and concession, and insisted upon either complete victory or the consolation of having yielded to irresistible force, while procrastination put off the settlement of issues until the proper time for adjusting them had passed.[36.2] [why mexico was defeated] then between us and this difficult people arose the extraordinarily complicated question of texas. it was characteristic of mexico to deny the justice of the texan revolt on the ground that settlers in her territory were bound to accept the political will of the country; but it was futile. "nobody will be argued into slavery," said burke; and this was peculiarly true when the proffered slavery did not in truth represent the will of the country, and was more capricious, cruel and injurious than the régime against which the mexicans themselves had rebelled. our recognition of texas not only was founded on just reasons, but was concurred in by the leading powers of europe. the annexation of that republic meant the wise and unforced incorporation of a free people, independent both by right and in fact, after mexico had practically abandoned all expectation of its becoming once more a part of that nation, and entertained little hope save to gratify a stubborn pride at the expense of texas and the rest of the world.[36.3] her treatment of texans and americans violated the laws of justice and humanity, and--since there was no tribunal to punish it--laid upon the united states, both as her nearest neighbor and as an injured community, the duty of retribution. in almost every way possible, indeed, she forced us to take a stand. she would neither reason nor hearken to reason, would not understand, would not negotiate. compensation for the loss of territory, in excess of its value to her, she knew she could have. peace and harmony with this country she knew might be hers. but prejudice, vanity, passion and wretched politics inclined her toward war; her overrated military advantages, her expectations of european aid, the unpreparedness of the united states, and in particular the supposed inferiority of taylor and his army encouraged her; and she deliberately launched the attack so long threatened. as was just and natural, mexico primarily owed her failure in the war to the characteristics that led her into it. from a strictly military point of view her case was not precisely hopeless. intrinsically the rank and file of her armies, though not by nature warlike, had courage enough, and possessed an extraordinary degree of that willingness to endure fatigue and hardship, which napoleon deemed still more important. they were more frugal and obedient than our men; and while the lack of moral and physical strength, discipline and confidence in one another and their officers made them shrink from the american bayonet and the fixed american eye behind it, they bore infantry and artillery fire as well as we did, if not better. many engineers proved themselves excellent; many artillery officers were brave and efficient; and hence there was no reason why the infantry and cavalry might not have been well handled. but the military point of view was by no means the only one to be considered. the want of public virtue had filled the army with miserable officers, the legislative halls with dishonest, scheming, clashing politicians, and the whole nation with quarreling factions and wrathful, disheartened people, secretly thankful to find their oppressors, whom they could not punish themselves, punished by the americans. the hungry and beaten conscript went into battle sure that if wounded he would starve, if killed he would be devoured by the birds, and should neither accident occur he would simply drudge on as before; and the industrious, useful citizen understood, that if he should help the leaders of the nation by paying contributions, he would then have to fatten them by paying again. "we are saved by hope," wrote the great apostle, and the nation saw no hope. primarily mexico was defeated because she did not fight; and she did not fight because she had nothing to fight for. the military class, who had long pretended to be the nation, was given a chance to prove its claim, and the poor wretches who could be forced into the ranks had to support it; but the people in general, holding aloof to a great extent, said in effect, "thou who hast consumed all the revenues without giving anything in return, thou for whom we have sacrificed so much, thou who hast used our own blood to make thyself master instead of servant--may the woe thou hast so long inflicted on us fall now on thee!"[36.4] santa anna, the logical hero of such a nation, was also its logical scourge--a statesman unable to guide, a general unfitted to command, a leader qualified only to win revolutions, lose battles, and alternate between dictatorship and exile. some observers--even american officers--impressed by the imposing front that he reared time after time, felt that he was a great man. unquestionably he gathered troops and resources as no other mexican of the time could have done. no doubt his lunge into the north and his defence of the capital were remarkable; and one could not complain of him, as did tacitus of a roman commander, that he was unable to harangue his army. he certainly did many things.[36.5] but he did few things well. his achievements were the temporary triumphs of autocratic will-power. he suffered always from an essential want of capacity. he did not understand the americans, and fancied that one defeat would cow us. he did not even understand his fellow-citizens, and could not realize that his long course of misconduct, and finally his negotiations with mackenzie, had cut the root of confidence. a proclamation that sounded eloquent, he felt must be convincing. the impossibility of controlling the factional politics of such a country and also managing a war without the support of the nation--of riding two such horses at the same time--lay beyond his comprehension. often his policy was like that of the man who ruins his constitution with drugs in order to cure a local ailment. even his apparently noble decisions grew out of selfishness and rang hollow. to his mind a collection of men was an army. personal aims and feelings, instead of sound policy and the demands of discipline, controlled mostly his relations with officers. because a revolutionary band could be held together by the hope of plunder, he imagined that a campaign could be waged on that basis. because he thought it would be natural for the enemy to attack him in a certain way, he concluded positively that no other attack would be made. strategy he did not attempt. and when it came to the direction of a battle, owing to ignorance and intellectual disqualifications, he lacked the quickness of perception and rapidity of combination that were essential to success. for the same reasons his total strength was never focused at the vital time and place, and a defeat became a rout.[36.6] this is what a final glance at the mexicans reveals; and now, to conclude the whole investigation, we should take a summary view of our own side. [the american congress] while the congress of the united states did not approach that of mexico in badness, there was too much resemblance. one should always remember that among the people who really make up the world and keep it going perfection is, and is likely to be, somewhat rare; but for an elect body our congress fell below all reasonable expectations. the comedy of its political manoeuvres was only surpassed by the tragedy of them. amos kendall said, after the hostilities began, "there can be no peace with that people [the mexicans] but through victory or with dishonor," and any person of judgment could see this; yet prejudices, passions and interests prevented many from honestly supporting a national war, and turned not a few into virtual enemies of their country. markoe wrote from vera cruz with reference to clay, webster, gallatin and others of their school, "these great men have by their speeches done more to prevent peace than though they had each of them severally arrayed 10,000 mexicans against scott"; and when one recalls the expense and bloodshed that would almost certainly have been spared this country and mexico had our government felt at liberty to spend with decent liberality in meeting scott's requisitions promptly, patience itself takes fire.[36.7] to think of giving him so small an army that the mexicans felt positively ashamed to yield! and then to reflect how politics went into the army itself, endangering the lives of men and the fortunes of the country through unfit appointments. "how we have been gulled and led about," exclaimed a soldier, "by a set of political demagogues, who, regardless of the fearful responsibility, have forced themselves into positions they possess no qualifications to fill, with a hope thereby to promote their future political aggrandizement!" we recall, even though we do not endorse, the frenchman who observed, "the more i see of the representatives of the people, the more i love my dogs"; and we also recall the opinion of a british king: "politics are a trade for a rascal, not for a gentleman."[36.8] the president showed himself a small man, but the saying of la rochefoucauld comes to mind: "we may appear great in an employment beneath our merit, but we often appear little in ones too great for us." the situation in which polk, essentially a local politician from tennessee, found himself--called upon to re-make the fiscal system of the country, to dispose of long-standing and now critical issues with great britain and mexico, to cope with a factious and unscrupulous opposition in congress, and to face a war in a foreign land, almost unknown to us, with a handful of regulars commanded by whigs--was extremely difficult; but he steered his course firmly to the end, set an example of honest, faithful administration, established a fiscal system under which the country enjoyed a period of great prosperity, effected with england an adjustment that in essence had been refused, enjoyed a series of uniform triumphs in the field, and obtained from our enemy the peace and the territory he desired.[36.9] indeed, he achieved a still more surprising triumph, for he disproved the favorite american axiom: "nothing succeeds like success." his lack of commanding qualities, his inability to win admiration and sympathy, and his resorting to small methods because he lacked the power to wield great ones, made him seem legitimate prey. he became the dog with a bad name, for which any stick or stone was good enough. other men in public life could misrepresent the facts--as many were doing all the time--and still be honored; but if polk "put the best foot forward," if he allowed men to draw inferences from their wishes, if--wittingly or not--he colored things, if--even by accident--he made an incorrect statement, he was promptly denounced as a villain. and when he had supported his tremendous burden loyally, if not with éclat; when denunciations had failed, threats crumbled, taunts miscarried, hostile predictions fallen to the ground; when our people had not risen up against the war, our treasury had not collapsed, our armies had not withered away; when our sword had been wielded with honor, our territory and commercial field been extended far to the west, our international status been elevated--after all these triumphs the bitter tongue of a partisan spit out on the floor of our national house the famous nickname, "polk the mendacious," the president left office under a leaden cloud of disparagement and contempt, and later authors delighted to dip their pens in the gall of his enemies. truly, however little we feel inclined to go into raptures over polk, we can admire his traducers even less. [general taylor] next, in view of the civil as well as military fame gained from the war by taylor, one thinks of him. in reviewing his operations we must beware of judging him by mere professional standards, for he was more, as well as less, than a technical soldier. the most essential qualities for a general, says the baron de jomini, are physical and moral courage; and in these respects the head of our army of occupation was flawless. indeed almost all the moral qualifications of an eminent commander were his. he was a born fighter and born leader. he could think best in danger and excitement. he could inspire confidence and win devotion. the fact that one so plain could be a paladin made even the ordinary feel capable of heroism. like all undisciplined men of great force he possessed large reserves of strength, and when an emergency stimulated these, he displayed a power that compelled those on the ground to imitate and those at a distance to admire him.[36.10] on the other hand, most of the intellectual qualifications of the commander were largely wanting. to be sure he possessed a great deal of practical shrewdness, and he used moral force with a broad sort of calculation that enabled him to produce effects which a mere educated soldier could scarcely have obtained. but he did not understand the aims or the art of war, lacked initiative, failed in prevision, neglected preparation, ignored details, took little care to gather information, misunderstood the intentions of the enemy, and underestimated their strength. he preferred swinging an axe at a door to conducting the battle sagaciously from a distance. he would chat with soldiers about home, and then sacrifice their lives. his "victories" made him famous, but the true test of generalship, observes henderson, is "the number of mistakes"; and every stage of taylor's progress was marked with grave errors. besides, "however brilliant an action may be," remarks la rochefoucauld, "it ought not to pass for great when it is not the result of a great design"; and not only were none of taylor's exploits deliberately planned, but he never understood the risks he was braving. some ironical but loving god seemed to attend him. the life he carelessly, improvidently ventured was guarded; and insubordination, both toward the president and toward the general-in-chief, made him the successor of the first and the superior of the second. "old zack is the most lucky man alive," said colonel campbell.[36.11] [general scott] scott, however, was of course the pre-eminent commander. in war he felt at home. he "is a soldier and a general from the ground up," wrote consul parrott after watching his operations. with the possible exception of molino del rey, the petulant indiscretion that he sometimes exhibited in civil affairs did not affect his conduct in the field. to appreciate him, "to _know_ him at all," said trist, one had to see him in the military sphere. karl von grone, who observed him at work, wrote: "he is quiet, reserved, reflective. when, after mature consideration of the circumstances, he has formed his decision, he goes with strong, sure steps to his goal. he can manage with scanty resources, is adroit in deceiving the enemy, and where feints are not possible, deals a heavy, straight blow. when main force must break the way, he demands much from his troops; but, as he possesses their full confidence, and is recognized as a fighter of dauntless courage, he can do this."[36.12] "he sees everything, and calculates the cost of every measure," said robert e. lee. he could be "quick as guncotton when neccessary," wrote parrott, yet deliberate and cautious under the utmost pressure. his initiative and self-reliance never failed; yet, as even the prejudiced semmes admitted, he made full use of all the talents, as well as all the valor, of his army. though his plans were laid with extreme care in view of all the information that could be obtained, he never permitted them to shackle him, and promptly adapted himself, whether in campaign or in battle, to a change of circumstances. both great things and little things were given his attention, but with due reference to their comparative importance. he knew the rules of his art, and also knew when to disregard them. he could both rouse troops to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and surpass the calculations of the expert. says hamley, it is "impracticable" to "conceive how sustained operations can be conducted in the face of an enemy without a secure starting-point." scott accomplished this.[36.12] characteristics of a more personal kind supported his professional ability. the general, trist assured his wife, was "the soul of honour and probity, and full of the most sterling qualities of heart and head; affectionate, generous, forgiving and a _lover of justice_." though few made allowances for his imperfections, he was always ready to do this for others; and his magnanimity would have been remarkable, even had he not been a natural fighting man. such traits enabled him to get on excellently with reasonable officers, while his ability, prudence, vigilance, good cheer, steadiness, courage, sympathy, and trust in his army, and his anxiety to avoid wasting the labor and lives of the men, gave him the entire confidence of the privates. a soldier who loved peace instead of war, a general who valued the lives of his troops more than glory, a conqueror who became in the hour of triumph a friend, and a citizen who placed his country above self-interest, he was the ideal commander of a republican army.[36.13] to speak broadly and leaving genius out of the account, he possessed all the military qualities of taylor, and all taylor lacked. taylor could fight splendidly, scott could also avail himself of the advantages that knowledge and skill were able to supply. the soldiers of the one believed their leader was going to win, those of the other could give reasons for their faith. the army of occupation was ready to follow its commander with eyes shut, the army of conquest with eyes open. both were kind at heart, but scott's humanity was made systematically effective. both faced perils with unwavering courage, but scott did all he could to understand what lay before him. both complained of the government, but scott had reason to do so. both disregarded instructions; but while taylor aimed to gratify himself, scott's aim was to benefit his country.[36.14] the advantages were not all on one side, however. taylor had excellent control of his temper and the everyday, personal shrewdness that scott needed. his unsophistication bore the winning appearance of ingenuousness, while scott's reflective and studious ways gave him the reputation of a schemer. each needed to be supplemented, but only taylor had a bliss. scott's men felt they were serving under a strong leader, taylor's that they were serving with one; while to great demos, always undiscriminating, the one represented head, the other heart; the one science, the other heroism.[36.14] both were remarkable. taylor was a distinguished plebeian, scott a distinguished patrician; the first a superb captain, the second a superb general; and each a great man. [the american army] the soldiers, of course, did not equal their chief commanders in point of interest, but certain facts concerning them deserve attention. the total number of regulars in the war service down to july 5, 1848, was about 31,000. of these, to use round numbers, 1600 were discharged because their term expired, 2550 for disability, and 500 for other causes; 2850 deserted; 530 were killed and 2100 wounded in battle; 400 died of their wounds; and there were 4900 ordinary or accidental deaths. of the volunteers 59,000 actually served; 7200 were discharged for disability, and 2000 for other reasons before the expiration of their term; 3900 deserted; 1350 were wounded; 600 were killed or died of their wounds; and there were 6400 ordinary or accidental deaths. so it appears that out of some 90,000 officers and men serving, 6750 deserted, 12,250 had to be discharged before their term expired, 11,300 met with ordinary or accidental deaths, and only 1550 were accounted for by the enemy. the difference between the number mustered in and the number available at the front, and also between the number who lost their lives by fighting and the number who dropped out from other causes, was most instructive. the americans captured seem to have numbered less than 1100. of the volunteers, a very disproportionate percentage went from the southwest; the northwest did well, and the northeast lagged.[36.15] from these figures it appears that approximately three out of one hundred regulars were killed or died in consequence of wounds and eight were discharged for disability, whereas the numbers for the volunteers were one and twelve; and in fact the showing of the regulars was still better, since the "new" regulars, officered with inferior men chosen largely for political reasons, did not equal the record of the old establishment. in many other respects also the volunteers ranked low. not only was there a greater percentage of sickness among them, but the invalids required attendants. the volunteers wasted clothing, provisions and ammunition both heedlessly and through ignorance of administrative business; and their arms were not properly cared for.[36.16] they had no intention of submitting to the discipline and routine labor of campaigning, and even at the close of the war could not be called real troops. the volunteers, wrote one of them, "will not be treated as regular soldiers." "sergeant, buck him and gag him, our officers cry, for each trifling offence which they happen to spy, till with bucking and gagging of dick, pat and bill, faith, the mexican's ranks they have helped to fill," so another, an exceptionally good man, testified. "soldiers will take their merry frolics," an officer admitted. the camp slogan of a sturdy north carolina company was: "soldier, will you work?" "sell my shirt first." "soldier, will you fight?" "twell i die." but even their fighting did not prove entirely satisfactory. individually they were braver than the regulars; but the soldier's business is to fight when the time comes, and the volunteers to a considerable extent wanted to fight when they pleased. they might do splendidly and they might not, their general knew. in a word, they were unreliable; and they even imperilled their own cause by exasperating the people. marcy confessed that he felt disappointed. yet there were offsets. their patriotism and enthusiasm stimulated their officers and the regulars; and at their best--silent, grim, patient, with a look of kingship in their faces--they glorified hardships, perils, wounds, disease and death.[36.16] a common idea of the regulars was expressed in the house by tilden of ohio, who described them as "a set of puppets ... shut up without exercise and in barracks, from year's end to year's end"; and the "sausage democracy" looked with contempt upon west pointers as both puppets and aristocrats. the regulars, however, were preferable not only in camp and on the march, but on the field. in addition to being steady themselves, they helped immensely to steady the volunteers; and the regular officers furnished volunteer generals with knowledge, skill and sometimes resolution. as for their own commands, west pointers might curse their men, but they took splendid care of them; and it was far better that men should fear their officers than that officers, like many in the volunteer army, should fear their men. general scott said that without the science of the military academy his army, multiplied by four, could not have set foot in the capital; and patterson, like him not a graduate of the school, concurred in this opinion.[36.17] our horse was to a large extent little more than mounted infantry; and our real cavalry, besides riding like the french and therefore badly, showed no mastery in sword practice. on the other hand our field artillery was excellent in personnel and material; and the engineers, though not fully trained according to the most exacting standards, earned abundant praise. more than once they made the very strength of the mexican position help our men while they were preparing to attack; and the report of general smith upon certain officers--"nothing seemed to them too bold to be undertaken, or too difficult to be executed"--might have been applied to the corps as a body.[36.18] in organization our armies were inferior to the best european models; but, said gabriel ferry in the _revue des deux mondes_, the soldiers made up for this defect by displaying an energy adequate for every need. the infantry were criticised by foreign observers for a lack of correctness and snap in their movements. "what is called the american army," wrote the minister of spain, to imply that we had no real troops. but they husbanded their strength in this way; it was therefore ready for emergencies; and they had the initiative, ingenuity, independence and self-reliance that have been cultivated of late years abroad in place of conventional precision.[36.19] despite all technical defects, the faults of the volunteers and the admixture of mere immigrants among the regulars, we had soldiers to remember with pride. so many of the officers were superior men that almost all caught the inspiration more or less, and the privates felt ready to obey and follow them. the troops as a body acquired a sense of invincibility. "we may be killed, but we can't be whipped," was a favorite watch-word; and they fully meant it, said karl von grone. dangers and hardships were bravely faced, as a rule, and often were faced with gayety. "oh, this is a glorious life of mine," exclaimed lieutenant hamilton; "a life in a land of fruits and flowers, of dark-eyed maidens and sunny skies, of snow-capped mountains and of flowering valleys; a life of adventure, of calm and storm, of bivouac and battle."[36.20] no doubt the political and social conditions of mexico helped our troops greatly, but in addition to routing every time an enemy who was by no means intrinsically contemptible, outnumbered us and knew the ground, they had to war against deserts, war against mountains, war against fearful storms, war against a strange climate, war against a devouring pestilence; and in spite of every difficulty scott, after capturing more than a thousand officers and more than six hundred cannon, occupied the capital of mexico with less than six thousand men. the troops themselves, instead of boasting, pronounced it a "miracle"; but the critical and unfriendly _journal des débats_ declared: "the new conquerors have equalled by their exploits the great cortez himself, if they have not eclipsed him."[36.20] yet after all it was "a war of conquest," we have long been told. popularly "conquest" is in truth an odious word, for it has commonly been associated with odious deeds: aggression and cruel tyranny; but "circumstances alter cases," and when the facts are unobjectionable, so is the term. legally, the idea has prevailed that conquest is robbery; but this idea seems to have grown from the old conception that the government owned the country, and such is not our opinion to-day.[36.21] forcible acquisitions may indeed be commendable. in that way rome civilized europe, england gave peace, order and comparative happiness to india, and our own country came into being; and none of us would undo these results. the welfare of humanity is the true principle. life has the right of way over death; enlightenment and energy over ignorance and torpor. possession means use; power and opportunities mean service. the primary law is that all shall move forward and coöperate in achieving the general destiny. like individuals, every nation must run its course to the best of its ability, and if it grossly flags, pay the penalty. in the absence of any other tribunal, war must enforce this penalty. "whosoever hath [in use], to him shall be given, ... but whosoever hath not, from him shall be taken away even that which he hath." such is eternal right; not the justice of the law schools, but the justice of the supreme power.[36.21] of all conquerors we were perhaps the most excusable, the most reasonable, the most beneficent. the mexicans had come far short of their duty to the world. being what they were, they had forfeited a large share of their national rights. even humboldt said that mexico "ought not to expect to withhold, from the uses of civilization and improvement," such neglected territories as new mexico and california. a philosopher like josiah royce, a moralist like francis lieber and an unsympathetic historian like dr. von holst agree substantially that our duty called upon us to occupy the golden gate. not merely an administration or a party, but the nation believed that our destiny called us there, and felt ready to assume the high responsibility of taking possession.[36.22] besides, while ours could perhaps be called a war _of_ conquest, it was not a war _for_ conquest--the really vital point. we found it necessary to require territory, for otherwise our claims and indemnity could not be paid. the conflict was forced upon us; yet we refused to take advantage of our opportunity. "it is almost impossible," says bryce, "for a feeble state, full of natural wealth which her people do not use, not to crumble under the impact of a stronger and more enterprising race." but we gave back much that we took, and paid for the rest more than it was worth to mexico. "all deserve praise, who ... have been more just than their actual power made it necessary to be," said thucydides; and we were not only just but liberal. finally, we gave proof, in the prosperity and usefulness of our new territories, that our responsibility was amply met.[36.22] so the account was fairly adjusted and more. but something still remains to say. a closer acquaintance with us and with real national life taught mexico some of her mistakes, confirmed the political relations of her states, and helped greatly to liberalize her ideas and institutions. "the sad part of it is that our chastisement is merited," preached ramírez. "he that reflects how useful are the lessons of suffering and misfortune," declared the minister of relations, "will admit that no one could show more clearly the deformity of our errors than the foreign invader [has done], and that there could have been no more efficacious means of elevating our reason above the bastard interests of political passion."[36.23] [the war leaves mexico friendly] still warmer sentiments prevailed. one of the chief obstacles in the way of making a treaty was the desire of not a few mexicans to have the united states annex their country; and after that plan failed, the american general-in-chief was actually invited to become dictator for a term of years, backed by american troops. with reference to trist, our commissioner, couto and cuevas remarked on presenting the treaty to congress, "of him there remain in mexico none but grateful and honoring recollections"; and when bidding clifford good-by, the president expressed--in no perfunctory way--a sincere desire for the most "sisterly" relations between the two countries, as essential to the welfare of mexico. indeed, that nation had not felt so cordial toward the united states for many years as it did immediately after the war.[36.23] in europe, too, fairer views and feelings regarding us began to be entertained. "if nothing occur to tarnish what has been so well begun," wrote our minister at the court of st. james in june, 1846, "the moral influence produced here and in europe generally will be worth all the expenses of the war." "it was a hard lesson for england to learn, but she has learned it," reported bancroft, who succeeded him; "that america means to go on her own way, and that europe ... must give up the thought of swaying her destiny." our triumphs over mexico, remarked c. j. ingersoll in the house, "have been admirable lessons ... to the world, that the [wise] policy of all nations is peace with these united states." only on respect and appreciation can peace and mutual helpfulness be founded, and both our victories and the manner in which they were used promoted harmony between us and the powers of europe.[36.23] humanity and moderation--such humanity and moderation as are practicable amid hostilities--gilded our arms. "the elevated and kindly character of taylor and scott," said the mexican historian, roa bárcena, "lessened as far as was possible the evils of war." the americans always treated us during the conflict with "the most noble courtesy," wrote ceballos. "we shall certainly consider it as an unprecedented event if this enormous booty [the wealth of the mexican churches] escapes from pillage," proclaimed the london _times_; and it did escape. we have beaten the enemy, felt robert e. lee, the knightly soldier, "in a manner no man might be ashamed of." even theodore parker, though opposed to the war, made this public acknowledgment: "it has been conducted with as much gentleness as a war of invasion can be." and a brave officer of rare intelligence uttered on the floor of our senate these words: "we have cause to be proud of the record this war will leave behind it--a monument more lasting than brass. we, the actors of to-day, must soon crumble to dust; the institutions we now maintain, and hope will be perpetual, may pass away; the republic may sink in the ocean of time, and the tide of human affairs roll unbroken over its grave; but the events of this war will live in the history of our country and our race, affording in all ages to come, proof of the high state of civilization amongst the people who conducted it."[36.24] notes xxi. behind the scenes at mexico 21.1. this is a good illustration of santa anna's political ability. 21.2. farías appears to have had no share in this quarrel with salas (méxico á través, iv, 593). 21.3. _the course of mexican politics_. _federalista puro_, no. 3, supplmt.; no. 6, supplmt. london _times_, feb. 9, 1847. apuntes, 71-3, 76, 124-6. =13=bankhead, nos. 120, 136, 140, 146, 153, 157, 160, 169, 180, 1846. =52=consul campbell, nov. 10, 1846. =52=consul black, aug. 22, 27; sept. 17, 22, 26, 1846. comunícación circular de ... peña y peña. garcía, revol. de ayutla, 18, 20, 27. ultimas comunicaciones habidas entre ... salas y ... rejón. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 538. prieto, memorias, ii, 195, 199. =13=thornton to addington, june 29, 1847. =13=gutiérrez de estrada to palmerston, mar. 1, 1847. méx. en 1847, 12-4. ramírez, méxico, 12, 142-4, 149, 152-4, 156, 165, 172, 176. =83=rejón to berdusco, dec. 23. _eco_, nov. 4, 7, 11, 14, 1846. escudero, mems., 8, 13, 14. dublán, legisl., v, 171, 238-9. memoria de ... relaciones, dec, 1846. =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 332, res.; 343, res.; 345, res.; 346; 368. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 100-1, 118, 120, 124, 126-8. =83=gov. querétaro to farías, oct. 20. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 144. rivera, los gobernantes, ii, 310. lara, resumen, 65, note. mora, papeles ineditos, 64-5. =162=conner, dec. 31, 1846. =164=_id._ jan. 5, 1847. bustamante, campaña, 7. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1125 (s. anna). baz, juárez, 43. méxico á través, iv, 576-7, 589, 591-2, 600-1, 698. _republicano_, sept. 28; oct. 20, 28; nov. 17; dec. 24, 1846; jan. 1, 22-3; feb. 3, 1847. _monitor repub._, sept. 25-6, 30; oct. 19-23, 26; dec. 25, 1846. _diario_, sept. 23, 25, 29; oct. 9, 12, 14, 16, 31; nov. 24; dec. 18-9, 22, 28, 29, 1846. and from =76= the following procl. gov. s. l. p., oct. 22, 1846. j. alvarez, oct. 22. comte. gen. mex., oct. 16. canalizo to comte. gen. mex., oct. 18. comte. gen. oaxaca, oct. 24. salas, procl., oct. 25. guerra, circulars, oct. 14, 19, 22; dec. 23. relaciones to gov. fed. dist., dec. 23. relaciones circular, oct. 19. comte. gen. chiapas, nov. 3. also others of minor importance. otero was associated with pedraza in the leadership of the moderados. 21.4. so far as possible, revenue was anticipated, even at a great loss. _e.g._, if a merchant expected a cargo to arrive at vera cruz, he sent a broker (_agiotista_) to the minister of the treasury, and by paying a sum in advance he obtained drafts on the vera cruz customhouse that were receivable at par for the duties. of course the merchant, the broker and the minister made profits, and the treasury lost (n. y. _herald_, jan. 18, 1845). another way in which the minister could make money was to accept at face value as part of a loan or payment government paper that had cost the one who tendered it only a trifle, and take a share of the net proceeds. "agiotista" became an odious term. it was given out that santa anna would accept no pay, but the treasury books showed that he drew his salary for even the time while he was at havana (=335=worrall to trist, nov. 28, 1847). they apparently showed also that in 1846 millions were distributed among generals, brokers and others. the british minister said that iturbe was the ninth finance minister whom he had seen devoting "his peculiar attention to the augmentation, of his private means while in office" (=13=bankhead, no. 104, 1846). another great evil was that, in spite of express prohibitions, state officials drew upon the proceeds of the tobacco monopoly. the following table illustrates the state of the treasury (1846): _oct. 12_ _oct. 16_ _dec. 26_ _dec. 29_ on hand $8510 $3410 - $1148 rec'd - 3500 $7162 3700 paid 1402 3628 5713 4367 a poll tax was thought of by rejón, but evidently the government dared not propose it (=73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 332, res., 346, 1846). 21.5. _mexican financial history_ (see also the first part of chap. xxxiii). comunicación circular de ... peña y peña. memoria de ... relaciones, mar., 1845; dec., 1846. rivera, jalapa, iii, 368, 716. _ilustrador católico_, no. 239. hacienda, series of memorias. hacienda, manifiesto de la admin. y progresos. london _times_, july 6, 1846. breve resumen. casasus, hist. de la deuda contraida, etc., _passim_. paredes, address to cong., june 6, 1846 (_diario_). alamán, liquidación. esposición del cong. gen. =11=martin, apr. 30, 1827; july 4; aug. 25, 1828. =11=series of mémoires on the spanish colonies. sierra, evolution, i, 178, 218. zamacois, méx., xii, 254. =52=consul jones, aug. 1, 1839. =56=w. s. parrott, oct. 4, 11, 1845. =58=howland & aspinwall, mar. 1, 1847. _republicano_, feb. 2, 1847. =13=ashburnham, nos. 39, 51, 1837; 3, 97, 1838. =13=pakenham, nos. 28, 1833; 6, 1836; 44, 62, 1839. =13=bankhead, nos. 81, 1844; 6, 38, 70, 106, 1845; 21, 104, 127, 146, 169, 1846. =52=poinsett, jan. 4; aug. 5, 1825; july 16, 1828. =52=butler, july 16, 1832. _revista econ._, dec. 14, 1843; feb. 5, 1844. tornel, reseña, 9, 171. macgregor, progress, i, 674-83. thompson, recolls., 12, 27-8, 87. =52=d. green, oct. 28; nov. 12, 29, 1844. n. y. _herald_, jan. 18, 1845. _siglo xix_, june 14, 1844; dec. 2, 1845. _patriota mexicano_, dec. 9, 1845. _reforma_, jan. 23, 1846. london _times_, mar. 29; may 15; sept. 9; nov. 11; dec. 6, 1845; mar. 2, 1846. _revue indep._, apr. 25, 1845. =52=consul black, aug. 23, 1845. =52=consul dimond, no. 338, may 7, 1846. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 346, 1846. =52=consul mccall, no. 65, sept. 26, 1845. balbontín, estado, 66. wash. _union_, feb. 2, 1848 (poinsett). n. y. _globe_, june 3, 1846. _diario_, sept. 18, 1846. _monitor repub._, nov. 27, 1846; jan. 9, 1847. ward, mexico, i., 331-7. =76=to s. anna, nov. 25. vicario capitular, contestación. priestley, josé de gálvez, chap. x. 21.6. _the present financial problem._ dublán, legislación, v., 172, 211-6, 235-7, 240. =77=relaciones circular, nov. 27, 1846. =13=bankhead, no. 6, 1845; nos. 21, 127, 153, 167, 169, 1846. =52=consul black, dec. 29, 1846. apuntes, 76, 124-6. ramírez, méxico, 171. =335=worrall to trist, nov. 28, 1847. rivera, jalapa, iii, 716. _ilustrador católico_, i., 281. méx. en 1847, 14-19, 24. _don simplicio_, feb. 13, 1847. =86=relaciones, oct. 26, 1846. _zempoalteca_, nov. 27, 1846. escudero, mems., 8, =92=gov. fed. dist., procl., jan. 16. =82=gov. durango to legisl., nov. 8, 1846. _columna de la libertad_, jan. 8, 1847. sierra, evolution, i, 178, 217-8. =52=mclane, no. 5, 1845. =56=w. s. parrott, oct. 4, 11, 1845. =11=mémoire, 1828. d. green to calhoun, oct. 28; nov. 12 in jameson, calh. corresp., 976-80, 991. _siglo xix_, jan. 14, 1844. london _times_, sept. 9; dec. 6, 1845; oct. 8, 1846; jan. 8, 1847. memoria de ... relaciones, dec., 1846 (lafragua). =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 316, res., 346, 371, res., 445. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 128. =75=relaciones, circulars to govs., oct. 9; dec. 17, 1846; circs. nos. 233, 238, 255, 1846. =75a=hacienda, circulars, oct. 10; nov. 9; dec. 5, 31, 1846. =86=v. cruz state treas. to gov., jan. 11; feb. 4, 1847. _constitutionnel_, dec. 18, 1846. wash. _union_, jan. 18, 29; may 11, 1847. _monitor_, oct. 12. =166=pommarès to conner, oct. 7, 1846. _republicano_, oct. 22; nov. 5, 13, 24; dec. 8, 1846; jan. 23, 1847. _monitor repub._, sept. 25, 30; oct. 18; nov. 19, 30; dec. 19, 1846. _diario_, sept. 23, 25, 29; oct. 2, 3; nov. 21, 23; dec. 4, 13, 15, 21, 29, 30, 1846; jan. 1, 7-9, 1847. méxico á través, iv, 589, 600, 628-9. =76=s. anna, nov. 7, 9, 19; dec. 3, 4, 7, 30, 1846; jan. 1, 2, 4, 7, 1847. =76=j. alvarez, sept. 30, 1846. =76=circ. to comtes. gen., sept. 28, 1846. 21.7. the law was a compromise (apuntes, 124). rejón, as he frankly told the spanish minister (note 21.6), was for nationalizing--_i.e._, confiscating--the property of the church. santa anna preferred to let the clergy keep the title to their wealth, and require a loan from them now and then--a process termed "milking" (jameson, calhoun corresp., 992). the essential basis on which the law passed was the practical necessity of raising money for the war; but many who recognized this necessity and even the desirability of reducing the wealth and power of the church could not bring themselves to act. 21.8. the law, if fully enforced, would no doubt have done much injury, however great its benefits. _e.g._, a great amount of land had been hypothecated to the church with no expectation on either side that the loan which it secured would ever be paid; but the government, in order to obtain cash, intended that the loan should be paid or the land sold. many individuals would thus have been ruined and the agricultural interests partially crippled, while on account of the small amount of money in circulation, only very low prices would have been realized for the land (=13=bankhead, no. 7, 1847). moreover, land with a church curse upon it was sure to sell slowly, and many believed that titles obtained in this way would not hold good very long. as the clergy would give no information about their property, some exempted property was seized, and these mistakes caused trouble (méxico á través, iv, 631). many objected to the law because they presumed that the proceeds of sales would reach private pockets. the principal arguments against it were summed up by the =88=ayuntamiento of córdoba as follows: "it attacks property, invades the rights of the states, contravenes the sovereignty of the church and is anti-religious, for there can be no religion without worship, no worship without priests and no priests without church property." on the other hand the puro =92=ayuntamiento of the capital described the law as "a law to save our independence and religion, in which nothing is done except that one class of society is to loan its property to society as a whole," adding, "how unfortunate would be our faith, if the religion of the savior could be supported only with money ... charity and poverty were the example of his mission." the metropolitan chapter of mexico took the ground that property once consecrated to god was sacred, and that to take it would be an act of sacrilege sure to bring upon the country the wrath and punishment of heaven (=92=representación). the bishop of puebla said to his flock: "far from us is the idea of disturbing public order, but we must notify our very dear lambs that the pasturage offered thorn is poisonous; and if for so doing we incur the wrath of men, we will strengthen our weakness with the words of the chief of the apostles at the council of the jews: 'we must obey god rather than men'" (=82=manifiesto). this was a clear and official incitement to insurrection. 21.9. _the law of jan. 11 and the struggle over it._ apuntes, 124-32. =13=bankhead, nos. 180, 1846; 6, 7, 10, 14, 17, 1847. gaxiola, invasión, 118. =52=j. parrott, feb. 6. =56=beach, report, june 4. london _times_, sept. 9; oct. 7, 1846; mar. 11; may 12, 1847. oil portrait of farías, city hall, mex. =52=consul black, feb. 24. _revue indep._, apr. 25, 1845. rivera, jalapa, iii, 822, 825-6. _católico_, iii, 553. conducta admin, de berdusco. _ilustrador católico_, no. 239. =88=córdoba ayunt., feb. 4. =92=mex. ayunt. to chapter, jan. 14. =92=ayunt., procl., jan. 14. =92=representación of metrop. chapter to cong. =92=segunda protesta; tercera protesta del ven. c bildo metrop. =92=exposición que el sr. vicario capit. =92=expos. del cabildo metrop. =92=procl. of gov. fed. dist., jan. 16. =95=querét. cong., jan. 12. =95=puebla ayunt. to gov., jan. 16. =95=sánchez to puebla ayunt., feb. 16. =82=bish. puebla, manif., jan. 27. =82=gov. puebla, procl., jan. 27; mar. 5, 15. lamentos de los mex. =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 332, res., 346, 445. dublan, legislación, v., 246, 255, 261-2. _registro oficial de durango_, jan. 26. =80=guanajuato cong., jan. 29. _locomotor_, jan. 18. mora, papeles, 74-6. negrete, invasión iv, app., 412-4. ramírez, méxico, 172, 184, 188, 190, 193, 198. _diario_, dec. 21, 1846; jan. 7-9, 11-16, 18, 19, 26, 30; feb. 4, 1847. _republicano_, dec. 9, 12, 1846; jan. 8, 11, 23-4, 27, 29; feb. 6, 11, 12; may 14, 1847. méxico á través, iv, 601-8, 628, 630-1, 638. and the following from =76=. comte. gen. querét., jan. 19, 20, 22. _id._, procl., jan. 20. comte gen. puebla, jan. 12, 28; feb. 17. guerra, order, jan. 24. min. eccles. affairs to metropol. chapter, jan. 14. comte. gen. mex., jan. 15. comte. gen. jalisco, feb. 2. j. alvarez, feb. 2. comte. gen. oaxaca, feb. 11, 15. comte. gen. guanaj., jan. 29; feb. 15, res. to comte. gen. puebla, feb. 24. decrees, jan. 15, 27; feb. 4, 7, 10. to s. anna, jan. 30. s. anna, jan. 7, 13, 22, 26, 29; feb. 9. 21.10. _beach's mission and escape._ =56=special missions, p. 257. =56=beach report, june 4, 1847. polk, diary, apr. 14, 1847. =108=mrs. storms to bancroft, july 23, 1846, and marcy's endorsement. griffis, perry, 224. =52=consul black, jan. 28, 1847. n. y. _sun_, apr. 15; aug. 16, 24, 1847. =166=dimond to conner, jan. --, 1847. _scribner's monthly_, xvii, 300. appleton, amer. biog. (article on m. y. b.). kenly, md. vol., 269. =76=to comte. gen. v. cruz, jan. 14. =76=landero, jan. 14. =76=s. anna, jan. 22. 21.11. apuntes, 126. =13=bankhead, no. 14, 1847. =56=beach, report, june 4, 1847. ramírez, méxico, 193-4, 198-9. méxico á través, iv, 608, 631. =199=anon. ms. of go-between. 21.12. the monarchists, who were closely associated with the church, shared in the insurrection (apuntes, 119), and no doubt many of the moderados took part in it (london _times_, may 10, 1847), though pedraza denied positively that he drew up the plan (apuntes, 131). 21.13. _the insurrection._ =56=beach, report, june 4, 1847. apuntes, 126, 128-37. =13=bankhead, no. 17, 1847. consideraciones, 37. méx. en 1847, 14, 19. león, hist. gen., 475. =52=j. parrott, feb. 6. bustamante, campaña sin, etc., 5, 8, 10, 11, 13. =52=black, mar. 6. london _times_, may 10, 12. salas, pamphlet, mar. 3. =13=peña y barragán, procl., mar. 8. séptimo disengaño. _boletín de la democracia_, mar. 2, 7, 13. farías, address. ramírez, méxico, 190, 193, 198-9, 201, 204, 209. méxico á través, iv, 631-5. rivera, jalapa, iii, 841-9. _arco iris_, nov. 24, 1847. escudero, mems., 14, 19, 20. =82=zacatecas cong., mar. 5. =82=jalísco legisl., mar. 12. =77=relaciones, circular, mar. 13. =80=méx. state legisl., mar. 18. balbontín, invasión, 104. =80=lt. gov. méx. state procl., mar. 23. =199=anon. ms. =76=farías, procl. =83=gov. querét. to peña y barragán, mar. 2, 20. rivera, los gobernantes, ii., 318. n. y. _sun_, apr. 15; aug. 24. _díario_, feb. 20, 21. _monitor repub._, dec. 27, 1846; feb. 13; mar. 23. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1125 (s. anna). lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 539. and from =76= the following, besides others of minor importance. comte. gen. querét., jan. 20. canalizo to anaya, feb. 26. j. alvarez, mar. 10. l. carrión, mar. 10. gov. puebla, feb. 17; reply, feb. 24. plan of puebla insurgents, feb. 27. govt. bulletins, mar. 2, 5. morales, mar. 1. aguascalientes legisl., mar. 4. gov. zacat. to relac., mar. 5. gov. querét. to relac., mar. 9. provis. gov. jalisco to relac., mar. 3. comte. gen. jalisco to garrison, mar. 7. gov. puebla to relac., mar. 5. lt. col. indep. battal. to mistress, mar. 15. comte. gen. oaxaca, feb. 17. gov. méx. state to relac., mar. 19. _id._, procl., mar. 18. decrees, mar. 1, 8, 12, 15. on this subject beach reported in substance as follows: when the government resolved to raise money on the church property, i urged the clericals to an organized resistance. they consented, and at the moment of general scott's debarkation at vera cruz they made a most important diversion in his favor by raising the standard of civil war at the capital, at puebla and in a degree at michoacán. this occupied 5000 men and all the arms, munitions of war and means of the government in the city of mexico for twenty-three days; effectually preventing them from aiding vera cruz, or strengthening puebla or the strongholds nearer the coast. on the tenth day of this rebellion or _pronunciamiento_, i was informed that $40,000 would be required of the clergy to carry it on another week, and that it would be paid if the importance of the crisis justified the outlay. as general scott had but just landed his artillery at vera cruz, and might be detained there for some time. i deemed that almost any outlay would be justified. the rebellion was therefore kept up, until the sudden appearance of general santa anna closed the affair. [one must remember, in passing judgment on the conduct of the clergy, how much they had suffered at the hands of santa anna and how much reason they had to fear him.] beach had arranged to visit mexico on private business, and he persuaded buchanan that he could, through almonte and others, bring about peace. hence he was appointed "confidential agent to the republic of mexico" to accomplish what he could; and, on learning the state of things at mexico, he saw that scott's operations could be materially assisted by inaugurating and continuing the clerical insurrection. his report may be found in the state department archives at washington. 21.14. santa anna left san luis potosí march 15 with more than 5000 men and ten guns. 21.15. rejón wrote to santa anna, march 7, 1847, urging him to stand firmly by his manifesto of august 16, 1846,--_i.e._ by the puros, and detailing a series of moderado intrigues intended (he said) to annoy and humiliate santa anna until he should inaugurate a revolution, with a view to then having him shot. 21.16. beach was watched for several days before he left the city. he escaped by paying for his lodgings for some time to come, leaving a trunk there, taking a carriage late at night without baggage, and choosing an unusual route (n. y. _sun_, aug. 16, 1847). a reward of $1000 was offered for him dead or alive (_ibid._, aug. 24). notices were put up denouncing as a traitor anyone possessing a copy of the new york _sun_. he was accused of having tried to bring about a clerical revolution and also to induce the states of guanajuato, querétaro, san luis potosí and jalisco to secede and declare for the united states. see also n. y. _sun_, may 27, 1847; polk, diary, may 11, 1847; kenly, md. vol., 269. we shall hear again of beach's operations. 21.17. santa anna received news of the insurrection near cedral. 21.18. santa anna may very possibly have hoped now to combine the military class, the conservatives and the clericals into a solid phalanx behind him, and he may have commended the movement against church property for the very purpose of making the clergy feel the need of his assistance. see tributo á la verdad, 76. 21.19. his overthrow was not really due to the law of january 11, but resulted from his radical ideas and unpractical methods, the odium of his former administration, his consequent inability to secure the coöperation of influential men, and the general state of unrest and dissension. 21.20. _outcome of the insurrection._ apuntes, 111, 115-8, 133, 136-8. =13=bankhead, nos. 33, 34, 1847. méx. en 1847, 14-18. =69=s. anna, order, mar. 14. _anglo-saxon_, mar. 13. =56=beach, report, june 4, 1847. bustamante, campaña, 30. london _times_, may 10. _britannia_, may 15. méxico á través, iv, 577, 635-40. ramírez, méxico, 184, 198-9, 205, 207, 209-12, 215-8. =82=gov. puebla, boletín no. 4 (s. anna to farías, mar. 6; gil to ruano, mar. 6). =77=relaciones, circulars, mar. 22; apr. 1. tributo á la verdad, 76. =75=rejón to s. anna, mar. 7. =84=palacios to gov. s. l. p., mar. 17. _republicano_, mar. 24. =75a=hacienda, circular, mar. 29. puga y acal, docs., 62-3. escudero, mems., 19. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 146-7. dublán, legisl., v, 262-5. _locomotor_, jan. 18. baz, juárez, 47. _diario_, mar. 29, 1847 (baz). the twenty-millions law had very little effect, if any. _le constitutionnel_, june 17, 1847 (the clergy have kept none of the promises by the aid of which they obtained the repeal of the confiscation of their property). xxii. vera cruz 22.1. "new volunteers," those called out in november. for the ten transports see chap. xviii, note 18.28. jan. 18 conner wrote to scott that santa anna had moved, about january 1, against taylor, but that from all accounts presumably taylor had probably retired to monterey (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 893). it was therefore natural for scott to feel satisfied that santa anna, learning of the expedition against vera cruz, would retrace his steps and reach that place in season. at scott's instance a spy, selected by consul campbell with the aid of consul dimond (who visited cuba for the purpose), was to have set out from havana in january for mexico city and san luis potosí (=166=dimond to conner, jan. 15); but the author found no further trace of him. 22.2. some transports reached antón lizardo feb. 27 and notified conner that scott was coming (=162=conner, feb. 27). certain troops, leaving tampico march 1, arrived at that rendezvous in advance of scott (=139=w. b. campbell to wife, mar. 6). by sunset on march 5 about seventy sail had appeared there. 22.3. _to antón lizardo._ macgregor, progress, i, 677. =47=conner, dec. 1 1846; feb. 17; mar. 7, 10, 1847. =159=collins narrative. =298=porter, diary. =66=remarks in margin of chart of v. cruz harbor. le clercq, voyage, 401, 418. robertson, remins., 214-6. campos, recuerdos, 31. hitchcock, fifty years, 238. grant, mems., i, 125. hartman, journal, 6. taylor, broad pennant, 123. _picayune_, mar. 26. _delta_, oct. 16. meade, letters, i, 187. =65=scott, gen. orders 28, 33, 34, 37. =313=saunders to conner, mar. 5. oswandel, notes, 63. semmes, service, 106, 109, 111. kenly, md. volunteer, 266. lawton, artillery officer, 65-6, 68. =146=caswell, diary. =322=smith, diary. kitchen, record, 21-2. =270=moore, diary. =327=sutherland, letter. ballentine, english soldier, i, 257, 261. =254=mcclellan to sister, feb. 23. moore, scott's campaign, 1-4. parker, recolls., 49, 82. washington _union_, apr. 6. _monitor repub._, mar. 16. =164=scott to conner, feb. 22, 26. =162=conner to wife, aug. 10, 1846; feb. 26, 27, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 879, 892 (conner); 896 (hetzel); 893, 896, 899 (scott); 568 (jesup). nebel and kendall, 17. diccionario univ. (_antón lizardo_). _niles_, mar. 13, 1847, p. 21. =332=tennery, diary. sedgwick, corresp., i, 65. =254=mcclellan, diary. =165=conner to scott, jan. 18; to breese and to aulick, feb. 28. hammersly, naval encyclop., 94. =139=w. b. campbell to wife, mar. 6. smith, to mexico, 108-10. =76=garay, mar. 5. =76=cos, feb. 19, 21. =76=soto, mar. 7. =76=watchman at ulúa, mar. 5. 22.4. for additional information regarding san juan de ulúa the reader may consult chapters xviii and xxx. 21.5. new york letters received in cuba and made known at mexico gave notice that scott planned to capture vera cruz before attacking ulúa (=76=relaciones, jan. 26); some mexicans believed he would enter the antigua river (which emptied a short distance to the north) with boats, and strike at once into the interior; some thought he would land at tuxpán, and march south along the coast; and some ridiculed the idea of an attack upon vera cruz on the ground that, since the americans could not possibly reach the capital by that route, it would be useless to capture the city (_monitor repub._, mar. 28). many argued that in any case ulúa would protect vera cruz. 22.6. besides fine old spanish guns, there were new and heavy english pieces (_nacional_, july 12, 1846) and twenty recently cast in the united states (davis, autobiog., 131). a battery of sixteen bronze long 24-pdrs., made in england in 1840, was pronounced by american artillery officers "far superior" to anything of the sort they had seen elsewhere (=213= hatch to father, apr. 2). it was in the city. as to the amount of ordnance in the city and castle accounts differed. scott made it 400 pieces; hitchcock, upwards of 350; balbontín, 113 mounted, 46 unmounted at ulúa, 83 and 57 respectively at vera cruz; g. t. m. davis, 390 effective pieces. the statement of the mexican government, december, 1846 (based of course on earlier reports), was as follows: vera cruz, mounted, bronze, eleven 24's, twenty 16's, six 12's, four 8's, four 4's, four mountain 4's, five 12-inch mortars, seven 8-inch howitzers, and of iron, mounted, three 42-lb. mortars, three 24-lb. cannon, five 12's, nine 8's, six 13-inch mortars, two 9-inch mortars; ulúa, bronze, mounted, thirty-six 24's, four 16's, four 8's, two 14-inch mortars, and of iron, mounted, ten 84-lb. mortars, ten 68-lb. mortars, sixteen 42-lb. mortars, fifty-one 24-lb. cannon, two 16's,--a total of 224 besides a considerable number of unmounted pieces in both places, some of which were doubtless mounted later (memoria de ... guerra). still other guns were sent from the interior. possibly some unserviceable ordnance may have been included in the highest american figures. balbontín gives the number of firearms as 7369--half of the total number belonging to the government. ripley (war with mex., ii, 19) and wilcox (mex. war, 251) state that there was no ditch, but the weight of evidence seems to be against them. perhaps the drifting sand filled the ditch before the americans took the city. 22.7. it was not easy to believe that the factions at mexico would not agree to turn their arms against the americans on learning they had landed. march 9 the state of vera cruz issued a strong appeal to them and to the nation. neutrals and valuable neutral property were taken aboard foreign war-vessels (=12=matson to giffard, mar. 5). the american blockade had greatly impaired the resources of the state and city. a forced loan was imposed by the former, but no large receipts could be expected. 22.8. the accepted (not official) mexican figures were 1030 for ulúa and 3360 for vera cruz, but the authorities did not consider it obligatory to publish the correct number. =13=march 11 the british consul, giffard, reported the garrisons as about 1500 and 4000 respectively, and later (according to mexican accounts that were probably rather flattering) more than 1000 threw themselves into the city. santa anna stated in april that morales had 5000 in the town (=76=s. anna, apr. 29), but he was unfriendly to that officer. scott's figures were 5000 besides those who perished or escaped during the siege; but before the surrender he heard the city alone had that number (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 221). british naval officers stated there were about 6000 in city and castle (meade, letters, i, 188), and col. campbell was told there were 5-6000 (=139=to wife, mar. 6). the mexicans complained of a lack of gunners, but their own figures were 680. no doubt the troops were poorly cared for, but such was the custom. robles counted for not a little. in the autumn of 1846 landero, personally liked but considered wanting in ability and regarded as a tool of santa anna, was made comte. gen. because morales was strenuously denounced by santa anna as politically unsafe (=76=s. anna, oct. 14); but on the approach of the crisis the people forced a change, and the confidence inspired by morales enabled him (landero admitted in his =76=report, apr. 3, 1847) to accomplish more than the latter could have done. particular resentment was felt against santa anna for taking away in august, 1846, the best regiment (the eleventh infantry). for the names of corps at vera cruz and ulúa see roa bárcena, recuerdos, 158. 22.9. _the situation at vera cruz and ulúa._ =13=consul giffard, nov. 1; dec. 1, 1846; feb. 28; mar. 11, 1847. =52=consul dimond, no. 336, may 2, 1846. engineer school, u. s. army, occasional papers, no. 16. =218=henshaw narrative. =280=nunelee, diary. =159=collins, diary. =6=bravo to tola, apr. 18, 1846. =224=hitchcock, diary, mar. 13. =13=pakenham, no. 25, 1842. _national_, july 12, 1846. _constitutionnel_, may 8, 1847. w. s. parrott, feb. 6, 1847. =80=méxico state legislature to people. memoria de ... guerra, dec., 1846, p. 22. (cisterns, etc.) lyon, journal, ii, 221. orbigny, voyage, 407-8. robertson, visit, i, 232, 239. ruxton, adventures (london, 1847), 12-15. robertson, remins., 225-6, 235, 237. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 541-50, 552, 569. naredo, orizaba, i, 107-8. scott. mems., ii, 422. hitchcock, fifty years, 248. ballentine, english soldier, i, 288-9. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 239. balbontín, estado, 49-55. tributo á la verdad, 17-26, 29, 88. apuntes, 152-5. s. anna, apelación, 33. _delta_, oct. 16, 1847. =350=weber, recolls. =12=matson to giffard, mar. 5, 1847; to fischer, mar. 8; to commodore, mar. 10, 25. oswandel, notes, 102. semmes, service, 102, 104-6. =139=w. b. campbell to d. c, mar. 20. rivera, jalapa, iii, 56, 865. otero, comunicación, 11. _diario_, apr. 8. _republicano_, dec. 8, 1846. =86=relaciones to gov., jan. 27, 1847; reply, feb. 1. =86=state treas. to gov., jan. 15. =86=morales to gov., feb. 8. =90=soto, proclam., mar. 2. =90=_id._ to state congress, dec. 1, 1846. =100=v. cruz ayunt. to prefect, june 4, 1846. =100=bravo to ayunt., june 9, 1846. =100=ayunt. to jefe of dept, oct. 26, 1846. =100=soto, proclam., feb. 6, 1847. =88=_id._, proclam., feb. 15, 1847. _regenerador repub._ puebla, mar. 13; apr. 7, 1847. =82=noticias de v. cruz. kenly, md. volunteer, 267. méxico á través, iv, 600. lawton, artillery officer, 67, 105-7. el estado de veracruz a todos. memoria de ... guerra, dec, 1846. =146=caswell, diary. =270=moore, diary. =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 441, 445, feb. 28; mar. 2, 1847. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 67. valois, mexique, 40-43. =271=morales to commander of ulúa, oct. 20, 1846. moore, scott's campaign, 12. conner, castle of s. juan de ulloa, 13. parker, recolls., 79. (learned) _monitor repub._, nov. 13, 30, 1846; mar. 28, 1847. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 413-4. =166=campbell to conner, jan. 9, 1847. =166=pommarès to conner, oct. 15, 1846. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 911, 1169 (scott). meade, letters, i, 188. diccionario univ. (_ulúa_). =47=conner, oct. 4, 1846. =165=_id._ to scott, jan. 18; feb. 5, 1847. =100=soto to jefe, v. cr. dept., sept. 17, 1846. =100=jefe to v. cr. ayunt., dec. 21, 1846. bishop, journal, 29. _niles_, may 9, 1846, p. 160. _so. quart. rev._, july, 1851. =86=v. cruz congress, manifiesto, mar. 9. and from =76= the following. a large amount of correspondence between the dept. and successive commanders at vera cruz, particularly in march, april, sept. and oct., 1846, jan. and feb., 1847, relating to the fortifications, garrison, supplies and dangers of the city and ulúa. s. anna, oct. 12, 14, 20, 1846; jan. 14, 18; apr. 29, 1847. morales, jan. 20, 1847. tampico letter to garay, jan. 25. soto, feb. 7, 15; mar. 7, etc. morales, feb. 9, 15; mar. 4, 5, etc. _boletín de la democracia_, mar. 2, 1847 (n. y. letter, jan. 8). to s. anna, oct. 17, 1846; jan. 30, 1847. to morales, mar. 6, 7. morales, proclam., mar. 5. landero, report, apr. 3. jalapa letter, mar. 16. canalizo to hacienda, jan. 11. landero, jan. 25, 1847. j. alvarez, oct. 21, 1846. memo., feb. 9, 1847. tampico letter, dec. 30, 1846. morales to marín, mar. 11. 22.10. what scott called his "little cabinet" consisted of col. totten (chief engineer), lieut. col. hitchcock (acting inspector general), capt. robert e. lee (engineer) and h. l. scott (acting as military secretary). col. james bankhead was chief artillery officer, capt. huger was acting chief of ordnance, and maj. turnbull was the chief topographical engineer (sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 239-40). col. harney commanded the regular cavalry, and capt. edson commanded three companies of marines loaned by conner, and temporarily attached to the third artillery. at this time the engineers, artillery and cavalry were kept by scott under his immediate orders. while at lobos islands he laid down the rule (=65=gen. orders 33) that every project of siege or bombardment should first be discussed between the senior engineer and artillery officers and then reported to him for approval or amendment. hence the detailed plan for the operations at vera cruz came formally from totten, and he has been credited with originating it. 22.11. simms wrote to gov. hammond of south carolina that scott's operations at vera cruz lacked brilliancy. 22.12. conner had reckoned upon the starvation method; but (1) the amount of supplies in the town and castle was not certainly known and, as we shall find, was too large for this method; (2) fishing was a resource of unmeasured value (even from the mole great quantities of fish were caught: _delta_, oct. 16, 1847); (3) it was possible that on some night the american line might be temporarily broken, and thousands of cattle be run into the city; (4) as british observers agreed, the mexicans were capable of bearing privations for a long while; (5) scott rested under an imperative obligation to remove his army from the coast in time to save it from the vómito; and (6) he had to count on reducing ulúa after capturing the city. 22.13. =13=giffard, mar. 11. scott, mems., ii, 422-5. ballentine, english soldier, ii, 3-6. davis, autobiog., 140-1. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 223, 239. balbontín, estado, 53, 55. =65=scott, gen. orders 33. =12=matson to commodore, mar. 11, 25. steele, amer. campaigns, i, 120. n. y. _sun_, aug. 16, 1847 (scott should have left 5000 to reduce v. cruz). _so. quart. rev._, july, 1851. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 47-9. oswandel, notes, 101. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 892 (conner). mccall, letters, 483. moore, scott's camp., 12. 22.14. this seems like a foolhardy performance; but other boats had gone as near without being fired upon, and the _petrita_ was supposed to be out of range (_mag. am. hist._, xiv, 567). the engineers intended of course to get as near as they could with safety, and it is possible that scott wished to set an example of fearlessness. mccall, who was on board, wrote that this occurred on mar. 6; other accounts place it on the seventh. 22.15. just as the fleet was leaving antón lizardo, 800 louisiana volunteers arrived. these, with a shipload who came some hours later, gave scott upwards of 11,000 men. his =62=return of mar. 25 included 13,470. 22.16. with some light guns, which would probably have been lost, a thousand americans might have been accounted for. it has been suggested that until the boats moved toward the shore the mexicans did not know where the blow would fall; but their own explanation was that they had no suitable troops to spare for the purpose (tributo á la verdad, 28). morales had, however, what he called an extra-muros section, _i.e._, militia. a lack of intelligence, enterprise or nerve was doubtless the real cause of his remissness. the one shot mentioned in the text probably came from a gun found later among the dunes (=69=backus to brady, sept. 22, 1848). a company of sappers and miners and an iron boat loaded with entrenching tools and sand-bags accompanied worth's brigade. less than half the surf-boats ordered by scott had arrived. 22.17. _the landing._ bullock, six months (1825), i, 10. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 216-8, 220, 222 (scott); 239-40 (gen. orders 80). ho. 1; 30, 2. pp. 1177-9. apuntes, 153. engineer school, u. s. army, occasional papers, no. 16. =218=henshaw narrative. =280=nunelee, diary. =216=heiman, first regt. of tenn. =159=collins, diary. =298=porter, diary. =69=backus to brady, sept. 22, 1848. robertson, remins., 216-9. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 540, 551. scott, mems., ii, 413-4, 418-9, 421. ballentine, english soldier, i, 292-303. davis, autobiog., 125. tributo á la verdad, 28, etc. mccall, letters, 475. taylor, broad pennant, 125. _picayune_, mar. 25. meade, letters, 187-8. =65=scott, gen. orders 28, 33, 34, 42, 45. =12=matson to commodore, mar. 11. oswandel, notes, 67-70, 83. semmes, service, 111, 125-7. ramírez, méxico, 234. lawton, artillery officer, 74, 79, 167. =270=moore, diary. _journ. milit. serv. instit._, v, 37; xxiv, 422-8. moore, scott's campaign, 5. _revue des deux mondes_, aug. 1, 1847, p. 418. conner, home squadron, 18-20, 60-70. smith, to mexico, 113-4. nebel and kendall, 17. parker, recolls., 49, 83, 85-6. =162=conner to wife, jan. 11; mar. 10, _united service_, july, 1895, p. 37; dec., 1896, pp. 492-517. stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 108. jones, tattnall, 58. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 847, 1169 (scott); 892 (conner). sedgwick, corresp., i, 71-2. =254=mcclellan, diary. =165=conner, mar. 11; order, mar. 7; to forrest, mar. 7. =316=judd to sherman, feb. 26, 1848. _mag. of amer. hist._, xiv (scammon). _so. quart. rev._, july, 1851. =139=w. b. campbell to wife, mar. 13. =76=morales, mar. 9, 10. =76=landero, report, apr. 3. 22.18. the consuls were in close touch with one another and with the mexicans, and hence the charge that scott gave no warning of a bombardment falls to the ground. he could not be expected to state positively and precisely what he intended to do. by mar. 13 morales reached the conclusion that he would not assault (=82=m. to gov. puebla, mar. 13), and by mar. 20 that a bombardment was to be expected (=76=m. to guerra y marina, mar. 20). intercourse with neutral vessels was allowed to remain open until the morning of mar. 23 (=12=matson to commodore, mar. 25), mainly as a way of escape for neutrals (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 230) (closed then--except under a flag of truce--because affording moral aid and comfort _ibid._, p. 228); and matson, the british naval commander, warned the british residents with his utmost energy that they would not be safe during "an assault or a bombardment" (=12=m. to commodore, apr. 2). he was notified in advance that intercourse with neutral vessels would shortly be cut off, and so informed giffard officially on march 18 for the benefit of british residents (=12=m. to commodore, march 25). scott's warning note to the spanish consul (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 219) referred to the city, not to ulúa, for the consuls resided in the city; yet matson and giffard had the face to assert that on the authority of conner they understood that only ulúa would be bombarded. matson admitted that he did this for effect on perry (=12=to commodore, apr. 2); and he did not question scott's right to act as he did (=12=to perry, mar. 27). again, scott's summons stated that batteries adequate to reduce the city were in readiness, and this was further notice of a bombardment. everything compatible with the military necessities of the united states was thus done for neutrals and non-combatants. moreover morales replied that scott might attack in the way he thought most advantageous (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 227). the truth is that the people were full of fighting spirit, did not know what real war meant, and felt not a little confidence. giffard certainly (=12=matson to commodore, mar. 25) and (as perry reported, =47=oct. 22) the other consuls probably took under their protection large quantities of property belonging to mexicans. by means of kites the mexicans distributed addresses to the "honest" americans, defying their prowess but inviting them to accept lands, as friends and brethren, in the country of perpetual spring. 22.19. the americans admitted the skill of the mexican gunners. twenty-eight balls were put through a wall five feet high and 150 feet long, more than a mile distant. americans were supposed to be lying behind the wall (kenly, md. volunteer, 267). 22.20. scott still supposed ulúa would have to be reduced after the capture of vera cruz, and felt greatly troubled by the non-arrival of the larger part of the heavy ordnance, etc., that had been duly called for (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 222). he was annoyed also by his lack of enough cavalry for thorough reconnoitring, and by the passing and repassing of small boats between the city and the north shore. owing to the treacherous weather none of the american vessels could lie close enough to the coast to stop this intercourse entirely. a sortie against the batteries was to be anticipated, but access to them was made so easy and secure that such an attack could have been repulsed. the squadron endeavored to divert the attention of the enemy while the mortars were being placed. 22.21. _scott's preliminary operations._ =13=giffard, feb. 28, 1847. engineer school, u. s. a., occas. papers, no. 16. =218=henshaw narrative. charleston _mercury_, apr. 6, 1847. =280=nunelee, diary. trans. ills. state hist. soc., 1906, p. 179. =159=collins, diary. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 216-25, 244-9 (reports of scott and his officers). ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1177 (conner). =298=porter, diary. =61=bankhead to scott, mar. 26. =60=pickett to ----, mar. 10. robertson, remins., 220-27. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 552. scott, mems., ii, 426. hitchcock, fifty years, 240-5. grant, mems., i, 127. ballentine, english soldier, i, 304-6; ii, 18-9. davis, autobiog., 126. tributo á la verdad, 29. mccall, letters, 477. hartman, journal, 7-8. _picayune_, mar. 26, 30, 31; apr. 2, 4. meade, letters, i, 191. =350=weber, recolls. =65=scott, gen. orders, nos. 33, 53. mccabe, lee, 17. =12=matson to commodore, mar. 11. oswandel, notes, 71-85. semmes, service, 129. =139=w. b. campbell to d. c., mar. 20. =210=simms to hammond, may 1. lawton, artillery officer, 73, 78, 81, 84, 89. =124=blocklenger, letter. =270=moore, diary. steele, amer. campaigns, i, 106. nebel and kendall, 18-9. =164=scott to conner, mar. 16. griffis, perry, 216. conner, home squadron, 68. _monitor repub._, mar. 16. =164=scott to conner, mar. 17, 18, 19, 20. _spirit of the times_, apr. 17. =166=dimond to conner, jan. 15. =166=campbell to conner, jan. 9. _united service_, july, 1895, p. 37. jones, tattnall, 57. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1169 (scott). =254=mcclellan, diary. =165=conner to scott, mar. 19. bishop, journal, 29. _so. quart. rev._, july, 1851. =76=morales, mar. 10, 16. =76=cano, mar. 26. _mag. of amer. hist._, xiv, 567. 22.22. the mosquito fleet consisted of the steamers _spitfire_ and _vixen_ under commanders j. tattnall and j. r. sands, and the gunboats _bonita_, _reefer_, _petrel_, _falcon_ and _tampico_ under lieuts. commanding f. g. benham, j. s. sterett, t. d. shaw, j. j. glasson and w. p. griffin (ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1182). each had a 32-pounder or 8-inch paixhan. additional information may be found in chap. xxx. 22.23. the parapet of the naval battery (known as no. 5) was of sandbags. each of the guns weighed 6300 pounds, and was mounted on a ship-carriage, so that transportation on land was extremely laborious. they were taken ashore march 23, and some 1500 men were employed in dragging them nearly two and a half miles through the sand. scott did not value the shell guns highly. they were 8-inch paixhans. captains aulick and mayo commanded the battery alternately. according to robert anderson the orders for the battery were issued by conner (lawton, artill. officer, 101) who had repeatedly offered it before scott gave up the hope of receiving adequate army ordnance in time (conner, home squad., 47, note 3). early on the morning of march 23 perry (who had withdrawn the mosquito fleet the previous evening) had tattnall launch a sharp though brief attack, presumably to divert attention from the naval battery, then under construction. an officer who gained fame later as commodore porter was tattnall's pilot. the opening of battery no. 4 (24-pounders, etc.) was delayed by a norther, and one of the howitzers was not ready as soon as the other pieces. only about half of the siege-train and ordnance stores called for in november arrived before vera cruz surrendered (see chap. xviii, note 18.11). 22.24. _summons and bombardment._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 222-44 (reports of scott and his officers; summons and reply; etc.); 230 (scott to consuls, mar. 25). ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175-83 (naval reports). =13=morales, circular, apr. 4. =13=giffard, nos. 7, 8, mar. 22, 29. =12=matson to commodore, mar. 25, 28; apr. 2; to perry, mar. 27. =47=perry, mar. 26; oct. 22. henshaw narrative. nunelee, diary. =216=heiman, first regt. trans. ill. state hist. soc., 1906, pp. 179-80. collins, diary. =224=hitchcock to lizzie, mar. 27. =60=perry to mason, mar. 25. =60=scott to perry and reply, mar. 25. =61=bankhead to scott, mar. 26. =60=pickett to ----, mar. 10. robertson, remins., 227-32, 278. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 555. scott, mems., ii, 426-7. hitchcock, fifty years, 244-7. ballentine, english soldier, ii, 24. davis, autobiog., 127. a soldier's honor, 24. apuntes, 155-8. tributo á la verdad, 30-1, 109. mccall, letters, 480. nebel and kendall, 19-21. hartman, journal, 9-10. _picayune_, apr. 4. meade, letters, i, 192. f. lee, lee, 36-7. mcclay, navy, ii, 180-1, 183. oswandel, notes, 90-5. semmes, service, 130-42. =139=w. b. campbell to d. c., mar. 28. _diario_, mar. 29; apr. 10. _regenerador repub._, apr. 7. kenly, md. volunteer, 267. lawton, artillery off., 91-7, 101, 104. caswell, diary. =322=smith, diary. moore, diary. =358=williams to father, mar. 25, 28. judah, diary. moore, scott's campaign, 15. arnold, jackson, 84. conner, home squadron, 47, note 3. wash. _union_, sept. 11. n. y. _sun_, apr. 16. =162=conner to wife, mar. 31. soley, porter, 67-9. jones, tattnall, 57. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 913, 1220 (scott). =180=scott to stribling, mar. 25. ramsey, other side, 190, note. bishop, journal. _so. quart. rev._, july, 1851. weekly _courier and n. y. enquirer_, mar. 2, 1848 (letter probably by hitchcock). griffis, perry, 221-3. furber, twelve months vol., 519-40 =76=g. gómez, mar. 25. =76=soto, mar. 28. =76=morales, mar. 24. =76=vega mar. 25. 22.25. march 24 the consuls requested scott to grant a truce and allow the women and children to leave town (=12=matson to commodore, apr. 2). with perfect propriety he declined to do so (scott, mems., ii, 427), unless morales should ask for a truce with a view to surrender (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 226), pointing out that due warnings had been given (note 22.18). he could not afford to suspend his operations or let the number of mouths be diminished; and doubtless he was counting on the moral effect of the presence of women and children. time pressed; there were well-founded reports that a mexican army was approaching; and cases of yellow fever had occurred (scott, mems., ii, 427, and see davis, autobiog., 141). scott's action looks hard, but it was humane to force an immediate surrender. roa bárcena (recuerdos, 178) fully admits that the american policy was just. this move of the consuls tended to shake the confidence of the mexicans, and led to dissensions among the officers. march 25 harney was sent against a force posted at a bridge near medellín, about ten miles from vera cruz (sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 250-2). including reinforcements, his detachment consisted of about 500 men with artillery. the independent reports of the two principal mexican officers give their number as 140-50 with scarcely any ammunition. harney thought there were 2000 of them, and claimed great credit for carrying the day. his orders were to reconnoitre only. there were other insignificant affairs (sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 249-55; ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 915; reavis, harney, 186). 22.26. _on the mexican side._ =13=giffard, mar. 11, 29. =12=matson to commodore, mar. 25; apr. 2. papeles varios, no. 10. henshaw narrative. nunelee, diary. collins, diary. robertson, remins., 222. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 552-3, etc. ballentine, english soldier, ii, 32-3. davis, autobiog., 138. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 220-38 (reports, etc.). tributo á la verdad, 29, 30, 109 (ult. boletín). apuntes, 157-60. _picayune_, apr. 9. (fish) _delta_, oct. 16. =312=morales, apr. 3. _revue de paris_, dec., 1844. semmes, service, 149. =82=noticias de veracruz. =86=relaciones to gov., jan. 27. =86=treasurer to gov., jan. 15. =86=many letters regarding inability to pay the tax. =100=morales to ayunt., mar. 12, 17, 20; reply, mar. 14. =95=ibarra, proclam., mar. 23. _regenerador repub._, apr. 7. =82=gov. to legislature of puebla, mar. 9. =82=ibarra, proclam., mar. 17. =82=morales to gov. puebla, mar. 13. =86=_id._ to soto, mar. 8. lawton, artillery off., 106-7. caswell, diary. moore, diary. =375=morales to soto, mar. 14. _monitor repub._, apr. 4. _spirit of the times_, apr. 17. =80=legislature of méx. state, address. =165=conner to scott, mar. 19. bishop, journal. and from =76= the following. comte. gen. puebla, proclam., mar. 16. arrieta, mar. 15. cano, mar. 26. s. anna, apr. 29. memo., feb. 9. f. vázquez, mar. 26. soto, jan. 23, 26; mar. 7, 9, 19, 24, 25 (two). g. gómez, mar. 18, 19, 20 (two). vega, mar. 24, 25 (two). canalizo, apr. 1. morales, mar. 5, 10, 16, 20, 24. landero, jan. 30, apr. 3. hacienda, mar. 15. to g. gómez, mar. 16. to soto, mar. 28. and many documents of minor importance. 22.27. morales, probably in view of santa anna's enmity, would not surrender though he believed he ought to do so (=76=landero, apr. 3), but he turned the command over to landero when capitulation was seen to be inevitable, and left the city in a boat during the night of march 25-6. he induced gen. josé durán, who commanded at ulúa, to regard himself as under landero's orders, it was stated by santa anna (=76=apr. 29), and so brought about the surrender of the castle. this apparently singular move was doubtless made to save vera cruz from being bombarded by ulúa. (recognizing this danger to the city, scott intimated, when summoning the town, that no batteries would be established in it against ulúa, unless ulúa should open fire upon it.) there was considerable dissatisfaction among the americans because the prisoners were set free, for their parole was justly deemed of slight value; but it would have been costly, and perhaps not easy, to hold them at vera cruz or send them to the united states, and they did good service by spreading tales of american prowess. mar. 26 the consuls went to scott's camp under a white flag, but he would not see them (=12=matson to commodore, apr. 2). on the morning of march 27 two boat-loads of neutrals under the french flag attempted to reach the neutral vessels at sacrificios, but perry would not allow them to proceed (=12=matson to commodore, apr. 2). (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 178, admits that perry's course was proper.) at about the same time the consuls and the second alcalde threatened that unless the military chiefs would promptly bring hostilities to an end, they would lead the non-combatants toward the american lines at the risk of being fired upon. this was said to have had great effect in town, but the chiefs had already decided to give up. owing to bad weather the navy was not represented at all the deliberations. some of the american military men felt that the share of the navy did not entitle its representative to sign the capitulation. it was stated by sedgwick that, aside from the investment, only about 600 americans took part in the operations. 22.28. next to matson's figures our best evidence regarding the casualties is the statement of giffard, that hundreds of women and children, harbored at the consulates, escaped from harm though the buildings suffered (=13=mar. 29). many other buildings were no doubt equally solid and equally distant from the principal scene of destruction. vera cruz was a great importing city, where large stocks of goods needed to be securely housed. mercantile establishments had strong vaults, in which families now took refuge. many found safety on the long mole. scott asserted that most of the people were sheltered in the basements. consequently one can hardly believe that more than 500 persons out of a civilian population probably not exceeding 3000 were injured. lieut. mackall believed that perhaps thirty or forty soldiers were killed or wounded (=252=apr. 30). kendall, editor of the new orleans _picayune_, who was on the ground, represented 150 as a mean estimate of the total number that perished (_picayune_, apr. 9). landero reported 750 killed and 200 wounded (=76=apr. 3), evidently an absurd statement, for a greater number must have been hurt than killed. other mexican estimates rose as high as 600 civilians killed, which would imply on a reasonable calculation that almost every civilian was hit. one of the best mexican authorities (_apuntes_, 165) states that 600 or more soldiers were wounded, and 400 of these lost their lives. this is far too large a percentage of fatalities. how accurate this authority is may be judged also from the fact that the americans are said to have thrown 6700 projectiles into the town, whereas (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 244) the number was actually about 2500 (possibly besides those from the naval battery, which may have thrown 800). it is worth while to add that scott was persistently represented (partly to exalt the mexicans and partly to injure the americans) as having destroyed a great number of non-combatants, but morales wrote on march 24 that most of the killed and wounded had been soldiers. next let us inquire as to the provisions. giffard stated (=13=mar. 29) that when the mexicans surrendered, the city had food enough for three days and the castle for ten; but probably he had reference only to the provisions belonging to the authorities, and perhaps, as he had objected strongly to the destruction of property and tried to stop the bombardment by sending word to scott that hunger would force the mexicans to yield in a few days, he felt compelled to support that representation. march 10 conner thought the enemy had subsistence enough for about four or five weeks (ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1179). =76=april 29, after having talked with officers from vera cruz, santa anna assured the minister of war that morales could have held out until he (santa anna) could have arrived with regular forces. gov. soto, who went down to the coast, where he was in communication with the city by means of boats and doubtless knew whether stocks of foodstuffs (belonging perhaps to neutrals) existed there, placed drafts for $30,000, payable at vera cruz, in the hands of morales on march 24 (=76=soto, march 25). this money must have been intended solely or principally for provisions, for on the fourteenth morales had written to soto that nothing else was needed. on the same day $2000 from oaxaca were delivered. these sums would have purchased enough food to last beyond april 15. about march 17 a french barque ran in during a norther, which shows that supplies from the outside could be hoped for. the property loss due to the bombardment was estimated at five to six million dollars (_monitor repub._, apr. 4). the southwest quarter of the town was demolished. it was ordered that not only morales, but landero and durán should be tried. besides disliking morales, santa anna felt resentment against vera cruz for receiving him so coldly in august, 1846. 22.29. _the surrender_; _losses_ (note 22.28). sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 224-6 (scott); 228 (consuls); 229-38 (scott, etc.); 239 (gen. orders 80). apuntes, 159-66. mccall, letters, 483-4. _picayune_, apr. 9. =252=mackall to father, mar. 30. =312=morales, apr. 3. =12=matson to commodore, mar. 25; apr. 2; to perry, mar. 27; reply, mar. 27. semmes, service, 141. _diario_, mar. 27; apr. 4, 8. _regenerador repub._, apr. 7. lawton, artillery off., 98, 100, 106. hiney, diary. =358=williams to father, mar. 28. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 160. =375=morales to soto, mar. 14. _monitor repub._, apr. 4, 5. n. y. _sun_, aug. 16. =166=kirby to conner, mar. 27. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1186. _mag. of amer. hist._, xiv, 570. bishop, journal. =13=giffard, nos. 7, 8, mar. 22, 29. henshaw narrative. collins, diary. =95=puebla ayunt., address, apr. 7 (v. cruz yielded because of "the lamentations of innocent families expecting every instant to die"). roa bárcena, recuerdos, 177-9. tributo á la verdad, 109 (ult. bol.). nebel and kendall, 21. robertson, remins., 232. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 558-69. scott, mems., ii, 427-9. hitchcock, fifty years, 243-8. =76=landero, apr. 3. =76=_id._ to canalizo, mar. 31. =76=canalizo, apr. 1. =76=s. anna, apr. 4, 29. =76=to s. anna, may 4. =76=terms of capitulation. the date of the capitulation was mar. 27. had vera cruz held out until april 15, perhaps 5000 regulars would have been in scott's rear (chap. xxiii, note 23.12). with this backing, 3-4000 irregulars could probably have been embodied. by means of signals and boat communication operations in concert with the garrison of vera cruz could have been arranged for, and the prospect would have encouraged the city to hold out to the uttermost. very likely scott's line could have been broken, and provisions introduced. he could not, then, before the advent of the yellow fever, have reduced ulúa and vera cruz, and have made the preparations necessary for advancing into a hostile region in the face of a numerous enemy. when the fever became active, santa anna's upper country troops could have retired quickly, leaving the americans to be annoyed by the coast forces. other diseases quite as fatal as the vómito prevailed in that district (thompson, recolls., 4). lieut. hatch (to father, apr. 2) wrote that all attributed the surrender to the effect of scott's artillery upon the civilians, and the circumstances prove as much. 22.30. the northers, though in themselves a scourge, drove the mosquitoes away, and so prevented the yellow fever. they subsided about the middle of april, and then the fever was due. 22.31. _hardships and consolations._ (losses) ho. 24; 31, 1; sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 253-5; ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1185 (naval). henshaw narrative. charleston _mercury_, apr. 6. nunelee, diary. collins, diary. _american eagle_, v. cruz, apr. 8. =60=pickett to ----, mar. 10. vigne, travels, i, 8. robertson, remins., 223, 226-7. campos, recuerdos, 31. scott. mems., ii, 430. ballentine, english soldier, ii, 8, 15. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 221 (gen. orders 54); 224-6 (scott, mar. 23). _picayune_, apr. 4. =350=weber, recolls. maury, recolls., 34. =12=matson to commodore, mar. 11, 25. oswandel, notes, 71-4, 79-81. semmes, service, 107-8. lawton, artillery off., 79, 88, 96. gilliam, travels, 40. =361=woods, recolls. caswell, diary. =327=sutherland to father, july 15. moore, diary. =136=butterfield, recolls. _spirit of the times_, apr. 17. stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 115. tennery, diary. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 879 (conner). bruell, sea memories, 57. lancaster co. hist. soc. mag., mar. 6, 1908 (nauman). our army loss was nine killed and fifty-one wounded (ho. 24; 31, 1). 22.32. _occupation of city and "castle."_ _american eagle_, v. cruz, apr. 6. nunelee, diary. collins, diary. polk, diary, may 15. robertson, remins., 232. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 567-8. naredo, orizaba, 108. hitchcock, fifty years, 247. davis, autobiog., 129-30. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 229, 235 (scott); 237-8. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1185 (perry). apuntes, 166-7. _picayune_, apr. 9, 10, 14. lawton, artillery off., 110, =252=mackall to father, mar. 30. =12=matson to commodore, apr. 2. oswandel, notes, 98. semmes, service, 145-6. _regenerador repub._, apr. 7. lawton, artillery off., 102-3. =222=hiney, diary. =146=caswell, diary. =322=smith, diary. =270=moore, diary. _id._, scott's campaign, 23. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 907 (marcy); 911 (scott). tennery, diary. sedgwick, corresp., i, 79-80. bishop, journal. _littell_, no. 157, p. 326 (hine). =139=w. b. campbell to wife, mar. 31. _britannia_, may 15 (v. cruz letter, apr. 1). =76=landero, gen. orders, mar. 29-30. =76=s. anna, apr. 29. nebel and kendall, 21. some of the national guards broke up and took flight in order to avoid surrendering. as fast as the arms were stacked american sentries mounted guard over them. when the mexican soldiers found the victors offering to divide rations with them, their sentiments became friendly, and most of those belonging at vera cruz went back to town that day. xxiii. cerro gordo 23.1. according to a memo. furnished by the adjutant general to the ordnance bureau, mar. 24, scott's forces were as follows. i. regulars. 1 dragoons, co. f. 2 dragoons, cos. a, b, c, f, i, k. *mounted riflemen (on foot). 1 art., co. k. 2 art., co. a. 3 art., co. h. (these three companies had field batteries.) artillery serving as infantry: *1 art., cos. b, f, g, h, i; _2 art., cos. b, c, d, f, g, h, i, k_; _3 art., cos. a, b, d, g, k_; *4 art., cos. a, d, e, f, g, h. 1 inf., cos. c, e, f, g, h, k. *2 inf., cos. a, b, d, e, f, g, h, i, k. *3 inf., cos. c, d, f, g, h, i, k. _4 inf., cos. a, b, c, d, e, i._ _5 inf., cos. e, f, g, h, i, k._ _6 inf., cos. a, c, d, e, f, h._ *7 inf., cos. c, d, e, f, i, k. _8 inf., cos. a, b, d, e, h, i, k._ (italics indicate the division of bvt. maj. gen. worth; asterisks that of brig. gen. twiggs.) ii. volunteers. (maj. gen. patterson.) tenn. mounted regt. infantry: baltimore and wash. battal.; ga. regt.; ala. regt.; two tenn. regts.; two ill. regts.; ky. co.; la. co.; la. regt.; two pa. regts.; n. y. regt.; s. c. regt. this list includes troops not mentioned by scott (mems., ii, 460-5). as worth was now serving with his brevet rank his command was called a division. the same change was made in twiggs's case. a letter of mar. 13 from marcy, due to a suggestion from polk of the day before, urged scott to make the protection of the troops against yellow fever his prime consideration (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904; polk, diary, mar. 12, 20). at the same time it gave a slanting assent to the movement against the capital by discussing the question of roads. this was scott's first authorization to proceed (_so. quart. rev_., apr., 1852), and the cabinet had not decided to have him do so, though he had assumed that benton's plan, endorsed by himself, was the basis of his expedition (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 913). the hesitation of the government is illustrated by the fact that marcy first wrote merely, "if you should occupy an interior position," which he changed to, "if you should move into the interior" (marcy papers). 23.2. this proclamation has been censured on the ground that it exasperated the mexicans by mentioning their domestic dissensions and bad government. if so, the blame rested primarily on the american government, which had ordered taylor to circulate a proclamation embodying such ideas (p. 1 of chap. xxxi). the word "unnatural" has been thought unfortunate as suggesting (since ordinary war seemed to mexico perfectly normal, and scott could not be supposed to be reflecting upon himself and his government) that the mexicans were acting in an inhuman and indecent way; but the author does not recall seeing any such point made by them. 23.3. many wagons were lost in wrecked vessels. it had been supposed that about two thirds of the animals would be obtained locally, but it was found by april 5 that not one tenth of them could be reckoned upon. 23.4. harney proceeded to la antigua on april 2 with two squadrons of dragoons, a section of artillery and two infantry companies, drove lancers from the village, captured about thirty-five horses and obtained mexican promises of assistance from the people (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 915-6). he returned the next day. the alvarado expedition set out on march 30. it was a joint affair designed not only (like harney's) to obtain draft animals and beef cattle and open up permanent markets for these desiderata, but to impress and "neutralize" the people of that section, acquire a harbor for perry's small vessels, provide a regular supply of water for the squadron, and perhaps capture the mexican vessels lying there. perry himself commanded the naval contingent, and quitman commanded the land force, which consisted of three volunteer regiments (ga., ala. and s. car.), a squadron of dragoons and a section of artillery (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 917-8). the march of about fifty miles (about 44 by the present railroad) was at times difficult and always hot. late on april 1 perry and quitman reached alvarado, a fishing town of 1200-1500 persons; and the land forces arrived the next day. they found it occupied by an american midshipman and five sailors. lieut. hunter, commanding a one-gun propeller, the _scourge_, sent down to assist in blockading the town, had violated his orders (probably to show what the naval men were capable of doing, if given a chance to act) by opening fire, upon which the town (though it endeavored later to rescind its action) had offered to surrender. learning that public property had been taken up the alvarado river, here a wide, clear, deep stream, he pursued it and, to take advantage of the panic resulting from the fall of vera cruz, captured the industrious town of tlacotálpam. quitman accepted this turn of events genially, but perry was furious, and to the disgust of many naval officers and the general public hunter was tried and cashiered. to scott the results of hunter's error were serious (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 547). the intention had been to grant capitulations to the towns on terms that would have provided the americans with a large number of the needed animals (wash. _union_, sept. 11) or to obtain the same result in some other way; but hunter's action, though only one day in advance, gave time for the removal of the livestock. quitman did, however, arrange with the authorities of tlacotálpam for at least 500 horses, and opened negotiations for more and for beef cattle. how fruitful these arrangements proved cannot be stated. april 8 about 300 of the fifth infantry sailed from vera cruz for the same district (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928), and about april 14 they brought back some wild mustangs. on retiring from alvarado the mexicans burned the few small vessels that constituted the national navy, and spiked or buried the ordnance of the forts. the buried guns were, however, discovered. in all they numbered about sixty, but a large part were valueless carronades. for quitman's troops the expedition was unfortunate. a number died and almost all were prostrated. he was back at vera cruz april 6. the affair amused the american public hugely. one evidence of this is afforded by the following lines (n. y. _sun_, may 7, 1847): "on came each gay and gallant ship, on came the troops like mad, oh! but not a soul was there to whip, unless they fought a shadow; "five sailors sat within a fort, in leading of a lad, oh! and thus was spoiled the pretty sport of taking alvarado." 23.5. _scott's preparations for advancing (including the alvarado expedition)._ ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 903 (marcy); 908, 912-3, 920, 928, 937, 1221, 1271 (scott); 915 (harney); 917 (quitman); 918 (mason); 939 (gen. orders). =60=scott to marcy, apr. 5. _courrier français_, apr. 17. =61=harney, report, apr. 4. negrete, invasion, iii, app., 435. scott, mems., ii, 431. robertson, remins., 238. velasco, geografía, iii, 203. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 230 (scott); 547 (jesup). davis, autobiog., 140. _delta_, may 19. diccionario universal (_alvarado_). =164=scott to conner, mar. 20. =60= mason to j. l. smith, apr. 9. semmes, service, 148, 211. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 445, mar. 2, 1847. nebel and kendall, 23. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1190. lawton, artill. officer, 121. =270=moore, diary. _id._, scott's camp., 44-9, 52. griffis, perry, 239. parker, recolls., 103-4. =12=captain of _alarm_ to commodore, apr. 13. bennett, steam navy, 94, 97. maclay, navy, ii, 185. =358=williams to father, apr. 5. =62=adj. gen. to ordnance dept., mar. 24. =65=scott, gen. orders 87, 91, 105. =65=_id_., proclam., apr. 11. =13=giffard, no. 12, apr. 13. polk, diary, mar. 12-14. =13=pakenham, no. 7, jan. 28. _metropol. mag._, jan., 1908, p. 441. soley, porter, 71. wash. _union_, sept. 11. n. y. _sun_, may 7, 21. _niles_, may 1, pp. 131, 141; 22, p. 189. _southwest. hist. qtrly._, xviii, 216. steele, am. campaigns, i, 120. =76=marin, jan. 2; apr. 26. =76=lópez, jan. 15. =60=plan of alvarado. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1200 (mackenzie). worth, although he had been given the most prominent place in the operations against vera cruz, demanded the leading position in the advance, and felt deeply offended when scott, mindful of the rights of the second division, replied that he would not, even to please his best friend, do an injustice (_mag. am. hist._, xiv, 573-4). there was a route to the interior _via_ orizaba, but it was not available for artillery. in reply to marcy's despatch of march 13, which suggested that the advance be made from tuxpán, scott pointed out the impracticability of that plan (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 909). 23.6. in january gen. r. d. de la vega was made chief of the division of the east and provided with an army--mostly of paper. the same month alonzo wenghieri offered to furnish 50,000 muskets, 25,000 tercerolas (carbines of a certain kind) and 50,000 swords at reasonable prices, but it is not certain that his offer, though endorsed by the war department, was accepted (=76=to hacienda, jan. 14). by march 12, four 16-pounders from vera cruz arrived at the national bridge. march 18 orders proper for the situation were despatched to la vega, but they sound as if issued mainly for form's sake. in february the government attempted to take control of 25,000 national guards for the purposes of the war (=76=circular feb. 3); but it soon rescinded that unpalatable assumption of authority, and confined itself to asking state governors for them (=76=circular, apr. 8). 23.7. march 24 the northern brigades were at querétaro on their way south (=76=acuerdo,[1] mar. 24). rangel's brigade and some artillery left the capital march 28. march 30, 1400 national guards, who had been turned over to the national government by the governor of the state (=82=guerra to gov., apr. 1), left puebla to join 700 of the same class already at jalapa, and some 12-pounders were despatched from the former city. these forces were primarily designed to aid in the defence of vera cruz by attacking scott's rear. there was great need of money, especially as the attitude of the clergy was now so dubious that even drafts accepted by them were distrusted (_diario_, june 8). [1] "acuerdo," frequently to be mentioned hereafter in the mexican citations, meant the decision of an executive conference, and was applied also to the memorandum embodying the decision. the conferences referred to will usually be those in which the president or at least the cabinet was concerned.] 23.8. one method of rousing the public was to excite religious fanaticism. a pamphlet, _clamor de las ovejas_, declared that some of the vera cruz churches were to be sold to protestants, others to mohammedans, others to pigs, others to worshippers of venus. 23.9. _mexican preparations before santa anna arrived on the ground._ _courrier français_, apr. 3, 10, 17. =52=consul black, apr. 25. davis, autobiog., 142. =13=bankhead, no. 34, 1847. apuntes, 120-2, 168. _revue indep._, apr. 25, 1845. memoria de ... guerra, dec., 1846. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 574. _diario_, mar. 29; june 8. _monitor repub._, mar. 31. rivera, jalapa, iii, 888. balbontín, invasión, 105. =94=canalizo, proclams., apr. 2, 4. =94=soto, proclams., jan. 22; feb. 5. _regenerador repub._, mar. 31. =84=guerra, decree, feb. 13. =84=relaciones, circular, feb. 16. _republicano_, mar. 31. ramsey, other side, 221, note. and from =76= the following (out of a great number). to rincón, oct. 10, 11, 1846. to la vega, jan. 25; mar. 18, 20, 27, 1847. acuerdos, mar. 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31; apr. 1. to gaona, apr. 1. to canalizo, mar. 28, 31; apr. 1. gaona, mar. 18; apr. 1. soto, mar. 7, 22, 26; apr. 3. g. gómez, mar. 18, 19, 25, 26. la vega, mar. 22, 24. canalizo, mar. 30; apr. 1, 3. to soto, apr. 1. soto to v. cruz cong., dec. 1, 1846. morales, oct. 15, 1846; feb. 2, 6, 1847. canalizo to his troops, mar. 29. guerra, circulars, feb. 3, 13; mar. 31; apr. 8. to comte. gen. mex., mar. 25. canalizo, proclam., mar. 29. to gov. puebla, apr. 1. gov. puebla, mar. 28. a little later santa anna had the spiked cannon drawn to cerro gordo by cattle. 23.10. the northern wall of the cañon is much more nearly vertical than the southern. the author went down one side and up the other by rough mule paths. 23.11. accounts differ as to the number of men and guns on each tongue but agree that _b_ was much more strongly guarded than _a_ and _c_. it had supporting works. after the battle r. e. lee wrote that the highway was commanded by thirty-five mexican guns (f. lee, gen. lee, 38). allowing four for el telégrafo, five for the battery at the camp, and seven for _d_, we should have nineteen left for the tongues. in all, according to the chief mexican artillery officer, there were forty-one pieces, so that santa anna was able to send additional guns to his left. there seems to have been a 12-pounder at _a_, but most of the guns were light. the four 16-pounders were at _d_, and commanded the highway. 23.12. after the battle santa anna reduced his numbers to about 6000 infantry (only about half of them permanent) and 1500 or 2000 cavalry (=76=may 7; negrete, invasión, iii, app., 112); but on march 20 (=76=to la vega) he had placed the troops from la angostura at 6000 (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 194, says 5650) to which must be added at least 2000 from the capital (_ibid._), 2000 (besides a brigade that arrived just before the battle) from puebla (note 23.7), and contingents from jalapa, coatepec and other places. mexican accounts run from santa anna's figures up to 15,000 (_republicano_, june 1, correspondent). canalizo, april 3, proclaimed that more than 12,000 were coming, and the troops to whom he referred did not include all who were present. =13=bankhead placed the number from mexico at 2500. roa bárcena (recuerdos, 195) specifies 3, 4, 5, 6 and 11 line regiments, 1, 2, 3, 4 ligero regiments, 5 and 9 cavalry, and 12 smaller corps of foot and horse. canalizo's demand that all citizens rally to the colors does not seem to have been very effective; but many who had given their parole at vera cruz were forced to take up arms (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 189). it appears safe to estimate that santa anna had at least 10,000, probably 11,000, and quite possibly 12,000 men besides the puebla brigade under arteaga, which arrived after the fight had begun. the brigade from mexico arrived april 11, and the three brigades from the north april 12. after the battle santa anna and others attempted to represent the troops as of wretched quality. but certainly he had picked the corps brought from the north, and there is no reason to suppose that the other troops were below the average. santa anna pretended that he lacked ammunition, but great quantities were found in the camp after the battle (oswandel, notes, 139). the distribution of it was very likely defective, however. it was asserted also that some of the cannon cartridges contained no powder. they should have been inspected. twenty-nine irishmen served in the hospital force (=76=acuerdo, mar. 30). the army was fairly well supplied with money. april 10 38,000 pesos went from the capital, and the bishop of puebla sent 10,000. 23.13. santa anna had water brought from el encero by a ditch, but it only began to run just as the battle opened. 23.14. _mexican preparations, apr. 4-16._ _delta_, may 1. _picayune_, may 2. =312=anaya to s. anna, apr. 9. =312=guerra to gov. puebla, apr. 9. =312=pablo to s. anna, apr. 8. =312=guerra to s. anna, apr. 9. =312=baranda to s. anna, apr. 8. _courrier français_, apr. 17. _repub._, apr. 22; june 1, 9. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 49. grant, mems., i, 134. apuntes, 121, 169-75. tributo á la verdad, 41. s. anna, apelación, 33-7. suárez y navarro, causas, 68. steele, amer. campaigns, i, 121. _diario_, mar. 29; apr. 3, 9, 30; june 10. gamboa, impug., 29-32. ramírez, méxico, 214, 229. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 157, 189. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 574. dublán, legislación, v, 264-5. _monitor repub._, apr. 24, 27, 28; may 3; oct. 24. =13=bankhead, no. 34, apr. 1. oswandel, notes, 139. =82=pavón, apr. 29. sedgwick, corres., i, 86. =76=gaona, apr. 8. =76=to canalizo, apr. 2. =76=to s. anna, apr. 9. =76=canalizo, mar. 29; apr. 3, 24. =76=s. anna, apr. 6, 7, 11, 13, 17, 29; may 7. =76=uraga, may 1. =76=memorias by heads of war dept., nov., 1847. =76=decrees, apr. 8, 10. =76=a great number of less important papers. no doubt, as willisen ("higher theory of war") and others have said, combining strategical defensive with tactical defensive is as a rule to be condemned; but here the circumstances were peculiar. the americans were pursued by the yellow fever, and only a decisive victory could save them from ruin. hence santa anna's policy cannot be censured unceremoniously. ripley (war with mexico) gives the name el telégrafo to la atalaya, an error that of course leads to much confusion. robles had a series of objections to the cerro gordo position. it could be turned; the rough and woody country made it possible for the enemy to get near; cavalry could not be used; the line was too long; a threatened point could not be easily reinforced; water was lacking; retreat, especially with artillery, would be difficult (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 197-8). 23.15. one of the field batteries was taylor's; the other was talcott's howitzer and rocket battery (r. jones to ordnance dept., dec. 3, 1846). steptoe's field battery and a squadron of dragoons accompanied patterson later. the statement regarding the artillery outfit is from lieut. hatch (=213=to father, apr. 7), who went with twiggs. 23.16. scott has been called rash for sending his army forward and exposing it to attack piecemeal. but (1) had it all formed one column it would have been no safer against a raid from some crossroad; (2) had it been attacked in front, numbers would not have signified, and the individual superiority of the americans as well as their superior artillery would have given them the advantage; and (3) santa anna, having possession of such fine defensive positions, was not likely to make a venturesome attack, especially as the battle of buena vista had shown how tenaciously the americans could defend themselves. the two last points bear also upon the criticism that santa anna ought to have attacked twiggs before the arrival of pillow and shields (see remark at the end of note 23.14). the volunteer division left vera cruz april 9 under patterson. it consisted of two brigades, for quitman's men had not sufficient transportation, and probably needed time to recover from the effects of the alvarado expedition. capt. loch, a british naval officer off vera cruz, was as much surprised as scott when it was found that santa anna had a large force at cerro gordo (=12=to commodore, apr. 9). 23.17. from the national bridge to cerro gordo the pavement was not in very good condition. above the latter point stone blocks took the place of cement. in places, where these had never been laid, or had been taken up by revolutionists, or had been overlaid with stones by floods, the highway was extremely bad. 23.18. the position looked impregnable but was not, for a besieging force could easily deprive the garrison of provisions and water. 23.19. _the march from vera cruz to plan del rio._ ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 920-2, 928 (scott); 921 (gen. orders 94). hartman, journal, 10. _picayune_, dec. 9. _delta_, may 15. =312=gutiérrez to gov. puebla, apr. 9. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 274 (twiggs). =217=henshaw papers. stapp, prisoners of perote, 159-60. raleigh _star_, may 5. =280=nunelee, diary. =159=narrative based on papers of f. collins. =220=higgins to clutter, apr. 1, 1851. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 36-48. davis, autobiog., 142-4. apuntes, 169. ward, mexico, i, 12; ii, 177-88. robertson, visit, i, 269. ruxton, adventures (1849), 22-5. tudor, tour, ii, 171-5. bullock, six months (1825), i, 32-42. orbigny, voyage, 409-10. robertson, remins., 238-40, 242. latrobe, rambler, 297. velasco, geografía, iii, 28, 37, 54, 64. lawton, artillery officer, 123, 132. engineer school, u. s. army, occas. papers, no. 16. =291=pierce, diary. _journal milit. service instit._, v, 38 (coppée). bishop, journal. =60=g. w. smith to stevens, apr. 23. hawthorne, pierce, 78-85. steele, amer. campaigns, i, 121. =185=memo. on the route. =356=whitcomb, diary. carleton, address. löwenstern, le mexique, 32. =236=judah, diary. wash. _union_, may 1. _vedette_, viii, no. 5. =322=smith, diary. norton, life. =270=moore, diary. =358=williams to father, apr. 21. =152=claiborne, memoirs. =136=butterfield, recolls. _revue de paris_, dec., 1844. =66=stevens to j. l. smith, may 7. =66=g. w. smith to stevens, may 1. =65=scott, gen. orders 91. thompson, recolls., 11-12. poinsett, notes, 25-9. =335=calendario de ontiveros. =12=loch to lambert, apr. 9. oswandel, notes, 108-10, 119. semmes, service, 162-75. =256=j. parrott to marcy, apr. 19. =254=mcclellan, diary. _mag. amer. hist._, xiv, 575. _littell_, no. 162, p. 546. =139=w. b. campbell to wife, apr. 8. moore, scott's camp. =71=diccionario universal (_puente nacional_). 23.20. _twiggs and his operations, apr. 11-13._ maury, recolls., 29. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 274 (twiggs). =217=henshaw papers. trans. ills. state hist. soc., 1906, p. 181. =159=narrative based on the papers of francis collins. polk, diary, apr. 30. =66=tower to twiggs, apr. 16. =60=scott (on twiggs), remarks on a letter from worth. _id._, mems., ii, 432. hitchcock, fifty years, 250. grant, mems., i, 131. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 25-6, 51-4. brackett, u. s. cavalry, 141. davis, autobiog., 143-6. apuntes, 173-5. robertson, remins., 240. =270=moore, diary. lancaster co. hist. soc. mag., mar. 6, 1908 (nauman). bishop, journal. =210=bragg to hammond, dec. 20, 1847; may 4, 1848. =327=sutherland to father, aug. --; nov. 28, 1847. =358=williams to father, apr. 21. =152=claiborne, mems. =112=beauregard to patterson, apr. 20. =204=gouverneur, diary. =66=tower to maj. smith, undated. =273=mullan, diary. lee, lee, 38. =139=w. b. to d. campbell, apr. 13. _hist. teacher's mag._, apr., 1912, p. 75. ho. 60; 30, 1; pp. 921 (gen. orders 94); 928 (scott). _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1852. =170=crooker to father, apr. 27. henry, camp. sketches, 268. furber, twelve months vol., 331. some may ask why scott put a general like twiggs forward. twiggs had a rank and a position that had to be recognized, and his officers and men had their right to see honorable service and win distinction. 23.21. major j. l. smith commanded the engineer company of fifty-one men. lee had ten of the men, and under his direction lieut. foster with eight had charge of building the road "located" by lee. lieut. mason also worked on the road. mcclellan with ten was assigned to pillow's command, and g. w. smith with ten to harney's (=66=g. w. smith to i. i. stevens, apr. 23). tower had charge of the reconnoitring on the mexican right. 23.22. i. i. stevens, one of the engineer officers, =66=reporting on may 7, stated in the most distinct manner that according to this plan el telégrafo was not to be attacked before the highway in its rear should have been occupied in strength, and that insistence upon this point constituted the essential difference between this plan and the operations previously suggested by beauregard. scott wrote to marcy (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261) that he had intended to turn the mexican position and attack in the rear. he clearly indicated as much in his memoirs (ii, 432), and his orders for the battle were that twiggs's division, supposed to be already near the highway, should move before daybreak to occupy it, while the orders only contemplated an attack in front as likely to be made before 10 o'clock. it was well understood in the army that his plan was to bag santa anna's army, and this implied--since some of the mexicans were likely to retire early--that the way of escape must be cut off before a frontal attack should be launched. stevens tried to reach the highway via the mexican right, but was taken ill and had to return (stevens, stevens, i, 124). 23.23. _scott's operations, apr. 12-16._ sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 261 (scott). _picayune_, may 1, 2. =217=henshaw papers. a soldier's honor, 24. trans. ills. state hist. soc., 1906, p. 181. =159=narrative based on the papers of f. collins. scott, mems., ii, 432. hitchcock, fifty years, 250. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 56-8. davis, autobiog., 144-8. bishop, journal. =322=smith, diary. =112=beauregard to patterson, apr. 20. =111=stevens to j. l. smith, may 7. =111=g. w. smith to stevens, apr. 23. =111=tower to j. l. smith, undated. =111=mason to j. l. smith, apr. 24. =65=scott, gen. orders 105, 111. =332=tennery, diary. mccabe, lee, 19, note. =12=loch to lambert, apr. 9. oswandel, notes, 113-5. stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 122-4. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 929 (scott); 939 (twiggs); 940 (pillow). 23.24. the range had to be estimated (=322=w. b. smith, diary), and perhaps it was not easy to rectify the estimate by seeing where the shot struck. many of them flew much too high. 23.25. scott's orders for the battle gave no directions for such a charge. his plan was to place twiggs's division and shields's brigade, supported by worth's command, on the highway in santa anna's rear and attack from that quarter. from one of his reports it appears that he made some suggestion to twiggs about the possibility of a frontal attack on el telégrafo--presumably in the case of some unlooked-for turn of events; but he did not expect that officer to create the turn. the charge seems to have been ordered by scott during the night (=213=hatch to father, apr. 21). to be sure, scott's orders spoke of a frontal attack, but evidently the reference was to pillow's movement. the officers of the rifles were taken by polk from civil life. scott offset this by having major sumner of the second dragoons, a veteran and able soldier, command the corps; but as sumner had been disabled on saturday, major loring was now at its head. when moving from shelter he exposed his men to being enfiladed by the enemy's cannon, and the other troops actually cried out, "that's the way to murder men" (=218=henshaw). this illustrates how political appointments are likely to work on the firing line. the rifles were expected to join in the attack on el telégrafo after repulsing the enemy on the left, but a part of them were unable to do so (p. 352). 23.26. _events of apr. 17-18 {except pillow's operations)._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 255-95, 298 (scott's orders; reports of himself and officers). maury, recolls., 37, 44. hartman, journal, 11. m'sherry, el puchero, 221-3. _picayune_, may 1, 6, 9, 19. _delta_, may 1, 15; june 18. =252=mackall to father, apr. 18. =335=trist, may 7, 25. =217=henshaw papers. trans. ills. state hist. soc., 1905, p. 213; 1906, pp. 182-3. =159=narrative based on f. collins papers. =6=riley court of inquiry. =60=plympton to scott, july 27. =60=e. k. smith to plympton, july 23. =60=j. r. smith to polk, nov. 30, 1848. =60=twiggs to j. r. smith, nov. 9, 1848. =60=morris to j. r. smith, nov. 15, 1848. =66=russell court of inquiry: orders 155. =223=hirschorn, recolls. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 46-52, 98-114. hitchcock, fifty years, 251-2. grant, mems., i, 132. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 59-84, 88, 90-1. davis, autobiog., 148-52, 155-8. apuntes, 175-83. tributo á la verdad, 42, 49, 62, 136. s. anna, apelación, 34-41. _id._, manifiesto, 1847, 7. eye witness, complete history, 79-80. robertson, remins., 248-52. lawton, artill. officer, 137-40, 267. engineer school, u. s. army, occas. papers, no. 16. n. y. _times_, july 16, 1916 (worth). bishop, journal. nebel and kendall, 24-5. s. anna, mi historia, 67-8. =66=g. w. smith to stevens, apr. 23. mansfield, mex. war, 195. =210=bragg to hammond, may 4, 1848. =254=mcclellan, diary; to sister, apr. 22. _diario_, apr. 28, 30; may 20; june 10, 23, 30. _republicano_, apr. 21, 23, 27; june 9; july 10. =84=ampudia to gov. s. l. potosí, oct. 10. gamboa, impug., 30. kenly, md. vol., 337. ramírez, méxico, 227-9, 231, 261. =298=porter, diary. london _times_, june 15. wash. _union_, may 10, 11; oct. 23. _monitor repub._, apr. 20, 23, 24, 27; may 3, 6; nov. 1, 30. _spirit of the times_, may 29; june 5. =124=blocklenger, recolls. =327=sutherland to father, aug. --. _vedette_, ii, no. 2. =322=smith, diary. =307=roberts to wife, apr. 21. =178=davis, diary. =270=moore, diary. =358=williams to father, apr. 21. =152=claiborne, memoirs. =112=beauregard to patterson, apr. 20. =66=stevens to j. l. smith, may 7. =66=tower to j. l. smith, undated. =66=mason to j. l. smith, apr. 24. arnold, jackson, 87. =66=g. w. smith to lee, apr. 20. =66=lee to twiggs, undated. =65=scott, gen. orders 249. =60=riley to westcott, nov. 30. =332=tennery, diary. giménez, apología. ho. 85; 30, 1. _journal u. s. artill._, 1892, pp. 419-20. lee, gen. lee, 38. oswandel, notes, 116, 122-8. semmes, service, 178-81, 183. rivera, jalapa, iii, 887-94. =82=soto to gov. puebla, apr. 18. =82=pavón to puebla sec. state, apr. 29. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1089 (hitchcock). _niles_, may 22, pp. 183, 188. =148=chamberlain, recolls. elderkin, biog. sketches, 66. _journ. mil. serv. instit._, xlii, 128. henderson, science of war, 215. stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 126. smithwick, evolution, 286. =76=s. anna, apr. 17, 21; may 7. =76=canalizo, apr. 18, 21. =76=carrera, may 1. =76=circular, apr. 20. =76=ampudia, apr. 25. =76=to brito, may 25. =76=alvarez, oct. 28. =76=canalizo to villaba & co., apr. 24; to son, apr. 24. =76=memorias by heads of depts., nov., 1847. remarks on the battle (april 18). the perfect confidence displayed in scott's orders for the battle is noteworthy. no doubt it had a great effect on the troops. the orders to worth were rather vague. probably this was because the course of the battle was expected to indicate how his division could be used to the best advantage, but possibly on account of his intense jealousy of twiggs it was not deemed wise to say clearly that he was to support twiggs. in fact he followed twiggs, ascended el telégrafo, saw the white flag at the tongues, and sent harney and childs (ripley, war with mexico, ii, 74) to accept the surrender of the mexican right wing. the movement assigned to twiggs was hazardous, but the military quality of santa anna and the mexican troops was now well understood. general shields was struck by a grape shot that passed through the upper part of his body; and his recovery, due to high surgical skill and the most devoted nursing, seemed almost miraculous. when shields fell, col. e. d. baker took command. canalizo was ordered to charge shields's brigade; but the ground was only partly cleared, and santa anna reported that a charge was not practicable. canalizo was, however, accused by many of causing the mexican defeat by letting the americans reach the highway. he could have dismounted all his cavalry, as he did his cuirassiers, and 2000 fresh troops--especially if aided by those at the tongues--might have done a good deal; but probably he believed that the battle had already been lost. when shields's men approached the highway they came upon a party of mexican surgeons, and on learning their business became instantly, according to the surgeons, their friends and protectors (_diario_, apr. 30). the chief mexican surgeon stated that the americans made no distinction between the two nationalities in bringing wounded men to the hospitals (_courrier français_, may 5). worth's command, deprived of its expected share in the battle through twiggs's departure from scott's plan, played the part of a reserve. harney's charge may have been launched just when it was because a thinning out of the summit of el telégrafo (probably due to sending troops against riley) led to the belief that the la atalaya guns were doing great execution (ballentine, eng. sold., ii, 81). harney placed the seventh infantry on his right, deploying some of the men as skirmishers to guard that flank, and the third on his left, protected by the rifles. (in consequence of loring's incompetence (=213=hatch to father, apr. 21) the rifles did not charge in a body or effectively.) this line was supported by the first artillery. some of harney's men joined with riley's in capturing the minor crest. the la atalaya battery fired over the heads of the charging americans as long as this appeared to be safe. vázquez died bravely at his post, whereas a number of high mexican officers proved recreant. after the fighting began near the summit of el telégrafo the mexican cannon placed there could not be used, for they would have injured mexicans as well as americans. santa anna appears to have done all in his power to stem the tide of defeat. about 1000 puebla men under gen. arteaga arrived during the battle. they were placed at the headquarters battery, but took flight early. s. anna's line was about a mile and a half long. 23.27. it has been argued that pillow's attack should have been a "mere feint," _i.e._ threat. but (1) scott had reason to fear that the purpose of a "mere feint" would be detected as soon as the grand battle should begin, and that the feint would fail of its purpose (see donaldson and becke, 387); and (2) pillow had troops of superior mettle, who probably would not have been satisfied to make a mere threat (nebel and kendall, 25, note). in ordering this attack scott violated napoleon's principle, which was to turn the enemy's flank without dividing his own army (johnston, foundations, 180), but the circumstances warranted doing so. in particular santa anna had shown that he did not wish to be aggressive, and scott intended to keep him busy (see hamley, operations, 160). 23.28. pillow had also a few tennessee horse and (attached to haskell's regiment) a kentucky company--in all about 2000 men (robertson, remins., 244). 23.29. the text is based primarily on the full and minute account given in the diary of george b. mcclellan (who accompanied pillow and whose integrity and technical ability will not be questioned) and the following documents: reports of engineers stevens (=66=may 7) and tower (=66=undated); haskell and sixteen officers (_picayune_, may 29); haskell (_ib._, june 28); pillow, reply (_ib._, june 9); _id._, =61=substitute report, may 29 (to take the place of his published report, which he admitted was not correct); =139=letters of col. campbell, an able and fair man (who said privately the affair was most badly managed; also that pillow was no general, and on the field had no judgment or decision); =224=williams to hitchcock, june 4, 1849; wynkoop, july 16, in _picayune_, sept. 19; stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 125 (stevens says, _e.g._, that pillow's attack failed because "made prematurely, with great precipitation, without order in the assaulting columns, and before the supporting columns were in position, and at the wrong point," and that it, "both as to time and as to direction, was earnestly remonstrated against by the engineer officer directing the attack, by the personal staff of the general, and by col. campbell, second in command"). of course ripley, who wrote his history of the war in consultation with pillow, gives a misleading account of this affair as of others. the author used also the following sources: sen. 51; 32, 1. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 257 (scott); 258 (orders 111); 294 (patterson); 296 (pillow). =217=henshaw papers. taylor, letters (bixby), 109. =69=pillow to adj. gen., june 25, 1848. =69=ripley to adj. gen., june 25, 1848. =66=tower to twiggs, apr. 16. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 50. hitchcock, fifty years, 251. furber, twelve months vol., 593. grant, mems., i, 133. davis, autobiog., 146. apuntes, 173, 181. _weekly courier and n. y. enquirer_, mar. 2, 1848. robertson, remins., 244-8. lawton, artill. officer, 139. =293=pillow to wife, june 9. =293=rains to mrs. pillow, apr. 18. _republicano_, june 9, 24. _picayune_, may 9; sept. 11. méxico á través, iv, 654. hillard, mcclellan, 18, 19. _nat. intelligencer_, june 11. _monitor repub._, june 24. =358=williams to father, apr. 21. _vedette_, viii, no. 5. oswandel, notes, 110-1, 122-35. semmes, service, 182-3. hitchcock in semi-weekly _courier and enquirer_, mar. 1, 1848. =100=mata, apr. 18. =82=pavón to puebla sec. state, apr. 29. =288=tapper to wife, may 3. _niles_, june 5, p. 219; oct. 2, p. 75. boston _atlas_, dec. 13. griepenkerl, applied tactics, 116. =316=judd to sherman, feb. 26, 1848. johnstone, foundations, 180. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1852. =181=armstrong to donelson, july 4. =139=cummings to campbell, may 12; june 13. =76=carrera, may 1. =76=s. anna, may 7. the reason why reversing the regiments caused trouble seems to have been that infantry were accustomed to man[oe]uvre and fight in a certain formation, and felt awkward if the right was unexpectedly brought out on the left. as wynkoop had farther to march than haskell and did not wish to attack before his support was in position, placing campbell third in the line of march involved a delay. one derives a lesson on the value of official reports from patterson's representation that pillow was wounded while gallantly leading his brigade (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 295). 23.30. the american soldiers were not pleased with this policy. the american government expressed itself against it and, placing an undeserved value on mexican officers, ordered that no more of them should be paroled except for special reasons. it is probably enough to say that scott was in the best position to judge; but one may remark that santa anna's difficulty was not so much to obtain men as to obtain arms. further grounds for releasing them are mentioned in sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 257. according to gen. pavón, gen. la vega and twenty-four other officers were not paroled. some six declined to give their paroles. among the spoils were a large amount of ammunition, $11,791.19 in cash (sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 24), and a wooden leg (supposed to have belonged to santa anna) now preserved in the capitol at springfield, ill. 23.31. _pursuit, losses, prisoners, spoils._ ho. 60; 30, 1, 948, 1012, 1221 (scott); 1089 (hitchcock); 1233 (marcy). sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258 (gen. orders 111); 262 (scott); 276, 278, 283, etc. scott, mems., ii, 443. hitchcock, fifty years, 253. ballentine, eng. soldier, 86-7, 106-7. tributo á la verdad, 62. bustamante, n. bernal, ii, 189. s. anna, apelación, 40. lawton, artill. officer, 140, 179. ho. 24; 31, 1. sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. _republicano_, apr. 27.; june 9. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 122, 136. _courrier français_, may 5. méxico á través, iv, 655. _monitor repub._, apr. 24; may 6. =322=smith, diary. williams to father, apr. 21. =152=claiborne, mems. =332=tennery, diary. =82=pavón to puebla sec. state, apr. 29. n. y. _sun_, aug. 16. _niles_, may 15, p. 164; may 29, p. 201. mcclellan, diary. nebel and kendall, 25. robertson, remins., 249, 253. =76=carrera, apr. 27; may 1. =76=ampudia, apr. 25. =76=canalizo, apr. 18. =76=_id._, undated. =76=s. anna, may 7. =76=junta directiva, may 3. =76=g. gómez to gaona, apr. 18. the cavalry appear to have been late in beginning the pursuit. ripley (war, etc., ii, 75) says scott was so busy that he forgot to send for the cavalry, but scott's orders for the battle put the responsibility on the commander of that corps, which was placed in reserve on the highway with a field battery (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 259). in places, too, they found the highway cut or blocked. 23.32. a deputation of the ayuntamiento met patterson (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296), and were promised protection on condition that no liquor should be sold to the troops. the term "nondescript costumes" applies primarily to the volunteers, but probably some of the regulars had lost parts of their outfits. 23.33. scott's report was a model in concealing facts; and worth, writing to a member of his family, called it "a lie from beginning to end." gen. u. s. grant, doubtless recording without investigation his early impressions, wrote in his personal memoirs (i, 132): "perhaps there was not a battle of the mexican war, or of any other, where orders issued before an engagement were nearer being a correct report of what afterwards took place," and such has been the accepted opinion, though a thoughtful comparison of the orders with scott's own report (sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 258, 261) is enough to disprove this view. for example, scott in his orders, intending to attack from the enemy's rear, assigned no troops to the frontal attack on el telégrafo, which was the main feature of the actual battle. unpublished documents of a wholly unbiassed character disprove it still further. as two more illustrations, the artillery, for which infinite trouble was taken to make a passable road, did not figure at all in the battle (though a section of taylor's battery went that way in season to join in the pursuit), and a court of inquiry declared that riley's brigade, which played a most important rôle, was diverted from its original destination--a finding approved by scott (=65=gen. orders 249). robert anderson said that if scott's orders had been carried out, not a mexican would have escaped (lawton, artillery officer, 137); and davis, shields's aide, stated that twiggs failed to execute scott's orders and disappointed scott's expectations (autobiography, 148). see also notes 22 and 25. it is possible that one reason why scott in his report commended twiggs's course was that, even if satisfied as to the practicability of his own plan, he did not care to raise an issue on that question. obviously it would have been impossible to prove now that the plan was practicable, and a bitter, harmful controversy would have resulted. that on general principles such an exposure of the american flank was very hazardous could not be denied. 23.34. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 296 (patterson). =217=henshaw papers. =159=narrative based on f. collins papers. robertson, remins., 253-7. ruxton, adventures (1847), 16. (king death) griffis, perry, 217. =298=porter, diary. _monitor repub._, apr. 24, 27. =322=smith, diary. =66=g. w. smith to stevens, may 1. oswandel, notes, 140. =256=j. parrott to marcy, apr. 19. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 948 (scott). =254=mcclellan, diary. ramírez, méxico, 260. xxiv. puebla 24.1. _worth's advance._ henshaw narrative. hitchcock, fifty years, 255. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 154. davis, autobiog., 173. _delta_, july 8. _picayune_, may 19. =159=collins papers, apr. 21; june 19. méxico á través, iv, 655. tornel, breve reseña, 345. robertson, visit, i, 303. orbigny, voyage, 411. lyon, journal, ii, 181. balbontín, estado, 22. velasco, geografía, iii, 97, 99. lawton, artill. officer, 141-4. robertson, remins., 276. =68=scott to worth, may 6. colección de itinerarios. _revue de paris_, dec., 1844. oswandel, notes, 162. semmes, service, 217-22. =139=w. b. to d. campbell, apr. 25. =185=memo. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 261 (scott); 300 (worth). ramírez, méxico, 228-9. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 236-9. =254=mcclellan to sister, apr. 22. =236=judah, diary. moore, scott's campaign, 10-2. norton, life. diccionario universal (_las vigas_ and _perote_). =327=sutherland to father, undated. ward, mexico, ii, 193-5. green, journal, 238. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 944-6, 948 (scott). =364=worth to daughter, apr. 30. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 58, 60, 110. tributo á la verdad, 43-6. =76=gaona, mar. 4, 8, 15; apr. 8, 19. =76=to _id._, apr. 17. =76=canalizo, apr. 21, 24, etc. =76=baneneli, apr. 24. =76=bravo, apr. 23. =76=s. anna, apr. 27. the distance from jalapa to perote was called about thirty miles. 24.2. "convoy" will be used to signify a line of wagons or pack-mules or both transporting merchandise or supplies under escort. among the difficulties in getting articles from the coast were the sandy road, the heat, the weakness and insufficient number of animals, the shortage of wagons, and above all the want of good drivers and conductors (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 127). scott had supposed that successive bodies of new troops would escort the convoys up, but the diversion of these to the rio grande for some time (in consequence of s. anna's advance against taylor) made it necessary to weaken his forces by sending escorts from jalapa (=61=scott to wilson, apr. 26). the policy of treating the mexicans kindly required more self-support and therefore larger trains than would otherwise have been necessary. moreover, in order to avoid a reverse, which would have had consequences of peculiar gravity in mexico, scott had to avoid risks. 24.3. it has been argued (_e.g._ by semmes) that scott was in fact able to obtain subsistence from the country all the spring and summer, and therefore the matter involved no difficulties (service, 208); but scott had to ascertain beforehand through agents (_delta_, may 18) both that subsistence existed and that it could be obtained; and to make the success of his precautions a basis for asserting that he should not have waited to take them, is unreasonable. scott said later that he might have rushed ahead by depending upon the provisions near at hand, but that within a week the army would have had to scatter and fight for supplies (mems., ii, 553). the resources of the country were found to be mostly at a distance from the line of march (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 949). time was required to select intelligent, reliable agents, and they needed time to go and come. a particular reason for deliberation lay in the fact that the new crops would not be ready before about the middle of june. it should be added that some statements of semmes and others regarding material elements of the situation are contradicted by scott's reports written at the time. semmes was probably influenced by worth, whose aide he was. 24.4. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 904. marcy forgot this when he severely censured scott for dismissing the men before their time was out (_ibid._, 1245). 24.5. by the =61=field return of may 7 scott had: engineer co. (smith), 43; ordnance co. (huger), 60; first div. (worth), 2331; second div. (twiggs), 2216; dragoons (harney), 433; volunteers (quitman), 2030. the disparity between scott's numbers as figured at washington and his numbers as counted at the front is suggested by the fact that on april 26 his volunteers (aside from those now discharged) were estimated by the adjutant general as 4994 (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 928). the regiments that went home were the georgia, the alabama, the third and fourth illinois, and the first, second and third tennessee. 24.6. _scott at jalapa (except his proclamation, etc.: note 8._ ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 910, 944-8, 954-8, 1221 (scott); 983-92; 950 (h. l. scott); 904, 953, 1241 (marcy); 967 (worth). =61=scott to wilson, apr. 26. =68=worth court of inquiry, proceedings. ballentine, eng. soldier, i, 278; ii, 118-23, 126-7, 129-30, 143-4. =66=beauregard to smith, may 10. =52=trist to buchanan, may 7. davis, autobiog., 164-6. hartman, journal, 13. =330=scott to cadwalader, apr. 25. =304=patterson, orders 10, may 1. (the district) robertson, visit, i, 278; ruxton, adventures (1915), 56; kendall, narrative (n. y., 1844), ii, 398; orbigny, voyage, 410; lyon, journal, ii, 186; velasco, geografía, iii, 99. =362=g. a. worth to van buren, may 20. robertson, remins, 261, 275. _revue de paris_, dec., 1844. =218=henshaw narrative. löwenstern, le mexique, 26. =68=scott to worth, may 6. =65=scott, gen. orders 128, 129, 135-6, apr. 30, 30; may 4, 5. =332=tennery, diary. thompson, recolls., 13. oswandel, notes, 142, 149, 152. sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 6 (scott). semmes service, 189-90, 207-10. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528 (hitchcock). =139=w. b. to d. campbell, nov. 2, 1846. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124, 129 (scott). _picayune_, may 4, 7, 11; nov. 14. steele, amer. campaigns, i, 110. =335=scott to trist, july 21, 1848. =61=field report, may 7, 1847. =61=scott to wilson, may 2. moore, scott's camp., 68. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 236. =322=smith, diary. =270=moore, diary. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29. polk, message, feb. 13 (richardson, iv, 515). scott, mems., ii, 452, 466, 553. london _times_, aug. 6. _diario_, aug. 5. n. y. _sun_, aug. 16. stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 133, 135. (bounty) u. s. statutes at large, ix, 184. upton, mil. policy, 215. _so. qtrly. review_, apr., 1852, 376-85. =6l=scott, memo., nov. 29, 1846 (12 new regts.). sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45-6. =364=worth to daughter, apr. 30. bishop, journal. =112=beauregard to smith, may 2. negrete, invasion, iii, app., 60. =60=scott to marcy, apr. 5. stevens, campaigns, 16. =139=five colonels to scott, may 1. =62=adj. gen. to brooke, may 29. (govt. will move) =76=to s. anna, apr. 21. the spanish minister reported that if scott had been prepared to attack the capital immediately after april 18, he could have taken it without a shot (no. 517, june 29). patterson left the army at this time because the return of so many volunteers destroyed his command, and pillow left because he had been appointed a major general and wished to bring on his division. ripley (war with mexico, ii, 514) says scott could have established a garrison of 4000 at mexico and held the city. but assassinations and sickness would soon have reduced his numbers. parties sent out for provisions and forage would have been cut off. the mexicans, not yet thoroughly beaten, would have been encouraged by the isolation of so weak a force, as they had been by the size of taylor's army. they might have been able to starve out the garrison. the result would probably have been at best that a rescue-army would have had to fight its way to the capital without the assistance of scott, his regular officers and his veteran troops. he had no right to take such a risk, especially when it seemed very doubtful whether success in holding the capital would signify much. 24.7. this agent, whose name has been given as campos and (probably correctly) as campomanes, appears to have been the parish priest of jalapa (baz, juárez, 47, note). the paper, which was printed first in spanish and then in english (=76=hitchcock to worth, may 12), may be summarized as follows: it is my duty, mexicans, to make known certain facts that are purposely concealed from you. for the sake not only of ourselves but of the whole american continent and of republican institutions, we of the united states made every effort consistent with honor to adjust our difficulties with mexico, but the patriotic herrera was thrown from power, and the new government, ignoring your interests in order to further its monarchical designs, compelled my nation to take up arms. like you, we hoped that good would result from the overthrow of paredes, and therefore we permitted santa anna to return; but, again like you perhaps, we were mistaken as to his intentions. what has followed, you know. your troops, whose devotion and valor we admire, have been badly led, and even betrayed or deceived; and he has not only rewarded those who waged civil war at mexico, but insulted the brave defenders of vera cruz. recently the battle at cerro gordo showed what you may expect from him. everywhere generals long supported in idleness by the nation have exhibited a lack of honor or skill, while the dead or wounded soldiers, abandoned on the field, have not been given by their leaders even the poor recompense of a grave. the clergy and all other peaceable and useful citizens have been, and still are, taxed, menaced and sacrificed, whereas criminals go unpunished. can this be called liberty? the mexicans, i am sure, have the courage to admit mistakes that involve no dishonor, and to adopt for the future a policy of peace, of liberty and of harmony with their brethren of the united states. my troops, as your bishops and priests will testify, have not committed the outrages alleged against us for the purpose of exciting your anger. we adore the same god as you, and many of our people and of our army are roman catholics. we punish crime and reward merit; we respect property--especially that of the church--and we seek your friendship. abandon prejudice, then; cease to be victims of the ambitious; act as a great american nation. if, however, the war must go on, my country will send--should they be needed--100,000 men, and settle the pending difficulties in a decisive manner. guerilla warfare, should it be persisted in, would lead to reprisals, and you could not blame us for your sufferings. i have set out for puebla and mexico, and shall certainly reach those places; but my desire is peace, friendship, union. it is for you to choose between these and war (tributo á la verdad, doc. 18). it has been said that this proclamation, by opening old political sores and insulting the mexicans, did more harm than good (_southern quarterly review_, april, 1852, p. 394); but (1) even the formal reply made to it admitted its truth, and the facts outlasted any temporary resentment that may have been produced in some minds; (2) it was intended for the common people, with whom plain, solid interests had more influence than high-flown sentiments of pride; (3) the clericals, who suggested the contents of the proclamation, were shrewd men; (4) the fury of santa anna against it (=76=may 18) is sufficient evidence that he saw it would injure him; and (5) we have direct proof that it was received eagerly by the mexicans. see, for example, roa bárcena, recuerdos, 240-1. closely allied with the clerical party were the monarchists, who, though comparatively few, wielded much influence on account of their wealth and social position. they had good reason to fear the united states but they hated santa anna; and it was suspected that they wished the people to realize that without european aid they were helpless. among minor matters attended to by scott at jalapa were the establishment of a battery commanding the city, and the creation of the military department of jalapa (plan del río to la hoya, inclusive). 24.8. _the understanding with the clericals, etc._ (beach) =56=report, june 4; n. y. _sun_, may 19, 22. (agent) hitchcock, fifty years, 255-6; =68=_id._ to worth, may 10; baz, juárez, 47, note; apuntes, 192; sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (scott). tributo á la verdad, 49, 54, 56 and doc. no. 18 (proclam. of may 11). s. anna, apelación, 41-3. claiborne, quitman, i, 311. consideraciones, 3, 7, 22-3. (priests tolerant) kendall, narrative (n. y., 1844), ii, 341-3; consideraciones, 32, 37; lawton, artill. officer, 160-1, 175. (true) =13=bankhead, no. 57, may 29; impug. del manif. london _times_, july 15. apuntes, 193. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 127 (marcy). ramírez, méxico, 239, 256-7, 263, 272. méxico á través, iv, 661. =236=judah, diary, may 2, 6, 17, 26. =95=protest, apr. 12. _monitor del pueblo_, apr. 29. =95=sánchez, proclam., apr. 29. =95=orders, may 8. =95=ayunt., proceedings. _picayune_, june 30. =82=otero, proclam., apr. 26. =82=baranda to gov., apr. 24 and reply (draft). =82=isunza, proclam., may 13. (crowning) scott, mems., ii, 549. (proclam. of may 11) wash. _union_, june 12. _courrier des etats unis_, may 22. mata, reflecciones. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 967, 995 (worth); 968 (proclam.) bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 190. =76=winette, statement, may 2. =76=to s. anna, may 14. =76=s. anna, may 18. =76=hitchcock to worth, may 12 (intercepted). =76=fúrlong, may 17. 24.9. his intellectual plane is suggested by the fact that after the battle he promptly sent instructions to his mistress but not to his second in command (=76=canalizo, apr. 24). 24.10. at this juncture appeals were again made to the roman catholics, particularly the irish, of the american army, and apparently 2-300 deserted while at jalapa (ballentine, english soldier, ii, 144). one appeal said, "are catholic irishmen to be the destroyers of catholic temples, the murderers of catholic priests, and the founders of heretical rites i this pious country?" a large amount of money seems to have been collected by santa anna at this time. the manifiesto of vera cruz state (_monitor republicano_, dec. 19, 1847) asserted that in fifteen days he obtained 120,000 pesos, though he said (may 9) he had received less than 25,000 (gamboa, impug., 35). 24.11. santa anna's flank position was even more favorable than washington's at morristown. while he lingered near vera cruz, scott could not feel safe, and his trains were in imminent danger. had he remained there, scott, whose small numbers would not have permitted him to send an adequate detachment to orizaba, might have felt compelled to go there with his whole army, and much embarrassment might have resulted (steele, american campaigns, i, 125-6. w. b. lane, _the united service_, june, 1896, p. 485. stevens, i. i. stevens, 146). 24.12. _santa anna's operations till he reached puebla._ only the principal documents can be cited here. tributo á la verdad, 48-9, 54, 136. _picayune_, may 6. _diario_ sept. 10. =312=guerra to s. anna, apr. 8. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 265-7, 570, 634. s. anna, apelación, app., 72-3, 76. =366=_id._, address to amer. soldiers, apr. --. _id._, detall, 8. defensa de ... estrada. s. anna, manifiesto, mar. 24, 1848. =12=loch to admiralty, apr. 20, 1847. apuntes, 183-91. gamboa, impug., 36. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 274. =13=bankhead, no. 42, 1847. _courrier français_, may 5. ramírez, méxico, 261. méxico á través, iv, 660-1. =88=córdoba ayunt., proceedings, apr. 26-9. =82=official docs., apr. 20-30. =82=prefect of matamoros, apr. 26. (indians) =82=prefect tlapa, may 13. _republicano_, may 4. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29. _nat. intelligencer_, june 2. _monitor repub._, may 4, 23. (tlacotálpam) sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 547. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 190. s. anna, comunic. oficial. carreño, jefes, cclxx. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 260. =76=carrera, apr. 27. (chiquihuite.) =76=acuerdo, mar. 29; =76=soto, apr. 3; =76=to soto, apr. 1. =76=canalizo, apr. 21, 24, 28. =76=to s. anna, apr. 21. =76=to canalizo, apr. 21. =76=to bravo, apr. 21. =76=fúrlong, may 9. =76=gov. to comte. gen. oaxaca, may 4. =76=s. anna, apr. 27. =76=_id._ to rosa, feb. 5, 1848. 24.13. _santa anna's operations after he reached puebla (except the amozoc fight)._ negrete, invasión, iv, app., 250-2, 255, tributo á la verdad, 49-53, 56-7. s. anna, apelación, 41-3. _id._, detall, 8. =166=pommarès to conner, aug. 29, 1846, confid. donnavan, adventures, 99. dos palabras. london _times_, july 9. apuntes, 192-3. gamboa, impug., 33-5. ramírez, méxico, 260, 282. méxico á través, iv, 661. =95=protest, apr. 12. _monitor del pueblo_, apr. 29. =82=comte. gen. to gov., may 10. =82=letter to secy., may 11. =95=puebla ayunt., proceedings, may 10-15. =82=isunza, proclam., may 12. =199=s. anna to giménez, may 15. _diario_, may 10. _monitor repub._, may 13, 23; dec. 12. baz, juárez, 47, note. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 190. =312=bishop puebla to s. anna, apr. 8. =76=s. anna, apr. 27, 29; may 11, 15. =76=to s. anna, apr. 20, 30. =76=to bravo, apr. 21. =76=to gaona, apr. 21. =76=carrera, apr. 23. =76=fúrlong, may 9. =76=s. anna to rea, may 12. 24.14. _the american advance to puebla (including the amozoc fight)._ ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 944-8, 957 (scott); 967, 994 (worth). =61=scott to wilson, apr. 23. =218=henshaw narrative. tributo á la verdad, 50. scott, mems., ii, 460. grant, mems., i, 135. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 159, 161, 175-6. s. anna, apelación, 41-2. =303=worth to quitman, may 10. =159=collins papers, may 20; july 3-8. robertson, visit, i, 312. orbigny, voyage, 412. lawton, artillery officer, 145, 156, 162, 170-4, 207-8. _journal milit. serv. instit._, xvii (van deusen). löwenstern, le méxique, 31. smith, to mexico, 153, 163, 165 (nothing in u. s. equal to puebla), 166. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527. brackett, lane's brigade, 191, 276. =213=hatch to father, june 3. =68=scott to worth, may 6. colección de itinerarios. _revue de paris_, dec., 1844. semmes, service, 225-6, 230-7. apuntes, 193-6. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (scott). gamboa, impug., 36. méxico á través, iv, 662. =236=judah, diary. moore, scott's camp., 84-96. rosa, impresiones, _passim_. =270=moore, diary. steele, amer. camps., i, 107, 110. _diario_, may 16. ward, mexico, ii, 201. stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 140, 142. =364=worth to daughter, apr. 30. =76=prefect of s. j. de los llanos, may 11. =76=comte. milit. huamantla, apr. 29. =76=to bravo, apr. 26. =76=fúrlong, may 5. =76=bravo, apr. 23. =76=s. anna, may 13, 15. =76=to s. anna, may 14. =76=s. anna to rea, may 12. and others. santa anna, to justify his course, said he felt compelled to leave puebla on account of the unfavorable local conditions and the approach of the americans (detall, 8). worth did not have outposts and scouts on the alert, as he should have had, at amozoc, and knew nothing about the roads (stevens, stevens, i, 142). scott's delay showed that he did not feel strong enough to advance to the capital. that city was therefore in no danger from his army. if santa anna, instead of going there, had now gathered all the mexican strength between puebla and vera cruz and prevented reinforcements from reaching scott, the latter would have been in a hard position. 24.15. the puebla ayuntamiento archives contain the agreement signed at chachapa by worth. later he sought to modify this (=68=orders 31), calling it merely a memorandum (=68=to h. l. scott, june 16), and on may 20 he signed a new =95=version. naturally the pueblans held to the former (=68=dorán to scott, june 17). for general orders 20 see p. 455. 24.16. semmes represents worth's régime as entirely satisfactory to the civil authorities (service, 275). this illustrates the fact that caution is necessary in reading what he says when worth is concerned, for the records of the ayuntamiento give a different impression. for worth's characteristics see chap. xii, note 12.8. the _southern quarterly review_, april, 1852, 406, note, said worth "was quite superficial, had no solid or profound attainments, nor was he gifted with grasp of mind requisite to high combinations and extended operations." robert anderson remarked once that he hoped worth would not, "from a fit of passion, alter his opinions" (anderson artill. officer, 32). hitchcock in n. y. _courier and enquirer_ (semi-weekly), mar. 1, 1848: worth has striking manners and great felicity in conversation, but is utterly destitute of stability and judgment. 24.17. _worth's operations at puebla._ =68=worth court of inquiry, proceedings, documents. weekly _courier and enquirer_, mar. 2, 1848. tributo á la verdad, 12, 48, 51-2. =224=h. l. scott to worth, june 20. =61=scott to wilson, apr. 26. hitchcock, fifty years, 257. (alarms) grant, mems., i, 136; _delta_, july 8; =218=henshaw narrative; =307=roberts, diary; sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 527-8. =303=gen. orders 128. collins papers. robertson, visit, i, 314. ruxton, adventures (1847), 30. bullock, six months (1825), i, 83. león, hist. gen., 477. lawton, artill. officer, 169, 174-5, 226. _journal des débats_, july 6, 1847. semmes, service, 210, 254, 264, 275. rivera, jalapa, iii, 912. apuntes, 193-5. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (scott). gamboa, impug., 33-4. ramírez, méxico, 261, 267-8, 272. méxico á través, iv, 662. =236=judah, diary. _monitor del pueblo_, apr. 29. =95=ayunt., orders, may 8. =95=ayunt., proceedings and corresp. with worth. =95=w. to first alcalde, may 18. =82=bravo, proclam., apr. 28. =82=isunza, proclam., may 13. =270=moore, diary. davis, autobiog., 274. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 61, 86-7. _monitor repub._, may 2, 21; june 5. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 994 (worth). _niles_ jan. 15, 1848, p. 311. =364=worth to sprague, july 29, 1847. =76=s. anna, may 13, 16. =76=fúrlong, may 13. =76=worth, may 12. =76=bravo, apr. 30. =76=worth to furlong, may 17. =76=to fúrlong, may 20. ripley (war with mexico, ii, 115) points out very pertinently that worth placed his troops injudiciously at puebla. worth's errors bore most unfortunate fruit. scott, before knowing or suspecting what had been conceded to mexican laws, made sharp comments on the attitude of the puebla authorities. naturally he felt seriously troubled. worth even allowed them to try citizens who had killed american soldiers, and of course the culprits were acquitted (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527; =95=ayunt. to worth, may 22). scott thought seriously of evacuating the city and recapturing it in order to wipe out that concession; but, concluding that such a course would be rather farcical, he simply overrode the concession by republishing general orders 20 (chap. xxxi, note 31.22). this action and the comments angered worth. scott angered him further by requesting him to withdraw the =68=circular of june 16, which was impolitic, implied that worth held an independent command, and if entitled to credence (lawton, artill. officer, 227) should have been given to headquarters, so that all the troops could be warned (=224=h. l. scott to worth, june 20). worth therefore demanded a court of inquiry (=65=gen. orders 196). quitman, twiggs and p. f. smith formed the court and sat on june 30. their =68=conclusions strongly condemned the circular, the terms granted to puebla and worth's complaints against scott; and they pronounced him worthy of a severe rebuke, as certainly he was. scott could not avoid approving the verdict and publishing it in orders (=65=no. 196), but these orders were made known only to chiefs of the general staff and commanders of divisions and brigades. from this time worth was no doubt in his heart a mortal enemy of scott. unhappily, more will be heard of this matter. as for criticising scott, worth wrote on july 29 (=364=to s.) that scott might have entered mexico city by may 20, in which case (it was worth's "firm belief") "peace would have immediately resulted"--a very superficial judgment. worth added: "we gain victories and halt until all the moral advantages are lost." hitchcock well said that worth looked only at his ability to march troops to a certain place, while scott had to see also how the advance could be supported and supplied (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). (other references for this note. =68=scott to worth, june 16. =68=worth to scott, june 20. =68=_id._, order 61, june 20. lawton, artill. officer, 226-8. =68=worth to h. l. scott, june 16. =68=scott to worth, may 6. _nacional_ (atlixco), may 16. davis, autobiog., 270-1, 274.) 24.18. at jalapa he left brev. col. childs with the first artillery (five companies), the second pennsylvania and three companies of the first pennsylvania; at perote seven companies of the first pennsylvania with some artillerists; and at each place a troop of dragoons (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125). the stock of ammunition was still inadequate, and the paymaster had only half of his estimate for january-april (_ibid._, 124-5). 24.19. domínguez, leader of the spy company, had been an honest weaver, it was said, but on being robbed by a mexican officer, took to the road and became a brigand chief. when the americans reached puebla he was living there quietly with his family; but, knowing the insecurity of his position, he accepted hitchcock's offer to become a scout. his band consisted at first of five men but rose to about 100, and probably might have been increased to 2000 (lawton, artill. officer, 266). he and men of his even entered the capital in disguise. while he was at the head of the company, the actual captain was a virginian named spooner, who had been a member of his band; and the two lieutenants also were foreigners. the men seem to have served and obeyed orders faithfully, and their leader refused very advantageous terms offered by santa anna. (for the spy co. see hitchcock, fifty years, 259, 263-4, 330, 335-41, 344-5. brackett, lane's brigade, 187. lawton, artill. officer, 266. henshaw narrative, aug. 8. =69=domínguez to polk [sept., 1848].) 24.20. hargous, an american merchant of vera cruz, was scott's financial agent (_picayune_, june 30). without him one hardly sees what the americans could have done. an intercepted letter from the wife of brev. col. childs, abusing polk roundly, gave considerable comfort to the enemy. another letter imparted much information about military matters. one is again surprised that our war department did not use a cipher. 24.21. scott instructed the commander at vera cruz what to do in case of attack, and gave the commander at jalapa full directions with reference to the sick and wounded (about 1000) lying there (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 997). there were also about 1000 sick at vera cruz and 200 at perote (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129). the people at home did not understand scott's situation. regiments nominally 800-1000 strong had actually less than 300 (=185=-to duncan, july 20). owing to the state of public sentiment in mexico, cutting loose from vera cruz was much less hazardous than it seemed. besides, the smallness of the american army made the problem of subsistence and forage comparatively simple. marcy was candid enough to admit that scott understood the advantages of holding jalapa, and was the best judge as to the advisability of giving it up (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1003-4). the british consul at vera cruz reported it as the unanimous opinion of the merchants of that place that with five times his actual force scott could not have kept the line to the interior open (=13=no. 19). 24.22. _scott at puebla._ ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 954, 957, 993, 997, 1012-3 (scott); 967 (worth); 998, 1002-4 (marcy); 1021-7 (scott and quitman). sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124, 129, 135 (scott); 242 (trist). rivera, jalapa, iii, 912, 925. henshaw narrative. haynes, scott's guide. tributo á la verdad, 56. scott, mems., ii, 453-4, 460, 466. hitchcock, fifty years, 256-9, 261, 266, 270, 341-4. grant, mems., i, 136. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 135-6. davis, autobiog., 169. _picayune_, may 19; june 30; aug. 20; nov. 14. _delta_, june 12; july 9. _republicano_, june 6, 7, 14. (sickness) =223=hirschorn, recolls.; _delta_, july 9; lawton, artill. officer, 145, 154, 242; =291=pierce, diary; scott, june 4 (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129); moore, scott's camp., 119; =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29; =316=judd to sherman, feb. 26, 1848. polk, diary, apr. 2, 10, 12; july 9, 13, 15. =159=collins papers, may 22. león, hist. gen., 477-8. lawton, artill. officer, 153, 177-8, 189, 203, 206, 211-6, 228, 233-4, 242-6, 256, 265, 272, 274. =68=worth court of inquiry, docs. =68=scott to worth, may 6. =65=gen. orders 206, 211, 238; july 9 12, 28. (4000 available) hitchcock, fifty years, 257. simples observaciones (written by hitchcock). =60=wilson to marcy, aug. 1. =335=trist to wife, aug. 6. oswandel, notes, 223, 240. semmes, service, 210, 239, 247, 263, 275-6, 278-81. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 524. =224=l. v. to m. o., aug. 21 (intercepted mex. letter). =185=[duncan] to lewis, july 20. =307=roberts, diary. =236=judah, diary. =95=ayunt. to bravo, apr. 29. =95=amable to prefect, aug. 18. =270=moore, diary. =327=sutherland to father, aug. --. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29. _kennebec journal_, may 21. _repub. banner_, may 19. _nat. intelligencer_, june 1. _monitor repub._, may 2; june 5, 8. sedgwick, corres., i, 101. =132=atocha to buchanan, aug. 1. baz, juárez, 47, note. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 87-9. =364=worth to s., july 29; to daughter, apr. 30. _ohio arch. and hist. qtrly._, apr.-july, 1912, p. 292. =61=scott to wilson, may 2. steele, amer. camps., i, 122. and from =76= the following and others. r. rueda, statement [june 18]. acuerdo, july 13. soto, july 3. soldier from puebla, statement, july 17. alvarez, june 16; july 28. isunza to canalizo, july 20. bravo, proclam., apr. 28. fúrlong, may 17. to fúrlong, may 20. "ein deuttcher," circular to germans. to alvarez, june 19. worth to first alcalde, may 17; to ayunt., may 18. alvarez stated that he had an organized party at puebla preparing for an insurrection, and meanwhile was systematically promoting desertion. the alarm caused by santa anna's advance against taylor led to the temporary diversion of troops (intended for scott) to the rio grande, but on april 30 marcy sent scott statements showing that about 3500 new regulars were expected to land at vera cruz before june 1 and that some 5500 volunteers also had been ordered to him. unfortunately the despatch was captured by the enemy, and scott did not receive another copy of it until june 6 (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 922-5, 1012). (expected) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 994. the official counting of the votes was deferred until jan., 1848. 24.23. richardson, messages, iv, 508. benton wanted full powers to negotiate (polk, diary, mar. 8, 1847), and was willing to take the position mainly with a view to its diplomatic functions (_cong. globe_, 29, 2, pp. 246-7). 24.24. the new regiments (which brought the regular army up to 1356 officers and 29,534 men) were to serve during the war and then be disbanded. one of them was the third dragoons. another consisted of "voltigeurs," theoretically an equal number of infantry and of mounted men (the former to be taken up on the horses of the latter, when celerity of movement should be desired) with a battery of small guns that could be taken apart and transported on mules (_niles_, may 15, 1847, p. 161); but practically the voltigeurs were foot-riflemen (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 924). the regiments destined for scott were the following: (brig. gen. pierce's brig.) 9 inf. from n. eng. under col. ransom, 12 inf. from n. and s. car., mo., ark. and texas under lieut. col. bonham in the absence of col. wilson, and 15 inf. from ohio, mich., wis. and iowa under lt. col. howard in the absence of col. morgan; (brig. gen. cadwalader's brig.) 11 inf. from pa., del. and md., under col. ramsey, 14 inf. from ill., tenn. and la. under col. trousdale, voltigeurs from pa., md., va., ga., ky. and miss. under col. andrews (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 924). each regiment was theoretically to consist of 851 men including 47 officers (_ibid._), but the two brigades going to scott were not expected to muster quite 3500. scott was authorized to change the organization should the exigencies of the campaign require (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). each private serving a year or more was to receive 100 acres of government land or $100 in treasury scrip as a bounty. the law of march 3 provided also that (in view of the deficiency in field officers caused by the lack of a retirement law) an additional major might be appointed in each regiment, that individuals might be accepted to fill vacancies in volunteer corps, that non-commissioned officers might be brevetted to the lowest commissioned rank, that distinguished privates might be given certificates of merit and $2.00 extra per month, that two companies might be added to each artillery regiment, that one more company in each artillery regiment might be equipped as field artillery, that unfilled regular or volunteer regiments should be consolidated and the supernumerary officers discharged, etc. (these laws were quite elaborate and cannot be given in full here; see u. s. statutes at large, ix, 123, 184.) after receiving scott's report on the battle of cerro gordo, polk ordered five companies of the third dragoons to him. 24.25. _reinforcements provided._ upton, milit. policy, 206-7. =62=adj. gen. to scott, may 10. =65=_id._, gen. orders 57, dec. 22; 2, jan. 8; 8, mar. 4; 17, apr. 15. semmes, service, 314-5. =354=welles papers. polk, messages, dec. 29 (jan. 4, 1847), 1846; feb. 13, 1847 (richardson, messages, iv, 508, 513. =108=polk to bancroft, jan. 30. wash. _union_, jan. 4, 7, 11, 12, 14, 21, etc. _nat. intelligencer_, may 26. _cong. globe_, sen. and ho., dec. 28 to mar. 3 (one needs to examine the proceedings and speeches considerably in detail). (voltigeurs) _niles_, may 15, p. 161. _amer. review_, sept., 1847, p. 223. statutes at large, ix, 117, 123, 184. boston _atlas_, jan. 14. =316=bragg to sherman, mar. 1, 1848. =61=ransom, apr. 12; may 9, 21; june 26. =61=scott to wilson, apr. 26. =330=h. l. scott to cadwalader, apr. 25. =61=adj. gen. to scott, dec. 17, 1846; jan. 23; mar. 20; may 6, 10, 22, 1847; to cadwalader, apr. 28; to qtr. mr. gen., apr. 21. ho. 42; 29, 2: adj. gen., jan. 13. =256=marcy to wetmore, jan. 6, 10; july 16. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 121 (marcy). senex, myth. ho. 48; 29, 2 (adj. gen.). sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 45, 50. =62=marcy to brooke, mar. 22; to pierce, mar. 22; to govs. ala., miss., la., mar. 22. =61=adj. gen. to cadwalader, mar. 26. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 866, 944, 948, 1221 (scott); 873, 905-6, 922, 953, 1241 (marcy); 924, 926 (statements). =69=scott, mems. for adj. gen., nov. 29, 1846. polk, diary. the principal references for the attempt to give benton the chief command are the following. =345=benton to polk, mar. 6; to van buren, jan. 26. polk, diary, nov. 10, 11, 18; dec. 3, 9, 11, 12, 14, 15, 18-21, 24, 25, 1846; jan. 2, 4, 16, 19, 22-3; feb. 4-mar. 12; mar. 19-20, 22; apr. 6, 14, 28; may 10-4; july 17, 1847. =210=simms to hammond, may 1. =354=welles papers. =345=blair to van buren, dec. 26, 1846; mar. 13, 1847. jameson, calhoun corres., 727. dix, speeches, i, 166. london _times_, feb. 18; mar. 17; apr. 17. meigs, benton, 364-7. benton, view, ii, 698. _id._, speech: _niles_, june 5, 1847, p. 223. scott, mems., ii, 401. _public ledger_, jan. 8, 27; mar. 1. _cong. globe_, 29, 2, senate, jan. 11, 14, 15 (badger's speech the most important one made on the subject), 25 (benton); house, _passim_. blaine, twenty years, i, 76. buchanan, works, viii, 365, 367. _mag. of amer. hist._, xiv, 575. wash. _union_, mar. 11. =61=benton to adj. gen., mar. 9. this call of apr. 19 included (infantry) a regiment, each, from ills., oh., ind.; a battalion (5 cos.), each, from n. j., mo., ga., ala., la.; three cos. from the dist. of columbia; two cos., each, from pa., md., va.; and one co. from fla.; also (horse) two cos. from la. and one co., each, from oh., ills., ga., ala., ark. a regt. consisted of ten cos. each co. included a capt., a first lieut., two second lieuts., four sergts., four corps., two musicians and eighty privates. a co. of horse had also one farrier and blacksmith (=62=memo., apr. 21). of vols. scott was now to have two brigades: i, *one n. y. and *two pa. regts. and two pa. cos.; ii, *one s. car. and *one la. regt., one la. and one ga. battal., two cos. la. horse and one co. ga. horse (asterisks mean, "already in mexico"). there were certain exceptions as to the dates of calls which it seems unnecessary to specify. after the lieutenant general plan failed, benton was nominated as a major general, and was promptly confirmed by the senate, and a bill authorizing polk to place him in supreme command was urged upon congress (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1219); but as it appeared doubtful whether the chief authority could be conferred upon him, benton declined the position abruptly (=345=letters dated mar. 9). this episode caused no material delay in war legislation. 24.26. one unfortunate result of giving up the line of communication was that new troops had to wait at vera cruz until assembled in sufficient force to defy the enemy, and some of them fell sick in consequence; but this was not fairly chargeable to the evacuation of jalapa, for the irregulars did their worst below that city. it was the intention of the government that quitman should go to taylor, but scott retained him because his services were valued and he could not be sent away without a heavy detachment (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 137). having only two full regiments, though a major general, quitman naturally felt aggrieved (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1024). to illustrate once more the difference between paper figures and real ones, the washington _union_ stated on july 20 that more than 15,000 reinforcements had marched from vera cruz. the text shows how many did go. july 19 marcy wrote that 1900 men were en route to vera cruz (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1003). the fact was that on august 2 or 3 about 850 men left that place for the interior under col. l. d. wilson of the twelfth infantry (=60=wilson, july 31). 24.27. _reinforcements arrive._ (other references will be given when the guerillas are studied: chap. xxix.) ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1002, 1241 (marcy); 1012, 1221 (scott). sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 4, 13, 16, 18, 20-25 (mcintosh _et al._). scott, mems., ii, 453, etc. =65=_id._, gen. orders 250, 1847. hitchcock, fifty years, 265, 269. davis, autobiog., 174-5. =69=marcy to pillow and quitman, apr. 14. hartman, journal, 15. _picayune_, aug. 20. _delta_, oct. 1. upton, milit. policy, 213-4. polk, diary, may 10. =159=collins papers. =291=pierce, diary. =61=cadwalader to wilson, june 13. =62=adj. gen. to scott, may 10, 22. =287=parrish, diary. =60=h. wilson to marcy, aug. 1. =60=l. d. wilson to marcy, july 31. mansfield, mex. war, 224. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 136. =236=judah, diary. _monitor del pueblo_, apr. 29. =178=davis, diary. =335=dimond to trist, july 14. semmes, service, 314. wash. _union_, july 20. =180=pillow to wife, june 14. =61=h. wilson to adj. gen., june 7, 14. =61=pillow to adj. gen. [june 19]. henshaw narrative. lawton, artill. officer, 215, 238-41, 272-4. =61=jones to wilson, apr. 29. =76=soto, july 17, 21, 23, 25, 31; aug. 3, 11. =76=canalizo, july 8. =76=alvarez, july 5. =76=hitchcock to worth, may 12. =76=many other documents. 24.28. under general orders 218, july 16, 1847, the following artillery companies were ordered to be equipped (_i.e._, were recognized) as light (field) artillery in accordance with the law of march 3, 1847: first regiment, co. i, capt. j. b. magruder; second, co. m, j. f. roland; third, co. e, t. w. sherman; fourth, co. g, s. h. drum. co. m was not organized in time to serve during the war; the others were already in the service. 24.29. scott, mems., ii, 460-5. grone, briefe, 84. =60=marcy to quitman, apr. 14. upton, milit. policy, 214. =159=collins papers, june 18. =236=judah, diary, apr. 26. lawton, artill. officer, 274. aldrich, marine corps, 104. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1002 (marcy); 1012 (scott). =62=adj. gen. to scott, may 22. _journ. milit. serv. instit._, iii, 415. the general staff (as given by scott in his mems., ii, 460-3) included at this time: lt. col. hitchcock, asst. inspect. gen.; capt. h. l. scott (not related to the general) actg. adj. gen.; first lt. t. williams, bvt. first lieut. g. w. lay and second lieut. schuyler hamilton, aides; maj. j. p. gaines (one of the encarnacion prisoners, who had escaped) vol. aide; maj. j. l. smith, capt. r. e. lee, and lieuts. p. g. t. beauregard, i. i. stevens, z. b. tower, g. w. smith, g. b. mcclellan and j. g. foster, engineer officers; maj. wm. turnbull, capt. j. mcclellan, second lieut. george thom and bvt. second lieut. e. l. f. hardcastle, topog. engs.; capt. benjamin huger, first lieut. p. v. hagner and second lieut. c. p. stone, ordnance officers; capt. j. r. irwin, chief quartermaster; capt. j. b. grayson, chief of subsistence dept.; maj. e. kirby, chief paymaster; surgeon gen., thomas lawson. the marine corps, which had no regimental organization, included, mar. 2, 1847, 1283 privates. on that day congress raised the number to 2293, and added twelve "commanding officers" (sen. 66; 30, 1). in may, 1847, the secretary of the navy, in order to help strengthen scott, offered a part of this corps (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 957). perry did not think it wise to detach all of the men whom the department proposed to contribute (=47=july 4), but a battalion under lieut. col. watson and maj. twiggs marched to puebla with pierce. 24.30. _picayune_, aug. 20; nov. 14. lawton, artill. officer, 244, 246, 274-5. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 135 (scott). =65=scott, gen. orders 246, aug. 5. collins papers. smith, to mexico, 178. hitchcock, fifty years, 271. xxv. on to the capital 25.1. this chapter is amply supported. about 1400 documents were used in writing it. as, however, any investigator consulting on this subject the =76=archives would easily find the pertinent papers, only the most important ones belonging to that collection will be cited. 25.2. _affairs at mexico to apr. 20._ sen. 19; 30, 2 (m. l. smith). =341=black, memorial, dec. 20. =312=anaya to s. anna, apr. 9. =312=baranda to s. anna, apr. 9. _monitor repub._, apr. 11. _picayune_, may 12. semmes, service, 328. =92=gov. federal dist. to mex ayunt., apr. 10. =92=mex. ayunt., proclam., apr. 27. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1088. _niles_, may 15, p. 168 (gamboa). kenly, md. vol., 338. n. y. _sun_, may 19. apuntes, 198-9. otero, comunicación. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 483. from =76= the following. memo., apr. 10. salas, apr. 12. ords. to generals, apr. 2. ords. to liceaga, apr. 10. relaciones to gov. fed. dist., apr. 11. almonte, may 14. to comte. gen. guanajuato, apr. 16. to j. p. gálvez, apr. 9. measures recommended, apr. 6, 14. relaciones, apr. 12. berrospe to monterede, jan. 20, 1846. 25.3. this specimen may be quoted: "the cunning dissimulator, ibarra [a member of the cabinet], venomous as a serpent, crawls forth obscurely from his lurking-place to-day in order that he may set his malignant teeth to-morrow in the vitals of the republic.... off with the heads of the vile traitors!" one ingenious writer said: if santa anna will not sacrifice his vanity by admitting he is incompetent, why should we sacrifice our lives and property? april 21 a general amnesty for political offences was declared in the vain hope of producing harmony (=76=to bustamante, apr. 21). 25.4. this important law provided (méxico á través, iv, 656): 1, the government is authorized to take all steps necessary to carry on the war and preserve the republican system; 2, but it must not make peace with the united states, cede territory, conclude negotiations [particularly with reference to a monarchical régime] with foreign powers; 3, make colonization contracts, impose punishments or confer civil or military appointments except those placed within its authority by the constitution; 4, any arrangement between the united states and authorities superseding the present government shall be void; 5, any person, whatever his status, who treats with the united states is hereby declared a traitor; 6, should congress be unable to meet, its place shall be taken by a council of government, consisting of the senior member present of each state delegation. 25.5. _affairs at mexico, apr. 20 to may 18._ s. anna, apelación, 44-5; app., 76. _id._, detall, 8. dublán, legislación, v, 267 (apr. 20). giménez, mems., 107-9. méx. en 1847, 20. _picayune_, may 6, 20. defensa de ... estrada. =312=basadre to s. anna, apr. 9, very private. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29. manifiesto del supr. tribunal. molina, el asalto. memoria de ... relaciones, jan., 1849. _boletin de noticias_, may 14. _republicano_, may 10, 22. _courrier français_, may 5. london _times_, june 15; july 9. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 196-8. encarnacion prisoners, 67. =52=trist, no. 7, june 13. =92=donations, mex., may 1-6. =92=bravo, proclam., may 6. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 570. =92=ayunt., call for volunteers, may 20. consideraciones. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 967 (worth). =80=olaguíbel to relac., aug. 15. lara, resumen, 66, note. méxico á través, iv, 655-6, 661, 704. prieto, memorias, ii, 210-2. hitchcock, fifty years, 255. ramírez, méxico, 229, 233-4, 239, 241, 246-7, 250-1, 256, 272-7, 284. =88=metropol. dean, may 8. _monitor repub._, apr. 22; may 3, 8, 10-11. s. anna, manifiesto, mar. 24, 1848. apuntes, 199, 200-1, 203-4. =80=guerra to gov., mar. 11; apr. 22. =80=gov. to bravo, may 5. _diario_, apr. 25, 28; may 3, 4, 6, 12, 15. from =76= the following. decrees, apr. 26; may 1. junta directiva, may 1, 3. acuerdo, apr. 20, 25. circular, apr. 30. garrison, estado, may 13. to generals, apr. 25. to brito, may 25. j. j. miñón, apr. 24. deserters, may 15. circular, may 4. basadre, may 16, res. to alvarez, apr. 26. to monterde, may 18. to s. anna, apr. 20-2. to bravo, apr. 24. to bustamante, apr. 21. almonte, apr. 28, 30; may 8, 12, 15, 18. monterde, may 9. bravo, may 11, 16. rincón, may 17. s. anna, may 16. 25.6. _affairs at mexico, may 18 to june 2._ negrete, invasion, iii, app., 61-72, 81-3; iv, app., 261-8, 273-4. tributo á la verdad, 56, 74-6. giménez, memorias, 109-11. s. anna to congress, may 28 (biblioteca nac.). _id._, apelación, app., 83-8. _id._, detall, 8. defensa de ... estrada. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 177-8. portrait of anaya: city hall, mex. _picayune_, july 15; aug. 7, 8. _monitor repub._, may 20; june 3, 4, 14; dec. 12 (s. anna, nov. 19). _republicano_, may 10; june 5, 10, 15, 26. méxico á través, iv, 662, 664-7. ramírez, méxico, 229-30, 233, 284-6. =13=bankhead, nos. 59, 60, may 29. london _times_, july 9, 16; aug. 6. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 290-3. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 157, 196-204. encarnacion prisoners, 67. =80=guerra to gov. méx., may 20. _diario_, may 19, 21, 23-4; june 8. _boletín de la democracia_, may 25. hitchcock, fifty years, 260. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 967. apuntes, 201, 204. otero, réplica. dublán, legislación, v, 264. =76=bravo, may 15, 16, 24, 30. =76=s. anna to rosa, feb. 5, 1848. =76=valencia, june 7, 1847. =76=mora, june 5. =76=to brito, may 25. =60=bravo, proclam., may 6. =76=s. anna, may 21. the statesmen who met s. anna were manuel baranda, ignacio trigueros and j. f. ramírez. 25.7. a signal illustration of the incompetence of the mexican government, particularly congress, was afforded by its treatment of great britain. at the end of august, 1846, bankhead, under the instructions of the foreign office (=13=to bankhead, no. 20), proposed mediation to mexico, but the offer was not welcomed. santa anna and rejón believed that it proceeded wholly from self-interest, and that, in order to prevent her commerce from suffering longer from the war and other interests from becoming imperilled, england was ready to sacrifice the honor and welfare of their country (=73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 332, res., 343, res., sept. 24, 27, 1846); and, moreover, the mexicans still felt quite able to cope with the united states (=13=bankhead, no. 130, sept. 7, 1846). in october, under renewed instructions (=13=no. 11), bankhead again submitted the proposal (=13=nos. 162, 180), and later he returned to the charge (apuntes, 202). the subject was unwisely referred by the mexican executive to congress, but nothing was done (_ibid._). after the battle of cerro gordo, however, the administration thought negotiations might be used to delay the american advance (_ibid._; ramírez, méxico, 246) and the puros hoped the subject might be made embarrassing to the government (ramírez, méxico, 224). violent, acrimonious and dangerous debates followed in congress and, in order to embarrass the executive (=13=bankhead, no. 45, 1847), enough puros remained away (at the time set for voting) to destroy the quorum (_ibid._). the matter was then dropped (ramírez, méxico, 246, 274). the general feeling was that british mediation would signify british control and a dishonorable, disadvantageous peace (london _times_, june 15; _monitor repub._, may 18). but, even if this view contained some elements of justice, trifling with a great power and throwing the vital interests of mexico into the cockpit of party politics could not be excused. 25.8. _the political situation after june 2._ s. anna, apelación, app., pp. 3, 6, 8, 10, etc. _id._, detall, 8. =87=coalition junta, july 7; aug. 8; etc. _republicano_, june 4, 5, 9, 15, 16, 20, 22, 26. =312=baranda to s. anna, apr. 8. méxico á través, iv, 667, 704. iniciativa que el hon. cong. del estado de zacat. otero, réplica. =13=bankhead, nos. 60, may 29; 64, 65, 70, june 29. _id._, no. 125, dec. 30, 1845 (tornel has no reputation for honesty). london _times_, aug. 6. =77=gov. s. luis potosí, june 19. =13=thornton to bankhead, june 14. =52=consul black, no. 389, sept. 12, 1846. encarnacion prisoners, 68, 77-8, 86. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29. =77=letter from coatepec, june 26. =82=treas. to sec. state of puebla, june 14; reply, june 15. =82=guerra to gov. puebla, aug. 2; reply, aug. 7. =80=legisl. of méx. state, mar. 26; june 12. =80=_id._, address, apr. 26. =80=coalition, address, aug. 4. _verdadero liberal_, aug. 12. =80=coal. junta to gov. méx., june 17. =80=_id._, dictamen, july 4. =80=oaxaca state, exposición, june 26. =83=gov. querétaro to gov. s. luis potosí, apr. 9. _diario_, june 7, 8, 11, 24, 30; july 3, 9, 18. _monitor repub._, may 3, 4, 26-7; june 3, 7, 11, 13, 14-16, 18, 19, 24, 30; july 6, 7, 9; dec. 12 (s. anna, nov. 19). _niles_, oct. 30, p. 141. =83=gov. querétaro to farías, oct. 20, 1846; to anaya, may 4; to all govs., may 7. =82=gov. jalisco to gov. puebla, apr. 13. =82=gov. méx. to gov. puebla, apr. 12. ramírez, méxico, 237, 244-6, 254, 263, 272, 288-90. =80=gov. méx. to bravo, may 5. =76=to alvarez, june 29. =76=extracto _re_ guanajuato. =76=j. j. de echeverría, june 6. =76=arellano, july 9. =76=olaguíbel to relac., apr. 19. =76=hacienda to basadre, aug. 9. =76=reyes, june 1, 22. =76=basadre, aug. 9. =76=yáñez, june 15. =76=mora, apr. 28. in february, 1847, a revolutionary government satisfactory to the people was set up in oaxaca state, and this supported the national cause to the full extent of its ability. a factional combination made up in congress, however, took the side (may 8) of the deposed authorities. this action naturally caused great dissatisfaction in oaxaca (=76=exposición de la cong. de oaxaca, june 26), and it was particularly imprudent because gen. antonio de león and his officers were partisans of the revolutionary party (ramírez, méxico, 255). 25.9. july 9 the mexican army of the east included, according to a document published by santa anna, 17,548 officers and men. a. lópez (décimo calendario, 57) placed the army, including the national guards, at 30,000 on aug. 9. the only official mexican accounts of the forces present in and near the capital early in august was made up during the following november, and are far from complete; but they were stated to have been five times as large as those existing in november, which were 8109 total, 6785 available (=75=report at meeting of govs.; méxico á través, iv, 701). the unofficial statements cannot be harmonized with these accounts nor (except when drawn from the same source) with one another. it does not help us to know what corps were present (see roa bárcena), for we have not the number of men in each of them. the commanders of brigades in the army of the east were generals terrés, martínez, rangel, pérez, león and anaya and col. zerecero. the three sections of valencia's army were commanded respectively by mejía, parrodi and salas. a portion of alvarez's force consisted of semi-savage "pintos"--men from the hot region, who were marked with spots (=11=mémoire). they lay flat when charged upon, and hewed the enemy down with heavy knives (_machetes_), and they were expected to fill the americans with terror. 25.10. the hill (el peñón viejo) was about 1000 yards in length at the base, and the higher of its two summits reached an elevation of about 400-450 feet (=66=reports of lee, stevens and mason, aug. 12, 26). the work of fortifying it was skilfully as well as thoroughly done. engineer i. i. stevens made out nearly forty guns. topog. engineer m. l. smith thought there were about sixty (sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 4). a large stock of rations was placed here (=76=acuerdo, aug. 5). 25.11. _santa anna's preparations (see note 25.1)._ =66=stevens to j. l. smith, aug. 12, 26. =66=r. e. lee, j. l. mason to j. l. smith, aug. 12. s. anna, apelación, 44-7. _id._, detall, 8-11. =60=patterson to marcy, oct. 26. _picayune_, june 30; aug. 8. donnavan, adventures, 29. pacheco, exposíción. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 91-4, 123-5. scott, mems., ii, 466. hitchcock, fifty years, 274. =224=intercepted letters (ed. by hitchcock). (embezzlement) consideraciones, 25; apuntes, 207. sen. 19; 30, 2 (m. l. smith, e. l. f. hardcastle). apuntes, 205-10, 223-8. molina, el asalto. raleigh _star_, sept. 1. =13=thornton, june 29. =178=davis, diary. portrait of lombardini: city hall, mexico. =350=weber, recolls. n. orl. _delta_, july 18. _verdadero liberal_, may 20. (san patricio cos.) dublán, legislación, v, 290; _diario_, july 15. méxico á través, iv, 668-71. =70="guerra," no. 1120. london _times_, may 10; sept. 6. semmes, service, 348-9. dublán, legislación, v, 280, 284, 289, 294. =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 517, june 29; 534, res., july 28. =73=lozano, no. 2, aug. 24. gamboa, impug., 51. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 205-6. =335=thornton to n. p. trist, july 29. encarnacion prisoners, 69. =60=wilson to marcy, aug. 1. n. y. _sun_, aug. 23. _diario_, may 24; june 5-10, 14-6, 18, 20, etc. _monitor repub._, may 31 (eleventh inf.); june 13-5, 18, etc.; dec. 12 (s. anna, nov. 19). _niles_, june 19, p. 251. =13=bankhead, no. 74, 1846. (honduras) =60=patterson to marcy, oct. 26, 1847. (powder from n. orl.) =166=consul mcfaul to ----, nov. 12, 1846. ramírez, méxico, 268. the following from =76= are cited for particular reasons. valencia, proclam., may 14. estado of garrison, may 13. ayunt., mexico, june 3. recommended measures, apr. 6, 14. circulars, june 12; july 24. s. anna to alcorta, june 12; aug. 3. valencia, july 19. statement, lines of defence, june 29. j. terrés, report on cavalry [nov.]. j. de d. peza, report on infantry, nov. 29. acuerdos, may 21, 23-4; june 5, 6, 8, 19, 25; july 17, 18, 19, 28, 30; aug. 2, 3, 5, 6. to alvarez, june 3, 30, etc. to mora, june 26; july 2, 20, 23, etc. to lombardini, june 26; july 2, 5, 7, 11, 22, 31, etc. alvarez. may 29; june 9, 16; july 5, etc. mora, july 9, 19, 20, 22, etc. lombardini, july 6, 7, 10, 12, 14, 15, etc. olaguíbel, aug. 20. decrees, june 5, 8; july 10, 12; aug. 8, etc. among other preparations were the following: information about the defence not to be published, and no communication to be had with points occupied by the americans; the troops to be trained in firing (june 6); the state of siege to be rigorous (june 28); as much wheat as possible to be ground and stored in the city, and the rest to be removed from the valley; all americans, even if naturalized, to leave the city (july 12); the american prisoners (_e.g._, from la encarnación) to go to toluca; prices of provisions fixed; no persons to be tried for acts not injurious to a third party. naturally there was much evasion of these edicts. a council of defence composed of the heads of the executive departments most concerned in the work began to meet on july 2 (=76=acuerdo, june 29; lombardini, july 6). after the near approach of the enemy the shops (excepting those selling provisions and those of the plaza del mercado) were to close, civilian horses and carriages to keep off the streets, and no civilian to leave the city [without a pass] except those who had brought in coal and provisions [but on august 13 permission was given old men, women and children to go out]. by august 24 nearly all civilians [of any importance] left the city (=73=lozano, no. 2). after the americans came within easy reach the usual efforts to cause desertion among them were made by the mexican government. the paixhan guns cast by the mexicans were believed by them to equal the american ordnance (apuntes, 207). 25.12. _diario_, aug. 10-13. =77=relaciones, circular, aug. 9. =73=lozano, no. 2, aug. 24. apuntes, 206-8, 210-20. méxico á través, iv, 671-2. ramírez, méxico, 296. =76=to basadre, aug. 10. =76=to alvarez, aug. 12. =76=relaciones to gov. zacat., aug. 11. =76=olaguíbel, aug. 11. =76=decree, aug. 8. 25.13. april 30 marcy had promised that by the end of june, scott should have about 20,000 men (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 922). scott felt he needed that number in addition to the garrison of puebla (sedgwick, corres., i, 141). he has been criticised for having his small army march in four divisions a day apart. twiggs and quitman together had only about 4000 men and it has been represented that, even had they and the cavalry combined, santa anna could have crushed them before worth could have reached the scene (semmes, service, 326); but, as a day's march was only 12-15 miles (hardcastle in sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 10), worth was but five hours (in case of emergency much less) behind quitman, and an attack strong enough to crush harney, twiggs and quitman, provided as they were with heavy ordnance, could not have taken place in a moment nor without warning. scott expected to be attacked on the march (scott, mems., ii, 466). he might have avoided the high mountains by taking the route _via_ tlaxcala and apam; but this route was long and unsuitable for his trains. there were nearly 1000 wagons (=335=trist to buchanan, aug. 22). 25.14. these works were abandoned because not in keeping with santa anna's plan. very likely the fact that it would not have been easy to subsist a large force here counted also. many of the americans believed santa anna had built the works in the expectation of using them to cut scott off after defeating him in the valley, and set their teeth the harder. all felt that they must conquer or die. 25.15. _scott's march to ayotla._ scott, mems., ii, 465-7. hitchcock, fifty years, 266, 271. grant, mems., i, 164-5. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 190-3. davis, autobiog., 192. _missouri republican_, nov. 3, 1857 (hitchcock). =217=henshaw papers. =218=henshaw narrative. haynes, gen. scott's guide. =183=drum, recolls. =376=nicholson, recolls. donnavan, adventures, 98. =159=collins papers. (route) lyon, journal, ii, 106; thompson, recolls., 33; velasco, geografía, i, 25; cardona, méx. y sus capitales, 129; robertson, visit, i, 321; ruxton, adventures (1847), 33-4; tudor, tour, ii, 211; leclercq, voyage, 178-9; mason, pictures, ii, 6; bullock, across mex., 67-8. lawton, artillery officer, 274, 281-7. =65=gen. orders 246, aug. 5. =291=pierce papers. sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). sen. 19; 30, 2 (m. l. smith, e. l. f. hardcastle). g. w. smith, co. a. carleton, address. =178=davis, diary. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124 (scott); 186-8. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303 (scott). app., 37. kenly, md. vol., 344. rosa, impresiones nebel and kendall, 27. brackett, lane's brigade, 280-1. colección de itinerarios. oswandel, notes, 242, 245. semmes, service, 235, 286-9, 325-8, 452-3. =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 534, res., july 28; 550, aug. 21. =73=lozano, no. 2, aug. 24. =335=trist, statement, july 25, 1849. =236=judah, diary. _diario_, july 2. sedgwick, corres., i, 108, 141. smith, to mexico, 188-93. wilson, mexico, 168. _niles_, oct. 30, p. 138. sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 37. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1032 (scott). =132=atocha to buchanan, aug. 1. ripley, war with mexico, ii, 187. michigan pioneer soc. colls., vii (toll). _so. qtrly. rev._, apr., 1852, pp. 406-7. =316=judd to sherman, feb. 26, 1848. ramírez, méxico, 239. _monitor repub._, oct. 1 (gamboa). manifiesto que dirige ... alvarez. 25.16. s. anna, apelación, 44; app., 146-50, 157-61. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 186-7. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 534, res., july 28. _monitor repub._, dec. 12 (s. anna, nov. 19). and from =76= the following. to canalizo, june 30. to alvarez, june 29, 30; july 13, 28; aug. 6, 9, 12, 14, 21. to valencia, aug. 9, 11, 13, 14, 15. canalizo, june 23; july 19; aug. 9, 10, 11. alvarez, july 5, 8; aug. 6, 8, 8, 9, 9, 10, 10, 11, 12, 12, 25. valencia, aug. 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14. expediente against valencia. acuerdo, aug. 13. 25.17. _the choice of approaches._ hitchcock, fifty years, 272-4. grant, mems., 164-5. _mo. republican_, nov. 3, 1857 (hitchcock). weekly _courier and n. y. enquirer_, mar. 2, 1848 (letter from hitchcock). =217=henshaw to wife, aug. 21. haynes, gen. scott's guide. =61=hamilton to scott, oct. 17, 1850. =66=r. e. lee, i. i. stevens, j. l. mason to j. l. smith, aug. 12, 26. chase, polk admin., 225. claiborne, quitman, i, 333-7. =221=hill, diary. =159=collins papers. lawton, artill. officer, 289. sen. 11; 31, 1 (m. l. smith). sen. 19; 30, 2 (m. l. smith, e. l. f. hardcastle). =178=davis, diary. =136=butterfield, recolls. s. anna, detall, 11. =52=trist nos. 11, 12, aug. 14, 22. =185=letters from worth, duncan and others. =335=h. l. scott to worth, aug. 13. _picayune_, oct. 8. nebel and kendall, 27. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, app., 27. apuntes, 208, 225. semmes, service, 348-52, 355-8. ramírez, méxico, 293. sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 461-2 (lee); 522-7 (hitchcock). =68=charges against duncan (scott). =236=judah, diary. wash. _union_, nov. 3. _nat. intelligencer_, nov. 12. _diario_, aug. 18. =377=capt. willing (paper published by engineer school, washington). stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 148-9, 190. _so. qtrly. rev._, apr., 1852, p. 412. =76=order to lombardini, june 19. =76=to mora, july 2. =76=acuerdos, aug. 5, 8. =76=mora, aug. 2. =76=gugerson to alvarez, aug. 10. =76=(spies) alvarez, aug. 12; valencia, aug. 13, 14; becerril, aug. 13; spy, aug. 12; etc. =76=bravo, aug. 13. =76=to bravo, aug. 13. the mexicaltzingo plan was said to be, that while the rest of the troops should force their way between lakes chalco and xochimilco by a broken causeway commanded by five batteries on a hill, worth should pass round or across the latter lake and coöperate with them wherever he could do so to the best advantage (davis, autobiog., 193; etc.). under orders from scott (hitchcock in _mo. republican_, nov. 3, 1857; =377=paper; =335=h. l. scott to worth, aug. 13; =68=charges against duncan) to examine the chalco route, worth (at duncan's suggestion) had duncan, supported by strong detachments, reconnoitre that route on august 14 under the pretence of obtaining provisions. duncan, who reported (=305=aug. 14) favorably, was sent to scott late that day to give an account of the reconnaissance and deliver a =305=letter from worth, which argued against dividing the army. not receiving credit in scott's report duncan published (_picayune_, oct. 8; dec. 18) a letter claiming in effect to have caused the change of plan (chap. xxix, p. 187). but the letter proved that he knew less about the matter than he supposed (=68=charges); it did not prove that the change of orders resulted from his report; and there is no proof that scott intended to divide the army--though he collected boats enough for about 2000 men with a view to crossing or to making the mexicans believe (claiborne, quitman, i, 335) he intended to cross the lake and it was thought that as many more could be obtained--or definitely decided to attack mexicaltzingo. on the other hand scott stated (=68=charges) that he was himself investigating (=305=mackall to ----, may 10, 1848) the chalco route while duncan was doing so, and that a spy sent from headquarters reported favorably upon it (=68=charges); and he denied squarely that he gave up the mexicaltzingo for the chalco route in consequence of duncan's report (=68=charges). extreme secrecy and all possible mystification of the enemy were necessary, and on account of worth's unfriendliness scott had special reasons for not opening his mind fully to him. other generals have purposely kept their subordinates in the dark (see henderson, jackson, i, 421, 441; _id._, science of war, 42). instead of proving that worth was the better general, worth and duncan proved the opposite, for they showed that worth committed himself to the chalco route on very incomplete data, whereas scott studied three routes and reserved his decision until, as far as was possible, he had full information before him. as usual, when worth's relations with scott were concerned, we find semmes inaccurate and biassed here. ripley uses the incident against scott at great length and very unfairly. facts regarding the mexicaltzingo route are brought forward, though not known to the americans at the time (ripley, war with mexico, 194). we are told (p. 191) that scott ordered duncan to study the chalco route after duncan had proposed to do so, as if scott had not previously ordered worth, duncan's commander, to investigate the route. it is alleged that the case did not warrant "a departure from the rules of the [military] art to so great a degree" [as was proposed by the mexicaltzingo plan]; yet ripley shows that the texcoco route was impracticable (pp. 179, 186), that el peñón was virtually "impregnable" (p. 188), and that the chalco route was considered out of the question (p. 190). this was a situation clearly warranting extraordinary measures. on p. 202 ripley seems to argue that the orders to attack mexicaltzingo cannot have been given to conceal the movement that scott actually made, since any movement against that point would have caused santa anna to place troops in that vicinity, detect promptly scott's real intention, and defend the southern line, and so the ruse would have defeated itself. but (1) the question concerns orders, not--as ripley assumes--an actual movement toward mexicaltzingo; (2) santa anna had troops in the vicinity of mexicaltzingo, but the results anticipated by ripley did not follow; (3) indeed, though ripley was not aware of the fact, santa anna concluded aug. 14 (=76=to valencia) that scott was going to s. agustín, and merely had the reserves at s. antonio garita go with five 4-pounders to s. antonio hacienda (=76=to valencia, aug. 14), for he was relying on his fortified points; and (4) since the same troops could not defend at the same time the works near mexicaltzingo and also the road to s. agustín, orders involving a threat against the former would have tended, without costing scott anything, to keep the latter clear. the vulnerable point of el peñón viejo was that owing to its steepness the cannon could have little action on the slopes (=66=stevens to smith, aug. 26). a particular disadvantage in attacking mexicaltzingo would have been that (santa anna said) such a movement could have been detected in good season, and reinforcements could have been placed there promptly (=76=to bravo, aug. 13). as the american generals needed information that could only be obtained from mexicans, they were peculiarly exposed to the artifices of spies, and some of these gained a confidential footing with worth and even with scott. 25.18. _to s. agustín._ =218=henshaw narrative. s. anna, apelación, 47, 50; app., 146-51. _id._, detall, 12. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 195. davis, autobiog., 192-5. =217=henshaw to wife, aug. 21. =221=hill, diary. =159=collins papers. latrobe, rambler, 121. lawton, artill. officer, 290, 293. sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. sen. 11; 31, 1 (map). sen. 19; 30, 2 (m. l. smith, e. l. f. hardcastle). g. w. smith, co. a. =204=gouverneur, diary. =178=davis, diary. gamboa, impug., 38-9. méxico á través, iv, 672. apuntes, 220, 229. arróniz, manual, i, 243. semmes, service, 352-5, 370-5. nebel and kendall, 28. =12=caryton to lambert, sept. 1. steele, campaigns, i, 123. =236=judah, diary. hitchcock, fifty years, 275. moore, scott's camp., 129. wash. _union_, nov. 3. stevens, i. i. stevens, 168. _niles_, oct. 30, p. 139. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303 (scott); app., 28 (twiggs); 37 (sumner); 39 (mckinstry). =76=to alvarez, aug. 11, 21. =76=to valencia, aug. 14, 15. =76=to lombardini, aug. 14. =76=acuerdos, aug. 15, 16. =76=to herrera, aug. 15. =76=becerril, aug. 15. =76=valencia, aug. 14, 15. =76=alvarez, aug. 16, 17, 19, 22, 25. =76=to alvarez, aug. 14, 15. ripley, war with mexico, ii, 647 (lee to mason). santa anna's policy seems to have been wise. any detachments that he could have thrown hastily in front of worth must have consisted of inferior troops, and would no doubt have been routed. the last portion of the chalco route was over ground which, though in part hilly, was firm (t. f. davis, diary). the brush with twiggs was greatly exaggerated by the americans, some of whom estimated the enemy as 12,000 strong, and felt that a victory was gained, whereas alvarez had no intention of fighting, and did not come within musket range. it has been said (ripley, war with mexico, ii, 289) that scott should have had the cavalry, worth and pillow advance without heavy baggage, and reach s. agustín in twelve hours. but (1) there was a distinct advantage in keeping worth's division intact, (2) scott's van was less likely to be attacked than his rear, (3) scott probably understood that santa anna intended to rely on his fortified positions, for he was well posted about affairs at the capital (=13=thornton to bankhead, june 14), nothing could be kept secret there, and santa anna's plan was known to many, (4) scott's judgment on the point was likely, especially in view of his fuller knowledge of the facts, to be better than ripley's, and (5) it was justified by the event. the chalco route was the one taken by cortez (gamboa, impug., 38). in leaving peñón viejo santa anna had money and provisions remain there for a prospective "distant march" (=76=to herrera, aug. 15). whether this referred to a pursuit of the americans or his own flight can only be guessed, but as the order was addressed to herrera, one inclines to the former view. 25.19. =52=trist, no. 11, aug. 14. méxico á través, iv, 672-3. apuntes, 220-2, 230. s. anna, detall, 11-2. =95=notice to first alcalde, aug. 19. _so. qtrly. rev._, apr., 1852. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 446. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 445, mar. 2. =76=to valencia, aug. 14, 15, 16. =76=to lombardini, aug. 14. =76=valencia, aug. 15, 16. =76=to alvarez, aug. 16. =76=acuerdo, aug. 16. xxvi. contreras, churubusco 26.1. the basis for distances is smith and hardcastle's map of the valley (sen. 11; 31, 1). a garita had to be a somewhat formal place, for municipal duties were levied and collected there, and some accommodations for the officials and the guards were necessary. the last word of "s. antonio abad" was commonly omitted. for the sake of distinction the acapulco road will be called the "highway" and the road _via_ tacubaya, san angel and ansaldo the "turnpike" (trist's word for it). the name contreras was applied by americans to three places, to none of which it belonged. contreras was a village on the turnpike some distance south of padierna. san agustín was also known as tlálpam. 26.2. august 14 valencia's =76=return (_estado_) included 486 officers, 5078 rank and file, 1447 horses, one siege 16-pounder, three siege 12-pounders, five 8-inch (68-pound) howitzers and fifteen smaller guns. one of the guns was assigned to torrejón and he saved it. another small one disappeared. the name of the rounded hill where valencia took post was peloncoahutitlán. 26.3. valencia had one excuse, for very possibly he believed (in view of santa anna's delay at san luis potosí, abandonment of tampico, apparent neglect of vera cruz, etc.) that the president traitorously intended to leave open a door by which scott could reach the capital; but none the less he was a conscienceless conspirator and the mortal foe of santa anna, disgusted with subordination, and eager to overthrow his chief. his past conduct had been thoroughly suspicious, and his manifiesto of august 22 does not bear analysis well. to remove him would have seemed an act of jealousy, if not treason, and very likely have caused a mutiny. santa anna hoped that the national crisis would hold him in line for the time being. besides, santa anna did not know precisely where valencia proposed to make a stand (_diario_, sept. 1). when he learned, he sent general mora to reconnoitre the position (=76=to valencia, august 19). again, he could not afford to raise an issue with valencia now, for the latter (doubtless with the help of his engineers) had divined scott's plans better than the former, and undertaken to guard a quarter left open by the president. finally it was quite possible that santa anna thought valencia would be taught a lesson by the americans. it is unnecessary to discuss the merits and disadvantages of valencia's position, for they will appear plainly in the narrative (see balbontín, invasión, 110-11). had the americans been willing to do as he wished, the hill would have been entirely satisfactory. of valencia's intellectual quality the following specimen is suggestive: "soldiers of liberty, anarchy put out its head, but your arms drowned it in a moment." 26.4. _mexican preliminaries._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 306 (scott); 348-9 (smith); app., 80 (alexander). collins papers. =66=lee to smith, aug. 21. semmes, service, 393. sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 276 (longstreet); 570. =224=intercepted letters (14, l. v. to m. o.; 26, to old gentleman). apuntes, 221, 230-6. balbontín, invasión, 111. gamboa, impug., 41. =70="guerra," no. 30 (f. pérez). méxico á través, iv, 672-3, 677. long, memoirs, 54. _so. qtrly. rev._, apr., 1852, pp. 408-9. latrobe, rambler, 90. sen. 19; 30, 2 (hardcastle to smith; smith to abert). valencia, manifiesto. calderón, life, i, 314. =178=davis, diary. prieto, mems., ii, 213. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 534, res., july 28. s. anna, apelación, 51-2; app., 140-54, 157-60. _id._, detall, 12. _monitor repub._, dec. 17, 1847. hitchcock, fifty years, 276. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 279-83. =76=acuerdo, aug. 16. =76=to lombardini, july 22. =76=to alvarez, aug. 21. =76=zerecero, aug. 25. =76=to valencia, aug. 16. =76=expediente contra valencia. the defences of valencia's camp were somewhat extended later, but not enough to render them formidable. 26.5. according to a topographical officer (washington _union_, nov. 3, 1847) the only route from san agustín to mexico of which the americans knew when they reached the ground was the highway. this surprises one at first. but the turnpike beyond san angel was a local road serving only a few farms, the small villages of san gerónimo and contreras, and a manufacturing establishment near contreras. it seemed to be of no strategic significance, and was not likely to be heard of at a distance. the fortifications along the highway were largely developed after scott turned toward san agustín. valencia's movements were impromptu. scott had an englishman residing at mexico in his pay, and we know that two persons brought data on aug. 19 (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 162). apparently scott did his duty as to seeking information. 26.6. _american preliminaries._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 304, 307, 315, 348-50 (reports of scott, worth and smith); app., 41 (mason); 66 (smith); 101 (magruder); 118 (cadwalader). wilhelm, eighth inf., ii, 307. _picayune_, sept. 8; oct. 21. =66=lee to smith, aug. 21. semmes, service, 380, 393. =224=intercepted letters (26, to old gentleman). hitchcock, fifty years, 275. grant, mems., i, 142. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 188 (trist, no. 12). =76=expediente contra valencia. =236=judah, diary. sen. 19; 30, 2 (hardcastle to smith). _monitor repub._, dec. 17. _diario_, aug. 19. 26.7. quitman had only the second pennsylvania, the marines, steptoe's battery and a troop or two of dragoons (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 341); but worth's division was available in case of need. see claiborne, quitman, i, 347. 26.8. pillow, as was decided by a court of inquiry (sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 332-45) on the testimony of such men as lee (p. 78), smith (p. 102), riley (p. 147) and shields (p. 268), did not devise the plan on which this victory was gained; and when lee brought word to scott of smith's plan he washed his hands of it (=335=trist, draft of address; sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 333); but he had the audacity to claim that smith merely executed the precise plans and views laid down by pillow for his guidance (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1018). pillow could claim the credit only on the ground that he was the senior officer on the field, and that smith's operations were a logical consequence of the events; but scott was the senior of pillow, and all that occurred was--as smith pointed out (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 104)--the logical consequence of scott's order to gain possession of the san angel road. the consensus of opinion was expressed by twiggs: "general smith deserves the whole credit" (stevens, stevens, i, 196). moreover the famous letter signed "leonidas"--prepared at pillow's quarters doubtless with his connivance (hitchcock in _mo. republican_, oct. 2, 1857; _republican banner_, feb. 23, 1858), conveyed by his agency (davis, autobiog., 285) to the new orleans _delta_, which published it sept. 10 (chap. xxix, note 29.31), and fathered (when exposed) by an untruthful subordinate of his--"puffed" pillow in the most extravagant manner for this "unparallelled victory," and represented scott not only as leaving everything to pillow but as blundering sadly. _e.g._ it said, "the army had been marching through marshes and almost impassable roads, nearly half around the city, to find some points upon the enemy's works that could be successfully assailed," the provisions had been nearly exhausted, and the mountains prevented going farther; pillow's "plan of battle [at contreras], and the disposition of his forces were most judicious," and he "achieved this signal and brilliant victory." (for the letter signed "leonidas" see sen. 65; 30, 1 (pp. 385-9, and the testimony of pillow, burns, freaner, trist); =335=pillow to trist, aug. 31, private; st. louis _evening news_, oct. 2, 1857; chap. xxix, pp. 435-7.) pillow's design in having such a statement prepared and placed before the people in advance of the official reports was probably to influence public opinion in the united states so as to make him an available candidate for the presidency or enable polk to put him in scott's place. as pillow was known to have great influence with the president, and was an active, affable, plausible man, he naturally had a following; but the sentiment of the able and honest officers towards him was one of contempt. "the ass pillow," "that consummate fool," said the future general d. h. hill (diary) of pillow as he showed himself on aug. 19. a sensible pennsylvanian wrote in his diary, aug. 10, that pillow was without question "the poorest and most unpopular" of the generals (oswandel, notes, 249). col. w. b. campbell characterized him as light, impetuous, of little military judgment and no skill (=139=to d. campbell, mar. 20, 28; apr. 18, 25); and a correspondent of the future gen. w. t. sherman described him as "a mass of vanity, conceit, ignorance, ambition and want of truth" (=316=judd, feb. 26, 1848). the doings of the pillow court of inquiry (sen. 65; 30, 1) were carefully digested and analyzed by the author; but as the subject concerns only incidentally the history of the war, space cannot be taken to present this analysis. 26.9. valencia could see that retreat meant his personal ruin, and he preferred to argue that honor required him to hold his ground. 26.10. persifor f. smith, a graduate from princeton, was admitted to the bar at philadelphia, practised law at new orleans, and had considerable military experience in the florida war. he was a simple, scholarly, unassuming man; but all ranks appreciated his ability, attainments, clear perception, valor, promptness and steadiness. 26.11. _the battle of contreras._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, etc.; app., pp. 66, etc. (reports of scott and his officers). s. anna, apelación, 52-5; app., 154-6, 160. _id._, detall, 12-4. _picayune_, sept. 8; oct. 21. =221=hill, diary. =61=twiggs to marcy, feb. 7, 1848. =66=lee to smith, aug. 21, 1847. =60=riley to westcott, nov. 30. semmes, service, 381, 385, 392. =224=intercepted letters (14, l. v. to m. o.; 25, note by e. a. h.; 28). apuntes, 237-43. mcsherry, el puchero, 73, 76. murphy, hungerford, 99. _delta_, sept. 9; nov. 12; dec. 1. _monitor repub._, sept. 27 (salas); dec. 12 (s. anna). _porvenir_, aug. 26, supplem. (valencia). =65=scott, gen. orders 258. balbontín, invasión, 111-8. hitchcock, fifty years, 276-8, 281. ballentine, english soldier, ii, 207, 218-20, 223-6, 228-9. davis, autobiog., 196-8. =66=foster to smith, aug. 23. =66=mcclellan to smith, aug. 23. =66=beauregard to smith, aug. 25. =66=tower to smith, aug. 25. =66=mason to smith, aug. 24. prieto, mems., ii, 222-7. lópez, décimo calendario, 58. =80=olaguíbel, aug. 20-1. =199=anon. ms. written by a person of importance. =307=roberts, diary. gamboa, impug., 42-3. =350=weber, recoils. =70="guerra," no. 30 (f. pérez). ramírez, méxico, 298. méxico á través, iv, 677. =217=henshaw to wife, aug. 21. =327=sutherland to father, nov. 28. jackson, memoirs of jackson, 41. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 188. long, memoirs, 54-9. wash. _union_, sept. 20. _diario_, aug. 24; sept. 1. _so. mag._, july, 1874, p. 75. =204=gouverneur, diary. =277=burnett, statement. _united service_, june, 1896 (lane). sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 62 (h. l. scott); 68-9 (williams); 72-4, 298, 300 (gen. scott); 75-9, 463 (lee); 81-6 (cadwalader); 97 (deas); 99-106 (smith); 137-8 (canby); 147-51 (riley); 162 (hooker); 180 (hodge); 182-4, 188 (ripley); 208-9 (rains); 230-1 (beauregard); 232-3 (hitchcock); 246 (morgan); 267 (shields); 270 (howard); 283, 286-7 (twiggs); 334-5 (verdict); 570. stevens, i. i. stevens, i, 174-9, 196. carreño, jefes, ccxc (pérez), ccxciv (torrejón). _niles_, oct. 30, pp. 138-9. _cong. globe_, 34, 1, p. 105 (foote). lancaster co. hist. soc. mag., mar. 6, 1908. giménez, mems., 266. =291=pierce to appleton, aug. 27. =291=gardner to canby, aug. 30. =291=pierce to hooker, aug. 22. engineer school, u. s. a., occas. papers, no. 16. valencia, manifiesto. =178=davis, diary. stevens, vindication, 4-7. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 281-3. =76=tornel, aug. 19. =76=orders to valencia, aug. 26. kenly, md. vol., 421. =73=lozano, no. 2., aug. 24. =210=bragg to hammond, dec. 20. =125=bonham to wife, aug. 24; to adj. gen., feb. 26, 1849. _so. qtrly. rev._, apr., 1852, pp. 415-26. calderón, rectificaciones, 41. s. anna, mi historia, 72-3. =112=beauregard to smith, aug. 25. =76=valencia, aug. 19. =76=j. b. argüelles, aug. 22. =76=alcorta to alvarez, aug. 21. =76=alvarez, aug. 21. remarks. this engagement was called by the mexicans the battle of padierna. at first valencia had a reserve under salas at ansaldo, but he drew this in at about the time when the battle began. he then placed torrejón's cavalry between ansaldo and his main position. a turn in the road near his position enabled him to command the turnpike for some distance. for further details regarding his dispositions see apuntes, 236. during the afternoon of aug. 19 the ninth infantry (ransom) and a battalion of the twelfth under lieut. col. bonham crossed the ravine and remained about 200 yards from valencia's camp until 9 or 10 o'clock, partly occupying usefully valencia's attention. when these troops retired, mexicans attacked the guard at padierna, but american reinforcements defeated them. r. e. lee and g. b. mcclellan helped set up magruder's battery, and t. j. ("stonewall") jackson commanded one section of it a part of the time. these officers distinguished themselves highly. riley understood he was "sent across the pedregal to cut off the retreat of the enemy and check reinforcements" (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 148). when smith moved to the right, he had magruder resume firing to divert attention from that movement. magruder's men tried to save themselves by falling flat at each mexican discharge, and the ground sheltered them somewhat, yet fifteen were killed or wounded. his guns were withdrawn over the rocks after nightfall. it has been said with force that it would have been better had scott been on the ground from the first. but he did not wish or expect to fight; no doubt he had much administrative work on hand; he was not far away; and he believed that his instructions to pillow provided for all probable contingencies. it seems to be true that pillow, a most plausible and insinuating talker, had gained a certain ascendency over him. probably for this reason, as well as owing to his general wish to gratify his officers, scott permitted pillow to make statements in his report on the battle, which, as the trial of pillow showed, ought not to have been there (=210=bragg). pillow later urged the point that scott approved of his dispositions; but it was scott's practice to accept what his officers did, and make the best of it. scott was slightly wounded in the leg during the afternoon of august 19 but did not mention the incident at the time. later the wound made him trouble. the fifteenth infantry (morgan) did not act with the rest of pierce's brigade on aug. 19, for pillow had detached it as a reserve. pierce was injured by falling from his horse, and hence col. ransom took command of the brigade. late in the afternoon valencia placed a 4-pounder and two battalions of infantry on the turnpike toward ansaldo to prevent more americans from reaching san gerónimo (balbontín, invasión, 114), but this force accomplished nothing. at first he had thought the americans crossing the pedregal in groups, partly concealed by the ground and trees, were mere scouting parties. it was found impossible at the pillow trial to decide at just what time scott arrived on the lookout hill (the lower summit of zacatepec). the variation of careful witnesses was an hour and twenty-five minutes. watches appear to have been out of order, and therefore one cannot be positive regarding the precise time of any event. smith's plan to attack santa anna on aug. 19 has been criticised as unsound (claiborne, quitman, i, 339, note). but he believed a repulse of santa anna would ensure the defeat of valencia; he wanted to dispose of santa anna before his forces could become stronger; he did not wish (having no artillery) to let him cannonade at his leisure; and probably the situation of the american right appeared to require unusual boldness. lee (=66=to j. l. smith, aug. 21) attached less importance to this operation. tower (=66=to j. l. smith, aug. 25) said the inexperience of the new troops, particularly cadwalader's, had something to do with leading smith to give up the plan. doubtless pillow's fiasco, aug. 19, tended to inflate valencia's confidence and so to ensure his destruction. valencia's artillery accomplished nothing against the americans at san gerónimo, partly because the trees and rough ground hid and protected them, and partly because the guns he used were not very powerful. smith supposed he was shields's senior, and retained the command after the latter's arrival at san gerónimo. shields refrained from claiming it, knowing that smith had made preparations to attack and understood the situation best. cadwalader, as well as shields, outranked smith; but doubtless he felt unequal to the situation, and he did not assert his rights. during the night the few houses at san gerónimo were required for the wounded. santa anna has been too much criticised for his course. valencia did not see the americans in force, aug. 19, until after one o'clock, and we do not know how promptly he reported the fact. santa anna stated that at about two o'clock he received word from valencia that cannon fire had begun. he was then at san antonio, yet in about four hours he had a considerable force near san gerónimo. he reasonably hesitated about attacking an unknown number of americans in an admirable defensive position. his cavalry could have done nothing in the ravines, lanes and woods which composed it, and his artillery little. had he attacked, as he threatened to do, late on aug. 19, he would have been beaten. after riley joined him, smith had about 3600 men (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 105). had santa anna advanced by the turnpike he would have exposed his flank to smith. valencia had got himself into a hopeless impasse, and the best thing he could have done was to tear himself out of it, as santa anna ordered. santa anna sent orders to pérez in the afternoon to help valencia, but overtaking that brigade (which had set out for the purpose) took charge of it. shields brought about 600 men (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 344). smith's plan of attack against valencia was not perfectly safe, for, as napoleon said, the ground of a night attack should be thoroughly known; but the circumstances warranted the risk. friday morning tower, who had discovered the ravine (=66=tower to j. l. smith, aug. 25), led riley's brigade, and beauregard led smith's. as soon as valencia was routed, orders were given to complete the road begun aug. 19, but this was soon found to be unnecessary. the fifteenth regiment, on account of its distance from riley, reached valencia's camp too late to take part in the battle. it should be remembered that smith's troops did not know of the demoralization of the mexicans, and expected to find them elated and confident. apparently shields made a mistake in leaving san gerónimo to go to the road on friday morning, but the mistake was natural. valencia went to toluca with a few troops. he was notified to present himself for trial, which would have meant death. some irregulars made a trivial attack upon quitman (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 347), but alvarez's troops did not come near san agustín. twiggs had a lame foot at this time, and he was not under fire aug. 19. brookes (brooks) was on his staff. ripley (war with mexico ii, 291) intimates that scott sent pillow and twiggs forward, aug. 19, without taking much into account valencia's army and cannon, and permitted the mexicans to open the battle when they pleased. this seems careless on scott's part; but, as the text shows, scott did not know valencia had marched to padierna, and had no reason to suppose (particularly in view of the threat against s. antonio) that large mexican forces would be there. ripley suggests (p. 292) that it was improper to let valencia see the road-building, learn the americans were moving that way, and prepare to receive them; but road-building ceased when the americans came in view of valencia, and after that time he had little opportunity for preparations. ripley complains (p. 293) that it was confusing to have twiggs open the battle, pillow take charge of it, and scott supersede pillow; but it is not customary for the general-in-chief to ride at the head of his forces on a road-building expedition, and under the circumstances the above arrangement was natural. he remarks (p. 297) that riley's reconnoitring with a view to assaulting valencia's rear proves that he understood his mission was more than to occupy s. gerónimo and await orders [_i.e._ understood that pillow sent him to do what smith did]; but riley testified that he had no such understanding, and reconnoitred on his own responsibility to obtain information that might prove useful (sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 147-8). ripley, in his efforts to sustain pillow's claims, says (p. 297) that riley fell back because of his "believing himself unsupported," yet says that riley "relied" on being supported. he explains (p. 298) pillow's not informing riley of the despatch of cadwalader by saying that a single mounted officer could not cross the pedregal; but an officer could cross on foot, and all or most of the officers were afoot (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 304). rives (u. s. and mexico, ii, 488) observes that placing four brigades successively between superior forces of the enemy involved a great risk; but it should be remembered not only that it was worth while to take the risk and that the american troops were of superior quality, but that santa anna was not present when riley went to s. gerónimo, valencia could not see what was taking place in that quarter, he was expecting a frontal attack all the afternoon, s. gerónimo was a splendid defensive position, and the mexicans could not see how large forces occupied it. had santa anna and valencia coöperated with judgment and good-will, scott's army would perhaps have been crushed; but had the mexicans been sensible and patriotic, we should have had no war. how much scott knew about the mutual relations of santa anna and valencia one cannot say, but in all probability he was well informed regarding them. as scarcely needs to be pointed out, this battle and that of churubusco had a great effect in discouraging, not merely the mexicans in the vicinity but those at a distance. men intending to fight or to provide money drew back at once (_e.g._ =76=isunza, aug. 24). 26.12. _santa anna's course after the battle of contreras._ sen. 19; 30, 2 (smith to abert). =224=intercepted letters (14, l. v. to m. o.; 22, diary; 23, narrative; 26, to old gentleman). apuntes, 209-10, 241, 244, 250-4. semmes, service, 396-7. _picayune_, oct. 8. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 325; app., 69 (reports of scott and others). s. anna, apelación, 53 _id._, detail, 14-5. balbontín, invasión, 120-1. =217=henshaw to wife, aug. 21. =61=huger, aug. 22. =70="guerra," no. 30 (f. pérez, rangel, argüelles, zenea). méxico á través, iv, 678. wash. _union_, nov. 3. _diario_, sept. 1, 2. _monitor repub._, oct. 24; dec. 13, 17. carreño, jefes, ccxc (pérez), ccciv, cccvi. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 446; iv, app., 283-4. lawton, artill. officer, 295. remarks on mason and hardcastle's plan of worth's operations (sen. 1; 30, 1). =76=report of losses, churubusco, aug. 21. =76=rincón, aug. 20. =76=argüelles, aug. 22. =76=rincón to s. anna, aug. 26. 26.13. to guard against contingencies scott had ordered worth with garland's brigade and quitman with his troops to proceed toward san gerónimo on friday morning, leaving san agustín guarded by harney (sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306-7). this has been thought risky. but scott had no doubt learned from lee that santa anna was operating in the vicinity of san gerónimo, where was evidently the critical field, and hence probably he felt that there was little danger of an attack upon san agustín that harney aided, if necessary, by clarke's brigade (not far distant) could not meet. 26.14. _scott's course after the battle of contreras._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306-9, 338, 344; app., 36 (reports of scott, pillow, shields, kearny). hitchcock, fifty years, 278, 281-2. davis, autobiog., 199. _picayune_, sept. 8. =66=lee to smith, aug. 21. =335=trist, draft of address. wash. _union_, sept. 15. sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 74, 632 (scott); 77 (lee). _so. qtrly. review_, july, 1852, pp. 81-2. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1018 (scott). smith, to mexico, 199. 26.15. _worth's operations at churubusco._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 333; app., 36,41-2,44-65 (reports of scott and officers). =221=hill, diary. =68=bonneville court-martial (testimony of hoffman, nelson, pemberton, worth, armistead, ruggles, etc.). =335=trist, draft of address. semmes, service, 394-400. sen. 19; 30, 2 (smith to abert). sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (lee). =224=intercepted letters (14, l. v. to m. o.; 23, narrative; 26, to old gentleman). apuntes, 244-6. _picayune_, sept. 22; oct 8. _delta_, sept. 26. =76=zerecero to guerra, aug. 25. =76=rincón to s. anna, aug. 26. balbontín, invasión, 120-2. hitchcock, fifty years, 278, 282. =260=henshaw, comments on map. stevens, stevens, i, 198. =61=huger, report, aug. 22. =65=scott, gen. orders 327, oct. 28. gamboa, impug., 47. =70="guerra," no. 30 (pérez, perdigón garay). ramírez, méxico, 299-301. =73=lozano, no. 2, aug. 24. =236=judah, diary. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1018 (scott); 1076 (hoffman). carreño, jefes, cccvi (pérez). _so. qtrly. review_, july, 1852, pp. 82-4, 90-1. lawton, artill. officer, 294-5, 298. smith, to mexico, 199-202. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 284. s. anna, detall, 15. _monitor repub._, dec. 17. 26.16. _twiggs's operations._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 322, 325, 348, etc.; app., 69-82, 85-8, 96-7, etc. (reports of scott and officers). =221=hill, diary. =12=caryton to lambert, sept. 1. apuntes, 246, 250-3. ballentine, eng. sold., ii, 230. =66=stevens to smith, aug. 24. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98 (h. l. scott). stevens, stevens, i, 180-4, 199. stevens, vindic., 4-7. carreño, jefes, 29. michigan pioneer soc. colls., ii, 173; vii, 117. _so. qtrly. review_, july, 1852, pp. 87-90. engineer school, u. s. a., occas. papers, no. 16. _journ. milit. serv. instit._, xvii (van deusen). =76=argüelles, aug. 22. =76=rincón to s. anna, aug. 26. davis, autobiog., 199. =70="guerra," no. 30 (g. pérez). negrete, invasión, iii, app., 447. calderón, rectificaciones, 43. s. anna, mi historia, 73-4. hitchcock, fifty years, 278-9, 282. 26.17. _shields's operations._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 303, 306, 315, 325, 333, 342; app., 76, 106, 113, 118, 128, 130-4 (reports of scott and officers). =66=lee to smith, aug. 21. claiborne, quitman, i, 342-3. city of charleston, year book, 1883, p. 523. =303=shields to quitman, aug. 21. =221=hill, diary. =335=trist, draft of address. semmes, service, 402. =224=intercepted letters (22, diary; 25, to e.). hawthorne, pierce, 100. apuntes, 246-7. murphy, hungerford, 102. =76=zerecero to guerra, aug. 25. balbontín, invasión, 121-2. davis, autobiog., 200-1, 286. =70="guerra," no. 30 (f. pérez). stevens, stevens, i, 198. ramírez, méxico, 300. carreño, jefes, ccxciv (torrejón), cccvii (pérez). =170=crooker to mother, sept. 1. _so. qtrly. review_, july, 1852, pp. 93-9. oil painting of butler: sen. chamber, columbia, s. c. sen. 19; 30, 2 (smith to abert). =291=pierce to appleton, aug. 27. _monitor repub._, dec. 17. =125=bonham to adj. gen., june 15, 1848. _nat. intelligencer_, jan. 3, 1848. stevens, vindication, 4-7. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 285. =277=burnett, statement. hitchcock, fifty years, 279. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464. s. anna, detall, 15. 26.18. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 325, etc.; app., 35, 42, 46, 49, 64, 77, 127, etc. (reports of scott and officers). semmes, service, 397, 401-2. =224=intercepted letters (17, j. u. to j. p. f.). apuntes, 254-8. =76=argüelles, aug. 22. =76=rincón to s. anna, aug. 26. balbontín, invasión, 122. ballentine, eng. sold., ii, 233. carreño, jefes, cccvii (pérez). _niles_, jan. 22, 1848, p. 323. 26.19. s. anna, detall, 15-6. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 313, 318, 340, 347; app., p. 36 (reports of scott and officers). _picayune_, oct. 21. apuntes, 247. charleston _courier_, oct. 2. balbontín, invasión, 123. fate of f. d. mills. grant, mems., i, 146. davis, autobiog., 202. =223=hirschorn, recolls. de peyster, kearny, 140, 142-5. _journ. u. s. cavalry assoc._, mar., 1911, p. 841. ramsey, other side, 287, note. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 285-6. remarks on the battle of churubusco. the active fortifying of the convent did not begin until the afternoon of aug. 18 (=76=rincón to s. anna, aug. 26); one gun arrived there on the morning of the twentieth and the rest were left by santa anna later that day (apuntes, 252); and hence scott could not well have learned from spies what the situation was in that quarter. it is bootless to say (calderón, rectificaciones, 43) that santa anna should have prevented scott from reaching coyoacán. neither he nor his army was in a condition to fight without fortifications, and they could not have stopped the americans anywhere if not at churubusco. on the mexican right at the convent were two 8-pounders and a 4-pounder; in embrasures at the front, an 8-pounder and a 4-pounder; _en barbette_ at the left an 8-pounder; and in an embrasure defending the left flank a 6-pounder. a detachment of the independencia battalion under peñúñuri occupied coyoacán when the americans approached, and retired with some loss. the fight at churubusco convent was actually begun by the mounted rifles, but their orders were merely to escort the reconnoitring party, and the first artillery was expected to clear the way by turning the supposed one-gun battery (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 330). riley had only the second and seventh infantry at churubusco. the fourth artillery was on guard at valencia's camp. scott ordered that worth should attack and turn san antonio after finding the americans were in its rear, but when he sent lee to give the signal to worth, lee found worth had already done this. ripley (war with mexico, ii, 250-1) says that scott ordered pillow to do what twiggs did and _vice versa_. but (1) nothing of this is found in scott's or pillow's report; (2) scott would not have been likely to order two bitter enemies (worth and twiggs) to coöperate in an indefinite manner, and (3) h. l. scott testified at the pillow trial that he carried from gen. scott to twiggs the order to attack the convent (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98). davis, shields's aide, says on the other hand (autobiog., 199) that scott knew by reconnaissances of a remarkably strong fortification at churubusco, and ordered twiggs to take the route actually taken by shields. but (1) davis's first statement is not correct; (2) scott was at coyoacán, where the roads forked, and would have recalled twiggs, had he seen that officer take the wrong road; (3) scott felt in haste to strike the retreating mexicans, and the quickest way to do that was apparently by the road to churubusco; and (4) h. l. scott's testimony, supported by the reports of gens. scott and twiggs, seems to be decisive. davis's account contains other errors, and appears to have been written long afterwards from memory. what scott intended to do after concentrating we do not know. probably, as was his custom, he held several plans in suspense, awaiting developments and fuller information regarding the enemy, which the delay expected in worth's operations would have given him time to acquire. but his promptness in sending off pierce and shields, and his attempt to hold back one of smith's and one of pierce's brigades, suggest that he aimed to get behind santa anna himself and force a decisive battle. gen. u. s. grant endorsed scott's strategy at churubusco as faultless and said the engineers served him perfectly (mems., i, 145); but stevens's confession is decisive on both points (stevens, stevens, i, 180, 184, 196, 199). stevens states expressly that scott had intended to reconnoitre before attacking at churubusco. worth's attacking the bridge without reconnoitring was mainly due to over-confidence and eagerness; but the intense ambition and rivalry of worth and twiggs probably had something to do with the undue haste of both. of course semmes (service, 398, 446) asserts that worth advanced with deliberation and reconnoitred the bridgehead, but the evidence, especially that given at the trial of major bonneville, is decisively against him. ripley, on the other hand, states that a reconnaissance was not practicable (war with mexico, ii, 267); but while a complete reconnaissance could not be made, the cornfields on the right would have enabled an officer to advance unseen, and at a glance learn something regarding the obstacle in front. this would have been to save, not lose, time. scott was accused of having no plan and leaving his generals to attack as they saw fit, and was criticized especially for fighting to gain a road neither needed nor used by him, from which the enemy could easily have been manoeuvred, had they cared to hold it (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 378); but the text explains these apparent errors. the battle was, however, in effect a blunder, even though not chargeable to scott as such. still, the ardor of the army was something not to be thrown away by delaying, and the promptness of the americans prevented santa anna from completing his preparations. (greene, russian army, 433: excessive prudence has a bad effect on the morale of the men.) perhaps scott gained as much as he lost in this way. moreover, had he manoeuvred the mexicans out of churubusco, it would have been necessary to fight them elsewhere, when they would probably have been more ready to fight; the moral effect of this victory on both armies would not have been gained; and our military annals would not have contained this page. the moral effect on the mexicans, however, was largely offset by pride in the stubborn resistance they had offered, and by the armistice that scott immediately offered. one could not always determine just where firing, heard from a distance, was taking place. probably for this reason we have inconsistent reports that make it impossible to determine precisely where and when the battle began. the sixth infantry, moving toward the bridge a considerable distance in advance of worth himself, were said to have received the first fire from the convent (hoffman: ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1076), but scott reported that the attack upon the convent began some time before that upon the bridgehead. stevens (i. i. stevens, 198) supports him. the writer in "apuntes" says that worth was checked by ammunition wagons in the road, and that santa anna, seeing this, recalled pérez to defend the bridge; but the wagons appear to have caused no such delay as this writer assumed. the rest of santa anna's force (which this writer says kept on towards mexico) was mainly cavalry, and presumably this cavalry assisted in flanking shields. brev. lieut. col. c. f. smith's battalion consisted of two companies from the second artillery, one from the fifth infantry and one from the eighth infantry (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 316). the fifteenth, but only one battalion (commanded by capt. wood) of the twelfth infantry was with pierce, and a battery of mountain howitzers. pierce, who had been thrown from his horse the day before, fainted and fell out before coming into action, so shields commanded both brigades. lee was the engineer officer with shields. seeing the need of more troops, he went back to scott and obtained the mounted rifles and a troop of the second dragoons, but these men did not reach the spot in time to fight. scott has been criticized for not sending a stronger force in this direction; but in fact he did not even retain an escort, and the rifles were twiggs's reserve (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 309). the south carolina regiment, commonly known as the "palmettoes," was made up of superior material. men fit to be officers were in the ranks. shields's movement was partly based on a misapprehension, for the mexicans could retreat from churubusco _via_ mexicaltzingo; but anyhow it was wise to aid the frontal attack on the bridge by applying pressure on the flank. shields seems to have marched too far north to coöperate effectively with the attack upon the bridgehead. presumably he did so in order to reach santa anna's rear. the combined effect of this movement and the outflanking of the mexican left was to extend the american line enormously, and expose it to a (happily very improbable) counter-attack. at about three o'clock the americans were in three sections, badly separated by distance or by the enemy, while the mexicans, besides fighting behind strong defences, were all actually or virtually in touch one with another, and able to give mutual support. shields naturally overestimated the numbers opposed to him. perhaps the victoria and hidalgo battalions from san antonio passed along the highway to mexico at this time. they would not fight. they thought hunger, sunburn and blistered feet bad enough. the americans believed that they fought at least 32,000 men on aug. 20 (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 313); but this was a great exaggeration. rangel's brigade was in town; alvarez's was far away; and there must have been a large number of soldiers guarding the fortifications, and attending to the general requirements of the service. the number fighting that day on the mexican side seems to have been about 16,000, though mexican authors have tried to reduce it to 12,000 or 13,000 (_e.g._ roa bárcena, recuerdos, 375). scott's dragoons were divided and assigned to special duties at this time (sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 38). pillow and a part of his troops joined worth, but figured very little in reports of the fighting. the eleventh and fourteenth infantry attempted to cut the mexican line from the bridge to the convent, but on account of the heavy fire were ordered to lie down. col. andrews explained that his regiment (voltigeurs) came up later than worth's division, and could not fire without endangering troops ahead of him (sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 122); but this is not convincing, for he must have left coyoacán at about noon, and there was room enough at the front. it was stated at puebla in october, 1847, that 260 americans fought with the mexicans at churubusco (_flag of freedom_, i, no. 1). some of these men cut their way through (=70="guerra," no. 30, perdigón garay), and reached mexico (_ibid._, rangel). some eighty appear to have been captured. they were fairly tried. a number were found not guilty of deserting, and were released. about fifteen (hartman, journal, 18), who had deserted before the declaration of war, were merely branded with a "d," and fifty of those taken at churubusco were executed (=65=scott, gen. orders 296). there was bitter complaint because any were spared, but scott declared he would rather be put to the sword with his whole army than do an injustice in the matter (davis, autobiog., 226), and urged the courts to find grounds for reducing the number of executions (=335=notes on letter to ho. of repres.). it was said that more than once the american deserters killed mexicans who tried to raise a white flag at the convent. for the deserters and their fate consult: =12=caryton to lambert, sept. 1; _picayune_, sept. 8; sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 319, 344; ballentine, eng. sold., ii, 230; =70="guerra," no. 30 (rangel, perdigón garay); judah, diary; _amer. star_, mexico, sept. 20; _diario_, sept. 2; _flag of freedom_, puebla, i, no. 1; =178=davis, diary; negrete, invasión, iii, app., 452; hartman, journal, 17-8; scott, =65=gen. orders 281-3; davis, autobiog., 224-7). hancock and longstreet, destined to be on opposite sides at gettysburg, here fought together. twiggs was at this time under fire (stevens, stevens, i, 199). rives (u. s. and mexico, ii, 493) explains the stiff defence of the convent as due to the presence of "men of spanish (not indian) descent"; but (1) the victoria and hidalgo battalions, which would not fight (_supra_) were still more truly "spanish" (vol. ii, p. 3), and (2) the nearly worthless officers were always of such descent. 26.20. sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 465, 478. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 313-4, 348, 384. ho. 24; 31, 1. =76=rincón to s. anna, aug. 26. =76=quijano, sept. 3. =76=olaguíbel, aug. 27. ramírez, méxico, 299. _monitor repub._, dec. 17 (s.anna). =76=alcorta, aug. 30. =12=caryton to lambert, sept. 1. semmes, service, 408. =76=report, aug. 21. =224=intercepted letters, _passim_. =76=cuerpo médico, report, aug. 24. 26.21. mich. pioneer soc. colls., ii, 173. stevens, stevens, i, 199. encarnacion prisoners, 55. hitchcock, fifty years, 278-80. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 331. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (lee). apuntes, 247. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 377. xxvii. negotiations 27.1. _the american situation after the battles of aug. 20._ =260=henshaw, comments on map. =61=trousdale, aug. 22. =217=henshaw to wife, aug. 21, etc. =218=henshaw narrative. vedette, vii, no. 9 (toll). st. louis _republican_, sept. 27. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314 (scott). hitchcock, fifty years, 284-5, 294. mcsherry, el puchero, 88, 100. =364=worth to daughter, sept. 2. =61=n. c. to elizabeth miller, nov. 30. semmes, service, 413. london _chronicle_, nov. 12. n. y. _herald_, feb. 5, 1848 (pierce). =236=judah, diary. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 129 (scott). semi-weekly n. y. _courier and enquirer_, mar. 1, 1848. =358=williams to father, oct. 1. =291=pierce to wife, aug. 23. davis, autobiography, 189. =350=weber, recolls. =303=shields to quitman, aug. 21. =221=hill, diary. =68=scott's statement to court of inquiry, apr. 17, 1848. gamboa, impug., 49. _picayune_, sept. 9. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 460 (turnbull). semmes (service, 413) says that eventually scott had to disperse the elements of peace, and incorrectly adds that they seemed to reassemble all the more rapidly. but scott had reason to believe that what it required months to do later could be done now in only a few weeks. he reported that understanding his nation's desire for peace and "willing to leave something to this republic--of no immediate value to us--on which to rest her pride, and to recover temper--i halted our victorious corps at the gates of the city" (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314). even the fiery worth deemed it best not to enter mexico at this time (=364=to daughter, sept. 2). 27.2. =108=marcy to bancroft, apr. 28. polk, messages, may 11; june 16, 1846; feb. 10, 1847 (richardson, iv, 437, 451, 511). ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 328 (scott); 334 (marcy). =297=benton ms. (with polk's notes) received by polk, july 4, 1846. =69=worth to bliss, nov. 29; dec. 14, 1846. 27.3. bankhead reported, oct. 10, 1846, that he was weary of arguing in favor of treating with the united states; that the dominant faction, positively refusing to negotiate, were crying, "a levy of 40,000 and make terms only on the other side of the nueces!" 27.4. _the overture of july, 1846._ sen. 107; 29, 2, pp. 1-3. sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 43-4. =13=pakenham, nos. 93, july 13; 107, aug. 13; 119, sept. 28; 130, nov. 12, 1846. =13=bankhead to pakenham, oct. 10. =256=marcy to wetmore, june 13. _locomotor_, june 27. =158=cobb to wife, june 4. _national_, june 22. _pregonero_, june 11. _monitor repub._, june 22. =162=buchanan to conner, oct. 1. =162=conner, july 19. =13=bankhead, nos. 92, 104, 105, june 29; july 30; 125, aug. 31; 128-30, sept. 7, 1846. rejón to buchanan, aug. 31 (in memoria de ... relaciones, 1846). polk, diary, sept. 19, 20, 26. buchanan, works (moore), vii, 40, 82, 87. _indicador_, aug. 27. _nat. intelligencer_, sept. 28. _diario_, dec. 6, 13, 25. =52=black, may 21; june 9; july 4. =166=_id._ to conner, july 9; aug. 1. =166=pommarès to gregory, july 2. =166=_id._ to conner, july 4, 21; aug. 12. reeves, amer. diplomacy, 298. polk, message, dec. 8 (richardson, iv, 494). =297=mackenzie, july 7. =76=comandante, v. cruz, aug. 26. see vol. i, pp. 217, 502, 504. sept. 26 buchanan replied to rejón that the united states did not wish to ignore in the _peace negotiations_ the causes of the war, since to do that would be to abandon the just claims of the united states (polk, diary, sept. 26; sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44). the necessity of explaining his previous despatch illustrated once more the mexican superiority in diplomatic fencing. buchanan added that delay would make it the harder to end the conflict. polk regarded the mexican reply as a refusal to treat (diary, sept. 19). in consequence he proposed aggressive operations in tamaulipas (chap. xiii, p. 263) and the imposition of contributions in lieu of paying for needed supplies (chap. xxxiii, p. 264). buchanan, however, directed conner to notify slidell, who was still on waiting orders at new orleans, whenever the mexican government should announce that it was "disposed" to treat (=162=oct. 1). 27.5. polk, diary, july 26, 30, 31; aug. 1, 4, 7, 8, 10, 1846. _id._ to senate, aug. 4, 8 (richardson, messages, iv, 456, 466). _id._, message, dec. 8, 1846 (_ib._, 494-5). benton, view, ii, 681-2. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, pp. 1211-21. see also the long debates on the subject in senate and house, jan. and feb., 1847 (_cong. globe_). von holst, united states, iii, 293. benton, abr. debates, xvi, 40, note, 45 (sevier), 60 (cass). boston _atlas_, feb. 17, 1847. =13=mora to palmerston, may 26, 1847. _diario_, may 24; june 8, 1847. _republicano_, june 11, 1847. =13=thornton to bankhead, june 14, 1847. (consul black notified) =13=pakenham, no. 40, mar. 29, 1847. wash. _union_, aug. 12, 1846. =108=polk to bancroft, jan. 30, 1847. _daily telegraph_, oct. 16, 1852. the request for two millions apparently grew out of the negotiation with santa anna; see chap. ix, note 9.38. polk's object was probably to be able to supply funds promptly to the mexican administration making a treaty, and to satisfy it that it would be able to gain the needful military support. the three millions could not be used until after mexico should have ratified the treaty (benton, abr. deb., xvi, 46 (berrien), 60 (cass); washington _telegraph_, oct. 18, 1852), and the government was required to account for the expenditure of the money (u. s. stat. at large, ix, 174; benton, abr. deb., xvi, 45). an improper use of it was therefore impossible. 27.6. _the overture of january, 1847._ ho. 85; 29, 2. washington _union_, oct. 9, 1846 (n. y.); apr. 22; june 11, 1847. =162=matson to conner, feb. 20, 1847. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 36-7. =162=conner to wife, feb. 17. =132=benton to buchanan, jan. 14. =132=atocha to buchanan, july 3. =132=buchanan to atocha, jan. 18; to scott and perry, apr. 23. _niles_, may 1, p. 129; may 15, p. 162. von holst, united states, iii, 332. _courrier des etats unis_, aug. 15, 1846. buchanan, works (moore), vii, 198, 211. =13=bankhead, nos. 141, sept. 29, 1846; 16, mar. 2, 1847. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 444, res., mar. 1. tributo á la verdad, 26. =58=dobson, feb. 14. _epoca_, feb. 23. =86=gefe v. c. dept. to gov., feb. 9. _don simplicio_, feb. 17. _diario_, aug. 18. webster, writings, ix, 158. =52=black, feb. 24. =13=pakenham, nos. 107, aug. 13, 1846; 40, mar. 29; 56, apr. 28, 1847. _nat. intelligencer_, june 10, 1845; may 3, 1847. =52=shannon to cuevas, mar. 1, 1845. =69=a clipping from _republicano_. polk, diary, nov. 7, 1846; jan. 12-19; mar. 20, 1847. _picayune_, may 6, 1847. _delta_, mar. 13. =76=morales, feb. 9. at atocha's suggestion the american commissioners were to have power to suspend hostilities after actually meeting mexican commissioners. such was webster's idea (writings, ix, 158). the plan would have given mexico a fine opportunity to protract the negotiations, let our war expenses accumulate, and cause our war spirit to languish. the mexican reply said that the texas affair [besides being atrocious in itself] was "a cover to ulterior designs, which now stand disclosed" (sen. 1; 30, =1=, p. 37). the failure of the overture naturally angered polk, and he declared for a most energetic military movement against the capital (diary, mar. 20). in april atocha, who loved to represent himself as "sole agent for santa anna's gamecocks and all, and his particular friend in every respect" (=162=conner, feb. 17), returned to mexico ostensibly on private business, but with =132=letters of introduction from the government to scott, shields and perry. "o god", exclaimed _el republicano_, "send unto us shells, rifles, shot and every kind of projectiles and misfortunes; burn and destroy us, reduce us to ashes, annihilate us, but ... permit not that atocha be the broker of a treaty of peace!" 27.7. _the mexican attitude._ sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 190, 205-12 (trist), 174. _picayune_, may 12; july 8; oct. 15, 17. apuntes, 264. =13=bankhead, nos. 42-3, apr. 30; 58, may 29; 83, aug. 29. polk, diary, apr. 16. ramírez, méxico, 224, 234, 239, 248, 263, 271, 275. meade, letters, i, 180. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44. méxico en 1847, 34. =77=undated clipping from n. y. _sun_ describing a mexican society to promote annexation to u. s. =47=mexican letter, orizaba, [sept., 1847]. =13=pakenham, no. 40, mar. 29. =13=bankhead to pak., oct. 10, 1846. semmes, service, 426. =335=belton to hitchcock, aug. 23. ocampo, obras, 263. _republicano_, oct. 24, 1846; may 8, 11; june 9, 11, 1847. _esperanza_, aug. 8, 1846. _eco de tampico_, nov. 11, 1846. _zempoalteca_, july 15, 1847. =80=speaker in méxico legislature, apr. 21. london _times_, july 15; oct. 27; nov. 6, 16, 1846; jan. 8, 13; feb. 9; mar. 15; may 10, 1847. tributo á la verdad, 27. m'sherry, el puchero, 189. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 332, res., sept. 24, 1846. encarnacion prisoners, 83. _opinion del ejército_, nov. 13, 1846. _cong. globe_, 29, 2, app., 211 (corwin); 323 (calhoun). =335=eayres to s. anna, oct. 10, 1846; reply, oct. 21. =52=black, sept. 22, 28, 1846. =92=mex. ayunt. to gov. fed. district, sept. 3, 1847. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 36. wash. _union_, sept. 28; oct. 6, 27, 1846; apr. 22; may 22; july 10; aug. 5; oct. 5, 1847. _nat. intelligencer_, nov. 7, 1846; feb. 5, 1847. n. y. _express_, nov. 12, 1846. _iris español_, oct. 30, 1846. _regenerador repub._, dec. 23, 1846. benton, abr. debates, xvi, 58-9 (calhoun). =132=cushing to buchanan, oct. 31, 1847. _constitutionnel_, nov. 10; dec. 5, 1846; aug. 17, 1847. _correspondant_, sept. 15, 1846. london _globe_, nov. 16, 1846. hitchcock, fifty years, 270. lawton, artill. officer, 144. _monitor repub._, sept. 2; nov. 14, 18, 1846; apr. 21, 29; may 15, 17, 27, 1847. _diario_, oct. 8; nov. 21; dec. 20, 23, 1846; feb. 13, 14; mar. 31; apr. 11; may 5, 21, 23, 25; june 10, 18; july 8; aug. 29, 1847. =76=mora, apr. 23, 1847. see also chap. xxxiv, note 34.21, and the corresponding text. 27.8. _appointment of trist._ polk, diary, dec. 3, 4, 9, 1846; jan. 18; apr. 10, 14, 16, 21-2, 1847. =335=buchanan to trist, july 13, 1847. mansfield, mexican war, 275. hitchcock, fifty years, 310. =52=trist to buchanan, july 31, private. ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 43 (buchanan). =57=trist, reports. polk, message, dec. 7, 1847 (richardson, iv, 536). benton, view, ii, 704. chase, polk administration, 215-6. =335=mrs. trist to t., july 13. =345=blair to van buren, dec. 26, 1846; july 7, 1847. _delta_, may 1, 1848. =335=trist to mann, dec. --, 1853 (draft). =335=document by trist _re_ his wife. =335=trist, draft of letter to the _times_. _amer. hist. review_, x, 312-4 (reeves). =335=trist to felton, june 14, 18--. =335=_id._, memorial (draft). =335=buchanan, aug. 28, 1845 (appointing trist chief clerk). for buchanan: =354=welles papers; _monitor repub._, mar. 10, 1848 (landa); poore, perley's remins., i, 332. 27.9. _trist's early relations with scott in mexico._ =335=trist's credentials, etc. =335=walker to trist apr. 15. =335=buchanan to relaciones, apr. 15. _pennsylvanian_, apr. 18. boston _post_, apr. 15. =335=trist to wife, apr. 18, 25, 28; may 4, 8, 15, 21, etc.; to buchanan, may 21. =335=trist's sister to t., may 22. =335=trist, drafts and memoranda. scott, mems., ii, 399-401, 576, 579. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 150, 153, 159, 181 (trist); 126, 135, 157, 172 (scott); 123, 128, 131 (marcy); 108-9. =335=buchanan to trist, july 13, private. ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43, 47, etc. =52=trist to scott, may 9. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 940 (marcy); 993, 1218 (scott). kenly, md. vol., 336. mansfield, scott, 364. polk, diary, apr. 15, 16; june 12-15; july 9, 13, 15, 17; aug. 24. =52=buchanan to trist, july 13. london _times_, july 15; aug. 16 (genevese traveller: scott warned). sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 38. polk, message, dec. 7, 1847 (richardson, iv, 535). =47=scott to semmes, may 9. =48=mason to perry, apr. 15, confid. =335=trist to scott, sept. 30 (draft). oswandel, notes, 155-6. semmes, service, 197-201. =345=blair to van buren, mar. 3, 1848. =335=trist to ho. repres., feb. 12, 1848 (draft). sen. 107; 29, 2, p. 3 (buchanan to conner, july 27, 1846). =132=mason to buchanan, june 28. n. y. _courier and enquirer_ in _niles_, july 10. buchanan, works (moore), vii, 270-9. _so. qtrly. review_, apr., 1852, pp. 386-93. (semmes episode) ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 976-92. =335=trist to felton, june 14, 18--. the government desired to keep the despatch of the peace commissioner secret, lest whigs should defeat the plan (polk, diary, apr. 16), but a member of the cabinet betrayed the fact (=335=trist to mann, dec. --, 1853). scott had been given some reason to expect that he would be (as he naturally desired to be) one of a peace commission (mems., ii, 576), as would have been very proper, and no doubt he was not pleased to find he had been ignored. he was further exasperated at this time by the arrival of lieut. semmes, as a representative of the navy, to see about the case of a naval prisoner (rogers: chap. xxx, p. 444), as if scott had not been able and willing to attend to the business, and in fact had not already attended to it (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 989), and by semmes's demand (which had to be refused) for an escort (semmes, service, 198, etc.; ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 977-92). it would not have been proper to detach one soldier unnecessarily. may 31 marcy wrote to scott that trist was "directed" to show the general his instructions (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 123); but buchanan used the word "authorised" (=52=to trist, july 13). so did polk (message, december 7, 1847) and marcy to scott on july 12 (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 133). polk and the cabinet were greatly disturbed by the quarrel between scott and trist, blaming both but of course blaming scott most. polk proposed to recall them, but marcy said scott could not be spared at that time, and the rest of the cabinet agreed with him (polk, diary, june 12, 14; july 9). polk said scott had thrown away "the golden moment" to make peace. but, as scott knew (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 120), the mexican congress by its law of april 20 (vol. ii, p. 81) had made peace negotiations practically impossible. a military officer is not expected to execute an order if the condition of things when he receives it is essentially different from that known or assumed by his superior at the time of issuing it. trist admitted later that he had been misinformed about the mexican situation, and was not sorry scott did not promptly forward the despatch (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 819, 825). as for the power to grant an armistice, scott held that the army, cut off without supplies in the heart of a hostile country, must be free to take military security for its own safety (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 121). trist was given authority to draw any part of the three millions appropriated to facilitate making a treaty. buchanan to excuse himself wrote (=52=to trist, june 14) that scott would not have replied to trist as he did, had he waited to see trist's instructions. this amounted to saying that, since scott knew nothing about those instructions, his letter was natural. marcy admitted (may 31: sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 122) that scott ought to have seen the instructions, the projet and buchanan's despatch, of which trist had a copy. dec. 26 =256=scott had written privately to marcy that he had heard from congressmen of a plan to place benton over him, but did not believe a word of it; and jan. 16 he again had expressed his gratitude and loyalty to the president. but it should not be forgotten that while the administration was entitled to full credit for its meanness and blundering, the trouble arose primarily from scott's having gone deeply into politics. he was not politically active now. jan. 16 he =256=wrote privately to marcy, "on setting out, on my present mission, i laid down _whiggism_, without taking up _democracy_," but the politicians were not fitted to believe this manly and truthful declaration. the whigs insisted that trist had been sent to embarrass and perhaps to ruin scott. 27.10. thornton, later sir edward thornton, british minister to the united states, saw scott also, who gave him to understand that he should advance against mexico july 1 or 2 unless a reply to buchanan's despatch should seem probable (=13=t. to addington, june 29). thornton believed that rejón was intriguing with scott to have the americans come to mexico, install the puros and make peace with them, and that rejón's party were insisting upon war for this reason (_ibid._). baranda had tried to catch scott in some entanglement by means of secret negotiations through the british legation, but had failed (=13=bankhead, nos. 47, 54, 1847). bankhead exerted all his influence with the government in favor of negotiations. june 22 the minister of relations replied politely to buchanan that his despatch had been referred to congress, with which the settlement of the matter rested (_diario_, june 26). 27.11. scott =335=wrote to trist, july 17, to the following effect: i concur with you, several of my generals and many foreigners of high standing here and at mexico in believing that our occupation of twenty principal towns, besides those we already hold, probably would not within a year or more force the mexicans to accept a peace on terms honorable to the united states without the pledge in advance or the payment of money to some of the principal authorities. this is expected as a preliminary to any negotiation. we must pay $10,000 down to one high official, and $1,000,000, probably to be divided among many, on the ratification of a treaty. with your concurrence i sent $10,000 to mexico yesterday, and at the proper time i will unite with you in pledging $1,000,000. i have no question as to the morality of this course, nor have you. we have tempted the integrity of no one. the overture, if corrupt, came from parties already corrupted. we merely avail ourselves of that corruption to obtain an end highly advantageous to both countries. such transactions have always been considered allowable in war. we do not know that this money would not go into the same channels as that which our government is willing to pay publicly for territory would go into. june 4 poinsett said he should be "surprised" if the mexicans could be made to accept the terms of the united states (=345=to van buren). june 11 buchanan said privately he should not be "much disappointed" should the war continue for years (=132=to frémont). july 16 marcy could see no hopes of terminating it (=256=to wetmore). hence the fears of trist and scott do not seem unreasonable. the $1,000,000 was to have been deducted from the sum to be paid by the united states government (=224=hitchcock, memo.) who the intended go-between was cannot be stated, though on settling his accounts scott told confidentially who received the $10,000 (scott in n. y. _herald_, nov. 3, 1857); but there is reason to believe that it was miguel arroyo, who will presently appear as secretary to the mexican peace commissioners. it has been said (rives, u. s. and mexico, ii, 501) that scott acted as he did with reference to peace because anxious to get back to the united states for personal political reasons. had this been true, scott would have resigned under the cloud of glory rising from his capture of mexico city. we have political letters written by taylor at this period, but scott seems to have shown no such activity. on the other hand he wrote to marcy (note 27.9), "on setting out, on my present mission, i laid down _whiggism_." july 16 scott mentioned the subject of paying for a treaty to a number of his principal officers at what came to be called improperly a council, stating (_cf. supra_) that he felt no scruples about it (hitchcock, fifty years, 257). pillow, who had already assented heartily to the plan (claiborne, quitman, i, 317), supported that view of it strongly (=68=shields to marcy, mar. 11, 1848). quitman, shields and cadwalader opposed it. probably their opinions had no practical effect, for scott had already committed himself, and the mexicans soon ceased to desire peace. july 7 trist sent to buchanan a copy of a note written by him (=52=to thornton) which could hardly fail to suggest to a politician that something peculiar was afoot, and early in august "gomez," an army correspondent of the st. louis _republican_, gave some account of the negotiations (published nov. 22, republished by the baltimore _sun_, dec. 6). polk and the cabinet made no sign, however. but on oct. 28 and january 18 pillow, now a bitter enemy of scott, wrote to polk about the affair (polk diary, dec. 11, 18, 20, 28, 1847; feb. 16, 19, 1848), pretending (=224=hitchcock, memo.) that scott had beguiled him into supporting the plan, and that his better nature had almost immediately reacted against it. pillow and polk doubtless thought that here lay an opportunity to do scott a great injury, and took the matter up with much apparent indignation; and in march, 1848, marcy confidentially ordered the officers sitting in the pillow court of inquiry to make an investigation (polk, diary, mar. 14, 16; =68=marcy, mar. 17). they did what they could, but the investigation came to nothing, for trist and scott would not implicate the british legation. see =68=proceedings of the court and statements of generals; _daily democrat_, chicago, sept. 15, 1857; =256=marcy to towson, mar. 17, 1848; =68=scott to marcy, jan. 28, 1848, and shields to marcy, feb. 12, 1848; davis, autobiography, 177; =224=hitchcock, memo.; claiborne, quitman, i, 326; =256=memo. scott overlooked the facts that such a bargain could not be kept secret indefinitely, and that, even if ethically justifiable and in accordance with the practice of giving presents to indian chiefs and barbary pirates, it would give great offence to american pride. the latter point was urged forcibly by shields. to buy peace of a vanquished enemy seemed to him and quitman humiliating and degrading. 27.12. _the puebla negotiations._ =52=trist to buchanan, nos. 7, june 13; 9, july 23 (and p. s., july 25); 12, aug. 22. =52=thornton to trist, july 29. =13=thornton to bankhead, june 14; to addington, june 29. =13=pakenham, no. 116, sept. 13, 1846. =335=trist to scott, june 25, confidential; july 16, confidential. =335=worth to trist, july 2, 22. =132=atocha to buchanan, july 3. =335=[thornton] to hargous, undated. =335=trist to thornton, july 3. =335=scott to trist, july 17; to p. f. smith, july 6. =335=trist to buchanan, no. 8, july 7. =335=---to trist, july 8. st. louis _republican_, nov. 22. baltimore _sun_, dec. 6. _diario_, may 21, 23-5; june 8, 26, 27; july 2, 18, 24-6; aug. 18. _monitor repub._, may 13; june 18, 25, 27-8. =335=---to ----, july 21. =335=otero to pesado, july 13. _picayune_, june 30; aug. 8; oct. 1, 15. _republicano_, june 24-5. scott, mems., ii, 579. =47=semmes to perry, july 28. claiborne, quitman, i, 314-21, 326. polk, diary (see note 27.11). =68=quitman to marcy, mar. 9, 1848. =68=pillow to marcy, jan. 18, 1848. =52=buchanan to trist, no. 7, dec. 21, 1847. =68=shields to marcy, mar. 9, 1848. raleigh _star_, aug. 25, 1847. =60=wilson to marcy, july 31; aug. 1. london _times_, may 10; aug. 6; sept. 6. ramírez, méxico, 239, 255-6, 263, 271. davis, autobiography, 177-8, 207-9. =224=hitchcock, memorandum. n. y. _courier and enquirer_, mar. 1, 2, 1848. _missouri republican_, sept. 16, 1857. =68=scott to marcy, jan. 28, 1848. =68=shields to marcy, feb. 12, 1848. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 38, 40. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44. sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37-9. lawton, artill. officer, 144, 150, 229, 232, 235, 238, 240, 259-61, 269-70. =335=trist to thornton, july 30. =335=e. e. smith to trist, aug. 31. =335=trist to scott, sept. 30 (draft). =256=marcy to wetmore, july 16; oct. 21. otero, comunicación. dictamen de la comisión, etc., 29, 30. _republicano_, may 8, 21; june 9, 28. =82=j. j. otero, proclam., apr. 25. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 115-20. =52=j. a. jones to polk, may 2. _delta_, july 15. hitchcock, fifty years, 260-1, 264-9, 326. =60=scott to marcy, apr. 5. =13=bankhead, nos. 184, dec. 30, 1846; 6, jan. 29; 34, apr. 1; 42, 46, apr. 30; 47, may 6; 54, 58-60, may 29; 61, june 26; 67, june 29; 75, july 29, 1847. =68=scott to towson _et al._, apr. 17, 1848. =335=h. l. scott to trist, may 29, 1852. wash. _telegraph_, oct. 13, 22, 1852. london _chronicle_, aug. 6. =335=trist to scott, sept. 1, 1861. sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 524-5. =56=m. y. beach, june 4. wash. _union_, june 2; july 10; aug. 5, 20. n. y. _sun_, may 22, ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 830 (trist); 945, 1011, 1085 (scott); 922 (marcy). =132=atocha to buchanan, july 3; aug. 1; sept. 4, 21. =132=dimond to buchanan, aug. 2. klein, treaty, 255. buchanan, works (moore), vii, 484. n. y. _herald_, nov. 3, 1857 (scott). furse, organization, 143. réplica á la defensa. semmes, service, 310, 413. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29. apuntes, 199. =185=---to lewis, july 20. =335=trist, marginal notes on sen. 52; 30, 1. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 135, 172 (scott); 181-6, 231-46, 306 (trist); 194 (s. anna). =76=orders for guzmán and avila. =76=alvarez, july 16. ripley (war with mexico, ii, 149) represents scott as desiring a reconciliation with trist in order to play a brilliant part in bringing about peace and so increase his political popularity. this view, which befits a pupil and friend of pillow and furthers the purpose of both to injure scott, is disproved by a number of circumstances and particularly by the fact that, after the reconciliation took place, scott, while ready to do all in his power for peace--even at the sacrifice of military glory--kept himself entirely in the background so far as that business was concerned. july 23, 1847, trist wrote to buchanan: scott's whole conduct with reference to the duties with which i am charged "has been characterized by the purest public spirit, and a fidelity and devotion which could not be surpassed, to the views of the government, in regard to the restoration of peace" (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 831). aiming to further the negotiations with santa anna, scott sent from puebla to mexico a =335=memorandum that he would advance and would either defeat the mexicans in view of the capital (if they would offer battle) or capture a strong position, and then, if able to restrain his troops, would halt and give the mexicans an opportunity to save the capital by making peace (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 524). ripley (war with mexico, ii, 167-9) endeavors to relate this honorable incident in a way to represent scott as the dupe of santa anna and to compliment pillow. but the fact that for good and purely american reasons the general-in-chief pursued this very course after the negotiations had ended, refutes ripley; and it also proves that in offering to make that agreement scott did not allow his military plans to be influenced by the enemy, as was charged, for by the morning of aug. 20, as no sign of a disposition to treat had met scott, he regarded the memorandum and every other vestige of an understanding as no longer binding upon him "in any degree" (=68=scott to court, apr. 17, 1848, confid.). scott was ready, in the interest of his country and humanity, to do anything, compatible with his duty, to obtain peace. rives (_op. cit._, ii, 445) states that in consequence of a letter of july 16 from pacheco, minister of relations, to congress a committee of congress reported that the restrictions placed by the law of apr. 20 on the prerogatives of the executive had been removed by the recent "act of reforms" of the constitution. this would have been an important point; but the facts are that the committee's report, now lying before the author, was dated july 13 and did not mention the law of apr. 20, and that congress was not in session to receive pacheco's reply of july 16 to its report (=52=trist, no. 9, july 23). 27.13. pacheco asked bankhead to use his good offices with scott to save the city from sack; but as neither the united states nor mexico had shown favor to the offer of british mediation, he would not act. it is hard to see how, with due regard to polk's declarations and the real desire of the united states for peace, scott could have taken the risk of scattering the mexican government and the elements of peace by refusing to remain outside the city for a time; and remaining outside involved an armistice, because--for one thing--the only large stock of provisions on which he could count lay in town. hence censure of scott for making the armistice came from polk with a very bad grace (=52=trist, no. 22; =221=hill, diary). 27.14. _the making of the armistice._ sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 186, 190, 231-2 (trist); 189 (pacheco), 192 (scott). =52=trist to buchanan, no. 12, aug. 22. =52=bankhead to trist, aug. 20, 21. contestaciones habidas, 3-7, 11-19. _picayune_, sept. 9. apuntes, 260-3, 268-9. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314 (scott); 356-9. kenly, md. vol., 350. =68=scott, statement to court, apr. 17, 1848, confid. =13=bankhead, nos. 76, aug. 21; 82, aug. 29. raleigh _star_, sept. 22. =221=hill, diary. méxico á través, iv, 681. hitchcock, fifty years, 279-80, 284-6. davis, autobiog., 189, 207, 215-6. =224=intercepted letters (hitchcock, ed.). =259=intercepted letter. chicago _democrat_, sept. 15, 1857. =61=gates to adj. gen., aug. 31. henshaw narrative. s. anna, apelación, 61-2. =291=pierce to wife, aug. 23; to appleton, aug. 27. =335=trist, memo., july 29. semmes, service, 412, 415-9, 427, 446. n. y. _courier and enquirer_, mar. 1, 1848. sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 170, 178, 191, 196-8, 204, 281, 288, 460, 465, 543. =80=relaciones, circulars, aug. 23, 30. =80=relaciones to olaguíbel, aug. 31, res. =73=lozano, no. 5, res., aug. 28. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 447-8; iv, app., 286. =335=trist, notes on a letter to ho. of repres., feb. 12, 1848. wash. _telegraph_, oct. 13, 1852. =236=judah, diary. sedgwick, corresp., i, 114. _so. qtrly. review_, july, 1852, pp. 112-6. s. anna, detall, 16. _monitor repub._, dec. 12 (s. anna, report, nov. 19). =70="guerra," no. 30 (f. pérez, statement, june 17, 1853). ramírez, méxico, 301. wash. _union_, nov. 3. =76=to lombardini, aug. 21. =76=tornel to lombardini, aug. 24. =76=circulars, aug. 26; sept. 1, 6, 7. =76=many others. mora was accompanied by arrangóiz, lately mexican consul at new orleans. quitman and pierce, who had not been able to distinguish themselves in the recent battles, and p. f. smith were armistice commissioners for the americans and generals mora and quijano for the mexicans. they met at mackintosh's house. in brief the terms, as drawn up, were as follows: 1, cessation of hostilities; 2, to continue while the peace commissioners are negotiating or forty-eight hours after one of the commanders-in-chief gives formal notice of its termination; 3, during the armistice no military work, offensive or defensive, shall be begun, enlarged or reinforced; 4, neither army shall be reinforced; troops and munitions _en route_ shall stop twenty-eight leagues [about seventy-five miles] from mexico; 5, no troops of either side shall advance "beyond the line now actually occupied"; 6, the intermediate ground shall not be trespassed upon by military men except when acting as messengers or engaged under a white flag on other business; 7, neither side shall prevent the other from receiving provisions; the americans may obtain supplies from city or country; 8, prisoners shall be exchanged; 9, americans residing at mexico and banished thence may return; 10, either army may send messengers to or from vera cruz; 11, the americans will not interfere with the administration of justice when mexicans are the parties; 12, they will respect private property, personal rights and trade; 13, wounded prisoners shall be free to move for treatment and cure; 14, mexican army health officers may attend on such mexicans; 15, commissioners shall superintend the fulfilment of this agreement; 16, the agreement is to be approved by the commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310). santa anna struck out article 9, but through passports the same end was reached (=52=trist, no. 13); and it was agreed that "supplies" (_recursos_) in article 7 should cover everything needed by the army except arms and munitions. for scott's draft see sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 543. it is believed that enough has been said in the text to show the wisdom of making the armistice, and more space cannot be given to the subject. any one interested in it should read trist's =52=no. 22 (most of it in sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 231-66). it should be borne in mind that the mexicans believed the armistice was greatly for the advantage of the americans. alcorta, minister of war, said that scott's purpose in proposing it was solely to give his troops a needed rest, collect his wounded, obtain provisions and prepare batteries (negrete, invasión, iii, app., 448). it was believed that his losses had been severe (=61=undated mexican letter). the reasons avowed by santa anna for accepting the armistice were to let the troops rest and recover morale, to gather the wounded and the dispersed, and in general to undo the effects of the recent battles; also to show the world that mexico was willing to discuss peace, and to convince all that the american demands were unreasonable. the weakest point about the armistice was scott's not requiring that chapultepec should be surrendered or evacuated, as at one time he intended to do (hitchcock, fifty years, 285). the reason for his policy was, in brief, that he believed santa anna fully intended to make peace, and, understanding the immense difficulties that santa anna would have to meet, he did not wish to increase them (=52=trist, no. 13). besides, magnanimity--which is a strong quality, not a weak one--to a beaten foe often produces good results. perhaps scott erred on this point; but if so, it was a noble error and not hastily to be censured. apparently by oversight, neither scott nor trist had been instructed what to do should the mexicans ask for an armistice with a view to peace. hence scott was left to take the course that seemed to him best, and that he did. pillow claimed great glory for opposing the unsuccessful armistice. rives says (u. s. and mexico, ii, 501) that scott was too eager for a return to the united states to be "critical" of santa anna's honesty. this is to say that scott was unfit to be a corporal. everybody was suspicious of santa anna. see sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 248-52. rives further says (p. 507) that scott should have seen that santa anna, situated as he was, would have accepted any conditions; but santa anna certainly would not. he did not accept our peace terms. rives also alludes to scott's "amiable weakness" in the matter (p. 508)--very erroneously, the present author thinks. 27.15. _picayune_, sept. 9; oct. 16, 17. gamboa, impug., 49, 50. apuntes, 270-1, 286. =13=bankhead, nos. 77, aug. 27; 83, aug. 29. =221=hill, diary. ramírez, méxico, 275, 303. méxico á través, iv, 686. hitchcock, fifty years, 280, 287-92, 294. grant, mems., i, 148. davis, autobiog., 211. =224=intercepted letters (hitchcock, _ed._). henshaw narrative. haynes, gen. scott's guide. =259=intercepted letter. sen. 19; 30, 2 (m. l. smith, nov. 30, 1848). =291=pierce to appleton, aug. 27. lawton, artill. officer, 297, 301, 303, 306. =178=davis, diary. _diario_, sept. 2, 4, 8. =335=belton to hitchcock, aug. 23. =335=e. e. smith to trist, aug. 31. =335=memo. in spanish, aug. --. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 415. semmes, service, 424. sen. 11; 31, 1 (hardcastle). =80=relaciones, circular, aug. 23. =80=alcalde s. fe to olaguíbel, aug. 29. =80=olaguíbel to legislature, aug. 30; reply, sept. 1. =80=valencia to o., aug. 21, 23. =80=o. to guerra, aug. 22. =80=guerra to o., aug. 24; reply, aug. 29. =199=ms. written by leading citizen. =73=lozano, nos. 5, res., aug. 28; 8, res., sept. 17. encarnacion prisoners, 81, 83-4. _monitor repub._, nov. 16 (alvarez). carreño, jefes, cccxv, note. =260=henshaw, comments on map. wash. _union_, nov. 3. apuntes, 271-2. and from =76= the following (and many others). alvarez, aug. 22, 23, 24, 26, 29. to comandante toluca, aug. 24. acuerdos, aug. 23, 25, 26, 28, 31; sept. 1, 4. to alvarez, aug. 21, 25, 28. tornel, aug. 27, 27, very res., 29. to ugarte and comtes. gen. guanajuato, s. luis potosí and querétaro, aug. 29. cosío, sept. 6. j. y. gutiérrez, sept. 2, res. to lombardini, aug. 9, 22, 24, 25. alcorta, aug. 22. quijano to lombardini, aug. 23, 24. to comte. gen. mexico, aug. 27, 29, 30. bravo, aug. 28. to herrera, aug. 25. to relaciones, aug 27. tornel to comte. gen., sept. 4. pacheco to tornel, aug. 23. circulars, aug. 26; sept. 1, 6, 7. alvarez to olaguíbel, oct. 30. olaguíbel, aug. 27. paredes, who had been banished, landed at vera cruz on aug. 14 (paredes, breve exposición). on august 26 a long train of army wagons went to the capital for provisions and was turned back; but an explanation came promptly from santa anna. the next day a similar train, while waiting in the main plaza of the city (=76=tornel, aug. 27), was attacked by the populace because the teamsters appeared to gaze with indifference, if not insultingly, at a religious procession (carreño, jefes, cccxv; henshaw narrative). immediately the prevailing hostility against the americans and a suspicion that santa anna was planning to introduce americans in this way and betray the capital (_arco iris_, nov. 29, 1847) led to a riot, in which six or seven of the americans were injured and two killed. tornel, now governor of the federal district, tried without effect to quell the mob; but herrera, comandante general, succeeded (apuntes, 271). mexican troops defended the wagons (davis, autobiog., 211). santa anna felt and expressed deep regret for the incident (=76=to relaciones, aug. 27), and some mexican officers were punished for imprudence (=76=to comte. gen. mex., aug. 27). scott viewed the affair philosophically. after this herrera and tornel took precautions (=76=tornel, aug. 29), the business was done at a very early time in the morning, the wagons did not actually go into the city (=76=to comte. gen. mex., aug. 29), and an officer of the american commissary department, disguised as a peasant, had charge of them. minor riots occurred later, however, and after a time the place where the supplies intended for scott were kept was discovered and sacked (hitchcock, fifty years, 291). owing to the non-success of the negotiations, about $300,000 of american cash had to be left in the town. both cash and provisions had been arranged for by the indefatigable hargous (_ibid._) during the armistice the american equipments, artillery, etc. were put into the best possible order. 27.16. santa anna had much difficulty in persuading good men to serve as commissioners. trist met the mexican commissioners first on aug. 27 at atzcapuzalco, about eight miles from tacubaya (sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 191, 195), but at the second session (aug. 28) it was agreed to meet at the house of alfaro (_casa colorada_) near tacubaya and within the mexican lines. the instructions drafted for the mexican commissioners, aug. 24 and 29, were avowedly drawn as if mexico had "triumphed," and represented merely a basis for bargaining (sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 313-5, 369-71). the commissioners were authorized at first only to receive and transmit the american propositions; but, believing they would be given (as they were on aug. 31: _ibid._, 335) full powers, like his own, to negotiate, trist laid his projet (_ibid._, 326-30) before them on aug. 27 (see roa bárcena, recuerdos, 389, note 1). aug. 29 santa anna and his cabinet discussed this (sen 52; 30, 1, 330). aug. 30 he discussed it with his generals (_diario_, aug. 31). sept. 1 the mexicans presented to trist their full powers, and the discussion of his terms began. sept. 2 they were discussed further, and, as agreement was found to be impossible, trist proposed that the armistice be extended. a large gathering at the palace then discussed the situation (apuntes, 278). sept. 3 santa anna ordered that no more provisions and other articles that could be useful to the americans should leave the city (=76=to comte. gen. mex.). sept. 4 pacheco, the minister of relations, issued a =77=circular intimating that unless trist should moderate his terms, negotiations would be broken off. cabinet consultations followed, however (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 202). sept. 5 pacheco notified the mexican commissioners that the nueces-rio grande district and new mexico would not be surrendered (_ibid._, 373-5). sept. 6 the final meeting was held and the mexican counter-projet presented (_ibid._, 375-80). the spanish chargé had thought that, owing to santa anna's disposition to jockey, the negotiations would last a long time. this was prevented by trist's frank, direct methods. trist was now in good health except for a severe toothache. he and scott worked in perfect harmony. santa anna was extremely anxious to gain foreign support and, if possible, a foreign guaranty of the boundary (=73=lozano, no. 3, res., aug. 25). seiffart, the prussian minister, who had felt annoyed by the insignificant rôle to which the negative policy of his government and his own lack of capacity had condemned him, now broke out with an unauthorized expression of sympathy for mexico, and santa anna endeavored to use this as a lever on his colleagues (=73=lozano, no. 8, res., sept. 17). but france had no representative on the scene. bankhead, besides entertaining considerable displeasure because his advice and the british offer of mediation had not been effective, had been for some months, and still was, too ill to take a strong position (=73=lozano, no. 5, res., aug. 28); and ramón lozano, the spanish chargé (the minister having left for home on the conclusion of the armistice), would not act without instructions, and personally expressed the opinion that it would not be easy to obtain a european guaranty of the new line (=73=nos. 5, res., 8, res.). 27.17. _the negotiations (including s. anna's difficulties)._ sen. 52; 30, 1, must be studied closely by any one desiring to investigate the subject, and hence citations of the documents that it contains need not be given. =52=trist to buchanan, nos. 13, aug. 24; 15, sept. 4, confid. =335=thornton to trist, july 29. sen. report 261; 41, 2. sen. 20; 30, 1. ho. 40; 30, 1. ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43, 47, 56, 59. =52=contestaciones habidas, 1847, with trist's notes, throughout. _delta_, nov. 13. _picayune_, may 12; june 30; sept, 9; oct. 1, 15, 16, 17. apuntes, 264-9, 277-9, 283, 286. =52=buchanan to trist, no. 3, july 13. =13=bankhead, nos. 83, aug. 29; 87, sept. 28. _constitutionnel_, aug. 17. ramírez, méxico, 234, 241, 271-2, 274, 278, 303. hitchcock, fifty years, 287-9. davis, autobiog., 209. =224=intercepted letters (hitchcock, ed.). =108=buchanan to bancroft, sept. 29. =224=letter from member of congress (intercepted), aug. 21. henshaw narrative. pacheco, exposición. =284=comunicacion que sobre ... dirigió ... otero. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 483 (otero). roa bárcena, recuerdos, 388-408. méxico en 1847, 34. london _times_, may 10; oct. 26. polk, message, dec. 7, 1847; feb. 2, 1848 (richardson, messages, iv, 536-9). =291=pierce to appleton, aug. 27. =47=private letter from orizaba, undated. lawton, artill. officer, 240, 271. =13=thornton to addington, june 29. _arco iris_, sept. 16. _opinión pública_, aug. 29. _diario_, aug. 31. =335=e. e. smith to trist, aug. 31. =83=gov. querétaro to relaciones, sept. 4. =83=gov. jalisco to relaciones, aug. 31. =83=farias, otero _et al._, declaration, aug. 22. =83=querétaro legislature to rel., sept. 4. semmes, service, 414, 426, 446. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 540. =80=gov. s. l. potosí to olaguíbel, aug. 28. =80=gov. querétaro to o., aug. 21; reply, aug. 27. =80=relaciones, circulars, aug. 23, 30. =80=olag. to relac., aug. 26. =80=olag., proclam., aug. 26. =80=relac. to olag., aug. 31, res.; sept. 6, 8. =80=proceedings of coalition junta, aug. 4, 25. =80=méxico legisl., aug. 27. _porvenir_, aug. 24, supplmnt, =199=ms. written by a leading person. =82=gov. oaxaca to gov. puebla, sept. 9. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 550, aug. 21. =73=lozano, nos. 3, res., aug. 25; 5, res., aug. 28; 6, sept. 10; 8, res., sept. 17. encarnacion prisoners, 83. =80=coalition junta to méxico state, aug. 14. =92=mexico ayunt. to gov. fed. district, sept. 3. n. y. _herald_, feb. 5, 1848. _nat. intelligencer_, aug. 31. _monitor repub._, may 26, 31; oct. 8. =132=atocha to buchanan, sept. 4. _amer. hist. review_, x, 319 (reeves). _amer. review_, jan., 1848, 5-14. _so. qtrly. review_, july, 1852, pp. 114-5. _republicano_, may 11. =181=buchanan to donelson, jan. 29. prieto, mems., 236. =364=worth to s., july 29; to marcy, oct. 30. =221=hill, diary. s. anna, detall, 16. s. anna, mi historia, 74. =86=relaciones, circular, sept. 4. and from =76= the following (and many others). cosío, sept. 6. j. y. gutiérrez, sept. 2. to herrera, aug. 25. to bravo, aug. 31. to comte. gen. mexico, sept. 3. to canalizo, aug. 12. to comte gen. querétaro, sept. 4. gov. michoacán, sept. 3. alvarez to olaguíbel, oct. 30. to alvarez, aug. 21. santa anna said in his manifesto: "a perpetual war is an absurdity; because war is a calamity, and the instinct of self-preservation, which is even stronger and more powerful in nations than in individuals, recommends that no means whatever should be omitted that may lead to an advantageous arrangement. to adopt this course the constitution gives me competent authority. consecrated to interests so noble and highly privileged, it is my duty to maintain at all cost the respect and reverence due to the supreme authority with which i am invested .... i will be yet more explicit: sedition and attempts at subverting the government shall be exemplarily punished" (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 250). (trist's "vague remark") _ibid._, 253. the mexican commissioners were instructed (sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 314, 369-71) to draw trist into discussions that not only would have given them opportunities to create awkward dialectic situations, as rejón and others had done with reference to texas, but might have excited fresh discord in the united states regarding our treatment of mexico. for example, they were to ask the motives and aims of the war, and whether the united states based its expectations upon force or upon friendly negotiation. the ground was taken that since mexico was now ready to give up texas, all reason for the war had ceased to exist [as if the fighting that had already occurred, its loss of life, triumphs and expenses, signified nothing]. it was urged that since no title except to texas had been claimed by the united states, we could continue the war only for the odious sake of conquest or the unheard-of purpose to punish mexico because she was unwilling to sell her lands and her people (see roa bárcena, recuerdos, 391, 400-1, 588, note 3). in justification of his plan to extend the armistice, trist pointed out that the american sick and wounded would recover, the rainy reason end, the inundations diminish, the roads improve and the temperature fall (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 259). ripley, on the other hand, asserts (_op. cit._ ii, 350) that the americans would have been "dependent upon the good faith of the mexicans for all of the conveniences and many of the necessaries of life," and, at the end of forty-five days, after living in unhealthy villages, would hardly have been fit to act. but had santa anna accepted trist's proposal he would have done so with the strong expectation of peace and american assistance, and hence would have treated our army well; and tacubaya, s. angel and s. agustín were not only salubrious but delightful in comparison with the capital, and free from its temptations. with reference to trist's departing from his instructions by proposing to refer a point back to washington, it is interesting to recall napoleon's dictum (which bears also on scott's action _supra_ regarding the sealed despatch): "a general-in-chief cannot exonerate himself from responsibility for his faults by pleading an order of his sovereign or the minister, when the individual from whom it proceeds is at a distance from the field of operations, and but partially, or not at all, acquainted with the actual condition of things" (maxims, p. 59). 27.18. there was probably some basis for certain of santa anna's charges against the american troops. scott allowed a day to pass, it was said, in order to enable americans in town to get away. ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 352) says this was done to allow unarmed inhabitants to do so. but it was good policy to prevent such persons from leaving, and such had been scott's course at vera cruz (chap. xxii, p. 32). naturally santa anna wavered back and forth, and trist believed that at about three o'clock, sept. 5, he almost decided to accept the american terms (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 251). 27.19. _the termination of the armistice._ sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 195-203, 231-66 (trist); 307, 346, etc. =52=trist to buchanan, no. 15, confid., sept. 4. sen. 20; 30, 1, pp. 9, 14. contestaciones habidas (1847), 22, 26, 28, 30, 34. _picayune_, oct. 16. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 354, 360. =303=h. l. scott to quitman, aug. 31. _national_, nov. 14. hitchcock, fifty years, 291-4. haynes, gen. scott's guide. =217=henshaw to wife, sept. 13. london _times_, nov. 13. sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37-9. ho. 40; 30, 1. =291=pierce to wife, aug. 23. lawton, artill. officer, 309. =335=trist to thornton, confid., nov. 24 (the americans kept the armistice faithfully). =335=memo. in spanish, aug. --. semmes, service, 415. sen. 11; 31, 1 (hardcastle). =80=relaciones to olaguíbel, aug. 31, res.; sept. 6, 8. =73=lozano, no. 7, sept. 16. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 448. =92=tornel to méx. ayunt., aug. 30. =187=thomas to eddy, aug. 26. n. y. _sun_, oct. 5. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 67. ramsey, other side, 330, note. and from =76= the following (chiefly showing orders contrary to the armistice). to alvarez, aug. 28. tornel, aug. 27, very res.; sept. 3. bravo, sept. 5. acuerdos, sept. 3, 4. orders to tenth infantry, aug. 28. to govs. puebla and four other states, sept. 6. to govs. méxico, guanajuato, jalisco, sept. --. to relaciones, aug. 27. s. anna, proclam., sept. 7. 27.20. _the armistice as viewed in the united states._ sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 138 (marcy); 231 (trist, no. 22). sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 14 (trist). apuntes, 278-9. polk, diary, feb. 7, 19; mar. 16, 1848. london _times_, oct. 29, ramírez, méxico, 241. polk, message, dec. 7, 1847 (richardson, iv, 536). =13=crampton, no. 42, oct. 13. wash. _union_, oct. 4-6. =256=marcy to wetmore, oct. 21. =58=jones to polk, may 2. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 448. =354=welles papers. =191=fairfield to wife, jan. 10. n. y. _herald_, dec. 15. _monitor repub._, dec. 21. baltimore _sun_, oct. 5. ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 56 (buchanan). =335=buchanan to trist, oct. 24-5, 1847. it has been said with truth that the war was waged on the theory that texas extended to the rio grande, but the united states could have neutralized (and this is the most that was considered by trist: sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 258) the region between that river and the nueces without implying in the least that our claim to it had not been valid. the fact that santa anna and pacheco thought that an extension of the armistice would benefit the americans (_ibid._, 260) is a striking, though by no means the only, answer to polk's charge that it would have been greatly to our disadvantage (_ibid._, 259). ramírez (méxico, 241) pointed out that inaction was bad for the mexicans, since they lacked funds to support troops long. santa anna could not materially increase his army after sept. 1, and he subsisted it with extreme difficulty (sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 259-60). the armistice in general was regarded by the mexicans as an american trick. the _american review_ (whig) argued that the rejection of the counter-projet (which conceded to us texas as far as the nueces and california down to 37 degrees) proved that polk was fighting, not for peace, but for conquest; but the counter-projet did not recognize the american claim to the rio grande line nor to an indemnity for the costs of the war, which mexico had forced upon us. any one interested in the equity of the matter should read the reply to the mexican commissioners drafted by trist (sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 14). 27.21. _army feeling._ =252=mackall to wife, feb. 21, 1848. _picayune_, oct. 17. =221=hill, diary. hitchcock, fifty years, 271, 290. _291_pierce to wife, aug. 23; sept. 1. robertson, visit, ii, 344. lawton, artill. officer, 309. diccionario universal (_mixcoac_). semmes, service, 414, 427. calderón, life, i, 142, 146. n. y. _sun_, sept. 16. such scenes were noted with keen appreciation not only by officers but by privates, as diaries and letters attest. clear afternoons and evenings occur now and then even at the height of the rainy season. xxviii. molino del rey, chapultepec, mexico 28.1. hardcastle's map (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 312) and (as elsewhere) the author's observations. _so. qtrly. rev._, oct., 1852. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 295-6. balbontín, invasión, 126. grant, mems., i, 149. =66=j. l. mason to j. l. smith, sept. 25. =66=stevens to smith, sept. 25. semmes, service, 436, 440. apuntes, 290-1. _picayune_, aug. 8. _delta_, oct. 14. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 355 (scott), 373 (sumner), 425-6 (smith). wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 259. =269=molina, recolls. the foundry was decreed in july, 1846 (=76=report on artillery, nov., 1846; memoria de ... guerra, dec.). the building it occupied had been a powder mill. the principal entrance to el molino was by an archway near the south end. sept. 5 scott heard that bells had been sent to el molino to be cast into cannon (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 355). santa anna did in fact call for gifts of bells, etc. to be used for military purposes (=76=carrera, sept. 6). 28.2. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 381-2 (s. anna to scott, sept. 6). =76=to herrera, sept. 6. =100=guerra, circular, sept. 11. apuntes, 290-2. s. anna, mi historia, 75. _id._, detall, 23. =76=acuerdo, sept. 4. giménez, memorias, 266. =76=alvarez to s. anna, sept. 25. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 293. balbontín, invasión, 125-6. grant, mems., i, 151. mason to smith: note 1. =76=alvarez, sept. 6. sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 134-5 (duncan). roa bárcena, recuerdos, 424. 28.3. ramírez, méxico, 299. =73=lozano, nos. 2, 8, res., 1847. =199=anon. ms. kenly, md. vol., 346. s. anna, apelación, 49. giménez, memorias, 111. =358=williams to father, oct. 1. exposición dirigida. =179=diario esactísimo. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 295-6. =100=alcorta, circular, sept. 11. _76_tornel, decree, sept. 7. 28.4. smith, co. a, corps of engineers. =221=hill, diary. hitchcock, fifty years, 296. =260=henshaw, comments on map. =217=_id._ to wife, sept. 13. =65=scott, gen. orders, sept. 7. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 354 (scott), 361 (worth), 425 (smith). =178=davis, diary. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 298 (scott). mason to smith: note 1. =66=foster to smith, sept. 8. =66=beauregard to smith, sept. 20. =224=hitchcock, introd. to intercepted letters. _so. qtrly. rev._, oct., 1852, 302. semmes, service, 431-4. under scott's orders, pillow with the ninth and fifteenth infantry was at s. borja and riley's brigade (twiggs's division) at nalvarte on sept. 7, evening (ripley, war with mexico, ii, 363). late on sept. 7 quitman's division also was sent to the south front of mexico. reconnoitring was done there on rather an extensive scale during the night, and the mexicans were thoroughly roused. 28.5. _the battle of sept. 8._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 354, 375 (scott), 361 (worth), 368 (return), 373 (sumner), 374 (huger), 425 (smith), 430 (hitchcock); app., pp. 134-165, 192 (officers). ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1237 (perry). =179=diario esactísimo. stevens, stevens, i, 204-7. sedgwick, corresp., i, 170. semi-weekly n. y. _courier and enquirer_, mar. 1, 1848. elderkin, biog. sketches. _so. qtrly. rev._, oct., 1852, 298-315. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 463-9; iv, app., 295-9. s. anna, detall, 23-5. balbontín, invasión, 125-9. hitchcock, fifty years, 296-9, 303. grant, wems., i, 152-3. ballentine, eng. sold., ii, 238, 240. =217=henshaw to wife, sept. 13. =218=henshaw narrative. =61=letter from mexico, sept. 11. =69=may to harney, nov. 17, 1848. =69=steele to harney, --, 1848. =69=harney to marcy, may 22, 1848. =66=mason to j. l. smith, sept. 25, 1847. =66=stevens to _id._, sept. 25. =66=g. w. smith to stevens, sept. 20. claiborne, quitman, i, 352. raleigh _star_, oct. 27. =221=hill, diary. =304=kirby to mrs. e. k. smith, sept. 12. =60=andrews to daniel, dec. 10. louisville _democrat_, dec. 17. =68=testimony at bonneville court martial. london _times_, nov. 13. semmes, service, 436-449. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 503. apuntes, 210, 294-304. =100=relaciones, circular, sept. 8. =199=anon. ms. _correo nacional_, dec. 10. gamboa, impug., 52. =70="guerra," no. 155 (testimony of garay). =70="guerra", no. 274 (testimony at the trial of andrade and jáuregui). _picayune_, oct. 14; nov. 3. =350=weber, recolls. _delta_, oct. 14, 26. ramírez, méxico, 304-6. méxico á través, iv, 687-9. davis, autobiog., 271. wash. _union_, nov. 3. _diario_, sept. 8. =364=worth to daughter, sept. 28; to s., dec. 27. prieto, memorias, ii, 238-9. =73=lozano, no. 7, 1847. moore, scott's camp., 155-63. steele, amer. camps., i, 117. _niles_, oct. 30, p. 137. bartlett, pierce, 153. wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 259. giménez, memorias, 112, 266. =205=graham, memo. book. =178=davis, diary. diccionario univ. (_león_). sen. 19; 30, 2 (m. l. smith, nov. 30, 1848). molina, el asalto. =291=pierce to hooker, sept. 15. stevens, vindication. =328=sweet, statement. =69=huger, sept. 9. lawton, artill. off., 311-4, 323, 326. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 426-7, 437-9, 447-53. =76=herrera to relaciones, oct. 14. =76=ortega, sept. 13. =76=to comte gen. mex., oct. 29. =76=m. andrade, sept. 9; nov. 3. =76=j. y. gutiérrez, proclam., sept. 11. =76=noriega, nov. 19. =76=alcorta, circular, sept. 11. =76=comte gen. oaxaca, sept. 15. =76=_id._ of querétaro, sept. 14. calderón, rectificaciones. remarks on the battle of sept. 8. in forming an opinion of the battle as a military operation one must ignore the fact that the position gained was used later as a stepping-stone, for at this time scott was not planning to capture chapultepec. it appears surprising that scott, knowing that heavy mexican forces were on the spot, apparently desiring to fight there, should have thought that a place as valuable to the enemy as he deemed el molino (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 355) ought to be attacked at night, and could be taken easily (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 579) by men unacquainted with ground and buildings familiar to the enemy, and should have neglected to have more of his troops near at hand; but we do not know what details were included in the information upon which he so confidently relied, nor do we know the source of it (_ibid._, 298). pillow reported, apparently during the evening of september 7, that the cannon and machinery had been removed (_ibid._, 298, 579); no smoke appeared to issue from the mill; no sound of boring could be heard (semmes, service, 431). it has been suggested that scott felt over-eager to punish santa anna for disappointing his expectations of peace; but he doubtless had learned from trist of santa anna's political difficulties. he was, however, angry on account of the violations of the armistice. the principal information on which scott acted was understood to have come through trist; it _had_ been correct; but scott seems to have erred in overlooking the chance that conditions might change in two or three days. rives (u. s. and mexico, ii, 528) states that the attack was based on a "rumor." this is an error. on account of the apparent incorrectness of scott's information and the massing of mexican troops in and near el molino, some americans suspected that santa anna set a trap for him. but the fact that santa anna left this quarter and took away a considerable part of his troops early in the night of sept. 7--leaving behind, according to roa bárcena (recuerdos, 427) 4000 infantry and artillery privates--disposes of that idea. it has been said that scott might have stopped work at the foundry (had work been then proceeding) by cutting off the supply of water (_i.e._, power); but he wished to seize the finished cannon supposed to be there (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 298) and the large quantity of powder that he had heard was at casa mata. the only argument advanced in favor of a night attack seems to have been the danger of fire from chapultepec. in reply it was said that (as had been seen at cerro gordo) a plunging fire did little harm. the distance of chapultepec seems almost to nullify this reply; but as a matter of fact the cannon of chapultepec appear to have done no execution in the battle. worth's officers met him after dark, sept. 7, and later one of them submitted his general plan of operations to scott, who discussed it at considerable length and finally (virtually admitting that a night attack was not advisable) approved all of it except the following point. worth strongly desired to effect a lodgement in the grove of chapultepec, which he believed he could take at a cost of fifty men (=364=worth to s., dec. 27). (indeed, he pushed some of his troops several hundred yards that way: sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 138; davis, autobiog., 271). but scott refused positively to have this done. semmes (service, 447) says that worth desired to capture chapultepec at this time because with his remarkable intuitive judgment he saw, as scott saw later, that this was the true approach to the city; but scott's later opinion was due to a study of the ground which neither he nor worth had at this time been able to make and to mexican fortifying not yet done. even if worth could have carried chapultepec rather easily, the prudent maxim that one should not buy (because it can be got cheaply) what one does not want, appeared to apply with especial force after losses that could be so ill afforded had been suffered; and it was not certain that the castle could be taken without a struggle. one costly surprise was enough for one day. engineer stevens (stevens, stevens, i, 206) thought an attempt should have been made to reconnoitre the mexican right with a view to turning the position; but to push a reconnoitring party between the mexican right wing and the cavalry of alvarez must have looked extremely hazardous. clarke's brigade consisted of the fifth, sixth and eighth infantry, it will be recalled. cadwalader had the voltigeurs and eleventh and fourteenth infantry. c. f. smith being ill, his battalion was commanded by captain e. k. smith, who was mortally wounded. semmes (service, 445) says that cadwalader's brigade and drum's guns had been added at worth's request, but hitchcock (fifty years, 296) and scott's general orders of sept. 7 show that scott originally intended to give worth one of pillow's brigades. worth could no doubt have had more light guns, but it was said that projectiles for the heavy guns were so few that it was necessary to husband them closely. scott, however, stated (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that he had plenty of such ammunition. ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 461) says that "the nature of the orders [given to worth] forbade an attack by artillery"; but (1) there is no evidence to prove this; (2) artillery was used on casa mata, only not long enough; (3) it was used again later with success (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 527; sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136). see stevens, stevens, 206. indeed, it seems to have been unnecessary to attack casa mata. it could not have held out long after the fall of el molino. ripley admits (p. 462) that the battle "was confused," but adds, "storming is always a work of confusion." here he confounds occurrences with management. the former must involve noise and confusion in such an affair, but the latter should not. sumner had one troop of the first dragoons, six troops of the second, part of a troop of the third, and a company of mounted rifles. foster had ten pioneers. drum had three guns, but one of them was sent out on the road to mexico, and during the battle one of the others became disabled by the breaking of a priming wire. semmes--determined, as usual, to defend worth at all hazards--says that during mcintosh's charge duncan's battery was called away to repel the mexican cavalry; but duncan's report (sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 136) shows that his guns did not turn against the cavalry until masked by mcintosh's troops. the part of cadwalader's brigade that moved to the left was the voltigeurs. after the repulse of clarke's brigade some of the voltigeurs went into the ravine and moved toward the rear of casa mata. this perhaps helped to force the mexicans out, and certainly resulted in the capture of many prisoners. vigorous pursuit of the mexicans was in general impracticable on account of the character of the ground and the fire from chapultepec. finding the engagement far more serious than he had expected, scott summoned forces from the southern front of the city and from mixcoac, but these could not arrive soon enough to give material assistance. jackson's section of magruder's battery came from mixcoac in time to contribute a little to the final repulse of the mexican cavalry. worth blamed scott for saying in his report that pierce's brigade interposed between garland and the mexicans, and asserted that it did not arrive until a considerable time after the battle ended (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1079); and it was felt by others, too, that scott erred here. but from the =178=diary of a man in the ninth infantry it seems clear that that regiment--a part of pierce's brigade--did as scott stated. the number of americans actually engaged was 3251 (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 369). our loss was 116 (including nine officers) killed, 665 (including forty-nine officers) wounded, and eighteen privates missing (_ibid._, 384). we captured 685, including 53 officers. one third of clarke's brigade, including one half of the officers, were killed or wounded (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 145). the fifth infantry seemed little more than a company after the battle (hitchcock, fifty years, 297). santa anna stated later (mi historia, 75) that iturbe, a wealthy resident of tacubaya, notified tornel that scott intended to enter the city during the night of sept. 7 by the san lázaro garita, on the eastern side of mexico, and that for this reason he (santa anna) took troops away from el molino; but santa anna always laid the blame for his mistakes upon some one. no doubt scott's feint against the southern side of the city and his not attacking during the afternoon were enough to cause alarm, but santa anna blundered in going to the southeast corner of the city, for an american attack there must have developed slowly owing to the swamps, whereas an attack upon el molino could be made quickly. he reached the scene of the battle at about half-past nine, and claimed that, but for his arrival, chapultepec might have been lost (apelación, app., 111). the government represented that he was in command during the battle (apuntes, 304). by scott's orders casa mata was blown up. the mexicans believed that a shot of theirs exploded the magazine. andrade was tried and acquitted. had he been as much at fault as alvarez alleged, the latter should have replaced him on the spot with another officer. about noon the mexican cavalry (or at least andrade's division) were ordered to charge, but on reaching the battlefield found the americans had retired. it has been suggested (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 448) that a part of the mexican cavalry should have been dismounted and placed between el molino and casa mata; but one may feel sure that alvarez would not have consented to that arrangement. one hesitates to think what the results of the battle might have been, had not santa anna withdrawn previously with a considerable part of his troops; and of this movement scott was not aware, though he may have hoped that his feint against the city would have an effect of that sort. after the battle the american troops reoccupied in general the positions held by them before it. 28.6. hitchcock, fifty years, 297-9, 303. =224=_id._, introd. to intercepted letters. =217=henshaw to wife, sept. 13. =73=lozano, no. 7, 1847. raleigh _star_, oct. 27. =221=hill, diary. semmes, service, 447-9. london _times_, nov. 13. =76=ortega, sept. 13. =100=guerra, circular, sept. 11. =76=j. y. gutiérrez, proclam., sept. 11. apuntes, 303-4. =199=anon. ms. _picayune_, oct. 14. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 361 (worth), 430 (hitchcock); app., 156 (cadwalader). sen. 19; 30, 2 (smith to abert, nov. 30, 1848). =69=huger, sept. 9, 1847. ho. 24; 31, 1. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 145 (lee). negrete, invasión, iii, app., 468. n. y. _tribune_, dec. 17, 1882 (mayne reid). s. anna, detall, 24. =70="guerra", no. 273 (trial of bravo). stevens, stevens, i, 206. 28.7. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 375 (scott) and map. =73=lozano, no. 7, 1847. semmes, service, 430. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1853, 2-3. _niles_, oct. 9, p. 89. =92=piedad judge, sept. 9. diccionario universal (_méxico_). robertson, visit, ii, 344. 28.8. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 376 (scott), 425-7 (smith). sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (lee), 185 (ripley), 579 (pillow says he reported to scott on sept. 9 that the mexican works opposite piedad, where pillow then was, could be carried easily). davis, autobiog., 223. hitchcock, fifty years, 298-300. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1853, pp. 4-5. =66=lee to j. l. smith, sept. 15. =66=beauregard to _id._, sept. 20. =111=_id._ to _id._, sept. 27. =218=henshaw narrative. =76=to olaguíbel, sept. 11. ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 470) and rives (_op. cit._, ii, 528) reflect upon scott for having no reconnaissances made between aug. 20 and sept. 7. but to make them would have violated the meaning and spirit of the armistice, which prescribed an "absolute cessation of hostilities" (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310), and it was highly important to show the strictest good faith during the delicate negotiations. rives (_ibid._) says "no preparation whatever had been made for the contingency of renewed hostilities." this statement results from a lack of information. numberless things had been done to put the army and its equipment into fighting trim. rives says also (_ibid._) that the mexicans, had they been enterprising, could easily have beaten our army in detail at this time. this seems to be a mistake (see sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 8). a frontal attack upon worth could certainly have been repulsed, and an attempt to strike pillow, twiggs or quitman would have exposed their own flank and rear. moreover it was clear that santa anna had no intention of assuming the offensive. rives says himself he had none (_op. cit._, 466), attributing his decision to "well-justified distrust of his own army"; and since the decision was made (july) nothing had occurred to reassure him. napoleon said, "a well-established maxim of war is, not to do anything which your enemy desires." 28.9. sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77-8, 145 (lee), 81 (cadwalader), 112-3 (beauregard), 123 (trist), 169 (hooker). sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375 (scott), 427 (smith). exposición dirigida, 6. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1853, pp. 6-15. hitchcock, fifty years, 300. =113=beauregard, remins. =66=_id._ to j. l. smith, sept. 20. =111=_id._ to _id._, sept, 27. =69=letter of sept. 11 from mexico. semmes, service, 430. (gunners) =76=carrera, report, dec., 1847. (key) apuntes, 304, 317. wash. _union_, dec. 9. =210=alvord to hammond, feb. 21, 1848. rodríguez, breve reseña, 870. stevens, stevens, i, 207. ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 472) remarks that even after taking chapultepec scott was "yet at a distance of two miles from the city, with the positive certainty of running upon the citadel if the direct route were pursued." but two miles on a broad, good causeway signified little, it was unnecessary to take the direct route, and scott had no intention of taking it. ripley admits (p. 473) that scott reasonably supposed that the defences at s. cosme were comparatively weak. 28.10. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 428 (smith). sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (lee), 112 (beauregard), 169 (hooker), 257 (quitman). =113=beauregard, remins. hitchcock, fifty years, 300. claiborne, quitman, i, 353-5. the description of lee is based principally upon a picture (seen at the confederate museum, richmond) made soon after the mexican war. the weather was still unusually favorable for military operations. 28.11. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 294-6. evidence at the trial of bravo (=70="guerra," no. 273). s. anna, detall, 22. =76=to monterde, may 24. =76=monterde, june 18, 21-2. =76=to lombardini, july 6, 23; aug. 3. =76=tornel, sept. 12. =76=to bravo, sept. 10. =76=bravo, sept. 14. =76=liceaga to lombardini, aug. 22. =76=reports on bravo's conduct, july 21, 24, 1848. apuntes, 317. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 459. 28.12. sen. 1; 30, 1, map; pp. 400 (pillow), 410 (quitman). =76=bravo, sept. 14. negrete, inv., iv, app., 294-6. semmes, service, 450-1. tornel, sept. 12. to bravo, sept. 10. apuntes, 307-8. =357=wilcox, diary. =70=evidence at the trial of bravo ("guerra," no. 273). ripley, war with mexico, ii, 396-8. (impreg.) =221=hill, diary. hitchcock, fifty years, 285, 302. the southeastern corner of the rectangle was irregularly cut off. a bullet-proof wall, about fifteen feet high, protected the eastern end, and ran along the southern line of the rectangle with platforms or scaffolds for infantry on its inner side, while a stone aqueduct--its arches filled in here with heavy masonry--extended (in the anzures causeway) along the northern side of the rectangle, and continued _via_ s. cosme to the city. cultivated fields, adjacent to el molino, occupied about a third of the rectangle. on each side of the north-and-south drainage ditch there was an embankment. the next section--perhaps one sixth--of the rectangle was occupied by the swamps and cypresses, and then came the hill--extremely steep except at the west, and steep there. a road or wide path led east through the grove to the foot of the hill. the opening in the south wall, covered by the exterior, unarmed redan (_b_), had a ditch outside of the redan for additional protection. the road that went up to the college was defended inside the main gateway with a 9-pounder (placed here sept. 12). the circular (arc of a circle) redoubt (_c_) was at the _glorieta_ (an open space furnished with seats, etc.). one or two other slight fortifications probably existed. the south wall of the terre-plein had a parapet except near the southeast corner. along the base of the west wall ran a fosse about twelve feet wide and ten deep. rather extensive mines (to be fired by powder-trains laid on or just under the surface of the ground) lay below the fosse; and beyond them--about half-way down the slope--stood a redan (_e_) for some fifty men, which seems to have been about 125 feet from the wall. this west wall was a priest-cap: _i.e._, it was indented like a shallow v, so that its two halves could afford support to each other. in the central portion of the terre-plein stood the masonry edifice of the military college with an open terrace at its eastern end and some stone buildings with flat, parapeted roofs, at its western end. a half-round bastion on each of the long sides afforded room for a heavy gun commanding in each case a semicircle. (the one in the southern bastion seems to have been disabled on sept. 8.) east of the southern bastion, in a smaller projection, stood a lighter gun looking toward the lower gateway; behind the somewhat zigzag parapet westward two or three smaller pieces covering the road and the southwest approach; on the terre-plein commanding the upper gateway a couple of light howitzers; and at the western end, specially screened with timber and sand-bags, two heavy pieces, which swept the approach from el molino. (one of the pieces was a 68-pound howitzer. ripley is precise in his account of the size and the placing of the guns, but the evidence is against him. he says there were eleven. there seem to have been thirteen; but one of them was not mounted, and two were now disabled.) timbering, proof against bullets, covered much of the lower story, the parapeted azotea of the main edifice and some other parts of the buildings; and sand-bags afforded further, though inadequate, protection at a number of peculiarly exposed points. 28.13. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (scott), 397 (twiggs), 399 (riley), 400 (pillow), 410 (quitman), 422 (huger); app., 197 (pierce), 201 (cadwalader), 230 (porter). sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 185 (ripley). =260=henshaw, comments on map. =217=_id._ to wife, sept. 13. =66=lee to j. l. smith, sept. 15. =66=mcclellan to smith, sept. 20. =66=beauregard to smith, sept. 20. =111=_id._ to _id._, sept. 27. =304=andrews to lovell, sept. 19. =304=hunt to _id._, sept. 15. =304=steptoe to _id._, sept. 16. =304=porter to _id._, sept. 16. =304=wilcox, diary. ramsey, other side, 457. =327=sutherland to father, aug. --. =178=davis, diary. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 426. =76=carrera, sept. 1. 28.14. negrete invasión, iv, app., 299-300. =61=letter from mex., sept. 11. apuntes, 305-6, 309-10, 314. ramírez, méxico, 307-8. _diario_, sept. 11. =73=lozano, no. 7, 1847. s. anna, apelación, 57. _id._, detall, 25. =76=to bravo, sept. 10. =76=bravo, sept. 11. =76=tornel to carrera, sept. 9. =92=ayunt. to s. anna, sept. 11. =92=letter from piedad, sept. 11. =199=anon. ms. 28.15. =76=bravo, sept. 14. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 427; iv, app., 299-300. =179=diario esactísimo. london _times_, nov. 13. s. anna, detall, 26. =76=to comtes. gen. querétaro and guanajuato, sept. 12. _arco iris_, nov. 30. apuntes, 310-2. =70=trial of bravo ("guerra," no. 273). =70=trial of terrés ("guerra," no. 155). molina, asalto. =269=_id._, recolls. prieto, memorias, ii, 241-3. rangel, parte (with notes). 28.16. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 377 (scott), 410-2 (quitman); app., 231 (mackenzie). sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 143 (lee), 193, 200-1 (worth), 259 (quitman). hitchcock, fifty years, 301-2. henshaw narrative. =376=nicholson, recolls. =221=hill, diary. 28.17. _the battle of chapultepec._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375, 391-425; app., 169-231 (reports of scott and officers). sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 119 (tilton), 146 (lee), 155-6, 158 (bennett), 170, 172 (hooker), 204-9 (rains), 217-8 (drum), 219 (bates), 220-1 (johnston), 222-4 (loeser), 270-5 (howard). stevens, stevens, i, 208-10. _niles_, oct. 30, p. 137. _cong. globe_, 34, 1, pp. 105-7. sen. report 32; 34, 1. brown, ninth inf., 70. henderson, science of war, 97 ("the issue of battle"). _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1853, pp. 15-42. =76=bravo, sept. 14. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 428-9; iv, app., 300-4. balbontín, invasión, 131. hitchcock, fifty years, 302-3. ballentine, eng. sold., ii, 242-7. davis, autobiog., 231-2. henshaw narrative. =180=pillow to wife, oct. 18. weekly n. y. _courier and enquirer_, mar. 2, 1848. =61=seymour, oct. 31, 1847. =69=h. v. johnson _et al._ to polk, apr. 6, 1848. =376=nicholson, recolls. =183=drum, recolls. =223=hirschorn, recolls. =66=g. w. smith to stevens, sept. 20. =66=tower to j. l. smith, sept. 23. claiborne, quitman, i, 361-2, 380-6. raleigh _star_, oct. 27. =221=hill, diary. =200=reid to gladden, may 27, 1849. s. anna, detall, 16, 26-9, 38-42. =151=numerous reports and letters regarding quitman's operations. =113=beauregard, remins. (based on diary and notes). =151=wilcox, diary. =303=quitman papers. _national_, nov. 14. =179=diario esactísimo. =60=riley to westcott, nov. 30, 1847. =60=loring to p. f. smith, sept. 27. =68=testimony at bonneville court martial. =60=miller to sister, undated. =60=_id._ to mother, mar. 24, 1848. london _times_, nov. 13, 1847. =335=reynolds to trist, sept. 27. oswandel, notes, 426. semmes, service, 453-5. _arco iris_, nov. 30. apuntes, 311, 314-6. =199=anon. ms. rangel, parte (with notes). _eco del comercio_, may 1, 1848. sen. 11; 31, 1 (m. l. smith, nov. 30, 1848). gamboa, impug., 55. =70="guerra," no. 1044 (trial of alemán). =70="guerra," no. 273 (trial of bravo). _monitor_, apr. 27, 1848. =70="guerra," no. 155 (trial of terrés). statue of bravo at puebla. _delta_, oct. 14, 26; nov. 3, 20. méxico á través, iv, 690-5. =76=bravo, dec. 27. dunovant, battles, 5-10. wash. _union_, nov. 3. _monitor repub._, oct. 24; dec. 16 (s. anna). nashville _repub. banner_, oct. 28, 1857. =292=pillow to wife, oct. 18. _spirit of the age_, feb. 10; july 29, 1848. pacheco, exposíción. wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 257-9. calderón, rectificaciones, 47. _vedette_, iv, nos. 3, 8, 12. =327=sutherland to father. aug. --. =178=davis, diary. _flag of freedom_, nov. 27. molina, el asalto. =269=_id._, recolls. =291=pierce to appleton, sept. 26. =51=marine off., oct. 20. reynolds, exculpation. =131=brindle, statement. ripley, war with mexico, ii, 396-402. encarnacion prisoners, 84. _hist. teacher's mag._, apr., 1912 (vieregg). remarks on the battle of chapultepec. chapultepec had been a protected summer palace, not a fortress. at this time the upper stories that one sees now did not exist. there were perhaps three times as many large trees in the grove as at present. for military reasons the small trees had recently been cleared away. scott had a small map of the city, apparently purchased from the british courier (sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 25). the twelfth infantry guarded the stores at mixcoac, and sept. 10 harney was sent there with a body of dragoons. sumner was then placed in command of all the dragoons at tacubaya (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 421). p. f. smith's brigade remained at mixcoac until the morning of sept. 13. lee, beauregard, stevens and tower reconnoitred the southern front. scott was there nearly all day sept. 9, and on the morning of the eleventh. the purposes in view were to study the mexican preparations, ascertain the nature of the ground, and find places for batteries. in general the ground, even where covered with water, appeared to be firm enough for infantry, and suitable places for batteries were found. bravo was appointed to the command of chapultepec on august 27. sept. 9 alvarez was ordered to take the cavalry to guadalupe. according to =76=bravo, sept. 14, the garrison of chapultepec on the morning of sept. 12, aside from gunners and engineers, was the tenth line infantry (250), mina battalion (277), unión battalion (121), querétaro battalion (115), toluca battalion (27), patria battalion (42). these 832 men were disposed as follows: defending the road to tacubaya, 160; redoubt on south side of hill (apparently at b), 215; _glorieta_ redoubt (c), 92; entrenchment at the right of the _glorieta_ (d), 42; north side of the hill, 80; buildings at summit, 243 (=76=bravo, report, sept. 14). the buildings near the gateway batteries were defended principally by the matamoros de morelia battalion. at the conference of sept. 11 engineers smith, lee, stevens and tower favored attacking san antonio, and quitman, shields, cadwalader and pierce took that view. pillow did the same. riley and twiggs sided with scott though not for positive reasons. hitchcock and trist do not seem to have expressed opinions. worth and p. f. smith were engaged elsewhere. scott's attacking chapultepec against the advice of lee illustrated the fact that his success in mexico was not due to that officer, as the value of lee's services and his later fame have led some to imagine. gen. u. s. grant regarded the battles of sept. 8 and 13 as wholly unnecessary (mems., i, 154). but here, as elsewhere in referring to the mexican war, he seems to have been merely recording youthful impressions. he says that, had scott gone round those positions, the mexicans would have evacuated them; but scott did not wish the mexicans to evacuate el molino and casa mata, taking with them their gunpowder and (supposed) foundry material: _i. e._, grant failed to understand the question. with regard to chapultepec also it is an issue between a lieutenant and the major general commanding. scott did not overlook the idea of going round (worth: sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 199); and hence, as he understood the case far better than grant did at the time or when he wrote his memoirs, one concludes that his judgment was correct. he stated (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 377) that [grant's] plan would have required too wide and hazardous a circuit. the following other objections against it may be suggested. grant's plan would have required the army to abandon the roads for difficult fields and marshes, limited the practicability of defending the rear in case of attack, weakened greatly the effective feinting upon which scott counted (_ibid._, 376), produced a bad moral effect--especially in view of the recent battle--by suggesting that he dared not attack chapultepec, exposed our assaulting troops to a cannonade from the rear, and left behind them a menace of other uncertain but alarming possibilities. the capture of chapultepec, on the other hand, worked morally as well as physically in our favor, and was thought by scott likely to have an even greater effect than it had (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 169); and it was stated by our engineers that mortars planted there would command a large part of the city. it has been said that our batteries were too far from the target; but it was not known what guns chapultepec had, and no doubt our engineers and artillery officers ventured as far as appeared expedient. clearly, however, too much was expected of our batteries. battery no. 1, to play on the south side of the fort, was laid out by lee; no. 2, opposite the southwest angle of the fort, by huger. the batteries did not fire accurately at first (=179=diario esactísimo). this seems to have been due to a lack of platforms for the guns. quitman's division supported no. 1, which was particularly exposed, and in the afternoon he made a bold reconnaissance of the road, discovering artillery and a ditch in his front (claiborne, quitman, ii, app., 308). the mexicans made advances toward no. 1 on sept. 12, but canister repelled them. to hinder reinforcements from reaching chapultepec, quitman by scott's order placed fifty men well forward on the road in the night of sept. 12-13, and some skirmishing occurred. a 9-pounder protected with sand-bags was planted just in front of no. 1. the intention had been to establish an advanced battery, but the mexicans prevented this. two new york companies supported no. 2. battery no. 3 had a brass 16-pounder. this, becoming unserviceable, was replaced with an iron 24-pounder. batteries 1, 2 and 3 commanded the south and west fronts of chapultepec fort, and no. 4 commanded its interior. no. 1 stood about 1000 yards from the south front of the fort; no. 2 about 1400 yards from its southwestern angle; no. 3 about 1140 yards from its west front; and no. 4 a little nearer than no. 3 (hardcastle's map in sen. 1; 30, 1). pillow reoccupied el molino early sept. 12 and his division slept there the following night. early sept. 13 twiggs resumed operations at la piedad, and the mexicans endeavored to draw him on. steptoe had two 12-pounders and two 24-pound howitzers. the weakness and gradual discontinuance of his fire and the fact that twiggs did not expose his infantry rendered this feint ineffective. scott states that taylor's battery also was at la piedad, but it does not seem to have been used at this time. perhaps, as the mexicans were likely to attack, it was held in reserve. the storming parties were composed of volunteers. in some and possibly in all cases some slight reward was offered. in a number of regiments so many volunteered that it became necessary to draw lots. scott thought pillow would need one brigade; but pillow sent for worth's whole division and received one (clarke's) brigade of it. ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 420) states that pillow asked for only one of worth's brigades, but against him is the testimony of scott, of worth and of semmes, who bore pillow's message. some of clarke's men arrived in time to fight. after the battle pillow admitted that not over 1000 of his men took part in the assault (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408). he had too many. they were in one another's way. pillow stated that the garrison was 6000, thus probably reckoning almost every mexican soldier within a mile of the hill. pillow wrote (=180=oct. 18): i led "to the very cannon's mouth, where i was cut down--then my men picked me up and carried me forward under my orders and with a shout of exultation and triumph, scaled the ditches and wall." in fact he seems to have received a painful wound on the ankle from a glancing grapeshot at the foot of the hill (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 378), and was not carried to the summit until serious fighting had ended (sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 156, 172, 204, 217, 222, 224). cadwalader succeeded him in command. lt. col. hébert with the eleventh infantry, assisted by sumner's dragoons and in effect by trousdale and jackson, kept off a strong force of lancers that menaced the american rear from the direction of los morales. sept. 13 when santa anna finally sent the san blas battalion (perhaps 400) toward the summit, the approach of the americans forced it to halt--apparently at the entrenchment (d) near the _glorieta_. the third ligero was ordered to reinforce this battalion, but the college fell before it arrived, and it retired. other troops were sent to the lower parts of the hill. some perished, some retreated, some were captured. the hidalgo battalion fought on the tacubaya road. reserves of 2-5000 were on the belén causeway near chapultepec. a mexican lieutenant of engineers named alemán had charge of firing the mines, and he was ordered to do his work. at his trial he said that he found his way blocked by mexican troops, and that before he could reach his post the americans were there. some, if not all, of the canvas pipes containing the trains had already been found and cut by our troops. the americans got over the fosse by laying ladders across it. the man who first reached the mexican flagstaff appears to have been capt. kimball, a vermonter but born in new hampshire. he stood on guard there till seymour, who commanded his regiment after ransom's fall, arrived. sept. 13 the americans took revenge for the atrocities perpetrated upon our wounded on the eighth. the second in command in casey's party was capt. paul, but capt. b. s. roberts, whose company stood at the head of it, led the successful charge. gen. rangel reported that by this time the mexican muskets had become useless and the one cannon that directly enfiladed the road had been accidentally disabled. it is quite clear, particularly in the light of mexican evidence, that the fort on the summit was carried before the gateway batteries. quitman rendered no essential service in the capture of chapultepec, though he kept many mexicans occupied. his troops that went up the hill were not needed. (even clarke's brigade was a greater reinforcement than the situation called for.) shields states that the three regiments turned off to the left because the mexicans in quitman's front were found too strong, and if these could not be beaten before those three regiments were detached, evidently the remainder of quitman's command was not strong enough to beat them. when roberts led the successful charge, worth (whom clarke rejoined), trousdale and jackson had appeared at the northeast of chapultepec and menaced the rear of the gateway batteries. except thirty to fifty under capt. terrett the marines did not distinguish themselves. their commander, however, said that their ammunition failed, and other officers stated that quitman ordered the corps to halt. this was their first battle. p. f. smith had the mounted rifles (minus two companies detached), first artillery and third infantry (minus two companies detached). it was hoped that he could strike the belén aqueduct, break through, and take the mexican flank and rear. smith's brigade not being strong enough--under the difficulties of the ground and in view of quitman's halt--to attack santa anna's reserves, veered toward the causeway, and under the partial shelter of maguey opened fire. his right companies took part in the final charge against the gateway batteries. had quitman given smith the pioneer party with planks, etc., for bridging the ditches, and a storming party, and supported him with two of the regiments that went up the hill, smith could have struck the mexicans effectively on the belén route, while quitman himself was doing what he could on the tacubaya road with the rest of his command. a great number of prisoners could probably have been captured in this way (stevens, stevens, i, 214-5). gen. rangel reported that the corps which defended the work on the tacubaya causeway lost one third, and that almost every member of his staff was wounded sept. 8 or 13. the serious fighting inside the fort lasted only four or five minutes. when the final assault occurred, the effective defenders, all told, probably did not number more than 275. bravo's sword was returned to him. he was charged by santa anna with bad conduct, but when tried was fully exonerated. in reference to chapultepec the author was kindly assisted by señor d. ignacio molina, head of the cartography section of the mexican government, who was a student at the military college in sept., 1847, and, being an engineer by profession, could be relied upon. 28.18. pillow estimated the mexican killed, wounded and captured at chapultepec at about 1800 (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 408), and mentioned that the prisoners included gens. bravo, noriega, monterde [dosamantes, saldaña], three colonels, seven lieut. colonels and 40 captains. the actual number of mexicans captured in the operations of sept. 13-14 was 125 officers, 698 men besides about forty students (hitchcock in sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 430). as to their killed, wounded and missing, one can only guess. the american loss on sept. 12-14 was: killed, 10 officers, 128 rank and file; wounded, 60 officers, 613 rank and file (ho. 24; 31, 1). what part of this loss was incurred at chapultepec cannot be stated. (black) mcsherry (m'sherry), el puchero, 108. 28.19. _the belén operations._ ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1019, 1021-5. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381-3 (scott), 398 (twiggs), 414-6 (quitman), 423 (huger); app., 180 (bonneville), 184 (smith), 191 (beauregard), 215 (seymour), 223 (smith), 225 (shields), 230 (porter). sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 188 (ripley). 633 (pillow). carreño, jefes, 166. _niles_, oct. 30, pp. 137-8. sen. report 32; 34, 1. brown, ninth inf., 62. haskin, first artill., 115. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1853, pp. 43-4. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 133, 145-9; iv, app., 304-8. balbontín, invasión, 132. davis, autobiog., 209-10, 232-4, 262-3. =376=nicholson, recolls. =218=henshaw narrative. =69=dimick to woodbury, dec. 1, 1848. =69=childs to dimick, dec. 2, 1848. claiborne, quitman, i, 347, 364, 367-9, 372, 385-6. =151=reports and letters. city of charleston, s. c, year book, 1883, p. 523. rowland, miss. register, 418. =113=beauregard, remins. =357=wilcox, diary. =303=reports. =60=loring to p. f. smith, sept. 27. =60=dimick to _id._, sept. 20. =60=_id. et al._ to p. f. smith, oct. 19, 1848. =60=_id._ to adj. gen., nov. 30, 1848. =69=williams to porter, apr. 11, 1857. =65=adj. gen., orders 7, feb. 20, 1847. rodriguez, breve reseña, 870. gamboa, impug., 56. =70="guerra," no. 155 (trial of terrés). _picayune_, nov. 20. _delta_, oct. 14, 26, 1847; jan. 11, 1848. méxico á través, iv, 695. dunovant, battles, 11-17. wash. _union_, sept. 11. _monitor repub._, nov. 3; dec. 16. _south. mag._, july, 1874, p. 78. =364=worth to daughter, sept. 28. ramsey, other side, 249, note. prieto, memorias, ii, 246. =270=moore, diary. =335=statement _re_ quitman by trist. =80=relac. to olaguíbel, sept. 14. statements to the author from quitman's daughters. =327=sutherland to father, aug. --. =178=davis, diary. =269=molina, recolls. reynolds, exculpation. stevens, vindication. s. anna, detall, 21, 29-32. raleigh _star_, nov. 3. =76=tornel to carrera, sept. 9. apuntes, 309, 317-22. diccionario universal (_méxico_). =68=bonneville court martial. semmes, service, 457. _monitor repub._, nov. 3 (terrés). stevens, stevens, i, 210-1. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 492-3. remarks on the belén operations. the mexicans retiring by this road were commanded by gen. lombardini. the principal corps was the activo regiment of morelia. the ditch across the tacubaya causeway at the gateway batteries was promptly filled in by the americans to permit passage. a part of the men who captured the gateway batteries pursued the fleeing mexicans, but not far. a part of the sixth infantry, having gone astray, joined quitman. it has been suggested that scott made a mistake in not giving orders, before the attack upon chapultepec, for subsequent operations, and thus left the troops to their own devices; but it was impossible for him to calculate in advance what the situation would be, and he went as soon as possible to the summit of the hill, which was the proper place for surveying the field and issuing suitable commands. the belén garita presented a hard problem because, having been more threatened than the san cosme garita, it seemed likely to be more strongly guarded, because, being nearer to the forces protecting the southern front, it could be more quickly and effectively reinforced, and because it was supported by the citadel, which could only be approached over open ground. scott, therefore determined to make only a feint at belén (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382). quitman, however, owing to the abortive alvarado expedition, had not figured at cerro gordo. aug. 20 and sept. 8 his duty had been to guard the rear. hence he had won no éclat under scott, and, feeling that scott was unfriendly to him, he apparently resolved at this time to take the bit in his teeth (davis, autobiog., 232). during his operations against the city scott repeatedly signified his disapproval of them, but quitman refused to retire without a positive order (claiborne, quitman, i, 386), and, since quitman had committed him, scott, although extremely annoyed (davis, autobiog., 234-5), wisely refrained from giving this. gen. u. s. grant said, "it is always, however, in order to follow a retreating foe, unless stopped or otherwise directed" (mems., i, 152). this principle authorized quitman's moving toward the city but not the later part of his operations. at the expense of his men, therefore, quitman was guilty of virtual insubordination--though not of positive disobedience--for personal reasons. this fact it is necessary to make clear. but his men were no doubt as willing as he to risk their lives, and it was only natural that quitman should seek to distinguish himself. that motive had to be recognized, for without it probably few volunteer officers would have been in the field. ripley (_op. cit._, ii, 549) says that according to scott's report orders were repeatedly sent to quitman to prevent his too rapid advance, but quitman did not receive them and could not find the staff officer who had borne them. what scott said (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 382) was that he repeatedly communicated his "views" to quitman, and davis (autobiog., 234-5) supports this statement. the purpose of ripley's remark apparently was to hint that scott's statement was untrue. the intermediate battery (at what was called the bridge of the insurgents) seems to have been built for four guns but to have had only one, two, three guns in place, or perhaps none. the accounts disagree. quitman and smith, both of them volunteer officers, appear distinctly to have colored their reports in favor of the palmetto regiment, which was second to none in gallantry, but was not enabled by circumstances to do all it would gladly have done here. the first artillery, on the other hand, did not receive the credit it deserved. it was merely a question of precedence, not of courage, but vigorous protests against their reports were the consequence. perhaps, however, the real explanation of their inaccuracies is that the reports represent orders of which circumstances (unknown or forgotten by them) prevented the execution. sept. 9, believing scott would attack the southern side, santa anna had two guns removed from the belén garita. the "citadel" had originally been a tobacco factory. terrés was treated by santa anna with the utmost contempt and even subjected to personal violence, but a court martial exonerated him, and he was regarded by scott with marked respect (_delta_, jan. 11, 1848). 28.20. _the s. cosme operations._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 381-2 (scott), 391-3 (worth), 421 (sumner), 424 (huger), 428-9 (j. l. smith); app., 166 (huger), etc. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1072-3, 1077, 1079. _journ. milit. serv. instit._, v, 46; xxxiii, 444. wilson, grant, 63-7. stevens, stevens, i, 211-2, 215. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1853, p. 44. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 430-41, 450; iv, app., 305-8. grant, mems., i, 150, 155-9. ballentine, eng. sold., ii, 249. =66=lee to j. l. smith, sept. 15. =66=mcclellan to g. w. smith, sept. 14. =66=stevens to j. l. smith, sept. 25. claiborne, quitman, i, 379. =113=beauregard, remins. =60=paul to lovell, sept. 20. semmes, service, 457-61. apuntes, 316-22. rangel, parte (with notes). =70="guerra," no. 273 (trial of bravo). _delta_, oct. 14. s. anna, detall, 30-2. méxico á través, iv, 695. _monitor repub._, dec. 16 (s. anna). =76=mora to lombardini, aug. 9; to guerra, july 22. =76=lombardini, aug. 22. jackson, mems., 43. =80=relac. to olaguíbel, sept. 14. g. w. smith, co. a, corps of engins. =51=letter from marine officer, oct. 20. =51=terrett, undated. =51=henderson to sec. navy, may 12, 1848. stevens, vindication. raleigh _star_, oct. 27. arnold, jackson, 130, 177. dabney, jackson, 47-9. murphy, remins., 69. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 496-502. remarks on the san cosme operations. the mexicans retreating by this route were commanded by gen. rangel, assisted by gen. peña y barragán and lt. col. echeagaray. it is impossible to be as precise as would be desirable in describing the first part of worth's advance, for the reports are both vague and inconsistent. this is mainly, no doubt, because the officers wrote from memory and without the aid of a map. ripley observes (_op. cit._, ii, 484) that worth's movement "had the great element of success, celerity." in reality, it was very slow, but unofficial accounts and the mexican reports contain evidence that the resistance was not only vigorous but more than once temporarily triumphant. the one-gun redoubt seems to have been abandoned when the hill yielded. ripley observes also (_op. cit._, ii, 485) that worth did not need to advance rapidly: "time was not immediately pressing." but this is a mistake, for substantially all the mexican preparations at the s. cosme garita were made after worth's advance began. the fortification (unarmed) near the english cemetery was at the bridge of santo tomás. the mexican infantry was withdrawn from this position because the americans could have struck the s. cosme highway (by a cross-road) between it and the city; but a large body of cavalry under torrejón remained and charged in order to gain time for rangel to make preparations at the garita. while quitman was struggling with the intermediate battery, duncan of worth's command sent a gun from la verónica causeway into a road that extended some distance toward the right, and fired at the mexicans. he and worth believed they gave quitman material assistance, but this does not appear to have been the fact, for the distance was found to be much greater than they supposed (=113=beauregard). the better way to aid quitman would have been to press forward without loss of time, and threaten the rear of the mexicans opposing quitman. later some of worth's guns did aid quitman by firing at the garita. with remarkable daring capt. terrett of the marines, lieuts. gore and u. s. grant of the fourth infantry, a few other officers and a small party of men captured the unarmed work near the junction of la verónica and san cosme roads by moving to the left round the english cemetery, and took the parapet on the san cosme highway. from the latter worth recalled them because the american guns behind them were about to open. cadwalader, sent to worth by scott, was placed by the former at the english cemetery to guard worth's left and rear. sumner, after pursuing the mexicans for some time, was detached to protect tacubaya. scott joined worth near the english cemetery and directed him to carry the garita (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 392), but he soon returned to the base of chapultepec so as to be within easy reach of all his scattered forces (_ibid._, 382). by scott's order huger sent to worth four siege guns and a mortar, but on account of the nature of the ground none of these pieces was used against the garita (_ibid._, 424). santa anna brought four guns to the garita, but only three of them were available. the stampede from the garita seems to have been due in part to a cornet signal for retreat, meant for a single corps. the cavalry under alvarez entered the city during the afternoon of sept. 12. grant was assisted by lieut. lendrum of the third artillery in handling the mountain howitzer. 28.21. _the night of sept. 13-14._ sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (scott), 393 (worth), 416 (quitman), 424 (huger), 429 (j. l. smith); app., 168, etc. (officers). ho. 60: 30, 1, pp. 1077-9 (worth), 1079 (scott). =179=diario esactísimo. stevens, stevens, i, 213, 215. sen. rep. 32; 34, 1. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 129, 450; iv, 108, 116-22; app., 309-10. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1853, p. 49. davis, autobiog., 235-7, 287-90. =217=henshaw to wife, sept. 13 [partly later]. =218=henshaw narrative. =61=gates, oct. 6. =376=nicholson, recolls. =151=steptoe to lovell, sept. 16. london _times_, nov. 13. =92=s. anna to mex. ayunt., sept. 15. =80=fernández to gov. michoacán, sept. 13. =80=relac. to olaguíbel, sept. 14. s. anna, mi historia, 83. gamboa, impug., 57-8. =70="guerra," no. 954 (trial of bonilla). =366=ayunt. poster, sept. 25. _monitor repub._, sept. 27 (pacheco); oct. 2 (s. anna). s. anna, contestación. lawton, artill. off., 315. =73=lozano, nos. 4 and 8, res., 1847. ramírez, méxico, 318. =92=mex. ayunt. to scott, sept. 13, 11 p.m. s. anna, apelación, 58-9. calderón, rectificaciones, 48. giménez, memorias, 114. stevens, vindication. raleigh _star_, oct. 27. =112=beauregard to quitman, sept. 17. =113=_id._, remins. rangel, parte (with notes). claiborne, quitman, i, 370. =221=hill, diary. semmes, service, 463. hitchcock, fifty years, 304. s. anna, detall, 32-3. apuntes, 334-5. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 503-4. quitman sent to scott for heavy cannon and ammunition, and the latter, though offended by quitman's course, had them supplied. during the night, under beauregard's direction, two batteries inside the belén garita (for a 24-pounder, an 18-pounder and a 24-pound howitzer) and a breastwork on the right for infantry were made ready. steptoe, sent here by scott, was on hand to superintend the firing. to assault the citadel across about 300 yards of open ground, even with the aid of these pieces, would have been a very serious affair, and it was most fortunate for quitman that worth's entering the town where no citadel existed made it unnecessary. it has been supposed that huger's brief bombardment caused santa anna to evacuate the city (semmes, service, 463); but santa anna knew, without being shown again, what the american artillery could do, and he seems to have decided upon his policy before this firing occurred. santa anna's chief published reasons for the evacuation were that he wished to save the city from bombardment, assault and sack, and save the army, arms and cannon for future operations. gamboa complained that no provision was made before the evacuation for the security of the people, the archives, etc. but scott's previous conduct was an adequate pledge, and the council relied upon his regard for international law. considering santa anna's known love of money, the vast mexican interests now imperilled, and his summary manner of deciding the question of evacuation, one cannot help suspecting that inducements were offered him. the council was probably held merely to divide the responsibility for what he had resolved to do. it was charged that santa anna let the criminals out of jail expressly to attack the americans, and to bring odium upon us by committing outrages that could be attributed to our troops. one cannot be sure about this matter; but it is noticeable that gamboa, in piling up all possible charges against the president, only accused him of failing to prevent the criminals from getting free. santa anna must have been completely exhausted, but it seems to be true, as was stated by the british minister (bankhead, no. 86, 1847), that some one in authority let about 2000 men out of confinement. very likely it was hoped that the americans would be guilty of disorder; but the palace at least was sacked before they entered it. some of the mexican soldiers acted like brigands, it was reported--even robbing the british consul. no preparations to evacuate the town had been made. some one might and should have had sentinels posted at the public buildings and offices ready to surrender them in a proper manner. see chap. xxix, note 29.2. on account of illness pierce had no part in the battles of sept. 8 and 13. probably in order to occupy a place in the reports he appeared at the belén garita at about four a.m., sept. 14 (though he belonged to pillow's division) on the ground that the ninth infantry was then serving under quitman. although scott refused to grant a capitulation or sign any pledge, he seems to have indicated quite definitely to the commission how the capital would be treated (negrete, invasión, iv, 122), and in particular that in consideration of being protected it would have to pay $150,000 for necessaries and comforts to be given our troops. the ayuntamiento attempted to force scott to make pledges by saying that otherwise it could offer no security to his army or its property. this was ingenious, and so was its solemn protest (negrete, invasión, iv, 108) that it had no intention of submitting voluntarily to any foreign authority. scott's report offended worth by saying that he did not pass the garita until sept. 14 (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1077). this was technically an error, and scott so acknowledged in writing (_ibid._, 1079). but one cannot suppose he intended (though worth imagined he did) to belittle worth, for his plan had been to give that officer the glory of capturing the city, and he was displeased to find that quitman had taken precedence of worth (claiborne, quitman, i, 377). moreover, scott stated expressly in his report that worth, had he not halted in obedience to orders, might have anticipated quitman (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 383). scott seems, indeed, to have intended, in giving worth the command on sept. 8 and destining him to take possession of the city, to close the breach between that officer and himself, but worth contrived, by taking needless offence on both occasions, to widen it. another complaint was that scott ordered worth to stop at the alameda, and thus enabled quitman to reach the palace first (semmes, service, 464); but apparently this was because scott intended to join worth there (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 417), for when scott proceeded from tacubaya to the city on the morning of sept. 14 he took the long route _via_ san cosme, not knowing what quitman had done. semmes (service, 469) states that s. anna left 40 pieces of artillery behind when he evacuated the city. gamboa asserted that at the end of the fighting, sept. 13, there were still 9000 mexican soldiers besides 4000 national guards (impug., 59). the spanish chargé reported that when the fighting ended santa anna had 12,000 troops. as the minister of relations was his guest at the time this would seem almost equivalent to an official estimate (=73=lozano, no. 7, sept. 16). mounted and unmounted, the americans found twenty-two cannon at the citadel (=304=geary to quitman, sept. 14). in spite of santa anna's efforts to prevent the capture of the city, many still believed that he was in league with the americans (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 419). 28.22. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383 (scott), 393 (worth), 398 (twiggs), 417 (quitman). _niles_, oct. 30, p. 137. sen. rep. 32; 34, 1. scott, mems., ii, 535. davis, autobiog., 237. =376=nicholson, recolls. =224=introd. to intercepted letters. =66=beauregard to quitman, sept. 17. =304=watson to shields, sept. 16. claiborne, quitman, i, 362, note, 376. =113=beauregard, remins. =151=roberts to _union_, july 12, 1848. =357=wilcox, diary. arroniz, manual, i, 411. =65=scott, gen. orders 286. semmes, service, 464. apuntes, 326. london _chronicle_, nov. 12. =307=roberts, diary. =187=thomas to eddy, oct. 26. wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 255. norton, life, 172. =327=sutherland to father, aug. --. lowell (mass.) _journal_, sept. 14, 1852. verse by grace greenwood (in stevenson, poems). epitomizing his operations in the valley, scott said his army had beaten thirty-odd thousand men, posted behind defences at chosen positions, killed or wounded more than 7000, taken 3730 (one seventh officers), including thirteen generals, and captured more than twenty colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, and an immense quantity of munitions (sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 384-5). the total american losses on sept. 12, 13 and 14: note 28.18. xxix. final military operations 29.1. the chief documents relating to taylor's field. brackett, lane's brigade, 31-2. =63=marcy to taylor, july 15, 1847. =169=taylor to crittenden, may 15; sept, 15, 1847. _delta_, aug. 3. wash. _union_, june 17. =76=mora, mar. 31; apr. 7; may 12. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1118-49, 1170, 1172, 1175, 1177, 1180, 1185-8, 1195, 1197-8 (taylor); 1003, 1193-4 (marcy). =76=a. chávez, july 29. =76=gonzález to urrea, july 12. =76=valencia, june 7, 19, 26. =76=filisola, aug. 10. =76=extracto, aug. 10. scott, mems., ii, 409-11, 460. =354=welles papers. =330=taylor, aug. 16. _spirit of the age_, feb. 17, 1848. =76=peña y barragán, june 26, 1847. charleston _mercury_, sept. 2. polk, diary, may 11. =61=adj. gen. to brooke, may 29; to taylor, july 16; to talcott, mar. 24. =69=wool to bliss, aug. 25. (tampico) kenly, md. vol., 241, 244, 252; =69=riley to bliss, dec. 14, 1846; =61=shields to adj. gen., jan. 19, 1847; =66=beauregard to gates, feb. 24; =76=i. múñoz, dec. 19, 21, 25, 1846; =65=gates, special orders 7, feb. 25, 1847; =76=váldez to f. de garay, jan. 3, 1847; =76=garay, jan. 22, res., 29, res.; =76=j. j. landero, jan. 25; =76=s. anna, jan. 9; =76=f. de garay, jan. 22; =76=to mora, may 24. (tamaulipas authorities) =76=j. cárdenas to relaciones, nov. 16, 1847; =76=urrea, nov. 15; =75=memoria de ... relaciones, nov. 19; =76=gov. tam. to comte. gen. tam., jan. 17, 1848; =76=_id._ to relaciones, nov. 29, 1847; =76=tam. congress, decree, nov. 14. (taylor's going home) =61=taylor, oct. 26, 1847; sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 145 (marcy); =330=taylor to gen. --, aug. 16, 1847; ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1199, 1213-4 (taylor); 1210 (jones). (costume) _delta_, aug. 3, 1847. =69=wool, gen. orders, dec. 22, 1847. the distance from camargo to mexico city seems to have been about 820 miles by the direct road. as early as may 11, 1847, polk remarked to the cabinet that it was more important to reinforce scott than taylor (diary). in march, 1847, taylor had: (regulars) 2 cos. of first dragoons; ditto, second dragoons; four artillery cos. (c of 1st; c and e of 3d; b of 4th) with batteries; five artillery cos. as infantry; (volunteers) arkansas horse regt.; ditto, kentucky; two cos. texas horse; two regts. kentucky foot; three ohio foot; three ind. foot; two ill. foot; two miss. foot; one each va., no. car., so. car. and mass. foot (=62=adj. gen. to ordnance dept., march 24, 1847). june 16 taylor wrote that wool would soon have at buena vista six regular companies (second dragoons, fourth artillery), four cos. of volunteer horse (first arkansas, third texas), and marshall's brigade (in all about 2500); that there would be a small garrison at monterey, and that the troops on or coming to the rio grande would go to a camp of instruction at mier. he reckoned that by august 15 he would have about 8000 effectives (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1177, 1180). the new orleans _delta_ of aug. 3 said wool had at buena vista about 2900, taylor at monterey 800, and the posts at cerralvo, mier and matamoros about 3300. in may and june the time of practically all taylor's 12-months men (thirteen regts.) was out. only enough for one company would reënlist. the government intended taylor should have after losing these men fully 10,000, to wit (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 924-6): (regulars) hopping's brigade consisting of tenth infantry (n. y., n. j.) under col. temple; thirteenth infantry (va., ga., ala., fla.) under col. echols; sixteenth infantry (ky., ind., ill.) under col. tibbatts; and also the third dragoons; (volunteers) marshall's brigade (one regt. each from *miss., *va. and *no. car., five va. companies--*three of them already in mexico); lane's brigade (ill. regt., ill. horse co., ind. regt., five n. j. cos., one fla. co., one ark. horse co., five texas horse cos.); cushing's brigade (*mass. regt., ohio regt., ohio horse co., five d. c. and md. cos., five ala. cos., one ala. horse co.). (the star means "already in mexico.") in spite of this it was charged that the government was leaving taylor with only a corporal's guard. troops began to leave taylor's for scott's field during the latter part of august. taylor retained the tenth and sixteenth regular regts. and the battery of deas (co. b, fourth artillery) and sent to scott, besides hays's men and a body under cushing, three regts. of volunteers (mass., ohio, ind.): an aggregate of 2957 (=62=adj. gen., oct. 6). he estimated that hays had about 400. wool, who had been commanding at saltillo and buena vista, moved to monterey after taylor left that place, and col. john hamtramck succeeded him. a letter from buena vista dated jan. 17, 1848, said that hamtramck then had 2600 and wool at monterey 1400; and that the total force in that field amounted to five light batteries, four infantry regiments, ten companies of dragoons and four companies of horse (_spirit of the age_, feb. 17, 1848). about 200 american prisoners (privates), who were supposed by themselves and other americans to have been exchanged for mexicans captured at cerro gordo, were sent by the mexican government in may, 1847, to huejutla, about 120 miles from tampico on the road to mexico, in order to prevent them from escaping or being recaptured, and suffered terrible privations in the mountains. july 7, 1847, gates, commanding at tampico, sent col. de russey of the louisiana volunteers, with 126 men (including 35 mounted men) and a 6-pdr. under capt. f. o. wyse to endeavor peaceably to obtain the release of these prisoners, or, if that could not be done, to rescue them. de russey sent word to gen. f. de garay, the mexican commander in that district, regarding his mission, but was ambushed near huejutla. with some loss he beat off his assailants, and after fighting more or less three days on his retreat, succeeded, after receiving aid from tampico, in reaching that place. his loss was 12 killed and 7 wounded. later the prisoners were released on parole. the garrison of tampico at this time was only about 650 effectives; but july 31 five companies of ill. vols. were ordered to go there from n. orleans. in april, 1848, gen. shields was ordered to take command at tampico. (for this paragraph: encarnacion prisoners, 70; =65=gates, special orders 41, july 7; =61=_id._, july 21, aug. 24; =365=wyse, may 15, 1876; =61=adj. gen. to gates, july 31; ho. 24; 31, 1; tampico _sentinel_, extra, july 18; =76=garay, july 19, 28; =76=v. de mora, sept. 10; apuntes, 380-4; _niles_, aug. 7, p. 357; =61=adj. gen. to shields, mar. 30, 1848.) in the summer of 1847 discipline at buena vista was in a bad state (=76=filisola, aug. 10; =76=report of a trustworthy spy). in august a mutiny occurred (sen. 62; 30, 1), and wool discharged dishonorably two lieuts. and two privates (ho. 78; 30, 1). polk countermanded this discharge on the ground that wool had exceeded his authority (=256=marcy to wool, jan. 17, 1848). a court of inquiry was ordered (ho. 60; 30, 1, 1207-8). this fully vindicated wool (sen. 62; 30, 1). by the autumn of 1847 the americans occupied tamaulipas and nuevo león pretty effectively, but in coahuila held only saltillo and its vicinity. in feb. and march, 1848, that state was overrun (=61=wool, mar. 2, 1848; =76=gov. coahuila, mar. 29, 1848), and on march 7 mazapil in northern zacatecas was made an american outpost (=61=wool to price, apr. 5, 1848; =76=comte. gen. zacatecas, mar. 10). the americans tried repeatedly without success to apprehend gov. aguirre, who was known to be hostile. finally, about the middle of dec., 1847, they burned his house and destroyed the clothing of his family who were there (=76=report to comte. gen. durango, res., dec. 21, 1847). valencia's plan of combined operations appears to have been an elaboration of a suggestion of filisola. by june 22 filisola, then at durango, was ready to advance. july 31 he feared his men would disband from lack of means. about aug. 1 he moved. many deserted or fell sick. august 11 he had 634 available privates. avalos was in a similar condition, and his brigade shrank rapidly. most of the troops placed under filisola's orders were diverted or simply failed to appear, and finally on aug. 23, 1847, he was ordered to querétaro. (this paragraph is based upon numerous =76=reports from the officers concerned.) _price's campaign._ in oct., 1847, it was feared at santa fe that the mexicans intended to attack new mexico (santa fe _republican_, oct. 9), and a considerable american force appears to have gone to the southern part of the province (=76=prefect el paso, oct. 26). in november el paso was the scene of preparations to march south. the people of chihuahua state had mostly been cowed at sacramento, but trias and a few others were determined to fight. he obtained 500 muskets that were landed at guaymas, and his arsenal turned out eight small field pieces. at santa cruz de rosales he took post with 804 men, besides officers. price had 665 men, but his artillery was much superior to that of the mexicans. his object was to get the munitions and other public property that trias had brought from chihuahua city. trias said he knew officially that a treaty had been signed; but, as the mexicans were more noted for astuteness than for veracity, price would not believe him. he did, however, wait about a week. after some fighting trias and his entire force surrendered. he lost 238 killed. the american loss was 4 killed and 19 wounded (=62=adj. gen. to price, oct. 4; nov. 20, 1847. =256=marcy to price, may 22, 1848; to wool, may 23. =76=trias, nov. 30; feb. 15; mar. 21. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 76-7, 113-36. =61=corresp. between price and trias, mar. 10, etc. ho. 24; 31, 1. _eco del comercio_, june 22, 1848. =76=chávez to armijo, oct. 21, 1847. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 535-7. méxico á través, iv, 710. =61=justiniani and trias, report, mar. 22, 1848. apuntes, 397-401). price exhibited energy and courage in this campaign but poor judgment. a force occupying el paso would have protected new mexico, and to go even beyond the city of chihuahua and fight so serious an aggressive battle long after the capture of mexico city and in the face of positive assurances that a treaty had been signed was hardly reasonable. one suspects that commercial interests were behind this campaign. gen. butler ordered restitution made (=60=to marcy, apr. 7). 29.2. the chief documents relating to hostilities at mexico. =221=hill, diary. _national_, nov. 14, etc., 1847. =65=scott, gen. orders 289, 296. apuntes, 325, 330-9, 362. london _chronicle_, nov. 12. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 451, etc.; iv, app., 310-2. s. anna, apelación, 59, 60, 63. gamboa, impug., 59, 60. ramírez, méxico, 317-8. semmes, service, 466-7. =92=ayunt. proclams. =92=corresp. between veramendi and s. anna. =92=ayunt. to quitman, sept. 15-6. =92=mexican officials to veramendi, sept. --. =92=quitman, proclam., sept. 26. =92=veramendi, proclam., sept. 27. _arco iris_, dec. 1. _picayune_, oct. 14; nov. 20. n. y. _sun_, oct. 14. diario esactísimo. _niles_, oct. 30, p. 138. =364=worth to daughter, sept. 28. prieto, memorias, ii, 248-58. =357=wilcox, diary. sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 25. =366=poster. s. anna, detall, 33-4. london _times_, nov. 13. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 383-4 (scott), 393 (worth); 399 (riley); 417 (quitman); 424 (huger); app., 169 (smith), 185 (smith), 188 (morris), 190 (plympton). hitchcock, fifty years, 304-5. _monitor_ _repub._, sept. 28. grant, mems., i, 162-3. henshaw narrative. claiborne, quitman, i, 378. engineer school, occas. papers 16. =73=lozano, no. 7, 1847. davis, autobiog., 240. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 507-11, 542. _american star_, oct. 14. santa anna sent an order to herrera to return to mexico, but by the time herrera received it he was so far away that he did not think it best to go back, and the order was soon rescinded. one of the =92=proclamations of the president of the ayuntamiento, 12:30 p.m., sept. 14, said: "the general in charge of the american forces which have occupied the city this morning has informed the ayuntamiento that if within three hours, counted from the time this notice is posted, there is not an entire cessation of the acts of hostility now being committed with palpable imprudence and to the grave prejudice of the peaceable citizens, he will proceed with all rigor against the guilty, permitting their goods and property to be sacked and razing the block in which are situated the houses from which the american troops are fired upon." there is no evidence that the last threat was executed. in another =92=proclamation of the same day the people were called upon to "reciprocate the civilization" of the american army, and to leave national affairs to the nation. in a =92=third the people were told that scott had refused to give the pledges asked for by the ayuntamiento until the hostilities should cease. the action of the ayuntamiento brought upon president veramendi the most violent denunciations and menaces of santa anna. veramendi =92=replied that he "idolized" his country, and was only trying to avert the disasters to which it had been doomed by "the most well-proven rapine, the most lamentable demoralization of our people, and not by true patriotism or zeal to prevent the sacking of the churches" and other outrages. veramendi wrote finally that it would be a waste of time to continue the discussion; that the authorities would do their duty and accept the verdict of public opinion. the americans commonly believed that the convicts were released from the prison by santa anna with the expectation that their crimes would be charged to the americans; and on the other hand otero asserted that the americans released them to prey upon the people. his view was certainly erroneous; and the other, though not without support, may have been so. in the confusion the jailers perhaps left the prisoners unguarded or released them to save them from starving. some believed that the real purpose of the uprising was to plunder the houses of the city under cover of the disorder, and there is reason to think this motive existed. no doubt, too, some americans robbed the houses of innocent citizens from which they supposed, or pretended to suppose, that bullets had come (=221=hill, diary). as late as december an uprising was planned. scott had agents (including a member of congress and a governor) to give him information (sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 38). scott's general orders 289, sept. 18, for the distribution of the troops in the city show that all the principal sections were covered, and that a guard and two guns defended each of the principal gates. no private house was to be used for quarters till all suitable public buildings had been occupied, nor then without the owner's consent or an order from headquarters. officers were to be with or near their troops. 29.3. the chief documents. lieber, guerrillas, 19, 20. _diario_, apr. 28; may 2, 4, 10, 23, 1847. =80=address of méx. legislature, apr. 26. _republicano_, may 8. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 138 (marcy). _porvenir_, may 27. _picayune_, feb. 23; may 6; dec. 9. kenly, md. vol., 312. ramírez, méxico, 241, 244, 260. méxico á través, iv, 712. =256=marcy to kearny, dec. 10, 1846. =76=mora, apr. 23, 1847. =86=vera cruz congress, manifiesto, sept. 28. =76=soto, proclam., undated. =92=address of citizens, apr. 6. =61=salas, proclam., apr. 21. =76=s. anna, may 16. =76=relaciones to olaguíbel, aug. 16. =257=[hughes] to frank, nov. 11. =76=decrees, apr. 28; may 1. roa bárcena, rec., 250-5, 262. in spanish _guerrilla_ means a party, each member of which is a _guerrillero_. the value of the work done by the spanish guerillas was commonly much overrated by the mexicans. not only did the "patriotic" irregulars act atrociously in mexico during the revolution against spain, but those organized by the viceroy behaved so badly that he disbanded them (méxico á través, iii, 234). guerillas ("light corps of the national guard") were decreed by the mexican government on april 8, 1847. a citizen after obtaining authorization from the state or the national government, could raise a body of volunteers (not less than fifty), rank according to the number from lieutenant to colonel (800), and give his name to the corps. other corps were to be supported by the state or the central government. goods taken from the enemy were to be divided among the captors and could be sold without paying duty. august 16, 1847, the government ordered that the people within thirty leagues (about eighty miles) of every point occupied by the enemy should rise _en masse_, and attack them with "the arms each may have, fire-arms or cold steel, great or small, long or short--in a word, if there be nothing else, with sticks and stones" (=76=relaciones to olaguíbel). other guerilla leaders in vera cruz state were m. senobio (near the coast), the spanish priest j. a. martínez, juan aburto, f. mendoza and j. m. vázquez. t. marín had charge of the guerillas near córdoba. jarauta was ordered to bring together a number of small parties that were simply preying upon the people. in the autumn of 1847 he offered to join the americans, but gen. patterson, who arrived at jalapa just then, would make no arrangement with him (kenly, md. vol., 328-31; =257=[hughes] to frank, nov. 11). 29.4. =76=urrea, aug. 12, res. =76=canales to urrea, feb. 5; aug. 6; to alcalde of guerrero, apr. 4. =69=lamar to bliss, apr. 21. =245=canales to ----, apr. 4. apuntes, 387-8. _republicano_, june 11. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1138-42; 1197 (belknap). =256=f. j. parker to f. smith, apr. 1. _picayune_, feb. 23. smith, chile, 294, 298. =245=boyd to bee, apr. 4. =148=chamberlain, recolls. if a train moved in sections with troops between them its length was increased so much that more strength was believed to be lost than gained. the "roads" were usually narrow, especially in rough country. for urrea see chap. xx, p. 400. 29.5. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1138, 1142, 1180, 1211 (taylor). =61=wool to adj. gen., dec. 20, 1847; feb. 4; mar. 2; may 9, 1848; to hunter, dec. 14, 1847; to hamtramck, dec. 18; to lobo, july 25; to marcy, feb. 26, 1848; =65=orders, 11, dec. 17, 1847. =65=_id._, orders 66, feb. 26, 1848. =69=commrs. of n. león towns to taylor, apr. --, 1847. =61=mcdowell to butler, jan. 18, 1848. =348=pattridge to miss w., july 21, 1847. apuntes, 387. _republicano_, apr. 14, 1847. _niles_, may 8, 1847, p. 152. =212=hastings, diary. sen. 32; 31, 1 (hughes, mem., 43). =148=chamberlain, recolls. =76=aguirre, proclam., aug. 27, 1847. =76=canales to r. uribe, apr. 10. =76=urrea, may 27. =76=jefe político, saltillo, to ayunt., sept. 28; nov. 4. final action regarding the fine of $96,000 was made contingent on the conduct of the people (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1139). general mora, commanding at san luis potosí, thought he could take advantage of a small massacre perpetrated by americans to score a point, but taylor disposed of him summarily (_ibid._, pp. 1138-41). 29.6. _sun of anahuac_, aug. 25, 1847. apuntes, 385-7. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, 1847. =350=weber, recolls. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 579. wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 278, 281. _picayune_, oct. 15; dec. 19. kenly, md. vol., 323. oswandel, notes, 153, 166, 215. =76=mora, apr. 23, 1847. =76=rea, nov. 14. dublán, legislación, v, 284, 288. _diario_, may 2, 10; june 27 (s. anna, decree, june 26). =76=lombardini, may 27. =76=guerra, circular, june 26. 29.7. =61=wilson to adj. gen., aug. 21, 1847. (losses) ho. 24; 31, 1. =68=court of inquiry, puebla, july 17. =221=hill, diary, nov. 8. =69=hughes to capt. scott, jan. 8, 1848. grone, briefe, 33, 37, etc. =61=lally to wilson, aug. 11, 26. =61=briscoe, report, mar. 1, 1848. =65=scott, gen. orders 250, 1847; 45, 1848. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 579, 582. _delta_, oct. 1, 5, 1847. kenly, md. vol., 304-8, 318. apuntes, 386-7. =234=mcdaniel to johnson, jan. 28, 1848. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1068 (marshall); 1069 (miles); 1082 (scott). _niles_, sept. 18, 1847, p. 35; oct. 16, p. 103. =291=pierce, diary. =291=bonham to pierce, july 27. =61=cadwalader to wilson, june 13. =287=parrish, diary. =76=soto, june 10, 14; july 19. =76=mendoza to soto, june 16. =178=davis, diary. _diario_, june 23. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 482 (lally); 488 (sears); 489 (ridgely); 491-5; app., 4, 13, 16 (mcintosh); 18 (cadwalader); 21 (wynkoop); 23 (walker); 25 (pierce). roa bárcena, rec., 252, 254, 262. oswandel, notes, 381. june 6 mcintosh lost six killed, fifteen wounded. for mcintosh and pierce see chap. xxiv, pp. 76-7. mcintosh left vera cruz june 4 with 132 wagons, about 500 pack-mules, 170 dragoons, 100 dismounted dragoons and about 450 infantry. the wagon horses were weak mustangs; the mules unbroken and vicious; the teamsters mexicans, mostly new to the business. the wagons became too much separated. the dragoons acted imprudently. a court of inquiry exonerated mcintosh. the guerillas destroyed the fine bridge at plan del río in the hope of stopping cadwalader, who marched from vera cruz to reinforce mcintosh. lally had two companies of the fourth infantry, two of the fifth, one of the eleventh, three of the twelfth, one of the fifteenth, two of the voltigeurs and one of louisiana horse. the "missing" numbered twelve. he admitted that at the national bridge only his artillery gave him the victory. lally had been appointed from civil life, and, though military in appearance, did not understand his present business (grone, briefe, 46-8). hearing at perote that lally had been repulsed, colonel wynkoop with two companies of infantry and one of cavalry marched to jalapa in thirty-six hours. naturally the americans greatly overestimated the numbers of the guerillas they were fighting. in november, 1847, the guerillas operated so near vera cruz that the farmers would not bring milk and vegetables to the city unless escorted. january 3, 1848, lieut. col. miles left vergara with some 500 wagons and a large number of pack-mules. he had 1300 troops, but only 150 of them were cavalry. the train extended at least nine miles. in spite of unusual precautions 250-300 of the pack-mules were captured near santa fe. most of the goods thus lost belonged to mexican merchants. in february, 1848, a party under lieut. col. briscoe was attacked on its way to orizaba. a number of other encounters are mentioned by mexicans. 29.8. oswandel, notes, 156, 215-6, 365, 382. =13=giffard, nos. 19, may 30; 37, oct. 20, 1847. =13=doyle, no. 1, jan. 13, 1848. =61=hughes to [wilson], sept. 13. =65=scott, gen. orders 127, apr. 29; 372, dec. 12, 1847. brackett, lane's brigade, 174, 186, 194, 196. =128=_id._, diary. =12=pell to lambert, nov. 30. zirckel, tagebuch, 50, 53, 61-2. _correo nacional_, dec. 21. henshaw narrative. grone, briefe, 37-61. =61=twiggs to marcy, mar. 1, 1848. hitchcock, fifty years, 310. scott, mems., ii, 575. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 579, 582. =152=claiborne, mems. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 138 (marcy). _delta_, dec. 23. apuntes, 386. =62=adj. gen. to wilson, aug. 12. moore, scott's camp., 72. ramírez, méxico, 241-3, 260. _fraser's mag._, xxxviii, 91-6. =76=j. g. terán, may 17. stevens, stevens, i, 134. vera cruz _eagle_, may 29. =61=wilson to adj. gen., june 7. =159=collins papers. polk, diary, july 16. =76=soto, july 23; aug. 11. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 60-1. _flag of freedom_, i, no. 4. =305=richardson, recolls. it was a common practice of these guerillas to mutilate wounded americans. the lasso was one of their weapons. their rule was to take no prisoners. after scott had to abandon his communications with vera cruz, the government felt extremely anxious to have the line re-opened and kept open. august 12, 1847, the commander at vera cruz was assured that this was "of the first importance," and troops were sent to him expressly for the purpose. the volunteers in general, personally brave and enterprising, did good service against the guerillas (stevens, stevens, i, 134); but as the latter almost always had horses, there was a particular need of cavalry on our side. about the first of july, 1847, the governors of illinois and georgia were called upon for two and five companies respectively of mounted men to help keep this line open. polk himself selected hays's regiment (diary, july 16). walker, though stern with the guerillas, would not permit his men to pillage. rebolledo was betrayed, and was taken by mexican counter-guerillas in november, 1847; but he was defended by an american named kennedy, who resided at jalapa, and was merely imprisoned. jarauta was shot in july, 1848, for revolutionary activities. marcy wrote to scott that the guerilla system was "hardly recognized as a legitimate mode of warfare, and should be met with the utmost allowable severity" (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 138), and ordered him to destroy the rendezvous of the guerillas. the guerillas failed completely to affect the general course of the war, as they were expected to do, but even as late as march, 1848, the road from vera cruz to jalapa was safe for large parties only. hays's rangers seemed to aim to dress as outlandishly as possible, and with their huge beards looked almost like savages. the officers were like the men in looks and costume. the horses were of all sizes and colors. for arms each had a rifle, a pair of pistols and one or two colt's five-shooters (hitchcock, fifty years, 310; brackett, lane's brigade, 174). hays's usual order for attack was to point at the enemy and shout, "give 'em hell!" (zirckel, tagebuch, 11). 29.9. =128=brackett, diary. tributo á la verdad, 58. grone, briefe, 33. =61=childs, jan. 13, 1848. (hostilities) =47=perry, nov. 2, 1847. =76=mendoza to soto, june 16, 1847. =47=private letter (mexican), orizaba, [sept., 1847]. =307=roberts, diary. _porvenir_, may 27. _picayune_, may 6. =76=acuerdo, july 30. =76=mora, apr. 23, 1847. =76=relaciones to guerra, aug. 26. =76=soto, sept. 12. =86=llorea to soto, june 12. =76=marín to soto, sept. 22, 25. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, 1847. _diario_, june 11. =214=hays and caperton, hays. =257=[hughes] to frank, dec. 16. méxico á través, iv, 662. 29.10. =128=brackett, diary. =80=méx. legislature, address, apr. 26, 1847; decree, may 31. =61=childs, jan. 13, 1848. _flag of freedom_, i, no. 3. gamboa, impug., 66. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 53, 215. apuntes, 386. _nacional_, dec. 18. s. anna, apelación, 29. =82=puebla state treas. to secy., may 10. and from =76= the following. bravo, may 22, 1847. guerra, circular, may 4. lists of guerilla patents issued. gov. oaxaca, proclam., jan. 25, 1848. peña y barragán, nov. 24, 1847. to torrejón, dec. 28. rea to peña y barragán, nov. 26; to guerra, nov. 14. rules of rea's officers. alvarez, june 16. rea said he had commanded regulars. he treated some captured americans with much civility. 29.11. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 385 (scott); 471 (childs); app., 33 (gwynn); 34 (morehead). =13=thornton, no. 5, oct. 29, 1847. _national_, nov. 14. brackett, lane's brigade, 113, 117, 131. =356=whitcomb, diary. zirckel, tagebuch, 102. =95=puebla ayunt., proceedings, aug. 31. =65=scott, gen. orders 246, aug. 5. =66=j. l. smith to h. l. scott, july 13. scott, mems., ii, 550. _flag of freedom_, i, nos. 1, 5. kitchen, record, 63-9. lawton, artill. off., 278. =270=moore, diary. oswandel, notes, 248, 254, 259, 265, 268, 293. s. anna, mi historia, 85. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 313. s. anna, apelación, 60. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 202, 206. méxico á través, iv, 699. =76=comte. gen. puebla, sept. 18. =76=relaciones to guerra, dec. 11. moore, scott's camp., 116, 214-6. =73=lozano, no. 9, 1847. =82=puebla congress, decree, aug. 12. ramsey, other side, 394-5. smith, to mexico, 171. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 517. s. anna, detall, 33, 35. the cavalry were under capt. ford, the artillery under capts. kendrick and miller, and the infantry (six companies) under lieut. col. black (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 471). capt. rowe, ninth infantry, commanded a hospital that was persistently attacked. a considerable number of the sick were able to do light duty. some civilian employees helped. childs had authority from scott to organize the convalescents into companies and battalions (=65=scott, gen. orders 246). scott spoke of the garrison as "competent" (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 303), and no doubt it was as nearly equal to the dangers that appeared to threaten it as was the army that advanced from puebla. but the garrison was weaker than scott had intended it to be, for many convalescents had represented themselves as well. four pennsylvania companies, ford's company and miller's company held s. josé, which was a poor building for the purpose and badly placed. guadalupe was occupied as a protection to loreto. guerillas entered puebla aug. 12. childs at once gave notice to the prefect that, should the people attempt to overpower the garrison, "the city would probably suffer" from his artillery (=69=aug. 12). the first attack upon the americans gave the guerillas about 700 mules and some other property. the next day some fifty armed teamsters and others went against the guerillas, and only fifteen of them returned. the authorities of the city were disgusted with the operations of the guerillas. about the first of september, by order of the state congress, the national guards moved to help recover the city from the americans, but the orders given them seemed to show little determination to coöperate with rea or fight in earnest, and hence many became disheartened and deserted (=82=ochoterena). typhoid fever broke out among the american sick and carried off many (moore, scott's camps., 218). news of the capture of mexico was brought in by a courier disguised as a lépero. s. cristóbal was on the road from mexico to puebla _via_ apam, which santa anna chose to take. alvarez went _via_ s. martin. 29.12. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 471 (childs); app., 28 (black); 34 (morehead). ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1029 (s. anna); 1030 (childs). ramsey, other side, 396. brackett, lane's brigade, 113, 117. moore, scott's camp., 218, 223-4. rodríguez, breve reseña, 1848. =95=puebla prefect to ayunt., sept. 17. =95=rea to prefect, sept. 23. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 314. _flag of freedom_, i, nos. 1, 5. =270=moore, diary. =76=s. anna to guerra, sept. 23, 30. gamboa, impug., 60. s. anna, detall, 35-6. 29.13. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 460; iv, app., 295. hitchcock, fifty years, 347. _flag of freedom_, i, no. 3. lawton, artill. officer, 324. brackett, lane's brigade, 71, 80, 101. =152=claiborne, mems. =76=isunza to relaciones, oct. 12. =76=s. anna, sept. 30; oct. 4. méxico á través, iv, 699. =82=j. a. ochotorena, oct. --. =82=s. anna to gov. puebla, oct. 6. =82=p. m. herrera to puebla sec. state, oct. 7. =82=_id._, diary. zirckel, tagebuch, 50, 53, 61-2. =61=taylor, order, aug. 16. apuntes, 347-8. =321=smith, diary. =327=sutherland to father, undated. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 477 (lane). ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1030 (lane); 1198 (taylor). =246=lane, autobiog. rosa, impresiones. semmes, service, 234. hartman, journal, 14-5. smith, to mexico, 161. s. anna, detall, 36. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 519. from perote, hearing that large mexican forces were in his front, lane took four companies of the first pennsylvania, walker's company of mounted riflemen, some convalescents and three guns under taylor (third artillery). wynkoop of the first pennsylvania commanded these men. before long they returned to perote. santa anna reported that he took from puebla 3500 men. his worst trouble was with his puebla national guards, who thought the expedition was a treasonable scheme of his to get them away from puebla. on finding his command melting away, he sent all but about 1000 cavalry back to puebla under alvarez. from puebla alvarez retired to atlixco and thence to the south. later he took possession of cuernavaca in the state of méxico. 29.14. _the huamantla affair._ ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1031 (lane). sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 477 (lane). apuntes, 348. perry, indiana, 234. ("peg-leg") =166=pommarès to conner, aug. 4, 1846. norton, life, 154, 157. brackett, lane's brigade, 88-94. =129=_id._, diary. zirckel, tagebuch, 96-8, 155. _flag of freedom_, oct. 23; 24, extra; 27. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 460-3; iv, app., 315-6. _correo nacional_, mar. 30, 1848. s. anna, apelación, 65. =222=hiney, diary. grone, briefe, 65-7. =152=claiborne, mems. gamboa, impug., 61. =147=chamberlain, diary. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 519. s. anna, detall, 37. besides losing walker, lane had 23 men wounded (ho. 24; 31, 1). lane was born in 1814. for a time he was a trader at lawrenceburg, indiana; and then he studied law in the manner of that time and region. he was not a man of much education. he meant thoroughly well in a rough way, but was rather careless about discipline. his men realized that he did not look out for their comfort or husband their strength, but admired his courage, energy and shrewd planning so much that they forgave him. he was called the marion of the war. to guard his baggage, etc., lane left at the hacienda the fourth ohio (col. brough), three regular companies under capt. simmons, and lieut. pratt (second art.) with two guns. walker had his own company of mounted riflemen, two companies of louisiana cavalry, and one company of georgia cavalry (brackett, lane's brig., 89). lane had, in the following order, the fourth indiana (col. gorman), four pennsylvania companies (col. wynkoop), five guns (capt. taylor), a battalion of the ninth infantry (maj. lally) and six companies of regulars (capt. heintzelman). santa anna, hearing that a few americans were on their way to huamantla, sent a party of puebla mounted police to protect the town. evidently this was the party that walker saw approaching it. much was written about this fight. it was said that walker was ordered not to advance beyond supporting distance; that he was authorized to act according to circumstances; that he dashed ahead because he received word that the mexican guns were being taken away, etc.; but lane reported that he ordered walker to move ahead ("within supporting distance") and, should the mexicans be found in force, to wait for the infantry (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 477). he reached the town about forty-five minutes before the infantry did. santa anna was repulsed by the fourth indiana. in spite of lane, much plundering was done by the victors, in whose defence it was urged that citizens fired from the houses. though walker captured two guns, he had no priming tubes, and therefore could make little, if any, use of them. lane's loss was about twenty-five killed and wounded. santa anna reported two killed, seven wounded, and a number missing, but his loss was estimated by americans at 100. 29.15. brackett, lane's brigade, 108. =356=whitcomb, diary. perry, indiana, 253. zirckel, tagebuch, 103. =76=scott to childs, sept. 16. negrete invasión, iii, app., 460. hitchcock, fifty years, 347. _flag of freedom_, i, no. 5. oswandel, notes, 339-41. =76=alvarez, oct. 13. =76=rea to alvarez, oct. 13. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 471 (childs); 476 (lane). ("rough paw") =335=trist to wife, mar. 14, 1848. santa anna overtook lane at el pinal, but admitted that the americans marched so cautiously that he could accomplish nothing. the loss of the garrison, sept. 13 to oct. 12, was fifteen killed, thirty-seven wounded (ho. 24; 31, 1). the loss of the mexicans was estimated by americans at 300-500. 29.16. diccionario universal (_atlixco_). méxico á través, iv, 662, 702. calderón, life, ii, 93. zirckel, tagebuch, 112. =76=g. rodríguez, oct. 14. =76=rea, oct. 24. =356=whitcomb, diary. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 479 (lane). 29.17. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 479 (lane). ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 75-6 (marcy, report). grone, briefe, 69. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 522-3. brackett, lane's brigade, 146, 149-51, 164. zirckel, tagebuch, 110-3. _flag of freedom_, i, nos. 1, 3. =76=alvarez, dec. 14. =76=rea, oct. 24, 1847; feb. 10, 1848. =76=memo. to head of plana mayor, feb. 19, 1848. =61=dumont to lane, nov. 15. =307=roberts to iowa state hist. soc., dec. 14, 1863. lane had the fourth ohio, fourth indiana, lally's and heintzelman's battalions, wynkoop's four pennsylvania companies, taylor's (3) and pratt's (2) guns, and a squadron of the third dragoons (capt. ford) on the atlixco expedition. when he entered the town the city authorities met him, surrendered, and asked protection. lane had one killed and one wounded; the mexicans admitted a loss of 219 killed and 300 wounded. on his way back to puebla lane turned off with 450 men to guexocingo to capture two guns just made there. they had been removed, but he destroyed the carriages (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 481). october 29-30 an expedition from puebla visited tlaxcala (=356=whitcomb, diary). november 9-10 at night lane with a force of dragoons went over this road again, and recovered twenty-one loaded wagons that had been captured by guerillas, besides seven that they had set afire as he approached. thirteen mexican officers and many horses and cattle were taken. this time he had about 100 cavalry, 200 indiana and 200 ohio men. he returned to puebla in the night of nov. 12-13 without having lost a man. in the evening of nov. 22 he left puebla for izucar de matamoros with about 200 mounted men. in the morning he surprised (=76=arenal to rea, nov. 26) a body of mexican irregulars, causing considerable loss, captured three cannon (=76=peña y barragán, nov. 28) and much ammunition, and rescued a number of american prisoners. on his return, nov. 24-5, he was attacked by rea, but again triumphed (ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 87). one or two americans were killed and several wounded. if rea's report can be believed, the americans greatly exaggerated, as was natural, his numbers and losses (=76=to peña y b., nov. 26). in january, 1848, lane with four companies of texas rangers, two of the third dragoons and one of mounted riflemen was sent from mexico to clear the roads of guerillas (ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 75). in the course of his rapid march he almost succeeded in capturing santa anna, then residing at tehuacán. he finally proceeded to orizaba and córdoba, captured public property, recovered stolen merchandise, and released american prisoners (ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 89-95). february 17 he set out from mexico with 250 rangers and 130 of the third dragoons against the guerillas north and northeast of the capital (_ibid._, p. 76). february 25 he captured the town of sequalteplán after a stiff skirmish, killing a considerable number and taking some fifty prisoners. it was said that jarauta led the guerillas here. for lane's operations subsequent to the atlixco expedition: brackett, lane's brigade, 168, 174, 192, 205, 234-45. whitcomb, diary. zirckel, tagebuch, 122-3. =61=dumont to lane, nov. 15. =76=s. anna, feb. 1, 1848. _id._, apelación, 65. _amer. home journal_, aug., 1906. _flag of freedom_, i, no. 1. t. f. davis, diary. claiborne, memoirs. =76=puebla comte. gen., nov. 28. =76=rea to peña y barragán, nov. 26. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 75-6 (marcy, report), 86-103. mention should also be made of capt. ruff, who on july 30, 1847, with eighty-two mounted riflemen attacked about 300 mexicans (guerillas and infantry) entrenched in houses and a church at s. juan near ojo de agua. with a loss of one man wounded, he killed or wounded about seventy to ninety of the enemy, it was believed (=69=porter to mrs. p., july 31; sen. 1; 30, 1, app., 25-6 (smith); smith, to mexico, 187). 29.18. (destruction, etc.) sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 205-6 (trist); exposición dirigida. =52=trist, no. 16, confid., sept. 27, 1847. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 130-2, 134-6, 155-65, 421-6. =13=bankhead, no. 86, sept. 28. pacheco, exposición. colección de documentos, 4. s. anna, contestación al oficio. méxico á través, iv, 700. =76=rosa to herrera, sept. 29. =76=m. ocampo to herrera, sept. 24. =80=méx. legislature, decree, sept. 18. rivera, jalapa, iv, 74. real or at least additional reasons for the decree of sept. 16 were probably that santa anna intended to leave the country or desired to let it try to get on without him. rives (u. s. and mexico, ii, 584) denies that peña was timid: but (1) bankhead and trist so described him; and (2) his conduct in the negotiations with slidell and with trist confirms their opinion. in the latter case all the strength of his entourage was required to make him face the situation. 29.19. =76=rosa to herrera, sept. 29. méxico á través, iv, 700. gamboa, impug., 65. =52=trist, nos. 16, confid., sept. 27; 17, confid., oct. 1; 18, oct. 25. =52=_id._ to hetty parker, sept. 28. colección de documentos, 110. =80=méxico legislature, decree, sept. 23. =80=_id._, comtee. on constit. points, report, sept. 18. =80=olaguíbel to méx. legisl., sept. 25. =80=michoacán legislature, decree, sept. 24. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 566. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 155-61. (toluca) _revue de paris_, dec., 1844; encarnacion prisoners, 75. =73=lozano, no. 9, 1847. peña admitted that it was impossible to fulfil the constitutional requirements, but said it was a public duty to establish a government as near them as was practicable (colec. de docs., 110). the legislature of méxico state denounced peña as representing the peace element, and refused to recognize any federal authority except the lagos coalition; but its decree was not favorably received by the public, and olaguíbel would not promulgate it. 29.20. =75=circular del ... peña ... á los gobernadores, sept. 27. =75=circulares del min. de relac., sept. 27. =75=peña, manifesto, oct. 13. =75=rosa to prest. of congress, oct. 14. =52=trist, no. 16, confid., sept. 27. communicaciones habidas. _correo nacional_, oct. 18. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 176, 408-11, 421-6, 469-83. s. anna, mi historia, 90. =6=anderson papers. =76=peña, circular, nov. 16. =6=s. anna to j. m. guerra, oct. 25. _id._, contestación al oficio. _id._, comunicación oficial. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 385 (scott). =75=s. anna to congress, nov. 1. scott assisted peña by giving safe-conducts to several members of congress (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 385). santa anna took the ground that he was still legally responsible for the government of the country, and therefore must be allowed to exercise the powers of a president. nov. 1 he made this demand formally (negrete, invasión, iii, app., 469). he also tried to create trouble for the new government by proclaiming that his removal from the command of the army was intended to cause his personal destruction or to pave the way for a disgraceful peace. he further said he could not be placed on trial until congress should declare there were grounds for trying him. but he found he had no prestige left. rosa said to santa anna that his resignation of the presidency had been consummated by actually giving up the executive power, and that, in view of public opinion, it would be impossible to prove peña's impartiality and maintain discipline in the army, unless the conduct of the general defeated at cerro gordo and in the later battles were officially inquired into (_ibid._, 421). in reply to another letter from santa anna he said (nov. 11) that peña would not discuss the resignation further, that his authority had been recognized by all the states and by congress, and that congress admitted no right on santa anna's part to resume the presidency. in january, 1848, rosa issued a circular reproaching santa anna for his past political conduct. 29.21. =76=m. ocampo, nov. 27. =76=comte. gen. oaxaca, mar. 16, 1848. =76=guerra to relaciones, feb. 14. =76=gov. oaxaca to relaciones, dec. 27, 1847. =76=milit. comte. orizaba, jan. 20, 1848. méxico á través, iv, 699-700. kenly, md. vol., 391-7. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 205-6. =76=s. anna to reyes, oct. 16, 1847. _correo nacional_, oct. 26, 1847; apr. 4, 1848. =76=j. m. miñón to guerra, oct. 20. comunicaciones habidas. =47=perry, nov. 3. _eco del comercio_, apr. 6, 1848. rivera, jalapa, iii, 927; iv, 8-9. _monitor repub._, nov. 10, 1847. =179=diario esactísimo, sept. 15. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 519-21, 532. =69=thomas to twiggs, mar. 6, 1848. =69=seymour to hughes, mar. 27. =69=---to adj. gen. of the amer. army, mar. 29. =69=hughes, safeguard to s. anna, family and attendants, mar. 17. =69=hughes to twiggs, mar. 15. s. anna, detall, 37. =13=doyle, nos. 29, 38, 1848. santa anna's military reports had excited resentment because he had been liberal with censures, particularly to relieve himself of blame. santa anna was ordered to turn the command over to rincón or (temporarily) alvarez. but he said that he did not know where rincón was, and that on account of the position of the americans he could not safely send his artillery to alvarez. reyes marched north. santa anna then chose tehuacán for a place of residence instead of going nearer guatemala, because he still had hopes of regaining power through intrigue or revolution. his presence was not desired there by the people, presumably because it endangered them. they made it difficult for him to stay; and his friends, whose opinions he asked, now felt that his remaining in the country would injure them. see also chap. xxxii, p. 242. he sailed from la antigua on or about april 4 in a spanish brig for venezuela, it was understood, after expressing warm appreciation of the treatment received at this time from the americans (=69=to gutiérrez, mar. 11, 1848). some thought he had increased his wealth since his return to mexico. 29.22. chief documents used. s. anna, apelación, app., 138-9. _id._ comunicación oficial. suárez y navarro, causas, 70-2. méxico á través, iv, 700-1. dublán, legislación, v, 300-4, 307-14, 333-5. apuntes, 339-40. curtis, buchanan, i, 590. negrete, invasión, iv, app., 399. =335=thornton to trist, dec. 5. =75=anaya at meeting of govs., nov. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 572. and from =76= the following. director gen. of artill., dec. --, 1847. suárez y navarro, nov. 9. j. de d. peza, nov. 29. sección de operaciones, nov. --. j. m. márquez to mora, nov. 29. rincón, jan. 8, 1848. olaguíbel, oct. 29; dec. 24, 1847. _id._ to alvarez, oct. 23, 26. bustamante, oct. 2. memorias of the chiefs of sections, nov. --. to plana mayor and to filisola, nov. 19. orders for reorganizing the army, dec. 1, 20. min. of war, memoria, nov. 19. diario, división del oriente, sept. 29-oct. 15. rosa to herrera, sept. 29. comte. gen. querétaro, sept. 16. to bustamante, oct. 30; dec. 30. quijano, jan. 27, 1848. gen. staff, memo., dec. 31, 1847. filisola, dec. 27. alcorta (plana mayor), dec. 27. gen. in chief of infantry, oct. 14. rosa, nov. 2. alvarez, oct. 20, 28; nov. 19. to alvarez, oct. 28, 31. alvarez to olaguíbel, oct. 21. to rea, nov. 1. to olaguíbel, oct. 23. valencia, jan. 4, 1848. nov. 19 a detailed statement of the available forces gave the figures as 6785 scattered over twelve states. the largest body (2683) was at querétaro. oct. 14 the army of the east had only one 16-pounder, one 12-pounder, one 6-pounder, three 5-3/4-pounders, one 4-pounder and two 24-pound howitzers. it was pointed out that even if men could be raised, they would be of the poorest sort, and long before an efficient army could be created, the americans might be expected to attack them. herrera probably had about 4000 men when he left mexico, but he could not prevent wholesale desertion on the way to querétaro. (gamboa asserted that herrera took only 2-3000 infantry from mexico, but his statements are not always to be relied upon.) jan. 2, 1848, valencia was captured by the americans. filisola and alcorta agreed substantially in recommending an elastic, evasive plan of campaign: bodies of, say, 2000 men to be stationed at strategic positions; the one attacked to fall back upon the next; these to fight or join the third, as might seem best; those not otherwise engaged, to strike for the american rear; and thus a campaign of movements, in which the mexicans would have the advantages of mobility, of knowing the country, and of having the coöperation of the people, would be pursued in order to wear out the americans. but the means of carrying out this system were lacking. in october the government planned to have three sizable armies; but by the end of december it limited its ambition to having two small brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, each headed by a colonel. 29.23. chief documents. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 60-2. =108=bancroft to polk, dec. 3, 1846. =256=barnard to totten, oct. 11, 1847. =66=_id._ to _id._, dec. 15, 1847 (taylor) =169=peyton to crittenden, jan. 25, 1848; =169=taylor to crittenden, nov. 15, 1847. =354=welles papers. davis, autobiog., 257-8. wash. _union_, jan. 7, 1848, n. y. _sun_, may 17, 1847. _niles_, oct. 23, 1847, p. 114. schouler, hist. briefs, 155. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 60-2 (marcy, report). calhoun corres., 718 (to clemson). _public ledger_, jan. 4, 1848. =169=rives to crittenden, feb. 8, 1847. richardson, messages, iv, 542-4. =13=crampton to palmerston, nos. 71, 1847; 5, 1848. claiborne, quitman, ii, 7. polk, diary, oct. 30, 1847. =61=scott, sept. 18. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 138-40, 211. =256=totten to marcy, nov. 23, 21. =256=trist to buchanan, sept. 28. _picayune_, dec. 15. see chap. xxxii, p. 235. sept. 17, at a gathering of generals, one of the best proposed retiring at once to vera cruz. for the defensive plan see chap. xviii, p. 348. general butler (calhoun, corres., 1146) and apparently daniel webster (boston _courier_, feb. 20, 23, 1847) favored this plan. had it been adopted we should in all probability have been forced sooner or later to resume active operations after having given up the results of much fighting. it seemed hardly possible that a majority in congress would soon be able to agree upon a policy, and it looked as if injurious debates on the subject might occur. marcy particularly advised scott to prevent the formation of a new mexican army, but authorized him to use his own judgment as to military operations. they were not, however, to be modified in consequence of mexican peace proposals (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140). for the difficult situation of the united states see the first paragraphs of chap. xxxii. 29.24. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1031, 1033, 1036, 1039, 1047-50, 1067 (scott); 1006-9 (marcy); 1060, 1260 (jesup). sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98 (h. l. scott). =364=worth to s., dec. 27, 1847. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 140-4. =76=comte. gen. mexico, jan. 10, 1848. =61=scott to twiggs, dec. 26, 1847. =65=_id._, gen. orders 376, 389 of 1847; 7 of 1848. =356=whitcomb, diary. =12=pell of sloop _daring_ to lambert, nov. 30, 1847. =66=lee to totten, jan. 1; feb. 1, 1848. hitchcock, fifty years, 310-1. =178=davis, diary. _picayune_, feb. 27. in june and august, 1847, the first and second illinois regiments (12-months men) were replaced with "for the war" regiments bearing the same names. as we have seen (note 29.8) illinois and georgia were called upon about the first of july for mounted companies. june 23 louisiana was asked to furnish two mounted, acclimated companies to clear guerillas from near vera cruz. july 16 a pennsylvania foot regiment, organized some time earlier at carlisle, was accepted. july 16 a proposed battalion of mississippi riflemen was accepted as infantry. july 19 an illinois horse company and a delaware infantry company were accepted. july 24 a maryland artillery company was authorized, and missouri was requested to furnish an artillery company, two infantry companies and two mounted companies. august 17 polk found that 6000 of the 50,000 volunteers authorized by the war bill had not been called out, and that the cabinet were in favor of calling more of them (diary). that day ohio was asked for an infantry regiment. august 21 an infantry company, tendered by w. j. corcoran of washington, d. c., was accepted. august 26 tennessee and kentucky were called upon for two infantry regiments each, and an indiana regiment was accepted. sept. 6 a north carolina company was accepted on the condition that it should be ready for muster by oct. 10. sept. 7, owing to the delay of the carlisle company, a pittsburgh, pa., company was accepted in lieu of it. sept. 8 two ohio companies were asked for. sept. 27 marcy stated that nearly or quite all of the 50,000 volunteers had been accepted (_niles_, oct. 30, p. 144). oct. 8 another tennessee regiment (ten extra companies were ready) and a michigan regiment were called for. aug. 23 only one of the five mississippi companies was ready. the government explained that men did not wish to serve on foot. the battalion was completed near the end of december (rowland, register, 416). alabama and virginia also were backward at this time. the act of march 3, authorizing individual enlistments of volunteers, provided no means for its execution, no bounty and no clothing, and volunteers received less pay than the regulars (=62=adj. gen. to hamtramck, feb. 28, 1848). naturally men did not care to leave home singly and be kept at dépôts for perhaps weeks, waiting for enough to be collected to be sent on. in aug. and sept. the transportation of troops was embarrassed by a serious epidemic of yellow fever at new orleans. transportation difficulties at vera cruz caused delays later. nov. 30, 1847, the authorized regulars were 1336 commissioned officers (eleven generals, thirty-five in general staff, 115 medical men, thirty-one in pay department, forty-three engineers, thirty-six topographical engineers, thirty-six ordnance officers, 118 officers in three dragoon regiments, thirty-five in mounted riflemen, 208 in four artillery regiments, 648 in sixteen infantry regiments, forty-seven in one regiment of voltigeurs and foot riflemen) and 28,960 enlisted men (3408 dragoons, 1146 mounted riflemen, 5492 artillery, 17,664 infantry, 1104 voltigeurs and foot riflemen, 100 engineer soldiers, forty-six ordnance sergeants, seventeen military storekeepers); but according to the returns (not all recent) the enlisted men numbered not more than 20,333 (adj. gen.'s report in sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 72). of 12-months volunteers there were (mounted) one regiment of seven companies, one battalion and four independent companies, and two companies of infantry: aggregate, eighty-two officers, 2037 non-commissioned men and privates. of volunteers "for the war" there were theoretically seven generals; 125 staff officers (including quartermaster's, commissary's and medical departments, and twelve (additional) in the pay department); of horse one regiment, two battalions, twenty-two independent companies (total, 184 officers, 4871 others); of foot artillery three companies (twelve and 342 respectively); of infantry twenty-two regiments, five battalions, eight independent companies (1159 and 27,603 respectively): aggregates, 1355 and 32,816 respectively. the number still on the rolls (nov. 30) "for the war" was not supposed to exceed 20,286. this number was believed by the adjutant general to be "much beyond" the number of effectives. there were supposed to be in the field 19,818 regulars and (aside from 803 on california service) 21,124 volunteers (officers and men); _en route_ 1691 regulars, 100 volunteers: total (_including_ the california men), 43,536. scott's army (regulars) was figured as 15,071 in the field, 1396 _en route_, 555 at vera cruz, 79 at tampico; (volunteers) in the field and at tampico, 14,955. his operating army, including the sick and the disabled, was estimated as about 30,209. wool's army was figured as (regulars) 3,642 in the field, 295 _en route_ and (volunteers) 2790: total, 6727. price was believed to have 255 regulars (dragoons), 2902 volunteers; and mason (california) 216 regulars (one company of dragoons and one company of artillery), 803 volunteers (adj. gen.'s report, sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 72). all the figures were approximate and there were discrepancies in the reckoning. nov. 20 the adjutant general stated the regulars sent to scott as reinforcements thus: of the old establishment (absent companies, reorganized companies and recruits), 5564; new establishment (troops raised and organized after march 4, 1847), five companies of third dragoons, the ninth, eleventh, twelfth (nine companies), fourteenth and fifteenth infantry, the voltigeurs, and recruits for the same, 6345 (=62=to scott); and also six companies (360) of marines under lieut. colonel watson. scott's returns were infrequent or were lost on the way. perhaps he dared not run the risk of exposing them to guerillas. hence as a rule one must accept general statements. quitman's division, being now very small, was broken up, and he was permitted to report at washington for a new command (claiborne, quitman, i, 395). as a rule no officer was permitted to leave the army except "with a view to the good of the service or the recovery of health" (=61=scott to patterson, oct. 28, 1847). oct. 22 even leaves of absence that had been granted or promised were cancelled. the government ordered the reinforcements to leave vera cruz promptly, and bankhead was put in the place of wilson there in order to obtain more efficient management (=62=adj. gen. to scott, nov. 9). after about the middle of october the troops at mexico were thoroughly drilled, and by the middle of november came to be better disciplined than ever before. april 29, 1847, although the 12-months army was about to disband, marcy requested patterson and butler to remain in the service as major generals, and marshall, lane and shields to remain as brigadier generals. marshall arrived at mexico city january 21, 1848. it is not possible to state how many troops came with each of the officers. col. hays brought five companies of rangers. lt. col. johnston had about 1300 men when at puebla. in general about half of a command fell out from sickness and other causes between vera cruz and mexico (=125=bonham to mother, dec. 7, 1847). fruits, liquor, insufficient clothing and at this time the measles were the chief causes of sickness. scott's announcement (=65=gen. orders 376) was dated dec. 15. jan. 6 scott had 14,964, of whom 11,162 were effectives (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1061). by feb. 13 his rank and file amounted to 26,910, and 2000 recruits were _en route_ (=62=adj. gen. to cass, mar. 9, 1848). though 5546 of the rank and file and 181 officers were then sick, he had been for some time strong enough to occupy zacatecas and san luis potosí, but the peace negotiations (chap. xxxii) affected his plans. the new posts were at río frio (between mexico and puebla), and the national bridge and san juan (between jalapa and vera cruz). early in march, 1848, a post was established at ojo de agua between puebla and perote. the purpose of the posts was to defend the line against the guerillas and furnish escorts for trains, couriers, etc. jalapa and puebla were held somewhat strongly. at the former there were on january 8, 1848, three infantry companies and a rifle company from the district of columbia, two infantry companies, a rifle company and a battery (six guns) from baltimore, four new jersey infantry companies, a pennsylvania infantry company and a mounted company. sickness and other causes reduced the effectives, however, to 556 (=69=hughes to h. l. scott, jan. 8, 1848). puebla was held, feb. 22, by some 2500 men: the fourth indiana, fourth ohio, fourth artillery, fifth ohio (five companies), second artillery (two companies), and two florida companies (perry, indiana, 287). pachuca was occupied dec. 29 by the ninth infantry (=178=davis, diary). cadwalader marched for toluca jan. 6 (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1062). jan. 29 col. clarke set out for cuernavaca with a brigade (=66=lee to totten, feb. 1). his approach compelled alvarez to break up the small force he had been holding at that point and hastily retire. ripley (war with mexico, ii, 524) says that scott neglected "the proper military measures of occupation" in order to favor peace negotiations contrary to the "policy" of his government; but the most fundamental policy of that government was to bring about a satisfactory peace; scott had not sufficient forces to carry out a military occupation of the country until late in december; and by that time peace was within reach. 29.25. twiggs to h. l. scott, jan. 16, 1848; to adj. gen., jan. 17; to bankhead, feb. 3. =69=_id._ to marcy, feb. 19. =61=scott to twiggs, dec. 26, 1847. =61=hughes to [wilson], sept. 13, 1847. brackett, lane's brigade, 241-2. _free american_, jan. 14, 1848. =152=claiborne, mems. velasco, geografía, iii, 176. leclercq, voyage, 386. moreno, cantón, 380. =88=córdoba ayunt., proceedings, feb. 16. _picayune_, feb. 27. there was a convenient road from orizaba to paso de ovejas on the national highway about thirty miles from vera cruz. the recently captured goods had been in charge of lieut. col. miles (note 29.7). bankhead arrived at córdoba feb. 13 and left for orizaba feb. 17. the michigan volunteers remained there. other reasons for this expedition will be mentioned in chap. xxxiii. 29.26. remarks of gov. j. d. porter of tenn. to the author (vanity, ignorance of war). ill. state hist. soc. trans., 1906, p. 178 (unfit to serve as corporal). =180=pillow to wife, dec. 8, 1846 (_re_ taylor). sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 252 (trist's opinion). =307=b. s. roberts, diary, nov. 26, 1847 ("ass by nature"). =335=trist, notes for letter to ho. of repres. ("lie"; lack of probity; scott's confidence, etc.). =252=mackall, sept. 18, 1847 (no vainer peacock or greater ass; gave no aid in the final battles). =292=pillow to wife, dec. 12, 1847 (eye to presidency). =335=paper prepared by trist (_re_ polk's brother). =277=pillow to maj.-(beautifully illustrates "wriggling"). scott, mems., ii, 416. lawton, artill. officer, 338 (vanity). =297=pillow to polk, may 30, 1844 ("fatal blow"). m'sherry puchero, 179 (not considered a general). chap. xxiii, note 23.29 (generalship). (recommendations) =180=pillow to wife, dec. 8, 1846. (confidence) =335=trist, notes, _supra_. pillow's letters generally. for uncomplimentary opinions regarding pillow see chap. xxvi, note 26.8. it should be remembered, however, that later he became a political issue in tennessee, and many things said of him then were colored by partisanship; also that the prejudice of many regulars in reference to the volunteers may have counted. 29.27. (after monterey) =364=w. to s., oct. 2, 1846. (ambition) scott, mems., ii, 416. (restive) lawton, artill. officer, 276. (affection) grant, mems., i, 151; =335=trist, notes for letter to ho., _supra_ (pillow: scott's fatherly affection for worth will always get the better of any resentment); lawton, _ibid._ (rejected) =364=w. to --, mar. 3, 1848. (friend) =183=drum, recolls.; =224=hitchcock, diary, apr. 14, 1846. (ounce) =364=worth to daughter, june 10, 1846. 29.28. (told) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1226 (scott). (brother officer) =183=drum, recolls. (his name was lieut. col. black of pa.). (root) =183=drum, recolls.; davis, autobiog., 286. n. y. _sun_, aug. 14, 1847. (favorably) _picayune_, jan. 17, 1848 (the plan ripening fast); =149=eells to chase, feb. 24, 1848 (w. may be the dem. nominee); =185=pillow to duncan, june 4, 1849 (w. had a good chance of nomination); =182=bowdon to w., mar. 18, 1848, strictly confid. (clashes, conciliate) _infra_. (antagonism) =169=mills to crittenden, jan. 28, 1848; grant, mems., i, 172. for remarks on worth's character see chap. xii, note 12.8 and chap. xxiv, note 24.16. at vera cruz worth ridiculed scott's methods in comparison with his own at monterey (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528), and his journalistic champion, the editor of the new york _sun_, took the same line (aug. 16). he was determined to have an assault, in which he would naturally have played a conspicuous part (_mag. of am. hist._, xiv, 569). he was enraged because scott properly had twiggs lead the advance from that city (_ibid._, 562; see also chap. xxiii, note 23.5). apparently in order to become prominent in the coming battle, he seems to have left vera cruz without a suitable supply of provisions--contrary to orders (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528). probably because scott, for reasons of policy, praised twiggs's conduct at cerro gordo in his report, worth pronounced the report "a lie from beginning to end" (=364=to s., dec. 27, 1847). he was impatient and offensive because scott would not permit him to advance upon puebla as soon as he wished to go (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 528; =364=w. to daughter, apr. 30, 1847). next, his wrath was excited there because, in accordance with the verdict of a court martial, scott censured--in the mildest possible manner--his improper conduct (p. 361; _delta_, jan. 6, 1848). wholly without authority he announced that his division was to lead the movement from puebla against mexico (=236=judah, diary, may 6), though it was twiggs's turn to lead. he accused scott of trying to belittle his achievements at churubusco (=364=to s., dec. 27, 1847). he blamed scott for the losses resulting from his own imprudence at molino del rey and for not permitting him to attack chapultepec that day; and he protested because scott, doubtless by accident, did not credit him with the technical distinction of actually passing the san cosme garita on sept. 13 (p. 416; sedgwick, corres., i, 169). unmoved by worth's conduct, scott seems to have given him all the prominence to which he was entitled. it was understood that he assigned him to command on sept. 8 with a special view to conciliating him (grant, mems., i, 151); and it is clear that he intended to have him capture the city of mexico (p. 412). it is probable that scott had shown some egotism and irascibility in the course of the strenuous campaign, but no doubt almost every high officer had done the same, for all had tempers and believed in themselves; and it is extremely doubtful whether any one had shown more kindness and magnanimity than he--particularly toward pillow and worth. even after all the trouble, scott wrote (mems., ii, 416) that pillow's nature was free from malignity, whereas pillow's letters prove the contrary strikingly. 29.29. (intimate) =185=duncan papers, _passim_. (widow) =185=p. to d., sept. 3, 1848. (urged) =185=p. to polk, june 21, 1849. (made) scott, mems., ii, 416; cullum, biog. register, i, 447. (trouble) sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 305. (gather) =329=taliaferro to --, apr. 26, 1848; scott, mems., ii, 417. pillow boasted of his power, and on that basis threatened men whom he wished to control (taliaferro, _supra_; sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 117). how strong this influence was is illustrated by the fact that col. campbell of tennessee, who had stated repeatedly that pillow had no military ability (pp. 353, 377), recommended him for appointment as a major general (=139=to polk, feb. 19, 1847). it is interesting to note, in comparison with the character of the cabal against scott, that he was supported by such men as trist, e. a. hitchcock, robert e. lee and robert anderson. 29.30. (reports) ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1015-20; sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 389-91, 629-34; lawton, artill. officer, 319-20. (same) lawton, art. off., 319-20; weekly n. y. _courier and enquirer_, mar. 2, 1848; =169=mills to crittenden, jan. 28, 1848. (terms) remarks in note 29.28; =169=mills to crittenden, jan. 28, 1848; =364=w. to ----, mar. 3, 1848 ("an ass will be an ass"). (trickily) sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 391; davis, autobiog., 285; note 31. (another) semmes, service, 358-9. (in u. s.) _picayune_, oct. 8. (tampico) semmes, service, 360. (mexico) sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 117. (improper) _ib._, p. 454 (marcy). (necessary) =169=mills, _supra_; ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1087, 1225-6 (scott). 29.31. (gen. orders 349) sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 455. (stigmatize) =210=alvord to hammond, apr. 21, 1848; =210=bragg to hammond, dec. 20, 1847. (assumed) _picayune_, oct. 8; dec. 18. (defiant) stevens, stevens, i, 223. (not written) _infra_. (seized) semmes, service, 361-4; _spirit of the age_, mar. 9; apr. 13, 1848. (charges) polk, diary, dec. 30, 1847; jan. 1; apr. 18, 1848; _infra_. (appeals) _infra_. (arrest) =256=marcy to butler, jan. 13, 1848. see note 29.28. for the leonidas letter see p. 376. this letter pillow seems clearly to have smuggled into a packet sent by freaner, the correspondent of the new orleans _delta_, to his paper, after freaner had rejected its twin (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 14) on the ground that it was incorrect, and the editor, inferring that it was endorsed by freaner, printed it (_ibid._, 250; _delta_, apr. 7, 1848). when scott finally opened his eyes (after august 20) to the rascality of pillow (=335=trist, notes, _supra_), pillow realized he had gone too far. he refused to ask for a court of inquiry when challenged to do so (=335=hitchcock to pillow, nov. 24, 1847, and note by h.), told quitman that he could not face an investigation (=335=trist, statement), and wrote to his wife that he was going to resign and live quietly (=292=oct. 27, 1847). then, it would appear, he induced burns (=335=ed. of _delta_ to trist, may 16, 1848), a paymaster in his division, to assume the authorship of the leonidas letter (the worst count against him), and became confident, even defiant, with reference to scott (=180=to wife, nov. 25). the friend to whom duncan wrote, in sending his letter to the press, modified it freely, and inserted in it a passage regarding the chalco route (p. 372) taken from a letter written by a man named chason. so he explained to duncan (=185=---to duncan, jan. 1, 1848). gen. orders 349, nov. 12, 1847, said (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 455): "it requires not a little charity to believe that the principal heroes of the scandalous letters alluded to did not write them, or specially procure them to be written, and the intelligent can be at no loss in conjecturing the authors--chiefs, partizans, and pet familiars. to the honor of the service, the disease--pruriency of fame, _not_ earned--cannot have seized upon half a dozen officers (present,) all of whom, it is believed, belong to the same two coteries." the next two sentences were still stronger: "false credit," "despicable self-puffings and malignant exclusions of others," "the conceited and the envious," "indignation" of the honorable officers. though in the right, scott allowed himself to go too far in his use of language, as he did at other times. commenting on the order, braxton bragg, though not one of scott's friends, said in substance: half the reputations in the war have been made by false reports and newspaper misrepresentations [this was to a large extent true], and it has gone so far that scott has at last issued a strong order (=210=to hammond, dec. 20, 1847). another correspondent of gov. hammond of south carolina said he was glad that scott had undertaken to expose "such quackery, charlatanry, imposture and lying braggadocio" (=210=alvord, apr. 21, 1848). this appears to have been the general sentiment of the officers (numerous citations could be given). on the publication of gen. orders 349 worth asked scott whether the charge of scandalous conduct referred to him. scott replied that it referred to the authors and abettors of the leonidas letter, and that he could not be more explicit. worth declared the reply unsatisfactory, and handed to scott a sort of appeal to the president that referred insultingly to the former (=68=scott, charges, nov. 27). scott therefore charged him with "behaving with contempt and disrespect towards his commanding officer." he was arrested for insulting scott in a letter to marcy (sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 471). the charges against duncan were writing a (published) letter in violation of the army regulation no. 650, and making in it a false statement about the adoption of the chalco route in order to magnify himself and worth (=68=charges, nov. 27). "arrest" signified confinement to the city of mexico. the new york _tribune_ said truthfully with reference to the troubles between scott and the generals: "the duties of a commanding general in the heart of an enemy country, with an army flushed with victory yet inactive, and under the influences incident to so perilous a position, are very delicate, and can only be met by firmness and the maintenance of rigorous discipline" (_nat. intelligencer_, dec. 28, 1847). 29.32. (conviction) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1218 (scott); _infra_. (censures) ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1229, 1248 (marcy); sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 131 (marcy). (relieved) =256=marcy to butler, jan. 13, 1848. (rank) =60=butler to marcy, mar. 2. (deposed) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1044. lee, lee, 46. (army) =152=claiborne, mems.; oswandel, notes, 481, 483; =221=hill, diary; =252=mackall, feb. 21; _picayune_, mar. 23; =13=doyle, no. 27, 1848; lee, lee, 44; =210=alvord to hammond, feb. 24; hitchcock, fifty years, 321. (departure) lowell _journal_, sept. 14, 1852; _picayune_, mar. 23; hitchcock, fifty years, 328. (looked) =327=sutherland to father, feb. 15, 1848. jan. 9, 1847, a =137=correspondent of calhoun wrote, "unless some powerful influence is soon brought to bear we [in charleston, s. c.] fear we shall stand forth discredited and degraded in the sight of all the world." it is hard to see how the country, without scott, could have avoided this. scott's chief complaints were a failure to supply seasonably the desired means for waging the campaign, interference with the rights of the commanding general (_e.g._ in harney's case), the plan to place a civilian (benton) over him, the apparent intention to let trist interfere in military affairs, and the refusal to provide a chief of staff satisfactory to him (lawton, artill. officer, 319). see also chapter xxvii, p. 129. all the charges except those against pillow were withdrawn. the latter should have been placed before a court-martial, and so polk and the cabinet decided (polk, diary, jan. 3, 1848). but--probably because he feared that his friend would be convicted--polk concluded to have first a court of inquiry in order to ascertain what the evidence was, and perhaps dispose of the matter (_ibid._, jan. 8). the court was selected by polk--doubtless with a view to pillow's acquittal (_ibid._, jan. 15). the fact that pillow was entirely satisfied with it (=180=to wife, feb. 27) is almost enough to prove this. the british chargé reported that it seemed to favor pillow (=13=doyle, no. 39, 1848). two of the members were brevetted later, though one of them (scott publicly stated) had no other connection with the war, and the connection of the other had been slight (scott in n. y. _herald_, nov. 3, 1857). the principal charges against pillow were, first, that pillow's claim to have won the battle of contreras was unfounded, on which the verdict went against him (sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 317, 333); and, secondly, that he was directly or indirectly the author of the leonidas letter. in order to maintain that he wrote it (which he had strongly denied on three occasions (_ibid._, 56-7, 131), burns had to admit that he had spoken falsely in it (_ibid._, 33, 388-9), and he swore that he believed he wrote certain interlineations (_ibid._, 32) which it was found had been written by the editor of the _delta_ (_ibid._, 250); but he stuck to it that he had dared to steal into pillow's private office, and remain there long enough to copy the substance and to a large extent the phraseology of a long document (_ibid._, 32). and therefore, although statements substantially equivalent to those of the leonidas letter were brought home to pillow (_ibid._, 389-391), pillow had to be acquitted. john sedgwick, later general sedgwick, wrote: i think the court must acquit pillow, "but the sentiment of the army will never acquit him" (corres., i, 182). naturally a lawyer like pillow had a great advantage at the trial over scott, upon whom it was incumbent to conduct the prosecution. his handling of the case was extremely clever. the same court was instructed to inquire into the so-called "council" of puebla (p. 391), and thus scott was virtually put on trial, yet, contrary to the articles of war, had no opportunity to question witnesses (mo. _republican_, nov. 5, 1857). pillow was before another court of inquiry (sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 338-73), and the evidence convicted him, morally at least, of attempting to appropriate, in violation of the articles of war, a captured mexican howitzer. pillow's appeal to the government grew out of scott's approving the findings of this court, and his arrest resulted from the disrespect shown in connection with the appeal. june 4, 1847, scott wrote to marcy: "considering the many cruel disappointments and mortifications i have been made to feel since i left washington, or the total want of support and sympathy on the part of the war department which i have so long experienced, i beg to be recalled from this army the moment that it may be safe for any person to embark at vera cruz, which i suppose will be early in november" (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 131). this application was denied and (since the circumstances on which it was based appeared to change) became obsolete. a correspondent of governor hammond of south carolina said it was "absurd, unjust, ridiculous, and impolitic, in this crisis of events here, to remove the victorious general, whose prestige with the mexicans is great, very great, both for war and peace" (=210=alvord, feb. 24, 1848). he attributed the recall to "mr. quackery pillow." the recall was dated january 13 (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1044). scott turned over the command to butler on february 18 (=65=gen. orders 59). march 14 the british chargé reported that signs of relaxed discipline were visible (=13=doyle, no. 27). as early as august 7, 1847, polk had contemplated substituting butler for scott (diary). nov. 25 pillow wrote that this was to be done (=180=to wife). early in january, 1848, some members of the cabinet favored giving taylor the place, but polk would not (diary, jan. 4). may 6, 1848, the adjutant general stated that the army under butler consisted of 26,785 (aggregate present), of whom 174 officers and 4611 men were sick, and that it occupied the following places: mexico, toluca, cuernavaca, pachuca, río frio, puebla, perote, jalapa, national bridge, orizaba, córdoba and vera cruz. some of the returns, however, on which the statement was based were several months old (=62=to cass). by may 1 scott, pillow, pierce, cadwalader, quitman, shields and cushing had left the country. may 23 s. w. kearny was appointed governor of mexico city (=65=orders 103). xxx. the naval operations 30.1. sen. 187, 263; 29, 1. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 774-5 (bancroft). sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 377-8. (war bill) vol. i, p. 181. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 973. (expense) ho. 188; 29, 1; sen. 139; 29, 2. in jan., 1846, there were also 3 receiving ships and 11 small unarmed vessels and storeships. in ordinary and building there were 2 (5) ships-of-the-line, 5 (3) frigates and razees, 6 (2) sloops-of-war, 2 (0) brigs and 3 (1) steamers, carrying 576 (614) guns. (the figures in parentheses represent vessels building.) the time of the crews of the _savannah_ and _warren_ expired before july 1 and sloat was authorized to send them east. three schooners--the _bonita_, the _reefer_ and the _petrel_--built at new york for mexico but not paid for, were purchased (_niles_, june 13, 1846, p. 226; see chap. xiii, note 13.31). in oct., 1847, there were also one ordnance transport and six storeships. 30.2. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 945. u. s. naval institute, proceedings, xiv, 539 (s. c. rowan, recolls.). griffis, perry, 200. ho. 24; 30, 2 (mason to speaker). (reputation) =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 445, 1847. sen. 69; 30, 1 (punishments). =374=shubrick to conner, july 17, 1845: "the time has been when the conviction of an officer of having told a _deliberate, premeditated, official lie_ would be fatal to him, so far at least as the opinion of a court martial would go, but that time has passed--alas! for the navy." in the course of a short cruise, 1847-48, farragut had to "rid the service" of five junior officers and bring to trial a first lieutenant for drunkenness (mahan, farragut, 97). mar. 5, 1847, =120=capt. mervine charged a lieutenant with being intoxicated repeatedly while commanding at s. josé, calif., amidst a hostile population. july 10, 1847, =120=j. h. brown, s. francisco, calif., wrote to biddle that officers got drunk at his house and did havoc. =120=commander hull informed biddle, mar. 4, 1847, that a midshipman came aboard intoxicated. many seamen were of foreign birth, but only 26 out of 853 officers. 30.3. =354=welles papers. ho. 188, 191; 29, 1. howe, bancroft, i, 292. polk, diary, sept. 9, 1846; feb. 20, 1847. =108=buchanan to bancroft, sept. 29, 1847. =256=marcy to wetmore, nov. 28, 1845. seward, seward at wash., i, 51. "bancroft" was of course george bancroft, the historian. 30.4. =48=bancroft to conner, aug. 30, 1845, secret. london _times_, june 11, 1846. =52=bancroft, no. 25, 1847. =52=king, no. 28, 1846. =52=martin, no. 14, 1847. _picayune_, may 7, 1846. =58=spofford, tyleston & co., dec. 11, 1846. =13=bankhead, no. 79, 1845. =58=emory, stetson & co., june 5, 1847. =46=newell to j. y. mason, nov. 25, 1846. sen. 1; 30, 1, 945 (mason, report). richmond _enquirer_, aug. 15, 1845. phila. _no. amer._, june 20, 1845. memoria de ... guerra, dec. 9, 1846. méxico á través, iv, 569. =13=pakenham, no. 42, 1846. =52=saunders (madrid), nos. 9, 12, 1847. =52=littlefield to saunders, may 2, 1847. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), may 16, 1846. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 566 (jesup). boston _atlas_, may 18, 1846. buchanan, works, vii, 325-6 (to w. r. j.), 355-6 (to t. n. c.). =49=bancroft to conner, aug. 29, 1846. what is said of cuba applies to porto rico also. 30.5. (action of mexico) =13=bankhead, nos. 68, 100, 147, 150, 161, 1846; london _times_, jan. 8, 13, 15, 1847; dublán, legislación, v, 161; =52=slidell to buchanan, mar. 27, 1846; =52=martin, no. 11, 1847; =297=mackenzie (s. anna) to buchanan, july 7, 1846; semmes, service, 80-1; méxico á través, iv, 569; =52=consul black, sept. 28; oct. 29, 1846; =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 294, res., 368, 1846; =52=bancroft, no. 16, 1847; =76=tornel, circular (regulations), july 26, 1846; memoria de ... relaciones, dec., 1846; =52=memoria de ... guerra, dec., 1846; _diario_, july 27; oct. 3, 1846. irving (madrid), no. 8, 1847. london _times_, jan. 8, 13, 15, 1847. semmes, service, 80. sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 40-1. =52=saunders (madrid), no. 9, 1847. =76=almonte, dec. 10, 1846. buchanan, works, vii, 334-42 (to r. m. s.). 30.6. =52=martin, no. 11, 1847. =52=bancroft, no. 16, 1847. =52=irving, july 18, 1846. richardson, messages, iv, 495-6. sen. 1; 30, 1, 945-6 (report). wash. _union_, july 22, 1847. the 29th cong., second session, provided for the punishment of the citizens (apprehended on privateers) of those states having treaties with the u. s. which made their acts piracy (wash. _union_, mar. 9, 1847; =13=pakenham, no. 26, 1847). =108=bancroft to buchanan, feb. 3, 1847. =13=for. off. to bankhead, no. 34, 1845. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, p. 811 (berrien). buchanan, works, vii, 23, 52. the suggestion of commissioning american privateers excited opposition in europe. it was feared that they would molest neutrals. even in the u. s. it was opposed (dayton in senate, jan. 27, 1847). nothing came of it. 30.7. (england) =13=bankhead, nos. 79, 1845; 150, 1846; =13=to bankhead, nos. 34, 1845; 1, 1847; london _times_, jan. 22, 1847; _britannia_, jan. 23, 1847; =52=bancroft, no. 16, 1847; _monitor repub._, nov. 21, 1846; =52=bancroft, no. 18, 1847; =108=_id._ to buchanan, feb. 3, 1847; =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 294, res., 368, 1846. (france) =52=martin, nos. 11, 15, 1847; =52=guizot to martin, feb. 26, 1847. (spain) =73=bermúdez de c., nos. 294, res., 368, 1846; =52=to consul campbell, may 14, 1846; =77=mex. consul, havana, dec. 10, 1846, res.; =76=almonte, dec. 10, 1846; =72=instructs. to capt. gen., june 18, 1846; =52=irving, july 18, 1846; nos. 5, 8, 1847; =71=docs. relating to cuban ports; sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 40; boston _courier_, jan. 20, 1847; buchanan, works, vii, 334 (to r. m. s.). sen. 1; 30, 1, 945-6 (report). _picayune_, aug. 26, 1846. conner, home squadron, 12. 30.8. richardson, messages, iv, 548-9, 561. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 774-5 (bancroft). sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 377. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 951. =59=circular to u. s. ministers, may 14, 1846. =47=conner to bancroft, may 14, 1846. =52=consul chase, jan. 20, 1846. =76=parrodi, july 2, 1846. =52=mclane (london), no. 54, 1846. =13=giffard (v. cruz), june 30, 1846. =162=morris to conner, oct. 24, 1846. =313=conner, instructions, may 14. american vessels were excluded on the score of impartiality and also because the admission of them would have defeated the main purposes of the blockade (richardson, messages, iv, 571). a particular advantage of the blockade is that it enables a belligerent to close ports that it is not desirable or not possible to capture and hold. under the u. s. regulations vessels lying in mexican ports on the announcement of the blockade could remain twenty days and then leave with or without cargo. approaching vessels could not be captured or detained unless previously warned in writing by a cruiser (=313=conner, instructions). vera cruz and tampico remained open for british mail packets (_ibid._). fishing boats were not molested. _bona fide_ british property, including cochineal, could be embarked on british war vessels at vera cruz (=13=bankhead, no. 23, 1847). from the end of june, 1846, conner permitted british mail packets to land quicksilver and take bullion. engagements made before the war could be fulfilled (=313=saunders to callaghan, june 23, 1846). a difficult question came up concerning the floating property of neutrals residing in mexico (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 1305). mexico decreed that since her ports of entry were blockaded, all her other ports might give free entrance to vessels forcing the blockade (=70="guerra," no. 1079), and that no tonnage dues should be charged during the continuance of the blockade (=76=guerra, circular, oct. 10, 1846). england had to admit that she was the last nation to protest against a strict blockade, but warned us that difficulties might arise in the enforcement of it (=52=mclane, no. 50, 1846); and she would not have our announcement published in the london _gazette_ since, said aberdeen, it might check trade and after all not be made good (=52=mclane, no. 55). spain insisted upon neutral rights with peculiar jealousy. the spanish commander even claimed free access to blockaded ports under arts. 14 and 15 of the treaty of 1795, but found that art. 16 warranted the blockade. spain's vessels were treated with special indulgence, but she made many complaints. for spain: =72=instrs. to capt. gen. of cuba, june 18, 1846; =52=irving, no. 2, 1846; =52=istúriz to irving, aug. 5, 1846; =71=papers relating to complaints; buchanan, works, vii, 240-1, 290-2; =47=span. commander to conner, june 24, 1846; reply, june 26. 30.9. =48=bancroft to conner, aug. 30, 1845, secret. _picayune_, mar. 11, 1847. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 377 (mason, report). ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1163 (conner). =76=parrodi, may 20, 1846. =76=capt. of port, tampico, may 20. semmes, service, 106. conner, home squadron, 9. negrete, invasión, iii, 173. =313=conner, proclam., may 14. =313=_id._, instructions, may 14. =313=saunders to c., june 20; oct. 24; to amer. consul, may 20. =313=c. to saunders, july 22; sept. 30. =164=conner, reports, spring of 1846. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 525 (spec. orders 128). _niles_, oct. 10, 1846, p. 85. =47=conner, oct. 8. (goatzacoalcos) about 140 miles s. e. from v. cruz. it does not seem worth while to follow the movements of particular vessels. sept. 30, 1846, the blockade was extended southeast to the river s. pedro y s. pablo. (difficulties) =47=conner, sept. 22, 1846; _picayune_, mar. 11, 1847; griffis, perry, 210; =313=saunders to wash. _union_, oct. 10, 1846; =313=_id._ to conner, oct. 24; semmes, service, 106; =162=conner, jan. 28, 1847. (_somers_) sen. 43; 29, 2; sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 945, 950; =374=semmes to conner, dec. 10, 1846; =13=pakenham, no. 151, 1846. just after the blockade began at vera cruz gen. bravo, commanding there, permitted several american vessels to leave the port, and in acknowledgment of his liberality two mexican merchant vessels were sent in to him with their cargoes, crews and passengers. courteous notes were exchanged (=76=gacyores to bravo, may 27; reply, may 28; bravo, may 26). at tampico capt. saunders and the city authorities were mutually considerate (=313=s. to bancroft, june 6, 1846). 30.10. (designed) london _times_, dec. 10, 1846. comte. gen. v. cruz. july 9, 1846. sen. 1; 30, 1, 945, 950-1. =13=pakenham, no. 98, 1846. =162=conner, dec. 18, 1846. foltz, report. _niles_, oct. 10, 1846, pp. 84-5. =47=conner, july 22, 1846. semmes, service, 100. parker, recolls., 58, 62, etc. mcclay, navy, ii, 177-8. bennett, steam navy, 98. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1233 (perry). 30.11. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 441, 1847. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 540. henshaw narrative, mar. 17, 1847. smith, to mexico, 117-8. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1233 (perry). =13=giffard, jan. 31, 1847. _picayune_, mar. 11, 1847. contributory tariff: pp. 261-3. 30.12. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 775 (bancroft). (mex. navy) balbontín, estado, 19; _diario_, apr. 4, 5, 1846; =70="guerra," no. 1120; =13=giffard, dec. 20, 1846. =76=acta of naval offs., mar. 12, 1846. memoria de ... guerra, dec, 1846. =76=mora y villamil, mar. 12, 1846. =76=orders to marín, mar. 9, 1846. =76=marín, apr. 26, 1847. n. y. _sun_, june 8, 1846. _niles_, may 1, 1847, p. 131 (hunter). 30.13. =375=perry to mason, nov. 16, 1846. conner, home squadron, 9, 11, 14. parker, recolls., 67, 71. =162=morris to conner, june 24; oct. 24, 1846. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1172 (conner), 1191-2 (perry). =46=perry, nov. 16, 1846. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 252-3. taylor, broad pennant, 287, 293. =166=perry to conner, dec. 27, 1846. =166=reports on condition of engines, boilers, etc. bennett, steam navy, 93. =47=conner, sept. 22, 1846. soley, porter, 64. =165=conner, nov. 24, 1846. 30.14. =162=conner's letters to his wife. curtis, buchanan, i, 603 (slidell). soley, porter, 53-4. semmes, service, 114, 128. conner, home squadron, 6, 23. =162=bancroft to conner, dec. 10, 1845. =162=matson to _id._, feb. 27, 1847. 30.15. =48=bancroft to conner, aug. 30, 1845, secret. polk, diary, jan. 17, 1846. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 774-5 (bancroft). =69=conner to taylor, feb. 4. =47=_id._ to bancroft, may 14. =162=_id._, may 20. =61=bancroft to conner, jan. 17. london _times_, june 29; dec. 10. semmes, service, 100. =76=bravo, may 4. tampico _eco_, june 9, 16. =76=parrodi, june 8, 17. =76=vilar to parrodi, june 8. =162=saunders to conner, june 20. =313=_id._ to _id._, june 17. =313=_id._ to wash. _union_, oct. 10. _niles_, may 23, 1846, p. 178. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 377 (mason, report). conner, home squadron, 9. bennett, steam navy, 34-5, 43, 62-3, 67-8, 71. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1163 (conner). _picayune_, aug. 26. for conner's coöperation with taylor see vol. i, pp. 466, 469. the _princeton_ was the earliest naval steam propeller. she was rigged as a ship. saunders opened fire, june 8, because he feared new fortifications (near the mouth of the pánuco) would make it hard to capture tampico. he did little damage. the enemy replied feebly. suspecting that the mexican gunboats intended to sail out and raid american commerce, he determined to capture them by surprise in the night of june 14-15. he had no good pilot. the boats had much difficulty in finding the channel, which had recently shifted, and were even compelled to row more than half a mile against a swift current within pistol shot of the shore. one of them grounded twice. the moon came out. the americans were discovered and fired upon. they replied; and then, as a surprise was no longer possible, they retired according to orders. may 28 conner, on the _cumberland_, was at pensacola; the _st. mary's_ off tampico; the _mississippi_ and _falmouth_ off v. cruz; the _raritan_ there or on her way to that port; the _lawrence_ (which seems to have been a brig but was not mentioned in the department's list of vessels under conner on may 13) assisting the army; and the _somers_ on the yucatan service (ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1163). aug. 10 the _cumberland_ (still the flag-ship), _potomac_, _falmouth_, _mississippi_, _princeton_, _flirt_ and the three gunboats (_bonita_, _reefer_, _petrel_) lay at antón lizardo; the _st. mary's_ and _porpoise_ were off v. cruz; the _john adams_ off tampico; the brig _truxtun_ had gone to chagres, and the brig _perry_ had gone to look for privateers near cape s. antonio (_picayune_, aug. 26). these data give one an idea of the usual distribution of the vessels. 30.16. _the affair of aug. 7._ =165=conner to bancroft, may 31. =47=_id._ to _id._, aug. 10. ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 630 (conner). _picayune_, aug. 22, 26. n. y. _sun_, dec 7. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 381. semmes, service, 88. parker, recolls., 66-7. taylor, broad pennant, 287. =76=landero, aug. 10. =76=comte gen. v. cruz, july 15. _esperanza_, aug. 27. _locomotor_, aug. 10. for alvarado, vol. ii, p. 344. for antón lizardo, vol. ii, p. 17. the americans felt the more chagrined because british naval men witnessed their failure. 30.17. _the affair of oct. 15._ =162=morris to conner, sept. 21. =47=conner, oct. 17. =162=_id._, oct. 16. united service, july, 1895, p. 33. ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 630-1. taylor, broad pennant, 290, 293, 298-306. _picayune_, nov. 8. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 381. griffis, perry, 199. semmes, service, 88. conner, home squadron, 17. =76=marin to comte. gen., oct. 17. =76=landero, sept. 5, 14; oct. 12. =76=soto, oct. 18. =76=marin to soto, oct. 15. _diario_, oct. 29, 30. =76=guerra, circular, oct. 21. wash. _union_, nov. 30. london _times_, dec. 10. according to conner's son (home squadron, 17), the secretary of the navy on sept. 22 instructed conner to attack alvarado, supposing he had been reinforced, and it has been said that the attack should not have been made without more strength; but the difficulty was that the american forces could not be made available. it is not easy to see how conner was at fault unless, as perhaps on aug. 7, he might have landed in boats under such protection as his cannon could give, stormed the fort that stood near the beach, and then landed more men. conner does not seem to have thought that sailors could do much ashore. he had a landing-force (conner, home squadron, 15), but whether at this time and place is not clear. probably a bold, though unsuccessful, attack would have been better than to back out. he is said to have argued, after the failure of aug. 7, that even success would not have been worth what it would have cost (_picayune_, aug. 26); but this left moral effects out of the account. it was said by a naval man that he should have added the mclane's tow to his own and gone ahead; but it seems extremely doubtful whether he could have advanced against the current. conner's report (oct. 17) says the _mississippi_ could not get near enough to make any impression on the fort, but a mexican account printed in _la esperanza_, aug. 27, stated that some shot from our vessels struck more than 200 yards behind the fort, and one sees no reason to suppose that the statement was an invention. conner seems to have thought of coming to alvarado again, for in jan., 1847, the mexicans reported that the bar was being sounded (=76=landero, jan. 28). for the capture of the place at the beginning of april, 1847, see vol. ii, p. 344. apr. 2 a naval expedition went up the river, returning on apr. 4 (=66=j. l. mason to j. l. smith, apr. 9). 30.18. _the first tabasco expedition._ (perry) =46=perry, aug. 15, 17; =165=conner to p., oct. 6; conner, home squadron, 12-3. =162=conner, oct. 30. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1165-70 (perry's report, etc.). ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 632-9. _diario_, nov. 7, 1846 (traconis' reports, etc.). =47=perry to mason, nov. 16. taylor, broad pennant, 316. =76=gov. of chiapas, oct. 27. =60=champlen to polk, dec. 4. semmes, service, 89. conner, home squadron, 9. information given to the author by a mexican civil engineer residing in tabasco. apuntes, 389-90. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 445, 1847. aldrich, marine corps, 97. ho. 4; 29, 2, p. 639. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 381. parker, recolls., 73-4. =76=traconis, nov. 16. _temístocles_, dec. 31. =76=santalo's testimony, nov. 2. =76=comte. gen. tab, apr. 6. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 950. =166=list of vessels captured. =166=perry to conner, nov. 11. =166=merchants to perry, oct. 26. =76=traconis, proclam., aug. 12. =13=giffard, jan. 31, 1847. meade, letters, i, 169. as perry was assigned to the _mississippi_ on oct. 6, and commanded this important expedition so soon afterward, it has been supposed incorrectly that virtually, if not formally, the squadron was divided. the hope of the united states at the beginning of the war had been that tabasco would be neutral. the orders were not to disturb it in that case (=49=bancroft to conner, may 19). perry's expedition was followed in nov. by a revolution in tabasco based ostensibly on the failure of the mexican government to protect the state; but really the outbreak was due to local rivalries, and probably it caused the national government no material annoyance (=76=alcorta, jan. 4, 1848; méxico á través, iv, 599; =13=bankhead, no. 186, 1846; =76=acta of garrison, nov. 19, 1846; wash. _union_, jan. 18, 1847). frontera was a valuable point, for the americans could obtain water and cattle there and hinder illicit commerce. the tabasco river is now called usually the grijalva. 30.19. for the tampico and pánuco expeditions: vol. i, pp. 279, 281. =162=mason to conner, nov. 29, 1846, priv. and confid. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175 (conner), 1176 (perry). semmes, service, 90. bennett, steam navy, 93. =47=conner, dec. 17. =166=perry to c., dec. 27; to benham, dec. 23; to sands and parker, dec. 21. =166=benham to perry, dec. 22. =166=parker to perry, dec. 22. =166=conner to hunt, feb. 8, 1847. =166=sands to conner, feb. 20. =13=giffard, jan. 31, 1847. the expedition set out on dec. 17. many of the people of tabasco supposed, when perry arrived off frontera in dec., that he was going to s. juan bautista to avenge his "defeat"; and as he did not, they presumably felt more haughty than ever (_temístocles_, dec. 31). 30.20. _niles_, oct. 31, 1846, p. 132. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 775. (bancroft) mason to conner, oct. 26. soley, porter, 59. farragut, farragut, 158, 197. _united service_, feb., 1897 (conner). méxico á través, iv, 419. scott, mems., ii, 422. n. y. _eve. post_, june 10. =165=conner to bancroft, june 11 (impregnable if properly equipped and manned). memoria de ... guerra, dec, 1846. wash. _union_, june 17. diccionario universal (_ulúa_). _journal des débats_, aug. 11, 1838. =162=morris to conner, june 10, 24; oct. 24, 1846. see chap. xviii, p. 349, and note 18.2. oct. 3, 1846, the garrison were in a state of mutiny because hungry (=76=morales, oct. 4; s. anna, oct. 14), but the americans did not know this. conner suggested that he be given a landing brigade, so that he could make a combined land and water attack (conner, s. juan de ulloa, 15). during the siege of vera cruz perry planned to bombard the fortress and attack it with boats on a dark night in conjunction with the land forces (ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1191). many original documents bearing on the construction of ulúa could be cited, but they would have only an antiquarian interest. david d. porter and david g. farragut are the men referred to. the eagerness of certain young officers led to some enterprises that were not altogether felicitous. contrary to orders lieut. parker burned the _creole_ (_criolla_), the last scrap of mexican commerce, under the guns of ulúa at night: but this injured hargous, the american merchant, who owned or had chartered her (=374=semmes to conner, nov. 28; dec. 6, 1846; =374=parker to semmes, nov. 27). it has been said that this ended a secret correspondence by which conner obtained valuable information (conner, home squadron, 7), but circumstances had probably put a stop to that about six weeks before (=166=pommarès to conner, oct. 17). a plan was laid to blow up a mexican powder magazine near v. cruz, but this resulted in the capture of passed midshipman r. c. rogers and another man (=162=semmes to perry, dec. 6, 1846; =162=wright to semmes, dec. 6; semmes, service, 91). for the capture of vera cruz and ulúa see chap. xxii. 30.21. =162=conner, sept. 30, 1846. =374=perry to c., nov. 24. =162=morris to c., oct. 24. _picayune_, jan. 6, 1847. curtis, buchanan, i, 603-4. griffis, perry, 210-1, 221. =108=appleton to bancroft, feb. 24; apr. 27, 1847. parker, recolls., 92. sen. 1; 30, 1, 945 (mason, report). =163=semmes to conner, sept. 29, 1850. =165=conner to perry, mar. 20, 1847. =256=marcy to wetmore, apr. 6, 1847. conner's reputation in the navy at the present day is that of a coward--one of the numberless instances of historical injustice. 30.22. _capture of tuxpán._ ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1192-8, 1202 (perry and others). semmes, service, 150-5. =76=cos, jan. 18; apr. 4, 16, 29. _picayune_, jan. 2. griffis, perry, 241. =76=soto, aug. 31, 1846. =76=cos to ayunt., apr. 24. parker, recolls., 78, 106-7. =76=proceeds. of tuxpán ayunt., apr. 22. captain of the port, apr. 26. _american star_ (jalapa), may 2. wash. _union_, may 13, 17; june 4; sept. 11. soley, porter, 72. _eagle_ (v. cruz), apr. 28. jones, tattnall, 64-5. perry's force, consisting of the steamers _mississippi_, _spitfire_ (a vessel--similar to the _vixen_--which had joined the squadron in november), _vixen_ and _scourge_, the schooner-gunboats _reefer_, _petrel_ and _bonita_, the frigate _raritan_ (carrying 180 officers and men from the _potomac_ besides her own complement), the sloops _albany_, _john adams_, _decatur_ and _germantown_, the bomb-vessels _vesuvius_, _ætna_ and _hecla_, and 300 officers and men from the ship-of-the-line _ohio_, which stopped at vera cruz, on her way to the pacific, to assist scott, who were distributed on the _mississippi_ and smaller vessels, gathered first at lobos ids., where the forces were drilled about a day for the attack. next, after having been separated by a norther, they met off the bar. the mexicans were driven a short distance from the town, but further pursuit into the chaparral would have been vain. an expedition went some distance up the river from tuxpán (semmes, service, 154). the city government had not wished cos to defend the town, and hence he withdrew all his troops from town before the attack. most of his troops soon scattered. the city would not help support them, but furnished the americans with supplies cheerfully. at perry's request steps were taken to maintain order. he now left the _albany_ and _reefer_ off the river, and sent the _hecla_ to blockade soto la marina, the _germantown_ to search the coast north of lobos ids., the _ætna_ to occupy tabasco river, the _porpoise_ and the _vesuvius_ to hold laguna. besides the flotilla mentioned above he probably had under his command at this time the gunboats _falcon_ and _tampico_ (vol. ii, p. 338; ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1182). for the loss of the _truxtun_ in aug., 1846, which led to a great deal of discussion regarding the conduct of carpender, her captain, see =162=conner, aug. 24; =47=_id._, aug 24; =47=carpender to conner, aug. 24; mason to polk, oct. 28, 1846; semmes, service, 82; n. orl. _commerc. bulletin_, sept. 8; parker, recolls., 78; docs. in conner papers; comte. gen. v. cruz, aug. 23 and docs.; taylor, broad pennant, 260; wash. _union_, sept. 12, 22; _nat. intelligencer_, sept. 14. 30.23. (small ports) ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1204-8, 1223, 1228-9; =76=buchanan to authorities of tapantla, may 10, 1847. the main purposes of taking the small ports were to gather fresh provisions, exclude contraband trade, and obtain funds under the contributory tariff (chap. xxxiii). the usual terms required a renunciation of mexican allegiance during the war, obedience to american orders, and the payment of all revenues to the united states. an indefinite number of citations bearing upon the situation in yucatan could be given, but the following are deemed sufficient. bankhead, no. 11, 1846. _journal des débats_, sept. 13, 1842. _constitutionnel_, nov. 2-3, 1846. polk, diary, aug. 29, 1845; feb. 27, 1847. sen. 43; 30, 1. =49=bancroft to conner, may 19, 1846. =49=mason to _id._, oct. 16, 1846; feb. 25, 1847; to perry, mar. 17, 1847. semmes, service, 84. =335=tinsley to trist, aug. 6, 1846. =335=robira to _id._, june 7, 1847. sen. 40, 42, 43, 45, 49; 30, 1. _gaceta de ciudad victoria_, jan. 27, 1846. _picayune_, oct. 8, 1846; jan. 12, 1847. méxico á través, iv, 599. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 382. suárez y navarro, causas, 6-9. richardson, messages, iv, 581-3. memoria de ... relaciones, dec, 1846. =76=barbachano, procl., july 2, 1846. _temístocles_, dec. 27, 1846. =13=pakenham, no. 33, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 256-7 (walker). wash. _union_, jan. 18, 1847. =366=declar. of mérida. =166=perry to conner, dec. 27, 1846. =166=conner to sands, feb. 8, 1847. =166=mcfaul to ----, nov. 12, 1847. buchanan, works, vii, 222. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175-6 (conner), 1204 (perry). =165=gen. orders, dec. 15, 1846. (may cruise) =47=perry, dec. 27, 1846; sept. 21, 1847. =47=conner, dec. 29. may 15 laguna port was opened to commerce; may 18 frontera. 30.24. _second tabasco expedition._ ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1207-23, 28-32 (perry and officers). =47=perry, june 25. =47=correspondence of perry and bigelow, july 18-23. bennett, steam navy, 97. negrete, invasión, iii, 153-6. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 526-8. =76=correspondence of bigelow and echagaray, july 1, 2; letters of e., may 31; june 9, 18, 23; july 5. méxico á través, iv, 703. (later) ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1233-6 (perry); =47=perry, aug. 16. on the way to s. j. bautista perry had six men wounded. many fell from exhaustion. june 30 on an expedition to tamulté, about three miles out, three were killed and eight wounded. the mexican leaders were bvt. gen. domingo echagaray and three maldonado brothers. aug. 16, 1847, the squadron was disposed as follows: (_raritan_ and _albany_ had gone home); _mississippi_, pensacola; sloop _germantown_, antón lizardo, preparing to distribute supplies; sloop _decatur_, blockading tuxpán; sloop _saratoga_, v. cruz, maintaining connection with the army and watching the police; sloop _john adams_, expected from tuxpán probably to join bomb-vessel _stromboli_ in goatzacoalcos river; gunboats _reefer_ and _petrel_ at tampico; gunboat _falcon_ at alvarado; steamer _scourge_, bomb-vessel _ætna_, gunboat _bonita_ at frontera; bomb-vessel _vesuvius_, gunboat _mahonese_ at laguna; steamers _vixen_ and _scorpion_ in reserve; steamers _spitfire_ and _petrita_ laid up with injured engines; bomb-vessel _hecla_ ashore on alvarado bar. aug. 18, 1847, perry ordered that all merchant vessels should be visited on their arrival in port to detect irregularities (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 788). 30.25. for the share of the navy in the conquest of california see chap. xvii. (impossible) =13=p. j. blake of _juno_, apr. 10, 1848; =53=pakenham to buchanan, dec. 14, 1846; =13=_id._, no. 57, 1846. (proclam. and orders) ho. 4; 29, 2, pp. 670, 673-4. du pont, official despatches, 9. (cancelled, etc.) =53=pakenham to buchanan, dec. 14; =12=walker to seymour, mar. 26, 1847; =132=howland & aspinwall to buchanan, sept. 22, 1847; =13=pakenham, no. 139, 1846; sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 1303 (mason); =48=mason to biddle, mar. 30, 1847; =48=orders, dec. 24, 1846; =247=biddle to larkin, mar. 6, 1847. =47=stockton to du pont and to hull, aug. 20, 1846. =47=_id._, reports, aug. 22; nov. 23. =47=hull to stockton, sept. 12. =47=du pont to stockton, oct. 12. =76=peinbert to ----, res., undated. _calif. star_, i, no. 9. (guaymas) du pont, official despatches, 13; =47=correspondence of du pont, spanish vice consul, and campusano; _sonorense_, oct. 9; =76=comte. gen. of sinaloa, nov. 11; =76=gov. sonora, oct. 16; =76=campusano, oct. 5; _cyane_, journal; u. s. naval instit. proceeds., 1888, p. 539 (rowan). (mazatlán) =171=cyane, journal and abstract of journal; =47=du pont to stockton, dec. 1; _id._, official despatches, 19; =12=walker to seymour, mar. 26, 1847; =76=téllez to bustamante, feb. 17, 1847; =13=a. forbes, apr. 17, 1847; =13=bankhead, no. 9, 1847. sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 378-80. sen. 1; 30, 1, 948. balbontín, estado, 19. memoria de ... guerra, dec., 1846. (spring) =120=shubrick to biddle, may 4, 1847; =120=list of captures. wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 82-100. =76=letter from mazatlán, may 5; =247=biddle to larkin, mar. 6, 1847. =47=shubrick, may 31; june 1; aug. 11, 1847. (monopoly) =12=seymour, dec. 26, 1846, no. 70. (after may) =61=r. b. mason to adj. gen., feb. 1, 1848; =47=shubrick, may 31, 1847. _journ. milit. serv. instit._, xxxii, 249. stockton intended to cruise for the protection of our whalers, etc., and also to invade mexico by way of acapulco (vol. i, p. 338); but affairs in california prevented. the _malek adel_ was bravely cut out at mazatlán, sept. 7, 1846, under the mexican guns. guaymas was cannonaded because the mexicans refused to give up two gunboats, preferring to burn them. as there were two harbors at mazatlán, a single vessel could not blockade the port satisfactorily. in the spring of 1847 shubrick was ordered to blockade both mazatlán and guaymas, but for this reason he kept both the _independence_ and the _cyane_ at mazatlán. in feb. and march, 1847, there might have been serious trouble between the british commander, sir baldwin walker, and captain montgomery of the _portsmouth_ owing to conflicting orders and interests; but the former, having far the stronger force, knew he could afford to be considerate, and the latter treated british commerce so well that our government was thanked by england (=13=to crampton, june 30, 1847; sherman, sloat, xxiv; and note particularly _journ. milit. serv. institute_, xxxii, 249-53). shubrick was at mazatlán in may, 1847, but left at the beginning of june. the _cyane_ remained a little longer. she and the _portsmouth_ anchored there, at the end of june, but both sailed away within two days. biddle was ordered jan. 6, 1846, to take command of the squadron, but did not receive the orders until dec. 31 (at lima). mar. 2 he took command. his vessels then were the _columbus_ (74 guns) on which he arrived, _independence_ (razee, 54), frigates _congress_ (44) and _savannah_ (44), sloops _portsmouth_ (20), _levant_ (20), _cyane_ (20), _warren_ (20), _dale_ (16) and _preble_ (16), storeships _erie_ (8), _lexington_ (8) and _southampton_ (6), and the captured _malek adel_ (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 948; =48=bancroft to shubrick, aug. 21, 1846). the _savannah_ and _levant_ went home; and the _warren_, on account of its condition, was assigned to guard duty (=120=shubrick to stockton, mar. 1, 1847). the _ohio_ reached the squadron in the early part of 1848. besides blockading, cruising for prizes, looking after the american whalers, and watching for possible privateers, long voyages were necessary to obtain provisions and instructions. the latter were usually very tardy and the commanders had to follow their own judgment in the main. monterey, calif., was in general the base of operations. 30.26. (succeeded) =49=bancroft to shubrick, aug. 21, 1846; =120=shubrick to biddle, mar. 5; july 20, 1847; =47=shubrick, july 21. (notice) =47=_id._, aug. 11. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1072-5 (shubrick). =76=téllez, nov. 4, 1847. (guaymas) ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1075-83 (lavallette _et al._), 1110 (shubrick); _correo nacional_, nov. 30; =13=wooldridge, nov. 18. (mazatlán) wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 95; lummis, mex. of to-day, 150; mofras, explor., i, 173; gaxiola, invasión, 162. guaymas, a place of considerable importance, was summoned oct. 19. the mexican troops and people decamped, and the cannon were removed. hence the cannonade did little harm. a civil official reported the evacuation to lavallette of the _congress_, who was there with the _portsmouth_ (montgomery). as campusano, who was believed to have 600-800 troops and 6-8 guns, remained in the vicinity and cut off water and provisions, the town was abandoned by its foreign residents also. american marines landed, but soon reëmbarked. nov. 17 a landing party was ambushed in the town, and the _dale_, then occupying the harbor, took part in the firing. one american was wounded. the harbor of mazatlán was open to the worst winds. 30.27. the references to téllez in =76= are almost innumerable. it seems enough to cite here: m. gutiérrez, may 19, 1846; to j. i. gutiérrez, may 13, 17; to téllez, aug. 18; j. i. gutiérrez, may 9; also gaxiola, invasión, _passim_; apuntes, 371-3; =13=bankhead, no. 74, 1846; wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 99. see also chap. xvi, note 16.5. téllez, who was a generous, careless person, arrived at mazatlán at the head of an expedition bound for upper california. during the year before the war the receipts from the customhouse were about $3,000,000. he pronounced may 7, 1846, in favor of federalism as an excuse for insubordination. in jan., 1847, fearing the government might overpower him, he pronounced for santa anna as dictator. he pretended to be a loyal mexican, and the government wavered between recognizing him as comandante general of sinaloa and trying to crush him. finally it decided on the latter course. cut off from his financial resources by the americans, he could not support his forces, and toward the end of jan., 1848, he gave up. j. p. anaya was then comte. gen. (capture of mazatlán, etc.) ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1089-92, 1104, 1110, 1117; wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 144-5; apuntes, 374-5; =76=téllez, nov. 10, 14, 15; =61=shubrick to r. b. mason, dec. 6; =13=wooldridge, nov. 18; gaxiola, invasión, 163-6. the _erie_ had arrived at m. on nov. 1. (nov. 20) ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1105-8; wise, _op. cit._, 150-7; =76=téllez, nov. 20; u. s. naval instit. proceeds., 1888 (rowan, p. 555); apuntes, 376; =76=horn, nov. 15, 21; gaxiola, invasión, 186. a land party of 94 and a boat party of 62 set out from mazatlán at about 1 a.m. the mexicans, who were commanded by lieut. carlos horn, a swiss, ought to have been routed, but they had received notice of the expedition and were on the alert. the american land party fell partially into an ambuscade, and the boat party were misled. after some desultory fighting both sides retired. the americans lost 1 killed and 21 wounded. the mexican loss was probably somewhat larger. dec. 13 americans routed a mexican advanced party about twenty miles from the city, inflicting some loss and suffering none (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1083-4; ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1121). the mexican blockade was evaded easily by bribery. (fortifications) ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1120 (halleck), 1131 (shubrick); =76=j. p. anaya, mar. 11, 1848. (safe) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1083 (shubrick). (s. blas) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1084 (shubrick); comte. gen. of jalisco, jan. 11; feb. 22, 1848; ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1127 (bailey), 1128 (chatard). s. blas was blockaded under a fresh notice issued jan. 1, in consequence of the delay. (manzanillo) ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1129 (shubrick); princ. comte., colima, jan. 18; comte. gen. jalisco, feb. 1, 29. altata was blockaded feb. 13 by a hired schooner, the _triton_ (=76=comte. gen. sinaloa, feb. 21). (expeditions) ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1133-7, 1158-61; comte. gen. jalisco, feb. 1. jan. 31 shubrick reported that not one mexican cannon was mounted on the coast except at acapulco (ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1129). early in nov., 1847, t. a. c. jones set out from the east to meet the _ohio_ at valparaiso and succeed shubrick. 30.28. the fort at acapulco was now in a ruinous condition. the cannon were removed and (it was reported) sold by juan alvarez. shubrick (=47=aug. 11, 1847) said it was worse than useless to blockade mazatlán without blockading s. blas, because vessels unable to enter at m. would then enter at s. b. and pay duties to the mexicans. he forcibly urged upon scott and col. mason, commanding in california, the importance of providing troops (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1035; =61=dec. 6, 1847), and mason sent as far as oregon for volunteers (sherman, memoirs, i, 38); but every effort to find men was in vain (=61=mason, may 19, 1848). all that mason could spare went to lower california. with the men who were ashore shubrick said he could have sealed up the west coast (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1084). mason to stockton, jan. 11, 1847. s. josé was occupied mar. 30; s. lucas apr. 3; la paz apr. 13. in august two companies of n. y. volunteers under lt. col. burton arrived on the ground. the passing of men and munitions from the mainland to the peninsula was promptly cut off by our navy. the towns of mulejé (opposite guaymas) and comandú, several hundred miles to the north of la paz, were the centres of the opposition. citizens of the former under vicente mejía and of the latter under j. m. moreno, all commanded by manuel pineda, marched south with no little devotion. pineda moved against la paz (held by burton); the other two leaders against s. josé (held by lieut. heywood of the navy). the latter were repulsed without much difficulty, but only the arrival of the _cyane_, dec. 8, ended a series of small skirmishes at la paz. in jan. s. josé had to undergo a more serious attack. by the twelfth our garrison (27 marines, 15 seamen, some 20 volunteers) found itself, after a desultory siege of about three weeks, in a critical situation; but on the fourteenth du pont arrived in the _cyane_, and this ensured the defeat of the mexicans on the following day. march 22 about 150 american troops, who had left monterey mar. 5, arrived at la paz. burton, having now about 270 men, assumed the offensive, and the skirmish of mar. 30 at todos santos (without loss on the american side) ended the hostilities. the american casualties in all the skirmishing were insignificant. for the principal documents see ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 103-12, 1055-64, 1086-8, 1095-1102, 1110-2, 1117-8, 1122-7, 1129-31, 1137-55; ho. 17; 31, 1; sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 293, 299, 488-504; du pont, official despatches, 23, 31, 35; =76=pineda to comte. gen. sonora, oct. 3, 1847; =47=shubrick, dec. 4, 21; =76=princ. comte. of mulejé to v. mejía, oct. 3; =76=pineda and mejía, oct. 3; =76=relaciones to guerra, feb. 26, 1848. u. s. naval instit. proceeds., xiv, pp. 304-25. 30.29. =13=bankhead, no. 168, 1846. london _times_, jan. 30, 1847. =73=bermúdez de castro, nos. 441, 445, 1847. =163=semmes to conner, sept. 29, 1850. conner, home squadron, 3-4, 21. bennett, _monitor_, 40-1. =162=matson to conner, mar. 28, 1847. =162=mason to _id._, nov. 29, 1846, priv. and confid. richardson, messages, iv, 570-2. =13=giffard to bankhead, may 27, 1846. =166=shubrick to conner, aug. 19, 1845, priv. buchanan, works, vii, 240-1, 290-2. =47=conner, june 30, 1846. spain complained of us, but unjustly. some thought inefficiency was shown by the number of american vessels lost (besides the _somers_ and the _truxtun_, the _boston_, the _hecla_ and the _neptune_ were wrecked, the _perry_ and the _cumberland_ were damaged, and some minor losses were suffered), but considering the character of the coast this opinion seems unfair. an important feature of the war was the demonstration of the superiority of steam vessels. 30.30. =76=lavallette, proclam., oct. 26, 1847. apuntes, 375-9. conner, home squadron, 14. negrete, invasión, iii, 139-46; app., 399. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1092 (articles), 1109, 1129-33 (shubrick). =47=letter to shubrick, dec. 23, 1847. =47=lavallette, orders, 5, 6, 1847; 3, 5, 1848. semmes, service, 85-7. gaxiola, invasión, 166-81, 217, 223. duties to the amount of $150,000 were collected. conner reported, june 30, 1846, that the blockade had deprived mexico of $500,000 in duties. this paragraph belongs logically in chap. xxxi, but is placed here to complete the subject. xxxi. the americans as conquerors 31.1. for the conduct of naval men see pp. 208-9 and note 30.30 of that chapter. 31.2. _the american policy._ ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 155-8, 165-6, 284. _matamoros flag_, july 14, 1846. =60=marcy to mcelroy, may 19, 1846. polk, diary, may 19-20. our proclamations had some effect upon the people, but probably not much. they were accustomed to meaningless promises. 31.3. gen. patterson once asserted that volunteers were no worse than regulars, but the evidence of other officers and of the mexicans was overwhelmingly against him. regulars committed offences, but these appear to have been commonly pilfering, and to have been chargeable mostly to fresh recruits. it is probable, however, that the volunteers often bore the blame for acts done by soldiers dishonorably discharged, deserters, teamsters and other civilian employees and by the many "black legs" and "human vultures" who followed the army. the great difficulty was to identify the culprits. mexicans were often afraid to testify against our soldiers. 31.4. after matamoros was captured, crowds of women and girls continued to bathe naked in the river. the same thing occurred elsewhere. 31.5. a mexican wrote to gen. mejía that taylor expressly refused to accept any responsibility for such men, and that he said the people might kill them. 31.6. _the matamoros district._ =91=ayuntamiento archives. davis, autobiog., 102. meade, letters, i, 86, 91, 105, 108-9, 147. =218=hershaw narrative. tilden, notes, 21. robertson, remins., 71. scott (=256= to marcy, jan. 16, 1847, private) gave an appalling account of the outrages and added, "as far as i can learn, not one of the felons has been punished." =291=cushing to pierce, may 4, 1847. smith, chile con carne, 292-4. brackett, lane's brigade, 22. buhoup, narrative, 50. oswandel, notes, 37, 49, 193. v. cruz _american eagle_, apr. 10, 1847. =13=giffard to pakenham, may 28; to bankhead, may 20; june 9. =13=bankhead, no. 118, 1846. french, two wars, 58. =65=taylor, gen. orders 62, may 17; 65, may 23; 94, aug. 2. =65=patterson, orders, sept. 29; oct. 14. _picayune_, aug. 4, 25. new orl. _commer. bulletin_, sept. 22. =69=cushing, order, sept. 24, 1847. =69=longoria, statement, aug. 17. =60=patterson to bliss, oct. 21. =60=taylor to hepburn _et al._, nov. 2. zirckel, tagebuch, 45-6. matamoros _reveille_, june 24. henry, camp. sketches, 118, 122, 124, 137. giddings, sketches, 89. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1178. _niles_, aug. 1, 1846, p. 341; sept. 12, p. 23. davis, recolls., 236. _spirit of the times_, july 4. sedgwick, corresp., i., 4-5. new london _morning news_, dec. 10. _history teacher's mag._, apr., 1912 (vieregg). =308=shields to walker, aug. 3. _nat. intelligencer_, dec. 23, 1846. =193=foster to father, aug. 14, 1846 (matamoros a "complete sink of pollution"). =180=pillow to wife, sept. 6, 1846. =76=mejía, june 20. =76=spanish consul, matamoros, june 7. =76=garcía to parrodi june 20; aug. 10. =76=division of the north, _noticias_, july 8. =76=_gaceta de tamaulipas_, july 16. =76=parrodi, june 3. =76=carroll to faulac, aug. 9. 31.7. in june, 1847, taylor expressed the opinion that the texan horse had scarcely made one expedition without committing murder, and asked that no more should be sent to him (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1178). some of them committed outrages at parras, where the americans had been kindly treated, and wool then ordered that texan volunteers should not be sent on distant expeditions except under "extraordinary circumstances" (=69=mcdowell to hamtramck, dec. 10, 1847). 31.8. _e.g._: no soldier quartered outside the town (as nearly all were) could enter it without a pass signed by his captain and his colonel. such passes were good for only one day, and only two could be issued the same day in the same company. soldiers could use only a particular road and had to leave the city before the retreat was sounded (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 508). besides punishing offences, our commanders endeavored, first of all, to prevent the sale of liquor; secondly, to shut out gamblers and other undesirable followers of the army; and, thirdly, to inculcate a sense of humanity and a regard for the rights of the people. in april, 1847, well-to-do refugees were ordered to return to monterey under the threat of occupying their houses, for while absent they were beyond the reach of american taxes and were encouraging guerillas (=97=monterey judge, apr. 14, 1847). a similar policy was followed elsewhere. 31.9. american officers were not, however, flabby in protecting the lives of their men, and sometimes the authorities or the people of a place where one of these fell a victim to mexican hate were held responsible until the culprit was discovered (_e.g._, =61=wool to pleasanton, jan. 15, 1848). such wholesale justice was often the only possible kind, and there is ample evidence that even the cruel retaliation practised by our soldiers had good effects. 31.10. _the monterey district._ meade, letters, i., 108, 130, 147, 161. =218=henshaw narrative. _picayune_, jan. 27, 1847. =212=hastings, diary, may 28, 1847. giddings, sketches, 221, 325. buhoup, narrative, 108. thorpe, our army at monterey, 120. =144=cassidy, recoils. anon, diary. =97=ayunt., saltillo, apr. 14, 1847. =93=ayunt., monterey, oct. 8, 1846; may 18, 1847. durango _registro oficial_, oct. 15, 1846. _epoca_, oct. 17. london _times_, june 15, 1847. =221=hill, diary. =280=nunelee, diary. =303=orders 149, dec. 3, 1846. everett, recolls., 216-9. =13=giffard to bankhead, may 20, 1846. =13=bankhead, no. 118, 1846. _diario_, oct. 9, 24; nov. 2. _monitor repub._, oct. 18, 28; nov. 20. washington _union_, dec. 29. _national intelligencer_, sept. 10; nov. 11; dec. 7, 23. _metropol. mag._, dec., 1907 (hamilton). henry, camp. sketches, 222-5. smith, to mexico, 85, 89. =61=hamtramck to mcdowell, jan. 20, 1848. =65=wool, orders 67, feb. 26, 1848. =65=taylor, gen. orders, 126, oct. 5, 1846; 149, dec. 2. =65=patterson, orders, sept. 29; oct. 14. =65=wool, orders 7, 15, 25, 31, 64, 66-7, 94, 112, jan.-mar., 1848. =65=taylor, special orders 114, sept., 1847. =65=wool, special orders 147, 156, dec., 1847. =61=wool to hamtramck, dec. 18, 1847. =61=mcdowell to hamtramck, dec. 10, 1847; to butler, mar. 2, 1848. =61=wool to pleasanton, jan. 15, 1848. =307=roberts, diary, nov. 28; dec 5, 1846. _delta_, aug. 15, 1847. =147=chamberlain, diary. apuntes, 65. _gaceta extraordinaria_, victoria, aug. 17, 1846. wilhelm, eighth infantry, i, 281. =69=morales to taylor, sept. 29; oct. 6. =65=worth, orders, oct. 8. =69=_id._ to bliss, sept. 27; oct. 5. =61=_id._, endorsement on statement of gaines. =61=taylor, june 4, 1847. =61=wool to jones, may 9, 1848. j. davis in _cong. globe_, 37, 1, app., p. 1034. =93=mitchell, proclam., apr. 6, 1847. =93=tibbatts, orders, sept. 8, 1847. _republicano_, apr. 14, 1847. carpenter, travels, 13, 29, 30. =52=dimond, no. 341, may 24, 1846. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 430-1, 1125, 1138, 1178 (taylor); 508, 512-3, orders 126, 146, 149; 533, spec. orders 113. _niles_, nov. 14, 1846, p. 165; nov. 21, p. 180; apr. 10, 1847, p. 89; oct. 23, p. 115. =370=taylor to louisville legion, dec. 1, 1846. _hist. mag._, may, 1870 (deas). sen. 32; 31, 1, p. 43. =214=hays and caperton, life of hays. _observador zacatecano_, dec. 27, 1846, supplement. =76=gonzález to s. anna, nov. 21, 1846. =76=garcia to parrodi, aug. 10, 1846. =76=ampudia, oct. 4, 1846. =76=j. f. rada, oct. 17. =76=letter from cadereita, apr. 5, 1847. =76=many others. by the end of the war desolation marked the route from the rio grande to saltillo except at the sizable towns. to the credit of the volunteers it should be added that on mar. 9, 1847, two priests and other citizens of monterey presented a =93=petition to taylor to let the kentucky regiment garrison the city, not only because those soldiers were accustomed to it, but because their "well known morality and good conduct" inspired "security and confidence." 31.11. some of the orders were: strangers now here and mexicans arriving must report for examination, no mexican may have arms or leave town without permission, all mexicans conducting themselves properly are entitled to civil and kind treatment as well as protection, and the troops must not molest them under pain of severe punishment (jan. 25, 1847); all officers are to see that soldiers annoying the mexicans are punished (feb. 1); not only officers but men are to arrest any soldier maltreating a mexican (feb. 12); gambling-houses and drinking-houses must be broken up, no one may stay in town who would countenance such things, "improper intruders" will not be tolerated, and quiet must be maintained (march 16); officers in town without my express permission must return to the camp at buena vista (june 6); no one may reside at saltillo, if able to work, without some honest vocation, a tariff of prices will be issued from time to time, public exhibitions and dances without permission are prohibited, mexican houses may not be taken for private uses without the consent of the owners (july 9). some of these orders were merely repetitions of orders previously given. the policy was to have no more troops in town than were needed to guard property, etc. to prevent serious outrages, soldiers were forbidden to leave the camp at buena vista armed (=65=aug. 10, 1847); and this was the rule elsewhere. 31.12. _the saltillo district._ wilhelm, eighth infantry, i., 299. =300=prickett, letters. =97=ayuntamiento archives. =97=jefe político to ayunt., nov. 30, 1846. =34=stokes to graham, aug. 8, 1847. perry, indiana, 138, 142. =61=paine to porterfield, jan. 24, 1848. =69=worth to e. gonzález, dec. 16, 17, 1846. =65=wool, orders 202, 209, 219, 245, etc., jan.-mar., 1847. =65=_id._, orders 275, 286, 308, 315, 341, 350, 394, 455, may-sept., 1847. =65=_id._, orders 138, dec. 14, 1847. =61=mcdowell to hamtramck, dec. 28, 1847. _picayune_, june 1; july 2, 1847. =65=worth, orders, nov. 16, 19, 23. =97=_id._, proclam., nov. 19. =69=_id._ to saltillo officials, nov. 17, 23. =69=gov. saltillo, order, jan. 11, 1848. _correo nacional_, mar. 3, 1848. =348=pattridge to miss w., aug. 25, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1111, 1125 (taylor). _littell_, no. 165, p. 88 (saltillo, may 11, 1847). =364=worth to daughter, jan. 4, 1847. _monitor repub._, mar. 29, 1847. arnold, jackson, 87-90. and from =76= the following and many more. gonzález to worth, nov. 30; reply, dec. 2. relaciones, feb. 1, 1848. gonzález to s. anna, nov. 21, 1846. orders of worth, nov. 16, 19, 22, 23, 1846. gonzález, protest, nov. 22, 1846. worth to gonzález, nov. 28; dec. 17, 1846. s. anna, jan. 4, 1847 (with docs. from gonzález). worth to ----, nov. 17, 1846. hunten to gonzález, mar. 29, 1847. filisola, aug. 10, 1847. avalos, aug. 5, 1847. 31.13. it was left for a regular to show the benefit of discipline, for he visited a suburban village, terrorized some 250 able-bodied mexicans, and went calmly from house to house collecting blackmail. 31.14. _the tampico district._ =99=ayuntamiento archives. =146=caswell, diary, apr. 1, 1847. _eco_, dec. 9, 1846. =99=shields to ayunt., dec. 28, 1846; jan. 2, 1847. =13=consul glass, aug. 21, 1847. =69=gates, orders 17, 26, 28, 35, mar.-apr., 1847. =159=collins, diary (introduction). =65=gates, orders 30, 48, 49; special orders 7, 10, 30, 41. _picayune_, jan. 2, 8; feb. 18; mar. 19. =69=shields, orders 3, dec. 22, 1846; to bliss, jan. 13, 1847. =61=j. l. gardner, nov. 23, 1846. =61=gates, dec. 4, 1846. =61=_id._, orders, sept: 18, 1847. =61=shields, orders, jan. 1, 2, 6, 1847. =61=_id._, dec. 23, 1846; jan. 19, 1847. =75=hacienda to relaciones, dec. 3, 1847. lawton, artillery officer, 12, 24, 37, 39, 40, 46-7. ballentine, english soldier, i, 276-81. wilhelm, eighth infantry, i, 299. =76=i. múñoz, nov. 26, 1846, =76=r. m. núñez, jan. 25, 1847. =76=testimony of mateo dorante. =76=f. de garay, jan. 22, 1847. =76=docs. sent by garay. =76=a. gonzález to urrea, feb. 1, 1847. =76=many others. 31.15. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 333-6 (marcy). =224=hitchcock, diary, mar. 26, 1846. =52=w. s. parrott, oct. 4, 1845. =52=slidell, no. 3, dec. 17, 1845. =61=taylor, no. 10, feb. 7, 1846. =61=carbajal to taylor, feb. 6, 1846. =61=_id._, memo., feb. 6. =61=canales to taylor, jan. 29, 1846. =61=[mesa to taylor], statement. _monitor repub._, june 14, 1846. =93=ayunt. to gov. n. león, dec. 31, 1846. london _times_, june 15, 1847. _picayune_, aug. 11, 1846. ampudia, manifiesto, 1847. henshaw narrative. =69=unsigned statement. =285=mejía to paredes, july 20, 1846. =52=butler, aug. 1, 1832. smith, annex. of texas, 46-7. _niles_, nov. 21, 1846, p. 180. =76=comte. gen. nuevo león, broadside, aug. 12, 1846. =76=ampudia, sept. 9, 1846. =76=mora y villamil, apr. 19, 1847, res. =76=many others. the number of citations could be multiplied, and the author may write an article or brief monograph on the subject. 31.16. july 7, 1847, the veteran ex-editor of the washington _globe_ said in a =345=letter: my son [frank p. blair, who had been u. s. district attorney of the province] "represents the state of things in new mexico as horrible. it seems that even respectable men at home, have become so depraved by the license of the region they are in, that they stick at no enormity whatever." a little later the most concise report from santa fe ran thus, "all is hubbub and confusion here, discharged volunteers are leaving, drunk, and volunteers not discharged are remaining drunk" (_niles_, nov. 6, 1847, p. 155). 31.17. here, as in california, military rule was softened by having a subordinate civil administration. the reader will understand, of course, that not everything was bad. in the scanty space that can be given to the subject here it is necessary to speak in broad terms. 31.18. _new mexico._ _nat. intelligencer_, dec. 8, 1846; apr. 1; may 13; aug. 11, 1847. wash. _union_, mar. 18; apr. 21, 1847. n. y. _tribune_, nov. 22, 1847. prince, concise history, 182-6. =13=doyle, no. 29, mar. 14, 1848. sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 58-9. =52=alvarez, sept. 4, 1846. =63=marcy to kearny, may 10, 1847. =61=kearny order, sept. 22, 1846. =61=grier, feb. 15, 1847. =61=newby, sept. 18; oct. 8, 1847. =61=price, feb. 26; aug. 14, 1847. =60=marcy to price, mar. 30, 1847; to edwards, mar. 25, 1847. =61=ingalls, feb. 16, 1847. =61=fischer, feb. 16, 1847. bancroft, pacific states, xii, 431. =61=broadside, feb. 15, 1847. =68=court-martial, feb. 4, 1848 (s. fe). =69=vigil, mar. 26, 1847. sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 183-6. inman, old s. fe trail, 113-40. =345=blair to van buren july 7, 1847. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 445, 1847. _anzeiger des westens_, sept. 24, 26; nov. 16, 1846; june 21, 1847 (kribben). =243=kribben, letters. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 172, 174-7 (kearny). ho. report 52; 37, 3. _niles_, apr. 24, 1847, pp. 119, 121; june 19, p. 252; aug. 14, p. 375; nov. 6, p. 155. n. y. _courier and enquirer_, aug. 13, 1847. ho. 5; 31, 1, p. 104. report of conner, indian affairs, 1858, p. 188. ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 11, 13, 17, 21, 24, 31, 33, 34, etc. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 520, 524, 531-5, 545. =256=polk to marcy, june 2, 1846. =201=gibson, diary. _picayune_, mar. 5, 1847. ho. 41; 30, 1, pp. 498, 511-2, 551. richardson, messages, iv, 507, 594, 639. wash. _union_, oct. 3; nov. 25, 1846. parkman, calif, and ore. trail, 416-20. elliott, notes, 233, 247. =224=santa fe letter (printed). sen. 23; 30, 1 (abert). ruxton, adventures (1847 ed.), 185, 189. benton, view, ii, 683. =61=price, sept. 18, 1847. =212=hastings, diary. cooke, conquest, 39, 41, 50. =239=mead to kemper, july 26, 1841. hughes, doniphan's expedition, 131. =61=wooster, sept. 25, 1846. sen. 7; 30, 1 (emory). ho. 24; 31, 1. price, portrait (mo. hist. soc.). =61=_id._ to delegates; to adj. gen., feb. 6, 1848. =65=_id._, orders 10, feb. 5. =61=prince to vigil, dec. 21, 1847. numerous documents relating to the subject may be found among the vigil papers (n. mex. hist. soc.). cutts, conquest, 217-35, 240-3. =76=varela, sept. 6, 1847. =76=chávez to armijo, aug. 24, 1847. =76=ugarte to filisola, july 2, 1847. =76=bent, proclam., jan. 2, 1847. =76=many others. the american loss in fighting the insurgents was 8 killed, 52 wounded. chihuahua was merely an addendum to santa fe. the people seemed to regard our troops "as a race of devils and with just reason," wrote a soldier in his diary. once two americans, fighting in their cups, tore each other's clothes off and went stark naked through the streets. of course property suffered. the women, however, in spite of husbands, fiancés and priests, were devoted to the americans, and when the time for evacuation came some followed their lovers for leagues, and a few even for days. for the state of things in chihuahua: sen. misc. 26; 30, 1. _the anglo-saxon_, (chihuahua), no. 1. bustamante, nuevo bernal, ii, 110. ho. report 404; 30, 1, pp. 6, 13. rondé, voyage, 136, 138-9. =212=hastings, diary. =201=gibson, diary. _anzeiger des westens_, june 21, 1847 (kribben). _republicano_, april 10, 1847. 31.19. kearny claimed the right to govern, but stockton and frémont insisted that his instructions to take possession of california and establish a civil government there had been made obsolete by events. kearny perforce accepted the situation for a time, and with his dragoons went north at the end of january. the friction between him and frémont was acute. finally, when both were on their way east, kearny had frémont arrested. on charges--essentially insubordination--preferred by the general, frémont was tried by a court-martial and sentenced to be dismissed from the army (=65=adj. gen., orders, feb. 17, 1848). polk remitted the sentence, but frémont resigned. this controversy having been merely incidental to the war, more space cannot be given to it; but, as the opinion of the author may be desired, he will say, after reviewing all the documents of the case, that he thinks frémont was a provokingly unprincipled and successful schemer, and that kearny showed himself grasping, jealous, domineering and harsh. 31.20. the mormons were free july 16, 1847, and but one company could be recruited from the battalion. this served till march 14, 1848. a part of the new york regiment was sent to lower california (chap. xxx, note 28, and the gold-diggings led some to desert. february 1, 1848, mason had only 621 effectives (=61=mason to adj. gen., feb. 1, 1848). 31.21. _california._ (this note, as written, included nearly two hundred items; but, as the subject concerns the history of the mexican war only incidentally, it has been condensed.) reports from military and naval officers in the adjutant general's office and the navy (squadron and captains' letters) archives. =323-5=stevenson, letter book, gen. order book, regtal. ord. book. colton, three years, 24, 32, 155, 172, 175. cooke, conquest, 45, etc. ho. 70; 30, 1, pp. 28, etc. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 160, 229, 242, 245-6. benton, view, ii, 715, 718. clark, first regt., 12, etc. =316=sherman papers. sen. 1; 29, 2, pp. 49-50, 65. _calif. star_, mar. 6, 1847. london _times_, aug. 13-4, 1846. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 55-7, 947. sherman letters, 39. wise, gringos, 47, etc. hughes, doniphan's exped., 204-30, 244-8. =256=marcy papers. =247=larkin papers. bancroft, pacific states, xii, 478; xvii, 417, etc. =4=amador, memorias, 172. =122=bidwell, california, 180. =210=hammond papers. _annals amer. acad._, xii, 70-1 (r. d. hunt). =349=watterston papers. =120=biddle papers. cutts, conquest, 65, 71, 123, 164, 248. wash. _union_, sept. 30; dec. 9, 1846. n. y. _journ. of commerce_, dec. 30, 1846. _diario_, oct. 16, 1846. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, p. 604 (benton). _annals of the am. acad._, xii, 71 (hunt). _nat. intelligencer_, sept. 22, 1846. buchanan, works, vii, 332. =132=buchanan papers. hall, s. josé, 154-6. sherman, home letters, 96, 113. _id._, mems., i, 29, 34, 56. _niles_, aug. 29, p. 416; sept. 12, 1846, p. 20; oct. 23, 1847, p. 115. sen. 33; 30, 1. ho. rep., 817; 30, 1. sen. 439; 29, 1. ho. 17; 31, 1. ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 47, 51, 53, etc., 1037, 1069. revere, tour, 78. sen. 7; 30, 1. sen. rep. 75; 30, 1, pp. 14-5. sen. 31; 30, 2, pp. 23, 28-30. sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 398-401. tuthill, calif., 208-13. schafer, pacific slope, 269. porter, kearny, 31. willey, trans. period, 66, 70. royce, calif., 197. =120=cits. to biddle, mar. 2, 1847. tyler, concise hist., 202-52, 277, 288. stockton, life, 158. =372=hyde, statement. =70="californias" (see richman, california, for many of the most important). =76=pérez, oct. 22. =76=comadurán to comte. gen. sonora, nov. 14; to cooke, dec. 16. =76=_id._, nov. 21; dec. 17. =76=cooke to gándera, dec. 18. =76=cuesta, dec. 30, 1846; july 23, 1847. =76=estado, tucson, dec. 3, 1846. =76=limón to cooke, [dec. 16]; reply, [dec. 16]. =76=cuesta to mil. comte. arispe, dec. 18. =76=vanguard section, estado, dec. 23; etc. for the mormons see vol. i, p. 290. p. st. g. cooke, acting as it. col., led the mormon battalion from santa fe, new mex., to california. 31.22. "_head quarters of the army_, tampico, february 19, 1847. _general orders, no. 20._ 1. it may well be apprehended that many grave offences not provided for in the act of congress 'establishing rules and articles for the government of the armies of the united states,' approved april 10, 1806, may be again committed--by, or upon, individuals of those armies, in mexico, pending the existing war between the two republics. allusion is here made to atrocities, any one of which, if committed within the united states or their organized territories, would, of course, be tried and severely punished by the ordinary or civil courts of the land. 2. assassinations; murder; malicious stabbing or maiming; rape; malicious assault and battery; robbery; theft; the wanton desecration of churches, cemeteries or other religious edifices and fixtures, and the destruction, except by order of a superior officer, of public or private property, are such offences. 3. the good of the service, the honor of the united states and the interests of humanity, imperiously demand that every crime, enumerated above, should be severely punished. (paragraphs 4-6 demonstrate the necessity of a code supplemental to the rules and articles of war.) 7. that unwritten code is _martial law_, as an addition to the written military code, prescribed by congress in the rules and articles of war, and which unwritten code, all armies, in hostile countries, are forced to adopt--not only for their own safety, but for the protection of the unoffending inhabitants and their property, about the theaters of] military operations, against injuries contrary to the laws of war. 8. from the same supreme necessity, martial law is hereby declared, as a supplemental code in, and about, all camps, posts and hospitals which may be occupied by any part of the forces of the united states, in mexico, and in, and about, all columns, escorts, convoys, guards and detachments, of the said forces, while engaged in prosecuting the existing war in, and against the said republic. 9. accordingly, every crime, enumerated in paragraph no. 2, above, whether committed--1. by any inhabitant of mexico, sojourner or traveller therein, upon the person or property of any individual of the united states' forces, retainer or follower of the same; 2. by any individual of the said forces, retainer or follower of the same, upon the person or property of any inhabitant of mexico, sojourner or traveller therein, or 3. by any individual of the said forces, retainer or follower of the same, upon the person or property of any other individual of the said forces, retainer or follower of the same--shall be duly tried and punished under the said supplemental code. 10. for this purpose it is ordered, that all offenders, in the matters aforesaid, shall be promptly seized and confined, and reported, for trial, before _military commissions_ to be duly appointed as follows: 11. every military commission, under this order, will be appointed, governed and limited, as prescribed by the 65th, 66th, 67th, and 97th, of the said rules and articles of war, and the proceedings of such commissions will be duly recorded, in writing, reviewed, revised, disapproved or approved, and the sentences executed--all, as in the cases of the proceedings and sentences of courts-martial; _provided_, that no military commission shall try any case clearly cognizable by any court-martial, and _provided_ also that no sentence of a military commission shall be put in execution against any individual, whatsoever, which may not be, according to the nature and degree of the offence, as established by evidence, in conformity with known punishments, in like cases, in some one of the states of the united states of america. 12. this order will be read at the head of every company serving in mexico." this order helps to explain the later improvement at the north which we have noted. 31.23. the ordinary safeguard ran thus: "by authority of ... the person, the property, and the family of ... [or such a college, mill, etc., and the persons and things belonging to it] are placed under the safeguard of the united states. to offer any violence or injury to them is expressly forbidden; on the contrary, it is ordered that safety and protection be given to him, or them, in case of need." safeguards were given to towns also. the following is a specimen: "_safeguard._ office of the civil & military governor, puebla, 22nd january, 1848. whereas the municipality of the town of san martin, on the main road to mexico, has presented a solicitation to this government with regard to certain permissions and protection this safeguard is given to said municipality in the following terms.--1. the authorities and inhabitants of san martin, their families and private property are placed under the protection of the united states forces, as long as they remain quiet, neutral and peaceable and will therefore be left unmolested and not interfered with by the troops and followers of the united states army. on the contrary their civil authorities will be respected, and protection and assistance will be given to them such as they should need or claim.--2. all honorable and peaceable inhabitants guaranteed to be such by the municipality have permission to carry arms for the defence of the community, their persons and their property against robbers.--3. they are allowed to organize a neutral police force of twenty five armed and mounted men for protection of the town against robbers and for assisting the authorities in executing their duties, the criminals taken prisoners by them to be delivered over to the governor of puebla.--4. permission is likewise granted to said authorities and inhabitants to defend themselves against any one who comes to plunder, rob or attack them, may he be robber, guerrillero [_i.e._, "guerilla"], or an american soldier.--5. the municipality of san martin has permission, to arrest and remit to their commanding officers all american soldiers, they may find within the district of san martin, drunk dispersed or deserters.--6. it is strictly prohibited to the troops and followers of the united states army to open the prison at san martin and put the criminals in liberty.--7. a copy of this safeguard has been forwarded to the general in chief of the united states forces in order to communicate it to the commanding officers of the army, and of divisions, which have to pass by san martin. another copy has been remitted to the commanding officer of the military post at rio frio.--" 31.24. numerous large monasteries, occupied by only a few monks, were found useful, and the use of them for such a purpose gave no offence (scott, mems., ii, 580). 31.25. _scott's policy._ scott, mems., ii, 393-6, 547-9, 580. hitchcock in _republic_, feb. 15, 1851. lawton, artillery officer, 147. =69=safeguard. =60=scott, may 26, 1846. =65=gen. orders 20, feb. 19, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 873. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 55. _so. qtrly. review_, jan., 1852, p. 133. 31.26. scott called upon "the 97 honorable men in every 100" to seize in the act and report the "scoundrels" committing outrages (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 914). he thus enlisted, he believed, the coöperation of "thousands of good soldiers" (=60=to marcy, apr. 5, 1847). as in civil life, it was of course impossible to apprehend all the criminals. 31.27. the impracticable attempt to keep liquor out of the city was not tried here. a system of license and supervision was adopted. april 1 two taverns were authorized to sell liquor (to be used on the premises). 31.28. worth's successors in the governorship were col. henry wilson up to about the middle of december, 1847; gen. james bankhead for a few days; gen. twiggs until mar. 25, 1848; col. wilson for a day or two; gen. s. w. kearny. when wilson left in december, 1847, the merchants and consuls gave him a vote of thanks (lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 585). mar. 30, 1848, the mexican ayuntamiento was restored. 31.29. thompson, recolls., 4. dysentery was prevalent and dangerous. dec. 29, 1847, a responsible writer at vera cruz stated that not less than 1,200 americans had succumbed there to the climate since april. 31.30. _the vera cruz district._ =52=trist, may 7, 1847. bullock, six months (1825 ed.), i, 19, 20. =100=ayuntamiento archives. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 572-3, 584-5. lyon, journal, ii, 214, 221. _flag of freedom_, i, no. 4. lawton, artillery officer, 112, 115, 117, 119. _niles_, sept. 25, 1847, p. 53, etc. =361=woods, recolls. =144=cassidy, recolls. =327=sutherland, letters. =322=smith, diary. =152=claiborne, mems. =270=moore, diary. oswandel, notes, 105-6. =86=s. anna to soto, apr. 14, 1847. wash. _union_, july 26, 29, 1847. _amer. eagle_, v. cruz, apr. 3, 13; oct. 11, 16, 1847. =76=j. soto, july 3, 1847. =256=j. parrott to marcy, apr. 19, 1847. =13=giffard, apr. 13; may 15; june 15, 1847. =221=hill, diary. =69=scott to patterson, mar. 30, 1847. =65=wilson, orders (1847) 20, 23, 64, 116, 128, 142. =65=bankhead, orders 167. =65=twiggs, orders 11, 14. =65=wilson, orders (1848), 130. =65=kearny, orders 172. =65=scott, gen. orders 75, 87, 101. =60=wilson to marcy, aug. 1, 1847. =61=worth, orders 1-7. =61=kearny, apr. 9, 1848, and endorsement. _don simplicio_, apr. 21, 1847. _diario_, apr. 13, 1847. long, lee, 68. =60=scott, apr. 5, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 914 (scott); 938 (dorich). =166=pommarès to conner, oct. 7, 1846. stevens, stevens, i, 117-8. =12=pell of sloop _daring_, nov. 30, 1847. kenly, md. vol., 288-9. 31.31. _the córdoba district._ =88=ayuntamiento archives. moreno, cantón, 378, 380, 382-3. london _saturday review_, 1865, p. 6. =65=bankhead, orders 11, 12, 28. 31.32. _the orizaba district._ =94=ayuntamiento archives. cubas, cuadro, 54. velasco, geografía, iii, 179. diccionario universal (_orizaba_). =65=bankhead, orders 38, 100. =69=colección de itinerarios. 31.33. neither at jalapa nor elsewhere were there many complaints from women. here the soldiers gave parties. harlots were the only women present, but they were treated--to the great amusement of the town--as ladies (roa bárcena, recuerdos, 247). 31.34. _the jalapa district._ =90=ayuntamiento archives. brackett, lane's brigade, 62-3. vigne, travels, i, 14-16. bullock, six months (1825 ed.), i, 55. velasco, geografía, iii, 28, 37, 54, 97. =257=orders and letters from g. h[ughes] to frank [markoe]. oswandel, notes, 196, 389. semmes, service, 205, 215. _nacional_, dec. 22, 1847; jan. 5, 1848. =69=alcalde to gov., nov. 25, 27, 1847. =69=orders, dec. 3, 10, 15, 1847; feb. 4; apr. 25; may 7, 1848. =69=patterson to pillow, sept. 22, 1846; to ----, nov. 24, 1847. =69=am. gov. to alcalde, nov. 26; dec. 13, 1847; jan. 17; feb. 28; mar. 15, 1848. =69=hughes, proclam., nov. 30, 1847. =287=parrish, diary. =332=tennery, diary. _picayune_, may 28; dec. 19, 24, 25, 1847. kenly, md. volunteer, 365-8, 382. wash. _union_, may 22, 1847. =159=collins papers. lyon, journal, ii, 186. ward, mexico, ii, 193. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 58-9. grone, briefe, 62. rivera, jalapa, iii, 900-2; iv, 20, 28-34. =69=hughes to prefect, may 31, 1848; to scott, jan. 5, 1848; to first alcalde, mar. 27, 1848; orders, nov. 29, 30, 1847; jan. 10; feb. 19; may 4, 5, 1848. =69=_id._ to officers, jan. 15, 1848. =68=court of inquiry, jalapa, may 31, 1848. _arco iris_, dec. i, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1029. _niles_, jan. 1, 1848, p. 276. =76=soto, proclam., sept. 10, 1847. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 235-6, 245-7. hartman, journal, 13. =327=sutherland to father, undated. =13=bankhead, no. 42, 1847 (the conduct of scott and his officers at jalapa is "highly extolled"). 31.35. lawton, artill. officer, 272. the presence of scott, worth and other superior officers who, as the soldiers knew, could not be trifled with, may help to explain the mystery. (later some outrages occurred.) the troops were kept within a large square space with sentries at each corner, and the boundaries of it could not be crossed after dark by either civilians or soldiers (_republicano_, june 14). at one place on the way to puebla, wrote a soldier in his diary, a sentry was placed at every shop, and even women selling bread on the street were guarded. 31.36. personally lane discouraged outrages. once when some of his famished men had robbed a poor man's cornfield lane, besides having him paid the full amount of the damages, added as much more from his own pocket (brackett, lane's brig., 74-5). it was said that priests were sometimes ill-used, but this was natural enough when they were capable of coöperating with guerillas, inducing american soldiers to desert, and harboring such deserters. 31.37. _the puebla district._ _flag of freedom_, i, nos. 1, 5. lawton, artillery officer, 272. =270=moore, diary. =95=childs, proclam., nov. 11, 1847 (placard). oswandel, notes, 345, 390. =95=ayuntamiento archives (proceedings, correspondence with worth, orders of worth, etc.). =95=fúrlong, proclam., oct. 14, 1847. =95=childs, proclam., oct. 25, 1847. =95=the bishop to scott, dec. 1, 1847. =95=fúrlong to scott, dec. 1, 1847. =95=ayunt. to prefect, oct. 26, 1847. =304=worth, orders, may 16, 1847. brackett, lane's brigade, 121, 125, 131, 136, 165, 210. =356=whitcomb, diary. _republicano_, june 13, 14, 21 (_el national_), 24, 1847. =69=fúrlong to am. gov., aug. 10, 1847. =69=prefect to childs, oct. 14; nov. 2, 8; dec. 20, 1847; feb. 8, 1848. =69=childs's official papers =61=scott, gen. orders 187, 1847. _nacional_, dec. 18, etc, 1847. =95=report of the committee appointed to confer with scott, jan. 4, 1848. =75=jefe político tlaxcala to scott, nov. 23, 1847. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 122-3. donnavan, adventures, 100. colección de documentos (childs, orders, oct. 16). ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1030 (childs). there was special feeling about churches. the bishop of puebla complained to scott that our soldiers desecrated a church at tlaxcala, and stole some priests' robes. but the soldiers had found that the church was the base of the guerillas they were pursuing, and discovered the robes on the floor. our officers made great efforts to prevent outrages here and to restore the stolen property (brackett, lane's brigade, 211; zirckel, tagebuch, 123; etc.). it seems to have been true that no church was desecrated by americans that had not been desecrated by mexicans, and used for hostile purposes. 31.38. the lépero dared not attack a sober american soldier. the scheme was to get the soldiers intoxicated, and, when they staggered and fell, knife them. after a time our men invented a trick to meet it. they would pretend to be intoxicated, fall to the ground, and make ready for the would-be assassin; and finally the léperos feared a drunken soldier even more than a sober one. carrying concealed weapons was forbidden; suspected persons were searched; and any one found guilty was given twenty lashes on the bare back. this had an excellent effect. 31.39. a specimen case was that of private gahagiun of the seventh infantry (=65=gen. orders 378). for breaking into a house and taking some ladies' clothing he was sentenced to receive fifty lashes on his bare back "well laid on with a rawhide," to be confined at hard labor during the rest of his term, to be then dishonorably discharged and drummed out--$250 of his pay to go to the person robbed and the rest to be confiscated. mexicans as well as americans were publicly flogged. in extreme cases hanging was the punishment. scott made the following daily details in order to ensure order and discipline (=65=gen. orders 298, september 24, 1847): "1. a general officer of the day to report to me; to superintend the good order and discipline of the garrison, visit the guards and outposts, organize patrols, and receive reports regarding order and discipline. 2. a field officer of the day of each division and of the cavalry brigade to superintend the troops in quarters, be present at the mounting and dismounting of the guards, have control of the in-lying pickets, etc. 3. one third of each regiment not on other duty will constitute its portion of the in-lying guard. 4. a captain or subaltern of the day of each regiment will superintend the quarters, attend the parading of regimental guards, have the roll called frequently and at unexpected times, visit company kitchens and messes, etc." the drill of the troops was kept up, and of course it was only when off duty that they could be disorderly. doyle reported that a gentleman from pachuca, a place at some distance from mexico, said: "nothing can be better than the behavior of the american troops at pachuca" (no. 5, 1848). on the other hand lane's men were guilty of excesses at tulancingo. in =65=gen. orders 395, december 31, 1847, scott said: "men free at home, must maintain the honor of freeman when abroad. if they forget _that_, they will degrade themselves to the level of felons and slaves, and may be rightfully condemned and treated as such; for felons, according to the laws of god and man, are _slaves_" (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1066). 31.40. quitman strictly forbade (sept. 21) "any interference with or mutiliation of the books, papers, or records contained within the palace." 31.41. matamoros, monterey, tampico, jalapa and puebla had an american newspaper; vera cruz and mexico two. 31.42. in consequence of the incapacity of our medical men and particularly their ignorance of the effects of the climate, diseases not considered dangerous by residents often proved fatal to the american soldiers (=13=thornton, no. 5, 1847). 31.43. _the mexico district._ davis, autobiog., 246, 258, 261-2, 277. henshaw narrative. donnavan, adventures, 93, 97. instrucciones otorgadas. wise, gringos, 260. lawton, artillery officer, 314-5, 321. jameson, calhoun corresp., 1163-5. quitman, orders, oct. 6, 1847, in papeles varios. _journ. milit. serv. instit._, xv, 627. mcsherry, puchero, 163. _vedette_, ii, no. 10 (brooks). norton, life, 172. =321=smith, diary. =358=williams to father, dec. 27, 1847; feb. 22, 1848. =152=claiborne, mems. oswandel, notes, 431, 433, 455, 525, 583. =92=ayuntamiento archives. =69a=archives of federal district. =80=archives of méxico state. hitchcock, fifty years, 307. =80=gracida to butler, feb. 25, 1848. =13=doyle, nos. 1, 5, 27, 1848. _britannia_, sept. 28, 1847 (_daily news_). claiborne, quitman, i, 395. calderón, life, i, 139-40. _national_, nov. 14, 1847. =60=n. c. to j. l. miller, may 7, 1848. =62=jones to bedinger, mar. 11, 1848. captain of vols., conquest, 27. =65=scott, gen. orders, sept. 14, 16, 17, 24; dec. 18, 31, 1847. london _times_, nov. 12, 13, 1847. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 205-12. _picayune_, oct. 15; nov. 14; dec. 19, 29, 1847. _delta_, nov. 6, 7, 12; dec. 19, 24, 1847. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 384 (scott). kenly, md. vol., 413. méxico á través, iv, 703-4. =65=scott, gen. orders 190, 355. rodriguez, breve reseña, 1848, 1849, p. 5. =13=bankhead, no. 86, sept. 28, 1847. =73=lozano, no. 8, res., sept. 17, 1847. ramírez, méxico, 318. n. y. _journ. comm._, feb. 28, 1848. _monitor repub._, dec. 7, 20, 1847. =277=veramendi to quitman, oct. 8, 1847. =366=memb. municip. council to ----, nov. 14 and reply. (mexican letter) _nacional_, nov. 14, 1847. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 260-3, 270-1. apuntes, 362-7, 369. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1065. sen. 34; 34, 3, p. 37. =132=nowell to mother, oct. 21, 1847. sedgwick, corresp., i, 153. stevens, stevens, i, 219. =121=placards and notices. _lancaster co. hist. soc. mag._, mar. 6, 1908. =214=hays and caperton, life of hays. london _chronicle_, nov. 12, 1847. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 543. lane (adventures) shows that our officers were by no means all saints, but this is not a fact to occasion surprise. ripley (war with mexico, ii, 571) complains that immorality was promoted at mexico by giving licenses to gambling places; but it would not have been possible to prevent the soldiers from gambling among themselves and in "dives," and no doubt scott believed it would be best to have the gambling done where some control could be exercised over it, and where the men would not be in danger of the assassin's knife. ripley admits that gambling "flourished" before licenses were given (p. 570). ripley suggests (p. 574) that "active operations would have been the immediate and effectual remedy" for the immorality; but, as we have seen, there were not enough troops, etc., for active operations, and perhaps shooting mexicans needlessly would have been no better business than gambling. ripley admits (p. 577) that most of the troops were kept outside the city. riley's brigade was at tacubaya, patterson's division at s. angel, and a part of butler's division at el molino del rey. the other part and smith's brigade remained in town. 31.44. probably fearing american interference or influence, the mexican government at querétaro discountenanced such elections (méxico á través, iv, 704). as the records are by no means complete, it is necessary in this and other cases to assume that like causes produced like effects, unless there is some evidence to the contrary. general conclusions could not otherwise be reached. 31.45. at tampico shields appointed three mexican alcaldes and also (to act with these in cases between americans and mexicans) an american court of three american citizens. 31.46. _gaceta de tamaulipas_, july 16, 1846. =65=scott, gen. orders 238. hitchcock, fifty years, 314-5. davis, autobiog., 246. =224=letter from c. to scott, nov. 14, 1847. instrucciones otorgadas. wilhelm, eighth infantry, i, 299. moreno, cantón, 378, 380, 382. quitman, order, oct. 6, 1847, in papeles varios. defensa de iriarte. mcsherry, el puchero, 163. =358=williams to father, feb. 22, 1848. v. cruz _american eagle_, may 22; apr. 3, 1847. ayuntamiento archives, jalapa, córdoba, orizaba, puebla, mexico, tampico, saltillo. =92=quitman, proclam., oct. 6, 1847. =366=_id._, poster, sept. 16. =95=worth to puebla ayunt., may 31, 1847; to alcalde, may 17, 1847; reply; proclam., may 22, 1847; to alcalde, may 22. =303=_id._, orders 34. _nacional_, jan. 28, 1848. =13=doyle, no. 5, 1848. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 251, 549. _diario_, may 14, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1047 (scott). =65=bankhead, orders, feb. 16, 1848. =61=hamtramck to mcdowell, jan. 20, 1848. lawton, artillery officer, 17, 39, 40, 194, 208. =63=marcy to davenport, aug. 6; dec. 14, 1847. brackett, lane's brigade, 165. =69=gov. jalapa to alcalde, nov. 26; dec. 13, 1847; jan. 17; mar. 15, 1848; orders 352; to ayunt., feb. 28, 1848. =69=gates, orders 26, 35. =65=wilson, orders 116, 142, 1847. =65=twiggs, orders 11. =65=kearny, orders 172. =65=wool, orders, july 9; dec. 14, 1847; jan. 26, 1848. =65=butler, orders 43, 1848. =61=mcdowell to alcalde, dec. 30, 1847. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 205 (trist). _picayune_, jan. 2; mar. 19; dec. 19, 23, 1847. _republicano_, june 14, 1847. kenly, md. vol., 380. =61=worth to bliss, sept. 28, 1846. méxico á través, iv, 703-4, 711. rivera, jalapa, iii, 900, 902; iv, 28-34. =69=worth to commrs., nov. 23, 1846; orders 61, 1846. =69=scott to hughes, jan. 28, 1848. =61=shields, jan. 19, 1847; orders, dec. 26, 1846; jan. 1, 2, 6, 1847. =61=worth, orders 2, mar. 30, 1847. =76=worth to e. gonzález, nov. 23, 28, 1846. =76=s. anna, jan. 4, 1847, with docs. =76=garay, jan. 22, 1847, and docs. =76=worth, proclam., nov. 30, 1846. =76=morgan to martinez, jan. 18, 1847. =76=aldrete to mejía, aug. 30, 1846. for taxes, etc., see chap. xxxiii. =76=mora, feb. 18; mar. 8, 1848. =76=many others. 31.47. an english soldier in our army said with reference to the better class at tampico: they were shy of "the strange, wild-looking, hairy-faced savages of the half-horse and half-alligator breed, who galloped about the streets and plazas mounted on mules and mexican ponies, and armed with sabres, bowies, and revolvers, and in every uncouth variety of costume peculiar to the american backwoodsman"; adding that the mexicans addressed them as "gentlemen," but in their absence spoke of them with intense bitterness as "cursed volunteers" (ballentine, eng. sold., i, 276-7). 31.48. the foreigners residing at mexico generally received the american army well. 31.49. in a soldier's written vocabulary occurred these words: weaves (for _huevos_), chickketer (_chiquita_), sennereters (_señoritas_), irrancus (_naranjas_), onerpas (_un peso_), leavero (_libro_). there were cases in which women went long distances to give information to officers they had never seen. after the battle of cerro gordo ladies at mexico wore their hair loose "à la scott," and were rebuked by the press. 31.50. _social relations._ scott, mems., ii, 580. grant, mems., i, 118. meade, letters, i, 86, 180, 185. =148=chamberlain, recolls. bullock, six months (1825 ed.), i, 55-6. _flag of freedom_, i, no. 5. =257=g. [hughes] to frank [markoe], dec. 13, 1847. =242=kingsbury to mother, oct. 14, 1846. =8=anon. diary. oswandel, notes, 211, 433. jamieson, campaign, 48. semmes, service, 173, 205, 215, 263. biog. de alamán, 40. =221=hill, diary. brackett, lane's brigade, 131, 136, 138. rivera, jalapa, iii, 912. _picayune_, may 28, 1847. kenly, md. vol., 368. =69=hughes to scott, jan. 5, 1848. =349=pattridge to miss w., may 22, 1848. apuntes, 363. wilhelm, eighth infantry, i, 430. sedgwick, corresp., i, 145. ballentine, english soldier, i, 276-7. _spirit of the times_, july 4, 1846. perry, indiana, 141. =76=document sent by garay, dec. 30, 1846. =335=belton to hitchcock, aug. 23, 1847. 31.51. this money had a powerful influence in keeping the people quiet. 31.52. scott, mems., ii, 396, 580. grant, mems., i, 102. gutiérrez de estrada, méx. en 1840. =110=barbour, diary. =95=belton, proclam., july 16, 1847. =13=doyle, no. 1, 1848. _delta_, jan. 19, 1847. rodríguez, breve reseña, 1848. lawton, artillery officer, 24. new london _morning news_, dec. 10, 1846. apuntes, 368. =350=weber, recolls. _cong. globe_, 45, 3, pp. 1627-8 (shields). _picayune_, sept. 14, 1847. xxxii. peace 32.1. =52=trist, nos. 16, confid., 17, confid., 18, 22-3. (trist's despatches, as printed in sen. 52; 30, 1, are not in all cases complete.) sierra, evolution i, 223. (outrages) _arco iris_, nov. 9, 1847. _razonador_ in _nacional_, jan. 5, 1848. _nacional_, jan. 19, 1848. =80=almonte to olaguíbel, sept. 16, 1847. =335=thornton to trist, dec. 5, 1847. hitchcock, fifty years, 308-9, 315. calhoun corresp., 1163, 1166. =349=partridge to miss w., may 22, 1848. =125=bonham to mother, dec. 7, 1847. ills. state hist. soc. trans., 1912, pp. 17-23. lawton, artill. officer, 327, 331. wash. _union_, may 22, 1847. =291=p. f. smith to pierce, undated. _monitor repub._, dec. 3, 14, 1847. _picayune_, dec. 23, 1847; jan. 7, 8, 1848. =13=doyle, no. 18, 1848. (damages) =76=circular, oct. 3, 1847. 32.2. sierra, evol., i, 223. =13=thornton, no. 6, 1847. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 571. =52=trist, nos. 18, 22-3. _picayune_, nov. 30, 1847; feb. 20, 1848. protesta de la diputación. tributo á la verdad, 58. _nacional_, jan. 8, 19, 1848. =80=olaguíbel, proclam., dec. 9, 1847. =335=thornton to trist, dec. 5, 1847. rivera, jalapa, iv, 23, 40, 45, 74. _correo nacional_, feb. 7, 19; mar. 21, 1848. (aguas cal.) =76=guerra to relaciones, jan. 24, 1848. =76=olaguíbel, nov. 29. =76=gov. oaxaca to relaciones, dec. 27. _monitor repub._, nov. 15, 27, 29; dec. 29, 1847. =366=correspondence between gov. s. l. potosí and a. o. de parada. =335=trist, memo, of second conference. =256=j. parrott to marcy, dec. 20, private, 27 private, 28, private, 1847. _no. american_ (mexico), dec. 14, 1847. =169=taylor to crittenden, nov. 1, 1847. =304=duncan to quitman, nov. 27, 1847. webster, letters, 343. =61=scott, sept. 18. (bankhead) =132=cushing to buchanan, oct. 31, 1847. =125=bonham to mother, dec. 7, 1817; jan. 12, 1848. gallatin, war expenses. =345=poinsett to van buren, june 4, 1847; mar. 9, 1848. =304=duncan to quitman, nov. 27. _no. american_ (mex.), dec. 14. p. f. smith, _supra_. _eco del comercio_, may 9, 1848. _correspondant_, nov. 15, 1847. _times_, jan. 15, 1848. the substantial war elements were the eventualists, monarchists and santannistas. the =76=archives for this time are full of reports of political disturbances. 32.3. polk, diary, nov. 20, 23, 30; dec. 4, 18, 1847. =132=donelson to buchanan, may 15, 1847, private. ho. 60; 30, 1, 1037 (marcy). =52=trist, no. 22. p. f. smith: note 1. richardson, messages, iv, 537-46. see chap. xxix, p. 183. had the war continued it would not have been against paredes or santa anna and the military class. it would have seemed to be a war of conquest directed against the mexican nation, and even the peace party would have had to turn against us. 32.4. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 585. =13=thornton, nos. 6, 7, 1847. =52=trist, nos. 16, confid., 18-20. =335=_id._ to rosa, oct. 20, 1847. _monitor repub._, nov. 8, 10, 13; dec. 29. ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 58 (rosa). richardson, messages, iv, 572. rivera, jalapa, iv, 22-3. méxico á través, iv, 704-5. exposición ó programa. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 483, 516. trist reopened the negotiations naturally by forwarding to luis de la rosa, the minister of relations, a letter (dated sept. 7) written by him as a reply to the note and counter-projet of the mexican peace commissioners dated sept. 6. in this he argued that texas possessed good grounds for rebelling, and became independent; that, having been rightfully annexed by the united states, she had to be protected against invasion; that any previously existing boundary between her and mexico had been obliterated by the revolutionary war, and she had a right to _claim_ the rio grande as the boundary; that as mexico would not negotiate on the subject, polk was compelled to accept that delimitation; that in the resulting war the united states had occupied mexican territory and now justly held it by right of conquest, yet not by the odious title of conquest resulting from war without good cause--not from a mere desire of obtaining territory (sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21). this letter and a brief accompanying note, which stated that his powers had not been withdrawn and expressed a desire to resume the negotiations, were transmitted by thornton, now acting (in the absence of bankhead and doyle) as british chargé, who strongly urged upon rosa the renewal of the negotiations (=52=trist, no. 19). rosa replied favorably, but said he was too busy just then, and needed certain documents. later peña explained the delay as resulting from the provisional character of his administration (=52=to trist, nov. 22). in reality the government desired to ascertain and influence public and congressional sentiment before acting (exposición dirigida). rosa's reply to trist said there appeared to be little hope of peace, but this was for self-defence (trist, no. 20). 32.5. =52=trist, nos. 19, 23. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 239. rivera, jalapa, iv, 23. _monitor repub._, nov. 17, 18, 23, 27; dec. 26. (deserters) _nat. intellig._, june 24, 1848. =76=rosa to govs., oct. 20. =75=report of the meeting of governors. méxico á través, iv, 706. =335=thornton to trist, nov. 25, 1847. dublán, legislación, v, 305. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 567-8, 571-6. =335=davidson to thornton, nov. 23. _picayune_, nov. 30.] at the meeting puebla, querétaro, michoacán, guanajuato and s. l. potosí states were represented by their governors, zacatecas by her vice governor, and jalisco by a commissioner. the president and the ministers were present. the meeting was advisory and confidential. the government took the ground that the war could not be continued and that mexico should endeavor to obtain, not an honorable peace, but one as little humiliating as possible, and one that would save mexican nationality; but it preferred war and promised to carry it on if given the necessary men and supplies. the governors naturally showed their repugnance to peace on such a basis, but could not offer adequate resources, and the one rational conclusion was inevitable. a report of the discussions may be found in the gobernación archives, mexico. the sessions began on nov. 19 and concluded on nov. 27. the insurrection came to a head on dec. 19. news of trist's recall helped to quiet the war party (=52=trist, no. 22). 32.6. pillow, address in chicago _daily democrat_, sept. 15, 1857. polk, diary, oct. 4, 5, 20-3, 25; dec. 30, 1847; jan. 2, 1848. =52=sec. state to trist, oct. 6, 25. richardson, messages, iv, 541. =335=memo. of trist on despatch of oct. 6. sen. rep. 261; 41, 2. ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 59-61 (trist). a private =335=note (oct. 24) from buchanan to trist, taken in connection with polk's diary, suggests a suspicion on the part of the administration that, in intimating that the united states might possibly not insist upon the rio grande line, trist had purposely played into the hands of the whigs, who were now asserting that the intermediate region did not belong to us. this suspicion and the idea that trist was helping scott to injure the president's friends in the army would explain a great deal of wrath. another personal =335=note (oct. 24) from buchanan shows that the terms offered by trist in september were now regarded as too moderate to be popular, and gives one the feeling that, especially since trist had shown a disposition to weaken them, the prestige of the administration demanded his recall. oct. 25 buchanan said trist had offered to give up a part of california, but trist denied this (=335=memo.). oct. 6 marcy directed scott to inform the mexican authorities of trist's recall (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1008). trist's patriotism and sense of duty do not seem to have been affected by his recall. nov. 27 he wrote to buchanan that a commission should be sent to take up his work on the spot (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 230); and the next day, through mrs. trist, he =335=adjured buchanan to lose "_not a minute_" about this, proposing scott and butler. dec. 31 polk received indirectly a similar recommendation from gen. twiggs, and sen. davis (the col. davis of monterey and buena vista) pointed out to him that, should mexican commissioners go to washington, probably their government would be overthrown during their absence, and they might be shot as traitors on their return (diary, dec. 31). polk therefore virtually decided that butler should take trist's place as well as scott's (_ibid._, dec. 31; jan. 2). pillow (address) attributed to his letter the recall of trist. 32.7. sen. report 261; 41, 2. ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 59-66 (trist). sen. 60; 30, 1, p. 61 (peña). =52=trist, nos. 21, 23. =13=thornton, nos. 11, 14, 1847. =335=_id._ to trist, nov. 22, confid.; nov. 22, private; nov. 25. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 583, 585. =335=trist to thornton, nov. 24, confid., nov. 25, private. =75=peña at meeting of govs. =52=peña to trist, nov. 22. trist's departure had to be delayed by the necessity of testifying at pillow's trial. 32.8. (traitorous) london _times_, mar. 15, 1848. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 140, 144 (scott). =256=marcy to wetmore, jan. 28, 1848. scott, mems., ii, 576. =13=thornton, no. 21, confid. _id._ to trist: note 7. sen. rep. 261; 41, 2. trist, no. 22. =13=_id._ to thornton, dec. 4, 1847. =335=_id._ to _id._, nov. 24. =335=_id._ to wife, dec. 4. it has been said that trist's decision was due to scott, but trist was not under scott's control. scott tried without success to dissuade him from breaking with polk (=335=statement by trist in his papers). trist =335=wrote to his wife, dec. 4, "_knowing_ it to be the very last chance, and impressed with the dreadful consequences to our country which cannot fail to attend the loss of that chance," i decided to-day at noon to attempt to make a treaty; the decision is altogether my own. sen. rep. 261, the basis of which was evidently supplied by trist, says that freaner, the correspondent of the new orleans _delta_, was "the only man who had been in any way instrumental in determining mr. trist to make the attempt." it has also been said that scott and trist wished to make the treaty because polk now wanted more of mexico, and they desired to "spite" him; but neither man was of such a type, no suggestion of the scheme appears in trist's official or personal letters or in thornton's reports to the foreign office, and public considerations are quite enough to explain trist's course. sen. rep. 261 says that on dec. 4 occurred an incident "in itself of the most casual, and trivial, and commonplace kind," which led to trist's making the treaty. this has been thought to mean the postponement of the train with which he was to have gone down; but the above description does not seem to fit this important occurrence, and the author is inclined to believe that it refers to a chance meeting of trist and freaner, while trist's decision hung in the balance. freaner was regarded by trist as an honest man of unusual sagacity, and he was a strong, sympathetic character. peña held that, since his peace commissioners had been appointed, he could deal with the subject through them only, and hence, as they were at a distance, he could not possibly send a proposal to mexico for trist to carry home, as it was suggested to him to do. trist counted on one fact as lessening his responsibility: the government could disavow his work without embarrassment (=52=no. 22). see napoleon's dictum (chap. xxvii, note 27.17, p. 398). 32.9. =13=thornton, no. 21, confid., 1847. =13=doyle, nos. 1, 3, 1847; 10, 1848. =52=trist, nos. 23-5. =256=j. parrott to marcy, dec. 27, 1847, private. sen. 60; 30, 1, pp. 61 (peña), 62 (trist). (rincón) méxico á través, iv, 705-7. =335=memo. _re_ withdrawal of notice. =335=thornton to trist, nov. 24, priv.; dec. 5, 11, confid. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 590. =335=trist to peña, dec. 26, 1847. lee, gen. lee, 43. noticias muy importantes. richardson, messages, iv, 545. =335=powers of the commrs. =335=trist, minutes of meetings, etc. doyle arrived at vera cruz on nov. 30, and soon received from the foreign office a despatch (=13=no. 40) making clear its attitude of benevolent neutrality (doyle, no. 3). polk's message encouraged the eventualists, because it showed that if they could defeat the present negotiations, the war would continue, the peace party would fall from power, and then the eventualists would have american support in setting up a government according to their ideas. rincón pretended to be ill. associated with the ministry of relaciones at this time as confidential advisers were such men as pedraza, lafragua and cuevas. 32.10. sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21. =335=buchanan to trist, oct. 24, personal. =335=---to _id._, oct. 25. =335=dimond to _id._, oct. 27. =73=lozano, no. 3, res., 1847. =335=trist, notes and memoranda. =335=notes of trist and couto. =335=thornton's translation of mexican draft of treaty. =335=notes from doyle and thornton. (unreasonable) méxico á través, iv, 706. sierra, evolution, i, 223. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 592, 596-7. =13=doyle, nos. 10 (with memoranda), 29, 1848. =13=palmerston to mora, june 20, 1848. =52=trist, no. 27. exposición dirigida, 6. (trist's conduct) negrete, invasión, iv, 324. trist relied for guidance on his original instructions (ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43-7), the _projet_ of a treaty accompanying the instructions (_ibid._, p. 47), =52=instructions of july 13 and 19, 1847, former treaties of the united states, and our general principles and policy (=52=trist, no. 27). see also polk's diary, apr. 13, 1847. in regard to the western end of the boundary the instructions were faulty, and trist found it necessary to use his judgment (=52=enclosure in his no. 27). greatly fearing the designs of the monarchists, he desired to have a secret article binding upon mexico the constitution of 1824, and was willing to promise in return that enough american troops to support the government should remain five years; but the proposition was declined (=13=doyle, no. 10, 1848). there was a difficulty in doing anything about tehuantepec, for british interests were involved, and that matter was dropped by trist in order to facilitate the adjustment of the boundary (exposición, _supra_). it did not signify much now, for the united states had its eye upon a better route (j. s. reeves in _amer. hist. rev._, x, 323). the subject that consumed the most time was the status of the people of the surrendered territory (trist, no. 27). the mexicans asked that their civil law should continue to rule there until the territory should be organized into states, but trist (perhaps in the interest of slavery) would not consent (=13=doyle, no. 10). 32.11. =13=doyle, nos. 10, 12, 13, 1848. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 568, 579, 591, 602-3, 605-6. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1039 (scott). =52=trist, nos. 25-7. méxico á través, iv, 706-8. =335=trist to wife, dec. 26, 1847; to scott, jan. 28, 1848; to commrs., jan. 29, 1848. =13=doyle to commrs., jan. 28-9. (s. l. p.) =83=gov. s. l. p. to gov. querétaro, feb. 5, 1848; =77=relaciones, circular, jan. 17; _nacional_, jan. 26 (plan); feb. 2; rivera, jalapa, iv, 41, 43; méxico á través, iv, 706. =256=marcy to wetmore, jan. 28. peña became the chief executive again because the expiration of anaya's term (ordered by the congress that elected him to occur on jan. 8, since it was expected that the new congress would have assembled by that date) left the country without a head, and the position devolved upon him as chief of the supreme court. l. de la rosa was then appointed minister of relations. the plan of the s. l. p. governor was that four states--s. l. p., zacatecas, guanajuato and jalisco--should combine, repudiate the national government, and continue the war, expecting other states to join them; but public opinion, even in his own state, failed to support him. almonte was actively working against peace at this time, basing his arguments particularly on the attitude of the peace party in the united states and the poverty of the american treasury. jan. 30 he called attention to the whig majority in our house, said our congress would probably refuse to send more troops to mexico, and urged the mexican government to procrastinate. the reply of the government was a mere acknowledgment of receipt. feb. 14 he argued that walker's report showed we could not continue the war much longer. on the other hand there seems to be some reason to believe that personal relations and interests may have influenced the mexican commissioners in favor of making the treaty (puga y acal, documentos, letter no. 74). marcy to scott, oct. 6, 1847: your military operations are not to be modified by mexican proposals to negotiate (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140). 32.12. =13=thornton, no. 11, 1847. =13=doyle, nos. 4, 1847; 13, 14 and 18, 1848. sen. 60; 30, 1, p. 65 (trist). ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1082 (scott). roa bárcena, recuerdos, 604-7. =13=doyle to commrs., jan. 28, 29; to rosa, jan. 29. hitchcock, fifty years, 315-6. méxico á través, iv, 706-8. =335=memo. from freaner. the mexican government naturally desired to keep all information about the treaty from its enemies. the public came to believe, however, that an important act had taken place on feb. 2. freaner carried the treaty to washington. for two weeks escorts had been waiting at the proper points on the road to vera cruz. the spanish representative, under his instructions, took no part in these negotiations. the prussian minister, lacking both official authorization and personal influence, was equally inactive. france had no minister on the scene. ripley (war with mexico, ii, 557) says that "no man who so palpably disobeys the direct instructions of his government" as did trist, could be fit to negotiate a treaty; suggests (p. 564) that it was improper to let the british coöperate in the matter; and argues (pp. 582-4) that scott should have broken up the negotiations or else assumed the full responsibility for them, withholding from the mexican government the fact of trist's recall. all this and the rest are mere fault-finding, and the critic could and would have been much more severe, had the course he recommended been adopted. of course he proves the obvious facts that scott and trist, in the interest of two nations and to accomplish what their government ardently desired, at great personal risk disregarded mistaken instructions, accepted british assistance without which they would probably have failed, and obtained a treaty which polk himself, though he hated both of them, felt constrained to accept; but this was a truly glorious achievement. scott had no right to act as ripley says he should have done. the armistice, a military affair, was properly his concern, but negotiating a treaty was diplomatic business. mackintosh, says ripley (p. 563), had a hand in the negotiations, but this seems to be an error. rives (u. s. and mexico, ii, 524-5) says "it might perhaps have been well to replace trist by a stronger man." but every possible man had been considered (p. 126), and a stronger man would probably have tried to drive the mexicans and have failed. trist they liked and trusted, yet could not deceive or frighten. the chief points of the treaty signed on feb. 2 were as follows (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 38): art. 1. peace. 2. immediate armistice, and so far as possible a restoration of the constitutional order in the places occupied by the americans. 3. after ratification by both governments the blockade to cease, the customhouses held by the americans to be given up, and the interior to be evacuated as soon as practicable. mexico to assist. duties collected after mexico's ratification to be paid over to her. 4. immediately on the exchange of ratifications all mexican places and public property to be given up, and all prisoners surrendered. the process to be completed within three months, unless the sickly season should require american troops to remain longer at designated points. 5. the new boundary (rio grande, southern and western lines of new mexico, the gila, the colorado, the line between upper and lower california). the line to be run and marked by a joint commission within a year after the exchange of ratifications. no change in it to be made except with the free and formal consent of both nations. 6. the united states may navigate the gulf of california and the colorado to the gila, and the two governments will arrange for "a road, canal, or railway" within a marine league of the gila, should it be found practicable. 7. the navigation of the gila and of the rio grande to new mexico to be free to both countries. 8. all mexicans in the transferred territory may go or stay, will have full power over their property, and may elect within a year to remain mexican citizens. 9. mexicans not so electing shall be "admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights of citizens of the united states," and meantime shall have the rights "now vested in them according to the mexican laws." no interference with roman catholic worship, property or ecclesiastical administration. 10. mexican grants of lands (made before may 13, 1846) to be valid, and the period for fulfilling conditions to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications. 11. the united states to prevent or punish indian incursions from its territory, and exact satisfaction for damage done, etc. 12. the united states to pay mexico $15,000,000. (as to method of payment, see p. 248.) 13. the united states to pay the claims against mexico already decided. 14. also to assume all other claims arising before feb. 2, 1848. 15. the latter claims are to be passed upon by an american commission (which will be supplied by mexico, on demand, with needed books, etc.), and not more than $3,250,000 may be paid to satisfy the claims. 16. each nation may fortify any point within its territory. 17. the commercial treaty of 1831, so far as compatible with this treaty, revived for eight years. 18. supplies for american troops in mexico to enter free of duty. 19. provisions respecting merchandise brought into mexican ports occupied by the americans. 20. a provision regarding certain merchandise arriving at mexican ports shortly after the restoration of the customhouses. 21. should difficulties arise between the two countries, negotiations and arbitration--not reprisals or hostilities--to be employed, unless the circumstances forbid. 22. provisions for resident merchants and prisoners in case of war between the two nations. 23. ratifications to be exchanged at washington in four months or, if practicable, sooner. _secret article._ the four months of art. 23 may be extended to eight months. 32.13. if we hold that texas extended only to new mexico, the treaty gave us 619,275 square miles (donaldson, public domain, 124, 134). (little) =198=gallatin, note on peace treaty; roa bárcena, recuerdos, 618; =13=palmerston to mora, june 20, 1848. the u. s. supreme court held (merryman _vs._ bourne, 9 wallace, 592) that the acquisition of california was "complete on the seventh of july, 1846." it said, "conquest is a valid title, while the victor maintains the exclusive possession of the conquered country"; and the united states intended to do this in the region we took. on this and other points see klein, treaty, 247-81; butler, treaty-making power, i, 78, 168-9; _u. s. cavalry journal_, xxv, p. 18; reid, problems, 271-5. it was necessary to take territory from mexico to offset our claims, quashed by the war (richardson, messages, iv, 537), and partially offset the costs of a war forced upon us, for, had the treaty awarded us a money indemnity, she would not have been willing and morally able, even if theoretically able, to pay it. (see benton, abr. deb., xvi, 40-1.) aside from the question of right, too, the american people would have been profoundly dissatisfied to see our armies return empty-handed, and this feeling would probably have meant more, to mexico than the loss of her nominal territory (see root in _cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., p. 395). mexico could give up more easily what she did than any equivalent territory. (map) gadsden line at n. e. is disputed. an apparent inconsistency may be noted here, for on p. 138 of vol. i it was intimated that an agreement with mexico was needed to fix the boundary of texas. the explanation is that the united states had demonstrated its ability to hold the line, but the republic of texas was not strong enough to prevent mexican troops from going and remaining north of the rio grande. the mexican commissioners rejected the line of 32°, desired by the united states (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 91), for three reasons: 1, it would be for a long distance only a mathematical boundary; 2, it was liable, when surveyed, to cut off important points like paso del norte; 3, it would prevent land communication between sonora and lower california (exposición dirigida). it was proposed at one time to divide s. diego, but for that concession trist demanded too much. besides, s. diego belonged distinctly to upper california. lower california was relinquished because inaccessible and poor. not only for sentimental reasons but because otherwise the treaty, they believed, could not possibly be ratified, the mexican commissioners were determined to hold all of sonora and chihuahua. tamaulipas, happily, had made no protest against relinquishing her claim to the intermediate region (=52=trist, no. 27). to ask the consent of the people in the acquired territory was not deemed necessary by the united states (butler, _op. cit._, i, 83-4), but citizenship was not forced upon mexicans by the treaty (art. viii). art. x was demanded by the mexicans (=13=doyle, no. 10, 1848). art. xix harmonized the american pledge that goods imported during our occupation of the ports should pay only the american tariff (=52=buchanan to trist, june 14, 1847), with the mexican view that our tariff could not be operative beyond the limits of our occupation (exposición dirigida). an error regarding the assumption of our claims has prevailed. two classes of claims were provided for: 1, those liquidated under the convention of 1839 but not covered by the three mexican instalments (vol. i, p. 81); 2, all unliquidated claims antedating feb. 2, 1848. under the first head the united states paid, under the act approved july 29, 1848 (statutes at large, ix, 265), $2,090,253.19 including interest (a. j. peters, asst. sec. treas. to the author, nov. 30, 1915); under the second head the claims commission awarded (in 1852) $3,208,314.96, including interest (sen. 34; 32, 1; documents preserved in the state dept.). the treaty provided that under the second head the u. s. should not be liable for more than $3,250,000. the phraseology of _our projet_ regarding this matter, when literally translated, did not readily penetrate the mexican mind, and hence was re-worked (sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 294). roa bárcena (recuerdos, chap. xxxiv) gives many interesting details derived from the papers of couto. other details may be found in the trist papers, doyle's reports, and the exposición dirigida (negrete, invasión, iv, 296). 32.14. _the armistice._ =13=thornton, no. 21, 1847, confid. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 590-1. =13=doyle, nos. 10, 28, 29, 1848. =52=trist, no. 26. =335=thornton to trist, nov. 22, 1847, confid. =335=trist to scott, jan. 28, 1848. =335=[peña] to mex. commrs., jan. 11, private. =76=many communications, principally between the mexican government and the mexican armistice commrs. (instructions, reports, etc.), feb., 1848. =60=butler to marcy, mar. 3, 13. =76=_id._, feb. 21, appmt. of w. and s. =76=lay to mora, apr. 27. =76=to lombardini, mar. 4. (terms) dublán, legislación, v, 345-8; negrete, invasión, iv, 334, 342; =111=butler, gen. orders, no. 18, mar. 6, 1848. =76=circular, mar. 10. méxico á través, iv, 706, 709. =76=otero, mar. 31. =291=winship to pierce, mar. 5. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140 (scott). as we have seen, the mexican government had frowned on elections held in occupied territory, probably fearing american pressure upon the voters. the reader may note an apparent inconsistency here. the war is represented sometimes as so lucrative that its continuance was desired by mexicans, and yet it is said that the districts occupied by our troops felt its burdens, and for that reason desired peace. both currents of sentiment existed. in some districts and at some times the one predominated; in other districts and at other times the other. doyle assisted materially in the armistice negotiations. the armistice was signed on mar. 2. its terms were: 1, suspension of hostilities; 2, neither side to extend its occupation of territory; 3, all civilians to travel freely, all military persons under white flag; 4, "contributions" for february and march under american =65=orders 376 and 395 to be suspended, etc.; 5, mexicans to exercise full political rights, and officials recognized by the mexican government to be recognized by the americans; *6, no americans to interfere with mexican elections; *7, mexican authorities to levy and collect taxes; *8, mexican postal facilities might be re-established, and the americans would protect them; *9, the mexican government might take the stocks of monopolized articles; *10, public offices not occupied by americans to be given up, and also, as soon as conveniently possible, all religious and charitable buildings; *11, mexican courts to act exclusively except when a person belonging to the american army was originally a party, or the interest of the american government is concerned; *12, police to be established; *13, person and property to be protected; *14, mexico to act freely against savages on the northern frontier, and american commanders to help with influence; 15, church property to be respected; 16, armed bodies assembled anywhere, to commit hostilities not authorized by either government, to be opposed by both governments; 17, the armistice to remain in force during the period fixed by the treaty, unless notice of terminating it is given. the starred articles have particular reference to territory occupied by the americans. some of the articles merely make obligatory what the americans had been doing. next after art. 1, art. 16 was chiefly important. the purpose of it was to prevent insurrections, and it could not fail to have that effect. the first intention was to keep art. 16 secret, but the wisdom of publishing it soon became clear. the armistice was published at querétaro on march 11. some slight and unavoidable violations of it, particularly in the pursuit of guerillas, occurred, but no serious trouble. 32.15. polk, diary, feb. 19. (learned) vol. i, p. 123. calhoun corresp., 1119-21. =137=fisher to calhoun, may 25, 1847. =52=trist, no. 27. =210=simms to hammond, jan. 15, 1847. _nat. intellig._, may 19; nov. 20, 1847. n. y. _sun_, may 17, 20; aug. 20-1, 1847. london _times_, oct. 29, 1847. dodd, walker, 25. bourne, essays, 227-36. benton, view, ii, 704. =108=storms to bancroft, july 23, 1846. (baker) _cong. globe_, 29, 1, p. 279. (secession) smith, annex. of texas, 204-14, 287. _u. s. mag._, feb., 1847, p. 100. 32.16. polk, diary, may 13, 1846; nov. 23; dec. 7, 1847; feb. 21, 1848. =13=crampton, nos. 59, 1847; 8, 9, 1848. =108=bancroft to greene, nov. 3, 1847. richardson, messages, iv, 541. =345=niles to van buren, jan. 20, 1848. =108=buchanan to bancroft, dec. 29, 1846, priv. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., 197. foote, remins., 220. _monitor repub._, mar. 10, 1848 (c. landa). calhoun corresp., 741 (to a. p. c. and mrs. c.). n. y. _journ. comm._, dec. 11, 1847; feb. 4, 1848. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), nov. 30, 1847. n. y. _sun_, jan. 24, 1848. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, pp. 157-60 (dickinson), 215 (crittenden), 219 (foote), 256 (dix), 302 (sevier), 321 (cass); app., 488 (tompkins), 349 (breese). _nat. intellig._, jan. 31, 1848 (cass). =345=blair to van buren, dec. 29, 1847. 32.17. =13=crampton, no. 19, 1848. =345=niles to van buren, jan. 20, 1848. =345=dix to _id._, jan. 27, 1848. (mad) =335=statement by trist, nov. 4, 1857. calhoun corresp., 742 (to c.), 751 (to j. e. c.). _public ledger_, jan. 4, 1848. n. y. _sun_, may 17, 1848. bourne, essays, 235. _cong. globe_, see note 32.16; also 428 (cabell). meade in ho., jan. 31, 1848, and ho. debate on ten regt. bill, jan. 24-feb. 3, _passim_. _niles_, feb. 5, 1848, p. 354. sen. misc., 8; 30, 1. =137=hatcher to calhoun, jan. 5, 1848. 32.18. polk, diary, sept. 4, 7, 1847; jan. 4, 15, 24-5, 1848. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 146, 148 (marcy). =52=trist, nos. 22, 25. =335=buchanan to trist, oct. 27, 1847, priv. =335=trist to thornton, nov. 24, confid.; to wife (for buchanan), nov. 28. =13=crampton, no. 38, 1847. =132=buchanan, memo., jan. 5, 1848. =60=butler to trist and reply, mar. 17, 18, 1848. 32.19. polk, diary, jan. 4, 5, 23, 1847; feb. 19-21, 1848. =52=buchanan to trist, oct. 6, 25, 1847. _amer. rev._, feb., 1848, p. 110 (everything done by congress for the war has been done under polk's pledge to make peace as soon as justice and honor could be satisfied.). richardson, messages, iv, 544, 573-5. (p.'s looks) _monitor repub._, mar. 10, 1848 (c. landa); tyler, tyler, ii, 457. w. e. dodd in ills. state hist. soc. trans., 1912, pp. 17-23. _id._, walker, 25-6. _picayune_, feb. 26; mar. 3, 1848. (sevier) wash. _union_, feb. 4, 1848. =13=crampton, no. 19, 1848. polk intimated to the senate that the treaty would need to be amended. trist was confidentially authorized to pay $20,000,000 for what he actually obtained, $5,000,000 more for lower california, and $5,000,000 for the right of transit across the isthmus of tehuantepec (polk, diary, apr. 13, 1847; ho. 69; 30, 1, p. 44). 32.20. polk, diary, feb. 19-21. =297=report of cabinet meeting, feb. 20, certified by polk's private secy. sen. report 261; 41, 2. sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 66-72 (buchanan). =13=crampton, no. 21, 1848. richardson, messages, iv, 573-5. klein, treaty, _public ledger_, june 15, 1849 (dallas). buchanan probably desired to have the treaty go to the senate. he would then share in the credit of the administration, should it be popular, and in the contrary event would be able to say that he opposed it (polk, diary, feb. 21). polk's accepting the treaty as the best agreement that could be obtained under the circumstances completely vindicated trist's decision to make it and scott's coöperation. in april, 1848, the question of occupying yucatan came up. the indigenes appeared to be on the point of exterminating the whites and as a desperate resource yucatan offered herself simultaneously to england, france and the united states. apr. 29 polk recommended intervention to congress, and this has been thought (ills. state hist. soc. trans., 1912, 17-23) to mean that he was ready to take yucatan, upset the treaty, and bring about the dismemberment--perhaps the annexation--of mexico. but the treaty, which had now been ratified by our senate, contained in art. 5 a provision expressly intended to prevent us from annexing more of mexico's territory without her consent (see buchanan to hilliard, works, viii, 56), and to believe that after giving this pledge our executive proposed to reverse his entire policy regarding mexico and be guilty of such bad faith would require much more evidence than we have. it seems to the author that humanity combined with an avowed desire to keep european powers out of yucatan fully explain what polk did (see polk's diary, apr. 25). congress decided against occupying yucatan. its troubles were settled by an agreement between the two parties (_nat. intelligencer_, may 17). 32.21. sherman letters, 46-7. polk, diary, feb. 28. _public ledger_, june 15, 1849 (dallas). n. y. _journ. commerce_, feb. 25-6; mar. 1, 11. _niles_, feb. 26, 1848, pp. 401-3. =139=fulton to campbell, mar. 5. =198=berrien to gallatin, june 7. morse, j. q. adams, 307-8. adams was stricken down two days after the treaty reached washington. by this time the senators understood its contents fairly well, no doubt. 32.22. polk, diary, feb. 25-mar. 10; apr. 27. =13=crampton, no. 21, 1848. meigs, benton, 378. benton, view, ii, 694. =210=woodward to hammond, feb. 23. =210=alvord to _id._, feb. 24. calhoun corresp., 743 (to mrs. c.), 745 (to t. g. c.). (politicians) benton, view, ii, 710. =253=mclean, remarks. =345=blair to van buren, mar. 3, 1848. n. y. _journ. commerce_, feb. 25; mar. 1-3, 7, 11. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 3-37 (proceedings). wash. _union_, mar. 2, 4. balt. _clipper_, mar. 4. balt. _patriot_, mar. 3. _nat. intellig._, feb. 28; mar. 4. _public ledger_, feb. 24. n. y. _herald_, oct. 30, 1847. johnson, douglas, 123. webster, writings, x, 3-33. boston _courier_, feb. 24, 1848. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., 497 (dayton). the whigs were suspected of trying to gain enough democratic support so that they could not be charged with beating the treaty as a party (polk, diary, mar. 3; _public ledger_, mar. 8). webster's policy was not only unpatriotic but unintelligent, for a continuation of the war would probably have led either to defeat or to larger acquisitions; but perhaps he believed no bad results would occur before the next presidential election. he knew the country as a whole wanted the treaty ratified for the sake of peace (writings, x, 7), and he was unable to make the new england whig senators join him against the treaty. calhoun wrote to gallatin that, owing to diversity of opinion in the senate, not even a majority could have been obtained for any proposition different from the corresponding proposition of the treaty (=198=mar. 13, 1848). what increased the danger involved in rejecting the treaty was the prospect that, with both scott and taylor out of the field, operations--even should they not become unsuccessful--would lack the interest which had largely prevented the public from thinking of the cost and other ills of the conflict, and hence it would be impossible to support the war (=132=w. r. king to buchanan, oct. 5, 1847; seward, seward at wash., i, 62). feb. 28 the committee on foreign relations reported the treaty without recommendation. webster at once proposed a commission. his motion was tabled mar. 2 (sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 4, 9). for frémont (benton's son-in-law) see chap. xxxi, note 31.19. benton was probably opposed to the treaty also because he had held that texas ended at the nueces. there was a particular reason for saying that we obtained the new territory by cession rather than by conquest. the latter construction would have raised the troublesome questions, what place is there under our constitution for a conquered province, and what right has our government to hold foreigners in subjection (=210=b. tucker to hammond, mar. 16, 1848)? four senators did not vote. for an analysis of the vote see rives, _op. cit._, ii, 636-7. 32.23. dallas in _public ledger_, june 15, 1849. sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 66-72 (buchanan). art. 10 was thought insulting to texas and contrary to the terms of annexation. probably american courts would not have enforced it, and almost certainly it would have caused much litigation. sevier and clifford were authorized to give mexico (if necessary), after her ratification of the amended treaty, a choice between the two methods of payment (=52=to s. and c., mar. 22, 1848). for the treaty as drawn and as amended see ho. 50; 30, 2. 32.24. polk, diary, mar. 11, 12, 14-18, 20, 23. welles papers. =52=buchanan to clifford, mar. 18, 1848. polk to senate, mar. 18: richardson, messages, iv, 577. claiborne, quitman, i, 318. ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 47-52 (buchanan), 55 (clifford, sevier). benton, view, ii, 711. =335=memoranda. the amount paid for nominal services in securing the consummation (in mexico) of trist's treaty was $28,728.67, while he received nothing for doing the real work. years later he was paid (sen. rep. 261; 41, 2). it is true that disgust with polk's course toward scott and himself, and particularly with polk's employing a man like pillow, led trist to say he would not serve again under polk (=335=nov. 28, 1847); but had the president now acted a manly part, trist would no doubt have accepted the appointment given to sevier. for r. e. lee's feeling on the matter see lee, gen. lee, 46. in the night of mar. 11 maj. graham left washington to notify butler of the ratification of the treaty (polk, diary). buchanan's letter to the minister of relations (ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 47-52) gave a conciliatory explanation of the amendments. 32.25. =13=doyle, nos. 18, 29, 1848. =83=relaciones, circular, feb. 6. =76=circulars, feb. 16, 18. _atalaya_, feb. 2, 1848. _correo nacional_, feb. 7. kenly, md. vol., 464. exposición dirigida. negrete, invasión, iv, 296-334. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 615, 619. rejón, observaciones. communicación circular. méxico á través, iv, 708-9. _eco del comercio_, mar. 15. =80=junta legislativa of méx. state to gov., dec. 17, 1847; reply from peña, dec. 28. in view of previous notes, further citations here seem unnecessary. 32.26. (impression) polk, diary, mar. 9; calhoun corresp., 757 (to t. g. c.). =60=butler to marcy, mar. 3, 13; apr. 7. =13=doyle, nos. 18, 29, 41, 52, 1848. ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 55-6 (s. and c.), 72 (rosa). _correo nacional_, feb. 7. méxico á través, iv, 710. long, memoirs, 62. apuntes, 393. (hunt up) =291=winship to pierce, mar. 5. =52=trist, nos. 25, 27, 29. rivera, jalapa, iv, 64. =125=bonham to mother, may 14. _picayune_, feb. 27. (hawked) wash. _union_, apr. 9, 25 (letters from mexico). it was feared that polk's haste in sending sevier and clifford would lead the mexican congress to feel that we were eager for peace; that the inexperience of those diplomats might tempt the mexicans to test their ability; that the recall of scott and trist would have an unfavorable influence, and that mexican congressmen might hold off in order to be bought by the americans with funds said to have been provided for the purpose (polk, diary, feb. 7). on the other hand the refusal of the government to appropriate any part of the fifteen millions coming from the united states produced a good effect. it was an excellent sign that almonte failed to get elected to the senate. a quorum assembled may 3. congress opened formally may 7. by may 9 the treaty was before it. 32.27. ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 61 (s. and c.), 62-72, 76. apuntes, 393-5. exposición dirigida. negrete, invasión, iv, 296; app., 399. ballentine, eng. soldier, ii, 295-6. méxico á través, iv, 710. _public ledger_, june 15, 1849 (dallas). (preparations) richardson, messages, iv, 544, 546. wash. _union_, june 9. _nat. intellig._, mar. 14. =13=crampton, no. 19, 1848. =13=doyle, no. 54, 1848. peña said he regretted the amendments but--especially since no new negotiation was deemed possible--did not think the treaty should be rejected on account of them. the vote in the chamber of deputies, may 19, was 51 to 35; in the senate, may 24, 33 to 4 (=60=butler to marcy, may 26). action of the new mexico legislative assembly looking toward absorption in the united states was of great assistance, for it stopped the cry that loyal citizens were being sold. some 300-500 american deserters, who were at querétaro, took a strong stand for peace, because they were likely to be captured and shot, should the war continue; and the mexicans felt considerable responsibility for the deserters. polk's message of dec. 7, 1847, declared strongly for pushing the war at the expense of mexico, if she would not make a treaty, and announced that california and new mexico would not in any event be relinquished. under this spur our congress voted additional forces. the whigs held off, but dared not refuse to support the war (p. 291). the speeches particularly worthy of attention were those of cass (mar. 14) and webster (mar. 23). noisy popular demonstrations of joy were lacking because there had been no business disturbances, no invasion and no sinking of ships, the seat of war was distant, for nine months nothing striking had occurred there, taylor and scott were out of the field, and few had personal reasons for feeling interested in our mexican relations. 32.28. richardson, messages, iv, 679-87. sen. 69; 30, 1, pp. 72-3. ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 56-79. =60=butler to marcy, may 21. calendario de ontiveros, 1847. kendall, narrative (n. y., 1844), ii, 185, 192. (distance) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1047 (scott). wise, gringos (n. y., 1849), 267-70. richardson, messages, iv, 630, 644. _nat. intellig._, june 24, 1848. portrait of peña: city hall, mex. apparently the mexican government deferred the appearance of sevier and clifford at querétaro (especially as they insisted upon having an american escort) lest it should seem to be acting under pressure or lest some untoward accident should occur. this course was doubtless wise. may 19 they were invited to come, for the deputies had just ratified the treaty and the senators were sure to do so. sevier was ill on may 26. he returned to the united states soon after the formalities were concluded, but clifford remained as our minister. rosa arrived at washington in november, 1848, as the minister of mexico. during their stay at querétaro our commissioners were led to embody in a protocol some explanations of the treaty. in 1849 the mexicans asserted that the protocol gave them additional advantages; and the whigs--apparently encouraged by benton, who was accused of acting in collusion with the mexican minister--undertook to make trouble for the administration and perhaps invalidate the treaty. but it was unreasonable to pretend that such a document could modify a treaty previously ratified by the american senate and the mexican congress. besides, sevier and clifford gave explicit notice, before drawing up the protocol, that they had no power to modify the treaty (=52=clifford to cuevas, apr. 30, 1849). at length the mexican government admitted formally that the protocol was merely explanatory (=52=lacunza to clifford, july 13, 1849). see also on this subject ho. 50; 30, 2, pp. 76-9. polk, diary, feb. 4, 6, 8, 10, 1849. foote, remins., 332-5. sen. 1; 31, 1, pp. 69-89. ho. 5, pt. 1, 31, 1, pp. 69-89. meigs, benton, 378-9. richardson, messages, iv, 679-87. foster, amer. diplom., 320. buchanan, works, viii, 350 (to c.). 32.29. memoria de ... relaciones, jan., 1849. the chief cause of difficulty was that clifford referred certain matters to washington that he should have settled himself, and thus caused delay. the worst consequence was that the customhouse at vera cruz did not pass into mexican hands at the appointed time, because no one had authority to surrender it. at length, however, gen. smith assumed the responsibility of doing this, and clifford endorsed his action. similar difficulties arose at tampico and mazatlán. (on this topic one may consult: =52=buchanan to clifford, aug. 15, 1848; =13=giffard, apr. 10; july 16; =52=clifford to smith, june 27; july 4; =52=smith to clifford, july 8; and reply, july 18; =52=otero to clifford, june 21; july 1; buchanan, works, viii, 177, 268, 272, 284.) complaint was made because a body of our troops, in order to go from monterey, mex., to new mexico, crossed territory not actually in our possession. june 30 arrangements were completed for paying the $3,000,000 which trist, and then butler, had been authorized to draw (polk, diary, feb. 23; =52=clifford, no. 15; sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 107-9). july 4 the treaty was duly proclaimed by polk (richardson, messages, iv, 627; ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 173); and two days later he recommended that provision be made for carrying it into effect (details in note 32.31). mexico appropriated funds to bring from the surrendered territory such of her citizens as might desire to leave it (negrete, invasión, iv, 342-9). 32.30. _evacuation of northeastern mexico._ =61=wool to jones, mar. 21; june 8, 15; =61=jones to butler, may 17; =61=_id._ to wool, june 7, 17; 65gen. orders 25; =65=wool, orders 156, june 12 (announcing that peace had been made); =76=a. de leano, monterey, june 25 (possession given yesterday); =76=aguirre to _id._, saltillo, june 29 (s. evacuated, june 14). =76=clarke to mex. commander, mazapil, mar. 18. july 6, =61=wool wrote to the adj. gen. from the brazos that four cos. of dragoons would soon set out for california, and bragg's battery and one co. of dragoons for s. fe under orders from the war dept.; and that all the volunteers except five mounted cos. had embarked. _the northwest._ =61=price to rails, apr. 16; =61=_id._ to vice gov. chihuahua, apr. 16; méxico á través, iv, 710; =76=price to mex. commrs., may 1; =69=wool to marcy, june 22; =61=_id._ to adj. gen., july 6. on aug. 6 news of peace and the retention of upper calif. (which went overland from la]* paz in lower calif.) reached mason at monterey. he then ordered the n. y. vols. discharged. this process was completed on oct. 26 (sen. 18; 31, 1, pp. 573, 626). =61=mason to adj. gen., aug. 19 (anticipatory orders given to burton in lower calif. to evacuate on learning of peace). sen. 18; 31, 1, p. 513 (burton to mason, june 27: official news of peace have come). _naval evacuation._ ho. 50; 30, 2, p. 52 (buchanan). =48=mason to shubrick or jones, mar. 11, confid. =48=_id._ to jones, june 27 (polk wished to retain lower calif., but did not wish to prevent peace by insisting; do what you rightfully can to help friendly mexicans come to the u. s., if they wish to do so). july 15 at la paz =47=jones and shubrick agreed that such persons should be transported to california, and that, in extreme cases of destitution caused by mexican vengeance, reasonable compensation should be made out of the military contributions collected in that quarter. =76=comte. gen. sonora, july 13 (u. s. vessels left guaymas july 5). gaxiola, invasión, 215 (lavallette evacuated mazatlán june 17). the treaty had been received at mazatlán on june 13. ho. 50; 30, 2, p. 52 (b.). =52=jones to anaya, june 13. 32.31. =60=butler to marcy, may 21; june 2. =80=memo., may 30. =13=doyle, no. 66, 1848. =52=clifford, no. 13, 1848. méxico á través, iv, 711. rivera, jalapa, iv, 88. (herrera) =52=rosa to sevier and clifford, june 2; =80=relaciones circular, june 13. grant, mems., i, 118. sen. rep. 32; 34, 1 (naylor). arrangements were made by butler and the ayuntamiento so that local mexican guards began to patrol the city as soon as the americans marched out (=92=memo.). our troops began to leave the capital on may 30 (=60=butler to marcy, june 2). the order of march was: heavy artillery; patterson's division (vols.); marshall's division (vols.); col. bonham and third division (regulars); kearny and second division (regulars); butler and first division (regulars). divisions were as a rule two days apart. worth remained at the capital for a time after june 12 to dispose of surplus property. after butler sailed (june 21) worth was in command. july 6 polk presented the consummated treaty to congress, recommending the appropriation of $12,000,000 for mexico, provision for a commissioner and a surveyor to run and mark the boundary line, and provision for commissioners to adjust the american claims against mexico assumed by the united states (richardson, messages, iv, 587-93). herrera was declared president on may 30. 32.32. =61=thomas to brooke, may 21. lerdo de tejada, apuntes, ii, 585. =13=giffard to doyle, aug. 1. méxico á través, iv, 711. =61=p. f. smith, july 11. =61=worth to smith, june 27. =254=mcclellan to "tom," may 23. (symbol) ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 911 (scott). (verse) oswandel, notes, 587. it seems unnecessary to cite the numerous orders regarding details. for the embarkation see ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 201. for one reason or another a few men remained in mexico. there was a plan to march some of the troops north from the capital, but it did not seem wise to ask the consent of the mexican congress. the original intention was to have the men going by water land as near their homes as practicable, but the northern men objected strenuously to the tedious voyage. the mexicans and americans awaiting execution were released. the members of the mexican spy co. were offered $20 apiece and a trip to texas. our sick and wounded soldiers were provided for on their arrival in the united states. xxxiii. the finances of the war 33.1. on mexican finances see also vol. ii, pp. 6-8. 33.2. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1070, table. sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 13-24. =61=scott, memoir on mexican finances received at the war dept., jan. 6, 1848. mexican national accounts were kept in so peculiar a way, and the officials were so much more anxious to conceal than to reveal the truth, that it would be extremely difficult and very likely impossible to state precisely all the details regarding the finances of the government. 33.3. ramírez, méxico, 243-4. dublán, legislación, v, 135, 172, 211, 240, 246, 255, 261-3, 286. =80=guerra to hacienda, sept. 8, 1847. _diario_, dec. 31, 1846; june 17; july 6, 1847. =76=guerra, circulars, june 17; july 6, 1847. s. anna, apelación, 67. =82=proclam. of act'g. gov. puebla, nov. 30, 1847. =80=méx. state legislature, address, apr. 26, 1847. =76=s. anna, nov. 16, 1846. vera cruz state, or at least her governor, showed much zeal, but all her resources were needed for home use. see also chap. xxi, p. 9. 33.4. =75=report of meeting of govs., nov., 1847. s. anna, apelación, 45, 67. _courrier des etats unis_, may 22, 1847. encarnacion prisoners, 69. méxico á través, iv, 667. apuntes, 206-7. _republicano_, june 17, 1847. =76=memo., apr. 6, 1847. _picayune_, aug. 7, 8, 1847. london _times_, sept. 6, 1847. semmes, service, 313. ramírez, méxico, 238. gamboa, impug., 67. dictamen de la comisión, 29-30. =92=mexico ayunt., sept. 9, 1847. =92=tornel to mexico ayunt., sept. 12. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1063 (scott). ripley, war with mexico, ii, 126, 489. the clergy may have given something in addition to the $1,500,000. see the end of chap. xxi, p. 15. the arrangement with the bondholders was known as the "conversion of 1846." this loan gave mackintosh a particular reason for desiring to have peace made. the loan was to have been repaid in nine months. during july and august, 1847, santa anna appears to have raised in one way and another, as indicated in the text, about $1,000,000. the pay of officials was reduced or withheld. for forced loans see chap. i, note 1.7. in july, 1847, though foreigners were exempt from forced loans, santa anna evaded the agreement by taking money without going through the ceremony of promising to repay it. 33.5. =80=lombardini to mexico ayunt., aug. 13, 1847. =75=meeting of govs., nov., 1847. _diario_, july 1, 1847. ramírez, méxico, 260. =90=jalapa ayunt., apr. 10, 1847. =94=canalizo to orizaba ayunt., apr. 4, 1847. =82=comte. milit., s. martín, to puebla sec. state, mar. 31, 1847. =312=anaya to s. anna, apr. 9, 1847. =76=many memoranda, orders, etc. there was waste, of course, as well as injustice and peculation. this was brought out at the meeting of governors. 33.6. ho. 6; 29, 1 (walker, report, dec. 3, 1845). sen. 2; 29, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1846). ho. 9; 29, 1 (_id._, estimates, dec. 4, 1845). ho. 51; 29, 1 (war dept. contracts). ho. 56; 29, 1 (marcy, report, jan. 9, 1846). ho. 81; 29, 1. 33.7. _bankers' mag._, ii, 202-4. [b]n. y. _herald_ (weekly), may 16, 23; june 6; july 3; aug. 8, 15, 29, 1846. london _times_, july 15, 1846. =198=gallatin to everett, dec. 16, 1847. =354=welles papers (hist. of 29 cong., 2 sess.). _nat. intelligencer_, nov. 28, 1846. [footnote b: all the citations of the _herald_ in the notes on this chapter refer to the financial articles.] 33.8. wash. _union_, nov. 30, 1846. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), may 16; june 6, 1846; june 19, 1847. scott, repudiation, 37, 47, 162. green, repudiation, 11, 13, 15. _niles_, dec. 4, 1847, p. 218. (sévigné) buchanan, works, vii, 66. london _spectator_, may 30, 1846. =354=welles papers. dewey, financial history, 245. bolles, financial history, 580-2. _journ. mil. serv. instit._, xiv, 198. the huge state debts were mostly due to extravagant enterprises often supported by fraudulent banking. delinquency was in reality a salutary suspension of payments that prevented bankruptcy, but the creditors did not know this at the time, and felt little disposed to be charitable. 33.9. taussig, tariff hist., 113-5. _niles_, june 6, 1846, p. 212; aug. 1, 1846, p. 345; aug. 14, 1847, p. 369. boston _atlas_, jan. 6, 1847. ambler, ritchie, 264. webster, letters, 337-9. =308=shields to walker, aug. 3, 1846. sen. 105; 29, 2 (walker to dallas, feb. 1, 1847). ho. 227; 29, 1. ho. 7; 30, 2 (walker, report, dec. 9, 1848). (walker, jarnagin) welles papers. (haywood) =1=allen to "effie," july 25, 1846; =210=mcduffie to hammond, july 20, 1846. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), aug. 1, 29; dec. 19, 1846; jan. 29, 1848. n. y. _globe_, jan. 9, 1847. _bankers' mag._, i, 136; ii, 74. ho. 6; 29, 1 (walker, report, dec. 3, 1845). sen. 2; 29, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1846). u. s. stat. at large, ix, 42, 53, 59, 106. lalor, cyclop., ii, 495; iii, 864. phila. _no. american_, july 16, 1846. walker's report of december 3, 1845, enunciated and defended his tariff principles (ho. 6; 29, 1). these were: 1, to collect only enough revenue for the economical administration of the government; 2, to have no duty higher than the lowest rate that will yield the greatest revenue (_e.g._ some luxuries are so easily smuggled in that a high duty would produce little); 3, below such a rate to permit discrimination, if thought desirable (_e.g._ less on necessaries than on luxuries); 4, to lay the maximum rate on luxuries; 5, to have only _ad valorem_ duties; and, 6, to discriminate against no section or class of the nation. he expressed the opinions that many of the high duties were becoming prohibitive and therefore unprofitable, and that the increased risk and costs of transportation during a war would cause nearly all of them to become so. besides, he said, "at least two thirds of the taxes imposed by the present tariff are paid, not into the treasury, but to the protected classes" (_niles_, aug. 1, 1846, p. 349). walker also charged that the specific duties, which formed a part of the 1842 tariff, taxed most highly the cheapest articles and therefore produced relatively little (sen. 105; 29, 2: to dallas). it was argued by others that war would sufficiently hinder importing to make a protective tariff unnecessary (wash. _union_, may 28, 1846). the essential idea underlying the tariff of 1846, though it was not strictly a revenue tariff, was that it would increase the revenue by stimulating importation. but opponents argued that unless europe should take a greatly increased quantity of our agricultural products--which there was no reason to expect--we could not pay for larger imports; while, should foreign goods be "dumped" at low prices upon our markets, american manufacturers would be ruined. even in the year ending june 30, 1845, the balance of trade had been $7,251,589 against us, and we had exported $8,606,495 in specie (_bankers' mag._, i, 136). under the tariff of 1842 the average rate of duty was 24 per cent; under that of 1846, 18 per cent. one natural effect of the uncertainty caused by the new fiscal laws was to check business, but this was offset by its tendency to check speculation and inflation. the specie feature tended to contract the currency, and many deemed this unfortunate in view of the large calls for money likely to result from the war. good judges thought its enforcement would have to be deferred, therefore. a special cause of alarm was that in preparing for the second war with england the duties had been increased instead of reduced. senator haywood of north carolina opposed the new scale of duties as sure to plunge the country into debt, opposed putting them into effect so promptly (dec. 1, 1846), and opposed the adoption of such a combination of new financial measures (wash. _union_, aug. 18, 1846). he therefore resigned, and this endangered the plan of the administration. the warehouse system consisted in deferring the payment of assessed duties without an interest charge, the government retaining the goods meanwhile as security for the eventual payment of them. goods could therefore wait for a purchaser, instead of going--if not at once in demand--for what they would bring at a forced sale. this encouraged importation and built up extensive stocks, which in turn attracted purchasers from afar (walker, report, dec. 9, 1846, in sen. 2; 29, 2). this system, like that of the sub-treasury, proved highly advantageous. the specie provision of the sub-treasury bill required the government to accept only specie after dec. 31, 1846, and to pay out only specie after mar. 31, 1847 (u. s. stat. at large, ix, 64), with the exception of treasury notes. 33.10. n. y. _tribune_, jan. 24, 1848. sen. 105; 29, 2 (walker to dallas, feb. 1, 1847). sen. 392; 29, 1 (polk, message, june 16; walker, june 15, 1846, etc.). polk, diary, sept. 29, 1846. ho. 6; 29, 1 (walker, report, dec. 3, 1845). sen. 2; 29, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1846). ho. 6; 30, 1 (_id._, report, dec. 8, 1847). ho. 2 and 10; 29, 2. ho. 9, 51, 56, 81, 82; 29, 1. sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 395. sen. 27; 30, 1.] the warehouse bill also delayed the payment of duties. walker's estimate of the customs revenue for 1846-7 was $27,835,731 (report, dec. 9, 1846, in sen. 2; 29, 2). the receipts were actually $23,747,865 (report, dec. 8, 1847, in ho. 6; 30, 1). walker pointed out that nearly half a million was due on warehoused goods (_niles_, july 31, 1847, p. 337); but these goods might not all have been imported, had it been necessary to pay the duties at once, and some of them were practically sure to be exported, and hence not all the duties assessed upon them could be considered a part of the revenue, as walker intimated. the democrats feared that taxes would make the war unpopular, and the whigs hoped to obtain that result by less expensive methods. 33.11. sen. 392; 29, 1 (walker to polk, june 15, 1846). gallatin, war expenses, 15-6. _niles_, sept. 19, 1846, p. 48; oct. 3, 1846, p. 80. _bankers' mag._, i, 193-4, 322. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), july 18; aug. 15; sept. 19; oct. 31, 1846; jan. 9, 1847. bayley, national loans, 70-2. _polit. sci. qtrly._, i, 375-84. n. y. _tribune_, jan. 24, 1848. u. s. stat. at large, ix, 39. knox, u. s. notes, 63-4. the act of july 22, 1846, was based upon and virtually embodied that of oct. 12, 1837. notes redeemed could be reissued. any fraction of the $10,000,000 could be issued in notes or in stock (bonds) at the president's discretion, but the amount of both could not exceed that figure. the bonds were to conform to the act of apr. 15, 1842, and to "be redeemable at a period not longer than ten years from the issue thereof." walker thought that only a war with a powerful maritime nation, exposing our commerce to peril and causing a great loss in customs revenue, would be thought to warrant excise and direct taxes. (the idea of a direct tax was widely unpopular, because such a tax would be based upon population, and therefore would favor the capitalistic sections.) before issuing treasury notes walker used up much of the surplus lying in the banks. the notes were issued at par. they could not become a circulating medium. for redemption they went to the city banks. so long as these banks had deposits of public funds, they were accepted as cash. after that, their tendency was to fall. about oct. 1, 1846, the notes were quoted at 98-1/2 in st. louis. for a time the new orleans banks would not receive the notes, but retaliation brought the banks round. since only specie and treasury notes were to be receivable after jan. 1, 1847, for dues to the government, the sub-treasury act aided the notes. on the other hand the issuance of the notes offset the specie requirement of that act, and therefore prevented or modified some of its anticipated consequences--particularly a drain upon the specie of the banks. one advantage of the notes was that, should the war suddenly end, they could be withdrawn and the interest on them stopped. this was not true of loans. 33.12. ho. 6; 29, 1 (walker, report, dec. 3, 1845). polk, diary, sept. 29, 1846. gallatin, war expenses, 14-6. _niles_, sept, 12, 1846, p. 17. de knight, currency, 69. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), june 6; aug. 15, 1846; jan. 9, 1847; jan. 29, 1848. _bankers' mag._, i, 193-4. the authority to issue these notes was limited to one year; but on jan. 28, 1847, the time was extended to six months after the ratification of peace with mexico, with the proviso that the notes thus authorized should not exceed $5,000,000 in amount (§ 15, u. s. stat. at large, ix, 121-2). in his report of dec. 9, 1846, walker stated that $3,853,100 of these notes had been issued, $1,766,450 bearing interest at one tenth of 1 per cent (de knight, currency, 69), and the residue at 5-2/5 per cent per annum payable on redemption. nov. 2, 1846, treasury notes of prior issues amounting to $412,283.97 were outstanding. the surplus, july 1, 1846, was $9,126,439. sept. 29, 1846, the treasury contained "only a fraction over" four millions (polk, diary, sept. 29). 33.13. =13=pakenham, nos. 127, oct. 29; 130, nov. 12, 1846. (walker) wash. _union_, may 10; dec. 9, 1847; n. y. _express_, dec. 12, 1846; welles papers; boston _courier_, feb. 17, 1848; =345=g. a. worth to v. buren, dec. 16, 1847; =198=gallatin to newboldt, feb. 8, 1848; =198=_id._ to rockwell, may 8, 1848; =181=buchanan to donelson, may 13, 1847. miss. hist. soc. pubs., vi, 363. dodd, walker, 24, etc. wash. _union_, nov. 16; dec. 8, 1846. n. y. _express_, nov. 18, 1846. _bankers' mag._, i, 321-2. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), sept. 19; nov. 7, 14, 28, 1846. bayley, national loans, 71. de knight, currency, 70. _niles_, oct. 10, p. 81; oct. 17, p. 97; oct. 24, p. 128; nov. 7, pp. 146-7, 1846. sen. 105; 29, 2 (walker to dallas, feb. 1, 1847). polk, diary, oct. 1, 13, 15-7, 22, 30; nov. 7, 1846. london _times_, oct. 27, 1846. sen. 2; 29, 2 (walker, report, dec. 9, 1846). _cong. globe_, 29, 2, app., 124 (ingersoll). dewey, financial history, 256. professor tucker proved, it was said, that walker's argument for free trade made an error of $1,000,000 per year in the productive industry of the united states. stewart of pennsylvania charged him in congress with a number of errors. rockwell of connecticut made a startling analysis of treasury statements (_cong. globe_, 30, 1, pp. 404-7); but it would lead us too far afield to enter upon such a discussion. $4,999,149 of the loan was issued (bayley, nat. loans, 71). on $363,900 there was an average premium of .277 of 1 per cent, while the rest went at par (de knight, currency, 70). opponents of the government attributed the success of the loan to marcy's statement that it would not be necessary to call for more volunteers. as a new call for volunteers went out almost immediately after the bids were opened, he was charged falsely with having played a trick on the public (n. y. _express_, nov. 18, 1846). for the truth in this matter see vol. i, p. 351. most of the loan was taken at new york, but it became fairly well distributed. walker's offering the loan only ten days after advertising an issue of $3,000,000 in notes (_niles_, nov., 1846, p. 147) was rather alarming, it must be admitted. a less reasonable criticism on his policy was that he could and should have borrowed liberally june 1 and july 1 at 5 per cent. at those dates he had a large surplus, the tariff had not been changed, and the administration did not expect a serious war. 33.14. sen. 2; 29, 2 (walker, report, dec. 9, 1846). dewey, financial history, 255-6. u. s. stat. at large, ix, 118. =247=king to larkin, nov. 7, 1847. polk, diary, feb. 16. =13=pakenham, no. 13, nov. 12, 1846. _niles_, apr. 24, 1847, p. 113; june 5, p. 224; aug. 21, pp. 392, 400; feb. 5, 1848, p. 354 (mclean). wash. _union_, jan. 14; apr. 12, 1847. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), apr. 24; nov. 30, 1847; feb. 26; mar. 4, 11, 18, 1848. bayley, nat. loans, 72. de knight, currency, 71-2. knox, u. s. notes, 64, 69. =108=buchanan to bancroft, dec. 29, 1846, priv. the estimated deficit, july 1, 1847, was $4,779,042 (walker, report, dec. 9, 1846 in sen. 2; 29, 2). by the act of jan. 28, 1847, the treasury notes were to be redeemable in one or two years, to bear interest (not more than 6 per cent) at the discretion of the president, and to be convertible into bonds. none could be issued, used as security for loans, or bought up by the government, at less than par plus the accrued interest. new notes could be issued for those redeemed, but the total outstanding amount of notes and bonds issued under the act could not exceed $23,000,000. the public lands were in effect pledged as security for the loan, which was made payable at any time after dec. 31, 1867. the act provided that the notes to be issued under it and all previous treasury notes could be converted into 6 per cent stock (bonds). it was predicted that the loan could not be placed at better than 90, if at all (n. y. _express_, dec. 14, 1846). bids (to be in by apr. 10) for $18,000,000 of it were invited on feb. 9, 1847. the new york and boston banks appear to have agreed on a price, but some new york capitalists offered more, and they in turn were outbid by corcoran and riggs of washington, who seem to have taken a very large part of it. the bids above par totalled about $55,000,000, and the premiums offered ran as high as 2 per cent. it has been called a mistake to pay 6 per cent on long-term bonds, and this is proved by the premium they soon commanded. but before the bonds were issued grave doubts regarding their acceptability were entertained, and a saving in interest was of relatively little importance. many had expected that the whole amount($23,000,000) would be issued in treasury notes and practically increase the amount of the currency; but the amount issued at first was largely taken for investments (n. y. _herald_ (weekly), mar. 20, 1847). hence the currency in circulation was diminished. however, the specie coming from abroad soon made up for this. bids for $5,000,000 of notes were invited on feb. 26. the rothschilds (represented by a. belmont) were soon understood to be interested, and were in fact successful to a large extent in the bidding. their bidding encouraged american capitalists. probably the notes could safely, and therefore should, have been made convertible into 5 per cent, instead of 6 per cent, bonds. the interest paid on them at redemption was 5-2/5 or 6 per cent (de knight, currency, 71). june 1, 1817, walker reported treasury notes as outstanding (minus $789,700 of cancelled notes on hand): of issues prior to july 22, 1846, $303,817; of issues under the act of july 22, $3,565,600; of issues under the act of jan. 28, $8,100,000; net total, $11,179,717 (_niles_, june 5, p. 224). about the middle of august, 1847, they sold at 106-1/2, but within a week (probably because reports that scott had captured mexico city were found to be false) they fell at new york to 103-1/2. the issuing of more notes was objected to on the ground that it would virtually mean a government bank controlled by a party. it was argued by some that notes for small amounts bearing interest at a nominal rate should have been put out. these, it was said, would have been purchased by persons of small means, who actually put their savings into specie needed by the government. the question was raised why polk asked in december, 1846, for funds to cover the fiscal year 1847-8 (n. y. _express_, dec. 14, 1846). walker's report included estimates for that period, but this fact does not seem to be an adequate explanation. one suspects that polk and walker knew the money would be needed, and thought this the easiest way to get it. 33.15. richardson, messages, iv, 516. pakenham, no. 6, jan. 28, 1847. sen. 2; 29, 2 (walker, report, dec. 9, 1846). ho. 6; 30, 1 (_id._, report, dec. 8, 1847). ho. 7; 30, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1848). sen. 105; 29, 2 (_id._ to dallas, feb. 1, 1847). sen. 392; 29, 1 (_id._ to polk, june 15, 1846). taussig, tariff hist., 115. welles papers. polk, diary, jan. 2, 1847. _niles_, jan. 2, 1847, p. 288. boston _courier_, feb. 17, 1848. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, pp. 281, 298. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), jan. 9, 1847. (pessimists) =345=g. a. worth to van buren, may 20, 1847. in dec., 1847, polk had to admit that a deficiency of $15,729,114 on june 30, 1848, was probable. the british minister reported that one reason for proposing the tax on tea and coffee was a wish to defeat anticipated attempts of the protectionists to repeal the tariff of 1846. it was suspected that walker made the appeal to congress in order to display his influence or to relieve that body of responsibility for modifying the tariff it had so recently voted. the motives of the house were mixed. some members doubtless objected to the plan on principle, others because they wished to be consistent with their action in accepting that tariff, others because the estimated return from such a tax ($2,500,000 or $3,000,000 per year) did not seem enough to meet the requirements, and others, perhaps, to rebuke what struck them like dictation on walker's part; but the main considerations appear to be those mentioned in chap. xxxiv (_e.g._, p. 285.) the vote in the house was taken jan. 2, 1847. walker persisted, but without effect. benton's idea was adopted in 1854. see "public lands, bill to reduce and graduate the price of," in senate index of _cong. globe_, 29 cong., 1 and 2 sess.; 30 cong., 1 sess., etc. 33.16. ho. 6; 30, 1 (walker, report, dec. 8, 1847). ho. 7; 30, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1848). =13=pakenham, no. 147, dec. 29, 1846. stockton, circular, aug. 15, 1846. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 905 (marcy); 930, 1085 (scott); 931 (worth). london _times_, june 8, 1846. richardson, messages, iv, 548-9, 570, 672. vattel, book 3, chap. 9, sect. 161. balt. _american_, feb. 17, 1847. wash. _union_, apr. 12, 1847. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), may 1, 1847. sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 552, 558, 561 (polk); 553 (walker). _niles_, apr. 24, 1847, p. 113. ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1075 (shubrick). =47=shubrick, apr. 15, 1848. =76=lavallette, proclam., oct. 26, 1847. sen. 24; 30, 1 (polk, message). ho. 20; 30, 2 (polk, message). polk, diary, mar. 10, 1847. we do not positively know that walker originated the idea of the tariff in mexican ports, nor that it had any relation to the tea and coffee tax; but one would naturally assume as much, and so the washington _union_ stated (_niles_, apr. 24, 1847, p. 113). at first, however, walker did not perceive that the tariff would have to rest upon the president's military authority. contributions took the place of the pillage formerly practised in war. an advantage of the plan, perhaps not contemplated at first, was that it would greatly discourage smuggling, and therefore, since imports would mostly have to pass the inspection of american officers, contraband could much more fully be excluded. this tariff was fiercely attacked in congress, but the position of the executive was impregnable. complaint was also made that americans as well as neutrals had to pay it; but had they not done so, they would have been able to defy competition, foreign nations would have complained, the mexicans would have benefited by the low prices of merchandise, and the united states would have obtained no revenue. the american policy prior to march 31, 1847, is shown by walker's circular of june 30, 1846 (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 158) and by marcy's =63=instructions to the commanding officer at tampico, dec. 15, 1846. the latter said: only united states vessels may enter, and those only when carrying articles produced in the united states or imports upon which united states duties have been paid, and on all such goods no duties will be charged. "but in a spirit of accommodation" clearances to tampico of cargoes of foreign products, etc., in american vessels will be granted (duties having been paid) without being unloaded in the united states. vessels admitted at tampico may take out return cargoes of the property of americans or neutrals without paying export duties; and specie belonging to neutrals may be freely exported. indeed this export of specie should be encouraged, since it prevents mexico from seizing the means of waging war. pakenham complained that this policy would give american goods (which would not have to pay a duty) a monopoly of the mexican market; but it seemed impossible at this time to run the risk of the military injury liable to result from admitting neutral vessels generally. he seems to have felt inclined to protest, but he did not find that the ministers of france, spain and germany intended to do so (=13=no. 147). previous to dec. 15, 1846, american goods had been extensively smuggled into mexico across the rio grande, and of course that process continued. 33.17. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 975, 1014 (marcy); 1083 (shubrick). sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 552-76, 583, 585 (marcy); 585 (circular); 586 (walker); 951 (mason). ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1073, 1086 (shubrick). sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 9 (marcy); 10 (walker). london _times_, june 8, 1846; june 15, 1847. polk, diary, june 11; nov. 6, 1847. richardson, messages, iv, 531-2, 548. =52=chargé martin, no. 31, may 15, 1847. =13=consul glass, july 12, 1848. ho. 6; 30, 1 (walker, report, dec. 8, 1847). ho. 7; 30, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1848). _constitutionnel_, may 15, 1847. =13=mora to palmerston, may 19, 1847. _nat. intelligencer_, apr. 24, 1847. =48=mason to perry, apr. 3; june 16, 1847. in some cases the mexican tariff was reduced very much more than one half, and many articles of daily use, that had previously been prohibited, became available. no tonnage dues were assessed on vessels (chartered by the united states) laden exclusively with supplies for our army or navy (=60=marcy to scott, may 10, 1847), and united states officers, soldiers and sailors were exempted from the operation of the order to pay duties (richardson, messages, iv, 548). at matamoros, tampico and vera cruz the military governors acted as collectors. at places held by the navy, naval officers did so. on the pacific coast it proved necessary to modify the tariff. june 11, 1847, the regulations were somewhat modified (polk, diary, june 11), and additional changes were made in nov., 1847 (polk, diary, nov. 6; sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 11). july 31, 1847, the duty on books was made 20 per cent _ad valorem_ (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 585). chargé martin reported from paris that the french newspapers, alarmed by the protest of the mexican consul at havre, called on their government to demand guaranties from ours. martin justly took the position that our admitting french commerce to mexican ports was a pure favor, to be enjoyed at the risk of those caring to take advantage of it, but expressed the opinion freely that in the treaty of peace we should protect the interests invited by our policy, as in fact we pledged ourselves to do and did (walker, report, dec. 8, 1847 in ho. 6; 30, 1, 619; chap. xxxii, p. 468). 33.18. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), may 1, dec. 4, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1037 (marcy). ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1148 (shubrick). =13=consul giffard, no. 37, oct. 20, 1847. richardson, messages, iv, 548. =13=consul glass, dec. 1, 1847; july 12, 1848. =75=hacienda to relaciones, dec. 3, 1847. =75=gov. tamaulipas to relaciones, dec. 10, 23, 1847. =75=gates, order, nov. 27, 1847. =76=hacienda to guerra, dec. 3, 29, 1847. =13=crampton, no. 30, aug. 13, 1847. =76=---to amador, feb. 2, 1848. the governor of tamaulipas wrote frankly to the central government that prohibition would merely promote robbery and smuggling while injuring good mexicans. he therefore did nothing except to collect a duty. yet gates, commanding at tampico, had to send escorts with traders, and could not fully protect them. 33.19. n. y. _express_, dec. 1, 1846. sumner, amer. currency, 167. _economist_, apr. 24, 1847. gallatin, war expenses, 3, 10. _bankers' mag._, i, 513-6, 609-12, 673-4; ii, 201, 706-7. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), dec. 19, 1846; feb. 6; apr. 17, 24; july 24, 31; nov. 20; dec. 11, 1847. _niles_, feb. 13, 1847, p. 384; feb. 27, p. 416; sept. 11, p. 18; sept. 25, p. 60; oct. 2, p. 80; oct. 9, p. 82; oct. 23, p. 128; nov. 6, p. 145. =52=bancroft, no. 46, dec. 4, 1847. welles papers. =198=gallatin to everett, dec. 16, 1847. ho. 6; 30, 1 (walker, report, dec. 8, 1847). ho. 7; 30, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1848). =181=buchanan to donelson, jan. 29, 1847. during the year ending june 30, 1848, almost thirty-seven and a half millions in breadstuffs were exported (walker, report, dec. 9, 1848 in ho. 7; 30, 2). as early as march, 1847, the _bankers' magazine_ estimated the increase in the value of our "present" exports of grain and cotton as $12-15,000,000. the customs receipts for the year ending june 30, 1847, were $23,747,865; for the following year $31,757,071. of course the rising tide of prosperity, besides increasing the customs receipts and bringing specie, enhanced the credit of the government generally, and assisted the country in other ways to support the burden of the war. the crops of 1847 were fine in europe; the importations were found there to have been excessive; and prices fell sharply. british business proved to be far less solid than it had been supposed to be. bancroft, our minister, reported "a whirlwind of bankruptcies overspreading the land" (no. 46, dec. 4, 1847). orders for american goods were cancelled. owing to a want of confidence the practice of consigning goods to english houses, with bills drawn on the consignees for a considerable part of their value, was to a large extent abandoned. every vessel from england brought large parcels of american bonds to be sold for what they would fetch. early in november the rate of exchange went up and specie began to be exported from this country, though much remained in the interior. numerous failures occurred in the united states. all called in their resources. but here the trouble did not prove to be long or very serious; and while another year of war might have caused embarrassment, the country, despite the revolution in france, soon found itself comfortable. 33.20 ho. 6; 30, 1 (walker, report, dec. 8, 1847). ho. 7; 30, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1848). u. s. stat. at large, ix, 217. =13=crampton, no. 40, apr. 2, 1848. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), jan. 29, 1848. bayley, national loans, 73. de knight, currency, 73. for the debates in congress consult the _cong. globe_. boston _courier_, feb. 23, 1848. =345=niles to v. buren, dec. 16, 1847. polk, diary, feb. 1, 1848. the debate in the house began feb. 8 and ended feb. 17. in the course of the discussion it came out that the treasury really had about $7,000,000 more than had been supposed, but that $4,000,000 were desired by the war department to make good certain deficiencies. the amount of the loan was therefore reduced from $18,500,000 to "not more than" $16,000,000 (bayley, nat. loans, 73). the power to borrow under this act was to continue one year. the bonds were to bear not more than 6 per cent interest, be sold at not less than par, and be reimbursable at any time after july 1, 1868. before july 1, 1868, the secretary could purchase the bonds at the market price (but not below par). coupons could be attached to the certificates, and such certificates be transferable by mere delivery. the secretary of the treasury was required to advertise for bids--these to be received 20-60 days from the date of the earliest advertisement at washington. in order to give the loan the aid of assured peace, walker arranged the advertising so as to defer the time of opening the bids until june 17, 1848. the premium obtained was $487,169. though assisted with this loan, the treasury ended the fiscal year with a balance of only $153,535.] 33.21. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 354 (taylor); 994 (scott); 1005 (mason); 341, 1007, 1037 (marcy). =256=j. parrott to marcy, dec. 20, 1847, private. =256=marcy to scott, nov. 17, 1847. sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 5 (marcy), 6 (scott). _cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., 423-4. polk, diary, sept. 19, 1846; aug. 31; oct. 4, 5, 1847. =63=mason to scott, sept. 1, 1847. richardson, messages, iv, 546-8. =13=crampton, no. 58, nov. 28, 1847. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 124 (scott); 145 (marcy). scott, mems., ii, 552-3. _diario_, may 23, 1847. _republicano_, june 9, 1847. ho. 6; 30, 1 (walker, report, dec. 8, 1847). for the olive branches (_i.e._ offers to treat) see pp. 122-4. a particular difficulty in attempting to live on the country would have been the general sparseness of the population, especially since the americans had to keep together. for this reason, though some of the enemy expected us to rouse the nation by undertaking to enforce such a policy, the wiser mexicans did not look for it. on the ground that places would be occupied alternately by the contending armies, the british chargé at washington deplored the order to exact contributions; but the course of the war preserved the mexicans from this misfortune in a way he did not anticipate. 33.22. ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1048, 1062, 1081, 1085 (scott), 1050, 1063, 1066 (gen. orders). j. parrott to marcy (note 33.21). =256=_id._ to _id._, dec. 28, 1847, private. =60=butler to marcy, mar. 7, 1848. =69=wool to marcy, jan. 24, 1848. sen. 14; 30, 1, pp. 11, 13. =63=marcy to gates, mar. 7, 1848; to davenport, may 2, 1848. =65=scott, gen. orders 358, 376, 395 (1847); 15, 31 (1848). scott, mems., ii, 553, 582. grant, mems., i, 170-1. =61=mcdowell to hunter, feb. 20; mar. 5, 1848. rodríguez, breve reseña, 1849, 5. =69=scott to commander at jalapa, jan. 6, 1848. =61=mcdowell to monclova ayunt., mar. 5, 1848. =80=actg. treas., méx. state, feb. 29, 1848. =60=taylor to marcy, nov. 20, 1847. =60=butler to marcy, mar. 2, 7, 1848. =92=mex. ayunt., session of sept. 16, 1847. =92=quitman, proclam., sept. 22. =92=veramendi to ayunt., sept. 24. =65=wool, orders 157, dec., 1847. _delta_, dec. 19, 1847 ("mustang"). =61=memoir on mex. finances. sen. 19; 30, 1, pp. 2-4 (scott). moreno, cantón, 380. =69=wool to taylor, mar. 7, 1847. =61=mcdowell to webb, apr. 15, 1848. =358=williams to father, dec. 27, 1847. besides the $150,000, scott collected some $70,000 (about $12,000 captured at cerro gordo, nearly $50,000 for captured tobacco, and smaller amounts for licenses, etc.). polk was accused of inconsistency for holding that mexico could pay us no indemnity except in territory and yet expecting to draw large revenues from that country (_amer. review_, jan., 1848, p. *2). the reply is threefold: 1, in the latter case he assumed that mexico was to be deprived by military force of the revenues normally used by a nation; 2, even if a mexican government might have had the physical power to raise a cash indemnity for us, it could not actually have obtained the money from the people for that purpose, as our own armies were expected to do by force; and, 3, polk's expectations were not realized. polk was also charged with encroaching upon the prerogatives of the house both in taxing the mexicans and in spending the proceeds. webster and calhoun concurred in this view (_cong. globe_, 30, 1, 495-6). but if gen. taylor had a right--as all admitted--to impress a mexican donkey into the service of his army, polk had a right to do all that he did in this regard. the authority of the commander-in-chief in the enemy's country, waging war according to the constitution, was quite broad enough to cover it. see _cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., 423-4. the estimated possible revenues were as follows: import duties, $12,000,000; duties on goods passing to the interior, $2,400,000; direct taxes on real estate, professions, trades, etc., $3,000,000; duties on the production of gold and silver, $600,000; melting and assay dues, $50,000; export duties on coined gold and silver, $1,000,000; revenue from the monopolies, $3,525,000 (=61=memoir). transit dues on animals and goods, including the duties at city gates (_alcabalas_), were to be discontinued. for a short time in 1847 perry allowed logwood to be exported under a 10 per cent duty. it seemed impracticable to seize the mines, for the miners would probably have fled on the approach of american troops. scott resolved not to take the ordinary state and city revenues, because he felt that such a course would be "to make war on civilization"; since every civilized community requires the means of paying for administration, without which it would fall into anarchy (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1049). his broad taxation orders were based upon an announced intention of spreading over the country. he proposed to send out expeditions soon. one actually proceeded, as we have seen, to toluca, another to cuernavaca, and another to the important mining town of pachuca (ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1048, 1061-2). the occupation of córdoba and orizaba was partly in pursuance of the same policy (=61=scott to twiggs, dec. 26, 1847). he proposed in particular to send 7000 men to san luis potosí in order to open the communication between tampico and the mining city of zacatecas. but his lack of troops and the peace negotiations prevented this. in order to force the products of the mines into circulation for the benefit of both americans and mexicans, scott forbade the exportation of gold and silver bullion, and on gold and silver coin exported he imposed a duty of 5 per cent (=65=gen. orders 362). walker's and polk's views on these points had been different from scott's, and scott's action was taken subject to revision at washington, where he presented his reasons. at the end of april, 1848, walker's instructions were put into force by general butler. scott instructed his officers to execute his orders in a conciliatory manner, if possible, but apply force should that be necessary. should there be no other way, the commanding officer was to collect the assessment in money or some equivalent from the wealthier inhabitants. in the northeast wool carried out the financial purposes of the government to the best of his ability, beginning at saltillo as early as may, 1847, with a revenue system, the occupation of buildings, and the seizure of cattle, mules, etc. he punished refractory towns and places violating pledges of neutrality with special taxes. mar. 2, 1848, he reported that all were paying their taxes. the owners of houses taken for the use of the army were indemnified through a tax on all the real estate of the vicinity. in northwestern mexico only coast towns were in our hands. california and new mexico, which the united states government intended to retain, were of course viewed in a different light. naturally all possible attempts were made by the mexicans to protect their property against us. subsistence, forage, etc., continued to be paid for, since the interests of the army prescribed that policy still. our officers were not permitted to have any interest (_e.g._ claim for special services) in cases of seizure, etc. 33.23. richardson, messages, iv, 591, 651, 678. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 107-9. =69=hughes to scott, jan. 5, 1848. =63=marcy to twiggs, mar. 7, 1848. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1062 (scott). sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 588. ho. 47; 30, 2, pp. 2 (marcy), 109 (mason). ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1131 (shubrick). =47=shubrick, apr. 15, 1848. =69=wool to marcy, jan. 24, 1848. sen. 14; 30, 1, p. 11 (scott). import, export and tonnage duties produced in all only $3,434,665; contributions from other sources, $553,055; captured money and property, $163,573; assessments on states and the city of mexico, $225,649; and state and municipal revenues, together with some other sources of income, $163,055. from these amounts the costs of collection, drawbacks on goods disposed of to men in the service, and the expenses of the state and municipal governments had to be deducted. it was to make up for surrendering the monopolies that scott quadrupled the state assessments originally contemplated. $769,650 derived from the military contributions were applied on the first instalment due to mexico. all of the $3,000,000 appropriated by the act of march 3, 1847, was paid to her shortly after she ratified the treaty of peace (sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 107-9; richardson, messages, iv, 588). 33.24. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 589. =13=pakenham, no. 74, june 13, 1846. ho. rep. 503; 31, 1. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1004 (marcy). sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 125 (scott). scott, mems., ii, 583. polk, diary, aug. 18-20, 24-5, 28; nov. 13, 1847. wash. _union_, dec. 9, 1847. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), may 23; june 20; oct. 31; nov. 7, 1846; aug. 21; oct. 16; nov. 6, 1847. ho. report 503; 31, 1. _picayune_, sept. 14, 1847. =256=j. parrott to marcy, dec. 20, 27, 1847, private. =139=w. b. to d. campbell, aug. 9, 1846. scott spent nearly $64,000 of the funds that he derived from the mexicans for blankets and shoes given to private soldiers; and $10 each were given to a large number of wounded men when they left the hospital. probably belmont's arrangement left the rothschilds a handsome profit, for john parrott, who had been our consul at mazatlán, offered, if the government would open a credit of two or three millions in london, to take charge of supplying cash in mexico at the rate of five dollars for every pound sterling, and a pound sterling would have cost the government only about $4.80. one main purpose of our government in laying an export duty on gold and silver was to facilitate the exchange of treasury notes for specie with mexican citizens; but probably little was accomplished, for nearly all the specie in mexico was held by foreigners. in the offices at washington a good deal of carelessness in making estimates and handling funds appears to have prevailed (_e.g._ polk's diary, aug. 18-28, 1847), and walker's relations with belmont and with corcoran and riggs were perhaps a little too intimate (_ibid._); but one finds no reasons for suspecting walker of crookedness. of course property was handled more or less wastefully in the field, and contractors took an advantage sometimes. roa bárcena (recuerdos, 249) states that some men buying grain, etc., for the american army required the sellers to give receipts for larger sums than were paid to them. see also polk, diary, july 10, 1847. the largest loss resulted from gaines's unauthorized calls for troops, which probably cost $1,500,000 (=13=pakenham, no. 74, 1847). 33.25. sen. 15; 30, 1. semmes, service, 472-3. bancroft, pac. states, viii, 545. ho. 70; 30, 1, p. 11. ho. 9, 27; 30, 2. polk, diary, nov. 7, 1846; feb. 16; nov. 6, 9, 1847; jan. 24, 1848. sen. 27; 30, 1. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, june 29, 1847. richardson, messages, iv, 591. ho. 6; 29, 1 (walker, report, dec. 3, 1845). ho. 7; 30, 2 (_id._, report, dec. 9, 1848). lalor, cyclop., iii, 864. n. y. _herald_ (weekly), apr. 10, 1847; july 1, 1848. 33.26. (webster) wash. _union_, dec. 11, 1846; _niles_, jan. 9, 1847, p. 303. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, p. 912 (stephens). the national debt, oct. 1, 1845, was $17,075,446 (walker, report, dec. 3, 1845). july 6, 1848, polk gave it as $65,778,450 including the bonds and treasury notes still available for issue (richardson, messages, iv, 591). walker's report, dec. 9, 1848, gave the increase of the national debt over that of march 4, 1845, as $48,036,151. in a sense the war with mexico cost too little. the estimates were pared below our needs. troops could not be called out when they should have been. transports and many other necessaries were lacking at critical times. this point will come up in the text of the next chapter. at the end of the war the country and the treasury were in a sound condition, and the government's income was ample. a period of solid prosperity ensued. it may be worth mention that american capitalists offered more than $100,000,000 for the less than $50,000,000 of government securities, and that the total received by the treasury in premiums was $555,511 (walker, report, dec. 9, 1848, in ho. 7; 30, 2). an account of the money market during the war (based mainly on the financial columns of the new york weekly _herald_) may be of interest. during the early spring of 1846 the oregon controversy with england was a strong depressing influence. the outbreak of the war with mexico caused a panic (may 11), but this passed immediately (may 12), and by may 19 the market was rather buoyant, largely in consequence of favorable news from taylor. it then declined; but about the middle of june there was a plethora of money, and much activity prevailed in consequence of the settlement of the oregon controversy. this faded gradually away into dulness, but quickened again about the first of august. fluctuations followed. the first half of september saw a decline. sept. 5 united states bonds that had sold at 113 before the war brought only 102, but the prospect of foreign demands for grain caused a revival (sept. 20-oct. 3). dulness then returned; the general feeling about the war was reflected in very low prices about the middle of november, and dec. 7 was a "blue day." though the treasury required all payments to it to be in specie on and after jan. 1, 1847, it did not begin to pay out specie until apr. 1. hence it piled up coin during the interim. jan. 3, 1847, the market was rather stringent. during the second half of february, the bank of england rate rose from 3 to 4. prices continued to decline until by april 4 good prospects at the seat of war and an influx of specie turned the tide. may 1 the new york banks were said to have more than $12,000,000 in specie. may 10 reading r. r. difficulties precipitated a panic, but this was only a flurry. money was extremely abundant in a few days (may 19) and prices advanced until about the middle of july. during the second week of august the increasing war expenses bore hard on the market, and treasury notes fell about 2 per cent. about oct. 1 the report that scott had entered mexico city was found to be untrue, and a panic set in (oct. 4), due to that fact and bad news regarding the financial situation in europe. the "explosion" of "corners" followed. by nov. 11 the banks were "shaking in the wind," and a crisis came on at once (nov. 14). paper money was loudly called for. after a troubled month, however, money became much easier and prices responded (dec. 19). another month, and the banks (really in a tight place themselves) were believed to be tightening everything to force a change in the financial policy of the government (jan. 25, 1848); but by feb. 10 natural conditions revived buoyancy, and there was a loud call for more treasury notes. things then quieted down, but the arrival of the draft of a treaty stimulated activity once more. absurd rumors about the terms of the treaty next caused a temporary reaction; but when it was accepted, prices went up (mar. 11). for the day-by-day prices of united states securities, dec. 1, 1846, to dec. 1, 1847, see ho. 6; 30, 1, p. 71. _other financial legislation of the war period._ u. s. statutes at large, ix, p. 35, act of june 27, 1846, sec. 2: $75,000 in u. s. stock belonging to the seneca indians to be cancelled, and interest to be paid them on a credit of that amount to be entered on the books of the secretary of the treasury. p. 94, act of aug. 10, 1846: mexican indemnity stock (see bayley, national loans, 71, modified by statements of this work). p. 106, act of aug. 10, 1846: treasury notes, stolen and put into circulation, to be redeemed by the government. p. 125, act of feb. 11, 1847, sec. 9: any non-commissioned officer, musician and private entitled under this act to receive a certificate or warrant for 160 acres (or 40 acres) may take instead of it $100 (or $25) in 6 per cent treasury scrip, redeemable at the pleasure of the government. p. 248, act of july 19, 1848: three months' extra pay to all who actually served out their term or were honorably discharged, or the heirs of those who lost life or died after being honorably discharged. p. 249, act of july 21, 1848: act of july 4, 1836, granting half-pay and pensions to widows, orphans, etc., made applicable to cases of these in the mexican war. p. 412, act of march 3, 1849: to provide for settling accounts of those who received money from military contributions, etc., in mexico. p. 414, act of march 3, 1849: to provide payment for property lost or destroyed in the military service of u. s. p. 520, act of sept. 28, 1850: bounty lands to be given to certain officers and soldiers who served in the mexican war. xxxiv. the war in american politics 34.1. the chief sources for this chapter were personal correspondence, the debates of congress, and periodicals representing all shades of politics. the leading newspapers were examined for every day of the war and also before and after it. 34.2. parker, sermon. rhodes, u. s., i, 88. weekly n. y. _herald_, may 23. _no. amer._, may 15, 21. =191=fairfield to wife, july 10, 1846. 34.3. london _times_, aug. 31. welles papers (account of 29 cong., 2 sess.). =108=marcy to bancroft, apr. 28, 1847. calhoun corresp., 717 (to t. g. c), 1096 (fisher). =13=pakenham, nos. 119, 132, 1846; 6, 9, 1847. =139=gentry to c, feb. 20, 1847. =139=a. to d. c., jan. 20, 1847. _journal des débats_, nov. 4, 1846. (elections) n. y. _tribune_, nov. 26, 1847; =132=stokes to buchanan, jan. 3, 1847; welles papers; schurz, clay, ii, 289; von holst, u. s., iii, 336; n. y. _herald_, nov. 7, 14, 1846; wash. _union_, oct. 16, 22; nov. 9, 14, 19, 27, 1846; may 5, 1847; _nat. intellig._, nov. 7, 1846. _pub. ledger_, dec. 23, 1846. in the winter we find some state legislatures passing resolutions (ho. 93, 97; 29, 2) in favor of prosecuting the war, but these are signs of prevailing discouragement. 34.4. (nomination and election) smith, annex, of texas, 250-2, 310-5. =345=gilpin to van buren, may 24, 1846. =234=a. johnson to ----, july 22, 1846, private. london _times_, july 15, 1846. welles papers. _nat. intellig._, nov. 20, 1847. (cabinet) polk, diary, feb. 8, 1847; =345=blair to van buren, jan. 29; feb. 29, 1848; =297=correspond. between polk and m. van buren, c. johnson, a. v. brown and others, dec, 1844-feb., 1845; poore, perley's remins., i, 334; welles papers; =297=simpson to polk, nov. 13, 1848. (myself) _tenn. hist. mag._, sept., 1915 (to c. j., dec. 21, 1844). boston _atlas_, dec. 31, 1846. =206=mangum to graham, feb. 21, 1845. (polk's discretion distrusted) _cong. globe_, 29, 1, pp. 554 (allen), 567 (webster). what is said of polk in this and succeeding paragraphs should be supplemented by referring to vol. i, pp. 128-9 and to the concluding chapter. 34.5. for a study of polk's character see vol. i, pp. 128-9. =345=pauling to van buren, feb. 5, 1847. (pillow) polk to johnson, may 17 [14], 1844: _tenn. hist. mag._, sept., 1915. seward, seward at washington, i, 37, 51. =345=frearoon to van buren, jan. 23, 1847. =345=blair to v. b., jan. 29, 1848. tyler, tyler, ii, 457 (gardiner). =345=g. a. worth to v. b., mar. 20, 1847. =139=gentry to campbell, feb. 20, 1847. schurz, clay, ii, 289. von holst, u. s., iii, 273, 292, 336. boston _atlas_, dec. 12, 1846. benton, abr. debates, xvi, 75 (badger). kohl, claims, 71. taking advantage of the feeling about polk's personality and methods, his enemies felt warranted in straining points against him. it was called treachery to negotiate with santa anna while negotiating with paredes (_no. american_, dec. 15, 1846), even though the latter negotiation had practically ended before the former began. his dwelling upon our claims against mexico in his annual message of 1846, which it was quite proper to do in reviewing the mexican situation, was represented as an afterthought, intended to justify a blow already struck and discrediting the assertion that mexico had caused the war by invading our territory (boston _atlas_, dec. 12, 1846). it was pointed out that the proclamation sent to taylor for distribution ascribed to the united states aims different from those professed in the message of may 11 (_nat. intellig._, aug. 14, 1846), as if polk could be required to say everything every time. 34.6. =256=marcy to wetmore, jan. 21; oct. 5; nov. 7; dec. 12, 1846. welles papers. =345=wright to van buren, nov. 10, 1846. =345=cambrelong to _id._, nov. 30. =345=thompson to _id._, dec. 23. =345=blair to _id._, dec. 26. =345=albany _atlas_, extra, dec., 1846. =345=g. a. worth to v. b., mar. 20, 1847. =253=mower to mclean, aug. 27, 1846. =132=wright to buchanan, sept. 8, 10, 1846. bigelow, tilden, i, 110-1. blaine, twenty years, i, 78. buchanan, works, viii, 365-7. =234=a. johnson to ----, july 22, 1846, private. the "conservative" party arose in 1837 from the opposition to van buren's sub-treasury plan, which silas wright championed. many honest conservatives, realizing they had been mistaken, left the party; but their places were taken by canal claimants. 34.7. welles papers. calhoun correspond., 713 (to mrs. c). (hang) =234=a. johnson to ----, july 22, 1846. (office-seekers) polk, diary, feb. 24; apr. 7, 1847, etc. (oregon) polk, diary, feb. 24, 1846; _polit. sci. qtrly._, xxvi, 458 (r. l. schuyler); _cong. globe_, 29, 1, p. 815 (delano); boston _atlas_, may 20, 1846; blaine, twenty years, i, 65; wash. _union_, aug. 18, 1846. (veto) =253=mower to mclean, aug. 8, 1846; =108=appleton to bancroft, july 16, 1847; wash. _union_, aug. 3, 1846, quoting _nat. intellig._; n. y. _herald_, aug. 15, 1846; _no. american_, jan. 14; dec. 20, 1847. (generals) von hoist, u. s., iii, 298; rhodes, u. s., i, 89; buchanan, works, viii, 365-7; calhoun corresp., 727-8 (to d. g.). =345=butler to van buren, nov. 6, 1847. 34.8. lowell, biglow papers, i, 59. (adams) =260=winthrop to n. hale, wash., "sunday." (giddings) wash. _union_, june 30; july 2, 1846. cole, whig party, 118-9. smith, annex. of texas, 258-80. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, p. 309. (la.) vol. i, p. 205 and note 10.3; n. orl. _jeffersonian_ in _nat. intellig._, aug. 28, 1846; wash. _union_, june 30; july 2; aug. 11, 1846. calhoun corresp., 1096-7 (fisher). n. y. _tribune_, may 13; dec. 15, 1846. =137=prescott to calhoun, aug. 20, 1847. 34.9. ho. 85; 29, 2. =253=mower to mclean, aug. 8, 1846. taussig, tariff hist., 114-5. =345=welles to van buren, july 28, 1846. london _times_, dec. 3, 1846. _courrier des etats unis_, oct. 17; nov. 6, 1846. n. y. _sun_, july 9, 1846. n. y. _express_, nov. 10, 17, 21, 30, 1846. _niles_, july 18, p. 305 (_sentinel_); aug. 1, p. 345 (_nat. intellig._); sept. 12, p. 17, 1846. boston _courier_, july 8, 1846. blaine, twenty years, i, 65. boston _atlas_, jan. 6, 1847. wash. _union_, aug. 18, 28, 1846. _nat. intellig._, aug. 5, 1846. n. y. _tribune_, dec. 3, 1846. _no. american_, july 16, 17; aug. 1; dec. 9, 1846. (betrayed) smith, annex. of texas, 314. 34.10. =241=w. to j. kent, dec. 11, 1846; jan. 17; mar. 5, 1847. _amer. review_, oct., 1847, 333-46. johnston and browne, stephens, 210-1. london _times_, dec. 3, 1846. sherman letters, 38-9. webster, writings, x, 12. winthrop, winthrop, 61. =13=pakenham, no. 98, 1846. n. y. _sun_, aug. 28, 1846. _no. american_, dec. 30, 1846; jan. 18, 1847. rhodes, u. s., i, 91. wash. _union_, sept. 30, 1846 (mass. convention). _nat. intellig._, july 18; dec. 25, 1846; apr. 17; nov. 20, 1847. st. louis _republican_, july 23, 1846. _journ. of comm._ in wash. _union_, aug. 6, 1847. stephen a. douglas, who stood quite close to the administration, said in the senate: "conquest was not the motive for the prosecution of the war; satisfaction, indemnity, security, was the motive--conquest and territory the means" (_cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., 222). 34.11. ho. 23, 81, 85; 29, 2. sen. 97; 29, 2. webster, writings, ix, 260; x, 12; xiii, 359. sherman letters, 38-9. boston _advertiser_, oct. 3, 1846. _niles_, sept. 18, 1847, p. 44. rhodes, u. s., i, 91. blaine, twenty years, i, 65. winthrop before the mass. convention (note 34.10). _courrier des etats unis_, oct. 17; nov. 6, 1846. wash. _union_, apr. 29, 1847. pierce, sumner, iii, 140, 144, 146. lowell, biglow papers, i, 56. livermore, war, 92. curtis, webster, ii, 324. _amer. review_, 1847, p. 441. =13=pakenham, no. 93, 1846. benton, abr. debs., xvi, 54 (morehead). (west) =198=berrien to gallatin, june 7, 1848. the _north american_ of oct. 8, 1847, used this language: "the abstract question of the extension of slavery is not the only nor the greatest issue of this contest. the great question is, shall we become the dependants and vassals of a southern political ascendancy?... the nabobs of the south will dictate to us the terms upon which, in the face of their hostile policy, we shall struggle for existence. our agriculture, our manufactures, our commerce, will be committed to their guardianship--the guardianship of the wolf over the lamb." at the springfield whig convention, sept. 29, 1847, webster said he would "resist any further increase of slave representation," which meant the same thing (writings, xiii, 362). _nat. intellig._, dec. 29, 1846. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, app., 919 (g. davis). (heroes) =345=law to van buren, aug. 2, 1847. welles papers. calhoun corresp., 1096-7 (fisher). _nat. intellig._, may 13, 1846. london _times_, dec. 18, 1846. =13=pakenham, no. 93, 1846. louisville _journal_, mar. 31, 1847. n. y. _express_, apr. 2, 1847. wash. _union_, aug. 13, 1847. (debasement, etc.) _amer. review_, 1847, p. 441; lyell, second visit (n. y., 1849), ii, 257; ho. 81; 29, 2; _monitor repub._, feb. 2, 1847 (quoting boston _atlas_); _nat. intellig._, nov. 28 (quoting n. y. _eve. post_); dec. 29, 1846; norfolk _herald_, apr. 12, 1847; etc. 34.12. n. y. _tribune_, may 19, 1846. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, pp. 788 (crittenden), 835. welles papers. =169=rives to crittenden, feb. 5, 1847. hammond, wright, 672. von holst, u. s., iii, 252. _amer. review_, feb., 1847, 109, 118. wash. _union_, mar. 19, 1847. schurz, clay, ii, 289. detroit _free press_, nov. 28, 1846. cincin. _enquirer_, dec. 16, 1846. _no. american_, may 12, 1846. n. y. _herald_, dec. 19, 1846. (capital) =139=fulton to campbell, jan. --, 1847. the proper stand for the whigs was pointed out by gov. briggs of massachusetts in general orders: "whatever may be the difference of opinion as to the origin" of the war, the constitutional authorities have declared that a war exists; patriotism and humanity dictate that it should be brought to a speedy and successful end; hence all should coöperate (_niles_, july 11, 1846, pp. 293-4). it will be noted that the author is dealing in this chapter with politics, not the convictions of private persons, which, even when mistaken, were entitled to respect, because sincere and associated with worthy sentiments. 34.13. _nat. intellig._, may 13, 15; july 18; sept. 19, 1846; jan. 27; aug. 5; dec. 11, 1847. =253=mower to mclean, mar. 1, 1847. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, app., 919 (g. davis); 29, 2, 34-6 (giddings). boston _atlas_, may 15, 18, 20; june 11, 1846. balt. _american_, dec. 2, 1846. n. y. _tribune_, may 26, 1846; sept. 3; nov. 18, 1847; jan. 7, 1848. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, 566 (hilliard). ($68) [_tribune_] whig almanac, 1847, p. 21. (_express_) wash. _union_, june 19, 1847. these and the citations of the following notes could be multiplied. 34.14. smith, annex. of texas, 274-5. =198=j. r. ingersoll to gallatin, dec. 25, 1847. benton, abr. debates, xvi, 78 (colquitt). louisville _journal_, sept. 17, 1847. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, app., 643 (giddings); 30, 1, app., 227 (cobb). mr. winthrop's vote on the war bill. webster at phila. (writings, iv, 26-34). wash. _union_, dec. 6, 1847. n. y. _tribune_, may 15, 1846. n. y. _courier and enquirer_, aug. 31, 1847. giddings, speeches, 259. 34.15. n. y. _tribune_, may 13, 1846. =130=gentry to campbell, feb. 20, 1847. wash. _union_, may 12; oct. 1, 1846; may 15, 1847. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, pp. 815, 931; app., 928-32. boston _atlas_, dec. 11, 1846; may 13, 1847. ky. _observer_, july 8, 1846, in wash. _union_, july 14. n. y. _tribune_, may 13, 1846. winthrop, speeches, i, 573-4. nicolay and hay, lincoln, i, 317-20, 327-45. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, pp. 154-6 (lincoln's speech). though lincoln's speech was later than the time referred to in the text, his argument was not. (conn.) clark, conn., 200-1. 34.16. =375=taylor to davis, feb. 16, 1848, in madigan, cat., 1914. _pennsylvanian_, nov. 4, 1846. winthrop, speeches, i, 574. n. y. _eve. post_, june 4, 1846. wash. _union_, july 14, 1846; mar. 29, 31; aug. 16, 20, 1847; jan. 2, 13, 1848. u. s. _gazette_, oct. 13, 1846. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, pp. 534 (brinkerhoff); app., 916 (hudson). boston _atlas_, dec. 11, 1846; may 13, 1847. _nat. intellig._, may 16; oct. 19; dec. 18, 1846; apr. 17; may 17; june 22, 1847. n. y. _courier and enquirer_, aug. 9, 17, 1847. (recognized) crittenden's amendment: vol. i, p. 473; _cong. globe_, 30, 1, p. 276. (smallness) vol. i, pp. 161, 455-6, 464. another interesting fact was that on mar. 26, 1846, mcilvaine of the house, discussing an appropriation bill, raised the issue that in sending taylor to the rio grande polk had been "invading mexico," yet, although the bill was objectionable from several points of view, it passed by a vote of 111 to 38 (_cong. globe_, 29, 1, pp. 558, 574). see also lumpkin's speech, _ibid._, 834-7. polk was mercilessly ridiculed for believing that santa anna would favor peace, but his opponents had to admit that a whig general, taylor, believed (or appeared to believe) ampudia's assertions to the same effect (chap. xii, p. 504) made under circumstances that rendered the idea far less plausible. 34.17. see vol. ii, p. 73. wash. _union_, feb. 25, 1847. st. louis _republican_, july 3, 1847. mcculloch, men and measures, 65. seward, autob. of w. h. s., 774. an undated slip from the chicago _times_, found by the author, contained a letter from burlington, ia., which stated that col. sweney, proprietor of the barret house, had known corwin well from boyhood on, and that he had heard corwin say with tears in his eyes that his speech was made by arrangement with webster and others, who desired to prevent the appropriation of more money for the war, and agreed to follow corwin. 34.18. for a discussion of the philadelphia speech see vol. i, p. 458. webster, writings, iv, 7; ix, 253; xiii, 348-50. _public ledger_, dec. 6, 15, 1846. n. y. _tribune_, dec. 4, 7, 1846. n. y. _herald_, aug. 22, 1846. n. y. _sun_, dec. 5, 1846. wash. _union_, dec. 2, 4, 7, 11, 1846; mar. 10; oct. 14, 16, 1847. charleston _mercury_, dec. 8, 1846. =253=dowling to mclean, mar. 24, 1848. nov. 6, 1846, at faneuil hall, boston, webster called forth rapturous applause by saying, in a manner quite unworthy of a senator and a great constitutional lawyer, "in my judgment it is an impeachable offence" for the president so to act as to involve the country in war without the consent of congress (_niles_, nov. 21, p. 186). this, if it meant anything, was a begging of the question. webster could not deny that the president had a right to repel invasion without consulting congress, and polk believed the mexicans had invaded our territory, thus precipitating the war. polk's message of may 11 mentioned, as was natural, the rejection of slidell and the failure of mexico to pay our claims, but its practical gist was contained in the following sentence: "as war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists by the act of mexico herself, we are called upon by every consideration of duty and patriotism to vindicate with decision the honor, the rights, and the interests of our country." 34.19. (independent, ground) webster, writings, iv, 24; xiii, 351. (senseless, fight) _ibid._, ix, 157-60. (prosecute) _ibid._, iv, 33; n. y. _tribune_, dec. 3, 1846. (refused) writings, ix, 157. (approve) pierce, sumner, iii, 112. (narrow) webster, letters, 350. (tired) writings, xviii, 246. lowell, biglow papers, i, 54, etc. (see a paper, written by the present author, on the biglow papers in mass. hist. soc. proceeds., may, 1912, p. 602). 34.20. (jay) pellew, jay, 310. the clerical quotations in the text are from a non-partisan paper, the n. y. _herald_, feb. 20, 1847. the extract from osgood may be found in his solemn protest, p. 13. that from parish the author has not been able to verify, but presumably it was correct. that such sentiments were entertained will not be questioned. osgood denounced the authors of the war as "desperate in wickedness," etc. see quotations from him and others in _cong. globe_, 29, 1, app., 930-1. weekly n. y. _herald_ (non-partisan), jan. 16, 1847: they who oppose this war will one day stand before the country like the men of the hartford convention. pierce, sumner, iii, 139. 34.21. boston _atlas_, may 18, 20, 1846. _monitor repub._, feb. 2, 1847. _nat. intellig._, may 11; oct. 15 (thompson), 26, 1847; jan. 26, 1848. (hudson) _cong. globe_, 29, 2, p. 418. n. y. _tribune_, nov. 6, 1847. (calhoun) benton, abr. debates, xvi, 58. wash. _union_, sept. 24, 1846; june 2, 1847. _diario_, dec. 20, 1846. meade, letters, i, 180. (joy) boston _daily chronotype_ in n. y. _globe_, may 14, 1847. =137=mclane to calhoun, jan. 18, 1848. richardson, messages, iv, 473. (1813-14) wash. _union_ dec. 10, 1846. see also vol. ii, p. 125. in the office of the sec. of relaciones was found a large collection of extracts from american speeches and newspapers (n. y. _herald_, feb. 5, 1848: gen. pierce). whig journals assured mexico that her cause was just; that a majority of the americans detested the war; that our treasury could not bear the cost; that our government was incompetent; that it was disloyal to our commanders; that our armies could not win the war; that soon the administration would be rebuked and its policy be reversed. the government "stand ready to yield anything that mexico may demand as the price of peace," asserted the n. y. _courier and enquirer_ (wash. _union_, july 10, 1847). for numerous other quotations see _cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., 347. april 27, 1847, _el progreso_ of querétaro said: the peace party in the united states "have been encouraging us to sustain ourselves until we could obtain from them a satisfactory arrangement of our difficulties as soon as they should come into power" (wash. _union_, may 28, 1848). 34.22. =256=marcy to wetmore, jan. 21; dec. 5, 12, 1846. welles papers (review of pol. hist. of u. s.; 2d sess. of 29 cong.). =253=mower to mclean, aug. 27, 1846. =345=blair to van buren, jan. 20; nov. 27, 1846. =345=gilpin to van buren, may 24, 1846. =345=thompson to van buren, dec. 23, 1846. =345=m. van b., jr., to van buren [apr. 28, 1846]. polk, diary, july 13; sept. 11, 1846; jan. 5, 1847. =108=appleton to bancroft, feb. 24, 1847. =108=wescott to bancroft, mar. 1, 1848. =253=reed to mclean, oct. 26, 1846. =206=j. graham to gov. g., jan. 10, 1847. _courrier des etats unis_, oct. 17, 1846. =379=ewing to ----, mar. 11, 1846. wash. _union_, nov. 19, 1846. _niles_, may 16, 1846, p. 175. =234=a. johnson to ----, july 22, 1846, private. n. y. _journ. of comm._, dec. 9, 1846. n. y. _herald_, nov. 14, 1846. bragg to van buren, mar. 10, 1847. seward, seward at washington, i, 37, 68, 71. "old hunkers" and "barnburners" (the van buren wing) were the two n. y. factions. 34.23. welles papers: note 34.22. =253=m. brown to mclean, june 5, 1846. bragg: note 34.22. =345=gilpin to van buren, may 24, 1846; apr. 6, 1847. seward, seward at washington, i, 37, 51. _nat. intellig._, jan. 6, 1847. _picayune_, feb. 26, 1848. n. y. _journ. comm._, jan. 7, 1847. _public ledger_, feb. 12, 1847. n. y. _tribune_, jan. 12, 1847. polk, diary, nov. 7, 1845; jan. 28; mar. 22, 23, 1846; jan. 14, 1847. =345=blair to van buren, nov. 27, 1846. boston _atlas_, jan. 9, 1847. =345=welles to van buren, july 28, 1846. =256=marcy to wetmore, apr. 23, 1848. (aspirants) =231=jackson to blair, dec. 14, 1844. 34.24. the author's remarks on benton, calhoun and cass are based on sources too numerous to be specified, and will not, it is believed, raise any question. the principal out-of-the-way sources are the following: welles papers: note 34.22. =137a=calhoun to mathews, sept. 19, 1847. =210=hammond-simms corresp., mar.-nov., 1847. =253=m. brown to mclean, june 5, 1846. =345=blair to van buren, jan. 20, 1846. =345=poinsett to van buren, june 4, 1847. =345=gilpin to van buren, nov. 23, 1845. london _times_, apr. 17, 1847. =206=j. graham to brother, jan. 10, 1847. polk, diary, may 21; june 22, 29, 30, 1846; jan. 9, 14, 15, 22; feb. 8, 13; apr. 7, 16, 1847. =108=appleton to bancroft, feb. 24, 1847. calhoun corresp., 707 (to t. g. c). =132=king to buchanan, oct. 5, 1847. calhoun, works, iv, 371. boston _atlas_, june 1, 1846. boston _courier_, feb. 23, 1847. _penna. mag._, xi, 462 (dallas, dec. 16). =168=d. h. lewis, may 11, 1848. wash. _union_, feb. 13, 18; mar. 15, 17; apr. 5, 1847. n. y. _journ. comm._, feb. 15, 1847. _public ledger_, feb. 12, 16, 1847. =210=tucker to hammond, apr. 24, 1847. allen of ohio, noted for vanity and a powerful voice, felt so disgusted about the outcome of the oregon business, that at the beginning of this session he threw up the chairmanship of the committee on foreign relations and declined to serve on any committee. niles, an excellent man, was a protectionist, like the pennsylvania senators. hannegan was a man of force but a rabid westerner. he, dickinson and breese were distinctly cass men. calhoun's partisans were butler (so. carolina), lewis (alabama) and the florida senators, while colquitt and speight were thought to be guided considerably by him; but as time went on his influence over most of this group waned. of the whig senators webster spent most of his time in the practice of law. crittenden was in general honest and sensible; but he and clayton had induced jarnagin to vote for walker's tariff, believing that it would discredit the democrats, and the failure of this unworthy trick damaged their prestige considerably. clayton had unusual ability and experience, but was crafty and insincere. mangum enjoyed a deserved respect, but was not of striking ability. of the house democrats, p. king stood high in the confidence of his colleagues, and had no little skill in leading. c. j. ingersoll was the most important pennsylvanian, but his attainments and eloquence were accompanied by erratic judgment. thurman surpassed the other ohio representatives in good conduct and talents, but brinkerhoff displayed more activity than he. douglas ranked first in the illinois group, and perhaps first among the supporters of the administration in the house. dromgoole (virginia) possessed remarkable legislative abilities and reputation; but did not care to exert himself overmuch. mckay (north carolina) and haralson (georgia) were chairmen, respectively, of the ways and means and the military committees, but did not distinguish themselves. rhett, an able and acute man, was a more consistent representative of south carolina principles than calhoun. of the whigs severance (maine) possessed more than average ability. winthrop (massachusetts) was a gentleman, a fine speaker and debater, honest, scholarly and conservative--an ideal public man. hudson (massachusetts) had energy and character but was too partisan. j. r. ingersoll (pennsylvania) had good abilities and good sense. giddings (ohio) has to be considered a calculating fanatic, not enthusiast, of the abolition school. vinton (ohio) stood among the best on either side of the house in wisdom, sincerity and good conduct. 34.25. welles papers: note 34.22. =13=pakenham, no. 150, 1846. von holst, u. s., iii, 252-4. =139=fulton to campbell, jan. --, 1847. =198=ingersoll to gallatin, dec. 25, 1847. (embassy) webster, writings, ix, 157, see vol. ii, p. 123; wash. _union_, june 27; oct. 1, 1846. _public ledger_, dec. 8, 1846. (sublimity) _no. american_, jan. 11, 1847. pierce, sumner, iii, 111, 139. charleston _mercury_, jan. 26, 27, 1847. =256=marcy to wetmore, dec. 5, 12, 1846. (the generals, etc.) marcy to w., nov. 14, 1846; greeley, recolls., 211; welles papers; =345=wright to van buren, jan. 28, 1847; =169=letcher to crittenden, dec. 20, 1847; =13=crampton, no. 9, 1848; johnston and browne, stephens, 224; calhoun corresp., 713, 715-6 (to mrs. c.); =108=buchanan to bancroft, june 14, 1847; =206=j. graham to gov. g., jan. 10, 1847; =181=buchanan to donelson, may 13, 1847; wash. _union_, jan. 30. scott was "in" politics but inactive. "old whitey," it will be recalled, was taylor's favorite horse. when the author refers to the course of "the whigs" or "the democrats" it is to be understood, of course, that exceptions existed. 34.26. the principal speeches have been cited elsewhere. they are to be found, of course, in the _congressional globe_ under the proper headings, and less fully in benton's abridged debates. _public ledger_, feb. 25, 1847. =191=fairfield to wife, apr. 14, 1846. 34.27. see particularly the debate on the $3,000,000 bill and the ten regiment bill, and, in the house, the loan bill. wash. _union_, may 18, 1846. 34.28. polk, diary, dec. 19, 1846. benton, view, ii, 678. house proceedings in _cong. globe_, 29, 2, dec. 8-16. richardson, messages, iv, 506-7, 594-600. u. s. _vs._ rice: 4 wheaton, 246, 253. story, commentaries on the constitution, § 1318. butler, treaty-making power, i, 128, 168-9. (decision, castine, harrison) wash. _union_, dec. 11, 15, 26, 1846; dec. 12, 1847. kent, commentaries, i, 282. _cong. globe_, 29, 2, app., 130, col. 1. von holst, u. s., iii, 261, note 1, 336. (kearny a whig) richmond _whig_ in _nat. intellig._, oct. 19, 1846. (unhappy) _amer. review_, feb., 1848, p. 110. _public ledger_, feb. 8, 1847. the _national intelligencer_ had the hardihood to state (dec. 25, 1846): "it is the opinion of the president that the fact of conquest annexes foreign provinces to the united states." the texans complained because the part of new mexico claimed by them was occupied by kearny; but since the enemy had held it by military force this action was proper, and buchanan assured henderson that the temporary military occupation would not affect the rights of his state (buchanan, works, vii, 215). the author did not find harrison's proclamation in ms.; but mr. d. m. matteson discovered it in _niles_, nov. 27, 1813, p. 215. copies of official documents in the burton historical collection, kindly furnished to the author, throw further light on the fact that american sovereignty over a portion of canada was declared in 1813. the subject is certainly an interesting one. 34.29. the whigs wished to repeal all of the new fiscal policy. welles papers: note 34.22. wash. _union_, mar. 9, 1847. lyell, second visit (n. y., 1849), 256. _public ledger_, dec. 8, 1846. (_nat. intellig._) charleston _mercury_, jan. 12, 26, 1847. pierce, sumner, iii, 122. _niles_, jan. 2, 1847, p. 288. boston _atlas_, jan. 6; feb. 6, 1847. (webster) _niles_, jan. 9, 1847, p. 303. n. y. _journ. of comm._, jan. 4, 1847. n. y. _tribune_, feb. 14, 1847. _no. american_, dec. 24, 1846; jan. 4, 1847. polk, diary, jan. 22, 1847. _nat. intellig._, jan. 14, 1847 (if the government desires the coöperation of the whigs, let it repeal the tariff and sub-treasury acts). note also the treatment of the important public land question (vol. ii, p. 261). 34.30. _cong. globe_, 29, 1, pp. 1211-21. greeley, amer. conflict, i, 189. smith, annex. of tex., 314, 351-2. welles papers. mclaughlin, cass, 229. cole, whig party, 119, 122-4. polk, diary, dec. 19, 23, 1846; jan. 4, 16, 22, 23, 1847. benton, view, ii, 695. wilson, rise and fall, ii, 15, 16. =13=pakenham, no. 5, 1847. =108=polk to bancroft, jan. 30, 1847, private. meigs, benton, 371. amer. hist. assoc. report, 1911, i, 187-95 (c. e. persinger). _cong. globe_, 29, 2, pp. 453-5, 541-55. von holst, u. s., iii, 301, 306-7. calhoun, works, iv, 323. =137=fisher to calhoun, aug. 22, 1847. stephens, u. s., 391. cutts, questions, 154. garrison, extension, 254-68. boston _atlas_, jan. 4, 1847. blaine, twenty years, i, 73. _so. qtrly. review_, jan., 1851, p. 196. wash. _union_, july 3; aug. 12, 1846; jan. 16, 1847. n. y. _herald_, jan. 16; feb. 20, 1847. merriam, bowles, i, 48. =139=gentry to campbell, apr. 18, 1848. the proviso, offered as an amendment to the $2,000,000 and $3,000,000 bills, was objected to because: 1, j. q. adams, benton and others argued that any territory acquired from mexico would come to us "free" by law, and slavery would not exist there unless subsequent legislation and also the natural conditions should be favorable to it; 2, the question would necessarily be settled when congress should have to decide regarding the government of such territory, and present action would not bind a future congress; 3, it did not relate to american territory, property or citizens--in short it related to nothing that existed; 4, the only way to reach the end aimed at by the proviso would be through a treaty, and, should the treaty be violated, mexico would have a right to interfere with our domestic affairs; 5, the president would have no right to sign such a treaty, for the subject belonged to congress; 6, the american senate would not ratify such a treaty, and hence the adoption of the proviso would prevent peace and the acquisition of territory; 7, it was insulting to mexico to legislate about territory belonging to her, would scandalize the world, and might prolong the war; 8, the proviso stood in the way of needed war legislation, tended to alarm the south and lessen its interest in the war, incited to discord at a time when harmony was peculiarly desirable, promoted sectionalism, and, if adopted, might render the administration powerless to wage the war successfully. as is well known, brinkerhoff of ohio was the father of the proviso, but for strategical reasons wilmot was asked to introduce it. wilmot himself did not insist upon the proviso, when polk explained to him some of the difficulties. for a convenient review of the later history of the proviso principle see lalor, cyclopædia, iii, 1115-7. the proviso threatened whig unity and success, of course, because the northern wing and the southern wing of the party could not agree regarding slavery. 34.31. =137=fisher to calhoun, aug. 22, 1847. (committed) richardson, messages, iv, 536-41. =169=rives to crittenden, feb. 5, 8, 1847. =330=j. p. to z. taylor, sept. 8, 1847. merriam, bowles, i, 48. curtis, webster, i, 303-7, 324 5[missing hyphen of 324-5?f1]. webster, writings, ix, 257-9; xiii, 328. =13=pakenham, no. 18, 1847. lalor, cyclopædia, iii, 1105. _amer. review_, oct., 1847, 345-6. louisville _journal_, sept. 17, 1847. cincinn. _enquirer_, nov. 15, 1847. _cong. globe_, 29, 2, pp. 555-6 (webster); app., 296-302 (berrien). =132=donelson to buchanan, jan. 8, 1847. =132=bancroft to _id._, oct. 18, 1847. boston _courier_, feb. 14, 1848. corwin to f., feb. 4, 1847: ohio phil. and hist. soc. pubs., july-sept., 1914. benton, abr. debs., xvi, 42 (berrien). wash. _union_, feb. 8, 25; sept. 8, 13, 16; oct. 5, 1847. _public ledger_, feb. 8, 17, 1847. cole, whig party, 119-22. pierce, sumner, iii, 159. _nat. intellig._, sept. 7, 1847. berrien's words (benton, abr. debates, xvi, 42): the war "ought not to be prosecuted ... with any view to the dismemberment of that republic, or to the acquisition by conquest of any part of her territory"; this government "will always be ready to enter into negotiations, with a view to terminate the present unhappy conflict on terms which shall ... preserve inviolate the national honor ... of mexico"; "it is especially desirable ... that the boundary of the state of texas should be definitely settled, and that provision be made by the republic of mexico for the prompt and equitable settlement of the just claims of our citizens." naturally the whigs endeavored to recommend the "no territory" idea by dwelling on other points (_e.g._ the country was already large enough; this plan would prevent a struggle between north and south over slavery; without it no treaty with mexico could be ratified). how much merit these arguments possessed, it is unnecessary to point out; but no doubt there was more or less honest belief in them, especially among the rank and file. the people in general, however, were against giving up all the fruits of our victories, and even calhoun admitted that we could not get out of the war with credit unless we made a large gain in territory. 34.32. =256=marcy to wetmore, dec. 5, 12, 1846. =108=appleton to bancroft, feb. 24, 1847. =108=polk to bancroft, jan. 30, 1847, private. welles papers. _public ledger_, mar. 2, 1847. boston _atlas_, jan. 18, 21; feb. 8; mar. 3, 1847. polk, diary, jan. 19, 1847. _nat. intellig._, aug. 11, 1846; july 22, 1847. n. y. _journ. comm._, jan. 7, 1847. n. y. _express_, sept. 4, 1847. n. y. _tribune_, jan. 8, 1847; jan. 27, 1848. balt. _american_ in wash. _union_, sept. 8, 1847. _no. american_, dec. 30, 1846; oct. 6, 1847. slidell to buchanan, nov. 5, 1846: "the fate of the administration depends on the successful conduct of the war" (curtis, buchanan, i, 601). 34.33. (elected) smith, annex. of texas, 307-9. =169=burnley to crittenden, dec. 12, 1847. =132=r. taylor to buchanan, nov. 18, 1847, private. seward, seward at washington, i, 57-8. schurz, clay, ii, 290-2. wash. _union_, nov. 16-18, 24 (clay's speech in full, which colton does not give complete), 27, 29; dec. 1, 1847. n. y. _sun_, nov. 16, 1847. n. y. _herald_, nov. 17, 1847. cincinn. _enquirer_, nov. 15, 1847. (abhorrent) _amer. review_, feb., 1848, 110. lexington _observer_, nov. 17, 1847. clay, works (colton, ed.), iii, 60-7. _no. american_, dec. 4, 1847. cole, whig party, 120. shackford, citizen's appeal, 18. hill, lawrence, 76. (in mexico) =256=j. parrott to marcy, dec. 27, 1847, private. webster, writings, xiii, 328. 34.34. =169=rives to crittenden, feb. 8, 1847. =13=pakenham, no. 132, 1846. _cong. globe_, 29, 2, app., 211-8 (corwin), 282-9 (severance). corwin to follett, feb. 4, 1847: ohio phil. and hist. soc. pubs., july-sept., 1914. n. y. _tribune_, jan. 25, 1847. _no. american_, may 27, 1847. sumner, orations, ii, 143, 187. pierce, sumner, iii, 138, 140. =253=dowling to mclean, dec. 7, 1847. 34.35. semmes, service, 69. =253=mower to mclean, nov. 22; dec. 13, 1847. =345=niles to van buren, jan. 20, 1848. =137=rhett to calhoun, may 20, 1847. =169=prunt to crittenden, dec. 5, 1847. london _times_, feb. 15, 1848. =13=crampton, no. 42, 1847. calhoun corresp., 727-8 (to d. g.), 737-9 (to w. t.). sherman letters, 38. welles papers. =108=polk to bancroft, jan. 30, 1847, private. _nat. intellig._, aug. 17; dec. 27, 1847; jan. 10, 1848. _public ledger_, dec. 25, 1847; jan. 31; feb. 11, 1848. bourne, essays, 227. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, pp. 93 (withdrawal), 94 (vote), 95 (unconstitutional), 391-2 (schenck), 396 (henley), 495, 530 (webster), 566 (hilliard). _amer. review_, vi, 331, 342. von holst, u. s., iii, 289, 337. amer. hist. assoc. report, 1911, ii, 83 (lamar). n. y. _journ. comm._, jan. 27, 1848. cincinn. _atlas_ in wash. _union_, aug. 25, 1847. ohio _state journal_: _ibid._, aug. 30. wash. _union_, nov. 4; dec. 16, 1847. =335=dimond to trist, oct. 27, 1847. =335=buchanan to trist, oct. 7, 24, 1847, private. n. y. _tribune_, nov. 5, 1847. n. y. _herald_, dec. 4, 1847. =198=g. davis to gallatin, mar. 6, 1848. =345=law to van buren, aug. 2, 1847. public sentiment was well voiced by the governor of virginia in a =42=message to the assembly, dec. 6, 1847 (exec. letter book, no. 73, p. 325): "shall the insolent mexican go unpunished? shall the glories of palo alto, resaca de la palma, monterey, etc., pass away in a dream, leaving no solid memorials behind them of a skill, a gallantry, and a self-sacrificing devotion unsurpassed in the history of man? i regard this war as a practical question, and to be disposed of accordingly. that morbid sympathy that lives only for mexico--that mexico which murders the drunken soldier, and lances the wounded on the field of battle--i cannot approve, nor can i respect that closet philosophy that calls on us to surrender everything because we are victorious. no, my sympathies are for my country, for the gallant dead, for those whose mighty deeds have given a bolder and a broader light to our glorious constellation, for the widows and for their orphans.... i would be just to mexico, but just also to my own country." the difficulty of reaching an agreement in congress about the relation of slavery interests to the war was thought by the british representative to stand in the way of compelling the administration to stop hostilities (=13=crampton, no. 71, dec. 30, 1847), and no doubt had considerable effect. in the speakership contest 220 representatives voted (_cong. globe_, 30, 1, p. 2). to hold that congress had power to prescribe the objects of the war was virtually to declare congress the supreme commander and treaty-making power. it was also to declare the nation impotent to wage the war, for, as the parties stood, it could not pass a bill over the president's veto. 34.36. =345=poinsett to van buren, june 4, 1847. =345=blair to _id._, dec. 9, 1847. webster, writings, x, 262 (_re_ ten regiment bill: the war unnecessary and unconstitutional). =256=marcy to wetmore, jan. 28, 1848. _public ledger_, dec. 15, 1847; jan. 31; feb. 2, 1848. wash. _union_, mar. 24, 1848. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, pp. 57-8 (goggin), 154-6 (lincoln), 267-9 (resolutions), 415-7 (smith), 495-6, 530-5 (webster), etc. (direct taxes) n. y. _journ. comm._, dec. 25, 1847. (chairman) n. y. _herald_, feb. 13, 1848 (financial article). _nat. intellig._, jan. 17, 1848. the british chargé at washington, though that legation was strongly in sympathy with the whigs, reported that the whigs lost no opportunity to embarrass and discredit the administration (=13=crampton, no. 19, feb. 9, 1848). slidell's instructions never having been acted upon, were practically a dead letter, and it was important not to make them public, lest the mexicans, knowing on what terms the united states had been willing to restore friendly intercourse, should use the information to embarrass future negotiations; but the house, admitting this point by promising to keep them secret--which everybody knew could not be done--demanded them, and resented polk's wise refusal to transmit them. the _national intelligencer_ (dec. 18, 1847) asserted that slidell had been "ordered not to negotiate a settlement of the boundary of texas ... unless in complication with the cession to the u. s. of california," which was positively false. polk, diary, jan. 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, 17, 23; july 6, 1848. after peace was declared he sent them (richardson, messages, iv, 594-600). the mexican tariff gave rise to some of the best declamation of the war period. the _national intelligencer_ accused polk of exercising "absolute monarchical power" in that matter (apr. 3, 1847). the albany _statesman_ (apr. 9) said, "this is surely the most flagrant usurpation and the most matchless piece of impudence with which any ruler in modern times has ever ventured to insult an intelligent people." in march, 1848, the subject came up in congress, and webster (writings, x, 262) declared the president had no right to lay the duties, and that the duties were paid by americans and neutrals; whereas in fact his military powers gave the president ample authority, and of course the duties were added to the prices of the goods. the _national intelligencer_ went so far as to deny that the president had any military initiative whatever, and to assert that as commander-in-chief he was merely "a subordinate" of congress (see wash. _union_, aug. 21, 1847). 34.37. =256=marcy to wetmore, dec. 5, 1846. _spirit of the age_, feb. 3, 1848. 34.38. wash. _union_, june 9, 1848. =157=barclay to cobb, dec. 24, 1847. _nat. intellig._, june 10, 1848. (illegal) delano's words, p. 277. (advised) =370=to davis, apr. 18, 1848. (mil. spirit) wash. _union_, may 22, 1847. norfolk _herald_, apr. 12, 1847. every representative who had voted or said that polk began the war unconstitutionally was bound to move for his impeachment. 34.39. by "hosea biglow" the author means, of course, the ideas expressed by lowell in his _biglow papers_. 34.40. as early as jan. 2, 1847, the n. y. _herald_, a non-partisan journal, said the course of the whigs with reference to the war had almost ruined them in public estimation. indeed that fact has been in a general way recognized (pierce, sumner, iii, 111; schurz, clay, ii, 289; von holst, u. s., iii, 252). probably the reasons why the democrats behaved better than the whigs were that (1) circumstances did not involve them in such dilemmas, and (2) they had the responsibilities of conducting affairs. xxxv. the foreign relations of the war 35.1. it should be remembered that american newspapers and public men were saying unpleasant things about england at this period. the dislike was mutual as well as natural. she still entertained, no doubt, a smouldering resentment against this country for having dared to become independent, and she noted with a jealousy that is quite easily understood the rapid growth of her sometime colony in population, wealth and commercial importance. 35.2. polk said: "even france, the country which had been our ancient ally, the country which has a common interest with us in maintaining the freedom of the seas, the country which, by the cession of louisiana, first opened to us access to the gulf of mexico, the country with which we have been every year drawing more and more closely the bonds of successful commerce, most unexpectedly, and to our unfeigned regret, took part in an effort to prevent annexation and to impose on texas, as a condition of the recognition of her independence by mexico, that she would never join herself to the united states" (richardson, messages, iv, 387). for further information regarding the interference of england and france see j. h. smith, the annexation of texas. polk was treated alternately by the _journal des débats_ and by most of the english press as a nonentity and as a power for evil. 35.3. _standing of the united states abroad._ =108=sumner to bancroft. feb. 1, 1846. (hate) =297=mclane to polk (received june 21, 1846). bennett, mems., 386. =52=bancroft, no. 25, may 3, 1847. =77=mangino, no. 10, mar. 8, 1837; jan. 29, 1846, res. smith, annex. of texas, 382. london _morning post_, apr. 5, 1846. jameson, calhoun corresp., 653, 698. n. y. _herald_, june 8, 1844. =77=murphy, nos. 17, nov. 1, 1845, res.; 2, jan. 1, 1846. _nat. intelligencer_, june 22, 1847. =132=donelson to buchanan, jan. 8, 1847. =52=king, nos. 21, 25, 28, 29, jan. 1, 30; june 1, 30, 1846. _constitutionnel_, jan. 15, 1846. _national_, nov. 28, 1844; dec. 3, 1845; jan. 22; may 16, 1846. =52=mclane, nos. 18, may 21, 1830; 5, sept. 18, 1845; 54, 55, june 3, 18, 1846. _morning chronicle_, dec. 25, 1845; jan. 17; july 27, 1846. _britannia_, jan. 10; mar. 28; apr. 18, 1846. _spectator_, feb. 7; sept. 26, 1846. _examiner_, mar. 29, 1845. _standard_, nov. 25, 1844. richardson, messages, iv, 387. _times_, sept. 23; dec. 27, 1845; jan. 26, 1846; mar. 27, 1847. _journal des débats_, jan. 22; may 15, 1846; jan. 2-3, 1848. martin, our chargé at paris, wrote (=52=no. 17, aug. 15, 1845) that the skill, prudence, firmness and disregard of european interference exhibited by our government in dealing with the annexation of texas had improved our position in europe; and mclane expressed the opinion (no. 5, sept. 18, 1845) that our spirited preparations during the summer of 1845 to fight mexico had had a good effect; but these were matters to increase respect rather than favor. the london _morning chronicle_ of july 27, 1846, after we had shown our prowess, politely explained our occasional coarseness of manners and speech as due to the working out of the principle of political equality, and asserted that the english middle classes viewed the united states with admiration and pride as a "magnificent demonstration of the progressive energy and self-governing power of their own victorious race." probably a similar feeling lurked in the upper and controlling classes. mclane's report to polk, cited at the end of the paragraph, was made in june, 1846; but such a state of feeling could not have arisen in a few months. 35.4. _standing of mexico abroad._ duflot de mofras, exploration, i, 32. (odium) =13=foreign office to bankhead, no. 53, dec. 31, 1844. =13=bankhead, no. 99, july 30, 1846. =52=mclane, nos. 18, may 21, 1830; 69, aug. 15, 1846. =77=mangino, no. 10, mar. 8, 1837. =77=relaciones to ministers at london and paris, july 30, 1845. memoria de ... relaciones, dec, 1846. =77=murphy, no. 5, apr. 1, 1845. =77=peña to garro, no. 24, oct. 28, 1845. =77=cuevas to garro, no. 15, july 30, 1845, res. (told) =73=lozano, no. 3, aug. 25, 1847, res. v. cruz _locomotor_, july 26, 1846. _amer. review_, jan., 1846, p. 87. dwinelle, address, 11. london _athenæum_, sept. 13, 1845. _journal des débats_, feb. 18; july 9, 1845; july 8, 1846. _national_, nov. 19, 1844; jan. 18, 1846. london _morning chronicle_, sept. 15, 1846. thompson, recollections, 236. _spectator_, sept. 19, 1846. _examiner_, aug. 2, 1845. smith, annexation, 382, etc. london _times_, apr. 11; aug. 25, 1846. even during the war mexico gave offence to england by her treatment of the offer to mediate (vol. ii, p. 368) and by her action regarding her debt. in the latter business bankhead charged her with a "breach of publick faith" (=77=to relaciones, may 18, 1847). 35.5. buchanan wished to give a pledge to take no mexican territory, insisting that unless we should do so, if interrogated, it was "almost certain that both england and france would join with mexico." polk refused, however, to do this, adding that such an inquiry would be "insulting" and would not be answered, and adding also that he would like to obtain a proper territorial indemnity (polk, diary, may 13, 1846). doubtless buchanan had an eye to his standing with the northern democrats, who did not wish the area of slavery extended. 35.6. see vol. i, p. 181 for the message. 35.7. for this paragraph. buchanan, works, vi, 484-5. =59=confidential circular, may 14, 1846. see also ho. rep. 752; 29, 1, pp. 50-2. 35.8. for commercial reasons spain was particularly jealous of our blockade, and although treated with special indulgence, she complained more than any other power; but no real friction resulted. see chap. xxx, notes 30.7, 30.8. 35.9. for these two paragraphs. =52=martin, no. 13, may 15, 1847. gutiérrez de estrada, méxico en 1840, p. 32. _gaceta de la nueva granada_, aug. 16, 1846, etc. _peruano, passim._ _comercio, passim._ =72=span. govt. to capt. gen. cuba, june 18, 1846 (including correspondence with the spanish minister at washington). dix, speeches, i, 214, note. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 207. _heraldo_, apr. 26, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1009. buchanan, works, vii, 290-2; viii, 282-3, 298-9. =52=irving, july 18; aug. 15; oct. 8, 1846. =52=saunders, nos. 1, aug. 6; 6, nov. 16, 1846; 8, feb. 13; 24, nov. 6, 1847. r. m. saunders, the american minister, mistakenly invited an offer of mediation from spain, but she felt very much afraid that we should reject it, and also that it might give offence to england and france. no written communications on the subject passed between him and the spanish government, however. _el heraldo_ also remarked that the war would tend to unite the spaniards of both americas against the u. s., and that spain, seizing the opportunity, should offer them her protection and tolerate no other influence. such a suggestion was not likely to help mexico. 35.10. =108=bancroft to polk, june 3, 1847. =355=wheaton, no. 287, june 23, 1846. =181=donelson to buchanan, july 7, 19; sept. 18, 1846. =132=_id._, jan. 8; feb. 21, private, 1847. =181=canitz to wheaton, june 25, 1846. baron gerolt, the prussian minister at washington, sympathized with and assisted our government (=181=buchanan to donelson, may 23, 1848). 35.11. =297=mclane to polk (received june 21, 1846). =13=to bankhead, nos. 18, 34, may 31; oct. 1, 1845; 15, june 1, 1846. =52=mclane, nos. 5, sept. 18, 1845; 50, 54, 55, 69, may 29; june 3, 18; aug. 15, 1846. =77=murphy, no. 2, jan. 1, 1846. =52=king, no. 28, june 1, 1846. _journal des débats_, feb. 4, 1845. =137=saunders to calhoun, june 27, 1846. gordon, aberdeen, 183-4. london _morning post_, jan. 17; apr. 5, 1846. =335=mclane, may 29, 1846. _morning chronicle_, feb. 3; may 30, 1846. _morning herald_, june 24, 1846. _britannia_, may 3, 1845. _times_, sept. 1, 1845; may 14; june 1, 11; aug. 25, 31, 1846. =13=bankhead, no. 94, sept. 29, 1845. =52=everett, no. 337, july 4, 1845. calhoun correspondence, 698. 35.12. mclane did not feel quite so confident. his private =297=letter of january 17, 1846, to polk said that in case of war with england he was not sure popular sentiment would be able to restrain the french government; but the representative of mexico at paris believed that in such an event the government would probably be unable to "neutralize the effects of the innate hatred of the french toward their neighbors and rivals," the british (=77=mangino, jan. 29, 1846, res.). 35.13. =77=garro, may 30, 1845, res. =11=mexique, xi, 215 (deffaudis). =297=mclane to polk, jan. 17, 1846, private. charleston _mercury_, sept. 8, 1846 (paris letter). =52=king, nos. 25, 28, 29, jan. 30; june 1, 30, 1846. _national_, june 27, 30, 1846. _correspondant_, may 1; nov. 15, 1846; jan. 15, 1817. _morning chronicle_, feb. 3, 1846. _journal des débats_, feb. 4; july 9, 1845. 35.14. aberdeen's intimation was construed in england as an offer of mediation, while the american government insisted that no such offer was made by him; but this difference of view did not lead to friction. pakenham told buchanan he had received no instructions on the subject, but knew that his government would be glad to bring about peace by interposing its good offices. buchanan replied that he was afraid formal mediation would prove a vain and "entangling" affair for the mediating power. so thought pakenham, for he believed the united states would make territorial demands which england would not be willing to countenance or advise mexico to accept. buchanan added that we should be glad to have england persuade mexico to listen to reason, since our government was anxious to establish peace on just and even generous terms (=13=pakenham, no. 82, june 28, 1846). pakenham concluded that our government relied on "the anxiety which england must feel, for the sake of her trade with mexico and the safety of british interests committed in so many ways in that country, to see peace reëstablished between the two republics" (=13=_id._, no. 93, july 13, 1846). senator archer hinted to polk that he (archer) could bring about mediation through his friend pakenham, but met of course with no encouragement (polk, diary, sept. 4, 1846). 35.15. this was described by palmerston in parliament as a definite offer of mediation (_morning chronicle_, aug. 26). the settlement of the oregon difficulty made such an offer more proper than it would have been at an earlier date. 35.16. buchanan was absent from washington at this time (pakenham, no. 16). according to the new york correspondent of the london _times_, the americans feared that unsuccessful mediation might be construed as giving some color of right to authoritative interposition (_times_, oct. 15, 1846). 35.17. _british mediation._ polk, diary, sept. 4, 10, 11, 1846. =52=to mclane, no. 44, july 27. =52=mclane, nos. 55, 69, june 18; aug. 15, 1846. =52=boyd, no. 3, sept. 18. =13=to pakenham, no. 10, aug. 18, 1846. =13=pakenham, nos. 82, 93, 99, 107, 116, 119, 132, june 28; july 13, 29; aug. 13; sept. 13, 28; nov. 23, 1846; no. 56, apr. 28, 1847. london _times_ (bentinck, disraeli), aug. 25; oct. 15, 1846. =1=ms. speech of aug. 6, 1846. _morning chronicle_, aug. 26, 1847. _journal des débats_, (fop) june 30; aug. 27, 1846. both of these british attempts to mediate were accompanied with similar offers to mexico, which proved equally unfruitful (vol. ii, p. 368). at the end of october bankhead was instructed to advise mexico that, since the united states had rejected the british good offices, she should settle with us at once on the most favorable terms that she could obtain. 35.18. for the benefit of the mexican government, the foreign office wrote to bankhead (=13=no. 15), june 1, 1846: "she [great britain] would find herself engaged in a war with a nation with whom she would have no personal cause of quarrel, in behalf of a nation and government which she has repeatedly warned in the most friendly and urgent manner of their danger, and which, solely in consequence of their wilfull contempt of that warning, have at last plunged headlong down the precipice from which the british government spared no efforts to save them"; and bankhead was instructed to let paredes know "the real state of the case without disguise." aberdeen's thus declining to interfere on behalf of mexico was particularly natural in view of the talk that had occurred with the mexican minister at london while the oregon issue was pending (vol. i, p. 115, and note 5.27 _infra_). as a step intended to settle that issue had now been taken, it appeared probable that there would be no longer any occasion to tow mexico along, and, as aberdeen was aware on june 1 that hostilities had occurred near the rio grande, it seemed important to disentangle himself completely, so as to be able to act with a free hand. 35.19. july 26, 1846, the _times_ asserted that a war with the united states "would be the very farthest from being unpopular" (denied the next day by the _morning chronicle_ so far as the mass of the liberals were concerned), and on september 28 said there had been few modern cases in which england could have "imposed" her arbitration with greater reason than upon the united states and mexico. 35.20. for this paragraph. =13=to bankhead, nos. 18, may 31; 34, oct. 1, 1845; 15, june 1, 1846. =77=murphy, no. 17, nov. 1, 1845, res. london _globe_, aug. 25, 1846. london _spectator_, may 30; sept. 26, 1846. =13=palmerston, memo. of reply to bankhead's no. 46, apr. 30, 1847. =52=mclane, no. 54, june 3, 1846. london _times_, july 26; aug. 25, 26; sept. 16, 1846. _morning chronicle_, july 27, 1846. _britannia_, mar. 9, 1844; apr. 18, 1846; jan. 9, 1847. _examiner_, may 30, 1846. _morning herald_, june 24, 1846. 35.21. =77=murphy, nos. 15, oct. 1, 1845, muy res.; 17, nov. 1, 1845, res.; 19, dec. 1, 1845, res.; 4, feb. 1, 1846, res. =77=peña y peña to murphy, no. 14, dec. 27, 1845. _diario_, dec. 29, 31, 1846. mora, papeles inéditos, 71-3. gordon, aberdeen, 183-4. =13=mora to palmerston, dec. 15, 1847. =13=palmerston, memo. in reply to mora, dec. 25, 1847; jan. 1, 1848, to mora. =13=to bankhead, nos. 18, may 31, 1845; 15, june 1; 4, aug. 15, 1846. london _times_, sept. 10, 1845; july 15, 1846. for the attitude of england in reference to california see chap. xvi, note 16.8. 35.22. aberdeen told murphy about the first of august, 1845, that the course of england and france in the event of war between mexico and the united states would very likely depend upon incidents that might occur, and gave murphy the impression that he would like to have the war take place and prove favorable to mexico (=77=murphy, no. 9, august 1, 1845). some friction arose between american authorities and french subjects in california. the united states justly attributed it to the latter, but took occasion to assure france that we would not "tolerate" any action on the part of american agents giving "just cause of complaint" to foreigners inhabiting regions occupied by our troops (buchanan, works, vii, 372). 35.23. the london _examiner_ of may 15, 1847, said: "much of the british goods in depot at the west indian islands have been forced into mexico through the medium of the new american custom house at tampico;" the capture of vera cruz will facilitate this operation; "and thus, instead of quarreling with the americans in behalf of mexico, we, or at least our traders, are quietly sharing with the americans the profits of mexican subjugation." see, however, chap. xxxiii, p. 263. 35.24. for this paragraph. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 951. (broglie) =108=bancroft to polk, oct. 18, 1847. howe, bancroft, ii, 10, 17. =297=mclane to polk (received june 21, 1846). =52=_id._, no. 69, aug. 15, 1846. =52=bancroft, nos. 25, may 3; 46, dec. 4, 1847. =13=pakenham, nos. 102, aug. 13; 111, sept. 13, 1846. =13=crampton, no. 21, july 29, 1847. (invariably) =13=doyle, no. 5, jan. 13, 1848. =132=bancroft, nov. 3, 1846. buchanan, works, vii, 290-2, 366-8, 372-3. _national_, may 1, 1847. _correspondant_, may 1, 1846. =53=buchanan to pageot, july 21, 1847. _examiner_, may 15, 1847. =77=murphy, no. 9, aug. 1, 1845. see chap. xxx, note 30.8. the mexicans expected that the injury done to neutral commerce by the war would lead foreign nations to help them (=13=bankhead, no. 162, 1846). for privateering see vol. ii, pp. 191-3; for the low tariff, see vol. ii, pp. 261-3. 35.25. revolutionary movements broke out in italy (january), france (february), germany, and austria (march). louis philippe lost his throne. 35.26. for this paragraph. =108=bancroft to polk, jan. 4; may 14, 1847. =108=_id._ to buchanan, nov. 3, 1847. howe, bancroft, ii, 5. london _globe_, aug. 25, 1846. =52=bancroft, no. 46, dec. 4, 1847. _national_, nov. 24, 1845. _correspondant_, feb. 1, 1846. =297=mclane to polk, aug. 2, 1846. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 294, res., july 28, 1846. =13=to bankhead, no. 15, june 1, 1846. =52=martin, no. 13, may 15, 1847. =52=boyd, no. 2, sept. 3, 1846. peña y peña (comunicación circular) said publicly and distinctly in 1848 that foreign powers signified to mexico that they regarded the annexation of texas as an accomplished fact; and he added that the one most interested to prevent the aggrandizement of the united states felt that its economic interests required it to digest in silence its own grievances rather than compromise those interests by declaring war. 35.27. aberdeen said to murphy that england did not wish to fight the united states _alone_, but added that "if france would join her, the case would be very different"; and he actually requested the french minister at london to sound guizot on the subject (=77=murphy, no. 15, oct. 1, 1845, muy res.). after another talk murphy reported to the same effect: "[aberdeen] would not mind in the least having a war [with the united states] if he could drag france along behind him" [_nada le importaría esa guerra si pudiese arrastrar tras sí á la francia_] (=77=no. 17, nov. 1, 1845, res.). it is of course possible that murphy attached too much seriousness to aberdeen's remarks; but the authorities at mexico had to take his reports as they stood. 35.28. murphy, who seems to have been at this time in the most intimate relations with aberdeen, reported (=77=no. 15, oct. 1, 1845, muy res.): france, in accordance with her long-standing disposition and animosities, "would be capable not only of opposing the views of great britain, but even of going so far as to make common cause with the united states against her, forcing louis philippe to adopt this extreme course however repugnant it might be to him. it is therefore not strange that the british minister views with dread anything that might expose him to war with the united states without securing a perfect understanding in advance with france, not because he needs the aid of her physical strength in a conflict with those states, but to commit her in such a manner that her physical strength would not be added to that of the enemy, causing perhaps a general conflagration of incalculable consequences in the world." 35.29. for this paragraph. =108=bancroft to polk, jan. 19, 1847. howe, bancroft, ii, 5-6. =52=boyd, no. 3, sept. 18, 1846. =77=murphy, nos. 15, oct. 1, muy res.; 17, nov. 1, res., 1845. =132=bancroft, nov. 3, 1846. =52=king, no. 29, june 30, 1846. _journal des débats_, july 9, 1845; oct. 6, 1846. =52=martin, no. 11, feb. 28, 1847. dict. nat. biog. (article on peel). dec. 28, 1847, chargé thornton was instructed (=13=no. 2) that, should mexico propose british mediation, he was merely to say that he would transmit the proposal to london. 35.30. =108=bancroft to polk, jan. 19, 1847. =52=martin, nos. 34, aug. 31, 1846; 13, may 15, 1847. dix, speeches, i, 207. _revue des deux mondes_, aug. 1, 1847, 429-31. washington _union_, oct. 6, 1846 (paris letter, sept. 17). (_l'epoque_) _niles_, july 25, 1846, p. 336. =52=king, no. 29, june 30, 1846. _courrier des etats unis_, july 20, 1846 (résumé of the french press). =77=mangino, jan. 29, 1846, res. 35.31. =297=mclane to polk (received june 21, 1846). =52=_id._, nos. 50, may 29; 54, 55, june 3, 18, 1846. =132=bancroft, may 18, 1847. _journal des débats_, sept. 19; dec. 21, 1846. =13=palmerston, memo. of reply to bankhead's no. 46, apr. 30, 1847; to mora, may 31, 1847. london _times_, sept. 16, 1846. =335=mclane, may 29, 1846. =108=bancroft to polk, may 14; june 3, 1847; to greene, nov. 3, 1847. howe, bancroft, ii, 18, 28. (anderson) lawton, artillery officer, 232. =52=bancroft, no. 25, may 3, 1847. =52=king, nos. 28, 29, 31, june 1, 30; july 20, 1846. j. f. ramírez, who saw numerous letters from europe, concluded by april 3, 1847, that mexico would receive no aid from that direction (ramírez, méxico, 224-5). 35.32. (credit) =297=mclane to polk (received june 21, 1846). (ranelagh) =76=murphy, oct. 1, 1845; mora, papeles ineditos, 97. (paredes) buchanan, works, vii, 411-3; ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 787, 789, 791, 796, 798; =47=perry to senior british naval officer at v. cruz, aug. 18, 1847, and reply, aug. 21. _britannia_, oct. 17, 1846; jan. 3, 23; june 5, 1847. 35.33. there are three reasons for presenting the newspaper quotations of this chapter: 1, they form a part of the history; 2, many indicate that the american task was not considered an easy one; and 3, many show how the mexicans were encouraged by the european press. this encouragement stood constantly in the way of our making peace. it is well to remember that gibes, quite as offensive, against england could be found in american journals of that period. 35.34. _times_, oct. 30; nov. 9, 1846; jan. 1; feb. 18; mar. 15; apr. 20, 26, 1847. _britannia_, feb. 20, 1847. _examiner_, dec. 22, 1846. 35.35. _times_, may 10, 12, 1847. _amer. review_, mar., 1848, p. 249. 35.36. =297=bancroft to polk, jan. 28, 1848. _journal des débats_, nov. 4, 1846; feb. 22, 1847. _constitutionnel_, dec. 18, 1846. _times_, aug. 31, 1846; jan. 1; may 10; sept. 30; nov. 13; dec. 2, 1847; jan. 4, 20, 1848. _chronicle_, mar. 6; june 1; sept. 30, 1847. _britannia_, oct. 9, 30; nov. 13, 1847. some of the french papers also bore heavily upon the operations of 1846. _le journal des débats_ said they had been a failure; that no foresight, energy or skill had been displayed; that the war had proved costly and was likely to prove endless. _le constitutionnel_ thought our resources might not hold out. but the press of france made no such exhibition of conscious weakness and humiliation trying to hide themselves (=108=bancroft to polk, jan. 28, 1848) as did that of england. 35.37. =108=bancroft to polk, jan. 4, 19; may 14; june 3; nov. 18, 1847; jan. 28, 1848. =52=mclane, no. 50, may 29, 1846. =52=boyd, no. 3, sept. 18, 1846. =52=bancroft, no. 25, may 3, 1847. _journal des débats_, jan. 21; june 1-2, 1846; oct. 5, 1847; aug. 15, 1848. =132=bancroft, may 18, 1847. =52=king, nos. 21, jan. 1; 29, june 30, 1846. _national_, june 18, 1846. 13to thornton, no. 2, dec. 28, 1847. =13=mora to palmerston, apr. 22; may 26; dec. 15, 1847; june 26, 1848. =13=palmerston to mora, may 31 (2); oct. 7, 1847; june 30, 1848. _britannia_, nov. 13, 1847. dr. j. m. l. mora, beginning in april, 1847, endeavored to secure british aid in settling the terms and guaranteeing the permanence of peace, and did not give up until near the end of june, 1848; but palmerston would not meddle, and cautioned the representative of england that, should a request for british mediation be presented to him, he should simply say the proposition would be transmitted to london. dec. 28, 1847, the british foreign office wrote to thornton (=13=no. 2) that cuevas had asked england to guarantee the treaty of peace; that it was highly improbable the united states would join in making this request; that to guarantee the treaty without a joint application would be equivalent to a contingent alliance with mexico against the united states; and that england was not likely to take that step in any event. xxxvi. conclusion 36.1. webster in the senate, june 24, 1846: "we certainly wished her [mexico] success.... we wished her well; and i think now that the people of the united states have no desire, it would give them, i think, no pleasure, to do her an injury beyond what is necessary to maintain their own rights. the people of the united states cannot wish to crush the republic of mexico; it cannot be their desire to break down a neighboring republic; it cannot be their wish to drive her back again to a monarchical form of government, and to render her a mere appanage to some one of the thrones of europe" (writings, ix, 158). crittenden spoke as follows in the senate, may 11, 1846: "from the first struggle for liberty in south america and mexico, it was the cherished policy of this country to extend to them sympathy, comfort, and friendship.... they were regarded as a portion of that great system of republics which were to stand forth in proud contrast with the governments of the old world.... as the head of the republican system, our policy was to cheer and cherish them, and lead them in the way to that liberty we had established, and of which we had set the example ... it was our interest to cherish them, and cultivate their friendship" (_cong. globe_, 29, 1, p. 788). as it may be thought that these statements were made for public effect, the following passage is quoted from resolutions passed by the people of bloomington (now muscatine), territory of iowa, june 5, 1846: "mexico, being a sister republic, has been looked to by citizens of the united states with the sincere hope that that country would become an enlightened, free and liberal nation ... and thereby, become another beacon (as the united states already is) to the monarchies of the world, to show them that men are capable of governing themselves, and let them see the advantages of a free, republican government" (iowa and war, no. 12). these statements were no doubt fundamentally true despite the resentment produced by the outrages perpetrated upon texans and americans, etc., which was mainly directed toward official mexico. senator hannegan rebuked sentimentality (often feigned for political reasons) in these words: i cannot "participate in the sympathy which i have heard invoked in behalf of mexico as a sister republic. in the first place the wrongs she has done us, and our citizens resident within her borders, show no very sisterly affection on her part; and in the next, i must confess my want of sympathy with any people where anarchy rules in the name of liberty. her history is a libel upon republican government. when human sympathy shall follow insubordination, misrule, and bloodshed, then, but not till then, will it be properly invoked for mexico" (_cong. globe_, 29, 2, p. 517, col. 1). =354=welles papers. 35.2. london _times_; aug. 6, 1847. webster to thompson, apr. 5, 1842: "every nation, on being received, at her own request, into the circle of civilized governments must understand that ... she binds herself also to the strict and faithful observance of all those principles, laws, and usages, which have obtained currency among civilized states.... no community can be allowed to enjoy the benefit of national character, in modern times, without submitting to all the duties which that character imposes" (ho. 266; 27, 2, p. 32). mex. nat. museum, boletín i, no. 9. ramírez, méxico, 235. london _spectator_, dec. 9, 1911: "when a country can not manage its own affairs, and can not keep order among its own people, it has already lost its independence." 36.3. this and following paragraphs are of course a very incomplete summary, which the reader can fill in from the first chapters of this work. with reference to the annexation of texas cass justly said: "the peace [and prosperity] of the world cannot be put to hazard by the pertinacious obstinacy of any nation, which holds on to nominal claims, without the power or the disposition to maintain them" (_cong. globe_, 30, 1, app., 425). it was the reasonable opinion of many that if taylor had had a strong army, well placed [especially had he been a general capable of impressing the mexicans] there would have been no war (_e.g._ =132=w. r. king, june 1, 1846; _so. qrtly. rev._, nov., 1850, 428). 36.4. grant, mems., i, 168-9: "i have seen as brave stands made by some of these men [mexican troops] as i have ever seen made by soldiers." =113=beauregard: the mexicans stood artillery and infantry fire "fully as well as our own troops," etc. _picayune_, oct. 4, 1846 (haile): all admit that the mexicans handle guns in battery as well as we could. =364=worth to s., nov. 2, 1846. the americans won mostly with the bayonet. the mexicans lacked the discipline and the confidence in themselves, one another and their officers which were necessary to sustain them against a charge. _constitutionnel_, aug. 17, 1847. negrete, invasión, iii, app., 443; 489 (otero). s. anna, apelación, 57. _id._, comunicación oficial. =76=to ocampo, dec. 18, 1847 (the chief cause of our ills is a want of military men possessing a political conscience). richtofen, zustände, 59, 60. =76=mora, apr. 14, 23, 1847. memoria de ... relaciones, jan., 1849. consideraciones, 7, etc. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 242. =76=olaguíbel to relaciones, aug. 15, 1847. puebla _nacional_, jan. 19, 1848 (payno). méxico á través, iv, 698-9. pacheco, exposición. ramírez, méxico, 234-5. the mexican newspapers did much to sap courage. from north to south there was a chorus of disheartening epithets for the adored _patria_: sad, unfortunate, lamentable, ill-starred, suffering, doomed. the whole diapason of misery filled the air. on all sides echoed confessions--on one another's account, of course--of mistakes, blunders and vices; egotism, cynicism, deceit, selfishness, hypocrisy, rancor, partisanship, dissension, indifference to the welfare of the nation, unscrupulous ambition, malfeasance in office, wholesale plundering, rascality favored by the authorities, personal degeneracy, social demoralization, military incompetency. even the orthodox estimate of the americans tended the same way. what had become of justice in heaven and hope on earth when our "infamous," "incompetent" generals could triumph again and again, with a handful of barbarians and adventurers, cowardly, ill-clad, ignorant, debased and undisciplined, over devout catholics and valiant patriots? a particular fact tended to promote dissension. there were three groups of states--the north, the centre and the south; and the first and the third felt that their interests had always been sacrificed to those of the centre. this paragraph and most of the other paragraphs of the present chapter are of course to be read in the light of what has already been said. for this one may refer to the index. some readers may feel that the author is inconsistent in saying (vol. i, p. 116) that mexico wanted the war and here that she was not really in it; but (1) many persons desire things which they feel unwilling later to pay for, and (2) the course of the war was very different from that which mexico had expected. the nation desired the uprising against santa anna, december, 1844, but was soon dissatisfied with the results of it. 36.5. sedgwick, corresp., i, 150; kenly, md. vol., 391; encarnacion prisoners, 69; stevens, stevens, 145. 36.6. balbontín, invasión, 135-6. scott, mems., ii, 466. =13=doyle, no. 1, 1848. memoria de ... relaciones, jan., 1849. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 242. =13=bankhead, no. 86, 1847. sierra, evolution, i, 376. =76=mora, apr. 28, 1847. _monitor repub._, nov. 8, 1847. _id._, nov. 30, 1847 (uraga). apuntes, 347. méxico á través, iv, 698. judging santa anna one must allow for the facts that his subordinates were incompetent, and that neither he nor they had known what real armies and real wars were. but this condition of things was far more due to him than to any other person. it should be remembered, too, that while the americans had numbers against them, they possessed the advantage of the offensive. but this, again, was very largely the fault of santa anna. 36.7. (kendall) wash. _union_, mar. 1, 1847. =257=c. to f. markoe, jan. 3, 1847. our commanders never had enough troops to garner the fruits of victory. =256=scott to marcy, jan. 16, 1847, priv.: "for god's sake give me a reinforcement of 12,000 regulars, at the least, for a sure and uninterrupted march from vera cruz upon the city of mexico." upton, military policy, 215: if scott had had 15,000 regulars after cerro gordo he could have taken mexico city. if troops, vessels, etc. had been supplied promptly, there would have been no battle of cerro gordo (ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 908). 36.8. scribner, campaign, 21. 36.9. polk's diary contains ample evidence regarding the character of his administration; _e.g._ may 16, 19; june 23-4; aug. 18; sept. 22, 24, 1846; aug. 19, 23; nov. 10-1, 1847; jan. 24, 1848. (period) lalor, cyclopædia, iii, 864. as taussig says (tariff hist., 122), our prosperity from 1846 to 1860 should not be attributed solely to the tariff of 1846. london _examiner_, jan. 2, 1847 ("polk has been the greatest of american conquerors, the most successful of american diplomatists," and yet his recent message does not boast). curtis, buchanan, ii, 72. schouler, hist. briefs, 138 (dallas said of polk: "he left nothing unfinished; what he attempted he did"). our problem was hard. the report of the quartermaster general, nov. 24, 1847, said that our nearest dépôts were farther from the source of supply than algiers from marseilles, yet we had accomplished more in a few months at the beginning of the war than france had accomplished in africa in seventeen years (sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 549). polk's relations with pillow offer a curious problem in psychology and in morals; but one sees from his diary how deeply buchanan's cleverness impressed his plodding mind, and a person like polk, with more taste than talent for subtlety, was naturally fascinated by pillow's readiness and cunning. besides, he was much indebted to pillow. his treatment of scott is another problem. perhaps he felt that as president he was above the ordinary requirements of fair dealing, and certainly he was intensely partisan. 36.10. jomini, précis, i, 143. grant, mems., i, 100. greene, army life, 142 (napoleon). =139=w. b. to d. campbell, nov. 2, 1846. 36.11. _so. qtrly. rev._, jan., 1851, p. 31. polk, diary, nov. 21, 1846; mar. 28; may 6, 1847, etc. garrison, extension, 242. henderson, science of war, 14. =139=w. b. to d. campbell, mar. 20, 1847. _amer. hist. review_, apr., 1919, 446, 454-6, 462 (marcy). 36.12. =256=j. parrott to marcy, apr. 19, 1847, private. lawton, artill. officer, 246. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 187. grone, briefe, 80 (punctuation modified). semmes, service, 378. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1255 (jesup). (shackle) hitchcock in _mo. republican_, nov. 3, 1857. =113=beauregard, remins. hamley, operations, 20. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 465 (lee). 36.13. =335=trist to mrs. t., oct. 18, 1847. =335=_id._, notes for letter to ho. of repres. lawton, artill. off., 151, 246. sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 190-1. =52=trist, aug. 14, 1847. sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 465 (lee). hitchcock in semi-weekly n. y. _courier and enquirer_, mar. 1, 1847. _id._ in _republic_, feb. 15, 1851 (_re_ a mexican book). ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1255 (jesup). roa bárcena, recuerdos, 635 (after mexico was captured, scott became "the most sincere and powerful of the friends of peace"). _so. qtrly. rev._, xviii, 428. 36.14. lawton, artill. off., 151. sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 190. _picayune_, oct. 22, 1847. grant, mems., i, 139. =253=harvey to mclean, june 13, 1847. 36.15. the earlier statements issued by our government were in many instances incorrect. the figures of the text are from the adj. gen.'s report of dec. 3, 1849 (ho. 24; 31, 1). they may be given more precisely as follows. i. regulars. apr., 1846, 7224 in all. on the texas frontier, may, 1846, 3554 present and absent. 27,470 (15,736 of "the old establishment," 11,186 of the new regiments, and 548 marines), including recruits, joined the army in mexico. the total in the service up to and including july 5, 1848, was about 31,024 (35,009 were recruited from may 1, 1846, and 32,190 of these were put _en route_; but some died or were killed in mexico before becoming attached to a regiment, and some cannot be accounted for). _losses._ _a_: old establishment. discharged on expiration of term, 1561; for disability, 1782; by order or by civil authority, 373; total, 3716. killed in battle, 41 offs.--422 men; died of wounds, 22--307, respectively; ordinary deaths, 49--2574; accidental deaths, 5--134; total deaths, 117--3437. wounded in battle, 118--1685. resignations, 37. desertions, 2247. _b_: new regiments. discharged on expiration of term, 12; for disability, 767; by order or by civil authority, 114. killed in battle, 5 offs.--62 men; died of wounds, 5--71; ordinary deaths, 36--2055; accidental deaths, 0--30; total deaths, 46--2218. wounded in battle, 36--236. resignations, 92. desertions, 602. _c_: marines serving with the army. killed in battle, 1--5; died of wounds, 0--3; ordinary deaths, 3--33; total, 4--41. ii. volunteers. mustered in, may, 1846, and later (16,887 mounted; 1129 artillery; 55,244 infantry) 73,260, including 3131 commissioned officers. of this number 14,448 (3-months and 6-months men; two regiments of 12-months men from ohio and missouri; one iowa company) did not serve. total serving, 58,812. discharged before the end of their term, 9169, including 7200 for disability. killed in battle and died of wounds, 607; ordinary deaths, 6216; accidental, 192; total, 7015. wounded, about 1340. resignations, 279. desertions, 3876. the number of ordinary deaths and discharges for disability was probably still larger, for the returns were incomplete. some "ordinary" deaths probably resulted from wounds. july, 1848, there were (officers included) 24,033 regulars and 23,117 volunteers. nearly all official figures of casualties are approximate. (discrepancies exist in the accounts) one may consult also: ho. 42, 48; 29, 2. sen. 36; 30, 1. _ohio arch. and hist. qtrly._, 1912, p. 280. ill. state hist. soc. trans., 1912, p. 17 (w. e. dodd). lawton, artill. off., 317. sen. 4; 29, 2. _picayune_, nov. 4, 1847. ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1114. =117=r. jones to mayer, feb. 8, 1849. brackett, lane's brigade, 131, 292. claiborne, quitman, ii, app., 311. semmes, service, 472. =61=r. jones to cass, mar. 9, 1848. _cong. globe_, 45, 3, pp. 1627-8 (shields). _u. s. army and navy journal_, apr. 25, 1885, p. 787. =288=naylor, alphab. list of american prisoners (1063 in all). sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 56. mich. pioneer soc. colls., vi, 20. rowland, register, 412. =61=wool to jones, jan. 7, 1848. one of the principal histories of the war gives the deaths resulting from battle as 5101, and the total number as "not less" than 25,000! many men afflicted with chronic diseases enlisted in the hope of deriving benefit from the climate of mexico, but died there. many came home bringing the germs of disease or with enfeebled constitutions. 36.16. (new regiments) =364=worth to s., sept. 5, 1846. (invalids) =291=smith to pierce, feb. 2, 1848; =254=mcclellan, diary, dec. 5, 1846; meade, letters, i, 161-2. (waste) meade, letters, i, 161-2. (arms) =256=scott to marcy, jan. 16, 1847, private. (undisciplined) =221=hill, diary; =95=report of comtee., jan. 4, 1848; ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 336 (taylor); =327=sutherland to father, aug. --, 1847; scott, _supra._ (close) hitchcock, fifty years, 346; olmsted, journey, 463. (one) =280=nunelee, diary. (another) oswandel, notes, 476. (officer) =146=caswell, diary. (n. car.) greensborough (n. c.) _morning post_, apr. 5, 1903. (braver) grant, mems., i, 167-8. (unreliable) balbontín, invasión, 75; smith, to mexico, 151. (imperilled) ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 336, 1178 (taylor); 1049 (scott); scott, mems., ii, 540. =256=marcy to wetmore, jan. 6, 1847. (stimulated) _cong. globe_, 35, 1, pp. 971-2 (quitman); stevens, campaigns, 12; =152=claiborne, mems. to suppose, as many appear to do, that the only business in war is to fight, is as if one should think that in railroading the only work is to run the trains. the following from scott's =256=letter to marcy, jan. 16, 1847, is pertinent: "a regiment of regulars, in fifteen minutes from the evening halt, will have tents pitched and trenched around, besides straw, leaves or bushes for dry sleeping; arms and ammunition well secured and in order for any night attack; fires made, kettles boiling, in order to wholesome cooking; all the men dried, or warmed, and at their comfortable supper, merry as crickets, before the end of the first hour.... volunteers neglect all those points; eat their _salt_ meat raw (if they have saved any at all) or, worse than raw, _fried_--death to any christian man the fifth day; lose or waste their clothing; lie down wet, or on wet ground--fatal to health, and, in a short time, to life; leave arms and ammunition exposed to rain and dews; hence both generally useless and soon lost, and certainly hardly ever worth a cent in battle," etc., etc. so in the field "the want of the _touch of the elbow_ (which cannot be acquired with the best instructors in many months); the want of the sure step in advancing, falling back and wheeling; ... the want of _military_ confidence in each other, and, above all, the want of reciprocal confidence between officers and men" cause frightful losses. mcclellan wrote in his =254=diary: "i have seen more suffering since i came out here than i could have imagined to exist--it is really awful--i allude to the sufferings of the volunteers. they literally die like dogs--were it all known in the states, ... all would be willing to have so large a regular army that we could dispense entirely with the volunteer system." trist stated in a =335=letter to the n. y. _tribune_, july 14, 1853, that the volunteer system was a debasing humbug, because the generals, aiming at political success, posed as great commanders with no basis except the courage of their men and the skill of their (regular) aides. worth said that the intelligent volunteers ridiculed the system, except for home defence, more than the regulars did (=364=to capt. s., nov. 2, 1846). webster said the advantage of the volunteer service was that it was generous and patriotic, entered into mostly to gain distinction, and because it gave men what they liked--an opportunity to bear arms under officers chosen by themselves (webster, letters, 347); but one sees at once that these views came far short of covering the case practically. that very ambition to win distinction, for example, made them dissatisfied and insubordinate when expected to do the ordinary work of soldiering (=169=taylor to crittenden, jan. 26, 1847); and volunteer officers like pillow did not compare with regulars like scott and taylor in kindness toward the men. the battle of buena vista was popularly supposed to have proved the efficiency of volunteers, but failed to do so (see chap. xx; =316=bragg to sherman, mar. 1, 1848; =330=taylor to brother, mar. 27, 1847; zirckel, tagebuch, 9), though they had had a sufficiently long training (upton, military policy, 209). the marquis de radepont, who accompanied scott's army to observe its operations, was particularly astonished that the general had so little control over the volunteers, a state of things that more than once endangered all, he said. scott, taylor, worth, twiggs, wool, quitman, smith and shields were not west pointers, but the first five were professionals. some of the volunteer officers, who had been in business, surpassed the regulars in such work as transportation. 36.17. (tilden) _cong. globe_, 29, 1, p. 543. (aristocrats) n. y. _herald_, june 20, 1846. (steadied vols.) stevens, camps., 12; ruxton, adventures (1847), 178; hitchcock, fifty years, 346. (reg. offs.) grant, mems., i, 168; =364=worth to s., sept. 5, 1846; =13=crampton, no. 17, 1848; collins, diary, jan. 29, 1847; lawton, art. off., 276. (took care) =254=mcclellan, diary, dec. 5, 1846; =148=chamberlain, recolls. (science) hitchcock, fifty years, 310; cullum, biog. register, i, p. xi. 36.18. grone, briefe, 83. _commerc. review of s. and w._, dec, 1846, 426-30 (poinsett). grant, mems., i, 143. sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 332 (smith). _observador zacatecano_, dec. 27, 1846, supplem. (requena). owing probably to the exigencies of the case the engineers were given a somewhat exaggerated importance. some of their officers were not experts; were perhaps hardly more than engineers by commission. and engineers were frequently employed to do reconnaissance work that was more properly the function of infantry patrols. 36.19. _commerc. rev._: note 18. grone, briefe, 70, 81. _revue des deux mondes_, aug. 1, 1847, 385. =73=bermúdez de castro, no. 517, 1847. 36.20. (immigrants) ho. 38; 30, 2. =278=niehenke, statement. =136=butterfield, recolls. grone, briefe, 84. _metrop. mag._, jan., 1908. (1000) sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 431. (600) hitchcock, fifty years, 293. (6000) sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 384. (miracle) =358=williams to father, oct. 1, 1847. _journal des débats_, aug. 15, 1848. 36.21. (legally) =250=lieber to ruggles, apr. 23, 1847. curtis, buchanan, i, 609. _cong. globe_, 29, 2, app., 125. (welfare) london _athenæum_, sept. 13, 1845. (right of way) von holst, u. s., iii, 272; london _atlas_, may 18, 1844. we are now trying to outgrow the old view of war and the analogous view of commercial and industrial competition, but in 1846 these had not become practical issues. this paragraph is to be understood in a broad, large way, of course. the london _chronicle_ said: in our colonies we fine owners who in a certain number of years do not develop their lands, and this fine is preparatory to ejectment; "the americans have acted on this principle after a kind of public lynch-law" (aug. 13, 1845). (its direct reference was to the annexation of texas, but the principle applied to the war with mexico.) rives argues that the war was "begun for the purpose of acquiring territory" in payment of our claims, and that therefore its morality was questionable (u. s. and mexico, ii, 657-8). but (1) the territory was wanted in payment of what was justly due us, and therefore we could rightfully collect, and that mexico could pay us only in land was not our fault; (2) the war was not entered into by us for the purpose of obtaining territory; and (3) it was not "begun" by the united states. 36.22. (humboldt) =181=donelson to buchanan, sept. 18, 1846. royce, calif., 51. lieber: note 36.21. von holst, u. s., iii, 269-72. (nation) chap. vi, note 6.11; _cong. globe_, 29, 2, p. 387 (giles); polk, diary, dec. 19, 1846; jan. 23, 1847; =1=senator allen in secret session, aug. 6, 1846; curtis, buchanan, i, 609; howe, bancroft, i, 286. _public ledger_, june 15, 1849 (dallas). welles, study. (bryce) this quotation is taken from a writer of good standing. the present author has not been able to find the passage, but presumes it was correctly quoted. davis, autobiog., 291-2. july 6, 1848, polk informed congress that we had more than 700 whaling ships in the pacific, representing not less than $40,000,000, and employing fully 20,000 seamen, and that owing to the acquisition of california we were less than thirty days from canton. these facts explain how important that acquisition was, and how serious it would have seemed to let a european power make it. 36.23. ramírez, méxico, 319. memoria de ... relaciones, jan., 1849, p. 8. (obstacle) vol. ii, p. 234. (invited) scott, mems., ii, 581-2. (trist) =335=thornton to trist, may 26, 1848. =52=walsh, nov. 10, 1848. (europe) j. h. smith in mass. hist. soc. proceeds., june, 1914, p. 462; howe, bancroft, ii, 5; =108=bancroft to greene, nov. 3, 1847; =108=_id._ to polk, jan. 19, 1847; bennett, mems., 386. (harmony) richardson, messages, iv, 587, 631; =132=mclane to buchanan, june 18, 1846; wash. _union_, nov. 3, 1846; n. y. _herald_, july 25, 1846; _cong. globe_, 29, 2, app., 125. the war helped to save mexican nationality because (1) it was to some extent a national issue; (2) it cut off the parts most likely to set the example of secession; (3) contact with the americans convinced the people of tamaulipas, n. león, etc., that they could not hold their own in competition with our citizens; (4) the mexicans received a stern lesson in political wisdom, which was taken to heart for a time, and had some permanent effect; and (5) the money that we paid strengthened the mexican government. the war helped the liberals, for it demonstrated our superiority. 36.24. roa bárcena, recuerdos, 635. ceballos, capítulos, 123. london _times_, nov. 13, 1847. lee, gen. lee, 43. parker, sermon. _cong. globe_, 30, 1, p. 499. webster, writings, x, 9. for scott's treatment of prisoners see, _e.g._, ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1055-9. appendix--the sources a. manuscript and personal sources as a number of the owners or holders of mss. (whose names are preceded below by colons) did not desire to receive applications for the use of their papers, it has been thought best to omit all addresses. some documents belonging to large collections are, for convenience of citation, listed separately. a few verbal statements (so described) are included. the numbers preceding collections, etc., correspond to numbers preceding citations of ms. documents in the notes. allen, william. =1=papers: library of congress. allred, r. n. =2=recollections: r. r. allred, esq. alvarado, j. b. =3=hist. de california: bancroft coll., univ. of california. amador, j. m. =4=memorias sobre la hist. de california: bancroft coll. anaya, p. m. =5=memoria: señ. lic. d. genaro garcía. anderson, robert. =6=papers: mrs. james m. lawton. anderson, w. e. =7=document. anonymous. =8=soldier's diary sent anonymously to the author. antrim, jay. =9=sketches: library of congress. aram, joseph. =10=narrative: mrs. grace aram. archives of france. =11=dépt. des affaires etrangères, paris. archives of great britain. =12=admiralty papers; =13=foreign office papers: public record office, london. archives of states. =14=alabama, =15=arkansas, =16=connecticut, =17=delaware, =18=georgia, =19=florida, =20=illinois, =21=indiana, =22=iowa, =23=kentucky, =24=louisiana, =25=maine, =26=maryland, =27=massachusetts, =28=michigan, =29=mississippi, =30=missouri, =31=new hampshire, =32=new jersey, =33=new york, =34=north carolina, =35=ohio, =36=pennsylvania, =37=rhode island, =38=south carolina, =39=tennessee, =40=texas, =41=vermont, =42=virginia, =43=wisconsin. archives of the =44=u. s. embassy at mexico. archives of the =45=u. s. legation in texas: state dept., washington. archives of u. s. navy dept. =46=captain's letters; =47=squadron letters; =48=confidential letter books; =49=orders; =50=executive letters; =51=marine corps. archives of u. s. state dept. =52=correspondence (and enclosures) with diplomatic and consular agents in mexico, great britain, france, spain, prussia and texas; =53=notes to and from the legations of those countries; =54=report books; =55=confidential report books; =56=special missions and correspondence with confidential agents in mexico, texas and california; =57=domestic letter books; =58=miscellaneous letters and replies; =59=circulars issued to diplomatic and consular agents. see also claims commission. archives of u. s. war dept. =60=secretary of war's files; =61=adjutant general's files; =62=quartermaster general's files; =63=military book; =64=adjutant general, miscellany; =65=orders; =66=engineer's office; =67=bureau of topog. engineers; =68=judge advocate general's office, courts martial, courts of inquiry; =69=discontinued commands, etc. archivo =69a=del distrito federal, mexico. archivo =70=general y público (particularly "guerra"), mexico. archivo =71=histórico-nacional, madrid. archivo =72=nacional de cuba. archivo =73=particular del ministerio de estado, madrid. archivos (_national_) de =74=fomento (maps); =75=gobernación (formerly called "relaciones interiores"); =76a=hacienda; =76=guerra y marina; =77=relaciones (i.e., exteriores). at mexico city. archivos (_state_) de =78=coahuila, =79=jalisco, =80=méxico, =81=nuevo león, =82=puebla, =83=querétaro, =84=san luis potosí, =85=tamaulipas, =86=vera cruz, =87=zacatecas. at the state capitals. archivos (_municipal_) de =88=córdoba, =89=guadalajara, =90=jalapa, =91=matamoros, =92=mexico, =93=monterey, =94=orizaba, =95=puebla, =96=querétaro, =97=saltillo, =98=san luis potosí, =99=tampico, =100=vera cruz, =101=victoria, =102=zacatecas. avila, juan. =103=notas californianas: bancroft coll. ayer =104=collection: newberry library, chicago. baldridge, william. =105=the days of 1846: bancroft coll. bancroft =106=collection: univ. of california. bancroft =107=papers: new york city public library. bancroft, george. =108=papers: massachusetts hist. soc. bandini, juan. =109=documentos para la hist. de california: bancroft coll. barbour, h. h. =110=diary: mrs. barbour. beauregard, p. g. t. =111=papers: c. s. hook, esq. beauregard, p. g. t. =112=papers: justin h. smith. beauregard, p. g. t. =113=reminiscences (done by him from diary and notes): claiborne papers, mississippi dept. of hist. beeler, louis f. =114=recollections. belden, josiah. =115=statement: bancroft coll. bell, a. n. =116=document. benjamin, w. r. =117=collection. berlandier, luis. =118=papers: library of congress. bevan, william. =119=statement. biddle, james. =120=papers: library of congress. biddle, charles j. =121=papers: charles biddle, esq. bidwell, john. =122=california, 1841-8: bancroft coll. bidwell, john. =123=statement: harvard univ. library. blocklenger, benjamin. =124=letter. bonham, milledge l. =125=letters: dr. milledge lake bonham, iii. botello, narciso. =126=anales del sur de la california: bancroft coll. boyle, john. =127=letter: miss esmeralda boyle. brackett, a. g. =128=diary: mrs. brackett. breckenridge, robert j. =129=papers: library of congress. brichta, a. c. =130=letter: belonging to the family. brindle, william. =131=statement: j. d. parrish, esq. buchanan, james. =132=papers: pennsylvania hist. soc. buck, dr. solon j. =133=collection. burton, c. m. =134=collection, public library, detroit. butler, anthony. =135=papers: univ. of texas. butterfield, james. =136=recollections. calhoun, john c. =137=papers: clemson coll. calhoun, john c. =137a=papers: library of congress. campbell, william b. =138=letters: john dewitt, esq. campbell, william b. (and david). =139=papers: lemuel r. campbell, esq.; mrs. james s. pilcher. cantwell, john l. p. =140=letter: miss jessica r. smith. carson, j. c. =141=statement: bancroft coll. carson, j. h. =142=gold mines of 1848: bancroft coll. cary, t. g. =143=california papers: boston public library. cassidy, p. a. =144=recollections. castro, manuel. =145=documentos para la hist. de california: bancroft coll. caswell, william r. =146=diary and letters: massachusetts hist. soc. chamberlain, s. e. =147=diary: loaned by the writer. chamberlain, s. e. =148=recollections (verbal). chase, salmon p. =149=papers: library of congress. cheatham, b. f. =150=diary and papers: mrs. telfair hodgson. claiborne, j. f. h. =151=papers: state of mississippi, dept. of hist. claiborne, thomas. =152=memoirs: belonging to the family. claims commission of 1849. =153=book of awards; =154=book of opinions; =155=journal: u. s. state dept. clay, henry. =156=papers: library of congress. cobb, howell. =157=papers (printed later by the amer. hist. assoc.): dr. u. b. phillips. cobb, howell. =158=papers: dr. r. p. brooks. collins, francis. =159=papers (published later in the qtrly. publication of the hist. and philos. soc. of ohio, 1915, nos. 2-3). _columbus._ =160=record of punishments, 1846-7: u. s. naval academy library. _congress._ =161=journal of a cruise, 1846: u. s. naval academy library. conner, david. =162=papers: hon. franklin d. roosevelt. conner, david. =163=papers: p. f. madigan, esq. conner, david. =164=papers: library of congress. conner, david. =165=papers: navy dept. library. conner, david. =166=papers: new york city library. coutts. =167=diary of a march to california: bancroft coll. crallé, r. k. =168=papers: library of congress. crittenden, j. j. =169=papers: library of congress. crooker family (of south carolina). =170=papers: dr. e. m. shealy. _cyane._ =171=journal of a cruise; abstract of journal: u. s. naval academy library. _cyane._ =172=log book: library, u. s. navy dept. davis, jefferson. =173=address: library of congress (reading-room desk). davis, jefferson. =174=papers: confederate memorial, new orleans. davis, jefferson. =175=papers: library of congress. davis, jefferson. =176=papers: state of mississippi, dept. of hist. davis, john w. =177=statement of the battle of san pascual: bancroft coll. davis, t. f. =178=diary: belonging to the family. diario =179=esactísimo de lo ocurrido en méxico, etc.: bancroft coll. dreer =180=collection: pennsylvania hist. soc. donelson, a. j. =181=papers: mrs. wm. a. donelson (now in the library of congress). dormitzer, walter. =182=collection. drum, r. c. =183=recollections (verbal). duke, moses s. =184=letters: miss winnie v. lynch. duncan, james. =185=papers: u. s. military academy. duncan, w. l. =186=notes on bishop's journal: mclean county (ill.) hist. soc. eddy =187=manuscripts: charles carroll, esq. edwards, marcellus b. =188=diary: missouri hist. soc. evans, mrs. lucy. =189=letter: belonging to the family. ewing, j. c. =190=diary: belonging to the family. fairfield, john. =191=papers: library of congress. ford =192=collection: new york city public library. foster, r. c. =193=letters: mrs. edward w. foster. fourth (mexican) infantry. =194=book of accounts: new york hist. soc. fowler, w. p. =195=collection. frémont, john c. =196=statement: library of harvard univ. gaines, e. p. =197=papers: library of congress. gallatin, albert. =198=papers: new york hist. soc. garcía, señ. lic. d. genaro. =199=collection. gibbes, w. h. =200=collection. gibson, george r. =201=diary: missouri hist. soc. giménez, m. m. =202=papers: señ. lic. d. genaro garcía. gleason, james. =203=letter. gouverneur, s. l. =204=diary: mrs. rose gouverneur hoes. graham, l. p. =205=memorandum book: e. w. mcglenen, esq. graham, w. a. =206=papers: a. w. graham, esq. griffin, john s. =207=journal of 1846: bancroft coll. guadalajara (public library) =208=collection. guitar, aldon. =209=letter. hammond, j. h. =210=diary and papers: library of congress. hardie, james a. =211=papers: library of congress. hastings, d. h. =212=diary: loaned by the writer. hatch, john p. =213=letters: library of congress. hays, john c., and caperton, john. =214=life and adventures of john c. hays: bancroft coll. heald, nathan. =215=papers: univ. of wisconsin library. heiman, a. =216=services of the first regt. of tennessee: tennessee hist. soc. henshaw, j. c. =217=papers: massachusetts hist. soc. henshaw, j. c. =218=narrative, prepared by mrs. henshaw from his papers: massachusetts hist. soc. heráldica =219=del ejército mex., etc.: biblioteca nacional. higgins, h. h. =220=plans and letters: mrs. t. m. coxe. hill, d. h. =221=diary: pres. d. h. hill. hiney, e. f. =222=diary. hirschorn, jacob. =223=recollections: justin h. smith. hitchcock, e. a. =224=diary and papers: mrs. e. a. hitchcock (now in the library of congress). holt, joseph. =225=papers: library of congress. hook, c. s. =226=collection. hoyle, e. d. =227=recollections. illinois university. =228=collection. indiana state library =229=collection. itúrbide, agustín de. =230=papers: library of congress. jackson, andrew. =231=papers: library of congress. jameson, j. franklin. =232=collection. janssens, agustín. =233=documentos para la hist. de california: bancroft coll. johnson, andrew. =234=papers: library of congress. jones, roger. =235=papers: w. r. benjamin, esq. judah, h. m. =236=diary: library of congress. kearny, s. w. =237=letter book: missouri hist. soc. keating, e. h. =238=map of monterey, mex.: monterey city govt. kemper, jackson. =239=papers: univ. of wisconsin library. kennerly, w. c. =240=narrative. kent, james. =241=papers: library of congress. kingsbury, d. m. =242=letters to his mother. kribben, christian. =243=home letters: b. d. kribben, esq. lakin, george w. =244=papers: univ. of wisconsin library. lamar, m. b. =245=papers: texas state library. lane, joseph. =246=autobiography: bancroft coll. larkin, t. o. =247=papers: bancroft coll. lasselle, stanislaus. =248=papers: indiana state library. leese, jacob p. =249=bear flag papers: bancroft coll. lieber, francis. =250=papers: library of congress. lowry, robert. =251=narrative. mackall, w. w. =252=letters: belonging to the family. mclean, john. =253=papers: library of congress. mcclellan, geo. b. =254=diary and papers: library of congress. mangum, w. p. =255=papers: a. w. graham, esq. marcy, w. l. =256=papers: library of congress. markoe and maxcy. =257=papers: library of congress. marshall, henry. =258=recollections: bancroft coll. maryland hist. soc. =259=collection. massachusetts hist. soc. =260=collection. mémoires. =261=i, apparently prepared by the french agent in mexico; =261a=ii, sur les revolutions du mexique: dépt. des affaires etrangères, paris. memorias. =262=reports issued under this title by depts. of the mexican government (see also "memorias" under the head of books and pamphlets. a number of the memorias were not published--unless in newspapers--but exist in ms. in the library of the sría. de relaciones). mervine, william. =263=letter books and papers: navy dept. library. mexican hist. =264=documents: museo nacional, mexico. miller, n. c. =265=letter. miller, w. d. =266=papers: belonging to the family. mississippi dept. of hist. =267=collections (dr. dunbar rowland, director). missouri hist. soc. =268=collection. molina, señ. d. ignacio. =269=recollections (verbal). moore, h. judge. =270=diary. morales, j. b. =271=papers: library of congress. morgan, george. =272=memoir of: col. j. m. morgan. mullan, james. =273=diary: belonging to the family. neeld, peter c. =274=letter. nelson, t. b., jr. =275=letter: mrs. annie j. holland. neville, harvey. =276=diary: chicago hist. soc. new york hist. soc. =277=collection. niehenke, r. =278=statement. notes. =279=sur les possessions espagnoles en amérique: dépt. des affaires etrangères, paris. nunelee, s. f. =280=diary: james howell nunelee, esq. o'keefe, michael. =281=statement: justin h. smith. olivera, agustín. =282=documentos para la hist. de california: bancroft coll. orders (general and special). =283=army of the north under mejía, ampudia and arista: new york hist. soc. otero, m. =284=comunicación que sobre las negoc. diplom., etc.: yale univ. library. paredes y arrillaga, mariano. =285=papers: señ. lic. d. genaro garcía. parker, james. =286=statement. parrish, p. c. =287=diary. pennsylvania hist. soc. =288=collection. pérez de acal. =289=papers: guadalajara public library. pico, pio (_familia pico_). =290=documentos para la hist. de california: bancroft coll. pierce, franklin. =291=papers: library of congress. pillow, gideon j. =292=letters: w. r. benjamin collection. pillow, gideon j. =293=letters: library of congress. pillow, gideon j. =294=letters: pennsylvania hist. soc. pinto, rafael. =295=apuntaciones para la hist. de california: bancroft coll. poinsett, joel r. =296=papers: pennsylvania hist. soc. polk, james k. =297=papers: library of congress (including the polk papers examined by the author at the chicago hist. soc.). porter, andrew. =298=papers: major john biddle porter. posey, carnot. =299=letters: dr. walter l. fleming. pricket, john a. =300=letters. primer battn. activo de oaxaca. =301=libro de servicios: rhode island hist. soc. puryear, j. f. =302=document. quitman, john a. =303=papers: in possession of the family. quitman, john a. =304=papers in the claiborne papers. richardson, c. t. =305=recollections: justin h. smith. riser, j. j. =306=recollections (mormon battalion). roberts, b. s. =307=diary and letters: brigadier general b. k roberts. roberts, charles. =308=autograph collection: haverford coll. roessler, edward. =309=diary: belonging to the family. roque, j. k. =310=document. santa anna, a. l. de. =311=papers: señ. lic. d. genaro garcía. santa anna, a. l. de. =312=papers: library of congress. saunders, j. l. =313=papers: library of congress. sawyer, charles h. =314=documents for the hist. of the conquest of california: bancroft coll. schouler, william. =315=papers: massachusetts hist. soc. sherman, w. t. =316=papers: library of congress. sibley, h. h. =317=papers: minnesota hist. soc. smith, c. b. =318=papers: library of congress. smith, george. =319=diary: belonging to the family. smith, persifor f. =320=papers: state normal school, west chester, pa. smith, t. f. =321=diary: belonging to the writer. smith, w. b. =322=diary: belonging to the family. stevenson, j. d. =323=letter book; =324=general order book; =325=regimental order book: new york hist. soc. sumner, charles. =326=papers: harvard univ. library. sutherland, d. h. =327=letters: belonging to the family. sweet, g. n. =328=statement. taliaferro, william b. =329=papers: miss l. s. taliaferro. taylor, zachary. =330=papers: library of congress. taylor, zachary. =331=papers: henkels catalogue. tennery, thomas d. =332=diary: rev. john s. cook, d.d. tlacotálpam, mex. =333=judicial archives. torres, manuel. =334=peripecias de la vida california: bancroft coll. trist, nicholas p. =335=papers: library of congress. turner, c. b. =336=letter: belonging to the family. turner, h. s. =337=diary: missouri hist. soc. u. s. house of representatives. =338=files: capitol, washington. u. s. house of representatives. =339=papers: library of congress. u. s. military academy (west point). =340=collection. u. s. senate. =341=files: capitol, washington. university of illinois. =342=collection. vallejo, m. g. =343=documentos para la hist. de california: bancroft coll. vallejo, m. g. =344=recuerdos hist. y personales: bancroft coll. van buren, martin. =345=papers: library of congress. wade, w. p. =346=document: belonging to the family. washburne, elihu b. =347=papers: library of congress. watterston, george. =348=notes on u. s. history: library of congress. watterston, george. =349=papers: library of congress. weber, juan l. =350=recollections (verbal). webster, daniel. =351=papers: library of congress. weeks, j. w. =352=reminiscences: bancroft coll. welles, edgar t. =353=collection: connecticut hist. soc. welles, gideon. =354=papers: library of congress. wheaton, henry. =355=papers: massachusetts hist. soc. whitcomb, t. m. =356=diary: t. j. whitcomb, esq. wilcox, c. m. =357=diary (portions copied by him): claiborne papers, mississippi dept. of history. williams, thomas. =358=letters: rt. rev. g. mott williams. winthrop-clifford. =359=correspondence: massachusetts hist. soc. winthrop-kennedy. =360=correspondence: massachusetts hist. soc. woods, william. =361=recollections. worth, g. a. =362=papers: library of congress. worth, w. j. =363=papers: w. r. benjamin collection. worth, w. j. =364=papers: mrs. k. s. hubbell. wyse, f. o. =365=papers: miss mary wyse. yale university. =366=collection (university library). yell, archibald. =367=papers: mrs. r. h. fitzgerald. map division, library of congress. =369=map of palo alto. taylor, zachary. =370=papers: mrs. w. r. stauffer. mitchell, w. i. =371=statement. hyde, george. =372=statement of hist. facts on california: bancroft coll. evans, joseph. =373=narrative: justin h. smith. conner, david. =374=letters: henkels catalogue. madigan, p. f. =375=collection. nicholson, a. s. =376=recollections (verbal). willing, wildurr. =377=paper on scott's operations (published later). winthrop, r. c. =378=the mexican war bill (massachusetts hist. soc.). de witt, john. =379=collection (see also no. 138). #/ b. serials as these titles, when occurring in the notes, are self-explanatory, it has been thought best to group them by themselves in order to give a comprehensive view of the sources of this class and make it a little easier to use the "list of books and pamphlets." most of the volumes of serials here cited as having been examined contained nothing of value for the author's purpose. academy of pacific coast history, 1910-11. academy of political science in the city of new york, 1910-17. alabama hist. society. transactions. publications, 1899-1904. american antiquarian society. proceedings, 1849-1918. transactions and collections, 1857-1911. american catholic hist. society. records and researches, 1887-1915. american economic association. publications, 1889-1905. american geog. society. bulletin i, pt. 1. american hist. association. papers, 1885, 1887, 1889-91. reports, 1889-1916. american-irish hist. society. journal, 1898-1905. record, 1901-02. american-jewish hist. society. publications, 1893-1914. annals of iowa. 3 series. buffalo hist. society. publications, 1879-1914. california hist. society. papers. columbia (d. c.) hist. society. record, 1895-1912. connecticut hist. society. collections, 1860-1916. delaware hist. society. papers, 1879-1913. essex institute. hist. collections, 1859-1914. firelands hist. society. pioneer, 1862-78. german-american hist. society. annals, 1901-11. hist. society of southern california. publications, 1888-1916. illinois state hist. library. collections, 1903-15. governors' letter books, 1840-53. publications or transactions, 1899-1917. illinois state hist. society. journal, 1908-14. transactions (see ill. state hist. lib.). indiana hist. society. publications, 1897-1912. iowa, hist. dept. annals, 1893-1914. iowa state hist. society. annals, 1863-74. historical record, 1885-1902. messages and proclamations of governors. iowa and war, no. 12, 1918. kansas state hist. society. transactions, i-x. collections, 1909-12. kentucky state hist. society. register, 1903-14. lancaster county hist. society. papers, 1897-1913. long island hist. society. memoirs, 1867-89. louisiana hist. society. publications, 1895-1912. mcclean county (ill.) hist. society. transactions, 1899-1903. maine hist. society. collections, 1847-87. collections and proceedings, 1890-99. maryland hist. society. miscellaneous and "fund" publications, 1846-81. massachusetts hist. society. collections, 1846-1918. proceedings, 1859-1918. michigan pioneer and hist. society. collections, 1877-1912. minnesota hist. society. collections, 1860-1915. mississippi hist. society. publications, 1898-1909. mississippi valley hist. society. proceedings. missouri hist. society. collections, 1880-1914. montana hist. society. contributions, 1876-1910. nebraska state hist. society. proceedings and collections, 1894-1913. transactions and reports, 1885-93. nevada hist. society. biennial reports, 1909-13. new hampshire hist. society. collections, 1850-93. proceedings, 1872-1905. new jersey hist. society. collections, 1846-1900. proceedings, 1845-1914. new mexico hist. society. publications, 1881-1908. new york hist. society. proceedings, 1844-49. collections, 1868-1916. miscellany. new york state hist. association. publications, 1901-13. ohio hist. and philos. society. publications, 1873-85, 1906-17. ohio state archæol. and hist. society. publications, 1888-1915. old north west geneal. society. see "periodicals." oregon hist. society. see "periodicals." pennsylvania hist. society. memoirs, 1850-95. bulletin, 1845-47. magazine of hist. and biog., 1877-1917. rhode island hist. society. collections, 1867-1902. publications, 1893-1900. proceedings, 1872-92, 1900-14. schuylkill county hist. society. publications, 1907-13. société de géographie. bulletin no. 51. south car. hist. society. collections. southern hist. association. publications, 1897-1906. tennessee hist. society. quarterly, 1902-4. texas state hist. society. see "periodicals." trinity college hist. society. publications, 1897-1912. u. s. naval institute. proceedings. university [of california]. chronicle, i-xiv. university of pennsylvania. publications. virginia hist. society. collections, 1882-92. see also "periodicals." west virginia hist. and antiq. society. see "periodicals." western reserve hist. society. publications, 1870-1914. wisconsin state hist. society. collections, 1855-1911. proceedings, 1891-1917. worcester society of antiquity. proceedings, 1875-1909. wyoming hist. and geneal. society. proceedings and collections, 1858-1912. c. periodicals this list includes the principal ones. the best collections are at the american antiquarian society, which has numerous mexican broadsides also, the library of congress, the city hall of new orleans (southwestern journals), the biblioteca nacional and the dept. of hacienda library at mexico, and the british museum. in a number of instances only scattered copies of a periodical were found or quotations in some other paper. advertiser. boston. advertiser. detroit. advertiser. newark, n. j. aguila del norte. matamoros, méx. aguila mexicano. matamoros, méx. aguila mexicano. méxico. american. baltimore. american. new york. american. portland, me. american eagle. vera cruz. american economic review. american flag. matamoros, mex. american flag. vera cruz, mex. american historical magazine. new york. american historical record. philadelphia. american historical review. new york. american home journal. american pioneer. monterey, mex. american political science review. baltimore. american [whig] review. new york. american sentinel. philadelphia. americana. new york. amigo del pueblo. méxico. anglo-saxon. chihuahua, mex. annals of the american academy. philadelphia. anteojo. méxico. anzeiger des westens. st. louis. arco iris. veracruz. argonaut. san francisco. army and navy journal. new york. athenæum. london. atlantic monthly. boston. atlas. albany, n. y. atlas. boston. atlas. cincinnati. atleta. méxico. autograph. new york. bankers' magazine. baltimore. bee. new orleans. boletín de la democracia. méxico. boletín del norte. matamoros, méx. boletín de noticias. puebla, méx. boletín militar. méxico. boletín oficial. san luis potosí, méx. britannia. london. brownson's quarterly review. boston and new york. california star. monterey, cal. californian. monterey, cal. católico. méxico. century magazine. new york. chronicle. cincinnati. church and state gazette. london. clipper. baltimore. collector. new york. columna de la libertad. querétaro, méx. comercio. lima, peru. commercial. wilmington, n. c. commercial advertiser. new york. commercial bulletin. new orl. commercial review of the south and west. new orleans. commonwealth. lexington, ky. congressional globe. washington. constitutionalist. augusta, ga. constitutionnel. paris. correo de la federación mexicana. méxico. correo nacional. querétaro, méx. correspondant. paris. correspondent. port gibson, miss. cosmopolita. méxico. courier. boston. courier. charleston, s. c. courier. new orleans. courier and enquirer. new york. courier and journal. natchez, miss. courrier des etats unis. new york. courrier français. mexico. courrier français. new york. crepúsculo. méxico. defensor de tamaulipas. victoria, méx. delta. new orleans. democrat. columbus, miss. democratic review. washington and new york. diario del gobierno. méxico. diario del gobierno de la república mexicana. méxico. diario del gobierno de los estados mexicanos. méxico. diario del gobierno mexicano. méxico. diario de méxico. méxico. diario oficial del gobierno mexicano. méxico. don simplicio. méxico. dwight's american magazine. new york. eagle. memphis, tenn. eagle. vera cruz. echo de la louisiane. new orleans. eco. tampico, méx. eco del comercio. méxico. eco del norte de tamaulipas. matamoros, méx. economist. london. edinburgh review. edinburgh. english historical review. enquirer. cincinnati. enquirer. richmond, va. epoca. san luis potosí, méx. epoque. paris. espectador. méxico. esperanza. tampico, méx. evening post. new york. examiner. london. express. new york. federalista. querétaro, méx. federalista puro. méxico. fenix de la federatión. toluca, méx. flag of freedom. puebla, méx. forum. new york. fraser's magazine. london. fredonian. free american. vera cruz. free press. detroit. gaceta de ciudad victoria. victoria, méx. gaceta de la nueva granada. bogotá. gaceta del gob. de méxico. méxico. gaceta del gob. ... de tamaulipas. victoria, méx. gazette. alexandria, va. gazette. cincinnati. gazette. corpus christi, tex. gazette. holly springs, miss. gazette. philadelphia. gazette de france. paris. genius of liberty. vera cruz. georgian. savannah, ga. globe. new york. globe. washington, d. c. guard. holly springs, miss. guard. toluca, méx. harper's magazine. new york. herald. cincinnati. herald. new york. herald and tribune. mobile, ala. heraldo. madrid, spain. historical magazine. morrisania, etc. history teacher's magazine. philadelphia. ilustrador católico. méxico. imparcial. méxico. independiente. san luis potosí, méx. indiana magazine of history. indianapolis. indicador. veracruz. infantry journal. washington. international military digest. new york. iowa journal of history and politics. iowa city. iris español. méxico. jalisciense. guadalajara, méx. jeffersonian. new orleans. journal. louisville, ky. journal. lowell, mass. journal. providence, r. i. journal des débats. paris. journal of american history. journal of commerce. london. journal of commerce. new york. journal of military service institution of u. s. governor's island, n. y. journal of political economy. chicago. journal of the u. s. artillery. fort monroe. journal of u. s. infantry association. kennebec journal. augusta, me. liberal. zacatecas, méx. liberal moderado. matamoros, méx. liberator. boston. lima de vulcano. méxico. littell's living age. boston. locomotor. veracruz. louisiana advertiser. new orleans. louisiana courier. new orleans. louisianais. new orleans. madisonian. washington. magazine of american history. new york. magazine of history. new york. maryland historical magazine. baltimore. massachusetts quarterly review. boston. memorial histórico. méxico. mentor del pueblo. puebla, méx. mercantile journal. london. merchants' magazine. new york. mercury. charleston, s. c. metropolitan magazine. new york. mexicano. méxico. military historian and economist. cambridge, mass. military service institution journal. new york. mississippi valley historical review. cedar rapids. missouri historical review. columbia. missouri reporter. st. louis. missouri republican. st. louis. monitor. méxico. monitor constitutional. méxico. monitor del pueblo. puebla, méx. monitor republicano. méxico. morning advertiser. london. morning chronicle. london. morning herald. london. morning news. new london, conn. morning news. new york. morning post, greensborough, n. c. morning post. london. morning star. houston, tex. mosquito mexicano. méxico. mountaineer. greenville, s. c. mountaineer-herald. ebensburg, pa. nacional. puebla, méx. national. paris. national anti-slavery standard. new york. national intelligencer. washington, d. c. national register. washington, tex. national vindicator. washington, tex. new england historical genealogical society register. new englander. new haven. news. galveston, tex. news. london. niles' national register. baltimore. north american. mexico. north american. philadelphia. north american review. new york. noticioso. san cristóbal, méx. nueva era constitucional de oaxaca. oaxaca, méx. observador judicial. méxico. observador zacatecano. zacatecas, méx. observer. lexington, ky. ohio archæological and historical quarterly. columbus. ohio state journal. columbus. old and new. boston. old north west quarterly. columbus, o. old school democrat. st. louis. opinión del ejército. san luis potosí, méx. opinión pública. morelia, méx. oposición. méxico. oregon historical society quarterly. portland. pabellón nacional. méxico. patria. new orleans. patriot. mobile, ala. patriota mexicano. méxico. pennsylvania magazine of history and biography. philadelphia. pennsylvanian. philadelphia. pensador mexicano. méxico. peruano. lima, peru. picayune. new orleans. picket guard. saltillo, mex. political science quarterly. boston. politician. nashville, tenn. político. méxico. porvenir. toluca, méx. post. boston. potter's american monthly. pregonero. morelia, méx. progreso. querétaro, méx. public ledger. philadelphia. puritano. méxico. quarterly journal of economics. boston. razonador. méxico. reforma. méxico. regenerador. oaxaca, méx. regenerador republicano. puebla, méx. registro oficial. durango, méx. república de rio grande y amigo de los pueblos. matamoros, méx. republican. jacksonville, ala. republican. new orleans. republican. st. louis. republican. santa fe, n. mex. republican. savannah, ga. republican banner. nashville, tenn. republicano. méxico. republicano federado. méxico. republicano jalisciense. guadalajara, méx. reveille. matamoros, mex. reveille. st. louis. revista econ. y comerc. de la repúb. mexicana. méxico. revue britannique. paris. revue de paris. brussels. revue des deux mondes. paris. revue des races latines. paris. revue historique. paris. revue indépendante. paris. saturday review. london. scribner's magazine. new york. scribner's monthly. new york. seminario político. monterey, méx. sentido común. morelia, méx. sentinel. tampico, mex. sentinel. vicksburg, miss. siglo xix. méxico. sinaloense. mazatlán, méx. sol. méxico. sol. tampico, méx. soldado de la patria. san luis potosí, méx. sonorense. hermosillo, méx. south atlantic quarterly. durham, n. c. south carolina historical and genealogical magazine. charleston, s. c. southern advocate. huntsville, ala. southern literary messenger. richmond. southern magazine. baltimore. southern quarterly review. new orleans. southwestern historical quarterly. austin, tex. spectateur militaire. paris. spectator. london. spectator. washington, d. c. spirit of jefferson. charlestown,va. spirit of the age. woodstock, vt. spirit of the times. new york. standard. london. star. columbia, s. c. star. raleigh, n. c. state sentinel. indianapolis. statesman. albany, n. y. sun. new york. sun of anahuac. vera cruz. telégrafo. puebla, méx. telegraph. houston, tex. telegraph. washington, d. c. temístocles. san juan bautista, méx. texas democrat. austin, tex. texas review. austin, tex. texas state historical society quarterly. austin, tex. texian democrat. houston, tex. tiempo. méxico. times. london. tribune. new york. tropic. new orleans. union. nashville, tenn. union. washington, d. c. unión nacional. oaxaca, méx. united service. new york and philadelphia. united service magazine. london. u. s. army and navy journal. new york. u. s. cavalry association journal. fort leavenworth. u. s. magazine and democratic review. washington and new york. vedette. washington. veracruzano libre. veracruz. verdadero liberal. guanajuato, méx. vigía del pacífico. mazatlán, méx. virginia historical society magazine of history and biography. voz de michoacán. morelia, méx. voz de la patria. méxico. voz del pueblo. méxico. west virginia hist. and antiq. soc., historical mag. charleston. western monthly magazine. cincinnati. whig. nashville, tenn. whig. richmond, va. whig review. _see_ american review. william and mary college quarterly historical magazine. yale review. new haven. zacatecano. zacatecas, mex. zempoalteca. jalapa, méx. d. books and pamphlets (except serials) these were used primarily, like the other printed matter, on account of first-hand material contained in them, secondly for ancillary information on biography, topography, industries, customs, etc., and thirdly for suggestions, many of which were too general to cite. some are mentioned simply to show that the author did not overlook them. others were examined that did not seem worth noticing at all here. to have expanded this list into a bibliography would have been foreign to the author's aim and would have made it intolerably long. for these reasons titles have frequently been shortened. the main use of the list was to make it possible to give very brief titles in the notes. numerous broadsides examined by the author are not mentioned. ¡a las armas, mexicanos! méx. 1846. acta. mazatlán. 1847. acta celebrada por el ejército de reserva. méx. 1829. acta constitutiva y de reformas, etc. atlixco. 1847. acta del pronunciamiento. méx. 1829. adalberto de cardona, s. méx. y sus capitales. méx. 1900. adams, e. d. british interests and activities in texas. balto. 1910. adams, henry. albert gallatin. phila. 1879. history of the united states. 9 v. n. y. 1889-91. adams, j. q. memoirs. 12 v. phila. 1874-77. addey, markinfield. "little mac." n. y. 1864. "stonewall jackson." n. y. 1863. "adopted citizen." texas question reviewed. n. y. 1844. aguilar y lópez. breve impugnación, etc. méx. 1848. ah, traidores gachupines. puebla. 1827. al público. puebla. 1847. al pueblo méx.: relación de las causas, etc. (aug. 24, 1847). méx. 1847. alamán, lucas. defensa. méx. 1834. dissert. sobre la hist. de la repúb. mexicana. 3 v. méx. 1844-49. hist. de méxico. 5 v. méxico. 1883-5. liquid. general de la deuda exterior de la repúb. mex. méx. 1845. memoria [on agriculture and the industries]. méx. 1844. alcáraz, ramón, _et al_. apuntes para la hist. de la guerra entre méxico y los estados unidos. méx. 1848. aldrich, m. a. u. s. marine corps. boston. 1875. alexander, e. p. amer. civil war. london. 1908. [allen, george.] the complaint of mexico. boston. 1843. allen, g. n. mexican treacheries and cruelties. boston and n. y. 1848. allen, h. w. recollections (s. a. [ellis] dorsey, ed.). n. y. [1866.] allen, j. c. roster of soldiers, sailors and marines of the war of 1812, etc. lincoln, neb. 1893. allen, l. l. scenes upon the rio grande. n. y. 1848. almonte, j. n. noticia estad. sobre tejas. méx. 1835. alocución dirigida en chacapa al general de las fuerzas amer. puebla. 1847. alvarez, juan. manifiesto. méx. 1845. alvarez, v. s. breve noticia de algunos manuscritos. méx. 1908. "amante de su patria." causas para declarar la guerra á los ee. uu. méx. 1829. ambler, c. h. thomas ritchie. richmond. 1913. "american, an." _see_ robinson, a. american gift book. n. y. 1848. american state papers. class i, vol. vi. wash. ampudia, pedro de. to fellow-citizens (july 10, 1846). 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[wetmore, p. m.] observations on ... the war with mexico. n. y. 1847. wharton, francis [ed.]. digest of the internat. law of the u. s. 3 v. wash. 1886. wheaton, henry. digest of u. s. supreme court decisions. n. y. 1821. wheeler, h. g. history of congress. 2 v. n. y. 1848. wilcox, c. m. mexican war. wash. 1892. wilhelm, thomas. hist. eighth u. s. inf. 2 ed. 2 v. 1873. wilkes, charles. narrative of u. s. exploring exped. new ed. 5 v. n. y. 1851. western america. phila. 1849. wilkinson, [h.] s. war and policy. london. 1900. willey, s. h. thirty years in calif. s. francisco. 1879. transition period of calif. s. francisco. 1901. williams, a. m. sam houston. boston. 1893. wilson, henry. rise and fall of the slave power. 3v. boston. 1872-77. wilson, j. g. gen. grant. n. y. 1897. wilson, r. a. mex. and its religion. n. y. 1855. conquest of mex. phila. 1859. winsor, justin (ed.). narr. and crit. hist. of amer. 8 v. boston. [1884]-89. winthrop, r. c. addresses and speeches. 4 v. boston. 1852-86. winthrop, r. c., jr. r. c. winthrop. boston. 1897. wise, h. alex. seven decades of the union. phila. 1872. wise, [h. aug.]. los gringos. london. 1849. wislizenus, [f.] a. tour to no. mex. wash. 1848. woodbury, levi. writings. 3 v. boston. 1852. wooten, d. g. (ed.). comprehensive hist. of texas. 2 v. dallas. 1898. wright, m. j. gen. scott. n. y. 1894. wynkoop, j. m. anecdotes and incidents. pittsburgh. 1848. wynne, j. major s. ringgold. balto. 1847. ya s. anna hechó la patria al infierno. méx. 1834. yoakum, h. k. hist. of texas. 2 v. redfield, n. y. 1856. young, a. w. amer. statesman. rev. ed. (ferris.) n. y. 1877. young, philip. mexico. cincin. 1847. zamacois, niceto de. hist. de méx. 18 v. barcelona y méx. zarco, fr. hist. del cong. extraord. de 1856 y 1857. i. méx. 1857. zavala, l. de. ensayo histórico de las revol. de mégico. 2 v. in one. paris. 1831, 1832. exposición. méx. 1829. manifiesto de los principios políticos del ecsmo. sr. j. r. poinsett, etc. méx. 1828. viage á los estados unidos del norte de américa. paris. 1834. zirckel, otto. tagebuch geschrieben während der nordamericanisch-mexikanischen campagne ... 1847 und 1848. halle. 1849. zurita, r. m. esposición. méx. 1845. index aberdeen, earl of, and oregon controversy and mexico, =1.= 115; and california, 321, =2.= 302; counsel to mexico, =1.= 434; warning on annexation, =2.= 299, 508; offers mediation, 301, 503; and interposition, 302, 304, 504-6. abert, j. j., chief topographical engineer, =1.= 475. aburto, juan, guerilla, =2.= 421. academy of fine arts, =1.= 14. acapulco, as port, =1.= 3; not occupied, =2.= 207, 448. acordada, insurrection of the, =1.= 41; building, 413. activo corps in mexican army, =1.= 157. acuerdo, meaning of citation to, =2.= 346 _n._ adams, j. q., texas speech, =1.= 70, 111; and oregon, 152; on secession, =2.= 272; effect of death on treaty of peace, 246. _aetna_, in attack on tuxpán, =2.= 444; in home squadron, 445, 446. agiotista, as term of reproach, =2.= 327. agriculture, mexican products, =1.= 1-2; farms, 5; conditions, 16, 410. agua nueva, taylor's advance at, =1.= 374; santa anna's advance, taylor's retreat, 381-4, 554; santa anna's retirement to, parley, 398, 561. aguascalientes battalion, at monterey, =1.= 494. aguirre, j. m. de, and occupation of saltillo, =1.= 266, 508; and guerilla warfare, =2.= 170; efforts to apprehend, 418. aiken, william, opposes war, =1.= 188. alabama troops, first enlistments, =1.= 195; at tampico, 282, 512; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 343; in alvarado expedition, 344; leave scott, 356; call (1847), 364, 365; in taylor's later force, 417; slow response to call, 431. alamán, lucas, industrial scheme, =1.= 16; appearance, 25; as real ruler, character, 43; and boundary negotiations, 60, 418-9; and butler, 62, 420; and monarchy, 90, 214; on judicial system, 409; on mexican character, 410; and american troops, =2.= 230. alamo massacre, american indignation, =1.= 117. _albany_, and vera cruz expedition, =2.= 18; in attack on tuxpán, 444; in home squadron, 445, 446. albany _statesman_, on tariff for mexican ports, =2.= 500. alcorta, l. j., and executive power (1847), =2.= 180; and armistice, 394; and war policy, 430. alemán, lieutenant, at chapultepec, =2.= 410. aliens, mexican antipathy and treatment, =1.= 58, 74, 103, 416. _see also_ attitude towards united states. allen, g. w., at palo alto, =1.= 164. allen, james, and mormon battalion, =1.= 290. allen, william, and war bill, =1.= 183; and democratic dissension, =2.= 496. alleye de cyprey, baron. _see_ cyprey. almonte, j. n., character, =1.= 26; and annexation of texas, 84, 87; belittles american chances in war, 104, 105, 107, 110, 115; excites fear, of spanish america, 111; and european protection, 122; and outbreak of war, 201, 442; treachery to paredes, 215; combination with santa anna, 216, 222; return to mexico with santa anna, 486; presidential candidacy (1846), =2.= 5, 82, 84; arrested (1846), 84; anti-peace attitude (1847), 235, 236, 466; combination against santa anna, 134; and privateering, 191, 192; subsides, 242; candidacy for senate, 474. altata, blockaded, =2.= 448. alvarado, j. b., leader in california, =1.= 319; and american occupation, 335. alvarado, expedition, =2.= 38, 344-5; blockade, 194; naval attacks, 197-9, 442; map, 198. alvarez, juan, at acapulco, revolt (1846), =1.= 216, =2.= 448; seizes california expedition, =1.= 522; supports santa anna (1847), =2.= 86, 88; character, 88; in plan of defence of capital, 90; and scott's advance to san agustin, 95, 97, 374; and combination against santa anna, 134; at molino del rey, 142, 146; at siege of puebla, 174, 175, 425; force (oct. 1847), 182; and scott at puebla, 363; "pintos" in force, 369; and contreras, 380; and chapultepec, 408; in the city, 414; later movements, 425, 433; and santa anna's surrender of command, 429. alvarez, manuel, american consul at santa fe, and armijo and kearny's expedition, =1.= 289. _american review_, on spirit of expansion and unrest, =1.= 123, 124; on slidell mission, 133; on advance to rio grande, 459-61; on british criticism of military operations, =2.= 307; on peace negotiations (1847), 400. _american star_, accompanies scott's army, =2.= 227. _amigo del pueblo_, on herrera's rule, =1.= 56; on incitation to war, 87; on slidell mission, 436; on california, 522. amnesty, for mexican political offenders, =2.= 367. amozoc, worth at, santa anna's attack, =2.= 69-70, 360. ampudia, pedro de, cruel execution of sentmanat, =1.= 117; commands at matamoros, 148; and taylor, 148, 149, 158, 455; intention to attack, subordinated to arista, 149, 455; and guerillas, 153; character and appearance, 158, 234; propaganda among american troops, 160; in advance, 162; before fort brown, 164, 166, 176, 468; at palo alto, 165; and rumors of arista's treachery, 168, 172; at resaca de la palma, 174; preparations and force at monterey, 230-1, 234, 494; position and policy in command at monterey, 234; "culinary knight," 241; during attack on city, 241, 242, 248, 255, 258, 259, 501; capitulation and retirement, 259, 502, 504; and pass of rinconada, 265, 508; at buena vista, 366, 388-91; and wool's march, 510; force at san luis potosí, 550; trial, 550; hostility to santa anna, =2.= 82; sent away, 84. amusements, mexican, =1.= 19, 23, 24, 27. anaya, j. p., at mazatlán, =2.= 448. anaya, p. m., substitute president, =2.= 15; council to consider defence of capital, 79; on effect of cerro gordo, 80; and santa anna, 82, 92; and santa anna's return to capital, 83; at churubusco, 110; chosen interim president, 236; suppresses war-party insurrection, 236; term expires, 240; appearance, at exchange of ratifications, 251; brigade, 369; in meeting of governors on peace, 464. anderson, robert, military book, =1.= 451; and volunteer officers, 481; on american rule in puebla, =2.= 225; on effect of victories, 305; on cerro gordo, 354; on worth, 360. andrade, manuel, at cedral, =1.= 553; at buena vista, 557; at molino del rey, =2.= 141, 146, 404. andrews, t. p., at chapultepec, =2.= 154; regiment, 363; at churubusco, 385. _see also_ voltigeurs. angeles. _see_ los angeles. angostura, at buena vista, =1.= 383-6. annexations of mexican war, mexican desire for, effect on, of occupation, =2.= 125, 215, 323; as only guaranty of order, 234; plan to absorb mexico, 243-4, 309; opposition to any, 274, 287-9, 492, 498, 502; and wilmot proviso, 287-8, 498; foreign opinion on, 297, 308; yucatan, 472; polk and policy, 502. _see also_ california; expansion; peace; texas. antigua, expedition, =2.= 38, 344. antislavery sentiment, as expected factor in war, =1.= 105, 107; and mexico, 119. _see also_ slavery. antón lizardo, rendezvous of vera cruz expedition, =2.= 17, 332. apache canyon, n. mex., expected fight at, =1.= 293-5, 516. apodaca, juan ruiz de, and liberal constitution, =1.= 32. appropriations for american navy, =1.= 190, =2.= 189. _see also_ finances. _arab_, santa anna returns in, =1.= 486. arbitrary rule, tradition, =1.= 30. arbitration of claims on mexico, =1.= 79-81, 429-31. archer, william s., and advance to rio grande, =1.= 152; and war bill, 182; and british mediation, =2.= 504. argüelles, d., at belén garita, =2.= 159, 160. arista, mariano, position, commands at matamoros, =1.= 149; orders troops to cross and attack, 149; on beginning of war, 155; force, 158; propaganda among american troops, 160; and outlook, 161; advance on taylor's communications, 162, 464; battle of palo alto, 164-70, 465; treachery rumored, 168, 172; battle of resaca de la palma, 170-6, 467; position after battle, 177; retires from matamoros, 177-8, 469; relieved of command, 178; pursuit, 204; effect of defeat, 213; rebuilds army, 225, 489; and fort brown, 468; hostility to santa anna, =2.= 82; sent away, 84; refuses command, 182. aristocracy, conditions, aspect, =1.= 5, 23-7; fears american influence, 103. _see also_ oligarchy. arkansas troops, and santa anna's advance, =1.= 383, 554; at buena vista, 386, 555, 558; in wool's march, 509; call (1847), =2.= 365; in taylor's later force, 417. arlégui, j. m. de, and doniphan's expedition, =1.= 521. armijo, manuel, control of new mexico, character, =1.= 285, =2.= 216; and advance of kearny's expedition, =1.= 289, 292-3, 516; wavering and flight, 294-5, 516-7. armistice, taylor's, at monterey, =1.= 259, 501-6; terminated, 263-4; after churubusco, =2.= 133; santa anna's activity and position, 134; peace negotiations during, 135-8, 396-400; question of extension, 136, 398; santa anna violates, 137; terminated, 138, 399; results, 138; terms, 394; wisdom, 394; clashes during, 396; opposing views on, 399; question and renewed peace negotiations, 240, 242; after signing of peace treaty, terms, 242, 471. arms, mexican, =1.= 156-7, 462; of american army, 450. army, american, character of official reports, =1.= ix, 404; belittled by foreigners, 105; condition, arms (1845), 139, 450-1; war acts on regulars, 190, 191, 474; attitude of regulars, 208, 481; size before call for vera cruz expedition, 537; regular force during war, recruiting, 537; ten regiment bill and amendment, =2.= 74-6, 363; question of lieutenant generalcy and major generalcy commanding for benton, 75, 365; character of new officers under ten regiment bill, 76; statistical facts, 318, 511, 512; regulars and volunteers contrasted, 319-20, 512-3; character of special arms, 320, 513; general character and achievement, 321; voltigeurs, 363; bounty, 364; authorized regular (1847), 431; supposed size (nov. 1847), 432. _see also_ morale; mounted riflemen; voltigeurs; volunteers; and officers and campaigns by name, regular regiments by number, and volunteers by name of state. army, mexican, position and character of officers, =1.= 8-10, 408; of rank and file, 10; cavalry and artillery, 11; and itúrbide, 35; power, 36; supports guerrero, 41; and bustamante, 43; backs santa anna (1832), 45; farías' attempted reforms, 45; makes santa anna dictator, 46; and seven laws, 47; and financial crisis, 48; revolts against santa anna, 53; and herrera, 55; foreign opinion, 106, 440; mexican opinion, 106; organization and condition (1845), 156-7, 461-2; size then, 157; and paredes, 214; fragmentary character, 494; condition and command after elimination of santa anna (1847), =2.= 182, 429-30; as fighters, 311; and civil discouragement, 509. _see also_ commanders and campaigns by name, especially ampudia; arista; santa anna. army of the east, mexican, =2.= 88, 369. army of the north, mexican, =2.= 88, 369. _see also_ valencia. army of the south, mexican, =2.= 88. _see also_ alvarez. arrangóiz, j., mexican consul at new orleans, on hope in privateering, =1.= 109. arriero, =1.= 18. arroyo, miguel, and douceur fund, =2.= 391. arroyo colorado, mejía's ruse at crossing, =1.= 147. art of war, =1.= 405. arteaga, m., at cerro gordo, =2.= 347, 352. artillery, mexican, =1.= 11, 156, 461-2; in monterey campaign, =1.= 228; field, of american army at outbreak of war, 450; in scott's army. =2.= 77, 365; character of american, 320. _see also_ regiments by number. artillery battalion, in monterey campaign, =1.= 241, 242, 244, 492, 496, 501, 508; at resaca de la palma, 467. _see also_ childs. ashburnham, charles, british chargé at mexico, on mexican relations, =1.= 74; on mexican obduracy, 134. ashburton, baron, and california, =1.= 524; and control of mexico, =2.= 309. ashmun, george, and advance to rio grande, =1.= 456. assessments, american, on mexicans, =2.= 264-6, 485-8. atalaya, hill at cerro gordo, =2.= 45; occupied by americans, 50-3. _athenæum_, and american absorption of mexico, =2.= 297. atlixco, aspect, rea at, =2.= 178; lane's attack, 179, 426. atocha, a. j., and santa anna, =1.= 202; and peace negotiations, =2.= 123, 124, 126, 387. atristain, miguel, peace commissioner, =2.= 135, 239. attitude toward mexico, american, =1.= 58, 60, 61, 65, 76-8, 85, 88-91, 95, 100, 101, 117-21, 125-7, 130-4, 323, 332, 422, 428, 429, 434-6, 439, 443-5, 458-61, =2.= 121, 123, 310, 508. _see also_ conquered territory; diplomatic intercourse; outbreak; preparation. attitude toward the war, of mexican people, =1.= 115-6, 442, =2.= 312, 510. _see also_ opposition; popularity; preparation. attitude toward united states, mexican, =1.= 28, 57-61, 63, 67, 70, 77, 81, 83, 102-4, 109, 111, 116, 161, 375-6, 418, 423, 431, 484, =2.= 124, 310. _see also_ diplomatic intercourse; outbreak; preparation. aulick, j. h., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 238. _aurora de la libertad_, excites fears of spanish america, =1.= 112; appeal to europe, 114. avalos, f., and plans against taylor, =2.= 165, 419. ayotla, twiggs at, =2.= 94. ayuntamientos, in occupied territory, =2.= 229, 461. backus, electus, at monterey, =1.= 252, 500; on mistakes there, 502. badillo, colonel, at cerro gordo, =2.= 44. bahía company, at monterey, =1.= 494. baker, e. d., wounded, =1.= 207; on war and expansion, 444; and absorption of mexico, =2.= 243; at cerro gordo, 352. balderas, lucas, killed at molino del rey, =2.= 145. baldwin, john, claim, =1.= 427. ballentine, george, on american infantry, =1.= 451; on tampico and american occupation, =2.= 461. baltimore _american_, on california, =1.= 325. baltimore troops. _see_ washington and baltimore battalion. bancroft, george, on polk and california, =1.= 127; on polk's reluctance to fight, 127, 133; on polk's ability, 129; and war, 181; instructions to sloat, 530; as secretary of the navy, =2.= 190; and plan to attack ulúa, 201; and conner, 201; and absorption of mexico, 243; on war finances, 260; on victories and foreign relations, 305; on british and war annexations, 309; on influence abroad of war, 324. bancroft, h. h., on castro's meeting, =1.= 526; on gillespie, 526; on sloat, 530, 531. baneneli, j., at cerro gordo, =2.= 55. bankhead, charles, british minister at mexico, and annexation of texas, =1.= 85; and mexican-american relations, 91-3, 435; and oregon and mexican controversies, 114-5; on rio grande campaign, 179, 180; on mexican abandonment of california, 319, 322; on mexican war enthusiasm, 442; on santa anna and peace (1846), 487; on factions of federalists, =2.= 4; on mexican finances, 8, 328; on mexican attitude toward peace (1846), 122, 386; and trist mission, 129-31, 133, 390; and privateering, 192; and mediation, 368, 504; on evacuation of city, 415. bankhead, james, occupation of córdoba and orizaba, =2.= 184-5, 222, 433; at siege of vera cruz, 335; in command at vera cruz, 432, 457. banking, mexican attempt, =1.= 17. _see also_ finances. baranda, manuel, and return of santa anna, =1.= 221, =2.= 368; and trist mission, 132, 390. barbour, p. n. at resaca de la palma, =1.= 174. barker, e. c, acknowledgment to, =1.= 450. barnburners, and polk, =2.= 270, 281. barrios, colonel, at belén garita, =2.= 159, 160. barron, e., british consul at tepic, and california, =1.= 524. beach, moses y., in mexico, intrigue, =2.= 11-4, 65; escape, 14, 332; and absorption of mexico, 243; on intrigue, 331. beale, e. f., and battle of san pascual, =1.= 535. beale's grant, =1.= 449. bear flag war, =1.= 331-3, 528-9, 531. beauregard, p. g. t., and landing at vera cruz, =2.= 23, 336; at cerro gordo, 50, 350; reconnoitres contreras route, 103; on plan of attack of capital, 149; at belén garita, wounded, 160, 415; engineer with scott, 366; at battle of contreras, 379; reconnoitres southern approach of capital, 408; on mexican soldiers, 509. béjar company, at monterey, =1.= 494. belén garita and citadel, =2.= 147; quitman's attack, 158-60, 162, 412, 414-6. belknap, w. g., at palo alto, =1.= 164; at resaca de la palma, 174. belknap, camp, =1.= 206. belmont, august, and american funds in mexico, =2.= 266, 488; and war loans, 482. belton, f. m., at tampico, =1.= 281, 512. benham, f. g., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338. benham, h. w., on taylor's carelessness at agua nueva, =1.= 549. benjamin, calvin, at chapultepec, =2.= 156; at belén garita, killed; 160. benjamin, park, on call to arms, =1.= 193. bentinck, lord george, and interposition, =2.= 302. benton, t. h., on polk and war, =1.= 130; and war, 182, 183, 471; on cause of war, 189; and scott, 197, 354; welcome to doniphan's force, 314; war plan, 349, 351; on advance to rio grande, 458; and doniphan's expedition, 517; on gillespie's mission to frémont, 528; and lieutenant generalcy, =2.= 75, 363; and peace, 123; opposes slidell as peace commissioner, 126; and treaty of peace, 247, 473, 475; public land gradation policy, 261, 482; and tariff for mexican ports, 261; character and leadership, 282, 291; and major-generalcy, 365. bent's fort, kearny's expedition at, =1.= 288-9, 515. bermúdez de castro, salvador, spanish minister at mexico, and slidell mission, =1.= 100; on mexican aggression, 455; on mexican finances, =2.= 8; on difficulties of march to mexico city, 37; on trist mission, 132; and peace, 133; and privateering, 192; and war, 298; on american army, 321; on scott's expedition, 357. berra, f., at monterey, =1.= 248. berrien, j. m., and war bill, =1.= 183; and treaty of peace, =2.= 247; no-annexation plan, 287-8, 498. biddle, james, on asia station, =2.= 189; commands pacific squadron, vessels, 206, 447. bidwell, john, and bear flag war, =1.= 529. bishop's palace at monterey, in battle, capture, =1.= 239, 245, 247-8. bissell, w. h., at buena vista, =1.= 390, 391, 394. black, john, american consul at mexico, and restoration of intercourse, =1.= 89, 91, 96; and slidell mission, 145, 453; report on santa anna's attitude, 201; expelled, =2.= 41; and peace negotiations, 122. black, s. w., at siege of puebla, =2.= 174, 424. black pass. _see_ hoya. blair, f. p., sr., warning on political effect of war, =1.= 353; on polk, =2.= 270; on excesses in new mexico, 453. blake, j. e., at palo alto, =1.= 165. blanchard, a. g., in monterey campaign, =1.= 241, 245, 247, 492, 496-8; advance to saltillo, 264. blanco, colonel, and wool's march, =1.= 273, 274, 510; guerilla, 274, 283. blanco, s., at buena vista, =1.= 389. bliss, w. w. s., as taylor's adjutant, =1.= 141, 261, 451, =2.= 318; on rio grande campaign, =1.= 179; parley after buena vista, 398; at palo alto, 466. blockade, not feared by mexico, =1.= 110; expected european difficulty, 114; policy, character, =2.= 193, 208, 303, 440; physical difficulties, 194-5; on pacific coast, 205-6, 446, 448. bloomington (muscatine), iowa, on good will toward mexico, =2.= 508. boca chica, =1.= 205, 480. bocanegra, j. m., character, =1.= 25; american correspondence, 68; and decree expelling americans, 73; and texas, 84, 85, 419, 433. bocas, force at, =1.= 553. _boletín oficial_, on mexican army, =1.= 106; on santa anna, 487. bonham, m. l., regiment, =2.= 363; leaves mexico city, 476. _bonita_, captured, =1.= 511; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 238; added to navy, 438; in home squadron, 442, 446; in attack at tuxpán, 444. bonneville, b. l. e., and wool, =1.= 509. borland, solon, carelessness and capture, =1.= 370-1. _see also_ encarnación prisoners. _boston_, wrecked, =2.= 449. boston _atlas_, demand for war, =1.= 456; on polk's cabinet, =2.= 270; on polk, 275, 276; on outlook of war, 277; encourages enemy, 280; on tariff, 286; on polk's war policy, 288. botts, j. m., opposes war, =1.= 189. bouck, w. c., federal appointment, =2.= 271. boundaries, mexican negotiation on louisiana purchase, =1.= 59-61, 418; sabine river, 63; offer of compensation for proper texan, 84-5, 88, 91, 95, 436; southern, of texas, 138, 449, 457, 470; texan, in peace negotiations, =2.= 135-6, 238, 396, 399, 463, 464, 469. _see also_ annexations. bounty in ten regiment bill, =2.= 364, 490. bowles, w. a., at buena vista, =1.= 388, 390, 391, 555, 557. boyd, j. mch., american chargé at london, reports cited _passim_. bragg, braxton, force in texas, =1.= 146, 452; at fort brown, 163; at monterey, 251, 254, 492, 496; at buena vista, 388, 390-2, 395, 555, 557, 558; on reports, 404; field battery, 450; in harney's brigade, 541; on scott's order against the cabal, =2.= 436; sent to new mexico, 475. bravo, nicolás, as partisan leader, =1.= 32; revolt against itúrbide, 35; presidential candidacy, 37; attempted revolt (1827), 38; pardoned, 44; acting president (1846), reforms, 217; and revolt, 217; incites against united states, 418; and santa anna (1847), =2.= 82, 83; retires, 84; at churubusco, 113, 117; and desire for peace, 122; at chapultepec, surrenders, 153, 155, 157, 408, 411; and guerilla warfare, 173. bravos battalion, formation, =2.= 3; at churubusco, 111. brazito affair, =1.= 301-2, 518. brazos island, camp, =1.= 205. breckenridge, h. m., claims commissioner, =1.= 430. breese, sidney, position in senate, =2.= 496. bribery money in peace negotiations, =2.= 131-2, 390. bridgehead at churubusco, =2.= 111; maps, 112, 113; attack and capture, 114-6, 383. briggs, g. n., on attitude toward war, =2.= 492. brinkerhoff, jacob, and advance to rio grande, =1.= 456; position in house, =2.= 496; and wilmot proviso, 498. briscoe, w. f., guerilla attack on, =2.= 423. _britannia_, on american army, =1.= 105; on military titles, =2.= 295; on people, 295; on polk, 300; on conquests in india, 302; on guerilla warfare, 306; criticism of military operations, 307, 308; on absorption of mexico, 309. british in mexico, merchants, =1.= 5, 17; mining companies, 15. broglie, duc de, and war, =2.= 303. brokers, in mexican public finances, =2.= 327. brooke, g. m., and reinforcement of tampico, =1.= 282, 512; and alarm over buena vista, 400. brooks, w. t. h., at contreras, =2.= 108. brough, c. h., in lane's march to puebla, =2.= 426. brown, ----, american agent to santa anna, =1.= 479. brown, jacob, at fort brown, =1.= 163; killed, 176, 468. brown, milton, on advance to rio grande, =1.= 457. brown, fort, construction, position, map, =1.= 148, 159, 463, 468; attack on, and battle of resaca de la palma, 164, 176, 467-9; former names, 454. bryce, james, on justice of expansion, =2.= 323. buchanan, james, and almonte, =1.= 87; and slidell mission, instructions, 95, 100, 127, 436-7; on war spirit, 126; on peaceful policy, 131; and monarchist plans in mexico, 135, 448; and southern boundary of texas, 139; and california, 327; and defensive-line policy, 348; and patterson, 351; and war programme, 351; and parrott, 434; and gillespie, 528; desire for peace negotiations, =2.= 121; overtures (1846), 122, 386; and trist, 127, 128; appearance, 128; and recall of trist, 236, 237, 464; and absorption of mexico, 243, 244; opposes treaty, 246, 471; as cabinet officer, 282; and dallas faction, 282; circular and conciliation of european opinion, 297, 502; and british offer of mediation, 301, 504; and beach, 331; and scott-trist, 390; does not expect peace, 391; on texas and kearny's occupation of new mexico, 497; and annexation and slavery, 502; and polk, 510. buena vista, later force at, =2.= 417, 418; mutiny, 418. _see also_ next title. buena vista campaign, taylor's insubordinate advance to agua nueva, =1.= 368, 373-4, 547-8; carelessness and capture of wool's scouting parties, 370-1; lessened morale of wool's force, 371; taylor's unstrategic position and carelessness, 374, 549, 550; assembling of santa anna's army, 374-9, 550; plan to attack taylor's weak and isolated force, 379, 543, 552; mexican advance for surprise, 380-8, 553, 554; map of route between mexico and agua nueva, 381; mexican force, 381, 552; flight of americans to buena vista, 382-3, 554; map of roads between monterey and el encarnación, 382; taylor's trips to saltillo, 383, 388, 555, 556; pursuit of americans, 384, 555; santa anna's failure to charge, 384; his play for time, 385, 555; field, 385; american position and force, 386, 548, 555; flank movement on american left, 386, 388; map of field, 387; condition of troops during night, 388; second day: mass in mexican army, 388; continuation of flanking, 389, 390; repulse of blanco's frontal charge, 389; pacheco's advance on american left, 389-91, 557, 558; repulse of flanking force, 391; repulse of pacheco, 391; rout of flanking force, ruse to save it, 392-3, 558; criticism of santa anna's tactics, 393, 558; hardin's charge and repulse, 393, 559; repulse of pérez's charge on centre, 394-5; miñón's repulse at saltillo, 395, 555, 556, 559; factors in american success, taylor, 395-6, 559; mexican valor, 396; losses and condition of american army, 396, 561; taylor's determination to hold ground, 397, 561; condition of the mexican army, 397; santa anna's retirement to preserve organization, 397-8, 562; parley, 398, 562; horrors of mexican retreat, 399; santa anna credited with victory, 399; taylor's tardy advance, 399; forays in his rear, 399, 562; alarm in united states, reaction, 400; mexican batteries, 556; question of taylor's order to retreat, 558; foreign comment, =2.= 307. bullion, export forbidden, =2.= 487. burke, edmund, on arbitrary government, =1.= 52; on political slavery, =2.= 311. burnett, e. c., acknowledgment to, =1.= 419. burnett, w. b., wounded at churubusco, =2.= 117. burns, ----, paymaster, and leonidas letter, =2.= 435, 437. burr, aaron, and spirit of expansion, =1.= 123, 444. burrita, expedition, =1.= 177, 469; camp, 206. burrough, marmaduke, american consul at vera cruz, reports cited _passim_. burton, h. s., in lower california, =2.= 448, 449, 476. bustamante, anastasio, vice-president, revolt, =1.= 43; as president, 43; resigns, reëlevates pedraza, 45; returns to power, santa anna undermines, 47-51; and california, 319; and chief command, =2.= 182. butler, andrew p., position in senate, =2.= 496. butler, anthony, as minister at mexico, =1.= 62, 419, 420; and sabine river boundary, 64; and claims, 76, 427, 428; and scott, 476. butler, b. f., on polk, =2.= 272. butler, p. m., killed, =2.= 117. _see also_ palmetto. butler, w. o., division in march to monterey, =1.= 229, 492, 496; in battle of monterey, 252-4, 499; command and force at monterey (dec. 1846), 283, 357; and command of vera cruz expedition, 351; and expected attack, 358; scott's instructions on troops for vera cruz, 362; in command at saltillo, 370, 549; at brazos, 476; takes reinforcements to scott, =2.= 184; succeeds scott, 188, 438; evacuates mexico city, 252, 476; and price's rosales expedition, 419; retained in service, 432; division garrisoned at molino del rey, 461; and peace commission, 464. cabinet, character of polk's, =2.= 269, 282. cadereita, aspect, =1.= 357. cadwalader, george, reinforcements for scott, =2.= 77; brigade in scott's army, 78, 363; at contreras, 105, 108, 379; at churubusco, 110; advance after armistice, 142; at molino del rey, 144-6, 402, 403; at san cosme garita, 161, 414; and douceur, 391; and plan of attack on capital, 408; at chapultepec, 410; occupies toluca, 433; leaves mexico, 438. cahuenga, capitulation of, =1.= 345. calderón de la barca, j. m., spanish minister at washington, on mexican army, =1.= 106. calhoun, j. c., and annexation of texas, =1.= 84, 86, 433; opposition to war, 123, 182, 183, 185-7, 189, 443, 472; desire to supplant, 123,=2.= 257; on unrest, =1.= 124; and defensive-line policy, 348, =2.= 183; and advance to the rio grande, =1.= 457, 458; and oregon question, 458; and lieutenant generalcy for benton, =2.= 75; and peace, 125; and polk's cabinet, 269; encourages enemy, 281; followers and polk, 281, 496; character and leadership, 282, 291; and wilmot proviso, 287; on treaty of peace, 472; and war annexations, 499. california, jones at monterey, =1.= 69, 423; abuse and expulsion of americans, 71, 73, 423; misgovernment and expulsion of mexican officials, virtual abdication, 87, 319-22, 522, 523; european interference feared, american precautions against it, 90, 95, 325-6, 530; offer to purchase, 95, 436; attitude of american government, 127, 324-5; conditions under mexican rule, 315; population, 315; character and life of californians, 315-7; map of coast, (1846), 316; map of northern, 317; foreign element, commerce, 317-9, 521; question of future, american interest, 322-4, 444, 523; great britain and, 323-5, 334, 336, 524, 527, 531, =2.= 302, 308, 505; france and, =1.= 324, 327, 523; expected peaceful acquisition, 325; and cause of mexican war, 326, 526; attitude of californians toward foreign control, 327-9, 526; factional war (1846), 329, 527; frémont and castro, 331, 528; gillespie and frémont's return, bear flag war, 331-3, 528-9, 531; its results, 333; sloat's hesitation, 333-4, 530, 531; possession taken at monterey, 334-5, 531; defensive union of factions, 335; stockton-frémont union and address, 336, 532; first southern campaign, 336-7, 532; stockton's rule, 337-8; rising in south against gillespie's rule, 338-9, 533-4; second southern campaign, 339-46, 534-6; kearny, battle of san pascual, 341, 534; american force, 342, 535, =2.= 219, 432; advance and recapture of los angeles, =1.= 342-4; frémont's conduct, his capitulation with insurgents, 345-6, 535-6, =2.= 218; results, =1.= 346, 536; in peace negotiations and treaty, =2.= 135, 136, 238, 240, 248, 468, 469; under american rule, 217-20, 285, 454; justice of acquisition, 322, 514; friction between kearny and frémont, 454. callender, f. d., at contreras, =2.= 104, 105. camargo, occupation, as camp, =1.= 210, 484; camp broken up, 356; troops left at, 493; force at (oct.), 506. cameron, j. a., american consul at vera cruz, reports cited _passim_. campbell, j. a., opposes war, =1.= 189. campbell, r. b., american consul at havana, and santa anna, =1.= 221; on strength of ulúa, 536; and spy for scott, =2.= 332. campbell, w. b., in battle of monterey, =1.= 249, 252; on mistakes at monterey, 502, 505; on taylor, 549, =2.= 316; at cerro gordo, 56, 57, 353; on attitude on reinlistment, 63; on pillow, 377, 435. campomanes (campos), ----, intermediary between scott and clergy, =2.= 357. campos. _see_ campomanes. camps, taylor's, at corpus christi, =1.= 143; texan, of taylor's reinforcements, 205-7, 480; camargo, sickness, 211, 484, 493; cerralvo, 212, 229, 493; scott's, before vera cruz, =2.= 27; vergara, 222. campusano, antonio, at guaymas, =2.= 206, 209, 447. canales, antonio, force at matamoros, =1.= 158; character, 158; at palo alto, 165, 166; at resaca de la palma, 171, 174; and fort brown, 176; leaves taylor's advance unopposed, 226, 236, 495; guerilla warfare, 479, =2.= 169-70. canalizo, valentín, command below perote, and preparations, =2.= 40, 41, 47, 61, 347; at cerro gordo, 45, 352; in the battle, 52, 55; and santa anna at orizaba, 68; and army at capital, 88; in plan of its defence, 90; fails, 95; combination against santa anna, 134. canitz, baron von, prussian minister of foreign relations, and the war, =2.= 298, 403. canning, george, on national responsibility, =1.= 76. cano, juan, at la hoya, =2.= 42; at cerro gordo, 44. cárdenas, j., protest to taylor, =1.= 454. _carmelita_, captured, =2.= 191. carmen island, occupied, =2.= 204. carnero pass, taylor and, =1.= 549. carpender, e. w., and loss of _truxtun_, =2.= 445. carrasco, j. m., at monterey, =1.= 252. carson, kit, and battle of san pascual, =1.= 535. casa mata, defences, =2.= 140; force, 142; capture, 145, 146, 403; blown up, 404. casey, silas, at chapultepec, =2.= 153, 156, 410; wounded, 157. cass, lewis, and gaines's texan expedition, =1.= 66; and war bill, 183; and oregon, 200; on defensive-line policy, 348; and absorption of mexico, =2.= 243; and barnburners, 281; character and leadership, 282; on annexation of texas, 509. castillo, pedro fernández del, as claims commissioner, =1.= 80, 429-31. castillo y lanzas, j. m. de, minister at washington, =1.= 77; minister of relations, and slidell, 100, 120, 438, 439; on approach of war, 104. castro, josé, leader in california, =1.= 319; comandante general, 319; and foreign occupation, 328, 329, 526; civil war with pico, 329; and frémont, 331, 528; and american occupation, 335-7, 530, 532; leaves, 337, 533; and bear flag war, 529; returns, =2.= 219. caswell, w. r., on pillow, =1.= 361. causes of the war, in general, =1.= 58-99, 102-16, 134-7, 148-50, 153-5, 158, 179, 185, 432-3, 439, 442, 448, 457-61, 470-3; special, 189-90, 471-3; advance to rio grande not cause, 154-5. _see also_ outbreak; preparation. cavalry, mexican, =1.= 11, 19; in scott's advance on mexico, =2.= 77; call for american volunteer, 365. _see also_ dragoons. ceballos, ramón de, on treatment by americans, =2.= 324. cedral, force at, =1.= 553. centralists, oligarchy as, =1.= 37; party resentment, 38-9; santa anna supports, 46-7, 415; rule, 47-8; and farías (1846), =2.= 9. _see also_ federalism; oligarchy. cerralvo, as camp, =1.= 212, 229, 493; occupied, 229, 562; force at, =2.= 417. cerro gordo, as defensive point, =2.= 40, 41; map of contour lines near, 40; selected as point to resist scott's advance, 42; field, defences, 42-5, 347, 348; general map of battle, 43; size and condition of mexican force, 44-5, 347; twiggs's force and artillery, 45; twiggs's character, 48; his blunder into, and retreat, 48; question of precipitous assault, 48-9; scott on field, 49; reconnaissance, 50, 349; scott's force, 50; advance flanking mexican left, 50-1, 53, 55, 350-2, 354; map of central part of battle, 51; capture of la atalaya, 51; attacks on and capture of telégrafo, 52-5, 350, 352, 354; flight of flanked mexicans, 54, 58-9; pillow's mismanaged attack, 56-8, 352-3; pursuit to jalapa, 58, 59, 354; spoils, losses, 58, 353; character of scott's report, 59, 354; effect on mexicans, 80. chachapa conference, =2.= 70, 360. chalco, worth at, =2.= 94. chamberlain, s. e., on retreat to buena vista, =1.= 554. chapultepec, and battle of molino del rey, =2.= 143, 145, 402, 403; and approach of mexico city, 149; decision to attack, 149, 408; position and defences, 149-52, 405-6, 408; maps, 150, 151; american dispositions and bombardment, 152-3, 409; plan for assault, 153; misgivings, 153-4; attack on grove and outworks, 154, 155; problem of santa anna's support, 154-5, 410; charge to the fosse, delay, 155-6, 409; attack on gateway, 156, 158, 411; capture of fort, 157, 410, 411; view from, 158; losses, 158, 411; worth's advance, 160, 410; and armistice, 394; mexican force, 408; wisdom of attack, 408; threat to american rear during attack, 410. character, mexican, =1.= 3-7, 15, 18-28, 53, 57, 115, 229, 266, 285, 293, 295, 315-7, 320, 333, 339, 346, 396, 407-9, 416-8, 438, 455, =2.= 1-2, 31, 32, 45, 63, 79-87, 91-2, 132, 136, 170, 228, 230-1, 233-5, 251, 254, 297, 306, 310-2, 323, 327, 329, 346, 367, 449, 450, 461, 509. _see also_ population; social condition. charleston _courier_, on war spirit, =1.= 132; and the war, 473. charleston _mercury_, on polk's alarm, =1.= 476. charleston _patriot_, and the war, =1.= 473. chase, franklin, consul at tampico, and occupation of city, =1.= 279, 511. chase, mrs. franklin, and occupation of tampico, =1.= 279, 511. cheatham, b. f., on mistakes at monterey, =1.= 502. chew, samuel, claim, =1.= 426. chihuahua, situation, =1.= 3; plans for expedition against, 266; gathering of wool's force, 267-70; his advance to monclova, 270-3, 509; his difficulties, 273-4, 509-10; advance to parras, 274-5, 510; diversion of wool's march, 275; results of march, 276, 510; and caravan trade, 286; doniphan's force against, 298-9, 519; his march to el paso, brazito affair, 299-303, 518; his advance to sacramento river, 303-4, 519; political affairs and preparations against doniphan, mexican force, 304-6, 519; battle of sacramento, 306-13, 520; occupied, 313, 520; doniphan's negotiations, 313; his march to saltillo, 313, 521; occupied by price, =2.= 166, 419; under american rule, 454. chihuahua rangers, in doniphan's expedition, =1.= 303, 519. childs, thomas, at palo alto, =1.= 164; at monterey, 241, 246; at jalapa, =2.= 361; command at puebla, besieged, =2.= 174-8, 424; as governor, 226. chimalpa, pillow at, =2.= 95. china, mexico, proposed attack on texans at, =1.= 235. chiquihuite, as defensive point, =2.= 41. chronology of the war, =1.= xix-xxi. churchill, sylvester, in wool's march, =1.= 270, 273. churchill, w. h., at palo alto, =1.= 164, 167, 466. churubusco, defences, =2.= 98, 110-1, 382; map of battle, 111; maps of bridgehead, 112, 113; capture of san antonio, 112; pursuit of mexicans to bridgehead, 113; coyoacán as american point of concentration, 112, 382, 383; attack and capture of convent, 113-4, 117, 382, 383, 385; map of convent, 114; attack and capture of bridgehead, 114-6, 383; shields-pierce flank attack, 115-7, 384; pursuit of mexicans, 117; kearny's charge, 118; losses, spoils, 118; american elation, 118-9; scott's army after the battle, 120; why not followed up, 120-1, 386, 393; scott's probable plan, 383; as blunder, 383; effect on morale, 384; mexican force, 385; pillow's troops in, 385; fate of captured american deserters, 385. citadel at mexico city, =2.= 159, 160, 413, 415. cities of mexico, =1.= 2. civil service, mexican, character, =1.= 11, 20. claiborne, j. f. h., on war spirit, =1.= 444. claims against mexico, european, =1.= 74, 425; american, and conduct of americans, 74; character and justice, 74-6, 424-7; american patience and forbearance, 76, 427; jackson's message (1837), 77-8, 428; demand (1837), 78-9, 429; arbitration, delays, 79-80, 429-31; award (1841), convention on payments, cessation of payments, excuse, 80, 431; question in efforts for resumption of intercourse, 92-5, 97, 435; mexican attitude, 103; and cause of war, 120, 132, 134, 190, 448, =2.= 279; polk's review, 49; assumption in treaty of peace, 241, 468, 469; necessity of enforcement, 311. _clamor de las ovejas_, =2.= 346. clark, m. l., in kearny's expedition, =1.= 288; to hold santa fe, 298; joins doniphan, 299, 303, 519; in battle of sacramento, 310, 312. clarke, n. s., command at matamoros, =1.= 493; brigade in scott's army, =2.= 77; at churubusco, 112, 113; at molino del rey, 144, 145, 402, 403; at chapultepec, 157, 409; at san cosme garita, 161, 162; occupies cuernavaca, 433. classes, mexican. _see_ population. clausewitz, karl von, on simplicity of war, =1.= 508. clay, c. m., captured, =1.= 370-1. _see also_ encarnación prisoners. clay, henry [1], on cause of war, =1.= 189; speech and resolution on war, =2.= 289; war programme, 290; results of policy, 314. clay, henry [2], killed, =1.= 394. clayton, j. m., and war bill, =1.= 182; defence of taylor, 260; and tariff of 1846, =2.= 257, 496; position in senate, 496. clergy. _see_ roman catholic church. clifford, nathan, and scott's expedition, =1.= 540; and tariff for mexican ports, =2.= 261; ratification commissioner, 249, 251, 474; minister at mexico, 475. climate of mexico, =1.= 1. coahuila state, overrun,=2.= 418. coalition of mexican states, and secession, =2.= 87, 234; opposes peace, 131; and opposition to santa anna, 134, 136; and collapse of government, 428. cochelet, ----, french agent in mexico, reports cited _passim_. collins, john, messenger to wool, =1.= 313. colombia. _see_ new granada. colonies, mercantile system, =1.= 29. colquitt, w. t., position in senate, =2.= 496. colton, walter, as alcalde, =1.= 338. _columbus_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 447. comanche indians, raids, =1.= 479, 521. comandú, and american occupation, =2.= 448. commander in the field, selection (1846), =1.= 196-8, 200, 477; for vera cruz expedition, 351-4, 538-9; proposed lieutenant generalcy, =2.= 75; scott removed, 188, 437. commerce, american, influence on demand for war, =1.= 122, 443. _see also_ santa fe trail; tariff. commerce, mexican, mercantile class, =1.= 5, 17; roads, inland transportation, 16, 18; protective tariff and prohibition, 17; smuggling, 17; american negotiations, 61, 419; over santa fe trail, 72; general restriction on american, 73, 424; of california, 317, 521; foreign, in occupied mexican ports, =2.= 262, 303, 484, 505, 506. commissaries, mexican, =1.= 157. concepción, fort, at vera cruz, =2.= 19. congress, american, and advance to the rio grande, =1.= 151, 456-9, =2.= 277; war message and war bill, =1.= 181-3, 470-3; war preparations, 190; and oregon, 201; the ten regiment bill, =2.= 74-6; and lieutenant generalcy, 75, 363, 365; and two and three million funds, 123, 387; and military government, 220; and absorption of mexico, 243-4; tariff of 1846, warehouse system, sub-treasury, 257, 478-9; treasury notes and loans, 258, 260, 264, 479, 485; proposed impost on tea and coffee, 261, 285, 482; proposed gradation of public lands, 261; initial popularity of war, 268; reaction, 269, 281; democratic dissensions, lack of leaders, 281-3, 496; position of whigs, leaders, 283, 496; character of war-time speeches, 284; attacks on war policy, 284-6; wilmot proviso, 286-7, 498; whig no-territory plan, 287-8, 498; clay's speech and resolutions, 289; demand for stoppage of supplies and recall of troops, 290-1, 500; whig control of house, programme, 290; influence of success of war, 290; continued baiting of polk, 291, 500; war-time character, 313-4; act (1847) for volunteers, 431; and yucatan, 472; other war-time financial legislation, 489. _see also_ senate. congress, mexican, first under itúrbide, =1.= 35-6; first republican, 36-7; first constitutional (1825), 37; and reëlevation of pedraza, 45; and farías' reforms, 46; of santa anna's supporters (1835), 47; seven laws (1835), 47; and santa anna, 52-3; character (1846), =2.= 5; war-time presidential elections, 5, 84, 236; war measure against church property, 9-12, 14, 329; new constitution (1847), 82; in abeyance, 85; and trist mission, 130, 132; supports peace party, 236; ratifies treaty, 250-1, 474; and british mediation, 368. _congress_, in pacific squadron, =1.= 336, 337, 532, =2.= 189, 206, 447; at guaymas, 206, 447. connelly, henry, and kearny, =1.= 516. conner, david, and resumption of intercourse (1845), =1.= 94, 436; peaceful instructions to (1845), 131; and policy of bold military attitude, 152; and return of santa anna, 202, 478, 486, 487; attitude toward attack on tampico, 277; occupies it, 279-81, 511-2; and the plan to attack vera cruz, 349-51, 536; and attack on taylor, 466, =2.= 197; and crossing of rio grande, =1.= 469; and vera cruz expedition, =2.= 18, 23, 332, 335, 336, 338; superseded by perry, 30, 201; squadron, distribution, 189, 197, 442; and blockade, 193; difficulties of shore operations, 196; character as officer, 196, 444; attacks on alvarado, 197-9, 442; tabasco river expedition, 199-200; yucatan operations, 201; and plans to attack ulúa, 201, 444. conner, p. e., at buena vista, =1.= 389, 556. conquered territory, policy of occupying territory, =1.= 262, 266-7, 508, =2.= 273, 492; civil government in new mexico and california, =1.= 337-8, =2.= 217, 218, 285, 453; character of naval control, 208; policy toward noncombatants, conciliation, 210-1, 449; outrages by volunteers at matamoros, 211, 450; and at monterey, 212-3, 450; liquor and troubles, 212, 213, 224, 457; regulations at monterey, later security, 213, 450-1; difficulty of convicting mexican offenders, 213, 451; rule in saltillo, 213, 452; police regulations, 213, 215, 229, 450, 452; conditions in tampico, 214, 452; prosperity, 214-5, 219; effect of occupation on mexican desire for annexation, 215; excesses in new mexico, 216, 453; price's rule there, insurrection, 217; successful rule in california, 217-20, 454; use of local civil officers, 218, 229, 461; scott's orders for military government, 220, 455-7; rule at vera cruz, 220-2, 457; at córdoba and orizaba, 222; affairs at jalapa, 223-5, 458; excesses elsewhere, 224, 225; mexican offences and exaggerations, 224; rule at puebla, 225, 459; clemency toward mexico city, 226, 459; military discipline there, 226, 459-60; life at capital during occupation, 226-8, 460; mexican courts, 229; social relations, 230-1, 461-2; general conclusions on conduct of occupation, 231-2; tariff, 261-3, 484; levies on mexicans, 264-6, 485-8; american opposition to occupation, 273, 492; title by conquest, 285, 468, 497; justice of conquest, 322, 514; conditions at chihuahua, 454. conspectus of events, =1.= xix-xxi. constitutions, spanish liberal (1820), =1.= 32; first mexican (1824), 36-7, 412-3; seven laws, 47; bases of tacubaya, 51; organic bases, 52; revival of organic bases, 217; renewal of constitution of 1824, 222, 488; of 1847, =2.= 82. consuls in mexico, cut off, =1.= 212, 484. contreras, battle of, field, =2.= 101; valencia's occupation of it, 102, 104; american reconnaissance and advance, 103, 380; pillow's attack and riley's flank movement, 104, 376, 378, 380; support of riley, 105, 107, 378-80; santa anna's movements, 105, 110, 379, 380; valencia disobeys order to retire, 106; map, 107; american troops during night, 107; american flank and rear attack, 108-10, 379, 380; flight of mexicans, 109; losses, spoils, 110; credit for victory, 376. convent at churubusco, =2.= 111, 382; attack and capture, 113-4, 117, 382, 383, 385; map, 114. convoy. _see_ transportation. cooke, p. st. g., in kearny's expedition, =1.= 290, 293; in california, =2.= 218, 455. córdoba, bankhead's expedition, aspect of route to, =2.= 184-5, 433; under american rule, 222, 229; lane at, 427. corcoran, w. j., company raised by, =2.= 431. corpus christi, taylor's force at, =1.= 142, 452. corral falso, as defensive point, =2.= 39, 41, 42. corruption, mexican, in army, =1.= 9; in civil service, 12; extent and effect, 13, 57, 416-7; question in peace negotiations, =2.= 123, 132, 390-1; and war-time trade, 263; and mexican attitude on the war, 312. corwin, thomas, on scott, =1.= 197; opposition to war, =2.= 126; and treaty of peace, 247; effect of "hospitable graves" speech, 278, 494; demands recall of troops, 290. cos, m. p. de, at tuxpán, =2.= 202, 445. _cossack_, claim, =1.= 426. cost of the war to united states, =2.= 266-7, 488. council grove, trade rendezvous, =1.= 288. courtesy, mexican, =1.= 26. couto, j. b., peace commissioner, =2.= 135, 239; and peña, 180; on trist, 323. cox, i. j., acknowledgment to, =1.= 450. cox, nathaniel, claim, =1.= 426. coyoacán, force at, =2.= 101; and battle of churubusco, 112, 382-3. crampton, j. f. t., british chargé at washington, and levy on mexicans, =2.= 486; on slavery and cessation of war, 500; on whig war policy, 500. crawford, j. t., british consul at tampico, reports cited _passim_. credit, lack of mexican public, =2.= 7, 253; american foreign, 256. _see also_ finances. _creole_, burned, =2=. 444. creoles, characteristics, =1.= 3, 407; and spanish-born, 29; and independence, 30-1. _crepúsculo_, on santa anna as dictator, =1.= 47; on santa anna and zacatecas, 550. crime and criminal law, mexican, =1.= 13, 21. crittenden, j. j., and war bill, =1.= 183, 187, 473, =2.= 277; defence of taylor, =1.= 260; and taylor's candidacy, 368; and tariff of 1846, =2.= 257, 496; and plan to stop war, 290; position in senate, 496; on american attitude toward mexico, 508. cross, trueman, killed, =1.= 160, 463; on taylor and transportation, 490. cuba, mexico and, =1.= 417; and mexican privateering, =2.= 192, 193. cuernavaca, and santa anna's dictatorship, =1.= 46; occupied, =2.= 184, 433. cuevas, l. g., on chances of expected war, =1.= 111; and annexation of texas, 434; on resumption of intercourse, 435; and peña, =2.= 180; peace commissioner, 239, 466; on trist, 323. _cumberland_, in home squadron, =2.= 197, 442; damaged, 449. cumplido, i., presidential candidacy, =2.= 236. curtis, s. r., and forays on taylor's rear, =1.= 562. cushing, caleb, sent to scott, =2.= 184, 418; brigade in taylor's force, 417; leaves mexico, 438. customs, mexican internal, =1.= 16, =2.= 253. _see also_ tariff. cuylti, gavino, and doniphan's advance, =1.= 301. _cyane_, at monterey, =1.= 423; in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 205, 206, 446, 447; at la paz and san josé, 449. cyprey, baron alleye de, french minister at mexico, on british recognition of texas, =1.= 432. dakin, j. h., recruiting advertisement, =1.= 445. _dale_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 206, 447; at guaymas, 447. dallas, g. m., and buchanan faction, =2.= 282; on polk, 510. dana, r. h., and public interest in california, =1.= 323. davidson, g. r., captured, =1.= 370-1. _see also_ encarnación prisoners. davis, c. w., and outrages, =1.= 425. davis, g. t. m., on errors at churubusco, =2=. 383; on belén operations, 412. davis, jefferson, at monterey, =1.= 249, 252, 500; in negotiations, 502, 504, 505; at buena vista, 555; and peace negotiations, =2.= 464; on glory of the war, 324. davis, john, and two million bill, =2.= 123. deas, edward, battery in taylor's later force, =2.= 418. deaths, in american army, =2.= 318, 511, 512. _decatur_, in attack on tuxpán, =2.= 444; in home squadron, 446. declaration of war. _see_ outbreak. defensive-line policy, taylor's plan, =1.= 282-3, 461, 513, 514; popularity, 347; persistence, =2.= 183, 430. deffaudis, baron. french minister at mexico, reports cited _passim_. delano, columbus, and war bill, =1.= 472; inconsistent war criticism, =2.= 277. delaware indians, in kearny's expedition, =1.= 288. delaware troops, =2.= 431. democracy, radical party in mexico (1846), =2.= 2-4. _see also_ federalism; puros. democratic party, and war, =1.= 184, 471; early reaction, =2.= 269, 281; and polk, dissensions, 269-73, 281, 283; leaders in congress, 282, 496; dissensions and wilmot proviso, 286; dissensions protract war, 288. _see also_ congress; polk. _democratic review_, and absorption of mexico, =2.= 243. de russey, l. g., wrecked, march to tampico, =1.= 547; attempt to rescue prisoners of war, =2.= 418. descriptions. _see_ physical aspect. desertion, in taylor army at rio grande, =1.= 160, 463; tendency after monterey, 262; amount, =2.= 318, 319; fate of deserters captured at churubusco, 385; deserters and peace, 474. _see also_ irish; propaganda. diablo, el, earthwork at monterey, =1.= 249; attack on, 253-4, 500; evacuated, 255. _diario_, desires war, =1.= 105, 115; on help from abroad, 112; on the army, 408; on united states and texas, 423; on start of final campaign, =2.= 92; on scott's predicament, 103; on peace negotiations, 123, 130. diaz de la vega, r. _see_ la vega. dickens, charles, jibes at americans, =2.= 294. dickinson, d. s., and expansion, =1.= 188; and absorption of mexico, =2.= 243; position in senate, 496. dictatorship, under first mexican constitution, =1.= 37; victoria's, 39; guerrero's, 42; santa anna's, 46, 51-3, 415; his virtual, during the war, =2.= 81, 85; invitation to scott, 323. dimond, f. m., american consul at vera cruz, and restoration of intercourse, =1.= 89; report on santa anna's attitude, 201; and war programme, 350; on mexico and american-british relations, 442; and spy for scott, =2.= 332. diplomatic intercourse, american-mexican, mexican characteristics, =1.= 58, 416; treatment of poinsett, 58-9, 417; louisiana purchase boundary, 59-61, 418; treaty of amity and commerce, 61, 419; recall of poinsett demanded, 62; butler as minister, 62, 419, 420; ellis as chargé, 63; sabine river boundary and gaines's expedition, 63-6, 420-2; departure of gorostiza, 66, 77; and recognition of texas, 66, 422, 423; bocanegra's threat, 68; gorostiza's pamphlet, disavowal, 77-9; rupture (1845), 87; efforts to restore, 88-91, 133, 434, 447; preparation to reopen, 91; british efforts for renewal, 91, 435; mexico agrees to resume, claims question in agreement, 92-4, 97, 435-6; need of haste, 94; instructions to slidell, 95, 127, 436; rejection of slidell, 96-8, 100-1, 120, 127, 133, 135, 145, 437-9, 447, 453; policy of bold military attitude to encourage resumption, 152; negotiations with santa anna (1846), 201-3, 471; difficulties of contrasted national characteristics, =2.= 310, 508. _see also_ claims; foreign relations; peace. direct tax. american attitude toward, =2.= 258, 480. discipline. _see_ conquered territory; morale. disraeli, benjamin, on mexico, =2.= 296; and the war, 299; and interposition, 302. district of columbia troops, call and response (1847), =2.= 364, 431; in taylor's later force, 417; at jalapa, 433. _see also_ washington and baltimore battalion. dodd, w. e., on calhoun's rivals and war, =1.= 444. domínguez, manuel, as scott's spy, =2.= 362. _don simplicio_, on santa anna's efforts at san luis potosí, =1.= 376, 377, 379; on revolt of 1846, =2.= 1; on political situation (1847), 16. donaldson, j. l., at saltillo, =1.= 559. donelson, a. j., on texas and european aid, =1.= 82; peaceful instructions to (1845), 131; on mexico and slavery, 188; and war, 445. doniphan, a. w., regiment in kearny's expedition, =1.= 288; reduces indians, 298; force for chihuahua march, 98, 303, 519; character and appearance, 299; character of force, 299, 303; caravan with, 298, 303, 519, 520; crossing of jornada del muerto, 299, 518; clark's reinforcement, 299, 303; preparations against at el paso, 300-1, 518; affair of brazito, 301-2, 518; at el paso, 302-3; advance to sacramento river, 303-4, 519; preparations against at chihuahua, 304-6, 519; map of march, 305; battle of sacramento, 306-13, 520; at chihuahua, 313, 520; negotiations, 313; march to saltillo, 313, 521, 547, 548; return to missouri, reception, results of march, 314; on and during the battle, 520; later career, 521. dorsey, g., on spanish american fear of aggression, =1.= 111. dosamantes, señorita, as volunteer, =1.= 230, 494. dosamantes, j., captured at chapultepec, =2.= 411. douglas, s. a., on cause of war, =1.= 189; on policy of occupying territory, =2.= 492; position in house, 496. doyle, p. w., british chargé at mexico, on british recognition of texas, =1.= 432; on conduct of american soldiers, =2.= 226, 231, 460; and renewal of peace negotiations, 238-40, 465; and armistice, 242, 470; on relaxed discipline after scott's departure, 438. dragoons, force (1845), =1.= 139, 450; at churubusco, =2.= 110, 119, 385; during armistice, 134; at molino del rey, 144, 146, 403; at chapultepec, 161, 408, 410; in mexico city, 164; with scott, 356; garrison at jalapa and perote, 361; in california, 475. _see also_ regiments by number. dress, mexican, =1.= 18-9, 24; californian, 316. drink. _see_ liquor. dromgoole, g. c., position in house, =2.= 496. drum, s. h., company at molino del rey, =2.= 143, 145, 403; at chapultepec, 152, 156; at belén garita, 159, 160; killed, 160; light artillery, 366. ducoing, theodore, claim, =1.= 427. duflot de mofras, eugène, on cause of war, =1.= 189; and california, 324, 523. duncan, james, battery in texas, =1.= 146; at palo alto, 168, 169, 465; at monterey, 241, 243, 248, 258, 492, 496; advance to saltillo, 264; field battery, 450; at resaca de la palma, 467; in advance of perote, =2.= 61; amozoc affair, 70; in scott's army, 77; at churubusco, 115, 117; at molino del rey, 143-6; at chapultepec, 161; and uprising in the city, 167; and cabal against scott, 178, 435; scott's charges against, 188, 436; polk rescues, 188; reconnaissance of mexicaltzingo route, 372, 373; and quitman's advance to belén garita, 414. du petit thouars, a. a., and california, =1.= 523. du pont, s. f., cruise off western coast of mexico, =2.= 205; at la paz and san josé, 449. durán, josé, and surrender of ulúa, =2.= 340, 342. durango state, and santa anna, =1.= 376; and secession coalition, =2.= 86. echagaray, domingo, at san juan bautista, =2.= 446. echeagaray, lt. col., at molino del rey, =2.= 145; at san cosme garita, 413. echols, r. m., regiment in taylor's force, =2.= 417. eckford, henry, claim, =1.= 426. edson, alvin, at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 335. education, under spanish rule, =1.= 13; common, after independence, 14, 409; higher, 14. eighth cavalry, mexican, at monterey, =1.= 494. eighth infantry, in texas, =1.= 143; at palo alto, 164, 168, 466; at resaca de la palma, 174; at monterey, 246, 492, 496, 501; advance to saltillo, 264; in scott's army, =2.= 77; at churubusco, 112, 115, 116, 384; at chapultepec, 157; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at molino del rey, 402. eighth line infantry, mexican, at monterey, =1.= 494. el carmen island. _see_ carmen. el paso, aspect and people, =1.= 300, 302; force against doniphan brazito affair, 300-2, 518; doniphan occupies, 302-3. el telégrafo. _see_ telégrafo. elections. _see_ president. eleventh infantry, in scott's army, =2.= 77, 363, 422, 432; at chapultepec, 154, 410; at churubusco, 385; at molino del rey, 402. eleventh line infantry, mexican, at cerro gordo, =2.= 52, 347; at san cosme garita, 162; and vera cruz, 334. elkins, samuel, claim, =1.= 426. elliot, charles, british minister in texas, on chances of expected war, =1.= 105, 107; on texas as theatre of war, 107; on policy of expansion, 123. ellis, powhatan, american representative at mexico, =1.= 63; and claims, 76-7; and california, 324; on tornel, 484. ellis, t. h., american chargé at mexico, reports cited _passim_. empire of itúrbide, =1.= 35. encarnación, santa anna's army at, =1.= 381; map of district, 382. _see also_ next title. encarnación prisoners, capture, =1.= 370-1; sent south, 562; at huejutla, attempt to release, =2.= 418. engineers, military, mexican, =1.= 156, 461, =2.= 312; american corps, =1.= 451; in the war, =2.= 320, 513; under scott, 349, 356, 366. england. _see_ great britain. _erie_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 447. escudero, j. a. de, and farías, =2.= 5, 9. _espectador_, on the war, =1.= 442. _esperanza_, on americans, =1.= 484. esteva, j. w., on mexican character, =1.= 410. estrada, gutiérrez de. _see_ gutiérrez de estrada. europe, expected to aid mexico, =1.= 112-5, 442. _see also_ foreign relations; interposition; nations by name, especially france; great britain; spain. eutaw indians, subdued, =1.= 298. evacuation of mexican territory, =2.= 251-2, 475-6. evans, george, and war bill, =1=. 183. eventualists, and secession and peace, =2.= 234, 239, 465. _see also_ puros. execution of american citizens, =1.= 70. expansion, spirit and attitude toward mexico, =1.= 123, 444; london _times_ on, =2.= 294; justice, 322-3. _see also_ annexations. expulsion of american citizens, =1.= 71, 73, 423, 424. fairfield, john, on scott, =1.= 197; on speeches in congress, =2.= 284. _falcon_, at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338; in home squadron, 445, 446. _falmouth_, scurvy, =2.= 195; in home squadron, 197, 442. farías, valentín gómez, vice president, character, =1.= 45; as acting president, attempted reforms, 45; flees, 47; as federalist leader, 48; and the war, 201; combination with santa anna, 216; imprisoned, 216; and revolt for santa anna (1846), 217, 221-3; and salas and santa anna, =2.= 1, 327; as leader of radicals (puros), 2; shelved, 4; election as vice president and actual executive (1846), 5; war policy, 6; financial problem and church property, 6, 9-14; and beach, 12; superseded by santa anna, 14; office abolished, unpopularity, 15, 332; hostility to santa anna, 82; and olaguíbel, 86; opposes peace negotiations (1847), 136. farragut, d. g., and ulúa, =2.= 201. _federal union_, and war, =1.= 473. federalism and federalists, in first mexican constitution, =1.= 36-7; oligarchical plots and revolt against, 37-8; party resentment, 38-9; overthrow, 47; pre-war factions, 48; bustamante's attempt to restore, 51; and herrera's rule, 55-6; party and poinsett, 59; restoration (1846), 217, 222, 488; war-time factions, =2.= 2-5; in election of 1846, 5; split on demands on church property, 11; and santa anna as executive, 15; states defy santa anna, plan for new republic, 86-7, 234, 369; state discussion on peace, 236, 464; antagonistic state groups, 510. _see also_ constitutions; government; moderados; puros. federation ridge at monterey, =1.= 239, 497; capture, 244, 498. fernández del castillo, pedro. _see_ castillo. ferry, gabriel, on battle of monterey, =1.= 503; and interposition, =2.= 304; on american army, 321. fifteenth infantry, in scott's army, =2.= 78, 363, 422, 432; at contreras, 105; at chapultepec, 154, 155, 157; garrisons it, 159; at churubusco, 384; advance after armistice, 400. fifth cavalry, mexican, at cerro gordo, =2.= 347. fifth infantry, in texas, =1.= 143; at palo alto, 164, 167; at resaca de la palma, 174; at monterey, 245, 247, 259, 492, 496; advance to saltillo, 264; in scott's army, =2.= 77, 422; at churubusco, 112, 115, 116, 384; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at molino del rey, 402, 403. fifth line infantry, mexican, at cerro gordo, =2.= 347. filisola, vicente, and doniphan's expedition, =1.= 521; and plans against taylor, =2.= 165, 419; and later command, 182, 430. finances, american, naval appropriations, =1.= 190, =2.= 189; unfavorable pre-war conditions, 255, 306; problem of war loans, lack of credit abroad, 256, 478; need of more income, 258, 260, 481; tariff of 1846, warehouse system, and sub-treasury, 257, 478-9; treasury notes, 258, 479, 480; first loan, 259, 479, 481; second loan, 260, 481; proposed impost on tea and coffee, 261, 285, 482; and gradation of public lands, 261; tariff for mexican ports, 261-3, 303, 484, 500, 505; effect of prosperity due to european conditions, 263, 484; third loan, 264, 485; levies on mexicans, 264-6, 485-8; funds and expenditures in mexico, 266, 488; cost of the war, 266-7, 488; political effects of polk's policy, 273, 281; money market during the war, 489; other war-time acts, 489. finances, mexican, itúrbide's troubles, =1.= 34-5; and expulsion of gachupines, 39; early republican difficulties, 39; crisis (1837), 48; under santa anna's dictatorship, 52; herrera's predicament, 55; war preparations, 213-4, 223, 488; santa anna's preparations at san luis potosí, 377; forced loans, 410, 431, =2.= 254, 477; general war-time character, 6, 327; problems, 7; demands on church, law of jan. 11, opposition, 8-11, 329; beach's intrigue and clerical revolt, 11-4, 330-2; santa anna and church property, 15, 329; effect of war on normal income, 253; taxation projects, 253; state donations, 254; clerical donations, 254, 477; loans, 254, 477; seizures and requisitions, 255; state of treasury (1846), 328. first artillery, at cerro gordo, =2.= 52, 54, 352; in scott's army, 77; at churubusco, 114, 382; at siege of vera cruz, 343; garrison at jalapa, 361; at belén garita, 413; in taylor's later force, 417. first cavalry, mexican, at monterey, =1.= 494. first dragoons, in kearny's expedition, =1.= 286, 288, 515; leave for california, 297; in wool's march, 509; at buena vista, 554, 555; in scott's army, =2.= 77; at churubusco, 119; in california, 219; at siege of vera cruz, 343; in taylor's later force, 417. first infantry, at burrita, =1.= 177; at monterey, 250, 252, 492, 496; in smith's brigade, 541; garrisons vera cruz, =2.= 37; at siege of vera cruz, 343. first ligero, at cerro gordo, =2.= 347. first line infantry, mexican, at monterey, =1.= 494. fischer, waldemar, company in kearny's expedition, =1.= 288, 515. flagg, a. c., and polk's cabinet, =2.= 269, 271. _flirt_, in home squadron, =2.= 197, 442. flores, j. m., rising in california, =1.= 339, 533; as provisional governor, 340; and battle of san pascual, 342; and american advance on los angeles, 343-4, 535; retires to sonora, 345; and larkin, 536. florida troops, calls, =1.= 537, =2.= 364; in taylor's later force, 417; at puebla, 433. food and drink, mexican, =1.= 2, 20-1. forbes, alexander, british consul at tepic, effect of his book on california, =1.= 323. forbes, j. a., british vice consul in california, on california and independence, =1.= 321; on expected american annexation, 325; and british control, 328, 329, 332. forced loans in mexico, =1.= 410, =2.= 254, 477; to pay claims, =1.= 431. ford, lemuel, at siege of puebla, =2.= 424; in lane's guerilla operations, 426. foreign relations, american, european attitude toward united states, =2.= 294-6, 502; and toward mexico, 296, 502; buchanan's circular on origin and purpose of war, 297; spanish america and the war, 298; attitude of spain, 298; of prussia, 298; england and outbreak of war, 299-300; france and outbreak, 300, 503; british offer of mediation, 301, 503-4; question of british interposition, 301-4, 504-6; and british-french relations, 304, 506; france and interposition, 304; effect of victories, 305; foreign help of mexico, 306; criticism of war operations, 306-8, 507; and treaty of peace, 308-9; influence of war on, 323. _see also_ diplomatic intercourse; preparation; nations by name, especially france; great britain; spain. foreigners. _see_ aliens. forsyth, john, and gaines's expedition, =1.= 64, 66, 422; and claims commission, 80, 429. _forward_, in attack on alvarado, =2.= 199; in tabasco expedition, 200. foster, j. g., at molino del rey, wounded, =2.= 142, 144, 403; at cerro gordo, 349; engineer with scott, 366. fourteenth infantry, in scott's army, =2.= 77, 363, 432; at chapultepec, 154; at churubusco, 385; at molino del rey, 402. fourth artillery, at buena vista, =1.= 555; at cerro gordo, =2.= 53; in scott's army, 77; at molino del rey, 143; at siege of vera cruz, 343; left at contreras, 382; in taylor's later force, 417, 418. fourth infantry, at fort jesup, =1.= 140; goes to texas, 141-2, 452; at palo alto 164, 167, 168; at monterey, 252, 256, 492, 496, 500-2, 506; in scott's army, =2.= 77, 422; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at san cosme garita, 414. fourth ligero, at monterey, =1.= 494; at cerro gordo, =2.= 347. fourth line infantry, mexican, at palo alto, =1.= 165, 168; at resaca de la palma, 171, 174, 175; at monterey, 494; at cerro gordo, =2.= 52, 53, 347. _fourth of july_, claim, =1.= 424. france, attack on mexico, =1.= 49, 74; and texas, 55, 67, 90, 432; and expected war, 112; and annexation of texas, 113, =2.= 295, 501, 502; and support of mexico, interposition, =1.= 112-5, =2.= 304; supposed manipulation of mexico, =1.= 121; and california, 324, 326, 327, 523, =2.= 505; and mexican privateering, 193; and american tariff for mexican ports, 262, 484; attitude toward united states, 295; attitude toward mexico, 296-7; and outbreak of war, 300, 503; attitude and british relations, 304, 506; and american victories, 305. franklin, w. b., reconnaissance in wool's march, =1.= 271. freaner, j. l., and recall of trist, =2.= 465; takes treaty to washington, 467. frederick william of prussia, and the war, =2.= 299. frémont, j. c., expedition canceled (1845), =1.= 131, 447; and castro, retirement, 331, 528; gillespie and return, bear flag war, 331-3, 528-9, 531; and sloat, 335, 531; joins stockton, force and appearance, 336; influences address, 336; in first southern campaign, 336, 337; command in north, 338; and second southern campaign, 342, 345, 535-6; treaty with insurgents, 345-6, =2.= 218; as governor, 217; and kearny, 454. french, s. g., on taylor as fighter, =1.= 238. french in mexico, merchants, =1.= 5. french revolution, influence in mexico, =1.= 30. frontera, blockade, =2.= 194; importance, 443. fugitive slaves, rendition in american-mexican negotiations, =1.= 419. furber, g. c., work as source, =1.= 404. furlong, c., and americans at puebla, =2.= 225. gachupines, characteristics, =1.= 3; expulsion, 39, 42, 413. _see also_ oligarchy. gahagan, dennis, claim, =1.= 427. gaines, e. p., nacogdoches expedition, =1.= 64-6, 420-2; requisition for six-months men, 196, 205, 452, 476, =2.= 272, 511; and scott, =1.= 197; taylor's letter, 347, 507; and command of vera cruz expedition, 353; relieved, court of inquiry, 476. gaines, j. p., carelessness and capture, =1.= 370-1; at saltillo, 541; of scott's staff, =2.= 366. _see also_ encarnación prisoners. gallatin, albert, on annexation of texas, =1.= 83; pessimism on peace prospects, =2.= 235; on treasury notes, 258; and the war, 314. gambling, american, =1.= 144, 207, =2.= 214; at mexico city, =2.= 460. gamboa, ramón, and santa anna, =2.= 134; on evacuation of mexico city, 415, 416. gaona, general, in preparations below perote, =2.= 40; abandons perote, 61. garay, f. de, and de russey's expedition, =2.= 418. garay, j. g. perdigón. _see_ perdigón garay. garcía, general, at matamoros, character, =1.= 158, 462. garcía conde, pedro, and battle of sacramento, =1.= 306, 309, 312, 519, 520. gardner, j. l., command at point isabel, =1.= 493. garland, john, at palo alto, =1.= 164; at monterey, 250, 251, 253, 492, 496, 499, 500; brigade in advance of perote, =2.= 61; in scott's army, 77; before san antonio, mex., 102; at churubusco, 113, 116; at molino del rey, 143, 145; at chapultepec, 161; at san cosme garita, 162; wounded in uprising, 167; and contreras, 381. garro, máximo, mexican chargé at paris, reports cited _passim_. gates, william, at tampico, =1.= 281, 282, 486, 512, 546, =2.= 484; discipline, 215; and prisoners at huejutla, 418. gateways of mexico city, =2.= 147. _see also_ belén; san cosme. georgia troops, in victoria march, =1.= 357; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 343; in alvarado expedition, 344; leave scott, 356; calls (1847), 364, 365, 430; for scott, 423; cavalry at huamantla, 426. "germanicus," on volunteers, =1.= 474. germans in mexico, merchants, =1.= 5; mining companies, 15. _germantown_, in attack on tuxpán, =2.= 444; in home squadron, 445, 446. germany. =see= prussia. gerolt, baron, prussian minister at washington, and the war, =2.= 503. gibson, george, commissary general of subsistence, =1.= 475; and graham, 500. giddings, j. r., and secession, =2.= 272; position in house, 496. giffard, f. l., british consul at matamoros, on conduct of volunteers, =2.= 211. giffard, t., british consul at vera cruz, on vera cruz expedition, =2.= 22, 32, 33, 337, 341; on american rule, 221; on scott and jalapa, 362. gillespie, a. h., mission to california, =1.= 326, 329, 526, 530; and return of frémont, 331, 332, 528; and bear flag war, 332, 529; in southern campaign, 336; rule at los angeles, 338; rising against, surrender, 339, 533-4; joins kearny, 341; in battle of san pascual, 342; in expedition to los angeles, 342. gillespie, r. a., at monterey, =1.= 245; march to mier, 483. glass, j. w., british consul at tampico, reports cited _passim_. glasson, j. j., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338. goliad massacre, american indignation, =1.= 117. gómez, gregorio, _jefferson_ and _natchez_ incidents, =1.= 424-5; in preparations below perote, =2.= 40; flight from la hoya, 58. gómez farías. _see_ farías. gómez pedraza. _see_ pedraza. gonzález, ----, and armijo, =1.= 293. gore, j. h., at san cosme garita, =2.= 414. gorman, w. a., at buena vista, =1.= 386, 556; at huamantla, =2.= 426. gorostiza, m. e. de, as minister at washington, =1.= 64; and gaines's expedition, 65-6, 420-2; pamphlet, mexican disavowal, 77-9; and texas, 432; and santa anna, =2.= 92. government, mexican, results of colonial system, =1.= 29-30; causes of failure, 56-7, 416-7, 438, =2.= 310, 312; difficulties in tracing political development, =1.= 411; extempore, after loss of capital, =2.= 179-81, 427, 428; results to, of the war, 514. _see also_ centralists; congress, mexican; conquered territory; constitutions; dictatorship; federalism; independence; local government; monarchy; oligarchy; president of mexico; revolutions; roman catholic church. graham, g. m., and garland at monterey, =1.= 500; messenger to mexico, =2.= 473. graham, james, and oregon, =1.= 200. grande, rio. _see_ rio grande. grant, u. s., at monterey, =1.= 252, 256, 501; on worth, 498; on magnifying of taylor's victories, 549; at cerro gordo, =2.= 49; at san cosme garita, 162, 414; on departure from mexico, 252; on cerro gordo, 354; on churubusco, 383; on battles before mexico city, 408; on mexican soldiers, 509. gray, a. f. v., at san pascual, =1.= 535. grayson, j. b., scott's chief of subsistence, =2.= 366. great britain, british loans to mexico, =1.= 37; and texas, 55, 67, 86, 90, 419, 432, 449, =2.= 295, 303, 502, 506; commercial treaty with mexico, =1.= 61; and california, 69, 319, 323-6, 328, 334, 336, 524, 527, 531, =2.= 302, 308, 505; mexican relations and claims, =1.= 74, 135, 425, =2.= 296-7, 502; and restoration of american-mexican intercourse, =1.= 91, 435; oregon controversy, 90, 94, 114-5, 200, 478, =2.= 295, 299, 504; question of interposition, =1.= 112-5, 442, =2.= 238, 301-4, 504-6; supposed manipulation of mexico, =1.= 121, 443; and mexican privateering, =2.= 192; and blockade, 193, 303, 440; and peace negotiations, 238, 465; attitude toward united states, 294-5, 501; and outbreak of the war, defeat of her policy, 299-300; offer of mediation, 301, 368; influence of french relations, 304, 506; and american victories, 305; volunteer officers for mexico, 306; and treaty of peace, 308-9, 508. _see also_ bankhead; doyle; pakenham; thornton. green, b. e., and mexican negotiations, =1.= 84-5, 433, 436; on tornel, 484. green, duff, on mexican finances, =2.= 8. green, p. c., claim, =1.= 426. greenhow, robert, and claims on mexico, =1.= 78, 429. grievances, american, =1.= 70-3, 423, 424. _see also_ claims; diplomatic intercourse. griffin, w. p., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338. grijalva river. _see_ tabasco. grone, karl von, on scott, =2.= 316; on american soldiers, 321. guadalajara, situation, =1.= 3. _guadalupe_, escape, =2.= 195. guadalupe hidalgo, shrine, =1.= 223, 488, =2.= 141; valencia at, =2.= 88; treaty signed at, 240, 467. guadalupe hidalgo, treaty of. _see_ peace. guanajuato, powder-mill, =2.= 87. guanajuato cavalry battalion, at monterey, =1.= 494. guanajuato state, in discussion on peace, =2.= 464. guatemala, and the war, =2.= 298. guaymas, as port, =1.= 3; bombarded, =2.= 205, 446; map, 206; blockade, 206; occupied, 206, 208, 447. guerilla warfare, in revolt against spain, =1.= 31-2; threat (1846), 153, 154; canales' force, 158, 226, 236, 479, 495; blanco's force, 273, 274, 283, 510; in north after buena vista, suppression, 399-400, 562, =2.= 169-71, 421, 422; during battle of buena vista, =1.= 559; operations on scott's line, =2.= 77, 171, 365, 422, 423; and scott's advance, 98; mexican addiction to, 168; adoption and sanction, 168-9, 421; vera cruz state as chief home, leaders, 171, 421; scott's operations against, 172, 423; lack of morale, attacks on mexicans, 172-3; operations and siege of puebla, 173-4, 178, 424; lane's operations against, 178-9, 426-7; british encouragement, 306; scott's warning on, 358; failure, 423. guerillas of vengeance, =2.= 169. guerrero, vicente, as partisan leader, =1.= 32; in itúrbide's revolt, 33; revolt against itúrbide, 35; and montaño's revolt, 38; presidential candidacy, 40-1; proclaimed president, 41; character, as president, 42; overthrow, killed, 43; warned by united states, 59, 418; and poinsett, 62. guexocingo, lane at, =2.= 426. guizot, f. p. g., policy of balance of power in america, =1.= 90, =2.= 304; and expected war, =1.= 108, 112, 115; and texas, 295; policy of neutrality, =2.= 300; and united states, 301; and palmerston, 304. gutiérrez, captain, at monterey, =1.= 254. gutiérrez de estrada, j. m., and monarchy, =1.= 90; on conduct of american army, =2.= 232. gwynn, t. p., at siege of puebla, =2.= 174. hacienda, =1.= 19. hacienda department. _see_ finances, mexican. haddon, w. r., on buena vista, =1.= 557. hagner, p. v., at chapultepec, =2.= 152; ordnance officer with scott, 366. haile, ----, on losses at monterey, =1.= 505. hamer, t. l., as volunteer officer, =1.= 207, 481; at monterey, 253, 254, 492. hamilton, c. s., on mistakes at monterey, =1.= 503; on army life in mexico, =2.= 321. hamilton, schuyler, of scott's staff, =2.= 366. hamley, e. b., on military strategy, =2.= 317. hammond, j. h., on war spirit, =1.= 127. hamtramck, john, command at saltillo, =2.= 418. hancock, w. s., at churubusco, =2.= 385. _hannah elizabeth_, claim, =1.= 424. hannegan, e. a., and expansion, =1.= 188; and absorption of mexico, =2.= 243; on polk and oregon, 271; position in senate, 496; on responsibility of mexico, 508. haralson, h. a., position in house, =2.= 496. hardcastle, e. l. f., topographical engineer with scott, =2.= 366. hardee, w. j., captured, expected mexican victory at palo alto, =1.= 161. hardin, j. j., at buena vista, =1.= 383, 386, 390, 391; charge, killed, 393-4, 556, 559. hargous, louis, and santa anna, =1.= 487; scott's agent, =2.= 362, 396; and navy, 444. harmony, peter, claim, =1.= 426. harney, w. s., escapade, =1.= 268-70, 509; insubordination and magnanimity of scott, 364-5, 545, 546, =2.= 248; and wool, detached from wool's march, =1.= 509; brigade, 541; at cerro gordo, =2.= 51, 53-6, 352, 354; command in scott's army, 77; in advance from puebla, 93, 94; at san agustín, 97, 381; at churubusco, 119; in mexico city, 164; at siege of vera cruz, 335, 339; la antigua expedition, 344; during chapultepec, 408. haro y tamáriz, antonio de, and santa anna, =2.= 4; and financial chaos, 11. harrison, w. h., and control of occupied territory, =2.= 285, 497. haskell, w. t., at cerro gordo, =2.= 56, 57, 353. hawkins, e. s., commands fort brown, =1.= 468. hays, j. c., at monterey, =1.= 238, 241, 255, 497, 498, 501; and protection of texas, 452; operations against guerillas, =2.= 172, 423; goes to scott, 184, 418, 432; character of rangers, 423. haywood, w. h., jr., and tariff, =2.= 479. heady, w. j., carelessness and capture, =1.= 371. _see also_ encarnación prisoners. hébert, p. o., at chapultepec, =2.= 410. _hecla_, in attack on tuxpán, =2.= 444; in home squadron, 445; ashore, 446. heintzelman, s. p., at huamantla, =2.= 426; in lane's operations, 426. henderson, g. f. r., on civilian judgment on military subjects, =1.= x. henderson, j. p., command of texan troops, =1.= 480; division in monterey campaign, 492, 496; in monterey negotiations, 502. henry, thomas, at cerro gordo, =2.= 55. henry, w. s., on camargo camp, =1.= 212; on mistakes at monterey, 502; on taylor's force after battle, 507. heredia, j. a., command at chihuahua, =1.= 305; battle of sacramento, 306-13; negotiations, 313; displaced, 521. hernández, priest, and butler, =1.= 62. herrera, j. j. de, head of government (1845), =1.= 55-6; and resumption of american intercourse, 89, 92, 94, 435, 436; administration totters, 95; and slidell mission, 96-8, 120, 437; fall, 98-9, 438; endorsed by many (1846), 216, 221; and california, 329; and santa anna (1847), =2.= 92; peace commissioner, 135; and evacuation of city, 167, 420; and executive power (1847), 180; supports peña, 180; force, resigns, 182, 429; president (1848), and american evacuation, 252; on restoration of cordiality, 323; and riot during armistice, 396. hervey, l., british agent in mexico, reports cited _passim_. heywood, charles, at san josé, =2.= 449. hidalgo, miguel, revolt, =1.= 31. hidalgo battalion, formation, =2.= 3-4; at san antonio, 112, 384; at chapultepec, 410. hill, d. h., on monterey, =1.= 254, 505; on pillow, =2.= 377. hilliard, h. w., on advance to rio grande, =1.= 457. hitchcock, e. a., in texas, on taylor, =1.= 144, 145, 452; leaves front, 158; scott's magnanimity, 545, =2.= 248; on worth's chachapa agreement, 70; on churubusco, 118; on molino del rey, 147; at siege of vera cruz, 335; on worth, 361; of scott's staff, 366; and plan of attack on mexico city, 408. holmes, i. e., on war spirit, =1.= 444; and war bill, 471, 472; on polk's alarm, 476. holst, h. e. von, on polk and war, =1.= 472, 473; on justice of acquiring california, =2.= 322. home squadron during the war, vessels, distribution, men, =2.= 189, 197, 442, 444-6. _see also_ conner; perry. hooker, joseph, at monterey, =1.= 253. hopping, e. d., brigade in taylor's force, =2.= 417. horn, carlos, at mazatlán, =2.= 448. horsemanship, mexican, =1.= 24. houses, mexican, =1.= 18-20, 23; inns, 20. houston, sam, european intrigue, =1.= 82; and treaty of peace, =2.= 247. howard, joshua, regiment, =2.= 363. hoya pass, as defensive point, =2.= 39, 42; abandoned, 58, 60. huamantla, battle, =2.= 176-8, 425-6. hudson, charles, position in house, =2.= 496. hudson, t. b., in battle of sacramento, =1.= 309, 311, 312. huejutla, prisoners of war at, =2.= 418. huger, benjamin, at molino del rey, =2.= 143, 145, 146; at chapultepec, 149, 153, 409; at san cosme garita, 161, 162, 415; at siege of vera cruz, 335; ordnance officer with scott, 356, 366. hughes, g. w., reconnaissance in wool's march, =1.= 271; on population of mexico, 407; on wool's force, 509; as governor of jalapa, =2.= 224, 230. hull, j. b., off western coast of mexico, =2.= 205. humboldt, alexander von, on léperos, =1.= 6; and the war, =2.= 299, 309; on justice of acquisition of california, 322. hunt, h. j., at chapultepec, =2.= 156; at san cosme garita, 162. hunt, w. e., in occupation of tampico, =1.= 279. hunter, c. g., at alvarado, =2.= 344. ibarra, d., removed, =2.= 66; and trist mission, 130, 390; attack on, 367. iguala, plan of, =1.= 33. illinois, hard times and unrest, =1.= 124. _see also_ illinois troops. illinois troops, at buena vista, =1.= 383, 386, 387, 389, 390, 556, 559; in wool's march, 509; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 343; leave scott, 356; call and response (1847), 364, 365, 430, 431; in taylor's later force, 417; at tampico, 418; for scott, 423. importance of the war, =1.= vii. _independence_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 206, 446, 447. independence hill at monterey, =1.= 239, 497; capture, 244-6, 499. independence of mexico, incitation, =1.= 30-1; hidalgo's revolt, 31; partisan warfare, 31-2; education for, 32; revolt of oligarchy and itúrbide, plan of iguala, 32-3; itúrbide's rule, 33-5; his overthrow, 35; congress, first republican constitution, 35-7, 412, 413; victoria's administration, 37-8; expulsion of gachupines, 39, 42, 413; spanish invasion (1829), 41. independencia battalion, formation, =2.= 3; revolts, 13; at churubusco, 111, 382. indiana troops, at buena vista, =1.= 386, 388, 390, 391, 555, 557; call (1847), =2.= 364, 431; in taylor's later force, 417; sent to scott, 418; at huamantla, 426; in lane's operations, 426, 427; garrison at puebla, 433. indianapolis, enlistments, =1.= 195. indianapolis _state sentinel_, on mexicans, =1.= 118. indians, characteristics and conditions of mexican, =1.= 4, 18, 21; mexican, as soldiers, 10, 161, 463; and independence, 31; mexico counts on help of american, 107; in kearny's expedition, 288; war and raids, 269, 509; submission in new mexico, 298; employment in war, 509; raids on american expeditions, 515. _indicador_, on war lethargy, =1.= 214. industry, conditions of mexican, =1.= 6, 15-7, 22. ingersoll, c. j., on polk and war, =1.= 456; on war bill, 472; on lesson of the war, =2.= 324; position in house, 496. ingersoll, j. r., position in house, =2.= 496. ingraham, d. n., at tampico, =1.= 512. iniestra, ignacio, and california, =1.= 522. inns, mexican, =1.= 20. intellectual life, lack in mexico, =1.= 20. intelligence arrangements and reconnaissance, taylor's neglect, =1.= 145, 161, 208, 226, 249, 374, 451, 464, 476, 478, 549; scott's, =2.= 72, 332, 362. internal improvements, and democratic dissensions, =2.= 271, 281. interposition, mexican hope of spanish-american, =1.= 111; and of european, 112-5, 122, 442; question of british, =2.= 301-4, 504-6; and of french, 304; effect of american victories, 305. iowa troops, non-active, =2.= 511. ireland, famine, effect on american finances, =2.= 263, 484; american relief and the war, 304. irish in american army, mexican propaganda among, =1.= 507, =2.= 81, 358; deserters in santa anna's army, 88, 385; in mexican hospital force, 347. _see also_ san patricio battalion. irregulars. _see_ guerilla warfare. irving, washington, american minister at madrid, reports cited _passim_. irwin, j. r., scott's chief quartermaster, =2.= 366. irwin, william, at marín, =1.= 562. isunza, j. r., governor of puebla, and scott's advance, =2.= 66, 69, 95. iturbe, ----, finance minister, graft, =1.= 214, =2.= 328. itúrbide, agustín de, and war on insurgents, =1.= 31; revolt, 33; rule, 33-5; overthrow, 35; and congress, 35; execution, 37; seizure by, 426; and financial system, =2.= 6. iztaccihuatl, mount, aspect, =2.= 93. izucar de matamoros, lane at, =2.= 179, 427. jackson, andrew, and texas, =1.= 62, 419, 428; and sabine river boundary, 64; and claims on mexico, 77-8, 428; and war spirit, 124. jackson, t. j., at chapultepec, =2.= 154, 160, 410; at contreras, 378; at molino del rey, 403. jalapa, site, aspect, =1.= 2, =2.= 63, 223; march of scott's army for, 38, 45-8; mexican preparations on route, 39-42, 346; defences at cerro gordo, 42-5, 347, 348; battle of cerro gordo, 48-59; occupied, 59, 354; scott at, his problems of advance, 61-5; american garrison, 74, 361, 362, 433; american rule, 223-5, 230, 231, 458; scott's fortification, 358. jalisco lancers, at monterey, =1.= 494. jalisco state, and santa anna, =1.= 376; in discussion on peace, =2.= 464. jarauta, c. d. de, as guerilla, =2.= 171; offers to join americans, 421; executed, 423. jarero, j. m., at cerro gordo, =2.= 44. jarnagin, spencer, and tariff of 1846, =2.= 257, 496. jay, john, and war of 1812, =2.= 280. _jefferson_, tampico incident, =1.= 425. jesup, t. s., and tents, =1.= 206; and wool's train, 274; taylor on, 352; quartermaster general, 475; and taylor's inadequate preparations for monterey campaign, 482, 491; and preparations for vera cruz expedition, 545. jesup, fort, troops at (1845), =1.= 140. jobson, s., on ulúa, =1.= 536. _john adams_, and vera cruz expedition, =2.= 18; in home squadron, 197, 446; in attack on tuxpán, 444. johnson, andrew, on cause of war, =1.= 189. johnson, sir thomas, mexican partisan, =1.= 531. johnston, a. s., at monterey, =1.= 253; texan regiment for taylor, 480; staff position, 492. johnston, j. e., at chapultepec, =2.= 154, 155; takes reinforcements to scott, 184; force at puebla, 432. jomini, baron de, on simplicity of war, =1.= x; on generalship, =2.= 315. jones, anson, on polk and war, =1.= 445, 446. jones, roger, adjutant general, =1.= 474. jones, t. a. c., occupation of monterey, =1.= 69, 323, 327, 423; commands pacific squadron, =2.= 448. jones, w. d., american consul at mexico, reports cited _passim_. jornada del muerto, doniphan's march, =1.= 300, 518. _journal des débats_, on sympathy with mexico, =1.= 112-4; on monarchist plan, 470; attitude toward united states, =2.= 295; on weakness of mexico, 297; on outbreak of war, 300; on palmerston, 301; and interposition, 304; on american victories, 305; and terms of peace, 308, 309; on mexico expedition as achievement, 321; criticism of military operations, 507. juárez, b. p., and demand on church property, =2.= 10, 11. judiciary, mexican, character, =1.= 12-3, 409, 427; in occupied territory, =2.= 229. _juno_, at santa barbara, =1.= 527. justice of the war, =1.= ix, 66-7, 70-83, 98, 100-1, 116-22, 136-7, 187, 190, 325-7, =2.= 310-1, 322-4, 514. juvera, j., at venado, =1.= 553. kearny, philip, in scott's army, =2.= 77; at churubusco, 119. kearny, s. w., preparation for santa fe expedition, force, =1.= 286, 288, 515; map of route, 287; march to bent's fort, 288-9, 515; caravan with, 289; armijo's preparations, 289, 292-3; price's reinforcement, 290, 516; mormon battalion, 290, 516; proclamation and letter to armijo, 290, 516; advance to san miguel, 291; assurances to inhabitants, 291-2, 516; expected fight at apache canyon, condition of force, 292-3, 516; resistance abandoned, 293-5, 516-7; occupies santa fe, 295-6; march to southern district, 297; leaves for california, 297, 517; reaches it, condition of force, 341; battle of san pascual, 341-2, 534; in advance on los angeles, 342-3; rule in new mexico, =2.= 217; rule in california, 217; governor of mexico city, 438; and frémont, 454; governor of vera cruz, 457; leaves mexico city, 476. kendall, amos, on peace, =2.= 314. kendall, g. w., in santa fe expedition, =1.= 72; on losses at monterey, 505. kendrick, h. l., at siege of puebla, =2.= 424. kenly, j. r., on war enthusiasm of mexicans, =1.= 442. kennedy, ----, and rebolledo, =2.= 423. kent, william, on the war, =2.= 273. kentucky troops, enlistments, =1.= 195; in monterey campaign, 255, 492, 496; at buena vista, 383, 386, 388, 554, 555, 558; in wool's march, 509; at saltillo, 541; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 343; at cerro gordo, 352; in taylor's later force, 417; call (1847), 431. kerr, croghan, at palo alto, =1.= 164, 168; at resaca de la palma, 172, 467. kilburn, c. l., at buena vista, =1.= 391, 558. kimball, e. a., at chapultepec, =2.= 410. king, preston, position in house, =2.= 496. king, w. r., american minister at paris, on war and slavery, =1.= 189; on french war sentiment, =2.= 300; on importance of victories, 305. kingsbury, private, on mexican women, =2.= 230. kirby, edmund, scott's chief paymaster, =2.= 366. kribben, christian, on chihuahua rangers, =1.= 519. la angostura. _see_ angostura. la antigua. _see_ antigua. la atalaya. _see_ atalaya. la bahía. _see_ bahía. laboring class in mexico, =1.= 6. laclede rangers, in kearny's expedition, =1.= 288; to hold santa fe, 298. la encarnación. _see_ encarnación. lafragua, j. m., and peace negotiations, =2.= 466. lagos coalition. _see_ coalition. laguna, occupation, =2.= 201, 204, 445. la hoya pass. _see_ hoya. lally, f. t., guerilla attacks on, =2.= 171, 422; takes reinforcements to scott, 184; rule at jalapa, 224; at huamantla, 426; in lane's operations, 426. lampazos company, at monterey, =1.= 494. lancers of the poisoned spear, =2.= 173. landero, j. j. de, and surrender of vera cruz, =2.= 33, 334, 340, 342. lane, camp, =1.= 480. lane, joseph, at saltillo, =1.= 371; at buena vista, 390, 555, 557; march to relieve puebla, =2.= 176, 425; battle of huamantla, 176-8, 426; reaches puebla, 178; operations against guerillas, 179, 426-7; conduct of soldiers, 225; brigade in taylor's force, 417; career and character, 425; retained in service, 432. la paz. _see_ paz. la peña redoubt. _see_ peña. laplace, c. p. t., and california, =1.= 523. laredo, occupation, =1.= 452. larkin, t. o., as trader in california, =1.= 317; on american immigrants, 318; on independence, 321; american consul, 324; on attitude of england, 325; on peaceful absorption, 325; instructions to, as confidential agent, 325, 329; and taking possession at monterey, 334, 335, 530; in first southern campaign, 337; captured, 536. larnard, c. h., on taylor, =1.= 204, 470. la rochefoucauld-liancourt, duc de, on detail, =1.= ix; on greatness, =2.= 314, 316. la rosa, luis de. _see_ rosa. las bocas. _see_ bocas. las vegas, kearny's expedition at, =1.= 291. las vigas. _see_ vigas. la vaca. _see_ port la vaca. lavallette, e. a. f., at guaymas, =2.= 206, 447; evacuates mazatlán, 476. la vega, r. díaz de, and rio grande campaign, =1.= 158, 179; captured at resaca de la palma, 467; in preparations below perote, =2.= 40, 42, 346; at cerro gordo, 44; captured, not paroled, 354. la viga garita. _see_ viga. law of april 20, 1847, =2.= 81, 130, 135, 367, 389, 393. law of february 4, 1847, =2.= 12, 15. law of january 11, 1847, passage and conflict over, =2.= 8-15, 329-32. _lawrence_, in home squadron, =2.= 442. laws, chaos of mexican, =1.= 12. lawson, thomas, surgeon general, =1.= 366, 475. lay, g. w., of scott's staff, =2.= 366. leavenworth, fort, aspect, gathering of kearny's expedition, =1.= 286. lee, r. e., in march to victoria, =1.= 358; and landing at vera cruz, =2.= 23, 336; at siege, 30, 335; at cerro gordo, 49-51, 53, 349; reconnoitres contreras, 103; at battle, 108, 109, 378; at churubusco, 110, 383, 384; on plan to attack mexico city, 149, 408; appearance, 149, 405; on removal of scott, 188; on scott as general, 317; on victory and humanity, 324; engineer with scott, 366, 544; reconnoitres southern approaches of capital, 408; at chapultepec, 409. leese, jacob, as trader in california, =1.= 318. leggett, aaron, claim, =1.= 427, 430. lendrum, j. h., at san cosme garita, =2.= 414. leo xii, and mexican church, =1.= 408. león, antonio de, brigade, =2.= 67, 369; and revolt in oaxaca, 369; at molino del rey, killed, 142, 145. león, joaquín velázquez de, as claims commissioner, =1.= 80, 429-31. leonidas letter, on scott, =2.= 187, 435-7; on pillow at contreras, 376. léperos, =1.= 6; and american soldiers, =2.= 166, 459. lerdo de tejada, m. m., on american rule. =2.= 221. lesson of the war to mexico, =2.= 323-4, 514. _levant_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 447. lewis, d. h., position in senate, =2.= 496. _lexington_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 447. lexington _commonwealth_, on british intrigue in mexico, =1.= 121. libertad redoubt at monterey, =1.= 239, 248. liberty of the press. _see_ press. lieber, francis, on justice of acquiring california, =2.= 322. lieutenant generalcy, plan for appointment of benton, =2.= 75, 363, 365. ligero cavalry, at monterey, =1.= 494. lillers, count, on attitude toward mexico, =1.= 119. linares, aspect, =1.= 359. lincoln, abraham, on doniphan, =1.= 299; war criticism, =2.= 277, 493. liquor, mexican drinks, =1.= 2, 21; and outrages by american troops, =2.= 211-3, 216, 224, 457; regulation at vera cruz, 457. livermore, a. a., on slavery as cause of mexican war, =1.= 473. liverpool _mail_, sympathy with mexico, =1.= 112. lizardi banking house, robs treasury, =1.= 432. llano, m. m., in monterey negotiations, =1.= 502. loans, mexican, =1.= 37, =2.= 254; american, 258-60, 479, 481, 485. _see also_ finances. lobos islands, rendezvous for vera cruz expedition, =1.= 367, =2.= 17. local government, in occupied territory, =1.= 338, =2.= 218, 229, 461. _see also_ police. loch, g. g., and cerro gordo, =2.= 348. locofocos, and polk, =2.= 270, 281. löwenstern, isidor, on mexican abandonment of california, =1.= 319. lombardini, m. m., at buena vista, =1.= 389-91, 559; character and command, =2.= 88; retirement from chapultepec, 412. lomita, camp, =1.= 480. london _daily news_, on conduct of americans in mexico, =2.= 226. london _examiner_, on expected war, =1.= 134; criticism of military operations, =2.= 307; on trade through occupied ports, 505; on polk, 510. london _globe_, and peace, =2.= 125; and interposition, 303. london _journal of commerce_, on american aggression, =1.= 113. london _morning chronicle_, on california, =1.= 322; on outbreak of war, =2.= 300; criticism of military operations, 307, 308; on american people, 502; on interposition, 505; on the war and development, 514. london _morning herald_, on chances of expected war, =1.= 108; on annexation of texas, 113. london _post_, on outbreak of war, =2.= 300. london _standard_, on chances of expected war, =1.= 109, 113. london _times_, on monarchy for mexico, =1.= 95, 135; on chances of expected war, 105, 106, 110, 113, 441, 442; on oregon and mexico, 115; on american hostility to england, 121; on taylor's force in mexico, 142; on santa anna, 216; on california, 322, 524; on santa anna at san luis potosí, 379; on slidell mission, 437; on mexican finances, =2.= 8; attack on united states, 91; and peace, 125, 235; on american government, 294; on military titles, 294; on american people, 295; on absorption of mexico, 297; on outbreak of the war, 300; and interposition, 302, 306, 505; criticism of military operations, 306-8; on mexican policy, 310; on probable pillage, 324. longstreet, james, at chapultepec, =2.= 157; at churubusco, 385. lópez de santa anna. _see_ santa anna. lópez uraga, j. _see_ uraga. loring, w. w., at cerro gordo, =2.= 350, 352. los angeles, in 1846, =1.= 315; occupied by americans, 337; gillespie's rule, rising against it, 338-9, 533-4; american advance and recapture, 342-4, 535; map of engagement near, 344. louis philippe, and texas, =1.= 67, =2.= 304; policy of neutrality, 300. _see also_ france. _louisa_, claim, =1.= 426. louisiana purchase, mexican negotiations on boundary, =1.= 59-61; and texas, 138. louisiana troops, calls, =1.= 150, 480, 537, =2.= 364, 365, 430; in vera cruz expedition, =1.= 368, =2.= 336, 343; at tampico, =1.= 546, 547; with scott, =2.= 422; at huamantla, 426. louisville legion, at monterey, =1.= 255. lowell, j. r., and secession, =2.= 272; on slavery and the war, 274; opposition to the war, 279. lower california, map of tip, =2.= 207; naval occupation, counter-attacks, 207-8, 448-9, 454; in peace negotiations, 469, 476. lozano, ramón, spanish chargé at mexico, and peace negotiations, =2.= 135, 396, 467; on spain and mexico, 297; on mexican force at time of evacuation, 416. lumpkin, wilson, opposes war, =1.= 189. mccall, g. a., at resaca de la palma, =1.= 170, 172. mccall, j. g., american consul at tampico, reports cited _passim_. mcclellan, g. b., on brazos island camp, =1.= 205; engineer, 451; at cerro gordo, =2.= 349, 353; with scott, 366; at contreras, 378; on volunteers, 513. mcclellan, john, topographical engineer with scott, =2.= 366. mcclung, a. k., at monterey, =1.= 253. mcculloch, ben, on scout, =1.= 204; rangers in advance on monterey, 236; at battle of monterey, 243, 498; and santa anna's advance, 382, 554; at buena vista, 556. mcfaul, eneas, jr., american consul at laguna, reports cited _passim_. mcgillivray, simon, claim, =1.= 427. mcilvaine, a. r., on advance to rio grande, =1.= 456; on cause of the war, =2.= 493. mcintosh, j. s., in texas, =1.= 143; at palo alto, 164; reinforcements for scott, guerilla attacks, =2.= 76-7, 171, 422; at molino del rey, wounded, 144, 145, 403. mackall, w. w., battery at monterey, =1.= 241, 243, 248, 258, 492, 496, 508; and volunteer officers, 481; on pillow, =2.= 433. mckay, j. j., position in the house, =2.= 496. mckee, w. r., at buena vista, =1.= 388, 390, 391, 394, 555, 557; killed, 394. mackenzie, a. s., and santa anna, =1.= 202-3, 479. mckenzie, samuel, at chapultepec, =2.= 153, 157. mackintosh, e., british consul at mexico, and california, =1.= 524, =2.= 302; and peace, 133, 467; and mexican finances, 254, 255, 477. mclane, louis, american minister at london, on england and the war, =1.= 442; on british dislike, =2.= 295; on europe and texas, 502; on mexican sympathy in england, 300; on attitude of france, 503; on british interposition, 302, 303; and vigorous war, 305; and aberdeen and warning on annexation, 308; on influence abroad of the war, 324. mclane, r. m., takes instructions to taylor, =1.= 350. _mclane_, in attack on alvarado, =2.= 199; in tabasco expedition, 200. mcnamara, eugene, california grant, =1.= 527; and mexican propaganda, =2.= 81. mcpherson, j. d., on marcy, =1.= 475. mcreynolds, a. t., with scott, =2.= 77. madrid _heraldo_, on the war, =2.= 298, 503. magoffin, james, character, =1.= 293; and armijo, 293, 516. magruder, j. b., battery at cerro gordo, =2.= 55; at contreras, 104, 105, 378; at chapultepec, 154, 161; light artillery, 366; at molino del rey, 403. maguey, drink from, =1.= 508. _mahonese_, in home squadron, =2.= 446. maldonado, e., and brother, at san juan bautista, =2.= 446. _malek adel_, captured, =2.= 205, 446; added to navy, 447. mangino, r., mexican chargé at paris, reports cited _passim_. mangum, w. p., on polk, =2.= 270; position in senate, 496. manifest destiny, and attitude toward mexico, =1.= 123, 444, =2.= 322. _see also_ annexations. mansfield, j. k. f., at monterey, =1.= 239, 250, 251, 500; on fort brown, 468; at buena vista, 555. manufactures, attempted promotion in mexico, =1.= 16-7. manzanillo, occupied, =2.= 207. map of mexico, =1.= xxii. marchante, francisco, and evacuation of tampico, =1.= 512. marcy, fort, at santa fe, =1.= 296. marcy, w. l., and taylor's occupation of texas, =1.= 142, 452; and advance to rio grande, instructions, 144, 453, 463, 490; and raising of army, 191, 193; clash with scott, 190-1, 477; appearance, 193; and scott's deliberateness, 199; and occupation of tamaulipas, 263, 360; and monterey armistice, 263; and advance to saltillo, 264; and defensive-line policy, 283; and price's force, 290; relations with scott, 354; throws responsibility of vera cruz plans on him, 355, 540; as claims commissioner, 430; character, 475; on polk's alarm, 476; and volunteers, 480, =2.= 320; and wool's march, =1.= 510; and further calls for volunteers, 537; and scott's preparations, 539, 544, 545; and taylor's presidential ambition, 547; and ten regiment bill, =2.= 74; and peace negotiations, 122; and trist-scott quarrel, 128, 129, 389, 390; and failure of negotiations (1847), 138; recalls price, 166; and scott and cabal, 188, 437; on conner, 202; and scott's order for military government, 220; appointment to cabinet, 271; and gaines's six-months men, 272; on democratic dissensions, 281; political despair, 291; on opposition, 292; and mexico expedition, 343, 346; and scott's release of time-expired men, 356; on scott at puebla, 362; does not expect peace, 391; and douceur, 391; on guerilla warfare, 423; and war policy after capture of mexico city, 430; on number of volunteers, 431. marín, occupied, =1.= 562. marín, t., guerilla, =2.= 421. marines, in scott's army, =2.= 78, 366, 432, 511; at chapultepec, 156, 410; in mexico city, 163, 164; at siege of vera cruz, 335. markoe, c, on opposition to the war, =2.= 314, 510. marshall, thomas, at buena vista, =1.= 386, 388, 390, 555, 558; at brazos, 476; left at camargo, 493; brigade, =2.= 417; retained in service, 432; arrives at mexico city, 432; division leaves mexico city, 476. martin, alexandre, french agent in mexico, on mexican army, =1.= 408. martin, j. j. m., american chargé at paris, on france and tariff for mexican ports, =2.= 484; on europe and texas, 502. martin, judge, acknowledgment to, =1.= 444. martínez, f. p., mexican minister at washington, and claims, =1.= 78, 79, 429. martínez, general, brigade, =2.= 369. martínez, j. a., guerilla, =2.= 421. maryland troops, calls (1847), =2.= 364, 431; in taylor's later force, 417; at jalapa, 433. _see also_ washington and baltimore battalion. mason, j. l., reconnoitres san antonio, =2.= 102; and molino del rey, 142; wounded, 144; at cerro gordo, 349. mason, j. t., and scott, =1.= 476. mason, j. y., as secretary of the navy, =2.= 191, 196; and offensive operations, 198, 200; and lower california, 207. mason, r. b., as governor of california, =2.= 218-20; and occupation of western coast of mexico, 448; supposed force, 432. masons, in mexican politics, =1.= 34, 38, 43, 413. massachusetts, and the war, =2.= 274, 493. _see also_ massachusetts troops. _massachusetts_, in vera cruz expedition, =2.= 18, 25, 26. massachusetts troops, call, =1.= 537; in taylor's later force, =2.= 417; sent to scott, 418. matamoros, taylor's assurance of peaceful intentions, =1.= 146, 148, 151, 454; taylor's force across river from, 148, 454; mexican force at, 158, 462; fortification, 158; map, 159; mexicans abandon, 177-8; taylor occupies, 178, 204, 480; under american rule, 481, =2.= 211-2, 450; troops left at, =1.= 493, =2.= 417; american tariff, 484. matamoros de morelia battalion, at chapultepec, =2.= 408. matehuala, troops at, =1.= 550, 552. matson, h. s., and siege of vera cruz, =2.= 33, 305, 337. may, c. a., at palo alto, =1.= 164, 168; at resaca de la palma, appearance and character, 174, 467; advance to saltillo, 264; return to monterey with taylor, 368; and santa anna's advance, 382, 554; in march to victoria, 541; at buena vista, 555. mayer, brantz, and advance to rio grande, =1.= 152. mayo, isaac, at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338. mazapil, occupied, =2.= 418. mazatlán, as port, =1.= 3; revolt (1846), 485; temporary blockades, =2.= 205, 446, 447; aspect, 206; under téllez, 207, 447; occupied, 207, 208, 448; map, 207; evacuated, 476. meade, g. g., at resaca de la palma, =1.= 173; on taylor's operations, 177, 179; on raw volunteers, 207, 208; at monterey, 246, 251, 499; on war blunders, 267; on taylor's defensive-line plan, 282; on taylor as general, 470; on his lack of information, 490; on organization of army in monterey campaign, 493; on worth, 498. mediation, british offers, =2.= 301, 368, 503-4; spain and, 502. _see also_ interposition. medical corps, mexican, =1.= 157. mejía, francisco, ruse at arroyo colorado, =1.= 147; and taylor at rio grande, 148; and irregulars in texas, 153, 154; on taylor and his force, 158, 159; propaganda among american troops, 160; and advance against taylor, 162, 464, 467; succeeds arista in command, 178; restores morale, 225; appearance, 226; plan at monterey, 226; preparations to resist taylor there, 230; and holding of monterey, 231, 494; and brigade command, 462; in battle of monterey, 494, 500; at matehuala, 552; in army of the north, =2.= 369. mejía, j. a., revolt, =1.= 49; americans in revolt executed, 70. mejía, vicente, attack on la paz, =2.= 448. _memorial histórico_, on monarchist plans, =1.= 90. memphis, enlistments, =1.= 195. memphis _daily eagle_, on enlisting, =1.= 195. memphis _enquirer_, on war spirit, =1.= 127. mendoza, f., guerilla, =2.= 421. mendoza, n., brigade in monterey campaign, =1.= 494; at contreras, =2.= 109. mercantile class in mexico, =1.= 5, 17; favor peace, =2.= 130. _see also_ commerce. mercantile system, and spanish colonies, =1.= 29. merritt, ezekiel, at san diego, =1.= 534. merryman _vs._ bourne, title by conquest, =2.= 468. mervine, william, at monterey, cal., =1.= 335; in second southern campaign, 340; on stockton, 534. mexicaltzingo, plan to advance by, =2.= 96, 372-3. mexican spy company, scott's, =2.= 72, 362, 476. mexican war. the analysis is carried out through the titles army; attitude; cause; conquered territory; cost; diplomatic intercourse; finances; foreign relations; government; guerilla; importance; justice; navy; opposition; outbreak; peace; politics; popularity; preparation; programme; and the leaders and campaigns by name, especially buena vista; california; doniphan; mexico expedition; monterey; new mexico; rio grande; santa anna; scott, winfield; taylor, zachary; vera cruz; wool. mexico, valley of, topography, =2.= 79; map, 80; aspect, 94, 119, 138; view from chapultepec, 158. mexico battalion, at monterey, =1.= 494. mexico city, situation, =1.= 2; profile of route from vera cruz, 2; aspect and life, charm, 21-8, =2.= 228; southern and western approaches, map, 141, 147; clerical incitation against americans, 142; quitman at belén garita, 158-60, 162, 412, 414-6; map of citadel, 159; capture of san cosme garita, 161-2, 413, 414, 416; evacuated by mexicans, release of criminals, 163, 415, 420; americans take possession, 163, 415; quitman first governor, 164, 460; uprising against americans, 166-8, 420; clemency toward, 226, 459; military discipline in, 226, 459-60; resumption of ordinary life, attitude of clergy, 226; invasion of americanisms, 227; social excesses, 227-8, 460; local government, 229; police, 229; social relations with americans, 230; american evacuation, 252, 476; riot during armistice, 396; kearny governor, 438; location of troops during occupation, 461. _see also_ mexico expedition. mexico expedition, proposals, =1.= 349; question of campaign left open, 351; taylor's attitude, 352-3, 362-3, 543; influence of scott's victories and treatment on mexicans, =2.= 36, 45, 65, 80, 81; dangers stated, 37; scott's preparations at vera cruz, 37; his proclamation before starting, 38, 344; transportation problem, antigua and alvarado expeditions, 38, 344-5; start, march to cerro gordo, 39, 45-8, 345, 348; map of vera cruz to perote, 39; santa anna's plans and preparations below perote, 39-42, 346; maps of cerro gordo, 40, 43, 51; and yellow fever, 42, 59, 64, 348; defences and force at cerro gordo, 42-5, 347, 348; battle of cerro gordo, 48-59, 349-55; occupation of jalapa, 59, 354; pursuit to perote, 60-1; scott at jalapa, his problems: of supplies, 61-3, 355; of santa anna's intentions, 62; of time-expired men, 63-4, 356; force after departure of time-expired men, 64, 356; advance to puebla, 64, 66, 69; map of profile vera cruz to mexico, 62; secret arrangement with clergy for occupation of puebla, 65-6, 357; scott's proclamation at jalapa, may 11, 66, 357-8; santa anna's preparations at orizaba, 67-8, 359; political influence on his movements, 68; santa anna at puebla, 69, 360; amozoc affair, 69-70, 360; worth's erroneous agreement with puebla, 70; occupation of puebla, 71; worth's rule there, 71-2, 361; scott's intelligence system, 72, 332, 362; condition of scott's army in puebla, 72-3, 362; concentration, communications severed, and reinforcements awaited there, 73, 357, 362, 363, 365; ten regiment bill to increase regulars, 74-6, 363; proposed appointment of benton as commanding general, 75, 363, 365; further call for volunteers, 76-7, 364; arrival of reinforcements, 76, 365; organization and size of scott's force in final advance, 77, 93, 365, 366; condition of force then, 78; situation of capital, 79, 94; unfruitful plans for defence of capital, governmental chaos, 79-82, 367; map of the valley, 80; santa anna's return to capital, opposition to his control, 82-7; his collection of matériel, 87; his army organization, its character and officers, 87-9, 369; his defensive plan, 89-90, 370; defences, old peñón, 90, 369; bolstering morale of inhabitants, 91, 142; their enthusiasm on start of final campaign, 91-2; scott's advance from puebla to lake chalco, 92-5, 371; failure of opposition to it, 95, 371; choice of line of advance, 95-6, 372; advance to san agustín, 96-8, 374; santa anna and scott's march to southern front, 97-8, 374; mexican enthusiasm lost, 98; santa anna's southern line, 99, 101, 374; general map of southern line, 100; field and mexican occupation of contreras, 101-2, 375; american reconnaissances and problem, 102-3, 375; battle of contreras, 103-10, 376-80; santa anna's arrangements after contreras, 110-1, 382; question of american advance to capital after the battle, 112; battle of churubusco, 111-9, 382-5; americans after churubusco, 120; why victory was not followed up, 120, 386, 393; halt at puebla and negotiations, 130; armistice, 133, 137-8, 394-6, 398-9; armies during armistice, 134, 138-9; defences and force at molino del rey, 140-2, 400; map of battles of mexico city, 141; scott's preparations after armistice, 142, 400, 404; battle of molino del rey, 143-7, 401-4; southern and western approaches to city, 147; scott's plans and caution after molino del rey, 148, 404, 408; american conference and problem, decision to attack western gates, 148-9, 408; defences of chapultepec, 149-52, 405-6; battle of chapultepec, 152-8, 408-11; quitman at belén garita, 158-60, 162, 412, 414-5; capture of san cosme garita, 161-2, 413-4, 416; evacuation of the city, 163, 415; possession taken by americans, 163-4, 415-6; american loss in final operations, 165, 411; rising in city, 166-8, 420; adoption of guerilla warfare against, 169; guerilla warfare on line of communication, 171, 422-3; operations against guerillas, 172, 178-9, 423, 426-7; "siege" of americans at puebla, 173-5, 424-6; extempore mexican government, 179-81, 427, 428; problem after capture of city, 183, 430; further tardy reinforcements, 183; size and condition of american force then, 184, 432; plan of further campaign, 184, 432, 433; american evacuation, 251-2, 475, 476; effect on american foreign relations, 305; foreign criticism, 307-8; inadequate force and preparation, 314, 510; achievement, spoils, 321, 416; administration and authorization, 344; mexican force when it evacuated, 416; supposed american force (nov., 1847), 432; size of army and posts (may, 1848), 438; distribution of troops after occupying city, 461. _see also_ conquered territory; scott, winfield; vera cruz; and battles by name for details. mexico state, and guerilla warfare, =2.= 169, 173; and rehabilitation of army, 182; war donation, 254; american assessment, 265; and collapse of federal government, 428. micheltorena, j. m., and jones's occupation, =1.= 69, 423; in california, 319. michigan troops, call, =2.= 431; at orizaba, 433. michoacán state, and santa anna, =1.= 376; in discussion on peace, =2.= 464. middle class in mexico, =1.= 5, 27. mier, occupied, =1.= 210; as camp, 212; force at, =2.= 417. mier y terán, m. de, popularity, =1.= 44. miles, d. s., at camargo, =1.= 210-2; at monterey, 245, 498; guerilla attack on, =2.= 422, 433. military government. _see_ conquered territory. miller, captain, at siege of puebla, =2.= 424. miller, sergeant, on camp life, =1.= 207. mina battalion, at chapultepec, =2.= 408. mining, mexican industry, =1.= 2, 15. miñón, j. j., captures by, =1.= 371; on eve of buena vista, 381, 383; in the battle, 384, 386, 391, 395, 396, 556, 559; brigade as screen at san luis potosí, 550. minor, george, at san diego, =1.= 534. mints, mexican, =1.= 16; rented, =2.= 255. _mississippi_, in occupation of tampico, =1.= 279, 281; yellow fever, =2.= 195; in home squadron, 197, 442, 446; in attack on alvarado, 198, 199; in tabasco expedition, 204; in attack on tuxpán, 444. mississippi troops, enlistments, =1.= 195; at monterey, 235, 492, 496; in victoria march, 357; at lobos islands rendezvous, 368; at buena vista, 388, 391, 392, 555, 557, 561; in calls and response, 537, =2.= 431; in taylor's later force, 417. _see also_ davis, jefferson. missouri troops, calls (1847), =2.= 364, 431; non-active men, 511. _see also_ doniphan; price. mitchell, d. d., and chihuahua rangers, =1.= 519. mixcoac, americans at, =2.= 134. mobile _herald and tribune_, on war spirit, =1.= 126. _moctezuma_, escape, =2.= 195. moderados, and puros, =2.= 2, 4; polkos, 3, 13; and election of farías, 5, 9; and demands on church property, 11, 330; and santa anna, 14, 15, 331; incompetent, 82, 85. _see also_ federalism. mofras, eugène duflot de. _see_ duflot. molina, ignacio, acknowledgment to, =2.= 411. molino del rey, position, defences, =2.= 140, 400; mexican force, 142, 402; scott's preparation and plan, criticism, 142, 401-2, 404; map, 143; american disposition and force, 143, 402, 403; santa anna's actions, 144, 402, 404; attacks and capture of mill, 144-5; capture of casa mata, 145, 403; cavalry fight, 146, 404; a mistake, losses, results, 147, 403; american garrison, 461. moltke, h. k. b. von, on strategy, =1.= x. monarchy in mexico, feared (1845), =1.= 90, 95, 435; plans and aid from europe, 114; american resentment, 122, 135, =2.= 304, 466; collapse of plans, =1.= 180, 470; paredes deserts, 214, 485; santa anna declares against, 219; anti-peace activity of adherents, =2.= 234, 463; adherents in polko revolt, 330; and clerical understanding with scott, 358. _see also_ itúrbide. monasterio, j. m. o., and claims, =1.= 77. monclova, wool at, =1.= 273, 509; aspect, 273. money, mexican minting, =1.= 15; american market during war, =2.= 489. _monitor constitucional_, on expected foreign aid, =1.= 114. _monitor del pueblo_, on scott's advance, =2.= 66. _monitor republicano_, on the war, =1.= 215; on texas and the war, 457; on santa anna, 488, =2.= 84; on church and war finances, 8, 9. monroe doctrine, and european attitude on the war, =1.= 112, =2.= 296; and monarchist plans in mexico, =1.= 122, 135; mexico and, 417; polk's reassertion, =2.= 295. montaño, m., revolt, =1.= 38. montemorelos, aspect, =1.= 357. monterde, j. m., captured, =2.= 411. monterey, cal., jones's occupation, =1.= 69, 423; in 1846, as port, 315, 521; sloat takes possession at, 334-5, 531. monterey, mexico, situation, aspect, =1.= 2, 257, =2.= 212; considered vital, =1.= 225; taylor leaves for victoria, 357; santa anna's plan against (dec.), 357, 541; taylor instructed to concentrate at, his insubordinate advance, 368; excesses of volunteers at, =2.= 212-3. 450; american regulations, 213, 230, 450; later force at, 417, 418. _see also_ monterey campaign. monterey auxiliary battalion, at battle of monterey, =1.= 494. monterey campaign, inadequate preparation, steamboats, =1.= 208, 481-3; advance up rio grande to camargo, 209-11; taylor's force then, 211, 212, 483; unfortunate placing of camp at camargo, 211, 484, 493; condition of mexican forces, 225, 230, 489; mejía's plan for guerilla warfare, canales frustrates it, 226, 236; taylor's inaction and lack of information, 226, 251, 489, 491, 499; his transportation, 227, 490-1, 493; taylor and popular demand for action, he does not anticipate resistance, 227, 491-3; his neglect of artillery, 228, 250, 500; route of advance, 228; advance and camp at cerralvo, organization of army, 228-30, 492, 493; mexican force, 230, 494; mexican preparations at monterey, 230-2, 494; defences, 232-4, 239, 249, 495, 497; general map of battle, 232; ampudia's position and policy, 234; measures to stay american advance, 234-5, 237, 495; mcculloch's rangers, 236; advance from cerralvo, aspect of country, 236-7, 496; arrival before monterey, 237; confidence and size of american force, 238, 496; worth's flanking movement to saltillo road, 239-44, 497; ampudia during battle, 241, 242, 248, 255, 258, 259, 501; detailed map of battle, 240; worth's capture of federation ridge, 244-6, 498; of independence hill, 246-8, 499; taylor's display in force, 249; fortifications in taylor's front, 249-50; his verbal instructions to garland, 250-1, 500; capture of tenería redoubt, 251-3, 500; futile attack on diablo, 253-4; taylor's mistakes, 254, 260, 500-3; mexicans abandon outworks, 255; advance toward plaza, retirement, 256, 500; failure to concert action with worth, 256-7, 501; worth's attack in city, 257-8; condition of mexican force, bombardment, 258, 501; capitulation, armistice, 259, 501-2; taylor's acceptance considered, 260, 502-6; evacuation by mexicans, 260; results, fame, 261, 506; condition and size of taylor's force after, 262, 506; polk and terms, armistice terminated, 263; to be end of northern advance, 350; losses, 505; foreign comment, =2.= 306-7. montgomery, j. b., and british commander, =2.= 446; at guaymas, 447. montoya, j. m., mexican chargé at washington, reports cited _passim_. mora, j. m. l., minister at london, and england and california, =2.= 303; and british mediation, 508. mora y villamil, ignacio, on california, =1.= 322; on texas and the war, 457; and defences of vera cruz, =2.= 19; and preparations below perote, 40; peace commissioner, 135; and guerilla warfare, 168, 422; armistice negotiations, 242, 394; and contreras, 375. morale, of american troops at corpus christi, =1.= 144; at rio grande, 147, 160, 164; results of rio grande campaign, 177-9, 469; of volunteers in first camps, 207, 481; wool's discipline, 268, 269, 273, 275, 276; character of doniphan's force, 299, 303; of wool's force before buena vista campaign, 371; taylor's influence, 372, 374; of scott's force at puebla, =2.= 73; at start of final campaign, 78; lack, in guerillas, 172; naval, 190, 438; mutiny at buena vista, 418; effect of newspapers on mexican, 509. _see also_ army; conquered territory; deserters. morales, juan, defence of vera cruz, =2.= 22, 31, 336, 337, 340-2. morehead, t. g., at siege of puebla, =2.= 174. morelia, powder-mill, =2.= 87. morelia battalion, at monterey, =1.= 494; at belén garita, =2.= 412. morelos, j. m., as partisan leader, =1.= 32. moreno, j. m., attack on la paz, =2.= 449. morfit, h. m., american agent in texas, reports cited _passim_. morgan, g. w., at cerralvo, =1.= 562; and fifteenth infantry, =2.= 363; at contreras, 378. morier, j. j., british agent in mexico, on mexican character, =1.= 410. mormon battalion, follows kearny's expedition, =1.= 290, 516; in california, =2.= 218, 219, 454, 455. morris, l. n., at palo alto, =1.= 164. mosquito fleet, =2.= 29, 338. mountain systems of mexico, =1.= 1. mounted riflemen, authorized, =1.= 190; in smith's brigade, 541; at cerro gordo, =2.= 52, 54, 350, 352; in scott's army, 77; at contreras, 104; at churubusco, 110, 114, 382, 384; at belén garita, 159, 160; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at molino del rey, 403; at chapultepec, 410; in the guerilla operations, 427. mouth of the rio grande, camp, =1.= 205. mulejé, and american occupation, =2.= 448. mules. _see_ transportation. munroe, john, artillery at point isabel, =1.= 146, 148. murphy, tomás, mexican agent at london, aberdeen's suggestion to, =1.= 434; and interposition, =2.= 302, 304, 504-6; and foreign officers, 306. muscatine, iowa. _see_ bloomington. nacogdoches, gaines's expedition, =1.= 64-6, 420-2. nájera, lieut. col., at monterey, falls, =1.= 243. napoleon i, on first quality of a soldier, =1.= 440; on flank movement, 497; on agent's responsibility, =2.= 398. nashville _union_, on war spirit, =1.= 126. _natchez_, vera cruz incident, =1.= 424, 425. national bridge. _see_ puente nacional. national guard, mexican, and federalists, =1.= 221, 222; brazito affair with doniphan, 301-2; attempt to centralize, 376, =2.= 346; at vera cruz, 22, 343; and siege of puebla, 174, 425. national highway, =1.= 16. _see also_ mexico expedition. _national intelligencer_, and peace, =2.= 125; on polk and his party, 269; and tariff, 273; on polk, 275; on outbreak of war, 277; encourages enemy, 280, 281; and tax on tea and coffee, 285; and no-territory plan, 288; and victorious war, 292; on title by conquest, 497; on tariff for mexican ports, 500, 501. navajo indians, conquered, =1.= 298. navy, american, foreign opinion, =1.= 106; pacific instructions (1845), 131, 447; war preparations, 190; mosquito fleet at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 29, 338; sailors and landed battery at siege, 30, 34, 338; vessels at the beginning of the war, distribution, 189, 197, 438; appropriation and increase, 189; establishment, condition, 189, 438; administration, 190-91; and mexican privateers, 192-3; blockade, 193-5, 205, 206, 208, 446, 448; scurvy and yellow fever, 194-5; and mexican navy, 195; difficulties of shore operations, 196; alvarado expeditions, 197-9, 344; operations on mexican western coast, 205-8, 446-9; character of service, 208, 449; character of control of occupied territory, 208; evacuation, 476. _see also_ california; conner, david; jones, t. a. c.; marines; perry; sloat; shubrick; stockton. navy, mexican, =2.= 195. negotiations. _see_ diplomatic intercourse; peace. _neptune_, at tampico, =1.= 281; wrecked, 449. neutrality, american, and texas, =1.= 63, 432; and sabine river boundary, 64; and gaines's expedition, 64-6; and recognition of texas, 66-7, 422-3; bocanegra-webster correspondence, 68; european, in the war, =2.= 300-5. _see also_ interposition; mediation. new granada, and the war, =2.= 298. new helvetia, trading post, =1.= 318, 522. new jersey troops, call, =2.= 364; in taylor's later force, 417; at jalapa, 433. new mexico, santa fe trail trade, =1.= 72, 284, 514; province, population, 284; political situation, 284-6, =2.= 216; american war policy toward, =1.= 286; preparation of kearny's expedition, force, 286, 288, 515; map of his route, 287; his march to pent's fort, 288-9, 515; armijo's attitude, preparations, and desertion, 289, 292-4, 516-7; price's reinforcement of kearny, 290, 516; mormon battalion, 290, 516; kearny's proclamation and letter to armijo, 290, 516; advance to san miguel, assurances to inhabitants, 291-2, 516; expected fight at apache canyon, condition of expedition, 292-3, 516; resistance abandoned, 293-5; occupation of santa fe, 295-6; fort marcy, 296; march to southern district, 297; retaining force, 298; reduction of indians, 298; doniphan's march to el paso, brazito affair, 298-300, 517, 518; condition of force at santa fe, 518; in peace negotiations and treaty, 135, 136, 238, 240, 248, 396, 468, 469; character of population, 216; excesses due to american occupation, 216, 453; price's rule, insurrection, 217, 453; civil government as conquered territory, 285; justice of acquisition, 322; supposed force in (nov., 1847), 432; texas and occupation, 497. new orleans, enlistments, =1.= 195; as rival of new york, =2.= 274; yellow fever (1847), 431. new orleans _commercial bulletin_, attacks policy of forbearance, =1.= 121; on easy victory over mexico, 126. new orleans _delta_, on paredes revolt, =1.= 120; demand for war, 443; leonidas letter, =2.= 187, 435; on taylor's force (1847), 417. new orleans _jeffersonian republican_, attacks policy of forbearance, =1.= 120. new orleans _picayune_, on monarchist plans in mexico, =1.= 90, 122, 135; attacks on policy of forbearance, 119; on rejection of slidell, 120; on war spirit, 126, 132; demand for war, 443. new orleans _tropic_, on policy of expansion, =1.= 123. new york, and peace, =2.= 123; polk and factions, 270, 491. _see also_ new york troops. new york city, enlistments, =1.= 194. new york _courrier des etats unis_, on european protection of mexico, =1.= 121. new york _express_, and peace, =2.= 125. new york _herald_, on unrest, =1.= 124; on war spirit, 124; on war as peace movement, 184; on war finances, =2.= 256; on opposition to the war, 494. new york _journal of commerce_, on war spirit, =1.= 124; on war as peace movement, 184. new york _morning news_, on policy of expansion, =1.= 123; on war spirit, 124-6. new york _sun_, and worth, =2.= 186, 434; favors absorbing mexico, 243. new york _tribune_, on policy of expansion, =1.= 123; on polk and war, 184; on the war and politics, =2.= 275; on annexation of texas and war, 276; demands recall of troops, 290; on scott and the cabal, 436. new york troops, in vera cruz expedition, =1.= 368, 537, =2.= 343; at cerro gordo, 53, 58; in march to puebla, 69; in scott's army, 78; at churubusco, 117; at chapultepec, 157, 409; in mexico city, 163; in california, 219, 454, 476; in lower california, 448. newspapers, mexican, war-time lamentations, =2.= 509. _see also_ press. niles, j. m., and absorption of mexico, =2.= 244; position in senate, 496. _niles' register_, on taylor's generalship, =1.= 503. niño perdido garita, =2.= 148. ninth cavalry, mexican, at cerro gordo, =2.= 347. ninth infantry, in scott's army, =2.= 78, 363, 432; at contreras, 109; at chapultepec, 154, 155, 157; advance after armistice, 400; at huamantla, 426; at pachuca, 433. _nonata_, captured, =1.= 511. noncombatants, american policy toward, =2.= 210, 220, 229. _see also_ conquered territory. nopalucan, aspect, =2.= 69. noriega, general, at palo alto, =1.= 165, 168; captured at chapultepec, =2.= 411. north carolina troops, enlistments, =1.= 195; calls, 537, =2.= 431; in taylor's later force, 417. norther, character, =1.= 541, =2.= 34. nuevo león, troops at monterey, =1.= 494; levy on, for guerilla warfare, =2.= 170, 422; attitude toward united states, 215; general occupation, 418. _see also_ monterey. oaxaca state, guerilla warfare, =2.= 173; revolt and the war, 369. obregón, pablo, mexican minister at washington, and boundary negotiations, =1.= 60. o'brien, j. p. j., battery at buena vista, =1.= 388, 390-2, 394, 557. ocampo, m., and santa anna, =1.= 376. occupied territory. _see_ conquered territory. o'donnell, leopoldo, and mexican privateering, =2.= 193. o'donojú, juan, treaty with itúrbide, =1.= 33. officers, character of volunteer, =1.= 192, 207, =2.= 215; for the ten new regiments, 76; value of west point training, 320. _see also_ army; volunteers. _ohio_, and attack on tuxpán, =2.= 444; in pacific squadron, 447. ohio troops, enlistments, =1.= 195; at monterey, 253, 492, 496; in taylor's later force, =2.= 417; with scott, 418; in lane's march to puebla, 426; in his guerilla operations, 426, 427; calls (1847), 364, 365, 431; garrison at puebla, 433; non-active men, 511. ojo de agua, aspect, =2.= 69; american post, 433. olaguíbel, f. m. de, warnings to santa anna (1846), =1.= 378, 379; supports farías, =2.= 82; character, 86; and opposition to santa anna, 86, 134, 136; yields to santa anna's demands, 92; supplies for scott, 134; in american rear, 148; and evacuation of mexico, 163; supports peña, 180, 428. old peñón, fortification, =2.= 90, 369, 373; mexican army at, 92; scott avoids, 96. oligarchy, of spanish born, =1.= 29; deposes viceroy, 30; hidalgo's revolt against, 31; partisan warfare on, 31; doomed, 32; revolt against liberal constitution, 32; plots against federal government, 37; rules victoria, 37; attempted revolt (1823), 38; expulsion of gachupines, 39, 42, 413; and bustamante's revolt, 43; and santa anna, 45; and farías' reforms, 46; makes santa anna dictator, 46; and seven laws, rule, 47; factions, 48; goes over to santa anna (1841), 50. _see also_ government; monarchy; roman catholic church. olozaga, salustiano de, on monarchy for mexico, =1.= 448. opposition to the war, mexico counts on, =1.= 105, 107, 119, 443; objections to war bill, 182-3, 471; basis, =2.= 273-5; whig troubles, 276-80, 283, 493, 494; warning from opposition to war of 1812, 280; encourages enemy, 280-1, 289, 495; character of speeches in congress, 284-6; and wilmot proviso, 286-7, 498; whig no-territory plan, 287-8, 498; protracts war, 288, 292; demand for stoppage of supplies and recall of troops, 290-1, 500; whig house programme, 290; effect on, of success of war, 290; continued baiting of polk, 291, 500; results, 292, 314, 510; historical results, 292-3, 501. oregon country, question and mexican relations, =1.= 90, 94, 130, 137, =2.= 299, 504; and british aid of mexico, =1.= 114; and outbreak of the war, 200, 458, 478; compromise settlement, 201; effect on polk, =2.= 271, 281; settlement and wilmot proviso, 286; danger in, 295. organic bases, =1.= 52; revival, 217. orizaba, situation, aspect, =1.= 2, =2.= 222; santa anna's preparations at, 67-8; bankhead's expedition, aspect of route to, 184-5, 433; american rule, 223; lane at, 427. orizaba, mount, aspect, =2.= 18, 60, 223. ortega, j. m., in monterey negotiations, =1.= 502. osgood, david, on war of 1812, =2.= 280, 494. oswandel, j. j., on pillow, =2.= 377. otero, mariano, on advance to rio grande, =1.= 155; on income of the church, 408; on texas and the war, 458; and peace negotiations, =2.= 136, 236; leader of moderados, 327. outbreak of the war, mexican policy to avoid formal declaration, =1.= 88, 434; protection of texas and boundary question, 138, 153, 449, 457, 470; taylor's force occupies corpus christi, 141-3, 452; original size of force, 142; reinforcements, 143, 454; condition of force, 143; rank controversy, 144; crossing of rio grande by mexicans as invasion, 144, 453; taylor's advance to rio grande, 145-8, 454; retaliatory orders, 148, 455; mexicans cross and attack thornton, 149, 455; de facto war, taylor calls for more troops, 150, 455; justification of advance to rio grande, 151-4, 456; advance not cause of war, 154-5, 185, 457, 471; war begun by mexico, 155, 190, =2.= 311-2; her grief for first battles, =1.= 179; polk's message, 181, 470; war bill in congress, 182-3, 471-3; quick peace expected, 184, 471; political considerations, benton, 184-5, 471; calhoun's opposition, 185-7, 472; existence of legal war, 186-7, 472; causes, 187-90, 326, 471, 473, 526, =2.= 284, 310-1, 508-9; proclamation, =1.= 191, 474; raising of army, 190-6, 445; selection of commander, 196-8, 200; polk and scott's plans, scott's relegation, 198-200, 476-8; and oregon question, 200, 458, 478; negotiations with santa anna, 201-3, 478-9; mexican preparations and declaration, 212, 222-3, 484, 488; effect of rio grande campaign on mexicans, 213; overthrow of paredes, 214-22, 485; santa anna's policy to command army only, 222-4; error of short-war policy, 347; popularity, =2.= 268; whig inconsistency on, 276-7; webster on pretexts, 279, 494; buchanan's diplomatic circular on, 297; british attitude, 299-300; french attitude, 300, 503; polk's alleged inconsistencies on causes, 491; as result of lack of preparedness, 509. _see also_ preparation; rio grande campaign. owens, s. c., in doniphan's expedition, =1.= 303; at battle of sacramento, killed, 311. pacheco, f., at buena vista, =1.= 389-91. pacheco, j. r., and peace negotiations, =2.= 133, 137, 393, 396. pachuca, occupied, =2.= 184, 433; under american rule, 460. pacific squadron, vessels during the war, =2.= 189, 447. _see also_ shubrick; sloat; stockton. padierna, battle of. _see_ contreras. pageot, a. j. y., french minister at washington, reports cited _passim_. pakenham, richard, british minister at mexico and washington, and expulsion of americans, =1.= 72, 423; and american claims against mexico, 79, 81, 431; on chances of expected war, 107, 109; warning against slavery expansion, 114; on california, 320, 322; on growing distaste for war, 347; on polk's dilemma, 349; on plan against vera cruz, 350; on santa anna's rule, 415; on mexican treatment of poinsett, 417; on monterey armistice, 502; on march to mexico city, =2.= 37; on desire for peace, 123, 126; on american war finances, 260, 482; and mediation, 301, 504. palmasola fort near tuxpán, =2.= 202. palmerston, viscount, and mexican privateering, =2.= 192; offers mediation, 301, 504; and california, 302; and guizot, 304; and american victories, 305; and interposition, 306; and absorption of mexico, 309. palmetto regiment, in vera cruz expedition, =1.= 368; call, 537; in march to puebla, =2.= 69; in scott's army, 78, 343; at churubusco, 117, 384; at chapultepec, 157; at belén garita, 160, 412; in alvarado expedition, 344. palo alto, battle of, american force, =1.= 163; american line, 164; map, 164; mexican advance and position, 164-5; mexican force, 165; artillery, 165, 465; torrejón's attack and repulse, 166-7; american movement on right, 167-8; defeat of mexican right, 168-9; losses, 169, 466; mexican retreat, 169. _see also_ rio grande campaign. palo alto, camp, =1.= 480. pánuco expedition, =1.= 281. pareda, j. n., and privateering, =2.= 192. paredes y arrillaga, mariano, revolt (1841), =1.= 50; revolt against santa anna (1844), 52, 53; and herrera's rule, 55, 56; and monarchy, 90, 214; revolt (1845), 95, 98-9, 438; as temporary president, 100; hostility toward united states, 100; and slidell, 100, 439; and the war, 104, 155, 190, 452, =2.= 66; revolt and american opinion, =1.= 120; effect of rio grande campaign on, 180, 470; on cause of the war, 189, 457, 474; his policy, 212; cuts off consuls, 212, 484; elected president, 212; war proclamation, 213; and plans to take command, 214-5, 217; difficulties, 214-6, 485; combination against, 216; overthrow, 217, 485; and california, 329, 522-4, =2.= 302; and artillery, =1.= 462; exiled, 485; supposed desire for peace, =2.= 122; combination against santa anna (1847), 134, 137; subsides, 242; return, 306, 395. paredes, fort, constructed, =1.= 158. paris _constitutionnel_, on chances of expected war, =1.= 105, 110, 113; on california, 325; on three-million fund, =2.= 126; on clergy and repeal of law of jan. 11, 332; criticism of military operations, 507. paris _correspondant_, sympathy with mexico, =1.= 112; on mexican church, 408; pessimism on peace prospects, =2.= 235; on outbreak of war, 300. paris _epoque_, and interposition, =2.= 304. paris _globe_, on chances of expected war, =1.= 108. paris _national_, on guizot's american policy, =2.= 296; on outbreak of war, 300; on england and war, 304. paris _portefeuille_, and neutrality, =2.= 304. parish, elijah, on war of 1812, =2.= 280, 494. parker, theodore, on taylor at buena vista, =1.= 559; on conduct of the war, =2.= 324. parker, w. a., _creole_ exploit, =2.= 444. parras, gathering of wool's force at san antonio, =1.= 267-70; his advance to parras, 270-5; aspect, 275; comanche raid, 521; american rule, =2.= 230; outrages at, 450. parrodi, anastasio, at tampico, =1.= 278, 511; at tula, 553; command in army of the north, =2.= 369. parrott, john, american consul at mazatlán, and t. a. c. jones, =1.= 69; on california, 522; on scott, =2.= 316, 317; and sloat, 333; and american funds in mexico, 488. parrott, w. s., american consul and confidential agent in mexico, =1.= 88, 89, 93, 94, 133, 434, 435; and advance to rio grande, 152; and sloat, 333; claim, 426, 430; on british control of mexico, 443. parsons, m. m., in battle of sacramento, =1.= 309, 311, 312. paso. _see_ el paso. patria battalion, at chapultepec, =2.= 408. _patriota mexicano_, on slidell mission, =1.= 436. patronage, as polk's resource, =2.= 270. patten, g. w., on scott at cerro gordo, =2.= 56. patterson, robert, and tamaulipas, =1.= 263; and securing of tampico, 281, 512; and command of vera cruz expedition, 351; march to victoria, 360, 542, 543; as general, 361; and pillow, 361; march to tampico, 365-6; at lobos islands, 368; command on rio grande, 493; distribution of force (oct.), 506; career, 507; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 26, 343; before cerro gordo, and plan to assault, 49; and the battle, 58, 354; takes time-expired men home, 64, 357; return to mexico, 184; at jalapa, 354; and jarauta, 421; retained in service, 432; division at san angel, 461; leaves mexico city, 476; on west pointers, 513. patterson, camp, =1.= 480. paul, g. r., at chapultepec, =2.= 410. paulding, j. k., on polk, =2.= 270. paz, occupied, counter attacks, =2.= 208, 448, 449. peace, speedy, expected, =1.= 184, 471; polk's suggested terms to santa anna (1846), 202, 471; santa anna and, after return, 221, 487; mistake in expecting speedy, 347; mexican law forbidding negotiations, =2.= 81, 130, 135, 367, 389, 393; scott's halt after churubusco, 121, 386, 393; attitude of polk and buchanan, 121; supposed favorable mexican attitude (1846), 122; rejection of buchanan's advances (1846), 122, 386; three million fund and bribery, 123, 126, 387; general american desire, 123; atocha's mission, 123-4, 126, 387; reasons for mexican obstinacy, 124-6; problem of ignoring slidell, 126; appointment of trist, his character, 127; his preconceived attitude toward scott, 127; trist's papers, 128; trist-scott misunderstanding and quarrel, 128-9, 389; bankhead as mediator for trist, 129, 390; controversy over receiving buchanan's communication, 130-3, 390; scott-trist reconciliation, 130, 392; question of douceur, 131-2, 390-1; puebla negotiations, 132, 391, 393; scott's military proposal to facilitate, 133, 393; mexican overtures after churubusco, 133; armistice, 133, 394-6; negotiations during armistice (1847): santa anna's attitude, 135; his terms and instructions, neutral region east of rio grande, 135, 396, 398; mexican commissioners, 135; trist's terms, deadlock, 135; santa anna's dilemma, 136-7, 398; counter-projet, failure, effect, 138-9, 399; chronology of negotiations (1847), 396; santa anna and foreign support, 397; ---arguments against, after fall of capital, 233, 470; attitude of eventualists and other war factions, 234, 463; and governmental chaos, 234; american pessimism, 235, 463; peña's determination to negotiate, 235, 463; trist reopens negotiations by reply to counter-projet, 235, 463; party success in presidential election, 236; state discussion, 236, 464; abortive insurrection of war party, 236, 464; support of mexican congress, 236; recall of trist, 236, 464; intention to harden american terms, 237, 244, 464, 474; trist ignores recall, 237-8, 465, 467; his boundary ultimatum, 238; further retardation, 238, 465; mexican commissioners, 239; secret meetings, propositions, 239, 460; delays, need of haste, de facto truce, 239; insurrection threatens disruption, scott's promise of protection, 240, 466; treaty secretly signed, 240, 467; terms, surrender of conquered territory to mexico, 240, 467-70, 473; map, 241; armistice, 242, 471; plan for absorption of mexico, 243-4, 309; polk and treaty, his dilemma, 244-6, 471-2; treaty in senate, 246-7, 472-3; amendment there, 247, 473; ratification commissioners, 248-9, 473; mexican opposition to acceptance, 249, 250; arguments in favor, 249-51, 474; ratification by mexican congress, 250, 474; exchange of ratifications, 251, 474; misunderstandings, 251, 475; evacuation of mexican territory, 251-2, 475-6; american opposition to annexations, 274; british offer of mediation, 301, 368, 503-4; reception of treaty in europe, 308-9; justice and liberality, 322-3; mexican cordiality, 323; effect in europe, 323; explanatory protocol, 475; spain and mediation, 503; mexico and british guaranty of treaty, 508. pedraza, manuel gómez, character, elected president, =1.= 40; overthrow, 41; restored by santa anna, 44-5; as federalist leader, 48; and butler, 62; paredes courts, 215; and santa anna (1846), 224; as leader of moderados, =2.= 2, 4; and clerical revolt, 14, 330; and peace negotiations, 132, 466. pedregal near contreras, =2.= 101, 104. peel, sir robert, and california, =2.= 302. peña fort near tuxpán, =2.= 202, 203. peña y barragán, m. de la, and revolt, =2.= 12, 13; at san cosme garita, 161, 162. peña y peña, manuel de la, character, =1.= 26, =2.= 180, 427; and renewal of american intercourse, =1.= 91-4, 435; and slidell mission, 96, 97, 437; on texas and war, 457; as executive (1847), =2.= 180, 427, 428; eliminates santa anna, 181, 428; determines to re-open peace negotiations, 235; congress upholds, 235; and recall of trist, 237, 465; and renewal of negotiations, 238; resumes administration, 240, 466; and insurrection and negotiations, 240, 466; and treaty before congress, 250, 474; at exchange of ratifications, 251; on european interposition, 506. pennsylvania, and tariff of 1846, =2.= 273. _see also_ next title. pennsylvania troops, in vera cruz expedition, =1.= 368, =2.= 343; calls, =1.= 537, =2.= 364, 430; at cerro gordo, 56, 57, 353; in scott's army, 78; at chapultepec, 157; at puebla, 174; at huamantla, 425, 426; in lane's guerilla operations, 426; at jalapa, 361, 433. peñón viejo. _see_ old peñón. pensions, mexican war, =2.= 490. peñúñuri, f., at churubusco, =2.= 382. peonage, not displaced by slavery, =1.= 188. people. _see_ population. perdigón garay, j. g., at belén garita, =2.= 159, 160. pérez, f., at buena vista, =1.= 393-5, 559; at coyoacán, =2.= 101; at contreras, 105, 379; at churubusco, 110; at casa mata, 142, 145; brigade, 369. perote, castle of, occupied by worth, =2.= 61; american garrison, 65, 74, 361, 362; and relief of puebla, 176, 425. perry, m. c., in occupation of tampico, =1.= 280; and reinforcements for it, 281, 512, 513; taylor on, 352; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 30, 36, 339, 340; tabasco expeditions, 199-200, 204-5, 443, 445; yucatan operations, 201, 204, 443; supersedes conner, 201-2; character as officer, 202; capture of tuxpán, 202-3, 444; operations at small ports, 203, 445; alvarado expedition, 344-5; squadron, distribution, 442, 444-6; and attack on ulúa, 444. _perry_, damaged, =2.= 449. _petrel_, in occupation of tampico, =1.= 279, 281; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 388; added to navy, 438; in home squadron, 442, 446; in attack on tuxpán, 444. _petrita_, at vera cruz, =2.= 23, 336; in tabasco expedition, 199; in home squadron, 446. philadelphia, enlistments, =1.= 195. philadelphia _north american_, on tariff of 1846, =2.= 257; and the war, 268, 275; on war and extension of slavery, 492. philadelphia _public ledger_, on speeches in congress, =2.= 284. physical aspect, general, of mexico, =1.= 1-3, 16; of corpus christi, 143; between there and rio grande, 146; of camps near rio grande, 205-7; of camargo, 211; of cerralvo. 229; beyond cerralvo, 236, 496; of monterey, 257, =2.= 212; between monterey and saltillo, =1.= 265; between the rio grande and monclova, 272; of monclova, 273; of parras, 275; of tampico, 276, 280, =2.= 214; of raton pass, =1.= 291; of santa fe, 296; of jornada del muerto, 300; of el paso, 300, 302; between el paso and chihuahua, 304; at sacramento river, 308; of monterey, cal., 334; between monterey, mex., and victoria, 357-9; between matamoros and victoria, 360; between victoria and tampico, 366; between saltillo and agua nueva, 373; between san luis potosí and encarnación, 380, 553; of buena vista field, 385; view on approaching antón lizardo, =2.= 18; of vera cruz, 18-9, 34-5, 221-2; along highway from perote to puente nacional, 39; of cerro gordo, 42-5, 347; of national highway between vera cruz and cerro gordo, 46-8; of jalapa, 59, 223; between jalapa and perote, 60-1; between perote and puebla, 69; of puebla, 71, 178; between puebla and valley of mexico, 92-3; of the valley, 94, 119, 138, 158; of the routes across it, 95-7; of santa anna's southern line, 99, 102, 374; of contreras field, 101, 103, 375; of churubusco, 111; of tacubaya, 138, 400; of molino del rey, 140; of western and southern approaches to mexico city, 147; of chapultepec, 150-2, 405-6; between vera cruz and orizaba, 184-5; coast storms, 194; of san juan bautista, 200; of tuxpán, 202-3; of mazatlán, 206; of orizaba, 222; of mexico city, 228. pickett, g. e., at chapultepec, =2.= 157. pico, andrés, battle of san pascual, =1.= 341, 342, 534; succeeds flores, 345; capitulation, 345. pico, jesús, and frémont, =1.= 345. pico, pio, as governor of california, =1.= 319; character, 328; british partisan, 328, 333, 531; civil war with castro, 329; and american occupation, 335, 337, 530. pierce, franklin, on war enthusiasm, =1.= 442; reinforcements for scott, =2.= 77, 171; brigade in scott's army, 78, 363; brigade at contreras, 104, 378; and at churubusco, 115-7, 384; and plan of attack on mexico city, 149, 408; armistice commissioner, 394; and molino del rey, 403; and battles before mexico, 415; leaves mexico, 438. pillow, g. j., as political general, character, =1.= 208, 361, 367, 543, 546, =2.= 185-6, 433; and polk, =1.= 367, =2.= 128, 186, 510; joins scott's headquarters, =1.= 367; on ripley's book, 405; at brazos, 476; on taylor's confidence, 492; left at camargo, 493; on taylor and vera cruz expedition, 536; on taylor and administration, 538; brigade at vera cruz, =2.= 27; before cerro gordo, 49; in the battle, 56-8, 352-3; censures on scott to polk, 74; absence, return as major general, 77, 357; division, 77; in advance from puebla, 93, 371; at contreras, 103-5, 376, 378, 380; at churubusco, 110, 385; force after the battle, 120; and armistice, 134, 395; advance after armistice, 142, 400; at chapultepec, 152, 153, 156, 409; misgivings there, 153; division in advance on belén garita, 159; cabal against scott, leonidas letter, 187, 435; scott's charges against, and arrest, 188, 437; polk rescues, 188; and the recalling of trist, 236; intrigue against scott and presidential ambition, 376; opinion of good officers, 377; ascendancy over scott, 378; and douceur, 391; and plan of attack on mexico city, 408; leaves mexico, 438. pineda, manuel, attack on la paz, =2.= 449. pino, manuel, force to resist kearny, =1.= 293, 294. "pintos," in alvarez's force, =2.= 369. pinzón, luis, at cerro gordo, =2.= 44, 51. plan del rió, as defensive point, =2.= 40, 42; scott's advance at, 48. plana mayor, mexican, =1.= 156. plateau, central, of mexico, =1.= 1-2. _plebeian_, on war and expansion, =1.= 444. poblana market girls, =2.= 71. poinsett, j. r., treatment as minister at mexico, =1.= 58-9, 417; boundary and texas negotiations, 59-60, 418; commercial negotiations, 61, 419; recall demanded, 62; on mexican agriculture, 410; on mexican cavalry, 440; on american army, 451; on trist mission, =2.= 390. point isabel, occupied by taylor, =1.= 146, 148; as base, taylor and line of communication, 160-1, 463; taylor's hurried march to, 163; as camp, 205; mexican customhouse, 452; navy at, 466, =2.= 197; troops left at, =1.= 493. police, in occupied territory, =2.= 213, 215, 229, 450, 452. politics, in choice of a commander, =1.= 197, 199-200; in vera cruz expedition, 356, 363, 368, 539, 544; influence on war operations, 545. _see also_ congress; democratic; government, mexican; opposition; polk, j. k.; president of united states; whig. polk, j. k., efforts to restore intercourse with mexico, =1.= 88-91; slidell mission, 94-5, 98, 100, 133, 436, 447; alleged desire for war, 127-8, 445-6, 478; diary, 128; character, 128-30, 447, =2.= 270-1, 314-5, 510; disproof of desire for war, =1.= 130-4, 150, 326, 447, 526; and oregon, 130, 137, 200-1, 478; and scott, 130, 354, =2.= 75, 188, 436, 511; intolerable conditions facing, =1.= 134-7; peaceful intent and advance to rio grande, 151-5, 456-61; war message, 181, 470; expects quick peace, 184, 471; and slavery and the war, 188; war proclamation, 191, 474; and volunteering, 191, 193; and selection of commanding officer, 196, 198, 200, 202, 476; and taylor, 196, 352-3, 507, 538, 544, 547; alarm over rio grande conditions, 198, 476; and scott's war policy, clash, 199-200, 477; negotiations with santa anna, 201-3, 471, 478-9, =2.= 491, 493; and terms at monterey, =1.= 260, 263, 505; war programme, occupation of territory, 262, 266-7, 350-1, =2.= 273, 492; and tampico, =1.= 278; and defensive-line policy dilemma, 283, 348; and new mexico, 286; and california, 325, 326, 332, 526, =2.= 514; selection of commander for vera cruz expedition, =1.= 351-4; and plans and responsibility for scott's expedition, 356, 540, 541, =2.= 343; and insubordination of harney, =1.= 365, 545; pillow's influence with, 367, 547, =2.= 128, 186, 510; and texan boundary, =1.= 449; and doniphan's expedition, 517; and ten regiment bill, =2.= 74, 76; and commanding generalcy for benton, 75, 365; and seekers for army office, 76; desire for peace negotiations, 121; and rejection of overtures (1846), 123, 387; three million fund, 123, 387; effect of policy on mexican obduracy, 126; problem of ignoring slidell, 126; appointment of trist as agent, 127; and failure of negotiations (1847), 138, 399; and cabal against scott, 185-8, 438; on privateering, 192; and puppet government for mexico, 235; recalls trist, 236, 237, 464; and absorption of mexico, 244; and the treaty, dilemma, 244-6, 471; appointment of ratification commissioners, 248-9, 473; and tariff, 257; and war loans, 259, 260, 264, 482; and tariff for mexican ports, 261, 262; and levies on mexicans, 264, 486; public and party attitude toward, 269, 271, 282, 291; cabinet, 269, 282; and patronage, 270, 283; and new york politics, 270, 491; effect of oregon policy on, 271, 281; and of river and harbor veto, 271, 281; and of attitude toward taylor and scott, 272; and of texas, 272; and of unfavorable war conditions, 272; and of fiscal policy, 273, 281; whig jibes, 275-6; inconsistency of whig criticism, 276-80, 493; and whig encouragement of enemy, 281; character of congressional attacks on policy, 284-6, 289; continuation of baiting, 291, 500; hampering of policy, 292; injustice of condemnation, 293; reassertion of monroe doctrine, 295; on france and texas, 295, 501; british on, 300; and british mediation, 301, 504; achievement, 314-5, 510; and trist-scott quarrel, 389; and douceur, 391; and armistice, 393; and mutiny at buena vista, 418; and hays's regiment, 423; further call for volunteers, 431; and trial of frémont, 454; and yucatan, 472; message (1847) on pushing the war, 474; and lower california, 476; alleged war inconsistencies, 491; and policy of annexations, 502. polk, fort, =1.= 205. polko revolt, =2.= 12-14, 330-2, 334. polko battalions, formation, =2.= 3, 13; at churubusco, 111. poll tax, question of mexican, =2.= 328. pommarès, ----, conner's agent, =1.= 478. ponce de león, antonio, brazito affair, =1.= 301-2, 518; in battle of sacramento, 310. popocatepetl, mount, aspect, =2.= 92, 93. popularity of the war in the united states, general american war spirit, =1.= 124, 444; why concentrated upon mexico, 125, 444-5; initial, =2.= 268; reaction, 269, 281, 490; restoration, 290, 499. _see also_ attitude; opposition; outbreak; preparation. population of mexico, in 1846, =1.= 3, 407; characteristics of spanish born, 3; of creoles, 3, 407; of indians, 4; social and economic classes, 5-6; clergy, 6-8; army, 8-11; civil officials, 11; judges, 12-3; criminals, 13; need, 16; picture of life and character, 18-28; general state, types, 28, 445; of new mexico, 284; of california, 315; characteristics of californians, 315-7; popular american opinion of mexican, 445; of santa fe, 517; characteristics of new mexicans, =2.= 216; british view of american character, 294-5, 502; contrast of american and mexican character, 310, 508; attitude of mexican, toward the war, 312, 510. _see also_ character; conquered territory; social conditions. _porpoise_, in home squadron, =2.= 197, 445. port la vaca, as base, =1.= 267. porter, andrew, at contreras, =2.= 104. porter, d. d., and ulúa, =2.= 201; at siege of vera cruz, 339. porter, j. d., acknowledgment to, =1.= 444. porter, t. h., skirmish, killed, =1.= 160. _portsmouth_, at san francisco, =1.= 333; in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 206, 446, 447; off mazatlán, 446, 447; at guaymas, 447. posada y garduño, manuel, and santa anna's dictatorship, =1.= 52; chief monarchist, dies, 215. posey, carnot, on soldiers and taylor, =1.= 374. _potomac_, and vera cruz expedition, =2.= 18, 25; scurvy, 195; in home squadron, 197, 442; and attack on tuxpán, 444. pratt, h. c, in lane's march to puebla, =2.= 426. _preble_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 206, 447. preparation for war, mexican, on annexation of texas, =1.= 87-8, 434; mexican hostile attitude toward americans, 102-4, 484; reasons for hope of mexican success, 104-16; united states deemed feeble, 104-5; expected opposition in united states, 105, 107, 119, 443; foreign opinion on relative military strength, 105-6; mexico's opinion of its own army, 106; texas as expected field, 107, 110; successful invasion of mexico deemed impossible, 107-8; mexican hope in privateering, 108; and on financial burden on united states, 109, 130; expected revitalization of mexico, 110; expected aid from spanish america, 111; and from europe, 112-5, 441, 442; importance of oregon controversy, 114-5, 130, 137, 442; mexican desire for war, 115-6, 442, =2.= 312, 510; american attitude, =1.= 117-37; resentment of mexican outrages, 117-9, 443; patience with an inferior people, 119; attacks on policy of forbearance, 119-21; effect of claims controversy, 120, 132, 134, 448; of rejection of slidell, 120, 127, 145, 445; supposed european manipulation of mexico, 121-2, 443; demand of the southwest, trade influences, 122, 443; slaveholders fear, 123; chance to overthrow calhoun, 123; and spirit of expansion, 123, 444; unrest, war spirit and allurements of mexico, 124-6, 444-5; expected easy victory, 125; annexation of texas and war spirit, 126, 132; polk's alleged desire for war, disproof, 127-34, 150, 326, 445-8, 478, 526; intolerable conditions, force as only solution, 134-7; and monarchy for mexico, 135, 448; bold attitude as argument for negotiations, 152. _see also_ diplomatic intercourse; outbreak. president of mexico, powers under first constitution, =1.= 37; election of victoria, 37; and of pedraza, 40; guerrero, 41; bustamante, 43, 47; pedraza restored, 45; election of santa anna (1832), 45; santa anna temporary, 49; santa anna's election (1844), 53; herrera, 55; paredes in power, 100, 212; santa anna titular and farías acting (1846), =2.= 5-6; farías eliminated, anaya substitute, 14, 15; santa anna resumes power (1847), 83; election of 1847 deferred, 73, 84, 363; santa anna resigns, peña acting, 180, 240, 427, 428, 466; anaya elected ad interim (1847), 236; herrera (1848), 252. _see also_ dictatorship; revolution. president of united states, scott's ambition, =1.= 130, =2.= 284, 390-2; taylor's candidacy proposed, =1.= 179, 208; his ambition and suspicions, 352, 363, 368, 538, 544, 547; effect of buena vista on it, 400; his letter to gaines, 507; effect on taylor of polk's attitude and own conduct, =2.= 272, 278, 493; whigs and candidates, 284; webster's candidacy, 291; taylor's candidacy as vindication of the war, 292; pillow's ambition, 376. _see also_ polk. press, mexican, conditions, =1.= 15; paredes's decrees on, 215; during the war, =2.= 84, 85, 91. _see also_ newspapers. price, sterling, to raise men, =1.= 290; troops to reinforce kearny, 290, 516; to hold santa fe, 298, 517; chihuahua and rosales expedition, =2.= 166, 419; as governor of new mexico, 217, 453; supposed force (nov., 1847), 432. _princeton_, in occupation of tampico, =1.= 279; at vera cruz, =2.= 26; in home squadron, 197, 441; in attack on alvarado, 198. principles of war, =1.= 405. prisoners of war, encarnación, =1.= 370-1, 562, =2.= 418; release after monterey armistice, =1.= 507; scott's treatment, parole, =2.= 58, 340, 353, 515; and armistice after churubusco, 134, 394; in treaty of peace, 468. prisons, mexican, =1.= 13, 21. privateering, mexican hope in, =1.= 108; projects, failure, =2.= 191-3; question of american, 192, 439. proclamations, war, =1.= 191, 213, 474; scott's, at vera cruz, =2.= 38; of may 11, 66, 357-8. programme of war, polk's rejection of scott's policy, =1.= 198-200; policy of occupying territory, 262, 266-7, 508, =2.= 273, 492; defensive-line policy, =1.= 282-3, 461, 513, 514, =2.= 183, 430; failure of quick peace programme, =1.= 347; project of attack on mexico city, 349; question of attack on vera cruz, 349-50; no further advance in north, 350; attack on vera cruz adopted, 350-1; advance to capital left open, 351, 540, =2.= 344; marcy shifts responsibility to scott, =1.= 355, 540; taylor ignores programme, 368; mexican plan after fall of capital, =2.= 182, 430; american problem after capture of capital, 183, 430; hampered by opposition, 292; effect of inadequate preparation, 314, 510. _progreso_, on american peace party, =2.= 495. pronunciation of spanish, =1.= xxi. propaganda, mexican, among taylor's troops, =1.= 160; among irish soldiers, 507, =2.= 81, 358; at siege of vera cruz, 337. _see also_ desertion. prospects of war. _see_ preparation. prosperity, of occupied territory, =2.= 214, 215, 219, 232; american, in the war, 263, 484. _provisional_, on united states and texas, =1.= 423. prussia, and the war, =1.= 403, =2.= 298-9. _see also_ canitz. public debt. _see_ finances; loans. public lands, bounty to soldiers, =2.= 75, 490; gradation policy, 261, 482. public opinion, lack in mexico, =1.= 13. puebla, situation, aspect, =1.= 2, =2.= 71; scott's advance from jalapa, 64, 66, 69; clerical control and attitude toward scott's advance, understanding, 65-6, 357; santa anna at, 69, 360; he evacuates, 70; worth's conference, erroneous agreement, 70, 360; occupation, 71; character of worth's rule, 71-2, 361; scott at, 72; condition of army in, 72-3; advance from, 78, 92, 371; scott at, and peace negotiations, 130, 391; guerilla operations and beginning of siege, 173-4, 424; american garrison and positions, 174, 424, 433; santa anna's siege, 174-6; lane's march to relieve, 176, 425; battle of huamantla, 176-8, 425-6; arrival of lane, siege raised, 178; losses in siege, 426; american rule, 225, 229, 231. puebla state, guerilla warfare, =2.= 173; in discussion on peace, 464. pueblo indians, submit to kearny, =1.= 296. puente nacional, as defensive point, =2.= 40, 348; abandoned, 41-2; aspect, 47; american post, 432. pulque, =1.= 508. punta aguda, occupied, =1.= 562. purísima bridge at monterey, =1.= 249, 254. puros, rise, aims, opposition, =2.= 2-4; demands and loss of prestige, 4-5; and presidential election (1846), 5; abandon farías, 12; attitude toward santa anna, 15, 82, 83, 87; and peace negotiations (1847), 136; and local government under scott, 229; eventualists, 234, 465; oppose treaty, 250; and british mediation, 368. _see also_ farías; federalism. querétaro, situation, =1.= 3; revolt, =2.= 236. querétaro battalion, at monterey, =1.= 494; at chapultepec, =2.= 408. querétaro state, in discussion on peace, =2.= 464. quijano, benito, armistice commissioner, =2.= 242, 394. quitman, j. a., brigade at monterey, =1.= 249, 252-6, 492; taylor on, 352; march to victoria, 357, 360; march to tampico, 365-6, 368; at brazos, 476; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 27; at jalapa, 62; in advance to puebla, 64, 69; amozoc affair, 70; division in scott's army, 78, 356, 365; in advance from puebla, 93, 94, 371; at san agustín, 103, 376, 380; during armistice, commissioner, 134, 394; advance after armistice, 142, 401; at chapultepec, 152, 153, 156, 157, 409-11; at belén garita, 158-60, 162, 412, 414-6; takes possession of the city, 163, 416; as governor of it, 164, 226, 460; and scott, 248; alvarado expedition, 344-5; court of inquiry on worth, 361; and contreras, 381; and douceur, 391; and plan of attack on capital, 408; division broken up, 432; leaves mexico, 438; not west pointer, 513. radepont, marquis de, on volunteers, =2.= 513. radicals, aim of mexican (1846), =2.= 2-4. _see also_ puros. rainfall of mexico, =1.= 1-2. ramírez, j. f., on mexican responsibility for the war, =1.= 116; on santa anna's manifesto, 219; on the church, 408; on judicial system, 409; on political situation (1847), =2.= 16, 83; on guerilla warfare, 168; on mexican political character, 310; on justice of the war, 323; conference with santa anna, 368; on armistice, 399. ramírez, simeón, brigade at monterey, =1.= 235, 494; at molino del rey, =2.= 142; flight, 145; at belén garita, 159, 160. ramiro, josé, and contreras, =2.= 106. ramsey, a. c., regiment, =2.= 363. ranchero, =1.= 19. ranelagh, viscount, proffer to mexico, =2.= 306. rangel, j., and preparations below perote, =2.= 40, 346; and contreras, 110; at molino del rey, 142; at chapultepec, 157, 161, 410, 411; at san cosme garita, wounded, 161, 162, 413; brigade, 369. rank controversy in american army, =1.= 144. ransom, t. b., at contreras, =2.= 109, 110, 378; at chapultepec, killed, 155; regiment, 263. _see also_ ninth infantry. _raritan_, and vera cruz expedition, =2.= 25; scurvy, 195; in home squadron, 197, 442, 446; in attack on tuxpán, 444. raton pass, kearny at, aspect, =1.= 291. _razonador_, peace organ, =2.= 82. rea, j., as guerilla, =2.= 173; siege of puebla, 174, 176; retirement and overthrow, 178-9, 426-7. rebolledo, j. c., as guerilla, =2.= 171; betrayed, 423. recognition of texas, american, =1.= 66, 422, 423; european, 432. red comet, secret society, =1.= 376. _reefer_, captured, =1.= 511; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 238; added to navy, 438; in home squadron, 442, 445, 446; in attack on tuxpán, 444. _reforma_, desires war, =1.= 116. reforms, farías' attempts, =1.= 45-6. regulars. _see_ army. reid, j. w., in battle of sacramento, =1.= 309, 311; pursuit of comanches, 521. reid, mayne, at battle of chapultepec, wounded, =2.= 156, 157. rejón, m. c., and annexation of texas, =1.= 86; santa anna's manifesto (1846), 219; and new government, 222; return with santa anna, 486; as leader of puros, =2.= 2, 3; demands and dismissal, 4; and demand on church property, 10, 329, 331; rejects peace overtures (1846), 122; and atocha as peace agent, 124; key of policy, 125; corrupt, 131; opposes peace negotiations (1847), 136; and treaty of peace, 249; and poll tax, 324; and british offer of mediation, 368; suspected intrigue with scott, 390. religion. _see_ roman catholic church. reno, j.l., at contreras, =2.= 104; at chapultepec, 154. reports, character of american army, =1.= ix, 404, =2.= 59, 354. _republicano_, on financial chaos, =2.= 11; on three-million fund, 126; on atocha, 386. repudiation, state, and american war finances, =2.= 256, 294, 478. requena, t., and defence of monterey, =1.= 233, 489; and santa anna, 377; in monterey negotiations, 502; on taylor's blunders, 503. resaca de guerrero. _see_ resaca de la palma. resaca de la palma, battle of, map, =1.= 170; mexican position and conditions, 170-2, 467; american advance, mêlée, 172-3; flanking of mexican left, 174; panic of mexican right, 174; may's charge, 174, 467; arista's conduct, 175; flight across rio grande, 175; little pursuit, 175, 467; losses, 176. _see also_ rio grande campaign. _revista económica y comercial_, on herrera administration, =1.= 438. revolutions in mexico, as relief for ennui, =1.= 21; hidalgo's attempt (1810), 31; itúrbide's (1821), 33; overthrow of itúrbide (1823), 35; montaño attempt (1827), 38; santa anna's overthrow of pedraza (1828), 40-1; overthrow of guerrero (1829), 43; santa anna restores pedraza (1832), 44-5; attempt against farías (1833), 46; mejía's attempt (1839), 49; attempts of paredes and valencia (1841), 50; santa anna's (1841), 51; overthrow of santa anna (1844), 53-5; attempted federalist (1845), 56; paredes (1845), 98-9, 120, 438; alvarez (1846), 216; overthrow of paredes, 216-7, 485; complexity of this, =2.= 1; clerical (polko), against farías (1847), 12-4, 230-2. reyes, i., and the defence of northern states, =1.= 305; and plans against taylor, =2.= 165; succeeds santa anna, 181, 429. reynolds, j. f., at chapultepec, =2.= 156. reynosa, occupied, =1.= 204, 479. rhett, r. b., position in house, =2.= 496. rhode island, and peace, =2.= 123. richmond _enquirer_, on war spirit, =1.= 126; on divided sentiment toward mexico, 443. _see also_ ritchie, thomas. richtofen, freiherr von, prussian minister at mexico, on bocanegra's note, =1.= 69. ridgely, randolph, battery at resaca de la palma, =1.= 172, 173, 467; at monterey, 254, 492, 496. riley, bennet, at cerro gordo, =2.= 53, 55, 352, 354; brigade in scott's army, 77; at contreras, 104, 108-10, 378-80; at churubusco, 114, 382; and plan of attack on mexico city, 149, 408; at chapultepec, 152; advance after armistice, 401; at tacubaya, 461. rincón, manuel, and alvarez' revolt, =1.= 216; at churubusco, =2.= 110, 114, 117; and high command, 182, 429; and peace commission, 239, 466. rincón del diablo. _see_ diablo. rinconada pass, mexicans to retire to line of, =1.= 259; taylor's force at, aspect, 265; wool's march and mexican abandonment, 508. ringgold, samuel, in advance to rio grande, =1.= 146, 147; at palo alto, mortally wounded, 164, 167, 465, 466; field battery, 450, 451; and artillery arm, 451. río, señor del, and peace negotiations, =2.= 236. río frio, american post, =2.= 432. rio grande campaign, river as boundary of texas, =1.= 138; taylor's force as guard, 142; crossing by mexicans as invasion, 144, 453; taylor's advance to, 145-8, 454; retaliatory orders, 148-9, 455; mexicans cross and attack, 149, 455; de facto war, taylor calls for more troops, 150, 205, 458, 480; justification of advance to, 151-4, 456-61; advance not cause of war, 154-5, 185, 457, 471, =2.= 276-7; mexican force, =1.= 158, 462; matamoros fortifications, 158; condition and position of american force, mexican opinion, 158-60, 462, 463; map of matamoros and american position, 159; minor mishaps, 160; mexican propaganda, 160; mexican impatience for combat, 161, 463; taylor and line of communication, 161, 464; mexican advance on line, 162, 464; taylor's march to point isabel, 163; return march, train, 163; size of american force, 163; its morale, 164; battle of palo alto, 164-9, 465; attack on fort brown, 164, 176, 467-9; pursuit of mexicans, 169, 466; battle of resaca de la palma, 170-6, 467; taylor's inaction, permits mexicans to retire from matamoros, 176-8, 469; americans cross and occupy town, 178; results of campaign, taylor's conduct, 178-80, 469, 470; effect on mexicans, 179, 213; original american force, =2.= 511. ripalda, father, catechism, =1.= 13. ripley, r. s., value of his history, =1.= 404; on scott and taylor, 490; on wool's march, 510; on scott's preparations, 539, 544; at cerro gordo, =2.= 53, 58; on cerro gordo, 348, 353, 354; on scott's delay at puebla, 361; on choice of routes, 373; on contreras, 380; on churubusco, 383; on scott and trist, 392; on armistice, 398, 399; on molino del rey, 403; on scott's failure to prepare, 404; on plan to attack city, 405; on chapultepec, 409; on belén garita, 412; on san cosme garita, 413; on scott's failure to occupy country, 433; on excesses in mexico city, 460; on peace negotiations, 467. ritchie, thomas, on southern opposition to the war, =1.= 189; on attitude of whigs, =2.= 276, 279. _see also_ richmond _enquirer_. river and harbor bill, polk's veto, =2.= 271, 281. rives, w. c., plan to stop the war, =2.= 290. roa bárcena, j. m., on mexican desire for war, =1=. 116; value of his history, 404; on texan boundary, 449; on american and mexican armies, 469; on taylor and scott as conquerors, =2.= 324, 511. roads, mexican, =1.= 16. roberts, b. s., on charge at cerro gordo, =2.= 54; at contreras, 104; at chapultepec, 158, 410; hoists flag in mexico city, 164. roberts, w. b., at cerro gordo, =2.= 56, 57. robertson, j. b., on mistakes at monterey, =1.= 503. robinson, j. a., american consul at guaymas, reports cited _passim_. robles, manuel, and defences of vera cruz, =2.= 19, 334; at cerro gordo, 42, 43, 45, 348. rockwell, j. a., on walker, =2.= 480. rogers, r. c., captured, =2.= 444. roland, j. f., company of light artillery, =2.= 366. roman catholic church in mexico, religious qualities, =1.= 4, 7, 14, 22, 26; authority and character, wealth, 6-7, 408; and education, 14; farías' attempted reforms, 45-6; and seven laws, 47; and santa anna's dictatorship, 52; fears american influence, 103; and war funds, 213-4, 223, =2.= 254, 346, 347, 477; santa anna declares against ecclesiastical domination (1846), =1.= 219; and war demands on its property, law of jan. 11, =2.= 8-11, 329; beach's intrigue and revolt, 11-4, 330-2, 334; and santa anna after revolt, 15, 65, 85, 332; arrangement with scott, 65-7, 331, 357-8; and peace, 125; incitation of religious fervor against americans, 142, 346; american attitude toward, 211, 221, 324, 458, 459; in treaty of peace, 248, 468. _see also_ government; oligarchy. romero, manuel, at monterey, =1.= 243, 494; and taylor's march to victoria, 542. rosa, luis de la, opposes peace negotiations (1847), =2.= 136; as peña's minister, 181, 428; at exchange of ratifications, appearance, 251; and reopening of peace negotiations, 463; minister at washington, 475. _rosita_, mexican privateer, =2.= 192, 193. rothschilds, and american funds in mexico, =2.= 266, 488; and war borrowings, 481. rowan, john, claims commissioner, =1.= 430. rowe, t. f., at siege of puebla, =2.= 424. royce, josiah, on justice of acquiring california, =2.= 322. ruiz de apodaca. _see_ apodaca. sabine river, as boundary, =1.= 63. sacramento, cal., and sutter's trading post, =1.= 318. sacramento river, battle of, mexican force, =1.= 306, 519; topography, mexican defences, 306-8, 520; map, 307; doniphan's formation, 308; his crossing of arroyo seco and gaining of plateau, 309; repulse of mexican cavalry, 310; artillery duel, 310; capture of forts, 311-2, 520; losses, 312. st. louis, enlistments, =1.= 195; and santa fe trail trade, 286. st. louis _missouri reporter_, attacks policy of forbearance, =1.= 121; demand for war, 443. st. louis _republican_, on rejection of slidell, =1.= 120; on war spirit, 132. st. louis _reveille_, on war spirit, =1.= 126. _st. mary's_, in occupation of tampico, =1.= 279, =2.= 197; off vera cruz, =1.= 486; in home squadron, =2.= 197, 442. salas, j. m., revolt in favor of santa anna, =1.= 217, 222, 485, 488; on santa anna at san luis potosí, 379; and farías and santa anna, =2.= 1, 4; and polkos, 3; supports moderados, 4; and rising against farías, 13; captured at contreras, 110, 378; and peace negotiations, 122; and guerilla warfare, 169; command in army of the north, 369. saldaña, general, captured at chapultepec, =2.= 411. saltillo, road from monterey, worth's movement on it, =1.= 239-44, 497; taylor's advance and occupation of town, 264-6; wool's expedition diverted to, 275, 358; doniphan joins wool, 313, 521; santa anna's plan against (dec.), 357, 541; and battle of buena vista, 383, 395, 555, 556, 559; valencia's plans against, =2.= 165; under american rule, 213, 452; wool's later force, 417; hamtramck commands, 418. san agustín (tlálpam), scott's advance to, =2.= 96-8, 374, 381. san angel, patterson's division at, =2.= 461. san antonio, mex., fortification, =2.= 98; american reconnaissance and advance, 102-3; capture, 112, 382. san antonio, texas, danger of mexican attack (1846), =1.= 153; gathering of wool's force, 267; aspect, 268. san antonio (abad) garita, =2.= 147. san blas, as port, =1.= 3; blockade, =2.= 206, 207, 448; not occupied, 207, 448. san blas battalion, at chapultepec, =2.= 410. san cosme garita, =2.= 147; capture, 161-2, 413-4, 416. san diego, cal., in the conquest, =1.= 336, 340, 534. san fernando de presas, =1.= 259, 502. san fernando de rosas, wool at, aspect, =1.= 272. san francisco, cal., importance of port, effort to acquire, =1.= 95, 323-4, 436. san gerónimo village, in battle of contreras, =2.= 104, 105, 107, 379, 380. san isidro, harney at, =2.= 94. san jacinto, battle of, =1.= 47. san josé, lower cal., occupied, counter-attacks, =2.= 208, 448, 449. san juan, american post, =2.= 432. san juan bautista, perry's attacks, =2.= 199, 204-5, 443, 445. san juan de ulúa, fortress, captured by french, =1.= 49; position and strength, 349, 536, =2.= 19, 21, 333; plan, 21; and the siege, 33; surrender, occupation, 36, 340; plan for naval attack, 201, 444. _see also_ vera cruz expedition. san lucas, occupied, =2.= 208. san luis potosí, situation, =1.= 3; santa anna at, 375-80; his march against taylor, 380; scott's intention to occupy, =2.= 184, 432; war-party insurrection, 240, 466. san luis potosí battalion, at monterey, =1.= 494. san luis potosí cavalry, at monterey, =1.= 494. san luis potosí state, in discussion on peace, =2.= 464. san pascual, cal., battle, =1.= 341-2; map, 341. san patricio, texas, taylor's intended movement, =1.= 452. san patricio corps of irish deserters, at buena vista, =1.= 391, 393, 395; origin, 494, 550; at churubusco, =2.= 111, 117, 385; fate, 385. sanders, john, and artillery in monterey campaign, =1.= 228; in battle of monterey, 246. sands, j. r., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338. santa anna, antonio lópez de, and education, =1.= 14; first appearance, 31; in itúrbide's revolt, 33; revolt against itúrbide, 35; and overthrow of pedraza (1828), 40, 41; and spanish invasion, 41; appearance and character, 42, 54, 220, 414, 415, 487, =2.= 312-3, 510; in retirement, =1.= 44, 45, 47, 48, 52; restores pedraza (1832), 44-5; elected president (1832), 45; dictator with reactionary support, 46, 415; plans, effect of texan revolt, 47; loses leg in attack on french, hero, 49; undermines bustamante, 49-50; and paredes revolt, 50; seizes power (1841), dictatorship, 51-2; constitutional president, 53; overthrow, banished, 53-4; and united states and texas, 63, 66, 85-6, 433; plans against texas (1842-3), 67, 70; closes new mexican trade, 72; and claims, 78; hatred of united states, 103; boasts power of army, 106; invites a blockade, 110; incites fears of spanish america, 111; on desire for war, 116; "butcher," 117; polk's negotiations (1846), 201-3, 471, 478-9, =2.= 491, 493; combination against paredes, =1.= 215-7, 485; alvarez' revolt in favor of, 216; return, 218, 486; manifesto, 219; position and caution, 219-22, 487; policy and command of army only, 222-4; reception at the capital, 222, 488; sets out for front, 223; and monterey campaign, 230, 234, 494, 503; and termination of monterey armistice, 264; and tampico, 278, 511; potential army, 283, 513; policy toward northern frontier, 305; and doniphan's march, 306; and california, 319; plan to attack during taylor's victoria march, 357; programme of one victory, 374-5; at san luis potosí, incites patriotism, 375; attitude of states toward, 376, 550; and national guard and officers, 376; financial worries and operations, 377, =2.= 254-5, 477; character of his northern army, =1.= 377, 379, 550; rumors of his intended treachery and dictatorship, 378, 379, 551; inaction condemned, 379; plan to attack taylor's weak and isolated force, 379, 543, 552; march, force, 380-2, 552-4; discovered by americans, their flight to buena vista, 382-3, 554; battle of buena vista, 384-97; retires to preserve organized army, 397-8, 562; retreat to san luis potosí, 398; credited with victory, 399; robs treasury (1844), 432; and texan boundary, 449; and salas and farías, =2.= 1; and puros, 2-5; and shelving of farías, 4, 327; and election (1846), 5; and church property, 9-12, 65, 329, 331; and clerical revolt, supersedes farías, 13-4, 331; political position as executive (1847), 14-5, 332; and defence of vera cruz, 20, 334; on surrender of vera cruz, 33, 341, 342; preparations against scott below perote, 40-2, 346; defences and force at cerro gordo, 42-5, 347, 348; battle of cerro gordo, 48-59, 352; flight, 55; in retreat, 67, 358; preparations at orizaba, funds, 67, 359; political influences on movements, at puebla, 68-9, 360; amozoc affair, evacuates puebla, 70, 360; loss of prestige after cerro gordo, 80, 367; as target for discontent, 82; return to capital with army, breach of faith, 82-3, 368; resumes executive power, opposition, 83-5; defied by states, 86-7; collection of matériel, 87; organization of army, its character and officers, 87-9, 369; plan of operation against scott's advance, 89-90, 370; defences, 90; power and enthusiasm for, on start of final campaign, 91-2; and scott's march to san agustín, 97-8, 374; confidence in, again lost, 98; southern line, 99-101, 374; and valencia's occupation of contreras field, 102, 375; and battle of contreras, 105, 106, 110, 379, 380; preparations at churubusco, 110-1, 382; battle of churubusco, 112-9, 382-5; attitude toward peace on his return (1846), 122, 124, 386; and trist mission, 130-2; peace move after churubusco, 133; armistice, 133, 137-8, 394-6; activity during it, combination against him, 134, 136, 398; peace negotiations during armistice, 135-8, 396-400; preparations at molino del rey, 142; and the battle there, 144, 402, 404; preparations against attack on city, 152; and chapultepec, 153-5, 410; at belén garita, 159, 160, 413; at san cosme garita, 161, 162; evacuates the city, 163, 415; and uprising in city, 167, 168, 420; and guerilla warfare, 169; siege of puebla, 174-6; battle of huamantla, 176-8, 425, 426; eliminated, 179-81, 427, 428; yields command, 181, 429; voluntary exile, 181, 242, 429; and salary, 327; capture of his wooden leg, 354; scott's proclamation on, 357; and british offer of mediation, 368; almost captured, 427. _see also_ mexico expedition. santa barbara, cal., pico's convention, =1.= 329, 527; occupied by stockton, 337; frémont at, 345; captured by insurgents, 534. santa cruz de rosales, capture, =2.= 166. santa fe, mex., powder-mill, =1.= 462, =2.= 87. santa fe, n. mex., texan expedition, =1.= 72, 118; occupied by kearny, 296; aspect, 296; troops remaining at, 298; population, 517; condition of force at, 518. _see also_ next title, and new mexico. santa fe trail, development and importance, =1.= 72, 284, 286, 514; kearny's expedition on, 288-9, 515. santa rosa, wool at, =1.= 272. santa rosa pass, skirmish, =1.= 541. santangelo, o. g. d. de a., claim, =1.= 427; on outrages, 448. santiago, fort, at vera cruz, =2.= 19. _saratoga_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189; yellow fever, 195; in home squadron, 446. saunders, j. l., attack at tampico, =2.= 197, 441. saunders, r. m., american minister at madrid, and spanish mediation, =2.= 503. _savannah_, at monterey, =1.= 335; and frémont, 345, 536; in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 447. schatzel, i. p., american consul at matamoros, =1.= 455. school of mines, mexican, =1.= 14. scenery, mexican. _see_ physical aspect. _scorpion_, in home squadron, =2.= 446. scott, h. l., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 335; of scott's staff, 366. scott, martin, at monterey, =1.= 245, 498. scott, winfield, political ambition and the war, =1.= 130, =2.= 284, 390, 391; relations with polk, =1.= 130, 354, =2.= 75, 188, 436, 511; and taylor and bliss, =1.= 141; and twiggs-worth controversy, 144; and advance to rio grande, 152-4; and command in the field, 196, 198; character, 197, 545, =2.= 248, 316-8; war policy and clash with administration, relegated, =1.= 198-200, 476-8; and taylor's intelligence system, 227; on monterey, 261, 505, 506; and taylor, 262, 352, 353, 363, 368, 544; and defensive-line policy, 283; and war programme, 350, 351; selected to command vera cruz expedition, 351-4; and earlier rebuff, 353, 539; and harney, 364-5, 545, 546; attitude toward pillow, 367, =2.= 186, 378; character of reports, =1.= 404, =2.= 59, 354; and flintlocks, =1.= 450; on polk's alarm at outbreak, 476; and taylor's advance from the rio grande, 490; and doniphan's expedition, 517; and taylor's insubordinate advance, 547; on twiggs, =2.= 48; attitude of troops, 49; at cerro gordo, 56; at contreras, 105, 106, 378, 379; at churubusco, 111, 118, 119, 383; halt after churubusco, on it, 121, 386; quarrel with trist, 128, 389; reconciliation and harmony, 130, 392, 397; and douceur, 131, 132, 390, 391; and mexican attitude toward trist, 132, 133, 390, 393; peace move after churubusco, 133; armistice then, 133, 137, 138, 394-6, 398-9; and molino del rey, 143, 147, 401, 402; decides to attack chapultepec, 149, 408; misgivings on it, 154; at the battle, 158; and advance after chapultepec, 161, 412, 414-6; in mexico city, 164, 415-6; cabal against, 185-8, 434-8; and worth, 186, 361; removed, 188, 438; orders for military government, 455-7; and catholic church, 221; discipline in mexico city, 226, 459-60; and local government there, 229; on conduct of his army, 231; pessimism on war outlook, 235; and recall of trist, 238, 465; and peace negotiations and de facto truce, 240, 242, 467; promise to protect peace government, 240; and armistice after signing of peace, 242, 471; magnanimity, 248, 317; and tariff for mexican ports, 262; and levies on mexicans, 265, 486-7; political effect of polk's attitude, 272; political effect of actions, 278; and foreign interests, 303; achievement, 316-8; invited to be dictator, 323; on plan at cerro gordo, 350; rebuke of worth at puebla, 361; and semmes's mission, 389; suspected rejón intrigue, 390; scott not acting in politics, 390; proposal to facilitate peace by halting before mexico, 393; at southern front, 408; and peña government, 428; plea for adequate forces, 510; contrasts regulars and volunteers, 512. _see also_ mexico expedition; vera cruz expedition. _scourge_, in attack on tuxpán, =2.= 203, 444; at alvarado, 344; in home squadron, 446. scouting. _see_ intelligence. scurvy, in navy, =2.= 194. _sea_, at tampico, =1.= 281. secession, and texan annexation, =2.= 272. _see also_ coalition. second artillery, in scott's army, =2.= 77; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at churubusco, 384; in lane's march to puebla, 426; garrison at puebla, 433. second dragoons, at fort jesup, =1.= 140; go to texas, 142-3; advance to saltillo, 264; at buena vista, 388, 555; in monterey campaign, 492, 496; at the battle, 497; in wool's march, 509; in harney's brigade, 541; in scott's army, =2.= 77; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at churubusco, 384; in taylor's later force, 417. second infantry, in victoria march, =1.= 357; in harney's brigade, 541; at cerro gordo, =2.= 53; in scott's army, 77; at churubusco, 114, 382; at siege of vera cruz, 343. second ligero, at resaca de la palma, =1.= 173, 174; at monterey, 494; at cerro gordo, =2.= 52, 347. sedgwick, john, on reynosa, =1.= 212; on scott and pillow, =2.= 439. seiffart, ----, prussian minister at mexico, and peace negotiations, =2.= 397. semmes, raphael, at san cosme garita, =2.= 162; wrecked, 194; on worth at puebla, 360; bias of account, 373; on churubusco, 383; and scott, 389; on molino del rey, 402, 403. senate, treaty of peace in, =2.= 246-8, 472-3. _see also_ congress, american. senobio, m., and siege of vera cruz, =2.= 31; in preparations below perote, 40, 41; guerilla, 421. sentmanat, francisco, executed, =1.= 117, 241. serfdom in mexico, =1.= 5. seven laws, =1.= 47; failure, 50. seventh infantry, in texas, =1.= 143; mexican propaganda in, 161; at fort brown, 163; march to camargo, 209; at monterey, 245, 247, 492, 496, 501; left there, 508; in smith's brigade, 541; at cerro gordo, =2.= 51, 54, 55, 352; in scott's army, 77; at churubusco, 114, 382; at siege of vera cruz, 343. seventh line infantry, mexican, at sacramento, =1.= 307; at monterey, 494. severance, luther, encourages enemy, =2.= 280; position in house, 496. sevier, a. h., on polk and peace, =2.= 245; ratification commissioner, 249, 251, 474. seward, w. h., on expansion, =1.= 444. seymour, sir george, and california, =1.= 334, 336, 531. seymour, t. h., at chapultepec, =2.= 410. shannon, wilson, american minister at mexico, and annexation of texas, =1.= 86, 87. _shark_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189. shaw, t. d., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338. shawnee indians, in kearny's expedition, =1.= 288. sherman, t. w., at buena vista, =1.= 390, 392, 395, 555; in smith's brigade, 541; light artillery, =2.= 366. sherman, w. t., on california and independence, =1.= 321; on treaty of peace, =2.= 246. shields, james, on enlistment, =1.= 195; in wool's march, 271, 509; at tampico, as governor, 282, =2.= 229, 418, 461; taylor on, =1.= 352; in vera cruz expedition, 368, =2.= 27; at brazos, =1.= 476; career, 509; before cerro gordo, =2.= 49; in the battle, 52, 53, 55; wounded, 55, 352; brigade in scott's army, 78; at contreras, 105, 107, 108, 110, 379, 380; at churubusco, 115-7, 384; force after that battle, 120; wounded at chapultepec, 157; discipline, 215; and douceur, 391; and plan to attack mexico city, 408; retained in service, 432; leaves mexico, 438; not west pointer, 513. shiver, captain, in monterey campaign, =1.= 492, 496. shover, w. h., at saltillo, =1.= 556, 559. shubrick, w. b., commands pacific squadron, blockade order, =2.= 206, 446; operations, 206-8, 447-9; and occupied territory, 208. _siglo xix_, on herrera's rule, =1.= 56; on americans, 103; on corruption, 417; on paredes revolt, 438; on church property and war funds, =2.= 8. silva, mariano, and surrender of monterey, cal., =1.= 334. simmons, s. g., in lane's march to puebla, =2.= 426. simms, w. g., and absorption of mexico, =2.= 243; on vera cruz expedition, 336. simpson, sir george, on california, =1.= 321. sinaloa state, and secession, =2.= 86. sitgreaves, lorenzo, reconnaissance in wool's march, =1.= 271. six-months men, gaines's requisition and service, =1.= 196, 205, 452, 476, =2.= 272, 511. sixteenth infantry, in taylor's later force, =2.= 417, 418. sixth infantry, in wool's march, =1.= 509; in scott's army, =2.= 77; at churubusco, 112, 115, 116, 384; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at molino del rey, 402; at belén garita, 412. sixth line infantry, mexican, at monterey, =1.= 494; at cerro gordo, =2.= 44, 54, 347. size of mexico, =1.= 1. slavery, mexico counts on help of american slaves, =1.= 107; european warning against expansion, 114; interests and attitude toward mexico, 123; extension not cause of war, 187-9, 473; and war annexations, =2.= 274, 289, 492, 502; politics of wilmot proviso, 286-7; and stopping of the war, 500. slidell, john, mexican mission and rejection, =1.= 91, 95-8, 100-1, 127, 145, 326, 436-9, 447, 453, 460; on oregon and mexican controversies, 114, 115; effect of rejection on american opinion, 120; on failure of mission, 133, 135, 181; and advance to rio grande, 152; report on santa anna's attitude, 201; and patterson, 351; and peace negotiations, =2.= 126, 387; and conner, 202; house demand for instructions, 500. sloat, j. d., pacific instructions to (1845), =1.= 131, 447; instructions on california, 326, 526, 530; hesitation, final occupation of monterey, 333-5, 530-1; gives place to stockton, 336; squadron, =2.= 189. smith, a. j., and mormon battalion, =1.= 290. smith, ashbel, on polk and war, =1.= 446. smith, c. f., at resaca de la palma, =1.= 172; at monterey, 242, 244, 498; in march to san agustín, =2.= 98; at churubusco, 112, 115, 116, 384; battalion at molino del rey, 144, 145, 403; and at chapultepec, 161. smith, d. w., american consul at matamoros, reports cited _passim_. smith, ephraim kirby, mortally wounded at molino del rey, =2.= 403. smith, g. w., and cerro gordo, =2.= 349; with scott, 366. smith, isaac, on mistakes at monterey, =1.= 503. smith, j. l., engineer company with scott, =2.= 349, 356, 366; and plan of attack on mexico city, 408. smith, j. m., at churubusco, =2.= 117. smith, m. l., reconnoitres old peñón, =2.= 369. smith, p. f., brigade in march to monterey, =1.= 229, 492, 496; in the battle, 245, 498; commands at monterey, 508; brigade, 541; and cerro gordo, =2.= 52; brigade in scott's army, 77; at contreras, 104-10, 376, 379; at churubusco, 114; at chapultepec, 156, 158, 408, 410; in mexico city, 163; as governor there, 226; armistice negotiations, 242, 394; and evacuation, 252, 475; on engineers, 320; court of inquiry on worth, 361; credit for contreras, 376; career and character, 377; not at conference on attack on capital, 408; not west pointer, 513. smith, sidney, and american repudiation, =2.= 256. smith, william, on the war, =2.= 499. smuggling, mexican, =1.= 17, 410. social conditions, in mexico, idleness, =1.= 15, 22; in country, 18; in villages and towns, 19-21; at the capital, 21-8; character of ruling class, 25-7; general conclusions, 28, 410; mexican statement on character, 411. _see also_ character; population; roman catholic church. society, mexican, conditions, =1.= 25; intercourse in occupied territory, =2.= 230-1, 461-2. soldado, fort, at monterey, =1.= 241; capture, 245, 498. _somers_, wrecked, =2.= 194; in home squadron, 197, 442. sotepingo, captured, =2.= 113. soto, juan, and defending of vera cruz, =2.= 22, 31, 341; and preparations below perote, 41; and santa anna at orizaba, 68. south carolina troops, call, =1.= 537; in taylor's later command, =2.= 417. _see also_ palmetto. _southampton_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 447. _southern quarterly review_, on worth, =2.= 360. spain, colonial policy, =1.= 29-30; and mexican-american relations (1846), 100; and monarchy for mexico, 448, 485, 486; and mexican privateering, =2.= 193; attitude, 297, 298; and blockade, 440, 449; and mediation, 503. _see also_ bermúdez de castro; lozano. spanish, as class in mexico, =1.= 3; merchants, 17. _see also_ gachupines. spanish america, and expected mexican-american war, =1.= 111; and the actual war, =2.= 298. spanish language, key of pronunciation, =1.= xxi. _spectator_, on misrule in mexico, =2.= 509. speight, jesse, position in senate, =2.= 496. _spitfire_, in occupation of tampico, =1.= 279, 281; in attack on tuxpán, =2.= 203, 444; at siege of vera cruz, 338; in home squadron, 446. spooner, ----, mexican spy company, =2.= 362. _springfield illinois state register_, on war and expansion, =1.= 444. staff, scott's, =2.= 306. staniford, thomas, brigade in monterey campaign, =1.= 492. states, mexican. _see_ federalism. stauffer, mrs. w. r., acknowledgment to. =1.= 451; on bliss, 451. stearns, a. j., as trader in california, =1.= 318; and american occupation, 337. stephens, a. h., on the war, =1.= 183. steptoe, e. j., battery in scott's army, =2.= 77; during chapultepec, 152, 409; in mexico city, 163; at cerro gordo, 348; at belén garita, 415. sterett, j. s., at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338. stevens, i. i., on mistakes at monterey, =1.= 502; at churubusco, =2.= 113, 383; on cerro gordo, 350, 353; engineer with scott, 366; reconnoitres old peñón, 369; on molino del rey, 402; reconnoitres southern approach to capital, 408; and plan of attack on capital, 408. stevenson, j. d., in california, =2.= 219. stewart, andrew, on walker, =2.= 480. stockton, r. f., pacific instructions to (1845), =1.= 131; command in california, character, 336, 532; and frémont, address, 336, 532; first southern campaign, 336-7, 532; rule, 337-8; plan against mexico, 338; second southern campaign, 339-44, 534-5; sends aid to kearny, 341; and frémont's capitulation, 346; and blockade, =2.= 205; relinquishes rule, 217. stone, c. p., ordnance officer with scott, =2.= 366. storms, mrs., in mexico, =2.= 11; and scott, 39; and absorption of mexico, 243. storrs, augustus, claim, =1.= 425. _stromboli_, in home squadron, =2.= 446. sub-treasury plan restored, =2.= 257, 479. sumner, charles, on cause of war, =1.= 189; attitude, 274; demands recall of troops, 290. sumner, e. v., and harney, =1.= 365; at cerro gordo, disabled, =2.= 52, 350; in scott's army, 77; at molino del rey, 144, 146, 403; during and after chapultepec, 161, 408, 410, 414. supplies. _see_ transportation. supreme court, on title by conquest, =2.= 241, 468. surnames, spanish, =1.= 44 _n._ sutter, j. a., trading post, =1.= 318, 522. swift, a. j., and engineer corps, =1.= 451. tabasco river, perry's expeditions, =2.= 199-200, 204-5, 443, 445; map, 205. tacitus, on a roman general, =2.= 313. tacubaya, americans at, =2.= 134; aspect, 138. tacubaya, bases of, =1.= 51. talbot, theodore, escape from santa barbara, =1.= 534. talcott, g. h., battery in scott's army, =2.= 77; at cerro gordo, 348. talcott, george, ordnance bureau, =1.= 474. tamaulipas cavalry, at monterey, =1.= 494. tamaulipas state, plan to occupy, =1.= 263, 507; authorities and urrea, =2.= 166; attitude toward united states, 215; general occupation, 418; and american tariff, 484. _see also_ tampico; victoria. tampico, as port, =1.= 2; situation, map, 276; defences, 277; reasons for occupation, 277, 511; conner's attitude, 277; mexicans evacuate, 278-9, 510; american navy occupies, 279-81, 511-2; securing, 281-2, 512, 546; march of troops from victoria to, 366, 546; assemblage for vera cruz expedition, 367, 546; plans for uprising, =2.= 165; first naval attack, 197, 441; under american rule, 214-5, 229, 230, 452, 461; aspect, 214; garrison, 418; american tariff, 484. _tampico_, at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 338; in home squadron, 445. tariff, mexican protective, =1.= 17; american, and the war, 105, 130, 186; of 1846, political effect, opposition, =2.= 257, 273, 281, 286, 478-9; proposed, on tea and coffee, 261, 285, 482; american, for mexican ports, 261-3, 303, 484, 500, 505. tattnall, josiah, in occupation of tampico, =1.= 281, 512; in attack on tuxpán, wounded, =2.= 203; at siege of vera cruz, 338, 339. taxation, mexican, of mines, =1.= 15; mexican war, =2.= 253; question of american war, 258, 480. _see also_ finances; tariff. taylor, francis, field battery, =1.= 450; in scott's army, =2.= 77; at churubusco, 114; during chapultepec, 152, 409; at cerro gordo, 348. taylor, george, at huamantla, =2.= 425, 426. taylor, william, american consul at vera cruz, reports cited _passim_. taylor, zachary, at fort jesup, =1.= 140; career, 140; character and ability, 140-1, 352, =2.= 315-6, 318; bliss as adjutant, =1.= 141, 451, =2.= 318; takes force to corpus christi, =1.= 141-3; its original size and first reinforcements, 142, 143, 454, =2.= 511; condition of force, =1.= 143; and worth-twiggs rank controversy, 144; attitude of officers and men, 144, 362, 372, 374, 549; rio grande campaign [_see_ this title]; neglects to acquire information, 145, 161, 208, 226, 249, 374, 451, 464, 476, 478, 549; fortifies the mexicans, 158-61, 163, 177; hero after rio grande campaign, 179; presidential ambition, personal effect, perverted judgments, 179, 208, 352, 363, 368, 538, 547, =2.= 284; and volunteers, =1.= 191, 474, =2.= 212, 450; relations with polk, mutual hostility, =1.= 196, 263, 352-3, 507, 538, 544, 547; continued in command, 200, 478; feelings and problems at matamoros, 204, 208, 481; volunteer reinforcements, their camps and morale, 205-8, 480, 481; monterey campaign, [_see_ this title]; results of campaign to, 261, 506; condition and size of force after it, 262, 506; fears displacement, 262; and scott, 262, 352, 353, 363, 368, 544; and patterson's orders for tamaulipas, 263, 507; advance and occupation of saltillo, 264-6; and wool's march, 275, 276, 509, 510; entire force of department (dec., 1846), 282, 355, 513, 537, 539; defensive-line policy, 282-3, 347, =2.= 183; insubordinate letter to gaines, =1.= 347, 507; on war programme, 349, 536; instructed not to operate beyond monterey, 350; and command of vera cruz expedition, 351-3, 539; and scott's plans for expedition, 355-6, 363, 540, 543-4, 546, 552; sets out for victoria, 357-60, 541-2; frustrates scott's plan for conference, 356, 358, 541, 542; temporary return to monterey expecting attack, 357; to victoria, 362; returns to monterey, 365, 368; insubordinate advance to agua nueva, 368, 373-4, 547; buena vista campaign [_see_ this title]; belittles enemy, 374, 463; visits to saltillo during battle, 383, 388, 555, 556; return to the field, 385, 391; personal part in battle, 393, 395; guerilla operations against, suppression of them, 399, =2.= 169-71, 421, 422; effect of battle on presidential chances, =1.= 400; on capture of tampico, 511, 512; force at time of buena vista battle, 548; and further operations, =2.= 165, 417; valencia's plans against, 165, 419; leaves front, 166; ordered policy toward inhabitants, 210-1; failure to preserve discipline at matamoros, 211, 450; and levies on mexicans, 264; political effect of polk's attitude, 272; and of own actions, 278, 493; candidacy as vindication of the war, 292; foreign criticism, 306-7, 507; achievement, 315-6, 318; later force, 417; not west pointer, 513. taylor, fort. _see_ brown. tea and coffee, proposed american impost, =2.= 261, 285, 482. tecolote, kearny's expedition at, =1.= 292. tehuacán, and santa anna, =2.= 429. tehuantepec, in peace negotiations, =2.= 466. _telégrafo_, on santa anna as hero, =1.= 485. telégrafo hill at cerro gordo, fortifications, =2.= 42, 44; attacks on, capture, 52-5, 350, 352, 354. téllez, rafael, and california expedition, =1.= 523, =2.= 447; at mazatlán, 207, 447. temascalitos. _see_ brazito. temple, r. e., regiment in taylor's force, =2.= 417. ten regiment bill, passage and amendment, =2.= 74-5, 363-4. tenería redoubt at monterey, =1.= 249-250; capture, 251-3, 500; after capture, 255. tennessee troops, enlistments, =1.= 195; in texas, 205; at camargo, 211; in victoria march, 357; in monterey campaign, 492, 496; at cerro gordo, =2.= 56, 57, 352, 353; at siege of vera cruz, 343; leave scott, 356; further call, 431. tenth infantry in taylor's force, =2.= 417, 418. tenth line infantry, mexican, at chapultepec, =2.= 408. terrés, a., at belén garita, =2.= 159, 160, 413; brigade, 369. terrett, g. h., at chapultepec, =2.= 410. tête de pont. _see_ bridgehead. texas, effect of revolt on santa anna, =1.= 47; conditional recognition by mexico, 55; american efforts to purchase, 59, 62, 418, 419; united states and revolt, recognition and neutrality, 63, 66, 422-3, 432, =2.= 311; neutrality and gaines's expedition, =1.= 64-6, 420-2; british designs, 67; santa anna's threatened invasions (1842-43), 67, 70, 121; webster's protest (1842), 69; antislavery opposition and mexican relations, 70; santa fe expedition, 72, 118; annexation justified, 82-3, 432, =2.= 311, 322, 509; and european aid, =1.= 82, 86; mexico and expected annexation, 83-6; american offers of indirect payment to mexico, 84-6, 88-9, 91, 95, 433-6; mexican diplomatic rupture and war preparations on annexation, 87, 126, 132, 434; as expected theatre of war, 107, 110; europe and annexation, 113, =2.= 295, 303, 501, 502, 506; american resentment of mexican outrages, =1.= 117; protection and question of southern boundary, 138, 153, 457, 470; taylor's force in, 142-3, 454; annexation as cause of the war, 189, 445-6, 448, =2.= 276; and jackson's message on claims, =1.= 428; british and french recognition of republic, 432; in peace negotiations, =2.= 135, 136, 238, 396, 398, 399, 463, 464, 469; effect of annexation on polk's position, 272; justice of revolt, 311; and kearny's occupation of new mexico, 497. _see also_ rio grande; texas troops. texas, fort. _see_ brown. texas troops, rangers, =1.= 143, 236; calls, 150, 480, 537; in monterey campaign, 237, 241-4, 256, 492, 496, 501; and santa anna's advance, 382, 554; at buena vista, 389, 556; retaliation for guerillas, =2.= 169; conduct, 212, 450; in taylor's later force, 417; in lane's operations, 427. _see also_ hays; henderson, j. p. theatre, mexican, =1.= 24. thiers, l. a., and united states, =2.= 296. third artillery, in twiggs's division, =1.= 541; at buena vista, 555; in scott's army, =2.= 77; in california, 219; at siege of vera cruz, 343; in taylor's later force, 417; at huamantla, 425. third cavalry, mexican, at monterey, =1.= 494. third dragoons, in scott's army, =2.= 77, 364, 432; origin, 363; in taylor's later force, 417; in lane's operations, 426, 427. _see also_ dragoons. third infantry, at fort jesup, =1.= 140; goes to texas, 141-2; at palo alto and resaca de la palma, 164, 167, 467; at monterey, 250, 256, 492, 496, 502; in harney's brigade, 541; at cerro gordo, =2.= 54, 352; in scott's army, 77; at churubusco, 117; at siege of vera cruz, 343; at chapultepec, 410. third ligero, at monterey, =1.= 494; at cerro gordo, =2.= 347; at chapultepec, 410. third line infantry, mexican, at monterey, =1.= 494; at cerro gordo, =2.= 44, 347. thirteenth infantry, in taylor's force, =2.= 417. thom, george, topographical engineer with scott, =2.= 366. thomas, g. h., at reynosa, =1.= 204; at buena vista, 394. thompson, g. l., special mission to mexico, =1.= 84, 85, 433. thompson, g. w., on democratic dissensions, =2.= 282. thompson, waddy, minister at mexico, and decree expelling americans, =1.= 73-4; and claims, 80, 426, 432; and bocanegra's threat, 84; on mexico and slavery, 188; opposes war, 189; encourages enemy, =2.= 280. thornton, edward, of british legation at mexico, and trist mission, =2.= 130, 131, 390; and peace, 133; and reopening of negotiations, 237-9, 463; and mediation, 506. thornton, s. b., force captured, =1.= 149, 455. thucydides, on vigilance in campaign, =1.= 371; on power and justice, =2.= 323. thurman, a. g., on delano's inconsistency, =2.= 277; position in house, 496. tibbatts, j. w., regiment in taylor's force, =2.= 417. _tiempo_, monarchist organ, =1.= 214; on americans, 484. tilden, d. r., on regulars, =2.= 320. tlacotálpam, hunter at, =2.= 344. tlálpam. _see_ san agustín. tlaxcala, americans at, =2.= 427. tobacco monopoly, mismanagement, =2.= 328. todos santos, skirmish, =2.= 449. toluca, seat of peña's government, =2.= 180; occupied, 184, 433. toluca, valley of, americans in, =2.= 134; aspect, 180. toluca battalion, at chapultepec, =2.= 408. toombs, robert, on polk and war, =1.= 130; opposes war, 189. _topaz_, claim, =1.= 424. topo road at monterey, worth's advance, =1.= 239, 241-4, 497. topographical engineers with scott, =2.= 366. topography of mexico, =1.= 1. _see also_ physical aspect. tornel y mendivil, j. m., appearance, =1.= 25; character, 46; and santa anna's interests, 46, 49, =2.= 83, 85; and herrera, =1.= 56; and butler, 62; and expulsion of americans, 73; and paredes, 99; hatred of united states, 103; on texas as theatre of war, 107; and hope in privateering, 109; and the war, 213, 484; and attack on taylor, 456; and overthrow of paredes, 485; opposes peace negotiations (1847), =2.= 137; and clerical crusade against americans, 142; and uprising in city, 167; and riot during armistice, 396; and molino del rey, 404. torrejón, a., attacks thornton, =1.= 149; force at matamoros, 158; on taylor's line of communication, 162; at palo alto, 165, 167, 168; at resaca de la palma, 171; at buena vista, 390, 557; brigade in monterey campaign, 494; at las bocas, 553; at contreras, =2.= 107, 110, 378. totten, j. g., chief engineer, =1.= 475; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 335, 336. tower, z. b., at cerro gordo, =2.= 50, 56, 349; reconnoitres san antonio, 102; at contreras, 107, 379; engineer with scott, 366; reconnoitres southern approach of capital, 408; and plan of attack on capital, 408. towns, aspect of mexican, =1.= 19-21. towson, nathan, paymaster general, =1.= 475. traconis, j. b., at san juan bautista, =2.= 200. trade. _see_ commerce. traill, x. f., at buena vista, =1.= 389. transportation, in mexico, =1.= 16, 18; in taylor's advance to monterey, 209, 227, 482, 490, 491, 493; in wool's march, 274; taylor's and guerilla warfare, 399-400, =2.= 169-70; scott's problem and guerillas, 38, 62, 77, 171, 344, 355, 365, 422, 423. treasury. _see_ finances. treasury notes, american war issues, =2.= 258, 260, 479-82. treaties and conventions, draft, of limits (1828), =1.= 60, 418; of limits (1832), 61, 419; of amity and commerce, 61, 419; claims arbitration (1838, 1839), 79, 81, 431. _see also_ peace. trias, angel, as governor of chihuahua, =1.= 305-6; battle of sacramento, 306-13, 519, 520; at rosales, =2.= 166, 419. trigueros, ignacio, conference with santa anna, =2.= 368. trist, n. p., on monks, =1.= 408; and texas boundary, 449; appointment as polk's agent, character, =2.= 127; preconceived attitude toward scott, 127; papers, 128; misunderstanding and quarrel with scott, 128-9, 389; british mediation with mexicans, 129-30, 390; reconciliation and harmony with scott, 130, 392, 397; and douceur, 131-2; negotiations during armistice, 135-6, 138, 396-400; on pillow, 185; reopens negotiations, 235, 463; recall, 236, 464; ignores it, 237-8, 465, 467; boundary ultimatum, 238; meetings and treaty, 239-40, 466; criticism of polk, polk's hatred, 244; ignored in ratification commission, 248, 473; on scott, 316, 317; mexican commissioners on, 323; and plan of attack on mexico city, 408; on volunteers, 513. _triton_, blockader, =2.= 448. trollope, frances e., jibes, =2.= 294. trousdale, william, at chapultepec, =2.= 154, 160, 410; regiment, 363. _truxtun_, wrecked, =2.= 202, 445; in home squadron, 442. tucker, george, on walker, =2.= 480. tula, force at, =1.= 550, 553. turnbull, william, topographical engineer with scott, =2.= 366. tuxpán, naval capture, =2.= 202-3, 444. twelfth infantry, in scott's army =2.= 78, 363, 422, 432; at churubusco, 384; during chapultepec, 408. twiggs, d. e., in texas, =1.= 143; rank controversy, 144; advances to rio grande, 146; at palo alto, 164, 167; in monterey campaign, 250, 404, 492, 496; division reorganized, 357, 541; to tampico, 357, 365-6; at lobos islands, 368; landing at vera cruz, =2.= 26; at siege, 27, 30, 343; march of division to cerro gordo, 39, 45-8, 345, 349; force and artillery, 45; appearance and character as general, 48; blunders into cerro gordo defences and retreats, 48, 349; question of assault, 49; in the battle, 50-3, 350, 352, 354; march to puebla, 72; division in scott's army, 77, 356; in advance from puebla, 92, 94, 97, 371; at contreras, 103, 109, 380; at churubusco, 113, 383, 385; force after the battle, 120; during armistice, 134; advance after armistice, 142, 401; and plan of attack on mexico city, 149, 408; feint during chapultepec, 152, 153, 409; court of inquiry on worth, 361; on credit for contreras, 376; governor of vera cruz, 457; and peace negotiations, 464. twiggs, levi, at chapultepec, killed, =2.= 156, 157; commands marines with scott, 366. tyler, john, expects war with mexico (1842), =1.= 69; and california, 324. ugarte, m., and kearny's march, =1.= 289, 294, 297. ulúa. _see_ san juan de ulúa. _unico_, mexican privateer, =2.= 191, 193. unión battalion, at chapultepec, =2.= 408. _united states_, at monterey, =1.= 423. university, mexican, =1.= 14. upham, william, and war bill, =1.= 183. upper class. _see_ aristocracy. upshur, a. p., and mexican-texan relations, =1.= 70; protest against trade restrictions, 73; and annexation of texas, 84. upton, emory, on inadequacy of mexico expedition, =2.= 510. uraga, j. lópez, at palo alto. =1.= 165; at resaca de la palma, 173, 174; at monterey, 233, 494; at cerro gordo, =2.= 53. urrea, josé, forays, =1.= 400, 562; at tula, 550; at buena vista, 553; and plans against taylor, =2.= 165; removed, 166; guerilla, 169. valencia, g., revolt, =1.= 50; plots against santa anna, 52; and paredes, 99; and santa anna (1846), 377, 550; and taylor's march to victoria, 542; at tula, 550; hostility to santa anna (1847), =2.= 82, 83; sent north, 84; brings northern army to capital, 88; character, 88, 375; in plan against scott's advance, 90, 96; fails, 95; ordered to southern front, 98; size of force, 101, 375; appearance, 101; occupation of contreras field, 101, 102, 104, 375; battle, 104-10, 377-80; escapes, 110, 380; and trist mission, 131, 132; in a combination against santa anna, 134, 136; in scott's rear, 148; plans for movement against taylor, 165, 419; subordinates, 369; captured, 429. vallejo, m. g., leader in california, =1.= 319; american partisan, 328; captured, 332. valverde, doniphan at, =1.= 298-9. van buren, martin, and claims on mexico, =1.= 78-9, 429; on cause of war, 189; and california, 324; followers and polk, =2.= 270, 281; followers and wilmot proviso, 286. _vandalia_, at california, =1.= 339. vanderlinden, pedro, at buena vista, =1.= 385. vattel, emerich de, on self-preservation, =1.= 136; on justification of war, 155; on enemy goods, =2.= 261. vázquez, ciriaco, at cerro gordo, =2.= 52, 53; killed, 54, 352. vázquez, f. p., bishop of puebla, on law of jan. 11, =2.= 329; and battle of cerro gordo, 347; complaint on american desecration, 459. vázquez, j. a., at tula, =1.= 550. vázquez, j. m., guerilla, =2.= 421. vega, r. d. de la. _see_ la vega. vegas. _see_ las vegas. velázquez de león, joaquin. _see_ león. venado, force at, =1.= 553. vera cruz, as port, =1.= 2; aspect, life, =2.= 18, 35, 221-2. _see also_ next title. vera cruz expedition, considered, risk, defences of city, =1.= 349-50, 536, =2.= 18-20, 333; adoption of project, =1.= 350-1; new troops to be raised, 351, 537; question of commander, 351-4; scott's plan and preparations, 354, 539-41; and yellow fever, 354, =2.= 22, 23, 37, 59, 336, 339, 342, 344; responsibility thrown on scott, =1.= 355, 540; troops from taylor's command, his resentment, 356, 362-3, 365, 540, 543, 544, 546, 552; scott at brazos island, 356; taylor frustrates scott's plan for conference, 356, 358, 541, 542; difficulties of assemblage at brazos, 363-5, 544; march from victoria to tampico, 365-6, 546; assemblage at tampico, scott there, 367, 546; rendezvous at lobos islands, 367, =2.= 17; sailing to antón lizardo, 17-8, 332; policy and preparations for defence, garrison, 20-22, 334; and polko revolt, 20, 331, 334; problem and solution of attack, 22-3, 335-6; landing of american force, 23-7, 336; general map of siege, 24; investment, 27; scott's warning to city, 27, 337; establishment of first batteries, 27-9, 337; map of american batteries, 28; shortage of requisites for siege, 28, 29, 336, 338, 339; initial bombardment, inadequacy, 29; mosquito fleet, 29, 338; dissatisfaction of officers, 30; naval battery and later bombardment, 30, 338; conditions within city, 30-2, 337, 339; negotiations and surrender, 32-3, 340, 342; justification of bombardment, casualties in city, 33, 339, 341; condition of scott's force, 34-5, 342; occupation, 35-6, 343; american garrison, 37; plans for naval attack on ulúa, 201, 444; american rule of city, 220-2, 457; american evacuation, 252; foreign comment, 307; scott's "cabinet," 335; american force at siege, 336, 343; american losses, 343; american tariff, 484. _see also_ mexico expedition. vera cruz state, guerilla warfare, leaders, =2.= 169, 171, 421; american assessment on, 265; appeal to mexican factions, 334; manifesto on santa anna, 359. _see also_ soto. veramendi, m. r., and uprising against americans, =2.= 420. vergara camp, =2.= 222. verónica causeway, =2.= 147, 161; advance over, 161. _vesuvius_, in attack on tuxpán, =2.= 444; in home squadron, 445, 446. vice, prevalence in mexico, =1.= 22, 23, 26, 27. _see also_ gambling; liquor. vice presidency, abolished in mexico, =2.= 15. victoria, guadalupe, as partisan leader, =1.= 32; in itúrbide's revolt, 33; revolt against itúrbide, 35; as president, 37-40; and texas, 60, 418; and commercial treaty, 61. victoria, taylor's march, =1.= 357-60, 541-2; santa anna's plan to attack, 357; patterson's march, 360-2, 542, 543; map of his march, 360; march from, to tampico, 365-6, 546; taylor leaves, 368. victoria battalion, formation, =2.= 3; at san antonio, 112, 384. vidal, luis, and doniphan's advance, =1.= 301, 518. viga garita, =2.= 148. vigas, as defensive point, =2.= 39; worth at, 60. vigil y alarid, j. b., receives kearny at santa fe, =1.= 296. vigne, g. t., on american rule at jalapa, =2.= 225. villages, aspect of mexican, =1.= 19. villevêque, ----, french agent in mexico, reports cited _passim_. vinton, j. r., at monterey, =1.= 246. vinton, s. f., position in house, =2.= 496. virginia, legislature on the war, =1.= 119. _see also_ next title. virginia troops, calls, =1.= 537, =2.= 364; in taylor's later force, 417; slow response to call, 431. _vixen_, in occupation of tampico, =1.= 279; in attack on alvarado, =2.= 198, 199; in tabasco expedition, 200; in attack on tuxpán, 203, 444; at siege of vera cruz, 338; in home squadron, 446. voltigeur regiment, in scott's army, =2.= 78, 422, 432; at chapultepec, 154-7; origin and status, 363; at churubusco, 385; at molino del rey, 402, 403. volunteers, authorization, =1.= 182, 190; errors in system, term, officers, their character, 191-2, 207, 474; taylor and, 191, 474, =2.= 212, 450; first call and response, =1.= 192-5, 445, 475, 476; mustering, new orleans camp, and voyage to texas, 195-6, 475; gaines's six-months men, 196, 205, 452, 476, =2.= 272, 511; conditions in texan camps, morale, =1.= 205-8, 480, 481; further calls, 351, 537, =2.= 76, 364, 430, 431; wool on, =1.= 371; term-expired men leave scott, =2.= 63-4, 356; infamous conduct at matamoros, 211-2, 450; excesses at monterey, 212, 450; and elsewhere, 213, 214, 224, 225; officers and their men, 215; statistics, 318; contrast with regulars, 319-20, 512-3; authorized size of army (1847), 431; supposed number (nov., 1847), 432. _see also_ army; names of states. von holst, h. e. _see_ holst. _voz del pueblo_, advocates war, =1.= 107, 434; on chances of expected war, 110; on slidell mission, 436. wagons. _see_ transportation. walker, sir baldwin, and american commander, =2.= 446. walker, r. j., and expansion, =1.= 188; and the war, 471; and absorption of mexico, =2.= 243, 244; opposes treaty of peace, 246; pre-war financial estimates, 255; tariff and political ambition, 257, 478; and need of more revenue, 258, 260, 480; loan negotiations, distrusted, 259, 260, 262, 480-2; proposed tax on tea and coffee, 261, 482; tariff for mexican ports, 261-2; and levies on mexicans, 264-5, 487; opposition to policy, 273, 281; as leader, 282; integrity, 488. walker, s. h., surprise, =1.= 160, 463; bold trip to fort brown, 464; at monterey, 501; operations against guerillas, =2.= 172, 423; appearance, 177; at huamantla, killed, 177, 425, 426. wall, william, at punta aguda, =1.= 562. wallace, lew, enlistment of company, =1.= 195. wallace, w. h. l., at buena vista, =1.= 561. walpole, frederick, on california and independence, =1.= 321. war, simplicity, =1.= x; principles, 405. war department, staff, =1.= 474. _see also_ marcy, w. l. war of 1812, federalist opposition, =2.= 280. war spirit. _see_ attitude; outbreak; popularity. ward, h. g., british minister at mexico, and monroe doctrine, =1.= 112; on mexican character, 410; and texas, 419. warehouse bill of 1846, =2.= 257, 479; success, 263; opposition, 273. warren, w. b., at saltillo, =1.= 556. _warren_, in pacific squadron, =2.= 189, 205, 447. washington, j. m., battery at buena vista, =1.= 384, 386, 389, 344, 555, 558; field battery, 450; in wool's march, 509. washington, camp, before vera cruz, =2.= 27. washington and baltimore battalion, at monterey, =1.= 250, 251, 492, 496; in quitman's brigade, 541; garrison at tampico, 546; at siege of vera cruz, =2.= 343. washington _globe_, on war spirit, =1.= 132. washington _national intelligencer_. _see_ _national intelligencer_. washington _union_, and polk's alleged desire for war, =1.= 446; on failure of peace negotiations, =2.= 138; challenge to polk's critics, 284; and victorious war, 292. watson, s. e., brigade in scott's army, =2.= 78, 366, 432. weatherford, william, at buena vista, =1.= 555. weber, j. l., on mexican army, =1.= 408. webster, daniel, bocanegra correspondence, =1.= 68; protests further war on texas, 69; on mexican responsibility, 76, =2.= 508; and annexation of texas, =1.= 82, 433; on slidell mission, 98; on claims controversy, 120; and california, 127, 324; on polk and war, 130; and war bill, 183, 472; and employment of volunteers, 192; and advance to rio grande, 458; and peace, =2.= 123, 387; opposition to the war, 126; pessimism on peace prospects, 235; and treaty of peace, 247, 472, 473; on cost of the war, 267; ineffective war criticism, 278-80, 494; on control of occupied territory, 285; on tariff, 286; and no-territory plan, 288; presidential candidacy and success of war, 291; results of opposition, 314; and defensive-line policy, 430; on war and slavery extension, 492; and corwin's speech, 494; position in senate, 496; on tariff for mexican ports, 500; on american attitude toward mexico, 508; on volunteers, 513. webster, l. b., battery in monterey campaign, =1.= 496; at saltillo, 556, 559. weed, thurlow, and taylor's presidential candidacy, =1.= 179. weightman, r. h., battery in kearny's expedition, =1.= 288, 515; in battle of sacramento, 310, 312. welles, gideon, on marcy, =1.= 475; on tariff, =2.= 273. wellington, duke of, on scott's expedition, =2.= 89. wells, j. m., guerilla attack on, =2.= 172. weng hieri, alonzo, arms for mexican army, =2.= 346. wentworth, john, and tax on tea and coffee, =2.= 285. west point, value of training, =2.= 320. _see also_ army. westcott, j. d., jr., position in senate, =2.= 496. whale fishery, american, and occupation of california, =1.= 323, =2.= 514; and mexican war, 205, 446, 447. _whig almanac_, on polk, =2.= 276. whig party, and outbreak of the war, inconsistencies, =1.= 185, 444, 472, =2.= 267-7, 283; encourage enemy, 126, 280-1, 289, 495; and responsibility, 275; jibes at polk, 275-6; and conduct of whig generals, 277, 493; effect of corwin's speech, 278, 494; character of webster's war criticism, 278-80, 494; ghosts of the opposition to war of 1812, 280; position in war-time congress, 283; character of opposition there, 284-6; and wilmot proviso, 286-7, 498; no-territory plan, 287-8, 498; protract war, 288; clay's speech and resolutions, 289; control of house programme, 290; effect on, of success of warm, 290-1; about face, 292; results of opposition, 292-3, 501; and treaty of peace, 472; proper attitude, 493; leaders in senate, 496; _see also_ opposition. whistler, william, in texas, =1.= 143. white, e. d., and gaines' nacogdoches expedition, =1.= 421. wickliffe, c. a., american confidential agent in texas, reports cited _passim_. wilcocks, j. s., american consul at mexico, reports cited _passim_. wilcox, c. m., value of his history, =1.= 404; on criticism at monterey, 503. wilhelm, thomas, on taylor in monterey campaign, =1.= 496. wilkes, charles, on california and independence, =1.= 321. williams, thomas, of scott's staff, =2.= 366. willock, david, with price, =1.= 516, 517. wilmot, david, and wilmot proviso, =2.= 286, 498; wilmot proviso, politics, =2.= 286-7; objections, 498. wilson, benito, surrender, =1.= 339. wilson, henry, at reynosa, =1.= 204; brigade in monterey campaign, 492, 496; governor of vera cruz, superseded, =2.= 432, 457. wilson, l. d., and twelfth infantry, =2.= 363. winthrop, r. c., on cause of the war, =1.= 189, =2.= 277; on slidell mission, =1.= 438; and peace, =2.= 123; position in the house, 496. women, mexican, of upper class, =1.= 24, 25. wood, allen, at churubusco, =2.= 384; wood, w. m., and sloat, =1.= 334. wool, j. e., as mustering officer, =1.= 195; gathering of chihuahua force at san antonio, 267-8; character of force, 268-9; character and discipline, appearance, 268, 269, 273, 275, 276, 509; and harney's escapade, 269; march to monclova, 270-3, 509; map of march, 271; halt during monterey armistice, 273, 509; hardships and criticism of march, 273, 509-10; wagon train, 274; parras route, 274, 510; at parras, 275; diversion of expedition to near saltillo, 275, 358; results of march, 276, 510; force (dec., 1846), 283, 513; and doniphan's expedition, 313, 521; command at saltillo, carelessness of scouts, 370-1; diminished morale of troops, 371; on volunteers, 371; asks aid from taylor, 372; in advance to agua nueva, 374; and retreat, preparations at buena vista, 383-5, 534, 555; in the battle, 393, 396, 558; and retreat of mexicans, 398; march and mexican abandonment of rinconada pass, 508; succeeds taylor in command, =2.= 166; and suppression of guerilla warfare, 170; levies on mexicans, 265, 487; and mutiny at buena vista, 418; and force after succeeding taylor, 417, 432; and conduct of texan volunteers, 450; evacuates, 475; not west pointer, 513. wooster, c. f., at battle of sacramento, =1.= 520. worth, w. j., in texas, =1.= 143; rank controversy, 144; on taylor, 144, 260, 501, 502; and advance to rio grande, 147, 152, 454; leaves front, 158; return, at camargo, 211; in march on monterey, 228, 229, 492, 496; at battle of monterey: movement to saltillo road, 241-4, 497; on ampudia, 241; appearance and character, 241, 498, =2.= 186, 360, 434; capture of federation ridge, =1.= 244-6, 498; and independence hill and bishop's palace, 246-8, 499; taylor neglects concerted action, 256-7; attack in city, 257-8, 501; and negotiations, 260, 501; as real victor, 261; in command at saltillo, 264; as commander there, force, 266, 282, 541; wool's force joins, 276; and expected attack (dec.), 357, 541; and gathering of vera cruz expedition, 364, 365; and harney, 365; embarks, 368; on war spirit, 444; and gathering of information, 490; on taylor's lack of transportation, 491; on camp at cerralvo, 493; landing at vera cruz, =2.= 25-6; and the siege, 30; and negotiations, 33; and surrender, 36; at cerro gordo, 50, 351, 352; pursuit to perote, 60-1; advance to puebla, 65-6, 69; amozoc affair, 70; conference on puebla, 70, 361; occupies it, 71; mistakes as ruler, scott's rebuke, 71-2, 361; "scarecrows," 72; division in scott's army, 77, 343, 356; in advance to valley of mexico, 93-4, 371; at san agustín, 97, 374; reconnoitres san antonio, 102-3; captures it, 112, 382; at churubusco, 114-6, 383, 384; force after the battle, 120; during armistice, 134; study of molino del rey, 143; in the battle, 143-7, 402-4; at chapultepec, 153, 156, 157, 161, 409, 410; misgivings there, 154; advance and capture of san cosme garita, 161-2, 413-4, 416; in the city, 164, 416; in uprising, 167; cabal against scott, arrest, 186-8, 434-6; polk rescues, 188; discipline as governor of saltillo, 213, 450; on excesses of volunteers, 213; armistice negotiations, 242; and lead in mexico expedition, 345; in plan of attack by mexicaltzingo, 372, 373; and contreras, 381; and failure to advance after churubusco, 386; not at conference on attack on city, 408; in command of mexico expedition, 476; on volunteers, 513; not west pointer, 513. wright, george, at molino del rey, wounded, =2.= 143, 144. wright, silas, and polk, =2.= 270. wynkoop, f. m., at cerro gordo, =2.= 56, 57, 353; rule at jalapa, 224; and guerillas, 422; at huamantla, 425, 426; in lane's operations, 426. wyse, f. o., in de russey's expedition, =2.= 418. yell, archibald, and santa anna's advance, =1.= 383, 554; and wool, 509; at buena vista, 555, 558. yellow fever, and vera cruz expedition, =1.= 354, =2.= 22, 23, 37, 59, 336, 339, 342, 344; and mexico expedition, 42, 59, 64, 348; in navy, 195; in new orleans, 431. york rite of masons. _see_ masons. yucatan, santa anna as commandant, =1.= 40; naval operations, 201, 204; attitude during the war, 203-4; annexation question, 472. yulee, d. l., position in senate, =2.= 496. zacatecas, situation, =1.= 3; powder-mill, 462; scott's intention to occupy, 184, 432. zacatecas state, and santa anna, =1.= 47, 86, 376, 550; unrest, =2.= 234; americans in, 418; in discussion on peace, 464. zavala, lorenzo de, and overthrow of pedraza, =1.= 41. zerecero, colonel, brigade, =2.= 369. zubieta, pedro, on judicial system. =1.= 409. printed in the united states of america. transcriber's note in general, spanish names, when used in english phrases, are printed without accents. the country is referred to as 'méxico' when the language is spanish, and 'mexico', without the accent, when in english. on occasion, the printer fails to observe this distinction. these are considered as printer's errors, and have been corrected here. where variants in spelling occur in quoted passages, they are always retained. the use of accents in spanish proper nouns is not consistent. these have been corrected, where detected, to assist in searches. on p. 338, the reference to "37. scott to conner, mar. 16" seems a corruption for "=164=scott to conner", which agrees with all other references to this source. on p. 486, a reference printed mere as "=6= memoir on mex. finances." most likely should be "=61=memoir on mex. finances. sen. 19; 30, 1, pp. 2-4 (scott).". there is a separate reference to that memoir in note 33.2, using =61=. also on p. 486, the asterisk appearing in "_amer. review_, jan., 1848, p. *2" is not explained. the references in the index are for both volumes i and ii. the volume number is included in bold type when the entries shift from one to the other. on occasion these volume numbers were missed and have been added. on p. 570, the page references for california, following "in peace negotiations and treaty," are to be found in volume ii. the volume number "=2.=" has been added. on p. 572, the volume reference for volume i for chihuahua rangers is missing and has been added. on p. 620, the references for w. j. worth, beginning with "capture of federation ridge" are in volume i, and that volume number has been added. the ordered list of numbered resources is missing #368. nor are there any `references to that number. the following table describes other textual issues, and the resolution of each. the [x/y] annotations mark the additions, deletions or substitutions made to the text. minor inconsistencies of punctuation in the notes have been silently corrected. on several occasions, letters or numbers have gone missing from the images used to prepare this text. where the word intended is clear, these have been added silently. p. 137 ass[s]embly removed. p. 185 boyant _sic._ p. 192 aga[ni/in]st corrected. p. 217 neccessary _sic._ p. 280 deser[ser]tion removed. p. 286 opposi[si]tion removed. mea[s]sure removed. p. 291 out-an-out _sic._ p. 348 a besieging force [c]ould restored. roa b[a/á]rcena, recuerdos, 197-8 corrected. p. 378 a[n/i]d he believed corrected. p. 383 not [to] be thrown away added. p. 401 caldéron / calderón accent corrected. p. 434 dou[tb/bt]less corrected. p. 449 american casu[a]lties added. p. 450 he[r/n]shaw corrected. p. 458 col[l]ección de itinerarios. removed. p. 460 mutiliation _sic._ p. 480 pennsyl[v]ania added. p. 485 deficienc[i]es added. p. 564 sant[e/a] fe corrected. p. 571 téléegrafo / telégrafo accent corrected. p. 582 policy of neutrality, =[2].= 300; volume added. p. 588 mansfield, j. k. f., at monterey, page =1.= [259/239], 250, 251, 500; corrected. p. 601 intolerable conditions facing, =1.= 134-7; volume added. p. 617 conditions in texan camps, morale, =1.= 205-8, 480, 481; volume added.